### NOT FOR PU BLICA TION

U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L

OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: SHMU EL ERDE, Deb to r. SHMU EL ERDE, A p pellant,

v. C A R O LY N A . DY E,

A p pellee. BA P N o . C C -18-1321-FLS Bk. N o . 2:18-b k-20200-VZ A dv. Pro

. 2:18-ap-01294-VZ

M E M ORA ND U M *

Sub m itted witho ut A rgum ent o n May 23, 2019

Filed – June 6, 2019 A ppeal fro m the U nited States Bankruptcy C o urt fo r the C entral Distric t o f C alifo rnia H o no rab le Vinc ent P. Z u rzo lo , Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 

# FIL ED
JUN 6 2019 SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. BKCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE NI NT H CI RCUI T

*Thi s di sposi ti on i s not appr opr i ate for publi cati on. Although i t may be ci ted for whatev er per suasiv e v alue i t may hav e, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, i t has no pr ecedenti al v alue, see9th Ci r . BAP Rule 8024-1.A ppearanc es: A p pellant Shm uel Erde, pro se, o n b rief; A ppellee C aro lyn A . Dye, pro se, o n b rief.

Befo r e: FA R IS, LA FFERTY, and SPRA K ER , Bankruptcy Judges. INT ROD U CT I ON This is a m eritless appeal. In 1984, chapter 11 1 deb to r Shm uel Erde lo st everything in a failed real estate pro

jec t. In 2001, he b egan a litigatio n c am p aign that inc luded at least six lawsuits in state and federal c o urt, five b ankruptc y c ases, and nineteen adversary pro c eedings in the b ankruptc y c o urt. He has c o llec ted
so m e m o ney in two settlem ents b ut o therwise has b een c o m pletely
unsuc c essful. A ll o f his lawsuits have b een dism issed with prejudic e, his
m o tio ns fo r po st-judgm ent relief have b een denied, and his appeals have failed. C o urts have dec lared hima vexatio us litigant at least fo ur tim es. He has adm itted that, fo r at least part o f that perio d, he was suffering fro ma “severe c o nditio n o f m ental derangem ent.” This appeal arises fro man adversary pro c eeding he c o m m enc ed in his fifth b ankruptcy c a se. He sued C aro lyn A . Dye, the chapter 7 trustee in

1 Unless specifi ed other wi se, all chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S

. C. §§ 101-1532, all “Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder a l Rules of Bankr uptcy Pr ocedur e, and all “Ci v i l Rule” r efer ences ar e the Feder al Rules of Ci v i l Pr ocedur e. 2his third b ankruptcy c ase, alleging that she im pro perly settled a c laimthat

she had ab ando ned to himand failed to pay real pro perty taxes. His c laim s suffer fro m num ero us fatal defec ts: am o ng o ther things, the trustee never settled the ab ando ned c laim, and the taxing autho rity never filed a pro o f o f
c laimfo r the unpaid real pro perty taxes. The b ankruptc y c o u rt dism issed his c laim s with prejudic e and, like several o ther c o urts, dec lared hima vexatio us litigant. The b ankruptcy c o urt was c o rrec t. W e A FFIRM.

FA CT U A L BA CK GROU ND 2 A . Prepetition ev e nts 1. T he dev elopm ent deal In 1983, Mr. Erde and his wife owned an aging b uilding at a prim e lo c a tio n, ac ro ss the street fro mthe University o f C alifo rnia Lo s Angeles. To redevelo p the pro perty, Mr. Erde fo r m ed a partnership with Tim o thy Bo dnar, who o ffered his experienc e develo ping real estate and his extensive financ ial c o ntac ts. Prio r to securing financ ing fo rthe redevelo pm ent pro jec t, Mr. Erde and Mr. Bo dnar ob tained a sho rt-terminterimlo an, b ac ked b y a guaranto r

2 We bor row fr om the bankr uptcy cour t’s detai led r uling and i ts attached copi es of ear l i er r ulin gs di scussing the extensi ve hi stor y of Mr . Er de’s many cases. We also exer c i se our di scr eti on to r ev i ew the bankr uptcy cour t’s docket and the av ai lable publi c r ecor d in Mr
. Er de’s many cases. See Woods & Erickson, LLP v. Leonard (In re AVI, Inc.) , 389 B.R. 721, 725 n.2 (9th Ci r . BAP 2008). 3(Patric k Mo r iarty) and a deed o f trust o n the pro perty, to pay o ff a

m aturing lo an o n the real pro perty. Mr. Erde had topledge the pro p erty, his perso nal residenc e, and several o ther investm ent pro perties as security fo r the interim lo an. Befo re Mr. Bo dnar c o uld arrange a lo ng-term lo an, the interimlo an b ec am e due. Unfo rtunately, Mr. Mo riarty was inso lvent and c o uld no t repay the lo an. A s a result, the lender initiated fo rec lo sure pro c eedings against the pro perty, Mr. Erde’s residenc e, and his investm ent pro p erties. Mr. Erde desperately tried tofind alternative financ ing to pay o ff the interimlo an. But in March 1984, Mr. Bo d nar’s atto rney rec o rded a lis pendens against the pro perty, whic h c lo u ded the title and prevented Mr. Erde fro msecuring alternative financ ing. Mr. Bo dnar then filed a chapter 11 b ankruptc y petitio n o n b ehalf o f the partnership. Mr. Erde lo st any chanc e o f securing financ ing to pay o ff the interim lo an; as a result, he lo st everything. The b ankruptc y c o urt eventually dism issed the partnership’s b ankruptc y c ase. 2. M r. E r de’slitig ation his tory
a. T he 1984 and 1996 bankruptc y c a s e s Mr. Erde initiated perso nal b ankruptc y c ases in 1984 and 1996 in the C entral Distric to f C alifo rnia. The rec o rd do es no t explain the dispo sitio n o f these c ases, and the rec o rds o f tho se c ases are no lo nger readily availab le.

