U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

95–694PDF 2015

THE IRAN–NORTH KOREA STRATEGIC ALLIANCE

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 28, 2015

Serial No. 114–76

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Ilan Berman, vice president, American Foreign Policy Council ................... 9

Ms. Claudia Rosett, journalist-in-residence, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ..................................................................................................................... 21

Larry Niksch, Ph.D., senior associate, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies .................................................................................................................. 34

Jim Walsh, Ph.D., research associate, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ............................................................................... 56

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Ilan Berman: Prepared statement .................................................................. 12

Ms. Claudia Rosett: Prepared statement ............................................................... 23

Larry Niksch, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 36

Jim Walsh, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................. 58

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 84

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 85

(1)

THE IRAN–NORTH KOREA STRATEGIC 

ALLIANCE 

TUESDAY, JULY 28, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 3:03 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe [chairman of 

the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade] presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittees will come to order. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to 

the length limitation in the rules. 

I do want to thank especially our witnesses for being here and 

the members as well. This apparently is Iran day at Capitol Hill, 

and so we will continue the discussion of Iran. 

The long history of secret cooperation between Iran and North 

Korea in violation of international law stretches back for decades. 

North Korea first sold Iran ballistic missiles during the 1980s during Iran’s war with Iraq. By the end of the 1980s, North Korea and 

China were supplying Iran with about 70 percent of its arms. Move 

to the 1990s, and Iran and North Korea had moved onto working 

together to develop long-range ballistic missiles. North Korean 

long-range ballistic missiles became the basis for the Iranian 

Shahab missile series, which currently threatens Israel, our other 

Middle East allies, and even Central Europe. In fact, the intelligence community has said that missile cooperation between Iran 

and North Korea has provided Iran with an increase in its military 

capabilities. By the beginning of the 2000s, the Iranians were giving North Korea sensitive data from their own missile tests to improve the North Korean missile systems. In fact, Iranian officials 

have been present at nearly every major North Korean missile test. 

This history of very close cooperation on ballistic missiles only 

has the potential to grow and deepen as a result of the Iranian nuclear deal. In 8 years, Iran will be able to freely work on its ballistic missile system. Iran was able to achieve so much in secret, 

thanks to its North Korean allies. We can only imagine what it will 

be able to do after the ban on the ballistic missile program is lifted. 

2

There is a growing evidence that Iran and North Korea have not 

only been cooperating on missile programs but also in the nuclear 

field. The media reports, as far as back as 1993, that there are indications that the Iranians financed North Korea’s nuclear program 

with $500 million in return for nuclear technology. South Korean 

news outlets rang the alarm in 2011 alleging that hundreds of 

North Korean nuclear and missile experts were working in Iran. 

One of those places that had North Korean experts working in it 

was Natanz, a nuclear facility where centrifuges will continue to 

enrich uranium under the nuclear deal. 

Iranian defectors have also revealed a long history of North Korean experts working on the Iranian nuclear program. Just like 

with the missile program, Iranian officials have attended nearly 

every North Korean nuclear test, gleaning important information to 

improve their nuclear program. Last month, an Iranian opposition 

group claimed that nuclear expert delegations from North Korea 

had traveled to Iran three times this year alone. The delegations 

allegedly met with Iranian officials responsible for nuclear warhead 

design. These recent visits occurred as Iran was buckling under a 

serious sanctions regime. 

Now that sanctions probably will be lifted and Iran will receive anywhere from $50 billion to $150 billion in what I term a signing 

bonus and hundreds of billions of dollars more in oil revenue, that 

means a lot more money to pay cash-hungry North Korea for gamechanging nuclear technology and expertise. 

The strong relationship between Iran and North Korea was 

forged in secrecy. We do not even know the full extent of their 

working together. What we do know is that now that the world has 

given the Iranian nuclear program an apparent stamp of approval, 

North Korea has a lot to gain from the Iranians as well. 

Continued work on the Iranian nuclear program will mean more 

transfer of sensitive nuclear information back and forth between 

the two most dangerous rogue regimes in the world. A better understanding of the strategic alliance between Iran and North Korea 

highlights the inherent dangers of an Iranian nuclear program. Unfortunately, it appears that these dangers will only multiply as 

soon as the nuclear deal goes in effect. 

I will now turn to the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. 

Keating from Massachusetts, for his opening statement. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Chairman Salmon, and 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, for conducting this joint hearing today. I 

would also like to thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss the relationship between Iran and North Korea. 

As this morning’s full committee hearing with Secretaries Kerry, 

Moniz, and Lew demonstrated, there are many questions that remain among members of this committee regarding the scope of the 

threat of Iran and North Korea. I believe that you will be able to 

provide valuable insight on this issue and I look forward to your 

testimony. 

Both Iran and North Korea present national security threats to 

the United States and our allies. They each have a history nuclear 

proliferation, engage in serious human rights abuses, and are a 

source of instability in their respective regions. Iran is a sponsor 

of terrorism through illicit activities led by the Islamic RevoluVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:36 Sep 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\072815\95694 SHIRL
3

tionary Guard Corps and Quds Force. Most threatening is its network of partners beyond its borders and the influence that its funding and support holds over the region. 

Likewise, North Korea is known to be heavily involved in 

transnational organized crime. Make no mistake, Iran and North 

Korea are dangerous actors on the world stage. 

Generally, the extent to which an adversary is considered a 

threat can be measured by considering its capability times its intent. As we review and analyze the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

Action transmitted to Congress, we must consider how a nuclear 

agreement with Iran would impact its capabilities and intentions 

beyond its borders. With this in mind, it is worth exploring whether, as some have suggested, a nuclear deal with Iran might enable 

and promote it to obtain nuclear or missile technology from cashstrapped North Korea. 

But in doing so, we have to rely on credible evidence. For example, we know that North Korea sold Scud missiles to Iran beginning in the 1980s, and according to the U.S. intelligence community, the two countries have cooperated significantly on ballistic 

missile technology, but according to the Congressional Research 

Service, according to unclassified and declassified U.S. intelligence 

community assessments, and in reports of that nature, they indicate to date that there is no evidence that Iran and North Korea 

have engaged in nuclear-related trade or cooperation with each 

other. 

I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about any cooperation between Iran and North Korea with respect to nuclear or 

missile technology and how the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

might affect the relationship between these two countries. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

This is a joint subcommittee hearing with three subcommittees, 

and all three chairs are here. I will now recognize the chairman of 

the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee, Mr. Matt Salmon from Arizona, for his opening statement. 

Mr. SALMON. I think there was a line in a movie like, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Doctor, Doctor. 

Mr. SALMON. Yes, Doctor, Doctor. 

Anyway, it is great to be here with both of you today and to have 

this hearing. I would like to also thank our distinguished witnesses 

for coming to speak on this Iran-North Korea relationship. 

As we consider the administration’s Joint Comprehensive Action 

Plan with Iran, we have to ask, will Iran follow through with its 

international obligations? After hearing the administration explain 

the terms of the deal this morning, I can’t be so sure. The deal 

could put Iran on a path toward developing a nuclear bomb within 

10 short years. As chairman of the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee, I am concerned with the decades-long nuclear and military cooperation between Iran and North Korea and exactly what 

implications the deal has on their prospects for developing nuclear 

weapons. 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been the primary 

focus of the U.S.-North Korea policy for decades. It has tested three 

4

nuclear devices within the last 10 years and, in May 2012, declared 

itself a nuclear arms state. North Korea appears to be expanding 

its capacity to produce both plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. North Korea has repeatedly emphasized 

the role of its nuclear weapons as a deterrent and as a means to 

obtain concessions and cash in exchange for technology and components. 

North Korea has a track record similar to Iran of failing to meet 

international obligations. The February 29 of 2012 agreement committed North Korea to a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range 

missile launches, and uranium enrichment at the Yongbyon facility, as well as readmission of IAEA inspectors. In return, the administration pledged 240,000 tons of food aid. The deal quickly fell 

apart when North Korea announced its intention to launch a longrange rocket in March, successfully doing so in December 2012. 

North Korea’s sales of missile technology and sharing of expertise to Iran is a major concern. Iran has cultivated a close relationship with North Korea on ballistic missile programs, beginning 

with the acquisition of Scud missiles in North Korea back in the 

1980s. Iran continues to pursue capabilities that could ultimately 

be used to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, and missile 

sales and missile test information have been a key source of hard 

currency for the Kim regime. 

In the past decade, Iran and North Korea have also cooperated 

on nuclear research and technology. In 2015 alone, North Korea 

nuclear experts allegedly visited Iran at least three times to exchange information and intelligence. 

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter stated in April that North Korea 

and Iran could be cooperating to develop a nuclear weapon, including sharing technology related to nuclear weapons, material production, or data from nuclear or explosives testing. 

Desperately insecure and cash-starved, North Korea remains hell 

bent on developing and improving its nuclear capabilities. With 

Iran’s impending access to $100 billion of frozen assets under the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran could use some of those 

assets to procure material, technologies, and expertise from North 

Korea. I hope our witnesses can inform us about whether this 

should be a major concern for Congress. 

