Part I: From OSS to CIA

The documents in Part I run from the last days of OSS in 1945 to the debate in

1947 that led to the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency.

During World War II America developed a capable intelligence armthe Office

of Strategic Servicesthat was not part of any department or military service.

Its Director, William Donovan, was not alone in arguing that the nation needed

something like OSS after the war. Disagreeing, President Truman dissolved

OSS soon after Japans surrender, gave several OSS units to the State and War

Departments, and asked State to take the lead in forming a new interdepartmen

tal organization to coordinate intelligence information for the President. After

several months of bureaucratic wrangling, Truman stepped in to establish a

small Central Intelligence Group (CIG) principally to summarize each days

cables for the White House. The fledgling CIG had powerful friends, however,

and a politically astute chief, RAdm. Sidney Souers, the first Director of Central

Intelligence. Within a few months CIG agreed to adopt the Strategic Services

Unitthe former OSS espionage and counterintelligence staffs that the War

Department had absorbed. By mid-1947, the acquisition of SSU and the maneu

vering of an aggressive new Director, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, had built

CIG into the nations foremost intelligence organization, which Congress soon

provided with a legislative mandate and new namethe Central Intelligence

Agencyin the National Security Act of July 1947.
William J. Donovan, Memorandum for the President,

13 September 1945 (Photocopy)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASI-UNGTÔN, D~. C.

13 Septemoer 1945

i~ORAI~DUM ~OR T~ ~IDENr:

1. I ui~erstand that it has been, or will be,

suggested. to you that certain of the priu~r~T functions

of this organization, nore particularly~ secret intelli

~ence, couderesDioflage, arid, the evaluation and. synthesis

of intelligence  that these functions he severed. and

transferred to se~rate asencies. I hope that in the

nat~,onal interest, and in your own interest as the Chief

Executive, that you i.~ill not periait this to be dor~.

2. ~Latever.a~ency has the duty of intelligence

should. have it as a conplete whole; To do otherwise

would be t.o add chaos. to existing confusion in the

intelligence field. The various functions that have

been iæte~rated are the essential functiqns in

intelligence. One is dependent upon: the other. -

-

.W1111anL ~- Donovan

-

Director

3
2. William D. Leahy, Memorandum for the Secretary of War and

Secretary of the Navy, Establishment of a central intelligence ser

vice upon liquidation of OSS, 19 September 1945 (Photocopy)

T}~ SECRETARY OF WAR:

SECRETARY_ OF T~ NAVY:

Subject: Establishment of a central

intelligence service upon

1i~uidation of

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the

Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy forward

the attached memorandum to the President.

2057

A ~2_ Iilaflo (Sc),~tv Dcc. No.

~~

kb~D

~ALI~hoffly 2~go3o1 ~

~4IL

~BUY

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

C~4~7~

19 September 1945~

I. O~:AMDUi~i FOR

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Fleet ~I~.LEA~~\ Adniiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Enclosure.

5
2. (Continued)

S ENCLOSURE

MEMORkNDUM FOR T~ PRESIDENT

A memorandum from the Director ofStrategic Services

on the establishment of a central, intelligence service was

referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 November 194k

for their comment and recommendation. The matter received

careful study and considerationat that time and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff were prepared to recommend, when opportune, the establishment of such an agency in three steps, namely:

1. An Executive Order setting up a National Intelli

gence Authority, (composed of the Secretaries of State,

War and the Navy, and a representative of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff), a Director of the Cehtral Intelligence

Agency (appointed by the President), and an Intelligence

Advisory Board (heads of the principal military and

civilian intelligence agencies).

2. Preparation and submission to the President by the above group of a basic organizational plan for es

tablishing the complete intelligence system.

3. Establishing of this intelligence system by Presidential directive and legislative action as ap

propriate.

Since their first studies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

have had referred to them a letter from the Director Of

Strategic Services to the Director., Bureau of the Budget, dated 25 August 1945, renewing his proposals on the subject.

Meanwhile, the cessation of hostilities, certain undecided.

questions regarding the future organization of the military

establishment, and the development of new weapons present

new factors which require consideration.

The end of hostilities.has tended to emphasize the

importance of proceeding without further delay to set up

a central intelligence system.

The unsettled question as to post-war military or

ganization does not materially affect the matter, and

certainly warrants no further delay since a central in

telligence agency can be fitted to whatever organization

or establishments are decided upon.

- 1 -

Enclosure

6
2. (Continued)

Recent developments in the field of new weapons have

advanced the question of an efficient intelligence service

to a position of importance, vital to the security of the

nation in a degree never attained and never contemplated

in the past. It is now entirely possible thatfailure to

provide such a system might bring national disaster.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize, as does the

Director of Strategic Services, the desirability of:

a. Further coordination of intelligence activities

rel~ted to the natiOnal security;

b. The unification of such activities of common con

cer~ as can be more efficiently conducted by a common

agency; and

o. The synthesis of departmental intelligence on the

strategic and national policy level.

They consider that these three functions may well be

more effectively carried on in a common intelligence agency,

provided that suitable conditions of responsibility to the

departments primarily concerned with national security are

maintained. They believe, however, that the specific pro

posals made by the Director of Strategic Services are. open

to serious objection in that, without adequate compensating

advantages, they would over-centralize the national intel

ligence service and place it at such a high level that it

would control the operations of departmental intelligence

agencies without responsibility, either individually or

collectively, to the heads of the departments concerned.

In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

append hereto an alternative draft directive, which they

believe retains the merits of &eneral Donovans proposals, while obviating the objection thereto.

The success of the proposed organization will depend

largely on the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he should have

considerable permanence in office, and to that end should

be either a specially qualified civilian or an Army or

I~avy officer of appropriate background and experience who

can be assigned for the requisite period of time. It is

considered absolutely essential, particularly in the case

of the first director, that he be in a position to exer

cise impartial judgment in the ~any difficult problems of

organization and cooperation which must be solved before

an effective working organization can be established.

- 2 -

Enclosure

7
2. (Continued)

A F PE D IX

DR AFT

DIRECTIVE REGARDING TI~ COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In order to provide for the development and coordina

tion of intelligence activities related to the national

security:

1. A National Intelligence Authority composed of the

Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, and a representa

tive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is hereby established and

charged with responsibility for such over-all intelligence

planning and development, and such inspection and coordina

tion of all Federal intelligence activities, as to assure the

most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission

related to the national security.

2. To assist it in that task the National Intelligence

Authority shall establish a Central Intelligence Agency

headed by a Director ~ho shall be appointed or removed by

the President on the recommendation of the National Intel

ligence Authority. The Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency shall be responsible to the National Intelligence

Authority and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.

3. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall

be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of

the heads of the principal military and civilian intelligence

agencies having functions related to the national security,

as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.

k. The first duty of the National Intelligence Authoiity,

assisted by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

and the Intelligence Advisory Board, shall be to prepare and

submit to the President f or his approval a basic organiza

tional plan for implementing this directive in accordance

with the concept set forth in the following paragraphs.

This plan should include drafts of all necessary legislation.

-

3 -

Appendix

8
2. (Continued)

5. Subject to the direction and control of the National

Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency

shall:

a. Accomplish the synthesis of departmental intel

ligence relating to the national security and the

appropriate dissemination within the goverrmient of the

resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.

b. Plan for the coordination of the activities of all

intelligence agencies of the government having functions

related to the national security, and recommend to the

National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such

over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most

effective accomplishment of the national intelligence

mIssion.

c. Perform, f or the benefit of departmental intelligence

agencies, such services of common concern as the National

Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently

accomplished by a common agency, including the direct

procurement of intelligence.

d. Perform such other functions and duties related to

intilligence as the National Intelligence Authority may

from time to time direct.

6. The Central Intelligence Agency shall have nO police

or law enforcement functions.

7. Subject to coordination by the National Intelligence

Authority, the existing intelligence agencies of the govern

ment shall continue to collect, evaluate, synthesize, and

disseminate departmental operating intelligence, herein

defined as that intelligence required by the several depart

ments and independent agencies for the performance of their

proper functions. Such departmental operating intelligence

as designated by the National Intelligence Authority shall

be freely available to the Central Intelligence Agency for

synthesis. As approved by the National Intelligence Author

ity, the operations of the departmental intelligence agencies

shall be open to inspection by the Central Intelligence

Agency in connection with its planning function. In the

interpretation of this paragraph, the National Intelligence

Authority and the Central Intelligence Agency will be

responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and

methods which, due to their nature, have a direct and highly

important bearing on military operations.

- -

Appendix __________

9
2. (Continued)

8. Funds f or the National Intelligence Authority shall

be provided by the departments participating in the National,

Intelligence Authority in amount and proportions to be

agreed upon by the members of the Authority. Within the

limits of the funds made available to him, the Director of

the Central Intelligence Agency may employ necessary person

nel and make provision for necessary supplies, facilities,

and services. With the approval of the National Intelligence

Authority, he may call upon departments and independent

agencies to furnish such specialists as may be required for

supervisory and functional positions in the Central Intel

ligence Agency, including the assignment of military and

naval personnel.

-

5 -

Appendix

10
3. Executive Order 9621, 20 September 1945 (Photograph)

rivz ~wp

I _________

tSBMThATIDIti G ThE OTFIOZ OF S5AXEGIC SW{VIC~

aiailnsP~xuo 0? lIZ ?~CflO~ ~ ~



~

ettati ~f tAo First

1w P tAo United

H

L

iS:

H ~

I:

ae

~ ~. ~ ~

:r44~~t~. ~

thereof as I coated Sn Oezt~ ath iata, sad so auth

Of the~othe AsoDnei,ixibpwty, ath~reiat Ł th~

~

Officesigee flads of the Office is the %nctct of

11
3. (Continued)

2

the Bureau of the Budget shall daterulzae to relate priest

ily to the functions transferred by this paragraph, are

transferred to the said Sent ce MLlitary persounel now

on duty in cennection with the activities transferred by

...

this paragraph say, sub3ect to applicable )n en4~ta the ~

extent mutually agreeable to the 5ecrotsry of tate 144 ~

N...~ ~\ to the aeeretaxtfef ~t or the Secretary *f the Svy,

4

as the ~àase ~be, sentient en such duty in the4~pa.rt- ~

~ ~ ...

cent ot~State~

a. Interim- Reseat a and I elligence SeS~ ~

...-

~shafl be abelisbed as of the close of bus3ness December $1r ...

...-

1945, and the~S eretaz7 of State shall pravide for winding ... ...-

up its affairs Pending nSa abolition, (a) the S~cxetary~ ....

of State may transfer from the said Service to ada agen~

...-

ales of the ...Deperbrtt of State as he shall design~te ~y ~

function of the Service, (b) the Secretary may oflfl ...tbe ~>. I

tar~flyjfles carried on by to Service, (c) t~e beadt the ~

Service, ho iiatne ~uze ~ay, sin~ -a -;- ~......--~~...- ~

1~reBPOnaibIn to the Secretary or 4o ouch other officer ~

~ ts~1&*

...- -~ I ttt aide beàin4tez~d as t~ ofl**eatenal eDUty\ ~

...

~

~ of th( Office

?

not tr

~

sfened~by

~

parepoph 1 of thjs ~irder, together with all persexmel, -

records, praperty, and tunas ol the Office not so trens~

...-

~

-~-- ...-~

furred, are transferred to the Department of Tar, and the

Office, Including the office of the Director of Stnt~gio

Services, is terminated The functions of the Director

of Strategic Services end of the United States Joint ~

12
3. (Continued)

chiefs of Staff, relating to the functicna transferred

I by this peraAraph, are transferred to the SeatI~ary of War

Naval psi on duty with the office~in connection with.

the activities transferred by this pan t

to applicah4 law and to

~

L , T:,:

~ ~.

~ \

a ~ ,

~

~ ~

,\~ ...~

_____

~

13
4. Truman to Donovan, 20 September 1945 (Photocopy)

~jy dear G.zwral Donovan2

I ap~x.ciats very aueh th, work which yea and your staff

~ertook, baginoing prior to the Japanese surrender, to liqui

date those -~.rtiee activities of the Offic. of Strategic Ser~v

ices which will not be needed in tine of pesos

Tinely et*p~ chould also be taken to conserve those resoincea

cod skills d.iel~,ed within your organisation wbith are vital to

our peacetine purposes.

Accordingly, I have today directed, by Ezecutive order, that

the activities or the 1~asearch and Aralysis ~nanch and the Pre

sentatLon Branch of the Office of Strategic Services be trans

ferred to the Stat. I~spar~eat. ~is transfer, which is effeo

tive as of October i; 3945, represents the beginning of the

developnent of a ooordinetedsyatee at foreign intelligence

nithin the pernanent tranework of the Gover~ont.

Consistent with the foregoing, the Executive ardor provides

tar the transfer of the rencining activities of tbe Office of

Stratogic Services to- the ~ar Departoent; for the abolition of

the Office of Strategic Services; and for the continued orderly

1i~uidction of so~ of the activities of the Office without

interrupting other services of a ailitary netwe the seed for

which will continue for acne tine.

.1 want to take this occaaion to thank you for the ca~able

leadership you have brought to a vital wartine activity in your

capacity a. Director of Strategic Services. You nay wall find

satisfaction in the achieveuent. of the Office and take pride

in your ewn contrt~tion to thea. Ibese are in thonsalvea

Large rewards. ~eat additional reward for your efforta should

ii. in the knosledge that the peace tine intal]igwiee services

at the Govszg~.snt are being erected on the foundation of the

facilities and resources nobilised throu$t the Office of Strategic

Service. during the war,

Siseer.ly yu~e,

-

~..

~s3oe ~fl~4J Dcnav

15
5. Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for Commander Clifford,

27 December 1945 (Photocopy)

-

.~. - OE~USSIFIED

E.O. 11652. S.c. 2~ ~& S~

C..r.A. irA. /z-I.4.1A~ ~

27DEC 1945

}MOP.&~DUM FOR CO~AMA1~DER CLIFFORD:

Subject: Central Intelligence ~&genoy.

1. ks you have requested, I an attaching:

(a). Copy of the State Depar~ent Plan.

(b) Copy of draft of directive proposed by the Joint

Chiefs of staff.

(c) Detailed comparison of Plans (a) azid (b).

2. i)ifferences between the two plans are far a rester, and

more fundam~tai, than they appear to be on the surfaoe.

3. L(r. McCormack,author of the State Depar~nent plan, ad

vocates that the Secretary of State should control ~merica s intelli

gence effort. 1he Secretary of State or his representative, }~r. ~c

Cormack feels, should determine the character of the intelligence fur

nished the President. Ee made this point clear not only in his pub

lished plan, but also in his talk to the public over the radio, end in

various addresses to ~r~y and I~aval officers intended to sell the State

Department plan.

4. There are three serious objections to i~r. X~oCormacks pro

posal:

(a) ~ecent experience has shovn all too clearly that as

lon~ as the .~rmy and l~y may be called upom~ in the

last analysis to support the nations foreign policy,

the Services should have a voice reaching the ~res

idant as unmistakable as that of the State Depart

ment.

(b) ~he evaluation of infornatioü is not an exact science

and every safeguard should be inposed to prevent any

-

one department from having the opportunity to inter

pret information in such a way as to make it seen to

support previously accepted policies or preoonoieved

opinions.

(c) Should the ~cCormack plan be adopted, it is inevitable

that it would be looked upon in tine as a State Depart

ment intelligence system, not en intergovernmental

system. The J~rmy end Navy meanwhile would be maintain

ing their own complete intelligence systems.

5 The plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff seems more likely to

provide the President with unbiased intelligence, derived from eli avail

able sources, and approved by all three departments of the GoyerDment

primarily concerned with foreign policy  State, War and Navy. Under

the JCS Plan, the interest of the President would s~Łm to be better pro

-

c~

17
5. (Continued)

2 ~

~

Subject: Central Intelligence Agency

tected then under the LicCornack plan for the following reasons:

(a) ihe Authority would be set up under the President,

end therefore on a level higher then that of any -

single department. As a result, no one department

could influence unduly the type of intelligence pro

duced. Furthermore, more balanced control could be

expected, as no single department would be dominant.

(b) The President would appoint the Director, making it

possible to procure a men of outstanding ability end

integrity.

(c) 1hrough the pooiim~ of expert personnel in the Central

Intelligence J~gency, many functions now performed by

various intelligence agencies could be carried out more

efficiently, expeditiously, end economically than could

be expected under the LicCormack plan. (i~r. L~cCormack

has indicated in interviews that he is not in favor of

a central intelligence agency.)

(d) ~he JCS Plan provides for the preparation of summaries

and estimates approved by the participating agencies

for the use of thore who need then most: the President,

those on a Cabinet level responsible for advising the

President, end the Joint Planners.

(e) The JCS Plan contemplates a full partnership between

the three departments, created and operated in the

spirit of free consideration. and with a feelir.g of

a full share of responsibility for its success. The

wholehearted cooperation of participating agencies

would be assured inasmuch as the Central Intelligence

Agency is desi~ned to operate cm a reciprocal basis.

6. ~he JCS Plan has the further advantage of having been under

consideration for many months. It was prepared after long consideration

by the technical staff of the .J. I. C. and unanimously approved by the mem

bers of the Joint Intelligence Co~ittee, which included the heads of the

intelligence agencies of the State, liar and ~Departments. It was then

approved, with minor changes, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff comprising

Fleet Admirals Leahy and King, Generals of the Army }~Iarshall and Arnold.

The recommendations of the JCS were concurred in at that tine by the Sec

retaries of War and the 1~avy.

7. I recommend that a directive substantially in line with the

draft attached (JCS Plan) be issued by the President as I believe it will

provide a program which will best serve him and the national interest.

18
5. (Continued)

-

Tflhl s-..

IW~uLU1U.I -

IIECUSSIFIED

Subject: Central Intelligence &nency. E.O. 11652. S.c. 3~ ~d 5~0

~I*I~.

~741kf ~~

8. As you ~ow, my interest in this subject is wholly objec.

tive as I e~ not a candidate for the job of Director ~d oouldnt accept

even if it were offered me.

-

19

6. John Magruder, Memorandum for Maj. Gen. S. Leroy Irwin,

Assets of SSU for Peacetime Intelligence Procurement,

15 January 1946 (Carbon copy)

Isou,~u~fUmcI1I~

bC IUSTO~ICAL ~I I N~ 0C4. V0~ ~

____

15 January 1946

MEMOR.ANDUM FOR: Maj. Gen. S. Leroy Irwin

SUBJECT: Assets ol SSU for Peacetime Intelligence

Procurement.

SSU today possesses the essential personnel, techniques and facilities for: 51]. the COmp]ex phases of clandestine

peacetine intelligence procurement. In addition the

agency is serving the occupation forces in Germany, Austria,

SEAC, and China~ continuing responsibilities developed

during hostilities. Except in SEAC, proposals to with

draw from these com~ii~ents, in order to concentrate

on long range future operations, have been opposed by

the Theater comi~nders concerned.

At present the primary ob3ective of SSU is to con

vert its w~ique assets into the foundation for clandestins

peacetine intelligence procurement. Work has been pro

ceeding~r steadily despite such handicaps as repeated re

ductions in budget and personnel quotas and the general

uncertainty as to the future of intelligence organization.

This has resulted in the loss of many ~ey officers and

personnel.

SSUIs paramount asset is its personnel, ~ju~~1~ffied a~d seasoned after four years of operation covering not

only zones of active military combat ~t also areas wziere

peacetime conditions prevailed. Many among the mdi

viduals who have left $SU constitute a poo]. of recover

able personnel for future work. Selected rosters noting

particular qualifications and talents have been comj~Led and are bei~ng kept current.

Long range clandestine intelligence procurement de

pends on secrecy, inconspicuousness and individual de

votion to duty. Personnel must be meticulously checked

for reliability, without there being revealed the purpose

for the investigation. TrP~Y1Tg must not permit too

Msep a knowledge of the organization, to protect against

individual divulgence or compromise. Procedurex muat be

flexible to permit coordinated development of various

sources of information and opportunities for penetration.

21
6. (Continued)

2

Secret intelligence the SI Branch

Records and Workina ?ilen c~ntain*

1 L~ ~

~~1l

5Coyer~ identities iaust be lived completely yet adapted to

the assignment. J~nd above aLl a break in security should

not reflect on or compromise the United States, nor can

official channels be called on for succor,

~echniciues SI personnel are experienced in the basic

techniques of procuring and handling clandestine foreign

intelligence data:

1. Locating, screening, recruiting and indoctrinating

operatives, agents and staf~ personae]..

2. Pl~i~ing, mounting and supporting clandestine

intelligence operations.

3. Collecting and reporting c].andes tine military,

political, economic, sociological and scientific

intelligence.

4, Crosschecking, evaluating, processing and

di8se~1 ting such reports locally and laterally

in the fie14 and to users in Washington,

Personnel All key branch personnel whether now in

the United States or abroad have had responsible experience

in sonØ or all of the techniques in the field during the

past tour years, in neutral, allied or ~nemy co~tries.

Bone who have already returned to civilian occupations

desire to resume clandestine inte.U.tgence work abroad in

the future under suitable cover. Others, Still on duty

in foreign countries are well quell tied for operations

direction or supporting posts at headquarters, Washington.