4b. State c ourt litig ation ag ains t M r. Bodnar et al. (2001- 2011) Y ears later, Mr. Mo riarty (who was then serving a federal priso n sentenc e) to ld Mr. Erde that Mr. Bo dnar had kno w n all alo ng that Mr. Mo riarty was inso lvent and c o uld no tho no r his guarantee o f the interimlo an. Sho rtly thereafter, Mr. Erde b egan his unending string o f lawsuits. He first filed suit in A p ril 2001 in the C alifo rnia state c o urt against Mr. Bo dnar, his atto rneys, and o thers (the “2001 State C o u rt A c t io n”). The superio r c o u rt dism issed the c o m plaint with prejudic e, ruling that Mr. Erde’s c laim s were b arred b y the statute o f lim itatio ns b ec ause he knew
o r sho uld have kno wn years earlier o f the wro ngful c o nduc t alleged in the
c o m p laint. Mr. Erde appealed the superio r c o urt’s ruling, b ut the c o urt o f appeal affirm ed the dism issal in Septemb er 2002. In Feb ruary 2003, Mr. Erde filed a lawsuit nearly identic a l to the 2001 State C o urt A c tio n against the sam e defendants (Mr. Bo d nar, his atto rneys, and o thers) in the federal distric t c o u rt. The distric t c o urt dism issed Mr. Erde’s c o m plaint with prejudic e, and Mr. Erde appealed the dismissal to the N inth C irc uit. The N inth C irc uit affirm ed, ho lding that Mr. Erde was attem p ting to relitigate the sam e c laim s he b ro ught against the sam e parties in a prio r ac t io n. Then, in O c t ob er 2005, Mr. Erde filed in state c o u rt a c o m plaint fo r
5dec larato ry relief o n b ehalf o f the partnership against so m e o f the sam e

defendants. The superio r c o u rt dism issed the lawsuit o n the gro und that Mr. Erde was a nonlawyer im perm issib ly representing the partnership. In January 2006, Mr. Erde m o ved fo r a new trial in the 2001 State C o urt A c tio n, even tho ugh the c o urt o f appeal had affirm ed the dism issal in Septemb er 2002. The superio r c o urt denied the m o tio n fo r a new trial. In June 2006, Mr. Erde filed ano ther c o m plaint in state c o urt against the sam e defendants (the “2006 State C o urt A c tio n”). He essentially alleged the sam e c auses o f ac tio n that he raised previo usly. The superio r c o urt dism issed Mr. Erde’s c o m plaint with prejudic e, ho lding that the issues had b een litigated and finally determ ined. The c o urt alsono ted that Mr. Erde asserted fac ts that were gro ssly inc o nsistent with his earlier c o m plaints. Mr. Erde again appealed, b ut the c o urt o f appeal affirm ed the superio r c o u rt in A pril 2008. He filed a m o t io n fo r rehearing, whic h the appellate c o urt denied. Mr. Erde returned to the superio r c o urt and filed a m o tio n fo r a new trial. The c o urt no ted that the m o tio n was “no tsub stantively viab le” and denied it. Mr. Erde then filed a m o tio n fo r rec o nsideratio n, which the c o urt denied. Mr. Erde then appealed the superio r c o urt’s denial o f his m o tio n fo r
rec o nsideratio n. The c o urt o f appeal dism issed the appeal and denied a sub sequent petitio n fo r rec o nsideratio n and rehearing.

6In Septemb er 2009, Mr. Erde attempted to resurrec t the 2006 State

C o urt A c tio n b y arguing that he had b een insane (“severe c o nditio n o f
m ental derangem ent”) fo r the prio r three dec ades and thus should b e allo w ed to relitigate all issues. The superio r c o urt denied the m o t io n and granted the defendants’ m o tio n to dec lare Mr. Erde a vexatio us litigant. Mr. Erde appealed the superio r c o urt’s o rder, b ut the c o urt o f appeal affirm ed. He requested that the appellate c o urt “reverse denial o f appeal” and petitio ned to reo pen the appeal, b ut the appellate c o urt denied b o th requests. He then filed a resub m issio n o f petitio n to reinstate appeal, which the c o urt o f appeal denied. He sent a letter perso nally to the presiding judge, and the c o urt warned himno t to c o ntac t it again. Two years later, Mr. Erde returned tothe superio r c o urt to file
suc c essively a m o tio n to strike the vexatio us litigant o rder, a m o tio n fo r a new trial, a m o tio n fo r dec larato ry relief, and a m o tio n to vo id the vexatio us litigant o rder. The superio r c o urt denied all requested relief.

c . T he M oriarty Judg m ents In the m eantim e, Mr. Erde apparently ob t a ined two state c o urt judgm ents against Mr. Mo riarty to taling $450,000 (the “Mo r iarty Judgm ents”) arising fro man unrelated b usiness transac tio n. 3

3 Accor ding to the feder a l di str i ct cour t, i n 1999, Mr . Er de loaned Mr . Mor i ar ty money to suppor t an ener gy pr oj ect. Mr . Mor i ar ty defaulted on the loan, whi ch r esulted in the two money j udgments totali ng $450,000. The r ecor d does not explai n why (continued...) 7d. T he Sing er s tate c ourt laws u it and s ettlem ent

In o r aro und 2007, Mr. Erde and his wife were em b ro iled in two state
c o u rt lawsuits against R ussell Singer, A d ob e O il Develo p m ent C o rp., and Po rt Pro perties, Inc
. (the “Singer Parties”). A s far as we c an tell, Mr. Erde was suing o n c o ntrac t c laim s that Mr. Mo riarty had allegedly assigned to him . The parties eventually entered into a settlem ent agreem ent in whic h the Singer Parties agreed to pay Mr. Erde $100,000 in settlement o f all
c laim s. The release pro vided that the parties “agree no t to pursue their
c laim s c o ntained in the [state c o urt ac t io ns] in any legal ac tio n against each
o ther o r any o ther perso n o rentity arising o r pertaining to the events desc rib ed in said [state c o urt ac tio ns] . . . .”

e. M r. E r de’s2009 bankruptcy c a s e and further proc eeding s ag ains t the Sing er Parties In 2009, Mr. Erde filed a personal chapter 11 petitio n (the “2009 Bankruptcy C ase”). He also initiated sixteen adversary pro c eedings, three o f which were against the Singer Parties. He asserted the sam e c laim s that he had settled with the Singer Parties in 2007 and fo r which he was paid $100,000. The Singer Parties filed a c o u nterc laimagainst Mr. Erde, arguing that his

