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ANALYZING MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL 

LAW ENFORCEMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

HOMELAND SECURITY, AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 15, 2015 

Serial No. 114–28 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DAVE TROTT, Michigan 

MIKE BISHOP, Michigan 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, HOMELAND SECURITY, AND INVESTIGATIONS

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin, Chairman 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas, Vice-Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MIKE BISHOP, Michigan 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

CAROLINE LYNCH, Chief Counsel 

JOE GRAUPENSPERGER, Minority Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

APRIL 15, 2015 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Honorable Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, United States Department 

of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Honorable John Roth, Inspector General, United States Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17 

Herman E. ‘‘Chuck’’ Whaley, Deputy Chief Inspector, Office of Professional 

Responsibility, Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 29 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 31 

Mark Hughes, Chief Integrity Officer, United States Secret Service, United 

States Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 46 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 48 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations ...... 1 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations ......................... 2 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee 

on the Judiciary ................................................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Response to Questions for the Record from the Honorable Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, United States Department of Justice ........................ 78 

Response to Questions for the Record from the Honorable John Roth, Inspector General, United States Department of Homeland Security ....................... 80 

Response to Questions for the Record from Herman E. ‘‘Chuck’’ Whaley, 

Deputy Chief Inspector, Office of Professional Responsibility, Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of Justice ............................ 82 

Response to Questions for the Record from Mark Hughes, Chief Integrity 

Officer, United States Secret Service, United States Department of Homeland Security ........................................................................................................ 86 

(1) 

ANALYZING MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL 

LAW ENFORCEMENT 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 15, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

HOMELAND SECURITY, AND INVESTIGATIONS

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn Office Building, the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Sensenbrenner, Goodlatte, Chabot, Poe, 

Labrador, Buck, Bishop, Jackson Lee, and Richmond. 

Staff present: (Majority) Robert Parmiter, Counsel; Alicia 

Church, Clerk; Allison Halataei, Parliamentarian & General Counsel; (Minority) Joe Graupensperger, Counsel; and Veronica Eligan, 

Professional Staff Member. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 

Homeland Security, and Investigations will come to order. 

Let me say, we are due to have roll calls a little bit after 3:15, 

and in order to save time, I am going to ask unanimous consent 

to put my opening statement into the record and ask unanimous 

consent that everybody else’s opening statement be put into the 

record. This will give more time for testimony and more time for 

questions. 

Without objection, that is so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sensenbrenner follows:] 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations 

Good afternoon, and welcome to today’s hearing. 

Over the past few years, there have been a number of troubling allegations regarding misconduct by Federal law enforcement agents. Since April 2012 alone, 

nearly a dozen high-profile, widely-reported incidents involving highly-trained law 

enforcement personnel, including at the Secret Service and the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, have roiled some of our nation’s most venerated law enforcement 

agencies and have shaken law-abiding Americans’ faith in these institutions. 

In addition to the problems that have been reported in the media, and which 

largely involve the Secret Service, the Justice Department released documents on 

Monday to this Committee which cause me grave concern. In 2010, a DEA Special 

Agent in Bogota, Colombia, who was a frequent patron of prostitution, assaulted a 

prostitute and ‘‘left the woman bloody.’’ He was ultimately suspended for 14 days. 
2 

In 2011, a DEA agent solicited sex from an undercover police officer here in the District of Columbia. He was suspended for a baffling 8 days. And in 2012, as we all 

know from the recent OIG report, DEA agents engaged in ‘‘sex parties’’ with prostitutes supplied by drug cartels. Ten individuals were involved. Two received letters 

of reprimand. One retired. The remaining seven were suspended by DEA for ‘‘Poor 

Judgment’’ and ‘‘Conduct Unbecoming’’, for 2, 1, 3, 3, 9, 10, and 8 days, respectively. 

‘‘Poor Judgment,’’ indeed. 

I will not go into the remaining allegations in detail, because I have only five minutes, because we have all heard similarly salacious details from reading the news, 

and because our friends at the DOJ and DHS Offices of Inspectors General have 

done excellent work in this area. However, it is clear that the allegations of sexual 

misconduct and other shenanigans at the Secret Service and the DEA have given 

the American people the impression that these federal agencies, rather than being 

bastions of professionalism and integrity, can sometimes turn a blind eye to behavior that is better suited for the frat house, or the big house, than the White House. 

Additionally, I am very troubled by the lack of transparency in the disciplinary 

process. We all know it is unreasonably difficult to fire a federal employee, even for 

gross misconduct. However, the evidence points to an epidemic of ‘‘under-discipline’’ 

at the DEA. In many cases, we have heard that the offending employees are merely 

placed on administrative leave, moved to desk duty, or quietly ‘‘resign,’’ for conduct 

that would be grounds for immediate termination in the private sector. This cycle 

of chronic ‘‘under-punishment’’ must not be allowed to continue, particularly since 

many of these agents have done nothing less than engage in criminal behavior. I 

am interested in hearing more from our panel about exactly what happens when 

the agencies receive a complaint about the conduct of an employee. 

Following the latest DOJ–OIG report, even Attorney General Holder felt compelled to act. He issued a memo which ‘‘reiterate[d] to all Department personnel, 

including attorneys and law enforcement officers, that they are prohibited from soliciting, procuring, or accepting commercial sex.’’ As at least one commentator noted, 

‘‘Finally, a Holder memo that got it right.’’ However, the fact that the Attorney General would feel compelled to issue a memo reminding law enforcement professionals 

not to solicit prostitutes shows there are real problems at these agencies. That is 

why we are here today. 

Let me be clear: our intent is not to disparage the vast majority of federal law 

enforcement personnel, who do their jobs professionally and honorably. The Secret 

Service employs some 6,500 people, and DEA has 10,000 employees. Every large 

agency will have a few ‘‘bad apples,’’ and incidents of this nature will occur. However, the public perception is that federal law enforcement personnel can engage in 

severe misconduct, including conduct that would be illegal if committed in the 

United States, and the agencies do not take it seriously. It is my hope that our distinguished panel can help this committee identify areas where problems exist in the 

disciplinary process for federal agents, so that we can implement real solutions. 

I look forward to engaging with our panel today on all these questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:] 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations 

Today’s hearing reflects bipartisan concern about serious instances of misconduct 

by federal law enforcement agents and the need to examine the adequacy of the 

processes used to report and investigate misconduct, as well as take disciplinary action when warranted. 

Much of the attention to this issue was initially prompted by the revelations in 

2012 involving the solicitation of prostitutes by agents of the Secret Service and the 

DEA. 

At the time, it was reported that a dozen Secret Service agents engaged the services of prostitutes before a presidential visit to Colombia for the Summit of the 

Americas, which I attended, and we subsequently learned that DEA agents were involved in that and other incidents involving prostitutes in Colombia. 

In my capacity as Member of the Committee on Homeland Security as well as this 

Committee, I examined the Cartagena incident, and met with then-Director Mark 

Sullivan to express my concern and press for strong corrective action, particularly 

regarding interaction between agents and foreign nationals while agents are working in foreign countries. 
3 

In fact, I have had a history of strong oversight with respect to issues involving 

the Secret Service, ranging from the intrusion into the White House last year to the 

2009 incident in which a couple evaded security to attend a state dinner at the 

White House honoring the Prime Minister of India. 

I have met with each of the directors of the Secret Service on multiple occasions 

over the past several years to discuss and address performance and misconduct 

issues. Their mission is critical and Congress must work to support and strengthen 

that agency. 

