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i 

94–101 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–14] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 26, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Haney, ADM Cecil D., USN, Commander, United States Strategic Command . 4 

McKeon, Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cooper, Hon. Jim .............................................................................................. 23 

Haney, ADM Cecil D. ....................................................................................... 39 

McKeon, Brian P. ............................................................................................. 25 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 21 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 67 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 67 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 71 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 26, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:31 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. I am going to call the hearing of the House Armed 

Services subcommittee to order. 

We just came back from a procedural vote. I think we have about 

an hour before we vote, so I want to go ahead and get started while 

the members may still be walking over from the chamber so that 

we can get as much done as possible. 

This is our first hearing of the 114th Congress, and I would like 

to welcome back our returning members, especially the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee, my buddy, Mr. Cooper. I look 

forward to another Congress working with you and solve some of 

the most technically demanding and most important issues that 

the Armed Services Committee has to handle. 

I welcome our new members here today as well. I won’t go name 

by name, but I look forward to working with each of you as well. 

We have got some important issues to address this year. We 

have a budget request from the President that in some ways is 

among the best we have seen since he came into office, but the 

Presidents request and the Congress makes the decisions, so we 

will see how it comes out. 

To make the best decisions possible, we need to hear from the 

best minds available. No pressure, fellows. We certainly have that 

today. 

I am pleased to kick off our NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] process for the fiscal year 2016 with two witnesses who 

have responsibilities for each of the key facets of the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee’s jurisdiction: missile defense, national security nuclear weapons programs, and nuclear proliferation and cooperative threat reduction activities. 

To help us understand the policies and programs this subcommittee oversees and how they relate to the fiscal 2016 authorization bill, we have the Honorable Brian McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Policy, Department of Defense; Ad-
2 

miral Cecil D. Haney of the U.S. Navy, Commander, the United 

States Strategic Command. 

Admiral, you are in much demand by the subcommittee. I appreciate you making yourself available. 

Mr. McKeon, I know you are very pleased to be returning here 

and I know you look forward to reviewing the transcript. 

I remind my colleagues that at the conclusion of this open hearing, we will adjourn to a classified discussion in a different room. 

I would also like to make sure that all the members are aware 

that we will have next Tuesday a classified session on next generation missile defense technology and capability. 

I do not believe that the world can afford nor can our own security allow U.S. power to continue to recede. If you think ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] is a threat, I agree with you. 

If you think Vladimir Putin is set on re-creating the Soviet-like 

sphere of influence regardless of what these sovereign neighboring 

countries want for themselves, I think you are right. If you watch 

China literally create islands in the middle of other countries’ territorial waters in the South China Sea and ask do they feel constrained by anything, I would tell you, I think the answer is no. 

So the question becomes, what are we going to do about it? Are 

we going to provide less funding for the Department of Defense 

than the President requested, which has already sustained literally 

hundreds of billions of dollars in cuts? I don’t believe that that is 

an option that the Congress can seriously consider. 

I hope the witnesses will make very clear today what they see 

as the impacts of a return to sequestration in fiscal year 2016 or 

a budget that funds only the Budget Control Act [BCA] caps. 

With that, I yield for a statement to my friend and colleague 

from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 21.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to working with you again in this session of Congress. 

I completely agree with you on the need to end sequestration, but 

I hope that the majority and the minority will be able to come with 

a plan to do that, because right now we are running on empty. 

I would—in order to save time, and look forward to the classified 

session, insert my statement for the record. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. McKeon, Admiral Haney, you both have provided prepared 

statements, which I will add to today’s record. Without objection, 

so ordered. And I ask you to briefly summarize those statements 

in 3 minutes or less so that we can turn to questions. 

And we will start with Mr. McKeon, if you would proceed. 
3 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN P. McKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Cooper, and other members of the subcommittee for this 

opportunity to testify today. 

In his speech in 2009 in Prague, President Obama highlighted 

21st century nuclear dangers and declared that the United States 

will seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, but while we work toward that goal, which he acknowledged 

would not be reached quickly, he pledged that as long as nuclear 

weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and 

effective nuclear arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to 

assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count 

on America’s security commitments. 

In his confirmation proceedings, Secretary Carter affirmed the 

view that nuclear deterrent remains our highest priority mission 

and, as such, nuclear weapons policy and strategy are an important 

element of our budget request. The request focuses on maintaining 

stable and robust deterrence in a time of geopolitical uncertainty, 

while managing the transition from our current nuclear force to a 

modernized nuclear force. We will manage this transition through 

life extension programs for the warheads, replacing aging delivery 

systems, and enhancements to sustainment and operations of the 

current force. It also includes the funding necessary to address the 

findings of last year’s nuclear enterprise reviews. 

Last November and December, we briefed the committee and 

your staff on the results of the two reviews ordered by then Secretary Hagel of the DOD [Department of Defense] nuclear enterprise. As we said then, the Department has undertaken a serious 

and vigorous response to the findings of these reviews. Senior leaders are being held accountable for addressing the issues identified 

in the reviews and we are working to create an enduring system 

of continuous self-evaluation, honest reporting of problems, and detailed monitoring of corrective actions and their effectiveness in fixing the problems. 

Secretary Hagel created what he called a Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group to reinforce senior leader accountability and 

asked the deputy secretary to lead the effort. In his final weeks in 

the Department, Secretary Hagel convened the group for one last 

time to reinforce the importance of this undertaking. Secretary 

Carter shares Secretary Hagel’s commitment to holding leaders of 

DOD accountable and to ensuring the real near-term improvements 

in the nuclear force sustainment and morale. 

The President has opted for a nuclear sustainment and modernization plan that is consistent with his commitment to retain a 

safe, secure, and effective deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons 

exist. As I said, the plan focuses on modernizing platforms, delivery 

systems, and weapons of our current triad to preserve military capabilities in the face of evolving threats. 

It is not, as some have claimed, a nuclear weapons buildup. On 

the contrary, the number of nuclear weapons in the United States 

is the smallest it has been since the Eisenhower administration 

and will continue to go down as we reach new START [Strategic 
4 

Arms Reduction Treaty] limits. Further, our approach to warhead 

sustainment and modernization will enable additional reductions in 

the non-deployed hedge force. 

The effort to modernize our delivery systems and extend the life 

of our warheads across the triad in our non-strategic nuclear force 

will require significant resources over the next decade and beyond, 

but as I noted at the outset, their nuclear mission is the highest 

priority of the Department and we must prioritize it accordingly. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we would ask your 

support for the President’s budget in this area, because it protects 

vital U.S. interests. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you, Mr. McKeon. 

Admiral Haney, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF ADM CECIL D. HANEY, USN, COMMANDER, 

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND 

Admiral HANEY. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking 

Member Cooper, and members of the committee. 

U.S. Strategic Command executes a diverse set of global responsibilities that contribute directly to our national security, and I can 

say with full confidence today that Strategic Command remains capable and ready to meet our assigned missions, and our strategic 

nuclear forces are safe, secure and effective. As you know, the current global security environment is more complex, dynamic and uncertain than at any time in our history as state and non-state actors challenge our democratic values and our security in so many 

ways. 

The nature of strategic threats, weapons of mass destruction, 

space and cyberspace, requires serious attention. We continue to 

see emerging capabilities to include, but are not limited to, the 

modernization of strategic nuclear capabilities, counterspace and 

cyberspace activities, conventional and asymmetric threats, and 

disturbing trends upsetting the strategic balance, giving rise for 

concern not only for U.S. Strategic Command, but for my fellow 

combatant commanders that we team with around the globe. 

Given all of this, including your description of the strategic and 

security environment, the missions of U.S. Strategic Command remain important to our joint military forces, our Nation, and our allies and partners. 

We remain focused on deterring strategic attack, and assuring allies by providing combat support to our joint military forces and 

other combatant commanders across the spectrum of their operations to support national security and strategic stability. 