Still others, who have become suspected for clandestine

activities in the areas where they are at present active

in a semiovert status, can neverth~1esa after a lapse of

time be used elsewhere either in Washington or abroad.

In certain regions where it has been necessary to

discontinue operations owing to lack of authority1 funds, or facilities local agents who nave served Mórican

secret intelligence purposes well have been sealed off~

with arrangements made to res~e contact in the future.

1. Processed intelligence reports, received from thp

field during the past four y.ars, indexed for

prompt use, numbering into tens of thousands.

2. War diaries, field histories, records of operationS].

experience and manuals of intelligence doctrine

and tec~miqu.a.

3. Wellindexed files on U.S. personnel (citizen or

resident) who have sper4 ~i 1zed ~.owl.dLe of

persons, subjects and objects

22
6. (Continued)

together with detailed interrogations of them

concerning that knowledge.

4. The most comprehensive bibliography in the United

States of the literature of espionage.

~ Eighly productive liaisons were. estab

lished duriüg wartime wit~. ~Sritish, French, Belgian, Czech9

Danish, Dutch, Norwegian, kolish, Siamese and Indo-Chinese

intelligence services. In addition, certain relations were

developed with the secret services of such neutral countries, as Switzerland, Sweden, Spain and Turkey.

These foreign liaisons are a continuing SSU asset

that according to their principles can only be maintained

by an Aaerióan secret intelligence ~witerpart, They

w113. be of i~ique value in peace-time in that other countries9 in seeking American. support, will voluntarily supply in

formation otherwise difficult to obtain.

~uxzent operations are of two general fr1 nR~ ~

L. Extensive semiovert operations in areas under

military coa~anders Germafly, Austria, eh1~ns~

and Southeast isia. These wi].]. terminate

when the military need ends. Meanwhile these

areas of occupation are proving to be em

cel].ent bases tram which to ~erate into

countries outside the areas, in transition

to longterm peacetime clandestine operations.

51 ml 1 ~ operations are t~m]rh~g place in and

out of ~5sitz.rland, Swedn, Italy, and Greece

to all of which it is planned to send new

pars~~pnn.]. operating under new directives,

2. Langterm operations on peace-time basis are

today well established in seven countries of

the Near East and ~our of Northern Africa.

These are true clandestine operations of

perni~nemt vain..

Plans nave bean drawn in detail for clandestine

oprati~zs in the Far East. They are complete end can be

put into full effect in eight mouths time. Plans are

being implemented for gradual expansion of Near East

Sperati~17nI a~d ~n1i~rgement of work in Atrica,



23
6. (Continued)

fr - -

4

Staf~ studies are now in process tor longterm

operations in key European countries. These must be

implemented country by country, since the restoration

of certain normal conditions is essential to the estab

llshnient and maintenance of successful cover.

Mor4ç and ~bysjca1 subversion branches of S8U have

been liquidated but selected personnel have been in

tegrated into the SI Branch. In addition to specialized

interpretation of reports they maintain complete files

on techniques and operations to furnish the basis lor

positive plAi~r11~~g for, or defense against, future sub

versive propaganda, sabotage or guerrilla activities,.

Counter Die - the X-2 Branch

Tecbniciuesz The X-2 Branch is in the unique position

of being -the only operating American counterespionage

organization with coordinated coverage in both military

and nonmilitary areas outside of th~ Western Hemisphere.

Its tasks are to:

1. Observe, report on and correlate information

concerning the activities of all foreign

intelligence services and related secret

organizations. 2. Advise and assist the appropriate executive

agencies of the United States Government in

frustrating such activities of these

services aS may be detrimental to American

interests.

3. To protect clandestine intelligence operations

of United States Government agenciesj

The branch operates by the use of agents and double

agents to obtain information concerning not only foreign

intelligence personnel and their activities but also

the structure 8nd pOlicies of their organizations. It

works in close liei~om with related American ag~itnies in

bt~4Y~g relevant information. On matters where the

aecurity of American lnterestj is not jeopardized, it

works in l.taisen with foreign counterintelligence

agencies to obtain data on matters and individuals of

mutuil interest. The intelligence services of ~ller

nations in particular show a marked interest in ms~ri~g

available to S~U, which they regard as their American

eGunterpart, counterintelligence material on subjects

24
6. (Continued)

5

I~7~~lLT&~l ;-~~

which they wish made known to the United States Govern

inent and which might otherwize not reach American eources.

personnel~ X2 ha~ developed a staff of specia.U.sts

in procuring and correlating counterespionage intelligence

with over three years active operational experience.

They work in close Ltaison with such executive and law

enforcement agencies as State Department, G2, ONI FBI

and Treasury supplying them with incoming information of

special interest. In military areas~ such as Germany,

Austria, Italy and China, 12 personnel operate as Special

CounterIntelligence Units which work in close liaison

with G2 Headquarters to conduct clandestine operations

against forei~ intelligence and sabotage organizations,

assist in the interrogation of captured enemy agents and

intelligence officials, analyze relevant captured enemy

documents. 12 complements the work of,CIC in security

matters of local interest, and receives dC intelligence of broader than local significance.

In nonmilitary areas, X2 persorme]. generally ?perate

j.n State Department diplomatic and consular offices~

particularly in major countries in Europe end the Near

East. Thea X2 representatives serve American Foreign

Service Officers with advice and assistance on security

against penetration by foreign intelligence services, and

with security checks on native employees, applicants for

United States visas or other individuals with whom the

officers are in tOuch. They also maintain appropriate

liaison with local counterintelligence and police

officials.

~tecords ,Washington 12 he~th~uartors are the central

operational center and collecting point for a].l information

sent in by the field stations and represetitatives. Eere

exists, a central file of information on over 400,000

individuals who are in one form or another connected with

foreign int4ligence and otherwise secret organizations whose activities are Or may be i~tmfcel to .~meriean

interests. In a~ô.ition there are maintained comprehensive

detailed studies of the structure, policies and operations

or foreign intelligence agencies.

Clandestine intelligence procurement requires highly

apecializad rapid and secure communications, maintained

throughout with complete secrecy and concealment of equipment.~

~omza~nicationS~

25
6. (Continued)

~!CRET

The ~J Coa~unicatic~a I~rt~ne.h ii ~t~sd by

who Mve s~rvsr4 with it since ita start, Overseas,

Ci ~c~~ti~E was ~n intsgr~ part of operations and t~

Br~nch was responsible tar c~4~c-~ t.tuns tr111~n1~Ylg of

ag~e~t pors~inal and for estab1i~htng all types of C~~~

cłti~a 1i-,~~ Teo~i~vse and et~u1~~t wore developed to protect tho agent tr~itt4ng frea deep inside ena~.

~ild or occupied territSzy~

Ig*thg 3.u close eooperati~ with iriq and Mavy

laboratories research has bo~ carried ~t with tbo aoat

.

advancd electrocic sad specia3.iz..d e~utpeent, both

and aizt~atic, to adapt da~tces c~mcaivod for war

comditioma to p.rwit nes scope for peaceties ~1andestins

activities, flis e~ert tec~ticions U ertia~tng this re

~earsh are still with 8$U or are largely recoverable.

~v.r

~ts Dre~ch throcgh research and £1.14 ezpsriocc. can sepply dowentaU.~ ~ other ituas ssse~tLs1 ~

prsv&4. detail, of ~byaical 5oovar and proper Ld.nti..

tie~atS~~t for agents. . Its personnel bays ac~irs4 knowledge

of asthods tar prad~cing bLank doc~ents at perfect

~ have developed -t.c~i~uas for the maWact*~re

of~ pipers sf.~act ttlui.si weight, color lad texture

sad with ut~.tic ws$ezosrka.

*stboda of secret Writthg have bean refined by 8~

____

-

reseercbera bsyend detection by tests presently to Aesrican and torwi~ agencies,

anU £pecisl 1w4s officers wes acti~i La .11 theaters

and in nantrel coontries turniakdog foreign carr~ica

to secret agents to peasit carrying out their sCtivitL~.

Through purchases. and sales carefully coordinated b7 ~sahi.ugten

hme~asrtsrs, large ~a~s of ~and nutral ourranay

were Obt~~~ed sitheut peraittieg any ~it an insignificant

of U.E. ~y to.. reach on~ hands.

jsr,An~e1 1~aleCtias ~A*5e5~~ The *Lectiaa

end placenent of ~J~ ~ ~~

~nd.etjft5 organizatien. Parsa~sl La needed with

sp~t~ljged ~owladg. of 1ang~ges and iiatries ~

addiU.en, high atudirds of security, end

of bologicaL essesasent

inatituted thiring the war, coubined with ens oS rassesasent

and careful reporting en iaciv1d~1 effectiveness in the

field4 ~r~s the potantt41t1.sa of MD per.~aa2 are a _______

26
6. (Continued)

:~EeR~

m~tter of continuous record and the relative ii~erits for

intelligence work of v4rious personality traits and

attributes nave been analyzed for guidance in future

recruiting. These records, assessment methods, and trained

personnel remain a significant SSU asset.

~rainixiR has been continuously readap ted and expanded

in the light of experience, and today new tr~i~ning manuals

based upon the requirements for peacetime are nearing

completion. The personnel, experienced in tr&inirig and

handling agents not only in Washington but in the field,

remabis with SSU or is to aa large extent recoverable.

~ect~ri~tY~ Security officers have been on duty with

al]. detachments and ield mission nead~4uarters. Follow

ing policies coordinated at Washington headquarters the

standards of security within the agency naVe been high

throughout, despite the varied nature of the agency a

functions and stations of duty. These standards will re

quire even more meticulous attention in peacetime worldwide

operations.

ReDroduction SSU has a fully equipped printing

plant for printing offset, photostat, ezalid mimeo

graphing with security stanth*is and efficiency so high

that the most highly classified material from the White

flouse and the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been entrusted to

it. The personnel responsible for wartime work rP~~~ in

tact and prepared to continue their essential role in

assuring undelayed and fully secure copying of even the

moat complex illustrated intelligence reports.

Services Procedures fitted to clandestine operations

require the complete cooperation and understend4ng of

services units.. Liaisons with Army, Navy, and Civil Service

have permitted the adaptation of existing procedures to

th. needs of intelligence personnel. Special compensation,

insurance, and hospitalization formulas have been worked

out to serve the individual while maintaining security with

regard to his work. Transportation and supply officers

have become trained to meet the most specialized require

ments of intelligence agents.

John Magruder

Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

Director

-

27

7. Truman to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 22 January

1946 (Photocopy)

46- 1951

~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Ji~

WASHINGTON

~ inio~~vnD

2: 1946

22, 1946

r ~OPi 0?

To The Secretary of Stat.,

Tb. Secretary of Tar, and

The Secretary of the Navy.

1. ~t is ~ desire, and I her.by direct, that all Yedare3. foreign

intel].tgono. aotivities be p~~d, developed and coordinated so as to

assure the most effective accosplisbeent of the intelligence mission

related to the national security. I hereby designate you, together with

another person to be naned by mu as my personal representative, as the

~ National Intelligence A,~thority to accomplish this purpose.

2. WitI~n the limits of &v~41-~~le appropriAtions, you shall, each

from time to tim. assign persona and facilities from yp~r respective

Depar~ents, ~bicb persona shall collectively forn a Central Intelligence

~oup and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence,

assist the National Intelligence Authority. The ~rectcr ?~ Central In

telligance shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National

Iutel.Ugsnc. Authority, and shall ut as a non-voting mesber thereof.

3. Sebjeot to the esiating law, and to the direction and oontxol

of the National IflteE.tgence Authority, the ~.reotor of Central Intern

gene. shells

a. Ace miplish the correlation and evaluation of

intelligence relating to the national security, and the

29
7. (Continued)

2

appropriat. dissemination vithin the Government of the

resulting strate~.c and national policy intelligence

In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and

facilities of the intelligence agencies of your Depart

ments.

b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activi

ties of the intelligence agencies of your Departments as

r.iat. to the national security and reco~nd to the Na

tional Intelligence Authority the establishment of such

overall policies and objectives as Will assure the most

effective acccspliahmsnt of the national intelligence

mission.

c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence

agencies, such services of co~n concern as the National

Intelligence Authority determines can be mere efficiently

accoepliahed centrally.

4. Perform such other functions and. duties related

to intelligence affecting the national security as the

Preeidónt and the National Intelligence Authority may from

time to time direct.

4. No police, a. enforcement or internal security functions

shall be exercised under this directive.

~. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of

your Departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence

Authority shall be freely av~41~b1e to the Director of Central Int.Ui

30
7. (Continued)

3

genes for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent

approved by th~ National Intelligence Authority, the operations of

said intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Director

of Central Intelligence in connection with planning functions.

6. The e~d.eting intelligence agencies of your Depar~ent.s

shall continue to collect, evalaste, correlate and disseminate departaen

tel intelligence.

7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by

an Intelligence Advisory Bcaxd consisting of the heads (or their repre-.

sentatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies

of the Oovemnaent having functions related to national security, as

determined by the Rational Intelligenea Authority.

8. Tithin the scope of enisting law and Freeidentia]. directives,

other departments and agencies of ~the executive branch of the Federal

Governaent shall furnish such intelligence information relating to the

national security as is in their possession, and as the Director of

Central Intelligence may frem tine to time request pursuant to regula

tions of the National Intelligence *nthority.

9. Nothing herein shall be con8trmed to authorize the mald.ng

of investigations inside the continental units of the United States

and it~ possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential

directives.

31
7. (Continued)

~ : .

4-

10. In the conduct of their activities the Nationil Inteli.i

genoa Lizthoxity and the Director of Central InteUigence shall be

reaponaible for fully protecting intelligence aoureee and aethoda.

Sincerely yours,

1,

\

~

32
8. National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the National Intelli

gence Authoritys 2nd Meeting, 8 February 1946

CO–~~IAL

N.I.A. 2nd Meeting

COPY NO.

NATIONAL INT~1,~IGENCE AU~HORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 212

Department of State Building

on Friday, 8February l9k6, at 10:15 g.m.

?PRESENT

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in the Chair

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson

Secretary Of the Navy James Forrestal

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,

Personal Representative of the President

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers,

Director of Central Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Alfred McCormack, Department of State

Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State

Mr. r~vidson Sommers, War Department

Capt. William R. Smedber~, USN

SECRETARIAT

Mr. J~nies S. Lay, Jr., Central Intelligence Group

~l. ~ bs~

ths~--~ foe zs~__ m?~L ths ~ vS

IvteULg~s ~

Dutsj~

002 g A

33
8. (Continued)

1. PROPOSED flNTATIVE d~~AR~74I ON .CENTRAL INTELLI -

GENCE GROUP

(N.I.A. 2) .~

SECRETARY BYRNES stated that he had discussed the intent

of paragraph k-a of the enclosure to. N.I.A. 2 with the Presi

dent, who assured him that only factual statements were desired.

Secretary Byrnes therefore suggested adding the words contain

ing factual statements after the word. summaries.

ADMIRAL SOURER questioned whether daily factual summaries

would not prove sufficient. Re therefore recommended deletion

of the words and veelcly in paragraph k-a.

TEN, NATIONAL INTElLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Approved N.I.A. 2 subject to rewording of paragraph 4-

of the enclosure thereto as follow~:

a. Production of daily summaries containing factual

statements of the significant developments in the

field of intelligence and operations related to

the national security and to foreign events for

the use of the President, the members of this

Authority, and additional distribution shown in

Appendi.x C.

2. PROPOSED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING TIE CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE GROUP

(N.I.a. 1)

ADMIRAL SOUERS suggested the following rewording of the

3rd and 4th sentences of paragraph 5 of the enolosure to

LI.A. 1, which had been suggested by Mr. MoCormaoks offior

for budgetary reasons:

As approved by this Authority and within the limits

of available appropriations, the necessary funds and

personnel will be made available to you by arrangement between you and the appropriate member of the Intelli

gence Advisory Board. .

You may determine the qualif lea

tions of personnel and the adequacy of individual candi

dates.

ADMIRAL LEAKY thought I.hat the arrangements should be

made between Admiral Souers and the appropriate Department

through its member on the Intelligence Advisory Board, rather

than between Admiral Souars and the appropriate member of that

Board.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Approved N.I.A, 1 subject to the following rewording of the 3rd and 4th sentences of paragraph 5 of the

enclosure thereto:

As approved by this Authority and within the limits

of available appropriations, the necessary funds and

personnel will be made available to you by arrange

ment between you and the appropriate department

through its member on the Intelligence Advisory Board.

You nay determine the qualifications of personnel and the adequacy of individual candidates.

34
9. National Intelligence Authority Directive 1, Policies and

Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group,

8 February 1946

CO?WIDLUTIAL COPY NO. lS~q

8 February l9k6

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. AUTHORITY

N.I.A. DIRECTIVE NO. 1

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING TRE

. CENTRAL IN~ELLIOEN~E ONOUP

Pursuant to the attached letter from the President, dated

22 Janucry 19k6. designating the undersigned as the National

Intelligence Authority, you are hereby directed to perform your

mission, as Director of Central Intelligence, in accordance with

the follo~ring policies and procedures:

1. The Central Intelligence Group shall be considered,

organized and operated as a cooperative interdcpartmental

activity, with adequate and equitable particxpttion by the State,

Wer and Navy Departments and, as recommended by you and approved

by us. other Federal departments and agencies. Thu Army Air

Forces will be represented on a basis similar to thet of the

Army and the Nevy.

2. The Central Intelligence Group will furnish strategic and

national policy intelligence to the I-resident and the State.

War and Navy Departments, and, as appropriate, to the State-WarNavy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and nther

governmental departments and agencies having strategic end policy

fuhctions related tc the national security.

3. The composition of the Intelligence Advisory Board will

be flexible and will depend, in each instance, upon the subjsct

matter un4er consideration. The Special Assistant to t$e

Se.retary of State in charge of Resemrch end Intelligence, the

Assistant Chief of Sts~Qf 0-2,. liDeS, t~e Chief of Naval Intelli

gence end the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intulligencu (or

their representatives) will be permanent members. You will

CONFIDENTIAL - 1 -

lilA DIR 1

35
9. (Continued)

- -

invite the head (or his representative) of any other intelligence

agency having functions related tp the national security to sit

as a member on alr matters within the province of his, agency.

All recommendations, prior to submission to this Autbority,

will be referred to the Board for concurrence or comment. Any

recommendation which you and the Intelligence Advisory Board ap

prove unanimously and have the existing authority to execute moy

be put into effect without action by this Authority. If any

menber of the Board doesnot concur, you will submit to this

Authority the basis for his non-concurrence at the same time

that you submit your recommendation.

4. Recommendations approved by this Authority will, where

npplicablØ, govern the intelligence activities of the separate

departments represented herein. The rpembers of the Intelligence

Advisory Board will each be responsible for ensuring that approv

ed recommendations are executed within their respective depart

ments

5. You will submit to this Authority as soon as practicable a

proposal for the organization of the Central Intelligence Group

and an estimate of the personnel end funds required from each

department by this Group for the balence of this fiscal year

and for the next fiscal year. Each yemr thereafter prior to

the preparation of departmental budgets, you will submit a

similar estimate for the following fiscal year. fl approved by

this Authority and within the limits of available appropriations,

the necessary funds and persoanel will be made available to

you by arrangement between you and the appropriate department

throu~ its member on the Intelligence Advisory Board. You

aay determine 4he qualifications of personnel and the adequacy

of individual candidates,. Pe,rsonnØl assigned to you will be

under your operation,al and administrative dontrol, subject only

to necessary personnel procedures in each department.

- COATIsjauirij-j. - 2 -

NIADIR1

36
9. (Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

6. The Central Intelligence Group will utilize all available

intelligence in producing strategic and national policy intel

]igence. P11 intelligence reports prepared by the Cuntral Intel

igence Group will note any substantial dissent by a partioipat

ing intelligence agency.

7. As required in the performance of your authorized mission,

there will be made aüailable to you or your authorized represen

tatives all necessary faÆilities, intelligence and information

inthe possession of our respective depa.rthents. Arrangements

to carry this out will be made with members of the Intelligence

Advisory Board. Conversely, all facilities of the Central

Intelligende Group andall intelligence prepared by it will be

made available to us and, through arrangements agreed between

you and the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board2 subject

to anyauthorized restrictions, to our respective departmoiits.

8. The operations of the intelligence agencies of our

departments will be open to inspection by you or yàur authorized

representatives in connection with yourplanning functions, under

arrangements agreed to between you and the respective members

of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

9. You are ruthorized to request of othar Federal departmunts

and agencies any information or assistance required by you in

the performance of your huthnrized mission.

10. You will be responsible for furnishing, from the perscnnal

of the Central Intelligence Group, a Secretariat for this

Authority, with the functions of preparing agebda, reviewing end

circulating papers for consideration, attending all meetings,

keeping and pu~lis~ing minutes, initiating and reviewing the

implementation of decisions, ant performing other necessary

secretarial services.

