Investigation of the 

Newark Police Department 

United States Department of Justice 

Civil Rights Division 

United States Attorney’s Office 

District of New Jersey 

July 22, 2014 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 1
 

II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 5
 

A. Investigation and Methodology........................................................................................ 5
 

B. Newark, New Jersey and the Newark Police Department ................................................ 5
 

III. FINDINGS.............................................................................................................................. 7
 

A. STOPS AND ARRESTS.................................................................................................. 7
 

1.	 Stops .......................................................................................................................... 7
 

a.	 Legal Standards.................................................................................................. 7
 

b.	 NPD Stops Have Routinely Violated the Fourth Amendment .......................... 8
 

c.	 Unconstitutional Stop Practices Undermine Effective Policing and Officer 

Accountability.................................................................................................. 11
 

2.	 Arrests ..................................................................................................................... 11
 

a.	 Legal Standards................................................................................................ 12
 

b.	 “Contempt of Cop” Arrests, Seizures, and Citations Have Violated the 

Fourth and First Amendments.......................................................................... 12
 

c.	 Narcotics Searches and Arrests Have Violated the Fourth Amendment ......... 15
 

B. DISPARATE IMPACT BASED ON RACE ................................................................. 16
 

1.	 Legal Standards ....................................................................................................... 17
 

2.	 Failure to Track and Analyze Appropriate Data With Respect to Race ................. 18
 

3.	 NPD’s Unconstitutional Stop, Search, and Arrest Practices Have Had a 

Disparate Impact on Black People in Newark ........................................................ 19
 

a.	 Pedestrian Stop Practices ................................................................................. 19
 

b.	 Arrest Practices ................................................................................................ 20
 

4.	 Quality of Life Citation Practices Have Been Ineffective and Have Facilitated 

Abuse....................................................................................................................... 21
 

C. USE OF FORCE............................................................................................................. 22
 

1.	 Legal Standards ....................................................................................................... 22
 

2.	 NPD Format for Reporting and Tracking Force ..................................................... 22
 

3.	 NPD’s Unreasonable Use of Force ......................................................................... 23
 

a.	 Examples of NPD’s Use of Unreasonable Force ............................................. 24
 

b.	 Lack of Effective System for Use of Force Reporting and Review ................. 25
 

i.	 NPD’s Force Reporting and Supervisory Review Systems...................... 25
 

ii.	 NPD’s Administrative and Criminal Force Review Systems................... 28
 

D. THEFT............................................................................................................................ 30
 

1.	 Legal Standards ....................................................................................................... 31
 

2.	 Theft by NPD Officers ............................................................................................ 31
 

3.	 NPD Practices Have Failed to Adequately Address Theft by Officers ................... 32
 

i 
a.	 Failure to Adequately Screen Candidates for Specialized Units ..................... 32
 

b.	 Failure to Follow the NPD’s Established Rotation Policy ............................... 33
 

c.	 Failure to Monitor Problem Officers or Conduct Integrity Tests .................... 34
 

E.	 INADEQUATE MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE CONTRIBUTED 

TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS .................................... 34
 

1.	 Overview of NPD’s Internal Affairs Process.......................................................... 36
 

2.	 Investigative Deficiencies ....................................................................................... 38
 

a.	 Failure to Collect Evidence from Complainants .............................................. 38
 

b.	 Failure to Objectively Assess Evidence from Officers, Complainants, and 

Witnesses ......................................................................................................... 38
 

c.	 Unequal Treatment of Officer and Complainant History ................................ 39
 

d.	 Discouraging Complainants Through Miranda Warnings ............................... 40
 

3.	 NPD’s Application of Discipline ............................................................................ 41
 

F.	 INADEQUATE SUPERVISION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN OF 

CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS ............................................................................ 42
 

1.	 Failures in Supervision and Management ............................................................... 42
 

2.	 Absence of an Effective Early Warning System ..................................................... 42
 

G.	 DEFICIENT TRAINING PRACTICES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE 

PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS ................................................... 44
 

1.	 Inadequate Officer Training .................................................................................... 44
 

2.	 Inadequate Training of Internal Affairs Investigators ............................................. 45
 

IV. OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN....................................................................................... 46
 

A.	 Gender-Biased Policing.................................................................................................. 46
 

B.	 Green Street Cell Block Suicide Prevention Policies and Practices ............................... 47
 

C.	 Policing Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity ......................................... 48
 

V.	 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 48
 

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Department of Justice opened an investigation of the Newark Police Department 

(“NPD” or “the Department”) in May 2011, after receiving serious allegations of civil rights 

violations by the NPD, including that the NPD subjects Newark residents to excessive force, 

unwarranted stops, and arrests, and discriminatory police actions. 

This investigation of Newark’s policing practices was conducted jointly by the Special 

Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorney’s Office for the 

District of New Jersey (collectively, “DOJ”) pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law 

Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Section 14141”), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“Title VI”), and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 

1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (“Safe Streets Act”). Section 14141 prohibits government authorities 

from engaging in a pattern or practice of law enforcement misconduct that violates individuals’ 

constitutional or federal statutory rights. Title VI and the Safe Streets Act together prohibit 

discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin by the recipients of 

certain federal funds. 

The investigation benefited from the assistance of the NPD and the City of Newark 

(“City”), which provided access to officers, command staff, documents, and available data. The 

DOJ also received input from other criminal justice stakeholders, including members of the 

community, law enforcement organizations, advocacy groups, unions representing NPD officers, 

and others who shared their experiences with the NPD. 

This report sets out the DOJ’s investigative findings. In sum, and as discussed further 

below, this investigation showed a pattern or practice of constitutional violations in the NPD’s 

stop and arrest practices, its response to individuals’ exercise of their rights under the First 

Amendment, the Department’s use of force, and theft by officers. The investigation also 

revealed deficiencies in the NPD’s systems that are designed to prevent and detect misconduct, 

including its systems for reviewing force and investigating complaints regarding officer conduct. 

The investigation also identified concerns that do not appear to amount to patterns of 

constitutional misconduct, but which nonetheless are significant and warrant consideration by the 

NPD. These concerns relate to the NPD’s practices in dealing with potentially suicidal 

detainees, the NPD’s sexual assault investigations, and the impact of the NPD’s policing on the 

LGBT community. 

The City of Newark is diminished, and the NPD rendered less effective, by these patterns 

and practices of unconstitutional conduct. The NPD’s policing practices have eroded the 

community’s trust, and the perception of the NPD as an agency with insufficient accountability 

has undermined the confidence of other Newark criminal justice stakeholders as well. Fixing the 

problems this investigation identified will not only make Newark a more equitable community, 

but also a safer one. As the NPD stated in its Transparency Policy, General Order 2013-03, “[i]t 

is a fundamental principle that the public’s trust and cooperation is essential to the Newark 

Police Department’s effectiveness . . . . The Department cannot prevent future crimes without 

commitment and cooperation from the community . . . .” 

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As discussed more fully in the body of this report, there is reasonable cause to believe 

that the NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of: 

	 Effecting stops and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

Approximately 75% of reports of pedestrian stops by NPD officers failed to 

articulate sufficient legal basis for the stop, despite the NPD policy requiring such 

justification. During the period reviewed, the NPD made thousands of stops of 

individuals who were described merely as “milling,” “loitering,” or “wandering,” 

without any indication of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In addition, a 

review of the NPD’s arrest reports raised concerns that, in some subset of NPD 

narcotics arrests, officers have failed to report completely or accurately the 

circumstances of those arrests. 

	 Policing that results in disproportionate stops and arrests of Newark’s black 

residents. The NPD stops black individuals at a greater rate than it stops white 

individuals. As a result, black individuals in Newark bear the brunt of the NPD’s 

pattern of unconstitutional stops and arrests. This investigation did not determine 

whether the disparity is intentional or is otherwise legally unjustified. Regardless, 

this experience of disproportionately being subjected to stops and arrests in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment shapes black residents’ interactions with the 

NPD, to the detriment of community trust, and makes the job of delivering police 

services in Newark more dangerous and less effective.1 

	 Retaliating against individuals who question police actions. In violation of the 

First Amendment, NPD officers have detained and arrested individuals who 

lawfully object to police actions or behave in a way that officers perceive as 

disrespectful. 

	 Using unjustified and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

In more than twenty percent of the NPD force incidents reviewed, the force as 

reported appeared unreasonable and thus in violation of the Constitution. Further, 

there has been substantial underreporting of force by NPD officers, and most 

NPD use of force investigations have been too inadequate to support reliable 

conclusions about whether an officer’s use of force—including deadly force— 

was reasonable. 

	 Subjecting individuals to theft by NPD officers in violation of the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. The investigation revealed evidence of theft of 

1

 As this report was being finalized, the American Civil Liberties Union’s New Jersey affiliate (ACLU-NJ) released 

the results of its review of NPD stop statistics. The ACLU-NJ review was limited to a subset of summary stop data 

the NPD now publishes on its website. As explained below, the DOJ obtained direct access to the NPD’s source 

records and the DOJ investigation thus included analysis of more precise information, including the location of 

stops, the documented justification, whether the stop was a pedestrian or vehicle stop, and descriptions of post stop 

activity such as searches and frisks. Like the DOJ investigation, the ACLU-NJ review of different, but more recent 

data identified racial disparities in NPD stops. 

2 
citizens’ property and money by officers, specifically in the NPD’s specialized 

units such as the narcotics and gang units, and in the prisoner processing unit at 

the Green Street Cell Block. The NPD has conducted inadequate investigations 

into theft complaints, failed to take corrective action against offending officers, 

and declined to implement the methods recommended by its own investigators 

that could prevent future theft by officers. 

The finding of a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct within a law enforcement agency 

does not mean that most officers violate the law. Nor does a pattern or practice reflect that a 

certain number of officers have violated the law, or that the number of unlawful acts have 

reached a particular threshold. See United States v. Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 

(5th Cir. 1971) (“The number of [violations) ... is not determinative ...., [no] mathematical 

formula is workable, nor was any intended. Each case must turn on its own facts”). Rather, the 

touchstone is whether the unlawful conduct appears more typical than isolated or aberrant. A 

pattern or practice exists where the conduct appears to be part of usual practice, whether 

officially sanctioned by policy or otherwise. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 

431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (a pattern or practice is “more than the mere occurrence of isolated or 

‘accidental’ or ‘sporadic’” acts; instead it must be a “regular rather than the unusual practice”). 

The patterns of constitutional violations described in this report result in significant part 

from a lack of accountability and review systems within the NPD. The NPD has neither a 

functioning early warning system nor an effective internal affairs structure. Those inadequacies 

undermine the Department’s ability to identify and address officer misconduct. The NPD’s data 

collection and analysis, and its system for regular review of officer use of force, are similarly 

deficient. 

One indication of the ineffectiveness of the NPD’s internal affairs system is that the 

Internal Affairs Unit (“IA”) sustained only one civilian complaint of excessive force out of 

hundreds received from 2007 through 2012. While there is no “right” rate at which force 

complaints should be sustained, only one finding of unreasonable force out of hundreds of 

complaints over a six-year period is symptomatic of deeply dysfunctional accountability systems. 

The NPD also has failed to adequately collect or analyze data about officers’ use of force, stops, 

or arrests. Nor has the NPD taken adequate steps to implement an early warning system that 

would track and identify officers’ problematic behavior. As a result of these systemic 

deficiencies, the NPD does not discern or respond to problematic trends in officer conduct that 

could constitute or lead to misconduct. 

Nor has the NPD provided officers with the tools necessary to support constitutional 

policing, such as adequate training, clear and easily accessible policies, and meaningful 

supervisory direction. Basic deficiencies have included the failure to ensure that NPD officers 

actually have access to the policies they are supposed to follow, to regularly update policies, and 

to provide or track necessary training. Supervisory review of officer actions, including use of 

force and arrests, has been lax. The cumulative effect of these deficiencies is an organization that 

is too prone to shield officers from accountability, and insufficiently focused on protecting 

constitutional rights. 

3 
The responsibility for correcting the NPD’s unconstitutional policing practices lies at 

every level within the Department. NPD supervisors and command leadership must ensure that 

officers receive the training, guidance, and direction necessary to police effectively and 

constitutionally, and clearly communicate to officers that constitutional policing and effective 

law enforcement are not in tension with each other, but rather are interdependent. Officers must 

act within the parameters that the law places on stops, searches, and arrests, and avoid escalating 

interactions to the point where they use force unnecessarily. The NPD further must collect and 

analyze data related to stops, searches, and arrests, so that it can minimize the disparate impact of 

its enforcement efforts and avoid bias in policing. NPD leadership must also ensure that, when 

officers do violate policy or the law, they are held accountable and that corrective action, 

including discipline, is effective, fair, and consistent. 

All of these findings, as well as proposed remedies, have been discussed with City 

officials and NPD leadership, and the City and NPD have pledged to quickly and thoroughly 

address these problems. To that end, the City and DOJ have reached an Agreement in Principle 

that will form the foundation of a comprehensive, judicially enforceable and independently 

monitored agreement to implement significant reform. 

The Agreement in Principle, which is attached, addresses each of the patterns of 

constitutional violations described in this report. The Agreement requires the City to establish a 

civilian oversight entity for the NPD and additional mechanisms for effective community 

engagement to help ensure the sustainability of reforms and to foster positive relations between 

the NPD and the Newark community. The City, NPD, and DOJ agree that the NPD will review 

and revise its policies, training, and internal oversight mechanisms, particularly regarding the use 

of force and stop, search and arrest practices. The NPD also will provide officers with proper 

guidance regarding individuals’ exercise of their First Amendment rights. The NPD will develop 

and implement accountability and supervisory practices to prevent, detect, and address unlawful 

stops, searches, and arrests and unreasonable force, and to detect and prevent theft by officers. 

The NPD will revise its internal affairs practices to ensure effective complaint intake, objective 

investigations of misconduct, and fair and consistent discipline. The NPD will also enhance its 

collection and analysis of data so that it can better understand its enforcement practices and 

ensure their effectiveness and constitutionality. 

Throughout the investigation of the NPD’s practices, all parties have recognized that 

Newark is a challenging city to police, given its significant level of crime and its budget 

constraints. The DOJ acknowledges in particular the skills and dedication of the many Newark 

police officers who abide by the rule of law and commit themselves daily to the difficult, and too 

often thankless, job of protecting public safety. The findings of this investigation are not meant 

to detract from these officers’ efforts. Indeed, many of the investigative findings underscore the 

need for the NPD and the City to better support and direct its officers. 

Alongside this appreciation for the difficulties of police work, all parties agree that any 

NPD policies or practices that violate civil rights must be identified and remedied. This shared 

respect for individuals’ civil rights reflects not only the fundamental importance of these rights, 

but also an understanding that repeated civil rights violations make policing less effective and 

more dangerous. The DOJ looks forward to working cooperatively with the City and the NPD— 

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as well as with the many other important stakeholders in this process, including community 

members and police unions—to carry out these reforms. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Investigation and Methodology 

The DOJ provided notice to the City and the NPD of its investigation pursuant to Section 

14141, Title VI, and the Safe Streets Act on May 9, 2011, and that the investigation would focus 

on allegations of excessive force; unconstitutional stops, searches, and seizures; discriminatory 

policing on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, and gender identity; 

risk of harm to detainees confined in holding cells; and retaliation by officers against individuals 

who legally attempt to observe or record police activity. 

The team investigating the NPD’s police practices consisted of experts in police 

practices, and lawyers and other staff from the DOJ. Police practice experts included current and 

former police chiefs and supervisors from other jurisdictions, who provided expertise on law 

enforcement issues, as well as an expert in the collection and analysis of police-related data. 

The investigation included intensive on-site review of NPD practices and procedures. 

The team conducted interviews and meetings with NPD officers, supervisors, and command 

staff, and participated in “ride-alongs” with officers and supervisors. The team also met with 

representatives of police fraternal organizations, conducted numerous community meetings, met 

with advocates and other individuals, and interviewed a wide array of local, regional, and federal 

stakeholders in the Newark criminal justice system, including representatives of the Essex 

County Prosecutor’s Office (“ECPO”), the Essex County Public Defender’s Office, the Newark 

Municipal Prosecutor’s Office, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The team set up a tollfree number and email address to receive information related to the NPD. The DOJ also worked 

with NPD’s contracted data management vendor to obtain substantial amounts of data related to 

NPD stops and arrests. 

 Throughout this report, specific facts and incidents are included as examples and 

illustrations, but the conclusions reflect the entirety of the information received, and are not 

based only on the individual events described here. 

B. Newark, New Jersey and the Newark Police Department 

Newark is New Jersey’s largest city, with a population of 277,140 people, according to 

the 2010 census. Newark’s population is racially and ethnically diverse: 53.9% black, 26.4% 

white, and 19.8% other or unknown.2

 Of the entire population, approximately 33.9% identify 

themselves as Hispanic or Latino, with 30.6% identifying as non-black Hispanic. 

2

 This demographic breakdown for the population used in this report differs slightly from the percentages in the 

overall 2010 census for Newark. The breakdown in this report is calculated on a block-by-block basis, a smaller 

geographic unit than the U.S. Census Bureau uses to calculate data. This breakdown is a more accurate figure for 

assessing NPD’s policing practices within precinct and sector geographic boundaries. 

