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95–636PDF 2015

IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH

IRAN (PART III)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 23, 2015

Serial No. 114–81

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Robert Joseph, Ph.D., senior scholar, National Institute for 

Public Policy (former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security) ................................................................................................. 4

Mr. Mark Dubowitz, executive director, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies ..................................................................................................................... 15

Mr. Ilan Goldenberg, senior fellow and director, Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security ....................................................... 49

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Robert Joseph, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................. 7

Mr. Mark Dubowitz: Prepared statement .............................................................. 18

Mr. Ilan Goldenberg: Prepared statement ............................................................. 51

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 100

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 101

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 103

(1)

IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 

WITH IRAN (PART III) 

THURSDAY, JULY 23, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 o’clock a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. 

This morning the committee continues to examine the nuclear 

agreement that the Obama administration has arranged with Iran, 

and we have a 60-day congressional review period. 

Yesterday, Members of the House attended a closed briefing with 

Secretary Kerry on this very consequential agreement. And we will 

begin to hear the case publicly today as Secretary Kerry testifies 

before the Senate. Myself and Mr. Engel led the briefing yesterday 

in closed session with the House with Secretary Kerry, but he will 

appear before this committee next week. 

What is clear from yesterday’s briefing—and clear from reading 

the testimony of our witnesses today—is that the administration 

has its work cut out making one particular case to this body, and 

that is, is this in our long-term national security interest? All of us 

want a verifiable and a lasting agreement, and that is what we are 

looking at. 

But are the temporary constraints on Iran’s nuclear program, the 

10-plus years’ constraints, worth the price of permanent sanctions 

relief? And if Iran does cheat—they have, by the way, cheated on 

every agreement that I know of that they have made in the past—

if they do, could sanctions developed over years be put quickly back 

in place? 

As we will hear from one sanctions expert today, this deal eviscerates the sanctions web that was putting intense pressure on the 

regime up until the interim agreement when we lifted those sanctions and they began to get $700 million a year. Virtually all economic, financial, and energy sanctions under this agreement now 

disappear. This includes not only sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program, but key sanctions on the bad banks that have supported 

Iran’s terrorism and ballistic missile development. 

In return? Iran is not required to dismantle key bomb-making 

technology. It is permitted a vast enrichment capacity, and it is allowed to continue its research and its development to gain an industrialized nuclear program, once parts of this agreement begin to 

2

expire in as little as 10 years. And just to quote the President on 

this, he said of his own agreement, ‘‘In year 13, 14, 15, Iran’s 

breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero.’’

And with tens of billions in near instant sanctions relief, it defies 

logic to think that somehow this money will not bolster Iran’s 

worldwide campaign of terror. With this agreement, the head of 

Iran’s elite Quds Force, responsible, by the way, for the death of 

hundreds of American troops, this individual gets removed from a 

key sanctions list. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps under 

this agreement is a winner. Hamas will be able to rebuild its tunnels faster, and Hezbollah will get more powerful weapons. And 

you have all seen in the last month reporting on Iran’s commitment to both of those institutions, to resupply rockets, missiles, 

special precision guidance for Hezbollah missiles, and its commitment to rebuild the tunnels under Israel. So it is no wonder that 

Israelis left, right, and center oppose this agreement. 

Even more troubling to us here in the United States is that 

Iran—with the backing of Russia—won an 11th hour concession to 

remove international restrictions on its missile program in 8 years, 

and conventional arms in 5. Of course Russia doesn’t care—they 

will be making hundreds of millions of dollars in arms sales—and 

the missiles are not going to be aimed at Moscow. What the Russians have is the capacity to sell to the Iranians—and this is what 

they want to do—targeting information, frankly. And as the Secretary of Defense just testified, ‘‘The ‘I’ in I.C.B.M. stands for intercontinental, . . . which means flying from Iran to the United 

States.’’ He said that is why we do not want that kind of capacity 

to be transferred. Countries build I.C.B.M.s for one reason, and 

that is to deliver nuclear weapons. 

At the same time that the restrictions on Iran’s missile program 

come off, so do sanctions on the Iranian scientists involved in their 

bomb work. This of course is a deadly combination. ‘‘Iran’s 

Oppenheimer’’ gets a reprieve. A German citizen involved in the 

A.Q. Khan network has his sanctions lifted. It is difficult to see 

how amnesty to nuclear proliferators helps us. 

In our hearing last week, many members expressed concerns 

about the adequacy of the inspections allowed under this agreement. The administration settled for a 24-day process, but this 

week a former top international inspector expressed great skepticism that this would give inspectors what they need. And as a 

former CIA director testified to us last week,

‘‘Our national technical means won’t be sufficient for verifying 

this agreement. Without an invasive inspection regime, I would 

not tell you we will know enough to give you sufficient warning. So that really puts the weight of effort on the IAEA’s ability to go anywhere at any time.’’

I now turn to the ranking member for any opening statement he 

may have. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for calling today’s hearing, and thank you for your steady leadership of this committee. 

Welcome to our witnesses. Congress established the 60-day review period, so that we could take the necessary time to thoroughly 

3

assess the deal on Iran’s nuclear program. It is important that we 

get input from a range of voices, and we are grateful for your time. 

So thank you for coming to testify here this morning. 

We have now had a few days to look at this deal. We have heard 

from Secretary Kerry, Secretary Lew, and Secretary Moniz behind 

closed doors yesterday. Next week we will hear from them again 

right here in this committee. And, obviously, this is a very complex 

agreement. It is possibly the most important issue some of us will 

ever deal with as Members of Congress. It demands close analysis 

and informed deliberation. 

While I am still reviewing the agreement, I must say I do have 

some serious questions and concerns about certain aspects of the 

deal, and I am going to get right to them. 

First of all, I would like to know more about access to undeclared 

sites. The administration has assured us that no site is off limits 

for the inspectors. That is a good thing, but inspectors are unlikely 

to have on demand access to undeclared sites. Iran can take 14 

days to comply with an IAEA request for access. That is problematic. 

Suppose after that Iran still blocks the way. Members of the 

Joint Commission could take another 7 days to resolve the IAEA’s 

concerns. Iran then has 3 more days to provide access. And if Iran 

continues to say no, another month could go by while the dispute 

resolution mechanisms run their course. My concern is that Iran 

could use that time period to sanitize sites and avoid detection if 

they are breaking the rules. 

Secondly, I would like to look at the arms embargo and ballistic 

missile sanctions. For months and months, we were told these programs were off the table. But under the agreement, the embargo 

will be lifted in a few years. To me, that seems like throwing fuel 

on the fire. If the deal goes forward, we need to think long and 

hard about what steps we can take to prevent Iran from causing 

even more trouble in the region once these restrictions are lifted. 

On the topic of sanctions relief, I am concerned about what Iran 

will do when sanctions are phased out and the spigot is turned 

back on. Iran is obviously a bad actor. This is a regime that orchestrates coups, supports terrorist groups, violates the human rights 

of its own people, and projects instability and violence across its 

neighborhood. 

Iran may use these new resources, tens of billions of dollars, to 

improve the lives of the Iranian people. But I am willing to bet 

such programs won’t come at the expense of Hezbollah, Shiia militias, Hamas, or the Assad regime. How can the United States help 

mobilize an international effort to stem the flow of resources to 

Iran’s violent and dangerous allies? 

Next, I am concerned about what happens when the research 

and development ban is lifted. For 8 years, Iran is limited in its 

development of advanced centrifuges. Without these limits, Iran 

could quickly reduce its breakout time or develop a covert program. 

But after year 8, Iran can quickly move toward the, and I quote, 

‘‘next stage of its enrichment activities.’’ After that part of the deal 

expires, is there anything we could do to prevent Iran from making 

rapid progress on its nuclear technology? 

4

Finally, I have a fundamental concern that 15 years from now 

Iran will essentially be off the hook. If they choose, Iran’s leaders 

could produce weapons grade highly enriched uranium without any 

limitation, and they can do so faster than they could before with 

more advanced centrifuges. 

What can we do to ensure that we just don’t find ourselves in the 

same place we are today in the year 2030? Because the truth is, 

after 15 years, Iran is legitimized as a threshold state. After year 

15, there are no restrictions on producing highly enriched uranium. 

That is troublesome. 

As we consider these issues, and people will say, ‘‘Well, what this 

does is it doesn’t prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon; it 

just postpones it.’’ That is trouble for me. 

As we consider these issues, we must ask ourselves an important 

question as well to be fair. What is the alternative to this specific 

deal? If this deal doesn’t go forward, can our sanctions regime and 

the P5+1 coalition hold? Would renewed pressure bring the Iranians back to the table if this deal fails? Would new sanctions have 

to be coupled with military action? I hope as our witnesses testify 

today they bear that context in mind. 

So I look forward to hearing from all of you, and I thank you 

again for your testimony and your time, and I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

This morning we are pleased to be joined by a distinguished 

panel. Ambassador Robert Joseph is a senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy. Previously, Ambassador Joseph 

served as the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security at the Department of State. 

Mr. Mark Dubowitz is the executive director at the Foundation 

for the Defense of Democracies. He is the author of 15 studies examining economic sanctions. 

Mr. Ilan Goldenberg is a senior fellow and director of the Middle 

East Security Program at the Center for New American Security, 

and previously Mr. Goldenberg served as the Chief of Staff to the 

Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations at the Department of State. 

So, without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared statements are 

part of the record, and members will have 5 calendar days to submit statements or questions or any extraneous materials for the 

record here. 

And, Ambassador Joseph, please summarize your remarks. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT JOSEPH, PH.D., 

SENIOR SCHOLAR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY) 

Mr. JOSEPH. Good morning, Chairman Royce, Congressman 

Engel, other distinguished members. Thank you for the invitation 

to testify this morning before the committee on the nuclear agreement with Iran. 

It is a true privilege for me to be able to provide my views and 

recommendations. In my prepared statement, I identify what I call 

five fatal flaws to the agreement. Ineffective verification that will 

5

not detect and will not deter Iran from cheating at suspect sites. 

Providing Iran with a path to nuclear weapons, not just enrichment, but also plutonium. The only commitment that Iran has is 

not to reprocess plutonium for 15 years. After that, if it decides to 

do so, it can. Third, busting the sanctions regime. Fourth, failing 

to prevent breakout. And, fifth, failing to limit Iran’s ballistic missile force. 

I also identify four strategic consequences—more proliferation in 

the region; undermining the international nonproliferation regime; 

enabling a more capable, aggressive, and repressive Iranian regime; and increasing, not decreasing, prospects for conflict and war 

in the region. 

Given the profound national security implications for the United 

States and our friends and allies, I believe this is truly a historic 

moment. And at this moment, I don’t think one can overstate the 

importance of the congressional review and action on the agreement. 

And here I would make four recommendations for your consideration. First, Congress should vote on the agreement and reject it 

if it decides that it is a bad agreement. And I think the metrics are 

very clear for deciding whether it is good or bad. Is it effectively 

verifiable? Does the agreement deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability? Does the agreement, following the expiration of the constraints placed on Iran, prevent Tehran from building a nuclear 

weapon in a short period of time? And is there a meaningful, 

phased relief of sanctions? And are there guaranteed snapback provisions? 

Because the answers to all of these questions in my assessment 

is no, I think it is important for Congress to reject the agreement 

and in its place insist on a return to the negotiating table to seek 

an outcome that meets U.S. national security goals. 

Second, Congress should, to the extent that it can, with regard 

to congressionally imposed sanctions, tie incremental relief to the 

fulfillment of Iran’s commitments. 

Third, if the agreement moves forward, Congress should make 

clear that any cheating will result in the immediate termination of 

the agreement. We know that Iran will cheat. Unfortunately, it appears that the Obama administration may well seek to explain 

away non-compliant behavior as it has reportedly done with Iran’s 

failure to meet its obligations under the initial joint plan of action. 

For this reason, I would recommend that Congress establish a 

Team B of outside, non-partisan experts, with access to the highest 

levels of intelligence to assess Iran’s compliance with all provisions 

of the agreement. 

And, fourth, Congress should move forward with funding to expand missile defense, both in the region and against the emerging 

Iranian nuclear armed I.C.B.M. class missile threat. 

To conclude, I have often heard the argument that despite its 

many flaws, we should go along with this agreement, because it is 

the best that we can do, and because it is as good or better than 

previous agreements. But based on my experience, in one case as 

head of the negotiations with Libya over its nuclear weapons program, I know this is not the best that we can do. 

6

I think that Libya does demonstrate that we can do a lot better. 

With Libya, we demanded unfettered, anywhere, anytime access to 

all sites. When we said we wanted to go somewhere, the Libyans 

took us there, without delay and without obstruction. And we removed the program by sending over a ship, by loading up hundreds 

of metric tons of nuclear equipment, and we also loaded up their 

longer range ballistic missiles on the same vessel, and we sailed it 

back home. And that was the end of the Libyan nuclear program. 

Now, I am not comparing Libya and Iran. Iran is different from 

Libya. Iran is different from North Korea. All of these cases are different and in some ways unique. But I think what Libya tells us, 

at least what it tells me, is that we need to approach negotiations 

with these types of rogue regimes using all tools available. This is 

not a choice between diplomacy or the use of force, or diplomacy 

or economic sanctions. We need to integrate these tools to support 

our negotiations, to put pressure on the other regime, to achieve 

the successful outcome of diplomacy. 

In the talks with Iran, we violated every rule of good negotiating 

practice. This doesn’t mean that it will be easy or cost- or risk-free 

to reject a bad deal with Iran. There are no cost- or risk-free alternatives. But the costs and risks of accepting this agreement far 

outweigh the alternatives of going back to the negotiating table. 

Certainly, Russia will criticize us. It will criticize us as it continues its aggression against Ukraine. Certainly, China will criticize us for doing so, as it continues its own aggressive activities in 

the South China Sea. Even some of our allies will criticize us, but 

other allies, including Israel and the Arab States, will cheer us, 

some in private, some in public. 

