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i 

94–217 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–15] 

THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE 

AGAINST ISIL AND U.S. POLICY, 

STRATEGY, AND POSTURE IN 

THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 3, 2015 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL TEHRANI, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Austin, GEN Lloyd J., III, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command ............. 6 

Wormuth, Hon. Christine E., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Austin, GEN Lloyd J., III ................................................................................ 49 

Wormuth, Hon. Christine E. ............................................................................ 43 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 103 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 107 

(1) 

THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION FOR 

USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST ISIL AND U.S. POLICY, STRATEGY, AND POSTURE IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 3, 2015. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Hearing will come to order. 

Good morning. Today, the House Armed Services Committee 

meets to hear testimony on the U.S. Central Command’s strategic 

threats and challenges. 

By way of information for our members and guests, we will go 

as far as we can go until 10:30, then we will recess to attend the 

joint meeting on the House floor, and then we will resume just as 

soon as that joint meeting is over. 

We explored with our witnesses maybe trying to rearrange this 

hearing; that wasn’t possible. And so with you all’s patience, we 

will come back just as soon as the joint meeting is completed in 

order to continue the hearing. 

Over the past year, the developments in U.S. Central Command’s 

[CENTCOM] area of responsibility have been troubling. The rise of 

the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS], questions about future 

security situation in Afghanistan, the Government of Yemen’s fall 

to Iranian-backed rebels, and the prospect of a deal ratifying Iran 

as a threshold nuclear power, all have created serious stress on our 

strategic position and on our alliances. Any notion that the U.S. 

could pivot away from the Middle East toward other regions has 

proven to be naive at best. 

Part of the challenge here is the absence of a comprehensive 

strategy across the Middle East. The limited approach that the 

President has taken has left instability and weak or failed states 

from Libya to Yemen. Many of those locations have become breeding grounds for terrorists, which is the opposite, of course, of what 

the administration has tried to achieve. As various actors in the 

Middle East and elsewhere follow our defense budget debates, one 

of the results of that has been more doubts about the reliability as 

an ally. 
2 

What I hope to hear today is a comprehensive strategy or at least 

the foundations of a strategy which will help provide a roadmap towards a more stable Middle East led by responsible actors. These 

states have just as much at stake in defeating Islamic terrorism as 

we do. 

This committee also needs to continue to explore operational concerns we have about various AUMF [authorization for use of military force] proposals that contain restrictions on how we engage 

the enemy. I believe it is critical that we do not validate Iran’s 

standing in the region by allowing them to have threshold nuclear 

capability. That has and will breed instability and increase security 

competition in both the Middle East and the wider geopolitical 

order. We cannot allow that to happen. 

Mr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I agree with the chairman, you, General Austin, you have 

the toughest assignment in the military. The problems keep cropping up in many places. For, you know, over a decade we had the 

wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Those two areas are still problematic, but many others have been added since then. And I think 

the chairman did a pretty good exhaustive list looking at Syria and 

Yemen and other places. 

And getting back to stability in that region is an enormous challenge. I will say that I think it sort of defies a comprehensive strategy where you come up with the strategy and then you just, you 

know, automatically plug it in no matter what happens. The problems evolve. They move in different directions, and they are contradictory. 

Certainly, we are opposed to Assad’s leadership in Syria. That, 

you know, bad leadership has led to all kinds of problems, but, you 

know, the alternative does not look much more attractive. So what 

is your solution? What do you do? There are no easy answers there, 

number one; number two, I think it would be a mistake for us to 

assume that it is either the U.S.’s responsibility or that we have 

the ability ourselves to solve these problems. 

This is primarily a regional issue. This is primarily a problem of 

governance, leadership, religion, all manner of different issues colliding in that region. What we have to do is see how we can be part 

of helping to move those countries in a correct direction to get to 

greater stability. This is not something that the U.S. can come up 

with a plan and then go in there and implement it and fix Syria 

or fix Yemen or fix Iraq. 

I think if we took that approach, that would be a mistake and 

would lead to greater pushback than it would to solutions. And obviously, one of the biggest problems in the region, aside from the 

Islamic extremists, like ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] 

and Al Qaeda, is the Sunni-Shia split, you know, most exemplified 

by the split between Saudi Arabia and Iran. That complicates everything. In the offensive that we have just heard about launched 

against Tikrit is launched against ISIL. Obviously that is, you 
3 

know, one of our foremost enemies that we want to see defeated. 

One of the countries leading that offensive is Iran, another country 

that we are troubled by. How do you sort of deal with all of those 

different complex situations? 

And I think what I want to hear today personally is not that you 

have the answer. I am not going to put that burden on you, to say 

here is the strategy that is going to solve the problem. I want to 

hear how the U.S. can best use its resources to make the problem 

better instead of worse, understanding that it defies any sort of 

simple solution or defies any sort of U.S. solution. 

And let me just say on Iran, on the idea that somehow if we do 

a deal with them we make them a threshold nuclear power, they 

have already done that. They made that decision and they moved 

forward. There is no deal—I think the deal that everybody wants 

is where we go in and we tell Iran you give everything up and we 

get to keep the sanctions on you. Well, I don’t think Iran is going 

to go for that, so we have got to figure out what is the best approach. And the approach the administration is trying to take is 

trying to contain them to make sure that they cannot break out 

and get to a nuclear weapon. 

If we don’t reach a deal, the risk of that happening goes up exponentially because then Iran has nothing to lose. The sanctions are 

there. How do we monitor it? How do we pursue it? If we can get 

an agreement that severely limits their nuclear program so that we 

can be confident that they won’t be able to get a nuclear weapon 

for at least a year or more without us first knowing that they are 

trying to do it, I think that is a significant improvement. If we 

walk away, the status quo is not to our advantage. There is no reason to believe that they won’t expand their nuclear situation that 

could lead to even greater conflict in the region. 

Again, I would prefer the answer that says Iran just walks away 

from the nuclear program, no questions asked. I just don’t see that 

on the table. And I think that is but one example of the complex 

set of choices that we face here that defy easy answers, that defy 

a U.S. policy that is just going to solve the problem. 

So in a complicated world, like I said, I look forward to hearing 

what we can do to hopefully contain the problem and move things 

in the right direction, understanding the limitations of our ability 

to simply solve them. 

With that, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am pleased to welcome back Ms. Christine 

Wormuth, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and General 

Lloyd Austin, Commander of the U.S. Central Command as our 

guest witnesses today. 

Without objection, both of your full written statements will be 

made part of the record, and we would invite you at this point to 

summarize your statements before we go to questions. 

Ms. Wormuth. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking 

Member Smith, and members of the committee, for inviting me 
4 

here today to talk about DOD [Department of Defense] strategy 

and posture in the Greater Middle East. It is a pleasure to be back 

here again this week to talk to you about a different and even more 

challenging part of the world. 

It is also a great pleasure to be here with General Austin. We 

are very lucky to have him serving as our commander in 

CENTCOM. He is also, frankly, a terrific reminder of the overall 

quality of all of our men and women serving in the region today. 

As you all know, our forces in CENTCOM are confronting many 

difficult global security challenges. New realities have forced us to 

take a hard look at our near- and long-term goals for our engagement in the Middle East. Although the Department will face many 

different challenges in the Middle East, as Ranking Member Smith 

noted, two issues are particularly critical and are at the top of our 

agenda: The first is how to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL, and 

the second is preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 

In Iraq and Syria, the Department is working with partners for 

a truly whole-of-government effort to try and degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. We have over 2,600 U.S. service men and 

women currently in Iraq working with the Government of Iraq, and 

more than 60 countries participating in our global coalition against 

ISIL. We are making progress. This is going to be a long-term campaign and we need to be patient, but we are making progress. 

We have blunted ISIL’s momentum. We have degraded its ability 

to mass and maneuver forces. We have pressured or eliminated its 

leadership cells, and we have disrupted its command and control 

and supply lines. In short, we have put ISIL on the defensive. And 

I think you are seeing that, and I am sure General Austin will 

speak to that in more detail in various parts of Iraq right now. 

But countering ISIL would not be possible without local partners 

in the lead. U.S. and coalition partners are supporting the Government of Iraq by assisting with training, equipping, and advising its 

armed forces. Last summer, we stood up our advise and assist 

teams to partner with local forces in the ISF [Iraqi security forces] 

and the Peshmerga, and early this year we began training these 

forces at four different sites across Iraq. I traveled to Iraq in January and was able to visit one of the sites myself, Taiji, where I was 

able to see firsthand the partnership that we have with Iraqi 

forces. 

In addition to our efforts in Iraq to go after ISIL, we are also 

working with our coalition partners in Syria, and we are also working to build the capabilities of the moderate Syrian opposition 

there. We expect the training of our first DOD class of vetted opposition elements to begin—we expect to begin training them later 

this month. Our forces in the region are strengthening our partners’ ability to fight terrorism locally, but ultimately, it is going to 

be Iraqi forces and Syrian fighters who will secure the gains 

against ISIL and inflict a lasting defeat. 

To support what we are doing, the President has developed and 

transmitted to Congress an authorization for the use of military 

force that demonstrates a whole-of-government support for him to 

successfully prosecute the armed conflict against ISIL within reasonable limitations. Enacting a bipartisan ISIL-specific AUMF 

would provide a clear and powerful signal to the American people, 
5 

to our allies, and to our enemies, and very importantly, I think, to 

our U.S. service men and women that the United States stands 

united to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. And I look forward 

to talking with you more this morning about the AUMF proposal. 

Defeating ISIL is a major focus and challenge but so is Iran in 

the region. As the President has made clear, his top priority is preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue to be a consistent area of concern for us in the Department of Defense. We are hopeful that the P5+1 negotiations 

will result in a comprehensive and verifiable deal that will ensure 

the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. But at DOD, our job 

is to remain vigilant as well, and we do that by helping to underwrite negotiations with our robust posture and capabilities in the 

region, and we maintain a laser-like focus on that. 

As the President has said publicly, we will do whatever is necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, including 

the use of military force, if necessary, and we are postured to do 

that in the region today. Beyond Iran’s nuclear program, we have 

other concerns about Iran’s activities in the region. They are engaged in a variety of destabilizing activities across the region but 

also well beyond that. And even if we are successful in neutralizing 

Iran’s nuclear threat through hard-nosed diplomacy, we will continue to support U.S. Government efforts to counter Iran and the 

full range of threats that it poses to our friends and allies in the 

region and beyond. 

Even as we work to degrade and defeat ISIL and to prevent Iran 

from acquiring a nuclear weapon, we are also at the same time 

committed to moving to a smaller force in Afghanistan and consolidating the gains that we have made there over the past decade of 

international support to the Afghanistan Government. The U.S. 

mission in Afghanistan has helped support the Afghan people and 

has protected U.S. national interests by working with local partners to build up the capacity of the Afghan National Security 

Forces. 

It is clear that we still have a lot of work to do in the next 2 

years, but I think we have made some very positive strides, and 

I am particularly encouraged by the fact that President Ghani sees 

the U.S. and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] role and 

presence as a very important part of his strategy to bring stability 

and security to Afghanistan. 

We are also going to continue to work with Pakistan and the 

Central Asian States to address existing and emerging threats in 

the region. Like Afghanistan, Pakistan is also facing a potent 

threat from extremists, and I think something we all saw tragically 

with the attack on the school in Peshawar. We are committed to 

continuing to improve our relationship with Pakistan by collaborating where our strategic interests come together and engaging 

diplomatically where they don’t. 

Meeting the range of challenges that we see in the CENTCOM 

AOR [area of responsibility] is going to take a lot of resources and 

effort, and it is important that we use those resources as effectively 

as possible, as Ranking Member Smith noted. The President’s 

budget request for 2016 supports our strategy for the region and 

enables the services to continue to address our most critical needs, 
6 

even as we get smaller and more capable over the next several 

years. 