3 (...continued) Mr . Er de lent substanti al sums to Mr . Mor i a r ty i n 1999 ev en though Mr . Mor i ar ty’s insolv ency in 1984 contr ibuted to Mr . Er de’s financi al tr oubles. 8adversary c o m plaints b reached the 2007 settlem ent agreem ent. The

b ankruptcy c o urt granted the Singer Parties sum m ary judgm ent and denied Mr. Erde’s m o tio n fo r a new trial. The chapter 11 c ase was sub sequently c o nverted to chapter 7 in January 2011, and Ms. Dye was appointed chapter 7 trustee. This put Ms. Dye, as trustee, in c o ntro l o f Mr. Erde’s c laim s against the Singer Parties. This gave the Singer Parties an o ppo rtunity: they had a chanc e to
reso lve Mr. Erde’s c laim s against themwitho ut having to deal direc tly with Mr. Erde. Ms. Dye reached a settlem ent agreem ent with the Singer Parties (the “Singer Settlem ent”), which c alled fo r the Singer Parties to pay the estate $5,000 in exchange fo r dism issal o f the three adversary pro c eedings. The Singer Settlem ent pro vided: The Trustee and the Settling C o unterc laim a nts shall execute a m utual and general release o f c laim s . . . which, inter alia, shall release any and all c laim s which the Deb to rhas b een asserting o r c o uld po s sib ly assert against the Settling C o unterc laim ants, inc luding any and all c laim s arising o u t o f the Deb to r’s alleged status as a credito r o rassignee fro mDefendant Mo riarty. Ms. Dye stated that she b elieved that Mr. Erde’s c laim s against the Singer Parties were “sub stantially witho ut m erit” b ec ause the c o urt had already granted the Singer Parties sum m ary judgm ent. The b ankruptcy c o urt appro ved the c o m pro m ise. Mr. Erde did no t

9o ppo se it, and no o ne appealed the o rder appro ving the agreem ent.

Ho wever, Mr. Erde later filed m o tio ns to am end the Singer Settlem ent, which the b ankruptcy c o u r t denied. Then, Mr. Erde appealed tho se denials to the BA P, essentially arguing the exac tsam e “jurisdic tio nal” argum ents that he raises here. The BA P affirm ed.

f. T he 2012 E rde-D ye Settlem ent Mr. Erde filed an adversary pro c eeding against Ms. Dye fo r “W ro ngful Taking o f Pro perty no t Pro perty o f the Estate.” Ms. Dye filed a separate c o m p laint against himfo r b r each o f fiduc iary duty, unjust enric hm ent, and b reach o f quasi-c o ntrac t; in respo nse, he asserted a
c o u nterc laim against her, alleging “W ro ngful Interferenc e in C o unterc laim ant’s Pro perty.” His c laim s related to Ms. Dye’s allegedly
wro ngful c o nduc t in handling the Singer Settlem ent and Mo riarty Judgm ents. He alleged that she had ab ando ned the Mo riarty Judgm ents to him, 4 yet the Singer Settlem ent released any c laim s that he m ight have against the Singer Parties in c o nnec tio n with the Mo riarty Judgm ents. In 2012, Ms. Dye and Mr. Erde settled b o th adversary pro c eedings (the “Erde-Dye Settlem ent”). Mr. Erde rec eived $10,000 fro mthe b ankruptcy estate, and the parties agreed to dism iss the adversary
c o m p laints and o ther pending c ases related to the Singer Settlem ent. N o

4 The abandonment of the Mor i a r ty Judgments i s di scussed in subsecti on h below. 10o ne appealed the settlem ent o rder. g . Sale of M r. E rde’sproperty and paym ent of real property taxes In N o vemb er 2011, Ms. Dye sought to sell Mr. Erde’s real pro perty lo c a ted in Beverly Hills, C alifo rnia fo r $2,150,000. Her m o t io n pro po sed paym ent o f estim a ted o utstanding c o unty pro perty tax liens fo r the years 2010-2011 ($32,790.98) and 2011-2012 ($14,040.97) and stated that “the Pro perty is b eing so ld free and c lear o f liens, with all liens to attach to pro c eeds . . . .” The c o u r t appro ved the sale o ver Mr. Erde’s obj ec tio n. The sale o rder pro vided that:

3. The sale shall b e free and c lear o f all liens, enc umb ranc es, c laim s, and o ther interests o f any kind whatso ever, . . . exc ept fo r easem ents, c o venants, and taxes no t yet due and o wing whic h the Buyer takes subjec t to [the trustee’s paym ent o f tax liens.] The sale c lo sed o n o r aro u nd Dec emb er 20, 2011, and Ms. Dye later repo rted that she had paid the pro perty taxes fo r the 2010-2011 tax year and the first half o f the 2011-2012 tax year.

h. M r. E r de’sbankruptcy c ourt proc eeding s ag ains t M r. M oriarty In his 2009 Bankruptcy C ase, Mr. Erde alsoinitiated an adversary pro c eeding against Mr. Mo riarty. He c laim ed, am o ng o ther things, that Mr. Mo riarty had fraudulently transferred assets tothe Singer Parties.

11The b ankruptcy c o urt held that Mr. Erde was entitled to enfo rc e the

state c o urt judgm ents against Mr. Mo riarty to taling $450,000 and tolitigate the c laimthat Mr. Mo riarty had fraudulently transferred his assets tothe Singer Parties. 5 The c o urt did no t enter findings o f fac t o r c o nc lusio ns o f law. In January 2011, Mr. Mo riarty and his wife filed fo r chapter 7 b ankruptcy pro tec tio n. A t that tim e, the Mo riarty Judgm ents were pro perty
o f the estate in Mr. Erde’s 2009 Bankruptc y C ase. They c a m e under Ms. Dye’s c o ntro l when Mr. Erde’s c a se was c o nverted to chapter 7. In o rder to regain c o ntro l o f the Mo riarty Judgm ents, Mr. Erde filed a
m o tio n (in Mr. Erde’s 2009 Bankruptcy C ase) to c o m pel the trustee to ab ando n the Mo riarty Judgm ents. The b ankruptc y c o urt granted the
m o tio n in part and o r dered Ms. Dye tofile either a c o m p laint objec ting to the dischargeab ility o f the Mo riarty Judgm ents o r a m o tio n fo r an extensio n
o f tim e to objec t to their dischargeab ility in Mr. Mo riarty’s b ankruptc y c ase. If she did neither b y A pril 21, 2011, the c o u rt wo uld deemthe Mo riarty Judgm ents ab ando ned to Mr. Erde. Ms. Dye o pted to do neither o f these things. Mr. Erde then initiated an adversary pro c eeding in Mr. Mo riarty’s

