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ORDER 1–

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

SUZANNE M. BEAMISH,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE HARTFORD/THE HARTFORD

FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., and

their subsidiary, CNA GROUP LIFE

ASSURANCE COMPANY, a Foreign

Corporation; and GREENPOINT

TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Washington

Corporation,

Defendants.

No. C06-213Z

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

docket no. 14. The Court has reviewed the briefs and records filed herein, and being fully

advised, now enters the following Order GRANTING Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment.

BACKGROUND

1. The Terms of the Long Term Disability Plan.

Plaintiff Susan Beamish (Beamish) was formerly employed at Greenpoint

Technologies, Inc. (Greenpoint) as the Senior Director of Finance. Administrative Record,

docket no. 17, at 00168. This is a largely sedentary position. Id. at 00263. As of March 1,

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ORDER 2–

2003, Greenpoint’s employees were covered by a long-term disability benefits plan (Plan)

insured by CNA Group Life Assurance Company (CNA). Id. at 00001-39. There is no

dispute that Beamish was a covered employee under the Plan. 

The Plan defines “Disability” as an “Injury or Sickness which causes physical or

mental impairment to such a degree of severity that You are: 1) continuously unable to

perform the Material and Substantial Duties of Your Regular Employment; and 2) not

Gainfully Employed.” Administrative Record, at 00012 (emphasis in original). “Material and

Substantial Duties” is defined as “the necessary functions of Your Regular Occupation which

cannot be reasonably omitted or altered.” Id. at 00021 (emphasis in original). 

The Plan requires claimants to submit proof of disability in order to receive benefits,

including “objective medical findings.” Id. at 00111. Under the Plan, objective medical

findings include “tests, procedures, or clinical examinations standardly accepted in the

practice of medicine for Your disabling condition(s).” Id. (emphasis in original). Under the

Plan, Greenpoint delegated discretion to CNA to determine benefit eligibility and construe

the Plan. Id. at 00118 (“With respect to making benefits decisions, the Plan Administrator

has delegated sole discretionary authority to CNA Group Life Assurance Company to

determine your eligibility for and entitlement to benefits under the Plan and to interpret the

terms and provisions of any insurance policy issued in connection with the Plan.”).

2. Beamish’s Medical History.

After undergoing radiation therapy for breast cancer, Beamish developed recurrent

chest pain. Id. at 00278. Beamish was treated with a variety of pain medications and

therapy. Id. at 00278-79. On November 3, 2003, Beamish fell on her way to work, injuring

her left knee. Id. at 00272. Her chest pain increased subsequent to this accident. Id. at

00279. On December 29, 2003, Beamish applied for short-term disability benefits under the

Plan. An examination by Dr. Wesch in January 2003 described normal gait and station,

normal strength and tone, stable joints, and a full range of motion with significant pain. Id.

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1 Hartford is the successor company to CNA. The record does not reflect precisely when,

between April 2004 and August 2004, Hartford took over CNA. 

ORDER 3–

at 00186. On February 13, 2004, CNA approved the claim, retroactive to December 27,

2003. Id. at 00160. On March 4, 2004, CNA received Beamish’s application for long-term

benefits. Id. at 00091. During its investigation into her claim, CNA consulted the notes and

medical opinions of Beamish’s treating physicians, Drs. Wesch and Irving. Id. at 00088. 

Beamish complained of serious pain, which Dr. Irving treated with a drug regime. Id. at

00272. As of March 2004, Beamish’s routine pain medications included Methadone,

Oxycodone, Neurontin, Zoloft, Amitriptyline and Tizanidine. Id. at 00474. Based on this

information, CNA approved Beamish’s long term disability claim on April 8, 2004. 

Administrative Record, at 00088-89. Dr. Suzanne LaCross, a psychologist, began seeing

Beamish in March 2004 to treat her depression arising from her chronic pain and inability to

work. 

