IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-60338

JESSICA C. MCGLOTHIN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No.: 1:17-CV-83

Before BARKSDALE, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

At issue in this diversity action is whether, as the district court 

concluded, two sections of Mississippi’s Uninsured Motorist (UM) Act, 

Mississippi Code §§ 83-11-101 et seq., are repugnant: §§ 83-11-101(1) (requiring 

automobile insurers provide UM coverage to extent insured is “legally entitled to 

recover”) and 83-11-103(c)(vi) (defining “uninsured motor vehicle”, as used in UM 

Act, to include vehicle “owned or operated by a person protected by immunity 

under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act”). State Farm Mutual Automobile 

Insurance Company maintains: the sections are not repugnant; and, as a 

result, it is not liable for UM coverage. Therefore, it challenges the district 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 31, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-60338

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court’s, on cross-motions for summary judgment, denying its motion in that 

regard and granting Jessica C. McGlothin’s. That part of the judgment in favor 

of McGlothin is VACATED, and judgment is RENDERED for State Farm.

I.

In February 2016, a fireman with the Biloxi, Mississippi, fire department, 

rear-ended McGlothin’s vehicle. The fireman was acting in the course and scope 

of his employment with the fire department at the time of the accident, and was

not—as McGlothin concedes—acting “in reckless disregard of [her] safety and 

well-being”. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c) (Mississippi Tort Claims Act 

(MTCA); police-and-fire-protection immunity clause). 

At the time of the accident, McGlothin’s vehicle was insured under a State 

Farm policy, which provided UM coverage. As required by the UM Act, the UM

provision in the policy provides, in pertinent part: State Farm “will pay 

compensatory damages for bodily injury and property damage an insured is 

legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle”. 

(Emphasis omitted.) 

Along that line, the UM Act’s definition of an “uninsured motor vehicle” 

includes, inter alia, “a vehicle owned or operated by a person protected by 

immunity under the [MTCA]”. § 83-11-103(c)(vi). Under the MTCA, employees 

of governmental entities are personally immune from claims arising from acts 

performed within the course and scope of their employment. § 11-46-7(2)

(government-employee immunity clause). Because the fireman is protected by 

immunity under the MTCA, the fire-department vehicle he was driving is 

considered an uninsured motor vehicle as defined by the UM Act. (As explained 

more fully infra, the city and fire department were also immune from suit 

pursuant to the MTCA’s police-and-fire-protection immunity clause.)

McGlothin filed this action in February 2017 in Mississippi state court

against the fireman, the fire department, and the City of Biloxi, claiming

negligence. And, in the alternative, she included State Farm as a defendant, 

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seeking UM coverage in the event the other parties were entitled to sovereign 

immunity, pursuant to the MTCA, Mississippi Code §§ 11-46-1 et seq. State Farm 

removed this action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.

McGlothin’s claims against the fireman, the city, and the fire department 

were dismissed because McGlothin failed to serve them with process. (This 

dismissal created complete diversity; and, therefore, the district court had 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 

L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571–73 (2004); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68–78 

(1996).) Instead, McGlothin pursued her claims against the fireman, the fire 

department, and the city in state court. The state court granted defendants’ 

summary-judgment motion, concluding: “[The fireman] was not acting with 

reckless disregard as required for a governmental entity or governmental 

employee to be held liable under the [MTCA]”. McGlothin v. Mason, No. A2402-

17-20 (Harrison Cty. Cir. Ct. 30 Nov. 2017). 

In this action, McGlothin and State Farm filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. The district court granted McGlothin’s, and partially denied State 

Farm’s, concluding McGlothin is entitled to UM coverage, pursuant to its ruling 

Mississippi Code §§ 83-11-101(1) and 83-11-103(c)(vi) are repugnant, with the 

latter being the more specific, controlling section. McGlothin v. State Farm Mut. 

Ins., 297 F. Supp. 3d 635, 638 (S.D. Miss. 2018). 

