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87–678 2015

CONSTRUCTION CONUNDRUMS: A REVIEW OF 

CONTINUED DELAYS AND COST OVERRUNS AT 

THE REPLACEMENT AURORA, COLORADO, 

VAMC 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

TUESDAY, APRIL 22, 2014 

Serial No. 113–65 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS 

JEFF MILLER, Florida, Chairman 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida, Vice-Chairman 

DAVID P. ROE, Tennessee 

BILL FLORES, Texas 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

TIM HUELSKAMP, Kansas 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

PAUL COOK, California 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

DAVID JOLLY, Florida 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

MARK TAKANO, California 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

RAUL RUIZ, California 

GLORIA NEGRETE MCLEOD, California 

ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

JON TOWERS, Staff Director 

NANCY DOLAN, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado, Chairman 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

DAVID P. ROE, Tennessee 

TIM HUELSKAMP, Kansas 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona, Ranking 

Member 

MARK TAKANO, California 

ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public hearing records 

of the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs are also published in electronic form. The printed 

hearing record remains the official version. Because electronic submissions are used to 

prepare both printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process of converting 

between various electronic formats may introduce unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the current publication process and should diminish as the process 

is further refined. 


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C O N T E N T S 

Tuesday, April 22, 2014 

Page 

Construction Conundrums: A Review of Continued Delays and Cost Overruns 

at the Replacement Aurora, Colorado, VAMC ................................................... 1 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Hon. Mike Coffman, Chairman, Subcommittee of O&I ........................................ 1 

Hon. Ann Kirkpatrick, Ranking Member .............................................................. 2 

Hon. Jeff Miller, Chairman, of Veterans’ Affair Committee ................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Ms. Lorelei St. James, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. GAO ...... 5 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 41 

Mr. Kirk Rosa, State Commander, Department of Colorado, Veterans of Foreign Wars .............................................................................................................. 6 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 53 

Mr. Ralph Bozella, Chairman, Veterans Affairs & Rehabilitation Commission, 

The American Legion ........................................................................................... 8 

Mr. Dave Davia Executive Vice President & CEO, Colorado Association of 

Mechanical and Plumbing Contractors .............................................................. 10 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 55 

Mr. Micheal Gifford, MPA, IOM, President, Associated General Contractors 

of Colorado ............................................................................................................ 12 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 61 

Glenn Haggstrom, Principal Executive Director, Office of Acquisition Logistics, and Construction U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs ........................... 22 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 65 

Accompanied by: 

Ms. Stella S. Fiotes, Executive Director, Office of Construction and 

Facilities Management, Office of Acquisition, Logistics and Construction, Department of Veterans Affairs 

And 

Mr. Richard L. Bond, Associate Executive Director, Office of Operations, Office of Construction and Facilities Management, Office 

of Acquisition, Logistics and Construction, Department of Veterans Affairs 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Statement From: Hon. Ed Perlmutter ................................................................... 67 

Statement From: Senator Michael Bennett ........................................................... 68 

Statement From: Senator Mark Udall ................................................................... 68 

Questions for the Record From: Hon. Mike Coffman ........................................... 70 


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CONSTRUCTION CONUNDRUMS: A REVIEW OF 

CONTINUED DELAYS AND COST OVERRUNS 

AT THE REPLACEMENT AURORA, COLORADO, VAMC 

Tuesday, April 22, 2014 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., at Old 

Supreme Court Chambers, State Capitol Building, 200 East Colfax 

Avenue, Room 200, Denver, Colorado, Hon. Mike Coffman [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Coffman, Miller, Lamborn, and Kirkpatrick. 

Also Present: Representative Gardner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MIKE COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Good morning. This hearing will come to order. I 

want to welcome everyone to today’s hearing, entitled, ‘‘Construction Conundrums: A Review of Continued Delays and Cost Overruns at the Replacement Aurora, Colorado, VAMC,’’ or Veterans 

Administration Medical Center. 

I would also like to ask unanimous consent that several of our 

Colorado colleagues be allowed to join us here on the dais to address issues very specific to their constituents. 

Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

I would also like to welcome House Veterans’ Affairs Committee 

Chairman Jeff Miller from the State of Florida, who will be participating in today’s discussions. 

Thank you, Chairman Miller. 

This hearing will address continued problems occurring in the 

construction of the Replacement Aurora, Colorado, VA Medical 

Center that have caused construction to become delayed by over 1 

year and over budget by more than $470 million, according to GAO. 

Further, it will address how VA’s handling of the project has resulted in several lawsuits due to its failure to pay contractors. 

The hearing will also support current legislation that, if enacted, 

will help get the Aurora facility and other delayed facilities operational as close to the initial completion date as possible. 

The Aurora project contract required the VA to deliver a design 

to be built for $582.8 million. VA contracted with Kiewit-Turner to 

be prime contractor for the project. 


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In November 2011, the parties agreed to a firm target price of 

$604 million. According to a VA fact sheet issued in February 2014, 

VA estimates the cost of the facility to now be $800 million. Unfortunately, based on competitive subcontractor and supplier bids acknowledged by VA, the real estimated cost of this project exceeds 

$1 billion. 

Many of the problems with the Aurora construction stem from 

faulty designs. 

First, VA did not even hire a contractor until after its initial designs were made. Since the contractor was not involved in the initial design and was forced to formulate its bid based on a design 

that was not finalized, the project required changes that led to extensive delays and cost increases. Even when VA delivered their 

final designs 8 months late, internal emails from VA engineers 

show that the designs were not even complete. 

The design issues also necessitated hundreds of change orders to 

get the project back on track. VA currently has more than 380 unresolved final change order requests worth over $350 million. Additional emails from VA show that change orders have sat on a desk 

in VA for between 1.5 to 2 years before any action was taken on 

them. 

Once acted upon, only one person was assigned to assess the 

change orders, which considering how the backlog has almost 

reached 400, one person cannot be able to timely handle these requests. 

VA’s refusal to issue final decisions on change orders, inability 

to produce designs that could be built within budget, and failure 

to pay contractors for work completed, has led to 16 lawsuits currently pending before the U.S. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. 

Notably, the contractors who are parties to these suits have offered to mediate these claims with VA, but VA has declined to do 

so. 

Considering these extensive problems with VA that are in no 

way limited to this one major construction project, recently, I, along 

with Ranking Member Kirkpatrick, introduced legislation that 

would require VA to engage the Army Corps of Engineers to act as 

a special project manager to help the numerous delayed and over 

budget VA major construction projects get completed closer to their 

initial cost and completion goals. 

With that, I now recognize Ranking Member Kirkpatrick from 

the State of Arizona for an opening statement. 

OPENING STATMENT OF ANN KIRKPATRICK, RANKING 

MEMBER 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning and thank you all for being here today in support 

of this very important issue that we will be discussing. I want to 

thank all of the veterans here today for their service to our country. 

Discussions for replacing the Denver facility began 15 years ago. 

With the congressional authorization in 2004, veterans in Denver 

and the surrounding area were able to finally point to a future date 

for when this new facility would be open. 


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After 9/11, and with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq stretching 

to the ends of 2014, the need for this replacement facility was considerably magnified, and everyone recognized something needed to 

be done. 

Today’s hearing is the fourth in 2 years that the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, to include this subcommittee, has held 

to review the VA’s construction policies and procedures. Valuable 

lessons have been learned from our investigations of several VA 

construction projects throughout the country. Now is the time to 

use these lessons and move this project forward. 

We all know that due to the ongoing litigation between the VA 

and Kiewit-Turner, this project is stalled until the Civilian Board 

of Contract Appeals issues its decision later this year. In the interim, there is still a great deal of planning and work needed to 

ensure this hospital will be ready to open its doors to veterans next 

year when the construction is complete. 

When this dispute is resolved, I hope we will not linger on past 

actions or place blame, but instead get all hands on deck to complete this facility and serve the veterans who need it. 

Our remaining troops in Afghanistan will return home at the end 

of this year. We have aging veterans who fought in World War II, 

Korea, and Vietnam. They all deserve access to world-class health 

care throughout the VA. 

The VA and Congress must work together to ensure that the Veterans Health Administration and its hospitals and medical facilities are fully equipped, staffed, and ready to provide nothing less 

than the best health care to the men and women who have given 

so much for our country. 

I am sure we would all agree that it is our obligation as a grateful Nation to do what needs to be done so that veterans’ sacrifice 

and service will never be forgotten. 

I look forward to the testimony today. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Ranking Member Kirkpatrick. 

I now recognize Veterans’ Affairs Committee Chairman Jeff Miller for his opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MILLER 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the chairman, Mr. Coffman, and the 

ranking member, Ms. Kirkpatrick, for inviting me here today to 

discuss this important issue, important not only to the State of Colorado and the veterans who will be served in this new facility, but 

all across the country. 

This project and VA major construction, in general, have been 

important issues for our committee for some time, as the committee 

members well know, especially considering the problems here, as 

well as in Las Vegas, New Orleans, and Orlando. 

The 2013 GAO report that addressed VA construction found 

these four facilities, on average, to be delayed by 35 months—not 

days, but months—and over budget by an average of $144 million. 

Now considering this report was from a year ago, and based on the 

evidence that we are going to see today, I am confident that these 

numbers are now much higher. 


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During the briefings from Glenn Haggstrom, principal executive 

director of VA’s Office of Acquisition, Logistics, and Construction, 

I was assured that everything was fine. I was assured that these 

projects are well under control. 

Stella Fiotes, executive director of VA’s Office of Construction 

and Facilities Management, who is here today, as is Mr. 

Haggstrom, recently defended VA’s major construction in this subcommittee’s March 25 legislative hearing, where when questioned 

regarding the VA’s belief of whether construction at the Vegas replacement facility was delivered on time and on budget, Ms. Fiotes 

responded: Yes, based on the way that we account for time and 

budget. 

Notably, GAO substantiated Las Vegas was delayed by 74 months and over budget by $288 million. 

Now the Aurora project represents everything that is questionable about how VA accounts for its construction projects. They initially, as you have already said, Mr. Chairman, asked for $800 million in appropriations to fund this project. They contracted with 

Kiewit-Turner to build the project for $604 million. Estimates now 

indicate that the Aurora construction will cost more than $1 billion, 

but VA maintains that it will only cost the $800 million that was 

originally appropriated. 

And with that, I find it relatively disingenuous that VA claims to have not exceeded its budget because it asked for $800 million, 

when in fact it agreed to provide a design for nearly $200 million 

less than that amount. 

That way of thinking provides no incentive to save the taxpayers 

money while providing every incentive to fix numbers to suit their 

specific interests. 

This issue is made clear through a VA internal email that is 

going to be discussed today in which a senior resident engineer described how, between the spring of 2011 and the spring of 2012, the 

contracting officer of the project actually instructed employees to do 

nothing to answer proposed change orders so as not to affect the 

firm fixed-price. 

The only way the committee is privy to this information is because VA is currently a party to 16 lawsuits for issues regarding, 

for example, failure to pay contractors, and this email was produced as part of the discovery. 

The budgetary overruns, the equally questionable production 

delays occurring in Aurora are representative of the lack of transparency and accountability that currently plague the Department 

of Veterans Affairs. 

The systematic issues that arise in VA major construction lead 

me to believe that VA is ill-equipped to handle them without outside guidance. And the Aurora construction is a perfect example of 

this. 

I look forward to hearing from all the witnesses who are going 

to be here today to testify. And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

I ask all members waive their opening remarks, as per this committee’s customs. 

With that, I invite the first panel to the witness table. 


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On this panel, we will hear from Ms. Lorelei St. James, director 

of physical infrastructure issues for the Government Accountability 

Office. Also on this panel will be Mr. Kirk Rosa, State commander 

of the Department of Colorado Veterans of Foreign Wars; Mr. 

Ralph Bozella, chairman of the Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation 

Commission of the American Legion; Mr. Dave Davia, Executive 

Vice President and CEO of the Colorado Association of Mechanical 

and Plumbing Contractors; and Mr. Michael Gifford, president of 

the Associated General Contractors of Colorado. 

Each of your complete written statements will be made part of 

the hearing record. 

Ms. St. James, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF LORELEI ST. JAMES 

Ms. ST. JAMES. Thank you, Chairman Coffman, Chairman Miller, 

Ranking Member Kirkpatrick, and other members. I am pleased to 

be here today to discuss VA’s construction of the Denver medical 

facility. My testimony today is based on our 2013 report that reviewed VA’s overall construction management of its major medical 

facilities and includes our findings concerning the Denver facility. In our report, we reviewed VA facilities over $10 million, including Denver, and we were concerned by the amount of time and the 

amount of cost increase from the time the project was initially designed and presented to Congress to the time it was expected to be 

completed. 

In Denver, we reported that cost increased 144 percent over the 

initial cost and that the estimated time to complete would span 

more than a decade. VA has stated the medical center is expected 

to be completed in 2015, but recently reported issues between the 

contractor and VA could very well impact this delivery date. 

In Denver, one of the reasons costs and time to complete increased was because VA changed from developing a shared facility 

to a standalone facility. In 1999, VA and the University of Colorado 

Hospital began discussing the possibility of a shared facility. However, in 2004, 5 years later, VA decided against this because of concerns over governance of a shared facility and space limitations. 

In 2005, VA selected an A&E firm for a standalone project, but 

the firm’s efforts were suspended in 2006 until VA acquired another site at the former Army base adjacent to the university medical center. 

Design restarted in 2007 after land acquisition proceedings 

began, but the A&E firm’s design were again suspended in January 

2009 when VA reduced the project scope because of the lack of 

funding. 

By this time, cost had increased by approximately $470 million 

and completion was delayed 14 months. 

Unanticipated problems also impacted estimates in Denver. In 

pre-existing buildings, asbestos and faulty electrical systems needed to be addressed. And they also discovered and removed a buried 

swimming pool, and found a mineral-laden underground spring 

that forced them to continually treat and pump the water from the 

site. 

We also found that VA changed the project delivery method, 

which may have contributed to delays. VA officials stated that DenVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:54 Sep 09, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\87-678.TXT PAT

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ver was initiated as a design-bid-build project and later switched 

to an integrated design and construction method after the project 

had already begun. 

