DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

B&L SERVICE, INC.,

Appellant,

v.

BROWARD COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and

RASIER-DC, LLC,

Appellees.

No. 4D19-2100

[July 29, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Sandra Perlman, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE16-

002723(04).

Mark J. Stempler of Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., West Palm Beach, 

for appellant.

Rocio Blanco Garcia of the Broward County Attorney’s Office, 

Fort Lauderdale, for appellee Broward County.

Alyssa M. Reiter of Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A., 

Fort Lauderdale, for appellee Rasier-DC, LLC.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

In this public records case, B&L Service, Inc. (“Yellow Cab”) appeals the

order denying its motion for attorney’s fees under section 119.12, Florida 

Statutes (2016). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Most of the relevant background facts are set forth in Rasier-DC, LLC v. 

B&L Service, Inc. (Rasier I), 237 So. 3d 374, 375 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018):

Uber and Broward County entered into a license agreement 

governing Uber’s services at the airport and Port Everglades.

Article 2.6.4 of the agreement addressed Uber’s monthly 

self-reporting requirements. Article 9.4 required Broward 

County to maintain the confidentiality of Uber’s trade secret 
2

information and assert its exempt status in response to a 

public records request.

Uber’s monthly reports contained both aggregate and 

granular data. The aggregate data is the number of pickups 

and drop-offs at the airport and seaport, “multiplied by the fee 

in each of those zones.” The granular data is information on 

every pickup and drop-off, including a time stamp, the 

longitude and latitude, and the first three characters of the 

driver’s license plate which identifies the individual. Uber 

marked the reports as containing trade secret information, 

exempt from the Public Records Act.

Yellow Cab made a public records request to Broward 

County for: “All reports or documents reflecting pick-ups by 

Rasier–DC, LLC or Uber at the [airport], and the sums of 

money paid or owing to [the county] for those trips, beginning 

in October, 2015 and through the present.” . . . The county 

responded that any reports marked trade secret would not be 

disclosed without Uber’s authorization, pursuant to the 

license agreement, and produced a redacted set.

Yellow Cab then filed a complaint against Broward County 

for violating Florida’s Public Records Act, seeking un-redacted 

monthly reports on Uber’s pickups at the airport. Uber then 

moved to intervene as the owner of the trade secret 

information and real party in interest. The trial court granted 

the motion to intervene.

(alterations in original) (emphasis in original removed).

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a final order 

wherein it found that all the redacted information in the reports was 

protected trade secrets and exempt from disclosure under Florida’s Public 

Records Act. The trial court also expressly found that Broward County 

“did not violate the Public Records Act when it refused to disclose 

unredacted monthly reports in response to a public records request.”

Yellow Cab thereafter moved for rehearing, arguing the trial court 

overlooked that its public records request was limited to the amount of 

money paid to Broward County and the number of pickups. Accordingly, 

it sought rehearing for the limited purpose “of obtaining an order that 

requires disclosure of only the amount paid, or due, to the County, based 

upon the number of pick-ups.” The motion did not seek rehearing of the 
3

trial court’s express ruling in the final order that Broward County did not 

violate the Public Records Act.

The trial court ultimately granted the motion for rehearing in part, 

finding that “the aggregate number of pick-ups and the sum of money paid 

by [Uber] to the County as a usage fee at the [airport] does not constitute 

trade secret information such that it would be exempt from public 

disclosure.” The court found the remaining redacted information in the 

reports to constitute trade secrets. The rehearing order did not mention 

or alter the ruling in the final order that Broward County complied with 

the Public Records Act. To the contrary, the rehearing order specifically 

states the final order is only “MODIFIED as set forth herein.”

In Rasier I, appellee Rasier-DC, LLC (“Uber”1) appealed the trial court’s 

decision. We affirmed, holding that “the total number of pickups and the 

fees paid to Broward County do not meet the definition of trade secrets 

under sections 688.002(4) or 812.081(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2016).” 

Rasier I, 237 So. 3d at 377. Importantly, Yellow Cab did not cross-appeal 

the trial court’s express ruling in the final order that Broward County did 

not violate the Public Records Act. 

After we issued our mandate in Rasier I, the trial court addressed 

Yellow Cab’s pending motion for attorney’s fees against Broward County 

pursuant to section 119.12, Florida Statutes (2016). The trial court denied 

the motion for two reasons. First, it found that by failing to cross-appeal 

in Rasier I, Yellow Cab waived the issue of whether Broward County 

unlawfully refused the records request. Second, relying on our decision in 

State Attorney’s Office of Seventeenth Judicial Circuit v. Cable News 

Network, Inc., 254 So. 3d 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), it found that Broward 

County’s refusal to produce the unredacted reports could not be unlawful 

because it was based on the “trade secret” exemption contained in section 

815.045, Florida Statutes (2016). This appeal follows.