Certainly, we should engage in consistent, vigorous oversight of all of the federal 

law enforcement agencies to ensure that agents are conducting themselves appropriately and within the bounds of the law. As the recent report of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice makes clear, we have a lot of work to do to address unacceptable incidents at a number of our federal law enforcement agencies, 

particularly including the DEA. 

However appropriate this hearing may be, I call on this Subcommittee to take on 

other issues related to law enforcement—but at the state and local level. 

We cannot ignore the fact that we have a crisis involving use of force by police 

in this country. Because no accurate statistics are required to be submitted or maintained, we do not know the actual frequency of police shootings across the country, 

or all of the circumstances in which they take place. 

I call on this Subcommittee to address these issues by holding hearings and considering legislation concerning topics such as (1) the use of lethal force by state and 

local police departments, (2) educational requirements, mental health and psychological evaluations, and training in non-violent conflict resolution received by officers and recruits, (3) the use of technological devices such as body cameras, and (4) 

the state of social science research and statistics in criminal justice reform. 

We have an obligation to the American people to investigate these issues, to find 

answers, and adopt solutions. 

Less than two weeks ago, a police officer in North Charleston, South Carolina 

shot and killed Walter Scott, an unarmed African American man. Cell phone video 

footage showed that Scott, who was struck by four of the eight bullets fired at him, 

was running away from the officer. 

The victim’s mother, Judy Scott, stated that, ‘‘I almost couldn’t look at it, to see 

my son running defenselessly, being shot. I just tore my heart to pieces. I pray that 

this never happens to another person.’’ 

Her prayer is our call to action. We must investigate what is going on with these 

shootings, which happen with alarming frequency, and we must help prevent them 

from taking place in the future. That is why I ask that this Subcommittee take on 

this issue. 

So as we proceed with the current hearing, to address important concerns related 

to federal law enforcement, I hope that we will resolve to work on a bipartisan basis 

to address these other critical issues as well. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goodlatte follows:] 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary 

Thank you, Chairman Sensenbrenner. I am pleased to be here today, and I am 

looking forward to a frank and detailed discussion with our distinguished witnesses, 

and the Members of this Subcommittee, on this important subject. 

During my tenure at the helm of this Committee, I have repeatedly expressed my 

appreciation for the dedicated law enforcement professionals who protect and serve 

our communities. Every day, thousands of federal law enforcement agents are hard 

at work, doing their part to keep Americans safe and delivering them the justice 

they deserve. 

Unfortunately, the indispensable services provided by the mostly-anonymous men 

and women of law enforcement are not what we are here today to discuss. Instead, 

we must deal with serious misconduct that has caused the public to forget that competent and professional service they expect from their federal law enforcement professionals. It is an inescapable fact that the exposure of a rogue agent or unsavory 

incident or series of incidents—such as agents engaging in sex parties with prostitutes paid for by drug cartels—stick in the collective memory more firmly than entire careers worth of effective, unblemished law enforcement work. That is why it 
4 

is so important that we get to the bottom of the troubling revelations involving our 

federal law enforcement agencies over the last decade. 

My colleagues have already laid out some of the specific lapses in professionalism 

and more details can be found in the press. Over the past few days, this Committee 

has received additional information from the DEA indicating that our concerns 

about agent misconduct, particularly of a sexual nature, are well-founded. However, 

of equal concern to me is the apparent lack of a sufficient response to that misconduct by the officials in the chain of command. The case examples we have seen 

point to an agency with a disturbing tendency not to appropriately investigate and 

punish federal law enforcement agents who engage in severe sexual and other misconduct. 

I am pleased that, though they are quite late in doing so, the agencies appearing 

before this Committee today finally seem to be taking this seriously. In December 

2013, the Secret Service created its Office of Integrity, headed by a Chief Integrity 

Officer, who I assume has been quite busy over the last year-and-a-half. On Monday, we received a communication from the DEA indicating that their Office of Professional Responsibility would undertake ‘‘a comprehensive review of DEA’s processes and procedures for investigating allegations of misconduct, as well as for determining and effectuating disciplinary action where appropriate.’’ 

It is good that DEA is conducting that review. I hope your review will result in 

significant and worthwhile changes to the disciplinary process. However, what troubles me is that we are learning about all of this only after these allegations have 

become public. The perception of agencies ‘‘protecting their own’’ and bad actors receiving ‘‘slaps on the wrist’’ has gained traction, and Congress has gotten involved. 

As professional law enforcement agencies, your integrity should be above reproach. 

Today, this Committee will examine these issues and the processes in place to address misconduct at the Secret Service and the DEA. I will be interested in our witnesses’ responses to a wide array of questions. What have you done to address these 

matters, at the ground level? Why was this misconduct allowed to persist for so 

long, and why does it keep occurring? Does Congress need to legislate in this area? 

And most importantly, as the officials responsible for investigating and dispensing 

discipline, how will you ensure that this sort of profoundly disreputable behavior 

will be met with an appropriately robust response in the future? 

We all have a responsibility to ensure that such behavior, should it happen again 

in the future, is handled appropriately so that trust is rebuilt with the American 

people and the reputations of our federal law enforcement agencies are restored. 

I thank the witnesses for their testimony, and yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:] 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary 

The vast majority of federal law enforcement agents perform as we would hope, 

and in fact often engage in acts above and beyond the call of duty. We are grateful 

for their service. Unfortunately, the past few years have brought to light a number 

of instances of unacceptable conduct by some of the agents reporting to the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. 

I have several observations and recommendations concerning this issue. 

First, it is unacceptable for law enforcement officers to solicit prostitution, engage 

in sexual harassment, or allow alcohol use to impair their judgment. Misconduct by 

law enforcement agents involves harm to anyone who would be victimized by their 

behavior, damages morale within the agencies, and undermines the moral authority 

necessary for agents to enforce the law against others. 

Of course these are problems suffered extensively outside the law enforcement 

community as well. But this Committee is charged with the responsibility of overseeing the actions of these agents, and we must investigate these problems and 

identify solutions. 

Consequently, we must ensure that there are strong, independent mechanisms to 

review allegations of misconduct. It is difficult for government agencies to police 

themselves. That is why we have Inspectors General and other offices within agencies charged with investigating misconduct and imposing disciplinary measures, as 

governed by the civil service statutes. 

The authority of the Inspectors General must be respected within the Departments, and they must have wide latitude to pursue indications of waste, fraud, and 

abuse. That is why I am disturbed that the DEA and FBI reportedly withheld infor-
5 

mation from Inspector General’s investigation into these issues. I hope we will hear 

more about that today. 

Finally, I believe the issues we will explore today provide additional justification 

for H.R. 1656, the ‘‘Secret Service Improvements Act,’’ which will strengthen the Secret Service largely by authorizing additional training and resources. I cosponsor 

this bill together with Chairman Bob Goodlatte, Crime Subcommittee Chairman Jim 

Sensenbrenner, and Crime Subcommittee Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee. 

As we have learned through hearings and other oversight in recent months, that 

agency has been stretched thin and morale has suffered. Assistance that the bill 

would provide will help the Secret Service better perform its critical mission and 

also help a stronger agency work to prevent future misconduct. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their experience with these 

issues and hope they will provide us with recommendations as to what steps we can 

take not only to better address instances of agent misconduct, but also to help prevent them from happening in the first place. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I will now introduce each of the witnesses. 

We have a very distinguished panel today. 

I will begin by swearing in our witnesses before introducing 

them. So if you would, all please rise. 

Do you and each of you solemnly swear that the testimony you 

are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you God? 

Let the record show that each of the witnesses answered in the 

affirmative. 

You will be getting an abbreviated introduction, as well. 