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The NPD currently employs approximately 1,000 sworn officers, and is still recovering 

from the layoff of 167 officers at the end of 2010 due to budget cuts. The Department is led by a 

Police Director, appointed by the Mayor of Newark and approved by the Newark City Council, 

and a Chief of Police, who reports to the Police Director. The NPD is composed of four 

precincts and additional bureaus and special units, including the Detective Bureau, the Special 

Operations Division, and the Support Services Bureau. All of these report to the Chief, whereas 

the Director directly oversees the Internal Affairs Unit,3

 the Training Section, and the 

Administration Bureau. 

General Orders and Director’s Memoranda set forth the NPD’s policies and procedures.4 

The investigation included a review of the NPD’s written policies, procedures, and training 

materials. To gain a complete picture of the NPD’s police practices, the team also reviewed 

myriad records and reports completed by NPD officers to document their activities and 

enforcement actions. When officers conduct a traffic or pedestrian stop, they are required to 

complete a Field Inquiry Report which, by policy, must include the legal support for the stop. If 

officers make an arrest, or take some other enforcement action, they are required to complete an 

Incident Report in which the officer is required to describe the legal support for the arrest, the 

elements of the alleged offense, and, if force was used, a narrative description of the nature of 

and reason for the use of force. Officers using force are required also to complete a Use of Force 

Report, which consists of data fields to complete, but provides no space for any narrative 

description of the force used or its justification. A supervisor is required to sign the Use of Force 

Report to document that the force has been reviewed and approved. 

When an individual complains that an officer committed misconduct, the NPD’s internal 

affairs unit is required to conduct an administrative investigation of the allegation and document 

its investigation and findings in an Internal Affairs Investigation Report. The NPD’s internal 

affairs unit also is required by policy to conduct an administrative investigation of all officerinvolved shootings, whether or not they result in any complaint, and independent of any criminal 

investigation of the incident. These shooting investigations also are documented in an Internal 

Affairs Investigation Report. The administrative investigation of a shooting differs from a 

criminal investigation in that the administrative investigation is focused on determining whether 

the shooting violated departmental policy and was a reasonable use of force, rather than whether 

the shooting was potentially criminal. This investigation included close review of a 

representative sample of each category of these reports. 

Three separate unions represent NPD officers: the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 

12 (“FOP”), the Superior Officers’ Association (“SOA”), and the Deputy Chiefs’ Association 

(“DCA”). All three unions have collective bargaining contracts with the City. SOA members 

3

 During the course of the investigation and drafting of this report, the name of the NPD’s internal investigations 

unit changed. At present, the NPD organizational chart no longer lists a specific “Internal Affairs” unit, although the 

Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”), of which IA was previously a sub-unit, still appears in the chart. NPD 

staff use the terms OPS and Internal Affairs interchangeably. This report refers to the NPD’s internal investigations 

unit as Internal Affairs or “IA.” 

4

 These policies and procedures are informed by the New Jersey State Attorney General’s Office guidelines for law 

enforcement agencies, which apply to all municipalities in New Jersey. These guidelines are available at 

http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide.htm. 

6 
                                                           

 

may also join the FOP to obtain that union’s legal defense benefits. Separately, NPD officers 

may also join the Newark Police Benevolent Association which advocates on behalf of NPD 

officers and also offers legal defense benefits, but is not the collective bargaining unit. The NPD 

currently does not have any form of civilian oversight, although the previous mayor announced a 

plan to establish a civilian-led police oversight panel in 2013. 

III. FINDINGS 

A. STOPS AND ARRESTS 

The NPD’s stops and arrests are problematic in a number of respects. The NPD engages 

in a pattern or practice of effecting pedestrian stops without reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In addition, the NPD’s response to perceived 

disrespect violates the First and Fourth Amendments. Further, an uncertain number of the 

NPD’s narcotics-related arrests appear to violate the Fourth Amendment. 

1. Stops 

Generally, a search or seizure is unreasonable “in the absence of individualized suspicion 

of wrongdoing.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (emphasis added). 

There is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD nonetheless engages in a widespread pattern or 

practice of making pedestrian stops without such individualized suspicion.5 This conclusion is 

based on review of NPD policies, stop reports for a three-and-a-half year period, arrest records, 

IA files, site visits to the NPD, interviews with stakeholders in the criminal justice system, and 

information provided by community members. 

a. Legal Standards 

Under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers may briefly detain an individual 

for investigative purposes if the officers possess reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 

afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop may be “the 

result of any combination of one or several factors: specialized knowledge and investigative 

inferences, personal observation of suspicious behavior, information from sources that have 

proven to be reliable, and information from sources that—while unknown to the police—prove 

by the accuracy and intimacy of the information provided to be reliable at least as to the details 

contained within that tip.” United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 478 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal 

citations omitted). Courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against 

unreasonable searches and seizures to mean that law enforcement officers must satisfy escalating 

legal standards of “reasonableness” for each level of intrusion upon a person—stop, search, 

seizure, and arrest. 

While reasonable suspicion is evaluated by looking at the totality of circumstances, an 

officer must be able to “articulate specific reasons justifying [the] detention.” Johnson v. 

Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 

5

 The investigation focused on pedestrian stops and did not assess the NPD’s vehicle stop practices. 

7 
                                                           

167 (3d Cir. 2002). A stop must be based on something more substantial than an “inchoate and 

unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The officer must be able to point 

to some particular and objective manifestation that the suspect was, or was about to be, engaged 

in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); see also United States v. 

Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2006); Johnson, 332 F.3d at 206. 

The Third Circuit has found that a stop is unconstitutional where an officer thinks an 

individual’s behavior is “suspicious” but is not able to articulate why or link it to criminal 

activity. Johnson, 332 F.3d at 210 (report that plaintiff was pacing and acting agitated, followed 

by officer’s observation of plaintiff sitting in a car reading the newspaper, did not give rise to 

articulable suspicion that plaintiff was about to commit a crime). Similarly, an officer may not 

stop individuals based only on a generalized description of appearance that could apply widely, 

when the officer has not observed suspicious activity by those individuals. See Brown ̧ 448 F.3d 

at 248-52 (stop was unconstitutional when officer stopped two individuals he observed hailing a 

taxi based on description of robbery suspects as two black males, ages 15 to 20, wearing dark 

clothing). 

Nor is an individual’s mere presence in a particular neighborhood or area—even “an area 

of expected criminal activity” or “a high crime area”—sufficient “to support a reasonable, 

particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 

119, 124 (2000); see also United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2004); United 

States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 1996) (mere presence on a corner known as a “hot 

corner” for drug sales does not support reasonable suspicion to justify a stop). Rather, while 

presence in a high crime area may be a factor, police must make their determination of 

reasonable suspicion upon the individual’s actions. 

b. NPD Stops Have Routinely Violated the Fourth Amendment 

The NPD uses a Field Inquiry Report to document stop activity by officers, and NPD 

policy requires that the report contain sufficient facts to demonstrate reasonable suspicion for a 

stop.6

 Reports failing to meet reasonable suspicion standards are to be rejected by the reviewing 

supervisor, and corrective training conducted to prevent a recurrence. Therefore, in theory, the 

Field Inquiry Report offers the best record of the NPD's stop activities. However, the NPD’s use 

of Field Inquiry Reports is not entirely consistent with its policy, as NPD officers also use Field 

Inquiry Reports to document encounters other than stops for which reasonable suspicion is not 

required, such as witness interviews. 

To ensure that the review assessed the NPD’s core pedestrian stop practices and not other 

encounters, the review of Field Inquiry Reports was conservatively limited to those in which the 

individual was described as a suspect, instead of a witness, and subject to a warrant check. By 

this measure, during the period of January 2009 to June 2012, NPD officers completed 39,308 

Field Inquiry Reports, each documenting a pedestrian stop. Of those 39,308 encounters, the 

officer did not record any justification for the stop on 6,200 occasions (15.8%). These 

encounters were excluded from further analysis. DOJ investigators analyzed a sample of one6 NPD GO 97-8 (Revised 7/1/2000). 

8 
 

                                                           

 

 

 

 

third (n=10,179) of the Field Inquiry Reports that recorded a justification for the stop. In 

approximately 75% of these remaining Reports, the officers failed to articulate reasonable 

suspicion to justify the stop, as required by NPD policy.7 Cf. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 

F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding violations of class members’ Fourth Amendment rights 

where statistical analysis revealed that 6% of stops lacked reasonable suspicion). 

In particular, thousands of the stops—all of which were at least long enough to run 

warrant checks—involved individuals who were described merely as “milling,” “loitering,” or 

“wandering,” without any indication of criminal activity or suspicion. Some of those were 

augmented with a notation that the “milling,” “loitering,” or “wandering” was taking place in 

high-crime areas, high-narcotics areas, or high-gang activity areas. Officers also routinely 

stopped and ran warrant checks for individuals solely for being present in high-crime areas, near 

scenes of suspected or reported crimes, or simply “in areas.” Without any indicator of criminal 

activity or suspicion of an intent to engage in criminal activity, these reasons do not constitute 

reasonable suspicion to detain an individual, and are therefore constitutionally deficient. Yet, the 

reports demonstrate that these have been the most common type of pedestrian stops made by 

NPD officers.8 

While poor report-writing may amplify the number of stops that appear unjustified, the 

repeated reliance on these insufficient justifications strongly suggests that NPD officers do not 

appreciate what is legally required for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Moreover, the 

frequent use of certain types of illegitimate justifications for stops, combined with the failure of 

reviewing supervisors to reject reports that contain them, suggests that the NPD has tolerated its 

officers’ stopping people for reasons that do not meet constitutional muster. 

7

 This high rate of unjustified stops may actually understate the problem. For example, if the Field Inquiry Report 

indicated that the stop was dispatch-initiated rather than officer-initiated, the review did not consider the stop 

insufficiently justified, even where the report did not articulate facts that would justify a stop. Similarly, stop 

reasons referencing quality of life citations were also generally not included in the “no reasonable suspicion” 

category because the majority of behaviors giving rise to quality of life citations are evident by observation. 

However, stop reasons consisting solely of the fact that an individual was arrested were included in the “no 

reasonable suspicion” category for reasons explained later in this section. Even when excluding this latter category 

of stops, the analysis shows that officers failed to articulate reasonable suspicion in 69% of the Field Inquiry Reports 

reviewed. In addition, if this analysis had considered the 15.8% of reports that recorded no justification for the stop 

to be insufficient, approximately 93% of the stops would have been considered unsupported by articulated 

reasonable suspicion. 

8

 Backseat detentions are another troubling aspect of NPD stop practices. Being placed in the backseat of a police 

vehicle can be a humiliating and often frightening experience. Police departments should use this practice only in 

strict accordance with the law. In Newark, there were credible complaints from community members that NPD 

officers routinely detain people and place them in the backs of police vehicles for significant periods of time and 

without cause, and then release them without actually filing charges, or even informing the individuals of the 

reasons for detention. It is difficult to assess the extent of this practice because of the lack of written documentation, 

in violation of policy, of the officers’ action. NPD policy (GO No. 09-03) requires officers to document detentions 

in Incident Reports, even when an officer subsequently releases an individual without bringing the person to the 

precinct for processing or filing formal charges. However, like other NPD documentation requirements assessed, 

this policy does not appear to have been consistently followed, reviewed, or enforced. The NPD should ensure that 

backseat detentions are used only as appropriate for officer safety or other legitimate reasons and should enforce its 

policies that require documenting this activity. 

9 
 

                                                           

These deficiencies in the NPD’s stop practices were also reflected in IA investigations of 

complainants that officers used excessive force, discussed more fully later in this report. 

Nineteen percent—almost one in five—of those IA files described a stop without a constitutional 

justification. If the initial stop that culminated in the use of force was itself unjustified, any use 

of force, whether otherwise appropriate or not, is troubling, and perhaps unconstitutional. 

At least part of this pattern of unlawful stops can be traced to NPD policies and training. 

NPD policy includes “[h]igh crime areas and the type of activity that takes place there” and 

“[p]roximity to scene of a crime” in its list of “reasonable suspicious factors to stop a person.”9 

Although the policy provides examples for each of these factors that include the factor plus 

additional information (i.e. high crime area plus exchange of currency and objects by the 

individual, proximity of scene of crime plus individual matches a description or is engaged in 

activity such as running or hiding), the policy does not clearly state that any of those factors 

alone are insufficient and that additional information is required to establish reasonable 

suspicion. This lack of clarity in NPD policies effectively promotes a view that living or simply 

being in a high-crime area is criminally suspicious. This violates the Fourth Amendment’s 

fundamental tenet requiring individualized suspicion to justify deprivation of liberty by law 

enforcement. The lack of clarity may also result in inadequate documentation of stops that might 

actually have been constitutional but were not fully described. 

In addition to stopping individuals based on their mere presence in high crime areas, 

NPD officers also have too often stopped pedestrians for other impermissible reasons. For 

example, NPD officers illegally stopped individuals whom officers perceived to react negatively 

to the presence of police officers, without any additional indicia of criminal activity. See, e.g., 

Bonner, 363 F.3d 217-18 (flight upon noticing police, without some other indicia of wrongdoing, 

is not grounds for reasonable suspicion). Officers also have impermissibly stopped individuals 

solely because they were in the presence of an arrestee or other suspicious person, without any 

other articulated indicia of criminal activity. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“[A] 

search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to 

that person.”). Specific examples of these types of reasons for stops include: “Actor Upon 

Noticing Our Presents [sic] Changed His Direction of Travel,” “Observed Actor Hid Behind A 

Car When He Observed Police Car,” and “Subject Was In the Company of a Female Who Was 

Cited For Drinking.” 

NPD officers also regularly have justified stops based solely on information or evidence 

discovered after the stop was initiated. Examples include “Individual Was Stopped on Bicycle 

No Proper ID” and “A Record Check of the Above Individual Revealed an Open Warrant.” The 

reasonableness of a stop is determined based on “facts available to the officer at the moment of 

the seizure.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (emphasis added); Johnson, 332 F.3d at 205; see also 

Brown, 448 F.3d at 245 (attempt to escape after stop was irrelevant in determining 

reasonableness of stop because attempt to escape occurred after stop was initiated). 

Similarly, officers have justified stops based on the fact that the individual was ultimately 

arrested. Typical examples of these justifications include “Arrested,” “CDS Arrest,” “Narcotics 

9 See NPD GO 97-8 (Revised 7/1/2000). 

10
 
Arrest,” and “Individual Arrested for [charge].” This is constitutionally impermissible: an 

officer must first have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to conduct a stop, and 

the discovery of evidence during or after the stop that provides probable cause for arrest cannot 

be used to retroactively establish reasonable suspicion for the stop. See Wong Sun v. United 

States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). Because the stop was not justified in the first place, the 

subsequent search and arrest are the direct result of impermissible police activity and are invalid. 

c.	 Unconstitutional Stop Practices Undermine Effective Policing and 

Officer Accountability 

The NPD’s unconstitutional stop practices negatively affect not only Newark’s residents 

but also the NPD’s ability to effectively police the City. First, the practice erodes the 

community’s trust, as individuals feel that they will be treated as criminals based on where they 

live or spend time, rather than on how they act. Indeed the NPD’s own stop policy warns that 

“[t]he indiscriminate use of stopping and questioning individuals will be detrimental to the 

positive community relations that this Department strives to obtain.” And representatives from 

other criminal justice agencies, advocates, and community members reported throughout the 

investigation that many Newark residents have come to expect that officers might stop, recordcheck, and search them at any time without any justification at all. One individual characterized 

this experience as “just part of living in Newark.” As with the NPD’s Quality of Life citation 

practices discussed later in this report, residents perceive these stops as harassment by police. 

Research has shown, and individuals interviewed during this investigation recounted, that 

witnesses who experienced such stops are less likely to accept police legitimacy and to provide 

assistance to police during investigations. 

Second, stops without adequate justification result in the over-collection, and improper 

retention and use, of personal information. NPD policy states that information about individuals 

in the NPD’s database is relevant for evaluating the veracity and reliability of their statements in 

the future. As a result, NPD officers’ unjustified stops can have long-lasting and substantial 

consequences for people’s lives, as well as for the NPD’s ability to hold officers accountable for 

misconduct. For example, as discussed later in this report, the NPD’s IA may improperly 

discredit the complaint of an individual in part because the individual has multiple recorded 

encounters with police. 

The NPD’s undisciplined stop practices also increase the risk that officers, without 

appropriate guidance to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate justifications for 

conducting stops, may rely on impermissible factors such as an individual’s race, color, or 

ethnicity. The NPD should be particularly attentive to this concern in light of the 

disproportionate impact its stop and arrest practices have on Newark’s black residents, which is 

discussed below. 

2.	 Arrests 

Although NPD officers generally write reports that facially appear to establish probable 

cause to arrest, those reports have reflected two categories of problematic practices. First, there 

is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of 

unconstitutional arrests for behavior perceived as insubordinate or disrespectful to officers— 

11
 
 

often charged as obstruction of justice, resisting arrest, or disorderly conduct. Second, there is 

reasonable cause to believe that some number of NPD narcotics arrest reports may not have 

accurately described the circumstances leading to arrest, and that the NPD has not addressed this 

problem. This assessment of NPD arrest practices is based on: a review of a random sample of 

100 arrest reports and associated incident reports from a three-and-a-half year period, January 

2009 to June 2012; NPD policy; IA files; Use of Force Reports; site visits to the NPD; interviews 

with stakeholders in the criminal justice system; and information provided by community 

members. 

a.	 Legal Standards 

Probable cause to arrest an individual exists “when the information within the officer’s 

knowledge at the time of the arrest is sufficient to warrant a reasonable officer to believe that an 

offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 

F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000). In determining whether an officer had probable cause to make an 

arrest, courts consider the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the 

moment the arrest was made. Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005). 