If sequestration returns, however, in 2016 and beyond, the Department’s readiness would deteriorate markedly, which would 

harm our ability to respond promptly and efficiently when called 

upon. As a consequence, we would have fewer forces available to 

support operations and respond to crises in a region as vital as the 

Middle East. 

This is a very dynamic time for our policy in the region. It is a 

challenging time. The Secretary has signaled his commitment to 

working with our government and international partners to shape 

a more secure region in the coming years. We are clear-eyed about 

the fiscal constraints we are facing, but we believe it is necessary 

even in the face of those constraints to maintain our commitment 

to protect our interests in the region and to combat the threats 

that we face there. 

Thank you. 

And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Wormuth can be found in 

the Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

General AUSTIN. Good morning. Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I want to 

thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to talk about 

the broad efforts and the current posture of the United States Central Command. 

Upfront and most importantly, I would like to thank all of you 

for your continued and strong support of our men and women in 

uniform and their families. I look forward to talking about them 

and about the exceptional contributions that they continue to make 

on behalf of the command and our Nation. 

I am pleased to appear here this morning alongside Ms. 

Wormuth. Christine is widely respected by professionals throughout the Defense Department, both civilian and military, and we are 

most grateful for her support of our efforts at CENTCOM. I will 

join her in making a few brief opening comments and then we are 

prepared to answer your questions. 

Ladies and gentlemen, much has happened in the CENTCOM 

area of responsibility since I last appeared before this committee a 

year ago. Indeed, the Central Region is today more volatile and 

chaotic than I have seen it at any other point, and the stakes have 

never been higher. The forces of evil that threaten our homeland 

and our interest in that strategically important part of the world 

thrive in unstable environments marked by poor governance, economic uncertainty, ungoverned or under-governed spaces. And 

therefore, it is essential that we be present and engaged and that 

we cultivate strong partnerships and continue to do our part to address emerging threats and to move the region in a direction of 

greater stability and security. And we must be properly resourced 
7 

to do what is required to effectively protect and promote our interests. 

At CENTCOM, in addition to doing all that we can to prevent 

problems from occurring, while shaping future outcomes, we spend 

a great deal of our time and energy managing real-world crisis. 

Over the past year, we dealt with conflicts in Iraq and Syria, we 

transitioned combat operations to a train, advise, and assist CT 

[counterterrorism]-focused mission in Afghanistan. At the same 

time, we dealt with a number of difficult challenges in Yemen, 

Egypt, Lebanon, and in a host of other locations throughout our 

area of responsibility. We actively pursued violent extremist 

groups, and we took measures to counter the radical ideologies that 

are espoused by these groups. 

We also dealt with Iran, which continues to act as a belligerent 

force in the region, primarily through its Quds forces and through 

support to proxy actors, such as Lebanese Hezbollah. And while we 

are hopeful that an acceptable agreement will be reached with Iran 

with respect to its nuclear program, either way, whether we reach 

an agreement or we don’t reach an agreement, Iran will continue 

to present a challenge for us going forward. 

We are faced with a number of challenges in our region; however, 

I firmly believe that challenges also present opportunities, and we 

make progress primarily by pursuing these opportunities, and we 

do pursue them. And I am confident that our broad efforts are having a measurable impact. Of course, the most immediate threat facing us now is a threat posed by ISIL or Daesh [Arabic acronym for 

ISIL]. This barbaric organization must be defeated, and it will be 

defeated. 

We are currently in the process of executing our regional military 

campaign plan, and I am pleased to report that we are making significant progress. At the outset, we said that we would need to halt 

ISIL’s advance, and we have done that in Iraq. We said that we 

are going to have to regenerate and restructure Iraq’s security 

forces to help them re-establish the border, and we are in the process of doing that right now. 

We said that we would have to help our partners in the region 

to bolster their defenses against ISIL, and we continue to help our 

friends in Jordan and Lebanon and Turkey. We said that we would 

have to build credible ground forces to counter ISIL in Syria and 

to guard against ungoverned spaces, and we will soon begin doing 

that as a part of our Syria train and equip program. 

So ladies and gentlemen, we are making progress. In fact, we are 

about where we said that we would be in the execution of our military campaign plan, which supports the broader whole-of-government strategy that is designed to counter ISIL. And we are having 

significant effects on the enemy. 

Since commencing our air operations in early August, just 7 

months ago, we have killed more than 8,500 ISIL fighters, we have 

destroyed hundreds of their vehicles along with tanks and heavy 

weapons systems. We have significantly degraded his capability, 

his ability to command and control his forces, and also his primary 

sources of revenue, namely, his oil refineries and his crude collection points. 
8 

The fact is that he can no longer do what he did at the outset, 

which is to seize and to hold new territory. He has assumed a defensive crouch in Iraq. And although he has greater freedom of 

movement in Syria, he is largely in a defensive there as well. He 

has begun to expand into other areas, namely North Africa, and in 

part because he knows that he is losing in Iraq and Syria and he 

needs to find other ways to maintain his legitimacy. 

In going forward, we should expect to see this enemy continue 

to conduct limited attacks and to orchestrate horrific scenes in 

order to create IO [information operations] opportunities and to 

distract and to intimidate. But make no mistake, ISIL is losing this 

fight, and I am certain that he will be defeated. Again, he will be 

defeated. 

Having said that, there is still work to be done to get to that 

point, and we intend to continue to execute the campaign as designed, and I say that because how we go about this is very important. If we don’t first get things under control in Iraq, where there 

is a government that we can work with and with some reliable security forces that are available, if we don’t get things right there 

first before expanding our efforts in Syria, then we risk making 

matters worse in both countries. 

But done the right way, in light of the limitations that exist, I 

believe that we can and we will be successful in our efforts to defeat ISIL. And at the same time, we can be assured continued 

progress in pursuit of our principal goal, which is to move this strategically important region in the direction of increased stability and 

security. 

Going forward, we will all be required to make tough choices, 

and we will need to find ways to do more or at least as much with 

less than the current fiscal environment. That said, I remain concerned by the fact that capability reductions can and will impact 

our ability to respond to crisis, and especially in the highly volatile 

Central Region. The resulting loss of flexibility makes the U.S. and 

our interests increasingly vulnerable to external pressures. 

And so I would ask Congress to do its part to make sure that 

we avoid sequestration and other resourcing limitations that serve 

to degrade the readiness of America’s military forces. 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, members of the 

committee, I want to thank you once more for the strong support 

that you continue to show to our service members, our civilians, 

and their families. They are the very best in the world at what 

they do. They continue to demonstrate absolute selflessness and 

they make enormous sacrifices in support of the mission and in 

support of one another. I am incredibly proud of them and I know 

that you are as well. 

So thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Austin can be found in the 

Appendix on page 49.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. We share your sentiment 

for those who serve our Nation, including yourself. 

I don’t think we have time to begin the questioning, so the committee is going to stand in recess until just after the joint meeting 

where we will resume. 
9 

In the meantime, you all please enjoy our hospitality as best you 

can. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Again, Ms. Wormuth, and, General, thank you for your patience. 

And we understand the inconvenience of this coming and going, but 

we appreciate you all being here. Members will continue to come 

in as they come back from the joint meeting. 

I don’t know, General, did you have a chance to listen to the 

Prime Minister’s speech? 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir, I did. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. You know, I was struck, your comments 

in your opening statement, about Iran’s other activities other than 

its nuclear programs. And that was certainly a point that was 

highlighted by the Prime Minister. 

You spend a lot of time dealing with military leaders throughout 

your region in the Middle East and North Africa. My question to 

you is: If there is an agreement that says that Iran shall not be 

closer to—that has the effect of having Iran not closer than 1 year 

of having a nuclear weapon, what, in your estimation, would be the 

reaction of other countries in the region? And I am thinking particularly about the Saudis, the Turks, the Egyptians, people who 

are interested in this negotiation other than Israel. What would be 

their reaction to that? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, no matter what the outcome is, I think 

there will be—always be some degree of speculation. I think the 

first thing that they will want to know is what the details of the 

agreement are before they make an assessment on how it affects 

their interests going forward and their security. 

To your point that you made earlier, sir, I think the people—the 

leaders in the region certainly believe that Iran’s quest for a nuclear weapon is a threat to the region. But they are also equally 

concerned about Iran’s ability to mine the Straits, Iran’s cyber capabilities, Iran’s ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] capability 

or ballistic missile capability, as well as the activity of their Quds 

forces, which is unhelpful. And so whether we get a deal or don’t 

get a deal, I think they will still share those concerns. 

As we negotiate a deal—and I certainly hope that we are able to 

negotiate one, I think one of the things that we will have to do 

early on is to go and reassure our allies that we are going to be 

with them going forward. And we have—we have interest in the region that we will have to protect and we will certainly—certainly 

move to do that early on. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. When I have traveled in the region and 

also visited with some of their ambassadors here in Washington, 

one of the concerns I have heard expressed is that having Iran be 

a threshold nuclear state, basically being able to have it within a 

year or less, will embolden them with these other kind of activities 

that you talked about because, then, they will have less concern 

that the regime is threatened and, therefore, they will be more aggressive in pushing their proxies and potentially naval matters in 

the Persian Gulf and so forth. Is that some of the concerns that you 

have heard that you think allies will need to be reassured about? 
10 

General AUSTIN. Yes, sir. I think there are arguments on both 

side of the fence in terms of, you know, what people speculate that 

Iran’s reaction will be and what we will need to do to counter those 

reactions or hedge against unhelpful activity. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. Well, I am concerned not only about 

Israel’s reaction, which we just heard, but there are a number of 

other countries that are vitally interested in this. And so it seems 

to me that that also has to be taken into account. There are lots 

of topics we can and should talk about, including ISIS [Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria], Yemen, and Afghanistan. 

But at this point, I am going to yield to Mr. Smith and other 

members for questions they may have. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Following up on the Iran issue, I mean, I certainly would prefer 

a situation where Iran gives up all of its nuclear capacity and, you 

know, we can take that off the table. And I don’t think there is any 

disagreement with that. The question is, you know, how would we 

get there? And the answer is, at the moment, we wouldn’t. Iran 

would not agree to that. And I suppose, as the Prime Minister suggested, we could simply hold out and hope for a better deal. 

But one question I have is, as this—if we were to do that, if we 

were to walk away, our sanctions regime is dependent upon other 

countries agreeing to it. What is your view on what Russia and 

China and Europe would do in terms of maintaining their sanctions on Iran if we walked away from a deal? And how would that 

effect Iran’s economy and the entire negotiation? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Ranking Member Smith, I think obviously 

the sanctions regime that we have been able to put in place with 

support from the international community has been key to bringing 

the Iranians to the table for the negotiations. And I think it would 

be an open question, particularly with some of the countries, as to 

whether the support for those sanctions over time for those very, 

very stiff sanctions, whether they could be sustained in the absence 

of an ongoing negotiation as we have right now. 

So again, I think, our judgment to date has been that as difficult 

as the situation is—and as you said, Iran has a vote in this. I 

mean, they have to be willing to make a deal—our sense has been 

that the talks that we are engaged in right now are the best chance 

for a potentially lasting solution, and we want to give them a 

chance. But if they end and there is not a deal, you know, I think 

we will have to revisit the way forward. But reassurance of the 

ally—or the partners in the region is going to be a very key part 

of that because they are obviously very nervous. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. General Austin, do you have a comment or—— 

General AUSTIN. I don’t, sir. I certainly agree—— 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General AUSTIN [continuing]. With what Ms. Wormuth has said, 

and I wouldn’t have anything to add to that, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. And then the other piece of it is—I mean, 

there is a number of arguments. One of the arguments is that Iran 

frequently violates deals and doesn’t do what they said they were 

going to. And if that is the case, there is really nothing we could 

do. You know, they are basically going to move forward and do 

whatever they are going to do and, you know, we are limited. 
11 

The more interesting question to me is: As has been pointed out, 

Iran has been a year or—depending on who you listen to, anywhere 

from 3 months to a year away from a nuclear weapon for, gosh, 10 

years now at least. Why, in your estimation, have they not just 

gone ahead and built one? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman Smith, I can’t speculate as to 

the reasons why they haven’t—— 

Mr. SMITH. Well, anyone can speculate. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, I guess what I would say is that is 

what it would be. It would be speculation, you know. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Our sense is, is that Iran’s leadership has 

not made the decision to go all the way and acquire a nuclear 

weapon. Why that is, you know, is known to the Supreme Leader, 

but I am not sure it is known to anyone in our government. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. No. I mean, it is, I think, a cost-benefit analysis there. And, you know, arguably the dumbest policy Iran has 

pursued in the last, you know, 15 years is the pursuit of a nuclear 

weapon because they are doing all manner of other bad stuff, but 

this is the one that has united the international community against 

them and brought sanctions against them. 