The first witness is the Honorable Michael Horowitz, who is the 

Inspector General of the Department of Justice. He is well known 

to this Committee. He has worked for DOJ in both main Justice 

as an Assistant Attorney General and as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. 

The Honorable John Roth is the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security. He most recently served as Director of 

the Office of Criminal Investigations of the Food and Drug Administration. He is a former Federal prosecutor, a senior official at the 

Department of Justice, and at DOJ he was the Department’s lead 

representative on the Financial Action Task Force in Paris. 

Herman Whaley is the Deputy Chief Inspector of the Office of 

Professional Responsibility at the DEA. He has had a professional 

career in local law enforcement, as well as a DEA Special Agent 

and a group supervisor. 

Mark Hughes is the Deputy Assistant Director and Chief Integrity Officer of the Office of Integrity at the Secret Service. He has 

previously been the Deputy Special Agent in Charge of the Washington field office, and the Deputy Special Agent in Charge of the 

Secret Service’s Office of Inspection. 

So I think all of you know the drill. You have a red, yellow, and 

green light in front of you. The green light means talk away. The 

yellow light means start to wrap it up. The red light means that 

the hook is about ready to be prepared. 

Mr. Horowitz—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a parliamentary inquiry? What is happening to the opening statements? 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. They have been dispensed with by unanimous consent, everybody’s, and they will all be put in the record. 
6 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, with a great deal of respect, Mr. Chairman, I realize I had a constituent in the anteroom, but I will hope 

to be able to make comments regarding my opening statement. So 

I thank the Chairman very much. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Well, each of you will be recognized 

for 5 minutes; and, Mr. Horowitz, you are first. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ, INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Jackson Lee, Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting 

me to testify today. 

Federal agents are held to the highest standards of conduct, both 

on duty and off duty. As a former Federal prosecutor and as Inspector General, I know that the overwhelming majority of Department agents meet those high standards and perform their work 

with great integrity and honor, thereby keeping our communities 

safe and our country safe. 

Nevertheless, we find instances where Department agents engage in serious misconduct, and even criminal violations, affecting 

the agency’s reputation, potentially compromising prosecutions, 

and possibly affecting agency operations. 

Furthermore, misconduct that involves sexual harassment affects 

employee morale and creates a hostile work environment. 

Following the incidents during the President’s trip to Colombia, 

the OIG conducted two reviews, one relating to Department policies 

and training involving off-duty misconduct by employees working 

in foreign countries, and one relating to the handling of allegations 

of sexual harassment and misconduct by Department law enforcement components. 

Our off-duty conduct report found a lack of Department-wide 

policies or other training requirements pertaining to off-duty conduct, whether in the U.S. or other countries. This was particularly 

concerning given recommendations we made in 1996 that the Department provide additional training regarding off-duty conduct 

and examine the standards of conduct that apply to off-duty behavior. Despite our earlier recommendations, little had changed in the 

intervening two decades. 

We did find the FBI made changes, including providing comprehensive training for its employees. However, the other three Department law enforcement components convey little or no information about off-duty conduct before sending their employees abroad. 

Having one of only four law enforcement components effectively 

prepare employees for these assignments demonstrates the need for 

Department-wide training and policies. 

In March 2015, we issued our report on the nature of reporting, 

investigation, and adjudication of allegations of sexual harassment 

or misconduct in the Department’s four law enforcement components. The report identified significant and systemic issues that require prompt corrective action. These include a lack of coordination 

between internal affairs offices and security personnel, failure to 

report misconduct allegations to component headquarters, failure 

to investigate allegations fully, weaknesses in the adjudication 
7 

process, and weaknesses in detecting and preserving sexually explicit text messages and images. Together, these reviews demonstrate the need to improve disciplinary and security processes, as 

well as to clearly communicate Department expectations for employee conduct. 

Strong and unequivocal action from leadership at all levels is 

critical to ensure employees meet the highest standards of conduct 

and are held fully accountable for any misconduct. 

As we also described in our March report, the failure by the DEA 

and FBI to provide prompt information to us in response to our requests significantly impacted our review. Both agencies raised 

baseless objections and only relented when I elevated the issues to 

agency leadership. Even then, the information was incomplete. 

In order to conduct effective oversight, an OIG must have timely 

and complete access to documents and materials. This review 

starkly demonstrates the danger in allowing those being reviewed 

to decide on their own what documents they will share with the 

OIG. These actions impeded our work, significantly delayed the discovery of the issues that we ultimately were able to identify, wasted Department and OIG resources, and affected our confidence in 

the completeness of our review. 

Unfortunately, this was not an isolated incident, and we continue 

to face repeated instances in which our timely access to records is 

impeded. Congress recognized the significance of this issue in passing Section 218 in the recent Appropriations Act. Nevertheless, the 

FBI continues to proceed exactly as it did before Section 218 was 

enacted. 

We were told an opinion from the Department’s Office of Legal 

Counsel would resolve this issue. Yet 1 year later, after the Department Deputy Attorney General requested that opinion, we still 

don’t have the opinion and we have no timeline for its completion. 

The Department has said the opinion is a priority, yet the length 

of time that has passed would suggest otherwise. 

The American public deserves and expects an OIG that is able 

to conduct rigorous oversight of the Department’s and FBI’s activities. Unfortunately, our ability to do so is being undercut every day 

that goes by without a resolution of the dispute. 

Thank you for your continued strong bipartisan support for our 

work, and I would welcome any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Horowitz follows:] 
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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Horowitz. 

Mr. Roth? 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOHN ROTH, INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ROTH. Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Jackson 

Lee, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me 

to testify here today to discuss Federal law enforcement misconduct 

within the Department of Homeland Security. 

Inspectors General play a critical role in ensuring transparent, 

honest, effective, and accountable government. The personal and 

organizational independence of IG investigators, free to carry out 

their work without interference by agency officials, is essential in 

maintaining the public trust not only of the IG’s work but of the 

DHS workforce as a whole. 

Many DHS components have internal affairs offices that conduct 

investigations. Under the authority of the IG Act, the IG has oversight responsibility for those internal affairs offices. This oversight 

responsibility generally takes three forms. 

First, we determine upon receipt of a complaint whether the allegations are of the type that should be investigated by the IG rather 

than the component’s internal affairs office. A DHS management 

directive establishes the IG’s right of first refusal to conduct investigations of misconduct by DHS employees. 

Second, for those investigations the internal affairs offices conduct, we have the authority to receive reports on and monitor the 

status of those investigations. 

Lastly, we conduct oversight reviews of DHS component internal 

affairs offices to ensure compliance with applicable policies, reporting requirements, and accepted law enforcement practices. 

The Department employs more than 240,000 employees and 

nearly an equal number of contract personnel, including a large 

number of law enforcement officers and agents in the U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Secret Service, and the Transportation Security Administration. We have about 200 investigators in headquarters and 

about 30 field offices across the country, which means we have less 

than one investigator for every thousand DHS employees. 

Last year we received over 16,000 complaints. A substantial 

number of those complaints alleged DHS personnel engaged in misconduct. We initiated 564 investigations. The remainder were referred to component internal affairs offices, other agencies, or were 

closed. Our investigations resulted in 112 criminal convictions and 

36 personnel actions. Thirteen of these convictions involved DHS 

law enforcement personnel, and 21 of the 36 personnel actions involved law enforcement. These convictions and personnel actions 

were for various offenses including theft, narcotics, child pornography and bribery. 