The constitutional validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually 

committed any crime, and probable cause cannot be retroactively established or disproven by the 

fact that the suspect later pleads guilty, is found guilty, or is acquitted. See id.; Johnson, 332 

F.3d at 211. The totality of the circumstances test is objective: the question is whether “an 

officer would be justified in believing that an actual offense was being committed,” not whether 

an officer subjectively believed there was probable cause to make an arrest. Johnson, 332 F.3d 

at 214. An officer’s erroneous belief that a suspect’s actions constitute criminal activity is 

irrelevant if the available evidence would not support that conclusion. Id. 

Officers may not arrest individuals for exhibiting behavior that is disrespectful or 

obnoxious, but legal, and must be mindful that some speech challenging or objecting to police 

action is protected by the First Amendment. Police officers “are expected to endure significant 

burdens caused by citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights,” including “provocative 

and challenging” speech and gestures. Gilk v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); City of 

Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987); see also Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 110 

(2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] reasonable police officer would not have believed he was entitled to initiate 

the law enforcement process in response to giving the finger.”); Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 

(7th Cir. 1997) (extending middle finger and shouting profanity protected by the First 

Amendment); Duran v. City of Douglas, Arizona, 904 F.2d 1372, 1377-78 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(while police officers “may resent having obscene . . . gestures directed at them, they may not 

exercise the awesome power at their disposal to punish individuals for conduct that is not merely 

lawful, but protected by the First Amendment.”). 

b.	 “Contempt of Cop” Arrests, Seizures, and Citations Have Violated 

the Fourth and First Amendments 

The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects verbal challenges 

to police action, holding that “[t]he freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police 

action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we 

distinguish a free nation from a police state.” Hill, 482 U.S. at 462-63. NPD officers have 

12
 
 

                                                           

 

 

engaged in a pattern of violating constitutional rights by detaining and arresting individuals who 

lawfully object to police actions or behave in a way that officers perceive as disrespectful. These 

types of arrests are sometimes referred to as “contempt of cop” arrests, and are often charged as 

obstruction of justice, resisting arrest, or similar offenses, even though the behavior has not met 

the legal standards for such charges. Contempt of cop detentions and arrests in retaliation for 

questioning or expressing criticism of police violate individuals’ rights under both the Fourth and 

First Amendments.10 

The NPD’s arrest reports and IA investigations, including some incidents involving 

unreasonable uses of force, reflect numerous instances of the NPD's inappropriate responses to 

individuals who engage in constitutionally protected First Amendment activity, such as 

questioning or criticizing police actions. 

For example, in one IA investigation, an individual was arrested after he questioned 

officers’ decision to arrest his neighbor. The individual alleged that officers immediately 

proceeded to use force against him. The officers’ own version of events, reporting that the 

individual told them loudly and “in a belligerent manner” that they could not arrest his neighbor, 

did not establish probable cause for the officers’ decision to arrest the man for obstructing the 

administration of law. 

In another incident, officers reported that a woman standing outside her apartment yelled 

profanity and spat in their direction. According to the officers, based on this conduct, they 

decided to arrest her for aggravated assault and disorderly conduct and used “physical contact” to 

effect the arrest. According to the woman, she had publicly criticized an officer for questioning 

a street vendor about a permit. Although the officers’ and complainant’s accounts of the incident 

differ, the officers’ own explanation of the incident—that they used force and arrested the 

woman in response to her using profanity and spitting towards them—provides insufficient 

justification for their actions. 

In another example, a civilian complainant alleged that a plainclothes detective used 

force and arrested him after he walked away from the detective. The IA investigation revealed 

that the detective first observed a group of people standing near the street and deemed them 

suspicious based solely on “the area” they were in. The detective’s report indicates that, 

although he had observed no criminal activity, he announced police presence and “randomly 

approached one actor” (emphasis added) and ordered him to stop. The individual attempted to 

walk away from the detective, and allegedly used profanity toward the detective while the 

10 In addition to the examples of First Amendment violations discussed here, prior to the initiation of this 

investigation, there were several highly publicized incidents where NPD officers prohibited citizens from recording 

police action. NPD ultimately settled at least three of the resulting lawsuits, and promulgated a Director’s 

memorandum in the fall of 2011 with guidance on individuals’ right to record police. However, this investigation 

found that NPD has not fully corrected the practice of inappropriately prohibiting individuals from recording the 

police, and needs to issue more detailed policies to guide officer behavior. For example, the current policy states 

that individuals have a First Amendment right to record police activities but gives officers the discretion to order 

individuals to stop recording if they “truly interfere with legitimate law enforcement operations.” The policy does 

not explain or provide examples of the types of conduct that might amount to such interference and thus does not 

provide sufficient guidance to officers on how to lawfully exercise their discretion. 

13
 
detective continued to issue verbal commands for him to stop. The complainant alleged that the 

detective grabbed him from behind and he turned in response. It is not clear from the detective’s 

report when he first touched the individual, but the report states that the individual turned 

around, raised his hands and reached for the detective’s wrists, suggesting that the officer had 

already initiated his use of force. The detective’s report indicates he pushed the individual up 

against the hood of a car, before arresting him for resisting arrest, obstructing the administration 

of law, and disorderly conduct. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a refusal to 

cooperate with the police, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective 

justification needed for a detention or seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991); see 

also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. 

In addition to a pattern of unjustified arrests in which individuals are formally charged, 

there is evidence that, in violation of the Constitution, the NPD has seized and detained 

individuals or issued unjustified Quality of Life citations in retaliation for protected conduct. 

For example, in one incident investigated by the NPD’s IA, the complainants alleged that 

a plainclothes officer stopped an individual on the street. Two complainants were present and 

one, unaware that the plainclothes officer was a police officer, asked the officer why she had 

stopped the individual. According to that complainant, the officer slammed him to the ground 

and used a choke hold on him. The second complainant then asked the officer why she was 

choking the other observer. The officer allegedly kicked the second complainant in the ribs and 

placed both individuals in handcuffs. In her interview with IA, the officer stated that she 

“bumped into” the first complainant causing him to fall on the ground. She admitted detaining 

the two individuals after they became “loud and hostile.” Both individuals were ultimately 

released from handcuffs and issued Quality of Life citations for disorderly conduct. The 

municipal court later refused to adjudicate the citations. 

In another excessive force complaint investigated by IA, two officers dispersing crowds 

at a high school following a large fight reported that a student spat on the ground in front of the 

officers. One officer reported to the IA investigator that he then grabbed the juvenile by his arm, 

“placing” his head against the hood of the police cruiser. The second officer confirmed this 

account. The juvenile was ultimately frisked, given a summons and released when his father 

arrived on the scene. Several of the IA files reviewed contained similar descriptions of officers 

detaining, arresting, or issuing citations to individuals perceived to have spat in the general 

direction of the officers, giving credence to these complaints and indicating that this practice 

may be more widespread. 

The NPD’s exercise of its police power to respond to “contempt of cop” behavior is part 

of the pattern of unreasonable stops and arrests by NPD officers, and consistent with the pattern 

of unreasonable force discussed below. A police officer’s job is difficult, requiring a thick skin 

and patience. Unfortunately, rather than using de-escalation techniques and acting within the 

constraints of the Constitution when confronted with disrespectful behavior, NPD has engaged in 

a pattern and practice of taking immediate offensive action, without regard to whether that 

conduct complies with the law. 

14
 
 

                                                           

 

 

c.	 Narcotics Searches and Arrests Have Violated the Fourth 

Amendment 

There is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD’s pattern of unlawful arrests extends to 

its narcotics arrests. NPD narcotics-related arrest reports reflect a strikingly high number of 

instances in which officers did not have to conduct a search to find the narcotics that provided 

the probable cause for the arrest. These numbers, and the circumstances of these arrests, suggest 

that some number of these narcotics arrest reports have been inaccurate. While this investigation 

did not determine which, or how many, arrest reports suffered such deficiencies, it is troubling 

that the NPD appears neither to have noticed this pattern nor to have taken appropriate steps to 

ensure that officers write accurate, reliable narcotics arrest reports that reflect legitimate 

searches. 

Out of a sample of 100 reports documenting NPD arrests between January 2009 and June 

2012, 58 documented arrests on narcotics-related charges. The overwhelming majority of these 

narcotics arrests and associated incident reports contained remarkably similar language to 

support officers’ reasonable suspicion to stop the individual. According to the narratives written 

by officers, in at least 46 of the 58 narcotics arrest reports in the sample, officers reportedly did 

not have to conduct a search in order to find narcotics. Rather, officers reported, using similar 

language, that suspects either voluntarily and immediately offered or discarded an otherwise 

concealed CDS (controlled dangerous substance) to the police upon mere announcement or 

recognition of police presence, or that the CDS was “in plain view” of the officers when they 

approached the suspects. In the “plain view” scenarios, individuals often were purportedly 

seated in cars holding clear plastic baggies in front of them or on their laps and officers could 

“immediately” see the contraband, even though the report indicated that the subject’s back was 

to an officer, or that the officer had not yet approached the car. 

The concerns raised by these reports may be partly explainable by poor report writing, 

and some portion of these plain view narcotics arrests may also reflect that NPD practices are far 

too opportunistic, with some officers’ relying too heavily on only the most obvious violations. 

Nonetheless, the sheer frequency with which NPD officers report finding contraband in plain 

view, sometimes in what appear to be less than plausible circumstances, makes it difficult to 

ascribe this problem to these dynamics alone. Indeed, police practice experts reviewing these 

reports observed that, in their experience reviewing such narcotics arrest reports in multiple 

jurisdictions across the country, the proportion of narcotics arrests in Newark that did not require 

a search is markedly high. These expert observations are consistent with concerns expressed by 

community members and other criminal justice stakeholders in Newark. The NPD and the City 

of Newark should engage a broad spectrum of criminal stakeholders, including the Essex County 

Public Defender’s Office and the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office, to determine how 

widespread this problem may be and develop an effective plan to combat it.11 

11 Improved report writing within NPD would also yield stronger cases for prosecution. One of the NPD arrest files 

reviewed also contained a report about the same incident written by Essex County Sheriff’s Department officers, 

providing an opportunity to compare these two agencies’ accounts of the same incident. In marked contrast to the 

canned language used in narratives written by NPD officers, the Essex County report contained many details 

15
 
 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

 

 

 

 

 

Prior to this investigation, the NPD apparently had not recognized this pattern in its 

arrests. This is due in part to the NPD’s insufficient accountability systems, such as adequate 

supervisory review, that are discussed later in this report. When this pattern was brought to their 

attention, City and NPD officials noted the brazen, open-air drug markets that plague Newark as 

a potential explanation for the high proportion of plain view arrests, and maintained that the 

NPD’s arrest reports accurately reflect the encounters. It is doubtless true that many of these 

arrest reports are accurate, and the review of these reports did not attempt to include an 

evaluation of the overall merits of any particular arrest, or examine the work of any particular 

officer. Rather, the prevalence of instances in which officers purportedly recovered drugs 

without the need for a search, together with the circumstances of those arrests as described by the 

reports, indicated that some portion of NPD arrest reports may have been inaccurate and that the 

NPD does not have the systems in place to reliably detect such deficient reports so that it can 

ensure that the underlying circumstances of the stop, search, and arrest are lawful.12 

B. DISPARATE IMPACT BASED ON RACE 

This investigation found that black people in Newark have been stopped and arrested at a 

significantly higher rate than their white and Hispanic counterparts. This disparity is stark and 

unremitting. Approximately 80% of the NPD’s stops and arrests have involved black 

individuals, while Newark’s population is only 53.9% black. Black residents of Newark are at 

least 2.5 times more likely to be subjected to a pedestrian stop or arrested than white individuals. 

Between January 2009 and June 2012, this translated into 34,153 more stops of black individuals 

than white individuals. The disparity persists throughout the city regardless of whether sectors 

have highly concentrated black residential populations or comparatively fewer black residents.13 

This investigation did not determine whether this disparity reflects intentional race 

discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or 

whether this disparity is avoidable or unnecessary, in violation of Title VI or the Safe Streets 

specific to the incident, including individualized descriptions of the suspects and specific actions giving rise to 

probable cause, locations of officers, approximate lengths of time of observation of actions by officers, reasons 

specific to the incident that led the officer to conclude they had reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and a 

plausible sequence of events. 

12 It is important also to note that, for the purposes of this investigation, the question was not whether arrestees were 

engaged in drug activity; rather, it was whether NPD officers were acting in accordance with fundamental 

constitutional requirements, such as individualized reasonable suspicion to support a detention, legal authority to 

support a search, and probable cause to support an arrest. The fact that an officer actually discovers evidence during 

or after a stop or search that provides reasonable suspicion for the stop or probable cause for the arrest does not 

render the officer’s actions constitutional. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-85. Nor does the fact that some of the 

individuals arrested and charged in the narcotics arrests reviewed pled guilty or were convicted in state court 

determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation in the arrest process occurred, or preclude consideration of this 

issue by a federal court in a subsequent Fourth Amendment challenge. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 314-23 

(1983); Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1986). Similarly, the Supreme Court has 

recognized that there are various incentives for a defendant to plead guilty independent of whether there may have 

been a Fourth Amendment violation. Prosise, 462 U.S. at 318-19. 13 As this report was being finalized, the ACLU-NJ released the results of its own review of stop data that NPD 

publishes on its website. The ACLU-NJ’s review of this different, more recent data also showed racial disparities in 

NPD stops. 

16
 
Act. As discussed in the Legal Standards section below, policing that has a disparate impact on 

members of a particular race may be unlawful not only where it is intentional, but also where it is 

unintentional, but avoidable. 

Nonetheless, regardless of why the disparity occurs, the impact is clear: because the NPD 

engages in a pattern of making stops in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Newark’s black 

residents bear the brunt of the NPD’s pattern of unconstitutional policing. This undeniable 

experience of being disproportionately affected by the NPD’s unconstitutional policing helps 

explain the community distrust and cynicism that undermines effective policing in Newark. In 

individual interviews and group meetings, many community and criminal justice stakeholders 

consistently described Newark as a city where black residents, and particularly black men, fear 

law enforcement action, regardless of whether such action is warranted by individualized 

suspicion. They indicated that unjustified stops by NPD officers have become so routine that 

many members of the black community have ceased feeling a sense of outrage and simply feel a 

sense of resignation. 

These conclusions about the racially disparate impact of the NPD’s policing practices are 

based on an analysis of NPD data obtained directly from the NPD’s data management vendor 

because the NPD does not maintain, track, or analyze demographic data for its law enforcement 

actions in a manner that could be relied upon for the close scrutiny required by this investigation. 

Further refinement of the systems and analysis of this data are necessary to more fully 

understand the nature and cause of this disparate impact, and the NPD should implement systems 

to collect and analyze this data as part of its effort to ensure that unlawful racially discriminatory 

policing does not occur. 

1. Legal Standards 

Discriminatory policing in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment may arise from either an explicit classification or a facially neutral policy or 

practice that is implemented or administered with discriminatory intent. See United States v. 

Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 457 (1996); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). 

Discriminatory policing under the Fourteenth Amendment includes selective enforcement of the 

law based on race. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). In addition, Title VI and 

the Safe Streets Act prohibit law enforcement agencies that receive federal financial assistance, 

such as the NPD, from engaging in intentional discrimination or in law enforcement activities 

that have an unjustified disparate impact based on race, color, or national origin. The Safe 

Streets Act provides that “[n]o person in any State shall on the ground of race, color, religion, 

national origin, or sex be ... subjected to discrimination under or denied employment in 

connection with any programs or activity” receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(1). 

Title VI establishes that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 

national origin, be excluded from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 

discrimination under any program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000d. Title VI’s implementing regulations prohibit law enforcement agencies from using 

“criteria or methods of administration” that have a disparate impact based on race, color, or 

national origin. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 

(2001). Thus, under these statutes, discriminatory impact may be unlawful even where it is not 

intentional. 

17
 
2. Failure to Track and Analyze Appropriate Data With Respect to Race 

A full understanding of the race-based effects of the NPD’s policing practices is made 

more difficult by the NPD’s failure to track and analyze data with respect to race, which is 

unusual, and at odds with sound policing practices, for a police department in a major city, 

especially one with such diversity. Although NPD Field Inquiry forms track race, and the Arrest 

Report and Incident Report forms track race and ethnicity, the NPD does not use this 

demographic data to analyze and inform its policing practices. In fact, when requested to 

produce basic data on stops and arrests that included race, the NPD was unable to do so because 

the NPD has not enabled its records management system to provide this information. Indeed, the 

NPD has not implemented any systems through which it can effectively monitor and assess the 

race-based effects of its policing practices. This failure is particularly surprising as the NPD has 

adopted a COMSTAT process similar to the one pioneered by the New York Police Department 

(“NYPD”) to help command staff ensure that the Department is policing effectively. Although 

the NYPD COMSTAT process includes tracking and analysis of policing activities by race, the 

NPD chose not to incorporate those features, meaning that NPD can use COMSTAT to analyze 

crime rates, but not to analyze the impact of its enforcement efforts on different racial or ethnic 

groups. 