The record also reflects that Beamish was seen by Dr. Heather Tagliarino as early as

July 2, 2004. Id. at 00449. Dr. Tagliarino wrote a letter to Hartford Life and Accident

Insurance Company (Hartford)1

 on August 17, 2004, stating that Beamish had been

diagnosed with Complex Regional Pain Syndrome, which “markedly impact[ed Beamish’s]

ability to sit or stand for prolonged periods of time, concentrate, or interact socially.” Id. at

00419. The letter concluded that it was unlikely Beamish could work in any capacity in the

near future. Id. 

Hartford continued to examine Beamish’s claims over the next several months. 

Hartford came to believe that support for Beamish’s disability rested entirely on her own

subjective complaints to her doctors, and her doctors’ subsequent report of those subjective

complaints. Hartford obtained the opinions of two consulting doctors to evaluate Beamish’s

condition; Dr. David F. Zakin, a psychological consultant, and Dr. Robert Marks, a

neurologist.

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ORDER 4–

Dr. Zakin reviewed the submitted medical records of Beamish, an undated summary

of interview for mental/nervous claims, a July 28, 2004 letter by Dr. LaCross, and a July 16,

2004 claimant interview. Id. at 00270-74. Although Dr. Zakin attempted to speak with Dr.

LaCross, he was unable to do so. Id. at 00275. He concluded that there was insufficient

evidence to conclude that Plaintiff was psychologically impaired: “Objective data regarding

the claimant’s reported psychological impairment is lacking. No psychological testing has

been conducted and in his monthly treatment notes, Dr. Irving does not make note of any

impairment in attention or concentration.” Id. at 00274. Dr. Zakin summarized the

conclusions of the treating physicians:

The records reviewed indicate that treating physicians have found the claimant to be

disabled secondary to her experience of complex regional pain syndrome. The

records reviewed also indicate that the medications taken for her complex regional

pain syndrome . . . may impact her energy level and cognitive state. However, there is

no indication in the records reviewed that Ms. Beamish experiences any occupational

impairment secondary to her psychological condition.

Id. at 00275. Dr. Zakin came to this conclusion because (1) Beamish’s depression began

after she left work, (2) restrictions on her activities were due to physical, not psychological,

limitations, (3) Dr. LaCross did not formally diagnosis Beamish with a psychological

impairment, (4) Beamish received therapy biweekly instead of weekly, and (5) Dr. Irving’s

notes made no mention of any impairment in mentation or cognition. Id. at 00275-76. In

sum, Dr. Zakin concluded that “there is no indication that the claimant evidences any

occupational impairment secondary to her psychological condition alone.” Id. at 00276. 

Dr. Marks concluded that the evidence did not show that Beamish was physically

impaired:

There are no objective observations of the patient’s mental status or physical abilities

impairing her ability to perform her occupation. There is no mention as to why an

arrangement at work to possibly reduce stress (deadlines could be relaxed) could not

be done . . . . There are complaints of pain by the patient. However, specifically with

regard to work there are no objective reports indicating actual physical or cognitive

limitations. The claimant apparently is able to go to the AP’s and psychologist’s

offices and there is no report of observation that claimant cannot ambulate normally,

use her limbs normally, and communicate normally. Since the question of mentation

has been raised, there is not even a mention of other evidence that the drugs have

impaired the claimant’s ability to function (such as slurred speech or appearing

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2 Kelley, an attorney with Oseran, Hahn, Springs & Watts, P.S., apparently represented

both Beamish and Greenpoint. See Administrative Record, at 00383 (“Ms. Beamish and

Greenpoint Technologies, Inc. (the policy holder) both directly and through this office submit

the following as her appeal to the decision terminating her disability benefits as outlined in your

letter.”). 

ORDER 5–

lethargic, etc.) Therefore, although there are subjective reports of pain, [I] could not

obtain reports of the AP’s observation of physical limitations or impairment sufficient

to prevent the claimant from performing the duties of her occupation.