In addition to the criminal matters we handled that are in my 

written testimony, we are also responsible for handling hundreds 

of complaints about employee misconduct. These include misuse of 

government assets, including government vehicles, failure to report 

certain contacts with foreign nationals, engaging in prohibited per-
16 

sonnel practices, violation of conflict of interest restrictions on 

former DHS employees, violation of ethical standards concerning 

government employees, improper disclosure of classified or law enforcement-sensitive information, illegal drug use or excessive alcohol use, and domestic violence and other state and local crimes that 

affect fitness for duty. 

Although a small percentage of our employees have committed 

criminal acts and other misconduct warranting sanctions, the behavior of these few should not be used to draw conclusions about 

the character, integrity, or work ethic of the many. I am personally 

grateful for the hard work and commitment to the mission demonstrated daily by the DHS workforce. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome 

any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:] 
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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Whaley? 

TESTIMONY OF HERMAN E. ‘‘CHUCK’’ WHALEY, DEPUTY CHIEF 

INSPECTOR, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. WHALEY. Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to testify here today. I appreciate the opportunity to explain how DEA responds to allegations of employee misconduct. 

I currently lead DEA’s Office of Professional Responsibility, 

which conducts investigations of all allegations of misconduct 

against DEA employees. Misconduct is generally defined as any 

violation of the Federal, state, or local law, or any violation of DEA 

standards of conduct. OPR also monitors trends in employee conduct and behavior; makes recommendations to DEA’s executive 

management when there are weaknesses in DEA’s internal controls, policies or procedures; and serves as a liaison to the Office 

of the Inspector General at the Department of Justice, as well as 

to other law enforcement internal affairs units in furtherance of 

misconduct investigations. 

As a career special agent with over 30 years of law enforcement 

experience, I take my role seriously. I want to protect the reputation of all the DEA special agents that act with integrity in fulfilling our vital mission by holding accountable those who don’t. We 

are DEA’s single point of contact for all accusations of misconduct 

against any DEA employee, contractor, or deputized task force officer. This is true regardless of the source of the allegations, whether 

they are made anonymously by other DEA employees, supervisors, 

or the general public. 

I can assure you my office takes every allegation of misconduct 

seriously and has procedures in place to ensure that complete, 

thorough, and fair investigations are conducted. DEA’s Office of 

Professional Responsibility is the first of three parts of DEA’s Integrity Assurance Program. Our role is limited to the investigation 

of allegations of misconduct. The Office of Professional Responsibility has no role in the process of imposing discipline. We collect 

and document the facts without opinion or bias and forward that 

information to DEA’s Board of Professional Conduct, which imposes 

discipline. The case is subsequently forwarded to the office of the 

deciding official, who determines any disciplinary action. 

The Office of Professional Responsibility works closely with the 

Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice to ensure all allegations are appropriately investigated. For every allegation that we receive, OPR shares the allegation with the Office 

of the Inspector General. OIG reviews each accusation of misconduct and determines how the complaint will be investigated. 

They can choose to investigate the complaint unilaterally, refer the 

complaint back to DEA and monitor the investigation, or they can 

refer the complaint back to OPR for us to investigate. 

While I understand we are here to talk generally about how misconduct allegations are handled by Federal law enforcement, the 
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recent report by the Inspector General is also relevant. We must 

constantly learn lessons and seek to improve our efforts. 

In addition to implementing all of the OIG recommendations, 

DEA has taken concrete steps to improve both the training we provide DEA employees, as well as how we coordinate investigations 

when allegations are made in an effort to avoid such problems in 

the future. These steps include ensuring that it is clearly understood by all DEA employees that this kind of behavior is unacceptable; outlining steps that employees and supervisors must take 

when incidents occur; increasing training for all employees, particularly those employees assigned overseas; further explaining the 

guidelines for disciplinary offenses; and improving internal procedures so appropriate individuals and field management and the Office of Security Programs and the Office of Professional Responsibility are promptly made aware of allegations so they can take appropriate action in a timely manner. 

Consistent with the recent direction put forth by the Attorney 

General which seeks to not only improve the communication between my office and the Office of Security Programs, but also to review the security clearances of the investigative subjects cited in 

the OIG report, I am committed to continuing to review and push 

for changes to improve this process. I appreciate the feedback provided by the OIG and look forward to continuing to work with 

them to improve our systems. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today. I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Whaley follows:] 
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APPENDIX A 
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APPENDIX B 
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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you, Mr. Whaley. 

Mr. Hughes? 

TESTIMONY OF MARK HUGHES, CHIEF INTEGRITY OFFICER, 

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HUGHES. Good afternoon, Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking 

Member Jackson Lee, Chairman Goodlatte, and distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you to discuss recent enhancements to the Secret 

Service policies and procedures that address allegations of employee misconduct. 

The Secret Service must address allegations of employee misconduct aggressively, fairly, and consistently. Any employee, regardless of rank or position, who violates our standards of conduct 

to include the failure to report misconduct will be held accountable. 

Secret Service employees take great pride in successfully carrying out the vital mission of our agency on a daily basis around 

the world. Unfortunately, the successes of the many have been 

overshadowed by the unacceptable failures of the few, resulting in 

significant changes to the way in which the Secret Service adjudicates allegations of employee misconduct. 

In May 2012, the Secret Service established the Professional Reinforcement Working Group, or the PRWG. This group, co-chaired 

by former OPM Director John Berry and Director Connie Patrick 

of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, affirmed many 

existing Secret Service practices and identified enhancements that 

could be implemented to further support the workforce. The Secret 

Service accepted these recommendations, and all of them have 

since been fully implemented. 

Additionally, the DHS OIG issued a report in December of 2013 

stating that it did not find evidence that misconduct is widespread 

in the Secret Service. However, the report contained a number of 

recommendations for the agency, some of which paralleled those of 

the PRWG, and all were fully implemented by April of 2014. 

Several recommendations focused on establishing a robust disciplinary process grounded on transparency, consistency, and fairness. They also led to the establishment of an Office of Integrity, 

a new set of disciplinary policies and procedures, and the development of a Table of Penalties which identifies specific actions that 

constitute misconduct, along with a range of potential discipline. 

As the process now stands, outside of a limited number of minor 

violations, allegations are required to be reported through the 

chain of command to the Office of Professional Responsibility, or 

the OPR. Under certain circumstances, including allegations that 

are criminal in nature or involve senior supervisory personnel, the 

agency must, pursuant to Department directives, refer the matter 

to the DHS OIG. 

The OIG will then make a determination whether to accept the 

case for further investigation or refer the matter back to the OPR. 

Following either the OIG’s declination of the referral or the completion of its investigation, the allegations are forwarded to the intake 

group chaired by the special agent in charge of the Secret Service 

Inspection Division. 
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Ultimately, substantiated allegations are presented to the Office 

of Integrity. Established in December of 2013, the Office of Integrity reports directly to the Office of the Deputy Director and oversees adherence to Secret Service code of conduct by impartially adjudicating employee misconduct in a fair, consistent, and timely 

manner. In accordance with the Table of Penalties and taking into 

consideration any mitigating factors such as the acceptance of responsibility or aggravating factors such as whether an employee 

holds a supervisory position, the Deputy Chief Integrity Officer will 

prepare a formal disciplinary proposal for presentation to the employee. Employees subject to disciplinary action are afforded certain procedural rights pursuant to Title 5 of the United States 

Code, regulations issued by OPM, and corresponding Secret Service 

disciplinary procedures. There is no doubt that the resulting process can take time and can be cumbersome. However, that system 

was put in place by Congress to protect the rights of the government employees, and we at the Secret Service must respect and operate within that framework. 

