“Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas 

Basing Requirements in the 21st Century

by Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici

with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin

China Strategic Perspectives 7

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research and Center for the Study of Chinese 

Military Affairs. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by performing research and analysis, publication, conferences, policy support, 

and outreach. 

The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary 

of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified 

Combatant Commands, to support the national strategic components of 

the academic programs at NDU, and to perform outreach to other U.S. 

Government agencies and to the broader national security community. 

Cover photo: Pakistan and Chinese navy ships during joint maritime exercise 

in Arabian Sea, November 24, 2005. Pakistan and China hold naval exercises, 

particularly in nontraditional security fields to strengthen their defense 

capability and enhance professional skills

(AP Photo/Inter Services Public Relations/HO)
“Not an Idea We Have to Shun”

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

Institute for National Strategic Studies

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Series Editor: Phillip C. Saunders 

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

October 2014

by Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici

with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin

“Not an Idea We Have to Shun”:

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements

in the 21st Century
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please visit the NDU Press Web site at:

www.ndu.edu/press/index.html.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

or reviews.

First printing, October 2014
Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1

Introduction........................................................................................................ 3

China’s Overseas Interests, Missions, and Likely Base and Facilities

Support Requirements....................................................................................... 5

Six Alternate Models of Basing: The Deductive Approach.........................12

Dual Use Logistics Facility versus the String of Pearls:

The Inductive Approach..................................................................................25

Could the String of Pearls Support Major Combat Operations? ...............33

Additional Considerations for a PLAN Logistics Base ...............................39

Conclusion and Policy Implications..............................................................46

Appendix 1. “String of Pearls” Distance to Chinese Bases in

Nautical Miles...................................................................................................50

Appendix 2. Required PLAN Force Structure for an Indian

Ocean Region Conflict ....................................................................................51

Appendix 3. U.S. DOD Port Requirements Applied to Zhanjiang ............52

Appendix 4. Citizen and Netizen Public Opinion on

Overseas Basing................................................................................................53

Notes ..................................................................................................................54

About the Authors............................................................................................61

1

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

Executive Summary

China’s expanding international economic interests are likely to generate increasing demands 

for its navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), to operate out of area to protect Chinese 

citizens, investments, and sea lines of communication. The frequency, intensity, type, and location 

of such operations will determine the associated logistics support requirements, with distance 

from China, size and duration, and combat intensity being especially important drivers.

How will the PLAN employ overseas bases and facilities to support these expanding 

operational requirements? The assessment in this study is based on Chinese writings, comments by Chinese military officers and analysts, observations of PLAN operational patterns, 

analysis of the overseas military logistics models other countries have employed, and interviews with military logisticians. China’s rapidly expanding international interests are likely 

to produce a parallel expansion of PLAN operations, which would make the current PLAN 

tactic, exclusive reliance on commercial port access, untenable due to cost and capacity factors. This would certainly be true if China contemplated engaging in higher intensity combat 

operations. 

This study considers six logistics models that might support expanded PLAN overseas 

operations: the Pit Stop Model, Lean Colonial Model, Dual Use Logistics Facility, String of 

Pearls Model, Warehouse Model, and Model USA. Each model is analyzed in terms of its ability to support likely future naval missions to advance China’s expanding overseas economic, 

political, and security interests and in light of longstanding Chinese foreign policy principles. 

This analysis concludes that the Dual Use Logistics Facility and String of Pearls models most 

closely align with China’s foreign policy principles and expanding global interests.

To assess which alternative China is likely to pursue, the study reviews current PLAN 

operational patterns in its Gulf of Aden counterpiracy operations1

 to assess whether the 

PLAN is currently pursuing one model over the other and to provide clues about Chinese 

motives and potential future trajectories. To ensure that this study does not suffer from 

faulty assumptions, it also explicitly examines the strategic logic that Western analysts associate with the String of Pearls Model in light of the naval forces and logistics infrastructure 

that would be necessary to support PLAN major combat operations in the Indian Ocean. 

Both the contrasting inductive and deductive analytic approaches support the conclusion 

that China appears to be planning for a relatively modest set of missions to support its 

overseas interests, not building a covert logistics infrastructure to fight the United States or 

India in the Indian Ocean. 
2 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Key findings:

■ There is little physical evidence that China is constructing bases in the Indian Ocean to 

conduct major combat operations, to encircle India, or to dominate South Asia.

■ China’s current operational patterns of behavior do not support the String of Pearls 

thesis. PLAN ships use different commercial ports for replenishment and liberty, and the 

ports and forces involved could not conduct major combat operations.

■ China is unlikely to construct military facilities in the Indian Ocean to support major 

combat operations there. Bases in South Asia would be vulnerable to air and missile attack, the PLAN would require a much larger force structure to support this strategy, and 

the distances between home ports in China and PLAN ships stationed at the String of 

Pearls network of facilities along its sea lines of communication would make it difficult 

to defend Chinese home waters and simultaneously conduct major combat operations in 

the Indian Ocean. 

■ The Dual Use Logistics Facility Model’s mixture of access to overseas commercial facilities and a limited number of military bases most closely aligns with China’s future naval 

mission requirements and will likely characterize its future arrangements.

■ Pakistan’s status as a trusted strategic partner whose interests are closely aligned with 

China’s makes the country the most likely location for an overseas Chinese military base; 

the port at Karachi would be better able to satisfy PLAN requirements than the new port 

at Gwadar.

■ The most efficient means of supporting more robust People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

out of area military operations would be a limited network of facilities that distribute 

functional responsibilities geographically (for example, one facility handling air logistics support, one facility storing ordnance, another providing supplies for replenishment 

ships).

■ A future overseas Chinese military base probably would be characterized by a light 

footprint, with 100 to 500 military personnel conducting supply and logistics functions. 

Such a facility would likely support both civilian and military operations, with Chinese 
3

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

forces operating in a restrictive political and legal environment that might not include 

permission to conduct combat operations.

■ Naval bases are much more likely than ground bases, but China might also seek to 

establish bases that could store ordnance, repair and maintain equipment, and provide 

medical/mortuary services to support future PLA ground force operations against terrorists and other nontraditional security threats in overseas areas such as Africa.

■ A more active PLA overseas presence would provide opportunities as well as challenges 

for U.S.-China relations. Chinese operations in support of regional stability and to address 

nontraditional security threats would not necessarily conflict with U.S. interests and may 

provide new opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation with China. 

■ Long-term access to overseas military facilities would increase China’s strategic gravity 

and significantly advance China’s political interests in the region where the facilities are 

located. To the extent that U.S. and Chinese regional and global interests are not aligned, 

the United States would need to continue to use its own military presence and diplomatic 

efforts to solidify its regional interests.

■ A significantly expanded Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean would complicate U.S. relations with China and with the countries of the region, compel U.S. naval and 

military forces to operate in closer proximity with PLA forces, and increase competitive 

dynamics in U.S.-China and China-Indian relations.

■ Finally, if some of the countries of the Indian Ocean region and elsewhere agree to host 

PLA forces over the long term, their decision will imply a shift in their relations with the 

United States, which may ultimately need to rethink how it engages and interacts with 

these countries.

Introduction

This is the second report by the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs assessing the future trajectory of China’s out of area naval operations. A December 2010 report 

used case studies of past Chinese operations, considered how other navies conducted out of 

area operations, identified obstacles that all navies confronted in operating out of area, and 

analyzed possible solutions the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) may undertake to 
4 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

conduct out of area operations more effectively.2 This report focuses on the logistics requirements for PLAN overseas operations in support of China’s expanding global interests and the 

facilities and basing arrangements the PLAN might employ to support these missions over 

the next 25 years.

This report is organized in five sections. The first section examines China’s expanding international economic interests, which are likely to generate increasing demands for 

the PLAN to operate out of area to protect Chinese citizens, investments, and sea lines of 

communication (SLOCs). The second section establishes six alternative logistics and support models the PLAN could potentially use to support its expanded operations. It evaluates each model against Chinese foreign policy and national security interests and then 

considers its compatibility with established Chinese foreign policy principles. This section 

employs a deductive approach: assessing China’s future overseas interests and likely military operations and then identifying which basing/access arrangements would best support 

those interests. The next section approaches the same issue with an inductive approach, 

examining potential basing/access arrangements through the prism of Chinese activities in 

the Indian Ocean and the operational patterns of Chinese military behavior in current out 

of area operations.

The fourth section takes a closer look at the supposed strategic rationale for the String 

of Pearls alternative and asks several questions: If China were intent on conducting major 

combat operations in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere, what force structure and logistics infrastructure would be necessary? What indicators would be present if China were to embark 

on this path? Are there indications that this is taking place? Would the Chinese consider this 

a sound strategic option?

The fifth section draws on interviews with U.S. military logisticians and Chinese writings 

to assess how China might implement logistics support arrangements that involve an overseas 

logistics support base, including speculation about potential base sites. 

The conclusion explores the strategic implications of the analysis. What do these findings 

suggest the United States should do with regard to its relationship with the other countries of 

South Asia and the Indian Ocean region (IOR)? What do these findings suggest about the future 

of the U.S. relationship with China? What activities should the United States military engage in, 

given the presence of Chinese military forces in facilities in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere? 

What do the findings of this report suggest about China’s future ambitions as a global or regional military power?
5

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

China’s Overseas Interests, Missions, and Likely Base and Facilities 

Support Requirements

Observers of Chinese foreign policy have long asserted that Chinese international economic interests are expanding and that its foreign policy and security interests will inevitably 

follow.3

 The growth in China’s global economic ties over the past decade has been dramatic. 

The desire of foreign firms to tap inexpensive Chinese labor and access the Chinese market 

produced a flow of foreign direct investment into China in the 1980s and 1990s, building new 

production networks that integrated China into the regional and global economy. China’s 

trade ties with both suppliers and markets grew rapidly as production of many goods relocated to sites in China. Over the last decade, Chinese state-owned enterprises and private 

companies have become significant international actors in their own right, making international investments to build factories and develop energy and mineral resources, acquiring 

foreign firms, and building major infrastructure projects everywhere from Latin America to 

Southeast Asia.4

 This activity has increased China’s overseas economic presence and made its 

domestic growth—and thus its internal stability—dependent on the ability to access global 

markets and resources.

From 2003 to 2014, Chinese foreign trade nearly quintupled, growing from $851 billion 

to more than $4.16 trillion. China became a major exporter to developed country markets in 

North America and Europe and also to developing countries in Africa, Latin America, and 

the Middle East. At the same time, China began to import large volumes of oil and natural gas 

(surpassing the United States as the world’s largest oil importer in September 2013).5

 The Chinese economy also imported large quantities of minerals, metals, foodstuffs, and other natural 

resources, becoming the most important driver of a global boom in commodity prices. Chinese 

imports from resource-rich countries in Africa, Latin America, North America, and the Middle 

East grew even faster than China’s overall trade, producing a new dependence on the maritime trade routes that connect China to regions outside Asia. In 2011, more than 60 percent of 

China’s trade traveled by sea.6

Trade is not the only dimension of China’s growing international presence. Chinese companies have become major investors in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Official data 

indicates that the cumulative total of Chinese outbound investment grew from approximately 

$33.2 billion in 2003 to more than $531.9 billion in 2012. Chinese government data shows that 

as of 2012, Chinese companies had invested more than $21.7 billion in Africa, $68.2 billion 

in Latin America, and $25.5 billion in North America.7

 The Heritage Foundation/American 
6 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Enterprise Institute “China Global Investment Tracker,” which captures the final destination 

of Chinese investment with more precision than official government data, shows even higher 

totals of Chinese investment outside Asia.8

While Chinese foreign direct investment in overseas factories, mines, and energy projects 

is an important and growing national interest, it also involves a significant increase in Chinese 

expatriates living and working abroad, particularly in the developing countries of sub-Saharan 

Africa. Erica Downs of the Brookings Institution testified in April 2011 that:

[t]he expansion of Chinese companies around the world has increased the 

number of Chinese citizens working overseas, including in countries with elevated 

levels of political risk. The number of Chinese working abroad is estimated to 

have increased from 3.5 million in 2005 to 5.5 million today. This has prompted 

China’s foreign policy establishment to step up its efforts to ensure the safety of 

Chinese citizens overseas.9

In addition to the 5.5 million Chinese citizens working abroad, more than 60 million 

travel overseas every year. Protecting these citizens—or evacuating them if the political or 

security environment becomes unstable—has become an increasingly important and politically sensitive task for the Chinese government. Mathieu Duchâtel and Bates Gill note that 

between 2006 and 2010, “a total of 6000 Chinese citizens were evacuated from upheavals in 

Chad, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Tonga.” In 

2011 alone, “China evacuated a staggering 48,000 of its citizens from Egypt, Libya and Japan.”10 Both PLA Navy and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) units deployed to assist in the evacuation 

of Chinese citizens from Libya.

These trends are likely to continue, albeit at a slower pace, as the Chinese government tries 

to rebalance the Chinese economy to rely more on domestic consumption to drive economic 

growth. China’s dependence on imported food, minerals, metals, and especially energy will also 

continue to deepen. China currently imports about 6.2 million barrels of oil a day, mostly from 

the Middle East and Africa. This figure is projected to rise to 13 million barrels a day by 2035.11

Despite government efforts to improve energy efficiency and diversify supplies of oil and natural gas, a recent study by the State Council’s Development Research Center concluded that by 

2030, China might import 75 percent of its oil and that dependence on overseas natural gas will 

also rise rapidly. The director of the center warned that “rising risk for the energy transportation routes will pose new challenges which will be directly affected by geopolitical risks in the 
7

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

neighboring regions, the Middle East and Africa.”12 China is constructing oil and natural gas 

pipelines from Kazakhstan, Russia, and Burma to mitigate some potential transport risks, but 

it will remain heavily dependent on seaborne oil and liquefied natural gas supplies from the 

Middle East and Africa. Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins conclude, “In the end, pipelines 

are not likely to increase Chinese oil import security in quantitative terms, because the additional volumes they bring in will be overwhelmed by China’s demand growth; the country’s net 

reliance on seaborne oil imports will grow over time, pipelines notwithstanding.”13

Expanding Interests, Expanding Missions

Chinese civilian leaders have called upon the PLA to play a greater role in protecting China’s overseas interests. Then–General Secretary Hu Jintao used a 2004 speech to the Central 

Military Commission to give the PLA four “New Historic Missions.” Daniel Hartnett summarized them: “to ensure military support for continued Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule 

in Beijing; to defend China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security; to protect 

China’s expanding national interests; and to help ensure a peaceful global environment and 

promote mutual development.”14 The third mission gives the PLA new responsibilities to help 

protect China’s overseas economic, political, and security interests. Examples include PLAN 

participation in counterpiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 and PLAN and PLAAF 

efforts to evacuate People’s Republic of China (PRC) citizens from Libya in 2011.