The intent of the IDC method is to involve both the contractor 

and the A&E firm early in the process to ensure well-coordinated 

efforts in designing a project. However, VA did not hire the contractor for Denver until after the initial designs were completed. 

Lastly, I want to mention the issues we found in VA’s overall 

construction management that contributed to delays and cost increases, including here in Denver. 

We found VA lacked clear guidance on the use of medical planners for large projects; did not have clear guidance on the roles and 

responsibilities of VA staff working with the A&E firm or the contractor; and had a slow, cumbersome change order process with 

some change orders taking weeks or even months to process. 

We made recommendations to address these problems and VA 

has taken action. These include ensuring the use of a medical planner in Denver, and other appropriate locations; clarifying roles and 

responsibilities; and streamlining its change order process to include establishing time goals for processing them. 

While we have not evaluated how these actions have impacted 

the Denver facility since our report was published, we are hopeful 

that these actions will improve the delivery of the Denver facility, 

as well as other medical facilities that VA is developing. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I am happy to answer any questions you have. 

[THE PREPARED STATEMENT OF LORELEI ST. JAMES APPEARS IN

THE APPENDIX] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Ms. St. James. 

Mr. Rosa, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF KIRK ROSA 

Mr. ROSA. Thank you, Congressman Coffman. On behalf of the 

nearly two million men and women of the Veterans of Foreign 

Wars of the United States, our Auxiliary, and specifically the nearly 19,000 VFW members here in the State of Colorado, I would like 

to thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding the continued 

construction delays and cost overruns of the Aurora VA Medical 

Center replacement project. 

The current VA Medical Center in Denver was built in 1948, and 

has outlived any reasonable lifecycle expectations. Over the past 66 

years, health care technologies have improved and patient demands have changed, but our medical center has not kept pace. 

Discussions for replacing the facility began in 1997, and in 2004, 

the Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services, or CARES, 

put the Denver VA Medical Center as one of three facilities most 

in need of replacement. 

Now on its fourth VA Secretary, the Denver VA Medical Center 

replacement project, in my opinion, is still a couple years away 

from its projected completion date of 2015. That is only provided 

there are no more delays. 

Veterans in Colorado have waited long enough and deserve better. That is why I am pleased to say that VFW proudly supports 


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Congressman Coffman’s bill, H.R. 3593. While this legislation will 

likely not have an immediate impact, it will benefit my fellow veterans. 

The perception of total lack of accountability and leadership 

within the construction division of the Department of Veterans Affairs in dealing with the new Denver VA hospital is completely out 

of control. 

A few examples are as follows. These are emails that were sent 

on various dates, the first one dated May 22, 2012. Both are with 

the Construction and Facilities Management. 

Item number one states that it is obvious that JVT, which my 

understanding is they are architects, overdesigned the whole 

project and missed critical details. 

Item two on that email, site investigation was very poor. We had 

survey problems, interior dimension problems for the CVS, many 

other problems with other dimensions and unforeseen conditions. 

Number four, design full of mistakes. 

Number five, 95 percent design is not even an 80 percent design 

that adds costs down the line and prevents us from controlling 

costs. 

Item number seven on that one, JVT tried to dictate all processes. It needed to be controlled by the R.E. office. 

Number eight, JVT doesn’t understand construction. K.T. was 

brought in late and had less contribution to the construction process. 

And the one that really gets us veterans upset, number nine on 

that email states design is based on appearance instead of 

functionality. 

This email is listed as exhibit number 74. It also talks about JVT 

having a bad attitude toward Kiewit-Turner and about them insulting Kiewit-Turner in public. 

Exhibit number 79 from the same individual of the Construction 

and Facilities Management on December 18, 2012, gives examples 

of problems that were not dealt with in a timely manner. 

One is the pond, the groundwater problem they had. There was 

an issue with that. 

Exhibit 81 is really interesting. This email, one statement in the 

fourth paragraph: Trial and error method for $600 million-plus 

project. We must be joking. 

Another statement on the email: Well, the taste of a dish that 

is prepared by several chefs normally tastes terrible. 

And: Do I sound like a bitter old man now? Have a nice holiday. 

That is unacceptable. 

A couple questions that I would like to get answered: At what 

point during all this do we finally say enough is enough, and we 

get the contractors paid and get the job done? Our veterans deserve 

it. 

Why is it that we can approve funding for foreign countries, billions of dollars, millions of dollars, in a very short time, yet we 

seem to be unwilling or unable to get a team in place that is held 

accountable, has the authority to approve changes, and get the 

funding, and get this done? 


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The one question, who is the hospital being built for? Is it for the 

veterans? Or in military terms, is it a dog and pony show for other 

people? 

And my last question, why is it that it seems to be, especially 

the last couple years, every time we veterans turn around, we veterans are in the news? People want to take away medical care or 

our earned benefits. Now it appears that the new VA Medical Center cannot even get done. 

So again, the veterans are thrown to the back of the bus. 

The hardships that veterans in Colorado have incurred due to 

the lack of an adequate VA Medical Center is wrong. The VA staff, 

both medical and administrative, are good people. They want to 

help the veterans. It is wrong to allow the VA staff to have to work 

in an outdated facility. 

Our veterans have earned the right to have timely access to comprehensive medical care in a facility that has all the resources necessary to provide the best care available. 

The United States military was sent in harm’s way numerous 

times over many years. We did the job that was asked of us. Now 

we ask the Congress to do their job and get this job done. Thank 

you. 

[THE PREPARED STATEMENT OF KIRK ROSA APPEARS IN THE APPENDIX] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rosa. Thank you for your service 

to our country. 

Mr. Bozella, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF RALPH BOZELLA 

Mr. BOZELLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kirkpatrick, Chairman Miller, and members. On behalf of the National 

Commander of the American Legion, Dan Dillinger, and the 2.4 

million members, I just want to say thank you to this committee 

for the scrutiny you are applying to sorting out this unfortunate 

and really unnecessary mess with VA construction projects. 

As you have heard, this is one problem in Colorado, but it is 

more than that. Here in Colorado, we have waited for this hospital 

since the late 1990s. We have seen three previous VA Secretaries 

promise and fail to deliver. And under this current administration, 

we have been waiting for a half decade since ground was broken 

on this hospital in August 2009. 

I have been tracking the problems of our hospital in Colorado for 

quite some time now. I get to act in another capacity with the 

American Legion as the chairman of the American Legion’s Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation Commission. I am active participant of our System Worth Saving Task Force, and this task force 

has been in existence for over a decade now, and this is the largest 

third-party evaluation system for VA’s health care. 

I have made seven visits across the country in this cycle thus far, 

and I have been able to see that VA has some problems, lots of 

problems, with accountability and transparency, largely communication issues. And these issues are hurting veterans’ ability to access their health care. 


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There appear to be systemic problems with how the VA manages 

their large construction projects, if we look at the big four. 

Here in Colorado, as you have heard, we are overdue and over 

budget. We have hundreds of millions of dollars locked up, and we 

feel like we are not getting anywhere. In Orlando, they are hundreds of millions of dollars over budget and miss deadline after 

deadline. The same applies to New Orleans. In Las Vegas, they 

opened the hospital, but they immediately needed millions of dollars in expansion because they couldn’t meet the basic needs of a 

proper ramp for ambulances to drop off patients at the emergency 

room. 

The GAO report referenced earlier here shows that these four 

projects were, on the average, 35 months over schedule, and that 

is an average. The average cost overrun, we have it as $366 million. And frankly, this is unacceptable and unconscionable. 

Other agencies and private sector organizations continue to build 

hospitals right here in the Denver, Colorado, region and across the 

Nation. Yet the VA replacement hospital on the Fitzsimons campus 

continues to stagnate. 

On behalf of all the veterans in the Western region, the American Legion calls for VA to complete this project, so veterans will 

no longer be required to use inadequate and substandard facilities. 

The American people want a first-rate health care system for our 

veterans. You look at the internal planning process for the SCIP 

program, and you will see that VA is trying to meet the needs of 

an expanding population. 

But the mismanagement is killing these projects, and nobody 

seems to be held accountable. 

It is the same problem we have seen across the country. VA 

health care is a great health care system for veterans when they 

can access it. Between the ability to share information, the networking, and high-quality care, VA has some state-of-the-art medical options for our veterans, but veterans can’t get that state-ofthe-art health care if they can’t get into a facility. 

VA needs to take a long, hard look at how they are managing 

their construction projects, because the results are across-the-board 

unacceptable. 

You have to put every option to fix all of these problems on the 

table. Steps need to be taken to ensure that future VA hospitals 

are planned, designed, and built within a transparent, accountable 

system that puts its veterans first. 

You have four projects in the four States, and who knows how 

many more are needed as the VA expands to meet the future needs 

of the 21st century veterans. 

Falling behind schedule is becoming the standard practice at VA, 

but you have to really think about what that means. Behind schedule means veterans have to drive farther and wait longer, and 

delay critical care until their facility can open. Behind schedule 

means pushing veterans out into the private sector where it is 

harder for their primary care providers to track the effects of specialty care because the private sector lacks the VA’s VistA system 

of electronic health records. Behind schedule means that the veterans of Colorado and the veterans of America are not getting the 

health care that they need. 


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The American Legion thanks this committee for the close attention to the problems of the veterans of Colorado and the rest of 

America. We want you to know that the American Legion is working diligently and tirelessly to keep the focus on this issue so we 

can get the positive and necessary changes from VA to make sure 

that America’s veterans, those who gave 100 percent for the defense of this Nation, do not have to face these problems in the future. After all, America’s veterans deserve better. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bozella. And thank you also for 

your service to our country. 

Mr. Davia, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DAVE DAVIA 

Mr. DAVIA. Thank you, Chairman Coffman, and members of the 

committee. Thank you for the invitation to participate in today’s 

hearing and for your continued stewardship on behalf of our veterans. My name is Dave Davia and I am the executive vice president and CEO for the Mechanical Contractors Association of Colorado, or something I will refer to as MCA of Colorado. 

We propose to this committee a more in-depth and technical 

analysis of the VA’s construction program and a prime and subcontractor selection reform process be considered, which we contend 

will improve budget and schedule performance. 

The MCA of Colorado is a trade association affiliated with the 

Colorado Association of Mechanical and Plumbing Contractors. 

There, we operate four different and unique trade associations that 

represent the heating, air-conditioning, refrigeration, plumbing, 

piping, and mechanical service industry here in Colorado. We represent hundreds of contractor members. In 2014, we are celebrating 

our 125th year of existence. 

The MCA of Colorado is a chapter of the Mechanical Contractors 

Association of America that serves the unique needs of more than 

2,500 member firms across the country and in Canada. 

In 2013, MCAA will also celebrate its 125th year in existence, 

and our other national organization, the Plumbing-Heating-Cooling 

Contractors National Association, is 132 years old this year as well. 

Our contracting firms operate in both public and private sectors, 

and in direct Federal construction projects like the VA hospital. 

As you are aware, Colorado is home to many Federal installations, like NCAR, UCAR, NOAA, JILA, NIST, and many others. 

We also have six, or a half-dozen, military installations here in Colorado, all of which our members work on, those bases. 

So it is fair to say that we operate both as first-tier prime contractors or subcontractors to general contractors, and you will hear 

from my colleague Michael Gifford here in just a moment. 

By virtue of our view of direct Federal procurement issues that 

the VA and other civilian and defense agencies operate, it is fair 

to say we have a nonpartisan and single-industry biased market 

perspective, so our comments are offered in that manner. 

Specialty contractor firms comprise about 64 percent of the industry, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, from an employment perspective. And in the mechanical, electrical, and 


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plumbing sector, we account for more than 30 percent of the overall 

project spend. 

In balance and fairness, Congressman Coffman, our first request 

of this committee is to take the views of performing subcontractors 

in proper balance with the views of nonperforming prime contractors that may be offered. 

Too often, direct Federal procurement policy forums outweigh the 

views of the prime contractors as compared to the subcontractors, 

and I am hopefully going to offer our comments and considerations 

here today to enlighten you in that regard. 

It is our sincere request that we can count on this committee’s 

continued leadership, and the subcontracting committee in the 

House Small Business Committee, to correct a longstanding and 

harmful bias we believe stems from greater political weight in policy forums. 

The MCA of Colorado supports the mission of the Department of 

Veterans Affairs. And in fact, many of our company principles and 

the people we employ are veterans themselves. 

We support the Helmets to Hardhats program. We also have an 

innovative program called the Veterans in Piping program—the 

third installation of its kind is housed at Fort Carson in Congressman Lamborn’s district—where we take discharging veterans, give 

them 16-week welding training experience, and place them in direct entry into our apprentice programs, and help them, our returning veterans, directly make their way into employment, which 

you all know can be problematic at times. 

The VA is a very large client of ours. We do work here in Denver, 

southern Colorado and western Colorado, in all the facilities, both 

in construction and in service. With those overlapping and intersecting public interests, we offer the following comments as constructive suggestions for improvements of the VA program. 

The MCA of Colorado is well aware of the GAO’s report that Ms. 

St. James referenced earlier. This report documents some significant problems with some VA facilities, primarily those in Denver, 

Orlando, New Orleans, and Las Vegas. 

Many of the problems the GAO highlights stem from issues with 

acquisition planning, major equipment purchasing, conflicting 

roles, duties of the VA construction contract administration staffing, and consequent delays and cost overruns because of the volumes and delays in change order processing. This report also catalogs a significant number of recent past VA facility projects that 

were completed more successfully. 

In perspective, this GAO report is one in a rather long line of 

analysis of problems in project acquisition and planning, going back 

many years to the 1980s. 

In the interest of time and the fact that my comments are running a little over, I will skip right to what we would like to ask 

this committee to consider. A written version of my comments are 

available. 

We would ask, in conclusion, that this committee would position 

in favor of amending 3593 to include the terms of the Quality Construction Act of 2013, H.R. 1942, which we believe has some fair 

and balanced contracting reform suggestions for this committee’s 

consideration. 


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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify on these 

important issues today. I am sorry for cutting my comments short 

and for extending my time. Thank you. 

[THE PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVE DAVIA APPEARS IN THE APPENDIX] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davia 

Mr. Gifford, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GIFFORD 

Mr. GIFFORD. Chairman Coffman, and committee members, 

thank you for inviting AGC Colorado to testify today. My name is 

Michael Gifford, and I am president and CEO of AGC. AGC has 

400 member firms who are the State’s leading general contractors, 

specialty contractors, and supplier firms in the State. 