Administrative Record, at 00283-84. 

As a result of this investigation, on January 11, 2005, Hartford advised Beamish that

her long term disability benefits would cease as of February 7, 2004. Administrative Record,

at 00076-77. The letter listed the information reviewed by Hartford’s consulting physicians

and summarized the conclusions of those physicians. Id. Specifically, Hartford noted that

“with regard to [Beamish’s] functional ability to perform [her] regular occupational work

activity . . . there are no objective reports that support that [she] present[s] with any physical

or cognitive limitations.” Id. Hartford also noted that “[w]e are not disputing that you have

been diagnosed with a condition and have been under treatment for that condition for

sometime [sic]. However, medical management in and of itself does not constitute a

disabling condition.” Id. at 00077. Hartford stated that Beamish had the right to appeal, and

described the appeal process. Id.

On February 9, 2005, Beamish’s attorney, Robert Kelley2 wrote a letter appealing

Hartford’s decision to terminate benefits. Id. at 00383. The letter took exception, paragraph

by paragraph, with Hartford’s termination letter. Id. at 00383-87. Beamish submitted

additional support for her claim to Hartford. On February 28, 2005, Dr. LaCross submitted a

letter to Hartford. Id. at 00353. The letter stated that Beamish had undergone a complete

psychological evaluation and testing. Id. It was Dr. LaCross’ position that Beamish’s

inability to work at a competitive pace due to pain and medication made her unable to hold a

job, as both “her task persistence and competitive pace are currently limited to one hour or

less a day.” Id. Dr. LaCross also stated that Beamish suffered from cognitive problems due

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ORDER 6–

to a combination of medication, chronic pain, and depression. Id. Although Dr. LaCross

believed that treatment had helped Beamish cope with depression and pain, she did not

believe that Beamish could return to employment in any capacity. Id. Finally, Dr. LaCross

felt that the focus of the Hartford psychological consultant she spoke with “the past week”

had an improperly “narrow” focus on whether depression, standing alone, disabled Beamish. 

Id. Finally, Dr. LaCross concluded that Beamish “is currently disabled by her pain,

depression, medication, and the variability of her condition.” Id.

Dr. Irving submitted a letter to Hartford on March 21, 2005. Id. at 00350-51. Dr.

Irving stated that Beamish had been disabled from November 2003 to the present by “a

particularly difficult diskogenic and neuropathic pain syndrome. . . .” Id. at 00350. All

treatments had failed to reduce Beamish’s “intractable” pain. Id. Dr. Irving also maintained

that Beamish’s pain precluded her from activities exposing her to stress, pressure, social

contact, or concentration for more than a few minutes. Id. Dr. Irving felt that comments in

his notes that Beamish presented without physical or cognitive limitations, and could move

and communicate normally were “taken out of context” by Hartford’s reviewing physicians. 

Id. According to Dr. Irving, Beamish experiences “severe piercing pain throughout her right

chest wall and thoracic spine, with unremitting throbbing pain twenty-four hours daily, seven

days per week even with medication.” Id. at 00351. Dr. Irving concluded that Beamish was

unable to perform any job, and was disabled. Id. Dr. Irving also noted that both he and Dr.

LaCross concurred that Beamish’s complaints of pain and depression were genuine. Id. at

00351.

Hartford then conducted a review of Beamish’s additional support for her claim. 

Hartford retained the services of Dr. Andrea Wagner, Board Certified in Physical Medicine

and Rehabilitation and Dr. Milton Jay, a Neuropsychologist. Id. at 00169. Dr. Jay and Dr.

Wagner did not speak with or physically examine Beamish.

On July 28, 2005, Dr. Jay spoke with Dr. LaCross. Id. at 00179. According to Dr.

Jay, Dr. LaCross acknowledged that she had seen no episodes of cognitive impairment. Id.

