This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0194

In re the Marriage of: 

Rachelle Frances Norgren, petitioner, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Randy Dean Norgren, 

Appellant.

Filed October 19, 2015

Affirmed

Peterson, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court

File No. 56-FA-08-1528

Dennis W. Hagstrom, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles A. Krekelberg, Krekelberg, Skonseng & Miller, PLLP, Pelican Rapids, 

Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and 

Klaphake, Judge.

*

 

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

PETERSON, Judge

In this post-dissolution appeal, appellant husband argues that the dissolution 

judgment should be reopened to permit a civil judgment for damages to be included in

the marital estate and divided between the parties. We affirm. 

FACTS

The 32-year marriage of appellant-husband Randy Dean Norgren and respondentwife Rachelle Frances Norgren was dissolved on February 5, 2014. The parties’ marital 

income was derived from a farm, a gas station, and wife’s employment in health care. 

After wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage in 2008, the district court issued a 

temporary order directing husband to manage the parties’ farm and share with wife 50%

of any profits from the farm after deducting related expenses. 

While the temporary order was in effect, in January 2011, Roger Halverson

brought a trespass lawsuit against husband for damages caused by three of husband and 

wife’s cows. The cows allegedly got out of a fenced pasture, wandered onto Halverson’s 

property, and, over the course of a week, damaged numerous trees on Halverson’s

property, which is a commercial tree operation. Halverson sought $31,250 in actual 

damages and statutory treble damages for trespass involving damage to trees, as provided 

for under Minn. Stat. § 561.04 (2010). 

According to husband, because he reads at a first-grade level, either his daughter 

or wife assisted him in reading and answering the trespass complaint. When husband 

received a motion for summary judgment in the trespass action on August 16, 2013, his 
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daughter read the motion papers to him, but he did not respond to the motion. Husband 

also did not attend the summary-judgment hearing because “[he] didn’t think [he] had to 

in order to get a trial date.” On September 23, 2013, the district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Halverson and ordered entry of judgment in the claimed amount of 

$93,750. 

Also on September 23, 2013, husband and wife entered into an oral stipulation that 

was incorporated into the dissolution judgment. Husband asserts that he was not aware 

of the trespass judgment until January 2014. The dissolution judgment was entered on 

February 5, 2014.

In an August 7, 2014 order, the district court denied husband’s motion to vacate 

and set aside the trespass judgment. The court rejected husband’s arguments that (1) the 

judgment was the result of his excusable neglect and included factual misrepresentations 

and (2) the damages award was inequitable.

On August 28, 2014, husband moved to reopen and modify the dissolution 

judgment to include the damages awarded in the trespass judgment as a marital debt to be 

divided between the parties. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion, 

ruling that husband is solely responsible for the trespass damages because he had not 

shown excusable neglect, mistake, or inequity to support reopening the dissolution 

judgment and decree under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1), (5) (2014). This appeal 

followed.
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D E C I S I O N

Whether to reopen a dissolution judgment and decree under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, 

subd. 2, is a decision within the district court’s discretion. Clark v. Clark, 642 N.W.2d 

459, 465 (Minn. App. 2002). “The moving party bears the burden of establishing a basis 

to reopen the judgment and decree.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 428 

(Minn. App. 2007). A district court abuses its discretion if it acts “against logic and the 

facts on record.” Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 2002).

A dissolution stipulation is considered a binding contract. Shirk v. Shirk, 561 

N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997); see Anderson v. Anderson, 303 Minn. 26, 32, 225 

N.W.2d 837, 840 (1975) (stating that courts favor the use of stipulations in dissolution 

proceedings and that “[w]here the parties stipulate as to the facts, the effect of the 

stipulation is to take the place of evidence”). A stipulation may be vacated for equitable 

reasons, but “upon entry of a judgment and decree based on a stipulation, different 

circumstances arise, as the dissolution is now complete and the need for finality becomes 

of central importance.” Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 521-22. A dissolution decree is final when 

entered, subject to the right of appeal. Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 1 (2014). 

The statute governing reopening a dissolution judgment and decree provides:

On motion and upon terms as are just, the court may 

relieve a party from a judgment and decree, order, or 

proceeding under this chapter, except for provisions 

dissolving the bonds of marriage, annulling the marriage, or 

directing that the parties are legally separated, and may order 

a new trial or grant other relief as may be just for the 

following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 

neglect;
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(2) newly discovered evidence . . .;

(3) fraud . . . or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(4) the judgment and decree or order is void; or

(5) . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment and 

decree or order should have prospective application.

The motion must be made within a reasonable time, 

and for a reason under clause (1), (2), or (3), not more 

than one year after the judgment and decree, order, or 

proceeding was entered or taken.

Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.