AGC and the construction industry have a deep commitment to 

veterans. Some AGC members are veteran-owned. AGC members 

also contract with veteran-owned firms. AGC and the construction 

industry also have a deep respect for the mission of the VA. 

A number of the members of AGC are performing construction 

work for the VA on the Aurora project, so AGC has an interest in 

the success of the project and its impact on industry members. 

AGC would like to make the following observations based on conversations with contractors on the project. 

The project design and schedule were not complete when the general contractor and subcontractors were directed to proceed and/or 

submit bids. Design changes occurred after this point. Schedules 

were delayed and lengthened. 

These changes in design and schedule caused many contractors 

on the project to incur additional costs. 

The system to deal with changes in design and the resulting increase in cost and schedule is a change order, which is the modification of a contract to incorporate a change in design, schedule, 

scope, or key terms. Changes are being ordered, but the formal 

change order paperwork is not being approved quickly enough, or, 

in some cases, at all. 

The result is that businesses are paying for increased labor and/ 

or materials costs, without compensation, and some are even at 

risk of failure, if this situation continues. This is a cash flow crisis 

for businesses on the project. 

The April 2013 GAO report on the VA found many of the same 

issues on multiple large VA projects. 

AGC works with a number of State and local agencies that do 

commercial construction, including hospitals, using the CMGC and 

design-build delivery models. We do not receive the same level of 

reports of problems with changes of schedule and/or change orders. 

But change orders do happen. Therefore, AGC developed a way 

in Colorado to deal with those cases where change orders arise and 

there is a delay in payment. My written comments talk more about 

that. 

Our request for action: While the VA may feel that they are making progress on the findings in the 2013 GAO report and earlier reports, the pace of improvement is not fast enough to help the contractors on the Aurora project. 


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The cash flow crisis is not fair to business, nor is it proper public 

policy. Some of these contractors have to wait a year or more for 

compensation on change orders, and the dollar amounts are in the 

millions of dollars. 

AGC Colorado is in support of H.R. 3593, the VA Construction 

Assistance Act of 2013, because it would allow the Army Corps of 

Engineers, an experienced construction management agency, to 

make an independent assessment of the effective design changes to 

cost and schedule. Then the change order and cash flow problems 

reported by our members can be addressed. 

I would like to emphasize that time is of the essence. 

In conclusion, AGC Colorado would like to reiterate its commitment to veterans and veteran-owned businesses, and thank you for 

this opportunity to provide views of the Colorado construction industry on this important matter. 

[THE PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GIFFORD APPEARS IN THE

APPENDIX] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gifford. 

Ms. St. James, even though your report was issued about a year 

ago, do you think the estimated Denver facility completion date 

could be or will be extended? 

Ms. ST. JAMES. In our opinion, based upon the work that we did, 

it could very well be extended. Their change order process seems 

continually to be overwhelmed. And with the disagreements now 

between VA and the contractor and the lawsuits, and required time 

for that, it is very likely that it could be extended. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Ms. St. James, in your 2013 report, you mentioned 

that you talked to the architect, engineer, the contractor, and VA 

officials working on the project. What did they say were the problems, if you could summarize them? 

Ms. ST. JAMES. I think what continually rose to the top was the 

change order process. 

Once you get behind the eight ball with change orders coming in, 

and depending upon what the change order is, it can have a cascading effect down the road. One change order is not always equal 

to another. And once you get behind that eight ball, it just slows 

down and makes it hard then for the project to continue, for subcontractors to be paid, and for it to get more toward a final completion date. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Do you think in any way that the slowness of the 

change order process is calculated to mask the true cost of the 

project? 

Ms. ST. JAMES. I couldn’t say that for a fact. I do know that VA 

had not constructed facilities of this size in about 13, 14 years prior 

to undertaking these large projects. And I just don’t think they 

were organized and have the resources, which they came out and 

admitted in their own internal report. They didn’t have the right 

resources to really undertake projects of this size. Simply, I don’t 

think, based on our work, that they were ready. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Rosa, in your testimony, you explain the importance of having the architect and engineer work together early 

on in the design process. Please explain how VA’s failure to have 


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JVT, which is architect and engineer, and K.T. work together on 

designing this facility could have caused delays or extra cost. 

Mr. ROSA. Congressman, I honestly think that had they got the 

construction company involved in the early design phases, not only 

would it have been much better for the VA as far as money goes, 

but the delays would have been much less than what they are right 

now. 

You have a design architect company that, from everything I 

have read and the research I have done, is not familiar with a 

project of this size, to do what we are trying to do. You have a company, a construction company, that is, and they should have been 

working together from day 1, not from 8, 9 months down the road. 

Now we are going to get them together. It is not right. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Any further comments, Mr. Bozella? 

Mr. BOZELLA. It seems, as Commander Rosa is saying here, Mr. 

Chairman, that at the beginning, that the design-build process that 

was used here by the VA on a major project of this size, I don’t believe that they have used that process in the past to this level. So 

they didn’t hit the ground running because of it. There were problems right from the beginning. 

And there was no communication. There was very little communication at first. There wasn’t a contractor at first. And then once 

they had the contractor, there was very little communication, at 

least what we could see at meetings, meetings that I attended, between the contractor and the VA. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Gifford, how does VA’s handling of change orders and project management, in general, on the Aurora project 

compare with other Federal agencies you and AGC have worked 

with? 

Mr. GIFFORD. Chairman Coffman, members of the committee, 

this is a higher amount than normal for other Federal agencies, or, 

I might add, State agencies and local agencies that we work with. 

The change orders and specifically in two areas, the changing of 

the schedule, because time is money, and the change of the design 

and having to incorporate that in, both of those are more than our 

experience with other Federal agencies, and we have a number of 

those projects here in the State. 

And then also, the same thing with some State agencies, including the building of hospitals and other highly technical, scientific 

type buildings on university campuses as well. 

So our experience is, in a number of those cases, that designbuild or CMGC is used as the delivery method versus the old lowbid or design-bid-build method. And so I don’t think it is necessarily the fault of the delivery method. But the earlier comments 

about having the contractor come in earlier in the process, I believe, are very valid. That is one of the key things in design-build 

or CMGC, is that you get the prime contractor and the rest of the 

team, including the mechanical contractors, on board early, so that 

you can have the benefit of that experience during the design process. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Davia, do you have any further comment on 

that? 

Mr. DAVIA. No, I would just echo what Mr. Gifford has said, in 

so far as to say design-build is becoming more prevalent in our inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:54 Sep 09, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\87-678.TXT PAT

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dustry, especially on larger and more complex projects that require 

coordination of what could be upward of 20 to 30 different subcontractors, from a scheduling perspective and from a timing perspective, given the facility and the space requirements or confinements that exist on this particular installation. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

I would just make the announcement right now that I would like, 

when the panel is done, for them to remain. We are going to do 

a second round of questions after the VA testifies, for this panel. 

Ms. Kirkpatrick. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DAVIA. I understand that there have been difficulties with 

payments to the subcontractors on the job. One particular instance 

involved problems establishing and enforcing correct labor rates for 

certain trades. 

How are these issues normally avoided? And what failed in this 

instance? 

Mr. DAVIA. Ms. Kirkpatrick, I am not clear what subcontractor 

you might be referencing, so I am going to make some assumptions 

in my remarks back to you. 

But in a typical project such as this, they will look to the Federal 

Davis-Bacon wage rate for the prevailing wage for the area in 

which the project is located. That is a point-in-time measurement 

of what the wage rates are at that point in time. 

Now for that population of individuals that may be operating 

under a collective bargaining agreement, there may be scheduled 

increases that may be at play over the lifetime of a project of this 

size. 

For the open shop, or merit contractors, keeping labor in place 

over a 3 or 4 year period and continuity is really, really important. 

So you as a contractor have to give some credence to, and understanding of, price increases from a labor perspective. And those are 

usually submitted on the front end with the contractor’s bid. 

This was a design-bid-build practice that was offered. We heard 

Ms. St. James reference that kind of design-build process later on. 

But by that time, it is kind of too late. And I don’t mean to be glib 

about that. I just mean to say, if we are having pricing constraints 

part way through a project because of design, those really don’t factor in the needs for labor increases to keep the job productive and 

people on the site. 

I am not sure if that fully answered your question. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you. 

Mr. Gifford, I think everyone here would like to see this project 

move forward and be completed as quickly as possible. The backlog 

on change orders is a problem. And I would just like to know your 

suggestion on how we clear up that backlog, move this project forward, based on your experience with other Federal contracting. 

Mr. GIFFORD. Chairman Coffman and Representative Kirkpatrick, the stark reality is that the budget is going to have to be 

adjusted and the change orders are going to have to be processed 

in a more timely fashion, if you want to complete the project on 

time. 

The current process is not working, and it is going to take that 

stark recognition to get that done. Otherwise, if that is not done, 


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many of these issues are going to be going to some other—it is 

going to continue to slow, and they are going to go to some other 

type of process, like a claim process or something else that is going 

to drag out over a number of years. And it may end up costing the 

same amount of money but through a very painful process for everyone involved. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Do you believe, if the Army Corps of Engineers 

took over management of this project, they would be able to solve 

that claims backlog and move the project forward? 

Mr. GIFFORD. Chairman Coffman and Representative Kirkpatrick, they would be able to solve the process part of it, but they 

would need an additional budget from the appropriate authority to 

then actually pay those change orders as well. So that would be 

something that I think would be out of their control. It would be 

in the control of Congress. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. That leads me to my next question to Mr. 

Rosa. 

You called on Congress to do whatever is necessary to complete 

that project. I just wonder if you would give us a little more detail 

about what that means. 

Do you think that there should be a specific appropriation request that is passed out of Congress that includes adequate funding to complete this project? I would just like to know your 

thoughts about that. 

Mr. ROSA. I think what it is going to take is for Congress to take 

a look at what is needed right now, money-wise. We know we are 

over budget already. At what point are we going to come to an 

agreement to say, ‘‘Okay, this is the bottom line. This is what has 

to be appropriated to build this hospital.’’ 

And if we get the construction folks together, get the architects 

together, get the VA together, and get a team in here, whether it 

is Army Corps of Engineers, the VA team, whatever, and tell them, 

‘‘This is what we are going to approve. You are going to be held 

accountable for this amount. Now get this damn thing built.’’ That 

is what it is going to take. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you all very much for your testimony 

today. And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

your leadership on this issue. Over the last years, you have been 

really following this closely, and I compliment you for your dedication on making sure the right thing is done for our veterans. 

There are major problems that the VA must address. The cost to 

taxpayers because of cost overruns is a big concern. But even more 

critical to me is the possible loss to veterans of critical health care 

access because of schedule delays. 

So Ms. St. James and Mr. Bozella and Mr. Rosa, does the Government Accountability Office believe that the schedule delay at 

the Denver facility could result in a veteran in my district in southern Colorado being denied access to a procedure that is not available elsewhere in the region during the meantime? 

Ms. ST. JAMES. I couldn’t really answer that for sure. What we 

do know is that the major hospitals will sometimes tailor what is 

needed in the area, based upon VA’s health care projections. 


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And in managing the money, if it is truly going to be over $1 billion versus $800 million, and if VA is expected to manage that 

$800 million, but it is really going to cost more, then what VA has 

to do is to reduce what it is going to offer. And that is the part I 

am not sure what they are working on to reduce and change some 

of the designs that could perhaps result in something not being offered. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Would you be able to give me more information 

on that later? 

Ms. ST. JAMES. Sure. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bozella and Mr. Rosa. 

Mr. BOZELLA. Congressman Lamborn and Mr. Chairman, the 

System Worth Saving Task Force has one more site visit this year, 

and it is going to be in Denver, May 12, 13, 14. At the end of that 

visit, we will have a much better idea regarding access to Denver 

facilities, scheduling, the problems that the construction might 

have. 

As you know, as you well know, the new facility in Colorado 

Springs is nearing completion. I think that is going to improve access for certain day surgeries and the clinic procedures there in 

Colorado Springs. 

There are certain things that they can’t schedule in Denver right 

now. And if they can’t schedule them, they are fee-based out to the 

private providers, which are some of the remarks that I made. And 

we do have concerns anytime a veteran is not seen in veteran-centric care offered by VA. 

There are problems with the private sector. For one thing, the 

private sector providers really don’t know how to treat the whole 

veteran, people who are coming there with PTSD issues, perhaps 

TBI issues, hearing loss, a variety of things where the VA is honed 

in in their treatment to the whole veteran. 

Then the other piece is the inability to share the electronic 

health record. 

So if their care is fee-based out, then there is a problem with 

that. I know we will share our report with you at the end of the 

Denver visit mid-May. So then we will have a better idea of what 

that access is. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I would like to work with you on that visit, to 

make sure it is as successful as possible. 

Mr. BOZELLA. You will have an invitation. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. Rosa, especially because you know the Colorado landscape 

very well. 

Mr. ROSA. Well, what I would like to say is that Mr. Bozella said 

it very well. For me to sit here and say yes to that would be wrong. 

For the most part, a lot of my members who go to the VA Medical Center, they talk about that they get the best care available 

to them right now. Whether they have been turned away or not, 

I can’t tell you. 

I can tell you of two instances I know for a fact—both of these 

are very good friends of mine who went to the VA Medical Center, 

and with what was done to them there, they went back a couple 


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weeks later and they were sent out to a civilian hospital to get it 

corrected. 

As far as what actually happened, I would rather not talk about 

it, but the one gentleman’s name is Terry Lyons. He is our post 

commander. He almost lost his leg. 

Do I think it is because of the doctors or anything there? I think 

it is more that it is an outdated facility that doesn’t have the capability to handle the load that is coming down the pike. That is what 

I think is the problem. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right, thank you all for your testimony. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. 

Chairman Miller. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. St. James, if you would, what was the biggest issue with VA 

that you saw as you were going through the review process that 

is preventing them from being able to get the job done? 

Ms. ST. JAMES. Well, there have been a couple topics that have 

been mentioned here. The change in the type of contract, the 

change order process. 

But when I stand back and look at it, it really does not matter 

what kind of delivery vehicle you have. It really comes down to 

leadership in the VA and to preserving and working toward a good 

relationship with the A&E firm, as well as with the contractor. 