Given the history of cooperation between North Korea and Iran, 

I am very concerned about what the Iran deal may mean for our 

national security interests in both the Middle East and Asia. We 

need to know their motives and the implications of their cooperation so we can prevent bad deals from the start and not allow bad 

actors to unite in nuclear proliferation efforts against international 

agreements. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. 

The Chair recognizes the ranking member for the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, Mr. Sherman from California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I will use my 5 minutes to focus on our hearing 

this morning. 

Secretary Kerry, I think, gave us some very interesting information, as he said that whether this deal holds or doesn’t hold, we are 

free to impose new sanctions on Iran to try to change its behavior 

5

with regard to terrorism, with regard to holding four American hostages, and with regard to its complicity in the crimes of Assad in 

Syria. 

Deal or no deal, we need to adopt additional sanctions. And the 

work, every time we have adopted sanctions on Iran, has started 

in this room. And I look forward to working, deal or no deal, with 

everyone here to have the sanctions that will change Iranian behavior. 

I point out that the proponents of the deal say sanctions changed 

Iran’s behavior and caused it to give up its nuclear weapon design, 

what the proponents say is an excellent deal. The opponents of the 

deal say sanctions can change Iran’s behavior if we only stick to 

our guns and get tougher. So the one thing everybody that has 

come to this room seems to agree on is that sanctions can change 

Iran’s behavior, and that outside the nuclear area, Iran’s behavior 

needs a lot of changing. 

The second comment that Senator Kerry made in response to one 

of my questions is that, as everyone knows, if we override the 

President’s veto, certain U.S. statutory sanctions legally are the 

law of the land and the waiver provisions don’t exist, so the President is obligated by law to enforce them. But I have been at this 

for a long time, and we know that Presidents, though, don’t always 

enforce statutes against Iran. In fact, the Iran Sanctions Act was 

not enforced once by the prior administration, and a lot of sanctions were pretty much ignored the first couple of years at least of 

this administration. 

And I asked the Secretary whether he would obey the law under 

those circumstances, and he said that that was too hypothetical a 

question. I would like to go on record to say that under all hypothetical circumstances, I intend to obey the law, but moreover, the 

Secretary came to us to talk about a hypothetical situation: What 

happens if Congress overrides the veto? And he told us what India 

would do, what Europe would do, what Iran would do, what China 

would do, but when I asked him what the administration would do 

under those circumstances, it was too hypothetical. 

As to the issue before us, Iran’s going to have a lot of money; 

North Korea has nuclear weapons and a thirst for money. What 

could go wrong? As we know, obviously, North Korea could sell a 

completed nuclear weapon. They could sell fissile material. They 

could sell a weaponization plan. They could sell a bomb without the 

fissile material and any combination of this. Iran and North Korea 

have a long relationship of working on military matters together 

from the 1980s, which increased in the 1990s. We used to get annual reports until 2013 of the concern that North Korea would export its nuclear technology. 

So we don’t have any proof that it is about to happen. We don’t 

have any proof that it has already happened. We just have a country that has almost seemingly a desperate desire for nuclear weapons and another one with a desperate desire for money. And we 

know that the one with the desperate desire for nuclear weapons 

is going to get its hands on a lot of money very soon. 

Now, the question is what we do about it. We have got to look 

at planes and ships that would connect the two. I think if there is 

an exchange of money for nuclear material, it is much more likely 

6

to take place on a plane. A ship gives us a chance to track it and 

a chance to make a decision as to whether to interdict and board. 

Of course, a ship is also possible. We should not be encouraging the 

civil aviation of Iran by selling them planes and parts. We know 

they are going to use those planes to take thugs to Damascus to 

kill people. And we hope they don’t use the planes to go pick up 

a nuclear weapon in North Korea. 

So we have got to see what are the opportunities to interdict either the shipment of a bomb in one direction or cash in the other. 

We have got to keep track of what Iran does with the $56 billion 

to $150 billion they get from this deal. But, finally, I think we are 

dependent upon China, which exercises such significant control 

over the most critical aspects of what the North Korean Government does. If China is willing to turn a blind eye to a cash-forbomb situation, I don’t know if we can stop it, and we certainly—

if they were willing to turn that blind eye at Beijing Airport, I 

know we couldn’t stop it. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the right honorable gentlewoman from the 

Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Ms. Ileana RosLehtinen from Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you so much, Judge Poe. 

I want to thank Judge Poe and Chairman Salmon for bringing 

our three subcommittees together to focus on the nexus between 

these two rogue regimes, Iran and North Korea. 

As Congress continues to do our due diligence on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between the P5+1 and Iran that the 

Obama administration submitted to us last week, it is important 

that we do not make the same mistakes again. 

In 2008, I was outspoken against the George W. Bush administration for removing North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list as a concession to Pyongyang during negotiations over 

its nuclear program. And I am also outspoken against this administration’s concessions to Tehran during the negotiations and ultimately this deal. 

Yet as far back as the Clinton administration, each administration continues to make the same mistakes of offering these rogue 

nations concessions while allowing them to maintain their nuclear 

infrastructure and misguidedly falling back on hope that this time 

will be different, this time things will change. 

These negotiations mirror the same track that the nuclear negotiations with North Korea took. Iran has been following the North 

Korean playbook on exactly how to extract concessions from the 

U.S. and the international community while simultaneously continuing to improve its nuclear program, expand its infrastructure, 

and support continues for its illicit activities. 

But it isn’t just that the Iranian regime is following the North 

Korean playbook, successfully, I might add, it is that the Obama 

administration is following the same failed playbook that the Clinton and Bush administrations pursued. It is alarming and striking 

just how similar the language is between President Clinton’s 1994 

announcement of a nuclear agreement with North Korea and President Obama’s announcement of a nuclear agreement with Iran earVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:36 Sep 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\072815\95694 SHIRL
7

lier this month. Last week, Alan Dershowitz wrote about the similarities and even posted a chart that represented the similarities 

in the language, the words used between the Clinton administration and the Obama statements. 

In 1994, President Clinton said that the North Korea agreement 

will make the U.S., the Korean Peninsula, and the world safer. He 

assured us that the deal didn’t rely on trust, that compliance would 

be certified by the IAEA. President Clinton also made the dubious 

claim that because of our willingness to engage North Korea on its 

nuclear profile, that would be a crucial step toward drawing 

Pyongyang into the global community and predicted the end of the 

rogue regime’s isolation. 

Does any of this sound familiar to us? It should, because these 

are the same arguments that President Obama used when announcing the deal and that were used today in our Foreign Affairs 

full committee hearing. 

When the North Korea deal was reached, one of the most significant flaws was that it failed to dismantle any of Pyongyang’s nuclear infrastructure. The deal was designed merely to delay the 

North Korean bomb, not prevent it, and we even promised, as we 

are doing in the JCPoA, to modernize and improve North Korea’s 

nuclear infrastructure. 

And now we are aiming to prevent the Iranian bomb. The totality of this deal hinges on the bet by the administration and the rest 

of the P5+1 that the Iranian regime will see the error of its ways 

and wants to be part of the global community and will forsake its 

support for terror and other illicit behavior. That is a heck of a 

gamble to make when all of, not even just a preponderance, but all 

of the evidence indicates that this is not the likely outcome, but 

rather that Iran will use this as a means to increase its belligerence. And now with this deal, we are likely to see an increase in 

Iran-North Korea activity on ballistic missiles and covert nuclear 

actions because not only will we be lifting the sanctions on Iranian 

scientists and on Iran’s nuclear program, but we will be lifting the 

sanctions on its ballistic missile program and its military leaders. 

And that is where Iran and North Korea are likely to resume their 

cooperation, on the weaponization and the ballistic missiles. 

This is a dangerous gamble for us to make with U.S. national security, and it is not a gamble that I or any of us should be willing 

to take. That is why we must reject this deal, demand a better 

deal, or else reimpose the sanctions and use the only action that 

Iran understands, strength, to force it to abandon its nuclear ambitions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The gentlelady yields back. 

The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Connolly, for 1 minute. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, I just heard my friend from Florida equate these two 

agreements and call for the vote to disapprove the pending agreement with Iran. I think there are some lessons from North Korea. 

One was we decided consciously to not engage, and we paid a very 

heavy price for that. And in the case of Iran, we have decided to 

engage, and we have an agreement that you couldn’t possibly comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:36 Sep 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\072815\95694 SHIRL
8

pare to that with North Korea. And I just think, you know, we 

should never be afraid to be engaged, especially when it comes to 

the nuclear question. I don’t think it is so cut and dried. 

While I respect my friend from Florida, I also respectfully disagree. I don’t think this is a clear-cut case at all that calls for absolute rejection and renunciation by the Congress of the United 

States. I think that is a very momentous step, not a political one, 

it shouldn’t be a political one and one we ought to contemplate 

with great care. 

So I certainly look forward to the testimony today, and I would 

like to hear some of the differences between North Korea and Iran, 

because I happen to think they are pretty profound. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman from Virginia. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. 

Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got a question 

for the ranking member. You know, what is keeping North Korea 

from selling ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons to Iran today? Regardless of whether we walk away from this agreement or not, 

North Korea can still sell them the weapons. Nothing is stopping 

them. 