5 The bankr uptcy cour t held that Mr . Er de was enti tled to pur sue those clai ms but di d not enter j udgment on the clai ms, pr obably because the S inger Par ti es wer e not par ti es to that adv er s ar y pr oceeding. 12Bankruptcy C ase, seeking a determ inatio n that the Mo riarty Judgm ents

were no ndischargeab le. He argued that the c o u rt had already held, in his 2009 Bankruptcy C ase, that the judgm ents were no ndischargeab le. But fo llo wing a trial, the b ankruptc y c o urt ruled that the judgm ents were dischargeab le. The c o urt stated that the earlier judgm ent did no t estab lish that Mr. Mo riarty had c o m m itted fraud o r a willful and m alic io u s injury b ec ause it had nofindings that Mr. Mo riarty did no t intend to repay the lo ans o r intended to c ause injury. Mr. Erde unsuc c essfully m o ved fo r a new trial. He then appealed to the distric t c o urt, b u t the distric t c o urt affirm ed.

i. T he 2012 m otion to reopen the partners hip’s 1984 bankruptcy c as e and appeal In O c t ob er 2012, Mr. Erde filed a m o tio n in the b ankruptc y c o urt to
reo pen the partnership’s 1984 b ankruptc y c a se and asso c iated adversary pro c eedings against Mr. Bo dnar and his atto rneys. The b ankruptc y c o urt denied the m o tio n, telling Mr. Erde that the issues in his c ase had b een repeatedly litigated in state c o urt. Mr. Erde filed a m o tio n to alter o r am end the 1984 o rder dism issing the partnership’s b ankruptcy c ase, which the c o urt denied. He then appealed the c o u r t’s dec isio n, b ut the distric t c o urt affirm ed and denied Mr. Erde’s sub s equent m o tio n fo rrec o nsideratio n. Mr. Erde filed a request fo r leave to file a m o tio n fo rsanc t io ns against

13Mr. Bo dnar’s atto rneys. The distric t c o urt denied his request. Mr. Erde filed

ano ther m o tio n to am end the final judgm ent and a request torefer the
m atter to the United States A tto rney fo r c rim inal investigatio n. Sho rtly thereafter, Mr. Bo dnar’s atto rneys filed a m o tio n to dec lare Mr. Erde a vexatio us litigant. The distric t c o urt denied Mr. Erde’s m o tio ns and dec lared hima vexatio us litigant. It required himto seek perm issio n b efo re filing any further do c u m ents related to his dispute with Mr. Bo dnar’s atto rneys o ver the develo pm ent deal.

j. T he 2014 bankruptcy c as e Mr. Erde filed a chapter 13 petitio n in June 2014. He vo luntarily dism issed it a few weeks later. B. M r. E rde’s2018 bankruptcy c a s e and the pres ent adv ers ary proc eeding Mr. Erde initiated his fifth b ankruptc y c ase in 2018 (the “2018 Bankruptcy C ase”) b y filing a c hapter 11 petitio n pro se. Mr. Erde c o m m enc ed an adversary pro c eeding against Ms. Dye, arguing that she im pro perly released the Mo riarty Judgm ents in the Singer Settlem ent during the 2009 Bankruptcy C ase after they had b een ab ando ned to him

. He requested that the b ankruptc y c o urt invalidate the Singer Settlem ent and require Ms. Dye topay him$600,000 plus interest, the alleged fac e value o f the Mo riarty Judgm ents.

14Mr. Erde filed a first am ended c o m plaint c o ntaining an additio nal

c laimthat Ms. Dye had failed topay pro perty taxes o n Mr. Erde’s Beverly Hills real pro perty, whic h resulted in the Lo s Angeles C o unty Treasurer & Tax C o llec to r filing a $6,556.69 claimin the 2018 Bankruptcy C ase fo r unpaid taxes in the 2011-2012 fisc al year. 1. T he m otion to dis m is s Ms. Dye filed a m o tio n to dism iss the adversary c o m p laint with prejudic e under C ivil Rule 12(b )(6) (“Mo t io n to Dism iss”). She c o ntended that the c o m plaint was frivo lo us and intended to harass her. Ms. Dye argued that Mr. Erde imperm issib ly c o m m enc ed the adversary pro c eeding witho ut perm issio n o f the c o urt and that she had im m unity fo r all o f her ac tio ns in her c apac ity as a chapter 7 trustee. S ee Ba rto n v. Ba rbo ur

, 104 U .S. 126 (1881); Bennett v. W i llia m s , 892 F.2d 822 (9th C ir. 1989). She c o ntended that Mr. Erde was m erely seeking to relitigate c laim s that were previo usly reso lved in the Erde-Dye Settlem ent. She argued that she did no t settle the Mo r iarty Judgm ents: “all the Trustee settled with Singer were c laim s the estate c o uld have asserted against R ussell Singer in his c apac ity as an alleged assignee o f Mo riarty.” She no ted that the b ankruptcy c o urt in Mr. Mo riarty’s c ase had ruled that Mr. Erde’s judgm ents against Mr. Mo riarty were dischargeab le, so the judgm ents
were wo rthless regardless o f the Singer Settlem ent.

15W ith regard to the pro perty tax c laim, Ms. Dye argued that the

pro perty tax was assessed three years after the 2009 Bankruptc y C ase was filed, she had no no tic e o f the o u tstanding tax, and the c o unty did no t file a pro o f o f c laimin the 2009 Bankruptcy C ase. She further argued that all o f Mr. Erde’s c laim s were b a rred b y the statute o f lim itatio ns. 2. T he v exatious litig ant m otion Ms. Dye alsofiled a m o tio n fo ran award o f sanc tio ns under C ivil Rule 11 and todec lare Mr. Erde a vexatio us litigant (“Vexatio us Litigant Mo tio n”). She po inted o ut that Mr. Erde had b een dec lared a vexatio us litigant previo usly and that his c laim s were m eritless. A dditio nally, she argued that Mr. Erde had released all claim s against Ms. Dye pursuant to the Erde-Dye Settlem ent, fo rwhich he rec eived $10,000. The o rder appro ving that settlem ent had b een “final” fo r o ver eight years. Ms. Dye requested that the b ankruptc y c o u rt sanc tio n Mr. Erde in the
am o u nt o f $12,771. 3. M r. E r de’soppos ition to the M otion to D is m is s and V exatious L itig ant M otion Mr. Erde o ppo s ed b o th m o tio ns. He essentially repeated his argum ent that Ms. Dye “did no t have jurisdic tio n to sell the Mo r iarty Judgm ents after

they were ab ando ned b y o r der o f the Bankruptc y C o urt.” He c o ntended that any prio r vexatio u s litigant ruling was irrelevant,

16b ec ause no ne o f themc o nc erned c ases invo lving Ms. Dye.