Moreover, the NPD does not collect race and ethnicity data for any of the Quality of Life 

citations it issues, which made it impossible to use these forms to help determine the accuracy of 

widespread complaints from the community that the NPD uses Quality of Life citations in a 

racially discriminatory manner. These deliberate decisions by the NPD when the process was 

implemented make it difficult for anyone within or outside of NPD to assess the racial impact of 

NPD’s policing. 

After persistent efforts spanning approximately one year in which the NPD was unable to 

provide comprehensive data, the DOJ ultimately arranged to work directly with the vendor that 

created the NPD’s record management system to gain access to the raw data, including 

demographic information on race and, where tracked, ethnicity, for NPD stop and arrest 

activities from January 2009 through June 2012. Although there are deficiencies in this data 

resulting from the NPD’s inconsistent record-keeping practices and lack of corrective 

supervisory review, the sheer volume of the available records provided a sufficiently reliable 

data set to analyze. 

Further study of these numbers and their explanations is warranted, particularly because 

the data show that Newark’s black residents bear a disparate burden of stops, searches, and 

detentions that violate the Fourth Amendment. Without carefully tracking, analyzing, and 

addressing the racially disparate effects of its law enforcement activities in Newark, the NPD 

will be unable to fully understand and respond to this divisive disparity, and will face greater 

difficulty gaining the community trust and legitimacy required for effective and constitutional 

policing. 

18
 
                                                           

 

 

 

 

3.	 NPD’s Unconstitutional Stop, Search, and Arrest Practices Have Had a 

Disparate Impact on Black People in Newark 

The disparate impact of the NPD’s stop, search, and arrest practices appears to be an 

additional harm stemming, at least in part, from the same poor policing practices that result in 

stops, searches, and arrests that violate the First and Fourth Amendments. NPD officers, failing 

to apply constitutional and legal standards for stops, searches, and arrests, appear to have 

substituted their own judgments for these standards in determining when a stop, search, or arrest 

is justified. Without meaningful supervisory review, this practice increases the opportunity for 

officers to rely—consciously or unconsciously—on impermissible factors such as an individual’s 

race when conducting law enforcement actions. 

In addition to the broad statistical evidence of disparate impact set out below, there is 

more specific evidence that, while not conclusive, supports a conclusion that the NPD’s failure to 

require its officers to adhere to legal standards for stops facilitates impermissible reliance on 

race. For example, NPD officers used the conclusory phrase “suspicious person,” without 

articulating any facts that establish actual reason for suspicion, to justify approximately 1,500 

stops conducted during the three-and-a-half year time period reviewed.14 Of these 1,500 illegal 

“suspicious person” stops, 85% were stops of individuals identified by officers as black, and 

15% were stops of individuals identified as white, a proportion starkly inconsistent with 

Newark’s demographic breakdown. 

a.	 Pedestrian Stop Practices 

 Community perceptions of disparate treatment by the NPD are confirmed by the data. 

NPD officers documented a total of 52,235 pedestrian stops between January 2009 and June 

2012.15 Overall, 80.9%, or 42,234, of these stops were of black individuals; 15.5%, or 8,081, 

were of white individuals (which includes a large number of Hispanic individuals); and 3.7%, or 

1,920, of the stops were of individuals identified as “other races” or “unknown.” In comparison, 

according to 2010 U.S. census data, Newark’s population is 53.9% black, 26.4% white, and 

19.8% other races.16 While the NPD conducted approximately 111 stops per 1,000 residents for 

white people, the NPD conducted approximately 283 stops per 1,000 residents for black people. 

14 As discussed previously, identifying someone as a “suspicious person,” without articulating any factual basis for 

that suspicion, does not establish a legal basis for a stop.

15 This analysis included all pedestrian stops, not just those that were accompanied by a warrant check. This was 

done because the analysis sought to discover the demographic impact of all police-initiated pedestrian stops. 

16 Because pedestrian stops are more likely to stop persons who actually live in Newark than are vehicular stops, 

residential population (census) provides a useful benchmark for conducting a preliminary analysis to discern 

whether a pattern of racially disparate policing appears to exist. While using residential population as a benchmark 

for measuring the rate of people subjected to law enforcement activity relative to the potential population of people 

who could have been subjected to such activity is not a perfect fit, it is adequate, and was the best benchmark 

available, given NPD’s failure to collect, track, and analyze demographic data. Residential population for this 

analysis was calculated on a block-by-block basis. Of the 26.4% of Newark’s population that is white, 14.7% also 

are Hispanic according to the 2010 census data. However, because, until January 2014, the NPD’s stop data did not 

include ethnicity, this stop analysis considered race but not ethnicity. By contrast, as discussed below, the arrest 

data did include ethnicity during the period this investigation was conducted. 

19
 
 

                                                           

 

This means that black individuals in Newark have been 2.5 times more likely on average to be 

subjected to a pedestrian stop by an NPD officer than white individuals. 

In addition to being 2.5 times more likely to be stopped than their white counterparts, 

black individuals in Newark also have been 2.7 times more likely on average to be subjected to 

searches and 3.1 times more likely to be subjected to frisks by the NPD. NPD officers 

conducted 34,153 more stops, 13,174 more searches, and 12,130 more frisks of black individuals 

than of white individuals over three-and-a-half years. Yet, according to the NPD’s 

documentation, the likelihood that a search or frisk by the NPD recovers evidence is essentially 

the same for both racial groups. The likelihood of recovering evidence during a frisk is 13.6% 

for whites and 12.7% for blacks, and the likelihood of recovering evidence during a search is 

14.2% for whites and 14.8% for blacks.17 Thus, not only are the unconstitutional stop practices 

of the NPD falling most heavily on black individuals, but those massively additional stops are 

not yielding more evidence of crime. In other words, the stops are both impermissible and 

ineffective. 

These racial disparities characterized every one of the NPD’s policing precincts and 

sectors, regardless of the racial makeup of those areas. For example, in the 3rd Precinct, which 

covers the southeast area of the city and has a relatively low black residential population (22%), 

black individuals have been stopped at a rate 5.5 times that of their white peers, with stops of 

black individuals totaling 4,819 and stops of white individuals totaling 2,194, despite white 

residents’ comprising 55% of the population. In the 4th Precinct, which covers the western area 

of the city, and where the residential population is heavily black (85%), black people accounted 

for 95%, or 14,693 of the stops, compared to 4%, or 572, stops of white people. When the 

precincts are broken down by sector, in 12 of Newark’s 29 sectors (including sectors from each 

of the four precincts), black people have been stopped at a rate more than 4 times that of white 

people. In some sectors in the 3rd Precinct, the stop rate for black individuals exceeded ten 

times the stop rate for white individuals. 

b. Arrest Practices 

The analysis of arrests by NPD officers over the three-and-a-half year period are almost 

identical to the analysis of pedestrian stops over that time period. Out of the 84,396 arrests in the 

three-and-a-half year period reviewed, 66,888, or 79.3%, were arrests of black people, while 

black residents accounted for 53.9% of Newark’s population. By comparison, only 5,567, or 

6.6%, were arrests of white people, while non-Hispanic white residents account for 11.6% of 

Newark’s population.18 Stated differently, black individuals were 2.6 times more likely to be 

17 These evidence recovery rates are provided for race-comparison reasons only. The NPD’s actual evidence 

recovery rates likely are materially lower than this, given the methodology of this review, which restricted the 

dataset of stops reviewed to those in which a warrant check was run, and the likelihood that the NPD did not 

complete this report for all stops. 

18 Although there were anecdotal accounts of mistreatment of Hispanic individuals by NPD officers based on 

perceived ethnicity and national origin, particularly when these individuals have sought assistance from the police, 

the arrest data reviewed as part of this investigation did not show a disparity in arrests of Hispanics. Out of the 

84,396 arrests, 10,277, or 12.2%, were arrests of Hispanic non-black individuals, compared to Hispanic non-black 

individuals accounting for 30.6% of Newark residents. As noted above, because the NPD’s stop data did not track 

20
 
 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

 

 

 

arrested than white individuals in Newark. As with stops, the disparity held true across all NPD 

precincts and sectors. It is also consistent throughout most categories of arrests, based on 

charges reported at the time of arrest. It is crucial that the NPD implement data collection and 

analysis so that it can more fully understand the nature and causes of these racial disparities. 

4.	 Quality of Life Citation Practices Have Been Ineffective and Have 

Facilitated Abuse 

Community members, criminal justice stakeholders, and NPD officers and stakeholders 

widely recounted complaints about the NPD’s use of Quality of Life citations (commonly 

referred to by officers and community members as “blue summonses”). These citations are 

issued by NPD officers pursuant to Newark’s Municipal Code. Officers and residents alike 

perceive that the NPD issues these citations in order to satisfy quotas rather than to improve 

public safety. This perception alienates many community members and there is some evidence 

that calls into question the effectiveness of NPD’s use of Quality of Life citations on reducing 

crime in Newark. 

During various time periods in recent years, NPD leadership reportedly instituted a quota 

to encourage officers to increase the number of citations issued. Officers’ eligibility for overtime 

and desirable assignments apparently were linked to meeting the Quality of Life citation quota, 

thus giving officers an incentive to issue more. Although there was conflicting information 

about whether a formal quota still exists, the perception of at least an unofficial quota persists 

among officers. 

There were consistent reports from a variety of stakeholders that, in recent years, the 

NPD’s increased emphasis on the use of the citations, coupled with poor training,19 has 

disproportionately and ineffectively targeted black individuals. Because the NPD does not track 

race and ethnicity for citations, the DOJ could not confirm the accuracy of this perception. 

However, given the racially disparate effects of the NPD’s stop practices, the allegations that the 

citations disparately affect the black community have some basis.20 

Moreover, complaints from NPD officers and—particularly in public housing projects— 

the community allege that the NPD’s practice of requiring officers to issue high numbers of 

citations results in officers’ focusing on convenient targets, rather than on the individuals 

involved in serious criminal activity. Issuing high numbers of citations, particularly if this 

ethnicity until January of 2014, this investigation did not include an analysis of stops of Hispanics in Newark. 

Further inquiry is necessary to determine more conclusively whether the NPD’s police activities have a disparate 

impact on Hispanics. 

19 That lack of appropriate training concerning Quality of Life citations results in officers’ improper issuance of 

citations is supported by the fact that these citations are dismissed by the municipal and county prosecutor’s offices 

approximately thirty percent of the time. 

20 Community members and groups also raised concerns that the NPD inappropriately uses Quality of Life citations 

to target people with mental illness, people with disabilities, and seniors. During the site visit, members of the NPD 

command staff lacked a sufficient understanding and sophistication about issues related to mental illness and 

disabilities, highlighting the need for training on these issues. Some community members reported that seniors and 

people with disabilities are terrified of calling the police because they perceive that NPD officers will assume that 

they have mental health concerns and will treat them like suspects. 

21
 
practice is seen as focused on low level targets of opportunity rather than the individuals more 

likely to be involved in serious criminal activity, alienates potential allies in the community who 

might otherwise be helpful as witnesses, or in providing information related to crime. 

C. USE OF FORCE 

There is reasonable cause to believe that the NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of 

unconstitutional force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Relying primarily on officers’ own 

descriptions of and justifications for the force they used, this review found that more than twenty 

percent of NPD officers’ reported uses of force were unreasonable and thus violated the 

Constitution. The investigation also revealed significant underreporting of force by NPD 

officers. This pattern and practice of unreasonable force both results from and is evidenced by 

failures in policy, supervision, investigation, training and discipline. 

1. Legal Standards 

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. 

IV. The use of excessive or unnecessary force by a law enforcement officer during an arrest or 

stop is considered an “unreasonable” seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. 

Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). The assessment of reasonableness and, therefore, 

constitutionality of an officer’s use of force is objective. Just as an officer’s bad intentions will 

not render an objectively reasonable use of force unconstitutional, an objectively unreasonable 

use of force is unconstitutional, even where the officer had good intentions. Id. at 397. 

Determining whether the use of force was reasonable requires carefully balancing the risk of 

bodily harm that the officer’s actions pose to the individual in light of the threat to the public that 

the officer was trying to eliminate. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). In Graham, the 

Supreme Court noted that, in order to properly balance these interests, courts must examine the 

totality of the circumstances, including the severity of the crime, whether the subject posed an 

immediate threat to the officer or public safety, and whether the suspect was actively resisting 

arrest or attempting to escape. Id. 

2. NPD Format for Reporting and Tracking Force 

The NPD’s use of force policy appropriately charges officers to use the “minimum force 

necessary to effect a lawful arrest” and officers must be able to “justify the degree of force used.” 

General Order 63-02. The policy requires that officers clearly document all uses of force in an 

Incident Report and complete a separate Use of Force Report, both of which are to be submitted 

to a supervisor for review and approval. The Use of Force Report (Form DPI:2000) (“Force 

Report”) is a paper form intended to track the specific details about use of force incidents. The 

Incident Report Form (Form DPI:802) (“Incident Report”) is an electronic record contained in 

the NPD’s Record Management System (“RMS”) that officers complete for all arrests, crime 

reports, uses of force and other incidents. Only the Incident Report includes a place to include a 

narrative description of an officer’s actions. The Force Report provides space to indicate what 

force was used, what resistance was encountered and whether there were injuries, but its format 

makes it impossible for a reviewer to tell what happened, especially in situations where more 

than one type of force is used, or force is used against more than one person. Upon approval, 

22
 
 

                                                           

 

 

 

 

 

supervisors are to forward copies of both reports to the Office of the Police Director, Internal 

Affairs, and the Police Academy. In addition, the policy requires each precinct or unit to 

maintain file copies of the Incident, and Use of Force Reports (and any associated Arrest 

Reports). 

The policy requires copies of Use of Force Reports to be forwarded to IA, where they are 

to be entered into a computerized case management system, IAPro, and for the Police Academy 

to retain them for “future purposes.”21 In apparent conflict with this policy, although IAPro 

appears to contain a record noting the occurrence of each use of force, very little of the data from 

the Use of Force Report is actually entered into the NPD’s data system for tracking or further 

analysis. The omission of this detailed data from any electronic database limits the ability of the 

NPD to track and analyze officer use of force practices for accountability, training, or officer 

safety purposes. 

3. NPD’s Unreasonable Use of Force 

With the assistance of experts, the team reviewed all 82 of the NPD’s IA investigations of 

allegations of excessive force for the eighteen-month period, from January 2010 to June 2011.22 

In 67 of these investigative files, IA determined that NPD officers had used force and IA then 

made efforts to conduct an investigation.23 Yet, IA did not find the force used by officers in any 

of these investigations to be unreasonable. In fact, IA sustained only one excessive force 

allegation in the six-year period from 2007 to 2012. 

The DOJ’s review yielded very different results. Upon evaluating the information in 

these 67 files, the investigation concluded that 14 incidents involved the use of unreasonable 

force by NPD officers, some of which are described below. In 27 other incidents, the 

documentation of the internal affairs investigation lacked sufficient information to allow an 

assessment of whether the force was reasonable. 

In addition to its review of IA investigations, the team also evaluated the NPD’s Force 

and Incident Reports for the nine-month period from January 1, 2011, to October 4, 2011 by 

selecting a statistically significant, random sample of 100 out of 336 incidents for review. 

Because the Force Reports included only officers’ accounts, without any documented 

investigation or additional information gathering by the NPD, such as interviews with victims or 

third-party witnesses, the review simply examined whether the officers provided sufficient 

21 The policy does not describe what those future purposes might entail, apart from an additional requirement for IA 

to include in its monthly reports a summary of all uses of force and firearm discharges that occurred.

22 To assess the NPD’s use of force, the team reviewed NPD’s Force Reports, Incident Reports, Internal Affairs 

investigations of excessive force allegations, and investigations of shootings in which officers were involved. 

Because this review of individual incidents relied on the same documentation that was available at the time of the 

incidents to the NPD’s direct supervisors and IA investigators, it permitted an assessment of both the reasonableness 

of each force incident and the supervisory or investigatory process that followed. Interviews with NPD officials, 

from line officers to NPD leadership, were also critical to evaluating the NPD’s use of force, as was information 

from other law enforcement stakeholders, community groups and individuals. 

23 In 15 of these 82 investigations, the NPD either affirmatively concluded that the incidents did not occur, or was 

unable to confirm that the allegations involved NPD officers and halted the investigation. As a result, these 

investigation files contained insufficient information for review and were excluded. 

23
 
 

                                                           

justification for their uses of force in their own reports. Similar to the results of the IA force 

investigation review, in nearly one third of the Force and Incident Reports reviewed, the force 

appeared unreasonable, and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment, based on the officer’s 

own description of the nature of and reason for the use of force. In a significant number of 

additional incidents the reporting was too unclear to permit an assessment of whether the force 

used was reasonable. Force appeared reasonable on its face in only a little more than half of the 

100 Force and Incident Reports reviewed.24 

a. Examples of NPD’s Use of Unreasonable Force 

The overall impression of this review is that NPD officers escalate common policing 

situations, in which force should be unnecessary or relatively minimal, to situations in which 

they use significant force, sometimes unreasonably. Taken as a whole, the investigation revealed 

that NPD officers too often use open and closed fist strikes, especially to the head of the subject. 