Chinese officers and scholars have begun writing openly about how expanding interests 

abroad require a greater PLA role to protect those overseas interests and recommending that the 

Chinese leadership consider establishing bases overseas. Retired PLAAF Colonel Dai Xu writes:

China is the world’s number-one or number-two importer of crude oil and 

mineral markets. At the same time, China is a major exporter of textiles, toys, 

and other goods. This import-export trade is primarily dependent upon maritime 

transport, yet these sea routes are full of incredibly perilous factors. . . . Looking 

at the example of the Middle East, which supplies over half of China’s oil imports, 

Chinese oil transport vessels traveling from that region must pass through the 

Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea. 

Danger is everywhere in the Persian Gulf, pirates run amok on the Indian Ocean, 

and the navies of India and the United States eye our vessels jealously. The power 

of various countries crisscrosses the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, 

and pirates also hunt these areas.15
8 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

He goes on to note:

[a]nother aspect is that, following the growth of China’s foreign exchange reserves 

and the expansion of foreign investment, the amount of Chinese-held fixed assets 

overseas will become increasingly larger. Incidents in recent years of Chinese oil 

workers being kidnapped in Africa and facilities being raided have also sounded 

the security alarm. Therefore, when selecting locations for overseas bases, in 

addition to the needs of escorting and peacekeeping, one must also consider the 

long-term protection of overseas interests.16

East China Normal University Professor Shen Dingli argues that the Chinese public expects the government to protect overseas interests and furthermore, he argues that the issue of 

an overseas base need not be considered taboo: “[Setting up overseas military bases is not an 

idea we have to shun; on the contrary, it is our right. . . . As long as the bases are set up in line 

with international laws and regulations, they are legal ones. . . . There are four responsibilities: the protection of the people and fortunes overseas; the guarantee of smooth trading; the 

prevention of the overseas intervention which harms the unity of the country; and the defense 

against foreign invasion.”17 Shen also highlights the utility of overseas bases in protecting these 

interests, including potential threats against Chinese SLOCs:

When the public discusses overseas military bases they refer to the supply base 

for the navy escorting the ships cruising in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia. The 

discussion shows people’s enthusiasm in defending the interests of the country. 

Yet their worries are not the most important reasons for the set up of an overseas 

military base. It is true that we are facing the threat posed by terrorism, but 

different from America, it is not a critical issue. The real threat to us is not posed 

by the pirates but by the countries which block our trade route.18

The vulnerability caused by China’s increasing dependence on imported oil is of particular interest to Chinese strategists. As James Mulvenon writes, “It is no surprise that 

PLA strategists would view China’s dependence on USN [United States Navy] protection 

of critical SLOCs as a source of frustration and motivation and would therefore seek to 

develop an independent means of securing key energy supply routes.”19 Mulvenon notes 

that this does not necessarily suggest that China will develop a full-fledged blue water navy 
9

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

to protect its SLOCs unilaterally. Beijing could devise a mixture of strategies and policies 

including diplomacy, maritime cooperation with countries in the IOR, and enhanced naval 

capabilities.20 A debate is under way about how China should meet the challenge of protecting overseas interests.

Expanded Missions for the People’s Liberation Army Navy

China’s expanding international economic interests are almost certain to generate increasing demands for the PLAN to operate out of area to protect Chinese citizens, investments, 

Expanded Chinese Interest Potential Corresponding PLA Missions

Protection of citizens living abroad Noncombatant evacuation operations, 

humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, 

counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, 

training and building partner capacity, 

special operations ashore, riverine 

operations, military criminal investigation 

functions, military diplomacy

Protection of Chinese property/assets Counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, 

humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, 

training and building partner capacity, 

special operations ashore, military criminal 

investigation, physical security/force 

protection, riverine operations, military 

diplomacy, presence operations

Protection of Chinese shipping against 

pirates and other nontraditional threats

Counterpiracy, escort shipping, maritime 

intercept operations, training and building 

partner capacity, sector patrolling, special 

operations ashore, visit, board, search and 

seizure, replenishment at sea, seaborne 

logistics, military diplomacy

Protection of sea lines of communication 

against adversary states

Anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, 

anti-surface warfare, carrier operations, 

escort shipping, maritime intercept 

operations, air operations off ships, 

helicopter operations, vertical replenishment, 

replenishment at sea, seaborne logistics 

operations, military diplomacy, mine 

countermeasures

Table 1. Notional PLA Missions to Protect Chinese Overseas Interests
10 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

and SLOCs. Such tasks could include protection of PRC citizens living and working abroad, 

of Chinese property or assets on foreign soil, of Chinese shipping from pirates and other nontraditional security threats, and of SLOCs against hostile adversary states. The PLAN could be 

assigned specific missions to protect those interests (see table 1).

The frequency, intensity, type, and location of operations will determine the military forces 

necessary and the associated logistics support requirements, with distance from China, size 

and duration of operations, and combat intensity being especially important drivers of logistics 

support requirements. Most of these missions would not require PLAN forces to conduct combat operations against adversary states. Accordingly, they have less demanding logistic support 

requirements, with distance, size, and duration of operations being the main drivers. These less 

intensive missions are listed in the first three rows of table 1 displayed above.

However, some missions (listed in the fourth row of table 1) necessary for the protection of 

Chinese SLOCs against adversary states would require the PLAN to be prepared for high-intensity conflict against a modern military in waters far from China. This type of combat operations 

would impose additional logistic support requirements, including large hospital and healthcare 

facilities; ordnance storage and distribution; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage and 

distribution; mortuary services; large ship and equipment repair facilities; air traffic control; 

and other air support facilities and operations.

Historically, such combat operations are best supported by well-developed bases in the vicinity of the operational area. Sustaining the large naval forces needed to conduct major combat 

operations against a major state in the Indian Ocean would require a sizable logistics support 

infrastructure. Ships get damaged in combat, so the PLAN would need large and numerous 

shipyard facilities to repair them. It is possible that the Chinese have a different operations 

and strategic concept in mind if they are contemplating a major conventional conflict with 

India—possibly a short, sharp attack intended to shock the Indians into compliance. Nonetheless, two historic data points appear to belie this argument. First, the Chinese are aware of the 

importance of logistics support and infrastructure for major conventional conflicts such as the 

Second World War.21 During that conflict, the United States established hundreds of shipyards 

throughout the Asia-Pacific to support the war effort. A considerable amount of writing on this 

subject emphasizes the importance of strategic rear areas, transportation support, and supplying front lines.22 Second, lessons taken from the Falklands/Malvinas conflict have made the 

Chinese intimately aware that even limited wars can impose a heavy logistical burden on combatants operating out of area.23
11

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

Major combat operations typically also produce large numbers of casualties, which would 

require sizeable hospital facilities in mainland China and in a forward location to treat critically 

and seriously wounded soldiers and sailors. The United States relies on forward medical facilities to stabilize seriously wounded soldiers before transport and also on large hospital facilities 

in Europe to care for wounded personnel from Iraq and Afghanistan before sending them to the 

continental United States (CONUS) for additional treatment at Walter Reed National Military 

Medical Center.

The PLAN would need ordnance resupply, given the high ammunition expenditure rates 

in major combat operations.24 Ordnance could be transported from depots in China on ammunition ships, but these ships would be vulnerable to submarine and air attacks (as happened 

with Japan during its Pacific War with the United States). A country cannot rely entirely on air 

or sea transport over long distances to resupply units engaged in combat. Militaries typically 

store some ordnance in forward armories so it can be easily accessible and dispensed to combat 

units. The long distance from China to the Indian Ocean means the PLAN would need an overseas base to store ordnance, especially for submarines and ships with vertical launch tubes that 

cannot be reloaded at sea.25

In addition, the PLAN would need access to petroleum, oil, other lubricants, and other 

replenishments to operate away from home ports for long periods. During peacetime, these 

stocks are available from commercial port facilities. However, during a conflict, the laws of war 

and customary requirements for neutrality prohibit port facilities or bases in neutral countries 

from providing support to combatants.26 If such a facility were supplying PLAN forces, it would 

no longer be considered neutral and therefore would be subject to attack by China’s adversaries.

Finally, any military bases and logistics facilities providing support for PLAN combat operations would require protection from air and missile attack. As the history of conventional 

military conflicts attests, from World War II to the Gulf War, if China was facing a country such 

as India with significant military capabilities, the PLA would need air bases to provide air cover 

for naval forces and to defend bases and logistics facilities from attack. The PLA would also 

want surface-to-air missiles with some ballistic and cruise missile defense capability to protect 

air bases, naval bases, and logistics facilities from air and missile attack. This all adds up to a 

substantial military footprint within the territory of a third-party host country.

The bottom line is that if China wants military dominance in the Indian Ocean (which 

implies the ability to fight and win major combat operations), it would need a much larger 

navy and a logistics and support infrastructure that far exceeds current capabilities. Even if we 
12 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

posited the possibility of Chinese use of covert munitions storage and secret wartime access 

agreements,27 it would be insufficient for sustained combat operations.

Some evidence suggests that even if its international missions do not expand, the PLAN is 

already having difficulty supporting current missions due to limitations in the available logistics 

infrastructure. These operational limitations are likely to eventually lead the Politburo Standing 

Committee and the Central Military Commission to authorize the establishment of some kind 

of overseas PLA facility. Retired PLAN Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo is an outspoken advocate for 

overseas bases. Not long after the initial Gulf of Aden deployment in October 2008, he insisted 

that China consider establishing an overseas base to ease the logistical and supply strain on 

PLAN forces.28 He noted that multiple 3-month deployments affected PLAN morale and ability 

to maintain readiness.29 Yin also pointed out that difficulties Chinese sailors confronted in out 

of area deployments (such as lack of fresh fruits, vegetables, and potable water, problems communicating directly with Beijing, and lack of medical care) would be resolved if Beijing would 

allow the PLAN to establish an overseas base near its forward operations.30

Then–PLA Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde also highlighted obstacles the PLAN faces 

while conducting out of area operations. In a May 2011 speech at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, General Chen noted that continued Gulf of Aden counterpiracy 

deployments would strain the PLAN and “give China great difficulty.”31 Chen also stated that 

China plans to continue these deployments because the missions protect its national interests 

abroad.32 The PLAN’s operational difficulties in performing current out of area operations, the 

likely increase in demand for such operations in the future, and other factors such as Chinese 

public support for overseas bases (see appendix 4) suggest that the PLAN cannot rely indefinitely on commercial facilities alone to support its overseas operations.

Six Alternative Models of Basing: The Deductive Approach

This report explores six possible overseas logistics support models that Chinese civilian 

and military leaders may consider to support expanded overseas operations: the Pit Stop Model, 

Lean Colonial Model, Dual Use Logistics Facility, String of Pearls Model, Warehouse Model, 

and Model USA. Each is defined and discussed below.

The Pit Stop Model. One option is to continue the current PLAN practice of using commercial port facilities to compensate for the lack of overseas bases. Some Chinese scholars and 

military analysts advocate continued use of commercial ports as “pit stops” to provide basic 

services such as refueling, provisioning, electrical power, and waste disposal for PLAN surface 

vessels.33 One article noted that “[s]uch arrangements are basically a commercial undertaking, 
13

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

but must be negotiated government-to-government because military forces are involved. Many 

nations have such arrangements in the region, particularly the Persian Gulf. Chinese sailors 

coming ashore would basically be treated like tourists, and subject to local law.”34

Some PLAN officers appear content with current ad hoc arrangements supporting the Gulf 

of Aden deployments.35 Zhang Deshun, then-PLAN Deputy Chief of Staff, stated in 2010, “[w]e 

have no agenda to set up military establishments” and no need to establish overseas bases.36 Senior 

Captain Yan Baojian, a South China Sea Fleet commander, indicated that the navy could operate 

overseas and conduct out of area missions without any bases on foreign soil: “The naval force can 

work extensively with China’s business operations worldwide for military supplies, in addition to 

[obtaining materiel from] advanced supply ships.”37 In a 2010 article, retired Rear Admiral Zhang 

Zhaozhong noted that the commercial use of regular supply points for rest and entertainment, 

food and water, ship and equipment maintenance, and medical treatment should suffice.38 Zhang 

argued both the international community and host nations would welcome these kinds of activities because the supply stops support United Nations–mandated missions, and the PLAN boosts 

the local economy by spending money at commercial facilities.

The Lean Colonial Model. The Lean Colonial network involves specialized bases scattered 

throughout the world to support colonies. Nations that utilized this model in the 19th and 20th 

centuries did so to support broader economic and foreign policy objectives rather than to project military power. The model utilizes bases within sailing distance of each other but lacking 

any fortifications or defenses against seaborne attack. The Lean Colonial Model can advance 

national commercial interests but cannot support a naval presence strong enough to preserve 

sovereignty when challenged.

Germany’s Pacific colonies, which at one time stretched from mainland China to just north 

of Australia and New Zealand, illustrate the Lean Colonial Model. With the exception of the 

Qingdao port in China, German colonial possessions were initially established by trading companies acting without government support.39 Germany supported these colonies financially, but 

they were viewed primarily as a source of national pride and prestige.40 German colonies developed ports and logistics centers to support commercial operations but did not invest in defensive fortifications or infrastructure to support naval operations. Although equipped with nine 

ships, the German Asiatic Squadron’s forays from its homeport in Qingdao were infrequent and 

ill supplied.41 The squadron’s logistics network was based on contracts with private companies, 

which greatly limited its operational capacity and range in the event of a conflict.42 The German Navy planned to use the squadron to harass British and American ships in the Pacific and 

to prevent a shifting of assets to the Atlantic rather than to defend German colonies. Within 
14 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

months after the outbreak of World War I, every German colony in the Pacific was under the 

control of Australia, New Zealand, or Japan.

Dual Use Logistics Facility. Some Chinese analysts and PLA officers argue that an overseas 

base would provide improved logistics and supply support to out of area PLAN ships and task 

forces at lower cost and with greater capability than commercial facilities. The overseas base would 

be equipped with medical facilities, refrigerated storage space for fresh vegetables and fruit, rest 

and recreation sites, a communications station, and ship repair facilities to perform minor to intermediate repair and maintenance. In a 2010 interview, retired Rear Admiral Yin Zhou argued 

that “a relatively stable, relatively solid base for re-supply and repair would be appropriate” to 

support Chinese ships conducting antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. “Such a base would 

provide a steady source of fresh fruit, vegetables and water, along with facilities for communications, ship repair, rest and recreation, and medical evacuation of injured personnel.”43

Dai Xu, a former PLA Air Force colonel, argued in 2009 that China “needs to have power 

adequate to protect world peace before it will be able to effectively shoulder its international 

responsibilities and develop a good image. The fulfillment of this duty requires a specific supply 

facility for the provision of support.”44 Dai argued that escorting and peacekeeping missions will 

become regular PLAN missions: “How to execute these tasks in ever wider sea areas with even 

lower costs and over longer periods of time is bound to become a practical issue that will have 

to be dealt with by strategic decision-making departments.”45 Military analyst Liu Zhongmin 

echoes these themes: “[H]ow China will develop its overseas bases is a question that we can no 

longer avoid answering. . . . Since China began to send navy convoys on anti-piracy missions to 

the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coast in 2008, the lack of overseas bases has emerged as a major 

impediment to the Chinese navy’s cruising efficiency.”46

The String of Pearls Model. The String of Pearls concept emerged from a 2004 Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) study, “Energy Futures in Asia: Final Report.” The authors argued that if 

China needed to protect its flow of energy through the Indian Ocean, it could build on its existing commercial and security relationships to establish a string of military facilities in South 

Asia. At the time, press reports suggested China had contributed to construction of naval bases 

in Burma, funded construction of a new port in Gwadar, Pakistan, and invested in commercial 

port facilities in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The speculative analysis in the BAH study has come 

to be accepted in some Indian and U.S. policy circles as a description of China’s actual strategy 

for its out of area activities.