The foundation of this discipline process is strong. Standards of 

conduct will, however, need to be periodically reinforced and in 

some instances adjusted, and the consequences for failing to meet 

them will need to be clearly communicated. These functions are 

core responsibilities of the Office of Integrity. 

For instance, following the March 4 incident, Director Clancy, in 

coordination with my office, issued an official message to all Secret 

Service employees making clear that they are required to report 

through their chain of command any activities that violate the Secret Service standards of conduct. 

Secret Service employees are provided with a number of avenues 

to report misconduct, including the ombudsman, the OPR, Inspection Division, the DHS OIG, or the U.S. Office of Special Counsel. 

Those who fail to properly report misconduct will be held accountable. 

In summary, the Secret Service is committed to ensuring a strict 

code of professional conduct, a transparent process for administering discipline, and accountability regardless of rank or grade. 

While it is ultimately the individual responsibility of employees to 

adhere to the standards of conduct, the Secret Service understands 

that it must provide its employees with clear, comprehensive policies, and mechanisms to reinforce them. When misconduct is found 

to have occurred, there should be no doubt that there is a mechanism in place to deal with it swiftly, fairly, and consistently. 

Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, this 

concludes my testimony. I appreciate the opportunity to explain the 

Secret Service disciplinary policy and I welcome any questions you 

may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hughes follows:] 
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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much. 

I yield myself 5 minutes. 

First, I would like to commend the two Inspectors General here, 

Mr. Horowitz and Mr. Roth, for a very comprehensive and enlightening report. Very infrequently do witnesses get commended from 

the Chair. Please note that this time both of you are being commended from the Chair, and we hope that this is a string that continues. 

Now, to Mr. Whaley and Mr. Hughes, let me give a couple of instances, particularly with the DEA. 

In 2010, there was a special agent in Bogota, Colombia who was 

a frequent patron of prostitutes, and on one of them he beat her 

up and left her bloody. He was ultimately suspended for 14 days. 

And the next year, in 2011, a DEA agent solicited sex from an 

undercover police officer in D.C. He was suspended for 8 days. 

And then in 2012, we know the DEA agents engaged in sex parties with prostitutes supplied by drug cartels, meaning the bad 

guys that law enforcement is supposed to be penetrating and bringing to justice. 

Now, of those 10 agents, two received letters of reprimand, one 

retired. The remaining seven were suspended by the DEA for poor 

judgment or conduct unbecoming for 2, 1, 3, 3, 9, 10, and 8 days, 

respectively. 

Now, this behavior is probably more likely to occur in a frat 

house or result in going up to the big house but has nothing to do 

with a law enforcement agency that depends upon the respect of 

the public for the support both in terms of appropriations as well 

as credibility in what they do. 

Now, let me ask you first, Mr. Whaley, since these were DEA 

agents. Just in your personal and private opinion, how long do you 

think those suspensions should have been? We will start out with 

the one who, in Colombia, was a frequent patron of prostitutes and 

left one of them beaten and bloody. Is 14 days enough? 

Mr. WHALEY. Sir, that behavior that that agent engaged in is absolutely deplorable to me, and—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Should he have been fired? 

Mr. WHALEY. In my opinion, he should have been fired. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Now, what is wrong with the system? Why wasn’t he fired? 

Mr. WHALEY. Well, DEA’s disciplinary system is comprised of 

three parts, the OPR—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. You have already told us what the three 

parts are. 

Mr. WHALEY. Yes. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. You think he should be fired. I think everybody on this Subcommittee thinks he should be fired. What 

changes in the system are needed to make sure that somebody who 

is a repeat offender, from what was in the report, is fired? 

Mr. WHALEY. Sir, the decision to fire someone would be that of 

the deciding official. I thought the behavior exhibited by that man 

was deplorable, and if I had the power I would have fired him. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. 

Mr. WHALEY. But it would be up to the deciding official to—— 
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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Now, in D.C., soliciting a prostitute who 

was an undercover police officer only got a suspension. Isn’t that 

a tap on the wrist? 

Mr. WHALEY. I was particularly offended by that case because 

you had an undercover police officer that was a witness against the 

agent, and I agree in that case that he should have been removed 

from service as well. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Then we have the DEA agents who 

were engaged in sex parties with prostitutes supplied by drug cartels. The longest suspension was 10 days, and I listed a whole 

bunch of other numbers. Obviously, if you are engaged in a sex 

party with prostitutes that are supplied by the folks that you are 

supposed to be enforcing the law against, that certainly is the ultimate conflict of interest. 

Now, do you think that maybe we should have kind of a suspension suggestion, like we do with the sentencing guidelines and trying to match offenses, so that somebody at least has an acceptable 

period of suspension depending upon how heinous the offense is? 

Mr. WHALEY. Sir, in the instance you are referring to in Bogota, 

I was concerned not only by the sexual conduct engaged in by the 

agents with prostitutes and living quarters and the close proximity, 

but also the transactions that were going on between them. So in 

that case, yes, absolutely, I think they were under-punished. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, you can understand why Congress 

and the public is upset when we see this outrageous behavior that 

is happening, and in every one of these instances I have cited the 

suspension has been less than a light tap on the wrist. 

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join 

you in this hearing and I believe this is an important hearing. Responsibilities that we have on behalf of the American people is for 

oversight. 

Let me say that I am sickened by the series of stories that we 

have had to face in our local communities as we have opened our 

local newspapers, because most of Americans view all of the services that are before me, from the FBI, who is not present, but the 

DEA, the ATF, the Secret Service, U.S. Marshalls and beyond, in 

a very high level of respect. 

You carry the mantra, the red, white and blue, the stars and 

stripes, the highest level of integrity. And frankly, I am very disappointed that we are even having to have this hearing. 

I just want to take just a moment as I make just a comment 

about law enforcement and the concepts of criminal justice that I 

wanted to make mention of in my opening statement. This is the 

first criminal justice committee hearing since the killing of Walter 

Scott and the unfortunate incident in Arizona where one was to 

have a stun gun but yet had a gun that wound up in the death 

of an individual in Arizona. 

I would indicate that I hope and look forward to the fact of being 

able to have hearings on the use of lethal force by state and local 

police departments, educational requirements, mental health and 

psychological evaluations, and training in non-violent conflict resolution received by officers and recruits, the use of technological de-
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vices such as body cameras, the state of social science such as securing statistics about the use of lethal force. 

And I say that because there are many people in America, no 

matter what their racial background, who are crying out for relief. 

The victim’s mother, meaning Walter Scott’s mother, the incident 

that happened in South Carolina, stated that ‘‘I almost couldn’t 

look at it to see my son running defensively, being shot. It just tore 

my heart to pieces. I pray that this never happens again.’’ And I 

think we in the United States Congress have a responsibility to 

make sure that it never happens again. 

As a segue to my series of questions, I hope that what we are 

confronting today on the Federal level, that we can say that it 

never happens again. 

Let me quickly, Mr. Horowitz—and I will be stopping questioning 

since I want to get to a number of questions—your detailed IG report made reference, I believe, to the fact that there may have been 

few, but our review of the handling of these allegations of harassment and sexual misconduct reveal some significant systemic 

issues with the components processes that we believe require 

prompt corrective action. 

So let me pointedly say to you, why is there not a process to fire 

these bad actors? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Congresswoman, there is a process, and the disciplinary process that goes forward under Title 5 would require a 

charging decision, and one of the concerns we highlighted, as you 

noted, was the charges being filed. The charges being filed were not 

the charges that the table that the DEA provides for these kind of 

offenses. Had certain charges been brought, a minimum 14-day 

penalty would have been required, up to possible removal. In the 

sexual harassment case that we cited in our report, if sexual harassment had been charged and found, removal would have been the 

only penalty. 