In February and April 2007, North Korea agreed to ‘‘abandoning 

all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and returning 

at an earlier date to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons and the IAEA safeguards.’’ Supposedly this significant 

achievement commits all six parties to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and will lead to a more stable and secure northeast Asia. 

For doing this, North Korea received, as it complies with its commitment, they received 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. Well, guess 

what? In September 2008, they cranked the nuclear program back 

up, and to this day, they have a nuclear weapon. Those are the 

facts. North Korea has got a nuclear weapon. 

If Iran wants a nuclear weapon, regardless of what this agreement that we talked about today at length, if we don’t have the 

ability to inspect the appropriate sites, they are still going to get 

a nuclear weapon. This agreement has no teeth, and they are going 

to have $150 billion to give arms and money to Hezbollah and 

Hamas. They are still exporters of terrorism. Those are the facts. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back. 

Does any other member wish to be recognized for an opening 

statement? If not, I will introduce our witnesses. 

Once again, I want to thank all four of you for being here today 

on this day of Iran at the Capitol Hill. 

Mr. Ilan Berman is vice president of the American Foreign Policy 

Council. Mr. Berman is widely published on issues of regional security and foreign policy and has also consulted for the CIA, the Department of Defense, and many other government agencies. 

Ms. Claudia Rosett is a journalist-in-residence at the Foundation 

for Defense of Democracies. Ms. Rosett is widely recognized as a 

groundbreaking reporter and won the 2005 Eric Breindel award 

and the Mightier Pen award for her work on the U.N. Oil-for-Food 

scandal. 

9

Dr. Larry Niksch is a senior associate at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies. Dr. Niksch specializes in U.S. security 

policy in East Asia and the Western Pacific. 

And Dr. Jim Walsh is a research associate at the Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program. Dr. Walsh is 

one of a handful, and a very few handful, of Americans who have 

traveled both to Iran and North Korea for talks with officials regarding nuclear issues. 

Each of you will have 5 minutes. There should be three lights in 

front of you. The red one means it is time to stop. 

We will start with Mr. Berman. You have 5 minutes. And your 

statements all are in the record, so we have all your statements. 

You may summarize them or you may read your statement. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ILAN BERMAN, VICE PRESIDENT, 

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Poe, Chairman Salmon, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, 

Ranking Members Keating, Sherman, and Deutch, thank you so 

much for the opportunity to be present before you today to talk 

about this issue. 

The strategic partnership between Iran and North Korea is one 

of the most significant, yet one of the most often overlooked aspects 

of the strategic threat that is posed both by Iran and by North 

Korea. It is also one that today, as Congress begins to deliberate 

over the new nuclear agreement struck between the P5+1 and Iran, 

merits renewed attention by this committee and by Capitol Hill as 

a whole. 

Because my time is limited here, let me focus on just three aspects of this strategic relationship, which are important in their 

own right, certainly, but also important in particular because of the 

implications they hold for the JCPoA. 

The first is that Iran’s relationship with North Korea is vibrant, 

certainly, but it is not unique. It makes up part of a larger global 

strategy that is being pursued by the Islamic Republic, and not just 

in Asia: It is being pursued in Latin America; it is being pursued 

in Europe; it is being pursued in Africa. And it is one that is designed simultaneously to lessen Iran’s global isolation as a result 

of the sanctions imposed by us and our international partners, and 

also, more ambitiously, to expand its strategic reach. And in Asia, 

in particular, what Iran has done has mirrored very much the 

Obama administration’s own Asia pivot, where in 2011, we have 

declared our interest in the region as an area of new opportunity 

and new strategic focus. The Iranians have done so as well, but not 

just in an economic sense and not just in a military sense. Iran has 

looked toward Asia in particular as a defense industrial hot spot. 

And in this regard, the partnership Iran has built with North 

Korea is of particular importance. 

The second takeaway is that North Korea has materially aided 

Iran’s strategic capabilities, and as a result, it has expanded the 

threat that Iran poses to the West. The members all talked in their 

opening statements about ballistic missile and nuclear cooperation 

between Iran and North Korea. This is vibrant. It is ongoing. And 

there is credible evidence to suggest that cooperation on these 

10

fronts has helped to materially enhance not only the Iranian nuclear program, but also the sophistication and the know-how of the 

North Korean effort as well. I am happy to delve deeper into that 

in the question and answers. 

The third takeaway, and I think the most germane, given that 

today is Iran day on Capitol Hill, is that Iran has learned a tremendous amount about nuclear diplomacy and about the way the 

West negotiates through the North Korean experience. Since the 

early 1990s, North Korea has engaged in extensive diplomacy with 

the international community over its nuclear program, and it has 

obtained significant diplomatic and economic inducements as a result of purported good behavior. These inducements have played an 

instrumental role in strengthening and stabilizing the Kim regime 

in Pyongyang, but they have not led Pyongyang to give up its nuclear program. To the contrary, it is very credible to say that they 

have made it possible for the North Koreans to continue their nuclear program and strategic programs. 

The North Koreans have reneged over time on every single one 

of the commitments that they have given in the Agreed Framework 

as well as in the now defunct Six Party Talks that stretched from 

2003 to 2009. They have done so, notably, without adverse consequences, because the international community continues to maintain that a conciliatory posture rather than a punitive posture is 

likely to change North Korean behavior. 

Here we come to Iran, because Iran today finds itself in very 

much the same position. In fact, I would make the case that Iran 

finds itself in a much better one because the scope of the financial 

relief that is inherent in the JCPoA dwarfs the kind of economic 

and political stimuli that North Korea received as a result of its 

previous negotiations with the West. 

I made this case in a hearing last week, and just to reiterate, because the historical evidence backs it up, the JCPoA is tantamount 

to a Marshall Plan for the Islamic Republic of Iran. This sounds 

like an exaggeration, but it isn’t. By way of comparison, I will point 

out that, under the terms of the JCPoA, later this year or early in 

2016, once we have requisite verification from the IAEA, the U.S. 

will begin unblocking $100 billion to $150 billion of frozen Iranian 

oil revenue. That sum equates to roughly a quarter of Iran’s annual 

gross domestic product, which last year was $415 billion. It also 

matches or exceeds the entire post-World War II reconstruction 

plan for Europe that was marshaled by the Truman administration. That effort was launched in 1948 and facilitated the disbursement of $13 billion, equivalent to $120 billion in today’s currency, 

to 17 separate countries in Southern and Eastern Europe over the 

course of 4 years. 

Now, we hope that Iran will use the financial windfall that it receives from the JCPoA for domestic purposes. But it is quite clear 

that they can use it just as easily, because money is fungible, on 

strategic capabilities, on the support of terrorism. If and when they 

do so, and I think there is every reason to believe that they will, 

they will find, in their partnership with North Korea, a cashstrapped partner that is more than willing to provide them with 

the resources that will materially expand both their ballistic missile program and their nuclear program. 

11

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berman follows:]

12


95694a-1.eps
13


95694a-2.eps
14


95694a-3.eps
15


95694a-4.eps
16


95694a-5.eps
17


95694a-6.eps
18


95694a-7.eps
19


95694a-8.eps
20


95694a-9.eps
21

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

I would like to remind witnesses and members to abide by the 

5-minute rule. We have votes in an hour and 5 minutes. Hopefully 

we can finish this hearing before we have votes. If not, then we will 

all get to come back later tonight and finish the hearing. 

Ms. Rosett. 

STATEMENT OF MS. CLAUDIA ROSETT, JOURNALIST-INRESIDENCE, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Ms. ROSETT. Thank you. Chairman Poe, Chairman Salmon, and 

Ros-Lehtinen, thank you for the chance to testify here today. 

The administration tells us that the JCPoA cuts off all Iran’s 

pathways to the bomb. That is simply not true. It does not cut off 

the pathways to North Korea. And I would be glad to provide you 

details on the shipping routes. 

For more than three decades, as you have just heard, they have 

been partners in arms, and North Korea’s chief role in that partnership has been as a munitions back shop for Iran’s Islamic Republic. At this point, as you know, North Korea has conducted 

three nuclear tests, is making nuclear warheads, estimated even by 

China to be reaching into the double digits, helped Iran’s client 

state Syria build a reactor that was under construction for years 

before it was discovered and destroyed in 2007 by an Israeli air 

strike. It beggars belief that Syria dared do that without Iran playing some part in it. And they are—oh. One more item. Our top 

military officials have been testifying and saying to the press that 

they assess that North Korea has the capacity to fit a nuclear warhead on an ICBM, meaning they can target us, and if the Iranians 

get that, guess what they can target too? 

The two countries are diplomatic allies as well. This is based not 

just on weapons but on a shared hostility to the United States. 

They are both regimes—this is vital to understand—based on the 

coercive perfection of mankind, and they have expressed this. The 

current Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, went to visit the 

founding tyrant of North Korea in 1989, and they both celebrated 

in Pyongyang together their shared hostility to the U.S. I can give 

you much more recent examples. One of the first meetings that Iranian’s nuclear negotiator, Javad Zarif, had in Iran after the first 

round of nuclear talks in Vienna last year was with a North Korean envoy. 