In the district court, husband asserted two statutory grounds for reopening the 

dissolution judgment and decree: “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 

neglect,” and that it was not “equitable” to exclude the trespass damages from the 

dissolution judgment and decree. On appeal, husband asserts that the trespass judgment 

was excluded by “mistake,” the trespass judgment constitutes an “encumbrance” on the 

farm operation that the dissolution decree directs to be distributed to both parties, and the 

district court’s decision was an abuse of discretion and inequitable. 

Mistake/excusable neglect.

There are several undisputed facts that make husband’s failure to raise the issue of 

the outstanding trespass judgment during the dissolution proceeding not excusable and 

not a mistake: (1) husband admittedly became aware of the trespass judgment in January 

2014, but he did not inform the district court about the judgment until August 2014, six

months after the February 2014 dissolution judgment was entered; (2) although husband 

admitted that he received the trespass complaint and responded to it, he incorrectly 

concluded that the trespass lawsuit had “gone away” and did not account for potential 
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damages from the lawsuit in the proposed dissolution stipulation; (3) husband did not 

appear at the summary-judgment hearing in the trespass action, although he admitted that 

he received notice of the hearing; and (4) husband was represented by counsel in the 

dissolution action, and the district court in the trespass action found that husband had 

been involved in prior lawsuits, all of which should have prompted him to seek legal 

counsel in the trespass action. See Black v. Rimmer, 700 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Minn. App. 

2005) (stating that a party’s neglect that leads to an adverse judgment is inexcusable), 

review dismissed (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005); Elk River Enters., Inc. v. Adams, 357 N.W.2d 

139, 140 (Minn. App. 1984) (stating that a party’s nonappearance at a hearing is not 

excusable when it is intentional). 

In rejecting husband’s excusable-neglect argument, the district court stated that

husband

knew of the [trespass] judgment prior to the final hearing and 

entry of the Judgment and Decree on February 5, 2014. His 

neglect has been found inexcusable in the [trespass] matter 

and due to his knowledge of the [trespass] lawsuit and 

judgment prior to entry of the Judgment and Decree, this 

Court must find that [husband] has not made a showing of 

excusable neglect. 

The district court’s reasoning is not against logic and the facts on record. 

 

The district court also found that husband failed to meet his burden to show that 

the failure to address the trespass damages in the dissolution judgment and decree was a 

mistake. Husband’s awareness of the trespass judgment before the dissolution judgment 

became final contradicts his claim of mistake. The district court found that husband “was 

aware of the [trespass] judgment against him prior to its entry” and could have taken 
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actions to correct the omission of the trespass judgment in the dissolution stipulation, but 

did not. Again, the district court’s reasoning is not against logic and the facts on record. 

Husband’s actions do not show excusable neglect or mistake within the meaning 

of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1). The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying husband’s motion to reopen the dissolution judgment and decree to include the 

damages awarded in the trespass action.

Other issues.

Husband included two additional issues in his appellate brief. Husband argues 

that (1) the trespass judgment is an encumbrance included under the provision in the 

judgment and decree that requires payment of all outstanding mortgages and 

encumbrances on the premises awarded to the parties as tenants in common to be sold by 

auction; and (2) the district court’s decision was “arbitrary and capricious and contrary to 

law, and therefore an abuse of discretion and inequitable in consideration of the facts in 

this particular case.” 

(1) The decree awarded the farm to the parties as tenants in common, required 

the farm to be sold, and required that the sale proceeds be distributed equally to the 

parties after, among other actions, “all the outstanding mortgages and encumbrances on 

the premises” are paid off. The issue whether the trespass judgment constituted an 

encumbrance on the farm was not raised in the district court, and the district court did not 

consider the issue. We, therefore, decline to address the issue for the first time on appeal. 

See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (explaining that an appellate court 
8

will only consider issues on appeal that were presented to and considered by the district 

court).

(2) Husband combines a general argument that the district court’s decision not 

to reopen the dissolution judgment was an abuse of discretion with an argument that the 

district court should have reopened the dissolution judgment for equitable reasons under 

Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(5). “[T]o reopen a judgment and decree because 

prospective application is no longer equitable, the inequity must result from the 

development of circumstances substantially altering the information known when the 

dissolution judgment and decree was entered.” Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 430 (quotation 

omitted). The district court considers “whether there is inequity in prospective 

application of the judgment and decree as a result of the development of circumstances 

beyond the parties’ control that substantially alter the information known when the 

judgment and decree was entered.” Id. at 431 (emphasis added).

Husband does not identify any circumstances that substantially alter the 

information known to him when the dissolution judgment was entered, nor does the 

record suggest the existence of such information. Husband, therefore, has not identified 

any changed circumstances necessary to reopen the dissolution on the theory that it is no 

longer equitable. Furthermore, other facts suggest, and the district court found, that 

appellant’s neglect in defending the trespass action vitiates his equity claim now, because
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he could have taken actions that may have successfully defended against the trespass 

action, or at least reduced the damages award.

Affirmed.