United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 18-1794

C.D., by and through her Parents and Next Friends, M.D. and 

P.D.; M.D.; P.D.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

NATICK PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT; BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 

APPEALS,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, U.S. District Judge] 

Before

Torruella, Lynch, and Kayatta,

Circuit Judges.

Benjamin J. Wish, with whom Todd & Weld, LLP, Laurie R. 

Martucci, and Martucci Law Associates were on brief, for 

appellants.

Selene Almazan-Altobelli and Ellen Saideman on brief for 

Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc., amicus curiae.

Ira A. Burnim, Lewis Bossing, Elizabeth B. McCallum, Paul E. 

Poirot, William T. DeVinney, and Baker Hostetler, LLP on brief for 

the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, 

Association of University Centers on Disabilities, Disability Law 

Center, National Center for Learning Disabilities, National Center 

for Youth Law, National Disability Rights Network, and National 

Down Syndrome Congress, amici curiae.

Felicia S. Vasudevan, with whom Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & 
Lehane, LLP was on brief, for Natick Public School District.

Anna Rachel Dray-Siegel, Assistant Attorney General, with 

whom Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was on brief,

for Bureau of Special Education Appeals.

Michael J. Long and Long & DiPietro, LLP on brief for the 

Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents, amicus 

curiae.

Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., Cristine M.D. Goldman, Colleen 

Shea, Colby Brunt, and Stoneman, Chandler & Miller, LLP on brief 

for National School Boards Association and Massachusetts 

Association of School Committees, amici curiae.

May 22, 2019
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. The Individuals with Disabilities 

Education Act (IDEA) requires that students with certain 

disabilities be provided a "[f]ree appropriate public education"

(FAPE) in the "[l]east restrictive environment" (LRE) appropriate 

for each student. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1), (5). Under the IDEA 

and Massachusetts law, the individualized education programs

(IEPs) of certain disabled students must also contain 

postsecondary transition goals and services based on ageappropriate assessments. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII); Mass. 

Gen. Laws ch. 71B, § 2.

Appellants are C.D., a resident of Natick, 

Massachusetts, who qualified as a child with a disability under 

the IDEA, and her parents. They challenge this circuit's prior 

interpretations of these IDEA requirements as incomplete or as 

inconsistent with the IDEA and current Supreme Court case law. 

The parents seek reimbursement for at least three years of C.D.'s 

education in a specialized private school. Rejecting these 

challenges, we affirm the district court, which upheld a decision 

of the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) 

ruling that the Natick Public School District (Natick) had complied 

with the FAPE, LRE, and transition requirements in proposed IEPs 

for C.D. See C.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist. (C.D. II), No. 15-

13617-FDS, 2018 WL 3510291, at *1 (D. Mass. July 20, 2018); C.D.
- 4 -

v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist. (C.D. I), No. 15-13617-FDS, 2017 WL 

3122654, at *1 (D. Mass. July 21, 2017).

I.

The IDEA offers states federal funds for the education 

of children with disabilities in exchange for the states' 

commitments to comply with the IDEA's directives, including its

FAPE and LRE requirements. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of 

Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295 (2006).

A FAPE "comprises 'special education and related 

services' -- both 'instruction' tailored to meet a child's 'unique 

needs' and sufficient 'supportive services' to permit the child to 

benefit from that instruction." Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 

S. Ct. 743, 748–49 (2017) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), (26), 

(29)). "The primary vehicle for delivery of a FAPE is an IEP." 

D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 

2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). IEPs are "comprehensive 

plan[s]" that are developed by the child's "IEP Team (which 

includes teachers, school officials, and the child's parents)" and

that "must be drafted in compliance with a detailed set of 

procedures." Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. 

Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the 

Supreme Court's recent decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County

School District RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017), the services offered 

in an IEP amount to a FAPE if they are "reasonably calculated to 
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enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's 

circumstances." Id. at 1001.

The IDEA also requires states receiving federal funds to 

educate disabled children in the "[l]east restrictive environment"

appropriate for each child. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5). The statute 

mandates at § 1412(a)(5)(A):

To the maximum extent appropriate, children 

with disabilities . . . are educated with 

children who are not disabled, and special 

classes, separate schooling, or other removal 

of children with disabilities from the regular 

educational environment occurs only when the 

nature or severity of the disability of a 

child is such that education in regular 

classes with the use of supplementary aids and 

services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.

Id. The Supreme Court has characterized this LRE mandate as 

embodying a "preference" for "mainstreaming" students with 

disabilities in "the regular classrooms of a public school system." 

Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202-03 (1982); see also

Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999 ("[T]he IDEA requires that children 

with disabilities receive education in the regular classroom 

'whenever possible'" (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202)). But the 

IDEA's preference for mainstreaming "is not absolute." T.M. ex 

rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 162 (2d Cir. 

2014); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n.21 ("The Act's use of 

the word 'appropriate' . . . reflect[s] Congress' recognition that 

some settings simply are not suitable environments for . . . some 
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handicapped children."). Instead, as we explained in Roland M.

v. Concord School Committee, 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990), "the 

desirability of mainstreaming must be weighed in concert with the 

Act's mandate for educational improvement."1 Id. at 993.

The final IDEA requirement at issue here is the 

instruction at § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) that certain students' 

IEPs "include[] . . . appropriate measurable postsecondary goals 

based upon age appropriate transition assessments related to 

training, education, employment, and . . . independent living 

skills" along with "the transition services (including courses of 

study) needed to assist the child in reaching those goals." 20 

U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa)-(bb). Massachusetts has made 

these transition requirements applicable starting at age fourteen. 

See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71B, § 2; see also 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) (making this requirement applicable 

"beginning not later than the first IEP to be in effect when the 

child is 16"). Because C.D. was fourteen or older when the IEPs 

at issue were proposed, these requirements applied.

 

1 Roland M. interpreted the IDEA's predecessor statute, 

see 910 F.2d at 987, but the text of the provision at issue has 

not changed, compare Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 

1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 612(5), 89 Stat. 733, 781 (1975), with

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
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II.

C.D. has borderline intellectual functioning and

significant deficits in language ability. She attended public 

school in Natick through fifth grade. For middle school, she

attended McAuliffe Regional Charter Public School in Framingham, 

Massachusetts, where she took all of her classes except math in a

regular classroom setting. To assist C.D., two private tutors

hired by C.D.'s parents attended C.D.'s middle school classes with 

her.

The summer before C.D. entered high school, her parents 

worked with Natick to develop an IEP for C.D.'s ninth grade year 

at Natick High School. C.D.'s parents wanted C.D. to continue her 

education in a regular classroom setting, with the help of the 

same private tutors. School officials explained that only Natick 

employees were allowed to teach or tutor students in Natick's 

classrooms.

Natick was concerned that larger class sizes and more 

advanced content in high school would make it difficult for C.D. 

to access the general education curriculum. It considered placing 

C.D. in replacement classes in which a modified general education 

curriculum is taught by a special education teacher. Ultimately, 

Natick, in its proposed IEP, chose a third option.

The school presented C.D.'s parents with a proposed 

ninth grade IEP, for the 2012-2013 school year, that placed C.D. 
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in regular classrooms for her elective courses but in a setting 

called the ACCESS Program for her academic courses. The ACCESS 

Program is a self-contained special education program located at 

Natick High School and designed for students who, like C.D., have 

cognitive and communication deficits. ACCESS offers a 

significantly modified curriculum, and its students typically earn 

certificates rather than high school diplomas.

C.D.'s parents rejected the IEP, saying that the ACCESS 

Program was an overly "restricted environment" and that C.D.'s 

placement there would "hinder" her academic and social growth. 

They enrolled C.D. at Learning Prep School, a private school that 

specializes in educating students with disabilities.

The summer before C.D. was to enter tenth grade, Natick 

presented to C.D.'s parents an IEP for the 2013-2014 school year 

that again placed C.D. in the ACCESS Program for her academic 

classes. C.D.'s parents again rejected the IEP, giving the same 

reasons, and enrolled C.D. at Learning Prep.

Before the next school year, the IEP Team reconvened, 

this time with the benefit of a fresh set of assessments of C.D. 

