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i 

94–218 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–16] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS HEARING 

ON

ALIGNMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE 

INVESTMENT AND RISK AND DEFENSE 

STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 3, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MICHAEL MILLER, Professional Staff Member 

BRIAN GARRETT, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Ballentine, Hon. Miranda A.A., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Installations, Environment, and Energy ......................................................................... 5 

Conger, John, Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Energy, Installations, and Environment ............................................................ 3 

Hammack, Hon. Katherine, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations, 

Energy, and Environment ................................................................................... 4 

McGinn, Hon. Dennis V., Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Energy, Installations, and Environment ....................................................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Ballentine, Hon. Miranda A.A. ........................................................................ 85 

Conger, John ..................................................................................................... 39 

Hammack, Hon. Katherine .............................................................................. 64 

McGinn, Hon. Dennis V. .................................................................................. 98 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J. .................................................................................. 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

‘‘Not Moving DGRC–Impact’’ chart displayed by Mr. Bishop ....................... 115 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Gibson ......................................................................................................... 119 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 119 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 132 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 131 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 132 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 123 

(1) 

ALIGNMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT AND 

RISK AND DEFENSE STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 3, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:33 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. Wittman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. WITTMAN. We will call to order the Subcommittee on Readiness for the House Armed Services Committee. Today’s hearing is 

on ‘‘Alignment of Infrastructure Investment and Risk and Defense 

Strategic Requirements.’’ 

This is the first hearing of the 114th Congress. I would like to 

welcome back our returning members, especially the gentlewoman 

from Guam, Ms. Madeleine Bordallo. Thank you so much. 

As our ranking member she has done a fantastic job, and I look 

forward to another Congress where we can continue to work together and get great things done to solve the complex problems 

that we face in this nation’s military readiness. 

And I want to welcome our new members here today as well. 

And I won’t go name by name, but I look forward to working with 

each of you. And we have some very important and challenging 

issues ahead for us this year. 

For this hearing I would like to welcome our distinguished panel 

of experts. This afternoon we have with us Mr. John Conger performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Energy, 

Installations and Environment; Ms. Katherine Hammack, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations, Energy and Environment; 

Mr. Dennis McGinn, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Energy, Installations and Environment; and Ms. Miranda Ballentine, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Installations, Environment and Energy. 

And this hearing today is critically important in helping us understand and evaluate this year’s infrastructure budget as it relates to readiness. Although we recognize that the Bipartisan 

Budget Act of 2013 provided some release over the last 2 years, 

even if funded at the current President’s budget request level, the 

Department continues to take risk in infrastructure in its effort to 

balance force structure, modernization, and readiness. 
2 

The infrastructure budget that we have before us today includes $8.4 billion for military construction, family housing and BRAC 

[base realignment and closure]; $10.8 billion for facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization, representing 81 percent of 

the total sustainment requirement; and a request for an additional 

round of base realignment and closure with a $10.5 million request 

for BRAC analytical efforts. 

As the witnesses today testify, I would ask that you address the 

following questions. How has the Department aligned infrastructure investments with the long-term defense strategic requirements? What level of risk in installations has the Department 

taken on? And what mitigation efforts has the Department implemented or plans to implement in the installations portfolio? 

I would like now to turn to our ranking member, Madeleine 

Bordallo, for any remarks that she may have. Madeleine, thank 

you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I too—it is an 

honor to serve with you again as the ranking member on the Readiness Subcommittee. And I thank all of our witnesses for their testimony today. 

This committee’s focus is on the readiness of our armed services. 

Though sometimes overlooked, the Department’s infrastructure is 

the platform from which it generates the military readiness. The 

airfields our military operates from, the ranges where they train, 

and the facilities that support the maintenance of weapons systems 

all contribute to the overall readiness of the force. 

In recent years the amount of investment in infrastructure has 

assumed a certain level of risk due to budget pressures placed on 

the Department. And this has meant deferring maintenance of facilities and postponing the recapitalization of aging infrastructure. 

As this committee begins its review of the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2016, I am encouraged to see the increased 

level of investment in our military’s infrastructure, especially to 

support the rebalance of the Asia-Pacific region. 

However, if we are to sustain and continue this important investment, it is absolutely critical that Congress removes the Budget 

Control Act. Failing to repeal sequestration will undermine our Nation’s military, including these infrastructure investments. 

The current budget proposal already assumes a level of risk. But 

going below these levels is simply, simply unacceptable. These infrastructure investments support the Department’s ability to generate readiness. And we have placed significant risk on future 

readiness by delaying needed maintenance and recapitalization of 

our facilities over the last several years. 

The President’s budget is a step in the right direction. But we 

cannot let the investment go below that level. 

So I am encouraged by the progress being made in the realignment to the Asia-Pacific region, and I believe there are important 
3 

investments to support this strategy in the fiscal year 2016 budget 

submission. 

In cooperation with the government of Japan, a steady stream of 

funding has been programmed to support the realignment of Marines from Okinawa to Guam, and the infrastructure investments 

associated with the move. And I fully support this continued effort. 

And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward 

to the testimonies of our witnesses. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you so much, Ms. Bordallo. 

Witnesses, as you can see from the length of mine and the ranking member’s opening statement, we intend to keep today’s opening 

statements brief. So I would ask, if you would, if you have an opening statement, we will take everything that you have for the 

record. But I would ask that in your opening statements that you 

keep things brief and to the point so that we can maximize the 

interaction between members and our witnesses. 

Mr. Conger, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN CONGER, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF 

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS, AND ENVIRONMENT 

Mr. CONGER. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department’s fiscal year 2016 budget request for energy, installations and environment. 

My written statement addresses the budget request in detail. So 

instead of summarizing it, I would just like to raise two topics for 

you to consider as we enter into today’s discussion. 

First, we cannot contemplate the budget request without considering the context of the Budget Control Act [BCA] caps. The Department submitted a budget request that was $35 billion higher 

than the caps and $38 billion higher than last year. Forcing us to 

adhere to the caps would have reverberations across the budget. 

The President’s budget request includes a significant increase for 

facilities over last year’s request. That is nearly $2 billion increase 

in MILCON [military construction] and $2.5 billion in facilities 

sustainment and recapitalization. 

Legislation will be required to provide relief from the BCA caps. 

And the relief provided—like the relief provided by the Bipartisan 

Budget Act a couple of years ago. 

If you must adhere to the BCA caps, Congress will have to cut 

$35 billion from our request, and that will certainly have—it will 

certainly have to consider cutting funds from the request for facilities. 

The second topic that I wanted to raise for your consideration as 

we go forward is BRAC. It should be no surprise that we are again 

requesting authority to conduct a BRAC round. 

As we deal with this constrained budget environment, with considerable force structure decreases since 2005, we must look for 

ways to divest excess bases and to reduce the cost of supporting 

our smaller force structure. A few key points I wanted to lay out 

in support of our request for BRAC. 

First, the Army and Air Force have done analyses indicating that 

they have 18 percent and 30 percent excess capacity, respectively. 
4 

And I will note that the Army’s analysis is based on a 490,000-soldier figure, not the projected 450,000. This aligns with our prediction based on the analysis performed in 2004 that we have significant excess capacity that would point to the need to have a 

BRAC round. 

Second, partially in response to Congress’s urging, we conducted 

a BRAC-like review of European facilities, delivered to Congress in 

January of 2015, which we project will save more than $500 million 

annually once implemented. I would be happy to discuss that as 

well. 

And third, in this budget environment a new BRAC round would 

have to be focused on efficiencies. I know BRAC 2005 was unpopular. But the recommendations from that round that were designed 

to save money, did. 

And the reason that the round cost so much was because we accepted a large number of recommendations that were not designed 

to save money. If you break out the roughly half and half of the 

recommendations, half of the recommendations were not designed 

to save money within 7 years. Those cost $29 billion and only had $1 billion of recurring savings annually. That is not based on a business case. That was 

based on things that we decided we needed to do. 

The other half of the recommendations were designed to save money, and they cost $6 billion and returned $3 billion a year annually. Spending $6 billion to get $3 billion a year, that is a good 

business case. And what that shows is when we do try to save 

money, we can. 

The new issue that I have heard raised this year is that we can’t 

expect Congress to pass our legislative proposal for BRAC because 

it mirrors the 2005 BRAC legislation. I understand the reality that 

no matter how many times the administration asserts that a future 

BRAC round will be about cost savings, Congress may want more 

than just our assurance. We can’t just say trust us. 

And so let me be clear. We are open to a discussion on this point. 

And I would like to solicit your suggestions as to specific changes 

in the BRAC legislation that would make it more acceptable. We 

want to know what would address your concerns. 

Thanks for the opportunity to testify. And I look forward to the 

discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conger can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conger. 

Ms. Hammack. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KATHERINE HAMMACK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, INSTALLATIONS, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENT 

Secretary HAMMACK. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member 

Bordallo and other members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to discuss the Army’s 2016 military construction budget. 

The velocity of instability around the world has increased. And 

the Army is now operating on multiple continents simultaneously 

in ways unforeseen a year ago. Although we believe we can meet 
5 

the primary missions of the Defense Strategic Guidance today, our 

ability to do so has become tenuous. 

Fiscal challenges brought on by the Budget Control Act strain 

our ability to bring into balance readiness, modernization and end 

strength. Even as demand for Army forces is growing, budget cuts 

are forcing us to reduce end strength and base support to dangerously low levels. We face a mismatch between requirements and 

resources. 

Although for 2016 the Army is asking for a 26 percent increase 

from fiscal year 2015 in military construction, family housing and 

the base closure activities, our $1.6 billion request is a 33 percent 

reduction from 2014 and a 55 percent reduction from 2013. 

As force structures decline we must rightsize the supporting infrastructure. We must achieve a balance between the cost of sustaining infrastructure and Army readiness. 

Degraded readiness makes it more difficult for us to provide for 

the common defense. The BCA increases risk for sending insufficiently trained and underequipped soldiers into harm’s way. And 

that is not a risk our Nation should accept. 

We need a round of base closure and realignment in 2017. Without a BRAC and the realized cost savings, the only alternative is 

to make up for shortages in base funding by increasing risk in 

readiness. 

We conducted a facility capacity analysis, as John Conger mentioned, based on our 2013 audited real property data, and determined that our excess facility capacity will be 18 percent when we 

reach 490,000 at the end of this year. As we shrink further, more 

excess capacity is created. We must size and shape Army facilities 

for the force we support. 

The European Infrastructure Consolidation [EIC] review addressed excess capacity in Europe. For the Army an investment of 

$363 million results in annual savings of $163 million, which is 

less than a 3-year payback. 

We are now facing critical decisions that will impact our capability and capacity for the next decade. It is important that we 

make the right decisions now. Without savings from a BRAC 

round, the risk is that the installations will experience larger cuts 

than would otherwise occur. 

We look forward to working with Congress to ensure the Army 

is capable of fulfilling its many missions. And on behalf of soldiers, 

families, and civilians in the best Army in the world, thank you for 

your support and the opportunity to discuss the Army’s budget. I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Hammack can be found in 

the Appendix on page 64.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Hammack. 

Ms. Ballentine. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIRANDA A.A. BALLENTINE, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, INSTALLATIONS, ENVIRONMENT, AND ENERGY 

Secretary BALLENTINE. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member 

Bordallo, esteemed members of the committee, it is my honor and 
6 

privilege to be here to testify before you today to discuss the Air 

Force’s installation, environment, and energy budget. 

I thank you for your support in giving the Air Force much needed relief in 2014 and 2015 from untenable sequestration levels. 

Without Budget Control Act relief in fiscal year 2016, the risk assumed to Air Force infrastructure could have sober impacts to Air 

Force readiness. The Air Force strives to ensure airmen have ready 

installations, resilient environmental infrastructure, and reliable 

energy. 

As of today I have been on the job for 135 days. I have visited 

10 bases in those 22 weeks. And I have looked at hundreds of facilities where our aircraft are maintained, where our airmen work, 

and where our military families live. And from those travels I can 

tell you there is more we can do to improve the affordability and 

viability of our installations, which today are simply too big, too 

old, and too expensive to operate. 

The Air Force has about 30 percent excess infrastructure capacity, as Mr. Conger alluded to. Our facilities have an average age 

of 40 years old, and many are much older. In fact about a quarter 

are over 50 years old. And if you combine excess infrastructure capacity with aging buildings, the bottom line is that our facilities 

and installations are simply too expensive. 

When facing unaffordable installations, there are really only two 

ways to get at the problem. You can either spend more money on 

them or you can make them cost less. It is a pretty simple equation. 

Therefore, rather than living with forced sequestration levels, we 

are requesting installation budget figures in fiscal year 2016 substantially closer to what we need. And the Air Force is supporting 

OSD’s [Office of the Secretary of Defense] request for a base realignment and closure round in 2017, which will allow us to comprehensively, transparently align installation and infrastructure 

with our mission imperatives. 

The fiscal year 2016 budget that the Air Force is requesting allows us to begin to chip away at the backlog of infrastructure recapitalization needs and maintenance that has contributed to the 

degradation of our combat readiness. Our $1.6 billion fiscal year 

2016 MILCON request is more than 65 percent higher than last 

year. Our $3.2 billion PB [President’s budget] 2016 request for 

FSRM [facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization] is 

more than 35 percent higher than last year. 

In addition to MILCON, O&M [operations and maintenance], and 

BRAC, I am also really excited about accelerating the use of additional tools to help our installations be more affordable. Tools like 

enhanced use leases have proven successful in leveraging other resources to meet our requirements. 

Power purchase agreements and energy service performance contracts have helped the Air Force cut electricity prices and get renewable energy with no capital outlays. Community partnerships, 

which you may know as P4 from some of your communities, allow 

us to leverage the resources and capabilities of our community 

members. 

Taken together, improved MILCON and facilities O&M budgets, 

plus BRAC, and the range of other tools and programs that I have 
7 

described really make me optimistic that we can restore the Air 

Force infrastructure to the place it needs to be. 

Chairman, Ranking Member Bordallo, members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to represent America’s 

airmen today. And I ask for your full support of the fiscal year 

2016 request, and look forward to taking your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Ballentine can be found in 

the Appendix on page 85.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Ballentine. 

Mr. McGinn. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS V. McGINN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS, AND ENVIRONMENT 

Secretary MCGINN. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member 

Bordallo, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to present the Department of the Navy, Navy and Marine Corps’ 

shore readiness overview. 