So, you know, I just think that it is worth it to continue to try 

to negotiate because if we could take the nuclear weapon off the 

table for some extended period of time in Iran, there is a big benefit to that. Just like, you know, for all of the missteps that happened in Syria, the fact that we were able to get rid of Syria’s 

chemical weapons is certainly a positive given now that ISIL is, 

you know, running around a good chunk of Syria relatively free. 

So I think we need to keep trying to figure out a way to get Iran 

to agree not to build that weapon. And I also think that it is clear 

from their past actions that it is—it is a 50/50 question for them. 

It is not something that they have 100 percent decided to do. Because if they had 100 percent decided to do it, it would be done at 

this point by even Prime Minister Netanyahu’s own admission saying they have been, you know, 6 months away from a bomb for 15 

years. So I hope we will keep trying to figure that out. 

Final question. And I know this is impossible to answer but a 

huge part of the problem in the region—and, believe me, there are 

many. But one big part of the problem in the region is the ShiaSunni split. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we have the 

ironic situation of Iran fighting ISIL and all of the different, you 

know, disruptive activities that are going on in Lebanon and Syria 

and elsewhere. 

And while we are trying to specifically contain the extremist 

threat that is ISIL, you know, part of what funded them early on 

was the notion of some of our allies in the region that, well, you 

know Assad is friends with Iran, so whatever we can do to go after 

him is fine and that added fuel to the fire. 

Is there any hope of any sort of, you know, both sides, Shia and 

Sunni, coming to at least—I don’t want to say a peace agreement— 

but figuring out how to better coexist in that region in a less extremist way? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, you are right. That is a difficult question 

to answer, and it involves some speculation going forward. But I 
12 

would hope that we would approach this, at least, on a country-bycountry basis at the outset. And certainly what we are trying to do 

in Iraq is, is ensure that the country stays together, it remains focused on the right things, that the government is accommodating 

to the Sunni population and the Kurdish population that is in the 

country which is, in my mind, you know, underlines or is a foundation for a lot of the problems that we have seen recently occur. So 

I think, you know, starting with that, I think it would be a good 

start. 

Also, no matter how we got here in terms of how the activity was 

supported in the past, the encouraging thing is that what we see 

currently is a lot of countries in the region and across the globe 

coming together to try to work with us to stem the flow of foreign 

fighters, to also minimize opportunities for this enemy to resource 

itself, to finance itself. And I think those types of things will make 

a difference going forward. 

And I will yield to Ms. Wormuth. 

Secretary WORMUTH. I was basically going to make the same 

point. I mean, I don’t think that there is a single cut-and-paste solution that you can take. But I think one of the lessons that we 

saw coming out perhaps of the previous experience of Iraq was that 

Maliki’s very sectarian approach to governing was a big part of 

how we got here; and that, I think, [Prime Minister] Abadi has a 

much greater understanding of the need for a more inclusive approach. And we continue to strongly underscore just how important 

it is that that be central to his approach to trying to solve this 

problem with ISIL. 

I think it is also—I wouldn’t want to overstate it—but I do think 

that the—the just pure barbarity of what ISIL has prosecuted in 

terms of the beheadings, the immolation of the Jordanian pilot, 

that has seemed to cause, I think, many countries and many of the 

publics in the region to look at this in a different way and to really, 

I think, question the extremism that they are seeing. So my hope 

is that perhaps that will do more to help bring the larger society 

together to try to find solutions. 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah. And I am sorry, final question on Iran. I guess 

the big question is: If the negotiations fall apart, where does that 

leave us? Because if negotiations fall apart—and we are not even 

trying to get them to stop—at that point, you know, it is a wide 

open question. Is Iran going to pursue that nuclear weapon or not? 

What do we do then? What do you think Israel does then? Do 

they wait and hope that, you know, the last decade continues and 

Iran doesn’t step across that line? How does that affect the region? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I think what I would say, Congressman, is, 

you know, if there isn’t a deal, certainly from the DOD perspective, 

we will continue to have the responsibility to—to essentially be the 

insurance policy, if you will, for the region in terms of making sure 

that we have the capabilities in our country to help defend Israel, 

to help defend our interests in the region. And we are committed 

to making sure that we have those capabilities in a very robust 

fashion. I think we will work closely with our partners in the region to reassure them of that continued commitment. And then I 

think, you know, how Israel approaches the problem will be, again, 

largely up to them. 
13 

But we—our responsibility in DOD is to make sure that we have 

the capabilities to respond if we think that there is a reason to do 

so and to make sure that we have the ability to provide a military 

option if needed. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And to the two 

panelists, thank you for being here and for your service to our Nation. 

I am always interested—I have been on this committee for 20 

years, so I go back to the Iraq war and 9/11 and all the tragedies 

of 9/11. 

And I heard you, Madam Secretary, and also, General Austin. 

You mentioned, Madam Secretary, sequestration. General Austin 

keeps talking about resources. 

We have had the service chiefs in here recently to talk about 

their budgets, and I know the world is very unsettled. I know that 

we have a certain responsibility, first, to the American people and 

then to our friends in other regions of the world. I don’t dispute 

that at all. 

But I just wonder, when you—you know, you are talking about 

the training these security forces in Afghanistan that it is—you 

know, still it is going well or it is going okay—maybe is a better 

word than ‘‘well.’’ It is a long process. 

I just wondered—I am not a great student of history, but I did 

study history. I just wonder how much longer can we as a nation— 

and you are a national figure because you are in the administration. General, you are an outstanding military man yourself. 

How much longer can we keep going down this road and expect 

our military to continue to do this and that when their budgets are 

being cut behind them? And I have been a strong proponent, if we 

are going to get serious about the world situation, we need to have 

a war tax. We cannot keep playing this budget game that we keep 

playing here in Washington and have you come testify. And then 

we have to battle this thing on the floor of the House, the chairman 

and ranking member do, of trying to salvage whatever money we 

can salvage. 

So my point is: Are we getting to a point that—as I think General Austin said, aren’t we at a point that we need to say the administration military leaders, you know, you and Saudi, you have 

got a lot of troops, put your troops on the ground. We have got 100 

to 200,000 Iraqis in the military. I know what we are trying to do. 

Some approximations I have heard is 20 to 30,000 fighters. General 

Austin, you say we have already killed 8,000. So let’s take the high 

figure of 30,000 jihadists and reduce that to 20. I don’t understand 

the numbers of this thing, the financial numbers, nor do I understand the numbers of kill. 

And how in the world are we going to continue to expand and 

send our troops around the world and try to take care of everybody 

else’s problems if they won’t step up and take care of it themselves 

and say to America, ‘‘You back us up, but we are going to be the 

frontline troops’’? I don’t know—I am not criticizing the administration. I just don’t know how much longer this game can keep going 

on. 
14 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, if I could try to respond to 

a couple of those points. I think fundamentally we have tried in a 

number of different areas, particularly I would say Afghanistan, 

but also in terms of the counter-ISIL campaign to work very much 

by, with, and through partner countries. So in Afghanistan, you 

know, we are very much trying to enable the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] to be able to take care of their own security. 

You know, fundamentally we got in there, as you well know, 

after 9/11 to ensure that Afghanistan would not be a safe haven 

for Al Qaeda. But in the next 2 years, I think we feel pretty good 

about what we are going to be able to do with the ANSF so that 

they will be able to take over by the end of 2016 and take care of 

their security themselves. We will stay there in a relatively small 

security cooperation footprint in Kabul, but it will largely be their 

responsibility at that point. 

And in Iraq and Syria, you know, we are working very closely 

with a huge coalition, and about more than a dozen of those members are contributing to the military coalition. So I think we are 

very much trying to take an approach that isn’t about America 

doing everything for everyone but trying to work with others to 

help them do more for themselves. And I am sure General Austin 

will want to add to that. 

General AUSTIN. And in terms of the effects that we are having 

on the enemy, sir, and in terms of the numbers, I think that the 

numbers are input to the overall calculus in terms of the effects 

created. But I think it is more important to focus on the effects. 

And as we look at ISIL’s behavior today, you know, you go back 

several months ago, ISIL was moving around in large convoy formations, flying a lot of black flags, taking up large swaths of territory. They can no longer do that, and it is principally because of 

the effects that we have had on—they have the ability to recruit 

more fighters into the country, and we know that. And so it is not 

about just the kinetic effects alone. It is about that, plus reducing 

visibility to recruit foreign fighters, plus reducing visibility to finance themselves. That creates the effects that we are beginning 

to see. And the enemy is beginning to struggle in a number of 

areas, in terms of governing, in terms of ability to control territory. 

So—— 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses. 

Again, just to go back for a moment regarding some of your testimony concerning our relationship with the Israeli Government and 

military. Again, General Dempsey has been before this committee 

a number of times and talked about how the mil-to-mil connection 

with Israel has a special sort of quality in nature that really is almost not matched anywhere in the world. And I was wondering, 

General, if you could sort of just kind of characterize that in terms 

of your own experience? 

And, Ms. Wormuth, you know, you mentioned, you know, that 

this is something that is ongoing and that will be there with or 

without an agreement. I was wondering, again, if you could just 

sort of underscore that point? 
15 

General AUSTIN. And, sir, I believe the question is, our militaryto-military relationship with Israel? 

As you know, sir, Israel falls in European Command’s area of responsibility. But we certainly—since it borders our region of responsibility or our area of responsibility, we certainly see a need 

to maintain good connectivity. 

I had a great relationship with the former chief of defense there, 

with Benny Gantz. And I have not had a chance to meet the new— 

or his replacement, but I have met him on a VTC [video teleconference] where he and Benny and I, you know, along with General 

Breedlove, were able to share some ideas and concerns. 

And so my hope—and I know this will be the case—is that we 

will continue to have a very, very strong relationship going forward. But, again, that—that—Israel is outside of my area of responsibility. 

Secretary WORMUTH. I would just add to that, Congressman, by 

saying, you know, we have an incredibly strong relationship, defense relationship, with Israel. Secretary Carter spoke with Bogie 

Ya’alon within days of coming into office. And I am sure that will 

be, you know, one of his very close counterpart relationships. 

We do many exercises with Israel. We have policy talks with 

them every year where we talk about everything from countering 

WMD [weapons of mass destruction] to exchanging lessons learned 

on homeland defense. We are very committed to preserving their 

qualitative military edge, and this is something that we talk about 

regularly and actively with the Israelis in terms of our arms sales 

to other countries in the region, for example, as well as our arms 

sales with Israel itself. 

We have provided, in the last several years, over a billion dollars 

for Israel’s missile defense programs from Iron Dome to David’s 

Sling to Arrow. So we have a very, I think, robust and healthy and 

resilient defense relationship with Israel. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay. Thank you. 

Both of you have talked about the impact of sequestration in 

terms of executing your mission in that part of the world. I remember in March of 2013 when sequestration hit for the first time, the 

USS Harry S. Truman, which was scheduled to be deployed in the 

Middle East, had to tie up in Virginia for a number of months before this place finally worked things out. 