This deal in particular gives North Korea—gives, I am sorry, 

Iran—a gift to North Korea as well—four things that will make it 

more attractive for these two countries to collaborate specifically on 

nuclear development. One is the snapback sanctions, which actually are a disincentive for the United States and its partners to call 

out Iran for cheating. The penalty is basically to blow up the deal, 

and this means Iran will have to go very far before anyone calls 

it out. Perversely, that makes it safer for North Korea to cheat, 

specifically on nuclear matters with Iran. 

Second, money, obviously lots of money. In fact, the rounding 

terms in the money that Iran will get dwarf North Korea’s annual 

merchandise trade exports. 

The third is procurement access. Iran will have far freer access 

globally both to the financial system and to markets, much easier 

22

to buy illegitimate goods. North Korea and Iran partner in weapons 

development. As convenient, you will have a procurement channel 

through Iran’s overseas illicit networks. While inspectors are 

watching Iran, you are going to have to watch the rest of the globe. 

Much harder to detect. 

Finally, nuclear research and development, which will be given 

to Iran, yes, for civilian purposes, but even things as basic as welding, advanced welding skills, can be of great use to North Korea 

in its weapon programs to be fed back to Iran. And this research 

and development is to include workshops and training from America and its partners in thwarting sabotage of nuclear facilities. 

The administration is entirely secretive about anything to do 

with Iranian-North Korean nuclear cooperation. Many accounts in 

the press. What is missing is confirmation from the administration. 

That Congressional Research Service report notes that Congress 

might wish to ask the administration for much more classified information to be declassified. The flow of that has greatly dwindled 

in recent years. 

Finally, the point I would really like to stress is that these deals 

for North Korea have been not regime transforming, but regime 

sustaining. That is the lesson that Iran has certainly read into the 

failed North Korea deals that we have done, from which North 

Korea emerged with a nuclear bomb. 

The answer would not be to conclude another nuclear deal with 

North Korea. It is time that Washington focused on a real strategy 

and plan for bringing down the regime in Pyongyang. There is no 

other answer to their nuclear weapons, and it would be the most 

salutary message that could possibly be sent to Iran because the 

message would be that nuclear weapons do not make it easier for 

tyrannies to survive. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosett follows:]

23


95694b-1.eps
24


95694b-2.eps
25


95694b-3.eps
26


95694b-4.eps
27


95694b-5.eps
28


95694b-6.eps
29


95694b-7.eps
30


95694b-8.eps
31


95694b-9.eps
32


95694b-10.eps
33


95694b-11.eps
34

Mr. POE. Thank you, Ms. Rosett. 

Dr. Niksch, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF LARRY NIKSCH, PH.D., SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. NIKSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One thing about my resume I should mention is that the main element of my career——

Mr. POE. Is your mike on, sir? 

Mr. NIKSCH [continuing]. I have been an alumnus of the Congressional Research Service for 43 years, where I worked on East 

Asian security issues——

Mr. CHABOT. Sir, if you could pull the mike a little closer too, it 

would be helpful. Thank you. 

Mr. NIKSCH [continuing]. Including the Iran-North Korean issue 

in the late 2000s. 

I want to address this policy of nondisclosure and denials coming 

from the executive branch about the North Korean-Iranian nuclear 

collaboration. And I have seen this for a number of years, going 

back into the Bush administration and continuing today. This has 

resulted in a relative obscurity of this issue in Washington. And 

the contrast here between these denials and this nondisclosure policy of the executive branch is the large volume of reports about 

both missile and nuclear collaboration between Iran and North 

Korea by reputable news media organs based on a large body of information provided to them by non-U.S. officials, intelligence officials, and intelligence reports in the U.K., Germany, Japan, Israel, 

South Korea, and Australia. 

I think these sources and the volume of this material conclusively makes the case that there is not only high-level missile collaboration between North Korea and Iran, but there is also highlevel nuclear collaboration between North Korea and Iran. 

Now, these non-U.S. sources basically lay out, I think over the 

years, several stages in how this Iran-North Korean strategic relationship has developed. I want to highlight stage three, which it 

seems to me began about 2011. Prior to that time, most of the flow 

of cooperation, benefits, and assistance flowed out from North 

Korea to Iran, but after 2011, I have seen a reverse flow from Iran 

into North Korea, expanding Iranian investment of personnel and 

money in North Korea’s domestic nuclear and missile programs. 

Iranian missile scientists were stationed in North Korea for a large 

part of 2012, well into 2013, to assist North Korea in preparing for 

that successful 2012 long-range missile test. And Representative 

Mike Rogers, then chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, 

was quoted in November 2013 that Iran and North Korea were 

working together to test engines for inter-continental ballistic missile. 

Now, what is the danger of this high level of collaboration, again, 

in both missiles and nuclear weapons? There is, I would argue, an 

immediate danger, and that is in North Korea’s success since at 

least early 2013 in developing, and I think by this time probably 

mounting nuclear warheads on its intermediate-range Nodong missiles. 

Reports from Richard Engel of NBC News, Chris Nelson in the 

Nelson Report, and other statements from South Korean officials, 

35

I think, make it clear that North Korea has made this singular 

achievement in its nuclear weapons program. 

The danger immediately from this—and reports are that production of these warheads is increasing. That is what the Chinese nuclear experts told our people in February in Beijing. The danger 

simply is this: Iran’s Shahab-3 intermediate-range missile is a twin 

of the Nodong, developed with considerable North Korean assistance. Nodong nuclear warheads will be, and I believe are, compatible with the Shahab-3. A North Korean-Iranian agreement to 

share Nodong nuclear warheads, it seems to me, is a realistic possibility at this stage. North Korea and Iran have had successful sea 

and air clandestine transportation networks. There have been few 

interdictions of these networks. The transfer of Nodong warheads 

from North Korea to Iran would have a good chance of success. And 

given the forecast for production increases in North Korea, you 

could see a real danger of this developing, it seems to me, as early 

as 2016. Thus, if this happens, Iran would have a secret stockpile 

of nuclear warheads, in Iran, that it could unveil at any time of its 

own choosing and thus present the United States, Israel, and the 

rest of the world with a fait accompli, regardless of what happens 

with the Iran agreement or anything else that goes on with the Iranian nuclear program. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Niksch follows:]

36


95694c-1.eps
37


95694c-2.eps
38


95694c-3.eps
39


95694c-4.eps
40


95694c-5.eps
41


95694c-6.eps
42


95694c-7.eps
43


95694c-8.eps
44


95694c-9.eps
45


95694c-10.eps
46


95694c-11.eps
47


95694c-12.eps
48


95694c-13.eps
49


95694c-14.eps
50


95694c-15.eps
51


95694c-16.eps
52


95694c-17.eps
53


95694c-18.eps
54


95694c-19.eps
55


95694c-20.eps
56

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. Members of Congress will ask 

you questions, so you can continue your statement. 

Dr. Walsh. 

STATEMENT OF JIM WALSH, PH.D., RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE 

OF TECHNOLOGY 

Mr. WALSH. Mr. and Madam Chairs and Ranking Members, it is 

an honor to be with you today. In my remarks, I will focus on the 

single most important question regarding any Iran-North Korea relationship: Will Iran look to North Korea to help cheat on the nuclear deal? 

First, we need to ask, how should policymakers assess the risk 

of Iran-North Korea cheating? As I told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, assessment is more than simply listing things 

that could go wrong. In theory, lots of things can happen, but in 

practice, very few of those possibilities come true. Experience and 

data enable analysts to distinguish between what is likely and 

what is unlikely. 

I would like to review with you the evidence available on this 

critical question. One piece of evidence, Iran’s past nuclear behavior. The DNI has repeatedly testified that Iran had a structured 

nuclear weapons program that begin in the late 1990s and was 

halted in 2003. These activities represent a clear violation of Iran’s 

NPT obligations and provide a cause of concern that Iran might 

violate its commitments in the future. 

A second source of evidence, Iran’s current capabilities and intentions. The DNI reported in 2012 that ‘‘Iran has the capacity to 

eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its 

political will to do so’’—not technical, political. ‘‘. . .We assess Iran 

is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons should it 

choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually 

decide to build nuclear weapons.’’

To state it plainly, Iran does not currently have an active nuclear 

weapons program. It has no active covert weapons facilities, nuclear weapons facilities, and has not made a decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Of course, Iran could change course in the future, 

and the U.S. should take steps to minimize that possibility and be 

prepared to respond. Nevertheless, as a matter of risk assessment, 

these are favorable conditions for a nuclear agreement. 

On its face, it would seem odd for Iran to, A, have no weapons 

program; B, not to have made a weapons decision; C, agree to the 

most intrusive verification regime ever negotiated in a multilateral 

nonproliferation agreement; and D, then decide to cheat. 

Three, Iran-North Korea nuclear relations. Missile cooperation 

between Iran and North Korea has been well documented. Nuclear 

cooperation between the two is a different matter, however. People 

who believe there has been nuclear cooperation rely almost exclusively on media accounts. I have reviewed some 76 media reports 

covering a span of 11 years. None of the 76 reports has been confirmed—none. On the other side of the ledger, the DNI, the IAEA, 

the U.N. Panel of Experts for Iran, and the U.N. Panel of Experts 

for North Korea, despite numerous opportunities to do so, have 

never claimed Iranian-North Korean nuclear coordination. The 

57

Congressional Research Service concluded, ‘‘There is no evidence 

that Iran and North Korea have engaged in nuclear-related trade 

and cooperation.’’