The difference between requirements and resources equals risk. 

And I think the focus that, Mr. Chairman, you laid out is right on 

the mark. We need to assess how much that risk is, how it manifests itself, and what we can do to mitigate it. 

I am glad to report that in our budget submittal for this year we 

are starting to make progress in addressing the delta between our 

requirements and our resources. However, we still have a ways to 

go. And there are risks that persist. 

As Ranking Member Bordallo pointed out, these installations do 

represent the jumping off platform and the place you come home 

to after going to serve our Nation’s security in all parts of the 

world. 

And our Navy and Marine Corps team deserve the absolute very 

best in terms of mission readiness that is delivered through our 

shipyards, our readiness centers, our bases that support them, in 

many cases in real time while they are conducting operations overseas in combat. 

So thank you again for holding this hearing. And I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary McGinn can be found in 

the Appendix on page 98.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. McGinn. 

In the interest of making sure that we get to all of our committee 

members today for questions I am going to delay my questions 

until the end. And we will go now to Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate all our guests being here. I appreciate your testimony. There are many things upon which I think we can agree. 

And you have also given us a chance to say no again. So I appreciate that testimony. 

Ms. Hammack, if I could address you with a parochial issue I 

would appreciate that opportunity. As you know the DGRC [Defense Generator and Rail Equipment Center], the rail facility at 

Hill Air Force Base in my district, I have not heard much from that 

lately. Are the negotiations progressing in moving that antiquated 

facility? 
8 

Secretary HAMMACK. No. The Army has no plans to move the 

DGRC that is currently located—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. 

Secretary HAMMACK [continuing]. At Hill Air Force Base. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. Thank you for the answer. Not a good 

answer, but I thank you for the answer. 

As you know, the enhanced use lease project is going to create 

another 15,000 jobs, hopefully that will give us a chance to force 

train re-modernize that particular base. As you understand, let me 

just show you. This area is your facility right through here. 

[The chart displayed by Mr. Bishop can be found in the Appendix 

on page 115.] 

Mr. BISHOP. This is obviously what Utah Transportation Authority is going to have to do to go around you at a great deal of expense, obviously, to the State of Utah. But what that does, if you 

can see, is it puts you outside the parameter of the gate, which 

simply means that there will have to be an additional gate for that 

facility which would require additional guards 24/7. 

Hill does not have for this Army facility on an Air Force base— 

they are not the—Air Force is not giving additional manpower billets to Hill. So how does the Army want to help account for this 

extra requirement and cost that building a new gate as well as facilities and maintenance of that particular area? 

Secretary HAMMACK. The Army does not have the budget to 

move that mission and there is no military reason to move the mission. 

Mr. BISHOP. Well, let me—oh, good. I am glad you said that because the Army Corps of Engineers recently did a study and they 

estimated the cost of relocating to Anniston, minus personnel costs, 

would be approximately $11 million. 

However, I understand that you are planning in your budget to 

appropriate $11 million to fix up the rails that are going into that 

antiquated building, just the rails alone, not the building itself. 

The Army Corps also did in their study said that you would recoup that money within 11 years if you are actually moving that 

into a modern facility that can actually meet the needs of the 

Army. 

So since you are going to spend the amount of money one way 

or the other, why would you actually—why in the world would anyone want to spend that much money for the rails into an antiquated facility when you can actually get a better facility if you 

just spend the money the first way of moving it, which is the right 

thing to do? Why in heaven’s name would you not want to do that? 

Secretary HAMMACK. The cost to move is estimated at $17 million. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is not what the Army Corps of Engineers did 

in their study. It is $11 million, $11 million. You are spending the 

same amount of money. 

Secretary HAMMACK. And the cost—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Why are you still so stubborn about this? 

Secretary HAMMACK [continuing]. To fix the tracks is estimated 

around $9 million. 

Mr. BISHOP. Once again that is not what the study came up with. 
9 

Secretary HAMMACK. We seem to have different numbers. Right 

now—— 

Mr. BISHOP. We certainly do. 

Secretary HAMMACK [continuing]. There is no military reason to 

move the mission off of Hill Air Force Base where it has been since 

the 1940s. 

Mr. BISHOP. Then how are you going to fund the extra gate, the 

extra manpower, the extra maintenance equipment? How are you 

going to fund that? Or are you just going to shove that onto the 

Air Force so they have to fund the extra stuff. 

Secretary HAMMACK. Currently the enhanced use lease has not 

moved into this area. They have not developed this area. And we 

have not seen a timetable for their planned development. 

Mr. BISHOP. Ms. Hammack, you know it is moving to that area. 

We have the timetable. We have the plans. You have seen that not 

only from the State, but also from the Air Force. You still are not moving that. If you are going to spend $11 million one way or the other, why not do it the intelligent way? And maybe you can tell me from whence is this $11 million coming in the first place? What pot have you found that to try and redo 

the rails and only the rails going into an old building? 

Secretary HAMMACK. The rail improvement has to do with life, 

health, safety reasons for the current mission at Hill Air Force 

Base. 

Mr. BISHOP. So from what pot of money is that coming? 

Secretary HAMMACK. It is coming from sustainment, restoration, 

and modernization. 

Mr. BISHOP. So you couldn’t use that to actually put it into a new 

modern facility that would recoup its benefits within 3 years? 

Secretary HAMMACK. No. That would take military construction 

and we don’t have the budget to move that mission—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Oh. So you can’t move money from one budget to another one? You insist on finding a way from moving your—from 

moving the same amount of money from one pot to the other pot. 

Is that what you are telling me? 

Secretary HAMMACK. I would say if you approve a BRAC this 

would be something that would be—— 

Mr. BISHOP. If we approved a BRAC nothing would change at all. 

If you have got the money, you have got the money. If you don’t 

have the money, you don’t have the money. 

But this is one of those things that I don’t understand the stubbornness of the Army in not looking at the broader issue and realizing there is a better way of doing this. 

And with that, if you have a response that is going to make me 

happy within the next 34 seconds because that is all I got, go for 

it. Otherwise, I will still be mad. 

I will still be mad. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary McGinn, I have a question for you. Can you give me 

an update on the expected release date of the final supplemental 

environmental impact statement, and the record of decision regarding the Marine realignment? 
10 

And the second part of the question also can you comment on 

why the Navy has requested funds for the live-fire training range 

at Northwest Field, even though the NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act] process has not concluded yet? 

Secretary MCGINN. I will answer the second question first. We 

have requested those funds in anticipation that the NEPA process 

will have been completed, in order to execute those funds in fiscal 

year 2016. 

The process leading us through the supplemental environmental 

impact statement is going well. We anticipate being able to sign a 

record of decision no later than the end of this spring. And we are 

working very, very closely with other Federal entities to make sure 

that there aren’t any showstoppers between now and then. 

As you know, there has been a lot of work that has gone into 

this, a lot of analysis. But I feel confident at this point to say that 

we will bring the process to a successful conclusion and we will 

have a record of decision. And we will be able to execute those 

funds for the live-fire training facility. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Conger, can you give us an update on the EAC [Economic 

Adjustment Committee] process regarding impacts to Guam associated with the Marine realignment? And can you discuss the findings and the results of last year’s meeting? Has anything changed 

regarding civilian infrastructure requirements over the past year? 

Mr. CONGER. Sure. So as you recall, last June we had a formal 

EAC meeting, Economic Adjustment Committee meeting. It is a 

Federal interagency meeting. You were there. The governor sent 

remarks. And we were able to discuss the fact that the plan has 

significantly changed. 

The impacts are going to be significantly reduced. But we needed 

to still assess what those impacts were going to be and come up 

with cost estimates for how we were going to be able to mitigate 

the impacts that we were going to have through the rebasing action 

that we were contemplating. 

That analysis is ongoing. But based on what I have seen preliminarily, the cost will be significantly less than what we were originally projecting based on the original EIS [environmental impact 

statement]. I think that makes sense. When you significantly reduce the footprint you are going to have significantly smaller impacts. 

I think the Department is committed to mitigating the impacts 

that we have. But the final study with those cost estimates will not 

be released until or approximately the same time as the ROD 

[record of decision] comes out, because we want them to agree. 

We are working in conjunction with the folks working the supplemental EIS. And they are going to be synergistic documents. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

And Mr. Chairman, I have a couple other questions. But if we 

do a second round I will continue. So I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. We will definitely do a second round. 

We will now go to Ms. Stefanik. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all the 

witnesses here today. My question is for Ms. Hammack. 
11 

Noncommissioned officers [NCOs] are the backbone of the armed 

services. They are responsible for executing missions, training 

younger enlisted service members, and guiding young junior officers. 

NCOs are such a strategic feature in the U.S. Army. And the 

President’s fiscal year 2016 budget permits the construction of an 

NCO training center at Fort Drum in New York’s 21st District, 

which I have the honor of representing. 

The academy will be built in place of the current dilapidated 

World War II-era buildings. Regrettably, this imperative project 

runs the risk of being cancelled due to sequestration and the Budget Control Act. 

Can you share with the other members here today other examples of failing Army infrastructure due to fiscal year 2013 sequestration, or lack of maintenance and modernization efforts, or potential projects or missions that will be discontinued? 

Secretary HAMMACK. Thank you for the question. You are absolutely right. Due to the impacts of sequestration in fiscal years 

2013 and 2014, we have an increasing number of failing facilities. 

Right now 7 percent of Army’s facilities are in failing condition, 

yet they still have operating units in them. Twenty-four percent of 

Army facilities are in poor condition. And the number of failing or 

poor increases every year. 

Sustainment is the lowest cost method of maintaining a building. 

You sustain it. If you do not sustain a building properly, if you 

underinvest, then it falls into restoration and modernization. 

Instead of fixing one leak you have to replace a roof. It is much 

more costly. And so we saw a 9 percent increase in requirements 

for restoration and modernization directly due to impacts of underfunding in 2013 and 2014 due to sequestration. 

The risk is, though, as we do not have enough money in restoration and modernization, you increase those buildings that are failing, and those are the ones that have to be replaced with MILCON, 

which is even a much higher cost. So we are increasing the cost 

for future generations due to sequestration right now. 

Ms. STEFANIK. My follow-up question, you just stated the high 

percentage of installations that are in failing condition or poor condition. As we continue to have this conversation about BRAC, 

shouldn’t the Army be doing its job and investing in installations 

that are in poor or failing condition? 

Secretary HAMMACK. The Army is working to invest in failing facilities. As a matter of fact, some of the projects that are on the 

MILCON list for fiscal year 2016 are to replace failing facilities. 

One is the wastewater treatment plant at West Point. And so the 

low amount of dollars we have we are using to invest in failing facilities. 

The challenge is that facilities are failing at a rate faster than 

we are being funded. So we get into a requirements-versusresources issue. We are underfunded and we have more requirements than the budget is allowing us to fix. So that results in an 

increasing number of failing facilities. 

Ms. STEFANIK. For the record I want to state my support of the 

construction of the NCO training center at Fort Drum. Thank you 

for the answers to the question. I do believe that we need to be fo-
12 

cused on making sure that our poor or failing condition installations receive the funding that they need, especially Fort Drum. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Stefanik. 

We will now go to Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the 

witnesses. First of all I just want to again publicly acknowledge 

Mr. McGinn, your work with the State of Connecticut at the Groton 

sub [submarine] base. 

The microgrid project, which is a collaboration between the State 

government, private utility stakeholders, as well as the Navy, is in 

my opinion the model for how to sort of deal with that basic infrastructure, particularly for coastal areas where climate change is 

going to require hardened sources of energy. Again, you have been 

doing great work and it is much appreciated. 

During the testimony this afternoon your colleagues were pretty 

specific about analysis that was done to identify excess capacity. I 

think it was 30 percent in the case of the Air Force, Ms. Ballentine, 

and Ms. Hammack it was 18 percent. 

Your testimony didn’t include that kind of analysis. And I am curious whether the Navy has looked at a similar projection that you 

could share. 

Secretary MCGINN. We have not yet done a capacity analysis. As 

you may know, starting in 1991 with the very first BRAC, the Department of the Navy, and since then, has closed 56 major installations. We have closed overall all installations over 250. 

As a result, the match of our force structure, our end strength, 

and our facilities is a little bit closer, perhaps, than my colleagues 

in the Army and the Air Force. However, we would welcome a 

BRAC and its disciplined analysis in which we are able to make 

business cases for having the alignment right or not. 

But we are prepared, and we worked very closely with Mr. Conger and his staff, and coordinate with my service counterparts to 

make sure that we are using the best tools available to determine 

if we do have excess capacity. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So, again, looking recently Admiral Greenert 

when he was asked about BRAC, and I am quoting him right now, 

‘‘I am always open to a BRAC. It is a good process. But I am satisfied with the Navy’s infrastructure as it exists today, base infrastructure, in that in the Navy I am satisfied with my base laydown 

there in that regard.’’ 

So again, just so I understand better the value of a BRAC to the 

Navy. It is really just kind of a stress test? Or you know—— 

Secretary MCGINN. It—that is a good analogy I think, a stress 

test. And I would say that had we not had prior BRAC rounds, we 

would be in really, really rough shape in terms of our shore readiness, our infrastructure mismatch. And I think that is the case certainly across the whole Department of Defense. 

So we would welcome it. We always look for ways to do the right 

thing in terms of matching the resources where they can do the 

most good in terms of readiness outcome. But—and we are prepared to participate fully in another round of BRAC. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay. Thank you for your answer. 
13 

Mr. Conger, in your testimony, which I didn’t get a chance to get 

around to, you talked about housing issues that you are in charge 

of or overlooking. The privatization of base housing has been, in my 

opinion, a great success. 

The transformation that has occurred at the Navy base in Groton, which again, was actually kind of disgraceful in terms of the 

conditions that sailors and their families were living in, has been 

just again completely changed because of the infusion of new capital that the developers have sort of brought to the table. 

But I would just share with you. There is one unintended effect, 

which is again the terms of these developments is that, again, military personnel get first dibs. Federal employees get second dibs. 

And if there are unoccupied units then the units are made available to nonaffiliated families. 

In Groton right now there are about 100 to 130 schoolchildren 

that are attending Groton schools because the development is property tax exempt. And they get no Impact Aid because they don’t fall 

into the Impact Aid sort of classification. The host community ends 

up taking the hit in terms of the per pupil expenditure for schools 

there. 

