Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

SCOTT A. WEATHERS MICHAEL E. BROWN

The Weathers Law Office, P.C. Kightlinger & Gray, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

CRYSTAL G. ROWE

Kightlinger & Gray, LLP

New Albany, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ROBERT WALKE and KAREN WALKE, )

)

Appellants-Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1304-CT-291

)

KITLEY LAW OFFICE, P.C., )

)

Appellee-Defendant. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable David J. Dreyer, Judge

Cause No. 49D10-1201-CT-3779

October 7, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CRONE, Judge
2

Case Summary

Robert and Karen Walke live on the west side of Wishmeyer Lane across from David 

and Sandra Comstock. The Comstocks brought a lawsuit against the Walkes seeking to 

permanently enjoin them from using Wishmeyer Lane, and the Walkes hired Kitley Law 

Office, P.C., to represent them. The Comstocks prevailed in their lawsuit, and the Walkes 

were permanently enjoined from using Wishmeyer Lane. 

The Walkes hired new counsel and sued Kitley for legal malpractice. Kitley filed a 

motion for summary judgment, arguing that any malpractice did not cause the Walkes to lose 

the lawsuit because there were no legal theories upon which they could have prevailed. The 

trial court granted Kitley’s summary judgment motion.

The Walkes appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Kitley. 

They argue that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they would have 

prevailed in the underlying lawsuit had Kitley effectively represented them on theories of 

prescriptive easement and public road. We conclude that the Walkes waived their claim for 

failure to present a cogent argument. Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that the Walkes 

failed to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they would have 

prevailed in the underlying lawsuit based on theories of prescriptive easement and public 

road. Therefore, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

The facts most favorable to the Walkes, the nonmoving parties, are that in 2009, the 

Walkes hired Kitley to defend them in the underlying lawsuit filed by their neighbors, the 
3

Comstocks, in which the Comstocks sought a permanent injunction preventing the Walkes 

from using Wishmeyer Lane as a means of ingress and egress. The background facts in the 

underlying case are that the Walkes and the Comstocks lived in Marion County on the north 

side of Brookville Road/Highway 52, with Wishmeyer Lane lying between their houses. The 

Comstocks lived on the east side of Wishmeyer Lane, and the Walkes lived on the westside. 

Although the Walkes’ property fronted Brookville Road, there was no vehicular access to it

in 2009, and the Walkes used Wishmeyer Lane to access their driveway.

The Comstocks purchased their home in 1987 or 1988, but that purchase did not 

include Wishmeyer Lane. Nevertheless, the Comstocks maintained the road, removing snow 

and cutting the grass around it. In 1991, the Comstocks purchased Wishmeyer Lane by deed. 

They had a survey performed and recorded to establish the boundaries of their property 

pursuant to Indiana Code Section 36-2-12-10 (legal surveys). Since that time, the Comstocks 

have maintained and paid taxes on Wishmeyer Lane. John and Mary Nelson owned the 

property on the west side of Wishmeyer Lane. They used Wishmeyer Lane with the 

Comstocks’ permission.

In April 1998 or March 2003, the Walkes purchased the Nelsons’ property.

1

 The 

Walkes did not claim ownership of Wishmeyer Lane. The Walkes used Wishmeyer Lane 

with the Comstocks’ permission. At some point, the Walkes asked the Comstocks for 

permission to use the property lying between the Walkes’ home and Wishmeyer Lane. The 

 

1

 The Walkes’ answer and counterclaim stated that they purchased their property in March 2003. 

However, Karen Walke testified that they purchased it April 1998.
4

Comstocks granted them permission and did not erect a fence around their property. Both the 

Comstocks and the Walkes mowed the grass in this area.

 Two other residents used Wishmeyer Lane to access their property. These residents 

had dedicated easements to use the road. The Comstocks never gave the Nelsons or the 

Walkes a recorded easement.

In 2006, the Walkes erected a chain-link fence on the east side of their property. The 

Walkes petitioned the Indiana Department of Transportation (“INDOT”) for permission to 

construct a driveway from their home to Brookville Road. In August 2008, INDOT denied 

their request because their property already had access to Brookville Road.