Considered narrowly as a logistics model, the main difference between the Dual Use Logistics Facility and String of Pearls models lies in the potential for Chinese commercial investments 
15

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

in port facilities to support higher intensity military and combat operations. Construction of 

commercial port infrastructure could serve as cover for construction of secret munitions stockpiles and other port infrastructure that could support combat operations. Chinese commercial 

ties with host countries could potentially translate into secret agreements to allow PLAN access 

to the facilities in a conflict. Finally, Chinese investments in commercial port facilities (and the 

resulting expansion in Chinese political influence in host countries) might allow commercial 

ports to be transformed into full-fledged Chinese military bases at some point in the future.

The November 2004 BAH report marks the first analytic reference to a so-called Chinese String of Pearls strategy. The authors were asked to address the question: “If China were 

confronted with a vulnerable source of energy supplies and the possibility of the United States 

cutting off China’s source of energy supplies through its superior navy, what possible strategies 

would the Chinese pursue and do we see any evidence that this is taking place?” The Booz Allen team did not extensively research Chinese sources to determine Chinese perspectives, but it 

engaged in educated speculation on strategic responses China might pursue if confronted with 

a “Malacca Dilemma”47 worst-case scenario. The term String of Pearls originated with “unidentified participants of a workshop conducted to support this project.”48

The report submitted to the Office of Net Assessment devotes only two pages to the String 

of Pearls concept. In a section entitled “Sealane Strategy,” the authors note that Chinese activities in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, and the South China Sea suggest that “China is 

building strategic relationships along the sealanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea 

in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China’s energy interests but 

also serve its broader security objectives.” The report states:

participants at the Energy Futures in Asia workshop referred to this set of strategic 

relationships along the sealanes as China’s ‘String of Pearls.’ . . . These relationships, 

which have been developing for years, could serve multiple strategic objectives for 

the Chinese. For example, bolstering its presence in Myanmar and Pakistan hems 

in India and simultaneously positioning [sic] China to address the vulnerability 

to its seaborne oil shipments with either defensive or offensive tactics. A sealane 

strategy positions China to take a more offensive approach to securing its energy 

resources by threatening to raise the risk premium for other energy consumers. 

Using its strategic positioning along the sealanes, China could pursue a deterrence 

strategy if it believed that its energy flows were in danger of being interdicted or 

threatened by the United States or others.
16 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Such a deterrence strategy “would entail posing a credible threat to any ship in the sealanes, thereby creating a climate of uncertainty about the safety of all ships on the high seas. 

Whether or not China will have the capacity to pose a credible threat is uncertain and a point 

of debate; China would require both robust military capabilities and permission from the host 

countries to allow it to undertake offensive operations from their territories.” The report included a map labeled “China’s Activities Along the Sealanes” that “highlights Gwadar and Pasni, 

Pakistan; three locations in Myanmar; the potential location of a Kra Canal in Thailand; Woody 

and Hainan Island in the South China Sea.”

Other defense analysts subsequently adopted the term “String of Pearls,” often treating 

it as a description of China’s actual strategy rather than speculative analysis. For example, 

the author of a 2006 report titled “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising 

Power Across the Asian Littoral” published by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies 

Institute asserted:

Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence 

or military presence. Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a 

“pearl.” An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 

300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” A container shipping facility in 

Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deep water port in Sittwe, 

Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan. 

Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernization 

form the essence of China’s “String of Pearls.” The “pearls” extend from the coast 

of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of 

Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and 

Persian Gulf.49

The report argued that Chinese efforts to establish a presence in the Indian Ocean are a response 

to concerns about access to energy shipments from the Persian Gulf:

To sustain economic growth, China must rely increasingly upon external sources 

of energy and raw materials. Sea lanes of communication (SLOC) are vitally 

important because most of China’s foreign trade is conducted by sea, and China 

has had little success in developing reliable oil or gas pipelines from Russia or 

Central Asia. Since energy provides the foundation of the economy, China’s 
17

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

economic policy depends on the success of its energy policy. Securing SLOCs for 

energy and raw materials supports China’s energy policy and is the principal 

motivation behind the “String of Pearls.”50

Considered in terms of logistics and military capability, the String of Pearls Model would 

offer some advantages. It could be less costly than a dedicated network of overseas military 

bases, since commercial investments in port infrastructure would generate some economic returns that military bases would not. Commercial investments are less likely to provoke negative 

international reactions than military bases or base access agreements. This model could also 

potentially offer a stepping stone toward a future network of dedicated military bases, with 

commercial investments helping to build the political relationships necessary for countries to 

provide China with base access or permit Chinese bases on their territory. 

The String of Pearls Model would have significant operational drawbacks as well. Commercial port facilities would not offer ammunition storage, prepositioned spare parts for military vessels, or maintenance specialists. They would provide less operational security and be 

vulnerable to attack in event of a conflict. Even if China were able to covertly preposition military supplies or negotiate secret base access agreements with host countries, Beijing would likely have difficulty securing permission to use such bases to support combat operations against 

major countries. Some of these operational drawbacks could be overcome by improvements 

in facilities and port security, but beyond a certain point such improvements would transform 

commercial “pearls” into overt Chinese military bases.

Warehouse Model. The Warehouse Model developed by the British between the two world 

wars demonstrates a fifth potential way for a naval power to maintain a fleet far from home. 

After considering their economic situation and war plans, the British decided a few defensible 

ports with large oil supplies and fully capable repair facilities were the best method to support 

naval operations in the Far East. The Royal Navy decided to stockpile oil at its naval base in 

Singapore rather than upgrading the coal-based infrastructure at smaller ports or investing in a 

costly tanker procurement program.51 Singapore was supplied with all the necessary stores and 

dock facilities to act as the base of operations for the Far East Fleet. Ports west of Singapore were 

never adequately updated to support major fleet operations.52 The Royal Navy relied entirely on 

oil stores within its main ports. In 1921, the British did not operate a single oil tanker east of the 

Suez Canal.53 Singapore was chosen due to its location protecting the main SLOC to India and 

because it was more defensible than alternatives such as Hong Kong. It was expected to be able 

to hold out for 3 months against superior Japanese forces until reinforcements could arrive from 

continued on page 20
18 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Broader Interpretations of the “String of Pearls”

The meaning of the term String of Pearls has broadened over time to go well 

beyond a speculative description of how China might use commercial investments to support naval operations in the Indian Ocean. Some analysts now use the term to refer to any 

Chinese blue water navy capability developments, any activity the Chinese navy has taken 

part in outside of the Asia-Pacific Region (for example, the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden deployments), and any efforts China may undertake to ensure continued access to oil and raw 

materials coming from Africa and the Middle East.

Some assessments assign motives that go far beyond concerns about access to 

energy and raw materials. One assessment argues: “The ‘String of Pearls’ strategy . . . 

provides a forward presence for China along the sea lines of communication that now 

anchor China directly to the Middle East. The question both the United States and India 

have is whether this strategy is intended purely to cement supply lines and trade routes, or 

whether China will later use these in a bid for regional supremacy.”1

Other assessments, especially from Indian think tanks and defense organizations, 

state unequivocally that the objective of China’s String of Pearls strategy is to dominate 

the Indian Ocean region. Consider this analysis from the Indian Army’s Centre of Land 

Warfare Studies:

China’s strategy to acquire port facilities for its navy in Pakistan, 

Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, is well known and has been called 

China’s “string of pearls” policy by western analysts. Beijing’s game plan 

appears to be to isolate India and dominate the SLOCs from the Indian 

Ocean to the South China Sea. Notwithstanding that Beijing is actively 

pursuing initiatives to tie down India in its neighborhood, it lodged 

protests in May 2006 over a new “quadrilateral” initiative held in Manila 

between the U.S., Japan, India and Australia.2

The String of Pearls concept has shaped how many analysts think about China’s 

activities in South Asia and the potential for the PLA Navy to operate overseas. A Google 

search for China and String of Pearls results in almost 300,000 hits. The Congressional 

Research Service’s periodic assessment of Chinese naval capabilities specifically mentions 
19

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

the String of Pearls concept as a possible future path for Chinese military operations.3

The String of Pearls was also mentioned in the Department of Defense’s Joint Operating 

Environment 2008, which includes a map entitled “The String of Pearls: Chinese political 

influence or military presence astride oil routes.” The map is of China, the Indian Ocean, 

and the Persian Gulf with areas in South Asia demarcated as potential “pearls.”4

Supporters of a more expansive String of Pearls concept argue that China’s investment and construction of both commercial and military sites in South Asia and broader 

development of strategic relations in the region are designed to:

■ assure access to energy supplies and raw materials coming in from the Middle East 

and the Persian Gulf

■ exert Chinese political influence in the Indian Ocean region

■ encircle, dominate, or hem in India

■ militarily dominate the Indian Ocean region

■ deter the United States, India, or other powers in South Asia from interdicting 

Chinese shipping coming from the Persian Gulf. 

1Chris Devonshire-Ellis, “China’s String of Pearls Strategy,” in China Briefing.com, March 

18, 2009, available at<www.china-briefing.com/news/2009/03/18/china%E2%80%99s-string-of –

pearls-strategy>.

2 Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria, “Breathing Fire: China’s Aggressive Tactical 

Posturing,” Centre for Land Warfare Studies Issue Brief no. 12, October 2009, 5.

3Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implication for U.S. Navy Capabilities—

Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service report RL33153, October 17, 

2012, 43.

4As found in The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the 

Future Joint Force (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, November 25, 2008), available at 

<www.scribd.com/doc/10537915.joe-2008>.
20 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Europe. Britain had two smaller bases located closer to Japan, both of which relied on Singapore 

as a logistics center.

The Royal Navy’s Logistical Model—a few very large bases intended to provide “one stop 

shopping”—directly led to its naval difficulties during World War II. These ports established 

British control over critical sea lines of communication, but the vast distances between them 

made reinforcement extremely difficult during the initial stages of a conflict. The Royal Navy relied too heavily on Singapore and subsidiary bases and neglected the procurement and fielding 

of the necessary fleet auxiliaries and support ships for afloat logistics and replenishment at sea.54

When the British war plan failed and Singapore was captured, other British bases could not be 

utilized effectively because they were too distant from intended operational areas or lacked the 

necessary infrastructure.55 Furthermore, once one of these mega bases fell, the lack of intermediate logistic centers made staging an offensive operation exceedingly difficult.

The Warehouse Model does have a few distinct advantages. The largest is its low international profile; relying on only a few well-equipped and dispersed bases limits the number of 

reliable allies needed and reduces the political ramifications of basing troops abroad. This was 

not a problem for Imperial Britain, but it was a serious consideration for the Soviets, who built 

a similar naval infrastructure during the Cold War using ports in Egypt, Somalia, and its satellite countries. A second advantage is cost. It is cheaper to build and maintain a few major bases 

than to develop and maintain a global network of well-equipped bases. Finally, large bases can 

have defensive capabilities and, if successfully defended, provide an excellent in-theater staging 

point for offensive operations.

Model USA. International experts consider the U.S. logistics model the most successful method to maintain large-scale military operations abroad. The terrestrial network combines large bases 

with minor bases/port access agreements to support U.S. naval and air forces and allow for flexible 

resupply. In addition to established infrastructure, the U.S. Navy currently maintains the largest auxiliary ship fleet in the world. The result is unprecedented capabilities to resupply ships while underway and to support prolonged ground operations from the sea. In addition to more than 30 naval 

bases and naval support facilities, the U.S. Military Sealift Command has 110 active service ships 

supporting fleet operations.56 The United States currently maintains a significant base operations 

network in every major ocean and sea and thus possesses a logistics system that can support operations anywhere in the world. The large auxiliary fleet means that the loss of any single base or even a 

series of bases does not automatically reduce the Navy’s operating range or capacity.

The U.S. response to the tsunami that struck the IOR on December 26, 2004, demonstrates 

the logistic system’s flexibility. Immediately after the tsunami struck, the U.S. Air Force quickly 
21

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

mobilized to create a forward logistics base in Thailand some 8,000 miles from CONUS.57 The 

Air Force transported approximately 24.5 million pounds of supplies over 47 days.58 The Navy 

also contributed greatly to the relief effort. By January 1, 2005, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 

72) Carrier Strike Group was providing logistical support, along with a Marine Expeditionary 

Unit that arrived on January 4.59 A U.S. Navy hospital ship sailed from San Diego and arrived 

in waters near Aceh within 2 weeks of the disaster. Forty-nine percent of the fixed wing aircraft, 

55 percent of the helicopters, and 25 percent of the ships used in the humanitarian relief effort 

were of U.S. origin.

This flexible logistics system allows the U.S. military to surge troops, supplies, and logistics 

support quickly and to support operations far from CONUS because it maintains logistics hubs 

scattered throughout the world. Yet the U.S. logistics model derives its strength mainly from its 

large auxiliary fleet and airlift capacity. The sheer number of platforms and amount of lift capacity support a wide variety of operations far from U.S. soil.

One major shortcoming of the U.S. logistics model is the high cost of building and maintaining large and complex bases, ports, and ships, making it economically infeasible for less 

affluent countries. Maintaining a geographically distributed and extensive system of bases also 

requires immense diplomatic and political capital. Finally, countries that choose to pursue such 

an extensive and capable logistics network may raise international concerns about potential 

interventionist ambitions. From a purely military perspective, however, the American logistics 

model is unrivaled in terms of capability.

The Chinese Foreign and Defense Policy Interest Framework

Which logistics model is China most likely to adopt to support its expanding international 

interests? Table 2 examines each model against criteria important to Chinese foreign and defense policy interests to assess the likelihood that Beijing will pursue a particular model. 