And with American leadership in close consultations, I am confident we can turn this around. At the end of the day, this is not 

about a popularity contest. It is about our national security. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joseph follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much, Ambassador. 

Mark. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MARK DUBOWITZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members of this committee, on behalf of FDD and its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, thank you very much for giving me the 

opportunity to testify. I am going to spend most of my testimony 

on the issue of alternatives and alternative scenarios, but I want 

to just reiterate that this is a deeply flawed agreement, that provides Iran with multiple pathways, patient pathways, to a nuclear 

weapon over the next decade to decade and a half. 

Thanks to sunset provisions, a fundamental flaw of this agreement, Iran must simply abide by the agreement to emerge as a 

threshold nuclear power. Ambassador Joseph has said, at the end 

of this, it is an industrial sized enrichment program. It is near zero 

breakout. They have an easier clandestine sneakout pathway and 

an advanced ballistic missile program, including I.C.B.M.s. 

The sanctions regime, the economic sanctions regime, is being 

dismantled while Iran’s nuclear program is not. Iran will have hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief, and it will use it to 

immunize its economy against future economic pressure. 

One of the biggest problems of the deal is it grants Iran a nuclear snapback. The administration assures us that sanctions can 

be reconstituted, even under non-nuclear sanctions like terrorism. 

However, this final agreement actually explicitly acknowledges that 

Iran would walk away from the agreement if new sanctions are imposed, a nuclear snapback. 

This provides Iran an insurance policy, even in the case of severe 

violations, and certainly in the case of small to medium sized violations, and gives Iran a powerful tool to stonewall the IAEA, undermine the dispute resolution mechanism, and deter U.N, EU, and 

U.S. snapbacks. Mr. Chairman, those are the problems. A revised 

deal is a solution. 

Now, President Obama has repeatedly said no deal is better than 

a bad deal. Mr. Chairman, this is a bad deal. It undermines the 

use of economic leverage. It leaves military force as the only option 

in the future to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons development. 

So what are the alternatives? Well, the President clearly had a 

Plan B in mind during the negotiations or he would not have 

threatened to walk away from the table if Iran didn’t agree to certain terms. Indeed, no responsible President would enter into negotiations, especially over something as critical to our national security, without an alternative. That alternative still exists—rejecting 

this deal. 

Now, I want to go through three likely rejection scenarios. None 

are good. Each can be managed. Scenario Number 1 I call the Iranian faithful compliance scenario. In this case, after Congress rejects the deal, Iran decides to faithfully implement its commitments. It triggers U.N. and EU sanctions relief. 

Now, in this case, the President has two options. First, he can 

rebuff Congress, and he actually can wield his executive authority 

to neutralize the Corker-Cardin statutory sanctions block and move 

16

ahead with the deal. Or, second, he can persuade the Europeans 

to join the U.S. in demanding that key parts of the agreement be 

renegotiated on better terms, leveraging the power of U.S. secondary sanctions to keep companies and banks out of Iran. 

Scenario 2 is called the Iranian walkaway scenario. In this case, 

Congress rejects the deal. Iran abandons its commitments. Now, if 

past is prologue, Iran will escalate its nuclear program, but it will 

do so incrementally, not massively, to avoid crippling economic 

sanctions or U.S. military strikes. 

In this scenario, the President could use the power of secondary 

sanctions to persuade the Europeans to join a U.S.-led effort to isolate Iran again. EU sanctions would likely hold or, at a minimum, 

European companies and banks would be reluctant to reenter Iran. Now, the administration has said in this scenario $100 billion 

would go back to Iran. But let us clarify this. That money is being 

held in China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, and they 

are unlikely to release the $100 billion in oil escrow funds for fear 

of U.S. sanctions, but also because those sanctions require Iran to 

spend the funds on goods from those countries. This is a boon to 

their exports. Why would they release the funds so that Iran can 

go take that money and spend it elsewhere? 

Scenario 3, which I think is the more likely one. It is the divide 

the P5+1 scenario. This looks more like Iranian compliance, Iranian faithful compliance scenario, except the Iranians try and use 

diplomatic leverage to try and divide the Russians and Chinese 

from the West and the Europeans from the U.S. Iran still complies 

with the agreement to trigger U.N. and EU sanctions relief, but 

what it does is it exploits the P5+1 discord and remains obstinate 

on things like inspections and resolution of PMD issues and the 

pace of nuclear compliance. 

Things get messy, though not to the point of escalation. The 

President threatens the use of new sanctions to keep countries and 

companies from normalizing with Iran, and he works to persuade 

the Europeans to join the U.S. in demanding that key parts of the 

agreement be renegotiated. 

Now, none of these scenarios are ideal, but they are not likely 

to be disasters either, and they are better than this deal. Now, they 

depend on the use of American power, coercive diplomacy, economic 

sanctions, and force projection. And this is the point: If the President believes that the Treasury can enact effective economic sanctions in the future, then such an option surely exists today. In fact, 

it is a better option today when Iran’s economy is still fragile and 

international investors have yet to return to Iran. 

If the President believes, however, that the multilateral sanctions regime today cannot lead to an improved agreement, or that 

the U.S. cannot manage the fallout from the three scenarios I outlined, then he is actually admitting that we lack the economic leverage to enforce this agreement in the future when Iran will be 

an even stronger and more dangerous regime. 

I would contend that we should test that proposition today rather 

than in the future when Iran will be at near-zero nuclear breakout 

with a hardened economy, an I.C.B.M. program, and greater regional power. At that point, a future President will be left with 

only two options: An Iranian nuclear weapon or military strikes to 

17

forestall that possibility. Congress needs to weigh these two much 

more dangerous scenarios against the scenarios that I have outlined in considering whether or not to disapprove of this deal. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dubowitz follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Dubowitz. 

Ilan. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ILAN GOLDENBERG, SENIOR FELLOW 

AND DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, 

members of the committee, I am pleased to be before you today testifying on the nuclear agreement reached between Iran and the 

P5+1. 

I want to make three central points. First, the agreement isn’t 

perfect, but, if effectively implemented, should deter Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon for years to come. Second, the deal is a far 

better option than any of the realistic alternatives. And, finally, 

what will be more important than the agreement itself are the policies that the U.S. pursues after the agreement, and I think here 

Congress has a major role to play. 

The limitations on Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity and plutonium pathway will put it at least a year away from a bomb using 

its known facilities. This will create a situation where Iran will be 

deterred from going for a bomb, because it knows that if it started 

to dash it would be quickly caught and attacked. This fear of being 

caught is what has deterred Iran for the past 20 years from going 

to the bomb, even as it got closer and closer. 

The agreement should successfully deter Iran from pursuing a 

nuclear weapon using secret facilities. The inspection regime gives 

the IAEA visibility into every element of Iran’s supply chain, making it exceedingly difficult for Iran to establish an entirely new secret pathway. Even with less stringent inspections, we caught Iran 

at both Natanz and Fordow years before those facilities became 

operational, and we can do that again. 

The agreement also puts in place the right incentives for Iran to 

comply. It receives no sanctions relief until it has already implemented the key nuclear concessions, and the snapback mechanism 

gives the United States an option to retrigger sanctions without the 

possibility of a Russian veto. 

The biggest weakness of the agreement, and my co-panelists 

have talked about this, is that the restrictions, particularly on uranium enrichment, start coming off in years 10 to 15. I would have 

preferred for this time to be longer, but the most important elements of the agreement are inspections and intrusive monitoring, 

because that is the most likely pathway for an Iranian bomb, and 

those stay in place forever. 

Moreover, no other option buys 13 to 15 years with a breakout 

time that is longer than today, not even a military option. I am 

quite confident of this, having spent a number of years working 

this issue closely at the Pentagon. Fifteen years is a long time in 

the Middle East. And even after 15 years many of the same options 

that we have today are still there. 

It is true that some of the $100 billion that Iran receives after 

it has implemented the key provisions of the agreement will likely 

go toward terrorism, but most will go toward repairing the economy. It was the threat of regime collapse that brought Iran’s leadership to the table in the first place. It would make no sense for 

50

them to not address that core problem. That is why they are sitting 

at the table looking for sanctions relief. 

A few billion dollars in extra funds to Iranian terrorism is a terrible thing, but it is something that the United States of America 

can counter through a more aggressive policy of training partner 

special operation forces, intelligence-sharing, joint covert action, 

and interdiction policies, working closely with the Saudis, the 

Israelis, and other key partners. 

What will be much more difficult to counter is an Iran that is 

able to provide a nuclear umbrella to its terrorist proxies, which is 

why we need to focus on the nuclear question first. The other argument is that we should have walked away and gotten a better deal. 

We already tried that approach between 2003 and 2005, and those 

talks collapsed. Afterwards, the United States and its partners 

began a decade-long effort to increase economic pressure, and Iran 

responded by increasing the size of its nuclear program from 164 

to 20,0000 centrifuges. 

This is the Iranian centrifuge snapback option that exists no 

matter what. It exists tomorrow; it exists under this deal. This is 

their point of leverage, so I don’t buy the agreement that somehow 

this deal creates that snapback option. 

If in 2013 we had levied new sanctions and gone for a better 

deal, Iran would have continued to build out its program, and 

today it would be only weeks away from a bomb. The United States 

would be faced with the dilemma of pursuing military action or allowing Iran to achieve a virtual nuclear capability today. 

Finally, the success or failure of the nuclear agreement will depend on the policies we now pursue, both in implementing the deal 

and in how we approach the Middle East. Congress should play an 

active oversight role. It can pursue legislation that creates additional snapback options outside the deal. 

It can establish a committee to ensure long-term implementation 

and oversight. It can provide more funding to the IAEA to make 

sure we have as many inspectors as possible and the best technology possible. That is, of course, if the deal passes the 60-day review period, which will be the first order for Congress to deal with. 

Congress should also push the administration to articulate a 

clear regional strategy that involves more forcefully pushing back 

on Iran’s support for surrogates and proxies and reassuring Israel 

and Saudi Arabia. This has been a real weakness of the administration’s policy and one that requires a course correction that this 

President can begin, but that really the next President will have 

to also lead by pushing back more forcefully against Iran and by 

also spending more time with the Saudis and Israelis addressing 

their concerns about Iran. 

So I hope we can spend more time today talking about U.S. policy options going forward, and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldenberg follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Ambassador Joseph, as you note, and as General Hayden testified last week, it is not the declared sites in Iran that is the biggest 

concern. It is the undeclared sites, the military bases where Iran 

has cheated in the past, the ones that the Supreme Leader still 

says we will never see. Those are the ones that we have got to be 

concerned about. 

You note the considerable delays that can be employed by Iran, 

drawing out what should be 24 hours to at least 24 days. But let 

me add one more concern. This suspect site provision is another 

one of the aspects of this agreement that expires in 15 years. And 

I would like the members just to concentrate on that for a minute. 

As I read this provision, it says, ‘‘The general provisions section of 

the agreement says a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns as defined in Annex 1 will last for 15 

years.’’ All right? 

So, by my read, this is the same time that Iran will be dramatically expanding its program. Without the suspect site provision, 

international inspectors would just be relying on their underlying 

authority as part of the additional protocol. 

So, Ambassador Joseph, how comfortable are you with that situation? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Sir, I share your reading of the agreement, even 

though there are gaps and ambiguities. If I am uncomfortable with 

the suspect site provisions in the first 10 to 15 years, I am very 

uncomfortable after that. It makes a bad situation even worse. 

I would like to, because it has been raised, just comment very 

briefly on this notion of being able to detect cheating because of our 

ability to find traces of uranium, enriched uranium, or plutonium. 

The IAEA this year has raised concerns about Iran’s cleanup at the 

military facility at Parchin. And they have stated that they very 

well may not be able to conduct a thorough investigation given 

Iran’s activities. 

Also, not all prohibited activities are traceable through uranium, 

enriched uranium, or plutonium. I mean, just think about manufacturing centrifuges, for example, with no traces. There are many 

things that Iran could do at suspect sites that would not be detectable through the national technical means that we have. 

The suspect site inspections are, as I say, a fatal flaw in this 

treaty, because that is where Iran is going to cheat. I am not as 

worried about Iran cheating at declared facilities where the IAEA 

inspectors are watching them. I welcome the additional access to 

those facilities and the additional information that the IAEA will 

get under the additional protocol and other provisions of this agreement, but that is not where the cheating is going to occur. 

It is going to be at the suspect sites. We know that, because that 

is where it has occurred in the past. And we know that because the 

Supreme Leader and other Iranian leaders have said, ‘‘We will not 

have access to military facilities.’’

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. And as you note also, if this agreement 

is going to really take away Iran’s path to a bomb, why would Iran 

continue pouring money into its ballistic missile program? Why has 

that become such an obsession for the Supreme Leader that he 

says it is their responsibility to mass produce I.C.B.M.s? Just what 

63

does this provide Iran in terms of money to invest in the missile 

program, missiles that can reach the U.S., and the ability to access 

foreign technology with respect to what Russians wanted out of 

this deal at the 11th hour? 

With more money and foreign technology, where does their program go? And what more should we be doing on missile defense? 

I say that because up until now, in the interim agreement for a 11⁄2

years, we lifted and basically allowed $700 million per month to go 

to Iran. And during the same period of time we see the announcement of the transfer of new rockets, new missiles, not just to 

Hamas, but now the precision guidance systems into Hezbollah. 

So they are doing something with the cash. Ambassador? 

Mr. JOSEPH. So Iran will have access to tens of billions, hundreds 

of billions over the period of this agreement, once the sanctions are 

released and the assets are provided to Iran. With that money, as 

you point out, they can invest in their ballistic missile program. 

They can invest in their nuclear program. They can invest in their 

terrorist surrogates. They can invest in the Revolutionary Guards 

and the fomenting of even more instability throughout the region. 

