Filed 8/17/20 In re D.G. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re D.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 B301091

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00605)

 ORDER MODIFYING 

 OPINION AND DENYING

 PETITION FOR REHEARING

 (NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT) 

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on July 29, 

2020 is modified:

On page 12, the following sentence is deleted:

“And in D.G.’s presence, Father stabbed furniture, 

and broke the mother’s phone.”
2

That sentence is replaced with the following sentence:

Father also stabbed furniture and broke the mother’s 

phone.

This modification does not constitute a change in the 

judgment.

The petition for rehearing filed on August 7, 2020 by 

appellant E.G. is denied.

____________________________________________________________

__

 ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J. BENDIX, J.
Filed 7/29/20 In re D.G. CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re D.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 B301091

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00605)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Steven E. Ipson, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

Lisa A. Raneri, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,

for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Acting 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

E.G. (Father) appeals from the jurisdiction and disposition 

orders declaring his son, D.G., a dependent of the court under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and

(b)(1),

1 and removing D.G. from Father’s custody. Father also

appeals from the permanent restraining order against him.

He contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to grant 

his request for a continuance of the jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing to allow him to retain private counsel and that the court 

should have excluded D.G. from the permanent restraining order. 

We disagree and affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The family consists of Father, the mother, F.G. (the 

mother), their child, D.G. (born in August 2018), and D.G.’s 

half sibling, I.G. (born in 2017).

2 The parents have never 

been married or lived together. For the entirety of Father’s 

relationship with D.G.’s mother, he has been married to another 

woman, and together they have nine children.

On July 11, 2019, the family came to the attention of the 

Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

(DCFS) based on allegations of Father’s ongoing physical abuse 

of the mother while the children were present. The latest abuse 

reported was a June 21, 2019 incident, alleging that Father, a 

former gang member, had punched the mother multiple times 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

2 The children in this case have the same mother but

different fathers. Father is D.G.’s biological father and I.G.’s 

father is A.A. Only Father and D.G. are parties to this appeal.
3

and had threatened to harm her and the maternal grandfather 

if she reported the abuse.

On July 12, 2019, the family law court granted the 

mother an emergency temporary restraining order against 

Father, prohibiting him from any contact with the mother and 

the children.

When interviewed by the DCFS investigator, the mother 

reported that after she obtained the restraining order, she and 

the children left the state because she was afraid that Father 

would find her and retaliate against her. She also disclosed that 

she and Father had been in a relationship for about two years, 

and although he did not live with her, he visited her apartment 

daily. She stated that he was very jealous and had been 

physically and verbally abusive to her throughout their 

relationship. She disclosed that in January 2019 her neighbor 

had called the police after overhearing the mother screaming and 

one of the children crying. Although Father had been abusing 

the mother at the time, when the police responded to the call, the 

mother denied the abuse because she was afraid of Father.

As for the June 21, 2019 incident that resulted in the 

report to DCFS, the mother stated that Father had accused her 

of cheating on him, and he pushed and punched her several 

times in the face and cursed at her. The children were present 

during the incident. The mother did not initially call the police 

after the incident because she was afraid that Father would 

follow through with his threat to hurt the maternal grandfather,

but after the mother observed two-year-old I.G. act out the 

June 21 event by mimicking a punch and pain, she decided to 

report Father. She stated that she planned to seek a permanent 

restraining order against him.
4

The mother’s coworker corroborated that the mother had 

bruises. He also observed that when Father came to the mother’s 

workplace, they would argue, and the coworker stated that 

the mother eventually disclosed the domestic violence in her 

relationship with Father.

When the social worker interviewed Father, he stated that 

he and the mother had problems in their relationship because 

he had refused to leave his marriage. He denied physically 

or verbally abusing the mother or threatening her with harm. 

Father claimed that the mother had issues with jealously and 

that she engaged in self-harm. He denied “domestic violence”

in the relationship with his wife and their children.