So one of our concerns was, like in many decisions you make 

with discretion, what decisions were being made at DEA about 

what to charge, and the most serious penalties, the most appropriate charges it didn’t seem to us were being filed. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me move to Mr. Roth. Thank you. 

Mr. Roth, you mentioned in your statement, you discuss problems with the corruption of border agents and CBP. Please tell us 

more about these issues, whether the agencies involved are appropriately addressing the problems. I really need a succinct, quick 

answer. 

Mr. ROTH. Certainly. When we talk about border corruption, we 

are talking about criminal activity, largely. We work closely with 

the CBP internal affairs offices and the U.S. Attorney’s Office—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So the point is? 

Mr. ROTH. They are addressing it, usually through criminal 

means. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Whaley, with the DEA, let me say that 

I was in Colombia during this horrific incident, and I think we 

should read into the record that the report states that DEA agents 

had sex parties with prostitutes hired by local drug cartels overseas for several years. One of those happened to be in Colombia. 

That triggered the investigation in the Secret Service. 
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So it is baffling to me—it is alleged that three supervisory DEA 

agents were provided with money, expensive gifts, and weapons 

from drug cartel members. It baffles that we do not have an expedited process, and I, for one, am a strong supporter of the rights 

of workers. But the question is, if you already had a record of complete ignoring of the rights of individuals, tell me why some immediate changes were not made. 

Mr. WHALEY. The investigation in Bogota happened in 2010, 

prior to the Cartagena in 2012, and both of them were decided at 

approximately the same time. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia, the Chair of the full Committee, 

Mr. Goodlatte. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have said many times how much respect I have for Federal law 

enforcement officers who combat the drug cartels and the scourge 

of drugs in this country, who track down terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks, who put their lives on the line to protect the President of the United States and others, and the people around him. 

But that is not why we are here today. This is very concerning to 

me. 

Mr. Whaley’s testimony says that the DEA generally has an excellent working relationship with the Office of the Inspector General, particularly when it comes to investigative matters. So I want 

to ask you, Mr. Horowitz, do you agree with that statement, and 

are you confident that the DEA is committed to reform in this 

area? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. As we noted in our report, we had serious concerns in this review as to how we were given materials. On the investigative side, we have had a strong relationship. We have had 

difficulties up until recently with regard to audits and reviews like 

this one. That has improved recently, and I will say that the problems currently are primarily with the FBI. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. So you were not getting cooperation prior to 

this, but with the DEA you are getting more cooperation now with 

regard to the data and information and the ability to go in and examine and conduct an audit? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That is correct. In fact, Section 218 I think has 

had an impact in a positive way with regard to the compliance by 

DEA. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Now, with regard to the FBI, your testimony 

and your report discusses the failures of the DEA and the FBI to 

promptly provide all the information you requested despite the requirements in Section 218 of the Fiscal Year 2015 Appropriations 

Act, where we specifically address this. Is there a legislative solution to this problem beyond what we have already done? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I have to say, I think the law is clear that we 

should be getting the materials. I think the appropriators, frankly, 

will have to look and Congress will have to consider what it means 

for an organization to not follow a crystal clear provision that Congress has put in place. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. In other words, we could withhold some funds 

from an agency for failure to comply. 
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Mr. HOROWITZ. I think it is up to the Congress to decide how to 

treat such a—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. You know, I hate to do that with the FBI. They 

have a very important and very serious role. But it is also important that they respect the Office of the Inspector General. I have 

raised this with the Director of the FBI. Has there been no improvement there? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. There has been no change at all since December 

when Congress passed that provision. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Your testimony, Mr. Roth, describes in detail 

the allegations of Secret Service misconduct in Cartagena, Colombia, and the new rules it has instituted regarding personal conduct. 

Are you confident that the Secret Service appears to be taking this 

matter seriously? Because it seems to have gone on for several 

years without them taking it seriously when we have seen three or 

four instances just since the beginning of this year. 

Mr. ROTH. There is no question that the Secret Service has taken 

steps to try to combat this problem. One of the issues that we have 

is we believe that there is a feeling among law enforcement officers, Secret Service officers, that they are not able to report misconduct up the chain because they will be either retaliated against 

or those complaints will be ignored. We think that is a serious 

problem within the Secret Service. 

We do applaud the structural changes, for example in Mr. 

Hughes’ group, that have been instituted as a result of our December 2013 inspection. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Is there anything the agency is not doing that 

you feel it should? 

Mr. ROTH. I think it is a difficult problem. I think the message 

has to be said loud and clear as to what is acceptable conduct, and 

there has to be the ability for agents to be able to report misconduct in a way that allows them to do so without fear of retaliation. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Whaley, on Monday evening the Justice Department sent a letter to this Committee identifying a couple of 

significant failures by OPR in connection with the investigation, including a failure to fully investigate the misconduct and a failure 

to properly refer the matter to the Office of Security Programs. 

Why were those failures allowed to happen? 

Mr. WHALEY. I concur that the investigations cited in the OIG report were not done as thoroughly as they should have been. I can 

assure you that going forward I will personally ensure that the investigations are done as thoroughly as I can possibly control. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to ask this question of Mr. Horowitz, Mr. Roth and 

Mr. Whaley. 

Recently it has come to light that in 2013 the DEA was caught 

impersonating an individual on Facebook, including using provocative photos of her and pictures of her children without her permission or knowledge. In a January 2015 article in Newsweek magazine, it stated that the Justice Department recently reached a set-
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tlement with the woman impersonated by the DEA to the tune of 

$134,000 of taxpayer money. 

Additionally, there is a presentation that was put together by the 

DHS Inspector General’s Office explaining how to use fake 

Facebook pages in an attempt to infiltrate drug rings. At the same 

time, the FBI is shopping for location-based social media monitoring. 

Should law enforcement be able to utilize social media to monitor 

or impersonate Americans without a court order or informed consent of the Americans being impersonated, as other types of monitoring require? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Congressman, you raise some very significant 

issues and something we have had concerns about and have been 

discussing internally, and we have done some reviews in these 

areas and are considering, frankly, in light of some of the reports 

and news you cited, whether we need to look in other areas as well. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. It is certainly a matter of concern any time that you 

have this kind of conduct that exposes the United States taxpayer 

to this kind of potential fiscal liability. We ought to be looking at 

that, and certainly that is something that we are considering as 

well. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Whaley? 

Mr. WHALEY. I know that the instant case you discussed was 

handled civilly through the court system. It wasn’t handled by 

OPR, but I certainly can see the privacy protection concerns being 

discussed by you, sir. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right, very good. Well, we appreciate your attention to this matter to the degree possible. Let me move on to another question. 

Mr. Horowitz, I will ask you about this. Your testimony touches 

on two specific OIG reports regarding misconduct by employees 

with the DOJ, specifically referring to those actions by DEA employees. I was interested in finding out about whether or not there 

has been any review of the DEA’s use of the license plates LPR 

technology in unsavory or nefarious ways. During a recent staff 

briefing given by DEA employees, it was indicated that there have 

been no identified instances of misconduct by those law enforcement officers using the database of license plates. 

Has there ever been an objective outside audit or review on this 

matter? And with all the other issues facing law enforcement 

branches of the DOJ, has this been an issue discussed internally, 

or do you take them on their word that all the users of the database system are using it specifically for law enforcement purposes 

and not for other purposes? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We have not conducted a review of that. We have 

noticed, again, the stories and the issues you have identified, and 

again it is something we have discussed. I would be happy to come 

and speak further with you and your staff about it as we consider 

those issues as well. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right. I would appreciate that, and I will have 

my staff follow up with you on that particular matter. 