Secretary. of State Secretary of the Navy

Secretary of War Personal flapresentative of the President

3ONFIrJZNTIAL -

3 -

NIA DIR I

37

10. Central Intelligence Group, Daily Summary, 15 February

1946 (Ditto copy)

s,,, \

6O/~IAb~. A

/

GENERAL

~ecret Yalta arid Tehran Agreements for Sale in Paris--Ti~ie ?~ris Expb~wsy

:that alleged se~fe~agreements between the US and the USSR at

yalta and Tehran have been offered for sale inParis by agents ci some

Russians~ in Switzerland, and that a French and a Swiss ne,~sp~per are con

sidering their publication. Ambassador Caffery has secured some of these

agreements ~there are said to be eleven.of them), about whic.h he reports

the following~

a. in one Tehran agreements the US promised to supply the USSR with

a ~IO billion credit In return for a Soviet commitment to support our pro

posals for fac litating world trade, fair distribution of raw materials, and the

regulation of international currency.

b. in one Yalta agreement, allegedly signed by Hopkins and Molótov,

the US recognized a Sovi~t claim of free acdess to the Mediterranean in

retifl-n for a Soviet agreement (1) to recognize the absolute independence of

Austria, flu~gary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslay ~La aml

) (2) to renounce any agreements with those countries giving the Soviets a pre

ferred position.

C. Another Yalta agreement covered the Soviet use of German

prisoners and Soviet acquisition of Ge~rnan industrial machinery for recon

stiuctión in the USSR.

In addition, the Embassy reports that these agents are also said to

be offering (a) secret Soviet agreements with Syria and Lebanon and Q) a

treaty between Iraq and Transjordan.

Document No. _~____ ~o ca~I E.inC ~S. 0

-

DECLSI~I~

ciass. c:~i~ To: TS S

~ ~ 4 ApiS ~

- I I/Il.: .~. E .&c~4~ ,.

)

a-r3c.~I

39
10. (Continued)

-

EUROPE-AFRICA

& GEi~MAMY: Discoiithriance of relief for displaced persons Lu US Zcne--The

V~ar Departm~t has authorized Gen. McNai~hey to announce by 1 March the

discontinuance of relief by 1 July for all displaced persons in the US Zohe in

Germany. Au exception will be ma~e, however, for those persons who are

unwilling to be repatriated because of possible persecution on the grounds of

race, religion, etc. Those desiring repatriation will be moved out by 1. July.

3. TURI(EY: USSR willing to wait for solution of Turkish problem--ln con

versation with the Turkish Acting Foreign Minister, as reported by Embas~y

Ankara, Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov has stated that we waited a long.

time regarding the arrangement we wanted with Poland and finally got it; we

can wait regarding. Turkey. He said that for a reestablishment of friendly

relations between the two countries, a solution of the USSRs claims regard- -

thg the eastern provinxes of Turkey was important, but the question of the

Straits was vital. Asked what the Soviet -equirements regarding the

Stra.its were, Vlnogradov replied tha e USSR ~jmust have an adequate

guarantee ) that the security of the ciiet Union wilt not oe endangered,

(b) that a sovereign and friendly Turkey at the Straits would not be adequate

for the defense of the Straits, and (c) that Soviet use of bases In the Straits

v~hen the need arose would be essential;

4. YUGOSLAVLA: Ar.ti-AMG propaganda in Venezia Giulia--Military authorities

in Venezia Giulia report that Communist press attac&s on the Allied Military

Government are mounting, probably In an effort to obtain UNO examinatton

of Allied actions in Venezia Giulla. The authorities also report reinforce

ments at Yugoslav troops in the Yugoslav zone of the province, apparently

in order to apply pressure on the local population during the visit of the

Council of ~oretgn Ministers Commission.

FAR EAST

5. Ci1INA: US moves Chinese arrnies--CG Chinese ~heatre reports that five

Chinese armies and Ji3,000 service troops are being moved north by him for

-

occupation of Manchuria. In addition to moving this force, he is supplying

them with 250,000 sets of US winter clothing.

d. FRENCH lN~QC1UNA~ Proposed 8mb- French agreement--The Chinese

Foreign Office has Informed Embassy Chungking that negotiations with

Prance concerning Indochina are in the final stage. Principal provisions

of the proposed agreement Include: (a) withdrawal of Chinese troops, (b). up

holding of prewar Chinese rights, (c) freedom of transportation on the Yunnaxi

Indochina Railway, and elimination of duties thi~ough Haiphong.

eONf~EN~

40
11. Souers to National Intelligence Authority, Progress Report on

the Central Intelligence Group, 7 June 1946

Copy Nb~._____ J,~JI ~i.i~~ej~

PROGRESS REPORT1

ON THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum Submitted To

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

by

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, USNR

Director of Central Intelligence

Dated 7 june1946

D$CUIEUTI.

ION IIN.A$$ ~

o ~cL*3*IFtE0

~SHAIO~o TOi TI ~ IEXT 1011W 0*711 L~ I I

&urrn ~1~*

s*m IlviEWilt SIflhI

i;~ SECRET

41
11. (Continued)

~~CEOflLT COPY NO. _~.

7 June 1946

N~ORA!~DUN FOR TEE NATIONAL INTELLIG~CE AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: Progress Report on the Central Intelligence Grot~p

1. ESTABLISE~NT

The Central Intelligence Group was officially acti

vated on 8 February 1946 pursuant to the approval of N.I.A. Di

rective No. 2. Actually, a small group of personnel from the

State, War, and Navy Departments had been assembled beginning

on 25 January, three days after the President signed the letter

directing the establishment of the National Intelligence Au

thority.

2. ORGANIZATION

The Central Intelligence Group has been organized in

accordance with N.IA. Directive No 2. The major components

at the present time are the Central Planning Staff, charged with

planning the coordination of intelligence activities, and the

Central Reports Staff, responsible for the production of na

tional policy intelligence. A Chief of Operational Services,

with a 8xnall staff; has been designated as a nucleus frornwhich

an organization to perform services of commonconcern may be

built. A small Secx~etarjat to serve the National Intelligence

Authority,the Central Intelligence Group, and the Intelligence

Advisory Board, has been created. The Administrative Division

Consists of an Administrative Officer;, a Security Officer, a

Personnel Officer, and a small group. of trained personnel tO

Provide necessary administrative services for the Central Intel

].igence. Group.

BEORE~L

42
11. (Continued)

TOP 3ECRET

3. PERS0I~L

Personnel for C.I.G. has been requested and selected

on the principle that only. the most experienced individuals in

each field of intelligence activity should be utilized in th.ls

vital preliminary period. The responsible officers in the De

partments have cooperated wholeheartedly toward this end. How

ever, the procurement of C.I.G~ personnel has necessarily been

a rather slow process, in view of the demobilization and the

fact that C.I.G. and departmental requirements for qualified

individuals naturally had to be reconciledi.n many specific

cases. Thepresent status of C.I.G. personnel is shown in

the following tabulation;

STATE

Actual Auth.

Staff 5 17

Staff -

6 10

Division * 5 16

WAR

ActuaTAuth.

l0(5A) 26

13 ( 5A) 20

16(3A) 33

NAVY

Actu~7uth.

4 18

8 10

4 15

TOTAL

Actual Auth.

19 61

27 40

25 64

16 43 39(13A) 79 16 43 71 165

not yet ..

.

.

C.I.G. 5 6

.

2

.

13 .

.

21 43 45 79 18 43 84. .

165

.. 9% .

57% 42% .. .

51%

* Includes Office of Director, .Secretariat, and Chief of Operational Services.

Auth. Authorized by N.I.A~ Directive No. 2

A Personnel assigned by A2

-

- .2 TOr ~EOI~T~

43
11. (Continued)

TOP C]~OflI~T

It may be seen that the organization of the Central

Planning Staff has been given priority, since effective planfling is considereda necessary prelude to accomplishment of

the C.I.G. mission. Concentration is now placed on manning

the Central Reports Staff. The need for filling positions in

the Ad.niiaistrative Division has been largely alleviated by

the part-time use of the personnel and facilities of the Stra

tegic Services Unit., although this Division will require re

inforcement when centralized operations are undertaken.

A development of great importance regarding person

nel has been the designatiOn of specially qualified consult

ants to the Director ot Central Intelligence. An outstanding

scientist with wide intelligence experience, Dr. H. P.

Robertson, is Senior Scientific Consultant to the Director.

Arrangements are well advanced for the designation ofj~..

George F. Kennan recently Charge dAffaires in Moscow and a

-

Foreign Service Officer with a dis~inguished career, as Spe

cial Consultant to the Director, particularly on U.S.S.R. af

fairs.

k. ACTIVITIES

The activities of the Central Intelligence Group to

date have been characterized principally by the administrative

details of organization, the consideration Of urgent problems,

and the basic planning for a sound future intelligence program.

Basic policies and procedures regarding the organization have

been established. Urgent problems in the intelligence field,

-3- TOPCEOItET

44
11. (Continued)

TOP 3ECRET

especially as regards certain vital operations, have been

carefully studied andappropriate action has been or is ready

to be taken. Substantial progress has been made in the anal

ysis of long-range intelligence problems. The throes of mi,

tial organization and planning are, therefore, generally past,

and the time for initiation of centralized intelligence oper

ations has now been reached.

Coordination 0. Intelligence Activities Beginning

on.12 February ].9k6, four daya after the activation of C.I.G.,

the C.I.G. has beenreceiving numerous suggestions or recom

mendations for ~tudies leading to the effective coordination

of Federal intelligence activities. A number of other studies

of this type have been initiated by C.I.G. These problems

generally fall into three categories;. (a) problems for which

partial but inadequate solutions were evolved during the war;

(b) problems which existing Governmental machinery was unable

to solve or incapable of solving; and (c) problems which re

cjuired new solutions in the light of the post-hostilities sit

uation.

Some of these problems, particularly in the third

category, require urgent interim solution. Among these prob

lems for which interim solutions have been evolved or i~nl.ti

ated are the liqu.idation of the Strategic Services Unit, the

development of intelligence on the U.S.S.R., and the coordina

tion of scientific intelligence.

- k - TortEorinT

45
11. (Continued)

TOP 3ECRET

Problems for which immediate solutions are well ad

vanced include the following:

a. Provision for monitoring press and propa

ganda broadcasts of foreign powers.

b. Provision for coordinating the acquisition

of foreign publications.

C. Coordination of collection of intelligence

information.

d. Coordination of. intelligence research.

e. Essential elements of information.

f. Provision for collecting foreign intelligence

information by clandestine methods.

~. Intelligence on foreign industrial establish

ments.

ii. Interim study of the collection of intel

ligence information inCh.tha.

i. Central Register of Intelligence Information.

Projects which are in various stages of study or

planning cover the following additional ~ubjects:

a. Disposition of files of the U.S. Strategic

Bombing Survey.

b. Censorship planning.

c. Intelligence terminology.

d. Resources potential program.

C. Application of sampling techniques to intel

ligence.

f. Survey of coverage of the foreign language press in the United States. ~.

~. Intelligence on foreign petroleum ~evelop ments. .

h. Coordination of geographical and related in

telligence.

5.. TOP~ECflET

46
11. (Continued)

Tor &EOflET

1. Disposition of the Publications Review Sub

committee of the Joint Intelligence Corn

uattee.

j. Survey of the Joint Intelligence Study Pub

lishing Board.

k. Disposition of the photographib intelligence

file in the Department of State.

1. Coordinated utilization of private research

in the social sciences.

in. Index of U.S. residents of foreign intelli

gence potential.

n. ~cploitation of American business concerns

with connections abroad as sources of foreign

intelligence information.

o. Planning for psychological warfare.

. ~. Utilization of the services of proposed

minerals attaches.

One of the functio~s of C.I~G. which has assumed

great importance is the support of adequate budgets for Depart

mental intelligence. Coordinated representation to the Bureau

of the Budget and the Congress, of the budgetary requirements

for intelligence activities, promises to be one of the mOst

effective means for guarding against arbitrary. depletion of

intelligence resouTces at the expense of national security..

So long as the C.I.G. is dependent upon the Departments for

budgetary support, however, its authority to speak as an un

biased guardian of the national security, will be suspect and

therefore not, wholly, effective.

Production of National Policy Intelligence Pursu

ant to N.I.A. Directive No. 2, the Central Repprts Staff con

centrated on the production. of a factual Daily Summry, the

-6- .

.

47
11. (Continued)

Tor CEICflDT

the first issue of which was dated 13 February. Although this

Summary covered operational as well, as intelligence matters

and involved no C.I.G. interpretation, it has served to keep

the C.I.G. personnel currently advised of developments and

formed a basis for consideration of future intelligence re

ports.

Despite the undermanned condition of the Central Re

ports Staff, the urgent need for a Weekly Summary has resulted

in the decision to produce the first issue~on ~ June. Until

adequately staffed in all geographic aree.~, however1 this pub

lication will concentrate on those areas for which qualified

personnel is now available. The concept of this Weekly Sum

mary is that it should concentrate on significant trends of

events supplementing the normal intelligence produced by, the

Departments. Procedures are being developed to ensure that

the iterns contained therein reflect the best jud~ent of qual

ified personnel in C.I,G. and the Departments.

The primary function of C.I.G. in the production Of

intelligence, however, will be the preparation and dissemina

tion of definitive estimates of the capabilities and intentions

.f foreign countries as they affect the. national security of

the United States. The necessity of assigning the best quali

fied and carefully selected personnel to this vital task has

delayed its initiation. Solution of the relationship of this

C.I.G. activity to the Departments, the State-War-N4vy Coordi

nating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other agencies

concerned with the national security, has also been deferred

-

7 -

TOF 3EC1IET

48
11. (Continued)

Tor CEOflET

pending the procurement of adequate personnel. This procure

ment .has now been given priority, a.nd it is anticipated that

the Central Reports Staff will be prepared to produce national

policy intelligence at an early date.

Performance of Centralized Operational Services The

operation of central services by the C.I.G. has been considered

to be a subject requiring careful study to ensure that Depart

mental operations are not impeded or unnecessarily duplicated.

The urgent need for central direction of the activities and

liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit was recognized by

the N.I.A. and an arrangement was effected whereby this Unit

is operated by the War Department. under directives from the

Director of Central Intelligence. This arrangement temporarily

provided C.I.G. with facilities for direct collection of re

quired information but is admittedly only a stop-gap measure.

C.I.G. planning and organization has now progressed

to the point where firm recoendations may be made for 0.1.0

operation of intelligence services which can be more efficient

ly accomplished centrally. Among those operations under con

sideration as C.I.~. activities are:

a. Monitoring press and propaganda broadcasts

of foreign powers.

b. Collection of foreign intelligence. in.forma

tion by clandestine methods.

c. Production of static intelligence studies

of foreign areas, to replace J6int ArmyNavy Intelligence Studies: (JA]~IS).

- 8 - ~or ~oni~

49
11. (Continued)

Tor CEOflET

a. Establishment of a Central Register of In

te1J.igence Information.

e. Basic research and analysis of intelligence

subjects of common interest to all Depart

ments, such as economics, geography, sociol

ogy, biographical data., etc.

In the consideration of performance by C.I.G. of cen

tral operations, however, the administrative, budgetary and

legal difficulties of the present organization have presented

real problems. The reduction of Departmental funds and person

nel for intelligence activities have made it difficult for Departments, despite their desire to cooperate, to furnish the

necessary facilities to C4.G. The ~.nability of C.I.G. to re

cruit personnel directly from civilian life, and the adn,1r~1strative complications of procuring personnel from the Depart

ments, are likely to jeopardize effective conduct of C.I.G.

operations. The lack of enabling legislation making the C.I.G.

a legal entity has made it impossible to negotiate contracts

vhich are required for many operations, such as the monitoring

of forei~ broadcasts.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. The present organizational relationship between

the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence

Group, and the Intelligence Advisory Board is sound.

b. The initial organizational and planning phase

of CI,G. activities has been completed and the operation of

centralized intelligence services should be undertaken by

C.I.G. at the earliest practicable date.

- 9 -

.

Tor 3Ep~~ET

50
11. (Continued)

Tor 3EOflET

c. The National Intelligence Authority and the Cen

tral Intelligence Group should obtain~ enabling legislation

and an independent budget as soon as possible, either as part

of a new national defense organization or as a separate agency,

in order that (1) urgently needed central intelligence oper

ations may be effectively and efficiently. conducted by the

Central Intelligence Group, and (2) the National Intelligence

Authority and the Central Intelligence Group will have the

necessary authority arid standing to develop., support, co

ordinate and direct an adequate Federal intelligence program

f or the national security.

SIDNEY W. SOU~RS

Director

(1002) - 10 -

TOr 3LOIIET

51

12. George M. Elsey, Memorandum for the Record, 17 July 1946

(Photocopy)

M~LORANIXIM PORs

FILE.

On 16 July ~r. Clifford ~nct Mr. Huston and Mr. Lay fron

the Central Intelligene. Group,. in ~ office and diecussed idth

then a proposed bill for the establi&uient or the Central Intel

ligence Agency. C~L~nc~er fla sy was also precent.

The basis of the discussion was the, c~ratt bill ~iob

had been Euhoitted by General Vandenberg to Mr. Clifford for

coen~ent, and Mr. Cliffords ~oran~an in reply of 12 July 1946.

Mi-. C.ULford pQint~d out that it wae~~i President e

original intention that a new agency be created and he re

narked that it appeared that the propoaed bill lal departing

fron the President a intention by establishing A óeparate and

elceable governuent agalcy. Mr. Clifford also r~rked that

the President had~ intended that his letter of 22 January 1946

would provid, a wàrkabl. plan for the Central Intelligenc.

Group. Zr. Clifford than adc.d if experiŁnc. had sho~n that

the plan outlined in the Presidents letter was not workable.

Mr. IIusthn~and Mr. Lay cascuscedat sone length the

ftfbr4Vll strative difficulties which the Cantral InteUig~c.

Gro~i~i has had due to its bd ng a et..p-ohLld of three separate

dep..xtou ats. They stated that experier~e showed that enabling

legislation was necei~sr.ry in oidur that. the Central Intelligence

Group could operate as an integrat.dorgard.zation. Th.3r also

interned Mr. Clifford that e~perient. had ahoun that the Central

Intelligence Group should bicene anoperating agency with a

large staf,t of Intelligence experts.

After lsngthy discussion, it via agreed by 41 preàent that th s origln~-l concept of the Central Intelligence Group.

should . be altered; e~rienao had shown that it~u1d be

ineffective if it renain.d on].7 a ~ii. piIIT~4~lg staff and that it

nust cow benoe. a legally sb~1isbsd, fairly aiaeabl.*, operating

agenc~. Mr. Clifford stated ~st he would discuss this cow

concept with *dairal Leahy and the PresSdss*~

- - There followed a dEtailed exeatcotion of th. draft

bill in light of the cc~euti and criticla ned in Mr. Cliffords

17 July 1946

53
12. (Continued)

i~oran~ of 12 July. hr. Huston and Mr. Lay agreed that aU

of Mr. Cliffords points ~re. lull t~c en and they agreed to

rÆriti the bill incorporatinj his suggestions.

It was apparent during th~]~~äj~ part of ~

discussion that neither ir. Hueton nor Mr. Lay had gixen ~ch

thought to the ~orde ~iich they had noed in drafting thebill.

Both stated that large part. of it had been extracted froa

othor proposed legislation or other docuxaents re2a~. ng to

Intelligence. In their hasty preparation of the draft in this

aci~sor._and-~ast. method, they had felled to grasp the esBØntisi

point that the Hational. Intelligence Authority thould be a p~~&Ie1l ng

group and the Central Intelligence Agency an operating group.

r. Clifford pointed out to thea tbe -robable opposition which a propoood bill IUOU]LI arouse if great care ar~ thought were

not given to the choice of words used.

Ur. thiaton and Mr. Lay will prepare a new bill and

senU it to Mr. Clifford for co~ent. -

GEORGE ~. ELSEI

54
13. National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIAs

4th Meeting, 17 July 1946

-

34 COPY NO.

N.I.A. 1~th Meeting

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 212

Department or State Bui.lding

on Wednesday, 17 July 19k6, at 10:30 a.m.

RS PRESENT

Secretary of StateJames F. Byrnes, in the Chair

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson

Acting Secretary o~ the Navy John L. Sullivan

Fleet Admiral Williain D. Leahy, Personal

Representative ~ the President

Lt. General Hoyt S~Vandenberg, Director of

Central 1p~e11igçnce

ALSO. PRESENT

Dr. William L. Lang~r, Special Assistant to

the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence

Mr. John D. Ilicicerson, Department of State

Colonel Charles W. McCarthy, USA

Captain Robert L. Deanison, USE

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National

Intelligence Authority

This docuzs~ct has been

apprOved fci~ re~? th

tfLQ }IIS~L

the Cant:;~ ~utei r~-~ ~

OOCO...8C

______

2~i C.IM6IF1ID fo SECeET

~vI4 (T~I r4~.~D~- s. ~

55
13. (Continued)

fl

1. REPORT BY THE DENECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SECRETARY BYRNES asked General Vandenberg to give the

members a report on present and future matters concerning the

Central Intelligence Group.

GENERAL VANDENBERG invited attention to the conclusions

contained in the Progress Report on the Central Intelligence

Group by Admiral Souers, former Director ot Central Intelligence.

General Vandenberg explained that at the present time each

intelligence agency is working along the lines of primary

interest to its department. It is his belief that C.I.G. should

find out what raw material received ~y one department is of

interest to the others. In order to do this, C.I.G. must be

in a position to see and screen all raw material received.