They have put a real priority on ballistic missiles, not just longrange ballistic missiles but short and medium range ballistic missiles. This seems to be their delivery means of choice. And in terms 

of an I.C.B.M., as you pointed out in your opening comments, this 

is a capability that only makes sense with a nuclear front end. It 

only makes sense in that context. 

So one has to ask the question: Why would they be spending all 

of this money on an I.C.B.M. capability if they had no intention of 

developing a nuclear weapon? 

In terms of missile defense, I think we need to work with our 

friends and allies in the region, providing even more support to 

Israel in our partnership on missile defense. We need to work with 

our Gulf Arab allies on missile defense as we are doing, but to expand that capability. 

We need to ensure that our forces in the region are adequately 

protected from the shorter and medium range capabilities. And I 

think, first and foremost, we need to begin to invest more in the 

defense of the American homeland. That is what the I.C.B.M. is all 

about—holding American cities hostage. 

And what has happened is that we have canceled the original 

third site in Europe. We have canceled Phase 4 of the phased 

adaptive approach, which was the only capability that would have 

the ability to shoot down a long-range Iranian missile. We need to 

either reinstitute a capability in Europe like the Phase 4 capability 

or, at a minimum, I believe, we need to build another interceptor 

site like we have in Fort Greely in Alaska on the east coast to protect against the I.C.B.M. threat, because protection of the American 

homeland I think is the first priority. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Joseph. 

Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know, 

in any agreement there are some good things in it, and there are 

some bad things in it. There are some questionable things in it. 

For me, the most problematic aspect of this agreement is that, 

again, after year 15, there will be no restrictions at all on Iran on 

64

their producing highly enriched uranium. They are home-free. They 

are essentially legitimatized as a threshold state. That bothers me, 

because if this were a deal that truly stopped Iran from having a 

nuclear weapon, then I would feel a lot more comfortable. I am 

very uneasy with the fact that this again doesn’t stop Iran from becoming a nuclear state. It simply postpones it to 15 years from 

now. 

Mr. Goldenberg, how do you react to what I just said? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Thank you, Congressman. I agree that the 

weakest element of the agreement is the fact that 15 years from 

now certain limitations go away. But I think a number of limitations do stay. First, for the next 15 years we are going to have clarity into what Iran’s research and development program will look 

like afterwards and during these 15 years, and it can’t start until 

year 8 or 9. 

And if Iran wants to make any changes to that program, the 

United States will have to approve those because there will be a 

board that includes the United States that would have to actually—has to vote by consensus. That means on any changes to 

Iran’s R&D program, we all need to approve it, so we have a veto. 

We also are going to have 15 years of access to their civilian nuclear program and what they are planning on doing and how they 

are doing it on various elements that are non-nuclear-related. 

There is a long history of working with other countries through 123 

agreements, through various mechanisms, so you get a full picture 

of what their scientists look like, what their plans are. 

And if we get to year 13 or 14 and this looks all very bad, there 

are plenty of opportunities then to start working with partners, reimposing sanctions, looking at other options at that point. You 

know, and we still have also the most important part for an Iranian sneakout, which I still believe is the most important question 

here is, can they build the HEU separately? That is what they are 

going to need to do. They are going to need a covert facility where 

they can actually spin centrifuges and enrich uranium. 

They are not going to be able to do that for at least 25 years, 

because they are not going to have the capacity—because we are 

going to have 25 years of monitoring of everything, the entire supply chain, from the moment it comes out of the ground all the way 

to the very end. That is one of the strongest elements of this agreement, and that lasts a lot longer than 15 years. 

So I agree it is imperfect. I wish it could be better. I think all 

of us do. But I think—as I think members here know better than 

anybody, tough negotiations, whether it is a piece of legislation or 

an international agreement, are never perfect. You always have to 

make sacrifices, as you wisely pointed out, Congressman, and this 

is where we are. I still think it is far superior to the alternative. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Another part of it that is problematic to 

me is we were told at the beginning that this would only be a discussion about Iran’s nuclear program, and that we couldn’t raise 

their support for terrorism, and we couldn’t raise the mischief in 

Syria, in Lebanon, in Yemen, and all the things they do as support 

for Hezbollah, for Hamas. 

And then we see the agreement, and we see that suddenly there 

is an 8-year limit on ballistic missiles and 5 years on arms sales, 

65

which effectively changes the United Nations resolutions. And suddenly that element of it was put in, which didn’t pertain to nuclear 

weapons, and that was problematic. Anybody care to talk about 

that? Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Ranking Member Engel, that is fundamentally 

the problem. This is not a 15-year deal. In some respects, this is—

I would think of this as an 8-year deal, and you need to look at 

this deal from the prism not only of nuclear physics, but economics, 

sanctions, heavy weaponry, and ballistic missiles. 

And what the Iranians have done is they have negotiated an 

agreement where on the front end of this agreement they are effectively dismantling our sanctions regime. That means that they are 

going to get hundreds of billions of dollars to spend on not only 

building their economy but building economic resilience against future economic pressure, and getting the money to buy battle tanks 

and combat aircraft and attack helicopters. They are getting money 

to develop an I.C.B.M. program. That is all front loaded in the beginning. 

And so by year 8, you have effectively arms embargo off, ballistic 

missiles off, all of the sanctions terminate including congressional 

sanctions, and now what Iran has done is it has hardened its defenses and hardened its offenses. And so only then, at that point, 

do the restrictions on R&D and the nuclear physics sunset provisions start kicking in. 

But at that point, what Iran has done is they have effectively 

hardened themselves defensively, economically. They have built a 

powerful I.C.B.M. program over time. And as well, regionally, because of the lifting of the arms embargo, Iran is now a regional 

powerhouse sowing chaos in the Middle East. At that point, what 

they can effectively do is use the nuclear snapback to threaten to 

walk away from the agreement unless we do not reimpose sanctions. 

So it is a front loaded agreement for Iran where they get all the 

benefits up front, and we are hoping down the line 10, 15 years, 

that we will be in a position to respond to a much more powerful 

Iran nuclear-wise, militarily, ballistic missiles, and regionally. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me finish by asking one more question on another thing that I have concerns about, and that is the inspections. 

The joint comprehensive plan of action describes a system in which 

Iran permits 24/7 monitoring of declared facilities. Now, for sites 

that may have undeclared material, Iran might be able to delay inspections, the way I read it, for up to 24 days. Does 24 days provide 

timely access? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, you know, Olli Heinonen testified with me 

yesterday before Financial Services. He was asked the same question, and he was asked to rate on a scale of zero to 10 the inspection regime. He said on declared facilities it is a seven to eight. On 

suspicious sites, it is a five. And on access to facilities where Iran 

would be engaging in the manufacture of a nuclear weapon, he 

ranked that as zero. 

And so the issue here is that there are three types of sites where 

we will want to get into, and it is suspicious sites and sites where 

they are building a nuclear warhead where Dr. Heinonen said at 

best it is a five, and with respect to a warhead design it is a zero. 

66

I would make one other comment, Congressman Engel. It is not 

about verification and inspection only. It is about enforcement. The 

IAEA doesn’t enforce; the United States of America enforces. And 

what I see from this agreement is what the Iranians have designed 

themselves, is effectively they have immunized themselves against 

American enforcement, which means that they can actually stymie 

and stonewall the IAEA, and they are going to be actually depending on the—we are going to be in a position where we are going 

to have to enforce the agreements that the IAEA can get into these 

sites. 

If I am Iran, what I do is I play around with the dispute resolution mechanism and the Joint Commission, because right now it is 

five to three, and all I have to do if I am Iran is flip one European 

country. And I will flip one European country by using the nuclear 

snapback, threatening nuclear escalation if anybody reimposes 

sanctions on me, including in an enforcement situation. 

So if they flip one seat, it is four to four, and you have basically 

stymied the Joint Commission, and now you are in a situation 

where it is not going to just be 24 days, it is going to be much, 

much longer. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Goldenberg, on inspections, is your opinion similar or different? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Well, I view it a little bit differently, Congressman, because my perspective is the reality is any suspicious site 

that we find we are going to have eyes on, realistically in most 

cases before the IAEA even has eyes on it through our intelligence 

community and through the intelligence communities of our other 

partners, that is the other redundant piece of this. 

We will have satellites. We have will various other mechanisms 

where we can do this. And, you know, Ambassador Joseph brought 

up Parchin before. The Iranians have been spending years trying 

to clean up Parchin now. They would have 24 days in this scenario 

to clean something up, and the reality is that—you know, you saw 

this in the case of Iraq. You know, in the case of Iraq, what we 

actually caught in terms of inspections was inspectors moving 

things out of the facilities because we had satellites on them. If the 

Iranians start behaving in a suspicious fashion, we will see it. 

And then the only other thing I will say is by far the most important part of the inspections, in my mind, is the fissile material, because the reality is, yes, the weaponization is the nastiest piece. It 

is obviously for a nuclear weapon. But the fissile material, the reason we focus so much on the fissile material is because you need 

a factory, you need industrial sized capability that is very difficult 

to hide in order to get the fissile material. 

A nuclear core in a weapon does nothing for you if you don’t have 

the material to use in it. And so I think that you do have to look 

at these various pieces, but the real choke point is the fissile material, which is where the agreement is focused on. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for an 

excellent series of hearings. But we were just whispering someVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:42 Sep 03, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\072315\95636 SHIRL
67

thing as the testimony was given. What were you pointing out to 

me, an important point, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, I was pointing out, by our memory, we 

don’t ever remember with a case of the Syrian, you know, reactor, 

the attempt to build a nuclear weapon site there, that we ever detected anything there. We don’t remember it with North Korea, the 

ability to detect what was going on. All we know is that North 

Korea ended up doing three nuclear weapons tests and ended up 

with a whole inventory of atomic weapons. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And now we are going to say our intelligence 

and satellite capabilities are so much more superior. 

But, Mr. Chairman, as you point out, as the 60-day review period 

of this Iran nuclear agreement continues, it is so important for us 

and Congress to do our due diligence and review the deal, and, importantly, draw attention to the flaws and deficiencies, because this 

will jeopardize our national security, the security of our ally, the 

democratic Jewish state of Israel, and indeed global security. 

This nuclear deal will not only not prevent Iran from acquiring 

a nuclear weapon, but it will also likely precipitate war as other 

countries in the region scramble to keep up with Iran. 

We are already seeing a conventional arms race. Look what happened in the Gulf countries council meeting where we tried to buy 

them off with a lot of arms. And if Congress does not vote to block 

this agreement, we will certainly see, in addition to a conventional 

arms race, a nuclear arms race in the region. 

Now, we conduct civil nuclear cooperation agreements, also 

known as 123 agreements, with nations across the globe. In previous agreements, we were successful for winning what is called 

the gold standard, an arrangement where our partners agree to 

forego enrichment and reprocessing as part of our civil nuclear cooperation. 

But with this deal, Iran will be allowed to enrich, and we will 

actually be helping Iran modernize. We will actually be helping 

Iran advance its nuclear infrastructure. We will be setting a precedent here. How can we expect any country that wants to enter into 

one of these agreements in the future to accept the gold standard 

when they can now look at this deal and say, ‘‘No, no, no. We don’t 

want the gold standard. We want the Iran standard.’’ How do you 

see this playing out, Mr. Chairman, correct, in the next 10 to 15 

years? 

And, Mr. Dubowitz, thank you for your testimony. This deal removes the EU and most U.N. sanctions from the top IRGC officials. 

Most of you have brought that out, including Quds Force Commander Soleimani, the Basij paramilitary chief, and the IRGC air 

force commander, among many others. This de-listing of these individuals will unfreeze their foreign assets. It will lift their travel 

bans. That means that we will be facilitating their destabilizing activities overseas. 

Why were these individuals included in the final deal? There is 

no need to do that. What process will be put in place to redesignate 

them, as fanciful as that would be, should they continue or when 

they continue to engage in terrorism? 

68

And thank you, Ambassador Joseph. I wanted to ask you about 

Annex 5 of the JCPOA, some of you had alluded to this additional 

protocol. On implementation day, Iran will provisionally apply this 

additional protocol. These are measures designed to add increased 

avenues of verification by the IAEA, and only fully implement 

these measures pending their ratification by the Iranian Parliament. What will this do to inspections, verification, and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program, if the regime was not actually obligated to implement the additional protocol? Ambassador? 

Mr. JOSEPH. If I could, let me just add a footnote to the North 

Korean experience. We debated for years whether or not North 

Korea had an operational enrichment facility. We debated that for 

years internally. The issue was only resolved when North Korea invited an American scientist to the facility, recorded it, placed it on 

the internet, and then we decided that they actually had an operational enrichment facility. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Will American inspectors be allowed in 

Iran——

Mr. JOSEPH. They will not. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. With this deal? 

Mr. JOSEPH. They will not be allowed. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Dubowitz? Oh, sorry, I am out of time, 

or almost. Go ahead. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Congresswoman, I just want to respond to Mr. 

Goldenberg’s point. I mean, the real issue here is that what Iran 

will want to do is not—they are not going to break out of their declared facilities. It is going to be in suspicious sites, and it is going 

to be in warhead design. 

And, by the way, you don’t need an industrial sized enrichment 

facility in order to produce uranium. All you do is you need a 

Fordow-like facility, with a few hundred highly powered centrifuges, which are much easier to hide, buried under a mountain 

on a Revolutionary Guard base. That is not an industrial sized facility. 

The other thing I would say is we did eventually detect Natanz 

and Arak. Unfortunately, they were almost built. So at that point 

it was too late. So the intelligence community, I have a lot of respect for the men and women who work there, but unfortunately 

we have gotten it wrong. We missed and didn’t stop the Soviet 

Union, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Syria. We underestimated Iraq in 1990. We overestimated in 2003. 