Three of the six logistics support models do not satisfy China’s broad foreign policy 

interests as enunciated by Beijing throughout its history of foreign relations. The Lean 

Colonial, Warehouse, and USA models all violate two of China’s most important foreign 

policy principles: noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and not acting 

like an imperialist or hegemonic power. The Lean Colonial Model is simply not applicable 

to a postcolonial world of sovereign states. Given China’s self-image as a champion of the 

developing world and a positive alternative to other global powers, it is highly unlikely to 

pursue models that involve large overseas military bases or extensive networks of facilities 

on the sovereign territory of other states. Beyond the rationale that China is unlikely to 
22 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Pit Stop Lean 

Colonial

Dual Use 

Logistics 

Facility

String of 

Pearls

Warehouse Model 

USA

Does not 

threaten China’s 

“peaceful rise” 

image

Yes No Yes Yes No No

Does not pose 

a risk to China’s 

relationship with 

host nation

Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

Neighboring 

countries will not 

feel threatened

Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

Helps China 

address a wide 

range of military 

contingencies

No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Helps China 

protect its 

overseas 

economic 

interests

No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Relatively 

inexpensive 

No Yes No No No No

Satisfies 

expectations of 

ordinary Chinese 

citizens

No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Does not 

generate 

excessive friction 

with the United 

States 

Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No No

Protected against 

external attack

No No No No Yes Yes

Does not require 

large amounts of 

transportation 

assets

Yes Yes No No Yes No

Table 2. Assessments of Chinese Logistics Models and International Interests
23

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

violate foreign policy principles that it has established as a foundation for its foreign and 

defense policy behavior, there is an even stronger reason that China will not establish these 

kinds of overseas bases. They would threaten China’s image as a peaceful rising power and 

could imperil China’s future economic growth, if the international community interprets 

such bases as evidence of malign Chinese long-term intentions.

In contrast, the Pit Stop Model closely conforms to China’s foreign policy principles. However, for reasons discussed below, this model is unlikely to support China’s national security 

interests over the long term.

Does the Pit Stop Model Serve Chinese Long-Term Security Interests?

Today’s limited out of area PLA operations are consistent with Chinese foreign policy and 

national security interests. China’s policy specifies that it will not set up military bases in other 

countries. Official policy states that China does not take part in operations far from China’s 

shores except at the invitation of a host country or when mandated by an international organization like the United Nations. China’s official overseas basing policy is consistent with efforts 

to portray China’s rise as “peaceful” to the international community. Even given these policy 

limitations, the PLAN has been able to conduct Gulf of Aden counterpiracy operations successfully since late 2008.

The Gulf of Aden deployment demonstrates that the Chinese military remains at the very 

nascent stages of out of area combat operations.60 For now, the PLAN appears to be content to 

remain at this stage of low-intensity combat naval force development, which can be supported 

using only commercial facilities (albeit at a higher cost than other logistics models).

An earlier NDU study on China’s out of area naval operations argued that most great powers follow a path of increasingly demanding out of area operations.61 If China follows this path, 

it will eventually participate in maritime intercept operations, engage in combat with pirates in 

the high seas, and continue to escort shipping through pirate-infested waters. China is likely 

to conduct freedom of navigation operations to keep its sea lines of communication open and 

could potentially engage in major combat operations to defend or seize disputed territories in 

the South and East China Seas or to protect natural resources associated with disputed maritime 

territory. China might also have to conduct SLOC protection operations if an Indian Ocean 

state such as India decides to threaten Chinese shipping with air, surface, and subsurface forces. 

Some Chinese government officials and military officers recognize the need to resolve the piracy problem on land, implying that the government could eventually employ special forces or 

other military assets to deal with that problem.62
24 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

All of these missions imply the use of PLA forces to engage in combat with pirates, terrorists, insurgents, and potentially other states. However, there are a number of reasons why a 

logistics support model that depends solely on commercial facilities cannot support combat 

operations that result in significant loss of materiel and manpower.

First, a country cannot assure access to commercial facilities during times of conflict.63 For 

example, during the Civil and Spanish-American wars, Hong Kong and Japan would not allow 

the U.S. Asiatic Squadron to access commercial port facilities. Second, commercial facilities do 

not have the capability to support severely damaged warships, mortuary services for soldiers 

killed in action, and medical attention for large numbers of wounded service members. Severely 

damaged warships can sometimes be repaired in foreign commercial shipyards, but this could 

be extremely expensive in the absence of a special arrangement with the host country, and a request could be denied due to political considerations. Even if commercial facilities agree to perform these operations, supporting the PLA Navy would not necessarily be their top priority if 

other commercial opportunities are more lucrative or the costs of abrogating existing contracts 

are too high. China cannot assume that foreign commercial port facilities would act against 

their own commercial interests to support China during a regional conflict.

High Costs of the Pit Stop Model

The high costs associated with an exclusively commercial logistics network will pressure 

China to pursue a different model, especially if the scope and intensity of PLA Navy out of area 

operations increase over time. Conversations with PLA officers indicate that using commercial 

ports to support the Gulf of Aden deployments has been extremely costly and time-consuming. 

Then-PLA Chief of General Staff General Chen Bingde indicated in May 2011 that the PLA has 

encountered operational difficulties in sustaining the Gulf of Aden deployment. Chen did not 

explicitly cite cost, but this was likely one factor.64

U.S. Navy logisticians suggest relying solely on commercial facilities can prove extremely 

costly, especially in wartime. Experts point out that even in operations short of war, there is a 

direct relationship between conflict intensity and the need for security at ports and other facilities.65 Necessary security features might include patrol boats to monitor and patrol harbors; 

divers to check for saboteurs below the water line; erection of jersey barriers and other fences 

around the piers serving the ships; and additional security personnel monitoring the gates.66 A 

commercial facility depends on costly private contractors or its own personnel to perform these 

services. A military facility can perform these functions more efficiently with military personnel. Ship and military equipment repair can also be extremely costly. Although a commercial 
25

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

facility can repair ships damaged in low-intensity combat, these repair services would be extremely expensive.67 The Pit Stop Model is unlikely to remain a viable logistics alternative if the 

intensity of Chinese military out of area operations increases in parallel with China’s expanding 

global economic, political, and security interests.

The Dual Use Logistics Facility and the String of Pearls: Two Viable Options

This analysis suggests that the Dual Use Logistics Facility and String of Pearls logistics 

models are most consistent with China’s longstanding foreign policy principles and can 

best support China’s expanding overseas economic and security interests. The third section of the study examines the ability of the two models to support the most likely PLAN 

operations over the next 20 years; the fourth section examines whether the String of Pearls 

Model could support higher intensity combat operations as part of a long-term effort to 

dominate the IOR. 

Dual Use Logistics Facility versus the String of Pearls: The Inductive 

Approach

The Dual Use Logistics Facility and the String of Pearls models both appear compatible 

with Chinese foreign policy principles and with China’s long-term overseas interests. Both 

models would involve the PLA using a mix of commercial and military facilities to project 

power farther from China’s shores. China would need to develop close political and strategic 

ties with at least some host nations to gain greater access to their commercial and military facilities. Both models would support increased out of area operations to protect China’s expanding 

overseas economic, political, and security interests. 

The two models differ in two important respects (other than the site of the bases). First, the 

Dual Use Logistics Facility Model is not tied to port access in specific countries, while the String 

of Pearls Model requires China to have good political relations with numerous host countries. 

The so-called pearls are all associated with specific facilities in specific countries that can be 

examined. Second, the String of Pearls Model can potentially provide greater logistics support 

for military and combat operations if overt commercial access arrangements are supplemented 

with covert prepositioning of munitions and military supplies and secret diplomatic agreements 

for base access in the event of a conflict.

If China intends mainly to combat nontraditional threats and develop a modest power projection capability to respond to a relatively small-scale overseas contingency, such as a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions, 
26 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

low-intensity conflict, counterterrorism, or protection of PRC expatriates, the Dual Use Logistics 

Facility is sufficient. China could use dual use facilities as forward operating logistics platforms 

to engage in nontraditional security operations (including special forces operations ashore) to 

combat terrorists and other threats to China’s overseas operations and citizens. However, if China 

seeks the capability to conduct major combat operations in the Indian Ocean, the String of Pearls 

Model is more plausible.

This section explores the ability of these two models to support the most likely PLAN operations in the Indian Ocean (excluding major combat operations) by examining the physical 

characteristics of sites supposedly associated with the String of Pearls and studying the patterns 

of current PLAN operational behavior overseas. The potential ability of the String of Pearls 

Model to support the force structure China would need to dominate the Indian Ocean is explored in the next section.

Examining the Physical Evidence for the String of Pearls

In recent years, authors have started to look more critically at the physical evidence for 

the existence of a Chinese “String of Pearls.” One assessment addressed persistent rumors that 

China has built or is building military bases in Burma. Veteran Burma watcher William Ashton 

wrote in 1997:

For all the reports on this subject which have appeared . . . few appear to draw 

on firm evidence or can be traced to reliable sources. Many seem to be based 

on rumours, speculation or even deliberate misinformation. There has also 

been considerable confusion over particular places, developments and military 

capabilities, which has then been recycled by journalists and academics in 

subsequent articles.68

In a 2007 article, “Burma, China and the Myth of Military Bases,” Andrew Selth writes, “It 

seems to have escaped the notice of most observers that at no stage had the existence of a large 

Chinese SIGINT [signals intelligence] station on Great Coco Island been officially confirmed 

by any government other than India’s, which was hardly an objective observer. This includes 

the U.S., which has both an interest in China’s activities in the Indian Ocean and the means to 

detect them.”69 After an in-depth examination of Great Coco Island and Hainggyi Island, both 

reportedly candidates for China’s String of Pearls, Selth found no physical evidence of a military 

facility on these islands:
27

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

Great Coco Island has no sheltered harbor or facilities capable of handling a 

ship of any size. There was only a small pier there until 2002, when the berthing 

facilities on the island were reportedly expanded. The airstrip, while apparently 

extended some time after 1988, was also vulnerable to the region’s poor weather. 

Similarly, neither the hydrography nor the topography of Hainggyi Island lent 

themselves to the construction of a maritime facility of any size.70

Selth concludes that “it would appear that there are a number of small maritime surveillance sites 

scattered around the Burmese coastline, including on Great Coco Island, some of which may have 

discreet intelligence functions. Much of the equipment at these sites is likely to have been provided 

by China, as part of the deals struck between Rangoon and Beijing after 1988.”71

Another assessment casts a skeptical eye on Gwadar, another String of Pearls candidate site:

The Gwadar deep-sea port is a case in point. The state-owned China Harbour 

Engineering Company, funded with a $198 [million] Chinese loan, has helped 

Pakistan complete the first stage of this project for a major Pakistan port near 

the entrance to the Persian Gulf at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz. It does 

indeed have a strategic significance as the possible terminus of a land route 

from western China and central Asia to the Indian Ocean, which would have 

considerable economic significance. But there seems little or no evidence that a 

naval base facility is part of the package, or indeed that China has any current 

intention or capacity to maintain an Indian Ocean fleet for which Gwadar could 

be a base. The same applies to the other civil engineering and commercial projects 

in the region which are quoted as evidence for the String of Pearls thesis, from 

Cambodia to Sri Lanka.72

Other analysts have pointed out that, with the exception of the special case of Pakistan 

(discussed below), “government officials in the respective ‘pearl’ countries have openly repudiated reports they have given China any preferential treatment and that Beijing is quietly building and/or planning to build military bases in their sovereign territories.”73 Bangladesh’s Prime 

Minister Sheikh Hasina claimed that the Chittagong port was “part of her government’s strategy 

to connect Bangladesh to the greater Asian region in order to develop its markets and promote 

economic growth in the interests of the people of that country.”74 Sri Lanka initially proposed 

the Hambantota port modernization project to India in 2005 but was turned down by New 
28 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Delhi. Sri Lanka subsequently obtained agreement from Beijing to finance eight infrastructure 

projects, including the Hambantota project, in 2007.75

Pakistan is the one country that may be interested in offering its territory as a potential 

site for a Chinese overseas base. In May 2011, Pakistan’s defense minister caused an uproar in 

the region when he announced that Pakistan had asked China to build a naval base at Gwadar 

and that the request had been clearly conveyed to the Chinese.76 The Chinese government immediately issued a flat denial that China had any intention of constructing military bases in 

Pakistan.77 The issue of Gwadar as a potential base for Chinese military operations recently 

regained further currency with the announcement that Port Singapore Authority (PSA)—the 

Singapore company originally appointed by the Pakistan government to manage the port 

of Gwadar—no longer plans to play that role and that a Chinese firm will eventually take 

over operations.78 The fact that a Singaporean company was running day-to-day operations 

at Gwadar made Chinese use of the port as a covert military facility highly unlikely, but even 

the news that a Chinese firm will be taking over operations makes the possibility only slightly 

more plausible. One of the primary reasons that PSA has withdrawn from the project is that 

Pakistan has failed to provide some of the long-term infrastructure and logistical support 

features necessary to make the port successful—factors that also make it unlikely to serve as 

a “pearl.”79

Several sites in the Indian Ocean are of significant interest to Chinese companies and may 

have some military utility. But is the PLA using these facilities to support operations in the Indian Ocean? 

Operational Patterns of Behavior: Current PLAN Overseas Logistics Support

A second way to examine the relative merits of the Dual Use Logistics Facility and the 

String of Pearls Models is to analyze current PLA operational patterns of behavior. All militaries prepare for operations by rehearsing missions before they perform them, by cooperating 

with allies and other partners that would be involved in joint operations, and by surveying the 

geographic landscape, terrain, and areas they expect to operate in. 

Some Western observers argue that China has already proven it intends to develop 

overseas basing and facilities because it currently utilizes an overseas basing network to 

support its Gulf of Aden deployments.80 Figure 1 represents China’s Gulf of Aden overseas 

basing network. Daniel Kostecka, an analyst with the U.S. Navy staff, points out that “[t]

he existence of this support network can be seen in the ports in the Indian Ocean where 

the PLAN has quietly called. The list of these ports is an indicator of not only where the 
29

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

PLAN prefers to replenish its ships and rests its crews but also of where it is likely to develop formal arrangements should it choose to do so.”81 In contrast to the claims of String of 

Pearls advocates, the current Chinese overseas access network does not overlap with “pearl” 

candidate sites at all. Instead, the PLAN has operated out of ports such as Salalah, Aden, 

Djibouti, and Karachi. 