And I am on the Education Committee. We looked at this question a little bit in terms of the ESEA [Elementary and Secondary 

Education Act] bill. It is not something that really is ripe yet for 

an amendment. 

But we are working with the Impact Aid community out there. 

And I hope, again, we can reach out to you and your staff in terms 

of trying to get an acceptable situation. 

The host communities are doing the right thing educating these 

kids when their parents are off serving the country. And we should 

make sure that again, they don’t get sort of left holding the bag in 

terms of the cost of that. And with that, I would yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

And now we are going to go to Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And one of the questions—and I am not as some of my colleagues 

are absolutely opposed to BRAC. I am not. But I haven’t been convinced that we are in a position—I see the numbers. I—particularly 

I know the Army’s numbers in regards to reductions. 

What I am concerned about is 3 years from now, 4 years from 

now we change the metric and we change where we are with regards to reduction of forces. Because I think that most of us on 

Armed Services agree that we are not in a good spot in regards to 

our force structure. 

So putting all that into place that we actually could be above 

those numbers or equal to the numbers that we are at this year, 

how do you fix that so you are not coming back here 4 years from 

now or 5 years from now saying oh my gosh, you know, you all got 

your act together. You got rid of sequestration. We are actually 

funding the military at the proper level. And now we need more capacity. How do you assure us of that? 

Secretary HAMMACK. When we look at BRAC we look at many 

different factors. And we also look at a 20-year force structure plan. 

But if you think back, the Army at World War II was a force of 
14 

8 million. We built warehouses and barracks and office buildings 

and training locations for a force of 8 million. 

And through the years we have reduced our excess infrastructure. But we have excess infrastructure left over from World War 

II, whether they are barracks or office buildings or dining facilities 

or stuff that we have never completely sized down to a force of 

490,000, which is where we will be at the end of this year. 

Mr. NUGENT. So if we go back to 562,000, let’s just say, for the 

sake of argument, if you resize your capacity in housing and structures, how is that going to affect us if we do go back to that number? 

Secretary HAMMACK. There are many different things that we 

can do. One of the highest military values is training lands, land 

on which you can train soldiers. When you talk about housing soldiers, there are many different ways to house soldiers. Whether 

you are talking about tents or whether you are talking about two 

per room. 

In the last 10 years we have doubled the size of a dorm or a barracks room to the point where you can put a bunk bed in there and 

it can be just as comfortable as a dorm room at a university. So 

we have the surge capability to expand and contract the Army. 

What we want to do is what we did in the European infrastructure analysis, which is consolidate to our most critical, most important assets to give us that flex capability to better manage the 

budgets that we have. Otherwise we are spreading a smaller budget across the same number of installations. And when you 

underman or when you have empty buildings they decay faster 

than occupied buildings. 

We would like to put some of these buildings into productive 

reuse in communities. And if you look at BRAC there are many 

success stories in communities where there are now community colleges or business parks. 

One is in Massachusetts, Fort Devens where there is now a 

movie studio. There is a billion-dollar Behr manufacturing plant. 

The Guard and Reserve are using the training lands. The old 

cantonment area, there is a new hotel in there. There are restaurants in there. 

It has turned into a very vibrant business park. And it supports 

the Reserve and Guard mission. So I think there are many opportunities for us to become more efficient in our real estate so that 

we can continue to support the military for the long term. 

Mr. NUGENT. I would hope it would not—BRAC, if it ever gets 

to that point, that the training facilities is paramount. I have three 

sons currently in the Army, two Active Duty, one National Guard 

Black Hawk pilot. And their ability to have those areas is paramount to their mission. 

And I just want to give you a side note. When my older son came 

back from Afghanistan, and I want to say it was 2008–2009, back 

to Fort Bragg, and there was a huge, if you remember, there was 

a huge uproar because they were supposed to come back to new 

barracks and they came back to the same junk that they were in 

when I saw my son off, my wife and I. 

So what you have done, though, has been remarkable. I will tell 

you the privatization at Fort Rucker and other areas where I have 
15 

had other—my other sons at, they have done an excellent job. I will 

give you credit that you have really done a good job in those areas. 

So I want to thank you for that. And I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Nugent. 

And we will now go to Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to begin by asking Ms. Hammack to follow up on a comment that she made. It seemed like you were providing us a choice 

between sustaining infrastructure that we might not need and 

readiness. And I would like you to sharpen that point, if you will, 

and tell us just exactly what is at stake in terms of the readiness. 

Secretary HAMMACK. What is at stake in readiness is our ability 

to fund training, our ability to ensure that soldiers are trained and 

equipped. So when we look at our budget it is a balance. And as 

we are reducing force structure, we can’t reduce force structure at 

the same pace as we are asked to reduce budgets. 

So then you look at reducing training. Well, we don’t want to deploy an untrained solider. Then you look at reducing equipment. 

But we don’t want to underequip a soldier. 

And so the last part of the budget pot is sustainment on our installations. And we have cut that to bare bones level. We are right 

now maintaining or sustaining our installations to life, health, safety levels. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Can you—you also touched upon this, but I wondered if you have some numbers to really drive it home. You talked 

about the cost of deferred maintenance. 

You know if you are going to patch a leak in the roof in year 1 

and you don’t and you wait until year 10 and you have got to replace a whole roof. What—in numbers what is that costing us, that 

opportunity to fix it today versus waiting for it to metastasize 10 

years down the road? 

Secretary HAMMACK. Let me give you a scale of costs. If you 

think just bare sustainment in a building, and that is just the 

structure itself, it is about $0.30 a square foot. If you don’t patch 

that leak in the roof and you now have to replace the roof that gets 

to about $30 a square foot. If you don’t fix the roof in time and the 

structure decays and you have to replace it, that is $300 a square 

foot. 

So the lowest cost is to adequately sustain a building. But right 

now we are $3 billion backlog with 5,500 major work orders in sustaining Army installations. 

We do not have the funding to sustain installations because we 

are putting our funding into training and equipping and maintaining the force so that we can do the missions asked of us by this 

nation. It is a tough decision. 

We are not maintaining the installations the way I would like to. 

We are not sustaining the installations the way I think we should. 

But we are deploying our soldiers the way I think we should. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. We are supposed to be down to a force of 450,000 

by 2017? 

Secretary HAMMACK. 2018; 490,000 by the end of this year and 

then by 2018 down to 450,000, which has risks associated with 

that. 
16 

Mr. O’ROURKE. What happens if we don’t do anything, if we don’t 

follow these recommendations, if we don’t ultimately address the 

18 percent of overcapacity that you have within the Army? 

And I guess what I am getting at is will there be a recommendation for a further drawdown so that the force that we do have is 

ready, albeit smaller, and at a level where we are sustaining the 

infrastructure? Is that potentially a choice that we are looking at 

down the road? 

Secretary HAMMACK. The risk right now, we are doing an analysis, a Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Assessment to 

see where we would take the cuts in manning to go down to a force 

of 450,000. Some bases we are evaluating cuts of 15,000 personnel, 

both uniform and civilian. 

So if you have a base of 30,000 and we take a cut of 15,000 in 

order to live within the resources we have, that means fully 50 percent of the structures on that base could be underutilized or empty 

or decaying to a point where they are failing. So they have no use 

to the community and they have no use to the Army. And if we 

ever have to surge, we would have to rebuild and build new. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thanks. That helps me to better understand this 

issue. And before I yield back to the chair I just want to thank you 

for your accessibility and responsiveness on issues that we have 

brought to your attention in the 2 years that I have been here. We 

really appreciate your support at Fort Bliss. 

With that, I yield back to the chair. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. O’Rourke. 

I just want to get a perspective question here. I think it is the 

right time. To Mr. Conger, can you tell me from the 2005 BRAC 

when you expect to accrue positive savings from that BRAC? 

Mr. CONGER. So we are accruing approximately $4 billion of savings a year. The investment that—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Net for the entire period of time. Tell me when 

you will recover what you spent for that BRAC. 

Mr. CONGER. So based on the $35 billion of investment and $4 

billion of recurring savings, it nets out in 2018. I will note, however—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. 2005 to 2018 is—I am not a good mathematician, 

but 13 years. 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. The implementation period does not have the 

spend evenly across. That doesn’t—the savings was not $4 billion 

a year from the beginning, but it was from the end. There was a 

factor in the middle of that. But the figure is 2018 for the breakeven point. 

Mr. WITTMAN. In a proposed—if you were given permission to 

pursue a BRAC, tell me the savings that you would accrue within 

the Fiscal Year Defense Plan, better known as the FYDP, in other 

words, money that you can actually plan to spend. 

Mr. CONGER. So we have done a projection. Obviously everything 

depends on the specific recommendations. But we have a projection 

that we are using for planning. 

And within that projection we expect to spend—and oh, by the 

way, we based it on the kind of inefficiency BRAC round that we 

anticipate that includes the ones we did in the 1990s and the effi-
17 

ciency recommendations from the 2005 round. That kind of pattern, 

spend plan. We expect to spend approximately $6 billion within the scope of that 6-year period. And we expect to recoup approximately $6 billion in savings within that 6-year period, and $2 billion a year from 

then on out. That is based on a 5 percent infrastructure reduction. 

So I would also note that, to address the previous question, if we 

anticipate that we have 20 percent, whatever the—18 percent to 30 

percent of excess, that is not—we are not proposing to eliminate all 

of the excess. This is the lowest military value property that we 

have that we would target. 

Mr. WITTMAN. So your net would at best be questionable within 

a period of time where you could actually save the dollars. And if 

you are going to use the same spend plan assumptions that you 

used in 2005, which underestimated costs, overestimated savings 

and took 13 years to accrue savings, it is questionable at best about 

the dollars that would be available within the FYDP. 

So the assertion that those dollars would be available for readiness I believe certainly leaves much for analysis to consider what 

would actually be able to be planned to be spent in readiness accounts. 

Mr. CONGER. I think it is fair to say that we would not complete 

the implementation of a BRAC round within the scope of a FYDP 

because by definition it takes longer. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. And there is a lot of money that has to be 

spent up front in order to get a BRAC going—— 

Mr. CONGER. You spend money to save money. There is no question about that. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. But asserting, like Ms. Hammack did, that 

somehow that tomorrow our men and women in uniform are going 

to get that training because we are going to start to close bases I 

think is a bridge too far. 

With that, we will go now to Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. And appreciate the 

panelists being here. 

After 13 plus years of war we are now looking to reset the force, 

restore some full-spectrum capabilities, enhance our ability to strategically maneuver. And so my question is going to be about the 

Global Response Force. 

My last year, which was in 2010, I culminated as the 2nd Brigade commander of the 82nd. We were the ground component for 

the Global Response Force. A lot to be proud of there in many 

ways, but underwhelmed by our ability as a country to sort of pull 

together and support strategic maneuver from an installation platform perspective. 

So, Mr. Conger, I am interested to know you know—and to illustrate you know we have Pope—we had Fort Bragg and then we had 

Pope Air Force Base, which we had merged, which I think was a 

move—emotional to be sure, but a move in the right direction. But 

C–17s are hours away, and even the C–130s there we now have 

moved away. 

So from the DOD’s perspective what is being done to complement 

the reset and to look from an installation standpoint that would 

support strategic maneuver? That can be the Army-Air Force inte-
18 

gration, which I think is particularly needing focus. But it can also 

be from a Navy and Marine Corps perspective too from East Coast 

and West Coast. 

I am interested in any of that. And then the other panelists can 

jump in too. 

Mr. CONGER. So, my instinct is to let the other panelists jump 

in first. I don’t have a specific answer to your question. I would 

have to take it—— 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, you know—— 

Mr. CONGER [continuing]. For the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 119.] 

Mr. GIBSON [continuing]. Candidly, with due respect, I mean that 

is really reinforcing my point is that I think we have really lacked 

a national perspective on this. 

It is certainly not in your inbox, per se, at this moment. But I 

mean from—take it back that you know as a guy who was the brigade commander for the Army’s element that was the Global Response Force, I was looking for more joint perspective, more national support. 

For example, unexpectedly, and I think the President made the 

right call. He deployed us to Haiti in the immediate aftermath of 

the devastating earthquake that occurred there in January of 2010. 

And my paratroopers, I mean we 3 days into this deployment we 

had 200 paratroopers on the ground because we didn’t have the 

platforms. The platforms were being directed toward Afghanistan. 

We had significant challenges in cycling. And this was an important mission the President had directed. And so you know from an 

installation standpoint, you know I think that ultimately we have 

got to do better as far as crafting the force so we can be a strategic 

deployment platform. 

So I do think that that is going to require more DOD involvement. I think there has got to be some modeling and simulation 

that comes and the Joint Staff is involved in that. 

But since it appears that you would like to go out to your—to the 

services here, I would be interested in if any of them have anything 

to say as far as strategic maneuverability or deployability, what 

initiatives you may have afoot. 

Secretary BALLENTINE. I would also take that one for the record. 

It is a little bit outside of the purview of my portfolio. But we will 

get back to you with some more details. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 119.] 

Secretary HAMMACK. We do want to ensure that our installations 

are strategic deployment platforms. And that does require an investment. 

You are absolutely right. Right now there is a focus on the Middle East from much of the Army’s perspective. And the concern 

that the chief has is, are we able to have multiple deployments at 

the same time. 

We are challenged right now with the areas that we are deployed 

in around the world. And will we be able to respond to something 

on a moment’s notice? 
19 

We are concerned right now that the readiness levels within the 

Army are some of the lowest they have ever been. And that is because we do not have the money to invest in it. 

We are at about 33 percent readiness if I remember the numbers 

right. We don’t agree that that is where we should be. But we have 

not been resourced. 

So we are challenged as we are reducing our installation funding 

as low as we possibly can so that we can put money in training to 

try and increase the readiness, so that we can put money in our 

equipping so that we can equip our soldiers. 

But the challenge right now is with 50 percent of the Army budget in manning, and the increases in pay and benefits every year, 

it is getting bigger and bigger every year and forcing the Army to 

take risk in some of these other areas. It is not an equation that 

is in balance right now. 

Mr. GIBSON. Ma’am, thank you very much. 

Chairman this is—I know you know I have been on this point for 

some time, but—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Mr. GIBSON [continuing]. You know as we are looking to really 

restore deterrence, which is very important to us peace through 

strength, we have got work to do to restore this capability, the 

Global Response Force, we have been working on it for a number 

of years. But part of it is including installations. 

Mr. WITTMAN. It is. 