Based on these assessments and on reports of C.D.'s progress at 

Learning Prep, Natick proposed a new IEP for the 2014-2015 school 

year that placed C.D. in a mix of ACCESS classes, replacement 

classes, and general education classes. C.D.'s parents rejected 

this IEP for two reasons. As they saw it, the proposed schedule 
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left inadequate time for speech and language services. In 

addition, Natick had not yet conducted a formal postsecondary 

transition assessment. As to C.D.'s postsecondary transition, the 

2012-2013, 2013-2014, and initial 2014-2015 IEPs had stated the 

parents' goal that C.D. graduate from high school and had provided 

transition and vocational services from the school's learning 

center.

Natick then performed a formal transition assessment and 

presented a revised 2014-2015 IEP. This final IEP proposed the 

same mix of classes, but extended C.D.'s school day to allow for 

speech and language therapy as well as career preparation services. 

C.D.'s parents rejected this IEP, and C.D. attended Learning Prep 

for the 2014-2015 school year.

In 2014, C.D.'s parents filed a complaint with the BSEA 

seeking reimbursement for C.D.'s tuition at Learning Prep. To 

qualify for reimbursement, the parents had to show that Natick's 

IEPs for 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2014-2015 "had not made a free 

appropriate public education available." 2 See 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). After a hearing in May 2015, a BSEA Hearing 

 

2 The transition planning and transition assessment 

requirements are procedural. Only certain procedural flaws, such 

as those that result in the denial of a FAPE or "a deprivation of 

educational benefits," are actionable under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); see also, e.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 

694 F.3d 167, 195 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying this harmless error 

principle to a claimed violation of the transition requirements).
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Officer denied the parents' request for reimbursement. The 

Hearing Officer concluded that the IEPs were "reasonably 

calculated to provide [C.D.] with a free appropriate public 

education in the least restrictive environment." And the Hearing 

Officer found that the facts and testimony presented did not 

support the parents' arguments that the transition assessments and 

plans were inadequate.3

C.D.'s parents sought review of the BSEA's decision in 

federal district court. The district court denied the parents'

motion for summary judgment and their supplemental motion for 

summary judgment. See C.D. I, 2017 WL 3122654, at *26; C.D. II, 

2018 WL 3510291, at *4. Giving "due weight" to the decision of 

the BSEA, C.D. I, 2017 WL 3122654, at *15, the district court made 

three relevant rulings. First, because Endrew F. had been decided 

while the parents' motion for summary judgment was pending, the 

district court verified that the Hearing Officer had applied a 

FAPE standard consistent with Endrew F.4 Id. at *16 ("[T]he 

standard articulated in Endrew F. is not materially different from 

the standard set forth in" the First Circuit's prior cases and 

"applied by the hearing officer."). Second, the district court 

 

3 The Hearing Officer also rejected other arguments not 

presented on appeal.

4 The district court first remanded in part to the BSEA 

for the Hearing Officer to confirm that she had applied a standard 

consistent with Endrew F.
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found it "unclear" whether the BSEA's decision had followed the 

First Circuit's prior cases on the LRE mandate. Id. at *19. And 

so the district court remanded to the BSEA to determine whether 

the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 IEPs, which proposed to place C.D. in 

the ACCESS Program for her academic courses, had provided a FAPE 

in the LRE. After the BSEA responded with a clarification order, 

the district court concluded that "based on the preponderance of 

the evidence, the BSEA hearing officer appropriately found that 

the district balanced the benefits of mainstreaming against the 

restrictions associated with the [ACCESS] classes, and that 

the . . . IEPs were reasonably calculated to provide a FAPE in the 

least restrictive environment possible." C.D. II, 2018 WL 

3510291, at *4. Third, the district court agreed with the BSEA 

that the 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and the final 2014-20155 IEPs 

complied with the IDEA's transition planning and assessment 

requirements. C.D. I, 2017 WL 3122654, at *19, *21.

III.

