2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-28-2010

Aaron Boring v. Google Inc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-2350

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 09-2350

_____________

AARON C. BORING; CHRISTINE BORING,

husband and wife respectively,

 Appellants

v.

GOOGLE INC.

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 08-cv-00694)

Magistrate Judge: Honorable Amy Reynolds Hay

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 25, 2010

Before: RENDELL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges, 

and PADOVA,* Senior District Judge.

(Filed: January 28, 2010)

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

_______________

 *Honorable John R. Padova, United States District Court Senior Judge for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
 Google Maps is a service offered by Google that “gives users the ability to look up 1

addresses, search for businesses, and get point-to-point driving directions – all plotted on

interactive street maps ... .” (App. at A5.)

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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Aaron C. Boring and Christine Boring appeal from an order of the United States

District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing their complaint under

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm in part and reverse in part. 

I. Background

On April 2, 2008, the Borings commenced an action in the Court of Common

Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania against Google, Inc., asserting claims for

invasion of privacy, trespass, injunctive relief, negligence, and conversion. The Borings

sought compensatory, incidental, and consequential damages in excess of $25,000 for

each claim, plus punitive damages and attorney’s fees. 

The Borings’ claims arise from Google’s “Street View” program, a feature on

Google Maps that offers free access on the Internet to panoramic, navigable views of 1

streets in and around major cities across the United States. To create the Street View

program, representatives of Google attach panoramic digital cameras to passenger cars

and drive around cities photographing the areas along the street. According to Google,

“[t]he scope of Street View is public roads.” (Appellee's Ans. Br. at 10.) Google allows
 For ease of reference, the amended complaint is referred to herein simply as the 2

“complaint.”

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individuals to report and request the removal of inappropriate images that they find on

Street View. 

The Borings, who live on a private road in Pittsburgh, discovered that Google had

taken “colored imagery of their residence, including the swimming pool, from a vehicle in

their residence driveway months earlier without obtaining any privacy waiver or

authorization.” (App. at A31.) They allege that their road is clearly marked with a

“Private Road, No Trespassing” sign (Appellants’ Op. Br. at 11), and they contend that, in

driving up their road to take photographs for Street View and in making those

photographs available to the public, Google “disregarded [their] privacy interest.” (Id.)

On May 21, 2008, Google invoked diversity jurisdiction, removed the action to the

United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and filed a motion

to dismiss. The Borings then filed an amended complaint, substituting a claim for unjust

enrichment for their earlier conversion claim. On August 14, 2008, Google again moved 2

to dismiss the Borings’ complaint for failure to state a claim. 

On February 17, 2009, the District Court granted Google’s motion to dismiss as to

all of the Borings’ claims. The Court dismissed the invasion of privacy claim because the

Borings were unable to show that Google’s conduct was highly offensive to a person of

ordinary sensibilities. Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695, 699-700 (W.D. Pa.

2009). The Court dismissed the negligence claim because it found that Google did not
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owe a duty to the Borings. Id. at 701. In dismissing the trespass claim, the Court held

that “the Borings have not alleged facts sufficient to establish that they suffered any

damages caused by the alleged trespass.” Id. at 702. The Court found the unjust

enrichment claim wanting because the parties had no relationship that could be construed

as contractual and the Borings did not confer anything of value upon Google. Id. at 703. 

The Court also held that the Borings had failed to plead a plausible claim for injunctive

relief under Pennsylvania’s “demanding” standard for a mandatory injunction, and

dismissed the punitive damages claim because the Borings failed to “allege facts

sufficient to support the contention that Google engaged in outrageous conduct.” Id. at

701 n.3, 704. In sum, the Court concluded that the Borings “failed to state a claim under

any count” and that “any attempted amendment would be futile.” Id. at 698, 704 n.8.

The Borings moved for reconsideration, asserting that it was error to dismiss their

trespass and unjust enrichment claims, as well as their request for punitive damages. The

District Court denied the motion. Boring v. Google, Civ. A. No. 08-694, 2009 WL

931181 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2009). The Court again said that the Borings had failed to

allege conduct necessary to support a punitive damages award. 2009 WL 931181, at *2. 