Strategic deterrence today is far more than just nuclear, although it is underpinned first and foremost by our nuclear capabilities. It includes a robust intelligence apparatus, space, cyberspace, 

conventional and missile defense capabilities, and comprehensive 

plans that link organizations and knit their capabilities together in 

a coherent way. 

Additionally, we are engaged daily in a broad range of activities 

across our other mission areas: space; cyberspace; intelligence, sur-
5 

veillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]; commanding weapons of mass 

destruction; joint electronic warfare; global strike; and analysis and 

targeting. These efforts guide my six command priorities: deterrence; strategic attack; providing our Nation with a safe, secure 

and effective nuclear deterrent force; building enduring relationships with partner organizations to confront the broad range of 

global challenges; addressing these challenges in space, building 

our cyberspace capability and capacity; and anticipating change 

and confronting uncertainty with agility and innovation. 

Achieving strategic deterrence in the 21st century requires continued investment in strategic capabilities and renewed multigenerational commitment of intellectual capital. 

The President’s budget for 2016 strikes a responsible balance between national priorities, fiscal realities, and begins to reduce some 

of the risks we have accumulated because of deferred maintenance 

and sustainment. This budget supports my mission requirements, 

but there is no margin to absorb new risks. Any cuts to that budget, including those imposed by sequestration, will hamper our ability to sustain and modernize our military forces. 

None of this work could be done, of course, without our welltrained and motivated people, and I can personally attest to their 

talent, dedication, and professionalism of the team of military and 

civilian experts that man our forces. They represent our most precious resource and deserve our unwavering support. 

In these uncertain times, I am proud to lead such a focused 

team, and we are building our future on a strong and successful 

past. And we count on your support, of course, in working together 

with those men and women so that we can ensure that we are 

ready with a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Haney can be found in the 

Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you, Admiral Haney. 

And I recognize myself now for the first round of questions. And 

this is for you, Admiral Haney. 

As recently stated by the director of the Defense Intelligence 

Agency at a HASC [House Armed Services Committee] hearing on 

worldwide threats, quote, ‘‘the threat to U.S. space systems and 

services will increase as potential adversaries pursue disruptive 

and destructive counterspace capabilities,’’ close quote. 

Can you provide your perspective on the threat to our space systems, and what are you doing about it, and are we properly organized in this—in space for our warfighting domain? 

Admiral HANEY. Chairman, yes, this is an important topic to me, 

as we have seen very disturbing trends in space from particular nation-states like China as well as Russia, who have been public 

about their counterspace endeavors and ambitions. We have seen 

direct-ascent, anti-satellite, kill vehicles launched just as most recently in last summer from China. Fortunately, this time it didn’t 

hit anything, as it did in 2007, creating just thousands and thousands of pieces of debris, which we are still struggling with, but it 

shows this intent of their investments that they are not very transparent in sharing their intent with us. 
6 

Additionally, we see things that they have also put in orbit that 

also is of concern, as well as things on land that are also being 

used to threaten our assets, such as lasers, such as jamming capability and what have you that threatens communications, GPS 

[Global Positioning System]. 

With all that, you will find in this President’s budget a plan to 

invest to provide us more capability for command and control. We 

must be able to get better at space situational awareness. There 

are some investments in that regard, and also space control. And 

these investments, including the ability to be more resilient with 

our capabilities in space, is what we aim to get to. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Would you say that Russia—or I am asking. 

Is Russia, China, Pakistan, are they all building new nuclear weapons with new military capabilities? 

Admiral HANEY. Yes, Chairman, they are. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

Mr. McKeon, who is following the U.S. lead in terms of not building new nuclear weapons? 

Mr. MCKEON. Well, there are a lot of countries in the world who 

don’t have nuclear weapons that are not seeking them, sir, but—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Anybody that does have them that is following our 

lead in not building more? You just heard me mention three. 

Mr. MCKEON. I did, but there is probably at least one. I am not 

sure of the answer to, and probably wouldn’t want to say it here 

in this setting. 

Mr. ROGERS. With that, I will yield to the ranking member for 

any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am worried that the greatest risk to our nuclear defenses is not 

at the witness table, and they are fine organizations, but it is on 

this side, because it is my understanding, and I am glad that a 

number of our colleagues are here on both sides of the aisle, it is 

my understanding that the budget for this Congress will be marked 

up to sequestration levels. 

And it is also my understanding that when we do our markup 

for the NDAA, that that will be at sequestration levels, which 

means, in plain English, when the admiral testified that the President’s budget was sufficient, but probably barely, and anything 

below that is trouble, we will be marking up the NDAA at a level 

$35 billion below the President’s budget. That is just unacceptable. 

And this committee has a great tradition of bipartisanship, people working together for strong defense for America. We have got 

to solve this problem. We really don’t have a lot of time to do it. 

I don’t want to upset, you know, leadership in either party, but this 

is the national defense we are talking about, and there has got to 

be an answer before we mark up, so that we don’t mark up to artificially and cruelly and devastatingly inadequate numbers. So 

somehow or another, I think that has got to be the top priority for 

this subcommittee. 

It is not our jurisdiction, it is really no one’s jurisdiction; it is everyone’s jurisdiction on the committee that cares about a strong national defense. So I am not blaming anyone, but this is a very curious situation. I cannot remember a markup environment like this 
7 

where we will be going in where we will be deliberately below the 

President’s number. 

So hopefully there will be a solution. I don’t have one right now, 

but I feel great urgency in trying to help us and our colleagues try 

to find one. One way to do it would be to find pay-fors that are 

within our jurisdiction. It is easy to try to get another committee 

to pay for stuff, but that would be ruled out of order automatically, 

so we are going to have to find, you know, monies within our own 

jurisdiction. How do we do that? There are only a few areas to go 

to, and none of those are popular. So we have really got a lot of 

work to do just in the next month or two, otherwise, there is a big 

train wreck coming. 

So I appreciate the witnesses being here. I look forward to questioning you in the closed session, but the real work has to be done 

by the folks on this side of the table, I think. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah. I want to associate myself with the ranking 

member’s remarks. Marking up to the BCA levels is not a responsible thing to do, and I am going to do everything in my power to 

keep us from having to do that. And I also think that the President’s number is much more responsible and the minimum that we 

should be thinking about. 

With that, the chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Fleming, for 5 minutes. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

the panel. And it is great to see you again, General Haney. 

You know, there has been talk over time over the last 6 or 7 

years I have been in Congress that we go from a nuclear triad to 

a diad, and most recently that discussion came up in Senate testimony when retired Marine General James Mattis recommended to 

the Senate Armed Services Committee the notion that moving 

away from a triad of nuclear forces, that is, from ballistic missiles—excuse me—ballistic missiles, submarines, bombers and 

land-based ballistic missiles to a diad of submarines and bombers. 

And so I would love to get your perspective on that, Admiral? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Fleming, thank you for the question. There have been—I know when we went through the Nuclear 

Posture Review in 2010 all the way through the Quadrennial Defense Review for 2014, a lot of work that is ongoing to continue to 

validate the need for the United States of America to have a triad, 

and I fully support that. 

The responsiveness of our intercontinental ballistic missile force, 

the survivability nature of our submarines, and the flexibility of 

our bombers is exactly what we need our adversaries to have to 

contemplate if they decide they want to escalate their way out of 

a conflict. Thank you. 

Dr. FLEMING. And so we want to make it as complex of an equation as possible. But did I call you ‘‘General’’? I am sorry. Did I— 

he just put your name in front of me and I wasn’t sure why. I 

apologize if I called you ‘‘General.’’ I meant to say ‘‘Admiral 

Haney.’’ Excuse me for that. 

But in any event, we want to make it as difficult on our enemies 

as possible, do we not? We want to make it as complex of an equation, and at the same time, we need as—to a prior question and 
8 

discussion, we need to have the most modernized weapons systems 

and delivery systems as possible. Would you agree with that, Admiral? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Fleming, yes, I would agree with 

it. Given the existential threat and the nature of the threat, very 

important for the United States. 