C.D.'s parents now argue that the district court applied 

the wrong legal standards. They say first that Endrew F. defined 

"progress appropriate" as "appropriately ambitious" and 

"challenging" so that the district court was required to ask, in 

 

5 The district court held that any challenges to the 

initial 2014-2015 IEP were mooted by that IEP's replacement with 

the final 2014-2015 IEP. C.D. I, 2017 WL 3122654, at *21.
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evaluating whether a FAPE was offered, whether the IEPs contained 

sufficiently "challenging objectives." Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 

1000. Next, the parents urge us to adopt, and contend that the 

district court should have applied, a multi-part test from Daniel 

R.R. v. State Board of Education, 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989), 

to evaluate whether the IEPs placed C.D. in an overly restrictive 

environment. Finally, C.D.'s parents argue that the district 

court ignored the plain language of the IDEA's transition planning 

and assessment requirements.

Our review of the district court on these legal issues 

is de novo. See Johnson v. Bos. Pub. Sch., 906 F.3d 182, 191 (1st 

Cir. 2018). We hold that the district court properly applied this 

circuit's standards and that those standards are consistent with 

Endrew F. and with the IDEA. The parents also raise alternative 

arguments that the district court erred in applying law to fact,

and we review these fact-dominated rulings deferentially. Id.

(quoting Doe v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 69, 76 (1st 

Cir. 2016)). Finding no errors, we affirm.

A.

Until Endrew F., the Supreme Court had 

"declined . . . to endorse any one standard for determining" 

whether the services offered in a student's IEP amounted to a FAPE. 

Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993. This circuit, along with several 

others, said that to offer a FAPE, an IEP must be "individually 
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designed" and "reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful 

educational benefit." D.B., 675 F.3d at 34-35 (citing D.S. v. 

Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 2010), then citing 

D.F. ex rel. N.F. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 430 F.3d 595, 598 

(2d Cir. 2005), and then citing Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 

392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004)). After Endrew F., this court 

confirmed, in Johnson v. Boston Public Schools, 906 F.3d 182 (1st 

Cir. 2018), that this "meaningful educational benefit" standard 

for evaluating whether an IEP offers a FAPE "comports" with the 

standard "dictated by Endrew F."6 Id. at 194-95.

C.D.'s parents say that our Johnson decision restricted 

its view to Endrew F.'s language about "progress appropriate in 

light of the child's circumstances," Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001, 

and that we have yet to examine language in Endrew F. about

"ambitious" and "challenging" goals, id. at 1000. On the parents' 

reading, after Endrew F., courts must ask not only whether an IEP 

offers meaningful educational progress, but also, separately,

whether the IEP's objectives are ambitious and challenging.

 

6 Other circuits that use a "meaningful benefit" standard 

have held the same. See L.H. v. Hamilton Cty. Dep't of Educ., 900 

F.3d 779, 792 n.5 (6th Cir. 2018); Mr. P. v. W. Hartford Bd. of 

Educ., 885 F.3d 735, 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Mr. P.

v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 139 S. Ct. 322 (2018); K.D. ex rel.

Dunn v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 904 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 

2018).
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The parents misread Endrew F., which did not construe 

the FAPE standard as two independent tests. That decision's core 

holding was that the "merely more than de minimis" educational 

benefit standard that had been used by the appellate court to 

evaluate Endrew's IEPs was insufficiently "demanding." Id. at 

1000-01; see also id. at 997 (quoting Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F.

v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 

2015)). Endrew F. defined a FAPE -- "an educational program 

reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress 

appropriate in light of the child's circumstances," id. at 

1001 -- in contrast to this rejected, "de minimis" standard. It 

was in this context that the Supreme Court employed the terms 

"ambitious" and "challenging." The Court explained that, for many 

children with disabilities integrated into "the regular 

classroom," an "appropriately ambitious" goal is "advancement from 

grade to grade." Id. at 1000. And the Court stated that, for 

those "not fully integrated in the regular classroom," the 

particular "goals may differ, but every child should have the 

chance to meet challenging objectives." Id. In short, Endrew F.

used terms like "demanding," "challenging," and "ambitious" to 

define "progress appropriate in light of the child's 

circumstances," not to announce a separate dimension of the FAPE 

requirement. Id. at 1000-01; cf. R.F. v. Cecil Cty. Pub. Sch., 
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919 F.3d 237, 252 (4th Cir. 2019) (defining adequate progress and 

"challenging objectives" under Endrew F.).