And now we are in a situation where we are betting the future 

of America on the IAEA. By the way, an additional protocol that 

both David Albright and Olli Heinonen have said is insufficient 15 

years or 20 years from now, and now we are going to be betting 

on our intelligence capabilities to detect a small lab 200 meters 

squared where the Iranians are actually doing nuclear warhead design, which is why Olli Heinonen gave it a ranking of zero. That 

is——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ [continuing]. Of deep concern. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Alan Lowenthal of California. 

69

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, witnesses. I want to go back to the scenarios, if we turn this down, 

what that really means and what happens to our partners in this. 

What if they start to sell, and what if we see within weeks that 

Iran starts to create a nuclear weapon? What are we going to do? 

I want to really hear another scenario where they start to build a 

bomb, what you think we should do. 

Thank you. Mr. Goldenberg. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Thank you. The reality is I think the nuclear 

snapback that Mr. Dubowitz talked about happens on day one. We 

turn down this agreement. I think there is no realistic new negotiation. This is not an agreement just between Iran and the United 

States. It is an agreement between Iran, the United States, Russia, 

China, Europe, the U.K., Germany, and France. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. That is right. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. And I think what happens afterwards is Iran 

starts building, again, enriching centrifuges using spinning centrifuges, enriching uranium. I don’t think that they will dramatically escalate immediately, but we are only 2 to 3 months away 

now. That is why we had to stop it in 2013 and froze it. Within 

a couple of years, we are looking at Iran probably being a couple 

of weeks away from a bomb, at which point we really have very little confidence about whether or not we can stop it or not. 

At that point, military options become a serious debate. Do we 

allow a virtual nuclear weapon? Or do we pursue military options? 

Now, to be clear, I think if we ended up in a war with Iran, we 

would win handily, obviously. 

Their nuclear program, and many of their conventional capabilities, would be destroyed, but they would still have the capability 

to build that nuclear program back up in a lot less than 15 years, 

and we would have no ability in terms of inspections to actually get 

in there, unless you want to start taking over the country or trying 

to coerce them in the types of ways that are going to require huge 

amounts of American manpower. 

And so, realistically, then, we have basically taken a beehive and 

we haven’t sprayed it. We have taken a bat to it, and the bees are 

flying everywhere. That is fundamentally what we are able to do 

in response. And the other thing I will just say about this scenario 

is we don’t know what happens once you open up the can of worms 

with military action, even successful military action like we took in 

Iraq in 1991. We are still dealing with the consequences of that 25 

years later. We still haven’t figured out how we are going to deal 

with Iraq precisely, and we still have forces there now and have 

had to go through all of this. 

So, you know, it is always an option. And I think that everybody 

needs to remember—and I think the Iranians remember—that at 

the end of the day, if that is the option that gets pursued, it is 

going to be much worse for them than it will be for us, but it will 

be bad for everyone. And it is an option that really should be held 

out as a last resort, and in the meantime this option, which buys 

us 15 very good years followed by additional assurances and opportunities to stretch this out even further, takes away none of those 

options in 15 years, in my view, because in terms of speaking about 

scenarios, I think it is also important to remember the scenario of 

70

a super-empowered Iran assumes everything goes right for them in 

the next few years. 

Sanctions aren’t America’s only tool to counter Iran. We have the 

Defense Department. We have the intelligence community. We 

have other ways to counter Iran in the region. We all just flip into 

sanctions, but you can do things like covert actions with partners. 

You can find ways to cooperate with others. You can push them 

back in Syria, and you can push them back in Yemen and elsewhere, without—and you can flex your muscles to conventional 

military force without—and still leave yourself options years down 

the line. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. I would just say this, Congressman. There is an 

inherent flaw in that argument, and here is the inherent flaw. The 

argument assumes that at some point the Iranians are going to 

break out to a nuclear weapon, and we are going to have to use 

military force to stop them. The question is, if that is true, would 

you rather use military force today against a fragile Iran, which 

has a small nuclear program and small force projection? 

Or would you rather use military force against Iran in 15 years 

when they have an industrial sized nuclear program with near zero 

breakout, easier clandestine sneakout, and I.C.B.M.s? By the way, 

a powerful economy, relatively speaking, that is immunized against 

future economic pressure. I oppose military force, which is why I 

think this is a deeply flawed deal, because I think this invariably 

sets us down a path where in 15 years when they are at near zero 

breakout, if they break out to a nuclear weapon, we will only have 

military force to stop them. 

So Mr. Goldenberg’s scenario today—today we actually have 

more options. If Congress rejects this deal, we go back to what I 

call the messy scenario, the divide the P5+1 scenario. The Iranians 

are absolutely going to try to flip it on us, but we still have U.S. 

secondary sanctions as a powerful instrument of coercion. That is 

what has kept the Russians, the Chinese, and the Europeans at 

bay, not multilateral diplomacy. It is fear that they will be cut off 

from the U.S. economy and the U.S. financial networks. 

I want to retain economic leverage, which is why we have it 

today. Let us negotiate a better deal that doesn’t put Iran in a position that when war comes Iran will be stronger and the consequences will be much more severe. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Lowenthal. 

Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Chairman Royce. And I do want to thank 

you again for convening this very incisive set of hearings that have 

really brought out the egregious flaws of this so-called arms control 

deal. 

Americans held hostage—again, we have had several hearings at 

the full committee level. I have had two at my subcommittee level. 

We have heard from Saeed Abedini’s wife. We have heard from all 

of the family members. They are incredulous that their family, 

loved ones, continue to be held hostage, are tortured, are mistreated in a myriad of ways. And even with all of this euphoria at 

the White House about this deal, they are still not free. I find that 

incredible. Your thoughts? 

71

Secondly, on inspections, we all know that the Iranian Minister 

of Defense reportedly said that Tehran will never allow any foreigner to discover Iran’s defensive and missile capabilities by inspecting the country’s military sites, echoed by the Supreme Leader 

as well. He will never permit inspectors to inspect Iran’s military 

bases. 

Managed access sounds more like managed manipulation or manipulated access. It is really not clear what all of this 24-day thing 

is all about. Going to the committee, what role will Iran play in 

preventing inspections when there is suspicious activity? Could you 

really walk us through that in a more comprehensive way? 

And, finally, on the issue of ballistic missiles, you, Ambassador 

Joseph, talked about, ominously frankly, that this should include 

moving ahead with a third interceptor site on the U.S. east coast. 

In the end of your testimony you made that point, as well as other 

anti-missile defenses being beefed up. Would you elaborate on what 

that means? How far in do you anticipate into the midwest, west 

coast? But of course you have said first on the east coast. Do you 

believe that is a realistic concern? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Thank you, Congressman. Let me just respond to a 

couple of your points, and also to this notion that the agreement 

buys us 15 years. That sounds pretty good. But let us not forget, 

as you say, Congressman, who we are dealing with here, what type 

of regime we are dealing with here. 

This is a regime that has proven itself a master of denial and deception. If Iran today doesn’t have a covert program, if it doesn’t 

have covert activities going on today as you hold this hearing, it 

would be the first time in 20 years. Again, what type of regime are 

we dealing with? 

And talking about, well, Iran will be a threshold state in 15 

years. What is the definition? By any definition, I would say—and 

I have been in this business a long time—Iran is a threshold state 

today. 

They have the ability to produce enough fissile material, at declared facilities let alone covert facilities that we may not know 

about, but at declared facilities in what our Secretary of State says 

is 2 or 3 months. He says we are going to postpone that at declared 

facilities, and he doesn’t talk about sneakout at undeclared facilities. And we don’t know the status of their weaponization. 

Why? Because the IAEA has been obstructed, has been 

stonewalled by the Iranians ever since the November 11 report by 

the IAEA that identified 12 activities that could be associated and 

could still be going on, and it included the design of a ballistic missile warhead, with regard to the weaponization program. 

And as far as I know, Congress has not received the side agreement between the IAEA and Iran that will get at issues such as 

Parchin and the possible military dimensions, the so-called PMD, 

the 12 activities. How are you going to make a judgment? How are 

you going to make a judgment on this without understanding what 

access the IAEA has in that case? 

With regard to ballistic missiles and the ballistic missile defense, 

I think clearly, as I said, we need to focus on shorter, medium, and 

their longer range capabilities. What the plan was initially was to 

have a capability in Europe to be able to shoot down I.C.B.M. class 

72

missiles from Iran. We canceled that in September 2009, the original third site. 

We then had a Phase 4 to the phased adaptive approach arrangement of this administration. Lo and behold, in March 2013, we canceled Phase 4, which was designed against the Iranian long-term 

threat. Either we need to put that capability back in Europe or we 

need to have the capability in the United States. We have interceptors in California to protect against North Korea. We have interceptors in Alaska to protect primarily against North Korea. But 

what about Iran? And there are gaps in our coverage. We need to 

be able to protect against that. According to the Missile Defense 

Agency, the best place to put this is in the northeast. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Congressman, could I say something about the 

hostages, please? Because they get forgotten. At the last minute in 

these negotiations, the Iranians got last-minute concessions, the 

lifting of the arms embargo, the lifting of ballistic missile restrictions. They turned a nuclear deal into a deal-plus-plus. Why 

weren’t we able, at the last minute, to demand the release of our 

hostages and get them back? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Congressman, just very briefly on the hostages, first of all, it is completely inexcusable. They need to be 

brought back. Obviously, I think we all agree on that. I don’t think 

anybody is saying that this regime is—I don’t think the administrative says it, and I certainly don’t believe it. This is a regime that 

we can work with on all kinds of other issues. This is strictly an 

arms control agreement. 

But my understanding, at least from talking to some of the hostages’ families that are hearing—and also hearing from others talk 

about is they didn’t really want this issue entangled in nuclear diplomacy. 

Mr. SMITH. You know, I have asked that question, too. They felt 

and they were advised by the State Department ad nauseam to 

take that position. And when you have a loved one in a precarious, 

horrible position like that, you are going to take the State Department’s admonitions to heart. 

But they openly said here at hearings they were bewildered. And 

I asked Secretary Kerry, as did the chairman, why is this off the 

table, on the fringes if you will? Because they pushed it aside. They 

wanted a deal and only a deal. They didn’t want anything to get 

in the way. 

I am amazed. I mean, it is shocking that they have not been released. But I think we should take with a grain of salt anything 

a loved one might say now because they don’t want to in any way 

have the State Department walk even further away. Never. 

And the last point I will say, Mr. Chairman, Naghmeh told us 

at the first hearing on behalf of her husband Saeed Abedini, she 

went to the State Department and the State Department said there 

is, ‘‘Nothing we can do to help your husband. Nothing we can do.’’ 

That changed in terms of statements that were made, but it was 

never an all-in effort to get them out. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Well, I agree with you, obviously, Congressman, that it is——

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. Let us go to Lois Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

73

Thank you to our witnesses today. Well, I know we all agree Iran 

should not get a nuclear weapon, and my approach is just to try 

to take a non-partisan, objective scrutiny of this, because it is so 

monumental. 

And I believe my colleagues have very articulately raised the 

concerns. I share, I would say, all or most of the concerns that have 

been raised about this agreement. I would like to focus back on the 

repercussions of disapproval. I think approval, if it came for approval, it would be very hard to vote to approve this agreement. 

The question is disapproval, and I want to understand the potential ramifications. I know you had said—talked about some of 

them. First, I would like to have your opinion as to the other countries in the P5+1 other than us. Do you believe that there is real 

motivation on their part for Iran not to achieve a nuclear weapon, 

and that they are at the table for that reason and not just our economic power? That is number one. I would like your opinion on 

that. 

And then, this is sort of a simple question, but after all of these 

years of negotiation, more intense the last couple of years, if we 

disapprove, what do you think is the effect of our standing in the 

world? Would anyone want to come back to the table with us? 

Would we be trusted to sit for years and negotiate an agreement? 

And I think I had one more question, if you can get to it, which 

is—and it was touched on before. If this agreement goes through, 

for those of you who have not already answered the question, what 

efforts could we make in Congress to give ourselves some more protection? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, Congresswoman, I was the one who laid out 

the scenarios, because I think it is absolutely critical that we 

don’t—we assume that there are going to be disastrous scenarios 

today, but then we assume in 15 years everything is going to be 

rosy and optimistic. I think we have to look in a sober way, what 

are things going to look like today? What will they look like in 15 

years? I think all of us agree in 15 years things will not look good, 

given Iran’s capacity. 

Today, I laid out three scenarios, and I think that the reason 

that countries are at the table is not only because they fear American economic power and sanctions. They are at the table because 

every one of the P5+1 does not want Iran to develop a nuclear 

weapon. 

And so the notion that we will all walk away from the table, and 

then go and aid and abet Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, 

I think is contradictory to the reasons that they are there in the 

first place. It is in their national security interest. 

Number two, the French hate this deal. The French tried their 

best to make this a strong deal. I think they are absolutely incredulous at the scale of the giveaways. So the notion that somehow 

the French are going to walk away and not work with us, and the 

French are the linchpin in the EU. If the French are with us with 

respect to economic sanctions, then the EU is with us, so we will 

still retain the power of economic sanctions. 

In terms of our standing in the world, I think, again, this is not 

a popularity contest. I think as Ambassador Joseph said, this is 

about American leadership, and this is about preventing Iran from 

74

not only developing a nuclear weapon but sowing sectarian chaos 

in the Middle East. I think this would be a reassertion of American 

leadership, that the U.S. Congress has said that this deal is going 

to lead to disastrous consequences down the road, and that we 

want to negotiate a better deal that removes some of these fatal 

flaws that Ambassador Joseph spoke to. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Congresswoman, look, I agree with Mark actually here that at the end of the day I don’t think our credibility 

goes entirely away. I do think it hurts our credibility that people 

that negotiate with the United States of America, because we are 

the United States of America, we are the world’s superpower. 

So I don’t think everything goes away, and all these countries 

have an interest in preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. 

I think it will be very difficult to hold the unity of the P5+1. I think 

a lot of the sanctions might start to atrophy. I think the Iranians 

will respond in a way that they will be able to move more quickly 

in terms of revving up their nuclear program than we will be able 

to in terms of renegotiating or putting in more sanctions and leverage, precisely because of this situation. And so I think they will be 

at the advantage, not us, in this scenario. 

