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EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTERDRUG TECHNOLOGY

COORDINATION AT ONDCP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 

REFORM AND OVERSIGHT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 25, 1997

Serial No. 105–65

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT 

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois 

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

STEPHEN HORN, California 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia 

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South 

Carolina 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey 

VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas 

BOB BARR, Georgia 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

TOM LANTOS, California 

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia 

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania 

GARY A. CONDIT, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, 

DC 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio 

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

JIM TURNER, Texas 

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine 

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee 

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

(Independent) 

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director 

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director 

WILLIAM MOSCHELLA, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian 

JUDITH MCCOY, Chief Clerk 

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Chairman 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

BOB BARR, Georgia 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

TOM LANTOS, California 

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia 

GARY A. CONDIT, California 

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

JIM TURNER, Texas 

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

ROBERT CHARLES, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

IANTHE SAYLOR, Clerk 

MICHAEL YEAGER, Minority Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on June 25, 1997 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of: 

Brandenstein, Albert E., Chief Scientist, Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center, Office of National Drug Control Policy; Ray Mintz, Director, Applied Technology Division, U.S. Customs Service; Lennard J. 

Wolfson, Director, Demand Reduction Systems, DOD Drug Enforcement 

Policy and Support, Office of the Secretary of Defense; and David 

Cooper, Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs 

Division, General Accounting Office ............................................................ 2

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: 

Brandenstein, Albert E., Chief Scientist, Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center, Office of National Drug Control Policy, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 6

Cooper, David, Associate Director, National Security and International 

Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, prepared statement of ........ 37

Mintz, Ray, Director, Applied Technology Division, U.S. Customs Service, 

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 23

Wolfson, Lennard J., Director, Demand Reduction Systems, DOD Drug 

Enforcement Policy and Support, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 31

(1)

EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTERDRUG 

TECHNOLOGY COORDINATION AT ONDCP 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 1997 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Dennis Hastert 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Hastert, Mica, Shadegg, Barr, and Barrett. 

Staff present: Robert Charles, staff director and chief counsel; 

Ianthe Saylor, clerk; Chris Marston, legislative assistant; Michael 

Yeager, minority counsel; and Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk. 

Mr. HASTERT. The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice will come to order. 

Today, this subcommittee meets to review the effectiveness of 

counterdrug technology coordination at the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center, CTAC, within the Office of National 

Drug Control Policy, the Drug Czar’s technology shop. This hearing 

is part of our continuing look at the need for reauthorization of 

ONDCP. 

As many of you know, ONDCP’s current authorization expires at 

the end of this fiscal year. CTAC is a small but theoretically important part of ONDCP, since it was tasked by Congress with coordinating the Nation’s research and development counterdrug technology development effort. 

At present, CTAC is supposed to coordinate the antidrug research and development efforts of 21 Federal agencies. CTAC’s role 

also, theoretically, includes preventing redundance in funding within the counterdrug technology community and, most importantly, 

recommending to the relevant agencies ways to plug any hole in 

the antidrug capabilities of law enforcement agencies. 

Today, the lessons we learn about coordination at CTAC may 

lead to insights about the overall coordination mission of ONDCP, 

something, in fact, that we are very, very interested in and want 

to be able to emphasize that when doing our reauthorization. 

Today’s hearing also highlights the importance of advanced technology in our Nation’s drug war. The specific technologies we will 

examine are drug detection technologies. They play a vital role in 

the production of our Nation’s 301 ports of entry, each controlled 

by the Customs Service. Of special importance are ports of entry 

2

on our southwest border, where last year 300 tons of cocaine, 150 

tons of methamphetamine, and 15 tons of heroin entered the 

United States from Mexico. 

The emerging technologies we will review today are capable of 

some amazing feats. Using the entire suite of technologies, from 

drug-sniffing canines to advanced x rays and particle detectors, our 

border agents are increasingly able to detect drugs in containers, 

trucks, car paneling, and dozens of other hiding places formerly 

unreachable by detection equipment. Our mission, if we are finally 

to turn the corner and win this war, is to do better. 

What this hearing is about today is basically finding the most 

cost-effective solutions to stopping drugs from crossing our border 

and then moving those solutions to the front of the line and implementing them effectively to get results. 

I would turn—when he comes in a minute—to our ranking member from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett, and would recognize anybody else 

on the panel if they have any opening statements. We will let everybody put their opening statement into the record. 

At this time, I would like to introduce our witnesses. First, we 

have Albert Brandenstein, chief scientist at the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center, at the Office of National Drug Control 

Policy. Second, we have Ray Mintz, Director of the Applied Technology Division of the U.S. Customs Service. And next we have 

Lennard Wolfson, Director of Demand Reduction Systems, in the 

Department of Defense Drug Enforcement Policy and Support Division. And finally, David Cooper, Associate Director of the National 

Security and International Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office. 

I would like to welcome our distinguished panel today. And, gentlemen, in accordance with House rules, we must swear you in, and 

please stand and raise your right hands. 

[Witnesses sworn.]. 

Mr. HASTERT. Let the record show that the witnesses answered 

in the affirmative. 

And, Dr. Brandenstein, please proceed with your statement. 

STATEMENTS OF ALBERT E. BRANDENSTEIN, CHIEF SCIENTIST, COUNTERDRUG TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT CENTER, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY; RAY 

MINTZ, DIRECTOR, APPLIED TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, U.S. 

CUSTOMS SERVICE; LENNARD J. WOLFSON, DIRECTOR, DEMAND REDUCTION SYSTEMS, DOD DRUG ENFORCEMENT 

POLICY AND SUPPORT, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; AND DAVID COOPER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, 

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Thank you. 

Chairman Hastert, other members of the subcommittee, my 

name is Al Brandenstein. I am the Director of the Counterdrug 

Technology Assessment Center and chief scientist of the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy. I am a career professional who began 

my involvement with counterdrug technology as an office director 

at the Advanced Research Projects Agency prior to moving over to 

3

head the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center when it was 

created in 1991. 

I want to begin by thanking you for the opportunity to testify on 

behalf of counterdrug coordination and the effectiveness of the Office of National Drug Control Policy in carrying out this role. 

I have a formal statement that I request be submitted for the 

record in its entirety. 

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I will briefly summarize my submitted testimony and limit my remarks to narcotics detection technology. 

My organization has the responsibility, within ONDCP for the 

National Counterdrug Research and Development Program, which 

supports the five goals of the National Drug Control Strategy. And 

you can see those goals are listed on the easel to the left, to your 

right. The topic for discussion today: Narcotics detection technology 

supports national goals 2 and 4. 

CTAC was authorized under the Counternarcotics Technology 

Act of 1990 as the central counterdrug enforcement, research, and 

development organization of the U.S. Government. As delineated in 

the statute, CTAC’s mission is to identify, define, and prioritize 

short, medium, and long-term scientific and technological needs of 

Federal, State, and local drug enforcement agencies, to oversee and 

coordinate drug technology initiatives with Federal civilian and 

military departments, and restructure a national counterdrug enforcement research and development program. 

In 1993, the statute was amended to expand CTAC’s responsibilities to include technology for addiction and rehabilitation research. 

CTAC has sponsored efforts in a broad range of counterdrug 

technology to meet a broad range of counterdrug technology requirements in the areas of data fusion and secure law enforcement 

networking, nonintrusive inspection, surveillance and tracking, 

testing and evaluation, and medical research. 

Nonintrusive inspection technology and narcotics detection technology are important areas for technology initiatives, and we have 

a central role in support and coordination and oversight of these 

activities. We have developed a balanced R&D program spanning 

many areas of R&D and technology. Our Director, General McCaffrey, is solidly behind our efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, last year, the ONDCP Director challenged the 

Federal counterdrug research and development community to formulate a comprehensive, proactive, 10-year counterdrug technology 

development plan. In response to this challenge, CTAC, working 

with the Science and Technology Committee—and I will speak to 

more of that in a moment—has undertaken a complete review of 

the National Counterdrug Research and Development Program. 

For the first time, a 10-year technology development plan is 

being prepared to ensure that the latest advances in medical research, drug detection, communications, surveillance, command 

control, and information systems are exhaustively exploited to support the goals of the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy. The objective of this planning effort is to formulate a comprehensive 10-

year counterdrug technology plan with a 5-year budget which supports the implementation and execution of the National Drug Control Strategy. 

4

Mr. Chairman, to know where we want to go in the future, we 

must know something about what we have done so far. This chart 

puts in perspective the past 5 years. During the years 1993 to 

1997, CTAC has had an oversight and coordination role of a Federal agency counterdrug law enforcement budget totaling around 

$390.6 million. The Department of Defense and CTAC, as you can 

see, comprised the largest share of this spending, some 74 percent. 

Now let me shift emphasis to the major oversight and coordination role of CTAC and narcotics detection technology. CTAC coordinates the R&D activities with major drug control agencies and 

oversees technology development and application through three distinct mechanisms: The Science and Technology Committee, the 

counterdrug research and development blueprint, and updates 

which we submit to the Congress and an outreach program. I will 

concentrate on the CTAC leadership of the S&T Committee. 

The S&T Committee, which I chair, is used to develop the scientific and technological needs of 21 agencies and facilitate oversight and coordination through highly focused technology working 

groups. Individual working groups have been established to focus 

on specific areas. 

For example, CTAC assigned the Contraband Detection Working 

Group responsibility for coordinating requirements and projects for 

narcotics detection technology. This group is chaired by the U.S. 

Customs Service, and it has representatives from DOD, Coast 

Guard, DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, INS, and the FAA. 

We work closely with the DOD and the Customs Service, the two 

leading agencies responsible for using and developing narcotics detection technology. Both of these organizations have entered into a 

formal MOU, delineating the basic development of all types of narcotics detection technologies. CTAC oversees, develops, and supports the test and evaluation program to assess the performance of 

these technologies which have been developed from mostly the 

DOD program, as well as the test of off-the-shelf devices. 

Now I will take a moment to explain the different types of narcotics detection technology being developed and how I envision employing this technology. An overall nonintrusive inspection system 

consists of a mix of subsystems, broken down into automated targeting systems, using computers to prescreen shipments for suspicious trends, physics-based systems, which are generally large 

scale, fixed-site systems, shown on the left of the chart, to detect 

illicit substances, using x rays, gamma rays, nuclear magnetic resonance, neutrons, microwaves, acoustic technology systems, which, 

available today, find large quantities, 50 kilograms or more, of 

drugs hidden within a conveyance, container, or cargo, and allow 

this to be done without physically opening the container or shipment. 

The systems available today detect density anomalies in the 

shipment rather than the substance themselves. Systems still in 

test, such as pulsed fast neutron analysis, will actually discern the 

contents. Man-portable, often hand-held systems, shown on the 

right side of the chart, employ immunochemical assays, electrochemical biosensors, and acoustic wave biosensors, as well as mass 

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copy, total carbon vapor and preconcentrators, to identify particular 

quantities down to 1 nanogram or less. 

To use such a system, an operator must wipe or vacuum a surface, clothing, packages, et cetera, to obtain a sample to analyze for 

the presence of drugs. These systems are all small in physical size 

and generally require that the container or the device be opened, 

something be opened for examination. 

CTAC supports the law enforcement community directly by developing technology prototypes and by developing standard test 

protocols to replicate a realistic operational environment in which 

to test these narcotics detection technologies. This program, the 

Narcotics Detection Technology Assessment Test Series, was created by CTAC in 1992 and has been used to test many of these devices in laboratory and operational environments. 