It is worth pointing out that Iran and North Korea chose completely different paths for their weapons efforts. North Korea pursued a plutonium route, while Iran focussed on enrichment. At one 

point, North Korea decided to develop enrichment, but the centrifuges it fielded appeared to be different and more advanced designs than Iran’s. So if Iran is helping North Korea, why are Iran’s 

centrifuges worse? 

Finally, let me address the effects of the nuclear agreement on 

these risks. I judge that the agreement reduces the incentives for 

nuclear cooperation. First, if we find evidence of that cooperation, 

no matter how small, it will constitute a prima facie violation of 

the agreement. Second, it would require cross-regional transfers of 

people and material, which increases the risk of detection. Already 

we have ample cases of countries interdicting shipments by North 

Korea. Third, Iran would have to worry about the prospect that a 

North Korean defector might spill the beans. Iran will be sensitive 

to this possibility insofar as it is an alleged Russian that outed 

Iran’s nuclear program in the early 2000s. 

Fourth, the mercurial nature of North Korea’s young Kim Jongun, complete with leadership purges and questionable behavior, 

might rightly give Iran pause at choosing it as a partner. 

Fifth, as a result of the agreement, surveillance on North Korea 

will likely increase, if only because governments fear such cooperation. And it will not simply be the U.S. that is doing the watching. 

Saudi Arabia and others will be motivated actors. Increased surveillance makes any cooperation between the two daunting and 

risky. 

In conclusion, I assess it is unlikely that Iran would attempt to 

cheat by collaborating with North Korea. Moreover, if it did, the 

chance that they would be detected would be substantial. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:]

58


95694d-1.eps
59


95694d-2.eps
60


95694d-3.eps
61


95694d-4.eps
62


95694d-5.eps
63


95694d-6.eps
64


95694d-7.eps
65


95694d-8.eps
66


95694d-9.eps
67


95694d-10.eps
68


95694d-11.eps
69

Mr. POE. I thank the witnesses. 

And I recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. 

Does North Korea have nuclear weapons? That is a yes or no 

question. 

Mr. WALSH. To whom, Mr. Chair? 

Mr. POE. To all four of you. Just go down the row. 

Ms. ROSETT. Yes. 

Mr. POE. Go down the row. 

Ms. ROSETT. Absolutely. 

Mr. NIKSCH. Yes, including nuclear warheads for the Nodong 

missile. 

Mr. POE. Okay. 

Mr. WALSH. I would—they have nuclear devices. They have tested nuclear devices. 

Mr. POE. Do they have nuclear weapons? 

Mr. WALSH. A nuclear device is not a usable military nuclear 

weapon. 

Mr. POE. So, no. 

Mr. WALSH. It is unclear. They have tested. That has been a——

Ms. ROSETT. The head of U.S. Forces Command Korea testified 

to Congress this spring that they have the ability to fit a warhead 

on an intercontinental ballistic missile. I think that we are looking 

at warheads here. 

Mr. NIKSCH. Richard Engel, the very experienced longstanding 

correspondent for NBC News, reported on April 3——

Mr. SHERMAN. Microphone. 

Mr. NIKSCH [continuing]. In 2013 that his sources and contacts 

in the U.S. Government—and he has extensive sources——

Mr. POE. So, that is yes? 

Mr. NIKSCH [continuing]. In the U.S. Government, were telling 

him that North Korea had succeeded in developing a nuclear warhead for a missile with a range of 1,000 miles. Now, that missile 

in the North Korean arsenal is the Nodong. Chris Nelson reported 

a month later in the Nelson Report——

Mr. POE. Thank you, Doctor. I think I got your answer was a yes. 

I am reclaiming my time. I am going to ask the questions because I am going to limit myself as well as everybody else to the 

time. Thank you. 

I know that the President of North Korea made the comment, I 

guess it was last year, that he was trying to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile and send it to Austin, Texas. I am offended 

by that to some extent, being from Texas, that he picked Austin, 

but the—set aside the nuclear agreement with Iran, just set that 

aside. Can North Korea and Iran still cooperate in mischief, like 

promoting terrorism, weapon development, conventional weapons? 

Set that whole thing aside and assume Iran will follow it as it is 

written. 

Mr. Berman, I will ask you that question. 

Mr. BERMAN. The answer is yes, sir, with caveats, which is that 

some of these programs are expensive. They are extensive, and 

they are expensive. This is why, in my opening statement, I focused on the sanctions relief that is coming in the direction of Iran 

in the near term. Because this cooperation is ongoing now when 

70

Iran is under sanctions and the North Koreans are hurting for cold 

hard cash. 

You heard Dr. Niksch talk about the ‘‘reverse flow.’’ Part of that 

has to do with the fact that, as Iran becomes reintegrated into the 

global economic community, it will have greater money to spend on 

collaboration with other countries, including North Korea. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Let me reclaim my time, Mr. Berman. In other 

words, they can still work together, and Iran can still follow the 

deal, but they can work together. That still would have a detrimental effect to the world. For example, in the work, I will ask you, 

Ms. Rosett, of terrorism. Iran being the world’s number one state 

sponsor of terror—I think North Korea should be on the list, but 

they are not—can Iran continue to develop its terrorist activities in 

the world working with North Korea to achieve that goal and still 

follow the deal? 

Ms. ROSETT. Yes. North Korea has been of substantial assistance 

to Hezbollah, which is something, again, the administration has 

been silent on, but a Federal case in which I testified as an expert 

witness last year found that they have——

Mr. POE. And be specific. Where is Hezbollah doing its mischief? 

Ms. ROSETT. Southern Lebanon, which is pointing right at Israel, 

that is. And may I also give you an illustration of how North 

Korea, in fact, helped with proliferation in Vienna, right where the 

nuclear talks were taking place, there is an enormous North Korean Embassy on the edge of town, along with a big Iranian Embassy in the middle of it. And with the Syrian reactor, it was a 

former North Korean Ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna who set 

up an enormous procurement network spanning Europe, China, 

Asia, which helped buy the components for the Syrian reactor that 

the Israelis finally destroyed in 2007. There is no reason that could 

not be duplicated today. He worked through China, which through 

these entire negotiations has still not rolled up the illicit procurement network of another Chinese proliferator to Iran, Li Fangwei, 

for whom there is a $5-million reward offered by the State Department, who remains active, although the U.S., since 2004, has been 

demarching the Chinese to please try to shut him down. So is it 

possible? Oh, yes, with bells. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

I will yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Keating, the ranking member. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A couple of questions for Dr. Walsh, one in terms of nuclear cooperation; the other in terms of missile cooperation. 

The first one, my understanding is that Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs differ significantly in the types of fissile material and the types of centrifuges that are being used. Given those 

differences, how much would Iran benefit from nuclear cooperation 

with North Korea should that occur? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, I think, Congressman, that the DNI has made 

it clear that Iran as a basic nuclear weapons capability, because 

they know how to build a centrifuge. You can’t bomb that knowledge out of their head. That is why the DNI says this is not a technical issue but a political issue and why I think the agreement is 

a good idea, because it puts Iran on a different path. Iran hasn’t 

71

decided to go for nuclear weapons, despite the media claims. The 

DNI says it has not made the bomb decision. This is why I think 

this is important. 

But they were very different programs. Again, the North Koreans 

focused on the plutonium route. The Iranians focused on the uranium route. They don’t really need the North Koreans. I mean, 

they are already there. The question is how do we keep them from 

making the decision, not how do we keep them from being there. 

That horse is out of the barn. 

Mr. KEATING. And just to follow up on the second part, with missile cooperation, there is a lot of expert knowledge that assesses 

Iran has likely exceeded North Korea’s ability to develop, test, and 

build ballistic missiles. So, in your view, would Iran have to gain—

what would they have to gain from missile cooperation with North 

Korea? You know, how would the conclusion of the nuclear agreement with Iran affect Iran’s incentive to work with North Korea in 

this kind of technology if so many experts believe they have already exceeded that? 

Mr. WALSH. Yeah. Well, I think Iran’s program has been sort of 

slow and steady wins the raise, and North Korea’s has sort of tried 

to leap to the end. Iran has solid fuel rockets. North Korea doesn’t 

have solid fuel rockets. When you have a liquid fuel rocket, that 

makes that rocket vulnerable to preemption and attack. So the Iranians don’t want liquid fuel propulsion technology. That is not 

going to help them at all. 

Now, to be fair, both face a problem with accuracy of their missiles and their guidance systems, but neither is in a position to 

help the other with that because they both have the same problem. 

Mr. KEATING. Another quick question. How would you compare 

the two agreements, North Korea and Iranian? What was lacking 

in—what were some of the problems with the North Korean agreement, and have they been addressed? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, you know, as a summary statement about the 

comprehensive agreement, any agreement that is hated by Iranian 

hardliners and supported by Israeli intel and military people can’t 

be all bad, but to answer specifically your question, the Agreed 

Framework was 3-pages long 20 years ago. The comprehensive 

agreement is 159 pages in the golden era of verification. As I alluded to, it is—compared to all the other nonproliferation agreements—this is not our first rodeo. We have been doing this for 70 

years. Compared to all the others, this is the strongest multinational nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated. It has unprecedented features. A dedicated procurement channel does not exist 

in any of the past agreements; snapback sanctions, does not exist 

in any of the previous agreements; the science and the mandates 

available to IAEA today, the additional protocol did not exist in 

1994, which gives the agency the right to go to any site, military 

or otherwise, on Iranian soil. 