Dr. FLEMING. Please describe the modernization and sustainment 

challenge of our current bomber fleet. What is your view of the 

President’s request regarding the modernization programs, the new 

long-range strike family of systems, and how those timelines are 

being tackled for the fleet aging out and for when the new bomber 

comes online? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, our air lag is supported today by 

the B–2 and the B–52 aircraft. The B–52, which was last off the 

assembly line in 1962, will be used out at least until the 2040 time 

period, so it is very important that we invest in a long-range bomber. We have also had multiple decades of utilization of our B–2 aircraft, and as a result, in order to have the strategic and conventional capability those platforms provide from a global strike nature and to our joint military forces, it is important that we re-capitalize and move forward as the Air Force is investing in the longrange bomber. 

Dr. FLEMING. So even at this point where we are trying to get 

the long-range strike bomber up and going, in development and 

eventually on the assembly line, we are looking at current weapons 

system bombers that will be nearly a century old when they are retired, certainly 80, 90 years old, and they will be flown by greatgrandsons and daughters, maybe even great-great-grandsons and 

daughters, when they are finally retired. 

Admiral HANEY. That’s correct, Congressman. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yeah. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your service and for being here today, and Mr. Chairman, for calling the 

meeting. 

I am going to follow up on the questions that Mr. Fleming raised 

and stay with it. 

The purpose of the long-range bomber is precisely what, Admiral? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, our long-range bomber today provides the flexibility to provide adequate capability to our joint military forces from the air, both conventional as well as strategic nuclear capability, as part of our nuclear strategic deterrent today. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So it would be designed to penetrate enemy airspace? 

Admiral HANEY. The capability is designed to penetrate enemy 

airspace. Our B–2’s in particular with their stealth capability and 

our B–52’s with their long-range strike capability. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And the long-range standoff cruise missile, what 

is its purpose? 
9 

Admiral HANEY. Today we have the air-launched cruise missile 

that is capable to be carried on our B–52 aircraft. Its purpose is 

to provide that flexible option to our national security apparatus, 

the President, in order to allow another avenue in which, if we 

were in extreme circumstances, to be able to have that capability. 

It is also designed as a deterrent mechanism first and foremost 

such that any adversary that would want to challenge us would 

have to consider—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Excuse me. 

Admiral HANEY [continuing]. That avenue. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I don’t want to get mixed up. We have got the 

current missile and the new long-range standoff missile. 

Admiral HANEY. That is—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am not sure which one of the two you were 

speaking to? My—— 

Admiral HANEY. Well, the air-launched cruise missile is what we 

have today. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Right. Exactly. 

Admiral HANEY. The air-launched missile will time-out here in 

between 2020 and 2030. It has been under various life extension 

programs and what have you there. The long-range strike option 

cruise missile is its replacement. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So it would also be air-launched? 

Admiral HANEY. That is correct. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And its purpose is to penetrate enemy airspace 

and deliver nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons? 

Admiral HANEY. Nuclear weapons. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Nuclear weapons only, as is the current airlaunched missile, correct? 

Admiral HANEY. That is correct. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So do we need both the long-range bomber and 

the long-range strike missile to deliver a nuclear weapon? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, the air-launched cruise missile 

that we currently have will expire, and we need a replacement for 

it, and that is why we need the air—the long-range strike option. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I understand that, you said it clearly, but my 

question goes to do we need a long-range bomber to deliver a nuclear weapon into enemy airspace as well as the new long-range 

missile? Do we need both—— 

Admiral HANEY. Yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI [continuing]. For that purpose of delivering a nuclear weapon? 

Admiral HANEY. We need both. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. In a classified hearing, I’d like to have an answer to three letters: Why? 

Admiral HANEY. I would be happy to discuss it. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Coffman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to continue the point a little bit about the next generation bomber. And, you know, given—again, given the advances 
10 

in precision-guided munitions and cruise missiles and other capabilities of striking targets, again, can you tell me why it is important to have a next generation manned bomber? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, one, as our current capability is 

getting older and mature, we will need something to replace it for 

decades to come. 

Second of all, our adversaries are getting more and more capability in anti-access and access denial kinds of capabilities, and I 

think it is important from a deterrence as well as from an offensive 

standpoint, being that these bombers are both strategic-capable, to 

be strategic-capable as well as conventional-capable to provide that 

kind of calculus that any adversary would have to think about in 

challenging our democratic values. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Washington State, Mr. 

Larsen, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, I have got a September 22 letter that was to the committee regarding some issues with regards to costs of the capitalization of strategic arsenal, and it says in your letter, ‘‘our planned 

capitalization activities will require close to 10 percent of the DOD 

budget for a period of time, but the cost of losing a credible deterrent capability would likely be much greater, not only in dollars,’’ 

and so on. 

Ten percent of the DOD budget obviously over any period of time 

is a lot, because a lot of folks are asking for 10 percent of the DOD 

budget in the DOD. So the question I have is, how do you—how 

are you thinking about—how are we thinking about planning for 

that amount of money, for the planned recapitalization? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Larsen, first I should state, you 

know, that was less than 10 percent, as you articulated. And as I 

look at some of the Congressional Budget Office work that is ongoing more specifically as it looks over a period of—in the 2020 to 

2030s when we would have to recapitalize the bulk of our strategic 

forces, it’s really in the order of 5 to 6 percent. 

Mr. LARSEN. And what is it now? 

Admiral HANEY. Today it is less than 3 percent, somewhere in 

the order of 2.6. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. Okay. So it is a doubling? 

Admiral HANEY. Thereabouts, yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. Three to six. Two and a half to five is a doubling. And so the plan, then—you and I may not be here then, but 

how are we thinking about the competition for dollars in the DOD 

budget to achieve that? 

Admiral HANEY. Well, the competition, I think, is what has to 

play itself out, quite frankly, as my recommendation to the Department, and I think it has been echoed through 2014 and then some, 

relative to the importance of our strategic nuclear capability, a 

time and place where others have modernized their capability that 

provide an existential threat to the United States of America. 

So in order to maintain and sustain strategic stability, it is very 

important that we have that kind of balance. And when you look 
11 

at over time, even the 2.6 percent, that we are able to take technology that was designed and built for the most part in the 1960s 

and 1970s, and the life span we’ve been able to have on what we 

have today, everything from Ohio-class SSBNs [ballistic missile nuclear submarines], designed for 33 years, and we are getting 42 out 

of it. Quite frankly, the question really is, can we afford not to. 

Mr. LARSEN. That is the question we have to ask for every budget item that comes to us, and we don’t have the money for all that, 

so—can you—I don’t know if it’s Admiral or Mr. McKeon, if you 

can—which one is best to answer this. Recently at the NATO 

[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] parliamentary assembly a 

couple weeks back, they had a discussion about hybrid warfare, it 

is nothing new, but it is being talked about with relation to how 

Russia is approaching Ukraine and other areas. Part of that is 

cyber operations. 

And I wanted to—I don’t know which one to ask. What kind of 

investment are we making in cyber operations to sort of perhaps 

fill the gap that the West has or even the United States has to play 

on that playing field as opposed to the other activities that we are 

doing with overflights and such? 

Mr. MCKEON. In terms of cyber, Admiral Haney may be best 

placed to answer since the Cyber Command is a subcommand 

under his command. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Mr. MCKEON. I can say we are investing a lot in cyber mission 

forces for cyber defense activities in the Department, and a total 

force of around 6,000 people we are projecting toward, but I don’t 

know the dollar figure off the top of my head. 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Larsen, I will have to provide you 

that answer in writing. I don’t have it on the top of my head. I 

know the investment in terms of the number of people that was already articulated. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 67.] 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. So when you do that, I would like the numbers of people and dollars is great, also the use, how it’s perhaps 

either filling a gap or enhancing what we are already doing, especially as it’s being coordinated with other elements of our ability 

to act? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, we are building these cyber 

teams, cyber mission forces, cyber protection teams in order to, one, 

protect ourselves from cyber attacks. We are being probed on a 

daily basis by a variety of different actors. 