He stated that he was no t a vexatio us litigant, arguing that he c anno t b e held in c o ntem pt fo r disob eying a “vo id o rder issued b y a c o u rt witho ut jurisdic tio n.” He also argued that his c laim s were m erito rio us. Finally, Mr. Erde repeated his assertio n that Ms. Dye failed topay pro perty taxes o n his Beverly Hills real pro perty, whic h was under her
c o ntro l after the 2009 Bankruptcy C ase was c o nverted to chapter 7. 4. T he bankruptcy c ourt’s ruling The b ankruptcy c o urt issued separate o rders granting the Mo tio n to Dism iss (“Dism issal O rder”) and the Vexatio us Litigant Mo t io n (“Vexatio u s Litigant O rder”) and issued ac c o m panying findings o f fac t and
c o nc lusio ns o f law (“Findings and C o nc lusio ns”). R egarding the Mo tio n to Dism iss, the b ankruptc y c o urt rejec ted Ms. Dye’s pro c edural argum ent that Mr. Erde needed to seek leave o f c o urt b efo r e filing suit against her, b ec ause such leave is o nly required to sue a trustee in a fo rumo ther than the o ne in whic h the trustee was appo inted. Sim ilarly, it also rejec ted Ms. Dye’s po sitio n that the c o urt sho uld dism iss the c o m p laint b ec ause Mr. Erde was previously dec lared a vexatio us litigant when pro secu t ing the sam e c laim s; tho se earlier c ases did no t invo lve Ms. Dye o r the b ankruptc y c o urt. The c o urt still fo und num ero us reaso ns todism iss the adversary pro c eeding. It held that the o riginal c o m plaint failed to c o m ply with the

17pleading requirem ents o f C ivil Rule 8(a). A d d itio nally, the c o urt agreed

with Ms. Dye that the o r iginal c o m plaint and am ended c o m plaint failed to state a c laimfo rrelief under C ivil Ru le 12(b )(6). It held that the c laim s in the o riginal c o m plaint were the sam e as tho se litigated and settled in the 2009 Bankruptcy C ase, such that they were b arred b y issue and c laim prec lusio n. The c o urt alsoheld that Ms. Dye had im m u nity fro mliab ility under the c irc um stanc es, b ec ause she did no t vio late her duties and did no t take any ac tio n that was no t appro ved b y the c o urt. The c o urt ruled that the c laim s were b arred b y the statute o f lim itatio ns. It agreed with Ms. Dye that the alleged wro ngful ac ts o c c urred in 2011 (o r, at the latest, when the 2009 Bankruptcy C ase was c lo sed in 2013), soMr. Erde’s c laim s in 2018 were b eyo nd the fo u r-year statute o f lim itatio ns. R egarding the tax c laim, the b ankruptc y c o urt no ted that Mr. Erde did no t dispute Ms. Dye’s argument that she had no kno wledge o f the 2011-2012 pro perty tax c laim . It alsono ted that, under the sale o rder, it was the b uyer’s ob ligatio n to pay taxes no t yet due and o wing. The c o urt next addressed the Vexatio us Litigant Mo t io n. It fo und that Ms. Dye had estab lished the requisite elem ents to dec lare Mr. Erde a vexatio us litigant under Mo l sk i v. Evergreen D yna sty Co rp. , 500 F.3d 1047 (9th C ir. 2007), b ec a use: (1) Ms. Dye filed a m o tio n, and Mr. Erde had an
o ppo rtunity to b e heard; (2) the rec o rds o f Mr. Erde’s ac tio ns in the

18superio r c o u rt, distric t c o urt, and b ankruptc y c o urt sho w that his ac tivities

were num ero us and ab usive and that his cu rrent ac tio ns appear to fo llo w the sam e pattern; (3) his ac tio ns were frivo lo us o r harassing; and (4) the vexatio us litigant restric tio ns were tailo red to fit the parties and c laim s. The
c o u rt held that the third pro ng was satisfied under S a fir v. U.S . Lines, Inc. , 792 F.2d 19 (2d C ir. 1986), b ec ause: (a) Mr. Erde had dem o nstrated a histo ry
o f duplic ative and vexatio us lawsuits; (b ) he had no objec tive, go o d-faith expec tatio n o f prevailing against Ms. Dye b ec ause his c laim s were b arred b y issue and c laimprec lusio n; and (c ) his ac tio ns fo rc ed Ms. Dye toexpend tim e and m o ney defending herself, when she c o uld have b een serving
c lients; and (d) o ther sanc tio ns were previo u sly ineffec tive at deterring Mr. Erde’s vexatio us c o nduc t. The Vexatio us Litigant O rder held that Mr. Erde was a vexatious litigant and pro hib ited himfro mfiling any c laimagainst Ms. Dye in any b ankruptcy c o urt. It alsoawarded Ms. Dye m o netary sanc tio ns in her requested am o unt o f $12,771. Half o f the am o unt ($6,385.50) was due im m ediately, while the sec o nd half was due o nly if Mr. Erde vio lated the rest o f the o r der. 6

6 Ms. Dye r epr esents that Mr . Er de has not pai d the sancti on awar d. S ubsequently, the bankr uptcy cour t di smi s sed Mr . Er de’s 2018 Bankr uptcy Case and declar ed hi m a v exati ous li ti gant as to all pr i or par ti es in all bankr uptcy cases. Mr . Er de r emains undeter red. He has sin ce fi led a moti on for declar ator y j udgment, two moti ons to di squali fy Judge Zur zolo, an obj ecti on to the cour t’s ev i dence, a r equest to stay entr y (continued...) 195. T he notic e of appeal

Mr. Erde tim ely filed a no tic e o f appeal. He stated that he was appealing the “O r der granting Defendant’s Mo tio n to Dism iss the C o m plaint against her, and granting Defendant’s Mo t io n dec laring Defendant a Vexatio u s Litigant.” Ho wever, he attached to the no tic e o f appeal o nly the Vexatio us Litigant O rder. O n the sam e day, he filed
ano ther do c um ent listing sixteen issues o n appeal that largely c o nc erned the c o urt’s jurisdictio n o ver ab ando ned estate pro p erty and the trustee’s liab ility fo r m alfeasanc e. Two m o nths later, prio r to filing his o pening b rief o n appeal, he filed with the BA P a “N o tic e o f Errata.” He stated that, due to“inadvertent
erro r,” he did no t attach the Dism issal O rder o r the Findings and C o nc lusio ns to the o r iginal no t ic e o f appeal. He attached all three do c um ents to the “N o tic e o f Errata.” JU RISD ICT ION The b ankruptcy c o urt had jurisdic tio n pursuant to28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(1). Ms. Dye argues that Mr. Erde’s no tic e o f appeal was faulty b ec ause he failed to attach a c o py o f the Dism issal O rder. Therefo re, she argues that we have jurisdic tio n to review o nly the Vexatio u s Litigant O r der, no t the

6 (...continued) of or der, and a moti on to alter or amend j u dgment. 20Dism issal O rder. W e disagree.