The chart shows where we did some of these tests. On the left, 

you see portable and hand-held particle and vapor detection devices, tests which were conducted in Miami, while the right side 

shows a cabinet-level x-ray test performed at Argonne National 

Laboratory. Since 1992, more than 20 of the tests have been performed at a range of places, from Puerto Rico to Otay Mesa, CA; 

Houston, TX; several tests in Miami; the one shown on the left, 

JFK International Airport; as far north as Canada and even in the 

prisons of Alabama. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement, and I will 

be happy, further on, to answer any questions you may have or the 

other members of the subcommittee may have. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brandenstein follows:]

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Mr. HASTERT. Thank you. 

At this time I would like to welcome the ranking minority member, Mr. Tom Barrett from Wisconsin, who has an opening statement. 

Please feel welcome. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to welcome our witnesses here today as well. 

The development and coordination of drug detection technology is 

vitally important in our fight against illegal drugs. One only has 

to look at the sheer volume of commercial and tourist traffic entering our country to appreciate the challenge. Every year, the Customs Service and other Federal agencies deal with the entry of 400 

million passengers and pedestrians, 10 million cargo containers, 

125 million cars and trucks, 600,000 commercial and private aircraft, and 270,000 watercraft. Even if the speed of inspection were 

not a factor—and it most certainly is—we don’t have the manpower 

or the resources to manually inspect each truck, each ship, and 

each airline plane entering the country. In reality, less than 5 percent of cargo containers get even a cursory inspection for illicit 

drugs. 

We have to do better than that, and that is why technology development is so important. The Office of National Drug Control 

Policy, Department of Defense, and Custom Service are on the cutting edge of nonintrusive detection technology. By nonintrusive, we 

are talking about tools that allow inspectors at ports of entry to locate drugs without spending countless hours opening and manually 

inspecting vehicles and containers. 

Some of these tools, like the advanced automated target systems, 

are under development and don’t actually scan for drugs. They are 

sophisticated computers which analyze shipping documents and 

law enforcement data bases to pick and choose which carriers are 

the ones most likely to be smuggling drugs. Other tools use x rays, 

gamma rays, and other means to spot anomalies inside vehicles or 

cargo containers where drugs could be hidden. Others use chemical 

and biological methods to detect trace amounts of the controlled 

substance from vapor or residue. 

Each of these technologies has advantages and disadvantages. 

Some are cheaper than others. Some are more mobile, more adaptive, and more readily integrated into existing systems. It is important to learn the costs and benefits of each of these technologies, 

the new ones over the horizon, and the challenges of coordinating 

the efforts of multiple Federal agencies. 

It is also important to spend some time to discuss a drug detection tool which is decidedly low tech but which has demonstrated 

time and time again to be cheap, reliable, and effective. It walks 

on four legs, has a wet nose, and is responsible for more drug busts 

than any piece of high-technology hardware. I am talking, of 

course, about drug-sniffing dogs, which are already an important 

part of our detection arsenal. I would be interested to know how 

they complement or even outperform their high-tech partners. 

Thank you. 

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin. 

At this time, Mr. Mintz. 

21

Mr. MINTZ. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on the effectiveness of counterdrug technology coordination at the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy. I particularly appreciate this opportunity because the words ‘‘counterdrug technology and coordination’’ define the focus of most of my 27-year career with the Customs Service. 

Since 1975, I have enjoyed the challenge and the fun of leading 

the Customs programs to develop our enforcement technologies, 

from aerostats to x-ray systems, and I am presently the senior Customs official responsible for new counterdrug technology. 

While developing technologies for Customs, I was also very involved in coordinating my activities with those of other law enforcement agencies. I helped to form and then became the associate 

chairman of the Drug Science and Technology Special Committee, 

established in 1988, under the National Drug Policy Board, and 

chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Policy and Enforcement. Later, I also helped write the charter for the 

ONDCP Science and Technology Committee and did then oversee 

the transition of the special committee into the ONDCP structure. 

Since that time, I have been the senior Customs representative on 

the ONDCP Science and Technology Committee. 

The U.S. Customs Service is this Nation’s principal narcotics 

interdiction border agency. We have a vital role in the National 

Drug Control Strategy, especially goal 4, to shield America’s borders from the drug threat. We also have a responsibility to maintain strong enforcement activities without adversely affecting the 

flow of legitimate commerce. 

For fiscal year 1997, we estimate this flow of commerce to include 451 million people, 125 million vehicles, and millions of tons 

of cargo. Under these conditions, effective technology is essential. 

It is for this reason that the Customs Service has become the world 

leader in the development and use of narcotics detection technologies. Hundreds of pieces of detection equipment, dogs and a variety of automated systems are used every day by Customs inspectors as a routine part of their enforcement activities. Almost all of 

these technologies are products of Customs’ own development programs. And I hope that you and the committee members will have 

the opportunity to see them in use along our borders. 

As indicated by the amount of commerce entering the United 

States, drug smugglers literally have millions of choices for hiding 

their goods. Fortunately, the Customs Service is being helped by 

the efforts of the Department of Defense to develop large-scale systems for the inspection of trucks, containers, and cargo. With the 

support of the Defense Counterdrug Technology Development Program, we are identifying critical new technologies for our major 

ports. In my view, this program is giving the Customs Service a 

dollar’s value for every dollar spent. 

However, despite the success of our combined national efforts to 

develop narcotics detection technologies, there are many challenges 

ahead. Drug smugglers react quickly and creatively to successful 

enforcement methods. There are still modes of entry into the 

United States for which there are few technologies available to help 

22

our inspectors. Even if these modes are not employed now, they can 

become major smuggling problems in the future. 

In brief, although we are closing the gaps in technology’s ability 

to meet operational requirements, we still have much to accomplish. As I indicated earlier, national and international interagency 

coordination has always been a key element of Customs’ technology 

development programs. Cooperation and coordination with agencies, such as DOD, DEA, INS, Coast Guard, FBI, FAA, and Canada 

Customs, have been hallmarks of our narcotics detection efforts. 

More recently, we are working with the FAA, Energy, and other 

organizations to coordinate the development of technologies to detect drugs, explosives, weapons, and terrorist materials. Our coordination with the ONDCP Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center has been consistent with this practice. We have worked within 

CTAC’s process to keep them informed of our technology needs, 

knowledgeable of the work we are doing, and aware of our desires 

and concerns regarding the direction of various technology programs. 

We also have been active leaders in many CTAC efforts, including the current definition of the 10-year counterdrug technology 

strategy. I expect that the preparation of this strategy will further 

harmonize our efforts and interagency technology coordination. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my oral statement. You have my 

written statement, which I would like to submit for the record. I 

would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection, your written testimony will be 

entered into the record. So ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mintz follows:]

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Mr. HASTERT. At this time, I would like to introduce Mr. Wolfson. 

Please proceed. 

Mr. WOLFSON. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a 

pleasure to meet with you today to discuss an important national 

program that can make a real difference in stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. Specifically, I will address the 

Department of Defense efforts to develop narcotics detection technology for use by Customs and also ONDCP’s involvement in support of that effort. 

In response to section 1205, National Defense Authorization Act, 

of fiscal year 1990, Defense focused its counterdrug R&D efforts on 

rapidly developing technology to detect drugs being smuggled into 

the United States, secreted inside commercial shipping containers 

and in other land transport vehicles. Implementing this congressional direction, the Department structured a broad-scope program 

to rapidly investigate in parallel practical technology approaches. 

The objective was to develop prototype inspection systems that 

could be demonstrated in operational environments against realistic targets. 

The Department also established an immediate and continuing 

relationship with Customs, the operational user of these prospective nonintrusive inspection systems. Such interfaces were at the 

operational level, the technology specialist level, and also included 

a formal Memorandum of Agreement between the Commissioner of 

Customs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense detailing how 

this program was to be implemented. 

Over the past 5 years, the joint Defense and Customs effort has 

been very fruitful. Currently, Customs has available the technical 

and operational information needed to commercially procure an effective initial operational inspection capability. In addition, the 

final stages of development are now under way to develop a next 

generation of inspection systems; that is, mobile and relocatable 

systems. 

Throughout this joint effort, Defense provided development and 

testing funding and technical program management, while Customs participated in the selection of the technologies to be pursued 

and provided operational personnel to support operational and 

technical testing, including stream-of-commerce testing. 

During the development period, the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center, CTAC, of ONDCP was involved in an oversight 

role and was kept abreast of progress, technical accomplishments, 

and major program decisions. 

Overall, CTAC has provided a very valuable forum, facilitating 

the interagency exchange of information, on ongoing and planned 

counterdrug technology programs, thereby eliminating duplication 

and developing partnerships among the different agencies. In addition, CTAC is uniquely positioned to compile summary documents 

detailing all counterdrug R&D programs and all counterdrug operational needs. 

Focusing back on cargo container inspection systems, from a national perspective, there are many major issues involved in implementing the widespread use of technology solutions at ports of 

entry. One major hurdle is the very substantial infrastructure and 

operation and maintenance cost for cargo container inspection. 

30

Placing this in context, as you are aware, there are over 300 

ports of entry, and these large inspection systems can cost between 

$1 million and $15 million apiece. 

To assist in high-level concept assessments, CTAC pursued several efforts to provide alternative views on technology fielding options. Defense’s position has continued to be that of the technology 

developer, our objective being to fund the development of technology solutions that were considered by Customs to be operationally suitable for their use. In this regard, we ensured that our development efforts were in lockstep with Customs and endeavored 

not to pursue the extended development of technology options that 

Customs did not find suitable to transition to operational use. 

In summary, we focused on rapidly developing operational systems that Customs was interested in deploying on the U.S. southwest border and at other ports of entry. This approach has paid 

dividends. The fixed-site x ray that was tested at Otay Mesa port 

of entry in San Diego, transitioned to operational use by Customs 

almost immediately after the development program was completed 

and is now a continuing valuable inspection asset. 

In addition, the first of several next generation relocatable mobile inspection systems has been tested and is also now operational 

by Customs on the southwest border. These mobile systems will 

offer a flexibility that is needed, given the changeable drug smuggling threat. 

In conclusion, the Department of Defense has responded to congressional guidance to rapidly develop inspection systems that Customs can effectively use at border ports of entry. The technology 

development effort has been accomplished with a very close and effective relationship with Customs, and key developmental products 

have transitioned to operational use almost immediately after prototype testing. 

As with all concurrent broad-scope development efforts, some 

technologies investigated were considered but then rejected. Real 

progress has been made, the technology and inspection systems already developed, and those under development will make a dramatic difference in our national capability to detect illegal drugs 

smuggled in vehicles and containers. In addition, CTAC’s involvement has been very beneficial and has provided a valuable alternative view and assessment of deployment options. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. You have 

my full testimony. I would like that entered into the record. Thank 

you very much. 

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection, your full opening statement will 

be entered into the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfson follows:]

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Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Cooper, you may proceed. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

it is indeed a pleasure to be here this afternoon to discuss with you 

the Federal agencies’ efforts to develop the important narcotics detection technology programs this country needs. 

If there is no objection, I would like my full statement entered 

into the record and I will summarize. 

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. COOPER. My testimony today is going to focus on three 

things: The responsibility of the key Federal agencies involved in 

developing detection technologies, the differing views that we found 

among those agencies about which technologies should be developed and deployed, and opportunities to strengthen the national 

technology efforts. 

You have already heard from the representatives of the three 

agencies today about their roles. I will just save time by adding 

that we found that OMB has also, in recent years, started to play 

an increasingly active role in reviewing agency budget submissions 

and suggesting how those funds should be spent on different technologies. And I can get into that a little bit later on. 

Let me move on to the differing views about different technologies. Over the last 6 years, we found Federal agencies spent 

about $100 million to develop technologies for detecting narcotics. 

However, the agencies have not always agreed on the most appropriate technologies to be used at the U.S. ports of entry. For example, in 1990, Congress tasked the Department of Defense, in coordination with Customs, to develop technologies for inspecting cargo 

containers. Cargo containers were recognized as a major threat for 

importing illegal drugs through U.S. ports of entry. 