It also declined to reconsider the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim because the

Borings did not point to any flaw in the Court’s disposition of that claim. Id. Finally, the

Court addressed the Borings’ trespass claim only to “eliminate any possibility that the

language in [its opinion] might be read to suggest that damages are part of a prima facie
 Google timely removed the action to the District Court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1441 3

and 1446. The District Court exercised diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We

have appellate jurisdiction over the final orders of the District Court under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.

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case for trespass.” Id., at *1. To clarify, the Court explained that it had dismissed the

trespass claim because the Borings had “failed to allege facts sufficient to support a

plausible claim that they suffered any damage as a result of the trespass” and because they

failed to request nominal damages in their complaint. Id., at *1. 

The Borings filed a timely notice of appeal from both the District Court’s order

granting the motion to dismiss and the subsequent denial of their motion for

reconsideration. 

II. Discussion3

A. Standard of Review

We conduct a de novo review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a complaint. See

Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). The Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). To avoid dismissal,

the complaint must set forth facts that raise a “plausible inference” that the defendant

inflicted a legally cognizable harm upon the plaintiff. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

1952 (2009); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)

(explaining that a plaintiff must “identify[] facts that are suggestive enough to render [his
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claim] plausible”); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (stating that “a plaintiff must ‘nudge [his or

her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible’ in order to survive a motion to

dismiss”) (citations omitted). Conclusory allegations of liability do not suffice. See

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (opining that the federal pleading standard “marks a notable and

generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it

does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions”). We must disregard “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action ... .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

A court confronted with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must accept the truth of all factual

allegations in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

non-movant. Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 549 F.3d 605, 610 (3d Cir.

2008). Legal conclusions receive no such deference, and the court is “not bound to

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 286 (1886) (cited with approval in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations

omitted)). Although a plaintiff may use legal conclusions to provide the structure for the

complaint, the pleading’s factual content must independently “permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. In short, when

the well-pleaded complaint does not permit us “to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct,” the pleader is not entitled to relief. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d

203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).
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On appeal, the Borings contend that the District Court erred in dismissing their

invasion of privacy, trespass, unjust enrichment, and punitive damages claims, as well as

their request for injunctive relief. We address each claim in turn.

B. Invasion of Privacy

Pennsylvania law recognizes four torts under the umbrella of invasion of privacy: 

“ [1] unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; [2] appropriation of another’s

name or likeness; [3] unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life; and [4]

publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.” See Burger

v. Blair Med. Assocs., Inc., 964 A.2d 374, 376-77 (Pa. 2009) (citing RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-E (1977)). The District Court treated the Borings’

complaint as asserting claims for both intrusion upon seclusion and publicity to private

life, and it held that the complaint failed to state a claim for either, focusing on the lack of

facts in the complaint to support a conclusion that the Street View images would be

highly offensive to a reasonable person. The Borings contend that the District Court was

wrong to decide, on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, that “a reasonable person would not be

highly offended” after having discovered, as the Borings did, that someone “entered onto

secluded private property [and] took 360 [degree] pictures ... .” (Appellants’ Op Br. at

19.) 
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i. Intrusion upon Seclusion

To state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, plaintiffs must allege conduct

demonstrating “an intentional intrusion upon the seclusion of their private concerns which

was substantial and highly offensive to a reasonable person, and aver sufficient facts to

establish that the information disclosed would have caused mental suffering, shame or

humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.” Pro Golf Mfg., Inc. v. Tribune Review

Newspaper Co., 809 A.2d 243, 247 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted). Publication is not an

element of the claim, and thus we must examine the harm caused by the intrusion itself. 

See Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 621 (3d Cir. 1992). 

No person of ordinary sensibilities would be shamed, humiliated, or have suffered

mentally as a result of a vehicle entering into his or her ungated driveway and

photographing the view from there. The Restatement cites knocking on the door of a

private residence as an example of conduct that would not be highly offensive to a person

of ordinary sensibilities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B cmt. d. The

Borings’ claim is pinned to an arguably less intrusive event than a door knock. Indeed,

the privacy allegedly intruded upon was the external view of the Borings’ house, garage,

and pool – a view that would be seen by any person who entered onto their driveway,

including a visitor or a delivery man. Thus, what really seems to be at the heart of the

complaint is not Google’s fleeting presence in the driveway, but the photographic image
 Though not pertinent to our decision, we note Google’s assertion, which is not 4

seriously contested by the Borings, that the Street View photograph is similar to a view of

the Borings’ house that was once publicly available online through the County Assessor’s

website.