Mr. GIBSON. So thank you for the opportunity. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Gibson, thank you. I think that is a great 

point, making sure there is strategic alignment. Any time that you 

are looking at the idea of installation capacity you want to make 

sure that as you are looking at that, alignment takes a front stage 

when it comes to making sure we are making the right decisions. 

And with that, we will go to Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think the hearing today obviously is really a good point for why 

there have been BRACs in the past. And there is just no question 

that Members of Congress, and for that matter I think a lot of the 

personnel on our installations also weigh in at these times. And it 

is sometimes very difficult to see where the benefit will be moving 

forward. 

But I wonder. I really need to press you to go a little bit further 

with this because I think that you know this is the Readiness Committee, and so it seems logical that one would be able to capture 

the resources that are needed out of our infrastructure to move in 

a different direction. And I think you have spoken to that. 

But it is not convincing, I think, to a lot of the members because 

the benefits do not accrue for some time with base closures. So how 

do you make the argument then, how do you move forward with 

why it is essential to do this at this time? 

You have talked about money that is not being spent if we don’t 

have to sustain some of the installations. Clearly the room that we 

need is not necessarily where it is available. And so that is—there 

is just no way of aligning some of those things across the country. 

I am just wondering, how are you going to move forward with 

these arguments? Because I see a real benefit in doing that, from 
20 

my community I have seen it. But on the other hand I know how 

possessive people are on a number of our facilities as well for giving up an inch of land. 

Secretary HAMMACK. Congress asked us to take a look. 

Secretary MCGINN. If I might—— 

Secretary HAMMACK. I will give it to you in just a minute. 

Congress asked us to take a look at our European infrastructure 

and to get that in balance. And that is something that we have 

done. And we have demonstrated that we have the analytical capability and we have the intellectual capability to balance our installations, to consolidate into locations that enable us to fight the 

fight for the next 50 years. 

Some of the things that we are closing and consolidating out of 

in Germany are just the same issues that we have here: remnants 

and leftovers from World War II that we are closing out that are 

inefficient to operate. We need to do that same kind of analysis. 

The fact that it has less than a 3-year return on an investment 

for the Army is the same kind of analysis that we need to do here, 

and present to a commission, to give you something to take a look 

at to see where we can achieve those savings. 

We believe there are savings to be achieved through consolidating onto our most efficient platforms that give us the highest 

military value so that we are poised for the next 50 years. That is 

what we are asking for. 

And Mr. McGinn. 

Secretary MCGINN. We think in terms of near-term, mid-term, 

long-term investments and risks, risk assessments. And as Mr. 

Conger, in answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, pointed out, the 

return on investment of a BRAC round is not any time soon. 

But I would just like to make the point that when you want to 

close that resources and requirements gap, and reduce risk in the 

form of better readiness, the best way to do it is to put more money 

in. And that is why we are consistent in—and I know that the committee supports this as well—in our support for the President’s 

budget. 

Or even more to get away from the bad things that happen as 

a result of sequestration. The things that are manifesting themselves since it first went into effect in fiscal year 2013. And we are 

still digging our way out of the hole on the shore readiness as well 

as in the platforms. 

Mr. CONGER. Let me just sort of close out on this [point]. From 

the past five BRAC rounds we are saving $12 billion to $13 billion 

a year right now, avoiding the costs. If we had not done them before and said well those savings are far out, we would have a much 

deeper hole to dig out of today. 

This is good government. It is the thinking about the future. And 

it is not necessarily about today’s immediate problem because as 

we have pointed out, this is a medium-term savings we are looking 

at. We think it pays for itself within the implementation period, 

but even so it is not going to solve the $35 billion problem we have 

today. 

The way we end up doing that is by making pennywise and 

pound-foolish decisions like underfunding, taking risks in sustainment or smaller MILCON requests. That is the way we have had 
21 

to deal with it because we have had an immediate problem to deal 

with. 

Facilities degrade slower than readiness does. And we have acknowledged that. And yes, it is the smart thing to do to take risk 

in facilities before you take risk in readiness. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Secretary BALLENTINE. Can I weigh in on this briefly from the 

Air Force’s perspective as well? 

If you look at the 2005 BRAC, that cost the Air Force about $3.7 

billion and we are already saving $1 billion a year. I haven’t been 

in the Air Force very long, as I told you all from the very beginning. But I come from the business community, and that is a darn 

good return on investment. 

EIC is costing the Air Force $1 billion and we are going to be 

saving $315 million a year. That is a good return on investment. 

Our readiness challenges are not going to be solved overnight, I 

am afraid. So we need to get after this infrastructure as soon as 

possible so that we can start piling that money back in. 

And I think it is an important question to ask; are we looking 

at today’s Air Force that is stretched too thin when we are looking 

at a 30 percent excess infrastructure? And will we come back 5 

years from now if the force structure is closer to where we need it 

to be, and say oh darn, we closed some things we shouldn’t have 

closed? 

And I will tell you that we will, in a BRAC analysis, do a very 

careful, thoughtful analysis to ensure that we are making sure we 

have got the right equipment in the right places for the right force 

structure. 

We have got to preserve some surge. We have got to preserve 

some plus up. And that would all be part of the analysis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. 

We now go to Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to follow 

up, if I could, on one of the previous questions just for the statement. 

You know, your budget request is for $251 million for BRAC and 

then an additional $2 billion in increased spending on military construction. And I think from my standpoint as somebody who represents a lot of the men and women who are going overseas and 

fighting, I would rather see that money spent in readiness right 

now, making sure that the men and women that are being deployed have the training and the equipment that they need, than 

seeing it built in facilities that will not come online for the next 

several years to come. 

And so when we talk about short-term versus long-term needs I 

think the priority is making sure those men and women are 

trained prior to leaving. And that is one of the things that we have 

to balance. 

I understand the request for a BRAC is going to continue to 

come. I understand that at some point there will be a BRAC. And 

there is a tremendous divide I think, an extreme lack of trust between Congress and the administration. And I would suggest to 
22 

you from my standpoint that I think the administration has well 

earned that lack of trust from the way I see it. 

I would like to ask a specific question about the Air Force, Ms. 

Ballentine. Last year the Air Force said that they had a 24 percent 

excess capacity. This year the testimony is that it is a 30 percent 

excess capacity. Did the process change that the Air Force used to 

determine that? And if not, what accounts for the additional 6 percent? 

Secretary BALLENTINE. Thanks for the question. Same process, 

and the 24 percent number that the Air Force testified to last year 

was from the 2004 analysis conducted for the 2005 BRAC round. 

We updated using the same methodology and in fact many of the 

same input looking at updated force structure. 

Since 2004 our overall force structure has come down about 10 

percent. That is about 10 percent in both personnel and in planned 

aircraft. So when we reran the analysis with updated numbers, 

that is where we get to the roughly 30 percent excess infrastructure capacity. 

Mr. SCOTT. But to—just to make sure I understand you correctly, 

you used the 2004–2005 as the foundation for your analysis. 

Secretary BALLENTINE. We used the same process that was congressionally and GAO [Government Accountability Office] approved 

at that time. And the same process as 1998. 

Mr. SCOTT. What were the major facility categories that contained the excesses? 

Secretary BALLENTINE. So we looked at nine categories. And I 

can certainly meet with you separately or provide for the record 

much more detail on precisely what we looked at. But we looked 

at nine specific categories ranging from parking aprons to depot 

labor, space operations and a number of others within that, and 

subcategories within those. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 119.] 

Mr. SCOTT. I would very much appreciate it if we could have— 

if we could schedule that meeting to look at that—those individual 

issues. 

Secretary BALLENTINE [continuing]. Happy to do that—— 

Mr. SCOTT. And certainly hope if you are visiting Robins Air 

Force Base or Moody Air Force Base that you will let me know, 

that both of those are in my district. 

Secretary BALLENTINE. Would love to do that as well, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. And I guess the other question I have, Mr. Conger, 

would be for—you know as we talk about BRACs and the numbers 

that the Department continues to give us, it seems the Department 

already knows and has some ideas of where they want to make 

some of these cuts. 

And I guess my question is you ask us to keep trusting you with 

a BRAC. And my comments earlier were certainly not geared towards you. You ask us to keep trusting you with a BRAC though. 

And I am asking you that you trust us with providing that list of 

where you expect to make those cuts, either by category or by base. 

Mr. CONGER. So I guarantee you that I do not have some sort 

of a secret list. The figures that we have provided are all parametrically based. We try to do that very—— 
23 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, let me—then—and I apologize for interrupting. 

You know I get short on time here. Is it too much housing? Is it 

too much industrial infrastructure, too much headquarter space, 

too many missions? 

Surely by category if you can tell us that one year it is 24 percent 

and one year it is 30 percent in one of the branches, surely that 

you can tell us the same thing for the Army and the Navy. And 

you can tell us by category where that excess capacity is. 

Mr. CONGER. We can certainly give you a copy of the 2004 study 

and the categories are there. And it will show you where the excess 

was at that point in time. We haven’t done a comprehensive e-service across the board, a redo of that analysis today. 

Mr. SCOTT. Then how can you be so confident it saves money? 

Mr. CONGER. So because the—if you look at the excess that we 

had then, what small amount we closed in 2005, the reduction in 

force structure amplifying that excess, we are convinced that there 

is excess to get after. 

The BRAC study will identify the low military value locations 

that we are—we would look to consolidate and close. And we projected based on a straightforward percentage reduction in infrastructure what those costs and savings would be. 

Mr. SCOTT. As somebody who majored in risk management I can 

tell you, you have got a lot of multipliers in there. 

Mr. CONGER. Yes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My question is for Mr. McGinn. With regard to the expected 

growth in the Navy force structure and the continued shift towards 

the Pacific, I am wondering how the Navy is reevaluating its infrastructure capacity and requirements. 

And specifically how do the infrastructure requests in this fiscal 

year 2016 support this rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific? And 

how this investment is working to facilitate continuing to move the 

Marines from Okinawa? 

Secretary MCGINN. As you probably know, that is a long-term or 

I would say midterm project. We will see the first Marines moving 

actually into Guam around 2020–2021. And it will take several 

years to complete it. 

We are starting already in terms of spending MILCON dollars. 

In fact, the question that Ms. Bordallo asked earlier about spending money to prepare live-fire training ranges in Guam is an example of that where we are 5 years in advance in order to make sure 

they are ready when those Marines come because they are going 

to be a rapidly deployable force. 

And we are also looking across the board at support structures 

like housing, for example, for Marines and their family working 

with the United States Air Force at Andersen Air Force Base to 

make sure that we are going to have Marines and Air Force personnel and families using that area instead of doing it separately. 

So I guess the short answer is simply we are very carefully going 

through what the requirements to maintain a ready deployable Marine force with live fire, with air combat element, ground combat 
24 

element, and special forces moving back from Okinawa to Guam 

and to Hawaii as well. 

Australia is another area. The Chief of Naval Operations was 

just down there. But we are looking at this very carefully. And also 

not just counting the troops, but what is it in terms of infrastructure and the projects that will improve or create that infrastructure 

that will make them truly ready? 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

And Ms. Hammack, you know the number of troop reductions 

that we are projecting now and that we will continue to see should 

sequester continue obviously is of deep concern to many of us. In 

Hawaii there have been proposed very deep cuts both at Fort 

Shafter and at Schofield Barracks. 

And I am wondering if you can speak to really what are the reallife impacts on this Asia-Pacific focus on programs like General 

Brooks’ Pacific Pathways of reaching out and proactively engaging 

many partners in the region how this cut would affect that mission. 

Secretary HAMMACK. When we are taking a look at how we are 

downsizing we are taking into account the many missions that the 

military has. General Odierno in a hearing end of January made 

a comment that sequestration is impacting Pacific Pathways. And 

we will not be able to do as much as we think we should do, or 

as General Brooks thinks we should do there. 

When we are looking at force structure reductions we are having 

to take a look at every location that has a BCT [brigade combat 

team] on it to determine how and how much we can take force 

structure down. 

Focus on Pacific is important. We have a lot of forces stationed 

in Korea, South Korea right now in support of that. It is one of 

those things that we have to evaluate and we have to balance. 

They are very tough decisions that we are making right now. 

In the listening sessions that we have had we have heard a lot 

from the communities and that comes into play. Military value 

does come into play. Op plans come into play. 

We are taking a look at everything and trying to put together a 

tough decision to reduce the force to levels that we don’t think is 

appropriate, whether it is 450,000 or even deeper to 420,000 where 

we would be if full sequestration stays the way it is right now. So 

as I said, there are tough decisions that are going to affect almost 

every State because it is going to affect Guard and Reserve as well. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. I think it is important that we share 

this understanding and these impacts not only on the local economies or the districts or the States that are affected by these sequester cuts but really how it affects the mission, how it affects our 

readiness, and how in places like the Asia-Pacific and particularly 

in the Korean peninsula where we continue to see the saber-rattling coming from North Korea. 

These are not theoretical things. These are things that have a 

very real impact on real people and the safety and security of the 

American people. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Gabbard. 

Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a relatively quick question. 
25 

Ms. Hammack, you were mentioning before about some of the 

places where redeveloped real estate, movie theater, this and that. 

Did we sell the real estate to private investors? Or do we own it 

in the hopes of turning a profit? How does that work? 

Secretary HAMMACK. One of the rules that Congress put in play 

under BRAC is the ability for special transfer authority and working with the local reuse authority. So the community sets up a local 

reuse authority that has a say in how that property is developed. 

Some of the other authorities we have to close bases, and we do 

have other authorities to close bases. We essentially close the base 

and give the real estate to GSA [General Services Administration] 

to sell to the highest bidder. 

The community doesn’t have a say in redevelopment. The redevelopment comes along with grants, structured payment plans. The 

land is transferred usually at or below market cost, in many cases 

below market cost. 

There is some value that comes back to the Army or the Department of Defense. And quite often that value received is used for environmental cleanup. So that is what helps fund our environmental 

cleanup on bases. Some require more than others. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So there are several components to this before an 

action is taken and several ways that you can go about it. Are 

there some areas that we are leasing? Or are we basically turning 

these areas over just to kind of get out from under? 

Secretary HAMMACK. Many cases it is we are trying to find a 

buyer for it so that we can entirely get out of any caretaker or real 

estate responsibility. But meanwhile, to your point, the Army does 

have leases around. And we are working to move things back on 

bases and to some of the empty real estate. 