In many cases, these actions were not necessary for the officer to control the situation and 

seemed to be simply retaliatory. 

The NPD’s own force documents helped explain why many in the community perceive 

NPD officers as needlessly escalating incidents, rather than as officers committed to protecting 

their community. Indeed, the NPD appears to be a department that too frequently turns to force 

as its first option when dealing with the public. 

In one incident, for example, while an officer was escorting an intoxicated 140-pound, 

69-year-old man from a store, the man grabbed the officer’s upper chest. The officer reported 

that he punched the man twice in the face in response. 

In another incident, a man suffered a concussion, loss of consciousness, and bruises and 

cuts after a detective in plainclothes struck him several times in the face with a closed fist. The 

detective’s incident report indicates that the man swung first, but acknowledged that the 

detective had startled the man with his sudden presence behind him. The police practice experts 

who reviewed this incident for this investigation noted this response did not appear to be a 

defensive or control tactic, but rather was retaliatory. Additionally, a sergeant on the scene 

admitted during the IA investigation that, although he had kicked the man, he did not complete a 

Force Report as required by policy. Despite the severity of his injuries, the man was not taken to 

the hospital until he complained of mouth pain at the police station. Further, while the man’s 

hospital records were included in the investigative file, the loss of consciousness and concussion 

were barely acknowledged in the investigator’s summary, and appear not to have been discussed 

with the complainant. 

Another aspect of the pattern of unreasonable force is the number of incidents in which 

officers appeared to respond with significant force against individuals who questioned police 

activities, sometimes, in the language of one police report, “in a loud and hostile manner.” In an 

incident more fully discussed in the assessment of arrest practices above, according to a citizen 

24 Because the information available in these reports was less than that available in an internal affairs investigation, 

the review of the use of force reports was limited to an assessment of whether the officer’s own report of the 

incident adequately justified the officer’s actions. 

24
 
complaint, when a man asked a plainclothes officer why another individual had been stopped, the 

officer reportedly slammed the man to the ground and used a choke hold on him. When the 

man’s female cousin asked why the officer was choking her cousin, the officer kicked her in the 

ribs and placed both individuals in handcuffs. Both the officer’s account and the IA 

investigation are incomplete, raising questions about the reliability of the investigation: while 

the complainants alleged specific details, including a choke hold and a kick, the officer’s account 

was minimal and uninformative, reporting only that she and other officers “quelled” the 

behavior. 

The investigation uncovered that officers also have used force in furtherance of an 

investigation rather than to effect a lawful arrest or prevent harm. In an incident in January 

2011, two officers decided to conduct a “well-being check” of a man and woman whom they 

observed arguing, and called over to them. As the couple approached the officers, the officers 

reportedly observed the man put something into his mouth and ordered him to spit it out. When 

the man did not comply, one officer immediately placed him in a choke hold to prevent him from 

swallowing the item. The choke hold was unsuccessful. After the man had swallowed the item, 

he reportedly refused to give the officers his hands to be cuffed and was “taken to the ground and 

given two strikes to the side of his head.” Although the officer’s report states that he acted for the 

man’s safety as well as to prevent him from swallowing the item, the encounter at that point was 

voluntary and the officers had not established a basis for any seizure. Although police officers 

may use reasonable force to secure or prevent the destruction of evidence while conducting a 

lawful arrest, they must have constitutionally adequate grounds for doing so. In this and similar 

incidents, NPD officers have used force before establishing probable cause to justify a seizure, as 

is required by the Constitution. Additionally, in this instance the NPD failed to scrutinize the use 

of a choke hold as a potentially deadly use of force that likely was unreasonable in response to 

the man’s resistance. 

b. Lack of Effective System for Use of Force Reporting and Review 

The pattern of using unreasonable force is both perpetuated and further evidenced by 

significant problems with the NPD’s force reporting and review practices. First, although NPD 

policies in many (but far from all) respects comport with contemporary best practices, the NPD 

does not always follow its own force policies, contributing to and reflecting the pattern of 

unreasonable use of force. Second, the NPD lacks a robust process for supervisory review of 

officers’ use of force by first-line supervisors. Third, the NPD often fails to refer serious use of 

force cases to the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office for review for criminal prosecution. When 

the NPD has referred cases, the criminal referral prematurely has ended the NPD’s 

administrative investigations of serious force, including officer-involved shootings. 

i. NPD’s Force Reporting and Supervisory Review Systems 

Consistent with the discussion above describing a culture that facilitates unreasonable 

force, the review revealed an unacceptable tolerance within the NPD for Force Reports that are 

insufficient to permit meaningful review. In particular, officers’ reports repeatedly failed to 

describe the actions that prompted the use of force. Instead, officers frequently have made 

conclusory statements that a person was “resisting arrest,” “flailing his arms,” or “swinging his 

shoulders,” without providing the facts that would permit an assessment of whether the level of 

25
 
resistance warranted the level of force used in response. Similarly, officers often documented 

their actions with vague, conclusory, and non-descriptive language that failed to describe what 

force they used and why, such as: 

	 “appropriate amount of force to effect a lawful arrest” 

	 “necessary level of physical force” 

	 “placed under arrest after a struggle” 

 “all necessary force” 

Other problematic descriptions of force indicated only that, after some unspecified amount and 

type of force, the subject was placed in handcuffs: 

	 “administered several compliance holds to handcuff and then escort” 

	 “attempted to handcuff him as he violently resisted being handcuffed. [Officers] 

eventually were able to place [the suspect] into handcuffs.” 

	 “after several attempts ... [three officers] were finally able to put handcuffs on the 

suspect.” 

Such descriptions make it impossible for a supervisor, investigator, or outside reviewer to 

determine whether the force used by officers in these situations was reasonable, or even whether 

the officers’ tactics raise officer safety concerns. Yet, there was no indication in the records that 

supervisors questioned the adequacy of officers’ force descriptions, or requested additional 

information. In fact, of more than 300 Force Reports reviewed as part of this investigation, 

supervisors approved every use of force description, including those DOJ found to be deficient. 

It is widely accepted and understood in the field of modern policing that, without 

meaningful review of officers’ use of force, it is more difficult to detect and correct uses of 

unreasonable force and officer safety issues, or to identify training needs, poor tactics, policy 

failures or inadequate equipment. Without routine, thorough force review, officers may become 

less careful about whether they use force consistently with policy or law. Poor decisions, bad 

tactics, and lax adherence to policy and law can reinforce themselves over time and become a 

part of the culture. Without effective supervisory review, the lines of accountability throughout 

the Department weaken, making it more difficult for leadership to promote and ensure its 

operational mandates and vision. 

The NPD’s Force Report, meant to facilitate NPD’s tracking and assessment of officer 

force, instead facilitates both poor reporting and ineffective review. The Force Report is 

intended to track the specific details when force is used, including the name, age and race of the 

individual(s) involved, the level of resistance the officer encountered, the type of force used, and 

whether anyone was injured or received medical treatment. While these are all important details 

for the NPD to document and track, the Force Report’s usefulness as a management tool is 

undermined by its failure to require a narrative description of the event and an explanation of the 

connection between an individual’s behavior and the officer’s use of force. For example, when 

26
 
                                                           

 

an officer uses more than one type of force, the Force Report provides no way of indicating 

which force was used first or what behavior prompted it. Similarly, if force was used against 

multiple individuals, the form offers a reviewer no way of discerning what force was used 

against which specific individual. By contrast, the New Jersey State Attorney General’s 

Guidelines on Use of Force include a model Use of Force Report—albeit last revised in 2001— 

that, although organized differently, does require information regarding what force was used 

against a specific individual when multiple individuals are involved. 

Pursuant to NPD policy, NPD officers are instead instructed to describe their uses of 

force in the narrative of the Incident Report Form, a separate electronic form. Although Force 

Reports and Incident Reports can be cross-referenced by the unique, computer-generated 

Criminal Complaint Number assigned to every incident, the NPD does not file the two reports 

together. Indeed, completed Force Reports are routed differently through the NPD than their 

related Incident Reports, and they are neither tracked nor routinely evaluated together by NPD 

supervisors. Thus, unless supervisors match up each Force Report with its corresponding 

Incident Report (a time-consuming process completed for this investigation), supervisors 

reviewing Force Reports do not see the accompanying narrative in the Incident Report that, 

theoretically at least, describes what happened. Nor is there any other mechanism within the 

NPD to ensure that this comprehensive force review occurs: IA staff reported that, although they 

track the number of force incidents, they have no responsibility to review individual officers’ 

Force Reports to ensure that the reports are accurate and complete. 

Exacerbating these problems, the NPD tolerates significant underreporting of force by its 

officers. In 30% of the Incident Reports reviewed that described a use of force, the officer did 

not complete the required Force Report. Similarly, in at least a dozen of the approximately 87 

internal affairs investigations of force complaints, officers reported uses of force during internal 

affairs interviews that they had failed to document contemporaneously in Force Reports. Thus, if 

the complainants in these cases had not come forward to pursue allegations of excessive force, 

there would have been no record that these officers even had used force. 

The NPD has not held officers accountable for failing to document their uses of force, 

even though this is a clear violation of the NPD’s use of force policy,25 and the NPD’s IA policy 

requires investigators to pursue evidence that an officer violated department rules or engaged in 

other misconduct, even if that misconduct was not the basis for the original complaint.26 The 

NPD’s tolerance of officers’ failure to report force therefore suggests that NPD condones such 

behavior, and may well significantly contribute to the widespread underreporting of force. 

Acknowledging the deficiencies in the NPD’s use of force reporting and review systems, 

NPD’s leadership reports that it has created a Use of Force Review Board to more closely assess 

uses of force and patterns of officer behavior. While establishing such a board is a necessary 

component of an adequate force review system, the NPD must also ensure that officers diligently 

report force and that supervisors, or dedicated force investigators, are equally diligent in their 

reviews. 

25 See GO 63-02 at 9. 26 See GO 05-04 at 14. 

27
 
                                                           

 

ii.	 NPD’s Administrative and Criminal Force Review Systems 

NPD also has mishandled serious use of force incidents that require both criminal and 

administrative review, including cases where officers have used deadly force. In particular, the 

NPD often has failed to refer serious use of force cases to the ECPO to be considered for 

criminal prosecution, and when the NPD has done so, the criminal referral inappropriately has 

ended the NPD’s administrative investigation. 

1.	 Failure to Appropriately Review Cases Involving Serious 

Use of Force 

The NPD’s policies require IA to refer to the ECPO any complaint “where a preliminary 

investigation indicates that the accused officer may have engaged in a criminal act or used force 

which resulted in serious bodily injury or death.”27 IA staff reported that all excessive force 

allegations are referred to the ECPO, not just allegations involving serious bodily injury or death 

as required by policy. However, this claim was not substantiated by the review of IA files. 

Instead, the review shows that, in practice, some excessive force files are referred to the ECPO, 

some are reviewed internally only by IA, and still others may be reviewed only at the command 

level without ever being assessed by IA. 

 This review revealed multiple instances in which credible complaints of potentially 

criminal uses of force were not referred to prosecutors for review, even though by any objective 

measure they should have been. For example, in one investigation a complainant alleged that he 

was physically assaulted by four officers at the Green Street Cell Block. He reported suffering a 

broken nose, lacerated lip and bruises to his cheek. Officers acknowledged administering blows 

to the complainant’s torso after they had already taken him to the ground. This review 

determined that the force used appeared excessive and potentially criminal under the relevant 

legal standards, but the NPD never referred this case to the ECPO. 

When the NPD has referred excessive force allegations to the ECPO and the ECPO has 

declined to prosecute the case, the NPD routinely has closed the administrative case with little 

additional investigation. Some NPD investigators expressly have relied on the prosecutor’s 

decision not to proceed to justify an exoneration recommendation. One IA investigator wrote in 

support of his recommendation to clear an officer that the ECPO “determined there was 

insufficient evidence to warrant criminal prosecution. Therefore, the actions of the officers were 

within the legal realm of their responsibilities and functions as Newark Police Officers.” There 

are numerous other cases where the investigator received notice of non-prosecution from the 

ECPO, and closed the investigation mere days later.28 See Garcia v. City of Newark, 2011 WL 

689616 *4 (D.N.J. Feb 16, 2011) (noting, in a civil case alleging that NPD officers engaged in 

excessive force, that NPD’s “IA investigator . . . stated that he has never sustained an excessive 

force allegation unless the Prosecutor had already found sufficient evidence to bring a criminal 

charge.”). 

27 Id. at 9.
 28 The IA investigators usually requested written statements from the accused officers, but this appears to have been
 

a formality, based on the subsequent lack of investigation and quick closure of the file. 

28
 
 

                                                           

 

The standard for criminal conviction and the standard for sustaining an administrative 

complaint are significantly different, and a decision by the ECPO not to prosecute criminally 

does not mean that an officer acted legally or in keeping with NPD policies. The NPD’s practice 

results in failures to sufficiently investigate serious uses of force and recommend appropriate 

disciplinary action, and is contrary to both the expectations of the ECPO and the New Jersey 

Attorney General’s IA Guidelines, which require that the NPD take appropriate administrative 

action even when cases are not criminally prosecuted. N.J. AG Guidelines at 20. 

2. Inadequate Review of Officers’ Use of Deadly Force 

The most significant and “intrusive” use of force is the use of deadly force, which can 

result in the taking of human life, “frustrat[ing] the interest of . . . society in judicial 

determination of guilt and punishment.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). Because 

deadly force poses such a high risk, it must be closely reviewed and controlled by a police 

department to ensure that it is used only when justified. Deadly force incidents, such as officerinvolved shootings, also often draw substantial attention to the Department, and can be a source 

of significant tension with the community when a police department responds inappropriately. 

NPD’s handling of officer-involved shootings has fallen strikingly short of generally 

accepted police practices. The NPD has not conducted adequate administrative investigations to 

determine if officer-involved shootings violate NPD policy. Indeed the investigations of all 29 

officer-involved shootings between May 2010 and January 2012 were generally incomplete.29 

This deficiency is partly due to how the NPD has handled its split jurisdiction with the ECPO for 

shootings involving law enforcement officers. The ECPO conducts the criminal investigation, 

while the NPD retains authority for the administrative review. However, as with its handling of 

other serious uses of force as described above, the NPD has misunderstood or misapplied the 

distinction between criminal and administrative investigations and abdicated its independent 

responsibility to conduct an administrative investigation to determine whether officer-involved 

shootings violate NPD policy or present officer safety concerns. 

Criminal and administrative investigations of officer-involved shootings are both critical 

processes for a police department and the community it serves. A criminal investigation assesses 

the lawfulness of the use of force and may result in prosecution. The administrative review 

assesses whether the incident involved any violation of policy and whether it raises any tactical, 

training, or other concerns for the agency. The NPD starts an administrative investigation after 

each officer-involved shooting, but always suspends the administrative investigation while the 

ECPO conducts a criminal review. A blanket rule of not conducting an administrative 

investigation of a shooting pending completion of the criminal review is problematic due to the 

unnecessary delay it imposes, but it is less troubling if the administrative investigation restarts 

once it is clear it will not interfere with a potential criminal prosecution. However, it appears 

that the NPD has not resumed its administrative review of the use of force once the ECPO has 

completed its criminal review and declines to prosecute. This is consistent with all IA 

29 Of these 29 officer-involved shootings, thirteen were confirmed hits, twelve were confirmed misses, and four 

were of unknown effect. According to NPD reports, five of the shootings resulted in critical injuries and four were 

fatal. 

29
 
                                                           

investigators’ statements that, once a criminal review is initiated, they are precluded from taking 

administrative action regarding the use of deadly force, although they may investigate and take 

action for any other rule violations that may be identified. 

Therefore, when the NPD suspends its administrative investigation pending criminal 

review, the NPD effectively ends its review of the incident.30 The NPD’s files do not include 

material gathered by the ECPO for its criminal review, and the NPD has not itself collected or 

considered critical evidence, or its absence.31 For example, some files lack photographs or 

diagrams of the scene or even a clear description of a subject’s injuries. Others lack a coroner’s 

report discussing the cause of death. The files do not contain statements from the subjects of the 

shootings, or any indication that the investigator tried to obtain such statements. The NPD’s 

response to officer-involved shootings appears to have been based only on the perspective of 

officers who were involved as witnesses and friendly civilian witnesses. The lack of 

thoroughness of NPD’s officer-involved shooting investigations is reflected in the brevity of the 

investigative files: one investigation file of a fatal shooting was nine pages long, and another file 

where the shooting left the subject in critical condition was twelve pages. 

As a result of the NPD’s practice of not conducting meaningful administrative 

investigations, shootings that violate policy, but have not been criminally prosecuted, have 

avoided review. Except in the extremely rare instance where a shooting is prosecuted criminally, 

there is no possibility of holding officers accountable, or determining whether there were training 

or other failures. Indeed, while the NPD’s lack of investigations made it impossible to draw firm 

conclusions about any shooting based upon the investigative file, at least one appeared 

unreasonable based solely on the documents available. 

