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ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

AND STAY PENDING APPEAL - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

FRANCES CLAIRMONT, 

Plaintiff,

v.

GENUITY INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. C02-1876L

ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

AND STAY PENDING APPEAL

FRANCES CLAIRMONT, 

Plaintiff,

v.

PAUL A. O’BRIEN,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on a motion filed by plaintiff Frances Clairmont for

entry of judgment following the Court’s order granting the individual defendants’ motion for

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 The “individual defendants” are former Genuity employees Ron Henderson, Robert

Hayes, Lynne Stewart, Paul Gudonis and James Freeze.

ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

AND STAY PENDING APPEAL - 2

summary judgment.1 Plaintiff also seeks a stay of her remaining claim against defendant Paul

O’Brien pending resolution of her appeal. (Dkt. #154). 

For the reasons set forth in this Order, the Court denies the motion in its entirety.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Background.

The background facts are set forth in detail in this Court’s March 24 and June 20, 2005

orders regarding the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and will not be repeated here. 

(Dkt. ##125, 153). Instead, a brief recitation of the procedural background is appropriate.

Plaintiff filed this action in King County Superior Court in July 2002; the individual

defendants subsequently removed the case to this Court. Over two years later and after the

deadline to join additional parties had passed, plaintiff filed suit against O’Brien in October

2004, then moved to consolidate that case with her case against the individual defendants. 

Although the Court found that plaintiff’s delay in suing O’Brien was egregious and would delay

resolution, it granted the motion to consolidate because the actions involved common questions

of law and fact, and the interests of judicial economy would be served by consolidation. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).

On March 24, 2005, the Court granted the individual defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, and denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. (Dkt. ##125, 150). Meanwhile,

O’Brien moved for summary judgment. The Court granted the motion in part and denied it in

part, allowing Clairmont to pursue her claim that O’Brien wilfully denied her billings value

commissions for the Microsoft WebTV Dial deal for August, September, and October 2001. 

(Dkt. 153). 

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 Plaintiff stresses that if she is successful in her appeal, two trials will be conducted,

resulting in the waste of judicial resources. While that outcome is possible, it is certain that two

appeals would occur if the Court granted plaintiff’s motion, leading to “piecemeal appeals.” 

Sears, 351 U.S. at 438. 

ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

AND STAY PENDING APPEAL - 3

B. Analysis.

The Supreme Court has outlined the steps a district court must follow in making

determinations under Rule 54(b). “A district court must first determine that it is dealing with a

‘final judgment.’ It must be a . . . decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be . . .

‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims

action.’” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (quoting Sears,

Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)). In this case, the Court has made a final

determination regarding plaintiff’s claims against the individual defendants. 

After the district court has found finality, it must determine, in its sound judicial

discretion, if there is any just reason for delay. Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8. The district court

must “take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved.” Id.

This inquiry is necessary in order to “preserve the historic federal policy against piecemeal

appeals.” Sears, 351 U.S. at 438. District courts should consider factors including “whether the

claims under review were separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the

nature of the claims already determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide

the same issues more than once.” Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8.

In this case, plaintiff’s claims against the individual defendants and O’Brien are based on

the same facts and legal issues regarding whether they wrongfully withheld commissions based

on order value, billings value, and other categories. Indeed, plaintiff stressed the commonalities

when she moved for consolidation of the two cases. For this reason, an appellate court would

have to decide the same legal and factual issues twice and entry of judgment would be

inappropriate.2

 See, e.g., Frank Briscoe Co., Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 776 F.2d 1414,

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ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

AND STAY PENDING APPEAL - 4

1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A similarity of legal or factual issues will weigh heavily against entry of

judgment under the rule”) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

Moreover, plaintiff has not shown that there is no just reason for delay or that the Court,

in its discretion, should stay the pending case against O’Brien. Plaintiff argues that she will be

burdened by having to proceed with discovery by O’Brien. However, discovery would be

necessary even if she ultimately prevails in her appeal against the individual defendants. 

Furthermore, when the Court granted plaintiff’s motion to consolidate, it expressly noted that

doing so would result in some duplication of discovery efforts because of plaintiff’s lengthy

delay in suing him. Plaintiff cannot now bemoan the predictable results of her own litigation

tactics. Also, plaintiff ignores the fact that O’Brien has a strong interest in the prompt resolution

of the claim against him. A stay would result in a potentially lengthy delay of that resolution. 

Finally, plaintiff argues that the monetary value of her remaining claim against O’Brien is small

compared to the value of her claims against the individual defendants. Although plaintiff’s

desire to expeditiously pursue her highest value claim is understandable, that factor does not

outweigh the delay in resolution for O’Brien and the resulting piecemeal appeals. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for entry of judgment and

stay pending appeal (Dkt. #154).

DATED this 29th day of July, 2005.

A

Robert S. Lasnik

United States District Judge

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