I also want to talk—I thought your question, Congresswoman, 

about what Congress can do afterwards, because this I think is 

very important. And whether you support or oppose the deal, I 

think this is something where Congress can really come together. 

There needs to be a piece of implementing legislation. Let us say 

you get through the 60 days, and if the agreement is overturned, 

then I think everything stops and is fine. That is one scenario. 

But if you get through the 60 days, there is still an opportunity 

here for members who oppose the deal to say, ‘‘I hate this deal, but 

I can make it better,’’ and those who are reticent but support it to 

say, ‘‘I am uncomfortable, but I am not going to get in the way.’’

But here is how we are going to make it stronger. One, work 

with the administration. They should be able to work with Congress to let us think about different American snapback provisions 

beyond the agreement itself that go in place and could be put into 

legislation for different scenarios, particularly middle ground scenarios where things are a little squishier than, you know, overwhelming breaches, which is one of the difficulties in the agreement. 

Two, some kind of board that oversees, whether it is in Congress. 

More money for the IAEA. Pushing the administration much harder on what they should be doing in the region. There is a number 

of things that people here can all agree on I think and really come 

together on a very strong piece of legislation. 

Chairman ROYCE. Steve Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Goldenberg, let me ask you this. Ambassador Joseph mentioned a little while ago something that I think makes a lot of 

sense. Why would the Iranians spend so much time and so much 

effort in developing I.C.B.M.s, intercontinental ballistic missiles, if 

they don’t intend to acquire and build nuclear weapons? And if you 

could make it brief, because I have got a bunch of questions. 

75

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Sure. I mean, I think that they started this 

program when they intended to build nuclear weapons, and we 

have been working to change that and——

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. At the end here especially, wasn’t that one 

of the big things that they insisted on? They insisted and we succumbed to this—the whole idea of lifting the arms embargo, which 

will give them the ability to acquire additional technology, I.C.B.M. 

technology from Russia. 

So, I mean, I think the answer clearly is they wouldn’t want to 

proceed with it, if they didn’t intend to get nuclear weapons. Ambassador Joseph, would you want to touch on that briefly? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Sir, I think you have got it exactly right. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. 

Mr. JOSEPH. I mean, it only makes sense in the context of a nuclear weapons program. 

Mr. CHABOT. Right. Let me follow up. You also said something 

before, which I think makes imminent sense, and that is that now 

that we have got this terrible deal facing us that we need to protect 

our cities, and you have suggested that we have to seriously consider an anti-missile shield on our east coast. And that is correct; 

you do support that, is that right? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Let me follow up on that, then. One of the 

very first things that the Obama administration did when they 

took office was to cancel our agreement, which was a slap in the 

face of two of our strong allies, the Czech Republic and Poland. 

And that anti-missile technology that isn’t there now, it was aimed 

at a potential Iranian missile heading in Europe’s direction or our 

direction. And so now that they have done that, and with this 

agreement, it seems that they have put us very much in harms 

way. Would you comment on that? 

Mr. JOSEPH. I certainly would, sir. Not only did the Obama administration cancel the third site, it canceled every single program 

that was designed to develop capabilities to keep pace with the 

threat. It canceled the MKV, the multiple-kill vehicle program. It 

canceled the KEI, which is what was to be a boost phase interceptor. It canceled the airborne laser. It reduced the number of 

interceptors, the ground-based interceptors at Alaska. I mean, it 

eviscerated the program. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Let me move on, if I can. Thank you. 

Mr. Goldenberg, how long was it after the announcement of this 

deal that we had people in the street in Iran, including Iranian 

leaderships, chanting ‘‘Death to America’’? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Look, I think that that is—this leadership nobody is talking about the fact that——

Mr. CHABOT. It wasn’t very long. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. It wasn’t very long. 

Mr. CHABOT. Almost immediate we heard that. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. You also had overwhelming support for the 

agreement that——

Mr. CHABOT. Now, you have also talked about snapback, the 

sanctions, and we can snap them back now. ‘‘Snap’’ sounds like it 

is pretty quick. You know, snap back. We have got—they are back 

on. 

76

Mr. Dubowitz—and, again, if you could keep your answer relatively brief—are we going to be able to snapback these sanctions? 

Mr. CHABOT. Snapback sanctions are a delusion. I could go on. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. I think you have answered my question 

there. 

And this 24-hour—you know, or excuse me, 24-day thing which 

the administration has been pushing, like which is—sounds pretty 

long to me because you can hide a lot of incriminating evidence in 

24 days, but it is really, I understand, a heck of a lot longer than 

24 days in the real world, because we have to go through a whole 

series of things which Iran can block, it is my understanding. 

Either Ambassador Joseph or Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, I certainly—I think they certainly can. And remember that this is a deviation from the standard additional protocol, which calls for 24 hours, 24-hour notice. So in the negotiations that was extended from 24 hours to 24 days, and 24 days is 

just the first phase, because it can continue for days or weeks 

thereafter. And Iran can obstruct the inspectors and they can get 

rid of a lot of the evidence in that timeframe, according to the 

IAEA. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. And it is not just 24 days; it is much, much 

longer because the time that it takes to snapback the U.N. resolution, and then U.S., and then EU sanctions, and have that impact, 

is much, much longer. 

Mr. CHABOT. How long can we realistically be talking here before 

you could actually get to a site and see what they are doing? Potentially. 

Mr. JOSEPH. I would think the way that the Iranians can play 

this, it could go on for months. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I yield back. This is I think just a terrible deal, and I hope that we look very closely at this. And I thank 

the chairman for letting us look closely at this. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Tulsi Gabbard of Hawaii. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am wondering what, if you can name specifically what materials—you alluded to this earlier, what materials can be hidden 

within that 24-day period? And the followup question is, how specifically can Iran get around the 24/7 monitoring that the administration is touting of the entire supply chain? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, there are a whole host of things that the Iranians could hide within the 24 hours. I mean, I mentioned centrifuge manufacturing. Okay? That involves a lot of different components, none of which necessarily can be traced to uranium or plutonium. 

The Iranians can continue, you know, the deception that we have 

seen for years in their games with the IAEA. According to the inspectors, according to the IAEA, they can undercut the ability of 

the inspections. 

Ms. GABBARD. I am just wondering if you can give some specific 

examples, because we are getting arguments from both sides. But 

I am wondering specific materials or specific problems or areas of 

vulnerabilities within the supply chain that can be hidden both 

from their cameras and their sealed—their seals and their moniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:42 Sep 03, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\072315\95636 SHIRL
77

toring that we can look to, and that you can point to as a vulnerability. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, I mean, one specific example is, you know, 

centrifuge parts. 

Ms. GABBARD. Okay. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. And another specific example is certainly on the 

issue of where Iran would be building a warhead, access to the 

computer modeling, the computer codes, the actual design of the 

warhead, multi-point detonation devices. I mean, all of that doesn’t 

leave a footprint. It takes place in a small laboratory. And according to inspectors, it would be a matter of a couple of days to literally move out all of that equipment. 

And, Congresswoman, you have to understand, the Iranians in 

2003, what happened then is that they hadn’t built contingency 

plans, so it was easier to catch them. They have learned from that, 

so they are not going to just get caught, oops, the inspectors have 

all of a sudden identified a site. They built contingency plans to 

sanitize the site, and inspectors have said that you can literally do 

that in a couple of days. 

So the issue is on the most fundamental aspect of the Iranian 

nuclear weapons program, the warhead design. We are effectively 

blind, and the Iranians have a contingency plan that in a couple 

of days they can sanitize a lab, move out all of the equipment, and 

even if we do get into that site there will be no evidence that they 

have conducted that activity. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Congresswoman, if I can just add, you know, 

it is true, on the warhead design it is incredibly difficult to find 

warheads. It is incredibly difficult to look at—you know, a nuclear 

weapon is three pieces. It is the ballistic missiles, it is the warheads, it is the fissile material. The fissile material in some ways 

is the least harmful piece, right, because it can also be used for civilian purposes. 

But that is where you detect, and that is what this deal is designed to do, because it is a lot easier to detect that. When you 

have to put a few hundred centrifuges, when you have to hide uranium, you can have weaponization plans, but if you don’t have the 

material to actually do it, and this is precisely when the administration talks about the supply chain. 

What it is saying is it will be incredibly difficult for the Iranians 

to be able to actually get the material secretly that it needs. It has 

to build an entirely independent system, starting with, where are 

we going to get the uranium to, where are we going to get the centrifuges to, where are we going—you have to do every piece of this 

process independently of the supply chain monitoring that we already have, and that is the rationale. 

It obviously has holes. And, you know, I would love to see a foolproof system for dealing with weaponization. I don’t think one exists in the world, period, if a country is really determined to do 

that. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Of course, if you are Iran, you know what you do 

is when you have an industrial sized program, and you actually are 

producing as Congressman Engel said, an unlimited amount of enriched uranium, which by the way you can enrich not only to 3.67 

percent, now they get 20 percent, but the Iranians will enrich to 

78

60 percent and they will use the fact that they need a nuclear-powered naval fleet. 

And so at that point you have got huge quantities of uranium all 

around the country, in a country that is more than twice the size 

of Texas. So that is when it becomes very difficult to actually detect 

a diversion of enriched uranium to a covert enrichment facility 

with a few hundred centrifuges buried under a mountain on a Revolutionary Guard base. 

And, by the way, why wouldn’t you co-locate that with your warhead design facility? So you would be able to very quickly move 

that highly enriched uranium into another small lab where you can 

now turn it into uranium elements for a nuclear warhead. That is 

the fundamental problem. In an industrial sized program, 150 inspectors or 200 inspectors are going to have a very difficult time 

detecting that. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. The additional protocol remains in place in 

that scenario. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Which every inspector, which every expert has 

said——

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mo Brooks of Alabama. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This question or series 

of questions is directed to each of you, one at a time. Brief answers 

would be appreciated, given time constraints. 

This past April Iranian Brigadier General Mohammad Reza 

Naqdi stated that erasing Israel off the map is non-negotiable. Do 

you believe his comments accurately reflect a goal of the Iranian 

Government? Ambassador? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes, I do. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Absolutely. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Goldenberg? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. But they wouldn’t do it if it meant the destruction of their regime, which I think it certainly would. 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. Second question. This past weekend Iranian 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini led a rally that was frequently punctuated by chants of ‘‘Death to America’’ and ‘‘Death to 

Israel.’’ Again, do you believe his comments accurately reflect a 

goal of the Iranian Government? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes, I do. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. It is their animating ideology. Without that ideology, there is no Islamic Republic. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Goldenberg? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I think it is important to remember that the 

overwhelming majority of the Iranian population is actually much 

more pro-American than pretty much any country in the Middle 

East. So this regime has issues, but thus far at least it has been 

deterred through, and will continue to be deterred, by our actions. 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. That is not answering my question. Do you 

believe ‘‘Death to America’’ and ‘‘Death to Israel’’ are goals of the 

Iranian Government? 

79

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Not realistic goals that they could pursue 

without facing severe consequences that have deterred them for 35 

years from acting on those goals in ways that could actually——

Mr. BROOKS. All right. Next, given your responses, do you also 

believe that Iran, the world’s foremost sponsor of terrorism, will 

use the conventional weapons made available by the Iran nuclear 

treaty to further Iran’s goal of destroying Israel and killing Americans? Ambassador Joseph? 

Mr. JOSEPH. I think there is a 100 percent chance that they will 

do that. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. It has already used conventional weapons to kill 

Americans and kill Israelis. Why wouldn’t it continue? 

Mr. BROOKS. Very good way to answer a question with a question. I tend to agree. 

Mr. Goldenberg? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. And there is a lot of other things, sir, 

that we should be doing to counter those activities, but it doesn’t 

necessarily preclude a nuclear agreement. 

Mr. BROOKS. And given how frequently we have seen Muslim 

fundamentalists be willing to sacrifice their own lives in furtherance of their desire to kill unbelievers, we saw it with 9/11 roughly 

14 years ago, we have seen it in many other places around the 

globe, including the United States. As I see this agreement, at 

some point there is a probability that Iran is going to obtain nuclear weapons. Do you agree or disagree? 

Mr. JOSEPH. I think they can go nuclear today if they so decide, 

and have a nuclear weapon in a very short period of time. 

Mr. BROOKS. And if they comply with this agreement, do you believe they still will obtain nuclear weapons, at some point? 

Mr. JOSEPH. It is hard for me to believe that they are going to 

comply with the agreement, because, as you know, the chairman 

pointed out, they have cheated on every other agreement. My sense 

is that they will use this agreement as a shield for continuing to 

develop a nuclear weapons capability, and when they decide they 

will go nuclear. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. I think at some point it will be an irresistible impulse to actually test a nuclear weapon. And even if they don’t, 

they will use the near zero breakout capability they will have to 

threaten the United States and threaten the region, and use it as 

an instrument of nuclear blackmail in order to expand their conventional and terrorist activities. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Goldenberg? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I think they have been deterred from actually 

going for a nuclear weapon for 35 years, because of the costs and 

consequences that come with that. And this agreement will extend 

and continue that trend. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. And, of course, Congressman, that actually contradicts the claim that if this agreement gets turned down by Congress, we are going to—Iran is going to engage in nuclear escalation to a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. BROOKS. I understand. 

80

Final question. Given the religious zealotry of the Iranian Government, what degree of certainty do you have, one way or the 

other, that Iran won’t use nuclear weapons to further ‘‘Death to 

America’’ and ‘‘Death to Israel,’’ if and when Iran obtains those nuclear weapons? Ambassador Joseph? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, I think Iran will use nuclear weapons. They 

will use it to intimidate. They will use it to blackmail us. They will 

use it to deter us from coming to the assistance of our allies in the 

region. 