Mr. LARSEN. The protection side is one thing. What about the 

other side? 

Admiral HANEY. The other aspect of it, we are distributing these 

forces out to the various combatant commands so that they can be 

integrated into our overall joint military force capability. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
12 

Mr. McKeon and Admiral Haney, when you think about key 

emerging technologies of strategic importance, would you put conventional prompt global strike hypersonic on that list, and if so, 

where? 

Mr. MCKEON. I am not sure how I would rank it, sir. It’s an important technology we are trying to develop, as you know. 

Mr. BROOKS. Admiral. 

Admiral HANEY. I would agree. I would not be prepared to rank 

it, other than to say it’s important that we continue the R&D [research and development] efforts so we can understand it and then 

be able to provide it as a part of our arsenal. 

Mr. BROOKS. When it comes to hypersonic technology and systems development, where would you say the United States is with 

regard to our allies and adversaries? Ahead, behind, about even? 

How would you characterize it, the progress we are making versus 

the progress some of our geopolitical foes are making? 

Mr. MCKEON. Congressman, I think we would have to get you a 

better answer in the IC’s [Intelligence Community’s] assessment of 

this. I am not sure I would say we were ahead, but I wouldn’t say 

that we are significantly behind, but I am not schooled on the analysis on that. 

Mr. BROOKS. Admiral. 

Admiral HANEY. I would agree. And the only thing I would add 

is in 2013, we had a successful flight and we have had a lot of good 

indicators of where we are with the associated program. 

Mr. BROOKS. Based on your knowledge of ongoing development 

activities of the last decade within the Air Force, DARPA [Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency], Navy and Army, how would 

you characterize the current state of conventional prompt global 

strike hypersonic development? Is it progressing as you would like 

to see? Should we put more funding into it, less funding into it, or 

about the same levels? 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, as you know, in the last year, we’ve had an 

unsuccessful test of the program. I think—we’ve had some conversations about this recently in the Department. I was in a meeting with the deputy secretary and Mr. Kendall not too long ago 

where we talked about this, and the deputy was pressing us on essentially the question you just asked us, and I think we came to 

the conclusion we have it at about the right level right now in 

terms of the research and development. 

Mr. BROOKS. Admiral, is there anything that you would like to 

add? Should we be pressing harder for development, or about the 

same pace, or slower? 

Admiral HANEY. I right now think we are in a good spot in where 

we are right now in terms of our investments with conventional 

prompt global strike. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you for your service. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here. 
13 

Admiral, thank you for your service to the country. Always appreciate your acumen and commitment, and glad it is on our side. 

My first question is for you, sir. The budget for missile defense has been slashed by about $7 billion as compared to projected levels from fiscal year 2009 and it 

continues on a fairly sharp downward slope, and this is in the face 

of a growing ballistic missile threat to the U.S. and our allies at 

a pace we really haven’t seen before. So I guess the obvious question I ask you, sir, is are you concerned about this trend, and your 

best military advice, should that trend continue? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, I think when you look at the 

whole, we have made some good—great strides of recent here relative to missile defense: one, the European Phased Adaptive Approach is on track with the phases we have there, the GroundBased Interceptor [GBI] program, we have investments in the sensor discrimination kill vehicle, and those things, which I think are 

very important as we go forward to be able to get the missile defense program where we want it to be for not just now, but into 

the future. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I certainly would applaud the way that the 

military has handled resources that they have had. My question 

was more in line with the budget. Do you think that the decreased 

budget for missile defense is wise from the military perspective? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, from the military perspective and 

just looking at from my career to where I am now relative to the 

kinds of capabilities we have, I would like to see more confidence 

in our various systems, particularly for the kill vehicle performance. I know there is some work going on by Missile Defense Agency associated with that and investments associated with it as well. 

So I couldn’t come here and tell you I need another dime in this 

particular area. I think what we have in the President’s budget is 

about the right balance. 

Mr. FRANKS. So quickly, then, two points related to the phased 

adaptive approach. You know, leaving the last phase, now having 

cancelled that, where does that leave us in terms of any sort of redundant homeland protection from potential ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] in the future from a country like Iran? 

Admiral HANEY. Well, the missile defense capability is a layered 

capability, includes the European Phased Adaptive Approach, our 

Aegis ships, our ground based indicators, our THAAD [Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense] programs, et cetera, all in an integrated fashion, and ultimately I would say our offensive capability 

as a whole as a joint military force is part of that. So—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Admiral, my question was—my question, sir, was 

with the loss of that last phase, have we not eliminated redundant 

protection for the homeland of the United States as opposed to the 

original plan? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, I believe with what we have 

today planned for missile defense is adequate in terms of our investment while we have research and development into other 

areas, as issue of homeland defense. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Well, Mr. McKeon, I—thank you, sir. Why 

is it the policy of this administration not to keep pace with the 

threats, and they continue to reduce our ballistic missile defense 
14 

budget? It seems—you know, I understand the admiral has given 

some very good answers, but I am not sure we are really addressing the question I am asking, is, in the face of increasing ballistic 

missile threats, increasing missile threats, why is the budget falling to the extent that it is? Is this just a policy conclusion of the 

administration? 

Mr. MCKEON. Congressman Franks, I would say a couple of 

things. Some of the reductions that we have already taken over the 

course of the life of the administration, we are cancelling some development programs that had various risk and unacceptable costs 

and schedule problems. A few of these were cancelled by Secretary 

Gates in the first year, such as airborne laser. 

Overall, we have a tough budget environment, which you gentlemen know very well, and missile defense has not been exempted 

from this. So we do occasionally have to make some tough choices. 

Priorities in the budget now are increasing the number of GBIs 

from 30 to 44, focusing on improving the kill vehicle and the longrange discrimination radar. We think we have the forces right now 

to deal with the current and projected threat. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. McKeon, I hope you are correct. One 

thing is certain: the original missile defense plan, the third site did 

give redundant protection of the homeland. It does not now, nor is 

it anticipated to do so in the future. And being the father of 6-yearold twins, I take that a little personally. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I had yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having this hearing. 

Admiral Haney, thank you for our earlier conversation and for 

being here and for your service. We earlier touched on, but I would 

like to explore in a little more detail, the fact that we are going 

to be purchasing weather information from China and Russia for 

weather over the Indian Ocean, including some CENTCOM [U.S. 

Central Command] areas like Afghanistan. Do you have any concerns about purchasing potentially sensitive information that 

would go to our warfighters from China or Russia? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, thank you for that question. As 

we look to the future, I have concerns that we have enough diversity in our capability so that we are not dependent on one particular country that may not be there to support us in the future, 

and I think we have to be very careful with that. So I’m supportive 

of the efforts that are ongoing now, particularly in the weather, 

which we depend upon, all the combatant commanders depend 

upon for our maneuverability and capabilities. And I know there is 

some work ongoing here relative to U.S. weather satellite capability. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Do you know what the dollar amount is that DOD 

is asking for in the President’s budget for that purchase? 

Admiral HANEY. I do not. I will have to—I am not sure if you 

are aware. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. McKeon, would you happen to know that? 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, I don’t know the dollar figure. The defense meteorological satellite program, the last satellite is funded and it’s 
15 

expected to launch, I believe next year, and it is fully funded and 

I don’t think we have any problems with it. Well, there may be 

some final numbers in the 2016 budget, so I have to confirm that 

with you. 

There is a follow-on program we are working on, it’s not a program of record yet, that would come online in the early 2020s, so 

we don’t expect there to be a gap. I am not familiar with anybody 

planning to depend on the Chinese or Russians. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, we will have to dig a little further 

into that. Maybe I could follow up with a question for the record? 

Mr. MCKEON. Certainly. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And lastly, Admiral Haney, we talked some about 

New START Treaty, and I have real concerns about it. I think it 

has many flaws, one of which is the fact that Russian tactical nuclear weapons were not included in the treaty at all. What concerns 

do you have about tactical capabilities in the nuclear weapon field 

for Russia? 

Admiral HANEY. Well, I have concerns that Russia has a number 

of non-strategic nuclear weapons in their arsenal and they also 

have modernization programs associated with them, as well as I 

am concerned about their violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces] treaty with a ground-launched cruise missile system that they have been testing. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And I guess I do have a follow-up. 

I was just given some information, Mr. McKeon, and I will just 

read a key takeaway that the Air Force supplied this committee. 

DOD currently does not rely on non-allied international sources for 

environmental data, but may be required to do so as early as 2017 

due to EUMETSAT [European Organization for the Exploitation of 

Meteorological Satellites], E–U–M–E–T–S–A–T’s recent decision 

not to replace Meteosat-7. 

Mr. MCKEON. Congressman Lamborn, I am not an expert on 

space, I will be the first to admit it. We have a very capable DASD 

[Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense] for space. I spoke to him 

about this issue in the last couple of days in anticipation of questions in this area. I have conveyed what he has conveyed to you. 

So we will double-check whatever briefing from the Air Force that 

you have and circle back. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 67.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

What we want to do now is go ahead and recess and go into the 

classified portion of the hearing at this time. They are saying we 

are going to be called for votes around 2:30, but our cloakroom has 

proved not to be very good at predicting those things, so I don’t 

want to keep you all waiting around here if we can avoid it. 

So we are now standing in recess to move into a classified setting. 

[Whereupon, at 2:17 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in classified session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 26, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 26, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 26, 2015 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. MCKEON. Low-earth orbit (LEO) systems in polar orbits are particularly important for polar coverage and for longer-range forecasting. For LEO systems, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) has made the decision to launch Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Flight 20 (DMSP–20). That decision, combined with our partners’ capabilities, will extend our ability to meet LEO requirements until the 2025 

range. This step provides us several additional years to determine how best to use 

DOD capabilities, such as our planned Weather System Follow-on program, and capabilities of civil and international partners to continue supporting operational requirements. 

Weather satellites in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) support requirements for nearreal-time weather information. In GEO, we rely primarily on two National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellites (GOES–13 and GOES–15), two 

EUMETSAT satellites (METEOSAT–7 and METEOSAT–10), and one Japanese satellite (MTSAT–2/Himawari-7). EUMETSAT currently does not plan to replace 

METEOSAT–7 when it reaches its estimated end of lifetime in 2017. This would 

leave a gap in the area covered by this satellite, which is located at 57 degrees east 

longitude over the Indian Ocean. The United States and our partners maintain onorbit back-up capabilities, such as repositioning these assets to this region that offer 

some flexibility for extending coverage for a few years. Work is ongoing with NOAA 

and our international partners and we will still ultimately need to determine an appropriate longer-term solution that will meet our requirements with acceptable reliability. [See page 15.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Admiral HANEY. The current planned investment for the Cyber Mission Force 

(133 teams) in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP—FY 2014—FY 2018) is 

$1.878 billion dollars for the development of approximately 6100 individuals required in the four Service branches. This effort began in October of 2013 and today 

we have 3100 personnel assigned to 58 of the 133 teams. My team is extremely appreciative of the support this committee has provided the Department and we look 

forward to continued cooperation as we help defend the nation. [See page 11.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 26, 2015 

(71) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Are there any allies who are not yet convinced Russia is violating 

the INF treaty? Who are they? What are we doing, country by country, to explain 

and demonstrate how we know? 

Mr. MCKEON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you agree with Ms. Gottemoeller that Russia is cheating, or not 

in compliance, with approximate 8 out of 12 treaties or agreements? Please explain 

how the U.S. is responding to each case. 

Mr. MCKEON. I agree with the answers Under Secretary Gottemoeller submitted 

in response to questions for the record posed by Representatives Garamendi and 

Turner after her December 10, 2014, testimony to the House Armed Services Committee. In her answers, she elaborated and clarified that Russia is in violation of 

the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the Budapest Memorandum. I also agree with 

her statement that verifiable arms control statements continue to be an important 

tool to enhance the security of the United States and its allies and partners. The 

Administration takes violations of arms control agreements very seriously. The 

United States is responding to each case of non-compliance or questions on adherence by Russia as follows: 

• CFE Treaty: Russia suspended implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007 and 

has made it clear that it will not return to compliance. In 2011, the United 

States suspended performance of certain obligations under the CFE Treaty with 

regard to Russia. We were joined by our NATO Allies that are party to the CFE 

Treaty, as well as by Georgia and Moldova, in taking this step. In all, 24 of the 

30 countries that are party to the CFE Treaty have suspended implementation 

of certain CFE Treaty obligations with regard to Russia. 

• INF Treaty: The United States has determined that the Russian Federation is 

in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or 

flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 

5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles. The United 

States is finalizing a range of diplomatic, economic, and military response options to convince Russia to return to compliance with the INF Treaty and to 

deny Russia significant military advantage from deploying the missile that violates the INF Treaty. 

• Budapest Memorandum: Russia is in clear violation of its commitments under 

the Memorandum to respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Ukraine. The United States, together with allies and partners, has levied extensive sanctions on Russia, is providing financial assistance to Ukraine, 

and is supporting allies and partners in the region through efforts such as the 

European Reassurance Initiative. NATO formed a Response Force to deter Russian military action against Allies. 

Mr. ROGERS. As you know, nuclear modernization costs continue to be a topic of 

discussion up here. What priority does the Department of Defense assign to the nuclear deterrence mission? Do you believe the nuclear modernization plan DOD and 

NNSA have laid out is appropriate and affordable amidst the wider defense budget? 

Mr. MCKEON. The President has opted for a sustainment and modernization program that is broad and consistent with his commitment to retain a safe, secure, and 

effective deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist. This plan focuses on modernizing the platforms, delivery systems, and warheads of our current Triad, including our non-strategic nuclear forces, to credibly preserve military capabilities in the 

face of evolving threats. 

This program will require significant resources over the next decade and beyond, 

but the nuclear mission is the highest priority mission within the Department of 

Defense, and we must prioritize it accordingly. The President’s FY 2016 budget request includes significantly increased investment in the nuclear Triad as well as its 

supporting infrastructure and manpower. Sequestration presents the greatest threat 

to the viability of our sustainment and modernization plan. 
72 

Mr. ROGERS. Why does the United States need the long-range standoff weapon 

(LRSO)—the follow-on to the current air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)? What is 

the short, elevator speech we can bring to our fellow Members on the floor and constituents back home—why is this capability important? 

Mr. MCKEON. The Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile will replace the 

Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) as the United States’ only air-launched, longrange standoff nuclear capability. 

• Sustaining the ALCM is becoming increasingly difficult, and its reliability in 

the next decade is not assured even with substantial investment. The ALCM’s 

service lifetime has already been extended more than two decades beyond the 

10 years that were originally planned. 

• The LRSO will sustain the U.S. ability to credibly challenge the evolving antiaccess/area denial (A2AD) capabilities of potential adversaries. These A2AD capabilities limit the survivability of the B–52 and will eventually threaten the 

ALCM’s ability to continue its role as a penetrating platform. 

• The penetrating LRSO cruise missile and the next-generation penetrating strategic bomber (LRS–B) will provide complementary capabilities, and neither can 

fully substitute for the other. Different capabilities provide varied confidence 

levels of penetration in the evolving and layered A2AD threat environment 

posed by our potential adversaries. A penetrating bomber that can carry a penetrating missile maximally expands the accessible space of targets that can be 

held at risk. 

• The LRSO is therefore important for preserving flexible and credible response 

options for the President, and hence for sustaining an effective deterrent 

against nuclear attack. Preserving these options also supports the President’s 

ability in a crisis to signal intent and control escalation by giving the President 

a nuclear deterrent that can be recalled if it successfully controls escalation. 

These are long-standing core elements of U.S. nuclear strategy. 

• The LRSO will provide a rapid and flexible hedge against changes in the strategic environment and limitations of the other two legs of the Triad. Under the 

New START Treaty, each strategic bomber counts as one launcher and one warhead, regardless of the number of nuclear cruise missiles and bombs in our inventory. This provides a rapid upload capability to hedge against geopolitical or 

technical surprise. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is it true that the Commander of U.S. European Command non-concurred last year when OSD–P asked for his input on approving Russian Federation 

requests under the Open Skies treaty? Why did the DOD proceed anyway? Have you 

personally reviewed the EUCOM non-concurrence and the strong objections from 

NORTHCOM and STRATCOM? 

Mr. MCKEON. As I outlined to then-Chairman McKeon in my classified letter 

dated November 17, 2014, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested Combatant Commanders, including the Commanders of U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Strategic 

Command, to provide information on the proposal to certify Russia’s An-30 Open 

Skies Treaty aircraft. This information was part of the deliberative process and was 

used to inform DOD and U.S. Government decision-making. As we worked with 

other U.S. departments and agencies, we determined that the specific concerns 

would be ameliorated by some important, separate components of the policy, which 

I outlined to Chairman McKeon. 

Mr. ROGERS. Russia and China are building missile defenses against the U.S. and 

its strategic forces. Why do we continue to worry about their concerns about our 

missile defenses? Why do we maintain there is something ‘‘destabilizing’’ about U.S. 

missile defenses but nothing about theirs? 

Mr. MCKEON. We consider missile defense to be a stabilizing force. Both Russia 

and China have or are developing missile defense capabilities of their own and have 

expressed concerns that U.S. missile defenses adversely affect their strategic capabilities and interests; however, as the United States has stated in the past, our 

homeland defense capabilities are focused on regional actors such as Iran and North 

Korea and are not designed for a large-scale Russian or Chinese missile attack. 

Mr. ROGERS. The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated, 

‘‘Today, only Russia and China have the capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic missile attack on the territory of the United States, but this is very unlikely 

and not the focus of U.S. BMD. As the President has made clear, both Russia and 

China are important partners for the future, and the United States seeks to continue building collaborative and cooperative relationships with them.’’ 

How is the Administration doing building a ‘‘collaborative and cooperative relationship’’ with Russia, in particular? If Russia attacked our forces in Europe with 
73 

its short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, would we not use our missile defense 

capabilities against it? 

Mr. MCKEON. Much has changed since 2010, and Russia’s unlawful actions in Crimea and its actions in eastern Ukraine have significantly altered the level of U.S.- 

Russian engagement. Working closely with Europe and other partners and Allies, 

the Administration has imposed real costs on Russia for its aggressive actions. The 

Department of Defense halted defense and military cooperation with Russia. The 

Administration has also prohibited exports of sensitive technologies that could be 

used in Russia’s military modernization and has imposed blocking sanctions on 18 

Russian defense technology firms. I do not want to speculate in an unclassified response about measures the United States would take in response to an attack on 

our forces in Europe; suffice it to say the United States would respond. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain why we use missile defense to defend American aircraft carriers from China’s ballistic missiles, but, we won’t plan to use our missile 

defenses to defend American cities? 

Mr. MCKEON. The U.S. fields a missile defense system for the homeland to 

counter the projected threats from North Korea and Iran. While the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) system would be employed to defend the United States 

against limited missile launches from any source, it does not have the capacity to 

cope with large scale Russian or Chinese missile attacks and is not intended to affect the strategic balance with those countries. 

Mr. ROGERS. As you know, U.S. Missile Defense spending is limited. At the same 

time, our allies are significantly investing, through Foreign Military Sales, in U.S. 

missile defense systems. What is OSD-Policy doing, in concert with the Joint Staff 

and COCOMs, to develop policies and guidance to make sure the U.S. can be fully 

interoperable and burden share with these allies? 

Mr. MCKEON. In the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), the Administration articulated its policy of seeking contributions from allies and partners. This 

policy has been repeated many times by high-level U.S. officials in speeches both 

at home and abroad. We work regularly through multi-national exercises, workshops, roundtables, and conferences to inform officials of allied and partner governments about ballistic missile defense (BMD), the costs associated with BMD, and 

the value of BMD both as a deterrent and as an active defense. We also work to 

inform and educate these audiences on the benefits of interoperability and sharing 

sensor information. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency works closely with 

foreign governments on Foreign Military Sales cases of U.S.-manufactured missile 

defense systems. There is a robust interagency group that collaborates to facilitate 

these cases. All of these efforts are coordinated with the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands. 

Mr. ROGERS. I’ve got a question related to space. You certainly know the national 

security advantage space provides. For something as important as space services, 

do would you want to rely on the Russians or the Chinese to meet warfighter requirements? 

Mr. MCKEON. The Department will not rely on Russia or China to meet U.S. national security requirements. The continuous availability of space capabilities and 

services is indispensable to the protection of U.S. national security. Our responsibility is to ensure that U.S. forces can count on receiving the advantages of space 

whenever and wherever necessary. 

Mr. ROGERS. I am concerned with the Air Force’s plan for space-based weather 

collection that we could be headed down a similar path of relying on unreliable partners. Should we be designing a new satellite system that would require our reliance 

on Russian and Chinese weather data for our warfighter requirements? 

Mr. MCKEON. The Department of Defense (DOD) does not rely on Russian or Chinese weather data and does not plan to rely on such data. At both geosynchronous 

orbit and low-earth orbit, DOD meets its requirements through a combination of our 

own capabilities and the capabilities of civil partners such as the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration and those of our allied partners, such the European meteorological consortium EUMETSAT and the Japan Meteorological Agency. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Fiscal Year 2013 NDAA contains a limitation on international 

agreements concerning outer space activities. The specific language requires a certification that that such agreement has no legally-binding effect or basis for limiting 

the activities of the United States in outer space, and that such agreement is equitable, enhances national security, and has no militarily significant impact on the 

ability of the United States to conduct military or intelligence activities in space. 

What is the current negotiation status of any international agreements regarding 

outer space, like the Code of Conduct or moratorium on direct ascent ASAT tests, 

and do we have your commitment to closely adhering to the existing U.S. law governing this area? 
74 

a. Are you familiar with the recent Joint Staff assessment of the EU Code and 

the impacts it found? 

b. Would any implementing guidance put in place concurrent with the U.S. signature on such draft of the Code disallow DOD from taking any actions in outer space? 

Would it require changes to any actions we could take in outer space? 

Mr. MCKEON. The European Union-led process to develop an International Code 

of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (EU Code) should reinforce key space norms 

that are already U.S. Government standard practice, such as pre-launch notifications under the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, observance of UN Debris Mitigation Standards, and safety-of-flight practices to share 

collision warning information. 

The Department worked closely with the Department of State during bilateral 

and multilateral informal discussions on the draft EU Code, and will continue to 

do so if these discussions progress to formal negotiations to ensure that U.S. national security and legislative requirements are met. 

The Joint Staff has conducted three operational assessments of previous drafts of 

the EU Code. The findings were incorporated into the Department’s position on the 

drafts, and this process will continue during any negotiations. If such negotiations 

reach a conclusion, the Department will conduct a final review to ensure the nonbinding EU Code does not constrain either the development of the full range of 

space capabilities nor the ability of the United States to conduct necessary national 

security space operations. 

Mr. ROGERS. During the peak years of nuclear modernization, how much of the 

DOD budget will be going towards nuclear deterrence? Is that an appropriate level 

of funding for what Secretary Hagel recently called ‘‘DOD’s highest priority mission’’? 

Admiral HANEY. USSTRATCOM assessment is consistent with the findings in the 

recent CBO report, ‘‘Projected Costs of the U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024,’’ that 

‘‘estimates the costs of the nuclear forces represent roughly 5 percent to 6 percent 

of the total cost of the Administration’s plans for national defense for the next 10 

years.’’ 

The President’s Budget reflects a renewed emphasis on the nuclear enterprise and 

I believe the investments entailed are appropriate to ensure continued long-term viability of the Nation’s strategic deterrent force. 

However, I remain concerned continued budget uncertainty and/or a return to 

Budget Control Act (BCA) levels could very well reverse the momentum in the 

President’s Budget and negatively impact both sustainment and the ‘‘just in time’’ 

modernization programs critical to maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear 

force. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why does the United States need the long-range standoff weapon 

(LRSO)—the follow-on to the current air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)? What is 

the short, elevator speech we can bring to our fellow Members on the floor and constituents back home—why is this capability important? 

Admiral HANEY. The standoff capability combined with the flexibility of the Air 

Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) provides makes it a key component of the Nation’s 

strategic deterrence strategy. The ALCM has provided strategic deterrence for more 

than 30 years and is well past its designed 10-year service life. Aging issues are 

a cause for concern regarding reliability, availability, and survivability of this crucial capability. The Long Range Standoff (LRSO) missile replaces the current nuclear cruise missile and addresses projected adversary defense developments to ensure future objectives remain achievable. 

Projected adversary air defense developments will impact confidence in the 

ALCM’s future capabilities and overall mission effectiveness. Combined with the 

penetration capability of the B–2 and the future Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS– 

B), the LRSO will allow for continued penetration into advancing air defenses to 

deny sanctuary for potential adversaries anywhere in the world. Additionally, improved capability aspects of the LRSO ensure viability of the B–52 as a standoff 

platform to the end of its service life in 2040. Ultimately, the combination of credible 

bomber, cruise missile, and gravity weapon capabilities enable continued operational 

flexibility and the ability to signal resolve to our adversaries. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you please outline your concerns about the Open Skies treaty? 

I’m asking for your best military advice concerning potential risks to U.S. national 

security. 

Admiral HANEY. USSTRATCOM’s capabilities are not significantly impacted by 

Open Skies overflights today, any more than we have been since the Treaty was implemented in 2002. After consultation with its allies, the U.S. approved certification 

of Russia’s Electro-Optical and Multi-Spectral Imaging digital sensors in 2014. However, this did not establish a precedent for certification of any sensor/aircraft com-
75 

bination in the future. Should Russia submit a request to certify new Infrared and/ 

or Synthetic Aperture Radar capabilities, it would be prudent to conduct further 

analyses of these particular sensors and their implications for national security. 

With that being said, as the U.S. works with Russia on a number of broader concerns, Open Skies continues to serve as a fundamental transparency and confidence 

building measure in support of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you agree with DIA Director, LTGEN Stewart who recently stated to the HASC, ‘‘The Open Skies construct was designed for a different era. I am 

very concerned about how it is applied today and I’d love to talk about in a closed 

hearing.’’ 

Admiral HANEY. When negotiations on Open Skies first began in the 1990’s the 

United States and NATO were completing the NATO-Russia Founding Act with 

Russia. Since that time Russia has taken actions that fall outside internationally 

accepted norms of behavior. 

While the U.S. works with Russia on a number of broader concerns, Open Skies 

continues to serve as a fundamental transparency and confidence building measure 

in support of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Regarding specific Russian OST airspace 

restrictions (e.g., Kaliningrad, Moscow) I support the State Department’s continuing 

dialogue with Russia and effort with other States Parties, via diplomatic channels, 

to urge Russia to address U.S. concerns. 

Mr. ROGERS. As you know, U.S. Missile Defense spending is limited. At the same 

time, our allies are significantly investing, through Foreign Military Sales, in U.S. 

missile defense systems. What is OSD-Policy doing, in concert with the Joint Staff 

and COCOMs, to develop policies and guidance to make sure the U.S. can be fully 

interoperable and burden share with these allies? 

Adm. Haney: Same question to you from a COCOM perspective. 

Admiral HANEY. As threat ranges from ballistic missiles increase over time, the 

interdependencies between Combatant Commands continue to grow in importance. 

Resource constraints underscore the criticality of leveraging allied and partner capabilities to mitigate gaps. Allied and partner engagement requires a comprehensive, 

coordinated approach to facilitate advancement toward optimal Missile Defense integration. This includes more specific policy to enable information sharing and integration of allies into the regional defense architectures. 

USSTRATCOM supports the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD/ 

P), the Joint Staff, and the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) in working 

with partners and allies to resolve policy issues related to burden sharing and interoperability. Foreign Military Sales are principally a Service and MDA issue, but we 

have been working with the GCCs to look at options for planning and use of allied 

and partner systems around the world. Our largest and most successful activity is 

the ongoing 23-nation NIMBLE TITAN missile defense engagement series. These 

two-year campaigns bring partners from Europe (NATO and non-NATO states), the 

Gulf states, the Asia-Pacific region, and North America, together with the U.S. Department of State, OSD/P, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands to stimulate the dialogue on many of the policy issues related to burden sharing and interoperability. We are currently in the middle of executing the NIMBLE TITAN ’16 

campaign, which culminates with a CAPSTONE event in June 2016. 

Mr. ROGERS. I am concerned with the Air Force’s plan for space-based weather 

collection that we could be headed down a similar path of relying on unreliable partners. Should we be designing a new satellite system that would require our reliance 

on Russian and Chinese weather data for our warfighter requirements? 

Admiral HANEY. Currently we are not designing a system that relies on Russian 

or Chinese data to meet warfighter requirements, nor should we in the near future. 

Mr. ROGERS. As recently stated by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency 

at a HASC hearing on worldwide threats, ‘‘the threat to U.S. space systems and 

services will increase as potential adversaries pursue disruptive and destructive 

counterspace capabilities . . . Chinese and Russia military leaders understand the 

unique information advantages afforded by space systems and are developing capabilities to deny U.S. use of space in the event of a conflict.’’ Can you provide your 

perspective threat to our space systems? 

Admiral HANEY. Both countries have acknowledged they are developing or have 

developed counter-space capabilities. Both countries have advanced directed energy 

capabilities that could be used to track or blind satellites, disrupting key operations. 

Based on the number and diversity of China’s existing and developmental 

counterspace capabilities, China probably will be able to hold at risk U.S. national 

security satellites in every orbital regime in the next five to ten years. Russia has 

publically stated they are developing counterspace capabilities and replacing Sovietmade on-orbit ballistic missile early warning systems. 
76 

Mr. ROGERS. The 2010 National Space Policy states that the Secretary of Defense 

shall ‘‘Develop capabilities, plans, and options to deter, defend against, and, if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with or attack U.S. or allied space systems’’. What 

is the priority of this responsibility for STRATCOM? 

Admiral HANEY. Space-based capabilities and effects are vital to U.S. warfighting, 

homeland security, and our way of life. Our national security is inextricably dependent on space capabilities. Therefore, addressing challenges in space remains a top 

priority for USSTRATCOM. We continue to work with the entire DOD community 

to keep pace with growing threats to our space systems. The recently released President’s Budget (PB 16) provides $4.7 billion of additional space security investments that are essential for enhancing our Space Situational Awareness, updating our Command and Control systems, and improving our 

Offensive and Defensive Space Capabilities. Additionally, USSTRATCOM is updating all of its operational plans and nearing completion on a major update to our concept plan for space operations. These planning efforts specifically address defending 

and protecting our space capabilities in an increasingly contested domain. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you discuss the importance of assured access to space and maintaining two launch systems that are capable of delivering national security satellites 

into orbit? 