When those types of things break down, then you will see those 

problems being reflected in a process, and specifically in the change 

order process. 

And again, VA, I think it was overwhelmed to build these large 

facilities and not having the resources to really do it in a way that 

could have been better. 

The CHAIRMAN. And when you say resources, do you mean financial resources or personnel resources or experience resources? 

Ms. ST. JAMES. I would think all the above, particularly I think 

noted was that they didn’t have the people with the right background to know how to go about starting projects of this size. 

And again, they recognized it in their internal review, but that 

was back in 2012. So I think it is time that they either get the resources and ask Congress for what it is they need, rather than having the hospitals that are taking longer to complete. 

The CHAIRMAN. And this is a good segue over to Mr. Rosa. 

The Congress has given VA every dollar that they have asked 

for, for any project, for any facility. They have given them every 

personnel who they have asked for, every piece of equipment that 

they have asked for. 

And so I would like to kind of modify your statement just a little, 

where you said that Congress should do their job and finish the facility. It is VA’s job to finish the facility. They are the contracting 

agency. 

We gave them every dollar that they asked for. In fact, they have 

the money right now to pay the people who have done the work. 

And so I think it is very hard, from an oversight standpoint for 

our committee, the biggest stick we have is the power of the purse. 

The only thing we can do is either give money or take money away. 

We are not going to take any money away. 


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Our job is to make sure that we fulfill the needs of the Department of Veterans Affairs. So I would just ask that we put a little 

bit of pressure on the VA, because, again, if we give them $1 billion 

tomorrow, if they choose not to give it to the contractor, not to approve the change orders, it doesn’t change where we are today. 

And we are going to have an opportunity, because of your testimony and some of the questions that have been asked, to ask VA, 

‘‘Why are we in this mess?’’ You know, the interesting thing to me 

is this is not just in Colorado. It is in Orlando. And the VA cannot be spending $1 billion for facilities that prob- ably should have cost $600 million. That is not appropriate use of 

funds that should be going to veterans’ health care, not for sticks 

and bricks, not for mistakes that are being made in the early stage. 

So your comments are well-spoken and well-taken, and rest assured that the committee will continue to keep the pressure on, as 

you would like, on the VA. 

What I would like to ask Mr. Davia about are change orders, and 

I know they are not all the same. But how long should it take for 

a change order to be either approved or denied? 

Mr. DAVIA. I would respond to that, Mr. Miller, with what would 

be considered in a traditional sense, when you start stacking a 

building, and when you start adding a lot more zeroes to the 

project, the procedural process for which a change order gets processed is quite long. 

So I would tell you that as a comparative, we, the construction 

industry, work with the City and County of Denver. The City and 

County of Denver reportedly had some issues in processing construction change orders and a whole lot of other things. 

And we came to a point where we found there was a 21 step 

process that was linear, and we helped them reengineer their process to a two-step process, which is at the same time, in parallel, 

to expedite that. 

The result of that is that we were seeing processing of change orders go from weeks, months, and considerably longer periods of 

time, to 30 to 45 days. 

An optimal change order would get processed very, very quickly. 

If it is a matter of changing the color of the wall, that is pretty simple. If it is a matter of delivering a different environment for respiratory issues, and you require a whole lot different equipment, 

that could take longer periods of time because you need lead time 

to get the equipment in place and get it engineered and get, structurally, it be able to be set. 

So I would tell you, from my perspective, 30 to 45 days is, at the 

outset, the longest. But I have known owners who have taken the 

serious nature of their projects like Denver and put them into a 

parallel process to expedite that kind of approval process. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

My time since has expired, but let me say thank you to each of 

you for being here, for being willing to testify. 

Commander, thank you for your service. 

Mr. Bozella, thank you as well. 

We are honored to have you here today testifying before the committee. 

I look forward to a second round of questions, Mr. Chairman. 


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Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gardner. 

Mr. GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. 

Thank you, Chairman Miller, for being here today to address this 

important issue, what should rightfully be an incredible pride of 

the Rocky Mountain State, a new VA hospital to serve the needs 

of our veterans. And hopefully, we can get through this and make 

that happen, and make sure that it does, indeed, become the pride 

that we know it will be. 

I am struck by, Mr. Bozella, I think you had said that we have 

watched other facilities, other hospitals, being built in Colorado. 

You can go, during the time it has taken to build this project, to 

move forward, to be completed, to be on a path to completion. I 

think if you look at Poudre, if you look at Banner, if you look at 

Sky Ridge, we have seen major, major investments that have been 

completed, that are well on their way to be completed. And yet, we 

wait, as the VA works through significant challenges here. 

And so I want to thank you for your diligence, for your time in 

being here today, but also your commitment to seeing this through, 

because as Chairman Miller mentioned, for every $1 million that 

we are over project costs, for every $100 million that we are over, 

whether it is Florida, Colorado, or Nevada, how many veterans 

have gone unserved, and many needs have gone unmet, many 

promises have been unfulfilled, because that money is being used 

somewhere else when it could go directly to meet the promises that 

we have made and need to keep. 

Mr. Davia, just a couple questions for you. In your testimony, 

you explain your support for the Common Sense Construction Contracting Act of 2014, which would ban and address the use of reverse auctions for direct Federal construction prime contractor selection. 

Can you talk a little bit about that, and the basis of that statement? 

Mr. DAVIA. Sure. Chairman Coffman, Congressman Gardner, 

thank you for the question. 

The act that we referenced with respect to reverse auctions, we 

believe that it is a procurement process that is a race to the bottom, and it is not in the best interest of the Federal Government. 

It is not a good policy to, as I start with, let’s just say $1 million, 

and the clock starts ticking, and it is going to stop ticking at some 

point in time. And every moment that goes by, there is an opportunity to lower the number. 

And our profit margins, on a national basis, are 2 percent to 3 

percent. So when we are talking about dropping hundreds of thousands of dollars, it is a process that we believe is fraught with difficulty, at best. 

And the other piece of that piece of legislation is what we call 

bid listing. It is a practice that existed well into the 1980s, and for 

some reason in the Reagan administration, it was changed. 

It is simple in that it requires the prime contractor, whether that 

be us or the general contractor, to say, ‘‘Here are my subcontractors,’’ at the time of submittal. And that says, ‘‘This is my team.’’ 


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So we have talked a lot about design-build. Now there are ways 

to switch out people on the team, but what the practice is, the 

same $1 million example, if I feel like I need to make up numbers 

somewhere else, then we start bid shopping, or bid peddling is 

what it is also known as. And we believe that those two pieces that 

exist in kind of Federal procurement could possibly lead to examples of what we are seeing today. 

And so those are those two pieces of legislation. I am happy to 

answer more questions or give you more details. 

Mr. GARDNER. In your testimony, you spoke about this a little bit 

in your opening statement. In your testimony, you spoke of the 

need to improve project planning and acquisition within the VA. 

Could you further elaborate on some of those things you may not 

have had time to get to during your statement, ways, improvements, that you would suggest the VA undertake to improve its 

major construction? 

Mr. DAVIA. I would. The most simple of which is Congressman 

Coffman’s proposal to remove the oversight of construction from 

where it sits today and move it into the Army Corps of Engineers. 

The Army Corps of Engineers is a pretty decorated project management delivery mechanism. 

We understand it as contractors. We know the process. It seems 

to be fairer and consistent and transparent. And we would support 

the moving of that piece of legislation forward. 

Mr. GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Davia. 

And, Mr. Rosa, what do you believe are the causes for the incredible delay and cost overruns that have occurred during the Aurora 

VA Medical Center construction project? 

Mr. ROSA. Congressman Gardner, from the research I have been 

doing, and all I did was go online, and I got into this one office. 

I brought supporting documents with me. 

But when I sit there and I look at stuff that went on back in 

2009, 2010, that shows before we even started building this thing 

that there were already going to be cost overruns, that the Construction and Facility Management folks from the VA already knew 

it then. 

And now we are sitting here trying to determine what caused it, 

but yet they knew it then. 

You hit groundwater, when the construction folks knew they 

were going to hit it, but the VA wants to say no. And what happens? They hit it. 

That is just the tip of the iceberg. 

That is where your cost overruns come from, people not paying 

attention, people not being accountable, people not doing what they 

are supposed to be doing and doing it the right way. There is a 

scope of work out there, and this is where you go back to the design folks, the construction folks, getting them all together in the 

beginning to try to eliminate these cost overruns, and build it for 

what it was bid for. 

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Our thanks to the panel. You are now excused. 

But please, if you could just wait in the area, that will be the last 

panel. You will come up, after VA, if there are any additional questions by the members. 


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I now invite the second panel to the witness table. On our second 

panel, we will hear from Mr. Glenn Haggstrom, principal executive 

director of the Office of Acquisition, Logistics, and Construction for 

the Department of Veterans Affairs. He is accompanied by Ms. 

Stella Fiotes, executive director. 

Mr. Haggstrom, your complete written statement will be made 

part of the hearing record, and you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GLENN HAGGSTROM 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. 

Chairman, Ranking Member Kirkpatrick, and other members of 

the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to update the 

committee on the construction of the Denver replacement medical 

center. 

Joining me today is Ms. Stella Fiotes, executive director of the 

Office of Construction and Facilities Management. 

In the past 2 years, VA has undertaken a comprehensive review 

of our entire major construction program and has numerous actions 

to strengthen and improve our ability to deliver major facilities for 

our veterans. With the implementation, acceptance, and closure of 

the recommendations in the April 2013 Government Accountability 

Office report, and from the VA Construction Review Council, VA 

has changed the way it conducts its construction business. 

With regard to the Denver project, VA and our prime contractor 

on this project, Kiewit-Turner Joint Venture, or K.T. is how I refer 

to them, is committed to successfully delivering the replacement facility. 

In achieving this, there are three key milestones that set the 

stage for where we are now. 

First, as part of the fiscal year 2010 appropriation, Congress au- thorized $800 million that established the total budget for this 

project. 

Second, in August 2010, K.T. signed a contract with the VA for 

preconstruction services, which included their close involvement 

with the project design going forward. At that time, the project was 

at 35 percent design, and K.T. submitted their offer for the 1.2 million square foot facility at $519 million. 

Third, K.T., after 16 months of involvement with this project that 

provided them access to design and construction drawings and 

specifications, on November 11, 2011, signed a supplemental contract agreement for the construction of the project, which established a firm target price of $604 million and a not-to-exceed ceiling 

of $610 million, with a contract completion date of April 2015. 

As we look at the total project today, almost 44 percent complete, 

the project scope remains essentially the same as it was in 2010 

when K.T. first became involved in the project. With the progression of the design to the full 100 percent documents, and with construction underway, there have been and will continue to be some 

changes to the project, something not uncommon for a project of 

this magnitude and complexity. 

As these changes have been identified and documented, VA has 

and will compensate the contractor accordingly, and has to date increased the contract target price to $630 million. 


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But clearly, there has been no change in the project scope or 

complexity dramatic enough to justify the contractor’s alleged cost 

of over $1 billion, nor has the contractor provided the required supporting documentation to VA to justify their estimated cost increase. 

Despite the cloud of litigation that hangs over this project, fortunately, a work stoppage has not taken place, allowing progress to 

continue. 

VA continues to work with the contractor to keep the project 

moving forward and has taken specific actions to ensure it does. 

In an effort to assess K.T.’s entitlement to the requested cost adjustments, VA entered into negotiations with the contractor. Despite fundamental disagreements regarding entitlement level and 

completeness of the documentation required from the contractor to 

justify additional payments, VA started processing supplemental 

agreements in the amounts that it considered justified, which K.T. 

refused to sign. 

Nonetheless, in an effort to ensure funding is available to K.T. 

and subsequently to its subcontractors, VA has issued unilateral 

modifications to allow K.T. to bill for the permitted amounts. 

Further, although K.T. is responsible for their cash flow and for 

paying their subcontractors for work approved and completed, in a 

good faith effort, VA has allowed for billing adjustments totaling up 

to $30 million. VA is proceeding cautiously with these adjustments 

due to the inherent risks to project completion, if K.T. is unable or 

unwilling to finish the project. 

The VA remains focused on managing successfully this project. 

Our goals are simple. We want to complete the project, pay K.T. 

what they have earned, abide by the requisite contracting rules 

and regulations, and act as prudent stewards of the resources entrusted to us by American taxpayers. 

Although there may be additional changes in cost and schedule, 

based on all pertinent information currently available to us today, 

VA has the funds necessary to complete this project. VA remains 

committed to meeting the current and future challenges necessary 

to finishing this long-awaited project for our veterans in the most 

judicious, cost-efficient, and timely manner. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[THE PREPARED STATEMENT OF GLENN HAGGSTROM APPEARS IN

THE APPENDIX] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Haggstrom. 

Mr. Haggstrom, I think when we met before, you gave me the 

$604 million figure as the figure that this hospital could be built 

for. Can you reflect on that? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. We did. And as I recall, Mr. Chairman, we met 

almost a year ago in May onsite when we had the opportunity, both 

Ms. Fiotes and I, to personally brief you on the contract, where we 

stood with that, and how that contract worked. 

The contract that was signed has a target price of $604 million 

with a ceiling price of $610 million, at that point in time. 

Since then, there have been numerous change orders and adjustments to the contract, which now bring it up to $630 million as the 

target price. 


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Mr. COFFMAN. Are you familiar with a letter—is there a copy of 

the letter that Mr. Haggstrom can be given?—a letter dated January 23, 2013, from Thaddeus Willoughby? 

And the letter states this: The current design exceeds the esti- mated cost of construction at award (ECCA) of $582,840,000 by an 

estimated—so they are saying that $199,160,000 in accordance 

with the contract clause. 

It essentially goes on to recommending that there be changes in 

accordance with the contract clause, design within funding limitations. 

Are you aware of this letter? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I am, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Do you disagree with this letter? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I believe you have to take that letter in context. 

And that letter was the result of a contract management firm that 

we commissioned to be a part of our team, and results in that cost 

estimate that they performed. 

And no point in time was this cost estimate ever accepted as an 

independent Government cost estimate. It was strictly the estimate 

of the firm and how they chose to look at the project. 