And I guess the question is, is that, again, if we go into 2016 

with sequester-level spending, General, do you have any testimony 

or comments regarding the impact of the number of carriers that 

might be available and how critical their mission is? 

General AUSTIN. The number of—having a carrier battle group in 

the region is absolutely critical to us. And, of course, I remain concerned about our ability to do that going forward. 

A good example of that is what we recently saw here in our 

counter-ISIL efforts. As things unfolded in Iraq and Syria, we were 

able to rapidly respond to that issue, that crisis because we had a 

carrier in the region and we were able to use that carrier to put 

up aircraft over Iraq to help the situation, gain situational awareness. And so without that degree of flexibility, it will be very, very 

difficult to address these kinds of emerging crisis in the future. 
16 

And so when you look at a region that has Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Egypt, there will continue to be 

challenges. And of course, I worry that we will have the resources 

to make sure that we can continue to work with our partners to 

address those challenges. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, recently we have heard a lot about Patriot batteries and 

the Army air defenders being stretched to their breaking point. 

And, in fact, recently deputy commander of the 32nd Air and Missile Defense Command stated this: ‘‘Today we have air and missile 

defense forces in nine countries. On any given day, nearly half of 

the Army’s Patriot batteries are outside the continental United 

States and we have begun forward deploying THAAD [Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense] batteries. We are rapidly approaching 

an inflection point where we face the risk of breaking our AMD, 

our air missile defense force.’’ 

I have two questions. First, as the imminent modernization of 

this system creates further strains on the deployment capability, 

what are your concerns as a combatant commander? And the second question is, what are the alternatives to drawing down force 

structure to make sure we don’t deny our combatant commanders 

the capability they need? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, on the first question, in terms of a combatant commander’s perspective on this, while I certainly share the 

Army services’ concerns in being able to manage the op [operations] 

tempo of its people, I think that is very, very important. But as you 

take a look at the emerging threats in the region, in the Central 

Region, certainly I remain concerned about Iran’s ballistic missile 

capability. Now they continue to gain more capability and that capability is more accurate and more lethal as we go forward. So I 

think there is a need—there will remain a need for a good air defense capability to make sure that we protect our interest in the 

region and also to be able to work with our allies in the region. 

In terms of ways to mitigate this, we are going to have to continue to work with the allies to help them develop capacity and capability to, again, not only take care of their own sovereign territory, but also add to, you know, the greater potential, the greater 

capability in the region. And we have a long way to go in that endeavor, but I think that that is—that is one of the major ways that 

we can look to address this issue going forward. 

Mr. ROGERS. Have you or OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] or Joint Staff been talking with any of our allies about 

hosting some of these assets on a semi-permanent basis instead of 

us rotating them around? 

General AUSTIN. We have not reached a decision to forward position any assets, sir. So we have continuing dialogue with our allies 

in the region in terms of what is possible, what is not possible. But, 

you know, certainly we have not taken a decision to forward position additional missile defense assets. 
17 

Mr. ROGERS. If you did, would it take some of the stress off by 

not having to rotate? 

General AUSTIN. I think it would, sir. I think that would certainly be one way to address this. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both for 

being here. Sorry we had that break that took us away for such a 

while. 

You know, it has been said—and I think as we—in hearing Mr. 

Netanyahu’s speech today and hearing your comments, that the 

challenges in the Middle East are like, at least, a three-dimensional chess game, and I think actually there are probably even 

more layers to that. 

And I think the fact that we have been given the opportunity to 

consider an AUMF is very important. It allows the Congress to 

weigh in and think through the implications of what we are doing 

and how best to achieve success. But, again, given that it is so 

multidimensional, it is actually rather hard to grapple with. I think 

we are all struggling with that. 

But I—and I think—I just happened to read in the paper today 

that Iran is actually playing a significant role in Tikrit. That their 

forces are there, you know, helping—helping push back on ISIL. 

And I think that highlights the complexity of the region. While we 

are trying to negotiate an agreement on their nuclear 

weaponization at the same time, we are taking—or taking advantage of their assistance. And I am curious, General Austin, how you 

think this through? 

General AUSTIN. Well, it certainly is a complex situation, ma’am. 

Thanks. 

Obviously, we are focused on helping—providing support to the 

country, the Government of Iraq in its efforts to counter ISIL. And 

this is a—this is an Iraqi effort. The Iraqis have to do this. We will 

enable their efforts with our air power, with our advice, and the 

assistance in any way we can. But at the end of the day, they have 

to be able to do this. 

And, certainly, there are areas in the eastern part of the country 

that they have—leading up to this point that they have gained assistance from their neighbor with and the popular mobilization 

forces that are there working. So if you look at the areas in the 

eastern part of the country, Jalula, Khanaqin, they have worked together in those areas. And then leading up to this, they have done 

a number of things to get to this point. 

So, in terms of sorting this out, again, our focus is on the Government of Iraq and working with the Government of Iraq to provide 

assistance to them to counter ISIL. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So, in essence, you defer to their relationship with 

Iran in that instance. And then how do you see that complicates 

the next step, so that is the accommodation between the Shia and 

the Sunni so that, going forward, the government is representative 

of the country and we don’t backtrack into the situation we are in 

today. 
18 

General AUSTIN. I think it is absolutely key that they make sure 

that they have provisions in place to accommodate the Sunnis and 

the Kurds. I think, you know, that lack of inclusion is what got us 

to this point, and I think the only way that we can ensure that we 

don’t go back there is if we have the right steps taken by the government. So pressure needs to remain on the government to ensure 

that they do the right things. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Another question. I think the other challenge of 

ISIS, in my mind, is that it is a little bit like Whac-a-Mole. You 

deal with it in one part of, you know, Iraq or Syria. And then, as 

you were saying in your testimony, now we are having to contend 

with it in North Africa. 

How do you think through the—you know, preparing our military 

response to those possibilities without always being able or unless 

you have adequate intelligence, to assess where the next challenge 

is? It seems to me we run the risk of stretching ourselves very, 

very thin. 

General AUSTIN. This is going to have to be an international effort going forward. And we are going to have to count on our strategic intelligence to lead that international effort as we go forward. 

There are certain things that we know about ISIL. We know that 

it looks to exploit sectarian tensions. We know that it wants to be 

a caliphate. So it looks to control large swaths of territory, and it 

must govern that territory. But it is also a big business, and it requires enormous resources. So, as you look around the globe, I 

mean, it is more likely to go to those places that has ungoverned 

spaces and also places where it can acquire resources to support 

this incredible effort. And I think, if you can reduce those possibilities, you have a much better chance of staying ahead of this. 

But there is a—there is a greater thing that I think, you know, 

feeds all of this and that is, you know, the narrative, the ideology 

that supports this, that feeds this. And I think there has got to be 

some things that are done to counter that ideology as well. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, General. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here. 

Ms. Wormuth, I would kind of take off on a question Ms. Tsongas 

touched on. Can you provide us with the—sort of the official DOD 

policy on military cooperation with Iran forces on the ground in 

Iraq? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Certainly, Congressman. Our policy is that 

we don’t coordinate with Iranian forces on the ground in Iraq. We 

are not communicating with those forces. We are not coordinating 

with those forces, so that is our policy. 

Mr. FRANKS. General, thank you for being here. Thank you for 

your dedication of your entire life to the cause of freedom. This 

committee is always grateful to people like you. 

In terms of that question, expanded just slightly, with the ISF 

and Iraqi Shia militia many times working to fight the same 

enemy, there is a concern that any training on our part for the Iranian—or the Iraqi forces may turn into training and equipping the 

Iran Quds forces. And it seems like we could see Iran’s presence 

kindle the sectarian violence that has sort of characterized this en-
19 

tire issue in the first place. And, also, I am concerned that, to 

legitimatize Iran’s actions there, it may actually increase their leverage in not only the debate with the President but with the Iranian commitment to try to gain nuclear weapons. 

So can you tell me any honest assessment of any cooperation between U.S. and Iranian forces and how do we train and equip the 

ISF without helping the Iranian forces or somehow getting tangled 

up in that? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, there is no cooperation between us and the 

Iranian forces, as Ms. Wormuth has said. And we are going to have 

to count on the Iraqi Government to do those things necessary to, 

number one, ensure that things don’t trend toward greater sectarian violence. And we encourage them to do that on a routine 

basis and—— 

But in terms of ensuring that, you know, our resources don’t migrate over to Shia militia, there is no easy way to be absolutely certain that that can’t happen. But I can tell you that we will do everything within our power to prevent that from happening. And, 

again, I think the first line of defense here has got to be the Iraqi 

Government. And we are focused on helping them, helping their legitimate forces to be successful in its endeavor. 

Mr. FRANKS. Now, let me shift gears on you here just a moment 

and say, you know, it could be or would be your responsibility as 

combatant commander under the draft AUMF to ensure that the 

mission is accomplished against ISIS and yet also to make certain 

that American forces cannot engage in ‘‘enduring offensive ground 

operations.’’ 

And can you give this committee your best assessment of your 

ability to defeat, degrade, and destroy ISIS within 3 years while remaining true to the commitment not to having enduring offensive 

ground operations or executing those types of operations? Just your 

best military assessment. 

General AUSTIN. I am confident—absolutely confident, that we 

can defeat ISIL. And I base that upon the progress that we have 

made to date. And as you know, we don’t have large amounts of 

ground forces in Iraq, but we have been very effective in terms of 

enabling the Iraqi security forces and enabling the Peshmerga in 

the north, and they are having good effects. And we have also had 

good effects against this enemy in Syria. So I am very confident 

that going forward, we will get this done, we will defeat ISIL. And 

so in terms of an enduring requirement for Iraq, I don’t see that 

requirement there because I think we will be able to get this done 

with the approach that we are taking. 

At the end of the day, sir, this has to be—it has to be done by 

the Iraqis. And we have to put the measures in place that will ensure, you know, a lasting solution and not just a short-term military solution. And we are hopeful that the Iraqi Government will 

do the things that are necessary to ensure that lasting solution. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Quickly before I lose my time, can you tell 

me what one thing that you might encourage this committee to try 

to offer policy-wise or resource-wise that would help to that end? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, policy-wise, as much flexibility as you can 

give us as you consider the legislation going forward. I think flexibility in combatting an enemy like this is absolutely essential. 
20 

And then resource-wise, I need the ability to maintain capability 

forward deployed in the region. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Wormuth and General Austin, thank you very much 

for your service and for the information you have provided for us 

today. I appreciate that. 

I want to follow up on some of the questions that my colleague 

was asking a moment ago and very specifically, General, can ISIS 

be degraded and defeated without U.S. ground forces, i.e., infantry 

brigades, artillery, armor? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, I think they can, and they will. But they 

will use—we will use the Iraqi security forces and the Peshmerga 

forces to do this. And I think, you know, we have advisors on the 

ground and how we employ those advisors will be—you know I will 

make a decision on that and request for authorities on a case-bycase basis. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I would assume that special forces on the 

ground, forward observers, and the like would be part of what you 

would want to be able to do? 

General AUSTIN. Certainly. Part of the calculus, sir, and when I 

think I have reached a point where I need to employ that, then I 

will go back to my boss and request specifically for that opportunity. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And, Madam Secretary, the issue of enduring 

has been much discussed. It was discussed here last time we met 

last week. And I raised the question, let’s be very specific. The 

power of the purse remains with us and if we simply don’t allow 

the general to have money for the brigades, infantry, et cetera, is 

that restriction viable in your mind? And your mind also, General? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, just to make sure I understand your question, are you saying that is it viable to not conduct 

enduring ground offensive operations if Congress doesn’t provide 

the funding? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, if they won’t provide the funding, you 

wouldn’t be able to do it, period. I mean that is very clear. It is 

the power of the purse. You don’t have money for that particular 

operation. And so the point that I am making here is that rather 

than some wishy-washy mushy language like ‘‘enduring,’’ we simply say, General, you have all the money you need for all of the 

other things, except for ground operations, that is, infantry brigades, other artillery, armored, et cetera, but all the rest of it you 

have whatever you might need? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I think Congress clearly always has the power of the purse. The intent with the AUMF proposal was to include a reasonable limitation that made clear that 

we were not going to prosecute the campaign against ISIL in the 

same way that we were in Iraq, for example, in the last decade or 

in Afghanistan. Those kind of very large-scale operations. 