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ORDER 7–

at 00183. Additionally, Dr. LaCross had conducted no cognitive testing regarding Beamish’s

complaints of cognitive difficulties. Id. Dr. LaCross opined that Beamish was not

psychologically disabled. Id. As a result, Dr. Jay “saw insufficient objective data to support

that depression ever provided a serious burden to this woman’s occupational capacity at

1/31/05, prior, or since.” Id. at 00181. 

Dr. Wagner reviewed Beamish’s record to determine whether Beamish suffered from

a physical disability. Id. at 00185-199. In addition to reviewing medical records and

correspondence from Beamish’s treating physicians, Dr. Wagner spoke with Dr. Irving on

June 30, 2005. Id. at 00195. In Dr. Wagner’s opinion, Beamish’s record was notable for the

lack of both “objective evidence of impairment” and “comprehensive physical examination

documenting any evidence of any impairment that would require limitations or restrictions

upon functionality.” Id. at 00197. Dr. Wagner also opined that Dr. Irving’s assessment was

a simple reflection of Beamish’s subjective, self-reported complaints, he could provide

“absolutely no objective information to support his assessment of Ms. Beamish’s

functionality,” and “Dr. Irving’s assessment of disability is completely subjective in nature,

without any objective basis.” Id. at 00198-99. 

On August 11, 2005, Hartford sent Kelley a letter reaffirming its decision to terminate

benefits. Id. at 00168-71. The letter listed the materials reviewed, the identity of the

reviewing physicians, and the conclusions supporting Hartford’s decision to terminate

benefits. Id. Consistent with the opinions of its reviewing physicians, Hartford stated that

there was no objective evidence of impairment. Id.

Beamish filed suit on February 13, 2006, alleging that Hartford violated ERISA. 

Complaint, docket no. 1. On March 6, 2007, Hartford moved for summary judgment. 

Defendants’ Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment, docket no. 14. For the

reasons outlined below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

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ORDER 8–

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review.

When an ERISA plan vests its plan administrator with the discretionary authority to

determine benefit eligibility, courts review a decision to deny coverage for abuse of

discretion. See Bendixen v. Standard Ins. Co., 185 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 1999). A plan

must unambiguously provide discretion to the plan administrator, or else the default standard

of review is de novo. Kierney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1999)

(en banc). Where a plan administrator has discretion, a motion for summary judgment

merely provides the “conduit” for bringing the issue before the court, and the usual tests of

summary judgment do not apply. Bendixen, 185 F.3d at 942. It is primarily the job of plan

administrators—not courts—to evaluate a claimant’s eligibility for benefits:

When [courts] review for abuse of discretion, it is because the plan has put the locus

for decision in the plan administrator, not in the courts, so [courts] cannot substitute

[their] judgment for the plan administrator. [Courts] can set aside the administrator’s

discretionary determination only when it is arbitrary and capricious . . . . [A] decision

grounded on any reasonable basis is not arbitrary and capricious and . . . in order to be

subject to reversal, an administrator’s factual findings that a claimant is not totally

disabled must be clearly erroneous.

Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. Welfare Benefit Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 875 (9th Cir. 2004)

(internal quotations omitted).

ERISA plan administrators abuse their discretion by “render[ing] decisions without

any explanation . . . constru[ing] provisions of the plan in a way that conflicts with the plain

language of the plan . . . or ‘rel[ying] on clearly erroneous findings of fact in making a

benefit determination.’” Bendixen, 185 F.3d at 944 (quoting Taft v. Equitable Life Assur.

Soc’y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993)). Administrators need not accord special weight to

the opinions of a claimant’s treating physician. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538

U.S. 822, 834 (2003). In addition, courts cannot impose “a discrete burden of explanation

when [plan administrators] credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician’s

evaluation.” Id. In sum, “[w]here there is relevant evidence in the administrative record that

reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if it is possible to

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3 Under the Atwood framework, a plan participant first had to show a substantial conflict

of interest on the part of the plan administrator. Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1323. If the plan

participant did so, the burden shifted to the administrator to demonstrate that the conflict of

interest did not affect the decision to deny benefits. Id. If the administrator failed to do so, the

court would review the decision to deny benefits de novo, rather than for abuse of discretion.