What Mr. Willoughby was responding to was notification to our 

A&E contracting firm that this is what those costs were, and to 

execute planning. It was nothing but planning. We never followed 

through on that. There was never a redesign or schedule adjustment that resulted from this letter. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Haggstrom, Mr. Chang, a resident engineer 

on the project, wrote a series of emails explaining the project’s 

management issues. In one, he stated, ‘‘The scope, schedule and 

budget were not managed.’’ He said: No leadership, no knowledge 

and experience in this business, not following the handbook. 

What is FAR OPM? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I believe that would stand for Federal Acquisition Regulation. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay, he references that. 

Not as to the handbook, FAR OPM, et cetera, and no skill in organization. 

As a result of these issues, when and what was done to try to 

correct the VA’s management and leadership shortcomings on the 

Denver project? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. To be honest with you, Mr. Chairman, I am not 

aware of the email. I don’t know Mr. Chang personally. Those apparently reflect his view of the project. They do not necessarily reflect the view of the rest of the Department of Veterans Affairs. 

Mr. COFFMAN. There was also internal correspondence directing 

the individual working on change orders not to process any change 

orders for a period of time, so change orders have gone 2 years unresolved. 

Is that simply incompetence from a bureaucratic standpoint? Or 

is that calculated to mask the true cost of this hospital? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I believe it is neither, Mr. Chairman. I have 

been involved in this project on a recurring basis since early 2012, 

first on a quarterly basis when we had executive partnering sessions, and then in the summer going to monthly meetings here. 

I have been down in Denver or—— 


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Mr. COFFMAN. Excuse me for a second. Do you think 1.5 to 2 

years is normal for the process of a change order? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. No, and I would ask Ms. Fiotes to comment on 

that. That was part of the process that we agreed with GAO on. 

We changed our change order process. GAO accepted those 

changes. And I think if you look at them, they very much align 

with the Corps of Engineers. 

But I would ask her to comment, if you will, on those processes 

and our changes. 

Ms. FIOTES. Mr. Chairman, clearly, that—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. Can you please start with how many change orders are pending right now? 

Ms. FIOTES. Currently, we have, in our books, about 120 change 

orders that are in review, either by the contractor or by ourselves. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Ranking Member Kirkpatrick? 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Everyone here wants this to be completed, because it is really 

about providing services for our veterans. With your completion 

now at 44 percent, do you think a completion date of April of next 

year, 2015, is achievable? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Congresswoman, the initial completion date on 

the contract when it was initially signed was in fact April 2015. 

Just recently, we have issued an extension that now adjusts the extended legal completion date of this project to May 2015. 

It is the responsibility of the prime contractor to comply with 

those agreements and ensure that they staff and manage this 

project accordingly to meet those completion dates. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. What is your plan to make sure that happens? 

You heard the first panel suggest that a team be brought in to look 

over this, oversee it, make sure that things happen on target, on 

time, in budget. 

Do you agree with that approach? And if you don’t, what is your 

plan? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I don’t. And I would ask the committee to allow 

Ms. Fiotes to put forth our position as she testified before the committee in late March on the view of the involvement of the Corps 

of Engineers with this project. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Ms. Fiotes. 

Ms. FIOTES. Congresswoman, thank you. 

As I stated earlier in my remarks, testimony, we believe that the 

assignment of a special project manager will not help the project, 

but in fact could hurt and complicate the project. 

Management oversight, an additional layer of management and 

oversight, doesn’t solve or resolve project issues. 

There are questions of authorities, questions of contracting. The 

VA has a contract with K.T.; the Corps of Engineers does not. We 

can’t just, with a single assignment of a special project manager, 

give up our responsibilities to manage the project and the funds associated with that project. 

In fact, the Corps of Engineers, and we have been meeting with 

the Corps of Engineers, because we have reached out to them to 

see what other avenues of support they could provide us. They provided us with support on the project early on. In fact, they reviewed our contract, and at the time, established that the project 


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and the contract were being managed in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulations. 

So we have been working with the Corps to see what other avenues, and what other types of support they could provide us. We 

have talked with them about what they call a major design-construct evaluation, which is another method they use on their own 

projects. 

But on the issue of the special project manager, they have in fact 

stated that where they have used that in the past, it was unsuccessful, and it resulted in an adverse impact to the project. And 

they cited a specific example with another agency. Therefore, they 

did not recommend that we pursue that. 

We do continue discussions with them on the possibility of a review of the project or specific aspects of our project management 

that could continue to improve our management of the process. 

And that is ongoing. Those discussions are ongoing. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. So it sounds like the funding is adequate. You 

have a good plan to complete the project. 

I heard the first panel talk about how important relationships 

are in having a successful project. And so I am concerned about the 

fact that the monthly meetings between the VA and K.T. have been 

terminated. 

Is that a concern of yours? Is there an effort to reestablish those 

monthly meetings? I really think that a good relationship is essential, again, to completing this project. 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Those monthly meetings were terminated at 

the request of Kiewit-Turner. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. And did they give you any reason for that? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I believe they felt that the investment of their 

time and effort was not warranted based on what they perceived 

the results of those meetings were. So in February, I was advised 

that they would no longer attend monthly meetings. 

However, I still do communicate regularly with Mr. Scott Cassels, who is a principal executive within Kiewit, on a monthly basis 

to discuss ongoing issues. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. I just want to express my concern about that, 

having managed major building projects, and knowing how important that line of communication is. I hope that that would be reestablished. 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I reassure you, ma’am, on a day-to-day basis, 

those teams are right across the hall. We are on the same floor, in 

the same building. And those discussions continue on a daily basis, 

to ensure that we do make progress. And where possible, we overcome those issues in those daily discussions and reviews that are 

continually ongoing. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, on a positive note, I want to compliment the VA on the 

progress of the super-clinic in Colorado Springs, which is anticipated to open later this year. And veterans in southern Colorado 

are really looking forward to that completion, so thank you for your 

work on that. 


VACREP180 with DISTILLER
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Mr. Haggstrom, my concern, as I stated earlier, is that schedule 

delays might result in a veteran in southern Colorado, or anywhere 

else in the region, for that matter, currently being denied access to 

the high level of care that they will ultimately be able to have 

when the Denver project is completed. 

Can you address my concern? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Certainly, Mr. Lamborn. I am not a clinician, 

and I wouldn’t pretend to be. We manage the construction of the 

project. 

But I can assure you that we have recurring meetings with the 

VISN director and the medical center director with regard to this 

project. And certainly, I am not aware of any veteran who is enrolled in the Eastern Colorado Health Care System who has been 

denied care as a result of this project. 

Mr. LAMBORN. So there are backstops with commercial hospitals, 

other hospitals? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I believe that Ms. Roff, who is the medical center director, has taken every avenue, be it through fee basis or with 

other VA Medical Centers or clinics, to assure that no veteran goes 

unserved. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, I appreciate your answer. 

Do you still believe that the completion date for the Denver 

project will be April of next year? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Sir, as I just spoke with Ms. Kirkpatrick, we 

have issued a contract extension, a modification. That extended 

contract completion date is now May 2015. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, one month later. Okay, thank you for that 

clarification. 

And that is in spite of the 16 pending lawsuits and all the other 

change order issues that we discussed? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. There is still an obligation of Kiewit-Turner to 

perform on this project, notwithstanding the litigation that is ongoing before the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. Haggstrom, what action, in a general sense, 

is the VA taking to address the increases of estimated cost or the 

delays? I know we have addressed specifics here, but can you just 

give us a little more of an overview? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I would be pleased to do that. 

First of all, I think I would like to make it very clear that, in 

fiscal year 2010, Congress authorized $800 million to complete this 

medical center project. This was an all-encompassing cost to include land acquisition, design, construction management services, 

and actual construction. 

And as we have gone through this whole process, we have made 

adjustments in management through management processes and in 

our change order. And there are two tracks that we have tried to 

take on this to ensure that both the subcontractors and the prime 

contractors are being paid. It is not the intent, and never will be 

the intent, of this department to have subcontractors or the prime 

contractors fund and finance the project. 

However, what has to be realized with regard to this is that this 

project does not contain a clause that allows for an economic price 

adjustment. Those adjustments that come to this cannot just be beVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:54 Sep 09, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\87-678.TXT PAT

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cause, ‘‘Well, our low bid was this,’’ or, ‘‘The market now says the 

cost is this.’’ That is not allowed in this contract. 

I would like to ask Ms. Fiotes—we have taken two tracks, 

through an equitable adjustment track and a change order track— 

to give you a sense on where we are, what we have provided to the 

contractor, in terms of additional payments. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Now, before we do that, and I would like that, but 

first let me ask, the fact that this is also happening in other places 

around the country, like Orlando, Las Vegas, and other places, does 

that point to a systemic issue with the VA not having the processes 

completely in order? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. There was an issue, admittedly, in Orlando 

years ago, in terms of the quality of the design and construction 

drawings. We resolved that. There continues to be issues in terms 

of the performance of the prime contractor to complete the work. 

But we keep talking about cost estimates. Are you aware that, 

actually, in Orlando, the department down-funded that project 

from the original authorization to a lesser authorization, and used 

those savings to perform another project in New Orleans? 

So we talk about cost estimates, but these are not necessarily the 

case. We are operating within the appropriation and the authorization that Congress gave us to do these projects. And we are allowed 

to expend those resources accordingly. 

Mr. LAMBORN. My time is up. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. Miller. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Haggstrom, help me reconcile the numbers. Everybody is focusing on $604 million or $620 million, or whatever 

that number happens to be, as the cost of the hospital. But you 

asked for $800 million, and that includes, as you said, the cost of 

the land and I guess management. 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Management, contingency fees, construction 

management services, design. 

The CHAIRMAN. You don’t consider that as part of the cost of the 

facility, so you don’t think $800 million is the cost of the facility? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. It is the cost of the overall medical center to 

construct. Where we have this particular type of contract, the 

brick-and-mortar piece of it is $604 million. 

The CHAIRMAN. I guess if you were trying to explain to a layman 

how much this medical center cost, and they are looking at the 

building and the land and the roads and all the infrastructure that 

was put in there, wouldn’t most people say that it is $800 million, 

not $620 million? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. That would be correct. It is the total cost to 

construct, not only the steel, the bricks and mortar, but all the 

other services that predate that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just as there are startup costs and costs that are 

not even associated, I don’t believe, even in the $800 million, are 

they? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. That is correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. So even if we agree that $800 million is the number, you know that number is going to be more than $800 million? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. There were additional funds that are spent in 

what Congress authorized in what they call the advanced planning 


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funds. And in those advanced planning funds, we have authorization to do those initial site investigations, those types of things. 

The CHAIRMAN. But I am talking about the startup of the hospital. It doesn’t just start up by itself. 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Oh, I see, the activation, you mean, Mr. Chairman? Yes, absolutely. 

The activation costs are separate and apart from the construction 

costs. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do we know what the activation costs are going 

to be for this? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I do not know. 

Those are out of the medical—— 

The CHAIRMAN. They would be over on the health side. 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Right, through VA. 

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, again, we are dickering, supposedly, about a $1 billion number. You keep driving it back to $600 million. But $1 billion is probably pretty close to accurate, even if you 

don’t factor in any of the change orders that are on the table today. 

So we could be talking about over that, correct? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Again, if you are looking at the cost of construc- tion, that is established at $630 million, plus whatever activation, 

potentially, that cost. 

The CHAIRMAN. Plus infrastructure and the acquisition of the 

land. 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, all right. 

Ms. Fiotes, you said there was no way that you could assign this 

contract to the Corps of Engineers? Is that what you said? 

Ms. FIOTES. Assign the entire contract over to the Corps of Engineers? 

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is what you said. I think if we go 

back to the transcript, it would say you said we could not. 

My question is, is it you could not or you will not? 

Ms. FIOTES. Well, I was responding to the actual proposal in the 

bill, which is the assignment of a special project manager from the 

Corps of Engineers to oversee the construction, not necessarily to 

take over the contract. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, okay. 

Ms. FIOTES. So I was responding to the special project manager 

and saying that would probably not work well. 

The CHAIRMAN. How about responding to this: What if Congress 

mandated that the Corps of Engineers take the project over? You 

could then assign that to the Corps of Engineers, could you not? 

Ms. FIOTES. I am not sure how to answer that, Congressman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes or no? 

Ms. FIOTES. If Congress mandated that we assign the contract to 

the Corps of Engineers, I guess we would have to assign the contract to the Corps of Engineers. I am not—— 

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very simple question. 

Ms. FIOTES. I am just not clear on what the details of that would 

entail. That is all. 

The CHAIRMAN. You are the only people that are defending the 

debacle that exists today in all the major construction projects. And 

all we are trying to do is to get a handle on what is going on. 


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Again, as I told the commander just a minute ago, we have given 

every dollar that has been asked for, haven’t we? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. To my knowledge, you have, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have given every FTE or personnel that has 

been asked for, every piece of the most modern equipment. 

I mean, I have been told the Orlando hospital has been delayed 

because we want to put in the latest and the greatest. And that 

is great, that we should be able to do that. But when you are talking about replacing a facility that was built in 1947, or whatever 

the date was, anything is the latest and greatest, I would suspect. 

I think you are the only people who have confidence in what is 

going on. We are looking to you to help instill what you feel to us 

and to the contractors. 

I mean, if I am to believe what you say, then you have the worst 

record of picking general contractors of anybody in this country, because you are picking bad ones everywhere you go, because they 

can’t build on time, they can’t build on budget. I don’t think that 

is the case. 

There is a problem. Let’s find it. Let’s fix it. 

I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gardner. 

Mr. GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Haggstrom, in terms of the budget, we have seen on the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals Web site that throughout 2012 

and 2013, K.T. was notifying the VA that the design was turning 

higher and higher, and is now over $1 billion. 

Why didn’t the VA share this information with the committee 

and Congress, rather than telling us that the project was within 

budget, as it continues to do so today? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Mr. Gardner, the contract that K.T. signed was for $604 million. Interestingly enough, we always try to reach a 

firm fixed-price contract. 

So in March 2013, K.T. provided to the department a firm fixedprice proposal of $898 million. With that proposal, we did the evaluation and we rejected it. And we rejected it because there was no 

supporting documentation that accompanied it that justified the increase in price. 

Interestingly enough, those proposals were based on 100 percent 

design drawings, and they had complete access. 