In August 2009, the Comstocks filed a lawsuit against the Walkes, seeking a 

permanent injunction preventing the Walkes from using Wishmeyer Lane. In July 2010, the 

trial court in that case concluded that the Comstocks were fee simple title owners of 

Wishmeyer Lane and that the Walkes had failed to present evidence to establish either a 

prescriptive easement or an easement of necessity. The trial court permanently enjoined the 

Walkes from using Wishmeyer Lane, effective thirty days after entry of the judgment.

The Walkes again petitioned INDOT to build a driveway from their house to 

Brookville Road. INDOT denied their request because the proposed driveway did not meet 

the required separation distance for Brookville Road. The Walkes dismissed Kitley and hired 

new counsel. The Walkes filed a motion to correct error in the underlying suit, arguing that 

their property was landlocked absent the ability to use Wishmeyer Lane, and therefore the 

judgment regarding the easement of necessity was in error. They also moved to stay 
5

enforcement of the injunction until INDOT granted them permission to build a driveway and 

construction of it was complete. On September 7, 2010, the trial court denied the Walkes’ 

motion to correct error but stayed enforcement of the injunction pending appeal or receipt of 

permission from INDOT to build a driveway and completion thereof. The Walkes chose not 

to appeal. Eventually, INDOT gave them permission to build a new driveway. On March 

27, 2011, they moved to lift the stay. 

On January 30, 2012, the Walkes filed the present legal malpractice lawsuit against 

Kitley, alleging that its representation of the Walkes in the Comstocks’ lawsuit against them 

fell below the applicable standard of care constituting a breach of duty that proximately 

caused them to incur damages. Kitley filed its answer and a motion for summary judgment. 

Kitley argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because the Walkes could not 

establish that any breach of duty caused their loss in the underlying case; that is, the Walkes

could not satisfy the requirements for a prescriptive easement or easement by necessity. 

Appellants’ App. at 18-32. 

On December 14, 2012, the Walkes filed their opposition to Kitley’s motion for 

summary judgment, arguing that there was a genuine issue as to whether competent 

representation would have resulted in judgment in favor of the Walkes based on prescriptive 

easement or public road theories. Id. at 113-17. The Walkes designated an affidavit from 

attorney Steven K. Huffer, which reads, 

5. I also performed my own investigation by visiting the subject property, 

taking photographs, and interviewing a witness, Katherine Wilkerson, age 93, 

who has resided just south of the subject premises since 1957 and is Mr. 

Walke’s maternal grandmother.
6

6. .... [Wishmeyer Lane] travels North between the properties for perhaps 

300 yards, across a railroad track, to which point [it is] paved. North of the 

railroad track the roadway loses its paved character and continues past a 

residence on the west side, then doglegs right past a parcel of land where 

firewood is apparently stored and trucks are parked, and past some old garages 

or dwellings which have now fallen into disrepair. The photographs I took on 

my visit to the subject property are attached hereto as Exhibit “C” collectively.

7. ... Ms. Wilkerson confirms that Wishmeyer Lane has been so marked

since 1957, and that auto traffic has freely used Wishmeyer Lane since that 

time to access the current Walke parcel and parcels to the North. ....

8. ... Wishmeyer Lane at one time accessed a railroad terminal, the building 

which had been used for [it] in the distant past having apparently burned down 

in 2003. It also has accessed a trash dump which formerly existed north of the 

railroad track.

....

12. It is my opinion that as of April 17, 1991, when Mr. Comstock acquired 

title to the fee of the land which lies under Wishmeyer Lane, the Walkes’ right 

to access their land across Wishmeyer Lane had already vested under either of 

two legal theories. Either Wishmeyer Lane had become a public road under 

the principles outlined in [Fenley Farms v. Clark, 404 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1980)], or there was an easement by prescription in favor of the Walke 

parcel as the dominant tenement and with the parcel underlying Wishmeyer 

Lane as the servient tenement. The use of the land by the Walkes and their 

predecessors in title, and the public in general, across Wishmeyer [L]ane for 

the purpose of ingress and egress to U.S. Hwy. 52 had been open and notorious 

and under claim of right for well in excess of 20 years by April 17, 1991, and a 

competent attorney representing the Walkes could have established at least a 

prima facie case of prescriptive easement under the standards set forth in 

[Shields v. Taylor, 976 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)].