Id. The Abatie court overruled Atwood for three reasons. First, Atwood failed to abide by

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), which plainly held that courts

must review denial of benefits under ERISA plans granting discretion to administrators for

abuse of discretion. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 966. Second, the Atwood approach did not follow

Firestone’s mandate that courts must weigh as a factor conflicts of interest under the abuse of

discretion standard. Id. at 966-67 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110-13). Third, Atwood placed

the burden of coming forward with evidence of the administrator’s motivations on plan

participants, although such information lay in the administrator’s possession. Id. at 967.

ORDER 9–

draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence, the administrator’s decision must be

allowed to control.” LaPrease v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 347 F. Supp. 2d 944, 954

(W.D. Wash. 2004) (Zilly, J.)

Courts apply the abuse of discretion standard even in the face of egregious conflicts of

interest. Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 965 (9th Cir. 2006) (overruling

in its entirety Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. 1995)).3

 An insurer

who acts as both the plan administrator and the funding source for benefits operates under a

structural conflict of interest. Id. When faced with a conflict of interest, courts must

consider the conflict as a factor in abuse of discretion review, considering all the facts and

circumstances to determine the plausibility of the plan administrator’s reason for denying

coverage. Id. at 968-69. In general, a court can view technical conflicts of interest

unaccompanied by evidence of something more with a low level of skepticism. Id. at 968. A

court may view with greater skepticism a benefits denial by an administrator with a conflict

of interest accompanied by shifting explanations for denial, evidence of malice, self-dealing,

failure to adequately investigate or ask the plaintiff for necessary evidence, or failure to

credit a claimant’s reliable evidence. Id.

The parties do not dispute that Ms. Beamish’s plan is an ERISA plan pursuant to 29

U.S.C. § 1002(1). The parties also agree that the plan delegated discretionary authority to

Hartford to determine eligibility for benefits and construe the terms of the Plan. Hartford

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4Plaintiff misunderstands Abatie, arguing in the alternative that the court should conduct

a de novo review of Hartford’s denial of benefits. Plaintiff’s Response, at 16. Plaintiff also

suggests that the standard of review for summary judgment is no different in ERISA cases.

Id. at 11. However, the usual tests of summary judgment do not apply when a court reviews

an ERISA plan administrator’s discretionary denial of benefits. Bendixen, 185 F.3d at 942. 

ORDER 10–

concedes that it possesses a structural conflict of interest because it served as both the plan

administrator and source of funding. Hartford also does not dispute that Beamish has a

medical condition for which she has received treatment. Administrative Record, at 00077. 

Thus, the issues before the Court are (1) the weight that the Court should give Hartford’s

conflict of interest in conducting its abuse of discretion analysis, and (2) whether Hartford

abused its discretion by denying Beamish’s eligibility under the Plan. 

2. Evaluating Hartford’s Conflict of Interest.

Beamish raises multiple, ill-defined bases for applying a heightened degree of

skepticism for the Court’s abuse of discretion review.4

 Beamish first argues that “it is

somewhat disconcerting” that Robert Kelley, the attorney who initially represented Beamish,

also represented Greenpoint, the plan administrator. Plaintiff’s Response, at 16. Due to this

conflict, Beamish suggests that the Court either apply greater scrutiny to Hartford’s denial,

allow the administrative record to be reopened to submit additional evidence, or issue an

order staying further proceedings pending discovery. While Mr. Kelley’s dual role has been

raised, nothing suggests that Mr. Kelley was less than zealous in his representation of

Beamish. See e.g., Administrative Record, at 00344 (letter from Kelley stating “Hartford’s

continuing disregard of Ms. Beamish’s medical information has now reached litigitable [sic]

levels. . . .”). 

