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MINUTE ORDER RE: ORAL ARGUMENT

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

GARY ALAN NOBLE,

Petitioner,

v.

SANDRA CARTER,

Respondent.

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Case No. C06-579-JLR-JPD

MINUTE ORDER RE: 

ORAL ARGUMENT

The following minute order is made at the direction of the Court, the Honorable James

P. Donohue, United States Magistrate Judge:

The Court has set oral argument on the Petition for Habeas Corpus for Thursday,

January 18, 2007, at 2:30 p.m. Each side will have up to 30 minutes to present argument. To

assist the parties in their preparation, the Court is interested in having the following issues

addressed in argument:

1. The Washington appellate courts failed to even mention Lackawanna County

Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001). Can a state court decision that fails to even cite

this critical Supreme Court decision be held to not violate clearly established federal law?

2. In this case, it appears that some kind of a hearing took place before the

juvenile court judge. For example, one of the orders of the King County Superior Court

regarding the 1969 conviction directs the transcription of statements made by law enforcement

officers during the juvenile court proceedings. See Administrative Record (“AR”) at App. C.

at 1-2 (order filed March 4, 1969). Is there any evidence in the record that the petitioner was

Case 2:06-cv-00579-JLR Document 15 Filed 01/16/07 Page 1 of 2
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MINUTE ORDER RE: ORAL ARGUMENT

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represented by counsel or waived his right to be represented while before the juvenile court?

3. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the Supreme Court held that a

juvenile court’s determination to retain or waive jurisdiction over a defendant is a “critical

stage” in a criminal proceeding, during which the basic guarantees of due process attach,

including the right to counsel. While there is no “constitutional right to be tried in a juvenile

court,” In re Personal Restraint of Boot, 130 Wn.2d 553 (1996), can the state court appellate

decisions in this matter be read consistently with Kent, particularly when it is not even

mentioned?

4. The petitioner was arrested on October 19, 1968, approximately three weeks

before he turned 18 years of age (see AR, Ex. 9 at 6), and charged in King County Superior

Court on November 18, 1968, approximately six days after he turned 18 years of age. See AR,

Ex. 5 at 2-3. Under State v. Kramer, 72 Wn.2d 904, 907 (1968), when a juvenile cause is not

heard on its merits prior to the time the juvenile reaches 18 years of age, the juvenile court

loses jurisdiction over the cause. If this is the case, why doesn’t the date of charge and guilty

plea govern this matter?

5. Does the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Grigsby v. Cotton, 456 F.3d 727

(7th Cir. 2006), provide support for the proposition that any juvenile decline hearing was

optional and transfer to superior court automatic upon return of the information against

petitioner, and for that reason, provision of counsel at the juvenile hearing (and the hearing

itself) was not a “critical stage” under Gideon at the time it occurred?

This list is not meant to preclude counsel from addressing other issues as they deem

appropriate. 

DATED this 16th day of January, 2007.

Bruce Rifkin

Clerk of the Court

/s/ Peter H. Voelker 

Peter H. Voelker

Deputy Clerk

Case 2:06-cv-00579-JLR Document 15 Filed 01/16/07 Page 2 of 2