When c o nsidering a defec tive no tic e o f appeal, the Suprem e C o urt and N inth C irc uit have c a utio ned “that the requirem ents o f the rules o f pro c edure sho uld b e lib erally c o nstrued and that ‘m ere tec hnic a lities’ sho uld no t stand in the way o f c o nsideratio n o f a c ase o n its m erits.” Le v. Astrue, 558 F.3d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (c itatio ns o m itted). Even if an
o rder “do es no t appear o n the fac e o f the no tic e o f appeal,” we are to
c o nsider: “(1) whetherthe intent to appeal a spec ificjudgm ent c an b e fairly inferred and (2) whether the appellee was prejudic ed b y the m istake.” Id. at 1022-23 (quo ting Lo lli v. C ty. o f O ra nge, 351 F.3d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 2003)). “In determ ining whether intent and prejudic e are present, we c o nsider first, whether the affec ted party had no tic e o f the issue o n appeal; and, sec o nd, whether the affec ted party had an o ppo rtunity to fully b rief the issue.” Id. at 1023 (quo ting Meeha n v. C ty. o f L.A. , 856 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1988) (quo tatio n m arks o m itted)). Ms. Dye c o ntends that Mr. Erde’s failure toattach a c o py o f the Dism issal O rder to the no tic e o f appeal m eans that we c anno t c o nsider any appeal fro mthat o rder. She c ites m ultiple c a ses fo r the general pro p o sitio n that Mr. Erde needed to tim ely file a no tic e o f appeal and that failure todo
so divests this Panel o f jurisdic tio n. But Ms. Dye is inc o rrec t when she
c laim s that “[t]he Dism issal O rder was no t c ited, o r referenc ed in any way
o r attached” to the no tic e o f appeal. While it is true that Mr. Erde did no t

21attach a c o py o f the Dism issal O rder, his tim ely no tic e o f appeal c learly

stated that he was appealing fro mthe “O rder granting Defendant’s Mo tio n to Dism iss the C o m plaint against her, and granting Defendant’s Mo tio n dec laring Defendant a Vexatio us Litigant.” His intent to appeal was apparent fro mthe fac e o f the no tic e o f appeal. Mo reo ver, his statem ent o f issues o n appeal, filed the sam e day, inc luded num ero us issues relating to the Dism issal O rder. It is ob vio us that he intended to appeal fro mthe Dism issal O rder. Mr. Erde’s no tic e o f appeal was suffic ient to info rm Ms. Dye o f the o rders that Mr. Erde wished toappeal. Furtherm o re, altho ugh we do no t c o ndo ne Mr. Erde’s “errata,” he sub m itted the Dism issal O rder b efo re he filed his o pening b rief. Ms. Dye knew o f the issues o n appeal well b efo r e she filed her answering b rief, and she was no t prejudic ed b y Mr. Erde’s initial failure toattach the Dism issal O rder to the no tic e o f appeal. A c c o rdingly, we have jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . § 158 toc o nsider b o th the Dism issal O rder and the Vexatio u s Litigant O r der. ISSU E Whether the b a nkruptcy c o urt erred in dism issing Mr. Erde’s adversary pro c eeding and dec laring hima vexatio us litigant. ST A ND A RD S OF RE V IE W “W e review de no vo the b a nkruptc y c o u rt’s o rder dism issing a
c o m p laint under C ivil Rule 12(b )(6).” T ra cht Gut, LLC

v. C ty. o f L.A.

22Trea surer & Ta xCo llecto r (In re Tra cht Gut, LLC) , 503 B.R . 804, 810 (9th C ir. BA P 2014), a

f f’d, 836 F.3d 1146 (9th C ir. 2016) (c iting A E ex rel. H e rna ndezv. C ty. o f Tula re, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012)). “De no vo review requires that we c o nsider a m atter anew, as if no dec isio n had b een m ade previo usly.” F ra ncis v. W a l la ce (In re Fra ncis) , 505 B.R . 914, 917 (9th C ir. BA P 2014) (c itatio ns o m itted). W e review fo r an ab u s e o f disc retio n the b ankruptc y c o u rt’s dec isio n to dec lare a party a vexatio us litigant. R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt v. C ty. o f L.A. , 761 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014) (c iting Mo lsk i, 500 F.3d at 1056). We also review the b ankruptcy c o urt’s im po sitio n o f sanc t io ns fo r an ab use o f disc retio n. M iller v. C

a rdina le (In re D eville) , 280 B.R . 483, 492 (9th C ir. BA P 2002), a ff’d , 361 F.3d 539 (9th C ir. 2004) (c iting Ca ldwell v. U nified C apita l Co rp. (In re R a inbo w Maga z ine, Inc.) , 77 F.3d 278, 283 (9th Cir. 1996)). W e apply a two -part test to determ ine whether the b ankruptc y c o urt ab used its disc retio n. United S ta tes v. Hinks o n , 585 F.3d 1247, 1261-62 (9th C ir. 2009) (en b anc ). First, we c o nsider de no vo whether the b ankruptc y
c o u rt applied the c o rrec t legal standard tothe relief requested. Id. Then, we review the b ankruptcy c o urt’s fac tual findings fo r c lear erro r. Id. at 1262. W e m ust affirm the b ankruptcy c o urt’s fac tual findings unless we c o nc lude that they are illo gic al, im plausib le, o rwitho u t suppo rt in inferenc es that
m ay b e drawn fro mthe fac t s in the rec o rd. Id.