Today, after those 100 percent design drawings, that firm fixedprice proposal, now, I believe, K.T. is saying this cost is over $1 billion. 

Well, what has changed? That is what we are asking K.T. to tell 

us. What has changed in terms of the project scope on this, that 

even after they had access to this information, provided a firm 

fixed-price contract, now a year later, it is again grown over $200 

million. 

So based on the facts, and, Mr. Gardner, that is all I can go on, 

are the facts. I can’t go on conjecture of somebody just saying it is 

going to happen. I have to have the facts in front of me to understand what those changes are. 

Mr. GARDNER. What is the VA’s belief for the percentage of completion of the project at this point? 


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Mr. HAGGSTROM. Approximately 44 percent. 

Mr. GARDNER. And that is not the same as the prime contractor? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. It may not be. 

Mr. GARDNER. Do you know what the prime contractor believes 

it to be? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I do not. 

Mr. GARDNER. You haven’t talked to the prime contractor about 

where they are with completion? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I don’t—— 

Mr. GARDNER. At least what they think they are? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. No, I have not, in several months, to my recollection. 

Mr. GARDNER. Is there anybody who has talked to the prime contractor about where they believe they are? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I would have to ask my project team. 

Mr. GARDNER. The project team doesn’t share that with you? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Mr. Gardner, they have not. 

Mr. GARDNER. Isn’t that something that you should know? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Mr. Gardner, we base our completion dates on 

how we have paid out, and that is 44 percent. 

Mr. GARDNER. But not on actual progress? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. It is related to the actual project and the cost 

of the project that we authorize payment against the total cost. 

Mr. GARDNER. Why was the firm target price of $604 million arrived at without regard to any design documents? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Well, as I said earlier, I find that very interesting, in that Kiewit-Turner was conducting preconstruction services on a contract that was awarded in August 2010. Sixteen 

months they were on this contract. They had access to these documents. And they signed. We didn’t twist their arm. We didn’t demand that they sign. They signed the contract for $604 million, as did we. 

Mr. GARDNER. But there were no design documents, at that 

point? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. We believe there were. 

Mr. GARDNER. The contractor, I believe, has made numerous requests to meet with the Secretary to try to resolve these issues outside of the legal process. Has that meeting taken place? And if not, 

why not? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. It has not. The Secretary has invested the authority within me to make this project happen. I have told K.T. 

that. And I cannot see, nor does the department see, any benefit 

at this point in time in terms of that meeting. 

K.T. has chosen to go to litigation. It is now in the courts, and 

those decisions will be made in the courts. 

Mr. GARDNER. So the Secretary has refused to meet with the contractor on this? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. That is correct. The Secretary has not met with 

the contractor, nor do we recommend that the Secretary meet with 

the contractor. 

Mr. GARDNER. I understand there are claims filed, but when 

there are disputes that arise, isn’t that a natural thing, a requirement to file a claim at that point? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. It is. 


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Mr. GARDNER. So why has the Secretary refused to meet with the 

contractor? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. There is nothing that is going to change with 

regard to the claims that have been put forth by Kiewit-Turner. 

This is a legal interpretation of the contract, and the courts need 

to decide. We have a position, as does K.T. 

And mediation is not going to resolve that difference in our 

views. And that is exactly why it is in the board of appeals to make 

resolution on. 

Mr. GARDNER. So there is an active contract—— 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. There is. 

Mr. GARDNER [continuing]. Of a VA hospital somewhere between $600 million and over $1 billion that has not been built, and the 

Secretary of the VA and the contractor have not met. 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I meet with the contractor. I represent the Secretary. He has given me authority to do so. 

Mr. GARDNER. Well, may I suggest that perhaps we need somebody else in the room, like the Secretary? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. I will, certainly, relay that to him. 

Mr. GARDNER. I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Ms. Kirkpatrick. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You said that this is a firm fixed-price contract, yet that doesn’t 

preclude change orders, does it? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. This is not a firm fixed-price contract at this 

time. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Okay, I misunderstood. 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. The goal is to get to a firm fixed-price contract. 

And even in a firm fixed-price contract, there is still the potential 

for change orders. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Okay, so I am just a little unclear on why you 

want to move it to a firm fixed-price contract from what it is now. 

And will you tell us again what it is now? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. What this is, is a firm target-priced contract. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. And how is that different, a target-priced contract different from a firm fixed-price? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. When you go into a firm fixed-price, many of 

the issues are included in that firm fixed-price that may potentially 

not be included in a firm target price. 

So what this is, is we are working with the contractor to try to 

establish a firm fixed-price, and then that would mandate what 

that final cost is of the project. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. When you get to the firm fixed-price contract, 

will that include the change orders that have now been issued that 

are being in the process of being resolved? 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. It would. And those adjustments have already 

been made within the contracting vehicle that we are using, in that 

we have adjusted that firm target price to $630 million. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Okay, thank you for that clarification. 

I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you so much for your testimony today. 

I just want to say, as a veteran, before you are excused, I just 

think that the mission of the VA is really to provide health care 

benefits to those who have served this country. And what you have 


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demonstrated, I think, today, or what has been demonstrated today 

in testimony, certainly, by the GAO, is that you have problems on 

every project, not just this project. And every project has different 

contractors. 

And what that leads me to believe is, clearly, the VA is not a 

construction entity. It is not your core competency. And I think 

that is, certainly, demonstrated here today. 

Thank you so much for your testimony. 

Mr. HAGGSTROM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I would like to bring the first panel back for a 

final round. 

Thank you so much for returning. This is the final round, and 

we will conclude the hearing following this round. 

Mr. Gifford and Mr. Davia I think from a contracting point of 

view, what is concerning to me is the extraordinary length of time 

that it is taking to do these change orders. And I have to think it 

is so long that it is calculated. 

And I think that there is evidence, certainly, that has been disclosed in internal documents that say it is calculated. 

From your perspective, I would like to hear your view on why 

this change order process is so slow, and is it there to mask the 

true cost of this facility? 

Mr. Gifford. 

Mr. GIFFORD. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I can’t 

sit here and speculate as to intent, on why change orders would 

take so long. 

However, I do know that the GAO’s report documents that this 

has taken place on a number of projects, regardless of delivery 

method. We have talked a lot about that. So it does seem to be a 

pattern. 

There has been recognition in the VA’s own testimony that they 

were slow in processing change orders and were needing to make 

improvements and are trying to do so. 

However, I will say that the true cost of a project is a simple 

mathematical formula, which is the budgeted cost, sometimes it 

has been called a firm fixed-price. In State contracting here, it is 

called a guaranteed maximum price, a GMP. 

But then you are going to have some change orders that I talked 

about before, that could be only scheduled related, just a change in 

schedule. It could be a change in design. It could be conditions that 

are encountered, a change in scope. Maybe you want to move somebody into the fourth floor of an individual building faster than you 

originally thought. Just that speeding up of a schedule, over time, 

different things. 

You have to add those pieces into the mathematical calculation 

to get to the final true cost. And the slower it takes to lay another 

change order on the table, then you are not adding that to the final 

numbers. 

Mr. COFFMAN. And it gives the appearance of a lower number, 

does it not? At that point in time? 

Mr. GIFFORD. At that point, it would appear lower than what the 

final cost is going to be, because you haven’t laid some of those 

other change orders on the table yet. 


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Until they are an official change order—remember, I said a 

change order is a change to the contract—it is just a field directive 

or a change directive. ‘‘Go do this, and we will count that up later.’’ 

Until you add that in, the cost of the project has not risen. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Davia 

Mr. DAVIA. I would only add that, in construction, we consider 

the cost to build something to be inclusive of land, the cost of materials, the people to build it, the commissioning, everything it takes, 

so that we deliver to the owner a fixed-price project for X dollars. 

And in layering items in different buckets, or calling them dif- ferent things, whether it is $600 million, or $1 billion, you need to 

derive at what it costs Congress and the taxpayers to arrive at, 

‘‘This is how much this building will cost.’’ 

And I would echo Mr. Gifford’s comments and only add one more 

thing. In an environment like today, most projects are being fasttracked. We do something called building information modeling, 

which is we build a building on the computer before we dig a ditch. 

And why that is important is it avoids collisions and other things 

that maybe the steel erectors put a wall here, and we have to drive 

our pipe or duct through it, and now all of a sudden, we are cutting 

it out and redoing it, which lends itself back to the original comments that I made, which is that it is really nice to have the entire 

design team involved long before we start kind of finalizing contracts and values. It would lend itself to avoid situations much like 

you are hearing today. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Are there smaller employers, either one of you, 

that may very well go under as a result of this mismanagement, 

in terms of the change order process? 

Mr. DAVIA. I will take a turn at that first. Two things, number 

one, I talked about the cash flow crisis, and yes, it is very possible 

that one or more especially smaller companies could cease to exist 

if they are starved of the extra cash long enough. 

And we are at a point now where I have a concern that that 

could happen on this project. I am not saying it will happen, but 

I have a concern. And there are two reasons for that. Number one, 

construction is a cash flow business, so you need cash flow to continue to work and keep your people working on other projects. And 

if you have receivables that are over 90 days, if you have a lack 

of cash on your balance sheet, you can’t go and bond for the next 

job. 

So if you can’t continue to do work, and you are owed money that 

you didn’t anticipate a change, an additional cost, they can really 

get you into a bad spot. Now, maybe you can go get some other 

work that doesn’t require bonding and try to make up the difference, but it really can impair your ability to go forward. 

And if you stop moving as a construction company, and you are 

smaller, the real possibility exists that you can no longer be in 

business. 

Mr. COFFMAN. My time has expired. 

Ms. Kirkpatrick. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Davia on fast-tracking, whether or not the 

VA or the Army Corps has that capability, I don’t really know. But 

in your experience, isn’t it typically the contractor who has that capability to fast-track? 


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Mr. DAVIA. Ms. Kirkpatrick, it is. It is issued by the owner to say 

the date is the date, and we need you to make that. And we would 

come back to them and say that may require two or three crews, 

it may require graveyards, weekends, things that weren’t part of 

our original pricing because in a panacea, we work 5 days a week, 

start at 7, end at 3. But when you get into that kind of environment, it does cost the owner more, and we as construction professionals, we work for the owner. 

So if that is what they say we need to do, we do it, but it does 

come at a price. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Do you see that as a possibility for this project 

in Aurora, or do you see it as necessary to meet that target completion date of May 2015? 

Mr. DAVIA. We heard today from the two gentlemen to my right 

and your left about access of a facility of this nature. I would say 

to you that the construction community always finds a way to rally 

behind things. All you have to do is look to Northwest Colorado to 

the floods we experienced. 

We can move mountains and do great things in a very condensed 

period of time. We just need the owner to say yes and have assurances that the funding is available, because if we move without 

that approval process, then we as the contractors are at risk. It is 

our livelihood that is at risk, not the owners’ or the veterans’. 

Clearly, in this case, we could do that if we were given the assurances and the green light to go. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Can a fixed-price contract be fast-tracked? 

Mr. DAVIA. I don’t know the terms of this particular agreement. 

But I would offer the following comments, maybe a little naively, 

to say I heard there is a desire to get to a fixed-price contract for 

this project, but it is currently not a fixed-price contract. 

Therefore, I can only assume that we can fast-track or the VA 

can make necessary arrangements to authorize the fast-tracking of 

this contract. But again, I think price will be the factor, if it is not 

already. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Gifford, I am concerned about the number 

of contractors who might be affected in this particular project, because, as you know, you testified or Mr. Davia that the profit margin is between 2 percent and 3 percent, and very few contractors 

have the ability to carry huge amounts of money for a long time, 

and especially in the current economic climate. 

Do you have any idea how many contractors on this particular 

job are facing that possibility? 

Mr. GIFFORD. Representative Kirkpatrick, I don’t have a firm 

number, because that would be going into some pretty minute detail in each financial situation. But it is not uncommon to have 

anywhere from 20, 30, 50, or even more subcontractors or pieces of 

a commercial building of this size. And all of them, to my knowledge, have a piece of any change in schedule, which is a huge one 

on this project, just to change the schedule and design. And so that 

goes to the financial wherewithal of each of those companies. 

But I wouldn’t be surprised if you were looking at 10 or more 

companies that could be in a serious category, just based on different ones that I have talked to. 


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Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you. And again, I thank the panel for 

testifying, and thank you for your service to our country. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Ms. Kirkpatrick. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bozella, transparency is a problem that you cited in your testimony, and that is one where the VA suffers what appear to me 

to be systemic issues and problems. 

What can the VA do to improve transparency in major construction projects like the Denver project? 

Mr. BOZELLA. Mr. Lamborn, Mr. Chairman, first, let me preface 

that by saying, in our work in the System Worth Saving Task 

Force, the biggest problem we see in VA is not the fact that they 

have problems. Every health care system has problems. It is what 

they do about the problem. 

And what they do is a very slow process of enabling the local administration of that hospital to be able to get out in front of it, tell 

the public what is going on, and what they are going to do to fix 

it, once we understand they have a problem. 

The Legionella issue in Pittsburgh, where six veterans died from 

Legionella disease—I know Chairman Miller is well-aware of that 

whole process. 

In South Carolina, and the backlog of G.I. consults, and four veterans ended up with cancer because they weren’t diagnosed in 

time. 

But the process to fix that goes through a long line up the chain 

of command to the central office to finally approve a press release. 

The same thing happens with the construction processes. 

This local administration was told they weren’t allowed to talk 

to us, the veterans, about what is going on in hospital. I have sat 

in meetings, the last one that comes to mind is June 2011, where 

the contracting officer sat in one corner of the room, the other contracting officer ran the meeting. The room was full of VA staff 

members. And nobody is asking questions. 

I was invited to the meeting as a veterans’ representative. I was 

the only person asking questions. And when the meeting was over, 

one of the senior hospital medical staff came to me and said, ‘‘You 

keep doing this. We are not allowed to say anything here.’’ 

So it seems to me the communication has closed up. And I believe that is where a different perspective on the change order process—it is like nobody is talking about what is wrong with the hospital. They, certainly, don’t want to talk to us. 

And I did challenge the VA with that, yesterday. And I want to 

credit Mr. Haggstrom and his team. They met with eight of us at 

the hospital yesterday, and that was the first time that we heard 

information of what the VA is thinking about this project, a lot of 

what you heard this morning. And it was good to hear that. 