Table 3 presents PLAN port visits during the first eight Gulf of Aden counterpiracy deployments. There have been additional task force rotations since this assessment was conducted 

in mid-2013, but an examination of subsequent visits reflects similar patterns, with no use of the 

String of Pearls candidate ports to support PLAN counterpiracy operations.82

Figure 1. PLA Navy Ports of Call in Support of the Gulf of Aden Counterpiracy 

Task Force
30 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Port Number of 

Visits

Dates Deployment 

Number

Support Activity Longest 

Visit (days)

Salalah, 

Oman

10 6/21/09

8/14/09

1/2/10

4/1/10

6/8/10

8/10/10

10/11/10

1/19/11

1/28/11

4/10/11

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

5th

6th

6th

7th

7th

8th

Food, perishables, 

diesel fuel, water, 

liberty

10

Djibouti 6 1/24/10

5/3/10

9/13/10

9/22/10

12/24/10

2/21/11

4th

5th

6th

6th

6th

7th

Food, perishables, 

water

5

Aden, 

Yemen

10 2/21/09

4/25/09

7/23/09

9/28/09

10/24/09

2/5/10

3/14/10

5/16/10

7/26/10

10/1/10

1st

1st

2nd

3rd

3rd

4th

4th

5th

6th

6th

Food, perishables, 

water,

diesel fuel

5

Colombo, 

Sri Lanka

1 1/11/10 4th Goodwill 3

Abu Dhabi, 

UAE

1 3/25/10 5th Goodwill

Jedda, Saudi 

Arabia

1 11/27/10 6th Goodwill 5

Karachi, 

Pakistan

1 3/13/11 8th Goodwill

Alexandria, 

Egypt

1 7/26/10 5th Goodwill 5

Cochin, 

India

1 8/8/09 ? Goodwill 3

Table 3. PLAN Gulf of Aden Ship Port Visits
31

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

Rangoon, 

Burma

1 8/29/10 5th Goodwill ?

Al Manmah, 

Bahrain

2 9/9/10

12/9/10

6th Goodwill ?

Dar EsSalaam, 

Tanzania

1 3/26/11 7th Goodwill, military 

exchange

5

The two ports visited most frequently by PLAN ships were Salalah in Oman and Aden in 

Yemen. Salalah appears to serve as a “catchall” relief site for PLAN ships deployed to the Gulf of 

Aden and is used to replenish food, water, and fuel and also for liberty calls. Nearly every PLAN 

Gulf of Aden task force has visited Salalah during its deployment. 

PLAN ships visited Aden 10 times, making it one of the most frequently visited ports. 

However, only one type of PLAN ship has visited Aden: comprehensive supply ships. The supply 

ships replenish their food, water, and diesel fuel and then provide replenishment-at-sea services 

to other ships in the PLAN Gulf of Aden Task Force. This operational pattern closely mirrors 

U.S. Navy operational patterns in the Persian Gulf, suggesting that the PLAN studied and applied U.S. naval concepts of operation. That the port of Aden also happens to have been the port 

in which the USS Cole was attacked by al Qaeda in 2000 is probably not lost on PLA Navy planners. Thus, the operational pattern of sending a single replenishment ship to Aden and having 

it replenish other ships not only mimics the U.S. pattern of behavior but is also a prudent force 

protection measure.

PLAN Gulf of Aden task forces have also used Djibouti to replenish naval supplies. A 

number of militaries, including the U.S. Navy, regularly visit Djibouti to stock up on food, other 

Table 3. PLAN Gulf of Aden Ship Port Visits (cont.)

Sources: Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 1 (Winter 2011); Li Jianwen and Mo Xiaoliang, “Chinese 

‘Zhoushan’ Warship Berths at Port of Djibouti,” PLA Daily, February 22, 2011, available at <http://eng.

mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2011-02/22/content_4226259.htm>; “Escort Fleet of the Chinese Navy Began 

Visit to South Africa,” Chinese-Embassy.org, April 6, 2011, available at <www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/

zngx/t812975.htm>; Liu Yiwei and Hourui, “Chinese Warship Berths at Port of Salalah,” PLA Daily, April 

12, 2011, available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2011-04/12/content_4236914.htm>; Andrew 

S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf 

of Aden, Chinese Maritime Studies, Number 10 (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2013).
32 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

perishables, and water when deployed on counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. The 

multinational nature of the facility means that PLAN ships and personnel frequently interact 

with U.S., European Union, Japanese, and Korean naval personnel at this site, providing opportunities for ad hoc cooperation.

The PLAN has conducted port visits before and after Gulf of Aden deployments, including visits to Cochin, India; Alexandria, Egypt; Colombo, Sri Lanka; Dar Es-Salaam, Tanzania; 

Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; and Karachi, Pakistan. The PLAN 

did not replenish naval supplies during these visits, which were port calls to bolster Chinese 

diplomatic relations with the host country. These visits likely involved liberty calls for Chinese crewmembers.

Chinese resupply activities are mostly conducted on a commercial basis. China and 

the host governments do not sign memoranda of agreement or negotiate a status of forces 

agreement covering visiting Chinese sailors. Chinese commentators describe PLAN port 

visits as similar to a visit by a tourist cruise ship. The host nation provides the ships “hotel 

services” and expects the sailors to aid the local economy through “tourist” activities. The 

local Chinese embassy or consulate negotiates agreements for PLAN ships to use facility 

water, food, and fuel. The Chinese embassy or consulate also arranges to have spare parts 

flown in by commercial air so that crews may conduct minor or intermediate repairs to 

ships and helicopters. 

This exclusive reliance on commercial port access is unlikely to persist. Recent reports 

suggest that the PLAN is considering using the Seychelles as a port of operations for Gulf of 

Aden deployments. Seychelles Foreign Minister Jean-Paul Adam indicated in September 2012 

that his country has invited China to set up a military presence.83 Subsequent Chinese press 

reports indicated that the PLAN was considering the option to use the Seychelles to support 

logistics and supply efforts for PLAN counterpiracy task forces. This news adds credence to the 

argument that the PLAN will move from exclusive reliance on commercial ports (the Pit Stop 

Model) and reach agreements with host nations to use their military facilities (the Dual Use 

Logistics Facility Model).84

What do these observations indicate about the viability of the String of Pearls Model versus 

the Dual Use Logistics Facility Model? First, there is no evidence that the Chinese are currently 

conducting military activities at any of the String of Pearls sites. To date, PLAN Gulf of Aden 

task forces have not used or visited a single String of Pearls site. Second, transactions between 

the PLAN and host countries providing support for PLAN Gulf of Aden operations have been 

commercial in nature. These ports have only provided “hotel services,” replenished supplies, 
33

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

and served as liberty sites for visiting PLAN ships. Finally, the number of PLA forces and units 

involved in out of area activities has been very limited. None of this evidence supports assertions that the Chinese intend to deploy enough forces in the Indian Ocean area to dominate the 

region or engage in major combat operations with any of its neighbors.

There is little physical evidence to suggest China is constructing or investing in port facilities in other countries to prepare for future combat operations against India or other countries 

in the region. Continued PLAN heavy reliance on commercial port facilities—mostly in countries that would likely be neutral if China and India engaged in a shooting war—would create 

significant vulnerabilities in a conflict. If China were in fact preparing for major conflict, it 

would likely negotiate with a politically reliable host nation and revisit a single military base 

repeatedly to accustom its forces to working with an ally in a familiar operating environment.

Could the String of Pearls Support Major Combat Operations?

This part of the study explores the arguments of those analysts who believe China intends to 

use the commercial port facilities and political relationships associated with the String of Pearls 

to encircle India and dominate the Indian Ocean. Such an objective would require China to have 

sufficient forces and an associated logistics support infrastructure to conduct major combat operations in the Indian Ocean. The analysis identifies the forces China would need to dominate the 

IOR and the other activities China would need to undertake to support this objective. 

Base Construction for Combat Operations

If China decided to try to encircle India or dominate the Indian Ocean, Chinese military 

planners would have to expect a potential conventional military response from India, the largest 

military power in South Asia. If China accepts this risk and decides to build military facilities 

in the String of Pearls to support this objective, planners would have to take projected Indian 

military capabilities into account. 

An examination of India’s air order of battle alone suggests that this would be a very 

risky proposition. India has a variety of aircraft within range of all the String of Pearls sites, 

including older MiG-23s and more modern Su-30s and Mirage 2000s. None of these ports 

are covered by effective integrated air defense systems, which make PLAN or PLA assets 

stationed there vulnerable to air attack. Although the PLA could station mobile surface-toair (SAM) sites to defend String of Pearls facilities (as they did in North Vietnam during 

the Vietnam War), SAMs would provide little or no defense against India’s conventional 

ballistic missiles. 
34 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Stationing military assets, particularly naval assets, at vulnerable String of Pearls sites 

would also divide Chinese military forces in the event of a conflict. The String of Pearls sites 

would be a long way from Chinese waters. Assuming the ability to pass through the Strait of 

Malacca and Strait of Lombok, the PLAN’s most modern destroyers would require more than 

6 days to sail from Gwadar to the southernmost Chinese ports (151 hours at 29 knots; see 

appendix 1 for distances). Stationing significant numbers of military assets far from China 

would make them unavailable to defend the Chinese mainland against other potential adversaries, including the United States and Japan. In order for it to deploy large portions of 

its naval and air assets so far from its territory, China would have to be confident that other 

parties would not enter a conflict between China and India and that hostilities would remain 

confined to the Indian Ocean.

The naval forces required to actually do what String of Pearls adherents claim China is 

attempting—to encircle India and to militarily dominate the Indian Ocean—would constitute 

an enormous naval force that would cast great doubts on Chinese claims of “peaceful development.” A prudent naval planner in Beijing would conclude that the PLAN would need to deploy 

a force at least as large as the Indian Navy to dominate the Indian Ocean. Appendix 2 lists the 

current and projected (2020) Indian naval order of battle. A Chinese navy seeking to dominate 

the IOR in 2020 would need at least 3 aircraft carriers, 32 surface combatants, and 21 submarines in addition to the forces necessary to handle non–Indian Ocean missions. If China’s current naval force structure (see appendix 2) represents the force needed to meet local maritime 

security needs, then the PLAN would need a force structure equivalent to both the 2013 PLAN 

and the 2020 Indian navy to conduct both missions. China’s naval force structure would have 

to be much larger than it is today to address the PLAN current defense mission and a projected 

Indian Ocean campaign. 

A new generation of Indian strategic analysts observes that the String of Pearls might not 

actually make sense from China’s point of view. For example, Iskander Rehman argues in “China’s String of Pearls and India’s Enduring Tactical Advantage” that:

[B]y virtue of India’s immense geographical advantages in the region, it is 

difficult to imagine China ever being able to wield as much military clout in 

the region as India can. India’s natural peninsular formation means that it has 

been described by some as akin to an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ jutting out 

into the Indian Ocean. Any naval task force venturing into the Bay of Bengal 

with hostile intentions would have to contend with India’s air force and naval 
35

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

aviation, operating not only from the mainland, but also from the Andaman 

and Nicobar archipelago in the Andaman Sea, whose airstrips are currently 

being extended, and which is slated to eventually host Sukhoi squadrons, and 

possibly MiGs and Mirages.85

Rehman adds:

China’s naval presence in the region will be dispersed along the several, often 

distant nodal points that constitute its string of pearls. Assuming that these forces 

together are superior in both quantity and quality to the Indian Navy, which is, 

all in all, most unlikely, India will still have the immediate advantage of force 

concentration and hence superiority if it decides to conduct a rapid strike at an 

isolated group of Chinese vessels. A direct attack on a naval base would be highly 

undesirable, as it would trigger a severe crisis with the hosting country. A massive 

naval deployment outside one such base could have the desired effect however, 

by compelling the Chinese to de-escalate their land assault, much as the Indian 

Navy’s stationing of its fleet 13 nautical miles outside Karachi during the Kargil 

war prompted, some claim, the Pakistan Army to accelerate the withdrawal of its 

forces from the disputed islands.86

String of Pearls and Major Combat Operations

As already noted, the PLAN does not currently make use of any of the candidate String of 

Pearls sites to support counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Any commercial port has 

some military utility. However, the question is whether supposed String of Pearls ports at the 

Coco Islands, Hambantota, Chittagong, and Gwadar are capable of supporting PLAN major 

combat operations in the Indian Ocean.

This question can be answered by identifying the physical features necessary to use a facility to conduct major combat operations. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Transportation apply a standard set of criteria to characterize military port facilities 

used to support major U.S. combat operations.87 These criteria are listed in the left column of 

table 4. Comparison of these criteria with the physical characteristics of the PLAN naval base at 

Zhanjiang indicates that Chinese military port facilities are designed and constructed to meet 

very similar standards. (See appendix 3 for the detailed comparison.)
36 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Requirements Gwadar Hambantota Chittagong Coco Islands

Recommended infrastructure 2012 2035 2012 2035 2012 2035 2012 2035

Three berthing spaces 1,000 

linear feet each X X X X

Minimum water depth of 35 

feet X X X X

30–45 acres of open storage X X X X X

Four rail offloading spurs of 

1,000 feet of straight track each

Four rail/truck end ramps X X

Gatehouse/security X X X X X X

Access to port-owned 

interchange yard to support 

switching two trains per day

X X

Suitable area to land/service 

helos (~5 acres) X X X X X

Two container handlers X X X X X X

Adequate interior roadways 

to port facilities X X X X

Office space with adequate 

utilities and communication 

service

X X X X

Processing area for 30 trucks X X X

Wash rack that meets USDA 

requirements

Terminal Access

Close proximity (<10 miles) 

to interstate highway system X X X X

Access to at least one major 

commercial rail carrier X X X X

Water channel access width of 

500 feet and depth of 35 feet X X X X X

Access to commercial 

rail interchange yard (if 

port-owned facilities are 

inadequate)

X X X X

Table 4. U.S. DOD Port Requirements Applied to String of Pearls Candidatess
37

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

Table 4 compares the current (2012) and projected (2035) physical features of String of 

Pearls candidate sites with the DOD port criteria. With the exception of Chittagong port in 

Bangladesh, the candidate String of Pearls sites all fall far short of what DOD considers minimally acceptable to support major combat operations. Projected improvements by 2035 may 

give some of the candidate sites additional capabilities to support military operations, although 

these improvements are intended to support expanded commercial activities. Of note, the port 

in the Coco Islands does not meet any of the DOD criteria. While Chittagong currently satisfies 

most of the DOD criteria, and Gwadar and Hambantota might do so at some point in the future, 

all three of these ports are located close to India and would be highly vulnerable to attack.