For example, as regards a given steel plant, State is studying

what produots are made there and the rate of production. War

Department, however, is interested in the construction and

physical details of the plant, the railroads serving it, and

other data required for target information. State Department,

if it broadened the base of its studies, might well be able

to furnish at least part of that type of economic intelligence.

It is the job of C.I.G., therefore, to find out the needs of all

the departments and to meet them, either by recommending that

one department expand its activities or by performing the neces

sary research in C.I.G. In order to do thi~, an adequate and

capable staff is urgently required in C.I.G. It is extremely

difficult administratively to procure the necessary personnel

under the present arrangement. General Vandenberg therefore

feels that he must have his own funds and be able to hire

people. This means that C.I.G. must be set up as an agency by

enabling legislation.

SECRETARY BYRNES expressed the understanding that the

N.I.A. was intentionally established as it is in an effort to

avoid the necessity foran independent budget.

SECRETARY PATTERSON agreed, end explained that this was

designed to conceal, for security reasons, the amount of money

being spent on central intelligence.

SECRETARY BYRNES thought that it would be difficult to

explain to Congress the need for intelligence funds without

jeopardizing security.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that such ocnsideratione should

be balanoed against the added administrative difficulties

they caused. Re expressed the belief that the important thing

was that the Central Intelligence Group should be an effeotive

end efficient. organization.

ADMIRAL LEABY said that it was always understood that

C.I.G. eventually would broaden its scope. It was felt, however,

that the Departments initially could contribute sufficient funds

and personnel to get it started. Be is about convinced that

N.I.A. should now attempt to get its own appropriations~ These

appropriations, however, should be small, since the three

departments should continue to furnish the bulk of the necessary

funds.

SECRETARY PATTERSON thought that the administrative problems

could be worked out under the present arrangements.

SECRETARY BYRNES believed that the major problem was to

find a way for the departments to give C.I.G. the money it

needed.

-1-

56
13. (Continued)

a

SECERTARY PATTERSON stated that he was perfectly willing to direct Army Intelligence. td furbish the hecessary funds

to 0.1.0. and then let the Director of Central Intelligence

pick his own personnel with those funds. us opposed a separate.

budget because he does not want to expose these intelligence operations.

BECENTAIIY BYRREB agreed that we could not afford to make

such disclosures in this country.

GENERAL VARDENBERG pointed out that each personnel action

must be handled at present by 100 people in each department. This means that knowledge of 0.1.0. personnel is exposed to

300 people in the three departments. Re feels that handling

personnel actions within 0.1.0. itself would improve security.

ADMIRAL LEAfY agreed that it was undesirable that so many

people in the departments should haO Iciowiedge bf 0.I.0 Re

felt that if each department gave 0.1.0. funds, perSonnel actions

could be taken by 0.1.0 itself without e*posing them.

GENERAL VARDERBF.R0 pointed out that this would still

require defending three separate appropriations aots before

the Senate and the Mouse of Representatives.

DR. LANOER agreed that the funds would have, to be defended

before the Congress in any case.

SECRETARY BYRNES recalled that members of Congress had

offered to include the State Department intelligence budget under

such terms as investigations abroad or as an added amount

in any other budget account. Me felt that since Congress was

apparently willing to do this, the funds might easily be hidden

in this manner within departmental budgets.

DR. LARGER thought that Admiral Leshy s suggestion would

be very effective. It might be possible to give N.I.A. an

independent budget for the more overt activities, and hide

other funds in departmental appropriations. This would serve

as idealcoverfor covert activities. Moreover, he believed

that an independent appropriation for 0.1.0. would make General

Vandenberg more effective in supporting departmental intelli

genca budgets.

ADMIRAL LEAR? felt that this problem must be approached

very carefully. He believed that no one was better qualified

to advise N.I.A. on this than Secretary Byrnes, with his

Congressional background. Admiral Lethy stated that the Presi

dent authorized him to make it clear that the President con

sidere4 the responsible agency in the present arrangement to

be the N.I.A. The President stated that the Director of

Central lntelligence is not responsible further than to carry

out the directives of the N. l.A. Admiral LŁehy said there ware

some indications that the Director of Central Intelligence, with the Intelligence Advisory Board, might tend to assume

greater control over intelligence activities than was intended.

Admiral Leehy reiterated that the President holds the Cabinet

officers on N.I..A. primarily responsible for coordination of

intelligence activities.

SECRETARY SULLIVAN compared the Director of Central

Intelligence toan executive vice president who carries out

the instructions and policies of the N.I.A.

-2-

57
13. (Continued)

ADMIRAL LEABY stated that with regard to a Hll to obtain

an independent budget end status for N.I.A., the President

considers it inadvisable to attempt to present such a bill

before the present Congress. The President feels that there is

not enough time for the N.I.A. to give thisquestion sufficient

study. Thepresident feels, however, that a bill might be

drafted and be under study by the R.I.A. with a view to the

possibility of presenting it to the next Congress. Admiral

Leshy stated that in the meantime he felt that General Vandenberg should be given, so far as practicable, all the assistance that

he requires.

GENERAL VAMDENBERG pointed out that C.1G. is not an agency

authorized to disburse funds. Therefore, even with funds from

the departments, it would require disbursing and authenticating officers in all three departments, plus the necessary accounting

organization in 0.1.0. He felt that this was requiring four

fiscal operations where one should suffice.

ADMIRAL LEABY suggested, and SECRETARY BYRNES agreed,

that this might be taken care of by the wording of an appropria

tions act.

DR. LARGER questioned this possibility unless 0.1.0. was

given-status as a disbursing agency.

SECRETARY BYRNES thought this status could be given the

agency by the President under the authority of the Emergency

Powers Act. -

GENERAL VARDENBERG said thai he understood that this

solution was decided against because it might indicate that

-N.I.A. was a temporary expedient which would terminate with

the end of the presidents war powers.

SECREPARY BYRNES was sure that it could be done by the

President under his reorganization authority and without

reference -to the Emergency Powers Adt. Secretary Byrnes under

took to talk with the Bureau of the Budget on this matter and

report back to the N.I.A.

ADMIRAL LEABY was convinced that 0.1.0. must have funds

for which it does not have to account in detail.

DR. LARGER questioned whether General Vandenberg was not

more concerned over the cumbersome arrangement for handling

personnel actions in all three departments.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stressed the fact bhat without money

there could be no personnel actions. For exsmple, he noted

that the State Department does not have sufficient funds to

pay personnel required for C.I.G. -General Vandenberg agreed,

however, that personnel actions were extremely difficult under

present arrangements. For example, it takes an average of

six weeks to obtain security clearance from the Departments, and he does not reel that he should employ anyone without such

clearance. General Vandenberg stressed the fact that his

greatest interest was in getting-C.I.G. into operation by what

ever means possible. He felt thattime was of the-essence

during this critical period. -

-

SECRETARY BYREES believed that the only way at present to

avoid the administrative difficulties was to arrange to have

each department transfer the necessary funds to 0.I.G.

-3-

58
13. (Continued)

GENERAL VAEDENBERG pointed out the difficulty of obtaining

funds from the Departments.. For example, although the State

Department requested about $330,000 for N.I~A., only $178,000

is being made available. While he appreciated the need of the

State Department for the other funds, this case exemplified the

fact that C.I.G. could never be certain of receiving the funds

which it requested and defended unless they were appropriated

directly to C.I~G.

DR. .UEGER believed that this situation would not recur

in the future, but he did agree chat States contribution to

Q.I.G. was not adequate. Re did not see, however, how this

could be increased except through a deficiency bill.

SECRETARY SULLIVAR asked why additional funds might not

be secured from the Fresidents emergency fund.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that total funds available to

0.1.0. for the fiscal year 19k? were $12,000,000; which left

a shortage for effective operations of $10,000,000. Re asked

whether it might be possible to obtain permission to epend

available funds at an accelerated rate in anticipation of the

submission of the deficiency bill.

SECRETARY BYRNES thought that such permission could not

be obtained. He noted that what keneral Vandenberg had

stated was that, 0.1.0. had $12,000,000 and wanted $22,000,000.

Dr.LAI4GER questioned whether any mechanism was to be

available for reviewing this proposed budget.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he had the details available.

Be noted, however, that comprehensive review meant that this

information must be widely disclosed to perscnnel in three

departments. -

SECRETARY SULLIVAR felt that since the Fresidents remarks

indicated that he held N.I.A. responsible, they must Imow

the details regarding any 0.1.0. budget request.

At Secretary Byznes request, GENERAL VANDENBERG then

made a brief report on 0.1.0. activities. Re noted that 0.1.0

was taking over Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service and all

clandestine foreign intelligence activities. In addition,

however. 0.1.0. is receiving daily requests to take over

functions now being done by various State, War and Navy Com

mittees. One example is the suggestion that 0.1.0. centralize

the handling of codes end ciphers to improve their security.

Another example is the concernof the War Department about axchange of information with the British. The StateWar-Navy

Coordinating Committee has a subcommittee covering this exchange,

but it handles only about 20 or 30 percent of the lnforfl!ation

actually exchanged. This subcommittee confines itself purely

to secret matters, whereas the Army Air Forces believe that

a central clearing house shotild be established where the bar

gaining value of this informat~.on may also be taken into account.

DR. LANCER pointed out that the SWNCC subcommittee deals

only with technical military information. He feels, however,

that the problem also involves such matters as the transfer

qf non-military information and the declassification of materini.

Unless these matters are centralized, each department will

continue, as at preeent, going its own way.

59
13. (Continued)

-

GENERAL VANDENBERG reported that hi has already set up an

Office of Special Operations. He has also established an Inter

departmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, but only on a

skeleton basis because of his need for additional personnel.

SECREPARY PATTERSON felt that all of General Vandenbergs

present problems should be solved if the Secretary of State

can obtain help from the Bureau of the Budget.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated his problems; briefly, ~were

that he needed money, the authority to spend it, and the

authority to hire and fire.

SECRETARY BYRNES felt there were rpally two problems:

First, to find ways to handle the money now available, and second,~

to get whatever additional ftthdsai required. He thought it

would be difficult to get additional funds flfteen days after

the fiscal year had begun. He questioned whether present funds

should not be sufficient since the understanding was that C.I.G.

was primarily continuing functions which have been previously

performed.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that C.I.G. was now under

taking certain new functions end also expanding some existing

odes. In answer to questions, General Vandenberg stated that

Tie proposed to have about ~l9O0 people in secret intelligence and a total of something less than 3000 in C.I.G. by the end of

the fiscal year.

DR. LARGER stated that he agreed with almost everything

that General Vandenberg had said, but that he was impressed with

the imposing size of the proposed organization. He thought

there should be a definite review of the program before a

request for an additional $10,000,000 is approved.

GENERAL VANDENBERG ~ointed out that there is a clear need

fOr additional appropriations for intelligence in view of

changing conditions. During the war there were American forces

all over the world who were procuring tnformation and intelli

gence in connection with military operations. These operations

were not oo;sidered as intelligence activities, however, and

the funds required for them were not charged to intelligence.

These operations are now shrinking rapidly. It is necessary,

therefore, to have intelligence agents all over the world to

get the same information which during the war was handed to

intelligence agencies on a silver platter.

SECRETARY PATTERSON agreed with this statement. He noted

thnt in each theater of operations G-2 activities were merely

apart of the Armys operations and were not considered to be

part of the intelligence organization directed from Washingtoit.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then discussed briefly his proposed

organization chart for the Central Intelligence Group. He noted

that there would be an Interdepartmental Coordinating and

Planning Staff to assist in the coordination of all intelligence

activities related to the national security. There would then

be four Offices to conduct C.I.G. operations., namely, Special

Operations, Collection, Research end Evaluation, and Dissemina

t ion. -

__________

-

5 -

60
13. (Continued)

After further discussion,

THE NATIONAL I?~ELUGE1WE AUThORITY:

a~ Noted General Vandenbergs report on the Central

Intelligence Group.

b. Noted that the Secretary of State v,uld discuss with

the Bure~u of the Sudget the solution of the problems

mentioned by General Vandenberg, and would report back

to the Authority.

c. Noted the organization of the Central Intelligence

Group which General Vandenberg was plann1n~ to put into

effect.

___

-6-

61
14. Clifford to Leahy, 18 July 1946

(Typed copy)

~. ~SEC1ULT

_______

0

Pr

THE WHITE HOUSE

WA~TT~GTON

July 18, l9l~6

My dear Admiral Leahy:

The President has directed me to assemble for him certain facts

and information regarding the Soviet Union. He has directed me to

obtain £rom the Central Intelligence Group estimates of the present and future forei~ and military policies of the Soviet Union. I an

therefore i~riting to request that the National Intelligence Authority instruct the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare such estimates

fo~ submission to the President at the earliest practicable date.

It is also desired. that the Central Intelligence Group prepare

a statement of conclusions drawn from the monitoring of Soviet broad

casts, iith special attention àevoted to the deseriptions of Soviet

and American forei~ policies.

Th~nnch as the President hopes that this information ~il1 be

in his hands before the convening of the Peace Conference in Paris

on 29 July 191i6, it is desired that the reports I have requested be

delivered to me prior to that date.

Very truly yours,

Is! Clark IL. Clifford.

CLARK U. CLIFF~)

Special Cowisel t o the President

Fleet Admiral Willlmli D. Leahy, USN

The National Intelligence Authority

Washington, D.C.

l9July19146 To: Director of Central Intelligence:

Please couply as a matter of priority.

IsviIwItthI3 ~ySIAI.s ddemI~ed e~t /s/ 114~ L. Leaby

~ CM Iii ~i sb)ectIs. ts dsclass ~ieX of Staff

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63
15. CIG. Office of Research and Evaluation, ORE 1. Soviet

Foreign and Military Policy. 23 July 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SOVIET FOREIGN AND MILITARY

POLICY

J~LBBARY COPr

OREI

23 July 1946

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65
15. (Continued)

ORE 1 ~.

23 JUly 1946 -

COPY NO.__________

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GEOUP

SOVIET FOREIGN AND MIlITARY POLICY

SUMMARY

1. The Soviet Government anticipates an inevitable conflict with the cap

italist world. It therefore seeks to increase its relative power by building

up its own strength and undermining that of its assumed antagonists.

2. At the same time the Soviet Union needs to avoid such a conflict for an

indefinite period. It must therefore avoid provoking a strong reaction by a com

bination of major powers.

.3. In any matter deemed essential to its security, Soviet policy will prove

adamant. In other matters it will prove grasping and opportunistic, but flexible

in proportion to the degree and nature of the resistance encountered.

4. The Soviet Union will insist on exclusive domination of Europe east of

the general line StettinTrieste.

5. The Soviet Union will endeavor to extend its predominant influence to

include all of Germany and Austria.

6. In the remainder of Europe the Soviet Union will seek to prevent the

formation of regional blocs from which it is excluded and to influence national

policy through the political activities of local Communists.

7. The Soviet Union desires to include Greece, Turkey, and Iran in its

security zone through the establishment of friendly governments in those

countries. Local factors are favorable toward its designs, but the danger of

provoking Great Britain and the United States incombination is a deterrent to

overt action.

B. The basic Soviet objective in the Far East is to prevent the use of

China, ICorea, or .Japan as bases of attack on the Soviet Far East by gaining in

each of those countries an influence at least equal to that of the United States.

9. The basic Soviet military policy is to maintain armed forces capable of

assuring its security and supporting its foreign policy against any possible

hostile combination. On the completion of planned demobilization these forces

will still number 4,500,000 men.

10. For the time being the Soviets will continue to rely primarily on large

masses of ground troops. They have been impressed by AngloAmerican strategic

air power, however, and will seek to develop fighter defense and long range

bomber forces.

LI.

66
15. (Continued)

2

ii. The Soviets will make a maximumeffort to develop as quickly as pos

sible such Special weapons. as guided missiles and the atomic bomb.

12. Further discussion of Soviet foreign jolicy is contained in Enclosure

A; of Soviet military policy, in Enclosure B.

I

67
15. (Continued)

E1

ENCLOSURE A

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

T51 BASIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

1. Soviet foreign policy is determined, not by the interests or aspira

tions of the Russian people, but by the prejudices and calculations of the

inner directorate of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. While the

shrewdness, tactical cunning, and longrange forethought of this controlling

group shoul4 not be minimized, its isolation within the Kremlin, ignorance of

the outside world, and Marxist dogmatism have significant influence on its ap

proach to problems in foreign relations.

2. The ultimate objective of Soviet policy may be world domination.

Such a condition is contemplated as inevitable in Communist doctrine, albeit

as a result of the selfdestructive tendencies of capitalism, which Communist

effort can only accelerate. In view, however, of such actual circumstances as

the marked Indisposition of democratic nations to adopt the Communist faith

and the greatly inferior war potential of the Soviet Union in relation to them,

that goal must be regarded by the most sanguine Communist as one remote and

largely theoretical. While acknowledging no limit to the eventual power and

expansion of the Soviet.Union, the Soviet leadership is more practically con

cerned with theposition oftbe U.S.S.R. in the actual circumstances.

3. For the present and the indefinite future the fundamental thesis of

Soviet foreign policy is the related proposition that the peaceful coexistence

of Communist and capitalist states is in the long run impossible. Consequent

ly the U.S.S.R. must be considered imperiled so long as it remains within an

antagonistic capitalist encirclement. Tbis concept, absurd in relation to

so vast a country with such wealth of human and material resources and no

powerful or aggressive neighbors, is not subject to rational disproof precise

ly because it is not the result of objective analysis. It is deeply rooted in

a haunting sense of internal and external insecurity inherited from the Rus

sian past, is required by compelling internal necessity as a justification for

the burdensome character of the Soviet police state and derives its authority

from the doctrine of Marx and Lenin.

4. On the basis of this concept of ultimate inevitable conflict, it is

the fundamental policy of the Soviet Union;

a. To build up the power of the Soviet state; to assure its inter

nal stability through the isolation of its citizens from foreign influ

ences and through the maintenance of strict police controls; to maintain

armed forces stronger than those of any potential combination of foreign

powers; and to develop as rapidly as possible a powerful and selfsuffi

cient economy.

b. To seize every opportunity to expand the area of direct or in

direct Soviet control in order to provide additional protection for the

vital areas of the Soviet Union.

* In this context socialism (as distinguished from communism) is considered

as antagonistic as capitslism.

S

1

68
15. (Continued)

-4- J~i~ c. To prevent, any combination of foreign powers potentially inimical

to the Soviet Union by insistence upon Soviet participation, with veto

power, in any international section affecting Soviet interests, by dis

couraging through intimidation the formation of regional blocs exclusive

of the U.S.S.R., and by exploiting every opportunity to foment diversionary

antagonisms among foreign powers.

d. To underaine the unity and strength of particular foreign states

by discrediting their leadership, fomenting domestic discord, prolioting

domestic agitations conducive to a reduction of their military and economic

strength and to the adoption ot foreign policies favorable to Soviet pur

poses, and inciting colonial unrest. 

~. Although these general policies are premised upon a oonviction of latent

and inevitable conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world, they also

assume a postponement of overt conflict for an indefinite period. The doctrine

of Marx and Lenin does not forbid, but rather encourages, expedient compromise

or collaboration with infidels for the accomplishment of ultimate Communist pur

poses. The Soviet Union has followed such a course in the past and had need to

do so still, . for time is required both to build up its own strength and to weaken

and divide its assumed antagonists. In such postponement, time is calculably on

the side of the Soviet Union, since natural population growth and projected eco

nomic development should result in a gradual increase in its relative strength.

It is manifestly in the Soviet interest to avoid an overt test of strenØth.at

least until, by this proCess, the Soviet Unien has become more powerful than any

possible combination of opponents. No date can be. set for the fulfillment of.

that condition. The Soviet Union must therefore seek to avoid a major open con

flict for an indefinite period.

6. The basis of Soviet foreign policy is consequently a synthesis between

anticipation of and preparation for an ultimate inevitable conflict on the one

hand and need for the indefinite postponement of such a conflict on the other.

In any matter conceived to be essential to the present security of the Soviet

Union, including the Soviet veto power in, international councils, Soviet policy

will prove adamant. In other matters Soviet policy will prove grasping, but

opportunistic and flexible in proportion to the degree and nature of the resis

tance encountered, it ~eing conceived more important to avoid provoking a hos

tile combination of major powers than to score an immediate, but limited, gain.

But in any case in which the Soviet Union is forced to yield on this account,

as in Iran, it may be expected to persist in pursuit of the same end by subtler

means.

SOVIET POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EASTERN EUROPE

7. It is apparent that the Soviet Union regards effective control of

Europe east of the Baltic and Adriatic Seas and of the general line Stettin

Trieste as essential to it~ present security. Consequently it will tolerate

no rival influence in that region and will insist on the maintenance there of

friendly governments that is, governments realistically disposed to accept

the fact of exclusive Soviet domination. That condition being met, the U.S.S.R.

does not insist upon a uniform pattern of political and economic organization,

69
15. (Continued)

but adjusts its policy in accordance with the local situation. The immediate

Soviet objective is effective control, although the ultimate objective may

well be universal sovietization.

S. In some àases no Soviet coercion is required to accomplish the de

sired end. In Yugoslavia and Albania the Soviet Union finds genuinely sym

pathetió governments themseltes well able to cope with the looal opposition.