In response to that congressional direction, DOD developed and 

tested, at a cost of about $15 million, a high-energy system at Tacoma for detecting narcotics in those containers. DOD and CTAC 

viewed that system as a key step toward developing an effective, 

nonintrusive method for inspecting containers. However, the system was not deployed because Customs did not believe it was safe, 

affordable, or operationally suitable for their purposes. 

Based on that Tacoma experience, Customs and DOD modified 

their Memorandum of Understanding to ensure that DOD would 

develop only those technologies that Customs would deploy. Based 

on that understanding, DOD also discontinued work on a pulsed 

fast neutron analysis project, after spending another $15 million. 

Like the Tacoma high energy system, Customs expressed concerns about the safety, affordability, and operational suitability of 

that system. Despite efforts over the last 6 or 7 years, including 

that expenditure of $30 million, commercial seaports, and particularly the containerized cargo coming through those seaports, still 

remains as the greatest unsolved detection requirement according 

to Customs. 

We also found that ONDCP and Customs differ in their views 

about what detection technologies are needed along the southwest 

border. ONDCP has recommended that Customs accelerate efforts 

to develop and acquire an automated targeting system that would 

identify high-risk cargo for inspection. Customs agrees about the 

36

need for such a targeting system and has begun testing targeting 

systems, prototype systems at selected sites. 

Customs further believes that additional low energy x-ray systems, like that used out of Otay Mesa, should be acquired for inspecting empty trucks crossing the U.S. Border. However, ONDCP 

is also developing a technology that ONDCP believes may be as effective as the systems that Customs is acquiring and will cost 

about one-fifth of the estimated $3 million cost of that system. 

While development of the current generation of narcotics detection technology is near completion, ONDCP, in a September 1996 

study that was mandated by Congress, concluded Customs needed 

the detailed methodology for determining which technologies 

should be acquired. ONDCP, recognizing that there are variations 

among the different ports of entry, recommended that Customs 

adopt a methodology that would provide a port-by-port analysis of 

the different technologies needed at each port. Customs disagreed 

with ONDCP’s port-by-port methodology because it felt the methodology did not realistically consider the personnel and funding constraints that Customs faces. 

We believe there is an opportunity to strengthen Federal efforts 

to develop detection technologies. In August of last year, the Director of ONDCP challenged other Federal agencies to work with 

ONDCP to prepare a comprehensive, proactive, 10-year counterdrug technology development strategy. That strategy would be augmented with a 5-year budget projection. We understand that 

ONDCP is working with other Federal agencies to meet the Director’s challenge. Such a plan, we believe, should provide decisionmakers with a road map to guide Federal efforts to develop nonintrusive inspection technologies and upgrade existing systems. 

We generally support ONDCP’s efforts to prepare a long-range 

technology plan. It is consistent with ONDCP’s broader efforts to 

develop a long-range plan for achieving the goals and objectives of 

the U.S. drug control policy. To be effective, however, we believe 

the technology plan should resolve the differing views between 

ONDCP and Customs on needed technologies. 

At a minimum, we believe the 10-year technology plan should address the use of high-energy x-ray systems for detecting narcotics 

contained in fully loaded containers, the possible use of explosives 

detection technologies for detecting drugs in containers coming 

through our seaports, the use of an automated targeting system for 

identifying high-risk cargo, the best technologies for detecting 

drugs in empty trucks, and methodologies for transitioning technologies from development to deployment. 

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be glad to 

answer any questions you or other Members might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]

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Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Brandenstein, you have been in your organization—your organization has been in existence at the offset of ONDCP since 

1991. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. We were established in—I actually came in 

November 1991, and ONDCP was started in 1988. 

Mr. HASTERT. That is correct. So you have a history there. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I have a history because those prior years I 

was at ARPA working on the same areas. 

Mr. HASTERT. In the 10-year plan, what are you doing, or what 

have you done? I mean, you talk about a 10-year task. I want to 

move to the prior history. What have you done, and what are you 

doing, to actually demonstrate coordination? I mean, you have the 

DEA and Customs Service, FBI, and Agriculture, and DOD, and 

the Coast Guard, and INS, all on the borders, all trying to fight 

the drug war one way or another, and with a lot of technology out 

there. What have you done to coordinate those organizations up to 

this point? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. The major forum to ensure the coordination, 

a formalized forum, is the Science and Technology Committee, 

which predates me, as Mr. Mintz said, in some other forms, and 

I became the chairman when I arrived in 1991. And through that, 

we meet approximately quarterly. In preparation of the 10-year 

plan and the 5-year strategy, we have been meeting almost every 

2 weeks. We have a series of——

Mr. HASTERT. You missed my question. I said you have been 

there since 1991, 6 years. What have you done to coordinate up to 

this point? I am not talking about a 10-year plan. A 10-year plan 

didn’t happen until now. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. You want to talk about the past? 

Mr. HASTERT. That is what I said when I asked the question. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, sir. We have developed technology initiatives—we have—in conjunction with those organizations that 

you listed, we collect their S&T requirements, and we publish them 

within the blueprint so that the entire group understands what—

we review those requirements, the entire group understands what 

the requirements are. It is collectively decided, so that they meet 

their needs, and then we review the projects that the agencies are 

planning to do, come up with a program which essentially removes 

duplication of effort because there are very limited amounts of 

funds. And publish again, in the appendix of our blueprint, the actual projects that are being conducted by all the Federal agencies. 

Mr. HASTERT. Well, one of the things, our goal here is to work 

with ONDCP, make sure we are effective, and make sure the dollars we spend are spent wisely. What I am just really asking you 

for is one or two success stories of what you have done? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. There are several examples. 

Mr. HASTERT. Let’s hear them. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. One of the examples, from a very tiny example, in terms of what it looks like, is on this table. With the FBI, 

and through the Contraband Detection Working Group and a couple other working groups, we jointly developed a crack cocaine detection system comprised of some fluids. It replaced existing technology, it costs about $12.50 for a test, and in the first year of its 

50

use, we seized about $7 million worth of drugs with this type of 

technology. 

Another example is the development of VACIS, the development 

of one of the contraband detection systems that was shown on one 

of the tables, on one of the charts. That was a joint effort. It is now 

in the current tests at Nogales. Eventually, some number of these 

will probably be entering the Customs Service inventory to augment the Otay Mesa type systems. 

In the area of medical research, we developed for the Addiction 

Research Center in Baltimore, the only Federal center dedicated totally to the medical research on drugs of addiction. We built a center, a PET scanning center, and a radiochemistry laboratory. 

Mr. HASTERT. PET scanning center? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Positron emission tomography. It is a brainscanning system so that you can look at the effects of various 

therapeutic drugs on an addict’s brain. This was our single biggest 

investment of the funds available to CTAC, and that was an investment of about between $6 and $7 million overall. For the prior 7 

years before we did this, the Addiction Research Center, which is 

part of NIDA, had been requesting a new PET scanning center. We 

did it. It was solely on CTAC funding. It was dedicated in December of this past year. It now allows them to have an intermediate 

research program, directed by Dr. Leshner, which has greatly increased even in the short time it has been there. 

Mr. HASTERT. I am going to reclaim my time. I appreciate that. But there are agencies there. We have spent $100 million, about $15 million a year, and we also have the Tacoma issue out there—

the $30 million mistake, that is pretty expensive, and I really 

haven’t seen evidence of how you coordinate. What we want to 

make sure is, that those dollars are spent. 

And I am going to come back on the second round. My time is 

up. I would hand this over to the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 

Barrett. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Cooper, maybe you can shed light on this. You 

made reference to the Tacoma situation. The chairman referred to 

it as a $30 million mistake. Would you concur with that? 

Mr. COOPER. Let me clarify for the record. The Tacoma tech- nology development was $15 million, and then there was a second 

project, the Pulse Fast Neutron Analysis, which was another $15 

million. So there were really two projects there. Nonetheless, in the 

case of the Tacoma technology, DOD moved smartly. After the congressional direction in 1990, they developed a technology that 

proved that it could detect narcotics in containers. I think it had 

like a 90 percent success rate. 

But in 1994, after DOD had developed that system and was 

ready to have it deployed, there was dialog between DOD and the 

Customs Service, and Customs said, that is good, but that is a high 

energy system, and it is not operationally suitable for Customs purposes. 

And I think that situation illustrates the need for the agencies 

to work very closely together, and, in fact, they have entered into 

that Memorandum of Understanding after that Tacoma experience 

to make sure that doesn’t happen again. And I think that is what 

we are all after, to make sure whatever moneys we invest in techVerDate Jan 31 2003 13:36 Apr 01, 2003 Jkt 085680 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\45479 45479
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nology, that there is a good chance for those technologies to be applied. 

Mr. BARRETT. You mentioned the DOD. I am sorry, I wasn’t in 

Congress in 1990. Maybe you can tell me what Congress’s role was 

here. 

Mr. COOPER. I think it was a result of some of the appropriation 

language that directed DOD to—because of their expertise in developing technologies for weapon systems and other kinds of things, 

got DOD involved in the drug war, if you will, to develop the kinds 

of detection technologies that would be useful in inspecting cargoes 

and containers coming across the borders. 

Mr. BARRETT. At that time, was it known that the technology 

would be turned over to Customs? 

Mr. COOPER. That was the purpose for DOD, to help Customs to 

develop those kind of technologies. As I said in my statement, the 

threat that that direction focused on was the containers coming 

through, and there are millions of containers every year that come 

through. 

Mr. BARRETT. In your GAO report, your analysis, did you place 

blame on one party or the other, or who was asleep at the switch 

here? 

Mr. COOPER. I think there was probably enough blame to go 

around for everybody. I am not sure it was any particular agency. 

I think that particular example illustrates what the theme of this 

hearing is all about, and that is to make sure there is good coordination among all the Federal entities. This happens to be one involving Customs and DOD, and, as I said, in the 10-year plan, if 

we can get that 10-year plan to where we want to get it to and 

identify all the different efforts that are being undertaken by Federal agencies and to make sure those efforts are integrated and everybody has a commitment to those efforts, and we have funding 

identified and timeframes for getting those technologies deployed, 

I think that would provide a road map for everyone, including the 

congressional decisionmakers, to see that effort and to have that 

insight into that effort. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Mintz, from your perspective, what has been 

done to ensure that that will not be repeated? 

Mr. MINTZ. Well, I think many things, but let me use the example of Tacoma and the MOU that has been mentioned. 

The MOU that Mr. Cooper describes is actually the second MOU 

we had. When that project was started, the parties involved were 

myself for Customs and I think Dr. Brandenstein at that time for 

Defense, and the MOU dealt with who would be responsible for 

what; when that system went to Tacoma, who was going to be responsible for maintenance; who was going to be responsible for providing test samples, et cetera. 

As we got into the system and found that, yes, it worked technically—and I would say in that respect, it was not a mistake, we 

did learn a lot technically about it, about that kind of high-energy 

system. But as we learned, it was too expensive at that time and 

still unsafe for the examination of foodstuffs. 

We decided at that point between Mr. Wolfson’s office, Mr. 

Pennella, and myself, that we needed a second MOU. This MOU 

was much simpler, and I think this is going to be the answer to 

52

your question. This MOU essentially said that the Department of 

Defense was going to do its best efforts to develop technologies that 

the Customs Service would employ, and we, the Customs Service, 

our responsibility was to participate in those programs and ensure 

that if the technology was developed according to requirements, we 

would do everything in our power to have that technology implemented. That is the focus of what we are doing now, and I think 

that is the answer to your question, ‘‘What are we doing now?’’ We 

are working together much more closely, realizing it is not just the 

technology that is the focus of our efforts, but rather on making 

that technology useful. And so we have a much better appreciation 

for that now, and I think that is what is helping us as we go 

through the current programs. 