This examination finds little evidence to support the claims of String of Pearls advocates 

that Chinese investments in port facilities in the Indian Ocean reveal a Chinese intention to 

encircle India or dominate the Indian Ocean militarily. China would require a much larger navy 

to conduct such operations, and it would make little strategic sense to station the bulk of that 

force so far away from Chinese territory. Major combat operations would require logistics and 

support capabilities that go well beyond what commercial ports could provide. Covert ordnance 

facilities could expand the capability of commercial ports to support some combat operations, 

but sustained major combat operations would require bases and the defensive military forces 

necessary to protect them from attack. Such a logistics infrastructure would be an overt string of 

Chinese military bases, not a covert String of Pearls. Although the long-term development plans 

for some of these port facilities would improve their capability to support combat operations 

(if planned facility improvements materialize), they are in locations highly vulnerable to attack 

Sources: Gwadar Port Authority Web site, available at <www.gwadarport.gov.pk/portprofile.html>; “Development in Port Hambanota,” Sri Lanka Port Authority Web site, available at <www.slpa.lk/port_hambantota.

asp?chk=4>; Shirajiv Sirimane, “H’tota Port Project Ahead of Schedule,” Sunday Observer (Sri Lanka), March 

7, 2010, available at <www.sundayobserver.lk/2010/03/07/fea01.asp>; Chittagong Port Authority Web site, 

available at <http://portal.cpa.gov.bd>; “Bangladesh to Build Second Naval Base in Chittagong,” Xinhua News 

Agency, August 9, 2005, available at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200508/09/eng20050809_201204.

html>; “Bangladesh Offered China to Use the Chittagong Port as a Commercial Outlet,” Reuters, March 15, 

2010, available at <http://gurumia.com/2010/03/15/bangladesh-offered-china-to-use-the-chittagon-port-asa-commercial-outlet/>; Cocos Islands on Google Maps, available at <www.google.com/maps/place/Coco+Isl

ands/@14.118519,93.37626,8z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m7!1m4!3m3!1s0x3091a3008390fbaf:0xbc796b23fe024f25!2

sCoco+Islands!3b1!3m1!1s0x3091a3008390fbaf:0xbc796b23fe024f25>.
38 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Figure 2. “String of Pearls” Sites
39

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

by India. If China does plan to dominate the Indian Ocean militarily, a major and sustained 

buildup of its naval forces is likely to be a better indicator of that intention than Chinese investments and construction in commercial port facilities in South Asia.

From a strategic point of view, a continued powerful U.S. and Indian military presence in 

the Indian Ocean makes China unlikely to attempt to dominate that region. If the United States 

enters into a rapid economic and military decline and India does not successfully modernize its 

military forces, then a substantial PLAN presence in the Indian Ocean might become a game 

changer for Chinese strategic influence in South Asia. However, India is likely to continue to 

develop and modernize its military, and the United States is unlikely to withdraw from the region in the foreseeable future.

Additional Considerations for a PLAN Logistics Base

The preceding analysis suggests that the Dual Use Logistics Facility Model is the logistics 

support model that best suits future PLAN needs. This part uses interviews with U.S. military 

logisticians and analysis of Chinese writings to identify likely characteristics of a potential Chinese overseas logistics base. 

Interviews with Military Logisticians

U.S. military logisticians have extensive experience supporting forward deployed forces in 

peacetime and wartime situations. This section draws upon interviews with staff of the National 

Defense University’s Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics and with Navy logisticians with 

experience at the U.S. Navy Logistics Force Western Pacific or Commander, Logistics Group 

Western Pacific (LOGWESTPAC) in Singapore to obtain a more detailed sense of the functions 

and activities the PLAN might perform at overseas logistics facilities.

The interviews focused on logistics support considerations for the missions the PLAN is 

most likely to perform and therefore did not examine logistics requirements for major combat 

operations against a major power. Likely missions include presence and military diplomacy 

missions, counterpiracy operations, maritime intercept operations, HA/DR, NEOs, SLOC protection by escorting Chinese shipping, and possibly counterterrorist operations on land using special forces troops. Such operations would support Chinese overseas interests without 

threatening the United States or other countries in the Indian Ocean. The logistics and basing 

infrastructure necessary to support such operations could also help project Chinese power and 

influence into the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the African continent—regions of considerable interest to China. The PLAN can support these operations with modest bases and 
40 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

logistical support facilities instead of a robust network of military bases that may appear threatening to countries in the region.

Interviewees were asked what a Chinese logistics network (including bases) to support these missions might look like. One expert suggested that if China would not require a 

large ground force presence to conduct escort and counterpiracy operations and to provide 

protection and NEO missions to Chinese expatriates, the bulk of China’s overseas missions would be expeditionary in nature and largely seabased.88 PLA forces are unlikely to 

need a large-scale, continuous replenishment effort. A hybrid logistics support network or 

Dual Use Logistics Facility Model that mixes commercial and military facilities is entirely 

workable for such missions.89 This basing model also emphasizes commercial contracts to 

support a Chinese military facility, cooperative development and use of a partner military’s 

logistics support capabilities, and continued positive economic and political engagement 

with the host nation.90

Spare Parts: Warehousing or a Distribution Network? Logistics experts noted the difficulty 

in determining which ship or aircraft parts will break before their expected service life is over. 

However, the PLAN would not necessarily need to store large numbers of spare parts for ships and 

aircraft in warehouses. An alternative is to develop robust and redundant distribution networks 

to quickly move spare parts where they are needed. Experts suggested a Chinese network might 

look less like solid lines of control between specific locales and a few suppliers, and more like a spider web of connections between local Chinese embassies/consulates, China-based PLA logistics 

facilities, and various overseas and China-based suppliers, husbanding agents, and contractors.91

This spider web model could also support some combat operations if resupply aircraft and ships 

could travel into the combat zone. Naval experts noted that with technician access to the ship or 

aircraft in question plus the availability of most spare parts by expedited delivery services, most 

parts can be replaced even during wartime, with the exception of submarine and aircraft carrier 

nuclear reactors.92 Most parts can be delivered to a repair facility by ship or airplane.93

For many items, the PLA is likely to follow the U.S. military in avoiding warehousing (parts 

stockpiled in a forward location) in favor of “stock positioning,” which involves contract arrangements with a repair facility or host country to deliver resources to an agreed location at a specific 

time.94 Warehousing might still be required for spare parts that are only produced in China.

Local and Husbanding Agents. Stock positioning and warehousing typically involve the 

use of local intermediaries or agents who can manage complex logistics transactions. The PLA 

would need to develop relationships with local agents who could work with DHL, Federal Express, and local logistics assets to move materiel from point A to point B. These local agents 
41

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

must be able to negotiate and supervise the numerous contracts to provide supplies to PLA 

units at port.95

Light Footprint. With the exception of port calls to provide liberty for sailors, the PLAN 

will likely keep surface combatants out to sea and send replenishment ships into port to refuel 

and restock and then replenish the other ships at sea.96 The PLAN currently operates this way in 

the Gulf of Aden. Chinese comprehensive supply ships pull into Aden, replenish food and fuel, 

and then resupply other members of the counterpiracy task force at sea.97 This decreases costs 

by reducing the number of berths required, limits potential political repercussions of a large 

Chinese naval presence in port for a prolonged period of time, and reduces risk of casualties in 

ports subject to terrorist attack. 

Division of Labor among Different Logistics Hubs. Logistics experts drew a distinction 

between logistical support for ships and for aircraft. Air operations require extensive practice, 

access to an airfield that can handle the type of aircraft being used, that is close to transportation 

assets, and that has the necessary fuel and maintenance capability. They also require strategic 

relationships with the host government and key host-nation contractors at the facility. The mechanics and parts needed for aircraft maintenance are reasonably portable, so extensive warehousing of spare parts would not be needed if an effective distribution system is established.98

These special requirements suggest that in many instances air logistics support may be provided 

in a different location than naval logistics support.99

LOGWESTPAC experts noted that the PLAN will likely develop a network division of 

labor, where logistics, supply, and repair functions are distributed among different locations.100

For instance, damaged U.S. Navy ships are not repaired at Singaporean shipyards but instead 

sail to Japan, which handles most major ship repairs in the Western Pacific.101 Conversely, the 

Singapore command maintains a strong web of connections and relationships with local contractors and husbanding agents and thus has primary responsibility for logistics arrangements 

throughout the Asia-Pacific region.102 LOGWESTPAC only manages shipborne logistics, deferring to its counterpart in Bahrain (Commander, Task Force 53) or to Commander, Fleet Air 

Western Pacific in Atsugi, Japan, when air logistics support is needed. The PLAN will likely 

develop similar divisions of labor among the various commercial and military sites that support 

their operations.

Dual Use Activities. Interviewees noted that most logistics activities are dual use and can 

be performed by either military or commercial ports or bases. Work force skills used to support 

commercial activity—such as supply chain management—can also support military activity.103

An airfield that supports commercial airliners can also support noncombat military aircraft.104
42 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

The PLA does not need a dedicated military base to install sensitive communications and other 

equipment (including radars or even weapons systems); most functions can be performed at 

commercial facilities. However, the PLA would need assured access, including permission to fly 

Chinese technicians into the host country, use maintenance and repair facilities, and conduct 

the necessary work on a damaged ship or aircraft.105

Legal and Political Restrictions. LOGWESTPAC logisticians noted that the command 

and staff have to work within various political and legal restrictions. Some host countries 

want a high degree of control over a visiting military’s activities on the facility and expect 

the visiting military to abide by very rigid legal obligations. For example, a host country 

may refuse a port visit if a request is not cleared 48 hours in advance. Some countries require a 1-week advance notification of a port visit to provide time for flight clearances of 

technicians being flown in to conduct repairs or install equipment on a ship. Host nations 

are often politically sensitive about hosting large numbers of military personnel, which 

encourages operations with a light footprint. Such political restrictions would especially 

apply in scenarios where a visiting military was involved in a major regional conflict. For 

example, Singapore might deny port visits and military flights if the United States were 

engaged in a conflict with China.106

PLA Overseas Missions and Overseas Logistics Characteristics. Our interviewees 

also noted that the characteristics and extensiveness of the logistics support network for the 

PLA will in some part be determined by the missions that the PLA will be expected to perform overseas.107 If the CCP leadership is essentially satisfied with a more robust version of 

the PLA counterpiracy mission, the overseas logistics support network would probably be a 

more definitive and reliable version of what the Chinese navy enjoys today—that is, signed 

access agreements with some of the countries that the PLAN currently uses for replenishment and supply. If PLA overseas missions include NEOs, HA/DR, and force protection of 

citizens, the PLA over the long run might attempt to establish permanent basic access to 

a facility with communications, housing for sailors, medical facilities, rudimentary ship 

and equipment repair, and replenishment and resupply functions. If the PLA is expected to 

conduct ground operations ashore in a distant location, the services needed at the facility 

would probably expand to include vehicle and equipment repair sites, intermediary medical and mortuary services, light prepositioned materiel sites for low-intensity conflicts, an 

extensive training area for ground troops, and some warehouses for spare parts and sensitive equipment. Finally, if PLAN missions involve an extensive SLOC protection mission, 

the PLAN would probably seek to establish an extensive network of facilities geographically 
43

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

dispersed to cover the wide area of the Indian Ocean. Additional features of the PLA overseas facility in this case would probably include large ship repair sites, extensive medical 

and mortuary services, POL sites, ordnance storage sites, air traffic control services, and 

other air support facilities and operations. The recent disappearance of Malaysian Flight 

370 en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing has revealed that the Chinese military realizes 

that it lacks the capability to maintain situational awareness throughout a vast space such 

as the Indian Ocean.108

How Big Would a Chinese Logistics Base Be? Former LOGWESTPAC staffers indicated that their command has about 100 people.109 Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics 

experts suggested that the PLAN, with its less experienced personnel, would probably need 

about 1.5 times more staff, or about 150 personnel.110 Finnair, a commercial air shipping 

company that performs air supply chain management functions, staffs its Helsinki terminal 

with 350 people.111 A full-fledged Chinese logistics base in Qingdao has a staff of approximately 500 personnel.112 These figures suggest a range of 100 to 500 personnel at a Chinese 

overseas logistics facility. Chinese scholars and military experts emphasize that PLA activities on a foreign base should be respectful of the wishes and sovereignty of the host country, 

which suggests that the PLA might try to minimize its footprint. U.S. logistics experts share 

this view. Considering all these factors, a Chinese overseas logistics support base might 

have 150 to 200 personnel. 

Selection Criteria for the Host Country

Chinese analysts have recently started to specify additional desired characteristics for their 

overseas facilities. Dai Xu describes the criteria for selecting a specific region and country that 

should host their overseas facility/facilities: 

We must choose a region where our strategic interests are important and 

concentrated and then select a country that has a friendly, solid relationship 

with us. Not only can our overseas commercial fleets obtain timely replenishment 

once we have this kind of base, but our commercial interests in the countries and 

regions around our base will also have a stable support point. This type of support 

can not only encourage domestic enterprises to take further steps toward going 

global, but can also deepen our friendship with the host countries and promote 

cooperation on other issues.113
44 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Legal Requirements and Political Restrictions

Shen Dingli writes:

Bases established by other countries appear to be used to protect their overseas 

rights and interests. As long as the bases are set up in line with international laws 

and regulations, they are legal ones. But if the bases are established to harm other 

countries, their existence becomes illegal and they are likely to be opposed by other 

countries.114

Shen argues that overseas basing decisions need to balance three relationships:

First, the relations between base troops and the host countries. It is possible 

to set up military bases as long as the establishment is in line with the host 

countries’ interests. Second, the relationship between the base troops and the 

countries neighboring to the host country. If the base troops can maintain 

regional stability, it will be probably welcomed by all the countries in the region. 

Third, the relationship between the big countries in the world. The establishment 

of the troop bases is sensitive to those big countries which have already set up 

bases abroad.115

Shaping the International Environment to Accept a Chinese Overseas Base

Military expert Liu Zhongmin argues that:

China also needs to make the international community aware of the fact that 

overseas bases are needed for two purposes: China’s own interests and the 

country’s assumption of more international responsibilities. There is no need to 

conceal these goals. Some countries expect China to undertake more international 

responsibilities but object to China’s plans for overseas bases, which are necessary 

for bearing such responsibilities. This is unreasonable.

He urges Chinese policymakers to begin consultations with potential hosts, noting that “China’s 

traditional friendly relations with many coastal nations on the Indian Ocean make it possible 
45

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

to set up overseas bases there.” Liu notes that Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern, and African 

countries are not worried about Chinese overseas bases because China does not have a tradition 

of maritime military expeditions. India is an exception, since it “has competitive relations with 

China in the Indian Ocean.” Liu argues that consultations and cultivation of support from different international organizations and the global community can overcome obstacles.116

Chinese analysts and military personnel advocating establishment of an overseas military 

base argue that it should:

■ provide essential logistics and supply support for out of area military operations

■ conform to international law and the strict restrictions and preferences of the host nation

■ support an acceptable Chinese role in the larger regional and international context

■ be built in a country or countries that maintain friendly relations with China and whose 

interests are advanced by a Chinese military presence

■ protect Chinese shipping and sea lines of communication against nontraditional and 

traditional threats, ensure the safety of Chinese citizens and businesses abroad, and deter 

foreign intervention against Chinese economic interests abroad.117

Staging Points for Nontraditional Missions Ashore

A more speculative argument is the potential for China to establish staging points to supply ordnance, weapons, and other equipment to support ground operations against terrorists, 

insurgents, and pirates in Africa. Comments by Chinese analysts and by the PLA Chief of General Staff in 2011 suggest Beijing may eventually decide that China’s economic interests in Africa require a ground force presence.118 Special operations against nonstate actors in Africa could 

be facilitated by a logistics support facility in a friendly country such as Pakistan. Such ground 

operations would go well beyond the rationales currently offered by advocates of overseas Chinese bases and would likely generate political concerns from African countries.