In Czechoslovakia also, although the government is democratic rather than

authoritarian in pattern, no interference is required, since the Communists

and related parties constitute a majority and the nonCommunist leaders are

friendly.. Even in Finland the Soviet Unionhas been able to display modera

tion, Finnish leaders having become convinced that a friendly attitude is

essential to the survival of the nation. In these countries the Soviet Union

seeks, to insure its continued predominance by the creation of strong bonds of

economic and military collaboration, but does not have to resort to coercion

other than that implicit in the circumstances.

9. In Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, however, the Soviet Union encounters

stubborn and widespread opposition. The friendly governments installed in those

countries are notoriously unrepresentative, but the Soviet Union is nevertheless

determined to maintain them, since no truly representative government could be

considered reliable from the Soviet point of view. In deference to Western

objections, elections may eventually be held and some changes in the coiposi

tion of these governments may be permitted, but only after violent intimidation,

thoroughgoing purges, electoral chicanery, and similar measures have inSured

the friendly character of the resulting regime. Continued political control

of the countries in question iill be. reinforced by measures insuring effective

Soviet control of their armed forces and their economies.

10. The elected government of Hungary was both representative and willing

to be friendly, but the Soviet Union has apparently remained unconvinced of

its reliability- in view of the attitude of the Hungarian people. Accordingly

coercion has been applied to render it unrepresentatively subject to Communist

control in the same de.gree and manner as are the governments of Poland, Rumania,

and Bulgaria. The end is the same as that of the policy pursued in those coun

tries the secure establishment of a reliably. friendly regime, however un

representative, coupled with Soviet control of the economic life of the coun~ry.

SOVIET POLICY IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY

11. Soviet policy in Austria is similar to that in Hungary, subject to the

limitations of quadripartite occupation. Having accepted an elected Austrian

government and unable to reconstruct it at will, the Soviet Union is seeking,

by unilateral deportations and sequestrations in its own zone and by demands

for similar action in others, to gain, at least, economic domination of the

country as a whole and to create, at most, a situation favorable toward a pre

dominant Soviet political influence as well, on the withdrawal of Allied con

trol. The Soviet Union will prevent a final settlement, however, until it is

ready to withdraw its troops from Hungary and Rumania as well as Austria.

~1~

70
15. (Continued)

. 12. The Soviet Union hitherto has been content to proceed with the con

solidation of its position in eastern Germany free of quadripartite inter

ference. Now, rejecting both federalization and the separation of the Ruhr

and Rhineland, It appears as the champion of German uSlfication in opposition

to the imperalistic schemes of the Western powers. A German administration

strongly centralized in Berlin would be more Susceptible than any other to

Soviet pressure, and the most convenient means of extending Soviet influence

to the western frontiers of Germany. The initial Soviet objective is pre

sumably such a centralized antiFascist republic with a coalition government

of the eastern European type, but actually under strong Communist influence

snd bound to the Soviet Union by ties of political and economic dependency.

SOVIET POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE

13. For a time it appeared that the Communist Party in France might prove

able to gain control of that country by democratic political processes and

Soviet policy was shaped to support that endeavor. The Communists recant e

lectoral reverses, however, appear to have led the Soviet Union to sacrifice

a fading hope of winning France to a livelier prospect of gaining Gernany.

The French Communists remain a strong political factor nevertheless, and exer

cite disproportionate influence through their control of organized labor. That

influence will be used to shape French policy as may be most suitable for Soviet

purposes, and to prepare for an eventual renewal of the attempt to gain control

of France by political neans. A resort to force is unlikely in view of 1the

danger of.provoking a major international conflict.

14. In Italy also the Communist Party is seekint major influence, if not

control, by political means, with a resort to force unlikely in present cir

cumstances. The Party and the Soviet Union have played their cards well to

divert Italian resentment at the proposed peace terms from themselves towaid

the Western Powers.

15. The Soviet Union misses no opportunity to raise the Spanish issue as

a means of embarrassing and dividing the Western Powers. Any change in Spain

might afford it an opportunity for penetration. Even its goading of the West

ern Powers into erpressions of distaste for Franco appeàrto have afforded it

an opportunity to approach him.

16. For the rest, the Soviet Union is concerned to prevent the formation

of a Western Bloc, including Ftance and the Low Countries, or a Scandinavian

Bloc, in accordance with its general policy. As opportunity offers, it will

seek to facilitate the growth of Communist influence in Scandinavia and the

Low Countrids, but not at thesacrifice of more important interests or at the

risk of provoking a strong reaction.

SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

17. The Middle East offers a tempting field for Soviet expansion because

of its proximity to the Soviet Union and remoteness from other major powers,

the weakness and instability of indigenous governments (except Turkey, and the

71
15. (Continued)

many local antagonisms and minority discontents. It is, moreover, an area of

Soviet strategic interest even greater than that of eastern Europe,in view

of the Øeneral shift of Soviet industry away from the European Frontier, but

still within range of air attack from the south, and of the vital importance

of Baku oil in the Soviet ecànomy. It is in the Middle East, however, that

Soviet interest comes into collision with the established interest of Great

Britain and that there is consequently the greatest danger of precipitating. a

major conflict. Soviet.policy in the area must therefore be. pursued with due

caution and flexibilitr. . .

.

.

.

-

1. Given the opportunity, the Soviet Union might be expected to seek the

following objectives: ~.

.

-

a. .

At least the withdrawal of British troops from Greece, and at

lost the incorporation of that Oountry in theSoviet sphere through the

establishment of a friendly governthent. .

-

b. At least the political and military isolation of Tuikey and the

imposition of a new regime of the Straits more favorable to Soviet in

terests; at most the incorporation of that country in the Soviet sphere

through the establishment there of a friendly government.

a.- At least implementation of the recent settlement with Iran,

which assures the Soviet a continued indirect control in Azerbaijan and

an opportunity toAevelop anj oil resources in northern Iran; atmost,

incorporation of that country in the Soviet-sphere through the establish

ment there of a friendly government. ..

Soviet policy in pursuit- of these objectives will be opportunistic, not

only in relation to the local situation, but more particularly in relation to

the probable reactions of the major powers.

19. Soviet interest in the Arab states is still airected rather toward

exploiting them as a means of indermining the British position in the Middle

East than as objectives in themselves. Their principal asset,. the oil df~

Iraq and Saudi Arabia, wo~ild be economically iüccessibie, although its denial

to Britain. and the. United States in the event of ~er would be of important

consequence. But, by fomenting local demands for the withdrawal of British

troops, the Soviet Union can hope to deny effective British support to Turkey

and Iran. To this end the Soviet Union will exploit antiBritish sentiment

among the Arabs, and particularly the vexing Palestine issue..

20. The Soviet Union has shown nO disposition to intrude into the in

volved Indian situstiói, possibly finding it as yet impossible to determine

the most advantageous course in that regard. It also shows no present aggres

sive intentions toward Afghanistan, although the establishment of a friendly

government there would seem a logical, albeit low priorit~, objective.

SOVIET POLICY IN THE PAP EAST

21. The -basic Soviet objective in China, Korea,. and Japan is to prevent

their becoming potential bases Æf attack on the Soviet !ar East. This requires

M~ IL.-LffT

72
15. (Continued)

-8- JJJ ~Li1i

that the U.S.S.R. exert with respect to each an influence at least equal to

(and preferably greater than) that of any other power. Since in this region

Soviet policy encounters that of the United States, it must be pursued with

due circumspection.

22. Although the Soviet Union cannot hope to establish a predominant in -

fluence over the whole of China, at least for a long time .to come, it could

accomplish its basic objective through either the formation of a coalition

government, with the Chinese Communist Partys as a major participant, or a

division of the country, with the Chinese Communist Party in exclusive control

of those areas, adjacent to the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. should logically

prefer the former solution as at once involving less danger of a collision with

the United States and greater opportunity for the subsequent expansion of Soviet

influence throughout China through political penetration by the Communist Party,

and tbe course of its relations with the Chinese Government would seem to con

firm that preterence.. The U.S.S.R., however, would not be willing to sacrifice

the actual political and military independence of the Chinese Communists unless

assured of their effective participation in the proposed coalition. If, there

fore, efforts to establish Cuch a coalition were to fail and unrestricted civil

war were to ensue, the Soviet Union would probably support the Chinese Commun

ists in their efforts to consolidate their effective control over Manchuria and

North China.

23. In Korea the Soviets have shown that they will consent to the unifica

tion of the country only if assured of a friendly government. In default of

unification on such terms, they are content to consolidate their control in the

north and to bide their time, trusting that an eventual American withdrawal

will permit them to extend their predominant influence over the whole- country.

24. The Soviets have been extremely critical of A~nerican administration in

Japan, which has afforded thea no opportunity to establish the degree of influ

ence they desire. Regardless- of the prevailing influence, they probably desire

to see Japan politically and militarily impotent. The greater Japans political

disorganization, the greater would be their opportunity to establish an equal

and eventually predominant influence there.

SOVIET POLICY ELSEWHERE

25. Soviet policy in other areas will follow the general lines set forth

in paragraph a, seeking to undermine the unity and strength of national states,

to foment colonial unrest, to stir up diversionary antagonisms between states,

* Despite a widespread impression to the contrary, the Chinese Communists are

genuine Communists, differing from other foreign Communist Parties only in

a certain local selfsufficiency derived from territorial control and the

possession of an army, in consequence of which they eEhibit unusual initia

tive and independence. In all essentials. they are an unusually effective

instrument of Soviet foreign policy. -

73
15. (Continued)

9

and to disrupt shy system of international cooperation froa which the U~S.S.R.

is excluded. Activity along these lines ia constant, though often .incónspicu

ous. Its importance to the Soviet Union derives not from any prospect of direct

gain, but from its effect in enhancing the relative power of the U.S.S.R. .

by

diminishing that of potentiaL antagonists.

26. Because of their position in world affairs, the United States and

Great Britain will be the primary targets of such Soviet activities. In addi

tiontc domestic. agitations, the effort will be made to distract .and weaken them

by attacks upon their interests in areas of special concern to them. In Latin.

America, in particular, Soviet and Comm nist influence.will be exerted to the

utmost to destroy the infinence of the United States and.to create antagonisms

disruptive to the Pan A erican, system.. .

.

~in
15. (Continued)

-10-

ENCLOSURE B -

SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

1. Soviet militarypolicy derives from that preoccupation with Security

which is the basis of Soviet foreign policy. (See Enclosure A,. paragraphs 3

and 4a.) On the premise that the peaceful coexistence of Communist and capi

talist states is in the long run impossible, and that the U.S.S.R. is in con

stsnt perilso long as it remains within adapitalist encirclement,. it is the

policy of the Soviet Union to maintain armed forces capable of assuring its

security and supporting its foreign policy against any possible combination of

foreign powers. -

The result is an army by far the largest in the world (except

the Chinese). .

.

2. Even the populous Soviet Union, however, cannot afford an unlimited

diversion of manpower from productive civil pursuits, especially in view of

manpower requirements for reconstruction and for the new Five Year Plan. Con.

sequently it has had to adopt a demobilization program which is. a compromise

between the supposed requirements of security and those of the economy. ,

By

Septemher the strength of the armed forces will have been reduced from 12.500,000

to 4.500.000 men.i~* Further reduction is unlikely. -

3. The prflable geographical diStribution of the total strength indicated

will he 1.100.000 inodcupied Europe,. 650,000 in the Far East, and 2.750.000 in

the remainder of the U.S.S.R. The compoaition will be 3,200.000 (71%) in the

ground forcSssnd tear services, ~00.OOO (11%) in the air forces, 300o000 (7%~

in the naval forces, and 500,000 (11%) in the MV]) (politiàal security,forces).

The postwar reorganization includes unification of-conmand in a single Ministry

of the Armed Forces having jurisdiction over all forces except the MVD troops,

which remain under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

4. In addition to its own forces, the, Soviet Union is assisting and par

ticipating in the rec6nst.itutiSn of the armed forces of its sateltites in such

manner as to insure its effective control of them. While in this its object is

primarily political, such forces supplement its own as locally useful .auxilliar

Las. -

5. Soviet experience during the war was limited almost exclusively to the

employment of large masses of ground troops spearheaded by mobile tankartillery

infantry teams. Air power was employed chiefly for close ground support. Naval

operationh wete ilsignificant. The Soviets had only limited experience in am

phibious operations, almost none in airborne operations, and none with, carrier

based air operations. -

6. -

It Lappears that for the time being the Soviet Union will continue to

rely primarily on large mmsses of ground troops, but with emphasis on increased

sechanization and further development of the tankartillerymobile infantry

spearhead. The ground support capabilities of the air forces will be maintained.

* As compared with 562,000 in 1935 and 1,000.000 in 1935.

._ aeCRET

75
15. (Continued)

At the same time, the Soviets may be expected to give increased attention to

the strategic employment of air power, in view of demonstrated AngloAmerican

capabilities in that regard, and to develop both fighter defense and long

range bomber forces.

7. Although there. have been indications that the. eventualdevelopment

of a high seas fleet (or fleets) is.a Soviet intention, its early accomplish

ment is prohibited by inexperience, lack of shipbuilding capacity, and the

higher priority of other undertakings. Even were these hindrances overcome,

geography handicaps the Soviet Union as a naval power, since naval forces on

its several coasts would be incapable of mutual support. Lt is, however,

within the capabilities of the Soviet Union to develop considerable submarine,

light surface, and shortrange amphibious forces.

8. The industrial development, which competes with the armed forces for

manpower, is, of course, intended to enhance the overall Soviet war potential.

Beyond that, intensive effort will be devoted to the development of special

weapons, with particular reference to guided missiles and the atomic bomb.

Some reports suggest that the Soviets may already have an atomic bomb of sorts,

or at least the capability to produce a large atomic explosion. In any case,

a maximum effort will be made to produce a practical bomb in quantity at the

earliest possible date. .

. .

I

76
16. Leahy to General Hoyt S.] Vandenberg, 12 August 1946

(Photocopy)

August 1.2, 1946

T1IEXORANDUM F~R

General Vander~berg:

August 12th Attorney General Clark sent 1~

Tan~n of F.B.I. to see m&in.rogard to providing xs

lists fox the F.B,I.;intelligence agents now in Latin

America. The Attorney General wishes that the provision

of National :Intefljgenee Agents be expedited as much

as possible and,tho President wishes us to oomply~

P.B.I..neede its agents.1or work hexe within

the United States,

Positive objection wae.expresaed to our having

sent ox-F.B.I. nen to .diBcuss our eoon problems with

F.B.I.

It ~ould~ appear advantagooun for the Director

of .C.I. h.tmself to make all contaCts with Mx. Hoover, and that ox-F.B.I. znen:now in theC.I. Group should

certainly not be used for such coutsoti. :

Granting that thero will be a temporary reduction

of efficiency by an early relief of F.B.I. agents in

Latin Amezioa, it is my opinion that the zelieTh can be

accomplished at a much earlier date than as at present

scheduled and that it should be done.

It is certain that we should not employ in the

C.I.G. any persons now in F.B.I., and it is my opinion that to avoid offending Mx. Hoover we ahould not here

aLter, without specific approval in each inatance by the

Authority, employ amy persons .vbo at any time separated

themselves from F.B.I.. ~:

E.O. J16~2, ~ .1 ~) or (E)

It~IAi1 D

77
17. Leahy to the President, 21 August 1946 (Photocopy)

.1 . 21 August 1946

Prom: At,thg1 Leaby ~-- DrL~:~

E.G. 11652 ~r. :~t t~ .,~.;) 0!

To: The President

Ba: tA4AtL ~ .~ a~NAfts, Dots 41Q177

The Batlonal Intelligence Authority today approved the

following quoted dire otive tO be iianed by the Authority to General

Vandenbe:rg. General Gravee approves.

Secretaries Patterson and Pbzrcstal consider it very

important that the diro~tLve be: issued without delay. So oretary

.Aoheaon:. 3tated that yo~n approval should be obtained.

The mombers of the Authority reoozanond your approval with

an understanding that any action taken by the Authority will be

withc~ut prejudice to future change. that i~ay be desired by the

Atomic Energy Coi~ittee, ~I recOmnend approval.

Pursuant to the Presidents letto~ of 22 January 1946,

designating thia Authority as responsible for pl*~ing developing,

and coordinating all Federal foróign intelligence activities so as

to assure the most atfeàtive aooàmp1i&~nt of the intelligence

mission related to the national aQOurity, the following pOlicies

and procedures relating to PedOTh3. ~ntŁUigence aetivitiea in the

field of toreign atom.tÆ ~~sgy developments and potentialities

effecting the national aecurity are announced:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, subject to the

direction and control of. this Authority, La hereby authorized and

directod to coordinate the collection by agencies subject to~

coordination by N.I.A, of~ all intelligence information related

to foreiLn atondc oner~y developments and potentialities which may

affect the national security, and ~to .aooomplish tho correlation,

~

,.... ~ .,.

79
17. (Continued)

evaluation, and appropriate diacomination ~ithth the Cove~uz~nt

of the resulting intelligence. The Director of Central Intouigenee

is further authorized to arrange with other intelligence ogenctea

of the Ooverz~ent to utilize their collection facilities in this.

field,

2, To acoomplish the f~motion assigned in paragraph 1, the

Secretary of ~Var and the COQndIng General of the ~anMttan Engineer

District have authorized the transfer to the Central Intelligence

Group of the personnel and working tiles of the Foreign Intelligence

Branch operated by the Co~n~ing Gonoral of the lianhattan Engineer

District,. effective at ~: earliest practicable date.

80
18. Vandenberg, Memorandum for the President, 24 August 1946

(Photocopy)

LT(p5~j~~(/i)2.

NATIONAL IN1tWGENCE AUTHORifY

NgW WAR DEPARTMENT BUU~ING

~EN1IALINJaUJGENcE

~

MEIDRANDUIL ~OR T~ PRESIDENT:

-During the pant two iieeks there has been a series of developments

which suggest that none consideration should be given to the possibility

ci near-term Soviet military action.

1.. Soviet propaganda against the U.S. and U.K. has reo.ohed the

highest pitch of violence since Stalins Pebruary speech and follows a

line which might be interprited e.g preparing the Russian people for Soviet

military action.

a. It states that reactionary ~nopolistio oliques and military adventorers are new directing U.S. policy toward world

domination through atomic diplomecy. The U.S. has ebandoned the

Rooseveltian policy which gave hope of collaboration with the U.S.S.R.

and the other freedom-loving people of the world.

b. It attacks th,~ Angloinoricsn bloc as dividing the

field throughout the world end gives a detailed accowit of Angie American imperialistic actions, including British troop nevenents to

Basra and Palestine and U.S. military operations in China and cttempts

to secure outlying sir be.sea

e. Rubasay Moscow iiterprets the attacks outlined in

a above as notice to the Con~st Party in the U.S.S.R. that there is

~o longer any hope of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and the

Western Powers.

d. Tito, in his speech of 21 August on the international

situation, raised the issue to a worldwide ideological plane when he

stated categorically that there is no question today of ~ fronts a West

ern and Eastern. The question today is one of true demeoracy versus

reactionaries throughout the world. In Soviet torminolo~r this obviously

means coneunism versus nonocosminism.

2. The Soviets have re-opened the Straits issue with a mete to

Turkey demanding exclusive control by the Black Sea Ebw.rs and ~oiut

Soviet-Turld.eh defense of the Straits.

3. Yugoslavia, after sending the U.S. a note protesting the

violation of her sovereignty by daily £lights over her territory of U.S.

trans port and military aircraft, has shot down two U.S. aircraft, end

defended mach action as Justified.

~ DEcI.A2SIflED

~

81
18. (Continued)

a. U.S. Military- Attache Belgrqde in coienting upon

these incidents stated that while he bad not previously believed that

Russia and Yugoslavia were ready- to fight, he regarded these incidents

as indicating that they were willing to risk a prompt start.

J~. Molotov in his speech on the It~1i~n treaty indicated

clearly that the Soviets intended to exclude the Western Powers from

Danubian trade and stated that it Italy respected the most-favored

natiOn principle she would lone her freedom to the monopolistic capital

isu of the Western Powers.

As opposed to the above indications which suggest the possibility of -

aggressive Soviet intentions, it may be noted that:

1. We have as yet no information of any change in the Soviet

demobilization program. In tact, the latest indications are that it has

been slightly accelerated.

2. We have as yet no indications of any unusual. troop concen

trations, troop movements, or supply buildups which would normally pre

cede offensive military action.

3. We have had no indications of any warning to Soviet shipping

throughout the world.

i~. There appears to be no reason, from the purely economic

point of view, to alter our previous estimate that because of the ravages

of war, the Soviets have vital need for a long period of peace before

embarking upon a major war.

~. There are no indications that the Soviets have an operational

atom bomb.

In spite of the factors outlined ~=iediately above1 the Soviets might

conceivably undertake a concerted offensive through Europe and Northern

Asia on one or a combination of the following assumptions:

1. That a foreign war was necessary to maintain the present ~

leadership in power, in the face of se.rious internal, discontent.

a. There have been indications of discontent in the

Ukraine and in the Murmansk and other areas. There have been a ~.

of purges. The Soviet press, in appeals to the people for improvement, has revealed internal difflculties in many fields. The recent inauguration of a wide program of Mar~,st reindoctrination suggests a breaI~own in

discipline. However, we have no real. basis for evaluating the extent and

seriousness of such discontent or its potentialities for effective resis

tance to the present regime.