On August 22, 2019, DCFS filed a section 300 petition 

on behalf of 12-month-old D.G., as well as his two-year-old 

half sibling, I.G., based on the allegations of Father’s ongoing 

domestic violence against the mother in the children’s presence 

and the mother’s failure to protect them by allowing Father to

have access to the children. The petition further alleged that

Father’s conduct endangered the children’s physical health and

safety and placed them at substantial risk of serious physical

harm. A copy of the July 12, 2019 emergency protective order 

against Father was also attached to the petition.

The parents appeared at the detention hearing on 

August 23, 2019, and the court appointed Father counsel. 

Father’s counsel objected to the child’s detention from Father; 

alternatively, she asked for unmonitored visitation. Father’s 

counsel represented that Father denied any physical abuse in 

the relationship and believed that the mother had inflicted 

the injuries on herself. The court found prima facie evidence 

to detain D.G. from Father and ordered the child released to 
5

the mother. The court ordered that Father have weekly 

monitored visits.

The court also took jurisdiction of the restraining order 

proceedings, and on August 26, 2019, held a hearing on the 

mother’s request for a temporary restraining order against 

Father. Father’s appointed counsel appeared at that hearing, 

opposed the restraining order, and asked the court to exclude 

D.G. from the order. The court, however, granted a temporary 

restraining order (TRO) covering both children and scheduled 

the hearing for a permanent restraining order for September 23, 

2019, the date of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing.

The jurisdiction/disposition report revealed that Father 

had a criminal history including arrests for robbery, a conviction 

for battery and was arrested for inflicting corporal injury on the 

mother on June 21, 2019.

When the dependency investigator re-interviewed the 

mother, she described that Father attempted to control every 

aspect of her life, including how she dressed and with whom 

she interacted. The mother also reported multiple incidents of 

physical violence before and after D.G.’s birth. She disclosed that 

once, while she was holding six-month-old D.G., Father struck 

her in the face causing her to bleed from the mouth. The mother 

further reported that Father “stab[ed]” furniture and broke 

her phone after he learned that it contained photographs of her 

injuries.

Father also was re-interviewed, and he continued to deny 

physically assaulting the mother; he repeated that the mother’s 

injuries were self-inflicted.

On September 23, 2019, the date set for the combined 

jurisdiction, disposition, and restraining order hearings, Father 
6

and his counsel, the mother and her counsel, and counsel for 

DCFS were present. Before the hearing began, Father asked 

to replace his appointed counsel, and the court conducted a 

Marsden3 hearing. At the hearing, Father expressed that he 

was unhappy with his appointed counsel because he did not 

like her advice. The court denied Father’s request, expressing 

that it did not appear that his lawyer had been ineffective or that

the communication between them had broken down.4 Father’s 

counsel then informed the court, “My client is requesting a 

continuance for him to hi[re] private counsel,” without specifying 

how long a continuance he was requesting or providing any other 

information on the subject. The court denied the request, 

commenting that this was the day scheduled for the hearings.

The court then asked all counsel if they were ready to 

proceed, and they all answered in the affirmative. After the 

presentation of the evidence, which consisted solely of DCFS’s 

reports, DCFS and the children’s counsel urged the court to 

sustain the petition and remove D.G. from Father. Father’s 

counsel argued that the court should dismiss the petition, 

pointing to Father’s denials, the absence of evidence of domestic 

violence in his long-term marriage, and the fact that no one 

witnessed the abuse. His counsel also reiterated Father’s 

position that the mother fabricated the domestic violence claims. 

Father’s counsel also asked that the restraining order request be 

denied, and in the alternative, the court not include D.G. as a 

protected person, noting that if the court took jurisdiction, it 

3 See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

4 On appeal, Father has not challenged the trial court’s 

denial of his Marsden request.
7

could protect the child by ordering monitored visitation for 

Father.

The court sustained the section 300 petition under

subdivision (b)(1), declared the children dependents of the court,

and removed custody of D.G. from Father, and ordered that he 

remain placed with the mother. The court also granted a threeyear restraining order that included D.G. as a protected person 

with a carve-out for Father’s monitored visitation.