The PLA might be able to conduct limited ground combat operations without staging ordnance and weapons ashore. China could follow the example of a U.S. Marine Expeditionary 

Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]), which deploys a reinforced battalion supported by aircraft and service support assets on board amphibious ships to conduct NEOs, HA/

DR operations, and low-intensity combat against terrorists and insurgents. MEU (SOCs) do not 
46 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

need prestaged equipment to conduct 6-month-long missions. The deployment of China’s first 

landing platform dock to the Gulf of Aden in July 2010 with PLA special forces on board could 

have been the initial test of such an operational concept.119

Characteristics of a Future Chinese Overseas Logistics Base

Interviews with military logisticians and Chinese writings provide insight into the operational and political considerations likely to shape the characteristics, features, and location of a 

potential overseas PLA logistics base. Pakistan’s status as a trusted strategic partner whose interests are closely aligned with China’s makes it the most likely location for such a base, but Karachi 

would be better able to satisfy PLAN requirements than Gwadar. Chinese experts recognize that 

host nation (and neighboring country) concerns will restrict which operations are possible from 

an overseas base. Chinese experts also acknowledge the need for a concerted strategic communications plan to gain international support for an overseas base and to dispel international suspicion. U.S. military logisticians suggest that a future Chinese overseas logistics base will likely be 

dual use in nature, rely on distribution networks rather than warehousing for resupply, have a light 

footprint of between 100 and 500 personnel, and make heavy use of husbanding agents.

Establishing an overseas base in South Asia would support a range of Chinese overseas 

interests, but it might also give rise to additional interests. Dr. Rodney Lyons of the Australian 

Strategic Policy Institute argues that a nation’s presence out of area is like gravity—a force that in 

itself exerts pressure in a certain direction.120 Chinese overseas logistics bases would be vulnerable to attack if China conducted major combat operations against India or the United States. 

But in peacetime, overseas logistics facilities could support a higher tempo of PLAN operations, 

increase Chinese political leverage in dealing with regional countries, and advance Chinese 

foreign policy goals. An increased PLA presence in the Indian Ocean would offer both opportunities and challenges for U.S. national security interests.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

This study began by examining China’s expanding overseas economic, political, and 

security interests, which are likely to generate increasing demand for PLAN overseas deployments. The study then identified and analyzed six basing models that the PLA might 

employ to support such missions. After examining each model in relation to China’s longstanding foreign policy principles and long-term interests, the research found two models 

conform to China’s foreign policy principles: Dual Use Logistics Facility Model and String 

of Pearls Model.
47

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

The current commercial Pit Stop Model is unlikely to be able to support the heightened 

demand for military missions to protect China’s expanding international interests. Evidence 

suggests that even the current tempo of counterpiracy operations and rotations is expensive and 

is straining PLAN forces. These factors will generate pressure for the PRC leadership to expand 

access beyond current temporary access to commercial facilities. The Dual Use Logistics Facility and the String of Pearls Model are the two options that conform to China’s foreign policy 

principles and would support likely missions to protect China’s foreign policy interests.

To distinguish between these two models, the assessment examined physical evidence of 

sites associated with the String of Pearls and the patterns of current PLAN operations abroad. 

There is little physical evidence to suggest that China intends to use commercial port facilities 

associated with the String of Pearls to support military operations. China’s current naval operational patterns of behavior do not involve any of the supposed String of Pearls sites. The PLAN 

uses commercial facilities to support its Gulf of Aden operations and has not engaged in joint 

military exercises with the host nations.

The study also explored the view that the String of Pearls indicates a Chinese intention to encircle India and dominate the Indian Ocean. The analysis noted that using the String of Pearls to 

support major combat operations in the Indian Ocean would require a much larger Chinese naval 

force structure and that the geography of the region favors India. The analysis also revealed that only 

Chittagong port in Bangladesh has most of the physical features necessary to support major combat 

operations. Gwadar and Hambantoto could potentially be upgraded over the next 20 years to improve their capability, but improvements sufficient to support major combat operations would likely 

transform them into overt Chinese bases. Moreover, it would make little sense for China to conduct 

combat operations from facilities highly vulnerable to Indian air and missile strikes.

Interviews with U.S. military logisticians and analysis of Chinese writings identified a number of likely characteristics of a potential Chinese overseas logistics base under the Dual Use Logistics Facility model. This information suggested that China would likely position any bases in a 

country with a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests (such as Pakistan), 

that the host country would likely impose restrictions on how China could use the bases, and that 

China would need an effective strategic communications plan to ensure international support 

and dispel suspicion. Logistics experts suggested that a future Chinese overseas logistics base will 

likely be characterized by a dual use nature, reliance on distribution networks for resupply rather 

than warehousing, a light footprint (between 100 and 500 personnel), a division of labor between 

logistics hubs, and heavy use of husbanding agents. Chinese logistics facilities could also potentially serve as a staging point for ground operations against nonstate actors.
48 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

An expanded PLAN overseas presence will present both opportunities and challenges for 

U.S.-China strategic and military-to-military relations. Opportunities include expanding the 

U.S. cooperative military relationship with China to:121

■ enhance cooperation in NEOs, HA/DR operations, and other nontraditional security 

fields

■ enter into discussions with China, India, and other interested parties about multilateral 

SLOC protection

■ allow for cooperation in counterterrorism, force protection, and littoral maritime security

■ participate in joint U.S-China-India naval exercises

■ expand opportunities for logistics cooperation (for example, U.S. ships refueling from 

Chinese underway replenishment ships or in Chinese-run facilities).

Although a Chinese forward presence would remain vulnerable to conventional attacks 

from India or the United States, China would still be able to exert strategic pressure in the IOR. 

In this light, the United States should:

■ continue strengthening its bilateral security relationship with India

■ pursue its own access agreements with countries in South Asia to balance any increased 

Chinese strategic weight in the region

■ increase the frequency and depth of U.S. engagement with potential hosts for PLAN logistics facilities (for example, countries in the IOR, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Aden)

■ consider initiating a series of rolling bilateral exercises with Indian Ocean countries 

modeled after the U.S.–Association of Southeast Asian Nations Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises and the U.S.–South American UNITAS exercises.

If China establishes a significant forward basing presence, the PLAN will be operating in 

closer proximity to U.S. forces and U.S. basing arrangements. The United States should:
49

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

■ continue to emphasize maritime safety issues and operational procedures in its Military 

Maritime Consultative Agreement discussions with the Chinese

■ reach an understanding about U.S. access to facilities in the Indian Ocean where China 

has access agreements

■ consider quid pro quo arrangements between U.S. and Chinese forces for the mutual 

use of water, fuel, and other interchangeable services.

Finally, if some countries agree to host large-scale PLA bases, this choice would imply a 

fundamental shift in their relations with the United States. As a consequence, the United States 

should:

■ make clear that it does not support PLAN use of overseas bases to conduct combat 

operations against other nation-states

■ make clear that if the host country allows the PLAN to conduct combat operations 

from its facilities, the United States would consider the circumstances and might treat the 

host country as a belligerent. In the event of a conflict with China, the United States would 

reserve the right to use force against facilities supporting Chinese military operations

■ make clear to the potential hosts of PLA bases that the United States will exert diplomatic and financial pressure to ensure that they do not assist China’s use of force against 

another nation-state in the IOR.

A Chinese announcement that the PLA has established an overseas military base or 

reached a long-term base access agreement in the IOR will present a challenge for U.S. regional 

policy in South Asia. However, China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean does not signal 

an intention to encircle India or to dominate the Indian Ocean. The United States will need to 

assure other countries that it remains actively engaged in order to balance the political leverage China will gain from a forward presence in the Indian Ocean and encourage China to act 

responsibly as Beijing seeks to protect its overseas interests.
50 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Sanya Zhanjiang

Point to Point Linear by Water Point to Point Linear by Water

Gwadar 2,656.95 4,392.77 3,054.31 5,280.85

Hambantota 1,816.78 2,676.65 2,221.85 3,300.90

Chittagong 1,028.93 2,746.19 1,198.54 3,365.75

Sanya N/A N/A 216.28 300.68

Zhanjiang 216.28 300.68 N/A N/A

Appendix 1. “String of Pearls” Distance to Chinese Bases in Nautical 

Miles

Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships, available at <http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docid=/

content1/janesdata/yb/jfs/jfs_5719.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Luyang%20

11&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JFS&>.
51

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

Appendix 2. Required PLAN Force Structure for an Indian Ocean 

Region Conflict

Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships, available at <http://client.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/

content1/janesdata/sent/sassu/indis130.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=India%20

Navy&backPath=http://client.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=SASS&>.

Aircraft Carriers Destroyers Frigates Submarines

2013 Indian Navy 2 8 13 15

2013 PLA Navy 1 26 53 63

2020 Indian Navy 3 15 24 24

2020 Total Minimum 

PLAN Force

3 41 77 87
52 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Requirements Zhanjiang

Recommended infrastructure Current

Three berthing spaces 1,000 linear feet each X

Minimum water depth of 35 feet X

30–45 acres of open storage X

Four rail offloading spurs of 1,000 feet of straight track each X

Four rail/truck end ramps X

Gatehouse/security

Access to port-owned interchange yard to support switching two trains per day X

Suitable area to land/service helicopters (~5 acres) X

Two container handlers X

Adequate interior roadways to port facilities X

Office space with adequate utilities and communication service X

Processing area for 30 trucks

Wash rack that meets USDA requirements

Terminal Access

Close proximity (<10 miles) to interstate highway system

Access to at least one major commercial rail carrier X

Water channel access width of 500 feet and depth of 35 feet X

Access to commercial rail interchange yard (if port-owned facilities are 

inadequate) X

Appendix 3. U.S. DOD Port Requirements Applied to Zhanjiang

Sources: “Port of Zhanjiang: Port of Call,” WorldPortSource.com, available at <www.worldportsource.

com/ports/portCall/CHN_Port_of_Zhanjiang_2532.php >; “Zhanjiang Port: General Information,” Sinoagentgd.com, available at <www.sinoagentgd.com/06Port_11.htm>; Xu Shaohua, “A Rising Port City in 

South China,” speech given at briefing on Zhanjiang (Guangzhou) Investment Environment, November 

5, 2003, available at <www.chinazj.net/daohan/e2003-11-05.htm>.
53

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

Appendix 4. Citizen and Netizen Public Opinion on Overseas Basing

Although the ability of public opinion to influence Chinese government policy remains 

debatable, some evidence suggests the Chinese Communist Party does take Chinese citizen 

viewpoints into account in determining policy.1

 Polling data suggest the Chinese public has 

a positive attitude toward overseas bases. In one 2009 poll by Huanqiu Shibao, 16,906 (89.6 

percent) respondents said “yes” and 1,967 (10.4 percent) respondents said “no” to the question, 

“Should China Establish Overseas Military Bases?”2

An October 2009 Huanqiu Shibao poll asked, “How should China strengthen its effectiveness in protecting Chinese vessels off the coast of Somalia?”3

 The construction of an overseas 

base was suggested by 40.4 percent of respondents; 31 percent advocated increasing the number 

of navy vessels; 21.2 percent called for increasing the area of protection; and 7.5 percent called 

for asking for support from international navy forces. The poll also asked: “Focusing on the current situation, what is the most pressing need for the Chinese navy?” Most respondents (32.7 

percent) indicated that having a stable, reliable, overseas base was the most pressing need; 30.2 

percent called for building an aircraft carrier; 22.8 percent advocated increasing the capacity 

of medium-sized surface fighter/destroyer vessels; and 14.3 percent called for increasing the 

number of supply vessels.4

Public opinion might not pressure the CCP to establish an overseas base or agree to longterm access agreements. However, this data suggests the views of Chinese citizens would not be 

an obstacle to establishing a permanent overseas basing network. 

1 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy Paper 

no. 26, September 2010, 44.

2本期话:中国应该在海外设军事基地吗?[This Week’s Topic of Discussion: Should China 

Establish Overseas Military Bases?], 2010, accessed at <http://debate.huanqiu.com/2009-12/675394.html>.

3网民呼吁寻求海外基地组航母编队维护远洋利益 [Internet Users’ Call for Establishing 

Overseas Bases and Arrange for Aircraft Carriers to Better Protect Interests Overseas], October 20, 

2009.

4 Ibid.
54 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Notes 1 Beginning in 2009, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) began deploying threeship flotillas to the Gulf of Aden for the purposes of conducting counterpiracy operations. These 

missions have largely involved escorting Chinese and other ships through areas known for Somali 

pirate activity. Up until that point Chinese shipping had been threatened by an increasing number 

of piracy activities, and the United Nations had authorized the formation of counterpiracy missions by its members.

2 See Christopher D. Yung et al., China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions, China Strategic Perspectives 3 (Washington, DC: National 

Defense University [NDU] Press, December 2010).

3 See Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 4 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2006).

4 Two excellent overviews are David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 2013) and Elizabeth Economy and Michael Levi, By All Means Necessary: 

How China’s Resource Quest is Changing the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

5 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China is now the world’s largest importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels,” Today in Energy, March 24, 2014.

6 2011 China Customs statistics, accessed at Global Trade Information Services, Inc.

7 Chinese Ministry of Commerce data, accessed at CEICData.com, China Economic and Industry Data Database, May 21, 2014.

8 The Heritage Foundation, “China’s Global Reach,” interactive map, available at <www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map>.

9 Erica S. Downs, testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, hearing on “China’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Players,” panel on “New Interest Groups in 

Chinese Foreign Policy,” April 13, 2011.

10 Mathieu Duchâtel and Bates Gill, “Overseas citizen protection: a growing challenge for China,” SIPRI Newsletter, February 2012, available at <www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/february12>.

11 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China,” February 4, 2014, available at <www.eia.

gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf>.

12 “China Focus: China ponders energy strategy,” Xinhua, February 13, 2014, <http://english.

cntv.cn/20140213/103226.shtml>; Michael Forsythe, “As U.S. Aims for Energy Independence, China 

Heads the Opposite Way,” New York Times, February 13, 2014.

13Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins, “China’s Oil Security Pipe Dream,” Naval War College 

Review 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010), 91.

14Daniel Hartnett, “The PLA’s Domestic and Foreign Activities and Orientation,” testimony 

before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on “China’s Military and 

Security Activities Abroad,” Washington, DC, March 4, 2009, 1.

15Dai Xu, “China Should Establish Overseas Base,” Huanqiu Shibao, February 3, 2009, 11, accessed at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/top/2009-02/363027.html>.

16 Ibid.
55

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

17 Shen Dingli, “Don’t Shun the Idea of Setting Up Overseas Military Bases,” China.org, January 

28, 2010, available at <www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-01/28/content_19324522.htm>.

18 Ibid.

19 James Mulvenon, “Dilemmas and Imperatives of Beijing’s Strategic Energy Dependence: The 

PLA Perspective,” in China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies, ed. Gabriel Collins et al. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 5.