Admiral HANEY. USSTRATCOM needs assured access to space to accomplish our 

UCP-assigned missions. Perturbations in the launch schedule place warfighting capability at risk. Multiple launch systems capable of delivering national security satellites into orbit increases our confidence that we’ll have the capabilities we need 

when we need them. 

Mr. ROGERS. What within the NDERG process do you feel is of value and what 

would you like to see done with this group? Are actions performed by the NDERG 

in any way duplicative with the NWC? 

Admiral HANEY. The Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) is 

a forum for the SECDEF to understand the status of the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise and associated sustainment and modernization programs given the importance 

of this strategic capability for our national security. This allows SECDEF the opportunity to interface with key stakeholders and leaders to synchronize efforts and hold 

leaders accountable for delivering a safe, secure, effective and credible nuclear strategic deterrent. I feel these forums are essential for mission success and are an effective and efficient process to resolve issues. It is vital that the performance of this 

critical mission continues to get this additional focus. 

The actions of the NDERG and Nuclear Weapon Council (NWC) are not duplicative. The NWC is a joint activity of the DOD and DOE established in public law. 

Their responsibilities are focused primarily on the activities supporting the Nation’s 

nuclear weapons stockpile and aligning DOE bomb and warhead sustainment and 

modernization programs with complementary DOD systems and programs. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is driving the requirement to modernize our nuclear capabilities? Is it age of our forces or the ongoing modernization efforts of other nuclear 

powers? 

Admiral HANEY. Simply stated, we’ve deferred many programs for as long as possible and any additional slip could result in a loss of capability and increased cost. 

Today’s complex and dangerous global security environment, to include the ongoing 

modernization efforts of other nuclear powers, demands that we properly sustain 

and modernize our strategic capabilities. The President’s FY16 Budget strikes a responsible balance between national priorities and fiscal realities, and begins to reduce some of the risk we have accumulated because of deferred maintenance and 

sustainment as we pursue modernization. This budget supports my mission requirements. We cannot as a Nation afford to underfund these vital missions, especially 

given that other nations are modernizing their strategic capabilities. We 

have delayed investment in some of the replacement capabilities for too long 

and we must not delay these programs any further: examples Ohio Replacement Program, Long Range Strike Bomber, B–61 and Long Range Standoff 

(LRSO) missile, Minuteman replacement. We must have sustained resources 

dedicated in PB16 and beyond. I remain concerned that if we do not receive relief 

from the Budget Control Act, we will experience significant risk in providing the 

U.S. with the strategic capabilities it needs. 

Mr. ROGERS. If sequestration were to return, what would your assessment be of 

the impact on sustainment and modernization of our nuclear forces? 

Admiral HANEY. If fiscal constraints are imposed by the Budget Control Act, it 

would measurably weaken our national defense, and provide encouragement and 

momentum to America’s foes. The missions that have the highest risk are those missions requiring strategic deterrence and assurance capabilities that take time to replace once they are no longer available. Sequestration in FY 2013 resulted in adjust-
77 

ments to our nuclear force sustainment and modernization plans to fit within the 

appropriated resources. Return of sequestration jeopardizes our ability to meet our 

national defense strategy by incurring unacceptable levels of risk. 

The President’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget strikes a responsible balance between national priorities and fiscal realities, and begins to address accumulated risks from 

deferred sustainment and modernization programs for weapons systems and infrastructure. Budget cuts imposed by sequestration will cause capability gaps in the 

coming decade because there is no margin left in the timeline required to modernize 

our strategic forces before our current capabilities become unsustainable. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why is a Triad of nuclear forces still necessary? What can we do 

with three legs that we can’t do with one or two? 

Admiral HANEY. Every day, the Triad deters potential adversaries, assures allies, 

and preserves stability with countries that pose an existential threat to the United 

States. It is the combination of attributes across the Triad that ensures potential 

adversaries understand they cannot escalate their way out of a failed conflict. The 

Triad imposes unacceptable costs and denies benefits of a strategic attack against 

the United States. 

The integration of warning, NC3, attribution, and nuclear forces provides an assured response across all postures. Our ICBM force promotes deterrence and stability by fielding a responsive and resilient capability. The Navy’s SSBNs and Trident II D5 ballistic missiles constitute the Triad’s most survivable leg. Our dualcapable B–52 and B–2 bombers continue to provide significant conventional capabilities along with flexibility and visibility. Finally, the three legs of the Triad provide 

the capability to mitigate risk caused by technological failure of any weapon or platform, technical advances by our adversaries, or significant changes in the geo-political environment. If the nuclear forces were reduced to a Dyad or Monad, the ability 

to deter, assure, and manage risk is significantly degraded. 

Mr. ROGERS. Since the President’s goal is a world free of nuclear weapons, why 

should we modernize our nuclear capabilities? 

Admiral HANEY. The President also said ‘‘So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in 

my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence.’’ He went on to state ‘‘Make no 

mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, 

secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to 

our allies.’’ 

The U.S. has a long-standing commitment to reduce nuclear forces consistent with 

national policy and geopolitical conditions. This has been demonstrated by an enduring track record of arms reduction treaties including on-going force structure 

changes under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. However, as long as nuclear attack remains an existential threat, we must commit resources to ensure our 

deterrent forces remain viable and credible. 

Modernization enables incorporation of modern safety and security features into 

weapons that were designed decades ago; allows reductions in the number of weapons by reducing numbers and types of warheads (e.g., B61–12 modernization). In 

order to maintain strategic stability, the United States must retain an effective nuclear capability, especially in light of adversary nuclear modernization efforts. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why do you need a replacement for the ALCM? 

Admiral HANEY. The Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) has provided strategic 

deterrence for over 30 years, but is well past its designed 10-year service life and 

aging issues will begin to adversely affect reliability, availability, and survivability. 

The stand-off capability combined with the maximum flexibility the ALCM provides 

makes it a key component of the Nation’s strategic deterrence strategy. The LongRange Standoff missile (LRSO) replaces the ALCM and addresses projected adversary air defense developments. 

Projected adversary air defense developments will impact confidence in the 

ALCM’s future capabilities and overall mission effectiveness. Combined with the 

penetration capability of the B–2 and the future Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS– 

B), the LRSO will allow for continued penetration into advancing air defenses to 

deny sanctuary for potential adversaries anywhere in the world. Additionally, improved capability aspects of the LRSO ensure viability of the B–52 as a standoff 

platform to the end of its service life in 2040. Ultimately, the LRSO will play a key 

role in enabling continued operational flexibility and in ensuring the ability to signal resolve to our adversaries. 

Mr. ROGERS. Can the Ohio-class be extended any further? 

Admiral HANEY. No, the OHIO-class submarines cannot be extended any further. 

The submarines original life span was projected for 30 years. However by the ingenuity of our engineers which have examined the design and looked for every effi-
78 

ciency to extend its life, the submarine can remain viable and in service for 42 

years. The Ohio-class will be the oldest class of submarine the U.S. has ever operated when they begin to retire in 2027. The Navy is delivering the OHIO Replacement SSBN ‘‘just in time’’ to prevent a critical capability gap. Additional replacement schedule slips will lead to a situation where current U.S. strategic deterrence 

requirements will not be met. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why is there increased investment in space capabilities in PB16? 

Why is it important? 

Admiral HANEY. Our potential adversaries have signaled their ability to conduct 

hostile operations in space as a natural extension of the terrestrial battlefield, and 

consider these operations essential to deny U.S. forces the asymmetric advantages 

of space. China launched an anti-satellite test in 2007 and July 2014. Russia has 

publicly stated it is expanding its counterspace capabilities, while in the possession 

of anti-satellite weapons and conducting anti-satellite research. This budget supports my mission requirements, maintains our asymmetric advantage in space, and 

protects our strategic capabilities. 

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