COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00011-CR

DAVID STUART SEELYE APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1298254R

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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On November 12, 2012, Appellant David Stuart Seelye pled guilty, 

pursuant to a plea bargain, to the offense of bodily injury to a child. See Tex. 

Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(3) (West Supp. 2015). The trial court placed him on 

five years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision and assessed a $500 

fine. The State subsequently filed a motion to adjudicate guilt. On December 11, 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

2015, Appellant pled true to the allegations in the State’s motion, and the trial 

court sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. That same day, Appellant 

signed written plea admonishments that included a waiver of his right to appeal.

Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The trial court’s certification of 

defendant’s right to appeal states that “defendant has waived the right to appeal.” 

See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). On January 11, 2016, we notified Appellant and 

his appointed counsel by letter about the statement in the trial court’s certification 

and informed them that unless Appellant or any party desiring to continue the 

appeal filed with the court, on or before January 21, 2016, a response showing 

grounds for continuing the appeal, the appeal could be dismissed. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3. 

Appellant filed a response, but it does not show grounds for continuing the 

appeal. Appellant argues that he believes his guilty plea was involuntary due to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition to his response, Appellant filed a 

request to withdraw his notice of appeal from the judgment adjudicating him 

guilty and a corrected notice of appeal stating that he wishes to appeal from “the 

judgment and sentence” entered on November 12, 2012, placing him on 

deferred-adjudication community supervision. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(f).

Dismissal would be required regardless of whether Appellant is attempting 

to appeal the November 12, 2012 deferred-adjudication order or the December 

11, 2015 judgment adjudicating his guilt. The deadline for filing a notice of 

appeal from the November 12, 2012 order expired approximately three years 
3

ago. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a) (stating that in a criminal case, the notice of 

appeal must be filed within thirty days after the trial court enters an appealable 

order or, if a timely motion for new trial is filed, within ninety days after the trial 

court enters an appealable order). Our appellate jurisdiction is triggered through 

a timely filed notice of appeal. Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1996). If a notice of appeal is not timely filed under rule 26.2, we do not 

have jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal and may take no action—

including granting an out-of-time appeal—other than dismissal. Slaton v. State, 

981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Because the corrected notice of 

appeal from the November 12, 2012 order is untimely, we do not have jurisdiction 

to address the merits of an appeal from that order. See id. 

We deny appellant’s request to withdraw his notice of appeal from the 

December 11, 2015 judgment adjudicating guilt. But because Appellant has not

shown grounds for continuing his appeal from this judgment, we dismiss the 

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f). 

PER CURIAM

PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: February 25, 2016