But even so, we have more capacity than we have the need for 

right now. So BRAC is a way for us to do that kind of rebalance, 

consolidations, and evaluate where we need to be for the future. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I think hearing some more of these situations, 

success stories, potential failures as we go forward it is always 

good to hear about how we are managing that situation. So thank 

you. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Dr. Wenstrup. 

Mr. Conger, I want to pursue a line of questioning that we had 

talked about earlier, and that is the context in which the concept 

of BRAC is proposed. Today we find ourselves in a threat scenario 

that is probably more complex than it has been at any time in our 

history, one that changes almost on a daily basis. 

We are also facing budgeting issues through sequester. We are 

also looking at where our end strength ultimately ends up being. 

We also look at what is the national security strategy, what should 

it be? 

Should it be to fight and win a war on one front and hold serve 

elsewhere, to fight and win a war just on one front, to fight and 

win on two fronts? I think that is part of the discussion that has 

to take place. And in that realm of uncertainty now comes the proposal to resize the capacity within the military. 

And one of the assumptions I think you have to have going forward in what the right capacity is, is some certainty about what 

the overall strategy for the Nation is, what the security risks are, 
26 

the issue of sequester and where are we with certainty with the 

budgeting process, which I would argue we are not anywhere close 

yet. 

Hopefully we get there. And where we are with end strength. All 

of those in my mind have a very particular impact on the assumptions that you would put into doing a BRAC. 

Give me your perspective on how we go about doing a BRAC, 

rightsizing capacity in the face of all that uncertainty. And show 

me that when we end up there, if we were to go down that path, 

that we end up in the right place. 

Mr. CONGER. Sure. I think that the best way for me to answer 

that question is to talk a little bit about what we did in Europe. 

And then I will bring it back to the specifics at hand. 

When we did the European Infrastructure Consolidation effort, 

which was a very BRAC-like process, we looked at excess capacity 

that we identified. We looked at the military value of the various 

sites and installations in Europe. And then we analyzed a variety 

of proposed scenarios, very much like the way a BRAC would work. 

When we did that we already incorporated the ability to have excess for contingencies and that was made part of the requirement. 

That was not excess per se. We incorporated that into the analysis. 

And we made a conscious decision to only look at and only accept 

recommendations that did not reduce our operational capacity. 

So in other words, how can we do the same thing for less money? 

What we are looking for in the context of a BRAC round is how 

do we do the same thing for less money? 

If—I understand the strategic uncertainty of what is our ultimate force level going to be. We rely on the Joint Staff to provide 

that input, the installations folks don’t make it up. 

Historically they provided a 20-year force structure plan that has 

been required. There is—but as you pointed out there is uncertainty. 

In the sequestration-BCA environment is the Army going to be 

at 450,000 or 420,000? What procurement programs are or aren’t 

going to go forward? Are we going to have A–10s or not A–10s? 

These are all things that factor into the calculus, and I understand that. But nonetheless, when you look at the BRAC analysis, 

it is based on retaining those places that have the highest military 

value, not those places that are not empty. 

And so the idea would be well, what happens if you reduce force 

structure to a particular location, but that base has the best training ranges or that base has the best maneuver acres, et cetera, et 

cetera. 

You don’t close that base. You fill that base. And those are the 

dynamics that have to be contemplated within a BRAC. You are 

only looking at divesting those installations that are of the lowest 

military value. 

Mr. WITTMAN. As we look at this in context, obviously we are 

coming out of conflicts, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom; coming into a realm of a more dangerous world; coming into a time of reset. If there is one thing we have seen historically about reset is we always get it wrong. 

We have a hard time determining what the future may hold. But 

in that realm of uncertainty, do you believe that there should be 
27 

a logical process to say let’s cross off a few of these other uncertainties on the list first before we get to the point of doing a BRAC? 

In other words, shouldn’t there be a little more certainty about 

what truly is the strategy? What are we going to do to address the 

sequester in the long term? Where are we going to end up with end 

strength? What is going to happen with the world around us as far 

as the threat scenarios? 

Wouldn’t it be logical in your mind to say let’s determine a little 

bit more certainty in those areas before we go about setting capacity that if we don’t get that right we can’t dial it up like a radio 

dial and say whoops, sorry, we made a mistake, we will just dial 

it back up; because it is hard to dial back up that capacity once 

it is lost. 

Mr. CONGER. I think it is. It all depends on how much you expect 

to cut. If I identified a parametric excess on the order of 20 percent, 

am I going to cut 20 percent of my infrastructure? No. 

During the BRAC 2005 round we had identified parametrically 

an excess of approximately 24 percent. What we ended up cutting 

was 3.4 percent of our point replacement value. And I know it is 

apples and oranges. It is two different metrics. But it is what we 

could measure. 

The idea is we are not going to pursue recommendations in the 

name of savings that accept so much risk that that would be an 

issue. That is where we are coming from. We are looking for savings. 

We found it in the European analysis fairly straightforwardly. 

We were able to identify many recommendations without accepting 

what we deemed to be operational risk. And we were still able to 

retain significant enough excess to be able to deal with contingency 

operations. 

I think that where we are going with a BRAC isn’t to give us 

BRAC authority so we can close all of our excess, because that 

would be foolish, right. What we are looking to do is having the authority to find those business cases and those scenarios which 

make the most sense that enable us to fully utilize our installations 

of highest military value. 

Because we can’t refill them right now because we are prevented 

from closing the places where we have lower military value and 

filling those up. We have constraints on what we can do. 

I understand Congress’ concern about the risk that we would accept. And I welcome ideas about how to constrain the authorities 

that Congress would provide so that you feel more comfortable with 

the authority you are giving. 

Mr. WITTMAN. If Congress were to consider the idea of directing 

the service branches to do an analysis based on a certain set of conditions or reality, would that be something that you could bring 

back to Congress within the year to give more context and more 

definition to what a BRAC might entail, including all these uncertainties, including what the end means are for a BRAC and what 

the ends might be? 

In other words, is it to save money? And if it is, how much is 

saved in the FYDP? Obviously not identifying bases, but looking 

across those general categories. 
28 

Mr. CONGER. So I think that it is important to recognize that 

when you—we could do a parametric capacity analysis like the—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. I just want to interrupt you. If you will, put in 

context, tell us what a parametric analysis is. 

Mr. CONGER. So if you are looking at excess capacity, you are 

looking at aircraft per apron space or brigade combat teams per 

training acre aggregated across the entire enterprise. 

You are not looking at, at Camp Swampy do I have—how much 

excess do I have in that particular location? You are adding it all 

up and developing a percentage based on what might have been 

the loading at a different period of time, how much have we vacated. 

That is the kind of analysis we do in order to avoid any sort of 

bias in the analysis that would point to a particular installation. 

We are very careful about that. We believe that any time you do 

a comprehensive BRAC analysis based on certified data where all 

bases are treated equally, that can’t be influenced by a proposed 

list. 

I already know I want to do this or I already know I want to do 

that. We don’t want to pollute the process that we see as transparent, analytical, and apolitical by influencing it with sort of a 

here is where we are going type of thing. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I am going to end with this and then I want to 

go to Ms. Bordallo. 

Would you believe it to be helpful to be able to answer some of 

the questions that I think you hear from the subcommittee members today, and also other questions that are out there, to be able 

to pursue such an analysis where you can look at those parameters? 

Do that analysis, put some scenarios in there where members 

can at least understand how you addressed the uncertainties that 

are around BRAC so they have a better sense, as you heard from 

Mr. Scott, a better level of trust in that those issues that they feel 

are important with this are addressed in that. And that they have 

some level of surety that if Congress were to go down the road of 

a BRAC that there is some context in which they have made the 

decision. 

Rather than what happened in 2005, which was let’s do a BRAC 

and then do the analysis. It was kind of the cart coming before the 

horse. 

Mr. CONGER. Right. I think that it is fair to request an excess 

capacity analysis across the government. I think the Army and the 

Air Force have already done ones. But I think we can do one that 

is comprehensive. I mean, we have been contemplating that ever 

since the language you inserted into that House bill last year. 

The specifics of how we would do that I think are fair to discuss. 

But I think that we think that it is important to do. We wouldn’t 

be able to do base-by-base types of things in this context without 

a formal BRAC process. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, we—and we wouldn’t expect that because I 

think that is what the BRAC is intended for is to do a base-by-base 

comparison. But to look overall, as you said, within the parameters 

and then address those different uncertainties that are out there. 
29 

Say this is how we factor in to provide for if this uncertainty 

were to happen within this range. The worst case scenario to the 

best case scenario here is how we have factored in what this would 

be. And here is how a BRAC could and would address that. I think 

those issues are very important in people’s minds. 

Mr. CONGER. Let me sort of plant this seed as well. What that 

parametric analysis does, what the excess analyses that the Army 

and the Air Force have done is that they point to excess where it 

creates the trade space in which you can make some specific decisions. 

In EIC we did the same sort of thing. We said ah, we see there 

is force structure reducing in Europe. We know that there is trade 

space here. Let’s go in and look at the specifics. And the specifics 

didn’t necessarily have to do with the specific places where there 

was excess created. 

But we knew that there was the room to move around in that 

space. The specific places where we might identify excess won’t end 

up necessarily being where the recommendations are. But they provide the trade space, this swing space that might afford an opportunity. 

I will leave you with a thought. In EIC, I will use an Air Force 

example, we have enough fighters in Europe to basically completely 

fill two fighter bases. Well, we have three fighter bases in Europe. 

But those were among the highest military value installations that 

we have on the continent. 

So instead what we contemplated and what we ended up recommending was taking a facility that had a support function, Mildenhall, and taking the assets there and filling up the fighter bases 

so it had—so that Spangdahlem in particular had multi-mission. 

We were able to preserve bases we deemed to be the highest 

military value. And so what we have proposed wasn’t necessarily 

where the excess was. Does that make sense? 

Secretary MCGINN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add? 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

Secretary MCGINN. Especially in this committee or this subcommittee you hear the expression ‘‘train like you fight.’’ That is 

right at the essence of achieving readiness. And we all, across all 

of the services across the Department, work encroachment issues 

all the time, whether it is jet noise or operations at sea, ground 

combat maneuvering, et cetera. 

And I just wanted to make the comment that this is a key aspect 

of military value that Mr. Conger was talking about. And it isn’t 

based on necessarily only a future BRAC issue or to not have one. 

It is happening right today, every installation. And preserving that 

ability to train like you fight directly contributes to our readiness. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. McGinn, I think that is a great point. It is one 

of the questions that comes up too all the time with the BRAC. And 

that is if you get to a point of releasing facilities that again you 

may need in some capacity in the future, to be able to reconstitute 

that becomes impossible to go back to those existing bases because 

then encroachment occurs. 

So then it becomes very difficult to train like you fight. And then 

you have to go to different areas where the costs are increased either to obtain the land or to pursue operations there. 
30 

And you heard Mr. Gibson bring up a very good point, and that 

is the strategic location, too, of those facilities, which also has to 

be part of an analysis. It is one of those areas that I think doesn’t 

normally come up at the beginning of an analysis. But it has to be 

part of that so we understand what the secondary effects of that 

might be. 

With that I go to Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

you. I think this has been very important and we have received a 

lot of information from this hearing. 

I am curious. Ms. Hammack and Mr. McGinn and Ms. Ballentine, if you could comment briefly, how are you leveraging privatization efforts, public-private partnerships or other innovative authorities to mitigate the risk in infrastructure investments and 

achieve financial savings? We will start with you, Mr. McGinn. 

Secretary MCGINN. We use all of the tools that Congress has 

given us the authorizations: enhanced use leases, energy savings 

performance contracts, utility energy services contracts, power purchase agreements, to be able to get private sector investment in our 

installations, that do a couple of things. 

They give us better, cleaner power. They get us more reliable 

power to the extent that we get distributed generation. And it is 

really good for the economy of not just the local area but the Nation and seeing putting this capital to work. 

At the same time, we in the services get the immediate benefits 

from seeing these deals occur, these contracts occur over a very 

compressed period of time measured in months, not years. And 

we—as soon as those projects are completed, we are reaping the 

benefits in lower utility bills, in better, cleaner, cheaper energy and 

a more robust backbone for distributed generation. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. 

Ms. Hammack. 

Secretary HAMMACK. Thank you, Representative Bordallo. You 

know we have been leveraging partners for quite a while. Housing 

is one of our most successful ones where we have privatized housing to deliver better housing for our service members. 

Most of our bases have lodging for visitors and for soldiers who 

are PCSing [permanent change of station] or for training missions. 

And we have privatized lodging, which has increased the quality of 

the lodging that we provide service members. 

We have also worked to privatize utilities, whether it is electricity, natural gas, or wastewater. And the private sector comes in 

and invests in the infrastructure, which actually then makes it 

much more efficient and then reduces our operating costs. So we 

found that utilities privatization helps save us cost in the long run. 

And now we are looking at a fourth category, which is how do 

we privatize some of our base operations. And quite often we call 

it the Monterey model because Presidio of Monterey, located in 

Monterey, California, is entirely surrounded by the city of Monterey. 

And what we have done is privatize all of our base operations facilities so the city of Monterey runs the Presidio of Monterey. And 

it has resulted in reduced operating costs. 
31 

We look to see where we can apply some or parts of the Monterey 

model through legislation that Congress authorized just last year. 

They clarified it. 

And some of our installations, many of our installations are located in remote locations, not in a location where a city or a county 

is available to provide services. But we are investigating where 

there are opportunities to leverage core competencies that might be 

outside the base so that we are not duplicating services on the 

base. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. And Ms. Ballentine. 

Secretary BALLENTINE. So the Air Force, like our sister services, 

looks at a number of other opportunities and tools in the tool kit. 

As I said at the beginning, when you have unaffordable installations, it is really simple. There are only two ways you can get after 

it. You can spend more money on them or you can make them cost 

less. And one of the things that really excites me is beyond just 

MILCON and FSRM and BRAC we have a range of other tools in 

our tool kit. 

So of course privatization of housing has been very successful. 

We are also working down the path of privatizing utilities. But 

there are a range of other tools as well. And I will give you a couple of examples. 

Enhanced use leases [EULs] is an exciting area of opportunity. 

Most folks have heard about the wastewater treatment plant down 

at Nellis. And in return they built a state-of-the-art fitness center. 

We have got another really exciting enhanced use lease down at 

Eglin Air Force Base where the Holiday Inn has built a hotel and 

we have put our radar on top. Our radar tower was on the ground 

and less effective because the other hotels were building up next 

to it. So we needed to build the radar tower anyway. 