I also just wanted to take the opportunity quickly—Congressman 

Franks asked the question—also, the 3-year clause in the AUMF, 

that is not intended to be an indication that we believe—certainly, 

that this Department believes that we will necessarily defeat ISIL 

within that timeframe. It is a recognition that the executive branch 
21 

and the legislative branch may well want to revisit the authorization at that time, but we think the campaign could well go on 

longer. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, I couldn’t agree more with you. Presumably, we will continue to be in session year after year. And if, for 

example, we were to restrict the funding, as I just described, we 

could revisit it at any moment and provide whatever money might 

be necessary at that time. But it does provide a restriction going 

in as does the 3-year time limit. 

And as I said last week, I think it is extremely important that 

the next Presidential campaign focus on this issue. And if you have 

a 3-year time limit, it most definitely will be focusing on the issue 

of how are we going to conduct ourselves militarily or other ways 

in the Middle East. I think that is extremely important that that 

happen in the next Presidential campaign. 

I think we are just nearly out of time. General, I want to just 

review what you said and that is that ISIL can be defeated—degraded and defeated without U.S. ground forces? 

General AUSTIN. Mr. Garamendi, we have ground forces in the 

country right now. But I think we are talking about brigades—battalions and brigades, large formations. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Exactly. 

General AUSTIN. Sir, yes. My answer is yes. And I make that 

statement based upon what we are doing now. 

ISIL is losing this fight. We are having significant effects on this 

enemy. We have got to do a lot more going forward. We always said 

that it would take time, but it will require the work of the Iraqi 

ground forces in order to get this done. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I appreciate that. And I would also assume that 

there may be a role for Jordan, Turkey, and other countries to have 

their troops on the ground. Would that be correct? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, there is always that possibility. We invite 

anyone who wants to contribute to this and certainly those types 

of decisions are made by the individual countries as you know, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Understood. Yeah. Thank you very much, General, and appreciate your support. And Madam Secretary, also. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Ms. 

Wormuth, and, General Austin, particularly for your service to this 

country. 

You know, when I hear—when we talk about Iran and Iran’s 

troops or advisors or whatever they are calling them assisting Iraq, 

what I worry is that the sectarian violence that Iran really does 

push. And in 2011, you know, when Maliki was beholding to Iran 

and Hezbollah actually attacked our troops with an IRAM [improvised rocket assisted mortar], Iranian warhead and killed five of 

our 1st Infantry Division kids the night that I was in Iraq, the 

night that my son was with the 1st Infantry Division. 

So I wonder how this is going to play out if we allow Iran to have 

that kind of play today if, in fact, we do have to use some special 

forces or something other than a brigade-sized team to assist the 

Iraqis? How is that going to play out, particularly with Iran’s past 

performance in supporting terrorism across the world but particu-
22 

larly Hezbollah and particularly killing American troops just, you 

know, 4 years ago? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, I certainly share your concern with the possibility of increasing sectarian activity as we go forward. And this 

is something that we continue to emphasize, again, with the Government of—to the Government of Iraq that, you know, they must 

be mindful of this. They must control the activities of Shia militia. 

They must guard against any kind of atrocities going forward of 

those elements. And they have to be, most importantly, inclusive 

of the Sunnis and the Kurds. And I think that is the biggest piece 

in this equation. And when that is done, I think you see the Sunnis 

coming into the government a bit more and balancing things out. 

So I—you know, I was in Iraq. I was a commander of Iraq when 

that IRAM attack occurred. I was the first senior officer on the 

scene there to—you know, after that attack and worked with Colonel Gainey who was then Lieutenant Colonel Gainey. Now he is 0– 

6 [Colonel] Gainey. But some tremendous 1st [Infantry] Division 

soldiers there, great—great courage and great discipline. 

But clearly I share your concern. We are going to do everything 

we can to encourage the Iraqi Government to stay focused on this, 

to be inclusive of the Sunnis and the Kurds. And I think, if they 

do that, I think this comes out in a better place. 

Mr. NUGENT. Let me ask you this: Are we in a position within 

Iraq to have a good handle on regards to what the Iranian forces 

are doing in regards to the Shias within the country? Do we have 

a good handle on that or is that kind of we don’t know for sure? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, we do not coordinate with the Iranians or— 

you know, I mean, there is no communication between us and 

them. 

Mr. NUGENT. Well I understand. 

General AUSTIN. So absolute knowledge of what their intent is— 

is not always there. But, clearly, we have very good intelligence 

services and we have good overhead imagery and those types of 

things. So, you know, the activity in Tikrit was no surprise. You 

know, I saw this coming many days leading up to this. It is a logical progression of what they have been doing in the east of the 

country, but we don’t coordinate with them. 

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate that. 

And lastly a question on the AUMF. I think that, you know, you 

hear—I mean, there is a lot of discussion obviously. But—and we 

are worried about strategy. Strategy really needs to be larger than 

just ISIS. I mean, it really is. And I know the President doesn’t 

want to go there, but it is radical extremism in Islam across the 

globe that is affecting us and our friends across the globe. And so 

I am worried, with AUMF, if it is just—and ISIS, does that really— 

is that really the strategy? I mean that is part of the strategy, but 

is that really where we need to be? Because you see it firsthand 

across the globe. And I know that all the combatant commands talk 

about it, I am sure. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Why don’t I take a crack at this quickly 

and then have General Austin pile on. 

The AUMF proposal, first of all, as I am sure you are aware, 

doesn’t have a geographic limitation, and that was very deliberate 

to address exactly the kinds of concerns that you have. Similarly, 
23 

there is the associated forces, which is designed to give us some 

breadth and discretion as to who we go after. 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Sorry I ran out of time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Wormuth, General Austin said that ISIS could be defeated 

without using U.S. ground troops. I am assuming—and, General 

Austin, you alluded to this—that would be primarily through the 

use of Iraqi ground troops. Are there any other partners who have 

committed to joining those Iraqi ground troops to defeat ISIS in 

Iraq? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, first of all, we have a number of the coalition partners who are participating with us in the 

air strike campaign. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I was speaking of ground troops, forces on the 

ground. So please answer that question. 

Secretary WORMUTH. As General Austin has indicated, this is 

fundamentally a campaign that is being led by the Government of 

Iraq and any offer to have ground troops from another country 

come in would have to be accepted by the Iraqi Government. So 

those—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Is the answer that there are no other forces than 

Iraq—— 

Secretary WORMUTH. Right now, we only have advisors on the 

ground. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. You said that part of our policy going forward 

would be to train and equip and advise those Iraqi ground forces. 

How much do we spend doing that between 2003 and 2013? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Sir, I don’t have an exact number off the 

top of my head, but I imagine it was many billions of dollars. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. In the tens of billions of dollars. 

And you also mentioned that we are going to use a whole-of-government approach. We are going to try to get the larger society together to find solutions. I am not sure that that affords us enough 

clarity to know exactly how this is going to be different than it was 

last time, never mind the increasing difficulty and complexity of 

Syria. We are just talking about Iraq right now. 

Can you put those concerns to rest and tell us whether there is 

a plan to enlist other countries’ ground military forces or if, in fact, 

you will be coming back to us if the Iraqi ground forces are insufficient to defeat ISIS to ask us to add additional U.S. ground forces 

to the mix? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, at this time, you know, the 

AUMF does not envision—the proposal that this administration 

put forward doesn’t envision large—it doesn’t envision employment 

of large ground combat formations. So that is what we are asking 

for now. 

In terms of the broader approach, I think fundamentally something that is different between today and in the past decade is we 

have much more of a partner in the Iraqi Government. You know, 
24 

Prime Minister Abadi wants us and wants the broader coalition 

there to help him. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. How long is his term in office? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I don’t know off the top of my head. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. You will not be able to predict his successor. 

Would you agree? 

Secretary WORMUTH. No. That is true. But I am sure we will 

work to give the Iraqi Government as much advice as we can about 

the kinds of leader that they would need to succeed him whenever 

that happens. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Is the administration taking seriously proposals 

to rethink Iraq as a state, to rethink our partners in Iraq, like the 

Kurds who have proven to be our only reliable allies on the ground 

in the fight against ISIS to ensure that they have greater autonomy to maybe look at the fact that Syria and Iraq, to a degree, 

have arbitrary lines set up a hundred years ago that don’t seem to 

be working for the peoples in those states and only seem to hold 

together when you have a brutal, repressive dictator, and the experiment in democracy so far in Iraq has been an abject failure? 

I don’t know that I have heard from the administration and from 

you some larger strategy about how we are approaching problems 

there, outside of a military solution to the immediate threat of 

ISIS? Would you care to comment on any of that? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Certainly. Sorry. 

Fundamentally, our approach is based on a federal government 

in Baghdad. We believe that we have better prospects for success, 

both in terms of sustaining Iraq as a country, but also in terms of 

defeating ISIL, which is one of our fundamental concerns, doing 

that through a single Iraqi state as opposed to a partition solution, 

for example, you know, which has been discussed and was certainly 

discussed in years past. 

So we are fundamentally taking the approach that we need to 

provide support through Baghdad to the Peshmerga, for example, 

who have been phenomenal partners and have been incredibly effective on the ground with the Sunni tribe elements, bringing them 

inside to get them into the fight. 

But right now, our approach is based on a federal Iraq. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Could you—it is not outlined in the AUMF proposal from the President. Could you define ‘‘victory’’? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Certainly. I think victory is defined as 

when ISIL is no longer a threat to Iraq, to its existence, to our 

partners and allies in the region, and to the United States. And to 

get to that, I think, will take some time. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. So as long as ISIL is seen as a threat to ourselves 

or any of our partners around the world, we have not won? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I think that is fair. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both 

for being here today to take our questions and inform us on many 

things. 

My first question is: How many nations are considered part of 

the coalition of this fight in Iraq today? 
25 

Secretary WORMUTH. Sir, we have 60 countries with us, I believe, 

currently in the operation. And somewhere between a dozen and 15 

are with us in the air strike campaign. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Okay. Who would you say are the top 5, maybe 

10 contributors? Because 60 is a big number, and I don’t know if 

that means somebody is donating a box of pens or really being engaged? So who would you say are the top contributors to this effort? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I don’t think I would want to get into a list 

of top contributors because different countries are contributing in 

different ways. As I said, we have about, you know, 12 to 15 who 

are very engaged in the military part of the campaign, whether in 

the air strikes or, also, in terms of contributing trainers or helping 

with the advise and assist mission. 

But we also have countries that are working with us very closely 

on things like the counter-messaging campaign. So, for example, 

Qatar has been very focused on that. We also have countries that 

are very involved with us, across the whole coalition, on trying to 

address the counter-financing campaign. So really different countries are taking their particular strengths and applying them 

where they make the most sense. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. And is it a good mix, say, of our traditional allies, 

like our NATO allies and Middle Eastern allies? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Yes. I believe so. We have wide representation from NATO as well as from countries in the region. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Okay. Thank you. 

Yeah. 

General AUSTIN. If I could add to that. You know, I—you recall 

back on the 23rd of September when we began flying missions into 

Syria, that night we had five Sunni Arab-led nations that flew with 

us on that attack. And that was really remarkable. And I think it 

speaks to the conviction of the folks in the region to really want 

to stand up and deal with this very horrible entity, ISIL. 

And for the most part, they have stayed with us and they are 

still flying, and I think that speaks volumes in and of itself as well. 