Mr. BROOKS. But will they detonate them? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, will they detonate? I think they will risk it, 

and I think they will be very—and the situation will be very subject to miscalculation, and I think that this could very easily escalate into their use of a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. BROOKS. If the chair would permit Mr. Dubowitz and Mr. 

Goldenberg? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. They would certainly detonate it to test it. And 

we would want the world to know that they have the capability to 

actually deploy a nuclear weapon. Whether they end up using it, 

I cannot say. But I think that it doesn’t matter whether they use 

it or not, fundamentally they will detonate it, and then they will 

have a nuclear weapon to blackmail the United States and the 

international community for all of their conventional and terrorist 

purposes. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I agree with my panelists, which is why I 

think we need this agreement, which stops that from happening is, 

in my view, the better option. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the additional time 

for the witnesses to respond. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Brooks, thank you very much. 

Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I presume that each of 

the panelists believes that today Iran is a nuclear threshold state. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes, sir. I do. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. They are a nuclear threshold state, but they are 

still a very weak state. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. They are a nuclear threshold state, sir. 

Mr. HIGGINS. With this deal, which would reduce the number of 

centrifuges from 19,000 to some 6,000, and reduce uranium and 

plutonium by 98 percent under this deal, wouldn’t Iran become less 

of a nuclear threshold or threat to the region? 

Mr. JOSEPH. It is certainly better that Iran, at declared facilities, 

is spinning fewer centrifuges rather than more centrifuges. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. 

Mr. JOSEPH. But they are going to have the additional centrifuges in storage, and they could very easily reconstitute that capability for breakout. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Now, we would detect it, but one also has to consider what may be going on at suspect sites. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. There is no fundamental difference between a 3-

month breakout and a 12-month breakout. Neither is enough time 

to reimpose sanctions. Both are enough time to use military force. 

81

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Actually, Congressman, I would disagree. I 

think there is a huge difference between a 12-month breakout and 

a 3-month breakout. And I think we also have to remember that 

a 12-month breakout is if everything goes right for Iran from day 

one, they build only one nuclear weapon, which nobody has ever 

done. You have to build an arsenal. That is the only way you can 

credibly deter. So you are talking about a lot more time than that. 

And, fundamentally, it gives us enough time to be able to respond in all kinds of different ways, politically, diplomatically, militarily. At a couple of weeks, the only real option is to pursue—to 

go military, because you are not going to have time to do anything 

else. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Well, it has always been stated that, you know, the 

12-month breakout was necessary from our standpoint strategically, to be able to detect whether or not Iran was moving toward 

a nuclear weapon, and to be able to act against it before they are 

able to accomplish that. 

I think the one thing that hasn’t been emphasized enough here, 

nobody is suggesting that the United States is taking the military 

option off the table. This is an interim step toward the goal of 

using international leverage to get Iran to move away from its nuclear ambitions. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Congressman, you should ask Secretary Kerry 

how the 1-year breakout was chosen. Was that based on a deep 

analysis by the intelligence community and the U.S. Government 

that 1 year was exactly the point of time that we needed in order 

to have the full range of options that Mr. Goldenberg said? Or was 

it chosen artificially or through negotiations with Iran? I would be 

interested in his answer. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Do you think he just came out with the 1 year arbitrarily to make it look better than the current situation? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. I think that this 1-year breakout was chosen arbitrarily. It was not put through a deep, rigorous analysis. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Why would they do that? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, because I think at the end of the day when 

they shifted the fundamental precept of this negotiation from Iran’s 

nuclear program judged by its practical needs to a breakout time, 

what they needed to do was they sat down with the physics of this 

and they tried to figure out what would be the most they could negotiate with the Iranians based on the existing enrichment capacity. 

And they realized that the Iranians are not going to give up their 

entire enrichment capacity. They weren’t going to go down to—

1,000 centrifuges to 500 centrifuges the administration initially 

started in the negotiation. They back-ended the analysis, and they 

came up with 1 year. But I don’t believe that there was any systematic effort in order to analyze or red team whether 1 year was 

sufficient. 

Mr. HIGGINS. What you are suggesting is the 1-year breakout 

was to appease the Iranians at the expense of the strategic interests of the United States. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. I am not suggesting to appease. I am suggesting 

that they thought that was the best they could negotiate. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I actually believe——

82

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Fundamentally different. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG [continuing]. Congressman, having worked on 

this issue inside the Pentagon when we were discussing precisely 

these types of questions, the question for us was always, do we 

have enough time to clearly see the program, stop it, and not only 

that we know we can stop it militarily and otherwise, but that the 

Iranians know that we can stop it militarily and otherwise, so that 

they are deterred from ever going for it? 

And this is something we talked about for years, and I was always very confident with a number like that. And on top of that, 

I do think we need to—I thought your point, Congressman, was 

really important about this being an interim step. The reality is, 

there comes a moment where our only options are military action 

or essentially accepting a virtual capability, because we are not 

going to have the ability to stop it. 

At that moment, the President of the United States has to make 

a terrible decision, and we all lose, whichever way he goes. 

Mr. HIGGINS. All right. Could I——

Mr. GOLDENBERG. And 12 months is not long enough to reimpose 

sanctions. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Let me just reclaim my time for one moment. It 

said that this deal would result in a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The fact of the matter is, Iran has been in nuclear proliferation for at least 10 years. Who else is pursuing nuclear weapons in the Middle East, other than Iran? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, Congressman, you are well aware of Pakistan 

and Pakistan’s program. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I am. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Saudi Arabia has said that——

Mr. HIGGINS. Saudi Arabia can’t make a car. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Saudi Arabia has a lot of money, and Saudi Arabia 

has a long-time relationship——

Mr. HIGGINS. And they can’t make a car. 

Mr. JOSEPH [continuing]. A long-time relationship with Pakistan. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Is there any evidence that Saudi Arabia is moving 

towards——

Mr. JOSEPH. And you could say the Libyans. The Libyans 

couldn’t make a car either, but they had an advanced nuclear 

weapons program, because they were able to buy it. They were able 

to buy the equipment, and they were able to buy the expertise. 

Saudi Arabia has a lot more money than the Libyans ever——

Mr. HIGGINS. So the point is, there is already nuclear proliferation in the Middle East before this deal is voted on or approved. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Yes. But the fundamental difference—I mean, the 

Saudis have actually signed multi-billion dollar contracts with the 

South Koreans and Russians to build a civilian nuclear program. 

The difference is that there will be the Iran standard. The Saudis 

will insist on domestic enrichment, and anybody who says we can 

de-SWIFT Saudi banks, cut off Saudi oil exports, and designate the 

central bank of Saudi Arabia to stop it from pursuing that path, 

should do a much more detailed examination of the Saudi economy. 

Those options obviously don’t exist. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I will just point out that if the Saudis really 

wanted to build a covert nuclear weapons program, they wouldn’t 

83

be going around on the front page of The New York Times saying 

that they wanted to do that. Is it conceivable they are doing it for 

leverage? 

Chairman ROYCE. Darrell Issa of California. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Goldenberg, where were you in 1979? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Sir, I was actually in Israel where I was born. 

I was a year old. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So for your entire life, from the age of 1 year old, 

Iran has been a terrorist state, first pretending that students had 

taken our Embassy while in fact it was the current government, or 

its legacy government with the same theological base, that took our 

Embassy prisoner, held them for more than a year, and in fact sequentially, when you were 4 years old or so, they blew up—they 

participated and funded the organization that blew up 200-plus 

Marines in Beirut and our Embassy. 

You were 3 or 4 years old when they killed the station chief, and 

when they sponsored kidnappings in large amounts. Did you continue growing up in Israel during the ’80s? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes, sir. I was there until the age of——

Mr. ISSA. So the organization and the funding of Hezbollah, for 

your entire life, has been responsible, along with Hamas and other 

terrorist groups, Palestinian, Islamic Jihad, that country has consistently funded the murder of Israelis and Americans for your entire life, from the time you were 1 year old, and they are doing it 

today. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Well, sir, when I was 4 years old, one of my 

best friends, actually his older brother was killed in a war by 

Hezbollah. Yes, it is true. But——

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So staying on that for a moment, because often, 

you know, it is—you know, the Judiciary Committee, another committee I sit on, you know, we consider antitrust. But of course antitrust is based on what the relevant market is. If you define a market broadly enough, nobody has market power. If you define it narrowly enough, everybody has market power. 

So I would like to define a question for all three of the panelists 

right now. For 36 years, Tehran has sponsored terrorists from 

around the world and killed Americans and countless others. For 

36 years, they have had a virtual straight path, and for 36 years 

we have heard about students and Iranians loving America. 

What will change in the next 13 years, the time it takes from 

where we are today to the time in which perfectly legally Tehran 

will have the ability to have nuclear weapons? All they have to 

do—and I just want to preface it—all they have to do is say they 

want a nuclear navy, and they will have the ability to do everything it takes to have a bomb ready in a matter of minutes. 

And I will go right down the aisle from left to right, please. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Sir, I think in 13——

Mr. ISSA. Or right to left, depending upon which way you are facing. 

Mr. JOSEPH. In 13 years, Iran will have the capability to have 

a nuclear weapon whenever it decides to do so that. In 13 years, 

I think in part because of this agreement, Iran will be more capable, it will be more aggressive in the region, and it will be more 

84

able to continue to repress its people. And the ultimate solution to 

this nuclear issue resides with the Iranian people. And here I——

Mr. ISSA. Okay. My question is somewhat short, so I will—let us 

keep going down. In 13 years, is there any—do you have any reason to believe they will be different than they were in the last 36? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Not at all. In 5 years, they are going to have access to combat aircraft, attack helicopters, heavy weaponry, in 

order to create more chaos and kill more Americans. In 13 years, 

I prefer in dealing with the Middle East to assume the worst and 

be surprised on the up side than assume the best and be devastated on the down side. So that is why I assume the worst about 

the Iranian regime. 

Mr. ISSA. And, Mr. Goldenberg, I used you for obvious reasons 

of your support for this initiative. But if in your entire life, since 

you were 1 years old in Israel, a regime has been able to sustain 

itself with and without sanctions, through this entire period, and 

continue to murder Americans, Israelis, and others, what is going 

to change as a result of this deal, while theoretically we maintain 

all of the sanctions that were in place for two-thirds of your life? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Sure. Thanks, Congressman. I will just say we 

don’t know what is going to happen inside of Iran in the next 15 

years. I think it is perfectly conceivable that hard liners double 

down and win this fight internally. It is also conceivable that pragmatists, and I say pragmatists because they are not liberals, they 

are not—you know, Rouhanis are not pushing for democracy. They 

do value economic engagement and international legitimacy more. 

And they did win this huge debate inside of Iran, which is very unusual and hasn’t happened in a long time. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So, to summarize——

Mr. GOLDENBERG. But it is possible. 

Mr. ISSA [continuing]. Two of you believe they will continue to do 

exactly what they are doing. Mr. Goldenberg, you believe they 

might continue doing what they are doing, trying to get rid of the 

big state, the little state, killing Americans, killing Israelis, sponsoring terrorism, destabilizing the region, but they might not. 

So you are counting on hope based on the partial elimination. 

There is a document, a classified document, it is about three times 

the thickness of this, that has a list—I can’t name the names, but 

it has a list of banks and ships and aircraft, all of which are going 

to be freed up immediately as a result of this agreement, so that 

their economic machine, the machine that causes their government 

to deliver goods and services to their people, and make their people 

more docile as a result, that is all the benefit to he regime. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I have taken a little extra time. I appreciate 

your understanding. I find the question that all three answered to 

be the question we should be asking is, what difference does it 

make, what change will happen as a result of this? If we concentrate on the question of nuclear, which I think is a good one, 

we miss the bigger question. A terrorist state for 36 years, given 

more money and less things that would cause the toppling of it, 

will undoubtedly continue doing for the future what they have done 

for 36 years in the past. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your continued ability to bring us 

facts, and it is enlightening. And I thank you and yield back. 

85

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Issa. 

Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The Ambassador talks about missile defense. A 

nuclear weapon can be smuggled inside a bail of marijuana. It is 

less prestigious, but it gives you plausible deniability, which might 

meet Iran’s MO even better. 

Secretary Kerry is over in the Senate saying you can’t bomb 

away knowledge. There are two types of military action we could 

take. The one that is dismissed by the Secretary is just hitting the 

nuclear sites, sets them back 2 or 3 years. According to him, the 

other approach is to threaten World War II rules of engagement 

style bombing of all strategic economic targets in Iran until they 

invite Mr. Dubowitz to go over there and clean out their nuclear 

facility. 

I thought I would get a smile out of that one. 

Okay. This deal has the good, the bad, and the ugly. We get rid 

of—the good is we get the stockpiles, decommission the centrifuges. 

The bad is they get their $100 billion. That is money for their people, money for graft and corruption, money to kill a lot of Sunni 

Muslims, money to kill Americans and Israelis. 

The ugly is 11, 12 years from now, and you gentlemen have all 

explained why that is true. Just to describe how ugly it is, it is too 

ugly for President Obama. He refuses to live in the White House 

except for with an Iran that has a 1-year breakout period and 

6,000 relatively primitive centrifuges. 

Yet he envisions a world in which his successors are living in 

that same house with Iran having 100,000 IR–8 advanced centrifuges and a breakout time that he describes at basically zero. 

Why does he do to his successor, whoever she may be, what he is 

unwilling to live with himself? 

So we have got to prevent this deal from being binding on future 

administrations. This is an executive agreement. It is not an executive legislative agreement, and God knows it is not a treaty. We all 

want to sit here and evaluate the deal. What would we do if we 

were President now or a month ago or a year ago? 

The real question before us is not, is it a good deal? The real 

question before us is, what should Congress do? And those who dislike the agreement the most, or at least with the most unbridled 

passion say, ‘‘Here is what we do. You should have a vote in Congress to override a Presidential veto of a resolution of disapproval.’’ 

Okay. What does that do? 