Beamish also objects to Hartford’s alleged failures to (1) follow the policy provisions

defining disability, (2) give credence to Beamish’s treating physicians, (3) describe the

manner of objective medical evidence Hartford sought, and (4) conduct an in-person medical

examination of Beamish. Beamish adduces scant evidence to support these claims. The Plan

does require proof of disability, including “objective medical findings.” Administrative

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ORDER 11–

Record, at 00111. Hartford did clearly communicate that Beamish presented no objective

evidence that any “physical or cognitive limitations” impaired her functional ability to

perform her regular occupational duties. Id. at 00076. A plan administrator need not

conduct an in-person examination of the claimant. Tuttle v. Standard Ins. Co., 459 F. Supp.

2d 1063, 1067 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (Burgess, J.). 

In sum, while Hartford possesses a structural conflict of interest, there is little to

suggest that Hartford’s decision to deny Beamish’s claim was motivated by that conflict of

interest. The Court views Hartford’s decision with a low level of skepticism. See Abatie,

458 F.3d at 968. 

3. Hartford did not abuse its discretion by denying Beamish’s claim.

Hartford did not abuse its discretion by denying Beamish long-term disability

benefits. Hartford had a conflicted record before it. Evidence in the record pointed both

toward and against a finding of disability. Hartford considered the evidence in full and came

to a reasonable conclusion. 

Beamish’s treating physicians firmly and repeatedly maintained that she was disabled,

and specifically tied their diagnoses to Beamish’s purported disability. See e.g.,

Administrative Record, at 00353 (letter from Dr. LaCross stating that Beamish could not

hold a job because her pain and medication limited her task persistence and competitive pace

to one hour a day or less). Hartford considered the observations of the four physicians who

personally examined Beamish. A plan administrator cannot “arbitrarily refuse to credit a

claimant’s reliable evidence, including the opinions of a treating physician.” Black &

Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 833 (2003). Drs. Wesch, Tagliarino, Irving,

and LaCross all physically examined Beamish. See Neumann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,

367 F. Supp. 2d. 969, 990 (2005) (“[E]xamining experts may be more persuasive than those

who merely review a paper record.”). All of Beamish’s treating physicians opined that she

was disabled. 

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ORDER 12–

However, a plan administrator does not need to give special consideration to the

opinion of a treating physician over a reviewing physician. Black & Decker, 538 U.S. at

834. Each of the four consulting physicians retained by Hartford concluded that there was

no objective evidence that Beamish was impaired. These opinions were rendered after an

extensive analysis of the record. Further, it was these consultants’ opinion that the

conclusions of the treating physicians were entirely premised on Beamish’s self-reported

pain. Drs. Jay and Wagner both actually spoke with Beamish’s treating physicians. 

Administrative Record, at 00179, 00195. As a result of these conversations, both concluded

that the treating physicians had not personally witnessed Beamish’s purported impairment,

and that their belief of Beamish’s impairment was entirely premised on Beamish’s selfreporting. Id. at 00183, 00198. 

Beamish does not suggest that Hartford’s consultants were biased or unqualified. 

Thus, Hartford could reasonably rely on the consultants’ opinions, which specifically

addressed and dismissed the conclusions of Beamish’s treating physicians. See Tuttle, 459

F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (“Far from giving selective consideration or mischaracterizing the

medical evidence, Standard thoroughly reviewed the evidence, sought additional evidence,

and explained its conclusions to Tuttle. Standard was not required to give special weight to

Tuttle’s treating physicians, particularly where their opinions were mere unsupported

conclusions.”); Riffey v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Disability Plan, No. CIV. S-05-1331, 2007

WL 946200, at *16 (E.D. Cal. March 27, 2007) (granting Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment where plaintiff complaining of neck and back pain, headaches, and depression

following surgery “continue[d] to rely on her subjective complaints of pain to support her

claim for long-term disability benefits, and . . . [did] not identif[y] any objective medical

evidence that she [was] totally disabled as defined by the Plan.”); Nolan v. Heald College,

No. C05-3399, 2007 WL 878946, at *10 (N.D. Cal. March 27, 2007) (insurer reasonably

relied on its experts’ opinions that insufficient objective medical evidence supported claim

for long-term benefits). 