And there—as Ms. Wormuth said, there are a number of countries 

that are contributing in various ways from everything from helping 

the counter—the ideology to providing kinetic capability. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. 

I somewhat envision that we could have basically two coalitions, 

if you will. Because I think it would help the Arab nations to have 

their own coalition and not appear subservient to us and to our coalition, but that we are working together. And I think if we had 

that posture and that is what the world saw, it would help those 

nations engage better and serve us all a little bit better and coordinate on command and control. 

Let me ask you one question as it goes to the AUMF, and I am 

really not trying to be flippant about this. But as a commander especially, I just don’t—I would—maybe finish this sentence for me. 

You know, how does—finish this sentence: Publicly stating that we 

won’t use ground forces or large brigades is a good idea because? 

General AUSTIN. Sir, how about if I take another approach and 

give you my thoughts on—— 
26 

Dr. WENSTRUP. With all due respect, I thought you might say 

that, sir. Go ahead. 

General AUSTIN [continuing]. Present commander. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Go ahead. 

General AUSTIN. So rest assured that I am going to ask for whatever I need to accomplish the mission as a commander. And, you 

know, I think we should—we should focus our efforts by providing 

good, clear mission statements and objectives. But as a commander 

on the ground or commander of the region—in the region, you expect for me to ask for what it is I need to be successful, and so you 

can count on me always doing that. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I appreciate that. And what I don’t want to do 

is ever tie your hands on that. I think it is great if we can use 

other forces, but at the same time, I would not want to tie your 

hands and put you in that position. 

Thank you very much. I do appreciate it. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here. 

Ms. Wormuth, following up on a statement that you made a few 

minutes ago, why is it the administration’s position that a single 

federal Iraqi state is necessary to defeating ISIS when the reality 

is that it is this single federal Shia-led, Iranian-influenced central 

government in Baghdad that has oppressed the Sunni people, created the oxygen for ISIS to come in and take advantage where the 

Sunnis have been forced to look in that direction in order to escape 

the oppression and persecution of this Shia-led government, and 

that this is the main cause for ISIS growing in its presence and 

strength in Iraq today? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question. 

I think what I would say is, to date, that the previous government in Iraq, under Maliki, was very problematic and did create 

many of, I think, the characteristics or the dynamics that you are 

speaking of on the ground. 

Ms. GABBARD. So understanding that, how can the administration place its hopes on the success of this on an individual person, 

in this new President when you have a parliament to deal with, 

you have Shia militias who are on the ground operating, sometimes 

in alliance, sometimes on their own, and you have the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on the ground? 

Secretary WORMUTH. First, I would say that I don’t think we are 

putting our confidence in a single person. Certainly, I think, you 

know, we think Prime Minister Abadi is a much more promising 

partner than what we had in Maliki, but we also are working with 

his entire government. And he has taken some steps that I think 

are indicative of his commitment personally but also more broadly 

of his government to try to take a more inclusive approach, things 

like signing the oil deal with the Kurds, things like submitting the 

national guard legislation to the Council of Representatives. 

And while, you know, I would not dispute at all that it is a very 

difficult political environment there and it is going to be very challenging to help the Abadi administration continue to have a more 
27 

inclusive approach, we think that that is a more promising pathway than seeing the country break apart into divisions where, you 

know, a Kurdistan in the north, a Shiastan, a Sunnistan, as, you 

know, some people in the think tank community have talked about, 

those would only harden all of the divisions, I think, that we have 

seen that have created many of the complexities. And an approach 

that tries to bring those together, we believe, is a more promising 

approach, without underestimating how difficult that will be. 

Ms. GABBARD. To follow up, General Austin, on a previous comment that you made to this point about the necessity of, I think 

specifically you said the inclusion of Sunnis and Kurds is essential, 

and that the government must be pressured to do that. 

And while there have been some steps and some rhetoric in that 

direction, really what it comes right down to, there is very little 

evidence that that is happening, where we see the right rhetoric 

but still on the ground we are not seeing the Kurds getting the 

heavy weaponry and the arms that they need, and they have been 

our most dependable ground force on the ground. 

We have the Sunnis who are coming here to Washington saying 

we are not getting what we need from this central government in 

Iraq and this is not just something long term; it is relevant now 

with this attack in Tikrit. So I am wondering specifically if you can 

address, what is the plan to ensure that the Sunni stronghold, like 

Tikrit and Mosul, have a plan or an agreement in place for the 

Sunnis to be in charge of security and governance for these places 

once the attack is successful and ISIS is driven out? 

General AUSTIN. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

I think the plan is we have to continue to engage and influence 

the Iraqi Government. And you asked why this is important, why 

we want to continue to do this. Iraq is an important country. It has 

got borders with allies that are key to us: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 

Kuwait. And what we are doing is working to counter an evil that 

we have not seen before: ISIL. And I think unless we help in this 

endeavor, we can look for this thing to spread over into the neighboring countries. And, again, the goal of this enemy is to establish 

a caliphate to control more turf. 

So I think you are right, Congresswoman. I think we have to do 

everything in our power to make sure we continue to engage the 

Iraqi Government and make sure—— 

Ms. GABBARD. Sorry, General Austin, my time is about to run 

out. 

Specifically with Tikrit and Mosul, is there a plan in place for 

the Sunnis to have governance over security on these towns postattack? 

General AUSTIN. Well, the Iraqi Government has got to put such 

a plan into action, and that is the intent, I am sure. But in terms 

of specifics of the plan to do that, at this point, I could not lay that 

out for you. But that must be the way ahead so—— 

Ms. GABBARD. I agree. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Stefanik. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to both of the witnesses here today. 
28 

We have spoken a lot about Iraq, Iran, and I want to turn toward 

Syria. 

Ms. Wormuth, what is the U.S. policy toward the Assad regime? 

And the reason I am asking this question is, I believe that the brutality of the Assad regime has contributed greatly to the ability for 

ISIS to rise and gain strongholds in Syria. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question. 

Our policy towards the Assad regime specifically is that Assad 

has completely lost his legitimacy and his legitimacy to govern. He 

has created a situation where there is tremendous instability in his 

country. He is not really governing much of his country. There 

have been over 200,000 casualties, I believe, to date. And what we 

have to do, our view, is that there isn’t a strictly military solution 

to that problem. What we need to do is to find a political settlement that would have a transition where Assad leaves the government. 

And in terms of the ISIL challenge in Syria, what we are trying 

to do is develop a partner on the ground. We obviously don’t have 

the same kind of partner on the ground that we have in Iraq, but 

we believe to be able to push ISIL out in Syria, we need to build 

that. And that is what our Department’s train and equip program 

is designed to do. 

Ms. STEFANIK. So do you agree with me when I state that the 

rise of ISIS in Syria is related to the brutality of the Assad regime 

in providing the circumstances that ISIS has been able to recruit 

supporters? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I would say that the tremendous instability 

in Syria has certainly been fertile ground for ISIL to spread. 

Ms. STEFANIK. And my other question is, so just to delve further 

on our policy towards Syria, is it that we oppose the regime in 

principle but have a policy of taking no actions that would harm 

the regime’s survival? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congresswoman, I think, again, our view is 

that fundamentally what we need to do is pursue a diplomatic and 

political solution that sees Assad leaving that government; that 

militarily there isn’t a solution. 

You know, I wouldn’t say we are taking no action. We have an 

extensive humanitarian assistance program underway to try to 

help support the Syrian population. We have worked with neighbors in the region like Turkey and Jordan and others to try to enhance their security as they deal with all of the refugee flows, but 

ultimately, we need to find a diplomatic solution. 

Ms. STEFANIK. I believe, Ms. Wormuth, with all due respect, that 

the administration’s lack of leadership in dealing with the Assad 

regime and having a coherent Syria policy has led us to where we 

are today. 

Thank you for representing the views, but I fundamentally disagree. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General Austin, thank you very much for your service. 
29 

And Ms. Wormuth, thank you for your service as well. 

Ms. Wormuth, you said earlier that Maliki sectarian approach to 

governing is how we got here, and there are a lot of nodding heads 

around the room. What are we doing in our plan going forward to 

ensure that that doesn’t happen again? 

Secretary WORMUTH. That is a great question, Congressman. You 

know, fundamentally, one of the lines of effort in our counter-ISIL 

campaign is governance and it is about helping the Iraqis, again, 

develop a stronger government that takes a very inclusive approach to how they are trying to bring everyone together, bring in 

the Kurds, bring in the Sunnis, bring in other religious minorities, 

for example. 

You know, and fundamentally, this is primarily the work of the 

State Department, but it is a major emphasis in terms of what we 

are trying to do. We don’t believe—without that focus and without 

that focus on building a stronger, inclusive government in Baghdad; we do not believe that the military campaign on its own will 

succeed. 

Mr. MOULTON. So can you just name one thing specifically that 

you are doing differently from, say, the period of 2010 to 2013? 

When I served in Iraq last in 2008, we had a very heavy hand on 

the Iraqi Government. We were very involved in their affairs. We 

made sure to keep Prime Minister Maliki within the lanes so that 

he wouldn’t become too sectarian. I wish we had a prime minister 

that didn’t require that kind of guidance, but we did and we provided it. But it seems that that was lost. So what specifically are 

we doing differently this time around? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, Congressman, I think one thing we 

are doing differently—I mean, I think I would say fundamentally, 

ultimately part of why things did not succeed in Iraq the first time 

is because when the United States left—and that was because, 

again, Maliki, as you know well, did not want the United States 

to stay and was not willing to submit the kinds of agreements to 

the Council of Representatives—all of the things, many of the 

things that we worked with them on through those many years 

started to dissipate when we left. And I think fundamentally one 

of the lessons from that this time is that we have to partner with 

the Iraqis, but they have to want it for themselves, at least as 

much as we do. 

And so we are now, I think, trying to provide advice to them, political advice, governance advice, military advice to help them build 

up their institutions, but fundamentally emphasize that they are a 

sovereign country and they have to be in the lead. And I think that 

is going to be challenging, but unless we want to stay there for an 

indeterminate period, they have to be able to do what needs to be 

done on their own. 

Mr. MOULTON. What I want to make sure is, is not just that we 

don’t have to stay there for an indeterminate period but that we 

don’t have to come back. And I will tell you, as someone who fought 

during the surge, it is not very comforting to hear that we are just 

going to leave that up to the Iraqis, that ultimately we are just 

going to say pass it off to them and maybe they will succeed and 

maybe they won’t and we will be right back. 
30 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, I think what I would say, Congressman, is we are not going to leave them abruptly. You know, we are 

working with them in partnership in a whole range of ways, diplomatic, political, economic, military, trying to help them do what 

needs to be done across the whole range of challenges that they 

face. And we will continue to work with them. Again, this campaign against ISIL we don’t expect to end anytime soon. 

Mr. MOULTON. General Austin, could you comment on this as 

well. I mean, you were there during part of this period. What specifically do you see being done differently this time around to ensure we don’t have to again see our military effort go in vain and 

then have to come back again 3 or 4 years down the road? 

General AUSTIN. Well, we certainly have learned some lessons 

from the past in terms of the requirement to remain engaged with 

the Iraqi leadership. 

But I think we have to use more than just the influence that the 

military brings. We have to use, you know, economic influence, 

international pressure, and a host of other things to put pressure 

on this government—— 

Mr. MOULTON. And are we doing that? 

General AUSTIN. I think so. I think we are increasing, but—— 

Mr. MOULTON. So if you think so, it just doesn’t give me a lot 

of confidence that this plan is actually being executed. 

General AUSTIN. Understand, sir. I think—when I say that, I say 

that, you know, this is a young government and we are using every 

lever in the inventory to influence it. And—— 

Mr. MOULTON. General, with all due respect, I was in Baghdad 

2 weeks ago, and that was not the story I heard on the ground 

which was that we were using all these levers. I mean, Iran has 

a very active effort to influence the Iraqi Government. It doesn’t 

seem like ours even is a shadow of that. 