The NPD’s weak investigations of officer-involved shootings provide a patina of 

oversight that is wholly insufficient to determine whether shootings are justified. Further, 

because it has conducted no investigation, the NPD has had little information to assess the need 

for changes to training, equipment, policies or tactics that may be placing officers and civilians at 

risk. By not conducting thorough investigations followed by appropriate disciplinary action 

when warranted, the NPD fails to deter officers from using deadly force unnecessarily and 

decreases public confidence that the NPD is exercising appropriate supervision and review. 

D. THEFT 

There is reasonable cause to believe that NPD officers have engaged in a pattern or 

practice of theft from civilians, and that the NPD has taken inadequate measures to prevent, 

investigate, and remediate incidents and allegations of such theft. 

30 While there is no good rationale for the NPD’s practice of dispensing with an administrative review altogether, 

delaying initiation of the administrative review may be the result of the potentially confusing guidance offered in the 

Attorney General’s guidelines on how departments should proceed in these situations. During the course of this 

investigation the Attorney General’s Office expressed its interest in considering modifications to its guidelines to 

provide greater clarity. 

31 With the potential exception of Grand Jury secrecy and similar requirements, there is no legal barrier to including 

information from a criminal investigative file in an administrative investigation. 

30
 
 

 

                                                           

 

 

 

1. Legal Standards 

Law enforcement officers who extort and rob persons of their property violate the Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights of those individuals. See e.g., Hernandez v. Borough of 

Palisades Park Police Dep’t, 58 Fed. Appx. 909, 912 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. 

McClean, 528 F.2d 1250 (2d Cir. 1976). 

2. Theft by NPD Officers 

The team reviewed numerous documents produced by the NPD, including general orders, 

audits, disciplinary histories for officers assigned to the Narcotics and Gang Bureau, and all 

thirty IA files provided by the NPD involving allegations of theft or lost property. The evidence 

makes clear that theft from arrestees has been more than an aberration limited to a few officers or 

incidents within NPD. Examples of the problem include allegations of theft of money and drugs 

during arrests and allegedly deliberate failure to return money and property such as wallets, cell 

phones, jewelry, and car keys upon arrestees’ release by the NPD.32 

The NPD has been aware for several years that theft by some of its officers is a serious 

problem. The Special Investigations Unit and IA have conducted several reviews of officers 

with high numbers of theft complaints.33 Some of the officers reviewed in the NPD’s internal 

reports had more than ten complaints of theft in a period of two to three years, and many 

additional complaints of other misconduct, generated both internally, by the NPD, and 

externally, by civilians. The NPD’s reviews concluded that theft of civilians’ property and 

money by officers was particularly problematic in the NPD’s specialized units, such as narcotics 

and gangs, and in the prisoner processing unit at the NPD’s Green Street Cell Block.34 

Moreover, these reports reflected that theft had become a problem not only with line officers, but 

also with more highly ranked officers and supervisors. Yet the NPD did not sustain any of the 

misconduct complaints of theft against any of the officers with the largest number of incidents. 

Further, the NPD’s internal documents mirror the many accounts of NPD theft alleged by 

community members and other criminal justice stakeholders, including law enforcement. 

Indeed, while the DOJ’s investigation was ongoing, there were several high-profile incidents of 

alleged theft by NPD officers. 

The issue of theft is especially evident at the Green Street holding facility. On several 

occasions the Essex County Jail has rejected the property bags of prisoners transferred from 

Green Street because of discrepancies between prisoner property and their corresponding 

inventory forms. A late 2009 NPD memorandum indicated that property bags were being 

opened and money or property removed at Green Street. The NPD installed video cameras in the 

Prisoner Processing Division to determine who was stealing from the property bags. In 2011 the 

32 Review of this issue was hindered by the deficiencies in IA investigations discussed later in this report, as well as 

NPD’s inability to provide all of the documents requested. Specifically, the NPD was unable to provide documents 

evidencing actions taken in response to the policy recommendations made by the Special Investigations Unit or to 

confirm that no additional documents existed. 

33 According to an NPD internal memorandum, ten officers generated 42 investigations of theft complaints in a twoand-a-half year period. 

34 The NPD holds detainees at a 58-cell facility on the lower level of its building at 31 Green Street. 

31
 
cameras recorded two officers—including a supervisor—disabling the camera. Although these 

two officers were charged with misconduct, neither was ever disciplined for tampering with the 

video cameras: the NPD terminated one officer for unrelated reasons and allowed the other to 

retire without sanctioning him, even though he had been being found guilty in a police trial 

regarding this incident. 

The ECPO also has expressed concern with the handling of arrestees’ property by the 

NPD. In one instance of theft (where a prisoner’s property bag was found to have been ripped 

open and fixed with a staple), the matter was referred to the ECPO for criminal investigation. 

After more than a year of investigating this incident, the ECPO declined prosecution in March 

2012, noting that “even though it is evident that a theft did occur, no specific officer can be 

identified for prosecution.” The ECPO also noted that “after a thorough investigation, it appears 

that the NPD’s’ general orders regarding the custody and inventory of prisoners’ property at 31 

Green Street ha[ve] been fundamentally deficient for some time,” but that the ECPO hoped the 

new holding facility in police headquarters on Clinton Avenue “is better equipped to safeguard 

prisoners’ personal property.” Although the NPD had planned to transfer its detention operations 

from Green Street to the new police headquarters on Clinton Avenue, that transition has been 

delayed indefinitely. 

3. NPD Practices Have Failed to Adequately Address Theft by Officers 

Despite its awareness of the theft problem, the NPD has not enforced its own rules 

regarding theft prevention, has conducted inadequate investigations into theft complaints, has 

failed to take corrective action against offending officers, and has not taken other steps it knows 

are necessary to prevent or effectively respond to theft allegations. The NPD has failed to follow 

through on the recommendations of its own internal audits and reviews regarding theft, including 

reassigning the problem officers out of specialized units, video monitoring the Prisoner 

Processing Division, and requiring supervisors to inspect and document prisoner property. 

Instead, the NPD has routinely allowed officers with multiple theft complaints to be assigned to 

or remain in units with the most opportunity for theft, and then—contrary to its own 

recommendations—has failed even to monitor or conduct internal integrity checks of these 

officers. 

The NPD’s lax response to allegations of theft by officers is longstanding and remained 

evident during this investigation. For example, despite the 2009 memorandum and other 

information alerting the NPD to problems in its property room, an early 2013 visit to the 

property room revealed that many obvious, easily correctable deficiencies still lingered: the 

property room door did not automatically lock; valuables other than cash were not stored as 

securely as cash; documentation of property was limited to a handwritten log book; property was 

not counted and inventoried by at least two people; and there appeared to be no systematic 

inspection of property bags for damage. 

a. Failure to Adequately Screen Candidates for Specialized Units 

Accusations of theft and corruption are most often leveled against officers in specialized 

units—particularly the various narcotics, gang, and street crimes units—where officers often 

come into contact with individuals carrying large sums of money. The NPD is well aware of this 

32
 
pattern: a 2010 internal review showed that the officers with the most theft complaints had been 

assigned almost exclusively to specialized units like the Central Narcotics Enforcement Team, 

the precinct Narcotics Enforcement Teams, the Narcotics Gang Enforcement Bureau, and the 

Street Crimes Task Force. Recognizing that inadequate screening has allowed such problems to 

occur, the NPD’s Special Investigations Unit recommended a policy of thoroughly reviewing an 

officer's IA history before assignment to a specialized unit. Despite the clear need for such a 

policy, the NPD did not act on this recommendation. 

Nor has the NPD implemented screening measures to ensure assignment of officers with 

appropriate and tested integrity to these units. Newark’s assignment policy, General Order 96­

08, includes general requirements for an officer’s becoming a member of a specialized unit: two 

years on patrol before a police officer can join a precinct narcotics enforcement team; two years 

of experience on a precinct narcotics team or anti-crime unit before a detective can join the 

Centralized Narcotics Division. This bare two-year service requirement may be waived for 

department “need,” a term not defined in the policy. 

The NPD’s assignment policy does not include any other criteria, let alone rigorous, 

objective, integrity-based criteria designed to minimize the possibility of theft or other forms of 

corruption, such as the absence of any history of dishonesty, theft, or similar allegations. Of 

most concern among these deficiencies is the lack of any prohibition against assigning officers 

with multiple theft complaints—even sustained theft complaints—to specialized units. The 

policy instead places a restriction on assignments in instances where an officer affirmatively 

requests a particular assignment, and provides that such a request will be denied if the officer has 

a pending “major” disciplinary case, discipline greater than three days’ suspension within the 

past twelve months, or two prior findings of guilty by trial board within the past twelve months. 

Other than these very narrow restrictions, the assignment policy does not limit selection of 

officers for the units, even if they have had prior discipline for theft, have been the recipients of 

multiple theft allegations, or other integrity-related complaints (e.g., truthfulness, falsifying 

reports, etc.). The assignment policy does not set a maximum number of theft complaints for 

candidates or otherwise discuss what kind of disciplinary history would be acceptable. These 

inadequate screening procedures allow officers with multiple theft complaints to be assigned to a 

specialized unit or transferred to another specialized unit while continuing to accumulate 

integrity-related complaints. 

b. Failure to Follow the NPD’s Established Rotation Policy 

 Rotating personnel out of specialized units is an essential tool for combating theft and 

corruption in police departments. NPD policy clearly recognizes as much, stating in General 

Order 96-08 that rotation is an “effective method at controlling police misconduct” designed to 

“minimize complacency and prevent corruption.” According to the rotation policy, officers are 

limited to two years in a narcotics unit and one year in a vice unit before they must be rotated to 

another assignment. The policy also requires the Human Resources Unit to notify officers in 

advance of the expiration of their term that they should submit a request for transfer. 

Although command staff emphasized the importance of such a rotation procedure in 

interviews during the investigation, the NPD largely has failed to enforce its “mandatory” policy. 

Many of the NPD officers with the highest number of theft complaints remained in specialized 

33
 
units beyond the maximum amount of time provided in the rotation policy. In fact, in several 

instances where memoranda made specific recommendations to enforce the rotation policy and 

rotate the officers with the highest number of theft complaints out of their units, the NPD did not 

transfer these officers for many months, and in some instances, transferred them to other 

specialized units with similar opportunities for theft. In one egregious example, an internal 

report recommended a transfer for an officer with more than ten theft complaints in just four 

years, but this officer was not transferred to a non-specialized unit (i.e., a unit that did not focus 

on narcotics or vice) until ten months later, more than two years after he had initially been 

identified as one of the officers with the most theft complaints lodged against him. Indeed, in the 

three years after this officer was first identified as a top offender he accumulated an additional 

six theft complaints. 

Not only has the NPD ignored its own rotation policy, but the policy is itself inadequate. 

While the policy sets a maximum amount of time in a particular specialized unit (e.g., two years 

in narcotics), there is no restriction on the number of rotations in a specialized unit or on 

transfers from one specialized unit to another, and then back again. There is also no requirement 

that officers who accumulate one or more theft or other integrity-related complaints will be 

rotated out of these assignments before the maximum time has elapsed. The fact that officers in 

specialized units continued to accumulate civilian complaints underscores the importance and 

effectiveness of adhering to a rigorous and regular rotation policy. 

c. Failure to Monitor Problem Officers or Conduct Integrity Tests 

The NPD itself recommended integrity tests and closer monitoring in 2010 in connection 

with the NPD’s internal review of officers with the highest number of theft complaints. 

Although such measures are an integral tool for combating theft, there is no information 

suggesting that the NPD took any action on these important recommendations. 

As part of a comprehensive approach to reducing the incidence of theft, the NPD should 

conduct regular integrity tests not only in response to allegations against specific officers, but 

routinely throughout the Department, both on a random and a targeted basis. The NPD should 

monitor officers suspected of theft, including those with high numbers of complaints. 

E. INADEQUATE MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE CONTRIBUTED 

TO THE PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 

An effective system for investigating complaints of officer misconduct is a basic 

component of any department’s accountability. Such a system requires the prompt and thorough 

investigation of civilian complaints; the sustaining of those complaints when they are supported 

by a preponderance of the evidence; and the imposition of fair and consistent discipline when 

appropriate. By contrast, a police department that fails to adequately investigate civilians’ 

allegations of misconduct through its IA system tacitly permits officers to engage in such 

conduct. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a deficient 

internal investigation process is evidence of a custom tolerating the tacit use of excessive force 

by police officers). 

34
 
 

 

                                                           

 

 

 

 

Much like the IA system assessed in Beck, the NPD’s system for investigating civilian 

complaints appears to have been “structured to curtail disciplinary action and stifle investigations 

into the credibility of the City’s police officers.” Id. While the NPD has severely and 

inconsistently disciplined officers for internal rule violations, there are serious deficiencies in the 

NPD’s handling of civilian complaints that translate to a lack of accountability for serious 

misconduct.35 For example, as noted above, according to the NPD’s own records, IA sustained 

only one misconduct complaint of excessive force in the six-year time period from 2007 through 

2012. Every police department is different and there is no threshold percentage of sustained 

complaints that a law enforcement agency must attain in order to demonstrate that its 

investigations of misconduct complaints are effective. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the 

NPD’s failure to sustain more than one excessive force complaint in six years is implausible on 

its face and appears significantly aberrant: a 2006 Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report 

found that large municipal police departments sustained an average of 8% of citizens’ complaints 

about police use of force.36 

Similarly, summaries of IA investigations involving complaints of theft from 2009 to 

2011 and disciplinary histories of officers assigned to the Central Narcotics Unit in August 2011 

(which included more than fifty theft complaints over six years against these officers) indicated 

that the NPD sustained allegations against only two officers.37 This means that officers with 

high numbers of credible complaints that have not been adequately investigated by the NPD, as 

discussed below, have continued to work on the force, often in the specialized unit from which 

the complaints originate, without any discipline or other corrective action, such as re-training or 

increased supervision.38 

The NPD’s low rate of sustaining civilian complaints has not been limited to allegations 

of theft or excessive force. In 2010, only 38 out of 814 (4.6%) complaints by civilians were 

sustained. In 2011, only 29 out of 601 (4.8%) civilian complaints were sustained. In 2012, 38 of 

561 (6.8%) civilian complaints were sustained. This slight increase between 2011 and 2012 

appears to have resulted from an increase in the number of relatively low-level “demeanor” 

35 The assessment of NPD’s IA and disciplinary processes included a review of the NPD’s policies and general 

orders related to IA and the disciplinary process, IA data on complaint intake and adjudication provided by the NPD, 

annual reports, an external audit conducted by the ECPO, interviews of IA command staff, the commanders 

responsible for making disciplinary decisions, and officers familiar with the disciplinary process, and a review of all 

of the IA files provided by the NPD where individuals alleged that they were subjected to excessive force, unlawful 

arrests, or theft during a period of approximately 18 months, from January 2010 to June 2011. In addition, members 

of the community and advocates provided feedback about their experience pursuing complaints through the NPD’s 

IA process. 36 Citizen Complaints about Police Use of Force, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, June 2006. The report 

did not address whether an 8% sustained rate is appropriate or acceptable. The report further noted that many 

factors, including variations between departments in complaint intake, review and documentation processes, can 

skew data in either direction. 

37Although certain documents reflect that administrative charges were sustained against these two officers in 2009 

for failing to properly document the receipt of a prisoner's property, the NPD provided no information whether these 

officers went to police trial on these charges, or whether they were ever disciplined. 38Poor record-keeping by the NPD and incomplete production of requested records prevented a review of all theftrelated IA files and the outcome of all investigations. 

35
 
                                                           

 

complaints sustained. These sustained complaints were generally either ancillary to criminal 

charges (in which another law enforcement agency had already charged the officer with an 

offense), or were for low-level rule violations such as “neglect of duty” or “language” (e.g. 

derogatory speech). Overall, it has been exceedingly rare for the NPD to sustain citizen 

complaints of misconduct, particularly serious misconduct. 

The NPD is far more likely to sustain complaints against officers when the complaint is 

made by another NPD officer or a supervisor. The sustained rates of internally generated 

complaints, while decreasing, are strikingly high: of the 653 internal complaints filed in 2010, 

453 (69.3%) were sustained. In 2011, of the 291 internal complaints filed, 171 (59%) were 

sustained, and in 2012, 285 internal complaints were filed and 153 (53.6%) were sustained. 

The NPD has been aware of deficiencies in its internal affairs system since at least 

February 2011, when a federal court found that the NPD condoned police officers’ use of 

excessive force by failing to adequately investigate civilian complaints. The ruling in Garcia v. 

City of Newark, No. 08-1725 (SRC), 2011 WL 689616 at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2011), was based 

in part on expert testimony that “it is the custom, practice and policy of the [Newark Police 

Department] to stringently discipline any misconduct against the organization itself but pay little 

or no attention to complaints from citizens, especially those regarding use of force.” 2011 WL 

689616 at *4 (D.N.J. Feb 16, 2011) (unpublished). Although, the district court issued this 

opinion just three months before this investigation commenced, the NPD appears to have done 

little since the court’s admonishment to improve its practices. Indeed, the NPD reduced the 

staffing of its IA by more than half in 2011 and 2012, making it more difficult to adequately 

investigate allegations of officer misconduct. 