Mr. BARRETT. Dr. Brandenstein, I understand you were involved 

in this as well. What is your analysis? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, I was involved from the very outset because when I was at ARPA, well, I was the executive agent for 

these programs. I also believe that the knowledge gained from Tacoma was extremely valuable, I think extremely valuable to the 

Customs Service. 

The Customs Service has a tremendous set of requirements that 

they have to meet when they install an operational system. The 

knowledge gained was at the technical level and at the level of how 

a system like this works. When they have to make a consideration 

of an operational deployment, they have to consider safety of the 

individual, they have to consider costs and physical space, and in 

that context, they selected another approach. 

But the knowledge gained, we know what 8–MEV systems will 

do. We have test data now at 8–MEV, which is the Tacoma system, 

and we have, because of the operational employment and tests that 

were done prior to the operational employment, test information at 

450 KEV, which is the Otay Mesa system. 

The Otay Mesa system has less penetrability than a high-energy 

x-ray system will have. But we also have data that indicates that 

at 2–MEV, which is considerably higher than 450, there is not as 

much penetrability difference between a 2–MEV system and an 8–

MEV system. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you. I see the chairman is going to move 

on, so I thank you for your answer. 

Mr. HASTERT. Just a comment. Mr. Cooper, do you agree with 

the statement that was just made? 

Mr. COOPER. Pardon me? 

Mr. HASTERT. Do you agree with the gentleman’s statement that 

was just made? 

Mr. COOPER. That they learned a lot from that and that 2–MEV 

has more penetrability? Yes, I would agree they learned a lot from 

the Tacoma experience, and I think the answers that have been 

given here indicate that when the technology developer doesn’t 

have all the information that they need about the operational constraints—and that is what they talked about, the safety constraints. 

Mr. HASTERT. Do you agree it was worth $30 million to find that 

out? 

Mr. COOPER. It is an expensive lesson to learn. 

53

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman from Georgia. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Brandenstein, I have a habit of reading things which sometimes people don’t like. And I have a couple documents here. 

Maybe you can help me clear something up. One document is the 

enabling legislation, section 1008(c)(2), and then your testimony. 

On pages 9 and 10, you talk about CTAC developing a transportable gamma-ray system to inspect tanker trucks. That is on page 

9. CTAC also recently completing a pilot test on drug-testing devices with Alabama, you reference on page 10. And then further 

down on page 10, improvement of an automated targeting capability for identifying suspicious luggage and containers with hidden 

drugs. 

I don’t have any problems at all with those sorts of things. What 

I am curious about is where the legal authority is for you all to engage in those activities, given the fact that the enabling legislation 

explicitly provides that the authority of CTAC does not extend to 

the award of contracts management of individual projects or other 

operational activities. 

And then second, some of the materials that you submitted show 

that ONDCP, CTAC, has spent, over the last 5 years, 1993 through 

1997, somewhat over $74.2 million on R&D. 

Now the two figures don’t quite add up. One is $73.7, and one 

is $74.2. But let’s not quibble about hundreds of thousands of dollars; let’s say approximately $74 million. Here again, what has that 

$74 million gone for if you cannot use it for the award of contracts 

management of individual projects or other operational activities? 

I have some confusion here. Something just isn’t matching up. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I think I can help remove the confusion. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. In the original legislation for CTAC, the authorization, which was in 1990, followed in 1990—fiscal year 

1991—I arrived in November 1991, and fiscal year 1992, the Congress appropriated a budget for CTAC to do startup projects, to 

help to remove duplication of effort, to do community-wide support 

projects that have projects that have the greatest use for all the 21 

Federal agencies. 

Now, none of them helps everybody, but the intent on our sponsoring of projects is to help the largest community. 

Now, the other point that you raised is the point in the legislation which says we are not program managers, I believe that is 

what you are referring to, and that is quite true. I run CTAC’s 

budget and coordinate the activity of what we are going to do. Actual projects sponsored using the CTAC funds with the S&T Committee and with other users. The funds are transferred to an agent. 

We are not program managers, we are program sponsors, but we 

do not do the daily program execution, we don’t do the monitoring, 

we don’t award the contracts. The technical, everyday oversight 

management is done, in fact, if you look at the back of one of our 

blueprints in which all the projects are listed, including the CTAC 

projects, you see the lead agency. In our case, CTAC is the sponsor, 

but the lead agency could be Customs Service—it is everyone except the Department of Defense, because they are the only organiVerDate Jan 31 2003 13:36 Apr 01, 2003 Jkt 085680 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\45479 45479
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zation that really has never had a project in which we sponsored 

it and used the appropriated moneys for that. 

Does that answer partially your question? 

Mr. BARR. So what you are saying then is, this $74 million I see 

here, which represents CTAC R&D spending from 1993 to 1997, 

are moneys that were transferred to other agencies. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. In some cases directly to other agencies, 

which represented at least one of them at this table. In other cases, 

they would go to our agent, and when we are doing a project to 

help a State and local organization, if it was a tactical technology 

project, it was most frequently the leader of the project, the technical leader—which I provided the oversight and coordination; I 

take a very strong role in examining the technology itself. But the 

day-to-day management, fiscal—creating the contract, managing 

every day, with one of the Federal agencies. When we do it for 

State and local agencies, most are tactical technology type projects. 

The FBI and DEA, you will notice, if you look at our blueprint, are 

the lead organizations that are overseeing this at the Federal level, 

and our agents are Fort Huachuca in Arizona and the Tennessee 

Valley Authority. Those are the two main agents that we use. 

So the funds would go to that agent. They have the responsibility 

for structure, issuing Broad Agency Announcement or some other 

type of solicitation to determine what we are going to get in order 

to respond to what we want to do. 

Mr. BARR. When you do that—and I am still a little confused 

here, because in your written testimony you say CTAC has recently 

completed a pilot test that also—that CTAC has developed a transportable gamma-ray system to inspect tanker trucks. 

I am still curious, and maybe something here is quite impressive 

that you can magically do this without extending—without awarding contracts, without managing any individual projects or engaging in any operational activities. And if you do it all by taking all 

of this money and transferring it to the other agencies that are actually doing these enumerated things which you all can’t do, is 

each and every one of those submitted to the Congress pursuant to 

your reprogramming or transfer of funds authority? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. We were asked to provide in the legislation 

periodic reports, and I think if you read the text—well, it might 

have been in conference, in conference language. But it is repeated 

many times in conference reports from year to year. 

Mr. BARR. I focus on statutory language, and it says here that 

you do have authority to submit reprogramming or transfer requests. And it seems to me that in light of the constrictions in you 

all’s enabling legislation according to which you are expressly prohibited from doing these things, if you then have other agencies do 

it, it would have to require reprogramming requests. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Every year, around August, the S&T Committee meets, usually, sometime in August, and we derive a projected program for the next year. We still don’t have a budget. And 

when the budget comes, when we then put together a program plan 

of what the projects will be—and I am concentrating on the CTAC 

projects. 

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

55

I would like to followup. Did you say one of the agencies you deal 

with is Tennessee Valley Authority? Just yes or no. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, and it is an agent. 

Mr. HASTERT. An agent. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, an agent, a technical and contracting 

agent. 

Mr. HASTERT. So you are actually prohibited from letting contracts? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HASTERT. What you are doing is circumventing what the law 

is, and you go to TVA to let the contracts go out. Is that what you 

are doing? I am just asking the question. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I need to have an organization. 

Mr. HASTERT. Can you tell me, yes or no? Are you circumventing? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. No. I don’t believe so. You are telling me; I 

am trying to tell you. 

Mr. HASTERT. What does the TVA have to do with ONDCP or the 

drug issues? Anything? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. When we were appropriated a budget, we 

have to have a way to generate that and either directly transfer it 

to one of the agencies or transfer it to an agency that can award 

a contract, and that is what we are doing. 

Mr. HASTERT. So you are going to the TVA, who has actually 

nothing to do with this stuff, and you are letting them award the 

contracts because you don’t have the power to do the contracts. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. That is true. 

Mr. HASTERT. Then there is a problem, isn’t there? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I can’t do it, not only because of the fact you 

could—if you wanted to, you could change the regulation and say, 

Brandenstein, or whoever, you do this contracting directly from the 

Office of National Drug Control Policy. I—our staff personally 

couldn’t handle that. We don’t—we just can’t do it. 

Mr. HASTERT. We will come back to that. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Arizona. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My colleague from Georgia has requested a brief yielding. I will 

yield to him for a moment. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you. 

I have also reviewed today the administration’s proposed reauthorization, and they are not proposing any change in the authorities or the specific prohibitions that I have just stated, so I think 

that the problem we have identified here—and I think we are seeing a circumvention here—is not addressed in the administration’s 

proposal. 

Did you recommend that that be addressed in the reauthorization? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Well, as I said in the very opening statement, I am not trying to——

Mr. BARR. I am just wondering if you asked for that to be 

changed. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Did I ask internally to ONDCP? I asked that 

it not be changed, because it would require that we create a much 

larger organization, and to explain what—why I don’t think it 

56

needs to be changed, this may appear to be a strange way, but I 

came from ARPA, and for 25 years—Advanced Research Projects 

Agency, within the Department of Defense. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Reclaiming my time, if you could be brief, I do 

have some of my own questions. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. For 25 years, ARPA operated with a budget 

of hundreds of millions of dollars, exactly the way I am telling you 

we operate. They were smart people who put together a program, 

and the money was funded through another, not through ARPA. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Just to stay on that topic, can you tell me why—

candidly, why you picked TVA and not some other organization? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, I can. The reason we picked TVA is because TVA can also award CRADA’s and the Fort Huachuca-Arizona U.S. Army contracting office cannot. 

What does that mean? It means if you would like to do medical 

research projects, and you occasionally want to have a—the kind 

of award that TVA can make. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Turning to page 9 of your testimony, you referenced that the system which you say CTAC developed, specifically, a transportable gamma-ray system to inspect tanker trucks, 

had recently been tested in Nogales, AZ, by Customs. 

As I read the GAO report—and maybe there is confusion in my 

mind as to whether we are talking about the Tacoma project or 

whether we are talking about this transportable unit. But as I read 

the GAO report, the GAO report seems to say to me that Customs 

did not want what you were seeking to develop. Is that correct, 

with respect to the Tacoma project or both the Tacoma project and 

the one tested in Nogales? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. The Tacoma project was not a CTAC project, 

it was started before CTAC was even created. The Nogales project, 

we have been coordinating and talking about the development. The 

lead agency for the VACIS project, which is the one you are talking 

about, is the Customs Service. They provide assistance all the time. 

The tests that are done in Nogales are now being evaluated to see 

whether there should be some changes in the system. 

Mr. SHADEGG. What were the results of those tests—if I might? 

Did they show the systems to be successful? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I think they show the system to be successful, and—but it is a prototype. Everything requires some change 

from prototype to become an operational system, especially under 

the constraints of an organization like the Customs Service must 

operate. 

Mr. SHADEGG. I find it curious, because last year Congressman 

Souder—who sits on this committee and I think will be here 

later—and I held a field hearing of this committee in Phoenix, AZ, 

which is in my district, went into the issue of the drug problem in 

America, and spent the balance of the day touring the border. We 

flew by helicopter, went to the border, saw the machine, a transportable machine to do this detection, and got a lengthy briefing 

about why the machine was not operational and couldn’t be used 

and was shut down and of—at least as of that day and for some 

time before that and, as far as I knew at that time, sometime 

ahead of that, not going to be of any value to them, because it was 

57

a combination of nonoperable and protests over whether or not it 

was safe. 

Do you know the outcome of those tests and whether they ever 

ultimately did do operational tests with it? 

Mr. MINTZ. May I answer that question, sir? 

Mr. SHADEGG. Certainly. 

Mr. MINTZ. I know that what you are describing did happen. I 

think part of the problem is, you were speaking to Customs inspectors at the time and they have a very short attention and patience 

span. 