Section 119.12, Florida Statutes (2016), allows for an award of 

attorney’s fees to a prevailing party who files a civil action against a public 

agency to enforce Florida’s public records laws. By its terms, section 

119.12 only allows for fees “if the court determines that [the] agency 

unlawfully refused to permit a public record to be inspected or copied.” Id. 

A refusal is unlawful, in turn, “when a court determines that the reason 

1 As we explained in Rasier I: “Rasier is a subsidiary of Uber Technologies, Inc. 

It licenses technology from Uber Technologies, Inc., and then licenses it to Uber 

drivers. While Uber Technologies, Inc., is not a party to the case, Rasier is 

referred to as Uber for ease of understanding.” Rasier I, 237 So. 3d at 375 n.1.
4

proffered as a basis to deny a public records request is improper.” Office 

of State Att’y for Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. Gonzalez, 953 So. 2d 

759, 764 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). In other words, a determination that a public 

agency acted unlawfully for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees is 

predicated on a finding by the trial court that the agency violated a 

provision of the Public Records Act. See Bd. of Trs., Jacksonville Police & 

Fire Pension Fund v. Lee, 189 So. 3d 120, 122 (Fla. 2016) (“[W]e hold that 

a prevailing party is entitled to statutory attorney’s fees under the Public 

Records Act when the trial court finds that the public agency violated a 

provision of the Public Records Act in failing to permit a public record to 

be inspected or copied.”).

With these parameters in mind, Broward County and Uber jointly argue 

that by failing to cross-appeal the trial court’s ruling that Broward County 

did not violate the Public Records Act in Rasier I, Yellow Cab necessarily 

waived the issue of whether Broward County unlawfully refused the public 

records request. We agree.

“Generally, a cross-appeal must be filed to challenge an unfavorable 

portion of a final judgment substantially favorable to the appellee.” Wiccan 

Religious Coop. of Fla., Inc. v. Zingale, 898 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2005). If a party fails to cross-appeal an adverse ruling and the case is 

remanded, the party is precluded from subsequently challenging that 

adverse ruling unless the parties consent to the issue being heard. See id.

The holding in Mootry v. Bethune-Cookman University, Inc. (Mootry II), 

279 So. 3d 207 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019), is instructive. In that case, a 

professor sued the university for breach of employment contract. Id. at 

208. One of the arguments the professor made in the first trial was that 

the university failed to comply with the procedures in the faculty 

handbook. Id. at 212. The professor lost in the first trial but the appellate 

court reversed for a new trial in Mootry v. Bethune-Cookman University, 

Inc. (Mootry I), 186 So. 3d 15 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). After the second trial 

resulted in a verdict for the university, the professor appealed and the 

court in Mootry II reversed and remanded for a new trial. Mootry II, 279 

So. 3d at 208. Of particular significance, the university cross-appealed in 

Mootry II and attempted to challenge “the trial court’s determination, prior 

to the first trial, that, by their conduct, the parties had made the faculty 

handbook (or portions thereof) part of [the professor’s] employment 

contract.” Id. at 211–12. The Mootry II court refused to address the 

university’s argument, holding that because the university “did not 

challenge this decision by the trial court in its cross-appeal in Mootry I

. . . . it has waived its right to challenge that decision in this subsequent 

appeal.” Id. at 212; see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Naugle, 182 So. 3d 
5

885, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that by failing to cross-appeal the 

comparative fault issue in the first appeal, the tobacco company waived 

the issue in the second appeal).

Here, similar to Mootry, the trial court made an express ruling in the 

final order that Broward County did not violate the Public Records Act in 

initially refusing to produce the unredacted reports. This ruling, which 

was final in nature and unaltered by the rehearing order, was undoubtedly

unfavorable to Yellow Cab. By failing to cross-appeal that unfavorable 

portion of the final order, Yellow Cab has waived its right to challenge that 

ruling in this subsequent appeal. As an award of attorney’s fees under 

section 119.12 is predicated on a finding that the public agency violated a 

provision of the Public Records Act, Yellow Cab’s argument that it is 

entitled to attorney’s fees under the statute must necessarily fail. Stated 

differently, there can be no unlawful refusal in this case in light of the trial 

court’s unchallenged ruling that Broward County did not violate a 

provision of the Public Records Act.

Affirmed.

FORST and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.