82
18. (Continued)

b. Although the people at the USSR are tired of war and

industrial production is down, the Party is probably still sufficiently

powerful to secure, throug~i propaganda, acceptance of further wax.

2. That in view of the strength of the Soviet forces in Northern

Asia and in Europe (as opposed to Allied forces) a sudden offensive sight secure these areas without much difficulty, and place the USSR in an in

pregnable economic and political position.

3. That the U.S. was war-wea.z~- and would not held out against a Lait accoli in 2 above.

14. That a combination of militaristic sarshals and ideologists

might establish ascendancy over Stalin and the Politbmo and decide ~on

a war of conquest.

a. Evidence to date, however, i~.cates that the Party dominates the military.

In weighing the various elements in this cosçlex situation the most

plausible conclusion would appear to be that, until there is some specific evidence that the Soviets are m~k1iig the necessary military preparations and dispositions for offensive operations, the recent disturbing develop nents can be interpreted as constituting no more than an intensive war of

nerves. The purpose may be to test U.S. detexwinatiou to support its ob

jectives at the peace conference and to sustain its commitnients in European

affairs. It may also be designed equally for internal consomption: to

hold together a cracking economic and ideological struct~ue by building up

an atmosphere of international crisis. However, with the Soviet diplomatic offerlsive showing signs of bogging dawn, the possibility of direct Soviet

military action or irresponsible action by Soviet satellites can not be

disregarded.

HOIT ~3. VA1~DENBE~

Lieutenant General, USi

83
19. Ludwell L. Montague, Memorandum for General Vandenberg,

Procurement of Key Personnel for ORE, 24 September 1946

(Typed transcript)

Transcribed l~ -\uly 1952 Souvenirs of JIC-CIG

by mawh for aL. :1

2L~ Septenber 19IL6

MEMORi~NDUM FOR G~ERAL VANDENBE~

Subject: Procurenent of Key Personnel for ORE

I. From the be~xining the cntcia]. problom in the develop

inent of an organization capable of producing high-level strategic

and national policy intelligence has been the procuroment of key

personnel qualified by aptitude and experience to anticipate

intelligence needs, to exercise critical jud~ient regarding the

material at hand, and to discern omergent trends. Such persons

are rare indeed and hard to caine by,. the recruithent of then is

necessarily slow, but their procurenent is essential to the

accainplishnent of our in.ission.

2. Whom Cm was set up the largest and strongest

intelligence organization in Washington was the Military Intelli

gence Service. If, in the course of domobilization, we had had

its full cooperation in recroitoent, we night now be in a far

better position to produce the sort of intelligence desired.

We have, indeed, received from 0-2 a considerable nunber of low- 4~,., ~

grade personnel which it was compelled to cull out through ~ ~

reductions in strength, but, in disappointing contrast to the ~ i.. .~ ~ attitudes of State and Navy, we have had no assistance and ~ some obstruction from 0-2 in the proeurenent of key personnel. ~ ~

~ ~

In consequence the Inte].ligence Division, WDGS, which had most m~ to contribute to ORE in this respect, has made the least contrib~. ~ tion Qf axw agency, and we have been compelled to use not-so- ~3 well qualified Naval officers in positions which could have

been appropriate~ filled from 0-2.

3. We have made repeated attompts to secure the cooperation

of 02 in this matter, without success. We have been unable

to obtain either nominations on general requisition or the

assignment of specified individuals. Two cases illustrate thern

attitude we have encountered.

a. We sought the assignment of Dr. Robert H. McDowell,

reputedly the outstanding intelligence specialist on the

Middle East, to Ore, where his capabilities would be

available to the caimnon benefit of the three Departnents.

After long evasion and, we understood, an eventual agree

ment to release bin, 0-2 refused to do so on the ground

4LSo fii~8 s..

00G090

85
19. (Continued)

__

that he was too valuable to be spared. If every Department

took that atU.tude, ORE could never be properly staffed.

State and Navy have released at least sane individuals ithan

they considered their best.

b. We sought the assignment of Lt. Col. David S.

Crist, who was on duty, not in 0-2, but in ACC Rumania.

His reassignment, however, had to be arranged through

0-2, which, on learning of his availability, gnabbed hæm

for itself. The 02 at~.tude was that as long as he

remained in the Aninj he must serve (against his will) in

0-2. He could cone to GIG only by exercising his opti.on,

as a Category IV officer, to leave the service. But when

Crist actually reached Washington he was warned in 0-2

that he had better not sign up with GIG, even as a civilian.

~. As long as this attitude persists GIG will not only be

handicapped in recruiting properly qualified key personnel for

ORE, but the Intelligence ~.vision of the War Department General

Staff will never be properly represented in ORE, to its dis

advantage as well as our own.

LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE

Acting Depity Asst. Director

Research and Evaluation

86
20. Vandenberg, Memorandum for the Assistant Director for

Special Operations Donald Galloway], Functions of the

Office of Special Operations, 25 October 1946 (Signed draft)

V ~ .~

.~ I~!:! ~~t!~L! t

~~.~, .::

~ .~ fl~ I

~A ~- ~ ~

~oc~ur~ont j~

~MORJJDDM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL OP~LTI0~ C1~L. j~c~2~c:~:.

-~-~ v-i~~

CC)~: ~

SU&JECT~ Functions of the Office of Special Operations fli~to.i~1 Zt~.f2.

Name : ~

Date: IgIA~d~~L ~

1. The Office of Special Operations will function in accordance with

the following policies:

a. The mission of the Offioe of Special Operations is the conduct,

under the direct supervision of the Director, of all organized Federal espionage

and counterespionage operations outside the United States and its possessions

for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the

national security. Such espionage and counterespionage operations may involve

semiovert and semicovert activities for the full performance of the mission.

The issistant Director for Special Operations will be directly

re6ponsible to the Director of Central Intelligence for carrying out the

missions assigned him, for the security of operational material and methods

and for the collection of secret foreign intelligence information required

the Office of Collection and Disseniinat~on and other user departments and

agencies.

o. The Office of Special Operations will coordinate its field

collection activities with other agencies of the Central Intelligence

charged with comparable functions.

d. All intelligence information collected by the Office of Special

Operations will be put in usable form, graded as to source and reliability, and

delivered as spot information to the Office of Research and Evaluation or to

other departments and agencies whenA~~c4~L~u.Qa–Q4.. The Office of Special

Operations will carry out no research and evaluation functions other than those

CONFIDENTIAL TfiD~e~~PET,

CO~1IDEN1~L~t -

-.

.

.

Ers~b~rOA~ ~oôu~~

87
20. (Continued)

pertaining to counterespionage

~TOP~SEC1iE1.

intelligence and to the grading

-

of source and

reliability.

e. In order to provide a basis for grading future intelligence in

formation to be collected by the Office of Special Operations the information

collected will be carefully screened by the Office of Research end Evaluation.

The latter office will render a periodic report indicating the intelligence

value of information obtained in each area of operations.

f. Ordinarily requests for specific information will come from the

State, War, Navy and other deparbnents and agencies through the Office of

Collection and Dissemination, where it will be determined that the Office of

Special Operations is the proper agency to collect the desired information.

Eowever, the Office of Special Operations is authorized to receive directly

from user departments or agencies requests for a specific action or the

eollection of specific information when such requests are clearly within the

sphere of activity of the Office of Special Operationa and the particular type

of desired information (or action) ni.ke such direct contact necessary for

security reasons. Such direct oontac~ will be made through the Office of Con

trol, Special Operations, and corresponding offices in the various departhOnts

and agencies. The Office of Special Operations will maintain direct liaison

with depai-bnente and agencies of the Federal Government on secret operational

matters, biawledge of which must be restricted to the minimi~ number of persons.

The Office of Special Operations will be responsible for the

collection, processing, and distribution of forei~i counterespionage intelligence

information and will be the repository for such information. Intelligence

derived from the prooessing of foreign counterespionage intelligence information

wi].1 be made available to

-

the Office of Research and Evaluation.

88
20. (Continued)

Chief, ICAPS

ik~ai.

p ~

~

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~

~ Ii

~-at1 t!1

~plrvr~rMTtkL..

~j%J~H il)LPI I IttL

2. Major support services for the Office of Special Operations will be

provided by the Special Projects Division, Personnel and Administrative Branch

of the ~ecutive Staff, Central Intelligence Group, under the operational

direction of the Assistant Director for Special Operations.

3. In carrying out the policies stated above operational security re

quirements will be strictly observed by all concerned.

EO?~ VA1~E~RG

I.ieutenant General, USA

Director of Central Intelligence

Assistant Director for Special Operations:_______________________

e&E~

~Iil iW~~ ~i~i* L

89

21. CIG Intelligence Report, 16 December 1946 (Ditto copy)

CENTRAL INuLrE~3cE GROW~

II~1TEWC~EUCE REPORT

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SOURCE

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The foilcuing rej~ort foUoee a diaeuoolon of th. lend u4foru by a Geiwan

engineer aid a Eneetan oolcnelt

The Run~infl oonoeded that the lend refore had above no reenit. out that

agr~oultuml production had nook ~er7 greatly but atoted that the ereation

of enoU faron era not the god of the Rueninno. Dathei~ thdr eta ~u to

iutitnte a uyetea of aoUootivn faming, ,bioh eta e,tpeoted to fcUor the

bre&cdnen of the mail fare (an nna,ot4ablo aoimeç*nce of the great

ehortago of agr3.aultura.3. irspiesnenta). hi, plane fur eoueetiet faredeg have already been erde and are epeeted to be carried cot e~thrr the end of

th~ n~~tt ber,eut. inked i,hether conrernion to ooilootive fhrudng roula

not eriate a problun by freeing a large ntuæior of agriculturel workers

bocaueu o~ the anter ore of etehhiery, the Rueetan smeared that ether

poenibflitiosi aould be feimd, ainco Itneeta in a3no.ye~ in need of eanpovar.

LUths /1~763

Dates )ly,

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ICPPJA

COIJI11~Y ~xa~s~4~uaoion Zone

If4FO. ~2 October 19.%6

SUBJECT ~eot~ Revolt of the LcM llofom 1)1ST. 16 1)~oejsbsr 1946

ORIQIN óernensy

!op uouucc

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50~

PMES

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4

91
22. Donald Edgar, Memorandum for the Executive to the Director

Edwin K. Wright], An Adequacy Survey of The Adequacy

Survey of the CIG Daily and Weekly Summaries as it was Pre

pared by OCD on 9 December 1946, 2 January 1947

.CGONfID~

~)W2LUW11AL~

2 January 19b7

M~1ORANDUM FOR THE ~flIVE TO THE DIRECTOR

Subject: An Adequacy Survey of the The Adequacy Survey of the GIG

Daily and weekly Summaries as it was Prepared by OCD on

9 December 191.6.

1. A. reading of the COD document shows:

a. The daily was variously criticized for the selections, the f~Lineas of detail, the lack of proper identification of

persons mentioned, the lack of high-lighting, etc.

b. The weekly was.variously criticized for the selections,

its overlong items, lack of synopses, etc.

c. The ~G Special Reports were nn~niw~ue2,y complimented.

I)espite a end ~, the general tenor of the paper is toat the

situation is good.

2. The Lids to A~ralLeÆ~raakes a very sigeificant comment:

It appears that the concept of the summaries has changed somewhat

since their beginning. Orig~U7 they were intended primarily to

keep the President informed and secondarily for the information of the

Secretaries of State, lar and Navy. Now, in view of the dissemination

~.ven to the summaries, it seems they are desi~ied as much for the

information of p1~TmeTa as for the President.

3. I believe that what all those persons interviewed, or almost

all, are trying to say, without in some instances knowing it. themselves,

is that GIG is i~Hng an unsuccessful attempt to meet with one series

of intelligence papers the intelligence requirements of officials,

rpnlr ng from the President of the United States of America down to

winor officexs on pertinent area desks in State, G-2, ONI, and A-2~.

L The art of writing to meet meat successfully the requirements

of a specific individual is eracting and d~nd~ an intimate knowledge

of that persons reading habits, his interests, intellectual capacity

and back~onnd, his activity in the field related to the manuscript, and his need for (1) operational data, and (2) informational or

collateral data.

. Obviously, it is impossible even for the competent drafters

in ORE to meet these demands in one paper destined to so diversified

a subscriber list.

CONFIDENTIAL

93
22. (Continued)

J~i~J~,k~II1 A

6. In his capacity as G-2 to the President, the Director of

Central Intelligence should present ouxrent intelligence in a form to

meet the Presidents personal recpzirements. It should be so succint

and vital that it is automatically and without hesitation placed before

the President by his Aides as delivered by dO. To insure this, it mast

not be overwritten: only those abbreviations should be uaàd which he

mill recognize inatantly~ only those proper nanleà should be used which

he will identity readily. The President cannot be e~ected to identity

an unidentified 1Heath (see No. 236, item 3) ~ or Irgün Zuai. Leuni

responsibi].ity (see No. 237, item S)~ or ~IT0 and PICLO (see No. 238, item 14); or ~mi4 isky (see No. 239, item 14). (These are from the,

first four dailies I picked up.) Only when he is personally h~~wfl1 ng

a subject should ~re than trends be reported. The exceptions, of

course, are fire alarm developments.

7. The President a own intelligence paper cannot be underwritten.

The Presidents time for the reading of inteUigence is too limited to

e~ect him to wade through even one of the items of the several in, any

given weekly p~er unless it is presented to him in the must category

by the DCI. Presented in the present manner is, in my opinion, a

guarantee that he will read none.

8. The sane considerations are present in drafting intelligence

for NIL ~bers, lAB members, and all down the line. In the field of

personal briefing sauce for the goo~is not sauce for the gander. In

fact, no epicure ever agreed to the adage even in the culinary field.

9. dO, to justify its existence, must establish a reputation of

doing outstanding werk in at least one intelligence field. That field

has been indicated by the NIL as the supplying of strategic and national

policy intelligence to the President and the NIL members.

10. CIG should prepare a daily statement of current intelligence

for the President, written for the President and for the President

alone. It should contain the foreigu intelligence he should have to

meet his responsibilities as President of the United States of ~nerica.

It should be written in a torn to make it distinctly the Presidents

and it should vary as the Presidents interests and activities vary.

A. careful analysis of the official and press reports of the ~ite House

and State Department press conferences mill give good guidance for

determining these interea~ and activities. If the President is

personally active, such as he we.s in the PalestinO problem, the daily

mmmary should be heavily weighted in that subject and in all subjects

bearing thereon. If there is a keowh disagreement betwe~n Cabinent

officers and/or high ren~d~ng officers on 8 subject which may eventually

require presidential solution, material related thereto should be

inc]nded. Needless to say in these cases the greatest objectivity is

vital.

2

-

94
22. (Continued)

VW~IIML.I~1Ut~L,

OONFID~IILL

11. Nothing should be included which cannot be classified as

must reading for the President personally.

12. It should always be remembered that any policy paper being

subeitted by one of the departments for presidential consideration

is ful2,y supported by ~itten argtiments setting forth the ori~.nating

departments reasons for recommending the proposed action. CIG

intelligence reports should, therefore, be designed, not to duplicate

nor overlap this type of material, bet to supply the President in

advance ~.th the broadest background so that he mill not feel, that

he is approaching an unhaomu problem. To accomplish this, great

selectivity is necessary. ~eat selectivity is dangerous, but the

danger must be run.

13. In addition to his responsibilities to the President, the

DCI has a responsibility to the Secretaries of State, ~ar and Navy.

In fulfilling this responsibality he should insure that all intelli

gence affecting the operations or development of policies by those

Cabinent members i~ made available to them uthether it comes from

State, War or Navy sources or not. The sane exacting standard of

presentation, i.e., direct writing ~. tixiut ove~writing and without

underwriting should obtain at this the Cabinent level. And it is

possible that eventually a special service for the directors of

intelligence of the four agencies should also be developed. In

addition, the directors should receive for their information ti at their

Secretaries have received and the Secretaries should receive for their

information what the President has received.

lii. In view of the recently expressed determination by the ~War

and Navy Departments that they must be free to develop their own

evaluations in the production of their departmental or staff ictelli

genes, dO should insure the receipt by War and Navy of correlated

intelligence information to facilitate their ucrk. I believe that

dIG could best serve in this field by discontinuing its present

weekly paper which serves all men and therefore none, and łubsti

tuting for it a weekly paper which is a correlation and summation

of developments of the past week with a M~rni~ of interpretation:

a weekly history.

15. This mi~it well be supplemented by periodic revision of

situation reports on the various strate~.c areas of the world. If

these were reviewed, corrected and brought up to date periodically,

possibly monthly, and were sapplied for reference perpo ~ to the

pertinent agencies a long felt need would be met. They could be

as full as the requirements of the several agencies might indicate

and would, probably vary as the strateg~.c importance of areas

varied. This series might include situation reports on specialized

sub3ecti as well as areas. To develop some sort of production

progrem in ORE which might overcome the complaints of the working

levels there, each branch might be required to produce a situation

report on .it8 area. or subject each month in the expectation that

such reports would be read regularly only by specialists in the

CONFIDENTIAL

95
22. (Continued)

I

OO~NTI~L

several departments but that they would be available to the hi~er

levels for ready reference as and Wien required either to check

against departmental intelligence or to supplant it. Special

supplements should, of course,. be written as required.

16. The above, in my opinion, covers the fields of current

intelligence and that mi~it be described as national policy intelli

gence, the former perhaps being also one form of national policy

intel]igencs.

17. To complete its sc.ssion, GIG should maintain uptodate

fact books on all strategic areas of the *,rld. A proposed program

in this field (the development of national intelligence digests) ham

been discussed by the lAB and need not be treated in detail here.

Our internal problem in meeting what i,ill apparently be our re

sponsibility is the development of an administrative program of

approach which might be as follows step by step:

a. The development of an outline which will insure the

meeting of the requirements of the several agencies.

b. The collection of all basic intelligence handbooks

whether prepared by the American (bvernnent, by the British, the Germane, the Japs, or others.

c. The brea1~.ng do~i of these ertant handbooks and the

reallocation of the material thus obtained to the American

outline.

d. The determination af those sections of the outline

which are not thus fleshed out and the preparation of collection

requests to fill these blanks.

A constant review of newly acquired intelligence

information to determine whether the handbook material should be

revised, corrected,or brought up-to-date. This is a~ continuing

process and no handbook should be considered as a finished

product. Therefore, handbooks should have a loose leaf design

permitting easy revision of meall sections. This design also

permits the easy creation and distribution of email operational

handbooks on special subjects merely by assembling selected

pages.

t. Upon determination by CIa of the need for revision,

agreement should be reached with the pertinent agency as to whether

revision will be made by GIG or by the agency.

14

3JUI~I iin.a4 LUlL

96
22. (Continued)

) wi, v~r~ u w~

18. If properly selected personnel is available to do the above

three primary taa~cs, i.e., (1) current intelligence; (2) situation

reports, and; (3) basic intelligence, they should be sufficiently

conversant with their specialized fields to be available for such

specialized oral. briefings as mi~it be required from time to time

for any and all purposes.

t~r~r...diaat4~g

~sad. $~r1mg--St~t

97
23. CIG, Office of Reports and Estimates, ORE 1/1, Revised

Soviet Tactics in International Affairs, 6 January 1947

1v~~ L.f ..~

1~.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

REVISED SOVIET TACTICS

IN ThF~ERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ORE. 1/1

ut~ e.:~* ~

~ rei~tee thio* t~ ~I$~(~CL~ ~r~i~ ~o~

thi~ ~s~trA1 IntcUi~i~ ty7.

N

___

r

6 January 1947

31

COPY- NO.______

99
23. (Continued)

ORE 1/1

6 January 1947 COPY NO. 31

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

REVISED SOVIET TACTICS

IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Indications of a Change in Soviet Tactics

1. The USSR has apparently decided that for the time being more

subtle tactics should be employed in implementing its basic foreign

and military policy (see ORE 1, dated 23 July 1946). Recent develop

ments indicating this decision include:

a. Soviet concessions ori the Trieste Issue.

~. Soviet acceptance of the principle of tree n~vigation on

the Danube.

c. Soviet agreement in principle to international inspection

of arme~nents and to eliminate the veto in the work of the contem

plated atomic and disarmament comaissions.

d. Indications of substantial reductions in Soviet occupa

tion forces.

~. Failure of the .USSR to render effective support to Azer

baijan.

~. Agreement of the Security Council to investigate respons

ibility for disorders on the Greek frontier.

g. Relaxation from former extreme positi.on, of interpreting

abstention as a veto to meaning not an expression of a veto.

ii. Agreemeht to have Foreign Ministers Deputies meet in

London before~ the forthcoming Moscow Conference to draw up draft

treaty for Austria and Germany.

Cox~siderations Conducive Toward a Change In Tactics

2. There are a number of considerations, both international and

domestic, which appear to have convinced the Kremlin of the desirabil

ity of a temporary change of course.

100
23. (Continued)

t)

3. International considerations in estimated order of importance

include:

a. The firm policy of the Wdsiern Powers, especially the US;

the realization that a further expansion of Soviet control in Eu

rope cannot be.accoinplished by force without risk of war; and the

desire to placate the US and the UK in order to encourage a relax

ation of Western vigilance, to strengthen the hand of Western ad

vocates of a conciliatory policy toward the USSR, and to obtain

economic aid from the West for, sorely needed rehabilitation.