Not only did they put the radar on the top, they painted it like 

a beach ball. So this thing has become kind of a landmark. And it 

is really a neat story. And the Holiday Inn then pays us a percentage of their gross revenues every year. It is a great opportunity. So 

those are a couple of EULs. 

Power purchase agreements allow us to get cleaner energy on our 

bases, provide some energy resiliency. We just did our largest solar 

array in the Air Force to date, 6.4 megawatts at Davis-Monthan 

Air Force Base. That thing is providing 35 percent of the base’s 

power. At peak sun it is providing over 100 percent of the base’s 

power. And it is saving them a half million dollars a year. 

That is another tool that helps get at the fact that these bases 

cost too much money, and gets at the energy resiliency. And there 

are a number of other examples like that. So this is one of the 

areas that I am really excited about and keeps me optimistic. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you. We see these at home. We have 

a large Air Force base and Navy base, and I see these partnerships 

ongoing. And I think it brings the military and civilian community 

together in a big way. And I think that is important. 

I have one last question, Mr. Chairman. Okay. 

Ms. Ballentine, in recent years a large percentage of the Air 

Force’s military construction budget has been focused on supporting combatant commander requirements such as the headquarters facility for U.S. Strategic Command and the U.S. Cyber 
32 

Command and new mission beddowns such as the KC–46 and the 

F–35. 

Now, can you describe the impact these requirements have had 

on the Air Force’s ability to focus on the recapitalization of infrastructure supporting current missions? 

Secretary BALLENTINE. Yes, ma’am. So General Welsh, our chief 

of staff, has said quite clearly that we have in the last several 

years been underfunding our existing mission infrastructure, 

things like nuclear infrastructure, space infrastructure, test and 

training ranges. And those bills are now due. 

This year’s PB 2016 MILCON budget I think is really the— 

strikes the right balance between three priorities. First, continuing 

to focus on COCOM commanders’ needs. That is around 21 percent 

of this year’s MILCON budget. 

Second, focusing on the Secretary’s three top priorities: nuclear, 

space, cyber. Those combined are about 17 percent. And much of 

that is what might fall in that category of existing mission recapitalization. We have got three very important nuclear recapitalization infrastructure projects in that bucket. 

And then the third pillar of the MILCON strategy is really balancing that existing mission infrastructure recap [recapitalization] 

with beddown of the new weapons systems. And those two are 

about 26 percent for existing mission recapitalization, things like 

firehouses and runways and the like, and 16 percent for F–35 and 

KC–46 beddown. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the second round 

of questions. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Absolutely, Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. 

I have one housekeeping item. I ask unanimous consent to include into the record all members’ statements and extraneous material. Without objection, so ordered. 

Panelists, thank you so much today for joining us. And we appreciate the time you have spent with us. Obviously all of our members got to ask questions, all of I think significance as we look 

about how we address a variety of challenges, obviously one of 

them being installation capacity in the context of what happens 

with sequester, end strength, and national security strategy. 

So thank you all so much for providing that perspective to us 

today. And we will continue the dialogue as we head forward into 

the National Defense Authorization Act. 

Thank you so much. And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 3, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 3, 2015 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 3, 2015 

(115) 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 3, 2015 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON 

Mr. CONGER. The Department’s global infrastructure network supports the mission requirements of a defined force structure. As such, the Department continuously evaluates its infrastructure as strategic objectives, force structure and mission 

sets evolve. The Department strives to ensure its infrastructure is aligned with force 

structure requirements, supporting both steady state activities and rapid force projection, while promoting efficiencies (such as joint use of facilities) to the greatest 

extent practicable. That is why it is so important for Congress to authorize a new 

BRAC round—it is only through BRAC that the Department can effectively accomplish that objective. [See page 18.] 

Secretary BALLENTINE. The United States Air Force continues to successfully support strategic maneuver to include XVIII Airborne Corps Global Response Force 

(GRF) and others with assets not co-located with Sister Service forces. Per coordinated discussion with the United States Air Force and Air Mobility Command, divestment of the 440th Airlift Wing (Pope Army Air Field—AAF) will have negligible 

impacts to XVIII Airborne Corps’ GRF Joint Forcible Entry (JFE) capacity and capability. Under the current installation landscape, DOD can deliver the GRF direct to 

an objective around the globe via USAF assets non-collocated at Pope AAF. Given 

sufficient strategic warning, the GRF can be forward staged, and the JFE executed 

via an integrated package of C–17s and C–130s. Additionally, 100 percent of current 

deployment requirements of the XVIII Airborne Corps are met through units external to Pope AAF. 

The USAF remains committed to supporting US Army airborne training requirements through the Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training (JA/ATT) Management System (JMS) program. Using JMS, the US Army can schedule additional JA/ 

ATTs to make up for the sorties currently flown by AFRC C–130Hs based at Pope 

AAF. The Air Force—via the JA/ATT construct—also supports 100 percent of the 

missions at Fort Benning, Fort Campbell, and many other Army, Marine Corps, and 

Special Operations Command units, whether or not they have co-located transport 

aircraft. In 2010, the 18th Air Force, XVIII Airborne Corps, and 82d Airborne Division senior leaders began to formalize what is now known as the quarterly JFE 

Readiness Symposium to allow Army and Air Force senior leaders to prioritize 

training objectives, to maximize training outcomes, and to resource joint exercises 

that enhance JFE readiness of both Army and Air Force units. [See page 18.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Secretary BALLENTINE. The Air Force January 2015 strategic, headquarters-level 

CONUS capacity analysis considered nine broad categories comparing simple ratios 

relating capacity to force structure and determined the Air Force has approximately 

30% excess infrastructure capacity. The categories include Reserves Parking Apron; 

ANG Parking Apron; Education & Training Parking Apron; Small Aircraft Parking 

Apron; Large Aircraft Parking Apron; Education & Training Classroom Space; 

Depot Labor; Space Operations; and Product Centers, Laboratories and Education 

& Training Facilities. [See page 22.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 3, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. Under constrained resources, the Department is balancing risk 

among force structure, modernization, and readiness to meet defense strategic requirements. The infrastructure investment accounts have taken a large portion of 

the risk. 

a) Explain how the Department aligned infrastructure investments with the defense strategic requirements? 

b) If Congress adopted the President’s Budget in fiscal year 2016, how would the 

infrastructure investments impact readiness? What are the risks to infrastructure 

and readiness already inherent at this investment level? 

c) If Congress fails to repeal sequestration, how would the corresponding decrease 

in infrastructure investment impact readiness? What are the risks to infrastructure 

and readiness that would be assumed under a budget constrained by sequestration? 

d) Do you have any examples of failed or failing infrastructure based on the risks 

taken under sequestration and the Bipartisan Budget agreement? 

Mr. CONGER. a) The Department’s infrastructure investment supports the defense 

strategy identified in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. Our 2016 budget request prioritized infrastructure investments to ensure that our military has mission 

capable facilities as necessary to protect the homeland, to build security globally, 

and to project power and win decisively. Our budget request also prioritizes infrastructure investments to ensure the life, health and safety of our military and civilian workforce, while maintaining a high quality of life for our service members and 

their families. 

b) The President’s FY 2016 budget requests $8.4 billion for the Military Construction (MilCon) and Family Housing Appropriation to invest in facilities that address 

critical mission requirements and life, health and safety concerns, to include the 

bed-down of forces returning from overseas bases, restoration and modernization of 

enduring facilities, and acquisition of new facilities where needed to ensure mission 

capability and readiness. This figure represents a 30% increase over the FY 2015 

enacted level. This increase begins to reverse the high risk to readiness experienced 

since sequestration began. While the FY 2016 MilCon request ($6.7 billion) includes 

projects in support of the strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific, projects needed to support the realignment of forces, and projects that are crucial to ensure that we can 

deliver the quality of life necessary to attract and retain an all-volunteer force, it 

is still not at the level to allow DOD to address recapitalization needs that have 

been delayed due to sequestration. 

c) If the Department’s FY 2016 budget request is reduced to the Budget Control 

Act levels, the infrastructure investment will likely be impacted similar to the FY 

2015 funding levels. At these reduced funding levels, DOD could see the $1.8 billion 

increase in military construction, $2.5 billion increase in facility sustainment and 

$946 million increase in restoration and modernization disappear, which could then 

have DOD Components continue addressing only facility life, safety and health 

issues. As we continue to stress the infrastructure associated with our readiness 

platforms, the risk to missions also increases and home and workplace quality of 

life suffrage continues to erode. 

d) A few examples of failing/failed infrastructure related to sequestration can be 

seen in the following: 

• China Lake Airfield. Deferral of major asphalt overlays caused all 3 runways 

to deteriorate into a compromised state of readiness simultaneously. In early 

2014, pieces of the crumbling runway caused damage to an F/A–18F. 

• Patuxent River Airfield. A restoration & modernization project had to be phased 

due to limited availability of funds resulting in delayed restoration and increased operational risk. As a result of deteriorated conditions, the right door 

and the external flap of the engine exhaust nozzle on a BF–5 aircraft was damaged. 

• Dam Neck Combat Systems Training Facility. Navy was unable to fund an restoration & modernization project to repair the roof and building envelope of a 

Fleet training building at Dam Neck Annex. As a result, radar training must 
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be suspended during inclement weather so computer equipment can be turned 

off and covered with tarps to prevent damage. 

Mr. WITTMAN. In conjunction with the fiscal year 2016 budget request, the Department of Defense is submitting a legislative proposal seeking an additional base 

realignment and closure (BRAC) round. 

a) Has the Secretary of Defense completed an updated assessment on whether excess infrastructure exists in the Department? 

b) What empirical support can the Department provide to support a request for 

additional BRAC rounds? 

Mr. CONGER. a. Army conducted a programmatic analysis of real property needed 

to support an end-strength and corresponding force structure of 490,000 active component Soldiers. For inside the United States, they report that their excess capacity 

ranges between 12 and 28 percent, depending on facility category group, with an 

average of approximately 18 percent. 

Air Force has also completed a capacity analysis, comparing current infrastructure capacity to projected force structure and mission requirements. The results indicate the Air Force has approximately 30 percent excess infrastructure capacity. 

This excess capacity results from decreases in Air Force personnel and force structure outpacing reductions in infrastructure. Since the last BRAC round in 2005, the 

Air Force has 50,000 fewer personnel and 500 fewer aircraft in its planned force 

structure. 

b. The opportunity for greater efficiencies is clear, based on three basic facts that 

have not changed over the last year: • In 2004, DOD conducted a capacity assessment that indicated it had 24% aggregate excess capacity; • In BRAC 2005, the Department reduced only 3.4% of its infrastructure, as 

measured in Plant Replacement Value—far short of the aggregate excess indicated in the 2004 study; • Force structure reductions subsequent to that analysis—particularly Army personnel (from 570,000 to 450,000 or lower), Marine Corps personnel (from 

202,000 to 182,000 or lower) and Air Force force structure (reduced by 500 aircraft)—point to the presence of additional excess. We project that a new efficiency-focused BRAC round will save about $2 billion 

a year after implementation with costs and savings during the six-year implementation period being a wash at approximately $6 billion. Our projection is based on the 

efficiency rounds of the 1990s. 

Mr. WITTMAN. According to the Department’s report, implementing EIC actions 

will not reduce the operational force structure or military capabilities in Europe, 

only excess infrastructure. 

a) Please explain the process and factors the Department used to ensure military 

capabilities in Europe were not reduced? 

b) The Department has stated that a BRAC-like process was used to inform the 

EIC decision process. Can you describe any lessons learned from the EIC effort that 

should be considered as the Department manages its overseas infrastructure moving 

forward? 

Mr. CONGER. a) A defined force structure plan provided by the Joint Staff served 

as a baseline for the EIC analysis. The process did not allow for any reductions in 

or changes to that force structure. Additionally, maintaining military value as a primary analytical factor helped ensure that no military capabilities were compromised. 

b) The EIC process showed that overseas capacity should be reviewed from a theater perspective to the greatest extent practicable, with a focus on joint use of infrastructure. 

It also demonstrated substantial savings are possible from realignment actions on 

scales much smaller than returning an entire installation. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The infrastructure investment accounts have taken a large portion 

of risk the last several years under constrained budgets. 

a) Within the President’s Budget in fiscal year 2016, what level of risk has your 

Service taken in infrastructure? 

b) Do you have any examples of failed or failing infrastructure based on the risks 

taken under sequestration and the Bipartisan Budget agreement? 

c) Can you discuss how you are leveraging privatization efforts, public-private 

partnerships, or other innovative authorities to mitigate the risk in infrastructure 

investments and achieve financial savings while improving the quality of infrastructure or services? 

d) Due to sequestration, the Army announced force structure reductions in 2013 

bringing the Active Duty end-strength down from 562,000 to 490,000. The Army is 

currently assessing options to implement further reductions to its end-strength and 
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has stated it may need to go to a force of 420,000 if sequestration-level funding returns in fiscal year 2016. If these force structure reductions are implemented, will 

the requirements for, or scope of, any of the military construction projects contained 

in the fiscal year 2016 budget request be impacted? 

e) The Army’s military construction budget is primarily focused on recapitalization to support current missions. Can you discuss the process used by the Army to 

prioritize military construction projects funded in fiscal year 2016 versus those contained in the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP)? 

Secretary HAMMACK. a) The Army continues to take risk in this budget to maintain, restore, or modernize its facilities and infrastructure. While fiscal year 2016 

limitations present challenges across all Army installations, further budget reductions would substantially increase risks to readiness and wellbeing. What the Army 

needs is consistent, predictable funding to apply to the life cycle management of its 

facilities and infrastructure. The FY 2016 budget for Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM) will fund those most critical projects that meet the 

criteria established by the Army Facility Investment Strategy in the project prioritization review process in FY 2016. 

b) All projects in the FY16 President’s Budget request address failed or failing facilities or address critical capability shortfalls. Some examples include constructing 

a new pier to replace the failed Pier #2 at Military Ocean Terminal Concord, California; improving Army cyber capability with a command and control facility for the 

US Army Cyber Command Headquarters and the Joint Forces Headquarters—Cyber 

at Fort Gordon, Georgia; replacing the obsolete and failed Waste Water Treatment 

Plant at West Point, New York; replacing the failed and obsolete WWII-era structure at Corpus Christi Army Depot to modernize the Army’s only organic, depot 

level facility for the repair, overhaul and maintenance of rotary wing aircraft and 

aircraft components; and replacing WWII-era facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap, 

Pennsylvania, providing a safe and efficient space to store, maintain, and fabricate 

training devices. All of these projects address pressing failed or failing infrastructure risks that are being addressed in the Army’s FY16 President’s Budget request. 

c) The Army is leveraging public-private partnerships such as the Residential 

Communities Initiative (RCI) privatized housing, the Privatization of Army Lodging 

(PAL), and utilities privatization (UP) programs. These programs have realized significant savings and cost avoidance for the Army since their inception. These programs have greatly mitigated the risk in infrastructure investments by leveraging 

private sector expertise and funding to improve the overall quality and long-term 

sustainability of infrastructure services. 