Father timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Father asserts that the court erred in failing to grant 

a continuance of the hearings to allow him to retain private 

counsel and that the court should have excluded D.G. from 

the permanent restraining order. We disagree. 

A. Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by 

Denying Father’s Request for a Continuance

A juvenile court’s order denying a continuance is reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion. (In re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 

1358, 1366.) The test for abuse of discretion is “ ‘ “ ‘whether the 

trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more 

inferences can reasonably be deducted from the facts, the 

reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for 

that of the trial court.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The abuse 

of discretion standard warrants that [appellate courts] apply 

a very high degree of deference to the decision of the juvenile 

court.” (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 459.)

The jurisdiction hearing on a section 300 petition must be 

held within 30 days of the filing of the petition. (§ 334 [“[u]pon 

the filing of the petition, the clerk of the juvenile court shall 
8

set the same for hearing within 30 days . . . from the date of 

the order of the court directing such detention”]; see also In re 

Daniel S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903, 913–914.)

The court, however, may continue the hearing beyond 

30 days if the continuance is not contrary to the interest 

of the child. (§ 352, subd.(a)(1) [“the court may continue any 

hearing . . . beyond the time limit within which the hearing 

is otherwise required to be held, provided that a continuance 

shall not be granted that is contrary to the interest of the 

minor”].) The hearing may be continued beyond 60 days only 

in exceptional circumstances, but in no case beyond six months. 

(§ 352, subd. (b).)

In considering the child’s interests, the court shall give 

substantial weight to the child’s need for prompt resolution 

of the child’s custody status, the need to provide a child with

a stable environment, and where there is a temporary placement, 

the damage to a child of such a placement. (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).)

Father asserts that he demonstrated good cause for his 

request for a continuance to retain private counsel because such 

counsel was critical to the preservation of his parental rights

and would not have prejudiced D.G. because the child remained

placed with the mother. Although we agree with Father that 

the facts do not show extreme prejudice to the child because 

he remained with his custodial parent, prompt resolution of a 

child’s status is in a child’s best interest, as evidenced by the 

code sections limiting the time period for granting continuances. 

Further, the denial of a continuance may be justified if it would

cause disruption to the proceedings. (See, e.g., In re V.V. (2010)

188 Cal.App.4th 392, 398; see also In re Giovanni F. (2010) 

184 Cal.App.4th 594, 603–604 (Giovanni F.).) That is the case
9

here. Father made his Mardsen motion and request for a

continuance on the date of the hearings without earlier notice 

to the court or the parties. Further, Father was, or should have 

been, aware that his request to replace his counsel might not 

be granted, but made no showing that he had even explored 

retaining private counsel. The inconvenience to all counsel 

in having to return at a later date and again prepare for the 

hearings, as well as the court’s need to manage its calendar 

in an extremely busy court, justified denial.

We find support for our opinion in Giovanni F., where the 

father sought a continuance to substitute his attorney after the 

jurisdictional hearing had begun. The juvenile court “denied 

the request, citing section 352 and noting the [adjudication] had 

commenced, there had been ample time for [the father] to hire 

an attorney and, given [the child]’s age, it would not be in his 

best interests to continue the hearing.” (Giovanni F., supra, 

184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 603–604.) The appellate court held that

refusing a continuance was not abuse of discretion, stressing 

that continuances are discouraged in dependency cases and 

that no continuance may be granted that is contrary to the child’s 

interests. (Id. at p. 604.) Prior to the jurisdictional hearing the 

child was detained with the grandmother and remained placed 

with her afterwards. The court concluded that the child was 

entitled to a timely resolution of his custody status and that

the father waited more than a month from setting this hearing 

to request the substitution of counsel. (Id. at p. 605.)