Under both Endrew F. and our precedent, a court 

evaluating whether an IEP offers a FAPE must determine whether the 

IEP was reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational 

benefit in light of the child's circumstances. See Johnson, 906 

F.3d at 195; cf. K.D. ex rel. Dunn v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 

904 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2018) (equating meaningful progress and 

challenging objectives). Depending on context, determining 

whether an IEP is reasonably calculated to offer meaningful 

progress may or may not require a sub-inquiry into how challenging 

the plan is. Here, the district court did just what Endrew F. and 

Johnson require in affirming the BSEA's conclusion that the 2012-

2013 and 2013-2014 IEPs offered a FAPE.7 See C.D. I, 2017 WL 

3122654, at *16 (describing the standard applied by the BSEA); 

C.D. II, 2018 WL 3510291, at *4 (affirming the BSEA's FAPE 

conclusion).

The district court also did not err in applying that 

standard to the facts in the record. The parents maintain that 

C.D. would not have made appropriate progress in the ACCESS 

Program, but the district court reasonably concluded that the 

 

7 C.D.'s parents argue that, in evaluating the 2012-2013 

and 2013-2014 IEPs, the BSEA misapplied the First Circuit's FAPE 

standard by omitting the word "meaningful" from its analysis. But 

the BSEA did not overlook that operative word.
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record supported the BSEA's finding that C.D., given her diagnosed 

intellectual disability and serious language deficits, could be 

expected to make meaningful progress in the ACCESS program and 

general education electives. See C.D. II, 2018 WL 3510291, at *3-

4.

B.

C.D.'s parents argue next that the 2012-2013 and 2013-

2014 IEPs violated the LRE mandate by proposing to place C.D. in 

the ACCESS Program, which the parents view as overly restrictive. 

They urge us to adopt, and argue that the district court should 

have applied, the multi-step test from the Fifth Circuit's decision 

in Daniel R.R. to evaluate this claim.8 See 874 F.2d at 1048-50. 

We reject both arguments. Instead, we affirm the district court, 

which properly relied on our decision in Roland M. in ruling that 

the IEPs did not violate the LRE mandate.

Courts that use the Daniel R.R. methodology evaluate 

compliance with the LRE mandate in two steps, asking first "whether 

education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplementary 

 

8 Natick and the BSEA argue that C.D.'s parents waived 

their argument based on Daniel R.R. by neglecting to "set forth 

[its] multifactor test" before the district court. But we deem 

sufficient the parents' reliance on Daniel R.R. in the district 

court; the parents' motions cited to and the district court quoted

from Daniel R.R. See C.D. II, 2018 WL 3510291, at *3; see also

Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir. 1988) 

(finding no waiver where " the district court was not left . . . to 

ferret out an evanescent needle from an outsized paper haystack").
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aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily," and, if the 

child cannot be educated in the regular classroom, asking second 

"whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum 

extent appropriate." Id. at 1048. In answering the first 

question, Daniel R.R. instructs courts to consider whether the 

district has made reasonable efforts to accommodate the child in 

a regular classroom; the benefits, both academic and non-academic,

available to the child in a regular class compared to the benefits, 

both academic and non-academic, available in a more restricted

class; and the effects of inclusion on other children in the 

regular classroom. Id. at 1048-49; see also Oberti by Oberti v. 

Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217-18 (3d Cir. 1993).

The parents frame their claim as presenting the 

following question, which they say is one of first impression in 

this circuit: When does a school's decision to educate a child 

with disabilities in a setting other than the regular classroom 

violate the IDEA's LRE mandate? Several other circuits, the 

parents observe, have used the Daniel R.R. test to evaluate 

parents' claims that their children should be mainstreamed.9 See

 

9 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have applied the Sixth 

Circuit's test from Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 

1983), which asks "whether the services which make . . . [an 

alternative] placement superior could be feasibly provided in a

non-segregated setting." Id. at 1063; see also DeVries v. Fairfax 

Cty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878-79 (4th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. Nw.

R–1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987).
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Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216-17; T.M., 752 F.3d at 161-62; L.B. ex 

rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 976-77 (10th Cir. 

2004); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H. ex rel.