The Army is leveraging private industry investment to improve facilities and infrastructure through authorities for energy savings performance contracting, utilities privatization, and power purchase agreements. The Army has the most extensive energy savings performance contracting and utility energy services contracting 

program in the Federal Government with over $2.26 billion of third party investment leveraged to provide energy and water savings facility improvements. These 

efforts use private industry technical expertise to develop, construct, operate and 

maintain more efficient facility infrastructure. We have privatized over half of our 

installation utilities infrastructure through the utilities privatization that not only 

improves the condition and reliability of installation utilities services, but also has 

resulted in substantial savings in natural gas and water. Our Office of Energy Initiatives is also utilizing the power purchase authority to attain mandated renewable 

energy goals and provide energy security infrastructure to installations, partnering 

with private industry to develop commercial scale renewable energy systems on our 

installations. 

The Army is in the process of implementing its plan to use the public-public partnership authority first published in NDAA 2013 and updated in NDAA 2015. This 

updated authority broadens the ability to realize cost savings or cost avoidance, as 

well as gaining efficiencies in the conduct of installation support services through 

the use of intergovernmental support agreements (IGSAs). Internally, the Army will 

communicate with its commanders through official orders and Army Senior Leader 

correspondence, to spread the word that IGSAs may now use legal instruments 

other than FAR-based contracts. The Army will also ensure that commanders fully 

understand the process of submitting IGSA partnership concepts for approval. 

Externally, the Army will host a public-facing webpage to convey partnership information to the general public, as well as to the Army Commands. In addition, the 

Army will participate in public forums with the Association of Defense Communities, Association of United States Army, Society of American Military Engineers 

and others to engage with the communities and States that are interested in 

partnering with us. 
126 

The Army will continue to assist commands with their Army-Community 

partnering meetings, identification of partnership opportunities, concept development and agreement consummation. These engagements provide valuable insight 

and lessons learned which help us to refine the partnership program and ensure it 

remains meaningful for all Army Commands. 

d) The MILCON projects requested in the FY16 Presidents’ Budget request are 

neutral with respect to pending force structure decisions associated with endstrength reductions and will continue to be required regardless of the final force 

structure decisions made as informed by the Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Assessment 

e) The Army prioritization process for fiscal year 2016 projects is the same process 

used for all projects in the Future Year Defense Program. 

To facilitate an objective assessment of the MILCON programming process the 

MILCON Integrated Programming Team (IPT) was established. This body consists 

of representatives from across the Army Staff and the Reserve Components along 

with subject matter experts on critical project related issues. The MILCON IPT acts 

under a charter which grants it formal recognition as an official Intra-Army Committee by the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The factors 

used in the prioritization process are aligned with the Army’s Facility Investment 

Strategy (FIS). 

On an annual basis the MILCON IPT develops an integrated, prioritized 1–N 

(order of merit) list for MILCON projects. This list includes the following appropriations: MCA, MCNG, MCAR and AFHC. The factors that are considered in the 

project’s ranking are: Existing facility condition and functionality (capability of the 

facility to meet its mission) from the ISR (Installation Status Report); Demolition/ 

disposal/facility reduction; Facility shortfall versus requirement from RPLANS (Real 

Property Planning and Analysis System); Army Focus Facilities—facility types identified for expeditious buyout of deficits; and Command priority 

For projects in the first two years of the FYDP, the MILCON IPT conducted a 

comprehensive risk analysis to ensure those projects will be executable in the near 

term. 

The MILCON IPT then met to deliberate on every project to ensure Congressional 

language, OSD, or Army leadership adjustments and priorities, and supplemental 

or clarifying information are considered. The MILCON IPT made appropriate adjustments to the prioritization of the project. Finally, the MILCON IPT program recommendation went through a vetting process consisting of a series of briefs culminating in program approval by the Under Secretary of the Army (USA) and Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) level. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The Army has again proposed to defer investments in facilities 

sustainment, budgeting across the services at 80% of the model, on average, versus 

the recommended 90%. 

a) Why did the Army elect to take risk in the sustainment accounts versus more 

risk in restoration and modernization and recapitalization activities? 

b) Can you explain the long-term effect of a delay in funding the facility 

sustainment account? 

c) Can you quantify the current backlog of facility sustainment, restoration, and 

modernization requirements across the Army? 

Secretary HAMMACK. The Army continues to take risk in Facility Sustainment, 

Restoration and Modernization (FSRM). The Army’s priority is to maintain Unit and 

Soldier readiness. With the budget caps under current law, the Army can only afford to fund sustainment at 80% (increase of 10% from FY15) of the Facility 

Sustainment Model. The Restoration and Modernization funding request represents 

67% of our critical requirement. 

Long-term effects associated with deferring facility SRM varies based on a number of factors, including facility type, materials, geographical location, age, and use. 

Over time, deferred sustainment causes a more rapid decline in facility life-spans 

and increases R&M and MILCON requirements. Further reductions in SRM will 

negatively impact operational readiness, training, and Soldier well-being, by increasing facility maintenance backlogs, steepening facility degradation rates, and increasing facility component failures. 

The Army has a $3B sustainment maintenance backlog. This equates to an estimated 5520 major work orders. The Army has made significant strides in reducing 

the routine demand maintenance order backlog since FY13 when sequestration 

caused the deferral of over 100,000 routine demand maintenance orders per month. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The infrastructure investment accounts have taken a large portion 

of risk the last several years under constrained budgets. 

a) Within the President’s Budget in fiscal year 2016, what level of risk has your 

Service taken in infrastructure? 
127 

b) Do you have any examples of failed or failing infrastructure based on the risks 

taken under sequestration and the Bipartisan Budget Agreement? 

c) Can you discuss how you are leveraging privatization efforts, public-private 

partnerships, or other innovative authorities to mitigate the risk in infrastructure 

investments and achieve financial savings while improving the quality of infrastructure or services? 

Secretary BALLENTINE. a) We assess our infrastructure investment risk as moderate. In our previous budget requests, the Air Force attempted to strike the balance between a ready force for today with a modern force for tomorrow under constrained budget levels. To help achieve that balance, the Air Force elected to accept 

risk in installation support, military construction (MILCON) and facilities 

sustainment. These reductions were critical to maintain adequate resourcing across 

the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for some of the Air Force’s unique capabilities. However, in the FY 2016 request, the Air Force begins to reduce the impacts of that risk by increasing funding for installations in all three of the areas 

noted above. 

b) The Cape Canaveral Range Communications Facility that we are seeking 

MILCON funding for in the FY 2016 request is a perfect example of the risks in 

infrastructure the Air Force was required to take under sequestration and the Bipartisan Budget Agreement. The original 1950’s vintage facility has had long standing leak problems that were made obvious during Tropical Storm Fay in 2008 when 

the building experienced severe flooding. This project has been the Air Force’s number one current mission space infrastructure MILCON requirement since 2013 but 

has been unable to be funded under the constrained budget levels previously mentioned. 

c) The Air Force is committed to making every dollar count. As such, the success 

of money and time-saving innovations are critical to the Air Force’s ability to operate in this fiscally constrained environment. Budgetary constraints are motivating 

our Department of Defense, our installations and community partners to re-evaluate 

the way we do business and seek alternatives to the status quo for methods to support our missions and maintain quality of life programs for our Airmen and their 

family members. The Air Force can achieve these goals by exploring partnership opportunities with stakeholders that include local cities/counties/states, utility companies, universities, and private sector property managers, developers and financiers. 

There are now 48 installations in the AF Community Partnership Program who 

with their community partners have identified over 1,000 initiatives across the spectrum of installation services and mission support; many of these initiatives are undergoing further refinement and development with potential application Air Forcewide. Initiatives identified to date include: agreements with communities to operate 

waste water treatment plants; medical, security, emergency response and civil 

works training; refuse management; grounds or pavements maintenance; construction/maintenance of ball fields; operation of Airmen support services such as libraries, golf courses and youth programs; and airfield operations and maintenance services. There has been much said regarding Section 351 (10 USC 2679) and how his 

new authority will facilitate our Department of Defense, our Air Force and the other 

Services to enter into intergovernmental support agreements with local governments. It will, since this authority will enable partners to provide, receive or share 

installation support services. However, there are many existing authorities that enable us to innovatively partner now to include the areas of enhanced use leasing, 

utility privatization and energy initiatives; Federal Acquisition Regulations and financial parameters. We want to highlight that the Air Force is committed to working with the appropriate DOD offices, the other Services and the Small Business 

Administration to ensure it addresses small business concerns consistently. This includes the effects upon small business prior to making a secretarial determination 

and working with local communities to mitigate impacts when feasible. More and 

more you are going to hear how the Air Force is committed to innovate and partner 

to achieve our mission and Airmen support goals and objectives. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The term ‘‘energy security’’ is defined by the QDR as having ‘‘assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs.’’ 

a) How is the Air Force developing renewable energy projects on its installations 

that are compatible with this goal, and providing redundant power in the event of 

a failure of the public grid? 

b) How is the Air Force doing on the advanced metering program? Not just in regards to the installation of the meters, but also the supporting infrastructure necessary to collect the data and use it to help manage the installation energy program? 
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Secretary BALLENTINE. a) Traditionally, the Air Force has ensured all critical 

operational power needs through use of emergency generators and emergency 

backup battery systems if commercial power fails. Efforts to develop renewable energy projects on Air Force installations have historically been driven by economics 

using third-party financing mechanisms, and not mission requirements or energy/ 

mission security. The Air Force is looking beyond financial considerations and accepting in-kind considerations that improve its energy security posture without increases in the rate it pays for electricity, while still pursuing a third-party financing 

strategy. 

This third-party approach uses Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Enhanced Use Leases (EULs) to develop renewable energy projects; both are accompanied by either financial benefits or in-kind considerations. A recent example of a 

third party approach that improves Air Force energy security is the Phase II solar 

photovoltaic project at Nellis AFB, NV. Under the agreement, the installation will 

purchase the electricity at the tariff rate (i.e., no discounted rate) in favor of an inkind benefit from the Phase II land lease. Specifically, this in-kind consideration is 

a $10 million substation and associated feeder lines, providing system redundancy. 

Under this set up, the electricity generated by the PV system will flow through the 

installation before it goes to the commercial grid. 

b) Due to financial constraints and technical issues, the Air Force was unable to 

achieve the 2012 target set by 42 USC § 8253 for the installation of advanced metering systems. The Air Force has developed a Meter Data Management Plan and intends to invest $42 million through FY2020 to ensure cyber-secure advanced meter 

reading systems (AMRS) are installed at its highest consumption installations. This 

plan puts the Air Force on track to capture 60% of the Air Force’s total energy consumption by the end of FY2020. After reaching the 60% milestone, the Air Force 

will conduct a business case analysis to determine whether it is cost effective to deploy additional advanced metering systems. 

Mr. WITTMAN. According to the EIC report, implementing EIC actions will not reduce the operational force structure or military capabilities in Europe, only excess 

infrastructure. Please provide additional information on how losing the fuel capacity 

and ramp space at RAF Mildenhall in the United Kingdom does not reduce military 

capability in Europe. 

Secretary BALLENTINE. Military capability in Europe was preserved by consolidating missions at installations that have excess infrastructure. For example, the 

Air Force will not compromise any military capability by relocating the Special Operations and tanker units from RAF Mildenhall to Spangdahlem AB and Ramstein 

AB in Germany. By taking advantage of the excess infrastructure (fuel, ramp space, 

etc) at Spangdahlem and Ramstein, we can divest the costly and unnecessary infrastructure at Mildenhall. It should also be noted that our EIC analysis also accounted for the infrastructure requirements necessary to support current Operational Plans and anticipated contingency operations. 

Fuel storage and ramp space requirements being met by RAF Mildenhall today 

will be met by the redeployment of units to Spangdahlem AB (CV–22 and MC–130J) 

and Ramstein AB (KC–135 tankers) in Germany. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The Air Force has again proposed to defer investments in facilities 

sustainment, budgeting across the services at 80% of the model, on average, versus 

the recommended 90%. 

a) Why did the Air Force elect to take risk in the sustainment accounts versus 

more risk in restoration and modernization and recapitalization activities? 

b) Can you explain the long-term effect of a delay in funding the facility 

sustainment account? 

c) Can you quantify the current backlog of facility sustainment, restoration, and 

modernization requirements across the Air Force? 

Secretary BALLENTINE. a) We are not deferring investment in Facility 

Sustainment. We continue to fund Facility Sustainment at 80% of the OSD Facility 

Sustainment model. With our asset management principles, we can sustain this 

level of investment indefinitely. 

b) We use asset management principles to make more effective use of existing resources, thereby reducing facility risk. This requires improved asset visibility. Based 

on an increasingly fiscally constrained environment, the FY 2016 budget focuses on 

ensuring investment in the most critical facility requirements to support Air Force 

priorities, while continuing to enable streamlining of business operations and enhancing operational efficiencies. The Air Force will fund Facilities Sustainment at 

80 percent of the calculated OSD Facilities Sustainment Model (FSM) to continue 

driving efficiencies while ensuring the proper level of support. Centralization and 

prioritization of replacement and repair projects using Asset Management tools will 

ensure investment in the most critical facility requirements. 
129 

c) The Air Force’s calculated backlog is $11.1B. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The infrastructure investment accounts have taken a large portion 

of risk the last several years under constrained budgets. 

a) Within the President’s Budget in fiscal year 2016, what level of risk has your 

Service taken in infrastructure? 

b) Do you have any examples of failed or failing infrastructure based on the risks 

taken under sequestration and the Bipartisan Budget Agreement? 

c) Can you discuss how you are leveraging privatization efforts, public-private 

partnerships, or other innovative authorities to mitigate the risk in infrastructure 

investments and achieve financial savings while improving the quality of infrastructure or services? 