That gamma technology is very useful to us. The system that you 

saw was developed as a prototype. In fact, Customs ourselves, we 

did the proof of concept and asked CTAC to fund it, which they did. 

That was a prototype system meant to operate maybe 200 times 

under controlled conditions. We then put it out into the field where 

it was subjected to a rigorous operational environment. It broke 

down then; it has broken down a few times since. It is currently 

in El Paso, rather than Nogales, and the darn thing stays up and 

keeps running with Band-Aids and baling wire. 

So it is a good system as a prototype, for the purpose, which was 

primarily to look at tank trucks and thick-walled tankers that the 

x-ray systems won’t penetrate. 

Mr. SHADEGG. My time is about to expire. Let me go back to Mr. 

Brandenstein. 

Your statement says you developed this. I take it when you use 

the word ‘‘developed,’’ you mean you did what Mr. Hastert brought 

out in the testimony, and that is, you kind of went through TVA 

or some other Federal Government agency to do this work, which 

is not in, as Congressman Barr tried to bring out, your specific authority. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, we did. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. I have a 

question. I just want to go back to this Tacoma project. 

Now I think I heard the testimony, Mr. Mintz—and I think you 

said it—that the problem was, it radiated food, which it was not 

intended to do. And I also understand that if there is an illegal immigrant in a container, you radiate that person as well, and that 

would go against the 1983 law, is that correct? 

Mr. MINTZ. I am not familiar with the laws on radiating people, 

but I think you are correct. Currently, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration allows us to only go to about 300,000 KVA for the radiation of foodstuffs. So if we radiated with anything higher, we 

would have to then dispose of the foodstuffs, and obviously that is 

not practical. 

Mr. HASTERT. And probably what would happen, a lot of the stuff 

that you are scanning is foodstuffs. 

Mr. MINTZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HASTERT. Good. Then you entered into a contract with DOD; 

is that correct? 

Mr. MINTZ. A Memorandum of Understanding, yes, sir. 

Mr. HASTERT. A Memorandum of Understanding is how you are 

going to work your way out of this problem; is that correct, in a 

sense? 

58

Mr. MINTZ. I prefer to say how we are going to find good useful 

technologies, yes, sir. 

Mr. HASTERT. Now, in a Memorandum of Understanding, was 

CTAC involved in this? 

Mr. MINTZ. No, sir. 

Mr. HASTERT. Now wait a minute. I am trying to put things together here in a logical order. CTAC was supposed to coordinate all 

these things, and especially the high-tech stuff we need at the border. They weren’t involved in getting—finding this problem out. As 

a matter of fact, if you got something that was used at the border 

that was created and OKed by CTAC, they actually did something 

we weren’t supposed to do, take that as a role of coordination. But 

now you are telling me when you do work in coordination, between 

you and DOD, it was completely outside of the realm of what 

CTAC did, and that was their job. Is that what you are telling me? 

Mr. MINTZ. Essentially, yes, sir, they were, as I am sure you recall, aware of what we were doing, but the MOU was strictly between the Commissioner of Customs and the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense. 

Mr. HASTERT. Now, Mr. Brandenstein, I looked at your mission 

statement, and to simplify it, it says basically you are supposed to 

identify and define, you are supposed to examine, you are supposed 

to make priority rankings, and you are supposed to oversee and coordinate. I don’t see anything in there where you are saying you 

are supposed to let out $74 million worth of contracts. Can you enlighten me on that? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. That is the third bullet, execute a plan and 

budget for the National Counterdrug Research Development Program, including the CTAC portions of it. 

In 1992, we were appropriated funds, and we jointly gathered together to develop a project series. 

Mr. HASTERT. Well, I want to take one other step and ask you 

one other question. In the National Narcotics Leadership Act of 

1988, it says the authority granted to the Director, meaning you, 

under this section shall not extend to the award of contracts, management of individual project, or other operational activities. 

Now this isn’t a rule, this is a statute. So you are actually in violation of the statute, aren’t you? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. No, sir, we are not. I don’t believe we are, 

because when the Congress appropriated the funds in 1992—and 

they have appropriated funds every year since then—we had to 

have a way to derive a program jointly with others, and we either 

would have transferred the money directly to that agency or we 

would use a contracting agent. We had no other choice. 

Mr. HASTERT. Can’t you just direct those funds to be spent directly by the agency? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. In some cases, we do that. In some cases, for 

example, we have projects where the source of CTAC funds are 

transferred to the DEA and also with the FBI. They have a program manager who does the entire technical—everyday actions on 

the program. 

Mr. HASTERT. Just to back off in just a second, when we look at what you have expended, $74 million, and $30 million has been in 

a project that hasn’t been able to be applicable at the border, and 

59

your job is to coordinate, and in fact the coordination that takes 

place has been through a Memorandum of Understanding between 

Customs and DOD, and you are out of the circle, or out of the cycle, 

I have a problem with that. 

Mr. Cooper, have you looked into this issue? Can you enlighten 

us a little bit here? 

Mr. COOPER. I have not been involved in looking at the legal 

basis for them to award contracts. 

Mr. HASTERT. One thing you have looked at is basic overall efficiency of the operation. Do you want to comment on that? 

Mr. COOPER. The only thing I would say is, it is clear from the 

ONDCP Director’s call in August 1996 to revitalize that S&T Committee. I think that is a recognition that the agencies need to work 

more closely together, and, essentially, that is the challenge that 

the ONDCP Director has put out there. 

Mr. HASTERT. And the job of the CTAC then is to do that coordination. 

Mr. COOPER. Yes, they are involved in that. 

Mr. HASTERT. And they are somewhat lacking. Do you want to 

make an estimate on that? 

Mr. COOPER. I think there is a recognition there is a need for 

CTAC to do a better job, yes. 

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you. 

I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Cooper, I think I need your help here a little 

bit. There obviously is some criticism here of Dr. Brandenstein’s operation, and it seems to be coming down two roads. One is whether 

he has the authority to do what he has, and I understand you don’t 

know enough or didn’t do enough analysis of that. The other—and 

I think this is coming from the chairman’s last question—is whether, even assuming they do have the authority, whether they have 

used the funds that have been appropriated to them effectively. 

And I would ask you to comment on that, and I know you may 

have touched on that, but if you could comment on that again. 

Mr. COOPER. The work that we did showed, I think, between fiscal year 1991 and 1996, CTAC ONDCP had about $8.4 million for 

detection technologies, and that is what the focus of our review 

was. It is an average of about $1.7 million. And I think some of 

that resulted in the tanker gamma-ray system that was looked at 

and talked about previously. 

Again, where we are coming from is, with this new call for this 

10-year integrated coherent strategy, what we are talking about is 

seeing all the Federal efforts reflected in that plan with priorities 

established, whether it is a CTAC priority or a Customs priority or 

whoever, with the appropriate moneys identified for developing 

those technologies. 

And to give you an example, one of the most critical needs today 

still remains a detection technology for fully loaded containers. 

Now if this plan were put together, I think the plan needs to identify where the Federal investment is going to be, who is going to 

be responsible for that investment, what the timeframe is for that 

investment, so that decisionmakers in ONDCP and all the Federal 

agencies and in the Congress can have that road map to see where 

Federal efforts are going and then——

60

Mr. BARRETT. And should the overseer of that be ONDCP? 

Mr. COOPER. I think that is the charge ONDCP has, yes, in their 

coordinating role, and I think that is what the Director is trying 

to get to, is a Federal-wide coordinated plan. And in August of last 

year, in challenging the Federal agencies to come up with that 

plan, he also said that he needed high-level commitment within the 

agencies. 

Mr. BARRETT. Does it concern you and had you heard before that 

the Memorandum of Understanding entered into between Customs 

and DOD did not in any way, from my understanding, include 

ONDCP. 

Mr. COOPER. I knew it did not include ONDCP. 

Mr. BARRETT. Do you think that is consistent with its purported 

role as the overseer of this effort? 

Mr. COOPER. I think ONDCP was aware of some of the problems. 

In fact, if you go back to I think the 1995 Blueprint Update, and 

you look at that, that update at that time, that blueprint was talking about deploying that technology that was being developed at 

Tacoma. I think everybody was going down the road at that point 

to develop, you know, that technology. 

Mr. BARRETT. Now, I am talking about the Memoranda of Understanding that came subsequent to Takoma. My understanding from 

Mr. Mintz’s statement was that that was a Memoranda of Understanding entered into between Customs and Defense. 

Mr. COOPER. That’s right. 

Mr. BARRETT. And ONDCP was not involved with that at all. 

That strikes me as inconsistent with its role or assignment to be 

coordinating these things. 

Mr. COOPER. I think it is inconsistent. And I think maybe you 

want to ask the other witnesses. But I think DOD and Customs 

probably didn’t see a need for ONDCP to be a part of that. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Wolfson. 

Mr. WOLFSON. Well, I don’t think it’s necessarily inconsistent. 

Basically that MOA, Memoranda of Agreement, was really for the 

execution of a series of programs, many of which were directed by 

congressional report language. Specifically, ONDCP was aware of 

the content from a policy role. They understood fully what was in 

the MOA. And it was my recollection they thought it was the way 

to go and had no objection to the content. 

Mr. BARRETT. Let’s back up just a little bit. You said much of it 

was in congressional report language. Can you be more specific? 

Mr. WOLFSON. Well, backing up a little bit, and I don’t have the 

specific documents here to reference, but many of the technologies 

that we pursued including, I think, very explicitly the PFNA, a 

high energy, and these low energy x rays, did appear in report language suggesting or providing guidance that these were things that 

the Department of Defense should look into, should in essence fund 

to support this container inspection effort. 

Likewise, many of the items included in the MOA, relocatable 

systems, were also surely in report language that this was part and 

parcel to what we were to spend R&D dollars on to pursue in support of Customs. 

Mr. BARRETT. So in response to that report language, you would 

start developing this technology. 

61

Mr. WOLFSON. That was very early-on the case, and we followed 

that lead. 

Mr. BARRETT. And at what point would you bring Customs in the 

loop for that? 

Mr. WOLFSON. Customs was involved almost immediately. Once 

we had this MOA, the one I’m referencing now I think was 1995, 

we even more formalized it, whereby, Customs actually sits on the 

selection panel where we actually decide Customs part—actually 

participates in the decision of what will even be funded. 

What we were looking for was to get a clear commitment from 

Customs that they would be interested in procuring the results of 

the R&D. 

Mr. BARRETT. And if they were not? 

Mr. WOLFSON. Then we felt, and I think they feel also, that unless it’s—that R&D isn’t worth pursuing I think is the clearance. 

Mr. BARRETT. That it is worth pursuing? 

Mr. WOLFSON. Is not. 

Mr. BARRETT. Is not. But if you have the congressional direction 

to continue pursuing it, did you continue to pursue it? 

Mr. WOLFSON. The congressional direction was OK. Congressional direction for the relocatable systems was generic. We are 

pursuing relocatable mobile systems that satisfy the requirement 

that Customs is seriously interested in procuring them. 

Mr. BARRETT. So for the State you are doing that? 

Mr. WOLFSON. Yes. Now prior to that, we had the direction, guidance, I think is a better term, to pursue PFNA, one of the systems 

that we spoke of earlier, that we cost—that we put in something 

on the order of $15 million, and also the high energy system. We 

pursued those. And as we’ve spoken earlier, those ended up, at the 

testing phase, resulting in a decision from Customs that they did 

not want to pursue. 

Mr. BARRETT. At any point in the proceedings in the last 6 or 7 

years, did DOD say to Congress, no? 

Mr. WOLFSON. We’ve had numerous discussions. I guess my comment would be other than the issues with Tacoma and PFNA, all 

the other items we’re developing look like they’re going to have 

great utility and would be of great operational use to Customs. 