1. Overview of NPD’s Internal Affairs Process 

The NPD’s IA process begins when the complainant completes a form called an 

Investigation of Personnel Report (“IOP”). A complaint can be filed by a civilian (“external” 

complaint) or by a member of the Department (“departmental” or “internal” complaint). The 

NPD then divides complaints into two categories: major offenses and minor offenses. Major 

offenses are those that may result in a penalty of more than five days of suspension, and minor 

offenses are those where the penalty may not exceed five days. The list of major offenses is not 

exhaustive, and in practice is highly variable.39 Unlike many modern police agencies, NPD 

policy does not set out the presumptive punishment for various categories of offenses: that 

failure reduces transparency and compromises consistency in discipline. 

Once categorized by IA, minor and major offenses follow two separate processes. Each 

precinct has a dedicated Integrity Control Officer (“ICO”) who is responsible for investigating 

allegations of minor offenses. Minor offenses are typically resolved at a “Disciplinary 

39 The NPD’s General Order categorizes the following as major offenses, and specifies that the list is not exhaustive: 

criminal offenses or allegations of criminal acts; aggravated insubordination; unauthorized discharge of firearms; 

refusal to submit to drug screening; and violations of Radio Discipline. See General Order 93-2 (“Disciplinary 

Process”), April 1, 2010, at 4. 

36
 
 

 

                                                           

 

 

 

 

 

 

Conference,” where a precinct or division commander conducts an administrative review of the 

alleged offense.40 

By contrast, the NPD’s IA unit investigates major offenses. NPD policies require that the 

IA investigator document the investigation in a report and recommend one of four findings: 

Exonerated, Sustained, Not Sustained, or Unfounded.41 The IA Commander, who is responsible 

for managing IA’s daily operations, the IA Executive Officer (the second-in-command), and the 

Police Director subsequently review the report and either accept the investigator’s 

recommendation, override it and issue a different finding, or ask the investigator to seek 

additional evidence. If, after that review, an allegation against an employee is ultimately 

“sustained,” a formal Complaint Against Personnel (“CAP”) is initiated, charging the officer 

with the relevant policy violation. Once a CAP is filed, the NPD’s complaint adjudication 

process is triggered and the accused officer is notified to appear before the Trial Board. 

The Trial Board is a three-member panel consisting of the Police Director’s designee and 

two commanders.42 NPD policy mandates that Trial Board proceedings “shall be informal” and 

the parties are not bound by the rules of evidence.43 The policy states “[t]he sole purpose of the 

Trial Board is to determine the facts and situations surrounding a case,” and to “determin[e] the 

truth.” 44 Although a sustained finding by Internal Affairs amounts only to a charge and is not a 

formal finding of guilt or innocence, Trial Board members reported that their main function is to 

sustain the decisions of Internal Affairs.45 Officers similarly perceive that the Trial Board makes 

decisions about an officer’s guilt or innocence before the evidence against the officer is tested at 

the hearing. 

Pursuant to state law, disciplinary sanctions imposed through the Trial Board process 

may be appealed through the Office of Administrative Law and the Civil Service Commission, 

and then to the Superior Court of New Jersey. The NPD can impose administrative sanctions 

prior to the completion of the appeal process. NPD staff reported that it can take more than two 

years to complete this process, which potentially magnifies the burden imposed on officers by an 

arbitrary disciplinary decision. 

40 See General Order 93-2.
 41 See General Order 05-04 (“IA”), September 21, 2005 at 14:
 

Exonerated: When the evidence indicates that the act complained of did in fact occur but the action taken by the 

officer was legal and the officer was in compliance with Department policies and procedures, or an incident
 

occurred and the officer was not involved.
 

Sustained: When the facts support the complaint and the Investigator reasonably believes that the incident occurred 

and that involved officers(s) engaged in the violation of Department policy/procedure and/or Criminal
 

Law/Ordinances.
 

Not sustained: When the facts and/or investigation fails to disclose sufficient information to clearly prove or
 

disprove the allegation or when material conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the accused employee. 

Unfounded: Indicates that the act complained of did not occur and the complaint is false.
 42 See General Order 93-02 (“Disciplinary Process”), April 27, 2011 at 3.
 43 See G.O. 93-02 at 8.
 44 See G.O. 93-02 at 8.
 45 See G.O. 93-02 at 8.
 

37
 
2.	 Investigative Deficiencies 

a. Failure to Collect Evidence from Complainants 

IA records reflect that IA investigators failed to make consistent attempts to follow up 

with complainants to clarify critical facts. Similarly, community members reported filing 

complaints with IA and receiving little or no subsequent contact from investigators. In order to 

conduct an effective investigation, investigators must exhaust reasonable means to contact a 

person, including telephone calls and in-person attempts, and document what steps were taken to 

do so. Moreover, in cases alleging serious misconduct such as excessive force, where the 

complaint is credible upon review, the NPD should move forward with the investigation, even if 

the complainant cannot be reached. 

b.	 Failure to Objectively Assess Evidence from Officers, Complainants, 

and Witnesses 

When investigating civilian complaints, NPD investigators have routinely failed to probe 

officers’ accounts or assess officer credibility. IA investigators have not, for example, inquired 

further when officers’ Force Reports or interviews with subjects have included non-descriptive 

language such as the “necessary level of force” or “minimum force necessary.” Investigators 

instead appeared to have presumed that officers had not used excessive force or committed other 

violations alleged, even when that presumption was plainly refuted by the weight of the 

evidence. 

Consistent with the NPD’s practice of accepting officers’ accounts with little critical 

analysis, investigators failed to give statements from complainants and witnesses sufficient 

weight. And investigators generally discredited statements that did not support accused officers’ 

accounts. For example, a complainant alleged that an officer threatened to hurt him, pulled him 

into the precinct bathroom, beat him, and pushed him through the bathroom window, shattering 

the glass and causing lacerations to the front and back of his head. A witness reported seeing the 

officer threaten the complainant, force him into the bathroom, and throw him into the window. 

She then observed the complainant having seizures and a group of officers enter the bathroom 

and shut the door. In exonerating the officer, IA concluded that the incident did occur, but 

accepted without question the officer’s description in the incident report that the officer “lunged 

forward to close the gap that was between him and [the complainant] after [the complainant] 

threw a punch at him. His forward momentum caused their bodies to collide, which caused [the 

complainant] to fall forward and into the window.” The investigator never interviewed the 

officer and ignored the complainant’s and corroborating witness’s statements. 

Even minor conflicts between complainant and witness accounts have often been deemed 

fatal to a complainant’s credibility, whereas IA investigators have not similarly probed conflicts 

between officers’ statements or Force Reports. In one record, five witnesses confirmed the 

complainant’s allegation that officers beat him repeatedly during his arrest. One witness 

provided the names of four additional witnesses who also observed the arrest, but the IA 

investigator never contacted any of them. And even though medical records documented the 

complainant’s injuries, the investigator recommended a finding of “not sustained” because the 

38
 
 

officers uniformly denied witnessing or using excessive force, and because the witnesses’ 

accounts, which all described excessive force, had minor differences among them. 

In another record, a complainant reported that an officer struck him repeatedly with a 

waffle grill. The investigator accepted the officer’s version of the facts despite conflicting 

information in his Force Report and subsequent reports. Although the officer’s report 

documented only that he had used “hands/fists,” he later reported that he inadvertently struck the 

complainant on the head with a waffle grill in self-defense. Instead of probing this 

inconsistency, the IA investigator exonerated the officer and noted that the use of force was 

“reported and filed with complete transparency.” 

This elevation of officer credibility, and simultaneous unwarranted discounting of 

complainant and civilian witness accountability, helps perpetuate patterns of misconduct. See 

Beck, 89 F.3d 966, 974 (finding that failure to adequately investigate IA complaints of 

misconduct permitted officers to engage in misconduct and this failure, in part, was fueled by a 

pattern of giving little weight to the accounts of credible witnesses who supported the 

complainant’s version of the facts while being overly favorable towards officers’ statements). 

c. Unequal Treatment of Officer and Complainant History 

The NPD’s bias in favor of officers was particularly evident in IA’s reliance on 

complainants’ criminal histories while discounting officers’ disciplinary histories. Investigators 

often have questioned complainants about their arrest histories during interviews, run checks of 

complainants’ criminal histories, and used this information to impugn complainants’ credibility, 

bolster the credibility of officers, and support findings that officers should be exonerated. 

Generally, a complainant’s criminal history should not be used in resolving a misconduct 

complaint unless there is a genuine issue of credibility. To its credit, the NPD’s leadership 

recently acknowledged that this practice is problematic and that investigators should cease 

routinely checking and invoking complainants’ criminal histories. 

The NPD’s inappropriate use of criminal histories has resulted in premature terminations 

of investigations and inaccurate assessments of available evidence. For example, IA reports 

commonly have referred to a complainant’s criminal history in the “findings” section of the 

report, noting that, for example, the complainant’s “criminal history would lead a prudent person 

to believe that he has the probability to be less than truthful,” or the complainant’s prior crimes 

demonstrated a “pattern of anti-authority behavior and an unstable relationship with law 

enforcement.” 

Investigators’ improper emphasis on complainants’ criminal history has not been limited 

to considering criminal convictions. Some IA records also have included consideration of NPD 

reports of previous stops of complainants, or incident and arrest reports from previous arrests, 

even where no conviction resulted. This is especially problematic because, as detailed in this 

report, the NPD’s stop and arrest practices have not comported with constitutional requirements 

and have resulted in unjustified stops. In one file, the investigator checked the complainant’s 

criminal history and compiled related incident and arrest reports for offenses dating back to 1996 

– offenses that predated the complainant’s allegation of excessive force by fourteen years. In 

recommending that the officer be exonerated, the investigator relied in part on the complainant’s 

39
 
 

                                                           

 

 

 

criminal history to question the complainant’s version of the facts. In other IA investigations, 

investigators reviewed the complainants’ juvenile court records and called the prosecutor’s office 

to inquire about details of the complainant’s previous arrests not captured in reports. 

In stark contrast, investigators have given no weight to accused officers’ disciplinary 

history, even when that history has demonstrated a pattern of similar allegations of misconduct. 

While investigators typically have included the officer’s disciplinary history in the IA record, 

those references appear perfunctory, with no indication that the disciplinary history should affect 

credibility determinations or other aspects of the investigation. For example, in one force 

investigation, an officer had 55 entries in his IA history over four years, including 26 use of force 

incidents. Both numbers are comparatively high but were not addressed in the investigation. In 

another force investigation, the officer’s 70 entries in his IA history over six years, including 40 

use of force incidents, were not considered by the investigator. 

An officer’s tendency to elicit certain types of allegations by civilians should be 

considered highly relevant in an IA investigation. See Beck, 89 F.3d 966, 973 (recognizing that a 

“system of investigation [where] each complaint was insulated from other prior and similar 

complaints and treated in a vacuum” is “sterile and shallow”). However, the NPD has taken the 

reverse approach, scrutinizing complainants’ criminal records, but routinely ignoring officers’ 

disciplinary histories. 

d. Discouraging Complainants Through Miranda Warnings 

The New Jersey Attorney General’s Internal Affairs Guidelines appropriately mandate 

that a complainant must be accorded all appropriate protections when the complaint arises from 

an incident where the complainant has been charged with a criminal offense. N.J. AG 

Guidelines at 27-28. Accordingly, contact with such a complainant must be coordinated through 

his or her defense counsel. Id. However, the guidelines also appropriately state that the need to 

issue Miranda warnings is triggered only “whenever the questioning of an individual is custodial 

in nature.” 46 Id. at 40 (“The question is whether a reasonable person would believe that he or 

she is free to leave.”); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When a civilian voluntarily 

meets with an investigator in furtherance of an administrative complaint of police misconduct, 

and remains free to leave the interview at any time, the interview is neither custodial nor an 

interrogation. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (“An officer’s obligation to 

administer Miranda warnings attaches, however, ‘only where there has been such a restriction on 

a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’”) (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 

495 (1977); see also Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1244 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Because the 

presence of both a custodial setting and official interrogation is required to trigger the Miranda 

right-to-counsel prophylactic, absent one or the other, Miranda is not implicated.”) 

46 The fact that a complainant may have been arrested during the course of the incident about which he is filing a 

complaint does not change a voluntary interview by Internal Affairs into a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., 

Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1984) (Although the probation officer questioned probationer about a 

crime, the interview with the probation officer, which was “arranged by appointment at a mutually convenient time,” 

and where probationer was “not physically restrained and could have left the office” did not amount to custodial 

interrogation.). 

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Despite these limitations, NPD investigators routinely have given Miranda warnings to 

complainants, and sometimes witnesses, before taking their statements. Over a quarter of the 

misconduct investigation files reviewed documented Miranda warnings to complainants. 

This practice is not only unnecessary and demonstrates a lack of understanding of the 

purpose of Miranda warnings, but it inappropriately suggests to complainants and witnesses that 

they are being questioned as suspects in a criminal case instead of as potential victims or 

witnesses of police misconduct. Ultimately, it can intimidate and discourage victims’ and 

witnesses’ participation in the complaint process. Indeed, NPD records included examples 

where the Miranda warning either prompted complainants to end the interview or dissuaded 

complainants from moving forward with their complaints. For example, in one record the 

complainant stated that he was unsure about moving forward with his complaint because the 

investigator asked him to sign a Miranda waiver. 

This practice is out of the norm for police departments across the country, and the NPD’s 

leadership acknowledged that it is inappropriate and may discourage complainants from coming 

forward. 

3. NPD’s Application of Discipline 

The way in which the NPD determines appropriate discipline in sustained cases is also 

seriously flawed.47 First, the NPD has no set presumptive penalties for particular violations. As 

a result, the Trial Board can impose the same punishment for an officer’s failure to report to 

work on time as for the officer’s use of excessive force against a civilian. Similarly, officers can 

receive vastly disparate discipline for committing similar offenses. While Trial Board members 

report that they consider past Board disciplinary decisions when meting out discipline, this 

practice appears to be haphazard and to rely heavily on Board members’ recollections.48 The 

current system also lacks guidance for what mitigating or aggravating circumstances might 

warrant consideration in determining the appropriate penalty. This means there is no structured, 

transparent way for the NPD to take into account the particular circumstances of the incident in 

determining discipline. And, with no guidelines for disciplinary penalties, there is no 

opportunity, much less requirement, for the NPD to explain why penalties diverge in seemingly 

similar cases. Accordingly, officers have no way to form a reliable expectation of the 

consequences for misconduct. 

Officers also report that the Trial Board’s decisions appear to be arbitrary. For example, 

officers have complained that some officers were not disciplined after testing positive for drugs 

or driving under the influence, while others were terminated for the same conduct. Disciplinary 

penalties appear inordinately harsh in some instances, particularly in response to internal 

47 This is not a new problem. The independent consultants that reviewed the Department’s IA system in 2007 

recommended “a complete review” of the disciplinary system due to the widespread perception that it is 

“administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner,” “often unnecessarily focus[es] on minor violations of rules 

and regulations,” and has historically operated on a “patronage system.” 48 NPD reports that it plans to appoint a permanent chairperson who will participate in all Trial Board proceedings as 

a means of ensuring consistent decision-making. However, such a position is insufficient by itself to ensure 

objective decision-making and is not an adequate replacement for formal and transparent standards. 

41
 
complaints, and weak or nonexistent in others, mainly in response to misconduct complaints 

from civilians. For example, the NPD has not disciplined an officer for engaging in excessive 

force in more than five years. Yet an NPD officer who assisted a disabled tractor-trailer was 

suspended for 30 days for failing to strictly abide by the Department’s towing policy and other 

minor rule violations, despite the officer’s almost otherwise flawless disciplinary record. 

Without transparent, objective criteria to guide and document disciplinary decisions, the 

NPD is ill equipped to persuasively respond to the widespread belief, both within and outside the 

Department, that discipline is meted out, at least in part, based on how well-liked or wellconnected an officer is. The NPD can and should work with officers and community members to 

develop disciplinary sanctions that make sense, and a system for imposing discipline that is 

transparent, consistent, and fair. 

F. INADEQUATE SUPERVISION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PATTERN 

OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 

1. Failures in Supervision and Management 

Effective supervision is critical to the operation of any police department. It is 

particularly important for supervisors in the field, where the requirements of law and policy are 

at risk of being misapplied in the heat of the moment, or even disregarded completely. Through 

consistent daily interactions, supervisors can shape and guide officers’ conduct and help them 

learn from their mistakes. They are able to identify problems and act immediately to prevent or 

minimize harm. For example, a supervisor on the scene can identify an arrest made without 

sufficient probable cause and order the citizen’s immediate release. Similarly, a more 

experienced supervisor at the scene of a use of force might be able to advise an officer of 

alternative techniques to minimize or avoid using force in future similar encounters. 

Unfortunately, the NPD does not take full advantage of its chain of command to promote 

accountability and constitutional policing. When officers use force, the NPD does not require 

supervisors to respond to the scene, where they would be able to conduct an immediate initial 

assessment of the incident. Further, although supervisors are required to approve officers’ Force 

Reports, the approval confirms only that the report was completed. Similar concerns are 

manifest with respect to the NPD’s stops and arrests. With nearly three quarters of documented 

stops lacking an articulation of reasonable suspicion, it is clear that supervisors are not reviewing 

and holding officers accountable for their actions. 