I. The benefits to the USSR from a reduction in its occupa

tion forces. With effective control over Sovietdominated areas

in Europe established to the nmximun extent possible at present,

the USSR can afford to reduce its present excessive occupation

forces, especially in view of the increased mechanization of the

remaining troops. A reduction in occupation forces would have

the following benefits:

(1) Release of additional nmnpower sorely needed for the

Soviet internal economy.

(2) Reduction of antagonism throughout the world.

(3) Alleviation of a nm.jor cause of popularhostility

toward the Contniniet Parties in occupied areas where local

elements have been disillusioned and alienated by ruthless

Soviet reparations policies, the conduct of Soviet troops

and the burden of subsisting these troops.

(4) A basis for attempting to induce further reductions

of occupation forces by the Western Powers. The USSR will,

undoubtedly use any drastic reduction in its occupation forces

to support a campaign of diplomacy and propaganda to secure

further reductions in the occupation forces of the Western

Powers. Proportionate reductions by all of the Allied Powers

would have the net effect of etrengthening the Soviet Unions

relative position on the Continent. Once the occupation

forces of the US and the UK have been reduced, there is small

chance that they could be readily increased again. The USSR,

on the other hand, is in a position to move troops into and

out of the areas under its control with relative ease and

secrecy. It is likewise in a position to conceal the pres

ence. of its troops abroad by infiltrating them into satel

lite armies and police forces, and by settling ~them as

civilians~ in occupied areas, ready for mobilization on

short notice.

-2-

101
23. (Continued)

0 ___

c.. The USSR~s need of support. at international gatheringA

from the smaller nations outside the Soviet bloc which hAve. re

cently been aligning thenEelves with Anglo-American. positions in

opposition to arbitrary Soviet tactics.

a. Net advantages to the USSR of general disarmament among

the.najor powers. The,realization of a general disarnmznent pro

gram would result in a decided relative advantage to the ~oviet

Union. Whereas the Western Powers derive their military strength

from extensive navies, strategic air forces and intricate Modern

weapons, that of the USSR La still essentially based on mess land

armies. Once reduced, therefore, the war potential of the West

would require years to restore, while that of the USSR would be

substantially restored merely by the remobilizing of IT~npower.

4. Domestic factors which would have equal weight in producing

a temporary change in Soviet tactics are:

a.. Internal economic conditions. The condition at Soviet

agriculture is undoubtedly ~erious, with critical shortages in

some vital foods., while certain basic industries are failing to

meet the quotas prescribed by the Fourth FiveYear Plan. As a

result, the Kremli~n may have been forced to revise its estimate

of the proportions o~ the national economy which could be di

verted to military purpOses, because the isinediate needs of the

USSR, particularly the devastated areas, have exceeded what it

~s reasonable to plan for industry to produce.

~. Civilian morale. There Ł.xe increasing signs of apathy,

and even unrest, among the Soviet populace. Shortages in food,

housing, and consumer goods have created widespread dissatisfac

tion. The vigorous campaign of ideological cleansing indiôates.

the concern with which the Kremlin views the situation.

c. Morale among former occupation troops. The occupation

has furnished a large number of Soviet citizens with their first

opportunity to view the outside world. The bourgeois tleshpots

of Germany, Austria, and the Balkans have produced disillusion

ment, a reluctance to return to the USSR, and a substantial num

ber of desertions. Demobilized occupa.tIon troops are spreading

the infection throughout the USSR, which is probably an inportant

~element in current domestic dissatisfaction. The large-scale

The Department of State considers this sentence too strong because

it implies that these conditions are rather prevalent. C.I.G. and

the War and Navy Departments, however, consider that these condi

tions are indeed prevalent.

3

102
23. (Continued)

occupation has thea constituted a breach in the barriers, which

guard the. Soviet people from foreign ideology and infori~tion,

andwhich are BO essentia]. to the i~ir~tenance of the Kremlina

control. .

Probable Future Tactics

.5. In view of the foregoing considerations, Soviet leaders must

have decided upon a temporary breathing space for the purpose ot eco

nomic and ideological rehabilitation at hameand the consolidation of

positions abroad. We believe,, however, that the Kremlin has not .

abÆn

doned any of its long~range objectives descri6ed in (~E 1, but that.

these objectives will now be pursued where expedient by methods more

subtle than those .of recent months. Such methods will include:

. Continued efforts to gain political and economic control

of Germeny, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Korea, by cer

tain characteristiàal].y Soviet, techniques, which would not neces

sitate the presence of large Soviet, military forces-.. Such tech

niques consist of the popular front, or coalition, political

strategy,. under~ which relatively weak Cosmunist parties merge

with and gain control of leftist and liberal organizations;.in

filtration, by Moscow agents or local Connninists, into key gov

eminent positions, especially police, judicial, military, prop

aganda, and educational agencies: the liquidation by local

Conmiunist parties of all native elements which might be expected to oppose the Soviet program; and the stripping or expropriation

of key industrial plants and the establishment of elaborate car

tel systeum, giving the USSR control of vital industry.

~. Intensification of militant Conmiunist activity in Euro

pean areas outside.of the present Soviet sphere, aimed at produc

ing Coninunist. or Communistcontrolled governments by legal or

revolutionary means in such countries as France, Italy, Spain, and Greece. .

~. Political and economic penetration in the Middle East, Far East, and Latin America.

~,. Elaborate campaigns of propaganda and diplommcy designed

to convince the world of the USSRs peaceful Intentions, and to

promote. disarnament and pacifism abroad.

~. An intensive longrange program to develop the war poten

tial of the USSR, concentrating especially on the expansion of

basic industries, on th~e secret development of new weapons, on

the acquisition of infornmtjon on secret military developments in other countries, and on reducing the vulnerability of Soviet

industry to attack by atom bombs, rockets, etc.

103
23. (Continued)

Ta~~.fl

Promotion of discord and unrest in the ca~italiat cowl

tries, especially by seizing any Opporttuilt,ies offered by per

iodic economic crises and unemployment, which the Soviets con

fidently predict for the near future.

ConclusioflŁ

~6. Recent developments have confirmed previous estinstes that

~.he USSR did not intend and was not in a position tO engage in inmie

diate military conquests. Its ultin~te.action will depend upon future

developments in the Soviet Union and in the outside world. Meanwhile,

the USSR is seeking to consolidate Its positions abroad and to improve

its econou4c and psycholog~ca]. position at home, while encouraging dis

arnminent and, pacifism in the rest of the world.

7. Soviet tactics, however, will renm.in flexible and opportunis

tic. The Kreml.th has never relied exclusively on any single line of

action. Rather, its tactics are based on the interplay of twO Æppar

:ent].y. conflicting courses, international collabbration and unilateral

aggression, and on its ~ability. su4denly to shift from one to the other.

This technique seeks to achieve nmximum surprise for each new mOve,

and to promote such confusion and uncertainty among the opposition as

tO prevent the development of any long-range counterstrategy. Thus,

in view of theconsiderationsdeacrjbed in the preceding pages, new

tactics of compromise and conciliation have been adopted merely as a

natter of expediency.. They will be employed oniy in those situations

where they are deemed to further Soviet foreign and military policy

as described in ORE 1.

.

5

104
24. WaIter L. Pforzheimer, Memorandum for the Record,

Proposed Legislation for C.I.G., 28 January 1947

(T~tped transcript)

Transcribed ~JuJy 1952 f

L~, C ~.

1.

-t~-~

-~ M~GER

~

EL (Natior~a1

by mawh for .. /1. cf Security Act of 19147)

~3 ~/94/7

~, ~z~(4) MFMORP~JM ~)R THE RECORD /~ ____~ ~)

aibject: Proposed Legi~s1atior~ for C.I.G.

Sanetine shortly after 1600 hourŁ on 22 January 19L7, a copy

of the proposed National Defhose Act of 19147 was delivered to the

Director of Central Intelligence for conunent on those sections

applicab]e to bin. Imnediate review of the int~1ligence sections

indicated that they had been lifted virtual2y verbatim fran s-201414, the Merger Dii]. introduced into the 79th Congress by Senator Thcenas.

These provisions are considered unsatisfactory to C.I.G. in many

respects. The salient features of disagreanent are included in the

flanorandian fran the. undersigned to the Director of Central Intelligence,

dated 23 Jazmaxy 19147, subject: Proposed Bill –or National Defense Act

of 19147.

A conference with the Director established the policy that an

attenpt should not be made to renove fran the Defense Act all but a bare

mention of the Central InteUigonoe Agency, and introduce a separate CIG

Bill. The Director also indicated hil desire to have included a provision

that he would serve as the advisor to the Council on National Defense

on matters pertaining to intelligence, and that in this capacity he would

attend a].l meetings of the Council. It was agreed that the Director

should take no part in the decisions of thO Council as this was a policy

mald.ng body, and it had lông been agreed that Central Intelligence should

not be involved in policy making.

At 1000 hours, 23 January 19147, a conference was held in the ofi~Lce

of Mr. Charles S. Murphy, Administrative Assistant to the President, at

~thich General Vandenberg, Vice Admiral Forrest Shennan, Major General

Lauris Norstad, the undersigned, and Mr. Houston were present. Mr.

Murphy stated that the subject was new to him, as he had firSt entered

the picture on 20 January 19147 and was charged with the over-all drafting

of the White House version of the National Defense Act. He stated that

he did not know that a proposed CIG enabling Act had been suhaitted to

Mr. Cliffords offiCe. He suggested (cOncurred in by all present) that

the draft of the proposed CIG enabling act be substituted for the

intelligence sections of the proposed National Defense Act as an initial

world.ng basis.

In connection with paragraph 1 (a) of the manoranduin for the Director

fran the undersigned, dated 23 January 19147, it was pointed out that no

mention Of a CIA had been siŁcle in the title of the proposed bill. This

was due to the fact that a considerable nunber .

of boards and councils were

created by thin bill and none of than were .bcing nanOd in the title. There

fore, it would not seen appropria~e to mento~ CIA~ the title. In this

General Vandenberg concurred. ~.dOC~t ~

approved for release tbrough

the BIST~ICAL ~w PROGRAM of

_______

the Centp~ Intelligsne. Agency.

JHS/Iic-~.~~c-~J 000117 ~p b1~2

105
24. (Continued)

In connection with paragraph 1 (b) of reference memorandum, it was

agreed to make sane mention of centralized intelligence in the declaration

of policy in the proposed bill. This suggestion had strong support fran

Admiral ~iennnn, a].thougli it was initially thought by the others present

that it might prove cumbersane. V.

in connection with paragraph]. (c) of reference menoranthsn, it was

felt that this suggestion was non-controversial and that the appropriate

definitions would be acceptable. V

In connection with paragraph 1(d) of reference memorandum, General

Vandenberg stated that he was strongly opposed to the Central Intelligence

Agency or its director participating in policy decisions on any matter.

However, he felt that he should be present at meetings of the Council.

To this Genera]. Norstad voiced serious exceptions, as he felt that the

Council was already too big. He thought that the Director shOuld not

even be present as an Observer, as this bad proven to be cumbersane and

unworkable at meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Sherman

suggested, however, that the Director should normally be present at

meetings of the Council, in its discretion. Genera]. Vandenberg concurred

in this, as did General Norstad, and it was accepted with the additional

proviso that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also attend meetings at the

discretion of the Council. V V

General Vandenberg indicated the difficulties which he had had in

having to go to the N.I.A. on so max~r problems. He felt that the diffi

oulties of his position would be multiplied, as he would have to ask

policy guidance and direction fran V

the Council on National Defense, which

consists of malv more members than the N.I.A. He was assured that the

intent of the act was that the CIA would operate independently and cane

under the Council only on such specific measures as the Council may, fran

time to tine desire to direct. V

It would not be necessary for the agency

to ask continual, approval fran the Council. With this interpretation,

General Vandenberg withdrew the opposition voiced in the last sentence

of paragraph 1 (e) of reference memorandum. V

V

~Ibe Director pointed out the difficulties of operation of clandestine

methods in the absence of detailed legislation, empowering him to operate

on unvouchered funds, select certain types of. personne]., and discharge

employees for any question of possible disloyalty. It was agreed that

these provisions wOuld be included in the proposed draft fran CIG. It

was requested further that this draft be sit~iitted ~ evening of the V

23 January 19147, in order to meet necessary deadlines.

It was the final sense of the meeting ~t the Director of Central

Intelligence should report to the Council on National Defense. As General

Vandenberg indicated that it would be necessary to report. somewhere; that

neither the President nor he was ansious to have another agency free wheeling

around the goveranent. However, it was thought that the agency should have

sufficient power to perform its owa functions without it being necessary to

have specific approval fran the Council on each action.

2 V

V

106
24. (Continued)

3~T7LAb~

The proposed draft of the National Defense Act of :19147 was modified

by the undersigned, with the assistance of Mr. Houston, to include the

changes discussed at the meeting, and to incorporate the necessary

provisions of the proposed CIa enabling act. Copies of the revised act

were personally handed to Admiral ~ennan and General Norstad by. Lt.

Botsford shortly after 1700, 23 January 191i7. A copy was also handed to

Mr. Murphy by the undersigned at l7l~, A copy of NIA Directive $ was

shown to Mr. Murphy. It was not left with bin, duo to the absence of

any security in his office. Mr. Murphy suggested the addition of a

paragraph providing for the dissolution of~ NIA and CIG, and the transfer

of its personnel, property, and records to the Agency. This was concurred

in Ofl 214 January 19147 by the undersigned, after one or ~o minor changes.

On 2S January, t1~e undersigned talked with Mr. Murphy, and was

informed that all but the barest mention of CIA would be anitted, as the

drafting coanittee thought that the material suhoitted by CIa was too

controversial and might hinder the passage of the merger legislation.

It had been felt by the drafting canmittee that the substantive

portions of the proposed CIG draft were too controversial and subject to

attask by other agencies. It was further felt that the General Authorities

were rather controversial fran a Congressional point of view, but that

dO might justify then in their own bill if they had the tine to present

then adequately. It was further felt that if detailed intelligence le&.s lation was included in the merger bill, CIG might not have tine to present

their ~d.cture to the Congress in detail in the course of the hearings.

The undersigned asked~ Mr. Murphy whether the elinination of CIA fran

merger le~.s1ation consti~ited permission to suhoit our own enabling act

as a canpanion measure. He stated that he could not co~mnent on this, as

he was authorized (with his drafting cosmd.ttee) only to draft the merger

bill, and could not approve or pass on other matters. Authority to draft

and introduce a CIA ~iab1ing Act would have to cane fran other sources.

The above information was trananitted to the Depity Director (Colonel

wright), who cabled General Vandenberg of the developasuts.

Colonel Wright ipOke with Admiral Leahy, to request information as

to whether Miu~phys position granted us a green light on our own legis

lation. The Admiral was inclined to agree. Be felt that we should delete

fran the draft the phrase ~&thject to emisting lawn (Sec. 302 (b)), as it

would only seru~e to can~Licate th:ings. We further felt that we should

then let the draft go through.

It was determined to .request that the position of Depaty Director be

included in the draft, the phrase mentioned in the preceding paragraph be

deleted, and an atteapt made to include a clm~se which would designate the Director as the Intelligence Advisor to the Council.

3

107
24. (Continued)

.

On 27 January 19b7, the undersigned drafted a letter, for the Deputy

IDirectors signature, to Mr. Charles Murphy. This letter set forth the

views of the Central Intelligence &aup on the draft of the proposed

section on central intelligence, suhaittee by the 1~ite House on 2S Januaxy

l91~7. After studying the manoran&an of 27 January l91~7, Mr. Murphy called

the undersigned and requested a concurrance on elininating paragraph 302 (b)

of his draft of 2~ January 19147, on the ground that in view of our

objections (as expressed in paragraph 2 of our manorandmn of 27 January 29147),

nothing would be lost by the total elimination of this paragraph. After

consultation with Colonel Wright, this concurrence was given by the under

signed. Concurrence was also given to the lowering of the proposed salary

for the Deputy Director, as set forth in paragraph 2. of our memorandum

of 27 January l91~7, from $114,000 per annum to $12,000 per anrum, as the

$114,000 figure was greatly in encess of the figure received by the

Assistant Secretaries of the various departments. In addition, Mr. Murphy

agreed to urge strong2y a point raised by paragraph 3 of our manoranthim

of 27 January 19147 designating the Director of Central Intelligence as

the Intelligence Advisor of the Council of National Defense (to be renaned

the National Security Council) and allowing the Director to sit as a

non-Toting member thereof.

Or 28 January 19147, Mr. Murphy requested the undersigned to come to

his office, and there handed him the Third Draft (dated 27 J anuazy 191i7)

of the p~oposed National Security Act of l9~&7. Mr. Murphy indicated that

most of our requests had not been complied with, and that the may and

Navy had seen fit to overrule his rØcasnandations in that connection.

The salary of the Director was lowered fran $l~,000 to $114,000 on the

~basis that, in all probability, the incumbent would be a military or

naval officer ~those salary should not be greatly in ~cess of that qf

the Chief of Staff of the Amay or Chief of Naval operations; that the

figure had been set on the basis of the sane salary being paid to the

Director of Military Applications of the Atanic ~er~ Commission; that

the .Ancy-Navy conferees did not want the salary merely a juicy plum

for sane officer for whom a berth was being seu~t.

The paragraph establishing the position of Deputy Director, which Mr.

Murphy had urged, was eliminated as being toa controversial, as was the

paragraph regarding the position of the Director as the Intelligence Advisor

of the Council The Anny-N avy conferees felt that the position of the

Director as the Intelligence Advisor was inherent ir the position itself,

and that it would not be proper to provide by law that the head of an

agency under the Council should sit on the Council.

Mr. Murphy stated that his role was simply that of a consultant on

drafting in the Avny and Navy. He further stated that the Drafting Committee

would present their final version to Mr. ~a.rk 14. Clifford, Special Counsel

to the President, at a meeting on the afternoon of 29 January 29147. He

further stated that ary caenents which we might care to make to the White

-14.-

108
24. (Continued)

.

I House on the proposed draft would be acceptable to him, and that his

feelings would not be hart.

After exauination of the proposed Third Draft by- Colonel Wri~it and the undersi~~ed, it was detem~.ned that sane was not satisfactory to C.I.G. Therefore, a manoranduin w~s dispatched (under date of

28 January 191&7) to Mr. Clifford, setting forth C.I.G. a comments on the

proposed draft.

WAL~ L. PFORZH~KER

Chief, Le~.slative Liaison Diviaion

-5

109

25. CIG Intelligence Report, 11 February 1947 (Ditto copy)

,i~ 1~-p

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CENTRAL INTELUGENCE GROUP

IHTEUJGENCE REPORT

U4~. 8 Yebuu.r7 I91&T

WASHING .~ius DISTIIBUT1CN usu~~G MUST ~

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Iii

26. National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIAs

9th Meeting, 12 February 1947

________

21

N.I.A. 9t~ Meeting

NATIO~JoL INT LIG~CE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 214,

Deportment of State Duilding

on Wednco~py. 12 Pobi~üöry 1947, crt ii:oo a.m

Secretary of Stote George 0. Marshall, in the Choir

Secretary of War Robert P. Pottorson

Secretary of the Navy games Forroetal

Ficet Admiral William D. Leahy,

Personal Representative of the President

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg,

Director of Contrel Intelligence

ALSO PRPS~T

Assistant Seoret~i-y of ~er Howard C. Petersen

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the

Secretary of State for Reseeroh and Intelligence Mr. H. Frcem~n Matthews, Depart~cnt of State

Captain Robert L. Dennison, U~ -

Mr. ~ames S~ Lay, rr., Central Intelligcnoe Group

SFCRET1.RI~.T

~, ~. S. ~rmcn, Acting Sec~ctary

~:omtot No

:lotbooptono$;.D

~ DeclitiNbd

Clom. Chaogid to: TS (.~ C

~4,xt Ra~Iew D.,~

Aotti.: HR 7~-3

DoteJ~Si~i.!9

-

~IA9thNccting - 1 -,

000032

_______

-

-

113
26. (Continued)

________ H

COORDINATIQ~1 CF INTEJ41G21~CE 4QTXVIt~3 Rfl.A~T? C

41m

To ~

?OPvnALJ~TIFs n ~

P

.

STCRflART PATTY!~RS0N gal a brief report on the present

stst~s of N,I~h. 6. He stated that, the Atomio)bàrgy commission

desired t retain three people to go ovcr inforantion oonteined

in the files to be trensferred to the Centrel Intelligence Group.

lie eel. that these three pEople were to search these flies to~

information pertain~ng to_urenjun deposits and suóh information

~wes to be retained by the Commiasion. Seeretory Petterson sug

gested theS 0.1.0. take up~ the mattcr pf the transfer of the

personnel wi.thMr. Lilienthel.

Uter 5QWC disousfloi, :HT.. :::~

tm. NATIONAL INTILLIGENCE AU~flOHITYc

Agreed to the !ransfer of the p~rsonnel

P ,

mentioned in:NflA; C en~ direotcd the

Director of Central Intelligeneato work

out the detei].s with Mr. LilionthØl.

