MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Special Assistant to the State Public 

Defender

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Plainfield, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Charles S. Tink,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

August 5, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

54A05-1410-CR-492

Appeal from the Montgomery 

Circuit Court

The Honorable Peggy Q. Lohorn, 

Special Judge

Case No. 54C01-0706-FA-79

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Charles S. Tink appeals the thirty-five year sentence imposed by the trial court 

upon resentencing for his class A felony burglary conviction. Tink contends 

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that the trial court abused its discretion during resentencing and that the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. 

Choosing to review only the appropriateness of his sentence, we conclude that 

Tink has not met his burden to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. 

Therefore, we affirm his sentence.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 5, 2007, Tink and a woman named Jamie Ingram committed burglary 

against Greg Myers. During the burglary, Tink struck Myers in the head 

several times, put him in a chokehold, and threatened to kill him and his family

if he contacted police. Myers, who was bleeding from his nose and mouth, 

briefly lost consciousness. After regaining consciousness, Tink and Ingram 

continued hitting Myers in the head, and Tink put him in a second chokehold, 

causing him to again lose consciousness, but this time for a longer period. After 

regaining consciousness, Myers was hit again. The attack lasted ten to fifteen 

minutes, and Myers suffered a broken nose with a deviated septum, facial 

fractures, dislocated jaw, bloody nose and mouth, bruised face, neck, and chest, 

and sore throat.

[3] The State charged Tink with class A felony burglary, class B felony burglary, 

class C felony battery, class D felony intimidation, and class D felony 

strangulation. The State also alleged that Tink was a habitual offender. 

Following a jury trial, Tink was found guilty as charged. During sentencing, 

the trial court merged Tink’s lesser convictions into the class A felony burglary

and imposed a forty-year sentence, enhanced by thirty years based upon the 

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habitual offender finding, for an aggregate seventy-year sentence. We affirmed 

Tink’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See Tink v. State, No. 54A01-

0712-CR-547 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2008), trans. denied.

[4] Thereafter, Tink filed a petition for postconviction relief. The parties 

subsequently agreed to a joint motion to dismiss the postconviction petition 

with prejudice. As part of the agreement, the State agreed to allow the trial 

court to vacate Tink’s habitual offender finding as well as his merged 

convictions, with prejudice. The State also agreed to allow the trial court to 

resentence Tink for class A felony burglary, provided that the maximum 

imposed sentence would not exceed thirty-five years. The trial court approved 

the joint motion to dismiss.

[5] On September 29, 2014, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and 

resentenced Tink to thirty-five years for class A felony burglary. This appeal 

followed.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Tink challenges the thirty-five-year sentence imposed by the trial court during 

resentencing for his class A felony burglary conviction. He argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion during resentencing in its findings of aggravators and 

mitigators and also that his thirty-five-year sentence is inappropriate. However, 

even assuming that a trial court abuses its discretion in its findings or nonfindings of aggravators and mitigators, we may choose to review the 

appropriateness of a sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) instead of 

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remanding to the trial court for resentencing. See Windhorst v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

504, 507 (Ind. 2007). Because we may dispose of this case solely upon an 

Appellate Rule 7(B) analysis, we will do so.

[7] Pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence authorized by 

statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the 

sentence “is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character 

of the offender.” Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of 

the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of 

the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light 

in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The 

defendant bears the burden to persuade this Court that his or her sentence is 

inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

[8] We note that another panel of this Court conducted a 7(B) review of Tink’s 

original seventy-year aggregate sentence and concluded that neither the nature 

of the burglary nor Tink’s character warranted a sentence reduction. Tink, slip 

op. at 8. Regarding the nature of the offense, we noted the extreme violence 

and senselessness of Tink’s crime as well as the severity of the injuries caused to 

his victim. Id. Moreover, due to his violent criminal history and his failure to 

address alcohol abuse problems, we concluded that Tink’s character was “not 

impressive.” Id. 

[9] Tink concedes that the nature of the offense has not changed since his original 

sentencing, and he does not challenge the previously identified evidence of his 

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poor character. Instead, Tink points to positive behavior he has exhibited in 

prison and argues that his “significant positive strides towards rehabilitation” 

should persuade us that a lesser sentence than the thirty-five-year sentence 

imposed by the trial court upon resentencing is warranted. Appellant’s Br. at 8. 

We are not so persuaded. 

[10] The sentencing range for a class A felony is between twenty and fifty years, 

with an advisory sentence of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. The parties’

dismissal agreement approved by the trial court capped Tink’s sentence at 

thirty-five years, well below the maximum sentence allowable by statute but 

slightly above the advisory. The trial court’s decision to impose a thirty-fiveyear sentence acknowledges the approved agreement while continuing to 

recognize the severity of Tink’s crime and the damage done to others. Further, 

while Tink’s recent strides toward rehabilitation are commendable, they do not 

eliminate his prior criminal history. 

[11] The principal role of appellate review “should be an attempt to leaven the 

outliers,” not to achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell, 895 

N.E.2d at 1225. Indeed, “[t]he question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not 

whether another sentence is more appropriate: rather, the question is whether 

the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2008). The thirty-five-year sentence imposed by the trial court upon 

resentencing is not an outlier and, under the circumstances, Tink has not met 

his burden to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense or his character. Therefore, we affirm his sentence.

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[12] Affirmed.

May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

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