Secretary MCGINN. A) Department of Navy (DON) installations provide the backbone of support for our maritime forces, enabling their forward presence and providing our training ranges and care for Sailors, Marines and their families. However, the Department is taking risk in our shore infrastructure in support of operational readiness. One example of this risk is our facilities sustainment levels. The 

President’s FY16 budget funds the Marine Corps at 81% and the Navy at 84% of 

the Department of Defense facilities sustainment model. The OSD guidance is to 

fund 90% of the requirement. We are aware that underfunding facilities 

sustainment increases the rate of degradation of our shore infrastructure, which 

leads to more costly repair, restoration and new construction in the future. 

B) The fiscal challenges we face today will be exacerbated and significant challenges will be forced on all Services if FY16 sequestration reductions are implemented. We continue to evaluate long-term impacts of sequestration. Although the 

Marine Corps has made significant progress over the last 8 years in replacing old 

and unsatisfactory buildings, delayed or canceled military construction projects will 

have long term impacts on the future operating budget, force posture, and the overall welfare of our Marines. The Navy has been compelled to reduce funding in shore 

readiness since FY 2013, and as a result, many Navy shore facilities are degrading. 

At sequestration levels, this risk will be exacerbated and the condition of our shore 

infrastructure, including piers, runaways, and mission-critical facilities, will further 

erode. Specific examples of recent failures include: • China Lake Airfield. Deferral of major asphalt overlays caused all 3 runways 

to deteriorate into a compromised state of readiness simultaneously. In early 

2014, pieces of the crumbling runway caused damage to an F/A–18F. • PAX River Airfield. A SRM project had to be phased due to limited availability 

of funds resulting in delayed restoration and increased operational risk. As a 

result of deteriorated conditions, the right door and the external flap of the engine exhaust nozzle on a BF–5 aircraft was damaged. • Rota Communications Facility. Due to funding shortfalls, the Navy was unable 

to perform required repairs to the facility. In early 2015, the facility suffered 

extensive flooding due to heavy rain. Flooding compromised multiple spaces, 

with some water entering through the foundation walls. This resulted in significant mold, and accelerated foundation/structural degradation which could have 

been avoided if repairs had been accomplished in a timely manner. 

If sequestration continues, examples of potential future DON impacts include: 

• Lack of airfield maintenance will cause foreign object debris (FOD) that could 

damage aircraft 

• Lack of pier maintenance could compromise Navy’s ability to resupply, maintain 

and deploy ships 

• Deferred sustainment of our training ranges impacts warfighter training and 

readiness 

• Unresolved HVAC problems can lead to mold and health issues in our barracks 

• Delaying roof repairs can lead to leaks that will deteriorate the building structure and interior, making operational and maintenance facilities unusable 

The Department of Defense released an assessment of sequestration impacts in 

an April 2014 report, ‘‘Estimated Levels of Sequestration-Level Funding,’’ and we 

continue to review and refine this assessment as conditions warrant. 

C) We continue to look for ways to leverage private sector investment and partner 

with our community to improve our infrastructure and services ashore. Our public/ 

private ventures continue to provide quality family housing and the new Renewable 

Energy Program Office is working with industry to establish cost-effective renewable energy projects to improve our energy security. However, partnerships will not 

offset the harmful effect of sequestration. A return to sequestration in FY 2016 

would necessitate a revisit and revision of the Defense Strategic Guidance. 

Mr. WITTMAN. a) The fiscal year 2016 military construction budget for the Department of the Navy includes a number of investments in energy-related construction 

projects on Navy and Marine Corps installations. Can you explain how these 
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projects either improve mission effectiveness or demonstrate a return on investment 

that supports their prioritization over other projects? 

b) The Secretary of the Navy established energy goals that far exceed the requirements for the other military services, including 50% alternative energy ashore by 

2020, 50% decrease in non-tactical vehicle fossil fuel consumption by 2015. What is 

the impetus for these targets, and why do you believe this is critical to national security? 

Secretary MCGINN. a) The Department’s FY2016 budget requests several utilities 

MILCON projects to increase our Energy Security ashore and improve the mission 

effectiveness by providing installations with reliable and resilient power. The Department of the Navy has accepted risk in our Shore infrastructure in order to support warfighting readiness and operations, and the condition and age of our utility 

infrastructure is a special concern. These MILCON projects will increase our Energy 

Security improving our ability to provide reliable electrical power to critical infrastructure during normal operations as well as during natural or manmade events. 

The projects are summarized below: P610, Electric Repairs Piers 2, 6, 7 and 11, NS Norfolk, VA $44,254,000 The electrical conduit and cable systems on the double deck piers have failed in many locations and continue to have outages caused by storms. Without this project, system 

failures and expensive recurring repairs will continue as well as significant life/safety concerns for electricians and other personnel in the area will remain. Each power 

failure results in the loss of shore power capability requiring vessels to produce 

their own power. P416, PMRF Power Grid Consolidation, PMRF Barking Sands, HI $30,623,000 

The project will consolidate separate electrical distribution systems at Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Barking Sands. Without this project, sharing and distribution of loads as well as renewable energy sources throughout the installation 

would not be possible. Providing continuous and reliable electrical power is essential 

for the mission of PMRF which is to provide Training, Tactics Development, and 

Test & Evaluations for air, surface, and sub-surface weapons systems and Advanced 

Technology Systems. P614, Upgrade Waterfront Utilities, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, VA $45,513,000 The 

electrical service in Dry Docks 2, 3, and 4 are severely undersized, severely inefficient, and were constructed as early as 1967. Upgrading the utility systems is imperative to maintaining ship repair schedules. Several breaks and outages have already occurred and interrupted ship repair schedules. The shipyard will continue to 

lose man-hours to install and remove temporary utility systems. 

P715, UEM Interconnect STA C to Mamala, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI 

$6,335,000 The project will install an electrical interconnection between former 

Naval Station Pearl Harbor and former Hickam Air Force Base power grids, establish new interconnections of high voltage circuits, modernize switch stations, and replace aging infrastructure. The project will enable load sharing and optimized power 

distribution across the Joint base, resulting in increased system efficiency and reduced energy costs. 

P670, ICS INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBASE Kings Bay, GA $8,099,000 Providing 

continuous and reliable electrical power is essential at SUBASE Kings Bay. This 

project improves electrical distribution reliability and redundancy through the installation of programmable, digital protective relays. Any unplanned electrical outages delays mission readiness and increases fuel use and manpower requirements 

to produce onsite power. Under contingency conditions where commercial power is 

curtailed, the installation can’t provide power in an emergency or reliable dispatch 

power from the Central Control Center to all base loads. This project also enables 

faster deployment of repair personnel in the event of a water or thermal system 

malfunction, which will reduce commodity losses and mission impacts. 

b) The Navy and Marine Corps’ strength is the ability to provide presence; to be 

in the right place, not just at the right time, but all the time. That takes energy. 

The Secretary’s goals are focused on delivering that presence and increasing our 

combat capability. 

The goals drive improvements in the energy efficiency of our weapons platforms 

that enable us to go further on a tank of gas or a battery charge. That focus on 

efficiency will be even more important as we deploy emerging weapons systems like 

the rail gun and directed energy weapons that will rely on electricity generated by 

the same fuel that powers a ship’s engines. The goals promote fuel diversity to improve operational flexibility and ensure that we remain interoperable with the commercial logistics chain. And, they encourage energy efficiency, load shedding, and 

the use of distributed generation at our shipyards and other installations. The energy security and resiliency of our installations is critical given the role they play 

in enabling operations and readiness. Fulfilling the secretary’s goals decreases the 
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chances that we will experience power outages, and enhances our ability to recover 

in the event the grid does goes down. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The Navy has again proposed to defer investments in facilities 

sustainment, budgeting across the services at 84% of the model, on average, versus 

the recommended 90%. 

a) Why did the Navy elect to take risk in the sustainment accounts versus more 

risk in restoration and modernization and recapitalization activities? 

b) Can you explain the long-term effect of a delay in funding the facility 

sustainment account? 

c) Can you quantify the current backlog of facility sustainment, restoration, and 

modernization requirements across the Navy? 

Secretary MCGINN. A) Over the last several years, the Department has taken risk 

in our shore infrastructure in order to support operational readiness and capabilities. This risk includes both reduced sustainment and deferral of many needed 

projects that restore and modernize our facilities, ranges and support infrastructure 

ashore. Our FY2016 budget requests funding to execute most critical projects to enable the Department to support the three pillars upon which the 2014 Quadrennial 

Defense Review is based: protect the homeland, build security globally; project 

power and win decisively. 

B) We are aware that underfunding facilities sustainment increases the rate of 

degradation of our shore infrastructure, which leads to more costly repair, restoration and new construction in the future. 

C) Deferred maintenance backlog for the Department of Navy is $41.1B, which 

includes $38.66B based on the Commander Navy Installations Command 2014 annual report and $2.45B based on the Marine Corps Installations Command 2014 annual report. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. I understand you have partially privatized the lodging at Joint 

Base San Antonio where the Air Force is the operating service branch. Since this 

is a joint base where combining operating efficiencies is an important part of reducing costs, can you leverage the privatized lodging program to include the Air Force, 

non-privatized lodging? Would doing so extend the privatization benefit across the 

entire installation, support the mission of joint basing and eliminate the nonprivatized lodging dependency on the Federal Government? 

Mr. CONGER. The Army, through their Privatization of Army Lodging (PAL), had 

privatized 983 units on Fort Sam Houston prior to the establishment of the Joint 

Base. It operates under the supported component’s contract but the function transferred to the Joint Base. The Air Force has currently chosen not to exercise the authorities for privatized lodging, but retain their lodging as a nonappropriated fund 

(NAF) operation. There is not a plan to include the Air Force facilities in the Army 

PAL inventory at this time. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I understand you have partially privatized the lodging at Joint 

Base San Antonio where the Air Force is the operating service branch. Since this 

is a joint base where combining operating efficiencies is an important part of reducing costs, can you leverage the privatized lodging program to include the Air Force, 

non-privatized lodging? Would doing so extend the privatization benefit across the 

entire installation, support the mission of joint basing and eliminate the nonprivatized lodging dependency on the Federal Government? 

Secretary BALLENTINE. The Fort Sam Houston lodging facility was included in the 

Privatized Army Lodging contract, prior to Joint Basing. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), July 2010 Report to Congressional Committees 

on Defense Infrastructure titled, ‘‘Army’s Privatized Lodging Program Could Benefit 

from More Effective Planning’’, the Army’s decision to privatize lodging was directly 

related to the poor condition of their facilities and the high estimated cost to repair 

them. The Air Force has maintained a dedicated Lodging Fund, separate from the 

Morale, Welfare and Recreation Fund, managed by Air Force accounting and hospitality professionals since 1974. This allows the Air Force to sustain lodging facilities 

to mid-level commercial lodging standards. Our Civil Engineers continue to program 

adequate funding for sustainment, restoration and modernization of facilities, resulting in lodging facilities AF-wide that are in overall good condition. Looking forward, we’ve programmed additional funds for recapitalization efforts at 15 properties over the next four years. 

The Air Force is very engaged in identifying opportunities to increase efficiencies 

and effectiveness in Air Force Lodging. The Army’s privatized lodging is one model 

the Air Force is reviewing. We continue to analyze their results, and that of other 
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military lodging and commercial hotel models to help identify areas for improvement. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. The Air Force’s current Program of Record at Hill AFB, Utah associated with Phase 2 of the Falcon Hill Enhanced Use Lease (EUL) has the existing 

location for the Army’s Defense Generator and Rail Equipment Center (DGRC) 

being placed outside the Air Force’s Security Perimeter beginning as early as 2018, 

making the DGRC completely isolated from the rest of Air Force property. This 

raises a number of questions: 

a) What is the Army’s plan to construct or otherwise provide an adequate security 

perimeter around the DGRC which meets DOD Force Protection standards? Please 

provide cost estimates, and indicate whether these costs are reflected in the Army’s 

FYDP. 

b) How many additional personnel billets will be required for the Army to staff 

its own security perimeter and at what estimated cost? 

c) Since the DGRC will no longer be within the Air Force Security perimeter, it 

will no longer be receiving base support services such as garbage and snow removal 

services from the 75th Air Base Wing. How will the Army procure these needed 

services and at what estimated cost? 

Secretary HAMMACK. DGRC is a DOD mission for which the Army is the DOD 

executive agent. The DGRC mission is a tenant activity at Hill Air Force Base, 

which is real property managed by the Air Force acting on behalf of DOD. Support 

agreements outline what services are provided between DOD components. The applicable support agreement in this case includes the provision of security and base 

operations services by the Air Force. The Army does not have any plans to make 

changes to security perimeters, security personnel, or other base support services. 

These matters are the responsibility of the installation host. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. I am pleased to hear of your efforts to reduce the Navy’s energy 

footprint, as highlighted by its adoption of energy efficient tubular LED (T–LED) 

on board ships. I understand that to date, almost 13% of the Navy fleet has converted to T–LED lighting, which has been successful and yielded energy and cost 

savings. In this regard, can you please advise on the Navy’s efforts to bring T–LED 

lighting to shore on bases? 

Secretary MCGINN. The Navy believes strongly in the potential for new technologies, including LED lighting, to improve lighting quality and reduce energy and 

maintenance costs on our shore bases. In order to enable our adoption of these technologies as quickly as possible, we have expanded our use of Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC). These contracts allow contractors to identify and install, where appropriate, technologies that provide energy savings and also share in 

those savings. We expect LED’s to be widely evaluated and used in these contracts. 

We also intend to work with industry to address any technical issues relating to the 

compatibility of existing fixtures with T–LEDs. We hope that engagement will enable us to more broadly and quickly adopt the technology. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Given the energy and cost savings that have been realized from T– 

LED lighting on ships, would you agree that the Navy should consider revising the 

uniform facilities criteria (UFC) to allow for the option of T–LED technology on 

bases? 

Secretary MCGINN. The existing Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) supports the installation of T–LED systems in new construction. The UFC also supports the replacement of existing lighting systems with T–LED systems (full fixture and tube 

replacement). In the case of retrofitting non-LED fixtures with T–LED bulbs, we intend to work with industry to address any technical issues relating to the compatibility of existing fixtures with T–LEDs. We hope that engagement will enable us 

to more broadly and quickly adopt the technology. 

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