(Trsnsfe~ subsequsntly oompleted on 18

February ~.947) P

RHEORT fl THE DIRECTOR OF d~TBE.L INTELLIGENCE

At Sseretery ?iarsh~Ils request, GI~TRAL VANDENBERG

steteØ that his lest report was rathc-r oonprÆhensivc in

pointing out the aooomplishments of 0.1.0. sinoe its inception.

However, this time he wished to report some of the diffieulties

encountered by 0.1.0. He said that before teking up these

difficulties be wished to point oute few ecoomplishments

reoentiy etfeetod byC.I.G.

qnwRa VLITDENEFRG said that whep it wes first egrcod

that the 0.1.0. teke over t~e s~tivitIssof the Federal Bureau

or Investigation in the South £~meriecn field, there was some

doubt es to whc.tber.Q.I.G. could ably ecoomplish this assign

ment. He hmntioned thet he had received a letter from

Ambassador Psuley which- commended the smooth tr~nsfer of these

setitities aoeomplished by the C.I.G. representstive etteohed

to his steff, Gonert~i Yandenbsrg also mentioned that Mr.

.~vaoæof the St&ta Department had, also stated that the

_9t6i4e~ting 2

114
26. (Continued)

a r L..k E-~.d

C.I.C.s rcpr6scntetivca who had re~1ełed the F.B.I. personnel

were of a particularly high typo. General Vondanberg brought

out the point that C.I.G. had a roving mission to check theso

newly assigned pcrsonnel in South J,merion end t~oir reports

indicated that they ~cro carrying out their functions in an

excmplcry nmnncr,

-

GI~ERi,L V~NDWB~RG than gave a brief report ~n

C~I.G.e monitoring of foreign broodgeate end atated

was now preparing to negotiate anewagreament with the Britta~

Broadcasting Corporation for bctte~ çxohango of materiel and

the future transfer of O~I.G.~e Oeiró Monitoring 8tation cover

ing the Middle Eaet from Cairo to Py~rus,

N~thrM~eting

~3~fl~R~L V.JD~2~B!Ro pointed out-tat 0.1.0. was 00cr,

dinating the exploitation of documents oofl.ected in the Far ~st

and that plane arc now being completed for similar exploitation

of documents from Burçpo.

115
26. (Continued)

D~ ~B~

SEVERAL VANDEVBERG stated he would now like to mention

some ofthe principal difficulties being encountered by C.I.G.

in its operations. He said that what-he believed to be essential

óoordination to reduoe duplication had been retarded by an tin

ceyteinty as to the directive authority of the Dircotor of

Central Intelligence. He said that the President specified that

the Director or Central Intelligen;ce shell ~for the coor

dine tion of such or the activities or the intelligenoe egcnoies

of the departments as relate to the national security end

xeeommend to the Netidnel Intelligence Authority the establish

ment or such ovcrell policies and objectives as ~tll assure the

most effective accomplishment of the netionel intelligence

miajion. (Paragraph 3 of PresidchtS letter of 22 ~Tenuary 1946,

emphasis added)

GEVERAL VLNDEN&rRG –urther stated that the Netioncl

Intelligence Authority specified that; Recommendotions approved

by this J.uthority will where practicable govern the intelligence

activities of the separete departments represented herein. The

members of the Intelligence Advisory Board will eech be respon

sible for insuring that approved recommendetians ere executed

-within their respective departments. (NIL Directive No. 1,

per. 4)

GEVP.RLL VANDEVBERG said thet the National Intelligence

Authority specified that: The Director of Central Intelligence

is hereby authorized epd directed to act fo~ this Authority in

-

cOordinating all federal foreign activities related to the

nstjonsl security to insure that the overall policies and oh.

jectives esteblished by th%e 4uthcrity are properly implemented

end executed. (NIA Directive No. 6, par. 3, emphasis added)

GEVERLVnNDFNBFRG pointed out that it was the feeling

of the agencies (Intelligence Advisory Board) thet the current

interpretetion of coordination wee by mutual agreement.

This placed the Director of Central Intelligence only in the

position of en executive sec~etery to the I.A.B. end thet he

did not believe this was what was contemplated by the N.I.A.

General Veadenherg then pointed out that in some instances it

.

VII, cthMteting 4

116
26. (Continued)

s

~

hod -taken six t6~ eight months to get agreement on a paper.

He stet4d tEnt in order to reotiry this he reoommonded that

the Director of Control Intelligence be considered as having

authority similor to that given to the Joint Roeearoh and

-

Development Board The J~oint Boaeeroh end Development Boerd

shall operate within its jurisdiction as an egenoy ofthe

seorataries of WarÆnd Navy and the necesBery authority is

hereby delegated by the Secretaries of War end Navy to the

Board so that its decisions, orders end directives shall be

consideJed as emanating from them and shall havo full force

end. effeot as such. (JRDB 1/1, 6 .Tune 1946, as amended 3

3~uly 1946)

GEniaL VLNDENBERG suggested that as en alternative -

to the above recommendation that C.I.G. forward its implementing

directives to the N.I.. members for subsequent iesuanoo from

their offices. However, such a ~raotice would be cumbersome

end involve a great loes of time on the part of all ooncerned

GBiIE~L VLNDR!BERG stated that the production of

strategic end national policy intelliganoa had been hindered

further by an uncertainty among the agencies as to its de

finition. In order to clarify this situction, C,I.G. hod

developed the following dcfinition, which he requested the

N.I.L. approve i Strategic and national policy intelligenes

is that composite intclligcnce,.interdepcrtmcntalin charac

ter, which is required by the President cud other high officers

and etaffe to essist them in determining policies with respect

to national planning and eocurity in peace end in war and for

the edvenoemeæt of broad notional poLicy. It is in thct

politicsleconomicmilitery area of concern to more then one

agency, must be~ objective, end must transcend the exclusive

competence of any one department.

GEnia.L W~ND~iJBE?G stated it was his understanding that

those parsons wha developed the plan for the creation of a

Central Intelliganda Group had in mind that the C,I.G. would

replace the roint Intelligence Committee. Tills, sd fec, hod

not tekcn place, nor had any working relationship been echieved;

tlil9thMeeting 5

117
26. (Continued)

further, thet r.I,0. continues to have responsibilities paret

Ileling those of 0.1.0., end until this is resolved, complete

coordination, effectiveness, end efficiency in the notional

intelligence mission con not be etteined. General Vandenberg

recommended thst J.I.C. beebolished, and that C.I.G. provide

the necessary intelligence to the ~oint Chiefs of Staff. He

said, however, he believed that some members of the J,C.S, hsd

steted that if this were done, it would lower the original

aencept of e Central Intelligence Group. General Vendcnberg

said it was difficult for him, in eppeering before epproprio

tion committees, to defend C.I.G.p request fOr funds sinoe

he *es constantly confronted with the quostiOn as to the amount

of overlap in intelligence. It was his understanding that

one of the principal tasks expected of the Director of Central

Intelligence was thereduction of such ovahep to an absolute

minimum.

GEFTELL VLNDflITBFRG stoted he would also like to point

out that when 0.1,0. went to the intelligence agencies of the

War end tZevy Departments for information, thOrc was constant

friction as to whether LI.C. or 0.1.0. should have priority.

In short, two agencies were asldng for the some type of intelli

gence but requested in a slightly different maimer. This

duplication was unnecessary and oqcupiad the time of personnel

which should be engaged in more productiVe intalligenea

activities.

&ECPETLRY FORRESTA.L then asked whether the. question

Of dissolutien of the r,i.c. and the assignment of its duties

to 0.1.0, had bean token up wi~th the--loint Chiefs of Staff.

Gn1EW~L VA.}IDfl~BERG -answered that he believed it had

through the I.i..8. members,

,i~. EDDY stated that he thought that it was important

now to abolish I..I.C. and to hove all interdepartmental intelli

gence under the 0.1.0. .

.

-

~a@c- DVQHLT

NL. 9th MOoting 6

118
26. (Continued)

p

Lfter

~

some discussion,

~

-

TEE ?TA.TIOWIL INPrILIGEITCF ~.1JTHORITY:

a. ~gracd that whilc they bclieved that the

3.I.C. should be abolished and its func~tions

assumed by C,I.G., they desired to withhold

decision until such time as it had been dis

cussed with tbe Yoint Chiefs~of Steff.

~. Noted that LdmiralLeehy~would take up

this matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

l.t Secretory Marshalls request, G~Th.L VLITD~TTBERG

then reread his first reoommendation.

SFCHFtEY P.TTFHSON stated that he sew no alternative

to the r.I.;.,.approving.this recommendation. He added, however,

that o proviso should ha insertcd in thereoommendatjoh to

allow any aggrieved agency to eppeal to the 1LI..~. through

that agencys respective Secretary.

GIEER.L V4JTDEVBFRG said it was realized that each

~agency hasthe inherent right to appeal through its ~espeetive

Seoretary any objection to a specific directive.

i,DHIRLL LLHY steted that he recommended approval,

but that he was i13 agreement with Sccret~ry Pattersons proviso.

SECRET.RY P~.TTERSCN rnised the question as to whether

General Vandenbergs reeornmendetion would involve C.I.G.

entering into the field of operntional intelligence or the,

agencies. ,

CE1TRJ. V..NDEVBERG stated that this was not the intent.

~. EDDY asked; if authority wee dalegeted by the,

~to the Director of Ccntrcl Intelligenoa that his

directives shall be considered as emanating from them, would

such authority ha interpreted to. ellaw the Direotor of Central

Intelligence to draft personnel from other egenoies to perform

specific jobs. .

GrER.I. VIJIDEDBERG stated that C.I,G. hŁd no intention

-

of interpreting thts authority as indicated by Hr. Eddy.

~weflr~1

1r~trWeti eg  7

119
26. (Continued)

-f

SEbBFtRYPIT~ERSOhT asked if 0.1.0. was contemplating

pedo~manding that some of? the intelligence manuals now pub

lished b~the int~liigonoe agencies of the State, War end Navy

Da~ertments be dis~ntinusd.

OrWELL V.VDEVEFBG stated he would like to have an

opportunity to look over these pubIioetio~ns bofore answering

this question.

SE-CBFPLRY FORRESTIL stst~d he believed that the proviso

to be added to General Vandenbergs reoommindetion under dis

cussion should rend along the following linesr Provided in

oases of. o~jeotidn to speoifio eotions,.- any aggrieved agency

may heve access to that sgenoyl-s Secretary and through him to

the N.1.Js..

MR. EDDY stated he assumed that any directives, before

being: issueq by 04.0.7 aould normally have hnd~ prior discussion

by the intelligenoc ;.dvisory Board..

GENFR.L V..PDENBERG oonoorrod. -

THE Ni.TI0IhL IZITEflIGEWCF J.TJTECRITYr C --

J.flroved the reoommcndntion~ ~the.t The Director

-

of Central IntelijÆenoc shell opejate within

his. jurisdio~ion as an agent of the Secretaries

Of State, War end thQ Navy, end the necessary

authority is hereby, dalegntcd by the Secretaries

of Stste,. War and the Novy t_the Director of -

Central Intclligence so thot his docisions,

orders a-nd directives shell be considered as

-

-

-

emanating from them and shall. have full fbyce -

-

and effect es, such, .providad any eggrieved -

-

agenoy may have acoe~s to that agcne~rs

Seoretsry ond through him tethe N.I.A.

Jt Seorotary)ffarshellts request, OrWELL V..NDENBFRG

thenl repeated his recommended definition of Strategic and

national policy intelligence. -

-

-

-

-Jitter some discussion, in-which General Vandenberg

pointed out the reason V~hy en approved definition of this term

__

-.

1311. gth-Meeting -

- s -

-

-

120
26. (Continued)

_________

was needed, -

THE NATIONAL INTZLLIGL7%CE AUTHORITY:

ApprâvŁd the followihg dâfinltión F Strategic

-

end national olióy intelligence is that coth

posite intelliginoa, interdØpertSntel ih

charaa~er, which is, requirea by the president

and other high officOre ant staffs to- assist

them in dater~ining policies with respect to

national planning and s~curity in peace end

in war end for the advancelent of broad

nationS). pOlicy. It is ii that political

economic-military area of -ocneern tQ more

then enS agency, must be cbjecti+e, arid

must transcend the exclusive competence -

of any one department.

SZCRflARY )EABSHALI~ stated that in a recant converse

tiOn Ccngressmn Taber was concerned from a sacurity stand

point with iSfateæce to appropriations for intelligence

ecftvitias. Sacratary Marshall further stated that Hr.

Taber bad said that it eppeered to huh that tOO thany people

had to be consulted in ccnsidarinE such appropriations.

Secretary Marshall went on tO atatathat ha believed the

best way to maintain proper security wa~ for the president

or the Secr~tsry of State to control these funds, and that

a request should be mSda for a fiSt apptoprieticp.

GENERAL VA1DENBERQ stated he had appeared recantly

before a joujit committee, which he was told betcra appearance

would consist of owOr five people.. Nowever,tijion azrivCl

ha found there weresctusliy twenty-two people present. -Ha

went on to state a subsequent meetin~ had bean oSlied and ha

would continua to be eareful of the inrorSticn presented.

Boweve, he ag~aad thSt aicurity cf intSlliganca oparetione

could, best be protected by funds which should be cOncealed

and appropriated in a lump sum control-),adl by One person.

-

__________

-

}i~ ~th Meeting

121

27. Montague, Memorandum for the Assistant Director, R & E

3. Klahr Huddle], Conversation with Admiral Foskett regard

ing the C.I.G. Daily and Weekly Summaries, 26 February 1947

26 ~bbruary 1947

?4E1~OR~NDUM FOR T~ ASSI$W1I~ DIRECTOR, R & .E

Subject: Conversation with .~idmira1 Foakett regarding the C.I .0.

Daily and Weekly S~mmaries

Reference: Memo, by Dr. VanSlyok, 19 February 1947

1. In disousaion with ma today Admiral Jbskett confirmed and

amplified the comments reported in Dr. VanSlyoke momornndua.

2. Mm. Foskett delivers the Daily S~miinary to the President

during the afternoon. Usually the President takes it with bin on

leaving his office and reads it during the evening. It carves as

the basis of his discussion of fore3.~ problems with Mm, Lea~r

the following morning.

3. The President considers that he peraonally originated the

Daily, that it is prepared in accordance with his own apecifica..

tiona, that it is well done, and that in its present form it satisfies

his requirements.

4. The President does not normally see any telegraphic material

which anticipates or duplioates the ooverage in the Daily. Ada.

Fbskett takes selected telegrams to him with t~ Daily in the after

noon and Ada. Leahy brings others in the morning, but these telegrams

normally refer to matters not treated in the Daily (e.g., operational

information).

5. The President reads the Daily, as marked by Mm. Foskett,

before seeing Ada. Leaky. Although Mm. Foskett marks certain

items as of particular interest, this is not intended to direct

the Presidents attention exclusively to than. The President

normally reads every item in the Daily with interest.

6. The marks seen on Ada. Leakys copies are not for the

President a guidance, bnt for the Admirals own ,oonveuienoe in

locating items to which he wishes to refer. Ada. Leaky seldom refers

tn report. indicating the development of situations previously dis

cussed. (Thin would explain a tendency we have noted to mark

marginal items instead of thosà reporting developments in apparent

ly more important situations.) Nevertheless, the Preaident desires

to be kept informed of developments in important oontLnuing situa

tions.

~~Tii~

123
27. (Continued)

7. Ada. Foskett considers that the Daily should not be too

closely screenedz within reasonable limitations of spaoe, it is

better to err on the side of being too inclusive than too exclusive.

In addition to considerations which we have discussed, ha points out that he and Ada.. Leahy, both in immediate daily attendance on

the President, normally differ in their selection of items to call

to his particular attention, eaoh with reason. (If such well-placed

authorities differ, how shall we make an exactly perfect selection.)

Reiterating that in neither case are their selections meant to be

exclusive,, he considers that we should provide them with a broad

in_itial selection, provided that each item should be of potential

interest to the President and that all together should not be so

rnmmroua as to overburden him.

8. Ada. Foskett was less definite with respect to the Weekly,

although he complimented its new format. After delivering it to

the President, he normally does not see or hear i~re of it, although he has heard some comment on particular items in it indicating that

the President do~a actually read it. (Dy the marks on Ada. Leaky a

copies we hoow that the Admiral has discussed certain Weekly articles

with the President.) It appears that the Weekly in its present

form is acceptable at the White Uouae and is used to an undetermined

extant without exciting comment indicative of a desire for any

particular change. Whea. I described the alternative under consider.

tion, Ada. Foekett was uneble to cay that it would be preferable. He undertook, however, to inquire further into the subject.

.~~LA~1 LTJDW~LL L.

1.

~DN1~.GUE

~

Chief, Intelligence Staff, ORE

ll~i~i/A\L

124
28. CIG Intelligence Report, 27 February 1947 (Ditto copy)

,7.(

./~ I~Z,.P

OI~7iLUI~1!&L I ?Z (JO11XRQL P ~.B. ~7WIALS ~ _______

CENTRAL INTEWGENCE GROUP

INTaUGENcE flEPORT

lWO.19heeesher19~6

DIST. 2~ Pubsw.~ 3%7

I. -I II~ (I (I~ ~ ___%~ ._J.t___

(leluAmeximexe, lT~, Ne,~eMUx )Pe, Ieeei I I~~ I ~ I,u,smx .~ Ir~~~n~ I~~i~ou I ~ ~ ~ Im1I~.u I I~ I .~ I~, -~

msTRwun~

I z z I z x -.

Laws I~ WAR NARY JUS1ICE ft & £ I C & P sami

SOURCE ~_ -

.

.

1~w opium from ~ngkek ant Intia, after being prepared for o~e..u.~.tise in

)Zacao by a special cc~~V process, in of the bent qte1.tt~ ant brings a

-

~

~

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.

-

2. £ Cldseee, 51~IT Lim.kIm, bent of the Ibeso Opi~ O~ise, 1*s been speociated

with it .iwe 1926. ~ ass Uchiaf opise idser when opium tint. sea a

5~...M-U.l~flt monopoly in ~oao. When bbs Portngmss ~broke op the

eclEpoly, BUfl encoseded In pmcba.ing aU the special. uqtdpssnt meded

for proceusing. So then wont into bteiteee for himself with a psitnir, P. 1. tobo, U.....)..m~ agent foi Ost~-psoit5s £ix~s.

3. The Neuih~ Opinc CÆbims in ceeposed largely of isportant political tig~wee in tin Pbilippite O~vi~nb. Contact umo for the ikedis CesMm In Saeso,

Songkok, nid Dcngkevg In said to be a Ion resident of thee. tiuse ottlee,

Antho4,- BotheI.o, a Soitiab sebjoct of Portugumes ~ractiee.

4. Tb, trennporuvg of opino from !hcso to ibniln takes the fOUwIIng course,

accondlng to prczsnb Infonenbion. ~,.mU ohi~nte are ~e rngularly from

..

.

~

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~

Soone to iloagkoi,g. There the opium is put op in nil containers, the

enaj.l.est buing ~p.retely the site of an Aserican nickel, but twice as

thick, ned holding five cooked piUs. These ar. deposited in $ certain -

drone &Iop. Portugumso ant rilipino w~n, liptug in Ira. i~hi.la vie Catb~ Pacific Agrnaye, pink up the o~~1~re from the dress shop ant fly back to

Soci~.

-~

~

I

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~

5. Once ii. hoe reached- Iboila, the opium Is further camouflaged before it O~~

tinuen its 3ov~ney to the ~bed Sbatsa. Pir.czaokere are purehesed in

Soomo sot shipped to SoaUa eta acugiong. In Son~Iexng, the firecrackers

being qhito lagal., are cleated by the Ismrieui O~nlat.. V~ exuiwal

-. ~bofla, the firecrackers hew. opium contatger~ Imarted Into tL~. Because

of the Hccigkcng clearance, Mavt4ia authoriiise give aleerem. with little or

no inspection, sot the iisecraukere a~&bip.ped cm to £~ica.

:

Slates.

i Next ~eviow t,etc.

CLAB9P~IOATlON a tnr&ta

ri~ r~

~t~tr~

COUNtRY cidi~

SUBJECT .~nin lufosmation, Opini m~ugghSug to the

teaWia~ntia

O~N

£VM&MwoN or eousct (Field eveisetiom) syewancm or

125

29. Elsey to Clifford, Central Intelligence Group, 14 March 1947

(Photocopy)

M~LORANWM POBi

14 March 1947

C,

c

Mr. clifford..

-

Subjects Central Intelligsncs Group.

1.

1. C.I.G. is up to it. old trick a again. It ha. aubsitted infoxna11~ the draft of a propoa.d bill to be suhaitted to Congress very ainilar

to the teo~-pr.vioue ~raftà ihich Vandenberg has sent to you in rec~t

months snd w~cb you tiled ~.thout further action.

2.. Mr. George Sataarewalder of Donald Stoe~ a group, called to

request advice and infôrsiation on what Budget should tell C.I.O. I

suggested that C.I.3. be informed that there was no necessity for

such legislation in view of the aection~ concerning Intelligence enich

ire included in the Unification Bill.

3. The Budget concure in that position and will inform C.I.G. that.

it is inappropriat, to propos. legislation at this time in view of

the Presidents support of the Unification Bill.

.9

E.e~ectfuUy,

o~m~! u. ~

127