By not requiring meaningful review of officer actions by supervisors, the NPD loses a 

principal benefit of their supervision. During the investigation NPD leadership acknowledged 

that NPD officers and supervisors often view each other as peers rather than superiors and 

subordinates, making it more difficult for supervisors to properly scrutinize officers under their 

command. 

2. Absence of an Effective Early Warning System 

Early warning systems are a significant component of police department supervision and 

risk management systems across the country. Such systems are comprised of one or more 

42
 
databases that track, and make it possible to analyze, various facets of officer activity, including 

stops, arrests, uses of force and misconduct complaints. That analysis, in turn, allows 

departments to identify outlier units and individuals whose behaviors are undermining their own 

successes. Early warning systems identify patterns of activity by officers and groups of officers 

for supervisory review and intervention. Once an officer is identified for review by the Early 

Warning System, a supervisor should conduct a comprehensive written review and provide an 

array of individualized alternatives for resolving any problems identified during the review, such 

as counseling, training, additional supervision or monitoring, and action plans for modifying 

future behavior. By identifying problematic trends and behavior as they develop, early warning 

systems enable management to provide direction and take corrective action before serious 

problems occur. Early warning systems also can be critical components of a City’s system for 

managing risk and liability, as police leadership is responsible for responding appropriately to 

officers with a history of problems. See Beck, 89 F.3d at 973 (finding that when an officer 

receives multiple similar complaints over a short time period, it can be inferred that the Chief of 

Police knew, or should have known, of the officer’s propensity for violence when making 

arrests). Especially in larger departments where an officer’s problematic behavior may 

otherwise continue undetected for some time, early warning systems have become valuable tools 

for effective and supportive officer supervision. 

To be effective, early warning systems require not only a reliable, accurate, and complete 

computer database, but strong policies and protocols that allow the Department to use the data to 

identify and change problematic officer behavior. Unfortunately, the NPD has failed to 

implement such a system. Since 2006, the NPD has used commercial case management software 

called IAPro. IAPro includes some early warning functionality, including the ability to generate 

alerts when officers reach specified thresholds, such as a certain number of misconduct 

complaints over a specified period. The NPD apparently did not use this capability at all until 

2010. In 2010, NPD tested an early warning system based on IAPro called the “Performance 

Monitoring System.” This system was designed to use IAPro’s alert features to identify NPD 

officers with multiple records in the system, who would then be subject to increased training and 

supervision rather than formal disciplinary action. Although this feature was reportedly 

implemented in late 2010 and identified approximately 100 officers for monitoring, the NPD 

could not provide documentation regarding the details or outcomes. And, in August 2011, NPD 

personnel provided only tentative and inconsistent answers about whether and how the 

Performance Monitoring System was being applied. However, there was general consensus that 

monitoring had stopped for most, if not all, of the officers initially identified, and that no others 

had been placed on monitoring. No alternative tracking or early warning system was formally 

implemented to replace the Performance Monitoring System, although NPD has asserted that it is 

now making efforts to increase the use of IAPro to identify officers for corrective action. 

The NPD’s attempts at implementing an early warning system have been undermined not 

only by its failure to use the information it gathers, but also by the poor quality and inconsistency 

of the information itself. There are significant, widespread data failures in areas critical to 

evaluating whether officers are in need of support and intervention. Although a principal 

purpose of an early warning system is to promote awareness of developing issues before they 

become problems, it appears that the NPD does not inform supervisors and district commanders 

of pending complaint investigations and charges against officers under their command. At a 

43
 
                                                           

 

minimum, the complaint information in an early warning system should include: allegations, 

investigation outcomes (e.g., guilty, sustained, dismissed); charges against officers; and 

discipline imposed. The NPD’s system has not consistently included these data, which can 

make it impossible for NPD supervisors to properly identify and hold officers accountable for 

patterns of problematic behavior. 

The NPD’s use of inconsistent terminology when entering data further complicates 

accountability efforts. For example, the NPD tracks uses of physical force in IAPro as “physical 

force,” but omits the more specific description of the type of force used that is recorded on the 

Force Report. As a result, supervisors reviewing data in IAPro have no way of knowing what 

types of force are actually being used by their officers, and therefore are limited in their ability to 

detect an emerging problematic trend, or respond most effectively. 

In sum, the NPD’s nascent efforts to implement a meaningful early warning system 

faltered some time ago, and efforts to restart this program have been insufficient and 

unsuccessful. This failure to institute an effective early warning system underscores the NPD’s 

lack of sufficient, sustained commitment to monitoring officers’ complaint and disciplinary 

histories and the supervision and intervention necessary to change problematic behavior. 

G. DEFICIENT TRAINING PRACTICES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE 

PATTERN OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 

1. Inadequate Officer Training 

NPD officers’ patterns of misconduct are consistent with the NPD’s failure to provide 

adequate training and sufficiently track the training it does provide. At the outset of this 

investigation, a random sample of 212 officers’ training cards—reportedly the NPD’s primary 

record of officers’ training—reflected that only two officers attended training in 2011. One had 

attended a class on drug, crime and terrorist vehicle interdiction, the other on a fingerprint and 

facial recognition software package. Although the NPD claimed that many other officers had 

attended training, there was no supporting documentation. The NPD must maintain a detailed, 

current record management system so it can effectively track and monitor what training has been 

offered and completed by its officers. 

In addition to the sample of training cards, the NPD provided a schedule of the training it 

offered from 2009 to 2011.49 That schedule showed a decline in training opportunities in 2011, 

when compared to the preceding years. In addition, the training identified in the NPD’s records 

appeared limited to external specialty classes that certain officers were authorized or directed to 

attend. The NPD’s officer training records did not document any regular annual training on 

routine police practices and current legal developments, such as those related to use of force, or 

search and arrest practices. Although the NPD reports that such matters are covered in refresher 

training presented annually by the legal advisor from the ECPO, that training reportedly was 

provided to only 280 NPD members in 2010 and to 418 members in 2011. Moreover, the NPD 

could not provide a syllabus of the training, but related that it covered several definitions of 

49 We have repeatedly asked Newark to provide updated training information, but have not been provided any. 

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force, review of actual use of force, and examples of permissible uses of force in the NPD. 

There was no indication that this training was tailored to the NPD’s particular force training 

needs, or was part of an overall NPD training plan. 

Based on a recently provided summary of training activities, the NPD appears to have 

increased specialized and subject-specific training opportunities for officers in 2012 and 2013. 

However, attendance at the annual training sessions provided by the ECPO legal advisor 

declined to 124 officers in 2012 and only 55 officers in 2013. This decline is of particular 

concern because these sessions, while far too limited in length and scope, nonetheless stand as 

NPD’s closest analog to the annual use of force training that is standard in well-run police 

agencies. 

The investigation also raised concerns that the NPD also may have underemphasized the 

importance of regular firearms qualification. Regular firearms qualification helps ensure that 

officers can fire their weapons accurately and appropriately in a variety of conditions. It is a 

critical component of officer and public safety. The New Jersey State Attorney General’s 

Guidelines and NPD policy require officers to qualify twice annually, with at least 90 days 

between qualifications. The policy does not prohibit officers who do not qualify from carrying 

their weapons, and only precludes them from working outside employment. This is an 

inadequate sanction. Officers who do not qualify with their firearms should be prohibited from 

carrying their firearms and be required to requalify promptly. 

A review of firearms qualification records in the early stages of this investigation raised 

concerns that a significant number of officers might not have satisfied the twice annual 

qualification requirement in 2011. However, a recent training summary from the NPD indicates 

that all officers may have qualified with their firearms in 2012 and 2013, although the 

information that the NPD provided was not sufficiently detailed to allow for confirmation of this 

assertion. Further, this information indicates that as many 77 officers in 2012 and 67 officers in 

2013 may not have qualified twice, as required by NPD policy. Nonetheless, if these numbers are 

confirmed, the NPD appears to have improved the rate at which officers qualify on their firearms 

in recent years, but the NPD should take steps to ensure that all officers comply with the policy 

and the accurate records. 

2. Inadequate Training of Internal Affairs Investigators 

In addition to the numerous deficiencies with the NPD’s IA policies, procedures, and 

practices, the NPD has failed to appropriately train its investigators. NPD command staff and 

officers, IA investigators, and Integrity Compliance Officers (“ICO”) consistently reported that 

investigative experience has not been required to become an investigator. The NPD is well 

aware of its IA training needs. In 2007, the City hired a consulting firm to conduct an analysis of 

the NPD’s organizational structure and operational methodology.50 The consultants interviewed 

members of the Department, conducted focus groups and reviewed documents. Their analysis 

included a review of the NPD’s Internal Affairs system. The consulting firm warned that the 

50 The goal of the analysis was to provide the City with recommendations on how to reduce crime through increased 

effectiveness and efficiency within NPD. 

45
 
NPD’s investigators “receive[] no formal training” and emphasized that IA must be “staffed with 

quality personnel.” Those training deficiencies remain. For example, one ICO interviewed had 

been on the job for three months, yet had not received any training, even though, prior to 

becoming an ICO, he had never been in a detective position or received any formal training on 

how to conduct investigations. The 2007 assessment also recommended that all investigators 

receive training in interview techniques, evidence collection, search and seizure law, 

administrative law, and advanced IAPro user training. Yet, the NPD’s Deputy Chief of Training 

and Support reported that there is no required training specifically for IA investigators. While a 

statewide training class is available, he reported that it has been difficult for the NPD to get its 

investigators into the program. This failure must be addressed if the NPD is to ensure adequate 

investigations of officer misconduct. 

IV. OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN 

At the beginning of the investigation, the DOJ notified the City that its review would 

include allegations of gender-biased policing with respect to criminal investigations of sexual 

assault, bias related to sexual orientation and gender identity, and risk of harm to detainees 

confined in the NPD’s holding cells. While the available evidence does not support a finding of 

a pattern or practice of misconduct in any of these areas, the investigation revealed potential 

issues or deficiencies in some practices that warrant further examination by the NPD. 

A. Gender-Biased Policing 

A review of a sample of NPD sexual assault files and interviews of the supervisor of the 

NPD’s special victims division and relevant staff at the ECPO who handle or supervise sexual 

assault prosecutions revealed crucial deficiencies in the way the NPD has responded to and 

investigated sexual assault complaints. This deficiency is, in part, grounded in what appears to 

be ignorance or bias concerning victims of sexual assault, as evidenced by comments made by 

several command staff during interviews and a review of a sample of sexual assault investigative 

files. Specifically, there is evidence that some NPD officers and detectives have made mistaken 

assumptions about who can or cannot be a “true” victim of sexual assault. This includes views 

that sex workers, employees of nightclubs or adult establishments, and women who consumed 

alcohol with an assailant cannot be legitimate sexual assault claimants. 

The NPD’s problematic response to sexual assault complaints is also structural, 

embedded in procedural problems with the way the NPD has handled sexual assault 

investigations. The NPD has not made significant efforts to provide vital support for victims 

such as referrals to counseling services or a competent liaison to assist them who is not the 

detective investigating the matter. 

Nor has the NPD evidenced an understanding of the emotional rollercoaster a sexual 

assault victim might experience, especially with regard to whether to participate in investigative 

and legal proceedings. Partly because of this, the NPD has stopped some sexual assault 

investigations prematurely. Often, as soon as the complainant indicates she or he may not want 

to move forward, the NPD has brought the complainant in to sign a declination form, without 

recognizing that complainants often change their minds several times throughout the charging 

and prosecution process. 

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In addition, investigators have appeared to ignore basic investigatory steps, such as 

checking the alleged assailant’s criminal record even when the assailant’s name and date of birth 

are known. For example, in one incident the investigator spoke to the alleged assailant, who 

acknowledged having had sexual intercourse with the complainant. But there was no further 

investigation, including no evidence that the investigator ran a record check. A record check 

would have determined whether the alleged assailant had an open warrant, and could have 

influenced the direction of the investigation. The NPD should revise its practices to better serve 

sexual assault complainants, and therefore better protect the public from sexual assaults. 

B. Green Street Cell Block Suicide Prevention Policies and Practices 

In response to several suicides at the NPD’s Green Street Cell Block, this investigation 

reviewed the holding facility’s suicide prevention measures. In assessing jail suicide precautions, 

the Third Circuit applies a three-part test to establish a violation: (1) the detainee had a 

“particular vulnerability to suicide,” (2) officials knew or should have known of that 

vulnerability, and (3) acted with “reckless indifference” to the detainee’s vulnerability. Colburn 

v. Darby Upper Tp., 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that allegation of a jail’s custom 

of inadequate monitoring for potential suicides could sustain a cause of action). Reckless 

indifference requires a level of culpability that is at least higher than a negligent failure to 

protect, such that the custodian either knew or should have known of a strong likelihood of selfharm. Colburn v. Upper Darby Tp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991). 

The Cell Block is comprised of fifty cells for males and eight cells for females, and is 

where the NPD holds detainees prior to their initial court appearance and subsequent transfer into 

the custody of Essex County. Detainees are usually held in the Cell Block for fewer than 24 

hours. The NPD provides no special or additional training to officers who are assigned to the 

holding facility, and some officers report that assignment to the holding facility is undesirable, 

and commonly perceived as an informal punishment. The layout of the Cell Block offers only 

limited lines of sight into the cells, and the cells all contain suicide hazards such as exposed cross 

bars which could be used as hanging points.51 

The hours immediately following arrest are a period of heightened risk of suicide, and the 

NPD must be able to identify suicidal detainees and immediately take precautions. General 

Order 08-08 requires intake officers to conduct a screening of all detainees entering the Cell 

Block,52 which includes checklist items for “Mental/Emotional Problems” and 

“Suicidal/Aggressive Behavior.”53 However, because officers have received no specific training 

regarding custodial operations in the cell block, it is unclear that the intake screening is effective 

in identifying potentially suicidal detainees. 

51 During this investigation, the NPD completed construction of a new police headquarters at Clinton Avenue that 

includes a modern holding facility which would likely mitigate concerns regarding suicide hazards. However, the 

NPD recently informed the DOJ that it will not be moving operations to the Clinton Avenue facility. As a result of 

this change in plans, the United States may seek additional remedies to ensure NPD ensures adequate suicide 

precautions are maintained at Green Street. 

52 See GO 08-08 at 11. 53 Prisoner Intake and Medical Status Report (Form DP1:1885-2). 

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If a detainee is determined to be at risk, the General Order authorizes the cell block 

supervisor “to employ extraordinary measures to protect a prisoner from self harm,” including 

but not limited to: placement in a cell that is easily viewable, constant observation, 15-minute 

checks, and referral to the EMS or the hospital. During a site visit, however, NPD officers 

working in the Cell Block acknowledged that only one of the options in the written policy was 

available: any detainees they believe to be suicidal are automatically sent to the hospital for 

assessment, where they remain until they are medically or psychologically cleared. NPD officers 

described no other precautions or steps they would take with potentially suicidal detainees. The 

discrepancy between policy and practice was evident in a review of the NPD’s documentation of 

suicide and suicide attempts, which showed also that suicidal detainees are not always sent to the 

hospital, raising concerns that the NPD’s current suicide prevention policies, practices, and 

training create an unacceptable suicide risk to future Green Street detainees if not corrected. 

C. Policing Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 

During the investigation there was anecdotal evidence that the NPD has engaged in 

discriminatory policing practices based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The 

investigation did not produce evidence sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or practice in this area. 

The LGBT community expressed concerns about the NPD’s lack of responsiveness to 

complaints about violent assaults against LGBT individuals, as well as harassment of female 

transgender persons by NPD officers—including the mistaken assumption that all female 

transgender persons are prostitutes. They also described a lack of cultural competence and 

insensitivity by NPD officers when engaging the LGBT community, and the transgender 

community, in particular. 

The NPD does not appear to have any policy or training that would provide officers 

guidance on how to interact respectfully and effectively with LGBT individuals.54 Community 

advocates report that NPD command staff are amenable to training on LGBT issues, although 

none had yet occurred. The NPD should engage with the LGBT community around the concerns 

noted, and develop training on policing related to sexual orientation and gender identity. 

V. CONCLUSION 

The patterns of misconduct identified by this investigation present both a challenge and 

an opportunity for the NPD. The City of Newark took an important first step by acknowledging 

the community’s concerns and cooperating with the investigation. Further, during the course of 

the investigation, the City initiated efforts to modify and improve its practices in some of the 

areas identified in this report. Most importantly, the City and NPD have already reached an 

Agreement in Principle with the United States to remedy the problems identified by this 

investigation. 

54 GO 03-04, “Biased-Based Policing” directs officers to enforce the law in a “fair and impartial manner” but does 

not provide any guidance on how that is to be accomplished with respect to any protected class, including race, 

gender and sexual orientation, apart from an admonition to comply with the Fourth Amendment and an 

acknowledgment in its introduction of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law for 

all who live in the United States. 

48
 
An effective and long lasting remedy to these violations will require the full and 

sustained commitment from the City’s leadership, as well as from the members of the NPD and 

the residents of Newark. Only a true partnership between the NPD and the broader community 

will establish a foundation for simultaneously respecting the rights of all Newark residents, 

effectively preventing crime, and better preparing and protecting officers. The DOJ is fully 

committed to working with the City, the NPD, and the Newark community to ensure that this 

effort is successful. 

49