23D ISCU SSION

A . T he bankruptcy c ourt did not err in dis m is s ingthe adv ers ary proc eeding . Mr. Erde’s prim ary argum ent o n appeal is that the b ankruptc y c o urt lac ked jurisdic t io n in the 2009 Bankruptcy C ase to appro ve a c o m pro m ise
o f the Mo riarty Judgm ents, so it erred when it dism issed his adversary pro c eeding in the 2018 Bankruptcy C a se. W e rejec t all o f his c o ntentio ns. C ivil Rule 12(b )(6), m ade applic ab le in adversary pro c eedings b y Rule 7012, pro vides fo r dism issal if the plaintiff fails “to state a c laimupo n which relief c an b e granted[.]” C ivil Rule 12(b )(6). The c o u rt “must also
c o nstrue the c o m p laint in the light m o st favo rab le to the plaintiff, and m ust
ac c ept all well-pleaded fac tual allegatio ns as true.” Ba rnes v. Belice (In re Belice) , 461 B.R . 564, 573 (9th C ir. BA P 2011) (c itatio ns o m itted). “ARule 12(b )(6) dism issal m ay b e b ased o n either a ‘lac k o f a
c o gnizab le legal theo ry’ o r ‘the ab senc e o f suffic ient fac ts alleged under a
c o gnizab le legal theo ry.’” Id. (c itatio ns o m itted). “In prac tic e, a c o m plaint
. . . must c o ntain either direc t o r inferential allegatio ns respec ting all the
m aterial elem ents nec essary to sustain rec o very under so m e viab le legal theo ry.” Id. (c iting Bell Atl. Co rp. v. Two m b ly, 550 U .S. 544, 562 (2007)). 1. M r. E r de’sargum ent that the bankruptcy c ourt “lac ked juris dic tion” to approv e the Sing er Settlem ent is m eritles s . The gist o f Mr. Erde’s m ain argum ent o n appeal is that, o nc e Ms. Dye

24ab ando ned the Mo riarty Judgm ents to himin the 2009 Bankruptcy C ase,

they were no lo nger a part o f his b ankruptc y estate, so Ms. Dye c o uld no t adm inister themand the c o u rt lac ked jurisdic tio n o ver them ; therefo re, the Singer Settlem ent im pro perly released the Mo riarty Judgm ent b ec ause the
c o u rt lac ked jurisdic tio n to appro ve the settlem ent. This argum ent fails.

a. T hes e exac t is s ues hav e been finally dec ided. The b ankruptcy c o urt held that the c laim s in the o riginal c o m plaint were fully litigated during earlier adversary pro c eedings, such that they are b arred b y c laimand issue prec lusio n. The b ankruptc y c o urt is c o rrec t. Under C alifo rnia law, c laimprec lusio n “prevents relitigatio n o f the
sam e c a use o f ac tio n in a sec o nd suit b etween the sam e parties o r parties in privity with them .” M

ycogen Co r

p. v. Mo nsa nto Co . , 28 C a l. 4th 888, 896 (2002). C laim prec lusio n requires that: (1) the sec o nd lawsuit must invo lve the sam e “c ause o f ac tio n” as the first lawsuit; (2) the first lawsuit m ust have resulted in a final judgm ent o n the m erits; and (3) the party to b e prec luded must have b een a party, o rin privity with a party, to the first lawsuit. S e e S a n D iegoPo l ice O fficers’ Ass’n v. Sa n D iegoC ity Em ps.’ R et. S ys. , 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2008). C o u rts m ay inquire into fairness and pub licpo lic y b efo re applying the do c trine o f c laimprec lusio n, b ut that inquiry is no t m andato ry. S ee R o berts v. Andrews F a m i ly R evo ca ble Tr. (In re Andrews) , BA P N o . EC–13–1385–JuTaK u, 2014 WL 2547808, at *8 (9th Cir. BA P June 5, 2014), a

ff’d , 668 F. A pp’x 757 (9th C ir. 2016) (c iting K o pp v. Fa ir

25Po litica l Pra ctices Co m m ’n , 11 C al. 4th 607, 620-22 (1995)).

W e agree with the b a nkruptcy c o urt that the c laim s alleged in the
o riginal c o m plaint are the sam e as tho se that Mr. Erde raised in the 2011 adversary pro c eedings (whic h he filed in the 2009 Bankruptcy C ase). His
c laim s were fully adjudic ated when the b ankruptc y c o urt dism issed the
c laim s with prejudic e pursuant tothe Erde-Dye Settlem ent; Mr. Erde agreed to the settlem ent with Ms. Dye and, indeed, rec eived $10,000. It
wo uld b e inequitab le to allo w Mr. Erde toattem pt to relitigate the sam e
c laim s against the sam e party. 7

b. T he s tatute of lim itations has run on M r. E rde’s c laim s . The b ankruptcy c o urt was alsoc o rrec t in ho lding that the statute o f lim itatio ns had run o n Mr. Erde’s c laim s . C alifo rnia has a fo ur-year statute
o f lim itatio ns fo rb reach o f fiduc iary duty. S e eC al. C iv. P. C o de § 343; Y a m a uchi v. Co tterm a n , 84 F. Supp. 3d 993, 1010 (N .D. C a l. 2015) (“[T]he statute o f lim itatio ns fo r b reach o f fiduc iary duty is three years where the gravam en o f the c laimis fraud; o therwise it is fo ur years under the c atchall pro visio n o f C alifo rnia’s C ivil Pro c edure C o de Sec tio n 343(a).”). Mr. Erde agreed to the Erde-Dye Settlem ent, whic h the b ankruptc y c o urt appro ved

7In addi ti on to i ssue and claim pr eclusi on, the r elease and settlement doctr ine i s an independently suffi ci ent basi s to affi r m. See Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. , 389 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Ci r . 2004) (holding that settlement agr eement bar r ed later clai ms cov er ed by the r elease in the settlement agr eement wher e ther e was no in di cati on of “fr a ud, dur ess, fai lur e of infor m ed consent, or any other basi s that would r ender[the settlement agr eement] inv ali d”). 26in A pril 2012. Mr. Erde did no t appeal the o rder appro ving the settlem ent,

and the c ase c lo sed in 2013. He filed his 2018 Bankruptc y C ase m o re than fo ur years after the Singer Settlem ent in 2011, the Erde-Dye Settlem ent in 2012, and the c lo sing o f the 2009 Bankruptcy C ase in 2013. S ee§ 108(a)(2) (extending any unexpired statutes o f lim itatio n until “two years after the
o rder fo rrelief”). Thus, his c laim s were b arred b y the statute o f lim itatio ns.