13. Mr. Comstock took title to the land underlying Wishmeyer Lane subject to 

the facts and claims a visual inspection would have revealed, and a casual 

inspection would have revealed a road, marked with a county road sign, which 

serviced not only the Walke property but additional properties to the north. 

Mr. Comstock took subject to the rights of others, including the Walkes, to 

travel across Wishmeyer Lane.
7

14. A reasonably competent attorney handling [the underlying lawsuit] for the 

Walkes would have presented evidence at the trial court of [the underlying 

lawsuit] of the public’s and the Walkes’ and their predecessors’ use of 

Wishmeyer Lane dating back to the 1950s, would have presented as a witness 

Ms. Wilkerson or someone with a similar history of residence in the nearby 

vicinity, would have presented aerial photographs and phone directories from 

the 1950s and 1960s, which could have been authenticated as public records or 

as a fair and accurate depiction of the area at the time they were taken by 

anyone who lived in the area at the time (such as Ms. Wilkerson). Photographs 

similar to the photographs I took could have been authenticated and presented 

as evidence. A surveyor or real estate attorney could have been called as a 

witness to explain the title history of the surrounding area. It is my 

understanding that no such evidence was presented, and the trial court was 

compelled to find against the Walkes and declare that they had no right of 

access to Wishmeyer Lane. Had the evidence described above been presented 

at the trial, it is significantly more likely than not [that] the Walkes would have 

prevailed.

15. It is also my understanding that the “public road” theory was not pled by 

[Kitley] and I am of the opinion that such a legal theory would have been 

advanced by a reasonably competent attorney for the Walkes. I am aware of a 

1991 letter from the City of Indianapolis Department of Transportation which 

indicates that Wishmeyer Lane is not a public road, but this letter is hearsay 

and on its face is qualified and does not appear to consider all of the 

compelling evidence to the contrary.

Id. at 119-23. Huffer attached aerial photographs of Wishmeyer Lane taken in 1956 and 

1962, telephone directories for 1968 and 1970 showing use of Wishmeyer Lane addresses, 

and Google maps.

On January 2, 2013, Kitley filed a motion to strike certain portions of Huffer’s 

affidavit, which the trial court denied. On March 6, 2012, the trial court granted summary 

judgment to Kitley. The Walkes appeal. 
8

Discussion and Decision

“Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Quezare v. Byrider 

Fin., Inc., 941 N.E.2d 510, 513 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied; Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). 

When reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment 

our well-settled standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court: 

whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment should be 

granted only if the evidence sanctioned by Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) shows that 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party deserves 

judgment as a matter of law. All factual inferences must be construed in favor 

of the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue 

must be resolved against the moving party.

Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Ind. 2010) (citations omitted). “In reviewing a 

trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we may affirm on any grounds 

supported by the Indiana Trial Rule 56 materials.” Kozlowski v. Lake County Plan Comm’n,

927 N.E.2d 404, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

To prove a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish: 1) 

employment of the attorney (duty); 2) failure of the attorney to exercise 

ordinary skill and knowledge (breach); 3) proximate cause (causation); and 4) 

loss to the plaintiff (damages). It is appropriate for a trial court to grant an 

attorney summary judgment on a legal malpractice claim if the designated 

evidence negates at least one of these elements. In Indiana, an attorney’s duty 

is generally to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge.

Flatow v. Ingalls, 932 N.E.2d 726, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied (2011) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

The trial court granted Kitley’s summary judgment motion on the issue of proximate 

cause. “Proximate cause requires the plaintiff to show at a minimum that the outcome of the 
9

underlying litigation would have been more favorable but for the attorney’s negligence. Such 

proof typically requires a trial within a trial.” Id (citation omitted). Here, the Walkes were 

required to establish a genuine issue of material fact that but for Kitley’s errors in 

representation, they would have prevailed on theories of prescriptive easement and public 

road. The Walkes contend that Huffer’s affidavit established that there are genuine issues of 

material fact on the issue of causation under both theories. However, the Walkes merely 

provide statements of law and reproduce portions of Huffer’s affidavit and fail to provide any 

actual argument as to how the facts support their position in light of the applicable legal 

principles. Accordingly, they have waived their claim for review. See Wenzel v. Hopper & 