General AUSTIN. I can’t speak to how much—I can say that 

Iran’s influence is growing in Iraq, but how much they have, I can’t 

speak to that. But I can tell you that we recognize the need to use 

everything that we can to influence and shape activities, and we 

will continue to stay after this, sir. 

Mr. MOULTON. If I may ask just one final question. You have 

talked about how important a diplomatic solution is in Syria. Who 

is our political partner there? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, that is one of the many challenges we 

have in Syria, is that the Syrian opposition council is the primary, 

as I am sure you know, opposition entity, but it has been fractured 

over time. And so we are working—part of what the State Department is doing—— 

Mr. MOULTON. Do we have a political partner? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, we have—again, we are working with 

the opposition council. We also are obviously working with other 

countries who also believe that what is needed is a transition for 

Assad out of the government. But we are certainly—we don’t have 

a partner in, in the Syrian Government, but we are working to 

build up the opposition council. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Very important questions. 
31 

Ms. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you so much for being here today. Very important questions and topics. And one that I think hasn’t been touched on, I am 

very concerned about, is the basically eradication of Christians in 

Iraq. At one time, over 1.5 million Christians there. Now we estimate between, what, 200 and 300,000 perhaps. Maybe you have 

some insights on the numbers there. But certainly that is the birthplace of many of famous Christian historic sites. 

And the reports last week of ISIL burning hundreds or thousands of years old documents and destroying religious sites is certainly very, very disturbing. 

So first, I was wondering if you could give me an update on the 

situation for Christians there, both in their persons and their safety, how many are still there, what their situation is, their wellbeing, but then also give me an update on the ISIL strategy and 

how many historic sites have been destroyed? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congresswoman, what I would like to do is 

to give you a much more specific laydown of some of the questions 

that you are asking for the record, if that would be all right. But 

I think it is fair to say that, you know, we very much share your 

concern about the status of Christians in Iraq, but also other religious minorities, obviously. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 

Secretary WORMUTH. ISIL has persecuted and prosecuted their 

barbaric approaches on Christians all over the country, and we are 

very disturbed about that, and it is one of the many reasons we are 

trying to defeat them in Iraq. I think something we have emphasized particularly again with the Abadi government is that as these 

military operations take place, it is very important that the ISF 

forces and the popular mobilization militias not conduct atrocities 

as they go into these towns. 

And Prime Minister Abadi was very vocal this morning saying 

that he has the responsibility and the Iraqi security forces have the 

responsibility to protect all of Iraqi citizens. But we share your concerns, and I would certainly like to get you a more detailed report 

for the record. But General Austin may have more specifics to 

share. 

General AUSTIN. I agree. We will take that for the record, Ms. 

Wormuth. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 

General AUSTIN. I would just say, Congresswoman, that having 

served in Iraq three times and now the Central Command commander, I have spent a lot of time with senior leaders, senior Iraqi 

leaders, and work with them on issues involving Christian and 

other religious minorities. And I can tell you that they value—they 

treasure the Christian population as a part of their community, 

their environment. And so when we saw Christians leaving Baghdad, for example, several years ago, they were concerned about 

that. 

So they want this population to be a part of their environment, 

and I think that we will have to continue to work with the govern-
32 

ment to ensure that as we go forward that they are doing the right 

things to protect these minorities. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. When can I expect a response back on—for the 

record? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I am sure we can get you something by the 

end of the week, ma’am. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. That would be great. 

Now in the Nineveh, there is a lot of Christians there. And I read 

an article last week how an independent group has come in to help 

train some of the people who live there, how to defend their own 

villages, you know, independent of us. 

But in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], we put 

over $1 billion in there to help train local forces against ISIL. Are 

we targeting and helping to specifically train some Iraqi Christians? Are they receiving any of the funds that we designated for 

this? 

Secretary WORMUTH. As of right now, Congresswoman, the funds 

for the Iraqi train and equip program are largely being spent on 

training the nine Iraqi Army brigades and the three Peshmerga 

brigades. I think about almost $19 million of that $1.3 billion is 

going to equip Sunni tribal elements. 

But to my knowledge, that money is not being spent on training 

other groups outside of the ISF and the Sunni tribes. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Do you think that might be a good idea since 

ISIL is trying to exterminate them? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, Congresswoman, there are, again, I 

think what we have been trying to do is work the train and equip 

program through the Iraqi Government. We could certainly talk 

with them. 

I know they—General Austin may have more information about 

some of these other training programs that the Iraqi Government 

is doing itself of more local populations. 

General AUSTIN. That has been our approach in the past, and 

certainly it will be our approach going forward. I think this is best 

done in working with the Iraqi Government because at the end of 

the day, as we transition, they are going to have to be the folks 

that really continue to take care of these elements. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Well, I am encouraged to hear that you think 

the Iraqi Government is concerned as well and cares about them. 

And I would ask you to visit with them specifically about this, ask 

them to reach out to these groups and specifically try to train 

them, because it would just be a travesty of historic proportions if 

this area has no Christians where so many of them have been 

there for thousands of years. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Austin, I want to switch to the topic of combat search 

and rescue [CSAR]. And I was retired colonel A–10 pilot but also 

ran the Joint Search and Rescue Center for CENTCOM Forward 

for JTF–SWA [Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia] in the early days 

of the Afghanistan operations. 
33 

And my concern is, with our operations in Iraq and Syria, I have 

been hearing from some colleagues that we have limitations on the 

combat search and rescue. The Jordanian pilot, as you know, has 

strategic implications with how he was murdered in a horrific way. 

And we have got our pilots flying single-engine F–16s into Iraq 

and Syria today. And in order to make sure that if they have to 

eject, even if they are not shot down, that we have somebody overhead right away, on-scene commander and then somebody else 

right behind them to immediately locate, communicate, and protect 

them, shoot anything that moves, that comes anywhere near them, 

in that geography you can’t hide. It takes a very robust capability 

of ground-alert assets, airborne-alert assets. 

The A–10, which I flew, is the only one that provides a rescue 

mission commander, SANDY One and SANDY Two, to be able to 

get to them and then the helicopter should go in and get them. And 

we have got to snatch them right away, as you know, because if 

they get picked up then it is disastrous consequences, not just for 

them and their family but strategically for our country. Can you 

imagine if we had now an American pilot that is the next one captured? 

So I know you know this is a challenge, but my question is, and 

I am asking for a classified briefing, what was the CSAR posture 

when we first started flying sorties there and specifically when the 

Jordanian pilot ejected, and has it changed since then? And are you 

limited at all from the arbitrary 3,100-person boots-on-the-ground 

cap by this administration to make sure that we have a posture 

that provides what I just described; that we have a covenant with 

those that are flying sorties are on the ground; that we are going 

to go get them, that we are going to rescue them. 

I have concerns from talking to my colleagues in the military 

that there is a pretty damning after-action report from the Jordanian pilot situation, and I am deeply concerned that we don’t 

have the combat search and rescue capability. 

Also, if you only have 12 A–10s over there and they are the only 

ones that can do the SANDY mission plus close air support, why 

don’t we bring more over? What are your limitations? What can we 

do moving forward? 

General AUSTIN. Let me assure you, Congresswoman, that I 

won’t put one pilot in the air if I don’t feel like I have the adequate 

means to recover those pilots. In working with my senior airmen 

and my air component, I think they have done a masterful job of 

ensuring that we have adequate coverage in a number of places to 

address our CSAR issues. 

As you know, we have forward-deployed CSAR capabilities currently, and we also are looking to perhaps put CSAR capability in 

other places, like Turkey, and we continue to work that. 

So I am confident that we have the adequate means to take care 

of our pilots, and if I feel that the risk has increased to the point 

where I need to, we will put CSAR assets in the air while the mission is being conducted. And we have done that and we will continue to do that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So you feel that there is no limitations right now? 

You have this CSAR posture that you need in order to make sure 

that we can rescue anybody who has to eject? 
34 

General AUSTIN. I think we have adequate CSAR capability. In 

this business, as you know, there is no such thing as enough, and 

so if I can get more, I will get more. 

And if I can position assets in Turkey, and we believe we can, 

we will move forward and do that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. And is the 3,100 boots-on-the-ground limitation impacting at all bringing in a more robust CSAR capability 

forward-deployed to make sure that we can be true to that covenant? 

General AUSTIN. I think we have adequate capability to take care 

of our troops with what we have on the ground and what we can 

potentially put into other places. I think that will increase that capability. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. 

Again, for the record, I would like a very detailed classified briefing on the CSAR posture and that after-action report on the Jordanian pilot. And I look forward to working with your staff to further discuss this important issue. 

General AUSTIN. We look forward to providing you that, ma’am. 

And by the way, in response to your point that you made earlier 

about a damning report, after-action report, I know of no such report. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. I look forward to following up with 

you, then. 

Thank you. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Let me touch on a couple things that we haven’t quite gotten to 

yet today: One is Yemen. General, for several years now we have 

heard that the most serious threat against our homeland, as far as 

terrorism goes, has emanated from Yemen, with Al Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula [AQAP]. How do you evaluate that threat today, 

and what effect does the overthrow of government there have on 

our counterterrorism operations to diminish that threat? 

General AUSTIN. I will take the first stab at this, sir, and if Ms. 

Wormuth wants to contribute then certainly, with your permission, 

I will ask her to do so. 

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, we have always said, is a 

very significant threat or a serious threat. We know that there are 

folks in that organization that have tried to export violence to our 

homeland, and so we remain focused on this extremist organization 

and we feel that there is a need to keep pressure on it. 

We have found that over the years, not only in Yemen but in 

other places around the region and across the globe, that the best 

way to counter these types of threats is to limit the amount of 

ungoverned spaces that they have available to operate out of. And 

so the more that we can do to help train and equip and advise host 

nations to control their own sovereign spaces, the less of an opportunity that there is for these organizations to export mischief to 

other places. 

Also, their ability to counter—host nations’ ability to counter 

these types of threats, I think, is also important. So what we have 

done over the years is when we had a viable government in place 

that was willing to work with us, we have worked with them to in-
35 

crease their capability so that they can do more to control their 

own sovereign spaces. And that certainly has helped us in countering some of the extremist organizations. 

In addition to that, you also obviously have to keep pressure on 

the organization, making sure that you understand what is going 

on with the organization and that where possible, you bring, you 

know, key operatives to justice when that opportunity is presented. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, but General, let me go back and try again. 

Today, what is the threat like from AQAP in Yemen against our 

homeland? Is it still serious? 

And secondly, what effect has the overthrow of the government 

had on our ability to diminish that threat? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Chairman, if you don’t mind, I am happy 

to—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think it is really a military question not 

a policy question. 

General AUSTIN. Yeah. So there is still a significant threat, sir, 

and so without the—and I apologize for not directly answering your 

question. But without the government fully operational, that makes 

it more difficult to do the things that I described earlier, to keep 

pressure on this organization, and so the threat will increase over 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

They have called votes, so I am trying to get to several things 

and I don’t mean to cut you short. I will get to Mrs. Walorski in 

just a second but I want to cover a couple things. 

Ms. Wormuth, I was with President Ghani a few weeks ago when 

he said that he would like for us not to reduce the number of 

troops we have in Afghanistan for the remainder of the year. We 

are going to have General Campbell here tomorrow. But the question I have got is where is that request in the administration, and 

when is it going to be answered? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Chairman. 

We are very much aware, obviously, of that request. President 

Ghani has asked us to consider giving him more—or he has asked 

us to perhaps have some flexibility in terms of the glide slope of 

the approach, and we are actively discussing that right now. And 

I think it will very much be a topic when the President comes here 

later this month. 