First, it fails. So the last picture the world sees is the proponents 

of the deal celebrating their congressional victory. And then we 

have to explain to the world that is not an executive legislative 

agreement. That was not a ratification, even though the picture 

you saw was the proponents celebrating, because the opponents 

couldn’t stop themselves, couldn’t prevent themselves from bringing 

the vote up in that manner, couldn’t just have us vote on a resolution of approval and vote it down. 

They had to bring up a veto override. Couldn’t contain themselves. The picture is much louder than the words. The picture is 

the proponents celebrating congressional support for the deal. 

Now, let us say we override the President’s veto, the dream of 

many. Okay. Does that snapback our sanctions? First, it doesn’t do 

86

anything at the U.N. The President will vote against Congress’ position at the U.N. Doesn’t do anything with the State Department. 

They are going to be all over telling foreign capitals, ‘‘Go do profitable business with Iran to the extent that Iran adheres to the deal. 

It is a great deal. Don’t listen to Congress.’’

But the question is, will they even follow the statute as to U.S. 

sanctions? That is the question I asked at the classified briefing. 

Secretary Jack Lew was very clear that he absolutely refused to 

answer the question. Okay. It took him 2 minutes to say that, but 

he absolutely did 2 minutes of not answering. 

So they are not going to follow the law. So even if we override, 

Iran still gets all of the sanctions relief because when we say ‘‘sanctions on Iran’’ we don’t mean sanctions on Iran. We mean sanctions 

on banks and oil companies in Europe and Japan who choose to do 

business with Iran, and in this case they will be doing business 

with Iran that President Obama tells them to do. 

It is nice to say Congress is going to—we are going to take our 

guns with us and go up to the Fed New York Branch and stop the 

transactions of the banks that are doing the things we don’t want 

to do. No. You can’t have sanctions. You can’t block a bank from 

doing business in the United States, unless the executive branch 

is. And the proof of this was George W. Bush who for 8 years violated the Iran Sanctions Act for the benefit of international oil companies every single day. 

And then we get—let us say, though, for—we did do that. Then 

the question is, would other countries kowtow to the United States 

Congress? It is one thing for Britain to say, or for Germany to say, 

or for North or South Korea to say, ‘‘We are going to buy less oil 

from Iran because the Americans have persuaded that that is a 

good idea, and oh, by the way, they said, well, banks will have 

trouble if we don’t adhere.’’

It is another thing for them to go to say, ‘‘We are stopping our 

banks from doing business with Iran, and we are not going to buy 

oil from Iran, because we are kowtowing to sanctions—to a policy 

that Congress likes, but we think it is stupid. The President of the 

United States thinks it is stupid. The whole world voted against 

it.’’ It would be politically difficult. 

But then let us say that did happen, and we actually went back 

to Kirk Menendez, sanctions, and declines in oil purchases, and we 

forced every bank to hold on to Iran’s money. Then, we have 4 

months for them to develop a nuclear weapon at a time when we 

are enforcing the sanctions that have certainly not crippled them. 

I realize we have lower oil prices, which has had an effect on 

them. But there are no riots in the streets of Tehran today. 

So you gentlemen have done a great job of telling us why this 

deal has problems. And I have 0.0 seconds to be fair to you and 

let you tell me why the course of action available to Congress—I 

think the President may not have boxed in Iran and blocked every 

avenue they have to a nuclear weapon, but he has has boxed in 

Congress and maybe cut off every avenue we have to an alternative 

foreign policy. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Congressman Sherman, I actually laid out three 

scenarios that respond to your question. 

Chairman ROYCE. They may be able to do that in writing. 

87

Mr. SHERMAN. In writing, and I know we will be talking by 

phone, et cetera. And I thought that this would still leave a minute 

for you, but obviously——

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Financial institutions are not going back into 

Iran until they know who the next President is, and the vote of disapproval will absolutely deter them from going back in, because 

they will be afraid that if the next President of the United States 

comes in on a vote of disapproval with the political wind in her 

back, or his back, that they might find themselves on the wrong 

end of an enforcement action. 

So it is exactly the message to the international community that 

says don’t go back into Iran right now, which will be the most powerful deterrent to basically enforce the sanctions over the next 18 

months. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, appreciate your being here. Ambassador Joseph, I 

listened to your five flaws; I agree. Your four recommendations; I 

agree. Libyan example; I agree. 

Mr. Dubowitz, your three rejections of the deal and your three 

flaws I thought were all pretty accurate. 

Mr. Goldenberg, I agree with you on this agreement is not perfect. I agree. And I look back at the North Korean NPT with a 

peaceful program, and I look back when Japan and South Korea 

were at the table, and they wanted a deal because their vested interests are right there in the area. 

I find it interesting that partners in the Middle East weren’t at 

the table. Israel wasn’t at the table. The Saudis weren’t at the 

table. And they don’t want the deal, but yet we are going ahead 

with the deal. 

You said we should give the IAEA more money to hire more inspectors, but we can’t get inspectors to look at the stuff they need 

to now. And I think it has been brought out, the Parchin military 

area where we know they more than likely detonated a nuclear 

trigger device, and then I look at—you know, and I think Mr. Issa 

brought it out very well, along with Mr. Brooks. Has Iran lied, 

cheated, deceived the U.S./U.N., broken security, or U.N. resolutions, other nations, have they lied and cheated to the IAEA? And 

I think we are all in agreement with that. 

With the economic sanctions in place, in fact they are so tough 

that Iran was starving. You know, people were having all these 

hard times. But while they were doing that, they were funding 

Hezbollah, they were funding Hamas, they have an access through 

Venezuela, through South America. They funded terrorism around 

the world. 

Again, as Mr. Issa said, you think of the Khobar Towers, 90 percent of the IEDs that killed or wounded 70 percent of our soldiers 

in Iraq and Afghanistan were funded by Iran during economic 

sanctions. Their spread of terrorism around the world has grown 

in strength with sanctions. And then when we release sanctions 

somewhat, they are only supposed to get a few billion, but it turned 

out to be around $14 billion or more, they go and help Assad. 

And you look at their history, and their history pretty much predicts the future of a country like that. When I look at them sponVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:42 Sep 03, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\072315\95636 SHIRL
88

soring the assassination attempt of the Saudi Ambassador on our 

homeland, would it be safe to say, especially when their leaders 

have been for years, since you were a baby 1 year of age, until the 

signing of this agreement, or the agreement, saying ‘‘Death to 

America,’’ ‘‘Death to Israel,’’ would you consider them maybe an 

enemy of our state? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Congressman, the Soviet Union was also an 

enemy of our state. Iran is an enemy of our state, but we did negotiate——

Mr. YOHO. I am sorry. They are an enemy of our state. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. And the Soviet Union was also. 

Mr. YOHO. That is what I wanted to hear. Will this negotiation, 

Ambassador Joseph, is it going to strengthen Iran? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Most definitely it will strengthen the regime. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Goldenberg? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. In some areas, and constrain it in others. 

Mr. YOHO. With the release of the money, it will strengthen it. 

So we are strengthening somebody that has shouted death ‘‘Death 

to America,’’ as you stated an enemy of the state, and you are a 

senior fellow/director, Middle East Security Program, Center of 

New American Security, right? Center for New American Security. 

President Obama said that this deal will make the Middle East, 

the U.S., and the world safer. Is that correct? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. If that is true, why are everybody telling us that we 

need to bolster our eastern missile defense system, our western 

missile defense system, our Alaskan and everywhere else? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I wouldn’t necessarily agree with that. I do 

think we need to take a lot of other steps in the region. 

Mr. YOHO. I think we are being naive here to a level of non-comparable analysis, from a guy that has only been here for 21⁄2 years. 

I don’t see this as a good deal. I have only been here 21⁄2 years. 

I don’t see this as a good deal, and I think we should walk away 

from the table. 

Senator Lieberman was here last week. We should run away 

from the table and put the sanctions back on now, because as Mr. 

Dubowitz says, snapback is a fallacy; it will never work. Once this 

goes down—and I hope all of Congress rejects this deal. When you 

have the Saudi and nobody else, and Israel saying, ‘‘Please don’t 

do this deal,’’ I think we should listen. And if we are this lone superpower at the negotiating table, and I see that what we didn’t 

get and what we gave up, I think it is time for us to walk away. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. The gentleman from Fairfax County, Virginia, 

Gerry Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Wow. I have got to 

say, I guess I don’t have the luxury of having made up my mind 

yet. Listening to my friend from California, Mr. Brad Sherman, apparently it is all simple and clear-cut. It is real simple. 

We can make up our minds before the ink is dry on the treaty, 

and we even see all the details, or go to a briefing. If we want to 

delineate this as just another political contest up here, then we 

89

have to be willing to say U.S. national security interest be damned, 

Middle East security interest be damned, because policy trumps everything. 

Now, that is not everybody up here, but it is too many up here. 

And I would like to see hearings that actually are used to actually 

explore and illuminate, learn more, question, probe. So I hope these 

hearings will—that will be the purpose they serve, not to simply 

reinforce already arrived at a priori convictions, because of some 

other commitment we have made to some intellectual pursuit that 

I don’t share. 

I have heard it is not perfect. 

Chairman ROYCE. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. On your time. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will have Secretary Kerry here——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I know. 

Chairman ROYCE [continuing]. Next week, along with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of the Treasury on this, just 

to——

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I exempt—if I can have my time—but I exempt the chairman from what I just said, because actually at your 

opening query you brought up something that bothers me, too, 

which is the non-identified inspection areas and that 24-day period. 

I think that is a problem, and I think it has to be addressed. 

But that has nothing to do with the preconceived notion of 

whether this is good or bad or hurt Israel or hurt U.S. or the 

Saudis like it. The notion that people say, ‘‘Death to America’’ in 

Iran, apparently we should never talk to them, we should never 

have an agreement that, unrelated to that, actually takes the nuclear equation or is proposed to take the nuclear equation off the 

table. 

What is U.S. interest? That is what we ought to be talking about, 

and we ought to be hard-nosed about it. And we are all going to 

come to different conclusions, but I really hope we recalibrate and 

try to diffuse the politics here. I know that is an impossible request. 

But you were trying to point out and got interrupted, Mr. Goldenberg, but, I mean, in the height of the Cold War, the Soviet 

Union, the last time I checked—I am old enough to remember—

was dedicated to the proposition of destroying us and capitalism. 

Does my memory fail me? I know you were young, but——

Mr. GOLDENBERG. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. Did we have any kind of negotiations with 

the Soviet Union? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Sir, all the time, on all——

Mr. CONNOLLY. All the time. Did we, including Ronald Reagan, 

put the nuclear question front and center, irrespective of, not in ignorance of, not to the exclusion of, human rights? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Jewish immigration. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Soviet misbehavior in other parts of the world. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Including arming elements that were fighting us. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. 

90

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ah. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Yes. But three treaties that were signed——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Dubowitz, I have not asked you a question. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Okay. I will wait for your——

Mr. CONNOLLY. This is my time, and I want to give Mr. Goldenberg an opportunity, uninterrupted, to answer my question. 

The proposition, Mr. Goldenberg, is made we should just walk 

away. It is simple. There are no consequences. In fact, I dare say 

the consequences are highly likely to be positive. Is there at all a 

conceivable idea that they might be negative? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I think that is the most likely scenario. We are 

going to—Iran will resume its nuclear weapons——

Mr. CONNOLLY. If you were putting a probability, just humor me 

here, but what is the probability you would put on the Russians 

and the Chinese coming back to the table if we did that? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Three percent. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now, I heard a conversation with Mrs. Frankel 

about U.S. credibility, and I heard Mr. Joseph and Mr. Dubowitz, 

Ambassador Joseph say, ‘‘Well, credibility wouldn’t be that damaged.’’ I want to explore with you for a minute the idea that the 

United States of America, the world’s sole surviving superpower, 

that negotiated and led the negotiations, and led the sanctions, and 

brought around for the first time in 35 years to the table to talk 

to us, and wrenched out concessions, would actually renounce its 

own treaty, the consequences would be relatively mild. 

Our credibility wouldn’t be hurt. What do you think the consequences would be next time we said we want to lead a negotiation on Subject X with anybody? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I think probably it would be very difficult for 

us to be——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Very difficult. So actually the damage to our 

credibility could be quite consequential, not minimal. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I agree with that, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And, furthermore, final thing, we have heard scenarios the Iranians will have to deal with it, and, you know, they 

have got other problems if we walk away and renounce this deal. 

What kind of probability might we put, though, on the opposite, 

that what this leads to, if we say no, is the hard liners are 

strengthened in Iran, the very group we don’t want to strengthen, 

and they accelerate the nuclear program because now they have 

nothing left to lose. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Congressman, I think if we walk away, 

Rouhani and the entire pragmatic faction of Iran is probably done 

politically, period, end stop. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And what is likely to happen to the nuclear program under that scenario, do you think? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Accelerate. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. It accelerates. And I only submit that we had to 

explore that, too. We had to explore, as Mr. Dubowitz and Ambassador Joseph and Senator Lieberman pointed out last week, there 

are consequences for going forward with this agreement. We have 

to weigh them very carefully. 

But we cannot minimize or ignore the consequences of no. We 

cannot pretend that the alternative isn’t fraught with danger as 

91

well. And we have got to weigh carefully that balance. Which risks 

are we, as Members of Congress, willing to take on behalf of our 

country? And for me that is the central question. I haven’t made 

up my mind yet, but I hope that is what we pursue in subsequent 

hearings. 

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Colonel Scott Perry from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My good friend from Virginia, I don’t know what you had for 

breakfast this morning, but I would like to on occasion have some 

of whatever makes you delusional about American credibility and 

what might have been damaged in the last 2 years over this discussion and this——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman? As a matter of personal privilege——

Chairman ROYCE. You are out of time. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. It is inappropriate for a Member of 

Congress to characterize another member at a hearing or on the 

floor of the House as delusional. I ask my friend to withdraw and 

retract the remark. It is inappropriate as a member of a Congress. 