Holland, 14 F.3d 1398, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1994). The parents' 

premise is incorrect. There is no ground for distinguishing our 

prior cases, like Roland M., involving parents who sought a more 

restrictive placement than the one proposed in the IEP.10 Those 

cases and this one in fact present the same question: Did the 

IEP's proposed placement violate the IDEA's LRE mandate?

The text of § 1412(a)(5)(A) and prior precedent provide 

the guidance we need to evaluate whether Natick complied with the 

LRE mandate here. In eschewing the Daniel R.R. test because "[t]he 

Act itself provides enough of a framework," we join the Seventh 

Circuit. See Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 499 (7th Cir. 

2002) (declining to adopt the Daniel R.R. test).

C.D.'s parents argue that the Daniel R.R. test adds

needed "complexity" to the statute's terms. But determining an 

appropriate placement for a disabled child is already a complex 

task. It is one that "involves choices among educational policies 

and theories -- choices which courts, relatively speaking, are 

 

10 See, e.g., C.G. ex rel. A.S. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch. 

Dist., 513 F.3d 279, 287 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that the district 

court "supportably concluded" that public school day placement 

rather than residential placement requested by parents was least 

restrictive environment appropriate); Roland M., 910 F.2d at 993; 

Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 229-30 (1st Cir. 1983).
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poorly equipped to make." Roland M., 910 F.2d at 992; see also

C.G. ex rel. A.S. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 279, 289

(1st Cir. 2008) (acknowledging "the truism that courts should 

recognize the expertise of educators with respect to the efficacy 

of educational programs"). That is why the IDEA "vests" state and 

school "officials with responsibility for" choosing a child's

placement. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001. And it is why courts 

owe respect and deference to the expert decisions of school 

officials and state administrative boards. See Lessard v. WiltonLyndenborough Coop. Sch. Dist. (Lessard II), 592 F.3d 267, 270 

(1st Cir. 2010) ("The standard of review is thus deferential to 

the educational authorities, who have 'primary responsibility for 

formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and 

for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's 

needs.'" (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207)). There is no need to

add complexity to the LRE mandate in the form of Daniel R.R.'s

judicial gloss, and every reason not to do so.

We proceed to review the district court's decision under 

§ 1412(a)(5)(A) and our cases interpreting it. Again, the IDEA 

mandates, at § 1412(a)(5)(A):

To the maximum extent appropriate, children 

with disabilities . . . are educated with 

children who are not disabled, and special 

classes, separate schooling, or other removal 

of children with disabilities from the regular 

educational environment occurs only when the 

nature or severity of the disability of a 
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child is such that education in regular 

classes with the use of supplementary aids and 

services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). Our cases have "weighed" this 

preference for mainstreaming "in concert with the" FAPE mandate. 

Roland M., 910 F.2d at 992-93. The two requirements "operate in 

tandem to create a continuum" of possible educational 

environments, each offering a different mix of benefits (and costs) 

for a student's academic, as well as social and emotional, 

progress.11 Id. For schools, complying with the two mandates 

means evaluating potential placements' "marginal benefits" and 

costs and choosing a placement that strikes an appropriate balance 

between the restrictiveness of the placement and educational 

progress. Id.; see also Amann v. Stow Sch. Sys., 982 F.2d 644, 

650 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (phrasing the question as whether 

the "IEP 'reasonably calculated' the balance between academic 

progress and" restrictiveness).

The district court correctly identified this legal 

framework. Quoting Roland M., the district court explained that 

"'[m]ainstreaming may not be ignored, even to fulfill substantive 

educational criteria.' Rather, the benefits to be gained from 

 

11 We have recognized that educating students with 

disabilities with their nondisabled peers can have benefits for 

disabled students' social and communication skills. See Lenn v. 

Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1090 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1993) 

(citing Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216-17).
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mainstreaming must be weighed against the educational improvements 

that could be attained in a more restrictive (that is, nonmainstream) environment."12 C.D. II, 2018 WL 3510291, at *3

(internal citation omitted) (quoting Roland M., 910 F.2d at 993)).

The parents argue, again relying on applications of

Daniel R.R., that the district court erred in failing to ask

whether C.D. could have been educated in the regular classroom 

considering "the whole range of supplemental aids and services." 

Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216. The record belies this contention. The 

district court here verified that Natick and the BSEA had 

considered "the nature and severity" of C.D.'s disability as well 

as the impact of "supplementary aids and services." 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1412(a)(5)(A). It noted that the BSEA and Natick had both 

examined three potential placements: the regular classroom, 

replacement classes, and the ACCESS Program. C.D. II, 2018 WL 

3510291, at *3. Then the district court found that evidence 

supported the BSEA's and Natick's conclusion that the ACCESS 

Program was appropriate because of C.D.'s particular

disability -- an "intellectual disability in conjunction with 

 

12 The parents argue that the district court "erred where 

it did not even articulate the need to balance non-academic 

benefits against the putative academic advantages of a 

substantially separate classroom." But the district court 

properly understood the balancing inquiry outlined in Roland M.
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weaknesses in receptive and expressive language."13 Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

We see no error in the district court's appropriately 

deferential analysis. As we have emphasized, the IDEA vests state 

and local educational officials, not federal courts, with the 

primary responsibility to make placement decisions consistent with 

§ 1412(a)(5)(A).

C.

C.D.'s parents next argue that the district court 

ignored the plain language of the IDEA in affirming the BSEA's 

ruling that the IEPs complied with the statute's transition 

provision. Not so.

We have previously held that the IDEA "does not require 

a stand-alone transition plan." Lessard v. Wilton Lyndeborough 

Coop. Sch. Dist. (Lessard I), 518 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2008). 

Nor does the statute require that the underlying transition 

assessments take a particular form. See 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII). Indeed, there is no restriction on the 

means of gathering information about a student's interests or 

abilities that may be relevant to the development of postsecondary 

transition goals. See, e.g., Mass. Dep't of Elementary & 

 

13 C.D.'s parents' dispute of a related factual finding 

made by the BSEA in its initial ruling on the LRE issue is 

misplaced. The district court ultimately reviewed the facts as 

clarified by the BSEA.
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Secondary Educ., Transitional Assessment in the Secondary 

Transition Planning Process, Technical Advisory SPED 2014-4, at 1-

3 (Apr. 9, 2014) (declining to adopt 'a restrictive approach which 

might seem to imply the required use of highly specialized formal 

assessments for each student").

The district court did not err in articulating or 

applying these transition requirements. It discussed the 

statute's assessment and planning dimensions, it cited repeatedly 

to Massachusetts' guidance implementing the federal provision, and 

it relied on case law correctly applying the transition 

requirement. See C.D. I, 2017 WL 3122654, at *19, *21 (citing 

Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg'l Sch. Dist., 774 F. Supp. 2d 393, 

407 (D. Mass. 2011), aff'd, 685 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2012)). 

The district court then reasonably applied those rules 

in affirming the BSEA's ruling. The IEPs stated grade-appropriate 

goals and services designed to prepare C.D. for the post-secondary 

transition.14 See Lessard I, 518 F.3d at 25; see also, e.g., 

 

14 Specifically, C.D.'s 2012-2013 IEP stated that C.D.'s 

parents hoped she would receive a high school diploma and 

vocational training. The IEP outlined educational goals and 

services that would have helped C.D. make progress toward that

diploma, and it also provided for vocational services from the 

school's learning center. The 2013-2014 IEP was similar, and it 

added opportunities to meet with the school's guidance counselor 

and career specialist to discuss post-secondary plans. The final 

2014-2015 IEP further proposed educational and vocational services 

and set out specific goals related to job readiness, job coaching, 

and independent living.
- 24 -

Rodrigues v. Fort Lee Bd. of Educ., 458 F. App'x 124, 128 (3d Cir. 

2011) (finding adequate an IEP that listed a transition goal and 

noted available services). And the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 plans 

reflected and were developed based on a transition-specific 

discussion at the 2012-2013 IEP meeting and on extensive 

educational and psychological evaluations done of C.D. and 

provided to Natick as part of the IEP development process. The 

final 2014-2015 IEP reflected and was based on assessments like 

these as well as a formal transition assessment. All three IEPs 

contained "appropriate measurable postsecondary goals based upon 

age appropriate assessments." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa).

IV.

Affirmed.