The point is, you should tell us what is wrong, tell us what you 

are going to do to fix it. Don’t be afraid of bad information. 

In fact, instead of us crafting your message, you craft your message and we can be become your greatest ally to resolve it. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And, Commander Rosa, I appreciate your work 

here in Colorado, and it has been great to work with you over the 

years. My office enjoys working with you and the folks at the VFW. 


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Do you have anything that you would like to respond to, having 

heard the VA’s testimony? 

Mr. ROSA. Mr. Lamborn, I sat here and I listened to it. And I 

will be honest with you, I come from an old school in the Navy. I 

am an old Navy Chief. And I think it would probably be better if 

I didn’t comment, because some of the things I heard—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ROSA. I think we have a term for it in the Navy, and I refuse 

to do that here, out of respect. 

But I do think that some of the things I have read in my research, dealing with these litigations and the lawsuits and everything, I am still trying to figure out how we can still have a date 

of May 2015 when we have constant delays. We have litigation 

going on. We have lawsuits going on. But we are going to complete 

this thing in May 2015? 

I am sorry, I am a realist. I am not a dreamer. Thank you. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

And I will just conclude by saying I do appreciate what the VA 

is doing in Colorado Springs with the super-clinic down there. They 

are doubling the current space available for local treatment of 

health care for veterans. And that means that people all over 

southern Colorado won’t have to make the trip to Denver that is 

sometimes very difficult, especially if there is a health issue. 

So what they are doing appears to be on time, on budget. And 

I applaud that. And I thank them for that good work. And I look 

forward to that opening later this year. 

I just hope we can get this facility in Denver fixed. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. That is Aurora. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Miller. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gifford, these are pretty general in nature, 

but does a contractor or a subcontractor do work before the change 

order is authorized or approved, as a general rule? 

Mr. GIFFORD. Representative Miller, that is a very good question. 

There are situations where the contract requires that when the 

owner directs additional work, that that work commence, even if 

there is not a signed change order. 

The CHAIRMAN. But they have been directed by the owner to 

make that change. So they are not just going out and doing this 

work, I would not assume, unless somebody had approved. But 

what they are saying is, we need to do this change, and this is 

what it is going to cost to make the change. 

Mr. GIFFORD. And to be clear, there is a chain of command, so 

the owner would direct the prime or the general contractor. Only 

the prime or general contractor would direct the subcontractor. 

The CHAIRMAN. And the other question is, when a contractor 

bids, when the prime bids a project, he is relying on documents and 

designs that are provided by the owner, correct? 

Mr. GIFFORD. That is correct. There are nuances in the different 

delivery methods, whether it is design-bid-build or—— 

The CHAIRMAN. So if there is a flaw in the design, or some type 

of groundwater problem exists, or there is dewatering that needs 


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to be done, or piles that need to be set, that wasn’t apparent from 

the design and the documents, who bears that cost? 

Mr. GIFFORD. Again, that is a fairly—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Especially if we have a firm target-price contract. 

Mr. GIFFORD. It would go back to the type of contract that you 

have. But you are describing maybe a condition that wasn’t known. 

It could be asbestos in a building, or it could be groundwater. 

The CHAIRMAN. Wasn’t known to the contractor. 

Mr. GIFFORD. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN. It may have been known to the owner? 

Mr. GIFFORD. In some cases, that, certainly, can be the case, that 

it can be known, and there could be other kind of design changes, 

where it just says, why do we have a curved wall when we can 

have a straight wall? 

The CHAIRMAN. And I am not implying at all that that it is what 

has occurred here. But I am definitely aware of instances at New 

Orleans, where the owner knew certain things existed and did not 

inform the contractor. And that is not right. 

Mr. GIFFORD. I would agree. In most cases, that is why the 

change order vehicle or tool exists, to adjust for those types of situations. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I am just trying to help the committee understand that I don’t believe the contractor is going out arbitrarily, 

throwing change orders at the owner in order to get their price 

jacked up. 

I mean, I find it very difficult and, unfortunately, because of the 

litigation, we can’t invite the prime contractor on this project to 

testify, but I can’t believe that they have submitted change orders 

and no documentation. 

Is that normal? 

Mr. GIFFORD. No, that is not normal. 

The CHAIRMAN. I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Gardner. 

Mr. GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DAVIA. I just would like you to respond to some of the comments made by Mr. Haggstrom. 

Mr. DAVIA. Thank you, Congressman Gardner. 

It felt like to me, from listening to the testimony, that there is 

an assertion that the general construction community may be filled 

with some bad actors or folks who just don’t get it right in every 

market, maybe specifically here in Aurora. Kiewit-Turner, to be in 

full disclosure, is not a member of mine, but I feel compelled to defend them a little bit. 

They are great contractors. My members enjoy working for them. 

If they were not good contractors, we sell a service, and if we can’t 

sell that service and perform to the owner’s expectations over a period of time, we would be out of business. Those are just the pure 

factors of the market and the dynamics we live in. 

We are not in the legal profession. We are in the profession of 

building items. And so it is not in our general interest, nor is it 

our desire, to end up in court, nor position a project to do that. 

You only get so many opportunities to do that before an owner 

says, ‘‘I am never going to hire that so and so again.’’ And that is 

unfortunate. 


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Ninety percent of construction firms in Colorado employee 20 or 

fewer people. This is a small-business issue. This isn’t about some 

behemoth financing some project, or trying to play chicken, if you 

will, with an owner. 

I have to tell you that we specialize in building buildings. We 

have teams that specialize in building certain kinds of applications 

just by nature. 

I too would offer, and this may sound trite, and I apologize, but 

I stopped believing in the tooth fairy a long time ago. I think the 

date of May 2015 is problematic, given the fact that you have this 

much before the legal system to interpret and sort out. 

And so I would just ask that this committee take a look at, real 

hard and fast, the proposal Chairman Coffman has, and try and 

find a way to support that. 

The Army Corps of Engineers does an outstanding job, in our 

opinion, of being stewards of taxpayer dollars and administering 

construction projects. 

So I would conclude my comments, unless you have something 

else you would like to ask. 

Mr. GARDNER. I just want to thank the panelists. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on this issue. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gardner. 

Ms. Kirkpatrick. 

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Mr. Chairman, I have some statements for the 

record, from Senators Udall and Bennet, and from Representatives 

Polis and Perlmutter, that I would like to submit for the record. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Is there any objection? 

So ordered. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, panel. You are now free to leave. 

Thank you so much for your testimony today. 

Mr. Bozella, thank you so much for your service to our country. 

Chief Rosa, from my Marine Corps days, thank you for your service as well. 

Today, we have had a chance to hear about many problems occurring with VA’s major construction projects, particularly with regard to extensive delays and cost overruns occurring at the replacement Aurora VA Medical Center. 

As such, this hearing was necessary to accomplish a number of 

goals: first, to assess the extent of delays and amount over budget 

for the current project; second, to require an explanation from VA 

on how the project has been allowed to suffer these pervasive problems; and third, to determine what measures can be taken to get 

the project back on track, so local veterans can begin receiving necessary care. 

I remain unconvinced that VA can fix these problems without 

outside intervention, so I encourage my colleagues to support our 

bipartisan bill, H.R. 3593, the VA Construction Assistance Act. 

I ask unanimous consent that all members have 5 legislative 

days to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous 

material. 

Without objection, so ordered. 


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Mr. COFFMAN. I would like to once again thank all of our witnesses and the audience members for joining us in today’s conversation. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 


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PREPARED STATEMENT OF KIRK ROSA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

On behalf of the men and women of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United 

States (VFW), our Auxiliaries, and specifically the nearly 19,000 VFW members living in Colorado today, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding the continued construction delays and cost overruns of the Aurora Veterans 

Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) replacement project. 

The current VAMC in Denver was built in 1948 and has outlived any reasonable 

lifecycle expectations. Over the past 66 years, health care technologies have improved and patient demands have changed, but our medical center has not kept 

pace. Discussions for replacing the facility began in 1997, and in 2004 the Capital 

Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services or CARES put the Denver VAMC as one 

of the three facilities most in need of replacement. Now on its forth Secretary, the 

Denver VAMC replacement project is still a year away from its projected completion 

date. 

Veterans in Colorado have waited long enough. The Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) reported last year that the total estimated time to complete this facility will be 10.5 years. In contrast, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command reports that they take approximately four years to build a medical facility from design 

to completion. This shows there are more efficient ways for federal agencies to contract and build facilities. 

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has taken steps to improve their major 

construction practices. In April 2012, the Secretary established the Construction Review Council to conduct oversight and performance accountability for planning, 

budgeting and executing VA’s capital asset management process. The Council identified five areas that contributed to VA’s construction cost overruns and delivery 

delays. 

VA identified that placing project development in front of authorization and appropriations in the capital investment program process will reduce the number of 

project unknowns and provide a more reliable cost and time estimate. Then the 

Council recommended four other actions that should improve VA’s real property capital program. The recommendations start with requiring VA to have the more complete design of a project before submitting for funding, and to conduct master planning in coordination with the Strategic Capital Investment Plan (SCIP). It then calls 

on VA to improve the design review process, better coordinate the SCIP process with 

the budget process to improve funding recommendations, and design a program 

management process that will be used while the facility is being built to improve 

communication within VA and between VA and the general contractor. 

These and other initiatives VA has undertaken to improve their real property capital planning are noble, but with access and utilization gaps in major construction 

that will cost more than $20 billion to close, more must be done. 

That is why the VFW supports Chairman Coffman’s bill, HR. 3593, the ‘‘VA Construction Assistance Act of 2013.’’ This bill will codify many of the recommendations 

of the Construction Review Council and GAO by: 

• Using medical equipment planners from the onset of a major medical facility 

construction project. 

• Developing and using a project management plans to improve communication 

among all parties involved. 

• Place construction projects under peer excellence review. 

• Developing a metrics to monitor change-order processing times and ensure 

that process meets other federal department and agency best-practices. 

By placing these provisions in code, there will not be any ambiguity at the project 

management level on what is required while a facility is under construction. This 

will lead to better communication between VA and general contractors, reducing the 

number of change orders and reducing the number of disputes between the two parties, and in the end ensure that facilities are built on time and on budget. 

The bill will also require VA to use the design-build process when possible. This 

process places the architectural/engineering company and the prime construction 

contractor under one contract. This method can save VA up to six months of time 

by putting the design phase and the construction performance metric together. Placing the architect as the lead from start to finish, and having the prime contractor 

work side-by-side with the architect allows the architect to be an advocate for VA. 

Also, the architect and the prime contractor can work together early on in the design phase to reduce the number of design errors, and it also allows them to identify 

and modify the building plans throughout the project. This is a common sense solution to more efficiently and effectively build major construction projects. 


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The last provision is for the Army Corps of Engineers to provide a special project 

manager to conduct oversight of the construction operations regarding compliance 

with acquisition regulations, and monitor the relationship of VA and the prime contractor. It will also authorize the Corps to assist in construction related activities, 

such as change-order requests, and provide guidance on developing best practices 

in overall project operations. 

The VFW supports this provision, but it should be seen as a stop-gap measure 

to help VA to quickly complete these three outstanding major construction projects, 

and systems must be put in place to ensure VA can function under similar guidance 

without the assistance of the Corps on future projects. 

It is important for VA to become more efficient at facility construction. Veterans 

have expectations that medical facilities will be available when VA first states what 

the completion date will be. It is obvious by looking at the number of delays and 

cost overruns that the contracting and building procedures that VA currently uses 

are antiquated and are costing VA millions of dollars more for each project; and 

causing five to six year delays in much needed medical facilities. By passing this 

legislation, VA will gain better oversight, cost controls and more efficient procedures 

for future construction projects. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks and I look forward to any questions 

you or the Committee may have. 

Information Required by Rule XI2(g)(4) of the House of Representatives 

Pursuant to Rule XI2(g)(4) of the House of Representatives, VFW has not received 

any federal grants in Fiscal Year 2013, nor has it received any federal grants in 

the two previous Fiscal Years. 


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PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GLENN D. HAGGSTROM

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to 

appear here this morning to update the Committee on the status of the construction 

of the replacement medical center in Denver. Joining me today is Stella Fiotes, Executive Director for Construction and Facilities Management. 

I would like to take a few moments to highlight two of VA’s most recent projects 

that have been completed to serve Colorado Veterans. Valor Point Homeless Domiciliary, which opened in May 2013, is a 40-bed facility with a two-fold mission: 1) 

To identify homeless and at-risk Veterans who need residential treatment to overcome homelessness; and 2) To provide these Veterans transitional, recovery-focused 

treatment that increases their independent living skills so that they can obtain and 

maintain housing upon graduation. The new Golden VA Clinic, which opened in 

February 2014, is a two-story, 40,000 square foot facility, with a Silver LEED energy efficiency rating, that replaced the 2,000 square foot Lakewood VA Clinic at 

the Denver VA Regional Office. Serving 12,000 Veterans, the Golden VA clinic has 

been outfitted with additional radiology, laboratory and mental health staff to increase access for Veterans. To date, over 6,000 Veterans have switched their primary care site to this clinic over other facilities in the Denver metropolitan area. 

The Office of Acquisition, Logistics and Construction (OALC), is currently managing the major construction project to replace the existing Denver VA Medical Center in the VA Eastern Colorado Health Care System (ECHCS) with a new medical 

center complex at the Fitzsimons campus in Aurora, Colorado and is actively engaged in the execution of 46 additional major medical and cemetery projects that 

are either in active planning, design, or construction. This year, VA plans to deliver 

five medical and two cemetery projects for Veteran use 

The Denver VA replacement medical center project will include 182 inpatient 

beds, an outpatient clinic, a 30-bed community living center, a 30-bed spinal cord 

injury center and a 4-bed blind rehabilitation unit. To date, construction has been 

completed on three phases, bringing the total project to 44 percent complete. This 

project will also allow continued collaboration between the Denver VA Medical Center and the University of Colorado Hospital, which relocated to the Fitzsimons campus, and with the U.S. Air Force, for which OALC completed construction and delivered the outpatient clinic currently in operation. VA currently serves over 78,000 

Veterans through these facilities, with 170,000 Veterans enrolled. 