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captured at that time. The existence of that image, though, does not in itself rise to the

level of an intrusion that could reasonably be called highly offensive.4

 Significantly, the Borings do not allege that they themselves were viewed inside

their home, which is a relevant factor in analyzing intrusion upon seclusion claims. See,

e.g., Pacitti v. Durr, Civ. A. No. 05-317, 2008 WL 793875, at *26 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24,

2008) (holding that no reasonable person would find the fact that defendant entered into

plaintiff’s condominium to speak with a third party highly offensive because plaintiff was

not in the condominium at the time), aff'd, 310 F. App’x 526 (3d Cir. 2009); GTE

Mobilnet of S. Texas Ltd. P'ship v. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d 599, 618 (Tex. App. 2001)

(finding that “the mere fact that maintenance workers ... look[ed] over into the adjoining

yard is legally insufficient evidence of highly offensive conduct.”).

The Borings suggest that the District Court erred in determining what would be

highly offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities at the pleading stage, but they do not

cite to any authority for this proposition. Courts do in fact, decide the “highly offensive”

issue as a matter of law at the pleading stage when appropriate. See, e.g., Diaz v. D.L.

Recovery Corp., 486 F.Supp. 2d 474, 475-480 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (denying defendant’s

motion to dismiss as to plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim because allegations that debt
 Google spends much time arguing that the Borings’ driveway was not actually a 5

private place sufficient to sustain an invasion of privacy claim. It notes that numerous

courts have found no intrusion upon seclusion based upon a view that can be seen from

the outside of the home, and points to the fact that images of the Borings’ home were

already available on the Internet. Because we conclude that the alleged conduct would

not be highly offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities, we need not decide whether

the Borings’ driveway was a “private place” for purposes of an invasion of privacy claim.

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collector called debtor at her home stating he would “repossess all of her household

belongings and even her car” stated a claim for invasion of privacy). The Borings also

suggest that the Court erred in expressing skepticism about whether the Borings were

actually offended by Google’s conduct in light of the Borings’ public filing of the present

lawsuit. However, the District Court’s comments came after the Court had already

concluded that Google’s conduct would not be highly offensive to a person of ordinary

sensibilities. Thus, the Court properly applied an objective standard in deciding whether

the conduct was highly offensive.5

In sum, accepting the Borings’ allegations as true, their claim for intrusion upon

seclusion fails as a matter of law, because the alleged conduct would not be highly

offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 

ii. Publicity Given to Private Life

To state a claim for publicity given to private life, a plaintiff must allege that the

matter publicized is “(1) publicity, given to (2) private facts, (3) which would be highly

offensive to a reasonable person, and (4) is not of legitimate concern to the public.” 

Harris by Harris v. Eastern Pub. Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (citing
 We note, however, that the facts revealed may not actually be “private facts,” as 6

required by prong 2, because the Borings’ property allegedly is or recently was available

to public view by virtue of tax records and maps on other Internet sites. See Strickland v.

Univ. of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 987 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (explaining that “a matter

which was of public record [was] not a private fact”).

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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D). For the reasons just described with respect

to the intrusion upon seclusion claim, we agree with the District Court that the Borings

have failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the third element of a publicity to private

life claim, i.e., that the publicity would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. It is

therefore unnecessary to address the other three prongs.6

In conclusion, accepting the Borings’ allegations as true, their claim for publicity

given to private life fails as a matter of law, because the alleged conduct would not be

highly offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 

C. Trespass

The District Court dismissed the Borings’ trespass claim, holding that trespass was

not the proximate cause of any compensatory damages sought in the complaint and that,

while nominal damages are generally available in a trespass claim, the Borings did not

seek nominal damages in their complaint. While the District Court’s evident skepticism

about the claim may be understandable, its decision to dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6) was

erroneous.