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ORDER 13–

Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Welfare Benefit Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 876-77 (9th Cir.

2004) is instructive. In Jordan, plaintiff claimed that the insurer arbitrarily demanded

objective proof of fibromyalgia, which cannot be objectively proved to exist. Id. at 877. The

Ninth Circuit rejected this contention, noting that the administrator asked for objective

evidence, not of the existence of the condition, but of a disability preventing plaintiff from

working. Id. Plaintiff’s doctors had merely submitted “conclusory findings of disability.” 

Id. Further, the record showed that the plaintiff was “in no acute distress” and was “freely

ambulatory.” Id. at 880. Further, plaintiff reported engaging in activities such as doing

laundry, grocery shopping, and cooking that cut against a finding of severe pain. Id.

Likewise, in LaPrease, the Court considered a claimant who complained of severe

back pain. LaPrease, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 946-47. LaPrease’s treating physicians concluded

that he was permanently disabled, and noted that he was taking 300 mg of methadone a day. 

Id. at 947. Upon denial of his claim, LaPrease submitted a form prepared by another doctor,

who, on the basis of LaPrease’s self-report and “a clinical exam,” concluded that LaPrease

had zero functional capacity. Id. at 948. The insurer’s reviewing physician concluded that

the treating physician’s diagnosis of total disability was based on LaPrease’s self-reporting

and not on physical or neurological testing. Id. The Court concluded that the insurer did not

abuse its discretion by denying LaPrease benefits. Specifically, the Court found that the

insurer’s reviewing physicians did not disagree with the treating physicians’ diagnosis, but

simply found that there was insufficient evidence to support their conclusions that the

claimant was disabled. Id. at 955. 

As in Jordan, evidence in the record suggested that Beamish’s pain did not impair her

near the degree suggested by Beamish’s doctors. The record is replete with references to

Beamish’s full range of ambulatory movement and lack of apparent distress. Administrative

Record, at 00186. Beamish’s doctors consistently found that her cognition and mentation

were normal during their examinations. Id. at 00207-212. A March 3, 2004 chart note from

Beamish’s orthopedic surgeon notes that “[knee] pain is out of proportion to exam @ joint

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line.” Id. at 00481. In addition, there is evidence that Beamish’s doctors were unaware of

the full scope of activities, such as Beamish’s pursuit of a Doctor’s degree in Administrative

Management and her antiquing on the weekends. Id. at 00183-84. As in LaPrease, Hartford

did not disagree with the diagnosis of Beamish’s treating physicians, but found that

insufficient evidence supported Beamish’s claim of disability.

Thus, although there is considerable evidence in the record before Hartford that

supports Beamish’s claim of disability, there is also “relevant evidence in the administrative

record that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support [a finding of no

disability].” LaPrease, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 954. Because it “is possible to draw two

inconsistent conclusions from the evidence, the administrator’s decision must be allowed to

control.” Id. Here, as in LaPrease, Hartford reasonably relied on the opinions of its

reviewing physicians, communicated fully with Beamish, and reasonably construed the terms

of the Plan. The Court holds that Hartford did not abuse its discretion by denying Beamish’s

claim for long-term disability benefits. 

CONCLUSION

Because Hartford did not arbitrarily and capriciously deny Beamish’s claim for long

term disability benefits, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

docket no. 14. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 1st day of May, 2007.

A

Thomas S. Zilly

United States District Judge

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