The factual differences between this case and Giovanni F.

are not legally significant. In both cases the child was living with

a relative and thus would not have suffered serious prejudice 

from a continuance. And although here, unlike in Giovanni F.,
10

the hearings had not yet begun, all parties were present and 

ready to proceed, making the inconvenience to parties and 

court comparable to Giovanni F. Under these circumstances, 

Father has not convinced us that the court abused its discretion 

in denying his request for a continuance.

B. The Court Did Not Err in Including D.G. as a 

Protected Person in the Permanent Restraining 

Order

The dependency court has broad discretion to issue 

restraining orders protecting a dependent child and any caregiver 

during the pendency of a case (§ 213.5, subd. (a)). Issuance of a 

restraining order under section 213.5 does not require evidence 

that the restrained person has previously harmed the child.

(In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) Instead, a court 

may, under section 213.5, issue a restraining order in favor of 

a child if a failure to make the order might jeopardize the safety 

of the child. (In re B.S., supra, at pp. 193–194.)

Courts have applied both substantial evidence and 

abuse of discretion standards of review to restraining orders. 

(In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1466.) On appeal, 

however, there is no practical difference between the two 

standards since “ ‘we view the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the respondent, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable 

inferences to uphold the juvenile court’s determination. If there 

is substantial evidence supporting the order, the court’s issuance 

of the restraining order may not be disturbed.’ ” (Ibid.)

Father argues that including D.G. as a protected person 

in the restraining order was unnecessary because there was 

no evidence that Father would harm the child. We disagree. 
11

Father relies on In re C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355, 

where the court reversed a restraining order against the father,

which included three children (ages 11, 12, and 16), and where

the facts showed that domestic violence did not occur in the

children’s presence. (Id. at p. 357.) Father also relies on

In re N.L., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 1460, where the trial court 

exercised jurisdiction over a six-year-old child based on sustained 

allegations that the mother abused drugs and had made false

allegations that the father had sexually abused the child. (Id. 

at. p. 1462.) The only evidence in the case regarding the mother’s 

possible danger to the child was that she had threatened the 

father. Nonetheless, the trial court granted the father’s request 

for a TRO protecting himself as well the child. The appellate 

court reversed the order protecting the child because there 

was no evidence that the mother had engaged in any violent or 

dangerous conduct toward the child, made any threats of such 

conduct, or that the mother’s violent conduct or threats to the 

father occurred in the child’s presence. (Id. at p. 1469.)

These cases do not persuade us. D.G. is significantly 

younger than the children involved in In re C.Q. and In re N.L.

And, because the children in those cases were older, they could 

summon help if their parents engaged in dangerous or harmful 

behavior. In contrast, D.G. is a preverbal toddler, entirely 

dependent on adults for care. Moreover, unlike the children in 

the cases on which Father relies, D.G. was present when Father 

physically assaulted the mother. Father’s other violent and 

erratic behavior in D.G.’s presence distinguishes this case from 

those cases where the appellate courts have reversed restraining 

orders which included children.
12

Father’s case is more comparable to In re B.S., supra,

172 Cal.App.4th 183, where the court affirmed the inclusion of 

an infant in a restraining order. There, the court concluded that 

the father’s “tendency to resort to violence” and “lack of impulse 

control” posed a risk to the child’s safety even in the mother’s 

absence. (Id. at p. 194.) Although Father argues that he never

harmed or threatened the child, as in In re B.S., “[s]uch a threat

could arise, even in the mother’s absence if the father got angry

with another adult or with [the child].” (Ibid.) Here, Father’s 

lack of impulse control and violent tendencies are shown by his

numerous physical assaults on the mother, including at least

once while she was holding D.G. And in D.G.’s presence, Father

stabbed furniture, and broke the mother’s phone. As in In re

B.S., Father’s lack of control and violent tendencies endangered 

D.G. even absent the mother’s presence. Consequently, the 

juvenile court reasonably concluded that Father jeopardized

the safety of D.G. It therefore did not abuse its discretion in 

including D.G. in the restraining order. 
13

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, J.