Mr. BARRETT. So you were happy to get direction from Congress? 

Mr. WOLFSON. I don’t know about happy. It was a lot of money from the Defense Department. As we spoke, we spent close to $100 

million to support products that Defense would not be fielding but 

that Customs would be fielding. 

Mr. BARRETT. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA [presiding]. Thank you. I have a couple of questions. 

First, let me ask Mr. Cooper of the General Accounting Office, I 

guess you have done some review of this whole area of technology 

and its use in detection and spotting drugs as they come in through 

the various means into the country. In your estimation, and I notice, too, there was a chart here about the R&D spending by the 

various agencies. We have got a couple of problems. One seems to 

be coordination of that activity. Another one is duplication. And 

then deployment of technology. So there are a number of problems 

here. It looks like DOD does the biggest share in dollars——

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes. 

62

Mr. MICA [continuing]. Is that correct? Then we drop down 

to——

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. CTAC. 

Mr. MICA. CTAC, FBI, and others. 

Is there any way to first, I guess in the area of coordination, to 

better have these activities proceed in a more efficient manner? Is 

the system so legislatively separated, budget separated that we 

can’t achieve any better coordination? At least at first level of activity, which would be I guess your basic R&D. 

Mr. COOPER. Let me try to answer your question. Of the $100 

million that we identified in the last 6 years that’s been spent on 

detection technologies and is primarily on the nonintrusive technologies, you are correct. DOD is the primary funder of that. Some 

$86 million of that $100 million was funded by DOD. And the coordination difficulties that you speak of is we believe reflected in 

that Tacoma experience where the DOD went out and developed a 

technology and kind of late in the game really started getting a 

better understanding of what the users’ requirements were, the 

user being Customs. And it became clear, even though that technology was a feasible technology for detecting the narcotics, that it 

had some difficulties with safety, with operational deployment, and 

that’s where we think there’s an opportunity for better coordination 

through the called for ONDCP’s 10-year technology plan. 

Mr. MICA. Now, was there anyone else duplicating that R&D? 

Mr. COOPER. No. 

Mr. MICA. That was pretty much pinpointed to that one project. 

Mr. COOPER. Right. We did not see any duplication. We have not 

reported any duplication. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. May I? 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. In the case of the PFNA, there was only one 

PFNA prototype in existence in the world. And that is the one that 

was developed within this program. And it was—that particular device people are looking—I think, have learned a considerable 

amount from that prototype, which we need to know, because it is 

the only type technology that will actually discern on a large scale 

system. It’s extremely expensive, and probably unless that can be 

overcome, the Customs Service, in my view, and I don’t think Ray 

would disagree with that, probably could never afford to have this. 

But currently, in the 1990—I believe in the 1997 Department of 

Defense budget for the counterterrorism, they’re also building another version of the PFNA system. 

Mr. MICA. Well, in the area of research and development of either technologies, has there been specific duplication? Did you identify, Mr. Cooper, have you seen a problem in that area where, because we have many agencies, is there duplication? What I am trying to do is go through each of these levels and say is there a problem. And, first, the R&D stage. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Do you want me——

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. If you are—in my view, there has been no 

unnecessary duplication in any part of the national counterdrug 

R&D program. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Cooper. 

63

Mr. COOPER. We did not identify any duplication. 

Mr. MICA. OK. So the next question would be of what technologies are—well, maybe my question is this is—are we finding 

success out of the R&D? And is that—where are we finding the 

most success and in what projects? Doctor. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. If we’re concentrating on drug detection 

technology, which is the subject of this, the—I feel that the most—

many improvements have been made in the technology that an individual operator will use. The hand-held devices that he uses 

are—the Customs inspectors at the various border crossing points. 

That’s been some amount of money dedicated to that. And there I 

think that I—that there’s been a tremendous improvement in that, 

the quality of that technology that has come out of this program. 

In the case of the very large scale systems, which has really been 

where most of the DOD funds have gone, they’re now looking at, 

and developing, some prototypes for transportble and relocatable xray systems, which can be very effective and at a reasonable cost. 

Mr. MICA. So——

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I think there have been limited cases. I cannot really find any of unnecessary duplication. There really has 

not—$100 million over a period of—since 1990 is about, you know, 

$13, $14 million a year. 

Mr. MICA. And your office is charged with the coordination of all 

of these efforts. I mean, you have had authority through the drug 

czars’ office, correct? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Well, one of my questions is it is my understanding that you get somewhere between $15 and $18 million a year for coordinating that effort. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. For actual execution of a program which fills 

the gaps in the technology development programs of the other Federal law enforcement agencies. And for assisting in the test and 

evaluation of the more successful—of the technologies that are coming out—the NDAT test is a continuing series of tests. 

If you look at the amount of money of CTAC’s, out of CTAC’s appropriation from the period of 1993 to 1997, approximately $10.4 

million of that total has gone to support the Customs Service, the 

drug detection technologies. And of that number, $10.4, approximately $4 plus million has been in test and evaluation of the prototypes and in a replicated operational environment. That needs to 

be done. Everybody recognizes that. It’s a broader service that we 

perform than strictly for the Customs Service, because the Customs 

provides—contributes to this. They’re involved in this. Everyone is 

involved in this. And it’s a service that no single organization owns 

in terms of, you don’t want to, you don’t want to pay for test and 

evaluation of someone else’s twice. That’s what CTAC is attempting 

to do as a service to the community. 

Mr. MICA. Now how much—now we are talking about $15 to $18 

million a year times 5 years. We are looking at close to $100 million. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. It’s $84 million, from the beginning, approximately. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Well, my math is fair. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. We got $71⁄2 million in 1995, I believe. 

64

Mr. MICA. But you are saying that is not all used for administration. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. No, sir, it’s not. No, it’s not. It’s used for 

projects which we coordinate through the S&T Committee on what 

those projects are going to be. 

Mr. MICA. And that is a most effective manner—Mr. Cooper, is 

this a good assessment of a most effective manner? 

Mr. COOPER. Let me provide some clarification. When you are talking about the $84 million——

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. COOPER [continuing]. For CTAC, that’s for all technology development——

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. COOPER [continuing]. That they’re trying to coordinate not 

just the nonintrusive technologies I referred to in my statement. When I’m talking about $100 million over the last 6 years, that’s 

only on technologies for nonintrusive inspections like containers 

and for trucks and things like that, most of which the Defense Department has funded for Customs. 

Mr. MICA. What we are trying to find out is there a more efficient way of achieving the same objective, and do we have too 

much administrative overhead? Is there duplication events, or 

some of the duplication question? I am trying to look at the administration of the project. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Could I speak——

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN [continuing]. About administrative overhead 

for a second? 

Mr. MICA. Go ahead. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Do you know—sir, there is one person 

that’s—that I have an office—I’m the chief scientist. 

Mr. MICA. Right. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. And I have two people from the Department 

of Defense who are in my office helping me. And one person from 

the U.S. Navy helping me, and a secretary. 

Mr. MICA. Right. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. So that’s five people. 

Now I augment that too in specialty areas to get technical support of people who actually know the in-depths of some particular 

technology by going out and getting consultants. 

Mr. MICA. And Mr. Cooper, your assessment, I mean you have 

reviewed the way some of the funds are expended for these 

projects. Does your assessment pretty much jibe with what I am 

hearing? 

Mr. COOPER. Well, my assessment, as I’ve reflected in our statement, is we see some opportunities for improvement. And that opportunity for improvement is——

Mr. MICA. One. 

Mr. COOPER. I’m sorry? 

Mr. MICA. Two. I will give you two. 

Mr. COOPER. Right. I mean, what we’re talking about is this 10-

year technology plan that ONDCP is in the process of trying to develop. We think that will bring together—it should bring together, 

I hope it will bring together all the Federal efforts that are out 

65

there in the technology area, so that you and other Members of 

Congress can have clear visibility on what kind of technology efforts are under way. 

Mr. MICA. Well, another major question I have is that GAO has 

recommended in several reports that a long-term commitment and 

supporting budget are essential ingredients to winning the drug 

war. As an expert in Defense acquisitions, what do you think a 10-

year technology strategy should include to make it successful? 

Mr. COOPER. OK. 

Mr. MICA. And I am interested in your comments generally, but 

specifically on decision methodologies. 

Mr. COOPER. OK. What I would see as essential ingredients in 

that 10-year plan is an integration, if you will, of a coherent strategy, Federal strategy for developing technologies, so we can see 

what DOD is doing to develop inspection technologies, what Customs is involved in, what their requirements are, what the funding 

needs are by some 5-year period or so, and also a timetable for deploying these technologies so we can get these technologies fielded. 

I think if we have that road map, it will provide a model for accountability so that we can track and know whether we’re achieving what that strategy is. And I—and so I think they are the essential ingredients for that 10-year plan. 

Mr. MICA. Dr. Brandenstein, we are all aware that a great deal 

of money has been spent on development. But that is really not the 

last technology issue. Deployment is really an even more expensive 

question. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. I know that deployment expense is one factor in the 

Customs’ decision not to deploy the high energy system developed 

at Tacoma. How does the long-term technology plan in the 5-year 

budget currently being developed at the ONDCP take deployment 

expenses into account? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. We’re in the process of writing the plan right 

now. And some sections of the plan are almost complete. The emphasis will be on the R&D aspects as you would expect. And the 

emphasis following on from that when a prototype is developed will 

be that there is some acquisition plan; if the prototypes are successful, that there will be an attempt to ensure that the various 

end user agencies will put into their budgets some planning factors 

for the out years when it will be necessary for them to come to the 

Congress and request the funds to acquire these as operational systems. This has never been done before by the agencies other than 

the Department of Defense, which regularly does this. 

The other agencies, many of them are not familiar with this type 

of out year planning and the technology development plan, the 5-

year budget and the 10-year strategy will definitely address that, 

because that has been a persistent problem ever since the creation 

of CTAC. 

At the very first S&T meeting that we ever had the need for acquisition plans came up as an issue. Everyone that was present 

was reiterating that as a problem. We have attempted in many 

ways to get agreements, good faith in many cases, have to be simply good faith agreements because the budget process within these 

other agencies, other than DOD, does not recognize in most cases 

66

a process of transitioning from R&D to system procurement. They 

don’t have—the budgets are not appropriated in that fashion. 

Mr. MICA. Well, you have outlined some of the problems and 

some of the transitioning from a development to deployment. Is it 

Dr. Mintz? You are the Director of Applied Technology Division of 

Customs. How do you view what has just been described, as workable or——

Mr. MINTZ. I——

Mr. MICA [continuing]. Practical? 

Mr. MINTZ. I still have some concerns. I mean, I know that all 

of us from an interagency point of view are going to be working the 

problem as hard as we can. I guess there are two aspects of it because we are dealing with technologies. And quite honestly, if I 

step back in time, 10 years from today in the past, or even 5 years 

from today in the past, if I had tried to predict the technologies 

that we would be employing today, I think I would miss by a fairly 

wide mark. So I’m a little nervous about our ability to be specific 

about those things 5 to 10 years from now. 

The other issue is the one that was just discussed and that is the 

funding of the acquisition. Development means little unless the 

systems are bought. I can easily see $500, $600, maybe even a—

$600 million or maybe even $1 billion worth of technology for Customs over the next few years, whatever they may be, and I really 

don’t know how the budget process will accommodate that. And 

that really is my main concern. 

Mr. MICA. Is there any reason why agencies can’t do all of this 

and plan all of this on their own? Or do they need the coordination 

of ONDCP as you have heard outlined? 