The CHAIRMAN. So you think it is going to hang at least through 

the end of the month, at least? I am concerned that, on the current 

trajectory, we are reducing the number of people throughout the 

country, we are reducing our intelligence-gathering capability 

throughout the country, we are reducing a variety of capabilities 

we have throughout the country, and meanwhile we are studying 

it. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman—or excuse me, Chairman—— 

The CHAIRMAN. It doesn’t matter. Mac is fine. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, I certainly wouldn’t go that far. 

We are taking President Ghani’s request very seriously, and it is 

being discussed at the highest level. The President has not made 

a decision yet, but I think we are very aware of the importance of 
36 

this request and want to do what we can to make the most of the 

next 2 years. 

So, again, I think that will be a discussion when the President 

gets here, but it is being looked at a very high level and in great 

detail. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as you can tell, I am frustrated at what we 

are losing in the meantime. 

Let me ask one more thing and then I will yield to Mrs. 

Walorski. 

General, last week in the Senate, General Allen, who is now the 

special Presidential envoy, said that ‘‘enduring’’ in the administration’s AUMF proposal could mean 2 weeks or it could mean 2 

years. 

And then Secretary [of State] Kerry also testified in the Senate 

that ‘‘enduring’’ could mean weeks and weeks but then he came 

over to the House [of Representatives], and he said, well, it could 

mean months, not years. 

So if this passed as submitted, you are the combatant commander responsible for implementing this AUMF, and so my question to you is, how long is enduring? Is it two weeks? Two months? 

Two years? 

General AUSTIN. Well, I think it is—you would have to evaluate 

the requirements on a mission-by-mission basis, and I would hope 

that, we could be—you know, when I am given objectives and goals 

and missions that they are specific enough for me to lay out how 

long it will take. 

But in terms of, you know, a mark on the wall of exactly how 

long enduring is, that is ill defined or not defined. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Smith and I got a letter from one of 

your predecessors, General Mattis, last week, who basically argued 

that we should not put restrictions as far as the kind of capability 

that we would limit our military commanders from using to achieve 

those objections. 

I heard you tell Mr. Franks a while ago that you thought more 

flexibility was better. I presume that that would be your outlook. 

If you are given a mission, you would just as soon have all means 

necessary—or at your disposal—available to carry out that mission? 

General AUSTIN. That is correct, Chairman. And I would ask for 

whatever I thought was necessary to accomplish the mission. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Mrs. Walorski. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Austin, you have been deployed on several operational 

tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What limitations have other 

AUMFs placed on your missions and operational abilities, number 

one; number two, if in your operational experience you have been 

most effective as accomplishing your mission without AUMF limitations, why would this AUMF provide you with the quote, unquote, ‘‘flexibility’’ you need to accomplish this mission? 

General AUSTIN. Well, you know, certainly, I have been involved 

in, over the last decade-plus, in fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

And we have had what we needed to have to accomplish our goals 

and objectives in both instances. 
37 

In terms of any limitations that this current—the proposed 

AUMF would place on us, the way it is laid out to—I think we will 

have what we need, we will have the flexibility to address the 

counter-ISIL campaign. 

And so to accomplish what has been given to me in this current 

mission set, I think we have the flexibility to get the work done. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. And just reflecting again on what the chairman 

said, but, you know, I was heavily impacted last week when I read 

the letter from General Mattis. And—when he talked about to the 

committee last week that they should not set any arbitrary guidelines, AUMF should not establish geographic limits, AUMF should 

put the enemy on notice that we will use all military capabilities, 

even if it includes ground forces. And we have heard other, just 

through the news and just through talk, other senior military leaders saying the same thing. 

And I have got to believe, with him being your predecessor, 

would you not agree with General Mattis’ views, that we simply 

cannot have these kind of ground game rules, number one, already 

established; and number two, we are telling ISIL and all interested 

parties exactly what we are not going to do? 

General AUSTIN. Well General Mattis is a great friend, a guy 

who I respect a lot. And I will tell you that we agree on some 

things; we don’t agree on everything. But in this case, Congresswoman, my thoughts are the more flexibility that I can have, the 

better it is for me in terms of prosecuting this kind of a fight. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Wouldn’t it be easier to have an AUMF that 

says destroy ISIL, period? Wouldn’t that give you unbelievable 

flexibility, unbelievable authority, and send a strong message to 

the other side, to the enemy camp that there is number one mission in this country, and all the bounds are off, all the rules are 

off, and you are in charge of a command that can go and do what 

the American people want, which is to destroy ISIL, even if they 

show up in Afghanistan, even if they show up in other places 

where we already know there is connections and networks being 

made? 

General AUSTIN. Well, again, the more flexibility I can have as 

a commander—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Would you support that kind of AUMF, sir, that 

said destroy ISIL? 

General AUSTIN. I am confident I will never get that kind of an 

AUMF, but I take your point. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I appreciate. 

I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman, do you have something right quick? 

Mr. COFFMAN. No, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Thank you, all, for your patience. A vote came just in time. 

And so we appreciate both of you and the challenges that you 

face in sorting through a very difficult, messy situation in the Central Command area of responsibility. 

Thank you again for being here today, and we will look forward 

to further discussions. 

With that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:44 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 3, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 3, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 3, 2015 

(103) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

Secretary WORMUTH. First, we very much share your concern about the status of 

Christians and other minorities in Iraq. We strongly condemn ISIL’s recent attacks 

on the ancient city of Nimrud, in Iraq, and on Christian villages in northeastern 

Syria—as well as their continued use of barbaric tactics to massacre and enslave 

innocent people, and persecute minority populations. This is among the very reasons 

we are working to defeat ISIL in Iraq. Unfortunately, DOD does not track the specific number of Christian tombs, shrines, statues, and other religious sites that have 

been destroyed by ISIL, so we do not have more detailed information to share. The 

State Department and USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] may be 

able to give you a more comprehensive briefing, based on their relationships with 

NGOs. 

What we do know is, as you suggested, there are an estimated 300,000–350,000 

Christians remaining in Iraq. Prior to 2003, Iraq’s Christian population was approximately 1.4 million, historically concentrated in northeastern Ninewa province, with 

small populations in several urban centers such as Mosul, Baghdad, Erbil, and 

Kirkuk city. Approximately one million Christians left Iraq due to security concerns, 

discrimination, and limited economic opportunities in the years following 2003. 

Today, Christians and other religious minorities are disproportionately represented among displacement camps in northern Iraq due to ISIL’s incursion and 

threats upon their historic communities. Most Christians still in Iraq are located in 

relatively secure Kurdish-controlled areas. Nonetheless, Christian communities in 

Iraq remain concerned about their future in the country due to ongoing sectarian 

violence and a lack of economic opportunity. [See page 31.] 

General AUSTIN. We do not track or have the information to share with you concerning the number of Christian tombs, shrines, statues, and other religious sites 

that have been destroyed by ISIL. What we do know is that there are an estimated 

300,000–350,000 Christians remaining in Iraq. Prior to 2003, Iraq’s Christian population was approximately 1.4 million (of an estimated total population of 26 million). 

Historically, Christians were concentrated in northeastern Ninewa province, with 

small populations in several urban centers such as Mosul, Baghdad, Erbil, and 

Kirkuk city. In the years following 2003, approximately one million Christians emigrated from Iraq due to security concerns, discrimination, and limited economic opportunities. Today, most Christians remaining in Iraq are located in relatively secure Kurdish-controlled areas of the north. Unfortunately, Christian communities in 

Iraq may still be susceptible to sectarian violence and are concerned about a lack 

of economic opportunity. [See page 31.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 3, 2015 

(107) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. President Obama’s proposal for a new Authorization for the Use of 

Military Force ‘‘does not authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces in 

enduring offensive ground combat operations.’’ Please specifically define ‘‘enduring 

ground operations.’’ Do you believe the reference to ‘‘enduring ground operations’’ 

will be clear to our commanders on the ground? Since the administration has not 

yet adequately defined ‘‘enduring ground operations,’’ which will be responsible for 

determining whether an action violated the stipulation against ‘‘enduring ground operations’’? 

Secretary WORMUTH. The AUMF would not authorize long-term, large-scale 

ground combat operations like those the United States conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. It would provide the flexibility to conduct ground combat operations in 

more limited circumstances, such as rescue operations involving U.S. or coalition 

personnel or special operations to take military action against Islamic State in Iraq 

and the Levant leadership. 

I do believe that the reference to enduring ground combat operations would be 

clear to our commanders on the ground, and certainly to the President and Secretary of Defense initiating any such action. Any requirement for U.S. ground combat operations would be assessed on a mission-by-mission basis. In light of existing 

guidance limiting the role of U.S. ground forces as described in the reports submitted by the President consistent with the War Powers Resolution, we do not believe there would be opportunities for the commanders on the ground to engage in 

‘‘enduring ground operations’’ without further orders from Washington. 

Mr. SHUSTER. A number of friendly nations continue to acquire and maintain 

American weapons technology, including systems like the PAC GEM–T missile, as 

an effective and efficient countermeasure to regional threats. How can we better leverage our industrial base in this manner to support our Middle Eastern allies in 

their fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant? 

Secretary WORMUTH. The Department of Defense (DOD) is working closely with 

the U.S. defense industry and partners in the Middle East region to help them build 

capabilities that facilitate their own security and that of the region. In support of 

this effort, DOD maintains close relationships with the defense industry to leverage 

new and existing technologies that meet the unique requirements of partners 

around the world. It is through the increased collaboration and dialogue with both 

industry and partner nations that the Department provides cost-effective solutions 

for greater capability as well as partner interoperability with U.S. forces and each 

other. 

The Department continues to work bilaterally with partners in the Middle East 

to support the development of air and missile defense capabilities while also establishing the foundation for increased regional collaboration in support of U.S. national security interests. The DOD-defense industry partnership has played a vital 

role in developing both bilateral solutions and opportunities for system integration 

in support of these efforts. 

Although missile defense remains a priority in the Middle East region, effective 

counter Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (C–ISIL) operations demand a different set of capabilities. DOD continues to work closely with interagency partners 

and industry to expedite delivery of defense articles and services in response to urgent requirements of partners engaged in C–ISIL operations. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The President has placed a 3-year limitation in his proposed Authorization for the Use of Military Force. Do you believe that the current strategy 

will defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in that time window? 

We have seen a steady decline in government stability that expands beyond the 

Middle East, into Africa and elsewhere. Has President Obama, as Commander in 

Chief, too narrowly defined and too marginally addressed extremist threats? Do you 

presently believe there are any other emerging terrorist threats or organizations 

that have the potential to fill the power vacuum that would be created by ISIL’s 

defeat? 

General AUSTIN. I believe the strategy that calls for the use of indigenous forces 

supported by a broad coalition to defeat ISIL is the right strategy and it will suc-
108 

ceed. We are only in month eight of a 36-month campaign, and the coalition already 

has made significant progress in the fight against ISIL. Specifically, the combined 

air-ground campaign continues to deny the enemy freedom of movement, while disrupting their ability to resupply and seize and hold new terrain. Overall, I assess 

that we are about where we said that we would be at this point in the campaign. 

That said, if more time is required, I am confident our national leadership will provide the necessary authorities to support our continued efforts to defeat ISIL. In the 

meantime, I do believe we should work by, with and through our coalition partners 

to achieve our shared goals and objectives. In the end, we want to defeat ISIL, and 

also take the necessary steps to ensure that what we see happening now in Iraq 

and Syria does not happen again in the future. 

The threat posed by a number of violent extremist organizations will likely persist 

after ISIL has been defeated. Certainly al-Qaida and/or its affiliates, such as alQaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaida in the Land of the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM), present an enduring threat to stability and security in the Central region. These groups have global ambitions and they aspire to topple ‘‘apostate 

regimes’’ and conduct attacks against the West and western interests. And so, we 

must continue to maintain pressure on these groups going forward, while also helping our regional partners to effectively address the ‘underlying currents’ or the root 

causes of the instability that are at play in that volatile and strategically-important 

part of the world. 

Æ