I will yield back at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you. 
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The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

I am embarrassed about this whole situation. It is embarrassing. 

It is embarrassing to the country. 

I am a former criminal court judge. I know a lot of peace officers. 

And like has been said, generally speaking, peace officers do the 

work nobody else would do. I respect them a great deal. And this 

conduct that has been discussed here today is not so much a reflection on the rest of us, but it hurts good peace officers throughout 

the country, those that work at the DEA, Secret Service, and state 

agencies, because too many want to classify all of them based upon 

the conduct of a few here. 

But the ones, from what I hear, it seems like some believe in this 

system that the rule is for thee but not for me, and they are not 

held accountable for what they do as other people in the country 

would be held accountable for. 

So, Mr. Whaley, just based upon looking at you, you seem to be 

a little embarrassed about this whole situation. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. WHALEY. Yes, sir. I hold DEA agents in the highest regard, 

and this is very embarrassing to me. 

Mr. POE. I mean, it is tough work. They are all over the world. 

They are working undercover. Nobody knows what they are doing 

for the good of this country, and here we have a few that have hurt 

the reputation really of the whole agency. 

I have questions for both you and Mr. Hughes. I will ask you 

first. Mr. Hughes, I want to ask you the same questions. 

Let’s use 2013, or 2014. Maybe you got those. How many complaints have been filed against DEA agents in 2014? 

Mr. WHALEY. In 2014, it is approximately 860 allegations of misconduct. 

Mr. POE. That is fine, allegations. Of those allegations, how 

many did you determine, your agency determine were bona fide allegations? 

Mr. WHALEY. I don’t have an exact number here with me today, 

but—— 

Mr. POE. Well, why not? 

Mr. WHALEY. It is going to be approximately 160-some-odd. 

Mr. POE. One hundred and sixty. 

Mr. WHALEY. Somewhere in that range, yes. 

Mr. POE. Okay, 160. How many of those in 160 were disciplined 

by being fired? 

Mr. WHALEY. I could take that question back and have that researched for you, sir. 

Mr. POE. Any? 

Mr. WHALEY. I do know there have been some removals. 

Mr. POE. Five? 

Mr. WHALEY. I don’t know the exact number, sir. 

Mr. POE. Would you be surprised—I mean, you don’t know what 

number it is. 

Mr. WHALEY. No, sir, I don’t. 

Mr. POE. Okay. How many of them went to jail, were prosecuted 

and went to jail? 
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Mr. WHALEY. There have been a number of personnel incarcerated. 

Mr. POE. How many? 

Mr. WHALEY. I don’t know the exact number, sir. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Roth, do you know? 

Mr. ROTH. I do not. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Horowitz? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I can get that quickly, but I don’t know the answer. 

Mr. POE. Okay. I want the answer. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the responses will be 

put in the record at this point. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Hughes, the same questions. In 2014, how many 

allegations, complaints, by any source, were made against a Secret 

Service agent? 

Mr. HUGHES. Congressman, we have approximately 100 to 120 

cases that we provided formal discipline on. 

Mr. POE. All right. Would that include all the complaints, even 

the unfounded ones? That is what I am asking you, all the complaints made against Secret Service agents. 

Mr. HUGHES. I don’t have a solid number for you on that, sir. 

Mr. POE. So you don’t know how many complaints were made by 

any source. 

Mr. HUGHES. A majority of the cases that we provided formal discipline on were substantiated and were the allegations that came 

forward. The way the Office of Integrity works, our initial stage is 

an intake stage which evaluates the circumstances surrounding an 

allegation. 

Mr. POE. But you can find out the number of allegations. 

Mr. HUGHES. Yes, sir. I can get that for you. 

Mr. POE. Somewhere along the system, those were removed, and 

you had how many bona fide accusations? 

Mr. HUGHES. That would be approximately 100. 

Mr. POE. How many of those 100 were fired? 

Mr. HUGHES. Two. 

Mr. POE. How many went to jail for criminal violations? 

Mr. HUGHES. None. 

Mr. POE. Nobody went to jail. 

Mr. HUGHES. No, sir. 

Mr. POE. Were any of those—well, how many people were prosecuted? 

Mr. HUGHES. None. To the best of my knowledge, there were 

none, sir. 

Mr. POE. So, what were the allegations? Can you give us a list 

of the allegations that were found to be bona fide by the Secret 

Service of that 100-plus? 

Mr. HUGHES. I would be able to get that list for you. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. And nobody went to jail. 

Mr. HUGHES. No. Out of all the allegations and discipline that 

was brought forward, there were no—very limited criminal activities that were followed up on within the judicial system. 

Mr. POE. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to submit a 

list of questions for each of the witnesses and their answers be 

given back to the Chair. 
71 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the witnesses are directed to respond promptly so this can be printed in the Committee 

record. 

Mr. POE. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Idaho, Mr. Labrador. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your service. 

I am concerned about these actions, mostly because of what it 

does with the trust that the general public has with law enforcement, and I assume that you have the same concern. It seems, at 

a time when we have this 24-hour news and we have all these 

issues that are happening in America, that continuing to talk about 

these issues is bringing down the trust that the American people 

have in your agencies, and I don’t want that. I want the opposite. 

I want people to really feel like they are being empowered and 

being protected by your agencies. 

Mr. Horowitz, I have a few questions for you. In your written testimony you discuss the lack of clarity regarding off-duty conduct for 

agency personnel and relate that these conduct requirements have 

not been updated since 1996. I understand that clarity for off-duty 

conduct is vital. However, don’t you find that a little bit troubling, 

that these agencies would require more training and more clarity 

just to determine that hiring prostitutes is not the right thing 

when you are protecting the President of the United States? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Unfortunately, I think it is pretty clear from 

what we have reported here that there does need to be training 

and a greater understanding of what is allowed and what off-duty 

is not allowed. 

Mr. LABRADOR. But what is it about the culture that would tell 

you that that is okay without clarity? I guess that is where I am 

having a hard time. To me, that is pretty clear. I don’t need any 

additional training to let me know that I shouldn’t be doing that. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I completely agree with you, Congressman. But 

I think what is evident here about the culture, certainly that existed at the time of these events, was how they ultimately came to 

be reported, which we describe in our report. So we have three incidents in there that we describe related to the prostitution issues. 

One is in the 2001-2004 time period. OPR learns of that not from 

a DEA employee supervisor reporting but when they arrest Colombian national police for corruption. That is how it gets reported. 

The second one is from 2005 to 2008. That gets reported in June 

2010 in an anonymous letter. 

The third one gets reported by the State Department, not by 

DEA, and I think that is indicative of the culture and the problem 

and a reform that has to happen. Those reports need to go not 5 

years later or 10 years later from somebody else but immediately. 

Mr. LABRADOR. So, can you describe the type of training, and 

quickly, the type of training that you feel will effectively prevent 

these instances of inappropriate conduct? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, first of all, there has to be clarity on what 

is allowed and what is clearly not allowed. That was missing. 

Whether it should have been obvious or not, it wasn’t to certain 

folks. That has to happen. There has to be real and rigorous training. The State Department, as we indicate in our report, the State 
72 

Department has rigorous training, the Defense Department has 

rigorous training, and the FBI has put in place some comprehensive training. There is no reason that the other law enforcement 

components shouldn’t be doing the same thing. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Okay. So if the offenders felt that this behavior 

was okay despite a set of clear expectations, why weren’t they reported every time? What is missing from the reporting requirements that we need to change? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think there are a couple of things that should 

happen. First and foremost, there needs to be a clear, unequivocal 

understanding of the responsibilities of every supervisor that they 

need to report this kind of misconduct to headquarters, to OPR immediately. 