Mr. MINTZ. I think it’s important that we do coordinate. And I 

think CTAC and ONDCP can provide that leadership for us. It’s 

important, for example, that all the plans be consistent and based 

on the same assumptions, the same threat, et cetera. I think what 

we are finding, as we’ve done before, that CTAC helps greatly in 

this area. Customs really depends on DEA and FBI to work in certain areas. It’s useful for us to know what they’re doing so that we 

don’t have to pursue that. So I think that the kind of coordination 

that’s happening now and that we look for in the future is the right 

way to do it. As I said, concerned about our collective abilities to 

come up with that plan that will be used in the way that we would 

like it to be used. 

Mr. MICA. Let me ask you, Dr. Mintz, another question. The Customs Service faces a formidable task. I was just in Miami. The 

amount of cargo—I think there is a million tons of cargo, container 

cargo now coming through Miami just at the airport. I don’t know 

about the other port. It’s just awesome. And we have a number of 

personnel down there. We have increased some personnel down 

there. But it is almost, I mean, an impossible task. 

Do you think that there is hope and that we should continue to 

pursue both the R&D and put resources, and to what extent, into 

this effort, or are we just whistling Dixie, or just it can’t be done? 

I am one of those people, I went down there and I said, well, why 

can’t we—isn’t there the technology in this great age, in this time 

of doing every kind of thing that Buck Rogers could have ever 

67

dreamed about that we couldn’t come up with some technology to 

detect drugs in these containers or in other cargo or passengers. 

What is your candid assessment? 

Mr. MINTZ. Well, candidly, speaking for myself, although I’ve 

shared this opinion and others have had it in agencies over the 

years. We don’t have any choice but to keep going with the technologies. But we are not going to win this war or cure this sickness 

with detection technologies or trying to stop supply. It’s got to be 

at the other end, at the demand side. In the meantime, I think 

Customs and the other agencies have no choice but to keep trying 

to do what we’re doing. It is an overwhelming task. 

Mr. MICA. Is there a possibility for a technological breakthrough 

here, or? 

Mr. MINTZ. No. 

Mr. MICA. I mean, maybe we should be offering a reward, you know, here’s $1 million, a firm that comes in with a technology 

that will do this the quickest. We just leave it to good, old fashioned ingenuity. Do we have any—I mean are there any creative 

approaches? 

Mr. MINTZ. I think we have tried a lot of creative ways. And 

CTAC has sponsored technology symposiums. They’ve been holding 

symposiums by Customs’ agencies worldwide to try to do this. I 

think part of the problem is that it is not just a single method, a 

single approach that the smuggler can use. We need something 

that works on cars, on people, on trucks for cocaine, for heroin, for 

methamphetamine, et cetera. 

So when you look at issues like cost and mobility and everything 

else, I think we’ve tried very hard. There may be a family of solutions but no single solution I think is likely to be found. 

Mr. MICA. Do we have programs with our institutions of higher 

learning, a substantial commitment there, folks looking at this? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. We do? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes. The entire program consists of projects 

going on within industry, research going on within industry, academia, and the national laboratories, and has been going on—that’s 

been happening since 1990, formally. 

Mr. MICA. I have another question, maybe. Let’s see, RDO, I am 

not sure who was involved in this at DOD or Customs. Since I have 

got you all here, down in south Florida, having spent some time 

down there looking at the situation, I got involved in this back in 

the 1980’s, and you know we did the—they did the overflight. I 

think we even did U–2. And then that is expensive. We put the 

aerostats up. And we put all kinds of folks there for detection. And 

every time you do something, the smugglers respond in some other 

way. 

But I was told the latest thing is these Jamaican war canoes that 

are built out of wood so they are not detectable. But I was told 

that, and now they are taking about 1,000—1 ton, 2,000 pounds, 

of cocaine in the night, dropping it in the Bahamas in different islands, and then bringing in fast boats. And the fast boats are detectable in the day visually. At night, they aren’t. But I am told 

that a small ring of sound buoys, and one of the universities that 

I think was down there looking at this said they could be quickly 

68

put out, could form a ring around, therefore, detection of this stuff 

coming in. 

Is anyone familiar with that project? Mr. Wolfson, you are smiling. 

Mr. WOLFSON. I’m not sure I’m familiar with that project. 

Mr. MICA. How do I get a project like this done? Who do I see? 

Mr. WOLFSON. I think there’s several issues—let me just raise 

since you’re raising it. One is a question of how much of a threat 

do you really have of that nature. 

Mr. MICA. Threat? 

Mr. WOLFSON. Of large amounts. You’re talking metric-tons 

being moved by fast boats from the Bahamas. There are fast boats 

moving large amounts, but——

Mr. MICA. Coming in at incredible quantities. I have been tracking this stuff for 17 years. And as fast as we chop them off at one 

end, they find a new one. That this is their lightest. 

Mr. WOLFSON. This is positively the case. 

Mr. MICA. So how quickly can we get them out there like that? 

No one is aware of that project. 

Mr. WOLFSON. I’m aware of technology to do that. 

Mr. MICA. Sound buoy. 

Mr. WOLFSON. The issue has become, with all the boats that are 

in that area, one has to look at, can I detect the boats I’m interested in, or do I just detect every boat that goes near the buoy 

or——

Mr. MICA. They told me that this is primarily for the night, and 

you don’t have too many people coming from the Bahamas at night. 

They can’t detect them. And now they are putting them on fast 

boats. They are coming in all along the coast. I mean, it is not the 

end all answer. But for the amount of money that they had mentioned to me, it seems like we could deploy something and cut them 

off at another pass. 

Mr. WOLFSON. There are lots of ways to address the problem, including airborne ways. 

Mr. MICA. All right. And you are going to be in my office in the 

next 2 weeks to make sure we discuss that and find another method to stay ahead of this. 

Mr. WOLFSON. Truly. 

Mr. MICA. I mean, I would love to just say that we could educate 

everybody and we could convince people not to consume this stuff, 

and the demand is the problem, and it is only education. We held 

down in my district in October, a hearing, I think you were there. 

I don’t think you were there. And I had the families of city council 

members—we are not talking gheto, we are not talking Detroit, 

New York, Miami, we are talking central Orlando, these kids that 

were on cocaine. 

I just had last week my ninth heroin death of a teenager I think 

in like 12 months. Cocaine is absolutely rampant; methamphetamine, all these other things. And then I will take you to the prisons and I will show you some of these dudes, and you can talk to 

them and educate them and everything you want about not doing 

dope and how it is bad for their body and their health and their 

mind and their physical being and their work ethic. And you could 

talk to one of these pictures of the former chairmen, and your 

69

breath will be able to warp the paint faster than you get results 

in trying to convert them. So I am convinced it takes a multifacetted approach. 

Mr. WOLFSON. Yes, it does. 

Mr. MICA. We let down some of our guard. Whatever it takes. If 

you guys can find a breakthrough in technology, I am prepared to 

commit whatever resources we need toward that effort, as long as 

the money is spent wisely, efficiently, as long as the R&D is an intelligent approach, the deployment, the coordination. We are here 

of the people that are paying the bill, expect no less, and they are 

working pretty hard for the money they send us. 

And this isn’t a Republican or Democrat issue, it is an issue that 

affects every one of our communities now. So we will work with 

you. And I am serious on that other issue of staying one step ahead 

of these folks. And I appreciate your coming. Let me see if the 

ranking member——

Mr. BARRETT. See if Mr. Souder has any questions. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Souder. Thank you. 

Mr. SOUDER. I just wanted to make a few comments and apologize first off for not being here. I feel like I have been on a race 

track this afternoon. We have been having these 19 to 18 votes 

over in the Education Committee, and bouncing between multiple 

things. 

But I strongly support the comments that Mr. Mica just made on 

the importance of the detection technologies. I have been down to 

the border a number of times, as we have been in Central and 

South America a number of times. Having this type of equipment 

is essential, just like having people who provide the tips are essential, the ability to have effective random searches are essential as 

well, and to find it when we have a decent tip. 

I wanted to react to one comment I heard in the brief period that 

I was here and that is the solution to all of this is reducing demand, not supply. Not suggesting that we weren’t going to focus on 

the supply, but the fact is that the evidence in every single category that we can reduce it isn’t good. In other words, the education programs aren’t working, the treatment programs aren’t 

working in data, and interdiction programs are having a problem. 

What we need to do is keep up the pressure on all of them. But 

there is no sign that the education and treatment is going to work 

any better than the interdiction. 

And part of our concern here today and what we are trying to 

draw out in this hearing, and I would like to followup with Mr. 

Mintz with this question, because, as one of the budget hawks 

here, I have been supportive of the funding in the drug area, because it is like Mr. Mica said in his district with the heroin deaths, 

in my district crack is the biggest problem. Our murder rate in 

Fort Wayne, IN, is higher this year than last year already, almost 

all drug related in one form or another. And it has us all troubled. 

Having worked over in the Senate side, as we put in the Office 

for Planning and a lot of these different things, the goal was to 

take all of these diverse agencies and try to coordinate. But if all 

that means is another layer of bureaucracy, and we aren’t effective, 

then we need to start looking hard in the public pressure, given the 

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70

ness of certain things anyway that is in dispute. If we are not effective with the dollars, then everything is going to be hit. 

And things like this question related to the Tacoma development 

where there wasn’t enough coordination to make sure that it could 

be used at the end leads to some concerns on part of it. 

Do you believe that, and I know this is difficult given the nature 

of the panel here, but do you believe that the planning function is 

working through the CTAC, or do you believe that, in fact, the individual agencies now that they know the importance of the coordination could do it? They weren’t before. I grant that they weren’t 

before. 

The question is have we learned our lesson? Is the pressure 

there? Or is there useful function with that? And I know it is a 

tough political question but it is one we have to ask, because some 

of this is coming down to a question if it isn’t done right and we 

see waste, then everybody loses. 

Mr. MINTZ. I think that the agencies can do the coordination. But 

at the same time, I think we also need a focal point; not someone 

to do the coordination for us, but maybe to help guide us a little, 

and to be a central spokesperson for what the coordinated groups 

produce. 

Because I think the key thing is that the product should not be 

an agency product where we get one agency then battling with another, if you will, over different kinds of issues. But to have a concerted cohesive plan that’s the national strategy. And I think that’s 

the role that CTAC should perform. To be the focal point, to be the 

spokesperson. I think that’s the key issue. 

I would like, if I may, just perhaps to correct an impression I 

may have left. I do not advocate by any extent that we should stop 

our efforts in interdiction in order to go over on the demand side. 

We need both clearly. We’re just not going to do it on the supply 

side. We’re not going to do it on technology alone. 

Mr. Mica, if I may, in Miami you’re probably familiar with the 

issue of cut flowers. I almost cried one night years ago on the 

tarmac watching our inspectors poke holes in those flower boxes. 

We still don’t have a technology solution. But by working with the 

flower importers and by working carrier initiatives, we’ve helped 

solve that problem. So it’s not always a technology solution. There 

are other ways to get at the problem. 

What we’re really trying to do is stop drugs. We’re not trying to 

develop technology. Our focus is to stop drugs. We’ll do it any way 

we can. And I think we’ve got to keep doing that. And I think 

CTAC can help us, and as I said, be the central point of reference, 

if you will, for the things that are going on in the Government. 

Mr. SOUDER. Let me followup with my question with Dr. 

Brandenstein; is that correct——

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SOUDER [continuing]. And let you comment on the coordination question. And let me put two specifics with it and then the answers if anybody wants to join in. I yield back. 

Yes, we don’t have to do this all with technology, but we spent 

about $100 million in technology. And the question is that, have we 

provided anything new for detecting drugs? 

71

It looks a lot on the border like we are still at the drug dogs. And 

I know at the Mexican border, often, they are being tipped off if 

the dogs are there and they send a decoy in. 

We have some in the trucking industry that are doing some 

searches; some in the Coast Guard. But what type of technology 

breakthroughs are we seeing for our money? Because it is one 

thing saying yes, we may not find it. On the other hand, if we are 

spending money, hopefully we are finding something. Or is it just 

hoping to hit the big one? While having been down in Colombia 

and just met with the flower people, I realize that they are trying 

to cooperate, because they realize if they don’t, there are not going 

to be flowers coming into this country. 