Trespass is a strict liability tort, “both exceptionally simple and exceptionally

rigorous.” Prosser on Torts at 63 (West, 4th ed. 1971). Under Pennsylvania law, it is
 The District Court cited to a single case from 1899 to support its claim that plaintiffs 7

in a trespass case are required to plead nominal damages. However, the case it cited was

not a trespass case. See Morris & Essex Mut. Coal Co. v. Del., L. & W. R. Co., 42 A. 883,

884 (Pa. 1899). In fact, that case is expressly inapplicable to this case. See id. (“The

whole proceeding was to recover damages based, not upon a wrongful invasion of

plaintiff’s [property] rights, but upon an act of assembly which authorized the taking of

the property.”). Similarly, none of the cases cited by Google in its brief are trespass

cases. In fact, Google itself indicates the possibility that we may have to remand the case

to proceed with a nominal damages trespass claim. While it may be true that for some

claims, the failure to seek nominal damages waives a claim for nominal damages, that is

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defined as an “unprivileged, intentional intrusion upon land in possession of another.” 

Graham Oil Co. v. BP Oil Co., 885 F. Supp. 716, 725 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (citing Kopka v.

Bell Tel. Co., 91 A.2d 232, 235 (Pa. 1952)). Though claiming not to have done so, it

appears that the District Court effectively made damages an element of the claim, and that

is problematic, since “[o]ne who intentionally enters land in the possession of another is

subject to liability to the possessor for a trespass, although his presence on the land causes

no harm to the land, its possessor, or to any thing or person in whose security the

possessor has a legally protected interest.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 163; see

also Corr. Med. Care, Inc. v. Gray, Civ. A. No. 07-2840, 2008 WL 248977, *11 (E.D. Pa.

Jan. 30, 2008) (holding that a complaint alleging that defendants entered into plaintiffs’

home on specified dates was “sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under

Pennsylvania trespass law.”). 

Here, the Borings have alleged that Google entered upon their property without

permission. If proven, that is a trespass, pure and simple. There is no requirement in

Pennsylvania law that damages be pled, either nominal or consequential. Cf. 1 STEIN ON

7
not the case with trespass claims. 

 We imply nothing about whether the claim would survive summary judgment, either 8

as to liability or damages, or about the limits on proof that may be appropriate.

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PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 1.3 (3d ed. 2009) (“harm is not a prerequisite to a cause of

action [for trespass,] and nominal damages can be awarded [even though] there has been

and will be no substantial harm.”); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 112 (2009) (“[I]n the

absence of proven or actual damages, plaintiffs are entitled to nominal damages in an

action for trespass.” (citations omitted)). It was thus improper for the District Court to

dismiss the trespass claim for failure to state a claim. Of course, it may well be that,

when it comes to proving damages from the alleged trespass, the Borings are left to

collect one dollar and whatever sense of vindication that may bring, but that is for another

day. For now, it is enough to note that they “bear the burden of proving that the trespass 8

was the legal cause, i.e., a substantial factor in bringing about actual harm or damage” C

& K Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 537 F. Supp. 480, 511 (W.D. Pa. 1982),

rev’d in part on other grounds, 704 F.2d 690, 699 (3d Cir. 1983), if they want more than

a dollar. 

D. Unjust Enrichment

To succeed on a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient

to establish “benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff, appreciation of such benefits by

defendant, and acceptance and retention of such benefits under such circumstances that it

would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without payment of value.”
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Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (quotation omitted). Typically,

with an unjust enrichment claim, a “plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant for a benefit

conferred under an unconsummated or void contact,” and the law then implies a

quasi-contract which requires the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for the value of

the benefit conferred. See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Phillip

Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 936 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); Hershey Foods Corp.

v. Ralph Chapek, Inc., 828 F.2d 989, 998-99 (3d Cir. 1987).

The District Court dismissed the Borings’ unjust enrichment claim after finding

that they had not alleged any relationship between themselves and Google that could be

construed as contractual, and because “it cannot be fairly said that the Borings conferred

anything of value upon Google.” (App. at A12-A13.) The Court further held that the

unjust enrichment claim failed because the Borings had not adequately alleged any other

tort, and Pennsylvania does not recognize unjust enrichment as a stand-alone tort. 

We agree that the facts alleged by the Borings provide no basis for an unjust

enrichment claim against Google. The complaint not only fails to allege a void or

unconsummated contract, it does not allege any benefit conferred upon Google by the

Borings, let alone a benefit for which the Borings could reasonably expect to be

compensated. The complaint alleges that Google committed various torts when it took

photographs of the Borings’ property without their consent. The complaint does not

allege, however, that the Borings gave or that Google took anything that would enrich
 Because we find that the Borings stated a claim for trespass (see supra, Section II.C.ii)

9

and thus survived a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as to that claim, we need not address

whether unjust enrichment is a stand-alone tort under Pennsylvania law. Instead, we hold

that the Borings have failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment, regardless of whether

it is a stand-alone tort, because they have failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a

benefit conferred upon Google by the Borings. Thus, on remand, the Borings are not

entitled to recover under their unjust enrichment claim.