Number two, there has to be consequences for not doing that. 

Much of the discussion is about the actions of the actors here. But 

the failures of the supervisors are equally serious. They didn’t have 

to engage in the prostitution, but they knew what was going on 

and didn’t take action, and that allowed this to continue. 

Mr. LABRADOR. So if the issue is that the expectations were not 

clear, and you say that the expectations have not been updated 

since 1996, why hasn’t that been done since 1996? Why haven’t we 

updated the expectations on a regular basis? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It clearly should have been done. We issued a report in 1996 after the good old boy roundup allegations that occurred back then about much similar issues and allegations, but in 

the United States. Twenty years later, 19 years later, nothing has 

changed. It should have happened. I think these kind of hearings 

and discussions will cause it to happen now. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Do you think there have been more instances of 

inappropriate conduct that were simply not reported because the 

expectations were not clear? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That is a great question, Congressman, because 

as we indicate here, we found a relatively low number of instances, 

but then you have to step back and ask what don’t we know, right? 

If in the three instances I described it took someone else to report 

what was going on, I don’t think any of us can say with any certainty we know what the scope of the issues were because folks at 

DEA were not reporting these events. The corrupt Colombian police 

officers were, the State Department did, and an anonymous letter 

did. And that has got to change. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Horowitz, are you familiar with the incident in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of Louisiana where top Assistant U.S. Attorneys were blogging and commenting on cases online? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I am. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Have you read the OPR report? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I have read a summary of the OPR report. I actually have not read the full report. 

Mr. RICHMOND. What is troubling to me—first of all, the OPR report I think was done in 2013, and it was just released to the public 2 weeks ago. But what the report seems to outline, first of all, 
73 

I think the conduct of the Assistant U.S. Attorneys borders on 

criminal violations, and I would ask that the office look into those, 

because they have put people in jail for less than what they did. 

If you are talking about New Orleans and the Eastern District of 

Louisiana, there is a very severe, I would say, distrust of the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office and our Federal law enforcement there, and I 

don’t think that this breeds any more confidence in that, and the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office has done some very good things. 

But this scandal appears to be something that, from the public 

perception and my perception, something that is being swept under 

the rug and not investigated to its end conclusion. I know that the 

Inspector General’s Office did not do it, and I would like the Inspector General’s Office to get involved because I am sure, as I sit 

here today, that there were FBI agents that were also involved in 

this, and the OPR report—I am not sure if they even had the authority to wage an investigation into whether the Federal law enforcement partners of the U.S. Attorney’s Office was also engaged 

in that activity. 

But the culture in that U.S. Attorney’s Office was that of a rogue 

frat house, with the authority to charge people where the charging 

document says ‘‘United States of America versus you.’’ And when 

people get charged, you know and I know that it up-ends their life 

and their life goes on a different journey. 

I am not sitting here defending anyone who has been indicted or 

charged for breaking the law, but I do want a U.S. Attorney’s Office that is trustworthy, and I want to know that my FBI agents 

in that office, in my district, are playing above board. As I sit here 

today, I can’t tell you that I have that trust about all of them. 

What is it that your office can do in terms of a follow-up investigation and looking into the actions of the law enforcement as it 

relates to that case, and just a general interaction with my U.S. Attorney’s Office? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Congressman, on that matter, we had some involvement later on in the process, and I am happy to talk further 

with you. I have to go back and refresh myself and also understand 

what I am able to say and might need to say in private to you 

about the work we did and what we have learned or not learned. 

But one of the concerns we had, and I know we talked about this 

a year or two ago when this occurred, was we only came to know 

about this nearer to the end of the process than to the beginning 

because the Department referred the matter to the Office of Professional Responsibility, not to the OIG. 

Primarily there is the issue out there about our jurisdiction, and 

the Inspector General limits our ability to look at certain matters. 

In this area, frankly, we thought we could have done that work, 

and ending that limitation on our jurisdiction needs to occur so 

that if we are going to be involved in something, we are involved 

at the earliest parts of it when the information is fresh and people, 

for example, are still working in that office who are available to us, 

because we don’t have the ability to question people who have left 

the office as we would when they were still in the office. 

So I would be interested in talking with you further about that 

and how we can move forward and speak to you about those issues. 
74 

Mr. RICHMOND. And I would be interested in knowing the specific 

language of the limitations, and a cite would be helpful because I 

would be interested in lifting some limitations. I think the OPR report was carefully written, to say the least, to still try to put the 

office in the best light and protect individuals. Even the version 

that was released was redacted significantly. I have heard many 

people express concern. 

But what that did is we had convictions overturned because of 

that report, and we had an entire investigation that was dismissed 

because of it. So, I would love to talk to you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time, and I yield back. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson 

Lee, for 2 additional minutes to get an answer to a question she 

was propounding to Mr. Whaley. 

Do you remember what the question was, sir? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will restate it. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me restate it. 

Mr. Whaley, we have learned in recent days that the sex parties 

and the solicitation of prostitutes by DEA agents in Colombia went 

back as far as 2001. So I was pressing the point of when your office 

learned of the behavior, when did you become aware of the solicitation, and the question is what you did about criminal behavior that 

is obviously separate from other work failures; and why, in knowing this, there was not an expedited process for those who were on 

the brink of criminal behavior? So the process that you offered I 

think has to separate itself when you are dealing with actors who 

were engaged or DEA agents who were engaged in what could be 

considered criminal behavior. 

Mr. WHALEY. Just like you, I am concerned about the behavior 

that was done down there. Like you said, the behavior happened, 

began in around 2001. It was reported to OPR in 2010 after the 

arrest of the corrupt CMP officers. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You didn’t know before 2010 about the behavior in 2001 that was going on for 9 years? 

Mr. WHALEY. That is correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So, if I may, Mr. Whaley, have you looked 

back to cure that very severe problem, which is 9 years you did not 

know? And as you know, as I indicated, I was in Colombia with the 

President when the incidents occurred, and I can assure you it was 

an international incident because you were dealing with young 

women who were prostitutes. But the question is, then, we are 

talking about a culture that no one, supervisor or otherwise, never 

got to headquarters. Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. WHALEY. I don’t believe there is a culture problem in DEA. 

None of the agents I have ever worked with, anywhere I have ever 

worked, have engaged in similar behavior. But there were different 

sets of incidents, one that ran from 2001 to approximately 2004, 

and then 2009-2010 to 2012. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will submit questions for the record, Mr. 

Chairman. 
75 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, all Members may submit questions to the witnesses within the next 5 days. 

If you receive any of these questions, it would be appreciated 

that you promptly respond so that the answers can be placed in the 

record. 

This concludes the business that we have before the Subcommittee today, and without objection, the Subcommittee stands 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
78 

Response to Questions for the Record from the Honorable Michael E. 

Horowitz, Inspector General, United States Department of Justice 
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f 
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Response to Questions for the Record from the Honorable John Roth, 

Inspector General, United States Department of Homeland Security 
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f 
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Response to Questions for the Record from Herman E. ‘‘Chuck’’ Whaley, 

Deputy Chief Inspector, Office of Professional Responsibility, Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of Justice 
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84 
85 

f 
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Response to Questions for the Record from Mark Hughes, Chief Integrity 

Officer, United States Secret Service, United States Department of Homeland Security 
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88 
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91 
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96 
97 

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