Section 83-11-101 (policy requirement) lists mandatory provisions to be 

contained in automobile-liability-insurance policies, including requiring 

automobile insurers provide UM coverage to the extent the insured is “legally 

entitled to recover”. As discussed supra, § 83-11-103(c) (uninsured-motor-vehicle 

definition) contains definitions of the term “uninsured motor vehicle” as used in 

the UM Act, which includes, in subpart (c)(vi), a vehicle “owned or operated by a 

person protected by immunity under the [MTCA]”. 

In granting summary judgment against State Farm on the issue of UM 

coverage, the district court concluded: under State Farm’s proposed reading of 

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the two sections, “[a]n insured would never be ‘legally entitled to recover’ damages 

from a person or entity entitled to immunity under the [MTCA]”; therefore, the 

sections are repugnant; “and the only way to carry out the Mississippi 

Legislature’s intent in enacting Miss. Code Ann. § 83-11-103(c)(vi) [(uninsuredmotor-vehicle definition)] is to view it as an exception to Miss. Code Ann. § 83-11-

101(1) [(policy requirement)]”. McGlothin, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 638. 

As a result, the court concluded § 83-11-103(c)(vi) (uninsured-motor-vehicle 

definition) was the more specific, and, therefore, controlling section, and 

McGlothin was entitled to UM benefits. Id. (On the other hand, the court granted

State Farm’s summary-judgment motion against McGlothin’s claims for extracontractual and punitive damages based on State Farm’s denial of her UM claim.

Id. at 639. McGlothin did not appeal that decision.) 

II.

It hardly bears repeating that the “grant[] and denial[] of summary 

judgment [is reviewed] de novo”. Century Sur. Co. v. Seidel, 893 F.3d 328, 332 

(5th Cir. 2018) (quotations and citation omitted). Equally well-known is that 

summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows . . . there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “When parties file cross-motions for 

summary judgment, we review each party’s motion independently, viewing the 

evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Cooley v. Hous. Auth. of Slidell, 747 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). 

The facts are undisputed. We must determine whether the two 

provisions of Mississippi’s UM Act are repugnant. Obviously, Mississippi 

substantive law applies to this diversity action. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 

U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938). 

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The UM Act requires all automobile-liability-insurance policies to contain 

a provision “undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally 

entitled to recover as damages for bodily injury or death from the owner or operator 

of an uninsured motor vehicle”. § 83-11-101(1) (policy requirement) (emphases 

added). Pertinent to this action, the Act was amended in 2009 to expand the 

definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” to include the above-described “motor 

vehicle owned or operated by a person protected by immunity under the [MTCA] 

. . . if the insured has exhausted all administrative remedies under that chapter”. 

§ 83-11-103(c)(vi) (uninsured-motor-vehicle definition). 

The MTCA generally waives “the immunity of the state and its political 

subdivisions from claims for money damages arising out of the torts of such 

governmental entities and the torts of their employees while acting within the 

course and scope of their employment”. § 11-46-5(1). “But it exempts certain 

claims from that immunity waiver.” City of Clinton v. Tornes, 252 So. 3d 34, 37 

(Miss. 2018) (citing § 11-46-9). 

One of those exemptions is found in the MTCA’s earlier-referenced policeand-fire-protection immunity clause:

A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course 

and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any 

claim . . . [a]rising out of any act or omission of an employee of a 

governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of 

duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the 

employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of 

any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury[.] 

§ 11-46-9(1)(c) (emphases added). 

The MTCA also provides that “no employee [of a governmental entity] shall 

be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring within the course and 

scope of the employee’s duties”. § 11-46-7(2) (government-employee immunity 

clause)(emphasis added); see also Tornes, 252 So. 3d at 37. 

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A.

In instances where the State’s highest court has not spoken on the direct 

question, federal courts are required to make an “Erie guess and determine, in 

[their] best judgment how [the State’s highest court] would resolve the issue if 

presented with the same case”. Temple v. McCall, 720 F.3d 301, 307 (5th Cir. 

2013) (first alteration in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

In doing so, our court “defer[s] to intermediate state appellate court decisions

unless convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state 

would decide otherwise”. Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Eurocopter 

Deutschland, GMBH, 524 F.3d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations 

and citation omitted); but, we “need not necessarily defer to state trial court 

decisions”, particularly when they are unpublished, Roecker v. United States, 

379 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 1967) (citing King v. Order of United Commercial 

Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153 (1948)).