VA is under contract with Kiewit-Turner (KT), as prime contractor, to provide 

pre-construction services and to build the new facility within a 40-month construction schedule. Both the VA Secretary and Deputy Secretary are briefed monthly on 

the status of this project as part of our Construction Review Council 

(CRC) meetings. The primary purpose of the CRC, which was established by the 

Secretary in 2012, is to serve as a single point of oversight and performance accountability for VA’s major construction program, and the regular meetings serve 

to ensure that VA leadership has visibility and oversight of the VA construction program—to include program requirements development and major changes. To date, 

VA is still in litigation with the contractor regarding the interpretation of the integrated design construct contract. As of March 2014, the contractor has filed a total 

of 23 complaints seeking monetary relief for approximately $13.3 million and has 

made it clear that it will continue to file additional complaints with the Civilian 

Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) if KT is not compensated in the exact amount 

requested for changes or contract modifications. On February 28, 2014, VA filed a 

motion to dismiss KT’s initial complaint, and KT filed its response with CBCA on 

March 31, 2014. VA filed its reply on April 14, 2014 which CBCA will take under 

advisement. 

Accordingly, I ask for the Chairman’s and the Committee’s understanding since 

VA will be unable to respond to the matters at issue in the litigation as it may compromise the Government’s legal position. However, regardless of the litigation, construction is ongoing. 

Regarding the cost of the project, VA received the final appropriation of the $800 

million total project cost as part of the FY 2012 VA budget. VA signed a contract 

with KT to provide pre-construction services on August 2010 and to build the new 

facility for $604 million with a firm ceiling price of $610 million. As of March 2014, 

VA has paid KT $254.9 million for work performed, and supported by required documentation, under the contract agreement. The original contract amount has been revised to $616.6 million (not to exceed $630 million), to reflect approved contract 

modifications. In a good faith effort and to assist the contractor in making payments 

for work performed, VA has allowed the contractor to bill for work performed later 

in the project up to $30 million. 


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As part of its schedule reviews, VA will extend the contract completion date to 

adjust for delays that were not the responsibility of the contractor. The first extension was offered in February 2014, and VA awaits a response from the contractor. 

VA will continue to monitor the schedule during its reviews and work to mitigate 

further delays in the completion date. However, VA is concerned that KT continues 

to fall behind their proposed schedule based on monthly evaluations of schedules 

provided to VA. 

In the Spring of 2013, VA initiated monthly meetings with KT to facilitate open 

communication amongst senior executives to ensure that the project continued apace 

in spite of the ongoing litigation. It was very disappointing that the contractor made 

the decision to discontinue these meetings. However, VA staff continue to work with 

the contractor to ensure the construction of the medical center moves forward and 

is still operating within the appropriation. The local respective project teams also 

continue to meet to address any issue that may arise during the normal course of 

construction. Additionally, Glenn Haggstrom, Principal Executive Director for the 

VA Office of Acquisition, Logistics and Construction, meets monthly with Mr. Scott 

Cassels, of Kiewit Corporation, to discuss issues of concern. 

VA appreciates the Committee’s interest and support to ensure that VA major 

construction projects, and more specifically the Denver replacement facility, are delivered successfully. While there have been challenges with this project, we have undertaken a comprehensive review of the major construction program and have taken 

numerous actions to strengthen and improve our execution of VA’s ongoing major 

construction projects. With the acceptance and closure of the April 13, 2013, Government Accountability Office report recommendations and implementation of CRC recommendations, VA has changed the way it conducts business, significantly. 

Change orders are not unusual during the construction of any large, complex 

project, such as the Denver replacement medical center; however, VA recognized 

that our process was too lengthy and too cumbersome resulting in delays in the execution of change orders. We addressed those challenges by establishing new policies 

and metrics for change orders, by adding staff and legal counsel to help with the 

review of change orders and by bringing online a real-time, information technology 

tool to accept and track change orders. As a result, we are in a much better position 

now and are processing change orders at a much faster rate than in the past. Although the total number of changes in progress is in constant flux, our goal is to 

process all change orders within 60 days. Other areas identified for review and improvement include the design-review process and steps to streamline procedures, 

while at the same time ensuring that decisions are made at the appropriate levels 

within the Department. We will keep the Committee informed of our progress in 

these areas. 

Discussions continue with our Federal and industry partners, including the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), on collaboration with VA on various aspects of 

our major construction program. VA and USACE have a long history of working together to advance VA facility construction and share best practices. Recent collaboration includes involvement in contract reviews for this construction project and the 

New Orleans construction project. Current discussions are a logical evolution of that 

relationship, and we will continue work with our Federal and private partners to 

drive the successful delivery of these facilities. 

In closing, each day, VA is moving toward its goal of improving and streamlining 

our processes to increase access to our Veterans and their families. To that end, to 

help ensure previous challenges are not repeated and to lead improvements in the 

management and execution of our capital asset program as we move forward, we 

will continue to focus on: 

• Ensuring well-defined requirements and costs are provided to Congress when 

seeking appropriations for construction projects; 

• Ensuring appropriate staffing levels are met to ensure timely project and contract administration; 

• Continuing open dialogue at every level that includes VA and construction 

and design contractors; 

• Ensuring early involvement of the medical equipment planning and procurement teams; and 

• Applying the acquisition program management framework to our projects. 

VA continually seeks innovative ways to further improve our ability to design and 

construct state-of-the-art facilities. VA is fully committed to this goal, and we have 

demonstrated great efforts to work together with our Federal and private partners 

to achieve VA’s goal of being a people-centric, results-driven, and forward-looking 

organization, which ultimately enables us to better serve Veterans and their families. 


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This committee has been a strong and supportive advocate for Veterans’ health 

care, and VA will continue to ensure transparency during the construction of the 

Denver replacement facility. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee today. My colleagues and I would be pleased to respond 

to questions from you and Members of the Committee. 

f 

FOR THE RECORD 

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

STATEMENT OF THE HON. ED PERLMUTTER (CO–7) 

Chairman Coffman, Ranking Member Kirkpatrick, thank you for your efforts regarding the new stand-alone U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Denver replacement medical center at the Fitzsimons medical campus in Aurora, Colorado. 

This hospital has been one of my top priorities for seven years, for six of those 

the project was in my congressional district, only to be removed in the redistricting 

process. This hospital has been promised to our veterans for nearly fifteen years. 

The project has gone through a number of iterations over the years under two Presidents and four Secretaries of the VA. The hospital is well underway and I appreciate the Committee’s interest in it, but the time has come to focus our efforts on 

ensuring the completion of this hospital. Our veterans deserve nothing less and the 

people of Colorado and our nation expect it. 

Once completed, this medical center will serve hundreds of thousands of veterans 

across the Rocky Mountain West. The 182-bed facility will include a full range of 

medical, laboratory, research and counseling services, a 30-bed spinal cord injury 

unit, a 30-bed community living center and a PTSD rehabilitation clinic. 

The original design called for an approximately $1.1 billion state-of-the-art medical center, but Congress authorized and appropriated $800 million for acquisition 

of approximately 40 acres of land and several buildings, as well as design and construction. The original design appears not to have significantly changed, and consequently a funding gap exists between the authorized amount for the contract and 

the overall cost of the project. This dispute is leaving the sub-contractors who are 

small businesses left footing the bill as they are required to continue construction 

without the guarantee of getting paid for work completed. The contract dispute will 

be heard next month by the U.S. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. 

Completely separate from the decision by the U.S. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, the project would immediately benefit from insights provided by independent, 

external experts regarding the VA’s construction policies and procedures going forward. I have urged the VA to work with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army 

Corps) which has decades of technical and managerial experience in hospital construction, as well as a remarkable track record for completing major construction 

projects on time and on budget. The VA has the authority to enter into an Interagency Agreement as soon as practicable to allow the Army Corps to conduct a Design-Construction Evaluation (DCE) on this project. This evaluation is a common 

practice to provide the VA with a full review of the procurement, engineering, construction and project management processes to identify problems and recommend 

solutions the VA can implement. The Army Corps regularly completes DCEs on its 

own projects at major milestones or when potential funding or schedule delays arise. 

The Army Corps has also worked with other federal agencies on a number of occasions to conduct evaluations on their construction practices to improve project management and timely project completion. The VA has a strong history of collaboration 

with the Army Corps on construction projects, and discussions are ongoing for the 

use of these DCEs on major construction projects, including the Aurora medical center. This approach can be done today, without any congressional action, and I continue to urge the VA to enter into this agreement as quickly as possible. 

Our veterans deserve the best hospital possible built at the best price as quickly 

as possible. They should not be forced to wait even a day longer than necessary for 

the timely, world-class care this medical center will provide. The U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers has the expertise to assist the VA in fulfilling this promise to Rocky 

Mountain veterans. 

I look forward to continuing to work with the VA on this critical project to ensure 

our veterans receive the health care they earned. 


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STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL BENNET (CO) 

Chairman Coffman and Ranking Member Kirkpatrick: 

Today’s hearing on the status of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Medical Facility in Aurora, Colorado, is critically important, not only to western region Veterans, but to the American taxpayer. When complete, this facility will 

provide world-class care to generations of Veterans and their families. However, the 

VA has struggled to keep this project on time and on budget, and we welcome continued scrutiny and oversight of this venture. 

As a Congressional delegation, we have attempted to maintain an open dialogue 

with the VA throughout this process. We have met with officials at the highest levels to identify and correct the systemic flaws plaguing this construction project. Although we have worked closely with VA officials over the last several months, our 

most pressing questions remain unanswered, and our concerns continue to grow regarding the management of the payment process to sub-contractors. The VA claims 

to have streamlined the change order system, yet sub-contractors remain unpaid. It 

is unconscionable that Colorado small businesses should bear the burden of the VA’s 

inability to competently manage this endeavor. 

Additionally, the fact that the VA and the prime contractor Kiewit-Turner (KT) 

have been unable to resolve fundamental contract disputes and have instead entered into litigation has increased frustration with this project and added unacceptable levels of uncertainty for Veterans. For months, the Congressional delegation 

has worked to find avenues for the VA and KT to resolve these contract disagreements. Unfortunately, entrenched interests prevented both sides from coming together to act in the best interests of the people. However, I firmly believe we cannot 

allow the litigation process to hold back much-needed progress. The VA does not 

need Congressional approval or additional funding to take advantage of available 

best-practice standards and resources available through other government partners. 

The need for action is why I, along with Senator Udall and Representative 

Perlmutter, have called for the VA to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding 

with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). The USACE has the technical and 

managerial experience with major construction projects, as well as a successful 

track record for completing hospital construction on time and within budget. The 

USACE and the VA have the ability to enter into an interagency agreement to conduct a Design-Construction Evaluation (DCE) on this project to ensure completion. 

This evaluation is common practice in the construction community and will provide 

the VA with a full review of construction and project management processes to identify problems and recommend solutions going forward. The USACE routinely uses 

the DCE process on its own projects, and the VA will benefit greatly from this independent assessment. 

Again, I thank Chairman Coffman and Ranking Member Kirkpatrick for their attention to this important issue. The delays and cost overruns plaguing this project 

are deeply disturbing and represent a disservice to our nation’s veterans and the 

American taxpayer. Veterans and Colorado small business deserve straightforward 

answers from the VA about how it will put this project back on track. 

Sincerely, 

f 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARK UDALL

Chairman Coffman and Ranking Member Kirkpatrick, the subject of today’s hearing is of great importance to Colorado and veterans from throughout the Rocky 

Mountain west. When completed, the VA Medical Center currently under construction on the Fitzsimons campus in Aurora will provide the world-class medical care 

and facilities that our veterans have earned, and your attention to the project is appreciated. 

The demand for an on-time, on-budget completion of this critical project has 

united the Colorado veteran community and our congressional delegation. It is important that Congress continue to exercise its oversight authority to ensure that 

taxpayers and veterans receive the best possible facility for their tax dollars. 

We must also continue to identify and correct the systemic issues that have led 

to significantly delayed payments for many of the small businesses employed as subcontractors on this project. While there is no doubt that significant disagreements 

exist between VA and the prime contractor, it is not acceptable to delay payment 

to subcontractors for work already completed. VA and its contractors must take immediate steps to establish management practices and contract agreements that provide for far quicker review of change order requests. As I have stated repeatedly, 


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VA should adopt standards and best practices long used by other federal agencies 

such as the Government Services Administration and the Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) to streamline the change order approval process. Those actions do not require congressional authority and should be taken by VA as soon as practicable. 

While the contract dispute between VA and the prime contractor is still pending 

review and adjudication in the U.S. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, there are 

other immediate steps VA can take to ensure that best practices are being followed 

during the construction of the Aurora hospital and other major VA projects. USACE 

has significant experience and expertise in the management and construction of 

large military medical centers—as well as a record of delivering on-time, on-budget 

major medical facilities to the Department of Defense. In light of that fact, I—along 

with Senator Michael Bennet and Rep. Ed Perlmutter—wrote to VA Secretary 

Shinseki in March of this year urging VA to allow USACE to conduct a Design-Construction Evaluation, or DCE on the Aurora project. 

DCEs are a common practice used to provide construction managers with a full 

review of the procurement, engineering, construction and project management processes in order to identify problems and recommend solutions going forward. The 

Army Corps regularly completes DCEs on its own projects and has worked with 

other federal agencies—including VA—to conduct evaluations of construction practices that improve project management and increase the likelihood of on-time completion. Such an evaluation would only look at the project going forward and would 

have no effect on the pending litigation. A DCE does not require a congressional 

mandate and could be underway in a matter of weeks. I would once again urge VA 

to take this common-sense, practical step as soon as practicable for the good of this 

project, Colorado veterans, and taxpayers. 

Again, I thank Chairman Coffman and Ranking Member Kirkpatrick for their attention to this important issue, and I appreciate the willingness of the witnesses to 

provide their important perspectives regarding this matter. As evidenced by the collaboration and united efforts of our veterans, state and local leaders, and the Colorado congressional delegation, the on-time, on-schedule completion of the replacement medical center is of extreme importance to all of us. We will not ask our veterans to wait any longer than absolutely necessary for this hospital. Through their 

service and sacrifice, they’ve earned the best medical care our country can offer, and 

every effort must be taken to deliver that care as promised. Anything less is simply 

not acceptable. 


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