20 Ibid., 5–10.

21 Mi Zhengyu et al., China’s National Defense Concepts (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army 

Press, April 1988), 200–202.

22 Ibid.

23 Christopher D. Yung, “Sinica Rules the Waves? The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Power 

Projection and Anti-Access/Area Denial Lessons from the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict,” in Chinese 

Lessons from Other People’s Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 89–90.

24 Within the U.S. defense analysis literature, there is a long list of studies that support the idea of 

high ordnance expenditure rates in combat. See, for example, Robert Berg, “The C.N.A. Ordnance Programming Model and Methodology,” Professional Paper 424 (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 

October 1984), 19; Angelyn Jewell et al., “U.S.S. Nimitz and Carrier Airwing Nine Surge Demonstration,” 

CRM 97-111.10 (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, April 1998), 52–64. That the Chinese have 

absorbed this lesson from their observations of foreign conflicts, see Yung, “Sinica Rules the Waves?” 

84–85, and Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars,” in Scobell, Lai, and Kamphausen, 160.

25 Craig Hooper, “VLS Underway Replenishment: When Will the Navy Get Serious?” DefenseTech.org, June 10, 2010, available at <http://defensetech.org/2010/06/10/vls-underway-replenishment-when-will-the-navy-get-serious/>.

26 According to the Hague Convention XIII, neutral nations must provide a belligerent “24-

hour . . . notice to depart . . . neutral ports or roadsteads at the outbreak of armed conflict. . . . Belligerent vessels, including warships, retain a right of entry in distress whether caused by force majeure or 

damage resulting from enemy action . . . [however] [i]n the absence of special provisions to the contrary 

in the laws or regulations of the neutral nation, belligerent warships are forbidden to remain in a neutral 

port or roadstead in excess of 24 hours.” See U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Edition 2007, 7–2.

27 This report specifically addresses the likelihood of this prospect later in the report as it addresses the possibility of a “String of Pearls” option being pursued by the Chinese military.

28尹卓:中国海军应在吉布提建立长期社给基地 [Yin Zhuo: The Chinese 

Navy should establish a long-term base at Djibouti], accessed at <http://cn.chan.cn/article/

n494656,fe393f,d2477_12053.html>.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31Chen Bingde, “Forging a New China-U.S. Military-to-Military Relationship Featuring Mutual Respect, Mutual Benefit, and Cooperation,” speech at National Defense University, Washington, 

DC, May 18, 2011.
56 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

32 Ibid.

33 By “hotel-like” or “tourist-like,” we mean naval operations that are stripped largely of 

their military content. “Hotel services” of commercial ports essentially involve refueling, restocking of foodstuffs, water replenishment, provision of electric power, and management or discarding 

of waste. Such activities are essentially indistinguishable from commercial port services to nonmilitary vessels.

34 “Logistics: Chinese Warships Fill Indian Ocean Ports,” StrategyPage.com, July 9, 2010, available at <www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlog/articles/20100709.aspx>.

35By ad hoc, we mean an arrangement that does not involve a status of forces agreement, a 

formal memorandum of understanding or agreement, or a signed legal document specifying the nature 

of the relationship between the visiting Chinese military and the host nation.

36Cui Xiaohuo, “Navy has no plan for overseas base,” China Daily, March 11, 2010.

37 Ibid.

38Zhang Zhao Zhong, “Will China Establish Overseas Military Bases?” China ThinkNet, January 26, 2010.

39W.O. Henderson, “Germany’s Trade with Her Colonies, 1884–1914,” The Economic History 

Review 8, no. 1 (1938), 7.

40Hermann Hiery, The Neglected War: The German South Pacific and the Influence of World 

War I (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 1.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 11.

43 “China Navy Official Says Overseas Base Needed,” Asiancorrespondent.com, December 

30, 2009, available at <http://asiancorrespondent.com/26981/china-navy-official-says-overseas-baseneeded/>.

44Dai, 11.

45 Ibid.

46 Liu Zhongmin, “Overseas Bases Needed For Much More Than Cruising Sailors,” Global 

Times, May 21, 2010, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/533918.shtml>.

47 The term Malacca Dilemma was first used by former General Secretary of the Chinese 

Communist Party Hu Jintao at an economic work conference in 2003. He noted that China’s dependence on oil coming from the Middle East would be vulnerable to certain powers who seek to control 

navigation through the Strait of Malacca. See Shi Hongtao, “Energy Security Runs Up against the 

‘Malacca Dilemma’: Will China, Japan, and Korea Cooperate?” China Youth Daily, June 15, 2004, as 

referenced in Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Maritime Security and the ‘Malacca Dilemma’,” Asian Security

4, no. 2 (May 2008).

48Communications with the Office of Net Assessment, November 30, 2011. The subsequent 

quotes for this paragraph and the next are drawn from communications with the Office of Net Assessment about the Booz Allen Hamilton report.

49Christopher J. Pehrson, “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power 

Across the Asian Littoral,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2006, 3.

50 Ibid., 5.
57

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

51 James Neidpath, Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919–1941

(New York: Clarendon Press, 1981), 53.

52Chris Madsen, “Strategy, Fleet Logistics, and the Lethbridge Mission to the Pacific, and 

Indian Oceans 1943–1944,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 6 (2008), 961.

53 Neidpath, 55.

54 Ibid., 953.

55 Ibid., 963.

56Military Sealift Command, “About Military Sealift Command,” available at <https://sealiftcommand.com/about-msc/>.

57Otto Kreisher, “Operation Unified Assistance,” Air Force Magazine 88, no. 4 (April 2005).

58 Ibid.

59 “Navy Logistics Supports Operation Unified Assistance,” The Navy Supply Corps Newsletter

(March/April 2005), 3.

60Yung et al., China’s Out of Area Naval Operations, 38–40.

61 Ibid.

62Zhang Yuwei, “Fight Somalia Pirates on Land, China Tells the UN,” China Daily, March 

11–13, 2011.

63 According to The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations:

all acts of hostility in neutral territory, including neutral lands, neutral waters, and 

neutral airspace, are prohibited. A neutral nation has the duty to prevent the use of 

its territory as a place of sanctuary or a base of operations by belligerent forces of 

any side. If the neutral nation is unable or unwilling to enforce effectively its right of 

inviolability, an aggrieved belligerent may take such acts as are necessary in neutral 

territory to counter the activities of enemy forces, including warships and military 

aircraft, making unlawful use of that territory.

See The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 7-2.

64 Chen.

65Author interviews with Captain Ronald Carr, Commander Brian George, and Commander 

William Clarke, all members of the OPNAV N4 staff with experience at Logistics Force Western Pacific 

in Singapore.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68William Ashton, “Chinese Bases in Burma—Fact or Fiction?” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7, 

no. 2 (July 1997), as cited in Andrew Selth, “Burma, China and the Myth of Military Bases” in Asian 

Security 3, no. 3 (2007), 300.

69 Selth, 300.

70 Ibid., 301.
58 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

71 Ibid., 302.

72 Stephen Marks, “Understanding China’s Strategy: Beyond ‘Non-Interference’,” in Pambazuka 

News, November 05, 2008, available at <www.pambazuka.org/en/category/books/51762>.

73Billy Tea, “Unstringing China’s Strategic Pearls,” Asia Times, March 11, 2011, available at 

<www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MC11Ad02.html>.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Peter Lee, “China Drops the Gwadar Hot Potato,” Asia Times, May 28, 2011, available at <http://atimes.com/atime/China/ME28Ad01.html>. Also see Farhan Bokhari and Kathrin 

Hille, “Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base,” Financial Times, May 22, 2011, available at <www.

ft.com/cms/s/0/f50629b6-81a7-11e0-8a54-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=4d9dd3aa-5fbd-11dc-b0fe0000779fd2ac.html>.

77 Lee.

78 “China May Take Over Gwadar Port from Singaporean Firm,” International Herald 

Tribune, September 1, 2012, available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/429443/china-may -takeover-gwadar-port-from-singaporean-firm/>; also see “Gwadar Goes to China,” International 

Herald Tribune, September 1, 2012, available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/429152/gwadargoes-to-china/>.

79 “China May Take Over Gwadar Port from Singaporean Firm.”

80Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the 

Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 1 (Winter 2011), 65.

81 Ibid.

82 For an update of Chinese counterpiracy operations and port visits, see Andrew Erickson and 

Austin Strange, “No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden,” 

China Maritime Studies 10 (November 2013), 140–141.

83 “Seychelles Invited China to Set Up Anti-Piracy Base,” DefenseNews, September 4, 2012, 

available at <www.defensenews.com/article/20111202/DEFSECT03/112020302/Seychelles-InvitesChina-Set-Up-Anti-Piracy-Base>; also see Jeremy Page and Tom Wright, “Chinese Military Considers 

New Indian Ocean Presence,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2011, available at <http://online.wsj.

com/article/SB10001424052970203518404577096261061550538.html>; “China’s Seychelles Facility Not 

a Military Base: Chinese Analysts,” FirstPost, December 13, 2011, available at <www.firstpost.com/printpage.php?idno=155082&sr_no=0>.

84 Li Xiaokun and Li Lianxing, “Navy Looks at Offer from Seychelles,” China Daily, December 

13, 2011.

85 Iskander Rehman, “China’s String of Pearls and India’s Enduring Tactical Advantage,” 

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, June 8, 2010, available at <www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasStringofPearlsandIndiasEnduringTacticalAdvantage_irehman_080610>.

86 Ibid.

87Department of Defense, Engineering and Design of Military Ports: Unified Facilities Criteria, 

UFC 4-159-02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 16, 2004), 3-1–3-4, 7-1–7-2, 8-1–8-3, 

12-1–12-6, 13-1–13-2.
59

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

88 Interview with COL George Topic, USA, (Ret.), Vice Director, Center for Joint and Strategic 

Logistics, National Defense University, March 16, 2011.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.; interview with OPNAV N4 staff members with experience working out of Singapore.

96 Interviews with Carr, George, and Clarke.

97 Ibid.

98 Interview with Topic.

99 Ibid.

100 Interviews with Carr, George, and Clarke.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 Interview with the Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics, January 2010. This point was 

reiterated in a later interview with Topic.

104 Ibid.

105 Interviews with Carr, George, and Clarke.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.

108 Greg Torode and Michael Martina, “Search for MH370 Reveals a Military Vulnerability for 

China,” Reuters News, April 22, 2014.

109 Interviews with Carr, George, and Clarke.

110 Interview with Topic.

111 “Finnair Cargo Terminal Operations,” FINNAIR.com, available at <www.finnaircargo.com/

en/terminal-operations/about-us.html>.

112Zeng Sheng et al., “Focus on Highlights of Qingdao Support Base’s Military-Civilian Integrated Support Training Exercise Under Informatized Conditions,” Renmin Haijun, December 3, 2010, 

3 (in translation).

113Dai.

114 Shen.

115 Ibid.

116 Liu.

117The analysts and military scholars cited here, while notably more hawkish than the average Chinese commentators on issues related to defense, have nonetheless tended to espouse views that 

generally reflect government policy or are within the range of government debates over policy. It should 

be noted that one of these scholars—Admiral Yin Zhuo—when considered by the CCP to “speak out of 

school” was formally reprimanded and forced to make a retraction of his statements.

118Chen.
60 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

119 “Type 071 Yuzhao Class Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD),” Globalsecurity.org, available 

at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/yuzhao.htm>. Also see Jeff Engstrom, “PLA’s Growing 

Force Projection Capabilities,” China Brief 10, no. 25 (December 17, 2010), 7-9.

120Comments made at the Institute for National Strategic Studies 2011 Pacific Symposium 

“The New Security Environment—Implications for American Security in the Asia Pacific Region,” National Defense University, Washington, DC, April 4–5, 2011.

121Although the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship has experienced ups and downs 

over the past few years, there is some evidence that the Chinese would like to develop certain types of 

cooperation. At the March 2011 PLA National Defense University–U.S. National Defense University 

Strategic Dialogue in Beijing, China, PLA NDU representatives expressed an interest in having the two 

militaries conduct joint exercises and lessons learned exchanges related to noncombatant evacuation 

operations. Similar suggestions were made to State Department representatives at the 2011 Strategic and 

Economic Dialogue.
61

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements 

About the Authors

Dr. Christopher D. Yung has been a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic 

Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), at the National Defense University 

since September 2009. Prior to entering government service, Dr. Yung was a Senior Research 

Analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, where he led projects or was involved in analysis 

related to China, Northeast Asia security, the People’s Liberation Army and its navy, and U.S. 

interoperability with the militaries of the Far East. In addition to Dr. Yung’s China- and Asiarelated expertise, he has direct military operations analysis experience. Between 1998 and 2001, 

he was the Special Assistant and Operations Analyst for the Commander, Amphibious Group 

Two—the senior U.S. Navy amphibious command in the Atlantic Fleet. This was followed by an 

assignment as Special Assistant and Operations Analyst for the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps 

Forces Atlantic—the highest ranking Marine Corps operational command on the East Coast. 

Dr. Yung holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 

International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. He also holds an MA in East Asian and 

China Studies from the same institution. He received language certificates in Mandarin Chinese 

from Columbia University and the Beijing Foreign Language Teacher’s Institute.

Mr. Ross Rustici was a Research Analyst in INSS. His areas of expertise include U.S.-Chinese strategic relations, cyber, and the People’s Liberation Army, as well as PLA Navy operations, force sizing, and defense transparency. Mr. Rustici holds MA degrees in International 

Relations and Public Administration from the Maxwell School of Syracuse University.

Mr. Scott Devary was a Research Intern in INSS. He holds an MA in International Relations and Diplomacy from Seton Hall University and a BA in Political Science from the University of Washington. He studied Mandarin Chinese at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Mr. 

Devary has been a Contract Researcher in the Center for Global Security at the Department of 

Energy and Brookhaven National Laboratory.

Ms. Jenny Lin is the Founder of Asia Taktik, LLC. She was a Salzburg Fellow and Sasakawa 

Peace Foundation Resident Fellow in the Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She simultaneously held research contracts at The Project 2049 Institute and 

INSS. Her research focus includes the U.S.-Japan alliance and China’s energy, military, cyber, 

and space industries. Ms. Lin received an MA in Public Policy from the American University 

and BA in Government and Asian Studies from the University of Texas at Austin. She is fluent 

in Mandarin and Min Nan dialect.

Col kris bauman, USAF

Senior Military Fellow

Mr. John A. Cope

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. T.X. Hammes

Distinguished Research Fellow

Mr. Frank G. Hoffman

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Christopher J. Lamb

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Andre Le Sage

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III

Distinguished Research Fellow 

Mr. Leo G. Michel

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Denise Natali

Senior Research Fellow

COL Richard Outzen, USA

Senior Military Fellow

Dr. James J. Przystup

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Nicholas Rostow

Senior Director

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Christopher D. Yung

Senior Research Fellow

For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm.

Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows