TOWARD A PAX UNIVERSALIS 
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

Newport, Rhode Island 

CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES 

Newport Paper #2 

April 1992 

"The Newport Papers" series is a vehicle for distribution of especially 

llbstantial work of Naval War College academic and research faculty and 

tudents. Papers are drawn generally from manuscripts not scheduled for 

ublication either as articles in the Naval War College Review or as boks 

�om the Naval War College Press but that merit extensive distribution. 

�andidates are considered by an editorial board under the auspices of the 

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resident of the Naval War College. 

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ot necessarily those of the Naval War College or the Department of the 

ravy. 

Correspondence concerning the Newport Papers should be addressed to 

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ermanent distribution should be directed to the Managing Editor, Naval 

Var College Press, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 02841-

010. Telephone 401-841-2236 or DSN 948-2236, and Fax 401-841-3579. 
THE AUTHOR 

Lieutenant Colonel Gary Anderson is a Marine Corps infantry officer 

currently serving as the Marine Corps representative to the Dean of Naval 

Warfare Studies at the Naval War College. He is an honor graduate of the 

Marine Corps Command and Staff College and National Defense 

University's National Security Program. He is also a graduate of the Naval 

War College Continuing Education program and holds a master's degree in 

public administration from Pepperdine University. 

His recent operational assignments include command of the Third Light 

Armored Infantry Battalion and a tour as the operations officer of il MEF 

in Okinawa. He also served as the J-3 for Joint Task Force Sea Angel, the 

1991 humanitarian assistance operation in Bangladesh. Lieutenant Colonel 

Anderson is a colonel-selectee and will attend the Marine Corps War 

College in Quantico, Virginia during the 1992-93 school year. 
ABSTRACT 

The centerpiece of the new U.S. strategy for the "New World Order" is 

strategic reserve called the Crisis Response Force, designed to replace 

lany aspects of our current forward defense. This study examines whether 

strong, standing strategic reserve is appropriate to the American situation 

l the coming decade; it proceeds by comparing the overall strategy with 

ve historic case studies of systems that faced similar problems and opporlnities. The historic models chosen are the Roman Empire (from the fall 

f Carthage to A.D. 69; from A.D. 69 to A.D. 306; and from A.D. 306 until the 

nal collapse); the Byzantine Empire; and the British Empire from Waterloo 

• World War I. The study applies a set of seven criteria to each case and 

(stematically examines the results to fmd pitfalls and mechanisms which 

lay have enduring relevance to a postulated future predicted by the 1991 

'aval War College Global War Game. The study concludes that, as a 

Klssibly extended) transitional stage toward an ideal network of regional 

)alitions, the new national strategy is realistic and effective-except, 

gnificantly. in the Middle East where a "naval bridge" approach should 

� taken. This study was originally prepared as a report for the Strategy and 

ampaign Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War 

ollege (Strategy and Campaign Report 12-91). 
Toward a Pax Universalis 

A Historical Critique of the National 

Military Strategy for the 1990s 

Lieutenant Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps 

P

RESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, defense secretary Richard Cheney, and 

General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have 

advocated a new U.S. strategy in the wake of the collapse of the Warsaw 

Pact and the recently completed "devolution" of the Soviet Union.! The 

president articulated the grand strategic design in his Aspen speech of 2 

August 1990.2 General Powell explained the proposed military framework 

for this grand strategic design in his "chairman's vision" speech on 5 

December 1990.3 

The thrust of the overall concept is that the United States simply will not 

be able to afford a strategy of strong forward defense everywhere, given the 

thirty-percent budget reduction anticipated in the wake of the communist 

strategic collapse.4 The wisdom of such an approach is obvious to observers 

of the military budget debate. The threats we currently face are hard to 

define; we know they lurk there-and we see the chaos in Africa, Lebanon, 

and now in Eastern Europe, posed by problems of governance, ethnic 

hatreds, and religious fundamentalism. However, from a strategic force 

planning perspective, these threats are difficult to translate to a Congress 

and a public hungry for the expected peace dividend. Who, in February of 

1990, would have predicted that we would be at war with Iraq one year later? 

The centerpiece of the Chairman's strategic vision is a strong, mobile, 

strategic reserve designed to replace many aspects of our current forward 

defense with the cheaper and more economical alternative of rapid deployment to a threatened area. Other aspects of the strategy include force 

packages dedicated to the Atlantic and Pacific, independent of the Contingency Force, for forward presence; reduced forward presence and U.S. 

basing overseas; and increased use of U.S. strategic mobility to compensate 

for reduced forward presence.s 

The heavy reliance on a strong strategic reserve, the nucleus of this 

strategy, is a point of controversy. Historian Arther Ferrill contends that the 
development of a strong, mobile reserve was a primary cause of the fall of 

the Roman Empire in the West. 6 Military commentators such as Harry 

Sumers have voiced concern that the reserve contemplated in the new U.S. 

strategy may be too lightly armed to win. Captain Allen L. Tiffany of the 

U.S. Army Reserve writes: "Though the importance of having rapidly 

deployable forces canot be overstated, rapid deployability must take a back 

seat to the intelligent and reasonable design of combat units ... 7 Dr. Mackubin 

Owens echoes that concern and urges an intelligent, sequenced introduction 

of forces into theaters in contingency situations.8 However, this study is not 

designed to comment on the adequacy of the reserve; it is rather to examine 

whether a strong standing strategic reserve is appropriate to our situation in 

the approaching decade. 

To say that the United States should not adopt the system proposed in the 

Chairman's vision because a strong strategic reserve failed the Roman 

Empire would be an unfounded generalization; it would also, however, be 

a mistake to ignore historical experience in examining the merits of the new 

strategy. This study attempts to place the new strategy in a historical context 

by comparing it with five historic case studies of similar problems and 

opportunities. Four of the cases examined are generally considered succeses, and one a failure. All had some degree of success for a considerable 

amount of time. The criteria used in selecting these five particular historical 

security systems were: 

• Each system had no large "superpower" competitor, but faced a 

number of smaller scale and less coherent threats than would be the case in 

bipolar competition. 

• Each system was relatively durable; it had lasted for at least a 

century. 

• Each encompassed a large multinational security system. (A candidate on the scale of Swiss or Swedish models would not have been large 

enough to satisfy the criteria.) 

The objective was to study models of complexity and relative diffuseness 

of threat approximating the challenges and opportunities that will be faced 

by the United States in the post-Cold War era. The models that were chosen 

are: The early Roman Empire (from the destruction of Carthage to A.D. 69), 

the middle Roman Empire (from A.D. 69 to A.D. 306), the late Roman Empire 

(from A.D. 306 to the collapse in A.D. 476), the Byzantine Empire (A.D. 527 

to A.D. 10(0), and the British Empire from Waterloo to World War I. 

Each case study examines several categories relevant to the situation the 

United States will face in the coming decades. These are: the method of 

2 
forward engagement, the type of reserve, the relative closure capability of 

reserve, the degree to which the system being defended depended on the 

periphery of the system for economic well-being, the cost of the security 

system, the balance between the forward-engagement and reserve components, indications and warning, and deterrence. 

The study then draws systemic comparisons and offers some conclusions 

based on those comparisons. The objective in so doing is not to attempt to 

model our own security system on historical experiences that may well have 

been made irelevant now by changed circumstances; rather, it is to fmd 

potential pitfalls and succes

ful mechanisms which may have such enduring 

relevance that they will be useful in a critical and constructive examination 

of our own strategic instruments. The key question in the systemic analysis 

is whether an effective balance-between forward engagement and the 

proposed standing strategic reserve component (represented by the Contingency Force)-can be built into the proposed new strategy. All seven factors 

listed above will influence this attempted balance, but not equally. The 

historic models will give some indication of the weight each factor once had 

in circumstances similar to those that will be encountered by U.S. strategists 

in developing the new strategy. 

To make such as

essments, it has been necessary to postulate the future 

environment in which the new strategy will act. The predictive vehicle 

chosen is the Global War Game played at the Naval War College in July 

1991. This game attempted to look ahead to the "new world order" in the 

next decade. 

The study as a whole attempts to answer these key questions: 

• Will the new strategy accomplish its objectives, that of giving the 

U.S. allies adequate security at an affordable cost with the reduced base 

force as postulated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? 

• Is the system of forward engagement envisioned in the new 

strategy adequate? If not, what can be done to adjust it? 

• Is the strategic reserve postulated in the new strategy adequate? If 

not, what adjustments can be made? 

This study may appear to some to be ethnocentric and perhaps neo-imperialistic. It is not intended to be so. In a speech to the United Nations on 

23 September 1991, President Bush stated plainly that the United States 

does not desire to impose a "Pax Americana" as a new world order. He 

stated, rather, that he was looking for a "Pax Universalis" whereby this 

country will be a partner in seeking a better world.9 

3 
There is a two-fold difficulty inherent in this study. First, for better or for 

worse, the United States is the world's only remaining superpower. There 

is no way to approach the subject without dealing with that reality. Dr. 

Robert Wood of the Naval War College likens this new senior-partner status 

to that of a "Global Marshal" rather than to the older and unpopular analogy 

of the "Global Policeman." He points out that the primary job of the U.S. 

Marshal in the American West was to put together ad hoc coalitions or 

posses to deal with emerging threats.lo General Powell envisions what 

appears to be the U.S. military's effort to position our forces so as best to 

contribute in the future to such efforts, in light of the lessons of the past few 

years. 

A second problem that must be faced in taking a historical perspective 

is that the security systems that have faced circumstances similar to those 

we see today all chose to call themselves "empires." In view of the criteria 

chosen, it would be hard to find historical examples that were not imperial. 

The unfortunate truth is that despite the purest of motives we cannot change 

the circumstances that we inherit. H we can profit from the experiences of 

the Romans and Byzantines, we should do so. In studying them, we may 

well learn to avoid their failures. 

The Early Roman Hegemonic Model 

In his provocative study, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, 

Edward Luttwak describes the early Roman imperial security system as a 

hegemonic empire. II With the destruction of Carthage, Rome became the 

sole "superpower" in the Western world, as it was known during that era. 

She was consequently thrust into the role of guarantor of security. From the 

fall of Carthage onward, Rome developed with nations and tribes on the 

Mediterranean periphery a patchwork system of client relationships that 

placed considerable strategic depth between potential enemies and key 

interests. The clients who provided this depth were allowed considerable 

latitude within this system to act independently as long as their efforts did 

not conflict with vital Roman interests.12 This allowed the Romans to 

exercise crisis management rather than having to garrison the entire 

periphery of the areas they viewed as vital. The system lasted roughly from 

146 B.C. to A.D. 67 and provided an acceptable and affordable degree of 

security. 

4 
Method of Forward Engagement. The Roman strategy of forward engagement during this period was, insofar as pos

ible, to allow the clients to 

handle on their own any low to mid-level threats to economic and social 

stability. If a threat became too great for the cllent to deal wi� the legions 

intervened. 13 Rome maintained garrisons on Roman soil close to the client's 

frontier, and sometimes in the territory of the client, depending on the 

coherence and immediacy of the threat. 14 Notwithstanding, the preferred 

method of dealing with any incursion on the imperial periphery was to allow 

the client to make original contact and then to as the situation. This 

afforded the luxury of considerable economy of force. This ring of surrogates was never fully closed, particularly along the Gennan border where 

competent clients were hard to find. IS Nonetheless, the system did allow the 

Romans to economize elsewhere. 

Type of Reserve. The hegemonic system had no actual standing strategic 

reserve, although as Luttwak points out, localized reserves were available.

I6 

Rome depended on the strategic depth afforded by the clients, backed up by 

neighboring legions in the region, to provide warning adequate to 

redistribute forces to a trouble spot or to raise new legions if warted. 

Luttwak and the noted historian T. Mommsen think the absence of a reserve 

constituted an unacceptable risk, but other commentators such as Arther 

Ferrill feel that the risk was justified by the absence of an enemy capable of 

launching an attack from two strategic directions at once. 17 

Relative Closure Time of Reserve. Because there was no centralized 

standing strategic reserve, an ad hoc reserve had to be constituted if a threat 

arose beyond the joint capabilities of clients and local Roman forces. This 

was generally done by fashioning a reaction force from neighboring regions 

or, in rare cases, by raising entirely new legions.I8 The proces

 was cumbersome, but it did not have to be exercised very often. Commentators who 

normally disagree on the quality of Roman strategy, such as Edward 

Luttwak and Theodore Mommsen, consider this to have ben an unacceptable strategic risk, but others such as Ferrill argue that tacking a superpower 

threat capable of coordinated attacks from several strategic directions, the 

Romans could well afford to take this risk. Ferrill further argues that while 

a reserve is an imperative at the tactical and operational levels of war, it is 

not always appropriate at the strategic level.19 The best evidence for this 

position is that the Romans during this period got along without one. The 

hegemonic system never faced a threat so ominous as to cause the Romans 

of that era to consider seriously creating a strategic reserve. When the 

5 
Flavian emperors shifted to a preclusive system (strong forward defense) 

after A.D. 70, they also did without a reserve. 

Economic Dependence on the Periphery. A primary reason why this 

system served Rome so well during this period was that no truly vital region 

or key interest of the empire was directly exposed to immediate risk in case 

of invasion. This gave the system strategic depth. Egypt, with its vital grain 

supply, was the most remote overseas possesion truly vital to the economic 

well-being of the empire; even it. however, was safely protected by clients 

on the west and east as well as by the strategic depth afforded by the desert 

to the south. 

Cost of the Security System. In terms of manpower and national treasure, 

the hegemonic system was perhaps the most inexpensive of those surveyed 

in this study.20 Of course, this was made posible by the fact that the client 

states were then bearing much of the cost, which would be borne by the 

Roman taxpayer in the middle and late Roman systems.21 The entire empire 

was guarded by an army that seldom exceeded 380,00 troops, only about 

half of whom were fully paid regulars and the rest auxiliaries.22 Although 

there is no record of anyone having actually done so, there were individual 

Romans in that period who could have paid from their personal fortunes the 

entire cost of the Roman contribution to the security system.23 This is a 

circumstance seldom equalled in the history of great empires. 

Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve. Obviously there was 

no such balance because there was no formal standing reserve. Ferrill's view 

that reserves have little efficacy at the strategic level when the threat is not 

strategically coherent appears to be the main principle at work here. 

Indications and Warning. The Romans of this period appear to have 

constructed an excellent intelligence system composed of spies, diplomats, 

and paid informers such as Josephus the turncoat Jewish general. This type 

of intelligence was particularly important in client management. To be sure, 

the intelligence system was not rapid; on occasion the Romans suffered 

strategic surprise, as during the Jewish Revolt. It appears their use of 

Josephus at the time was an attempt to "get inside the heads" of their rebel 

opponents.24 The system appears generally to have worked well enough to 

give the Romans relatively good warning. 

Deterrence. The operation of "armed suasion," the knowledge of what 

Rome was capable of doing if displeased, is described by Luttwak in The 

Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. This concept appears to have been 

used by the Romans as a tool with which to apply a measured threat of 

6 
military power in the diplomatic arena for the purposes of managing clients 

and deterring potential foes.2S 

The Middle Roman Empire and Preclusive Security 

The father of the era of "preclusive security" (as Luttwak calls it) in the 

Roman Empire was the Emperor Vespasian, who began after A.D. 67 the 

process of absorbing the majority of the client states directly into the empire, 

thereby increasing immensely central control of the security system.26 There 

is a great deal of debate among historians as to why the Romans abandoned 

the mesy but successful hegemonic system. Luttwak feels that the soldieremperors may have simply become impatient with the "leisurely" 

diplomatic processes required to manage the c1ients?7 It is also likely that 

Vespasian and his allies in the Senate realized that with the "middleman," 

in the form of client governments, eliminated, Rome's coffers would be 

increased greatly. It is probably safe to asume that no "cost-benefit 

analysis" of any sort was done to ensure that the long-term costs of larger 

armies, fortifications, and direct imperial administration would not eventually outweigh the increased revenue; we will probably never know if one 

was. The reason the Romans abandoned the hegemonic system is probably 

irrelevant to this discusion, but it is significant that the hegemonic empire 

required less outlay of men and money than the preclusive system that will 

now be examined. 

By the reign ofTrajan (about A.D. 101), the empire had stopped expanding 

and had embarked on a deliberate policy of strategic defense, a strategy of 

perimeter protection thoroughly characterized by forward engagement with 

no standing strategic reserve. Like its predecessor, this strategy has ben 

criticized by some for lacking a reserve and by others for fostering a 

"Maginot mentality.,,28 However, it must be noted that the system served 

Rome well for over two hundred years and was never seriously breached in 

a manner threatening the overall security of the empire. 

Method of Forward Engagement. This era was probably the golden age of 

forward engagement. The Romans tenaciously defended every foot of the 

imperial periphery with a series of limes (field fortifications) that included 

watchtowers, blockhouses, great legionary bases, and extensive patrolling.29 Remains of these great fortifications, such as Hadrians's Wall, can 

still be seen today. The legions that maned them came to stay, and they 

became regionalized. Some modem critics feel these legions became too 

7 
regionally oriented.30 However, the legions did have a great impact in 

making the border regions of the empire more Roman in culture and 

economics, which made them easier to govern and more profitable to tax, 

and also rendered them more fertile ground for army recruiting. 31 

Type of Strategic Reserve. Like the hegemonic model, this system had no 

standing strategic reserve but depended on forward engagement and the 

superb combat efficiency of the Roman legions to prevail against even 

numerically superior enemies.32 Although strategically defensive, this system depended on offensive action to win its battles. Romans of this period 

fought from within field fortifications only until they were able to launch a 

decisive counterattack. 33 

Relative Closure Capability of Reserve. Lacking a standing reserve, and 

because any reserve would have to be formed before being dispatched, this 

system had a very por closure capability. However, like the hegemonic 

system, it did not face a coordinated strategic threat that would have 

necesitated such a reserve.34 On those rare occasions when a local debacle 

such as the Parthian War required considerable reinforcement, neighboring 

regions contributed legions to the trouble spot. 3S 

Economic Dependence on Periphery. This is a doubtful area. It is certain 

that the periphery became more important to the empire as the outer 

provinces became more Romanized, but this process was an evolutionary 

one. The emperor Aurelian certainly felt comfortable about giving up Dacia 

(Romania) voluntarily in A.D. 155 as an economy of force measure, but later 

emperors fought fiercely to retain the tax base and recruiting pol that the 

provinces had come to represent.36 We are forced to conclude that the 

resources devoted to the fixed defenses by a succession of emperors were 

not spent lightly, and further that the money was invested to protect 

something deemed very valuable indeed. 

Cost of the Security System. The system of preclusive security was more 

expensive in men and money than the hegemonic system (though less so 

than the strong reserve system that followed it). Added to the cost of 

maintaining a 380,OO-man legionary force was the cost of building and 

maintaining the limes, roadbuilding, and creating provincial bureaucracies 

to replace the deposed client governments.37 There does not appear to have 

ben an accurate method of determining whether the costs outweighed 

benefits. It would appear, considering the system's relative longevity, that 

those in power thought that it was cost-effective. 

Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve. As with the early 

hegemonic system, there is no isue relative balance because there was no 

8 
standing reserve. This should not imply a value judgment, but it does support 

two ideas: that unbalanced systems with sufcient strategic depth, strong 

forward engagement, or a combination of both, can operate succesfully; 

and, that a strong mobile reserve is not necesly required in a security 

system lacking an opponent capable of launching coordinated attacks from 

more than one strategic direction. No inference can be drawn that a strong 

mobile reserve will not work; we can only conclude that a balanced system 

is not a prerequisite in all situations. 

Indications and Warning. It would appear that the strong intelligence 

proces of the hegemonic system was not significantly diminished during 

this era, but Rome appears to have depended for warning on tactical means 

such as watchtowers, blockhouses, and patrols, augmented by rapid reaction 

systems rather than on more strategic-level human intelligence.38 Systems 

which rely on strong forward defense can accept such shallow warning 

arrangements if there is relatively little danger of strategic attack from 

several directions.39 Thus Luttwak' s criticism of the system is probably not 

relevant. Fortunately for Rome, she did not face a Genghis Khan or a 

Napoleon. 

Deterrence. Roman deterrence remained strong in this era.4O It was certainly 

highly visible, and the Romans had developed an unmistakable record of 

military successes from which they could draw to demonstrate it. Even the 

most unsophisticated barbarian prowling the periphery of the empire could 

see concrete proof of Roman engineering and military excellence in the 

limes, Hadrian's Wall, and other visible manifestations of Roman power 

and competence. Those who tested the system were dealt with harshly. 

The Late Roman System and a Standing Strategic Reserve 

Beginning in the third century A.D., a fundamental change occurred in the 

Roman Empire. The reason for the relative decline of the Roman security 

system during this period, leading ultimately to the collapse of the Roman 

Empire, has been a major cause of debate among historians who have 

specialized in examining the decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire; 

Edward Gibbon, Theodore Mommsen, Hans Delbruck, and Arther Ferrill 

disagree to some extent on this point. Declining population, increasing 

barbarian pressure, and a decline in the state of public morals have all 

received some measure of blame for the collapse of the empire in the West. 

9 
A definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this study and 

may well remain a pennanent subject of controversy. 

One fact, however, remains clear: beging with the reigns of Diocletian 

and Constantine the Great, the empire developed a strong, mobile strategic 

reserve as the primary means of ensuring security. The system evolved 

gradually, first attempting a balanced combination of forward engagement 

and reserve, then producing a system that relied primarily on the strategic 

reserve.41 The reasons given for the decline of forward engagement structure 

are varied, but the decline itself is irfutably documented.42 

Ferrill argues strongly that the root cause of this change was not a more 

dangerous external threat but an attempt by the autocratic emperors of the 

period to protect the central seat of power. As the reserve became increasingly stronger and more elite, the perimeter security force became more like 

a local militia.43 It also became increasingly barbarian." Luttwak claims 

that to some extent barbarians were invited, in a hollow imitation of the 

hegemonic client system.4S Delbruck is inclined to think they forced their 

way in.46 Whatever the cause, forward engagement declined slowly but 

inexorably. 

This decline resulted in a situation where barbarian incursions meant the 

immediate los of territory on the imperial periphery until a counterattack 

could be mounted.47 Increasingly, however, the quality of the reserve itself 

also declined; this decline was not as precipitous as that of the border troops, 

but it meant that imperial forces began to fail in their counterattacks. Thus, 

large chunks of the empire were lost forever.48 Worse, these peripheral 

regions had become the primary recruiting territory for the legions; the 

effects of their loses were not only cumulative but exponential. 49 This 

meant that the decline began to pick up momentum, because each Roman 

loss was a disproportionate enhancement to the various barbarian entities 

encroaching on the empire . .50 Despite heroic efforts on the part of several 

talented and energetic individuals, the empire was dead by A.D. 476. 

Method of Forward Engagement. We can be sure that Constantine the 

Great and his immediate succesrs did not deliberately set out to create a 

system that would destroy the empire; the change to a mobile reserve 

(actually begun by Diocletian) was a reaction to the strife that had preceded 

his ascension to the purple. After fighting a great civil war to preserve 

control of the empire, Constantine created a standing reserve specifically to 

ensure his hold on power, not to undennine the system of forward engagement.S

l The subsequent decline of forward engagement was a classic 

example of the law of unintended consequences. The decline was evolution10 
ary, and in the East it was ultimately ar

ted. Ferrill strongly argues that 

the barbarization of the army exacerbated this decline both on the periphery 

and eventually in the reserve itself as well:S2 Eventually, the border any 

became a mere collection of ragtag militias and barbarian federate mercenaries (the term federate, or foederati, denotes barbarian mercenaries 

fighting for Rome but under the control of their own officers) of doubtful 

quality and of increasingly doubtful loyalty.53 

Type of Reserve. Although Diocletian was rust to use a strong strategic 

reserve, it was Constantine who began the proces of institutionalizing it. 54 

The reserve began as a cavalry-dominated entity that nonetheles relied to 

some extent on disciplined infantry formations. 55 As the years wore on, this 

reserve became even more cavalry-oriented and increasingly Germanic.56 

As tactics began to revert to a more Gothic model (of relatively undisciplined heavy cavalry), the Romans lost much of the traditional tactical 

advantage they had enjoyed against the more numerous barbarian hosts. 

This meant that likelihood of Roman tactical succes was reduced by the 

fifth century; where it had once be

n nearly certain, it was now problematica1.57 As it evolved, the Roman security system needed a reserve that could 

quickly move to a threatened area and defeat an incursion-or failing that, 

at least conduct a successful counterattack to recover lost ground.58 In 

actuality, the system in its later years proved incapable of doing either with 

any consistency.59 

Relative Closure Capability 0/ Reserve. This aspect of Roman security had 

not changed appreciably from the time of the early empire. It still took 

approximately two months to march from Rome to Cologne.60 Even the 

switch to cavalry-heavy formations did not appreciably spe strategic 

mobility, because the army could move no faster than its trains. Transport 

by sea was generally faster than by land (to areas on the periphery that were 

accessible by sea), but it remained very risky due to the vagaries of 

Mediterranean weather. 61 This is an important point because the system 

depended on rapid closure to make up for its growing lack of a strong 

forward component and its increasingly inadequate strategic depth. Rome 

had become dependent on a rapid-deployment strategy that simply could 

not do the job. 

There is an irony here. Luttwak points out that the Romans lacked the 

modem means of rapid deployment available to us today and speculates that 

they might have done things differently if given that advantage. However, 

as noted, the Romans usually required at least sixty days to march their 

strategic reserve to the closest point on the periphery-Cologne; the players 

11 
in the 1991 Naval War College Global War Game (about which more later) 

found that (setting aside Maritime Prepositioned Force asts) it would take 

a U.S.-based strategic reserve about that same sixty days to get to the Middle 

East with enough sustainment to be credible. Today, it still takes about sixty 

days to get the real combat power of the contingency force to a theater except 

for the Maritime Prepositioning Force. It sems that one pays a price for 

technological improvements in combat power: one's forces become heavier 

and les mobile. 

It is important not to draw hasty conclusions here. If this Roman system 

had pos

 adequate strategic depth, or an adequate means for warning, 

it probably would have been much more effective in the long run. Thus we 

cannot infer from this case that standing strategic reserves without a strong 

mechanism for forward engagement are inherently bad; we can only observe 

that they were bad in this particular situation. We can also observe that any 

system that depends strongly on a standing strategic reserve allows the 

quality and combat capability of that reserve to decline only at great peril 

to its security. 

Economic Dependence on the Periphery. By A.D. 200, Rome had come to 

depend on the outer provinces as a primary source of resources and 

economic strength.62 As is the case with our own economy today, many vital 

resources were located in exposed positions on the periphery of the security 

system. This dependence meant that Rome had strategic depth only in the 

sense that the imperial center was protected from peripheral threats; each 

loss on the periphery made the system weaker. However, the primary 

concern of the autocratic and centralized imperial center was the preservation of the power base of the emperor; protecting the periphery was of 

secondary concern. As a result, ironically, the system ate the talented pig of 

the fable, "one leg at a time ... 63 

Cost of the Security System. One of the pitfalls of trying to compare the 

strategic reserve of the late Roman Empire to the presently proposed 

American system is that whereas the Chairman envisions a system that 

would be cost-effective, the late Roman reserve was designed more to 

protect the emperor from internal devils than from the barbarians at the 

proverbial gate.64 Cost, therefore, was not a major consideration for the later 

Roman Empire. This is exemplified in the words of the Emperor Septimus 

Severus to his sons, "Be united, enrich the soldiers, scorn the rest...65 Preston 

and Wise show that this was done with a vengeance. In addition, as they 

point out, a caste system was created to ensure the availability of revenueproducing skills and military manpower for a security system that grew 

12 
increasingly more expensive in its later years.66 This meant that succes

ive 

generations were locked involuntarily into hereditary occupations. This act 

of economic desperation not only failed to cure the empire's economic woes 

in the long run, but also helped set the scene for the curse of feudal serfdom. 

Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve. The decline of the 

Roman system of forward engagement in comparison with the strategic 

reserve is one the few points on which the majority of historians agree. 

Because the decline of the forward engagement system is important in 

comparing the proposed U.S. system with the late Roman model, we will 

use the words of the historians themselves to describe the state of balance. 

Delbruck comments, "Now, however, the emperors could not get along 

without relatively large bodies of troops readily available even if in so doing 

they weakened the borders and sacrificed them to the incursions of the 

barbarians ... 67 Ferrill writes, "Over the course of a century after 

Constantine's change in Roman grand strategy, the frontier troops turned 

into a ragtag local militia, while the reserve troops did all the fighting . .,68 

Luttwak also admits to the late Roman system's lack of balance: .. It is 

apparent that reductions made in the provincial forces that guarded the 

frontiers in order to strengthen the regular field armies would always serve 

to provide security for imperial power, but they must have degraded the 

day-to-day security of the common people . .. 69 

Indications and Warning. As the system of forward engagement declined, 

so did that for intelligence. As an example, at Adrianople in A.D. 378, Valens 

thought he was facing only 10,00 Visigoths; the enemy force actually 

numbered many more than that. Worse still, the Romans had no idea of the 

actual disposition of the enemy. This was a far cry from the days of Scipio 

Africanus. Marius, and Caesar, when the proper preparation of terrain for 

an entire campaign was considered a high art form.7o With the exception of 

an occasional talented individual such as Aetius, who used his personal 

knowledge --of the Huns (gained as a hostage) to splendid advantage at 

Chalons, Roman strategic and tactical intelligence appears to have declined 

alanningly.71 Lacking effective strategic depth, the Roman system needed 

very timely warning. What it got was not effective enough in the late years 

of the empire. 

Deterrence. Roman deterrence had formerly been a function of reputation 

and visible presence. By the fifth century, both had declined disastrously, 

until the humiliating situation in A.D. 452 when all that stood between Rome 

and the Huns was the Pope. Roman legions were now a parody of their 

former selves and were legions in name only. 72 They were not to be seen on 

13 
the periphery; worse still, when they did amve there, they often lost to their 

adversaries. This decline was slow at first, but as Ferrill documents, a 

"snowball effect" ocur as the concept of suasion effectively evaporated 

in the last decades of the empire. 

The Byzantine System: A Balanced Model 

The Byzantine system eventually became what the late Roman system 

was originaly designed to be: a balanced argement that had as its core 

a strong strategic reserve complemented by strong and supple means of 

forward engagement. Both the late Roman system in the West and the 

Byzantine system were fathered by Constantine, but where the system of 

forward engagement broke down in the Western empire, it flourished in the 

East. 

Due largely to the reforms of the Emperor Maurice, the Eastern or 

Byzantine empire developed a concept of forward engagement based on the 

hardy peasant militia of her provinces combined with a superb cadre of 

profesional soldiers and field fortifications. The mobile strategic reserve, 

a heavy cavalry fonnation, moved quickly to reinforce when neces; as 

often as not, however, the forward-based forces alone could handle low to 

mid-level incursions. The mobile reserve was certainly effective, but it was 

first and foremost a means of ensuring the survival of the centralized 

autocratic dynasty in Constantinople.73 

The Byzantine system proved to be one of the most resilient in history, 

lasting esntially intact for five hundred years. Even after the economic 

and social collapse after A.D. 10, some semblance of empire lasted until 

the fifteenth century. This knack for survival merits the Byzantine system 

special attention. 

Method of Forward Engagement. Like the contemporary late Roman 

Empire, the Byzantine Empire lacked strategic depth; unlike its sister 

system, the Byzantine model developed, after the reign of the emperor 

Justinian, a healthy system for forward engagement and forward defense. 

"Ultimately, by granting tax relief to serving soldiers and plots of land on 

discharge, the state succeeded in recruiting the entire anny rank and file 

from the dependable inhabitants within its borders ... 74 A strong peasant 

militia augmented the regular units within each theme (military district), 

resulting in a military system defended largely by natives fighting for hearth 

14 
and home. A strong chain of fortifications gave the corps as well as the 

populace, in each theme, a series of protected rallying points. 

The theme system was strong enough to repel minor incursions, and it 

almost invariably blunted and slowed even major invasions enough to give 

the strategic reserve time to reinforce or counterattack. This meant that for 

at least a half-millennium, the empire was relatively untroubled by the los 

of key economic territory on the periphery, which had dogged the Roman 

Empire in its later years. To be sure, this problem eventually caught up with 

the Byzantine Empire as it decayed from within, but this did not occur until 

five centuries after its Roman sister-system in the West had coUapsed.7S 

Another key factor of the Byzantine system was its use of diplomacy. 

The threats that faced the Byzantine Empire became ever more coherent as 

the years went by. Eventually, she even faced another "superpower" in the 

rising empire of Islam. Constantinople was not above bribing an enemy, as 

an economy-of-force measure, while addresing a separate foe on another 

flank.76 Edward Gibbon castigates the Byzantines for this seemingly unmanly conduct, but this was not a matter of appeasement for the sake of 

weakness; it was an expedient meant to retain the latitude to focus efforts 

where they were needed most.

77 The Byzantines rarely allowed anyone, 

once bought, to renege on the arrangement.78 

The Byzantine navy, on the seaward flank, was also a key part of the 

system of forward defense. Using a combination of tactics and advanced 

technology such as Greek fire, the Byzantine fleet ensured the empire's 

superiority at sea.79 The Byzantine navy was originally a power-projection 

organization with sea «ontrol accruing gratuitously due to the absence of 

organized naval resistance. This changed with the rise of the fleets of the 

Vandals and later of Islam. At that point, the Byzantines applied the same 

professionalism to the problems of gaining and maintaining sea control that 

they showed in land warfare. 

Type of Reserve. The Byzantine mobile reserve was a superb cavalry 

organization famous for its horse archers. This mobile, hard-hitting force 

ensured the security of the imperial court against potential mutiny in the 

themes, but also carried out the function of a strategic reserve for the 

imperial periphery. It was a capable military organization devoted to the 

study of the art and science of war.80 Officers appear to have ben rotated 

to service in different provincial themes often enough to ensure that they 

did not develop loyalties to regional leaders who could pose a threat to the 

emperor.81 

15 
The entire Byzantine an

y reflected an approach toward the study of war 

unparalleled until the ninetenth century. Their military texts, such as Leo's 

Tactica andArs Militaira by Maurice, remain military clasics to this day. 

The Byzantines were capable of thorough and accurate strategic estimates 

and operated a superb "lesns learned" system, as exemplified by this 

pasge by Belisarius: "I found that the chief difference between the Goths 

and us was that our own Roman horse and Hunshfoederati (mercenaries) 

are all expert horse bowmen .... Their bowmen on foot are always drawn 

up to the rear. So their horsemen are no good till the battle comes to close 

quarters, and can easily be shot down while standing in battle array before 

the moment of contact arrives. "

8

2 

This studious approach to war permeates Byzantine history. The reserve 

appears to have ben the hub of the professional education system, but it is 

also apparent that service with the provincial themes was a prerequisite for 

advancement.83 This would help mitigate the type of decline of the Byzantine forward engagement system which would plague the late Roman 

system. 

Relative Closure Time of Reserve. The Byzantine ability to bring up its 

reserve to points on the imperial periphery was not technically greater than 

that of the late Roman model, although the Byzantine reserve appears to 

have ben somewhat more mobile than the Roman, due to an improvement 

in logistics trains.84 It is hard to compare this system to the Roman model 

in this regard because the Byzantine Empire did not have a large body of 

water in its center as did the Romans. The Mediterranean Sea vastly 

complicated the Roman problem of maintaining communications and 

strategic transport. This made the Byzantine problem of mobility an easier 

one than that faced by Rome. In any case, the Byzantine model was far more 

able than the late Roman system to get its strategic reserve to the frontier, 

because the forward themes were able to buy the time necessary before vital 

territory and resources were lost. 

Economic Dependence on the Periphery. The Byzantine Empire was 

highly dependent on its periphery for manpower, food, and other resources; 

it could not afford to trade space for time.85 It was this knowledge that kept 

the forward-engagement component strong. The empire was fortunate here 

in that it was a mature security system. The dwellers on the imperial 

periphery valued their status as citizens of the empire and, for the most part, 

were willing to contribute to its defense.86 This made the management of 

the security system a corporate effort rather than a problem left only to the 

emperor, as it became in the West. The Eastern empire never fell prey to the 

16 
temptation to which Theodosius had sur

ndered in allowing federate status 

to the Gennan barbarians; that is, that he allowed the barbarians to be 

Romans when it was found useful to identify them as such. However, he 

had no means to compel their loyalty. Even though it made judicious use of 

mercenaries, the Eastern empire never became so dependent on them that 

they called the tune or controlled vital portions of the imperial marches. 

Thus. with a few notable exceptions. vital economic areas remained well 

protected for the five hundred years during which the system remained 

intact. 

Cost of the Security System. The system was probably comparable in cost 

to that of the middle Roman Empire. The standing army was undoubtedly 

expensive. as were the navy and the fortifications. This was mitigated by 

the extensive use of militia in the themes. The high quality and enthusiasm 

of these citizen soldiers were ensured by the many palpable threats that faced 

the empire. The militia knew they were defending their homes and family 

against a very real menace. Therefore, they were willing to put up with the 

rigors of periodic military training as a hedge against the disastrous alternative of invasion.87 Consequently, the cost of se(;urity was relatively high, 

but bearable. 

Indications and Warning. The Byzantine security system was one of the 

best in this respect that the world has ever sen. An organized series of spies, 

military observation, and diplomatic contacts kept a careful eye on enemies 

and friends alike.88 The impressive forward-based forces gave effective 

warning at the operational and tactical level to complement strategic intelligence efforts. The Byzantine system of forward engagement made it les

 

dependent on warning than was the late Roman system, but nevertheles the 

Eastern empire took every advantage of the earliest posible indications. 