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Google at the Borings’ expense. An unjust enrichment “claim makes sense in cases

involving a contract or a quasi-contract, but not, as here, where plaintiffs are claiming

damages for torts committed against them by [the] defendant[].” Romy v. Burke, No. 9

1236, 2003 WL 21205975, at *5 (Pa. Com. Pl. Philadelphia May 2, 2003).

E. Injunctive Relief

Pennsylvania law provides that in order to establish the right to injunctive relief, a

plaintiff must “establish that his right to relief is clear, that an injunction is necessary to

avoid an injury that cannot be compensated by damages, and that greater injury will result

from refusing rather than granting the relief requested.” Kuznik v. Westmoreland County

Bd. of Comm’rs, 902 A.2d 476, 489 (Pa. 2006) (citing Harding v. Stickman, 823 A.2d

1110, 1111 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)). An injunction is an extraordinary remedy. See

Ambrogi v. Reber, 932 A.2d 969, 974 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 

The District Court held that the complaint failed to set out facts supporting a

plausible claim of entitlement to injunctive relief. We agree that the Borings have not

alleged any claim warranting injunctive relief. The complaint claims nothing more than a

single, brief entry by Google onto the Borings’ property. Importantly, the Borings do not
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allege any facts to suggest injury resulting from Google’s retention of the photographs at

issue, which is unsurprising since we are told that the allegedly offending images have

long since been removed from the Street View program. 

F. Punitive Damages

Pennsylvania law provides that a defendant must have engaged in “outrageous” or

“intentional, reckless or malicious” conduct to sustain a claim for punitive damages. Feld

v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747-48 (Pa. 1984). Indeed, “punitive damages cannot be

based upon ordinary negligence.” Hutchinson ex rel. Hutchinson v. Luddy, 946 A.2d 744,

747 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).

The Borrings’ complaint fails to allege conduct that is outrageous or malicious. 

There is no allegation that Google intentionally sent its driver onto their property or that

Google was even aware that its driver had entered onto the property. Moreover, there are

no facts suggesting that Google acted maliciously or recklessly or that Google

intentionally disregarded the Borings’ rights.

The Borings argue that a claim for punitive damages must always be determined

by a jury, after discovery. But courts do indeed dismiss claims for punitive damages in

advance of trial. See Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d 439, 445, 447 (Pa. 2005)

(reversing a denial of summary judgment as to a punitive damages claim because “[a]

showing of mere negligence, or even gross negligence, will not suffice to establish that

punitive damages should be imposed”); Feld, 485 A.2d at 748 (holding that submission of
 Appellants rely on two cases to argue that punitive damages must always be 10

determined by a jury after discovery: Kirkbride v. Libson Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800

(Pa. 1989), and Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W. 2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 

Kirkbride addressed whether a punitive damages award must bear a reasonable

relationship to the compensatory award, rather than addressing what kind of conduct must

be alleged in order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on a punitive damages claim. 

555 A.2d at 801. The Jacque case, in addition to having no binding authority on our

Court, addressed whether a punitive damages claim may be awarded in connection with a

trespass claim, where nominal damages had been awarded and the trespass was

committed “for an outrageous purpose but no significant harm resulted.” 563 N.W.2d at

161. Thus, that court did not hold that the issue of punitive damages must always go to

the jury. 

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punitive damages issue to jury was error). And, under the pleading standards we are 10

bound to apply, there is simply no foundation in the complaint for a demand for punitive

damages. Cf. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (explaining that while a plaintiff may use legal

conclusions to provide the structure for the complaint, the pleading’s factual content must

independently “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct”);

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (explaining that a plaintiff must “identify[] facts that are

suggestive enough to render [his claim] plausible”).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of Google’s

motion to dismiss the Borings’ claims for invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment,

injunctive relief, and punitive damages. We reverse, however, with respect to the trespass

claim, and remand with instructions that the District Court permit that claim to go

forward.