Mr. PERRY. I will indeed withdraw my remark. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend. 

Chairman ROYCE. And let us get on to the question of questioning the witnesses here, shall we? 

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, absolutely, although I would say the 

question of credibility—I must return to that essentially. We don’t 

have any credibility left on the planet in foreign relations as far as 

I am concerned, basically due completely to this administration and 

the things they have done now and throughout their time in office. 

That having been said, Ambassador, do we consider Iran a rational actor as a state? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Sir, I think they are rational. I think they are a 

rogue state, but they are rational. 

Mr. PERRY. They are rational. Indeed, is North Korea rational or 

irrational or non-rational? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Sometimes I look at North Korea’s behavior and I 

think they are more rational than we are with regard to our North 

Korea policy. 

Mr. PERRY. How about with regard to Iran? 

Mr. JOSEPH. As I said, I think Iran is—the Iranian leaders are 

rational, but rationality may be something that differs between 

Tehran and Washington. 

Mr. PERRY. Willing to give up the lives of many of their countrymen—Iran, that is—and North Korea for that matter, but in this 

case Iran, for quest of their mission so to speak? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Absolutely. They have demonstrated that over and 

over for decades now. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. Decades. Decades. Millions—not millions, hundreds of thousands, maybe millions dead at the cost of this quest. 

And it says in the agreement that this agreement, if you—I am 

sure you have read it. I have now twice. Built on mutual respect 

in the near—in the beginning of the thing. Built on mutual respect. 

And respect is earned over a period of time based on your actions, 

92

correct? I mean, that is my—would be one of my definitions or 

character——

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, real respect is. I think this is more of diplomatic nicety. When you have, you know, thousands of Iranians 

chanting ‘‘Death to America’’ in the streets within hours after the 

signing of the agreement, I wonder about the respect of——

Mr. PERRY. I mean, I guess what I am getting to is the agreement isn’t necessarily based—not necessarily, it is not at all based 

in factual actions that can be documented. It is based on the hope 

that things will change. 

Mr. JOSEPH. I think it is——

Mr. PERRY. From our——

Mr. JOSEPH [continuing]. Triumph of hope over experience. Absolutely. 

Mr. PERRY. So, as I read it, sanctions relief happens early next 

year under this agreement, things all happening essentially at the 

same time. Sanctions relief happens almost immediately. That is 

our part of the deal, right? We relieve you of the sanctions that are 

imposed upon you, and they agree to minimize their enrichment, 

move and store some of the enrichment capability, and then work 

on redesigning facilities, not dismantle facilities. 

And they are not redesigned at that time. There is a road map, 

as it says in the agreement, for redesign. Is that—and get rid of 

some of their stockpile that we know of, not including stockpiles 

and materials provided by the Russians. Is that pretty much it? 

Mr. JOSEPH. That is pretty much it. 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. So they get essentially—essentially, we give everything away, like everything we have, that is the sanctions. That 

is what we have, right? We have sanctions. 

Mr. JOSEPH. It is even worse than that. It is more than sanctions. It is the release of their assets, which——

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. JOSEPH [continuing]. You know, is the signing bonus. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. The 150 billion, right, or thereabouts. Not 13 

billion or 14 billion or million, 150 billion, in an economy 300 billion or 400 billion. So it is almost half of their economy they get 

one fell swoop. 

Mr. JOSEPH. I think the 12 billion to 20 billion was what they 

got when they signed the first agreement——

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. JOSEPH [continuing]. In November 2013. 

Mr. PERRY. So you just look at the scale of the deal, like if you 

were buying a car, would this be a good deal. And it seems like you 

are not getting much car for a lot of money, right? I mean, in 

that——

Mr. JOSEPH. This is a bad deal. 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. Let me ask you, why is Iran a member of the 

Commission? If we feel so badly about them and they are bad, they 

are a rogue actor, not—why are they even a part—if a convict is 

sentenced, do we allow the convict to then sit on the jury? Is that 

what has happened here? 

Mr. JOSEPH. Sir, I think this is just another example of breaking 

every rule of good negotiations. 

Mr. PERRY. Has it happened ever before? 

93

Mr. JOSEPH. Well, there have been joint commissions that were 

set up in the arms control world with the Soviet Union, but I think 

here you have clearly a rogue state. 

Mr. PERRY. The 24 days where we dispute something, that is 

only the beginning, right? Isn’t there another 35 days minimum——

Mr. JOSEPH. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. To fight that out? Minimum. 

Mr. JOSEPH. Minimum. 

Mr. PERRY. Minimum 35 days. This might go on interminably 

while we have no idea what they are doing. And it is all predicated 

on IAEA inspections. 

Last question, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for your indulgence. Are 

there going to be Americans inspecting? 

Mr. JOSEPH. No. 

Mr. PERRY. Great. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Judge Ted Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. Are any of you aware of so-called 

secret side deals that we are just now learning about? We will just 

go down the row. Mr. Joseph? 

Mr. JOSEPH. I am aware of what I have read in the newspaper 

about the secret arrangements with the IAEA in Iran on the question of Parchin and the potential military dimensions, the 12 activities that Iran has engaged in, all related to weaponization. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Have you seen this so-called secret deal? 

Mr. JOSEPH. No, I have not. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. I am aware of letters that Secretary Kerry has 

provided to the Europeans and the Chinese assuring them that we 

will not snapback sanctions against their companies, and, therefore, enabling them to invest tens of billions of dollars back into the 

economy, deals which will be grandfathered in in a snapback scenario. 

Mr. POE. So you know about the secret deals. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. It hasn’t—my understanding is it is not classified, but certainly it is not being publicly discussed in the way it 

should be. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Congressman, I would say it is probably wise 

to—you know, just from conversations with the administration and 

friends in there, my understanding is you should really ask them. 

My understanding is that these are usually agreements that traditionally are signed with IAEA and a lot of different cases that are 

kept between the IAEA bilaterally, but that the administration 

should absolutely be here briefing you, and I hope they do, on all 

of the details of that agreement. 

But they don’t even necessarily have the paper, and it has a lot 

to do with the fact that, you know, there are certain elements that 

you don’t want to get out publicly, period, about nuclear 

weaponization and whatnot. But honestly, Congressman, I would 

really suggest talking to the administration about it. 

Mr. POE. Susan Rice says that there are some deals that she will 

let us—she says she will let us know about. 

94

Moving on to something else, crude oil sanction lifting. Now, I 

am from Texas, and I am confused in the sense that we are going 

to lift the sanctions on Iran exporting their crude oil, but the U.S. 

Government is still not going to lift the sanctions on the United 

States exporting our crude oil, or the prohibition against exporting 

crude oil. 

It seems like, you know, in Texas we want the same deal the Iranians are getting, and we will even promise not to develop nuclear 

weapons. But the Iranians exporting crude oil, will we be buying 

that crude oil? I am just opening that up. So is the United States 

going to end up buying Iranian crude oil that is lifted from the 

sanctions? Any of you. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, I mean, oil is a global market. Iranian medium and heavy sour crude will be sold by oil traders around the 

world. It is entirely possible that U.S. refineries end up buying Iranian crude, unless there is some way and there is some forensic 

process to figure out whether that molecule of oil that is actually 

coming into the United States came from Iran or came from some 

other country that sells an equivalent heavy or medium sour blend. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Although, Congressman——

Mr. POE. Just a second. I only have a few minutes. 

I understand that. It is a world market. Crude oil is a world market. They put more crude oil on the market, and then whoever buys 

it buys it. It seems ironic to me. 

The other question I have, is their cash. There has been a discussion about how much money they are going to actually get, from 

50 billion to 150 billion. Hey, billions is billions to me. However 

much money they get, what is to prohibit them from using the cash 

they have to continue to be the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism? What is to keep them from sending money to their terrorist 

groups throughout the world to cause havoc? Is there any prohibition in this agreement that prohibits that from occurring? 

Mr. JOSEPH. There is no prohibition at all on that. And in fact, 

if you look at what the Supreme Leader said following this negotiation, they are going to continue to support their allies, like Assad, 

and their friends, like Hezbollah and Hamas. They are going to 

continue to do this, and they are going to continue to foment instability throughout the region. They say they are going to do that 

with——

Mr. POE. Okay. Last question. No, excuse me. I have to ask the 

questions. Is not the best hope and policy of the United States—

should it not be that there should be a regime change in Iran, a 

peaceful regime change, free elections, and that would be the best, 

safest hope for the world and Iran is if they had a regime change? 

Yes or no. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. This deal makes no sense unless that happens, 

because you would never want to give the same hard men of Iran 

and the Revolutionary Guards an industrial sized nuclear program 

with near zero breakout and an I.C.B.M. So President Obama is 

betting the future of American national security on exactly that 

scenario, a peaceful transformation. 

And if he gets it wrong, then the same hard men who rule Iran 

will have an industrial sized program, near zero breakout, an 

I.C.B.M. And not 100 billion, but hundreds and hundreds and hunVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:42 Sep 03, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\072315\95636 SHIRL
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dreds of billions of dollars that Iranians will get over the lifetime 

of this agreement. 

Mr. JOSEPH. This deal makes it more difficult for a regime 

change. This deal strengthens the current regime, gives it more 

tools to repress its people. And because it has a nuclear option, it 

will feel less threatened by outside intervention and more able to 

continue to repress its own people. 

Mr. POE. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to the gentleman from 

Jackson County, North Carolina, Mark Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank each of you for your time today. I guess I am the last one 

up before closing remarks. And so I have watched all of you. Mr. 

Goldenberg, would you say that, based on your non-verbal and your 

verbal cues, that you are the smartest one at that table? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. No. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So if I have questions about the deal, then 

who at that table should I ask, other than you? If you are not the 

smartest one, who should I ask? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I think you should ask all three of us. I think 

three different people can have different perspectives on a very difficult problem. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Well, let me—because I have some sincere 

questions, and it sounds like you have talked to the administration 

on this deal. Is that correct? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I do talk to them occasionally. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Occasionally. All right. So let me ask you, as it 

relates to ballistic missiles and arms sales, that is a 5- and 8-year, 

or vice versa, 8- and 5-year, respectively, kind of caveat. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Well, so explain to me how the second part 

of that paragraph says ‘‘or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming a broader conclusion, whichever is earlier.’’

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I think——

Mr. MEADOWS. So could we have ballistic and arms sales a year 

from now? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. If Iran goes above and—far above and beyond 

what we expect and is committed to the deal in this agreement, 

maybe the IAEA comes to that conclusion. I am highly skeptical. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So your testimony—let me—because 

this is headline-making right here. Your testimony is ballistic arms 

sales and ballistic missile sales and arms sales could happen a year 

from now if Iran goes above and beyond, and the IAEA, not Congress, not the U.N., but the IAEA confirms that. Is that your testimony? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I think it is not physically possible for Iran to 

do everything it would need to do to——

Mr. MEADOWS. But your testimony was—so you are changing 

your testimony. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I guess I phrased it differently, but I would 

say that the likelihood of that is infinitesimal. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So what about 2 years? 

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Mr. GOLDENBERG. Still incredibly low. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Three years? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I think—honestly, I think that I don’t speak 

for the administration, and you should ask them about this. 

Mr. MEADOWS. No. You have been talking to them. You have 

been speaking for a lot of people this morning. I have been listening to you. So here is my question. Do the 8-year and 5-year notes 

and timeframes really mean anything with that last little sentence? Because it could happen earlier. Isn’t that correct? You are 

the smartest guy in the room now. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I think——

Mr. MEADOWS. Could it happen earlier? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I am happy——

Mr. MEADOWS. I am not asking for probabilities. Yes or no. Could 

it happen earlier? Yes or no. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Could. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Yes. So let me ask you another question, 

because I am confused. I have heard Secretary Kerry sitting almost 

exactly in your same place saying climate change is the number 

one national security threat that we face. That is what I have 

heard. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Congressman, I am not an expert on climate 

change. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So let me ask you a different question. 

Why do you think the sale of coal to Iran from the United States 

on a President who has talked about climate change and has a war 

on coal, why do you think they would put the sale of coal in this 

particular deal and selling to Iran? Does that not seem odd to you? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I am not familiar with that provision or precisely how you——

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, I thought you read the deal. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I absolutely read the deal. 

Mr. MEADOWS. And so you didn’t see that in there. I have. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Okay. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Do you trust me on that? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Sure. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. All right. So let me ask you one last question. Your testimony here today is that the Middle East and Israel 

will be safer under this deal. Is that correct? Let me—because 

there was a question here by Mr. Yoho and you said they will be 

safer. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I believe so. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So let me ask you this question. Reconcile 

this for me. If it is safer, why did this administration immediately 

send someone to Israel to give them and augment their military capability when we haven’t done that before? We immediately set out 

to help them. So if it was going to be safer, why are we giving them 

more money for military is Israel? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Because we are partners. And they obviously 

have anxieties about the agreement. I don’t think people can disagree about what the agreement actually says, or people can disagree about whether it is a good agreement or not. Obviously, we 

have disagreements with some of the political leadership in Israel. 

There is also a lot of this——

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Mr. MEADOWS. So we are going to give——

Mr. GOLDENBERG [continuing]. Security establishment in Israel 

that if you talk to them has a much more nuanced perspective, and 

some of them are anxious, some of them are supportive, some of 

them are opposed, and so I think that it is—one thing we can do 

is, when you do something that a friend of yours clearly is not 

happy about it, you go try to find other ways to reassure them and 

let them know we are still there are for you for——

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, I thought you might say that, but the only 

problem is Ashton Carter said that that is not the reason he is 

doing it. There is quote out there that says, no, he is not trying to 

appease them. So it is either one or the other. 

And with that, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the members. We thank the witnesses. 

We appreciate their appearance here this morning. These are critical issues that have been raised, and we are going to have an opportunity next week to further explore those issues with our Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and Secretary of Energy. 

So, for now, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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