Deterrence. The Byzantine Empire's leaders had a superb grasp of the 

political-military requirements for deterrence. They knew the value of 

power politics both domestically and in foreign afairs. They were not above 

terror, psychological operations, or bribery to gain vital national objectives. 

They understood long before Clausewitz that war is a political act, and they 

knew how to make themselves feared. The Byzantine's strategy after the 

reign of Justinian called for them never to start an unproductive war or let 

an enemy who had started one escape unscared. 

17 
The British Empire from Waterloo to World War I As 

A Maritime Model 

Thus far the study bas not examined a system with truly global responsibilities. The reason is simple: of the great security systems that have come 

and gone since the time of Columbus, only the British Empire after the fall 

of Napoleon meets the thre given criteria as replicating the strategic 

conditions the United States wil face in the post-Cold War world. This is 

particularly true with respect to the absence of a great superpower competitor. Spain, Portugal, Holland, and France all faced great powers in their 

quest for worldwide empire; as often as not, that competitor was England. 

Even after 1814, the British faced superpower competition in Europe. The 

British did not choose to play in that league; Britain instead chose to 

dominate the non-European world through unchallenged control of the seas. 

She was able to do so because of agrements reached at the Congress of 

Vienna, where Viscount Castlereagh agreed to accept Metternich's 

European balance of power. In return, Britain got acces to French and 

Spanish overseas holdings that added immeasurably to its overseas empire. 

The Congres of Vienna thereby secured Britain's European flank. Although the British eventually withdrew from the system by refusing to as

ist 

in the suppres

ion of nationalist uprisings, they continued to benefit from 

the mechanisms created by the Congres of Vienna until Bismarck effectively destroyed them in 1871. However, the balance of power Bismarck 

then created acted as effectively in British interests as had the mechanisms 

of the Congres until Bismarck was dismis in 1 890. At that point the 

European flank became much les

 secure.89 Until then, the British took 

advantage of their secure European flank to turn their string of colonies and 

naval bases into a security system unique in history. 

A combination of a small profesional army having vast technological 

superiority over most potential foes with a clever use of indigenous soldiers 

in colonial formations allowed the British to maintain adequate security at 

a very affordable price. This advantage was reinforced by the fact that any 

posible combination of strategic foes would have to deal with the British 

fleet before posing a truly serious threat to the security of the system as a 

whole. This argement worked well for the British until they violated their 

own 

bankrupted 

doctrine by engaging directly in a European war (World War I) that 

the system and called the entire social fabric of British society 

into question. 

18 
I 

I 1 

1 

In addition, rapid technological change required the British to go to the 

great expense of modernizing her fleet to keep ahead of naval upstarts such 

as the Americans, Germans, and Japanese. Britain kept the naval lea� but 

only with difculty. Even without World War I it is unlikely that the British 

would have kept the mantle of sole naval superpower for much longer; the 

winds of nationalism and navalism were blowing hard in nations with 

economic and industrial potential far greater than that of Great Britain. 

The British system lasted only a century, barely long enough to meet the 

hundred-year survival criteria laid down, but it merits consideration for two 

key reasons. First, as noted, it is the only truly global system to meet the 

criteria. Second, it is the only one that faced anything like the kind of 

technological change that our own new system will face in the coming 

decades. 

Method of Forward Engagement. As we do today, the British faced several 

regional challenges. In Europe, their problem was to keep the continental 

powers so preoc

upied with each other that none would have the money or 

inclination to start a naval race or join coalitions to challenge British 

supremacy at sea. The result was that the British concept of forward 

engagement in this era was diplomacy, as a means of sustaining a balance 

of power. The mechanisms of the Congres of Vienna and Bismarck's 

system that replaced it were generally adequate to give the British a fre 

hand elsewhere. The role of the Royal Navy in the system was to isolate 

British colonies and other posions from outside interference. The contribution of the British fleet and the evolution of gunboat diplomacy is well 

documented elsewhere; it is sufficient to say that its ubiquity and reputation 

for effectivenes played a major role in the relative state of global stability 

enjoyed throughout the nineteenth century. 90 

As befitted Britain's place among what Paul Kennedy calls "gunpowder 

empires," the British An maintained throughout the colonial posions 

an effective- -forward presence, supported by its masive technological 

superiority over native threats and insulated by the navy from potential 

European foes.91 The colonial army was not particularly efficient by emerging European standards, but it became an extremely effective to

l for the 

job at hand. It was greatly asisted in this by native regiments led by British 

officers, a cost-effective means to ensure colonial control. The Indian Any, 

led by British officers, allowed a very small British cadre to control a 

teeming native popUlation very effectively. The same model on a smaller 

scale worked elsewhere in the empire as well.92 

19 
This happy situation lasted well past 1870 when the Prus

ians unified 

Gennany and altered the European balance enough to allow them to enter 

into a naval arms race if they so desired. Bismarck had the good sense to 

resist this temptation. His pasing from the scene in 1 890 allowed Kaiser 

Wilhelm, however, to embark upon such a course. This was the beging 

of the end of the Pax Britannica, and the result for Germany would ultimately 

be even more unhappy.

93 

Type of Reserve. As with the early and mid-Roman systems, the British 

imperial model maintained no standing strategic reserve. None was required. Given the lack of coherent threats and also a population that 

mistrusted standing armies as a threat to civil government, the lack of such 

a reserve is hardly surprising. 

Relative Closure Time of Reserve. Again, as with the early and mid-Roman 

models, a reserve would have to be constituted before it was dispatched, 

making for a very unresponsive closure time. This defect was rendered 

relatively moot by the effective system of forward engagement and the 

protection afforded by the navy. To be sure, debacles occurred. The British 

military required 315 days to mount the failed rescue operation to Khartoum 

and a year and a half to react effectively to the Indian Mutiny. 94 As serious 

as these crises were at the time, they probably did not warrant the expense 

and political problems that would have resulted from the establishment of 

a reserve. Both situations were resolved quickly enough not to result in 

permanent damage to the empire. The ad hoc expedient of putting together 

expeditionary forces of warships, Royal Marines, and army units provided 

reaction time good enough for the general level of threat. In the century that 

the system effectively existed, it never lost a colony, and it expanded almost 

continuously until 1914. 

Economic Dependence on the Periphery. The string of colonies, trading 

bases, and dependencies that Britain maintained around the world was, quite 

literally, the imperial economy. The loss of India, Egypt, or South Africa 

would have destroyed the fabric of the interdependent imperial economic 

system.9S Britain was a truly great economic power because of the empire. 

That much of the empire was shed voluntarily, however commendably, does 

not erase the fact that its loss ended Britain's status as a true economic 

superpower. Even though the empire depended economically on the 

periphery, the oceans and the British fleet's control of them insulated the 

colonial system from European competitors and thereby gave the system 

good strategic depth. 

20 
Cost of Security System. This system was relatively inexpensive. Any 

security arangement that relies on a great fleet-in-being will require vast 

sums of money, but the British fleet indispensably protected a maritime 

trade.96 The need to modernize after the onset of the ironclad made the 

system much more expensive in the last fifty years of its existence than in 

the first; overall, it was a relative bargain. 

The army also was extremely inexpensive until very close to World War 

I. Low pay rates for regulars and colonial trops alike, as well as the use of 

wtocratic officers willing to work for little financial compensation, allowed the British to keep defense costs very low for most of the period. 97 

The British Army of the time was no match for a continental foe, nor was 

it meant to be.98 Britain's island status, its naval superiority, and the 

European balance system protected the homeland. The British Army was a 

colonial constabulary on a grand scale, and a cheap one at that. 

Indications and Warning. A security system with good strategic depth and 

adequate provision for forward engagement is not as dependent on early and 

accurate warning as one that lacks these advantages. The British were 

fortunate to pos both in abundance. They were doubly fortunate, because 

their resources for warning were mediocre at best. The British of the 

Victorian era were notoriously suspicious of people in intelligence work, 

and the perfonnance of Britain's intelligence services suffered accordingly.99 Consequently, the British were surprised by the Indian Mutiny, the 

events in Khartoum, and the Boer Rebellion. Fortunately, none of these 

threats were of such a magnitude that they could not be handled by the very 

slow deployment of ad hoc response forces. 

Dete"ence. The deterrent posture of the empire was adequate to ensure the 

security of the system as a whole. The combined strength of the British fleet, 

the colonial anny, and active diplomacy created a synergistic effect of 

deterring revolts of dissatisfied native populations, warning off European 

overseas adventures that would hann British interests, and keeping 

Europeans preoccupied with continental events and therefore less interested 

in overseas projects than might otherwise have been the case. 

Gunboat diplomacy was a political-military innovation that allowed the 

rather ponderous British fleet to exercise a more precise forward function, 

particularly in what we now call "peacetime engagement."UlO Local potentates who did not respect the reasonably light annament of the gunboats 

generally knew that it was backed up by far more fonnidable forces "over 

the horizon." 

21 
This deterrent effect of overall British power did not work in all cases. It 

was particularly weak when religious fanaticism was involved; the Indian 

Mutiny and the Dervish problem are examples. In other cases, such as the 

Boer War, British miscalculation undermined deterrence. lOt Overall however, the deterrent system served the empire well. 

A case can be made that the British Empire was the ftrSt world-clas 

security system to be undone by technology. The development of ironclad 

warships and the maturation of German industry allowed the Kaiser's navy 

to challenge the British in a naval arms race that ultimately caused the British 

to adopt several policies that undermined the existing security system; given 

the Kaiser's ambitions, this was necessary. Britain could not be defended 

by "naval measures alone" from rising German military/naval power. loo 

Probably the most dangerous of these policies in the long run was to become 

so closely aligned with anti-German elements as virtually to ensure British 

continental participation in World War 1. 103 Closely tied to this was the 

reform of the British Army, which allowed the British to contemplate 

seriously full involvement in the coming conflict. This, combined with naval 

modernization, also made the security system much more expensive. In 

today's post-industrial age, the impact of technology on strategy will very 

likely become even greater than it was in the nineteenth century. 

Systemic Comparisons 

This section examines the strategy proposed in General Powell's vision 

for dealing with the new world order in the 1990s and compares it to how 

our historical systems reacted to similar strategic problems and opportunities. This is done in the full realization of the dangers of historical 

parallelism or of a skewed attempt to draw lesons. The purpose here is to 

draw points of relevance and identify any obvious pitfalls that may await us 

in designing our own strategy. 

Figure 1 is a comparison of the proposed national strategy with the 

historical systems previously studied, using the same categories with which 

we examined the historical cases. The new strategy is designed to deal with 

a series of presently incoherent but very real security challenges that will 

arise over time. As in the Naval War College 199 1 Global War Game, the 

Chairman's strategy sees the world from a regional perspective, with each 

region presenting differing potential for crisis in a world of post-Soviet 

"devolution ... 104 Each of our five historical security systems also dealt with 

22 
--'"

".,.".-�.. ..

--_._-

Forward Engagement 

Type of standing reserve 

Relative reserve closure capability 

Economic dependence on 

peripheriy 

Cost of security 

Systemic balance 

Indications and Warning 

Deterrence 

Early 

Roman 

strong 

none 

po 

low 

low 

none 

good 

go 

Mid 

Roman 

strong 

none 

por 

moderate to 

high 

fairly low 

none 

go 

good 

Systemic Comparisons 

Late Byzantine British New U.S. Sttategy 

Roman 

weak strong strong moderate in Europe, moderate in Pacific, 

weak in Midea<it 

strong strong none strong mobile contingency force 

por go

 po

 go

 in Europe & Pacific; moderate in Korea; po

 in Midea<it 

I 

high high high high, particul

ly in Midea<it 

I 

high moderate low lower than Cold War system it replaced 

none high none balanced except in Mi�t 

po go

 fairly po

 

dependen 

moderatey good but technologypo

 good go

 good except in Mi�t 

Figure J. 
regional challenges in the absence of a truly bipolar superpower competitor, 

but none of them faced a fonner competitor who, although much weakened, 

still retained the capability to destroy the remaining superpower as Rusia 

will be able to do for some time to come. This factor may not become a 

day-to-day issue, but it will remain a major consideration in every major 

strategic decision. 

As the players in the 1991 Global War Game found, predicting the world 

situation in the next ten to twenty years will be difficult, given the unprecedented breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. It appears certain 

that the new world order will be less orderly than the one we came to know 

from 1 945 to 1989.105 This study has drawn heavily on the 1 991 Global War 

Game (GWG), less as a predictive model than as a medium for understanding the nature of the world that will face the new strategy as we attempt 

to implement it. The new world order, as nearly 1,200 players and analysts 

in Newport in the summer of 1991 saw it, has several key features. 

• The game postulated the breakup of the Soviet Union into something smaller and much less manageable than the old Soviet state (being 

unaware, of course, of the future-and still inchoate-Commonwealth of 

Independent States) . 

• The players saw the United States as concerned primarily with 

three key regions: Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. They showed 

little interest in Africa, the Asian mainland, or even Latin America except 

insofar as those areas presented issues that threatened vital U.S. interests or 

world economic stability. 

• The Middle East was seen as continuing to be the most volatile 

region as well as the one in which effective U.S. forward presence was most 

problematical. It was also apparent that a deterrent would have to be very 

"visible" to be effective there. 

• Given an opportunity, the players representing the United States 

would have preferred to act through hegemonic regional coalitions to deal 

with security problems, but, due to lingering regional mistrust and traditional hostilities, this did not prove feasible in the foreseeable future outside of 

Europe. The players tasked with designing U.S. strategy saw Nato continuing to provide regional security and stability in Europe and hoped it would 

act as a model for the Pacific and the Middle East in the long run. They held 

out the prospect that the series of bilateral security relationships the U.S. 

has built in the Pacific would evolve into a Nato-like coalition, though 

presumably not within this century. They were much less hopeful about such 

a system evolving satisfactorily in the Middle East. 

24 
• In no region did the players see any viable substitute in the 

immediate future for the presence of the United States as a leader.I06 

If we overlay the new strategy upon this model of the new world order, 

two issues immediately arise. First, as the new strategy acknowledges, we 

will have some of the same regional responsibilities as in the former bipolar 

world, but we will have fewer assets with which to influence events. Second, 

our ability to keep U.S. forces forward deployed will diminish from Cold 

War levels as a result of both economics and a political-military environment wherein nations will be less willing to have U.S. forces deployed on 

their soil than when there was an overarching Soviet threat. With this in 

mind, an examination of the new strategy within the construct of the 

historical case study systems is in order. 

Method of Forward Engagement. The new national military strategy 

envisions a method of forward engagement that "deters forward" but does 

not usually "defend forward" with U.S. forces to the degree that was true in 

the past. I07 This is certainly in keeping with the perceived need to reduce 

the presence of U.S. forces overseas. Figure 2 outlines the general comparative sizes of forward-deployed forces proposed for the two regional theaters. 

Diplomacy and allied forward engagement, along with the strong and 

mobile reserve proposed in the contingency force, would make up for a 

reduction in forward presence under the plan as currently drafted. lOS The 

signed official strategy does not specify the relationship of the contingency 

force commander to any theater commander in chief that he is to support 

once his forces are deployed to the region. 

There is no obvious parallel with any of the historical cases, because a 

different system of forward engagement is currently envisioned for each 

region. In Europe, Nato will probably retain the capability to make the 

Chairman's vision work. In the Pacific, our bilateral defense agreements, 

combined with the strategic depth provided by the Pacific Ocean itself, 

should make the new strategy effective. Korea remains a special case here, 

but a strong U.S. forward presence is still contemplated until Republic of 

Korea forces can become self-reliant enough to justify U.S. reductions. As 

this is one area where we can still expect to "defend forward," defensive 

battlefield success would be required to ensure the time necessary for the 

mobile reserve to play a decisive role. 

As a consequence, our new system of forward engagement is a series of 

mini-systems. In Europe, it most resembles the client-oriented early Roman 

model, with Nato acting as a client on a grand scale. Along the Pacific Rim 

25 
I ATLANTIC FORCES ! 

o Underwrite Security and Vital Interests in Europe, Middle East, and SW A 

o Continuing Commitment to Alliances 

o Continue Forward Presence in Europe, Mediterranean, and Arabian Gulf 

o Project Reinforcements from CONUS 

• High Intensity Environment 

• Primarily Heavy Forces 

• Bulk of Reserves Augment and Support 

Europe 2 Div lCVBG 

SWA 

CONUS 

Army, Navy, USMC, USAF Exercises and Prepositioning 

3-4 Div 5 CVBG MEF 

6 Res Div 

2 Cadre 

I PACIFIC FORCES I 

o Provide Stabilizing Influence in Economically Important Region 

o Continue Forward Presence in Japan and Korea 

o Include Reinforcements from Hawaii, Alaska, and CONUS 

Arnlx Nan � 

Korea 1 Div(-) 

Japan l CVBG 

Hawaii! 1 Div )MEF 

Alaska 

CONUS 5 CVBG 

Figure 2. 

3.6 TFW 

2 TFW 

1 1 Res TFW 

llSAE 

1 -2 TFW 

1 -2 TFW 

TFW 

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy [draft] (Washington: U.S. Govt. 

Print. Off., 30 September 1991). 

it resembles the Byzantine model; it relies strongly on indications and 

warning and strategic depth, as well as on the Seventh Fleet and other Pacific 

Command assets for forward presence. In the special case of Korea, there 

is an attempt at a balance that also closely resembles the Byzantine model. 

26 
In the Middle East however, we have a difficulty. Unlike on the Pacific 

Rim, there is no strategic depth. Worse still, our net of bilateral alliances is 

weaker there than in any other region. Neither is there much chance of 

creating the conditions for a strong forward defense even if we wanted to. 

At present (Autumn 1991) we still have forces deployed in the region as a 

residue from Desert Storm, but this is a short-term deterrence measure, not 

part of a strategy of forward engagement. Unfortunately, the Global War 

Game found the Middle East to be the region where a clear deterrent will 

be most neces, but also the area where it is most difficult to achieve. 100 

Type of Reserve. The new military strategy proposed by the Chairman 

would have a series of forward-engagement strategies that vary by region; 

this is not the case with the envisioned strategic reserve. The new strategy 

has a single strategic reserve (as outlined in Figure 3) to be employed in a 

crisis in any region (albeit in smaller tailored force packages if the situation 

warrants) . This mobile strategic reserve is different in function from that of 

the late Roman and Byzantine models. The U.S. contingency force is 

designed to realize economies in forces and money; it is primarily an attempt 

to do more with less. 

The late Roman and Byzantine reserve concept had a primary mission of 

preserving an autocratic, centralized, power base; their secondary mission 

was to guard the territorial integrity of their respective empires. The late 

Roman model attempted to use barbarian mercenary levies to provide 

perimeter security, with eventually disastrous results. 1 10 Its centralized 

reserve guarded the seat of power first, and counterattacked only after that 

mission was asured. III The Byzantine system was more balanced; it relied 

on a combination of citizen militia and professional cadres to eliminate 

small incursions while delaying and disrupting large ones. The Byzantine 

emperors used mobile cavalry reserves as the decisive hammer to punish 

any invader seriously enough to cause him to consider carefully any further 

adventure. However, it is safe to as

ume that the rulers in Constantinople 

maintained this reserve under their own control in order to ensure that no 

ambitious local strategos (military governor or corps commander) turned 

his regional force into a threat to the imperial throne. 

The reserve created in the new U.S. strategy will face a different security 

system in each of the three major regions. If Nato continues to function 

reasonably well in cooperation with the political and economic framework 

of the European Community, and if the strategic depth afforded by the 

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact remains constant, the reserve should never 

have to be employed in Europe. With the exception of Korea, the same holds 

27 
true in the Pacific Rim, but for different reasons. Unchallenged U.S. naval 

supremacy and the vast distances involved will make it difficult for any 

potential foe to asemble a threat beyond the capability of U.S. forces. If 

U.S. forward presence in Korea remains viable, there should be an adequate 

element of forward engagement in case of North Korean invasion to give 

the strategic reserve time to arrive and counterattack (in a manner reminiscent of the Byzantine system). Accordingly, the mobile contingency reserve 

would enhance our systems of forward engagement in Europe and the 

Pacific Rim, as well as in the special case of Korea. The Middle East is 

another matter altogether. 

The new strategy does not have a standing force designed for the Middle 

East, and it contains no significant means of forward presence capable of 

either deterring aggression or buying time once aggression occurs. Also, the 

region offers virtually no strategic depth. This means that a mobile reserve 

will have to be extraordinarily fast-moving or have an indications and 

warning system bordering on the telepathic if the reserve plan is to be 

effective. Both of these subjects will be discused in later sections, but 

suffice it to say that the effectiveness here of a strong mobile reserve as 

structured in General Powell's vision remains a point of concern. 

Relative Closure Time. The ability of the reserve to arrive in a crisis area 

relatively quickly has generally been a critical element in any security 

system dependent on a strong, mobile reserve. The tenn "relative" is key 

here. In the late Roman system, the reserve remained capable of great 

mobility, but its relative, or effective, mobility declined proportionately with 

the decline of effective forward presence. In the last years of the empire, the 

perimeter of the imperial security system was distressingly close to the 

center. This total lack of strategic depth rendered every loss of territory vital. 

Because there was no effective forward defense, any barbarian incursion 

was by definition initially successful, and every reaction by the reserve was 

a counterattack rather than a reinforcement. Ferrill points out that the 

resulting constant reaction and combat stres had a deleterious effect on the 

anny as a whole. The Byzantine system, by contrast, maintained a satisfactory relative closure capability because of the healthy balance between 

forward engagement and the mobile reserve. Its original strategic depth was 

about the same as the late Roman model (because it had evolved from that 

system) . However, the Byzantines retained an effective and relatively 

inexpensive system of forward defense while the Romans neglected theirs. 

28 
CONTINGENCY FORCES 

The "come-as-you-are" arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable crises, requires fully 

trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly deliverable, largely self-sufficient, and 

spedficaly 

therefore drawn primarily from the active force structure. Our military strategy requires forces 

tailored to this challange. Each service brings unique capabilities to contingency 

forces. The Any contributes airborne, air asult, light infantry, and rapidly deliverable heavy 

forces. 'The Air Force brings its entire range of fighter and bomber forces. Carer-based naval 

air power is an esntial element as is the amphibious combat power of the Marine Corps, 

particularly when acces ashore is contested. 'The unique capabilities of our Special Operations 

Forces are an esntial resource which must be protected, even as we reduce our forces. 

I CONTINGENCY FORCES I 

o Forward Stationed and Deployed An

y. Navy, Marine and Air Forces-plus 

Special Operations Forces 

o Joint National Contingency Forces 

-Can Provide Principal Response or Complement Forward Deployed Forces 

-OPCON to Geographic CINC 

-Faciliates Joint Training and the Development of Joint Doctrine and Tactics 

o Respond to the Unexpected and Unpredictable 

-Mobile, Flexible, Fast, and Lethal 

CINCS ASSIGNED FORCES 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

JOINT NATIONAL CONTINGENCY FORCES 

� � USMC 

4-5 Div Tailored Mix MEF 

These forces will include: 

llSAE 

7TFW 

• Forward stationed and deployed An

y, Navy, Marine, and Air Forces and 

prepositioned equipment and supplies. 

• Special Operations Force units drawn from the Anny, Navy, and Air Force. 

• Joint National Contingency Forces: Our global interests dictate the need to 

preserve and enhance a core of mobile, flexible, highly trained, and ready forces, based in 

the CONUS, that can deploy-and arrive ready to fight-on short notice in response to 

unpredictable future crises. They complement our forward deployed assets; can provide an 

initial response capability where we have no forward deployed forces; can be an additive 

force where we do; facilitate joint training and the development of joint doctrine, tactics, 

techniques, and procedures; and enhance joint force employmnet since these forces will 

routinely train together. 

Figure 3. 

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy [draft] (Washington: U.S. Govt. 

Print. Of., 30 September 1991). 

29 
The key point here is that the new national military strategy has potential 

problems in the Middle East. 1 12 The previously discus

ed lack of forward 

engagement and strategic depth in the Persian Gulf area gives even our most 

agile reserve elements por relative mobility in the strategy as it is curently 

articulated. With the exception of forward deployed amphibious forces and 

the MPF, the United States will be unable to bring credible and sustainable 

ground forces into the region within thirty days of the order to deploy. This 

would be true even under the most optimistic projections for procurement 

of fast sea lift and the C- 17 aircraft. 1 l

3 In other regions, with combinations 

of effective forward engagement, strategic depth, and sea control, this 

closure capability is acceptable; in the Middle East it is not. 

Economic Dependence on Periphery. This concept actually detennines 

strategic depth, because it dictates how much space the system can afford 

to trade for time. A security system may make this tradeoff if it is not 

dependent on the periphery for vital raw materials or food. If that dependence 

exists, the system must develop some means of ensuring the integrity of 

the periphery-by forward engagement, rapid response to threats, or some 

combination thereof. The global system of economic interdependencies that 

the new U.S. strategy will be called upon to defend is a necklace of 

industrialized nations and resource providers with several vital nodes such 

as the Pacific Rim, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States itself. 

Several of these regions have strategic depth in relation to potential threats; 

as outlined earlier, the Pacific Ocean gives the Pacific Rim considerable 

depth. "Depth" today is not so much a matter of distance as of water barriers; 

few states are able to mount a naval expedition large enough to threaten 

seriously island nations such as Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia-at least not 

without a naval construction program which would undoubtedly give sufficient warning to the United States and other actors in the region. This depth 

does not exist in Korea, but we can expect to see a viable enough forward 

defense there to make the new strategy effective. 

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union gives Europe a 

reasonable degree of breathing room; this will allow latitude for designing 

reduced, but effective, forward presence arrangements. Again we see 

problems in the Middle East. The vital Saudi and Kuwaiti oil fields are a 

mere few hours' march from the nearest nations capable of threatening them. 

Lacking a viable forward presence, our alternative is a mobile reserve with 

a relatively short closure time. As discussed earlier, we lack this also. 

In this connection we find a strong cautionary leson in the unhappy fate 

of the late Roman system. In the early empire, Rome had not yet come to 

30 
depend on the regions that were to become vital economic provinces during 

the middle imperial period. As a consequence, the early imperium could 

buy cheap defense-in-depth by means of the client system. The Roman 

Empire of the middle era protected the now-vital regions through preclusive 

security in the form of strong forward basing. These regions were no less 

vital to the late empire, but the forward engagement strategy was replaced 

by a mobile reserve that was simply not fast enough to defend against a 

threat or strong enough to retake regions once lost. Thus, each loss became 

cumulative. 

If, however, the fate of the late Roman system should serve as a warning 

of the dangers associated with the lack of an adequate forward-engagement 

strategy, it should not lead us to the hasty conclusion that a standing strategic 

reserve will not work. It does indicate that a lack of strong forward engagement is dangerous in the absence of strategic depth between the periphery 

and vital economic areas. 

Cost of the Security System. The relative cost of the new U.S. security 

system as opposed to the historical cases examined in this study is of great 

interest here. The primary rationale for the new U. S. concept is its reduction 

in manpower and operating costs from the levels associated with the Cold 

War. 

There is excellent evidence to suggest that, with the exception of the late 

Roman model, each of the historical security systems examined in this study 

existed because their creators were willing, in view of the threat that existed 

at the time, to accept the costs associated with them. The early Roman 

system, true to its frugal Latin origin, demanded that its clients pay a 

proportionate share. In effect, the Romans "bought" strategic depth by 

ceding much control to clients within their respective spheres of influence 

in exchange for Roman assistance when truly serious threats surfaced. This 

saved Rome much in the way of manpower and treasure; it was truly security 

on the cheap. The middle imperial period of preclusive security saw Rome 

exclusively assuming the cost of imperial security� in doing so, of course, 

she gained the advantage of exclusive control over the entire security system 

including that which had formerly been in the purview of the client kings. 1 14 

The middle imperium was more expensive than the early period, but not 

nearly as expensive as the late system, which ultimately proved to be as 

inefficient as it was ineffective. Although Edward Luttwak dwells on its 

early successes, Arther Ferrill reminds us that the system eventually proved 

a costly failure. 

1 15 

31 
For a militarized autocracy, the Byzantine Empire proved to be a relative 

bargain from the perspective of security. The use of a healthy citizen militia 

backed up by a solid professional cadre proved to be an effective and 

reasonably efficient means of forward engagement. To be sure, the system 

was more expensive than the early or middle Roman models, because it 

added a strong centralized reserve (which was designed probably to protect 

the central government as much as the marches). However, the cost was 

made acceptable by the relative coherence of the threat compared to that 

facing the other four models; peasants and emperors alike could see the 

danger from every direction. 

Napoleon was to refer contemptuously to the British as a "nation of 

shopkeepers," but the shopkeepers were to lock him away and build a 

security system that would dominate the world beyond Europe for the 

century. In World War I they were then forced by circumstances largely 

beyond their control to violate their prime economic directive by becoming 

decisively involved in a major European war. 

It appears that the new u.s. strategy can succeed in giving acceptable 

security at a reasonable cost in manpower and national treasure in Europe, 

the Pacific rim, and in Korea. Even in the problematic Middle East, the 

solutions to problems of improving deterrence and decreasing our closure 

time to the theater appear to be matters of allocation of existing resources 

rather than of need for increased resources. The proof will be in the 

implementation. 

Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve. As we have seen, a 

balance between these elements is not a prerequisite for a succesful security 

system. In three of our five cases there was no strategic reserve at all, with 

no catastrophic result. These three systems survived by use of strategic 

depth, strong forward engagement, or a combination of both. Only the 

Byzantine system had an effective balance. The Byzantine Empire was 

dependent on the periphery for its economic survival as a great power; it 

developed a balance because it lacked the strategic depth to allow a defense 

that could trade space for time. The periphery required strong forward 

engagement, and the emperors demanded protection for their seat of power. 

Given strong forward engagement or great strategic depth, a security 

system can probably do nicely without a strong standing reserve, as did the 

first two Roman systems and British imperial model. Unfortunately, we lack 

today the depth and forward-engagement potential afforded by previous 

systems in the key area of the Middle East. This problem of strategic balance 

32 
will be the greatest security challenge facing the implementation of the new 

strategy. 

Indications and Warning. Intelligence and warning have played a role in 

all of our historical case studies, but the centrality of that role has depended 

on the succes of the forward engagement strategy and the strategic depth 

involved. The early imperial Romans, middle-empire Romans, and Byzantines appear to have had excellent intelligence systems, inasmuch as their 

warning was proportionate to the time needed to react. The British system 

was less impres

ive, but the diffuseness of the threat, combined with the 

absolute British ability to isolate a problem area through sea supremacy, 

negated the need for a truly efficient warning system. A mediocre system 

of I&W was good enough in the greater scheme of things. 

The late Roman Empire saw its intelligence system decline fastest at the 

very time it was needed most. It appears that the late Rome security system 

as it existed around the early third century, when Luttwak contends that it 

did a good job, was complemented by a competent warning system. This 

was also the period when some balance remained between forward presence 

and the mobile reserve. However, as in most security systems, the real 

effectivenes of "indications and warning" is rooted in the system of forward 

presence. As Roman control on the periphery became more and more 

dependent on barbarian mercenaries, so did its intelligence sources. Rome 

knew what the barbarians in her service let her know, and this benefited 

Rome only insofar as Roman and barbarian agendas coincided. 

Since the late 1970s the U.S. indications and warning system has been 

very dependent on technological means, whereas historically it has been 

based on human intelligence. 1 16 As seen in the events leading up to Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm, space-based imagery and other technical means 

can only indicate what the enemy allows us to see and hear or that which 

cannot be hidden. It does not tell us about hidden agendas or other factors 

so important when we have neither sufficient forces to slow or stop an enemy 

nor sufficient strategic depth to trade space for time. The good news here is 

for Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Korea, where our new strategy will 

probably offer sufficient forward engagement or strategic depth to make our 

indications and warning system adequate. As in most categories, the Middle 

East remains a difficult case. If the 1991 Global War Game is at all 

predictive, we will need at least sixty days of warning to deploy adequately 

the strategic mobile reserve presently contemplated. In fact, we simply will 

not have that much advance notice to get our troops in place, and we will 

lack prepositioned forces to buy time to do so. 

33 
Deterrence. All security systems worthy of the name incorporate some form 

of deterrence. The early Roman system, as Luttwak describes it, deterred 

its more sophisticated foes through the certainty of Roman power "over the 

horizon"; les

 subtle potential adversaries were given more frequent and 

blunter lesns in the efficacy of Roman anns. 1 I7 The preclusive security 

system of the middle Empire had a more universally visible manifestation 

in its system of field fortifications. Likewise the Byzantines were extremely 

conspicuous in their security precautions and were careful in the psychological messages of military preparednes

 they sent to a plethora of potential 

foes. Even when the Byzantines were forced to pay bribes, they took great 

pains to let the recipient know that he was to stay bribed or suffer the 

consequences. The British in their time maintained a very marked presence 

in their colonies to deter bad behavior by colonists and natives alike. The 

British navy effectively kept troublesome third powers out of their sphere 

of influence. The later years of the late Roman epoch, on the other hand, 

were difficult for the imperium in that although the Roman army remained 

an effective field force, it had lost the reputation of invincibility it had 

enjoyed as late as the third century. Potential adversaries respected it but 

were no longer terrified of it. Delbruck and Ferrill disagree on the cause of 

this situation, but both agree that the eventual impact on Roman deterrence 

was disastrous. 

If, again, the results of the 1991 Global War Game can be relied upon, it 

is ironic that the deterrent effect of the U.S. victory in Operation Desert 

Storm will probably be greater everywhere except where it was exercised 

and where it will probably remain most needed: the Middle East itself. The 

postwar experience of Iraqi rearmament supports the 1991 Global War 

Game's conclusion that actors in this region must face deterrent presence 

that is active and exercised often if they are in fact to be deterred. Unfortunately this is the very region where such a presence is most difficult to 

achieve. 

The U.S. strategy for the 1990s appears viable as currently articulated in 

every key region in the security system of the new world order except in the 

Middle East, where it is most likely to be challenged. We do not need to 

scrap the new concept; the proposed strategy has a very strong basis in fiscal 

reality, postulating a method that we can afford. Unlike the historical models 

examined, the approach of the new strategy will require a different method 

of forward presence in each region where vital U.S. security interests exist. 

The Middle East, however, will call for an effective forward presence where 

34 
the United States has traditionally not maintained one; this is a challenge, 

but not an impossible one. 

I

n the best of all possible worlds, the ideal solution to the u.s. strategic 

dilemma of trying both to lead a great global security system and to seek 

stability in an increasingly unstable world, at an affordable price, would be 

to pursue the option originally attempted by the players representing the 

United States in the 1991 Naval War College Global War Game. The players 

wanted to create standing regional coalitions designed, in effect, to be the 

rough equivalent of the clients in the early Roman hegemonic model. The 

players sought coalitions where the U.S. could be a senior partner, not an 

imperator in the Roman sense. In this they anticipated President Bush in his 

remarks to the United Nations in September 1991. As far as possible, the 

players representing U.S. decision makers wanted to craft coalitions to 

handle local instabilities by creating standing regional mechanisms with the 

support when necessary of U.S. military power. They hoped for such 

coalitions in Europe, the Pacific, and the Middle East, and also for a stronger 

U.N. role. 

Implementing this vision in the game proved to be difficult. The players 

found that, with the exception of Nato in Europe, most regions were not 

ready for this kind of security arrangement in the near term. Regional 

antagonisms died hard, and there was a lingering mistrust of certain actors 

in the Middle East and the Pacific-key actors which were indispensable to 

viable coalitions. While agreeing that stabilizing coalitions are a worthy 

long-term goal, the players quickly came to the realization that there must 

be interim mechanisms, and that the interim may last a very long time. 1 18 

The game also indicated that there is no short-run substitute for U.S. 

forward presence in any region, including Europe. The players generally 

agreed that the United States could cut back significantly in Nato and that 

some decrease in presence in the Pacific was warranted; however, no total 

substitute for U.S. involvement could be found in any region. The U.S. role 

in Europe was seen as evolving from that of military leader to one of honest 

broker. The security structure in the Pacific is now built around a web of 

bilateral agreements between the U.S. and other Pacific powers, agreements 

which could well become the basis for ad hoc coalitions in case of regional 

crises; however, the region did not appear ready for standing mechanisms. 

The Middle East was even more intractable in this regard. There, the U.S. 

35 
is linked bilaterally with several states which do not even talk with each 

other. There was simply no substitute for U.S. engagement. 1 19 

Given the imperfect world we live in, the strategy outlined by the 

Chainnan, and as recently issued in "The National Military Strategy for the 

1 990s," is a logical approach to the problem of managing worldwide 

stability without bankrupting ourselves as a nation. It will work in Europe 

where the combination of Nato and our new-found strategic depth should 

serve us well. Likewise, in the Pacific we have adequate strategic depth and 

the sea superiority afforded by the Seventh Fleet to provide adequate 

forward engagement to back up our string of bilateral security agreements. 

Even in the special case of Korea we maintain adequate forward engagement 

to buy time in which to bring U.S. forces to bear should deterrence fail. 

Only in the Middle East does the proposed U.S. strategy face a situation 

where we lack the strategic depth, adequate forward deployed forces, and 

indications and warning to give us relative closure capability adequate to 

ensure either deterrence or sufficiently rapid response against a regional 

aggressor, such as Iran or Iraq. There are two alternatives. The first is to 

seek an entirely new strategy which will adequately cover all regions. The 

second is to adjust the proposed strategy to make it viable in the Middle 

East. The first alternative is probably not realistic; the Chainnan's vision is 

a commonsense one. It does have definite problems in one critical region, 

but this writer believes we can adjust the new strategy to compensate for its 

shortcomings in the Middle East without sacrificing the excellent overall 

concept. If we accept that the strategy can be fine-tuned in the Middle East, 

we are then led to the question of how to do so. 

Options for Improvement. There are three ways in which the shortcomings 

of the current strategic vision might be adjusted in the Middle East region: 

first, by building a better system of forward presence; second, by improving 

the relative closure time of the strategic reserve; and third, by improving 

our indications and warning to make the thirty-day window of vulnerability 

we curently face less crippling. The Global War Game saw as critical the 

effective ability to react with credible and sustainable forces within thirty 

days of the start of a crisis. It showed a need to improve response capability 

in this time frame. Improving 1& W is a difficult option because it is effective 

only in proportion to the readiness of decision makers to accept and act on 

it quickly and decisively-a matter outside the realm of strategy and not a 

strategic option. Consequently, the options presented below for adjusting 

the current strategic vision in the Middle East aim at improving forward 

presence and improving our relative closure time. 

36 
Option One. Pennanent basing (to improve forward engagement) is a 

preclusive security arrangement that would allow us to keep ground and air 

forces pennanently based in the Middle East and prepositioned ground 

equipment (pomcus) in Europe. This would probably involve a combination 

of ground prepositioning and rotational unit deployment that would reduce 

reaction time while giving us a credible deterrent. It would also reduce our 

dependence on timely warning. 

Option Two. A more rapid mobile reserve (for improved relative closure 

capability) would reduce the closure time of the contingency force through 

buying increasingly fast sea lift and more and larger transport aircraft. The 

decreased reaction time would lower our profile in the region day-to-day 

while increasing our strategic mobility in all regions, not just the Middle 

East. 

Option Three. A hegemonic client-oriented strategy (for improved forward engagement) suggests that lacking a client coalition in the short run, 

the United States could opt to cultivate a regional hegemonic state as the 

primary means of our own forward engagement, in a manner reminiscent 

of the early Roman imperial model. This solution would have to allow for 

greater relative deterrence, but it could permit longer closure times if the 

client's anned forces remain competitive with any likely opponent. This is 

the approach we attempted with Iran from the fifties to the late seventies. 

In that case we picked a poor client, but that does not mean that the concept 

is inherently flawed. We should learn from the Iranian experience that client 

relationships are high-risk affairs, subject to vagaries of the client's internal 

politics. A reliable client would also compensate for less than ideal warning, 

because the critical warning time from a U.S. standpoint would be that 

necessary for a potential adversary to build a force that would require our 

assistance to the client. 

Option Four. A "naval bridge" strategy (a combination of improved 

forward presence and relative closure capability) would be the use of 

combined carrier task forces, maritime prepositioning forces, and forwarddeployed amphibious forces acting both as means of forward engagement 

and as a connecting "bridge" between the forward engagement component 

and the strategic contingency force outlined in the Chainnan's vision. Such 

a strategy would entail the movement of the Maritime Prepositioning 

Squadron One, currently assigned to Europe, closer to the Middle East in 

order to reduce its transit time; this would also mean more penneable 

boundaries between unified commands. It would also entail more frequent 

visits and exercises of the maritime prepositioning squadrons to the Gulf for 

37 
such demonstrations as off-loading exercises. This strategy would also 

require an aircraft car

er and an amphibious ready group close to the Straits 

of Hormuz on a pennanent basis. It would give the United States the ability 

to bring up the equivalent of a mid-sized Marine Expeditionary Force 

(37,00 personnel) well under the thirty days after crisis recognition that we 

previously mentioned as critical for effective crisis response; more importantly, this force would arrive with thirty days of logistical endurance. 1 20 

The purpose of this force would be to provide the bridge between forward 

presence and the contingency role. This bridge would provide visible, 

credible deterrence as well as an effective and logistically sustainable 

forward-deployed presence should deterrence fail. This ability to bridge the 

gap between the thirty-day window of vulnerability and the sixty days 

required to get the bulk of the standing strategic "contingency force" into 

the theater was seen as critical by the GWG 91 players. 

Discussion of Options. Option one (pennanent basing) would be very 

difficult to implement, barring extraordinary and unforseen developments. 

Ground basing is not a desirable component in the Middle East region. Most 

governments in the region view a large, long-term U.S. presence as a 

potentially greater threat to their internal security than any potential external 

power. The combination of anti-Western hostility among Muslims (especially Shiites) and the fear of "contamination" by Western influences is 

probably very realistic. It is also likely that Congress and the American 

public would balk at the cost of any new overseas basing in an era when 

some sort of peace dividend is expected. This would be a very difficult 

option to sell in the absence of any strong lobbying effort for an increased 

U.S. ground presence by Mideast states. 

Option two (a more rapid mobile reserve) will probably come about to 

some degree as a natural outgrowth of the Chainnan's vision, but the 

improvement in strategic mobility will probably be evolutionary and dependent on cost constraints. It will not be a quick fix, and it will not make 

up for the lack of strategic depth and effective forward defense that dogged 

us during the Iraqi crisis in 1 990. In addition, it would not lead to a truly 

credible deterrent in a region where leaders most need to observe power to 

appreciate it. This option would be the most expensive of the four if we 

attempted to increase strategic mobility enough to bring sufficient anny 

forces to the region within the critical first thirty days of a crisis. The players 

in the 1991 Global War Game saw that as improbable, given current 

budgetary realities. They saw the reduction of the closure time from sixty 

38 
to something approaching thirty days as a more realistic, but still a very 

expensive, alternative. 

Option three (a hegemonic client-oriented strategy) is also probably not 

viable at present given the cur

ent governments of the likely candidate 

clients, but the evolution to such a system should not be ruled out as an 

eventual possibility. Since the two most likely client candidates (Iraq and 

Iran) are curently very hostile to U. S. interests, luring one into our camp 

would be a long process, and getting the American public to accept such a 

relationship would be problematic at best. The possibility of the Gulf 

Cooperation Council developing into a militarily effective Nato-like entity 

cannot be ruled out in the long run, but the Global War Game players did 

not see it as a realistic near-term option. An eventual evolution to this 

strategy would not necessarily be precluded by the interim adoption of one 

or more of the other options. 

Option four (a naval bridge strategy) has the attraction of not requiring 

new forces and of being readily achievable within the guidelines of General 

Powell's vision. It would also assist the rapid introduction and initial 

sustainment of contingency forces into theater when necessary. Perhaps the 

best argument in favor of such a strategy is that it can be implemented with 

forces and equipment currently in the inventory at very little cost increase 

over existing arrangements. Additionally, the Maritime Prepositioned Force 

(MPF) combined with other prepositioned assets (such as those currently 

maintained by the U.S. Army and Air Force) would logistically sustain army 

and air force elements as they arrive in theater; the precedent for this was 

set during the initial phases of Desert Shield. This ability to act as an 

"enabling force" truly makes the Navy-Marine Corps team the bridge 

between forward presence and the introduction of strategic reserves. Anny 

and air force initiatives to improve strategic mobility would be complementary to the concept rather than competitive with it. The relatively small 

"footprint" of a MPF squadron, with its 150 or so merchant seamen and a 

tiny complement of full-time navy personnel, would almost certainly be 

easier to "sell," from a political-military standpoint, to Bahrain, Oman, 

Qatar, or other potential exercise hosts. 

This proposed course of action will be greatly enhanced if the navy 

continues to examine options for changing the mix of aircraft in carrier air 

wings to provide a greater air-to-ground capability; this orientation would 

have utility in the Middle East, where the sophisticated anti-ship threat once 

posed by the Soviet Union has dissipated. This is not to suggest that the navy 

abandon its sea-control mission, a prerequisite for power projection, but it 

39 
does reflect the reality that sea control can now be presumed, except at choke 

points and close inshore (the areas where the line between sea control and 

power projection becomes somewhat blured). The allegation by some 

analysts that the navy did not bring to bear enough "air-to-mud" capability 

during Desert Stonn and will not do so in the future would be largely 

overcome by creating forces tailored to local enemy denial capabilities 

rather than by deploying standard packages to all regions of the world. At 

this writing the Navy and Marine Corps are conducting a "Naval Force 

Capabilities Planning Effort" designed to seek more flexible and innovative 

methods of employing naval power in the manner described above. 

The principal disadvantage of this "naval bridge option" is that it will 

require frequent and vigorous exercises to remind regional actors-several 

of which are notoriously slow leamers-of its capabilities and rapid responsiveness. U.S. planners need to keep in mind that one of the primary causes 

of the 1 990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a fundamental misunderstanding 

of both the will and the capability of the United States to act decisively in 

the Middle East region. The naval bridge option will require less dependence 

on timely indications and warning than option two, but it will be more 

dependent on it than options one and three. Option four has a third disadvantage in that it will require some hard strategic decisions. Most of all, the 

pennanent placement of a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready 

group with a Marine Expeditionary Unit on station in the region may well 

require a smaller reduction in naval forces than is currently contemplated, 

or the acceptance of some degree of risk elsewhere by reducing presence 

there. The dedication of a second MPF squadron to the Middle East, moving 

it closer to that theater, entails less risk if the Atlantic squadron is chosen. 

The threat in Europe appears to have diminished radically in the wake of 

the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. This certainly does 

not mean that MPF might not be used in Europe, but merely that the strategic 

calculus has changed to the extent that "hot spots," such as the Middle East 

and Korea, will require more immediate response in the foreseeable future 

than will Europe. 

Conclusions. Option four, the naval bridge, appears to be potentially the 

most realistic of the options in the near tenn. Option two is less expensive 

than the others, but due to fiscal realities, is much less achievable in the near 

tenn, if at all. Option three will probably be considered as an ultimate 

solution to the imbalance between forward deployment and strategic contingency forces if relations with any of the potential candidate hegemonic 

clients improves in the long tenn. TIlis option will have to overcome strong 

40 
memories of the debacle of our attempt to cultivate Iran; it is a very high-risk 

option. Option one would be difficult due to the cost, regional dislike of a 

standing Western presence, and the vulnerability of land prepositioning 

without adequate forces readily available for protection in the early stages 

of a crisis. Option one offers the best chance of deterring aggression in the 

region and of acting effectively early if deterrence fails. Option four offers 

the best opportunity for early forcible reentry into the region if an attacker 

strikes the arrival ports and airfields with nuclear or chemical weapons; the 

MPF carrier battle group and amphibious ready group would provide the 

core of the forward air and logistics needed. Of course the MPF would need 

to off-load and transfer some equipment to amphibious shipping in order to 

support adequately an amphibious operation; marines have been preparing 

for such an eventuality for years. 

Would a forward engagement system of the size proposed in option four 

be enough to deter or fight effectively if deterrence failed? Michael Mazarr 

of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that the United 

States needs a middle-weight mechanized corps. He states that if we had 

possessed such a corps (a light armored division and a light mechanized or 

motorized division supported by an armored cavalry regiment and an 

airmobile brigade) on 2 August 1990, we could have more effectively 

deterred Iraq. He further believes that such a force, designed to be flown 

into Saudi Arabia within a week or so, could have combined with the Saudi 

army and expanding U.S. tactical air assets (on land or at sea) to put up a 

very stiff fight. III 

If the Global War Game and the results of Desert Shield are at all 

predictive, the corps Mazarr postulates is not logistically feasible using 

purely army assets likely to be available in the near term. However, such an 

organization becomes much more realistic when built around the Marine 

Expeditionary Force (MEF) postulated in option four, with its thirty days 

of sustainability. The ground combat element of that MEF is a marine 

mechanized division with a corps-sized command element already in place; 

its organization takes advantage of the synergism of the marine Air-Ground 

Task Force concept as well as its logistics sustainability. When army 

logistics units arrived in theater, the force could be reconfigured along 

service lines as appropriate. This is an example of the credibility and 

sustainability the naval bridge strategy affords, in which each service lends 

its own unique strengths to the overall efforts. 

Recommendation. The naval bridge concept of option four should be 

adopted immediately, as it makes the strategy outlined in the Chairman's 

41 
vision viable, using assets currently existing, without major changes in force 

structure and with minimal political-military repercusions for the Middle 

East. The other options should be pursued as longer tenn solutions to the 

overall strategic problem in the Gulf Region as the situation dictates. 

Improving strategic mobility as outlined in option two should remain a high 

national strategic priority. The client-oriented strategy outlined in option three would best be pursued in the fonn of a Nato-like client coalition. 

This will be a very long-tenn endeavor if it can be done at all in the Middle 

East, where mistrust and long-standing rivalries are a virtual cottage industry. Opportunities to improve forward presence should be pursued as 

they adse, but we need to be aware that this option may well prove a 

double-edged sword in tenns of internal instability within allied nations. It 

should be noted that since the original draft of this monograph in August 

1991, several of the elements of the naval bridge option have been implemented, and the rest are contemplated. 

In his lecture on Metternich and the Congress of Vienna, Professor 

George Baer of the Naval War College points out that the systems created 

by Metternich and Bismarck shared a major weakness in that both stressed 

stability over the creative management of change. The word "stability" is 

often used interchangeably with the concept of the "new world order" in 

discussing the present changing national security environment. The naval 

bridge strategy proposed in this paper is seen as a short to mid-tenn "fix" 

to a recognized soft spot in the proposed national military strategy. However, even this concept should probably be viewed as itself a bridge to an 

ultimate system of standing regional coalitions designed to manage change, 

allow for healthy commerce and economic development, and guard against 

elements that would seek change through catastrophic means. The new 

world order is a blank slate with enonnous potential for good as well as evil, 

and the potential for evil must remain a major consideration in our national 

security planning. The National Military Strategy provides a superb vehicle 

for feeling our way into a new era, but it should be viewed as an evolving 

entity rather than as a closed system. 

42 
Notes 

1. "Devolution" was a tenn used to describe current events in the 199 1 Global War 

Game at the Naval War College. See Global Wargame, G WG-1 991, Section 1. "Executive 

Summary. CNWS-S&C: 11-91" (Newport, R.I. : Naval War College. 199 1), p. 6. 

2. President George Bush, "Remarks by the President in his Address to the Aspen 

Institute Symposium, M Aspen, Colo.: 2 August 1 990. 

3. General Colin L. Powell, "Military Realities and Future Security Prospects," 

remarks delivered at the Royal United Services Institute, London: 5 December 1990. 

4. Ibid. 

5 . U.S. Joint Chiefs of S taff, "National Military Strategy for the 1 9905" 

(Washington: 21 January 1 992), pp. 1 9-21. 

6. Arther Ferrill , The Fall of the Roman Empire (New York: Thames and Hudson, 

1988), pp. 167- 1 69. 

7. Allen L. Tiffany, "A Light Infantry Division with More for the Fight," Military 

Review; August 1 991, p. 42. 

8. Maclrubin T. Owens, "The Marine Corps and the New National Military 

Strategy, " Amphibious Warfare Review, Summer 1991, pp. 64-69 . 

9. President George Bush, "State of the World 1 991," delivered to the United 

Nations General Asembly , New York: 23 September 1 991. (Based on author's notes from 

viewing the speh). 

10. Dr. Robert Wood, "Remarks Delivered to 1 991 Global War Game Players," 

Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Newport. R.I. : 7 July 199 1. 

11. Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (Baltimore: The Johns 

Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976), p. 49. 

12. Ibid. , pp. 30-3 1. 

13. Ibid . pp. 26-27. 

14. Lynn Montross, War through the Ages (New York: Harper and Bros ., 1960), p. 83. 

15. Delbruckdescribes in some detail the Roman attempt to close this ring in Germany 

in The Barbarian Invasions. He points out that the debacle at the Teutoberger Forest in A.D. 

9 marked the high-water mark of this attempt to close it. The final Roman attempt to 

establish hegemony in Gennany came to an end in the strategic failure of Gennanicus in 

the punitive campaign of A.D. 16. See Hans Delbruck, The Barbarian Invasions: History of 

the Art of War, v. 2, trans. J. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln, Neb. and London: Univ. of Nebraska 

Press), p. 120. 

1 6. Luttwak, p. 27. 

17. Ferrill, p. 27. 

1 8. Luttwak, pp. 48-49. 

19. Ferrill, p. 27. 

20. This is a judgment based purely on the smaller size of the anny, the smaller 

standing imperial bureaucracy of the era, the lack of expensive standing fortifications and 

the absence of the paid mercenaries that characterized the two later Roman systems and the 

Byzantine empire. 

2l. Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Rise of Christian Europe (London: Harcourt, Brace, and 

World, 1965), p. 54. 

43 
22. Montros

. p. 83. 

23. Ferrill (p. 26) estimates the second-century Roman military budget to have ben 

from 450 to 500 million sesterces. This was probably somewhat higher than at the time of 

the Emperor Augustus (approximately 27 B.C. 10 A.D. 14) due to higher costs asiated with 

flXed fortifications. It also does not take into account the cost of civil administration of 

provinces that had ben self-governing colonies during the hegemonic period. 

24. Flavius Josephus. The Wars o/the Romans. trans. William Whiston (New York: 

E.P. Dutton, 1915). pp. 1 -2. 

25. Luttwak, p. 5 I. 

26. Ibid .• pp. 1 1 1-1 17. 

27. Ibid .• p. 1 13. 

28. Ibid. . p. 61. 

29. Ferrill. pp. 25-26. 

30. Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise. Men in Arms (New York: Praeger. 1970). 

p. 47. 

31. Ibid. . p. 45. 

32. Hans Delbruck (p. 194) is a dissenter here. He believes that the Germans were 

better tactically and that the Roman military genius lay in the strategic ability to put 

numerically superior forces on the field at the decisive time and place. 

33. Luttwak and Ferrill agre that the main strength of the Roman strategy in this era 

of strategic defense was the tactical offensive capability of the legions. 

34. Ferrill. p. 27. 

35. Luttwak, pp. 125-1 26. 

36. Preston and Wise. p. 39. 

37. Ibid. . p. 45. 

38. Luttwak (p. 72) describes a system capable of giving sufficient operational 

warning because it presented a strong front. An enemy masing to attack would have to 

conduct a costly buildup that was difficult to conceal. given the relative undisciplined nature 

of barbarian forces. nus would give the Romans time to reinforce where necesry. There 

appear to have ben no strategic surprises great enough to punish the system for its relative 

ineffectiveness. It sems that its inteJligence was generally adequate. The Romans depended 

on superior command and control in the form of runners and other means of signalling to 

give them adequate warning once a serious threat began to develop. 

39. Luttwak (pp. 124- 1 25) claims that the lack of a reserve made this system very 

thin by the time of Marcus Aurelius. 

40. Luttwak, p. 1 25. 

4 1 . Arther Ferrill acknowledges that this was an attempt to balance the system. in his 

esy. "'The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire." in Paul Kennedy. ed .• Grand Strategies 

in War and Peace, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Pres. 1 991). p. 83. 

42. For background. se Delbruck's The Barbarian Invasions or Vegetius' The 

Military Institutions o/the Romans (Harrisburg. Pa: The Telegraph Press. 1960.) 

43. Ferrill, The Fall pp. 1 52- 153. 

44. Delbruck, pp. 317-3 18. 

45. Luttwak, p. 1 88. 

46. Delbruck, p. 3 1 8. 

44 
47. Trevor-Roper, p. 67. 

48. Ferrill, T1Ie Fall, pp. 128- 130. 

49. Preston and Wise, p. 49. 

SO. Delbruck explains this proces in some detail in chapter 6. 

51. Fern, The Fall, pp. 46-47. 

52. Ibid., pp. 1 67-169. 

53. Preston and Wise, p. 49. 

54. Ibid., p. 47. 

55. Ferrill, T1Ie Fall, pp. 47-48. 

56. Preston and Wise, p. 45. 

57. Ibid., pp. 47-48. 

58. Luttwak explains this concept in chapter 3. 

59. See Ferrill, "The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire" and Preston and Wise, 

chapter 3. 

60. Ferrill, The Fall, p. 46. 

61 . Luttwak., p. 84. 

62. Trevor-Roper, pp. 62-64. 

63 . An apt analogy is a song by folk singer Ray Stevens about a talented and heroic 

pig who does many wonderful things for a family that reciprocates by eating it one leg at a 

time. Not surprisingly, the pig eventually escapes, hobbling away on wooden legs. 

64. General Powell made this point in a speh, "Military Realities and Future 

Security Prospects" (Dept. of Defense transcript. undated). 

65. Preston and Wise, p. 46. 

66. Ibid., p. 46. 

67. Delbruck., p. 218. 

68. Ferrill, The Fall, p. 83. 

69. Luttwak., p. 189. 

70. There is no reliable account of the Roman intelligence system of this era, but we 

can discern from Vegetius' contemptuous comments on security, as well as from por 

Roman perfonnance during the second Battle of Adrianople and similar campaigns, that 

intelligence had declined appreciably. 

71. Delbruck., pp. 275-276. 

72. Preston and Wise (pp. 48-49) accuse Theodosius of creating a security system 

that was Gothic in all but name. 

73. Preston and Wise, p. 51. 

74. Ibid., pp. 53-54. 

75. Ibid. , pp. 62-63. 

76. Montross, p. 1 15. 

77. Preston and Wise, p. 57. 

78. In his Tactica, the Emperor Leo advocates any means neces

ry that would 

economize scarce manpower resources to achieve political-military aims, but he stres 

the need to back up every stratagem with raw power to ensure that. above all, Byzantine 

power is respected. See Preston and Wise, p. 57. 

79. Preston and Wise, p. 59. 

80. Ibid., p. 57. 

45 
81. Montros

, p. 1 14. 

82. Preston and Wise, pp. 52·53. 

83. Ibid., p. S2. 

84. C. W. C. Oman. The ByVlntine Empire (London: Putnam and Sons� 190 1), p. 2 19. 

85. Preston and Wise (pp. 62.tl3) point out that the los of the hardy peasants of the 

Asiatic themes on the periphery of the empire was the element that eventually tenninated 

the Byzantine claim to be one of the great empires. This emphasizes the importan of the 

periphery and of the lack of strategic depth in the system. 

86. Ibid., pp. S4-S5. 

87. Oman. p. 91. 

88. The emperors Maurice and Leo devoted considerable space in their writings to 

military intelligence. Leo gives a masterful strategic intelligence estimate of various 

potential enemies in Tactica, quoted in Montros, p. 128. 

89. Profesr George Baer of the Naval War College gives an excellent overview of 

this proces in his lecture titled "Metternich." 

90. Stephen W. Sears, ed., The Horizon History of the British Empire (New York: 

American Heritage, 1 973), pp. 334·335. 

91. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random, 

1987), p. 154. 

92. Ibid., p. 1 55. 

93. Michael Howard, The Lessons of History (New Haven: Yale Univ. Pres, 1 991), 

p. 95. 

94. Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria 's Little Wars (New York: Harper and Rowe, 

1 972). Farwell uses the figure of 317 days for the relief force to actually reach Khartoum, 

counting from the first day of the siege (p. 290). 

95. Kennedy, pp. 229-23 1. 

96. Preston and Wise, p. 221. 

97. Ibid. , pp. 205·206. 

98. Ibid. , p. 106. 

99. Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (New York: Basic 

Books, 1976), pp. 34-35. 

100. Sears, pp. 334-335. 

101. Preston and Wise, pp. 260-261. 

102. Paul Kennedy, The Rise of British Naval Mastery (Atlantic Highlands, N.l.: The 

Ashfield Pres, 1983) p. 229. 

103. Howard, pp. 96 and 120-121. 

L04. As pointed out in note L, the term "devolution" was used extensively in the 199 L 

Global Wargame at the Naval War College. It characterized the then-continuing breakup 

of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the instruments of government created after 

the Bolshevik Revolution. That trend accelerated during the preparation of this study at a 

rate that exceed the expectations of the Global War Game players. 

105. See Global Wargame, p. 14. 

106. Ibid., p. 9. 

107. lCS, The National MilittJry Strategy (Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1992) 

p. 7. 

46 
108. Ibid., pp. 20-23. 

109. Global Wargame, p. 7. 

1 10. Ferrill, The Fall, pp. 1 68-169. 

Ill . Ibid., pp. 155-157. 

1 12. Global War Game. pp. 22-23. 

1 13. Ibid., pp. 12-13. 

1 14. Luttwak, pp. 111 - 1 16. 

1 15. Ferrill. The Fall. p. 1 69. 

] 1 6. "U.S. Intelligence Often Of the Mark," Providence Journal (Providence, R.I.), 

22 September 1991, p. A-4 (reprinted from St. Petersburg Times). 

1 1 7. Luttwak, pp. 32-33. 

118. Global Wargame, p. 10. 

1 19. Ibid., p. 9. 

120. Marine Corps Top Level Schools Brief to Marine Corps Fellows delivered at 

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, S September 1991. 

12 1. Michael 1. Mazarr, "Middleweight Forces for Contingency Operations," Military 

Review. August 1991. p. 35. 

47