And in terms of technology, we are in the digital age of 

verification. There were no satellites and open-source material and 

digital seals and environmental sampling. All of this is available to 

us today. This is not your father’s IAEA, and this is not your father’s verification system. We enjoy, as the Snowden revelations 

72

would seem to imply, robust national technical means that we can 

apply in addition to IAEA inspection. 

Mr. KEATING. And what do you think in terms of international 

sanctions on North Korea? What has been their effect? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, the bottom line there. It is not about Iran. Is 

it about China and Russia, right? We are blessed as a country in 

that we are surrounded by two big oceans and two big friendly 

neighbors. The second luckiest country in international relations, 

North Korea, because they are right smack next to the biggest 

growing economy on the planet. And as long as that is true, everything else sort of pales in comparison to that. I must add, though, 

that the Russians who also share a border, have been a heavy contributor in this regard. 

Mr. KEATING. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona Mr. Salmon. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Some say that North Korea may be less likely to selling nuclear 

weapons or weapon qualities of fissile material than nuclear technology or less sensitive equipment to other countries in part because it needs its limited fissile material for its own deterrent. 

Some believe that is possible. I am not sure that that is something 

I believe, but I want to throw that out there. 

However, that the North might find a nuclear weapons or fissile 

material transfer more feasible if its stockpile is large enough or 

it faces an extreme economic crisis with a potentially huge revenue 

from such a sale could help the country survive. So my question is, 

what is the current estimate of North Korea’s stockpile and how 

satisfied are they with what they have? Anybody have any ideas 

on that? 

Ms. Rosett. 

Ms. ROSETT. China gave that estimate that by next year they 

could have 40 nuclear warheads. They had enough for that. We 

also know from sources, such as David Albright’s think tank here 

in Washington, ISIS, not the terrorist group, that the size that can 

be seen of the uranium enrichment plant at the Yongbyon Nuclear 

Complex has at least doubled since they unveiled it in 2010. Remember that they denied even having that for years. Finally, then, 

displayed it to an American nuclear physicist. Now it has been expanding. U.S. officials suspect there are additional hidden facilities. 

So it is quite substantial. And if I may also just address the different plutonium and uranium tracks. The reason that North 

Korea began with plutonium is the Soviets built them a reactor 

which they then disregarded the NPT on, and they had spent fuel 

which the Agreed Framework let them keep. Meanwhile, in the 

1990s, they were also hosting A.Q. Khan of Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan 

network, of which Iran was a member as well. So they actually 

pursued both tracks from the beginning. And this is just what you 

have seen Iran doing. You can argue that the Arak heavy-water reactor is now going to be filled up with cement, but you have seen 

the two countries, actually as quickly as they could each in their 

own way, pursuing these. And from China’s estimates, from estimates we have had in past years, from the signs of activity, you 

have to consider that North Korea probably has a substantial 

73

quantity and you need to ask the following question: What for? 

How many nuclear warheads could North Korea use before it was 

hit? So anything extra you are seeing is for what? Bragging rights? 

For sale? One more thing, danger of bragging rights. This isn’t 

about protecting your country. This is about sustaining your regime 

for both Iran and North Korea. That is what these weapons are for. 

And that is why they are going to go after them. It is not—Iran, 

if this is all about a commercial and nuclear program for Iran, this 

has been the most elaborate windup in human history to a civilian 

power project. Okay. And no, what they want are the weapons. 

North Korea has been going after them. I would look at China’s estimates with some suspicion. It is China. But when China is saying 

to American nuclear scientists they can have 40 warheads by next 

year, you should be concerned. 

Mr. SALMON. Well, I don’t even think the administration is advocating that this is for peaceful nuclear purposes. I mean, this is a 

country that is probably more awash in oil and gas than any other. 

I mean, I think anybody that is naive enough to believe that they 

were actually creating this nuclear program for peaceful purposes 

deserves the award of the month or the award of the year. 

Ms. ROSETT. If I may, in the JCPoA Iran reaffirms that it never 

will—it said it never will seek a nuclear weapon. In other words, 

it lies in the JCPoA. So if you are concerned about cheating, it 

should concern you from the beginning that it includes clear lies 

by the Iranian regime from the get-go. That is—also just one other 

thing, on the procurement networks, North Korea has road mobile 

KN–08 intercontinental ballistic missiles. That is what our military 

has been warning about. They think that these things are actually 

usable. Where did North Korea get the vehicles? They were sold by 

China. The Hubei Sanjiang space vehicle company, and when they 

were caught, because North Korea paraded them in 2012, China 

said, ‘‘Oops, we thought they were for use in logging. We sent them 

thinking they were being used as lumber trucks.’’ I submit to you, 

beware of the similar things going on with Iran, and on the procurement channel, it operates under complete confidentiality. 

If you liked Oil-for-Food, you will love the U.N. procurement, the 

P5+1 procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program. I am not 

even sure Congress will be able to see what is being approved 

through that. Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I see I have run out of time. 

Mr. POE. I recognize the gentleman from California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I just want to note a few things for the record. 

This new deal with Iran is more intrusive than prior deals. Those 

prior deals have prevented Holland from having nuclear weapon. 

Costa Rica doesn’t have the bomb. But as far as stopping Iraq and 

Syria. That was bombing that stopped them from having the bomb. 

Qadhafi thought he was going to be destroyed; turned out he was 

right. South Africa, it was Mandela, and the newly independent 

states gave up their weapons back to Russia because the Russian 

Army wouldn’t have it any other way. 

So it is hard to say that any of the deals we have had have prevented a determined state from getting a nuclear weapon. But 

Costa Rica remains nuclear free. And just because the deal is more 

intrusive than prior deals doesn’t mean it is anywhere close to 

74

being good enough. The IRGC says they are against the deal. If 

Iran was trying to get Congress to go along with the deal, they 

would put out the word that the IRGC was against the deal. So we 

don’t know if that is genuine or for our consumption. We do know 

that everyone in the Israeli Government is against this. The vast 

majority of former officials in the Israeli Government are against 

this. You know, even, we have dissenting opinions in this country 

from the 95 percent view, but only 1 percent of the United States 

Senate is socialist or at least availably so. You get a range of views 

in any democratic country. As I think the chairman pointed out, or 

wrote, it is insane to think that Iran has this nuclear program as 

an efficient way of generating electricity. They are spending billions of dollars on it. They have incurred hundreds of billions of 

dollars, at least tens of billions of dollars, of sanctions to their economy, all so they could generate electricity? This is a country that 

flares its natural gas. So it is free natural gas. They have no other 

use for it. Easiest thing in the world to do is produce a natural gas 

electric generation facility. 

Iran has the means and the motive. The means here is they are going to get their hands on $100 billion. That puts them in, some 

say $56 billion. I think it is considerably more than that. That puts 

them in a position to buy a weapon from either Pakistan or North 

Korea. And they certainly have the motive. Look what happens to 

leaders that get themselves on the American people fear-and-hateyou list, the axis of evil list. Qadhafi is dead. Saddam Hussein is 

dead. Kim Jong-un is alive and well and doing unusual things in 

North Korea because he has nuclear weapons. The Supreme Leader 

has not failed to notice this. 

So the question is, how do we—it is beyond these hearings to 

talk about how to prevent Pakistan from selling nuclear weapons. 

There are two ways to prevent Iran from buying a nuclear weapon 

from North Korea. First, don’t let it have its hands on $56 billion 

to $100 billion. Nobody is going to sell a nuclear weapon for pocket 

change. 

The second would be controls on North Korea. And the question 

is, should we be prepared to keep North Korea off the terrorist list, 

although they deserve to be on it, and even recognize them as a 

nuclear weapon state providing they agree to controls—to observation, not that would prevent them from doing whatever they are 

going to do, just enough to prevent them from selling it to somebody else. 

Mr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, sir, let me, if I may, could I pick up on a 

point that you made earlier, when you were talking about the 

IRGC and sort of, you know, where they come down on——

Mr. SHERMAN. No, because I have got 1 minute. Go ahead. 

Mr. BERMAN. Oh, okay. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Stick to my question. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, in that case, I think it bears noting that what 

you are looking at in both countries is sort of a target of opportunity. 

With regard to Iranian hardliners, they understand——

Mr. SHERMAN. I am asking about North Korea. As long as they 

have nuclear weapons, they might sell them. Could be Iran, could 

75

be somebody else that emerges later. Should we cut a deal with 

North Korea that will prevent them from surreptitious sales of a 

nuclear weapon and should we be prepared to give to North Korea 

recognition as a nuclear weapon state, agreement not to put them 

on the terrorist list or anything else you care to identify——

Mr. BERMAN. I don’t think so, sir, for the simple reason that even 

if the most rosy predictions that you heard this morning at this 

table are true, they have not been proven out over time. And the 

idea that you move directly from a JCPoA with Iran to a JCPoA 

with North Korea stretches——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay, anybody have a contrary view? 

Mr. WALSH. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ms. Rosett. 

Ms. ROSETT. Yes. May I just say, it would not work. That regime, 

the nuclear program in North Korea is so entrenched, so deep, so 

vital, they will not—you will not talk them out of it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I am not asking to talk them out I am talking 

about just letting us watch to make sure they don’t sell. 

Ms. ROSETT. They won’t let you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. They won’t let you do that for anything we could 

deliver. Anybody else disagree? 

Ms. ROSETT. There is a price at which they would make that 

deal. There is always a price. But the price would be such that they 

would emerge from it with yet more nuclear weapons. You would 

buy far worse trouble. They will not make a deal that will let 

you——

Mr. SHERMAN. That will prevent—okay. 

Mr. NIKSCH. We haven’t tried it with North Korea. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And we haven’t even offered them a non-aggression pact. 

Mr. NIKSCH. The Bush administration basically took what was 

then called the proliferation issue off the table in 2008. So when 

North Korea had to issue a disclosure statement about its nuclear 

programs, North Korea did not have to say a word and did not say 

a word about its nuclear activities even in Syria. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me just get in one more comment, and that 

is, unless it is clear that we hold China——

Mr. NIKSCH. So what you are talking about is not——

Mr. SHERMAN. Unless we hold China responsible for what North 

Korea does, given the fact that the existence of the North Korean 

regime is dependent entirely on China, or substantially on China, 

we are going to have to worry an awful lot about what North Korea 

might do in this situation or some other situation. It is China’s 

fault that Kim Jong-un is still there. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Okay. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, 

Mr. Weber, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. I forget which one it was that said there 

has been reporting on the North Korea success Richard Engel and 

Chris Nelson. Was that you, Dr.——

Mr. NIKSCH. Richard Engel of NBC News and Chris Nelson, who 

writes the Daily Nelson Report, that all of us Korean watchers 

read daily. 

76

Mr. WEBER. So you mentioned a date for Richard Engel of April 

3, 2013, but you didn’t——

Mr. NIKSCH. A report on NBC News. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, but you didn’t mention a date on Chris Nelson. You say he writes daily. 

Mr. NIKSCH. It was May 2, 2013. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, and you said that the—now, you also said, I 

think, and I don’t want to put words in your mouth, that this administration—and it is probably not just this one—but has a policy 

of nondisclosure and denials. 

Mr. NIKSCH. This goes back into the Bush administration. Both 

the Bush and Obama administrations have had this policy, both 

with regard to Iranian—North Korean nuclear collaboration——

Mr. WEBER. Got you. 

Mr. NIKSCH [continuing]. And also denials that North Korea has 

been assisting through Iran in supporting Hezbollah and Hamas. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Were you the one that said the Chinese told 

us in February that productions of warheads were increasing, and 

they would have about 40? Or was that——

Ms. ROSETT. That was me. And may I also just say, there is a 

reporter who won a Pulitzer Prize, wrote for the LA Times for 

many years, who wrote on August 4, 2003, that according to his 

sources inside Iran, and with ‘‘foreign intelligence agencies,’’ there 

was evidence—he put this quite clearly—I can give you—send of 

the article—that North Koreas were in Iran developing—working 

on warheads, nuclear warheads with the Iranians. The name of 

that journalist is Douglas Frantz. He was the deputy chief of staff 

for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

Mr. WEBER. Frantz? 

Ms. ROSETT. Frantz, F-r-a-n-t-z. It is in my written statement. 

He was the deputy chief of staff to John Kerry when John Kerry 

was a Senator, and he now works in the State Department in the 

Bureau of Public Affairs. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, so——

Ms. ROSETT. I have tried to interview him about that story and 

have been told he is not available. I would suggest that the Secretary speak with his own long-time trusted former reporter who 

wrote this as a documented fact in 2003. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, great. Great point. You also said, if I think, 

if I heard correctly, that there was a former North Korean Ambassador to the IAEA that set up the procurement channel? 

Ms. ROSETT. Yes, Yun Ho-jin. He is on the U.S. designated list. 

He worked in Vienna. In fact, at one point he showed IAEA inspectors around the North Korea Yongbyon reactor. When the Al-Kibar 

reactor was discovered in Syria, he turned out to be a major procurement agent. He had been buying goods. In other words, North 

Korea was a very full service shop for that operation. They didn’t 

just give them the designs. They helped them buy things worldwide. He had fronts in Europe, in Damascus, in China, and in Beijing. To this day, the administration is so secretive about this; they 

must know things about those transactions. They don’t even give 

the addresses of his companies. 

Mr. WEBER. What was the name of the site in Syria? 

77

Ms. ROSETT. Sure. It was in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province. It was 

near a place called Al-Kibar and the CIA briefing on that, the Bush 

administration was also terribly secretive. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, who discovered that? 

Ms. ROSETT. The Israelis discovered it. 

Mr. WEBER. The Israelis discovered it. 

Ms. ROSETT. They told the United States, and——

Mr. WEBER. Should we fear they have moved to Iran now? 

Ms. ROSETT. I hope they are there looking. The problem is, are 

we listening, and does the public learn? 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Ms. ROSETT. I mean, let me just say one more thing on that Syrian reactor. It was discovered while the U.S. was concluding a nuclear agreement with North Korea, and we were being told——

Mr. WEBER. You mean they were cheating while we were negotiating? 

Ms. ROSETT. Exactly, very likely with Iranian knowledge of the 

whole scene. Okay, the administration should tell us more about 

what we want to know. 

Mr. WEBER. Let me move on. I just wanted the history. 

Ms. ROSETT. While we were being told the reactor was being shut 

down in North Korea, the North Koreans were actively building 

near completion the reactor. 

Mr. WEBER. Got you. I appreciate that. People lie. There is a 

shock. 

So, Dr. Walsh, you mentioned solid fuel versus liquid fuel rockets 

and you mentioned that snapback sanctions did not exist back in—

and this wasn’t your—I don’t know how you said it—your father’s 

agreement or something of that nature. 

Mr. WALSH. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. And so snapback sanctions you believe now do exist, 

and so, in your opinion, in 24 days, if somebody goes in there and 

gets these sanctions back in place—and I think Secretary Kerry 

said that they were within 2 months of possible breakout when 

they started negotiating 2 years ago. So is 24 days of the supposed 

having a discussion over a clandestine site—that is almost a 

month. So if they were close to 2 months, do you, in your opinion, 

do you think snapback sanctions happen fast enough to prevent a 

2-month breakout? Really? 

Mr. WALSH. I appreciate the question because under the Joint 

Comprehensive Agreement, breakout times goes from a couple of 

months, which is today, or it was, you know——

Mr. WEBER. And you don’t think they are cheating while we are 

negotiating? 

Mr. WALSH [continuing]. Sir, to a year. Because we are removing 

98 percent of their enriched material and cutting their centrifuges 

by two-thirds. That is what the agreement does. It extends breakout from a couple of months to a year. On those 24 days, people—

there seems to be confusion about that. If IAEA wants to get into 

a site, Iran blocks them, and then we see trucks pulling up and ferreting stuff away, or they bulldoze the building, that is prima facie 

noncompliance with the agreement. Then the thing kicks in, but we 

have a year breakout period. 

78

Mr. WEBER. You don’t leave any room for underground tunneling 

of any sort where they are actually doing things underground? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, we have environmental sampling. We have 

tunnel monitors. We have——

Mr. WEBER. After they break out in 2 months, it is a little late 

to be worried about——

Mr. WALSH. It is a year breakout, sir. It is a year breakout under 

the comprehensive agreement. 

Mr. WEBER. Yeah, but they already said they were within 2 

months the last time. 

Mr. WALSH. No, prior to the interim agreement, prior to the 

JPOA——

Mr. WEBER. I get that. If you trust that everything they have 

they reveal to us and that we can——

Mr. WALSH. Well, the DNI says that. I am willing to go with the 

DNI. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, 

Mr. Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Rosett, did I say it correctly? 

Ms. ROSETT. That is correct, yes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. We know that both Iran and North Korea 

do use technology from and through China. I am wondering how 

China’s involvement affects the relationship between Iran and 

North Korea, and not only in a material way but if you can, or if 

anybody can, the subtleties through the U.N. in anything that happens. 

Ms. ROSETT. The U.N. is not your friend in this. Remember, it 

was—let’s start with the fact that at United Nations, Iran for the 

past 3 years has chaired the second largest voting block in the 

General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement. The U.N.—the reason I mention Oil-for-Food is that there is considerable disincentive 

for any one state to call out cheating, to do anything else. It is a 

collective problem. And that is exactly what happened with the incredible corruption through Iraq contracts overseen by the U.N. 

This deal sets up a similar mechanism in which things will go 

through the U.N., and it is very hard to get information. 

With respect to China, there is much debate about this. It is my 

view, and I have been covering these areas since the 1980s when 

I worked in Far East. I will just add, I made a trip to North Korea 

in 1991. I didn’t need to go to Iran. There were Iranians on my 

plane in from Beijing to Pyongyang. They are very busy there. I 

have seen it. 

But China, I believe, benefits from the instability that is created 

by North Korea. And if you ask yourself the simple question, ‘‘who 

do North Korea or Iran, for that matter, have an incentive to attack, and who do they have an incentive not to,’’ I would argue that 

they don’t chant, ‘‘Death to Russia,’’ ‘‘Death to China.’’ They chant, 

‘‘Death to America,’’ ‘‘Death to Israel.’’ They are, by character of the 

regime, opposed to free societies. That is not frivolous. And they 

also don’t dare attack Russia or China, who would obliterate 

them——

79

Mr. PERRY. Would Iran use or could they use North Korean territory to test, to store, to—for instance, in the agreement, there is 

a discussion or at least a point of a multiport explosive device. 

Ms. ROSETT. Multipoint detonation, yes. 

Mr. PERRY. Right, for nuclear purposes. Now, I watched the Secretary of Energy today say that would not be allowed, yet in the 

agreement, it says that the Commission will facilitate their use of 

that. Is that something that would be—well, I guess they can do 

it in Iran based on the agreement. 

Ms. ROSETT. They can do it if it is watched and surveyed, but 

it is an excellent question. There is already speculation that Iran 

may have received test data from North Korea’s tests. In testimony 

to this committee last year, former—an Obama administration official Glyn Davies was asked, would the two cooperate, Iran and 

North Korea, on nuclear test data? He said they would have every 

incentive to do so. 

Mr. PERRY. What is Russia’s relationship with North Korea as it 

relates to Iran and this situation with their nuclear, the peaceful 

program? 

Ms. ROSETT. Yeah, Russia has become much, much friendlier 

with North Korea. Russia built the reactor to begin with. Russia 

delights right now in frustrating the United States. Russia 

doesn’t—North Korea is not going to launch a nuclear attack on 

Russia, okay. Russia is very happy with what is happening with 

North Korea right now. 

And may I add, there is considerable reason why Iran might use 

North Korea for a nuclear test site. There is no other country in 

the world in the 21st century that has conducted nuclear tests. It 

is conspicuous when you do that. North Korea has done three. They 

have threatened a fourth since last year. And it would be the best 

way you could possibly hide a test in plain sight. And it is very 

easy. You don’t need Iranians sitting there on the bleachers. All 

you need is a thumb drive to——

Mr. PERRY. Forgive me. 

Dr. Walsh, so I listened to your testimony, which seemed to countervail everybody else on the panel here. 

Mr. WALSH. I am the minority witness. 

Mr. PERRY. But based on what we have heard here, you feel completely comfortable, it is absolutely zero. I think that is what your 

characterization was, zero evidence of collaboration between North 

Korea and Iran? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, on nuclear, that is what the Congressional Research Service says. And as I pointed out, at no point has the DNI, 

the U.N. Panel of Experts for Iran, the U.N. Panel of Experts for 

North Korea, or IAEA ever made that claim. I would encourage you 

all if you have doubts about it, simply call the DNI into a closed 

session and ask. 

Mr. PERRY. Doctor——

Mr. NIKSCH. I wrote for the Congressional Research Service, and 

my report, which I believe you have, ‘‘North Korea Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy,’’ which I wrote and updated from 

2007 to 2012, contains a section on nuclear collaboration with Iran 

and Syria. And if you read that, it goes to the point I made that 

to find out about this, you are not going to hear it from State DeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:36 Sep 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\072815\95694 SHIRL
80

partment or even the U.S. intelligence community for the most 

part. 

Mr. PERRY. Why? 

Mr. NIKSCH. There is a policy—again, going back to the Bush administration—of what I would call issue avoidance and nondisclosure about the Iranian-North Korean relationship. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield. 

Mr. SHERMAN. There is a policy on issue avoidance? 

Mr. NIKSCH. Issue avoidance and nondisclosure. 

Mr. POE. That is a policy? 

Mr. NIKSCH. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that is called the mushroom policy. 

Mr. NIKSCH. The State Department constantly issues statements 

that North Korea is not involved in any state support of terrorist 

groups and therefore should not go back on the official U.S. list of 

terrorism-supporting organizations. But in 2011, Secretary of Defense, then Secretary of Defense Gates, gave a speech in San Francisco——

Mr. POE. Excuse me, Dr. Niksch. The Chair reclaims the time 

with just one question. But your report will be made part of this 

record, without objection. 

Mr. NIKSCH. His speech was a lot different than the denials from 

the State Department. 

Mr. POE. All right, I am going to recognize Mr. Yoho from Florida 

for his 5 minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I will probably come back to you Dr. Niksch in a minute. 

But, first, I want to go to Dr. Walsh. You were saying there is 

no evidence that North Korea has helped Iran, and there is no conclusive evidence according to the DNI, but yet, Mr. Frantz’s article 

and research says that they were over there, they were working in 

2003, and that is the period of time when there is evidence of a 

nuclear trigger detonation maybe. And the IAEA has got a 14-page 

annex, pretty conclusive that there was a major explosion, possibly 

a nuclear trigger device that was backed up by 1,000 pages of documents from Iran. And for you to say that there is no evidence, I 

think there is plenty of evidence out there. 

And then you said we have anywhere, any time, anyplace, and 

I have heard John Kerry say that same thing. And yet we know 

that is not true because it is only time anywhere is if Iran says it 

is okay. And the secret deal that we found out from Tom Cotton 

and Mr. Pompeo, talked that—they brought this to light, and we 

know that through the IAEA, there is an agreement. And it is private between them and Iran, and it is with their permission. And 

you were talking about, we have access to environmental sampling. 

That is not true. The environmental sampling is done by Iran, and, 

you know, as Senator Menendez said today, that would be like having Lance Armstrong pull his own blood sample. I mean, let’s get 

real here. This is a bad deal. And for you to say that this is a good 

deal for America and the rest of the world, I find that disingenuous 

because this administration has backed us into a corner going to 

the U.N. and saying that if we pull out, it is all on us. And I think 

that is bad for us, it is bad for the world. 

81

And with the North Korea deal that was done, Japan and South 

Korea wanted the deal because it affected them very strongly, and 

we went along with that deal. 

On this deal, none of our Middle Eastern partners were there. 

Israel wasn’t there. None of them want it. And we went ahead with 

this. It just doesn’t make any sense. What are your thoughts on—

just on North Korea working with Iran? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, on several different things. On the Frantz report, as I say in my written statement, historically—and I am the 

person here who is, you know, that is what I do in my scholarship 

is look at the nuclear histories in states that start down the path, 

stop and reverse course—media reports have proven incredibly unreliable. I will take the DNI every day of the week. Any time or 

anywhere inspection is in the additional protocol, it has been in the 

additional protocol; it has been exercised. It is not a secret deal. 

Yes, it is confidential. That is normal regular operating procedure 

for the agency. 

This is not the first time they have dealt with this situation. 

When South Africa denuclearized, they went in. It was confidential. 

When the U.S. shows nuclear stuff to the IAEA we don’t give the 

Russian Duma access to that report. For the agency to do its work, 

it has to—which is with sovereign states—it has to maintain confidentiality to be the effective. Bad for the——

Mr. YOHO. I am going to interrupt you though. We pay 25 percent of the budget for the IAEA, and if we are paying that much, 

I want to know the information because we are supposed to vote 

on a deal. And Secretary Kerry said we are going to get briefed on 

it. That doesn’t cut it for me. I want the information, so we can 

make our own decision. 

I am going to go to Dr. Niksch now. 

Do you have any evidence that the missiles you were talking 

about from North Korea or any other military specifically for nuclear weapons, being conducted between Iran and North Korea, do 

you have any information on that for sure, that we know there is 

transfer there or has been in the past? 

Mr. NIKSCH. Certainly with regard to the Nodong intermediaterange missile that I have mentioned. The Shabab-3 missiles that 

Iran produced contain significant components of the North Korean 

Nodong. And North Korea and Iran from, again, numerous reports, 

citing European, German, Israeli defense and intelligence officials, 

that collaboration in trying to improve the Nodong and Shahab-3 

missiles has continued. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Mr. NIKSCH. Every North Korean missile test since 2006 has 

seen, reportedly, Iranian delegations in North Korea to observe 

those tests and undoubtedly get the data from those tests. 

Mr. YOHO. All right, thank you. And I heard John Kerry say this 

multiple times, that you can’t bomb knowledge out of the people. 

And you said that. But you sure dang sure can bomb the will out 

of them, and I am not advocating more, but if we would have negotiated from a power—or position of strength, we would be in a better situation, and I think we would all be safer 5 years from now. 

And this deal will go through, possibly, and when it does, you 

know, it is going to be hanging on somebody’s reputation. You 

82

know, they will either be the next Chamberlain in history, or if 

they are lucky, they will be the next Reagan. See you. 

Mr. POE. I want to thank all of our witnesses. Excellent testimony. I wish we could go on for a longer time, and I appreciate 

your willingness to continue talking about this. 

And, Ms. Rosett, I want to especially thank you for your work 

that you did in the U.N. Oil-for-Food program, the scandal, and revealing that. 

This concludes the hearing of the three subcommittees, and the 

three subcommittees are adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(83)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

84

f


95694n.eps
85

Æ


95694m.eps