Galliher, P.C., 830 N.E.2d 996, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (failure to present cogent 

argument constitutes waiver of issue for appellate review); Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

Waiver notwithstanding, the Walkes’ claims are without merit. First, Huffer’s 

affidavit did not establish that there is a genuine issue as to whether competent representation 

on the theory of prescriptive easement would have succeeded. Prescriptive easements “are 

not favored in the law,” and therefore “the party claiming a prescriptive easement must meet 

stringent requirements.” Wilfong v. Cessna Corp., 838 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ind. 2005)

(citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to our supreme court’s 

reformulation of the elements of prescriptive easement, to prevail on such a claim, “the 

claimant must establish clear and convincing proof of (1) control, (2) intent, (3) notice, and 
10

(4) duration.” Id.

2 Further, a prescriptive easement may not be acquired by another person 

by adverse use unless the use is uninterrupted for at least twenty years. Ind. Code § 32-23-1-

1. Use of the land is not adverse if the use was permissive. Shields, 976 N.E.2d at 1247.

In his affidavit, Huffer opined that as of April 17, 1991, when the Comstocks acquired 

title to the land on which Wishmeyer Lane is situated, a prescriptive easement in favor of the 

Walke parcel had already vested. However, the twenty-year period required to establish a 

prescriptive easement did not commence against the Comstocks until they acquired title to 

the land in 1991. See Downing v. Owens, 809 N.E.2d 444, 450 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 

(“[A]n adverse possessor of land, albeit in fee simple or by easement, may not tack the 

servient owner’s knowledge and acquiescence of the possessor’s use of the land with that of 

the owner’s predecessor(s)-in-interest’s for purposes of proving use of the land for the 

twenty-year prescriptive period.”).

Second, Huffer’s affidavit also failed to establish that there is a genuine issue as to 

whether competent representation on the theory of public road would have prevailed. 

Ind. Code § 8-20-1-15 previously provided that a road could become a 

public highway if used as such for twenty years or more. That portion of the 

statute was removed when it was amended in 1988; however, we may still hold 

that the public accepted a street by usage if the street was used as a public 

street for twenty years prior to 1988. If the street became a public street 

before 1988, then the public has a vested right in that street, and the vested 

right was not eliminated by the amendment of the statute. Under this statute, 

use is the sole test, though frequency of use or the number or [sic] users is 

unimportant. It is enough if it is free and common to all who have occasion to 

use it as a public highway.

 

2

 Prior to Wilfong, a party claiming the existence of a prescriptive easement was required to show “an 

actual, hostile, open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted adverse use ... under a claim of right.” Wilfong, 838 

N.E.2d at 405.
11

Jackson v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Cnty. of Monroe, 916 N.E.2d 696, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), 

(citations and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied (2010). 

In Fenley Farms, upon which Huffer relied in his affidavit, all those who had occasion 

to use the road included more than the individuals who resided along the road. There, the 

road led to a ferry landing on the Ohio River, and members of the public used the road to get 

to the ferry and cross the Ohio River. 404 N.E.2d at 1168. Here, there is no evidence that 

persons other than those who lived on the road used it. The aerial photographs and Google

maps that Huffer submitted with his affidavit merely show that a road existed and continues 

to exist, not that members of the public used the road. See Jackson, 916 N.E.2d at 703 (“The 

roads appearance on various maps, by itself, shows only that it existed, not that the public 

used the road.”). Likewise, the fact that some property owners had a Wishmeyer Lane 

address does not show public use of the road. Further, there is insufficient evidence 

regarding the railroad terminal or trash dump to draw any reasonable inferences regarding

how and when Wishmeyer Lane could have been used in conjunction therewith. Finally, Ms. 

Wilkerson’s statement to Huffer regarding the public’s use of Wishmeyer Lane merely 

relates that people used the road to get to the properties adjacent to it. It is unclear how she 

would know whether or not the previous owner(s) of Wishmeyer Lane had given those 

property owners permission to use the road.

Accordingly, the Walkes have failed to establish a genuine issue as to whether they 

would have prevailed on theories of prescriptive easement or public road had Kitley pursued 
12

those strategies. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary 

judgment in favor of Kitley.

Affirmed.

BARNES, J., and PYLE, J., concur.