c . M r. E r de’sc laim s are s ubs tantiv e ly untenable. W e also agree with the b ankruptc y c o urt that Mr. Erde’s arguments lac k any sub s tantive m erit, b ec ause his prem ise is flawed: the Singer Settlem ent did no t dispo se o f the Mo riarty Judgm ents. The Singer Settlem ent o nly pro vided that the Singer Parties and the chapter 7 trustee “shall release any and all c laim s which the Deb to r has b een asserting o r
c o u ld po ssib ly assert against the [Singer Parties], inc luding any and all
c laim s arising o ut o f the Deb to r’s alleged status as a credito r o r assignee fro mDefendant Mo riarty.” In o ther wo rds, Mr. Erde c o uld no lo nger assert
c laim s against the Sing er Parties, inc luding tho se that m a y have arisen o ut
o f the Mo riarty Judgm ents. C o ntrary to Mr. Erde’s assertions, it did not “dispo s e o f” o r “release” the M oriarty Judg m ents, under which Mr. Mo riarty (no t the Singer Parties) was liab le. In any event, as Ms. Dye po ints o ut, the Mo riarty Judgm ents were o f
no value, b ec ause the b ankruptc y c o urt in Mr. Mo riarty’s b ankruptc y c ase had determ ined that they were discharged. Mr. Erde do es no t challenge

27this fac t
. 8

2. M r. E r de’sargum ent that M s . D ye failed to pay property taxes or otherwis e v iolated her dutiesas trus tee is m eritles s . Mr. Erde’s assertion in the first am ended c o m plaint, that Ms. Dye failed to pay the pro perty taxes o n his Beverly Hills pro p erty during the 2009 Bankruptcy C ase, is equally unpersuasive. Mr. Erde im plic itly c o nc edes that the c o unty did no t file a pro o f o f
c laimfo r the taxes in the 2009 Bankruptcy C ase o r raise the issue during the sales pro c ess and that Ms. Dye, the chapter 7 trustee, did no t have any kno wledge o f such a c laim . He also do es no t dispute that the b ankruptcy
c o u rt appro ved o f the trustee’s final ac c o unting and that he did no t raise any objec tio n regarding the taxes. He fails to address the b ankruptc y
c o u rt’s further po int that the sale o f the Beverly Hills pro perty required that the b uyer wo uld b e respo nsib le fo r all taxes no t yet due and o wing. A dditio nally, Mr. Erde fails todispute the c o urt’s ho lding that all o f Ms. Dye’s ac ts were appro ved b y the b a nkruptc y c o urt, soshe is entitled to im m unity fro mliab ility. S ee R ea d v. D uck (In re Ja ck

sen) , 105 B.R . 542, 545 (9th C ir. BA P 1989) (“a trustee o r an o ffic ial ac ting under the autho rity o f the b ankruptcy judge is entitled to derived judic ial im m unity b ec ause he is

8 We need not addr ess the bankr uptcy cour t’s r uling that Mr . Er de’s complaints di d not comply wi th Ci v i lRule 8. 28perfo rm ing an integral part o f the judic ial pro c ess”). 9

B. T he bankruptcy c ourt did not err in determ iningthat M r. E rde was a v exatious litig ant and im pos ing s anc tions . Mr. Erde next c o ntends that the b a nkruptc y c o urt erred in lab eling hima vexatio us litigant b ec ause his c laim s were m erito rio us. W e again disagree. The N inth C irc uit has held that, b efo re c o u rts c an dec lare a litigant vexatio us and im po se pre-filing restric tio ns, they m u st: (1) give litigants no tic e and “an o p po rtunity to o ppo se the o rder b efo r e it [is] entered”; (2) c o m p ile an adequate rec o rd fo r appellate review, inc luding “a listing o f all the c ases and m o tio ns that led the distric tc o urt to c o nc lude that a vexatio us litigant o rder was needed”; (3) m a ke sub stantive findings o f frivo lo usness o r harassm ent; and (4) tailo r the o rder narro wly so as “toc lo sely fit the spec ificvic e enc o u ntered.” R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt, 761 F.3d at 1062 (quo t ing D e Lo ng v. H ennessey , 912 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (9th C ir. 1990)). In evaluating the final two fac to rs, c o urts
m ust c o nsider: (1) the litigant’s histo ry o f litigatio n and in particular whether it entailed vexatio u s, harassing o r duplic ative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s m o tive in pursuing the litigatio n, e.g., do es the litigant have an objec tive go o d faith expec tatio n o f prevailing? ; (3) whether the litigant is represented b y c o unsel; (4) whether

9 Mr
. Er de also ar gues that Ms. Dye has a hi stor y of v i olati ng her duti es as a chapter 7 tr ustee. These ar guments ar e i r r elev ant, as none of the alleged i nstances hav e any bear ing on the pr esent case. 29the litigant has c aused needless expense too ther parties o r has

po sed an unnec essary b urden o n the c o u rts and their perso nnel; and (5) whether o ther sanc tio ns wo uld b e adequate to pro tec t the c o u r ts and o ther parties. Id. (quo ting Mo lsk i, 500 F.3d at 1058). Mr. Erde o nly c hallenges the b ankruptc y c o urt’s Vexatio us Litigant O rder o n the b asis that his c laim s against Ms. Dye are m erito rio u s (i.e., o ne sub -fac to r o f the third fac to r). He c laim s that he “has b een m o tivated b y his go o d faith b elief that his c laim s are m erito rio us” and that “Dye has acted witho ut jurisdic t io n.” A s we discu ss ab o ve, we agree with the b a nkruptc y
c o u rt that his argum ents are all unavailing and m eritless. He do es no t take issue with any o f the b ankruptc y c o urt’s o ther findings o r the reaso nab leness o f the filing restric tio ns o r m o netary
sanc tio ns (which he has no t paid). A c c o rdingly, we find no erro rin the b ankruptcy c o urt’s determ inatio n that Mr. Erde is a vexatio us litigant o r its im po sitio n o f filing restric tio ns and m o netary sanc tio ns. CONCL U SION The b ankruptcy c o urt did no t err in dism issing the adversary pro c eeding and dec laring Mr. Erde to b e a vexatio us litigant. A c c o r dingly, we A FFIRM b o th the Dism issal O rder and the Vexatio us Litigant O rder.

30