At the same time, it just seems that with all the type of technology around this country, that we ought to be able to find some 

things. Sometimes we feel like unless we have a tip you don’t know 

where to start. 

Could you field both a little of the coordination question and the technology question of have we found something for this $100 million and where do you see this going? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. For the $100 million that you mentioned, of which some $84 million of it was spent within the Department of 

Defense, and of which some of it was congressionally directed to 

look at—it’s my opinion that there has been an exhaustive look in 

every type of phenomena that you could possibly consider for a 

piece of hardware that eventually end up in something either man 

can hold in his hand and do an examination with or, as it shows 

on the charts over there, a vehicle could go through and there be 

a major system that it is being used to exploit, to determine whether there’s something in the cargo. And now they’re looking at transportable versions of some of these systems on the left and 

relocatable versions. 

At the Department of Defense, the major group that has been 

funding these programs has looked at about everything that you 

could possibly consider. That plus the work—and with the total 

conjunction and coordination with us and with the Customs Service, Customs Service being the end user, I cannot think, from a 

physical phenomena point of view, as an engineer, of things that 

remain—that should be looked at that haven’t been looked at. And 

becomes, at that time, making selections of what you—what optimizes the detection probability, how well it will actually detect a 

drug against a system tradeoff sort of a study, examination of how 

much it will cost, and how much space it’s going to take up, is it 

safe for an inspector to use, and various considerations of these factors. And we’re now in the stage that that is exactly what is happening. 

And that is what the Customs Service is doing. They’re making 

decisions. And they have made some decisions. They made a considerable number of decisions. In the back of our most recent blue 

print is a technology development plan that the Customs Services 

had. That plan is the basis, I believe, of what we are going to modify, change, and put into the 10-year—the 5-year budget plan and 

10-year strategy plan. Everything you can think of. 

And when I started the—many of these programs that they’re 

talking about actually when I was at ARPA, the origination of 

72

those programs were with me, because I have the person doing this 

in 1990 within the—at the Department of Defense over at ARPA. 

We had some of the best—we’ve had the best minds in the country. 

We’ve had academics spend weeks in summer study determining 

what should we look at. These programs—these ideas became the 

basis of many of the projects that were done over the last 5 or so 

years. 

We now have I think exhausted the phenomena. And you’re into 

the stage of making selections based on these engineering and system acquisition and cost factors. And we need a mix. 

The importance of a nonintrusive inspection system, which is 

where all these drug detection technologies end up, as part of a 

system, is that as has been stated here earlier, you do one thing, 

the druggy is going to do something else. And so it’s like any problem, that you have an interactive response, and they’re doing everything they can to defy you, to find—to get their drugs through. 

You’re going to need a mix, because the operational scenario will 

change from the confronting the Customs Service, from year to 

year, month to month, as soon as they determine what you’re 

doing, and in one sense they will attempt to confound it and get 

around it. So you need systems that have flexibility. You need to 

be able to adjust how you do things. And that’s what is happening. 

Mr. SOUDER. I have to go cast another vote. But I want to say 

again thank you for coming. This subcommittee is probably the—

and I am on a lot of them, like six or something—probably the 

most active of the subcommittees I am with, and also a sense of 

unity on our side where we play tag team. But we talk more, we 

are more cohesive because we have a commitment to try to get 

what we need in this country, to fund it if we see the action. And 

we strongly see ourselves—unless we can find some breakthrough 

technology, we are very concerned in some of these areas. 

So with that I yield back and thank the gentleman. 

Mr. MICA. I thank you, Mr. Souder. 

I just have one or two concluding questions here. 

Looking through the way some of the, I guess, research money 

is spent here, and I noticed, and it may not all be contained in this, 

but at the Department of Agriculture, the theory of eradication, 

you know you look at the levels of stopping drugs, and of course 

you know you would love to stop it and educate and everybody 

would be aware of it, that they shouldn’t use it. But the other end 

is where drugs are produced. And as I read this, we have spent 

about $5 million in the Department of Agriculture actually looking 

for ways to deal with crop eradication or doing something to destroy the production. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. That is a very small amount. Is that adequate? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I think it is. The agricultural——

Mr. MICA. Is this the total money or is it mixed into other things 

that I don’t see? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. If you want to help me. If you’ll point to the 

page, he’ll get with you. 

Mr. MICA. I am on B–4. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. In the blueprint. 

73

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes. I’m looking at the blueprint. 

Mr. MICA. And you have got in 1994 it says you spent $5.5, almost $5.6. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. And each year. 

Mr. MICA. Five point three, it was actually going down in 1995. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I think if you looked at the 1996 number, I 

think you’ll find the 1996 number—we didn’t have the 1996 number at the time we did this. We have those numbers now. I think 

you’ll begin the 1996 numbers actually probably even a little bit 

less. 

The USDA has been working this problem—this is only in the 

1994, 1995 number. They’ve been working this problem probably 

since 1989. 

Mr. MICA. But are we putting enough resources in there, in your 

estimation? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Well—see, we know how to eradicate the 

crops. The Agricultural Research Service work has lead to various 

chemicals that will allow crop eradication. 

Mr. MICA. But there is a great reluctance on the part of the 

country for that method. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. Now there are other ways of either making the end 

product not usable or indestruction of the crop. Now we know cocaine or coca is produced Peru, Bolivia, and a little bit in Colombia. 

I mean, it is not like it is produced in 48 countries and regions and 

everything. That is where it is being produced period. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. And if you can stop it at its source or interfere in that 

production in some fashion, that is much more cost effective than 

our Customs folks——

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, it is. 

Mr. MICA [continuing]. Or our DOD folks or our law enforcement 

folks or any education folks, because it isn’t going to—it isn’t going 

to pop up anywhere else. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. The——

Mr. MICA. They produce there. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. The eradication of the coca plant——

Mr. MICA. We spent $5 million on that total. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Well, that’s every year. The chemistry to do 

this is they have several different approaches. The problem you 

would have is there are some international diplomatic problems involved with attempting to do this. You have to get the cooperation 

of the host government because, as you said, we’re going outside 

the United States to do this. And we certainly, diplomatically—and 

I’m speaking not of a technical person, I’m just giving you my opinion, it would be very difficult to get some of these arrangements in 

place. 

Mr. MICA. But you know I have been down there. I dealt with 

those folks in the 1980’s. And there is great reluctance to some of 

the chemical spraying and——

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. But there are other methods of destroying crops. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, there are. 

74

Mr. MICA. And I am just wondering if those are being adequately 

pursued so we can get—your job isn’t to negotiate internationally 

with, you know, these folks. That is going to be our task. Your job 

is to come up with the creative ways of destroying this stuff——

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. MICA [continuing]. At its source and production. So I am 

wondering again if this is enough, if it is adequate. Maybe you 

should take——

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I would be glad to get back to you with some 

indications from the Agriculture Research Service if they feel that 

the program that we have with them——

Mr. MICA. I think it is worth looking at. 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Because I think if you can stop it, because the other 

one—that is, cocaine and coca. And I have been in the field. I 

helped create the Andean strategy back in the 1980’s, and helped 

draft this certification along all of that and those things. 

So if you look at creative approaches and go back to these people, 

and some of them are you hop to when you have got somebody that 

is hot to trot like Fujimori or someone like that, and the timing is 

right, and Hugo Bonnsar is a good old friend of mine. He would 

love to have something that would do away with that and make his 

bananas bloom or something. So we need to look at some creative 

agricultural production methods. 

The other one that scares me is poppy production. And when we 

were down last year, and they were just down recently this year, 

we heard there are 10,000 hectares of poppies now being produced. 

And if you are familiar with Colombia, it is the flower growing capital of the world. In fact, it looks like a flower production center 

from almost anywhere you fly over it. Tremendous capability of 

producing cheap heroin, which is now flooding the streets. So poppy 

is another area. And I am not sure that we have done enough 

there. And the Mexican heroin is now becoming a significant problem. 

So maybe those two, targeting in a bit on some more technology——

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I would be more than pleased to come back 

to you or to the committee in general with some options to pursue 

in this area. 

Mr. MICA. Well, obviously we don’t have all the answers. And we 

appreciate your——

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. I will provide some more current information 

than I have at my fingertips right now. 

Mr. MICA. We just have some suggestions from looking at it and 

observing it over the years and again from our legislative perspective. 

Is there anything legislatively standing in your way either for 

technology development, for deployment, for research, that anyone 

can mention? 

Mr. BRANDENSTEIN. Well, I think I’m the one that has to say 

something about that. Because earlier in this deliberation, this 

committee hearing, I believe you might have been out of the room, 

the chairman was concerned about whether we actually had the 

authority to use the appropriated budget that Congress gave us 

75

each year since 1992. And I would like only to comment that I 

firmly believe we have been able to do this using the method that 

we have, which was to operate exactly the way ARPA operated for 

25 years, the Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency, 

spent a budget of $600 million a year without a contracting office. 

Their appropriated funds were sent to a technical and contracting 

agent, which is exactly what I do. And they are not program managers in the sense that we have the technical oversight because I 

help select the projects and try to monitor the technical performance, but the technical workings of the project are being done by 

a contractor. And the overseer at the everyday level is one of the 

lead agencies of the 21 agencies that we work with and coordinate 

our activity through the—through CTAC. So if there’s additional 

legislation to clarify that, because I think it is—I thought from the 

very, and I still feel, that from the very beginning it was important 

for CTAC to have a budget because it gives us a voice at the table. 

It makes us able to be current and to do the prototype developments where there are holes in the plans of the other agencies. 

And many of these holes are because the need is greater than one 

single agency. 

And nobody likes to pay someone else’s bill. And the need for 

testing is a function that transcends the agencies. And somebody 

has to do this. And that was—that’s essentially how we form up 

a program through the S&T panel—S&T Committee. And we have 

to put the money someplace. 

Mr. MICA. Well, we are not a legislative committee and we are 

not an appropriations committee. We are investigations and oversight. We want to make certain that the money is properly expended, that if we have administrative costs, that they are sufficient but not excessive, and that if we have 21 agencies involved 

in a project, that there isn’t duplication, that in fact there is coordination and the best utilization of taxpayer moneys. 

And if we are spending $15 to $18 million in your area, and it 

could be spent somewhere else, that is our job to sort through that. 

And we are here today to question you about how we are proceeding on this and then to review the longer term plan that has 

been proposed. 

So I want to tell you that I appreciate your coming and testifying. I welcome and solicit your additional comments either for the 

record formally or informally. Sometimes you don’t want to put 

some comments in writing. But we are here only to get the job 

done. 

Again, it is not a partisan issue. It is an issue that we have 2 

million of our fellow Americans, 70 percent of them are in prisons 

and jails, because of drugs. We have the latest statistics, I think, 

being released even this week, that the alarming rate of use by our 

young people, even with more education dollars—we are spending 

one six-hundredth I believe of our budget we spend on education 

and treatment on the development of counterdrug technology. And 

we want to make sure that that is properly expended. 

If you need more money, if you need double your budget and it 

would help, I am the biggest fiscal conservative next to just one or 

two Members of Congress, and I will be glad to appropriate, find 

76

the funds you need to do your job, whatever, as long as we have 

something to show for it. 

So that is why we are all here today. We appreciate your being 

here, your testimony, and your future cooperation to make this 

thing work. So if you will let us know. 

There being no further business to come before the subcommittee, I will also ask unanimous consent that the record be 

left open for 2 weeks for additional submissions. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

I thank you, gentlemen. I thank others who are interested in 

being with us again on this important subject, and we look forward, as I said, to working with you in the future. 

Again, no further business before the National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, this meeting 

is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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