The Mississippi Supreme Court has not decided whether the two sections 

at issue are repugnant. And, to make our Erie guess far more difficult, neither 

has the Mississippi Court of Appeals. Therefore, State Farm urges we consider

two Mississippi circuit court decisions, each of which was rendered by a 

different court. 

First, in 2009, a circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 

State Farm in Rayner v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 

No. 2009-36 (Rankin Cty. Cir. Ct. 9 Dec. 2009). In Rayner, the circuit court 

stated: “[S]ince . . . Plaintiffs are not legally entitled to recover against the 

Deputy/County, etc., the Court finds that no UM benefits are owed to Plaintiffs 

under the State Farm policy”. Id. 

The accident in Rayner, however, occurred in 2008, and, because the 

judgment provides no reasoning, it is unclear whether the court applied the 

UM Act as written before or after the 2009 amendment to § 83-11-103(c)(vi)

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(uninsured-motor-vehicle definition). And, even if the court did apply the 2009 

amendment, it is unclear whether the parties raised the issue presented by 

this action: whether §§ 83-11-101 (policy requirement) and 83-11-103(c)(vi) 

(uninsured-motor-vehicle definition) are repugnant. Moreover, the Mississippi 

Supreme Court affirmed Rayner in a per curiam affirmance, No. 2010-CA00738-SCT (Miss. 21 July 2011), which, according to Mississippi Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 35-A(c), “ha[s] no precedential value”. 

Second, in 2014, the other Mississippi circuit court granted summary 

judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding: “[B]ecause the Plaintiff’s claims 

against [the law-enforcement officer] are barred by the police and fire 

protection exemption to the MTCA, . . . Plaintiff is not legally entitled to recover 

UM benefits from State Farm”. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., No. 

L12-545 (Lafayette Cty. Cir. Ct. 16 Oct. 2014). Therefore, citing Fidelity Union 

Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940), State Farm contends the district court 

reversibly erred by not considering the order in Williams. 

It is true that, in Field, the Supreme Court held, because of the uniformity 

between two state-trial-court decisions interpreting the state statute in issue, the 

federal third circuit “was not at liberty to reject these decisions merely because it 

did not agree with their reasoning”. 311 U.S. at 179. But in 1967 in Roecker, our 

court distinguished Field, relying on the 1948 decision in King, 333 U.S. at 159–

62. See Roecker, 379 F.2d at 406 (ruling, as quoted supra: “a federal court need 

not necessarily defer to state trial court decisions”). Because Mississippi trial 

courts are not “court[s] of statewide jurisdiction”, unlike the chancery court in 

Field, we need not defer to these unpublished circuit-court decisions. Id. 

B.

As discussed above, § 83-11-101(1) (policy requirement) limits UM coverage 

to those sums the insured “shall be legally entitled to recover as damages for bodily 

injury or death from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle”. 

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(Emphases added.) It is uncontested that the fireman was acting in the course 

and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, and, therefore, pursuant 

to the MTCA’s government-employee immunity clause, § 11-46-7(2), McGlothin is 

not “legally entitled to recover” damages from him. Moreover, because it is also 

uncontested the fireman was not acting with “reckless disregard” for McGlothin’s 

safety or well-being, the fire department and the city are also immune, pursuant

to the MTCA’s police-and-fire-protection immunity clause, § 11-46-9(1)(c), and 

McGlothin is not “legally entitled to recover” damages from either entity. 

Accordingly, under § 83-11-101(1) (policy requirement), McGlothin cannot recover 

UM benefits from State Farm because she is not “legally entitled to recover” from 

the fireman, the fire department, or the city. 

McGlothin contends, however, consistent with the district court’s ruling, 

that the 2009 amendment expanding the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” 

to include “[a] motor vehicle owned or operated by a person protected by immunity 

under the [MTCA]”, § 83-11-103(c)(vi), is repugnant to § 83-11-101(1) (policy 

requirement), because, otherwise, an insured would never be “legally entitled to 

recover” from “a person protected by immunity under the [MTCA]”. 

“[S]tatutes on the same subject, although in apparent conflict, should if 

possible be construed in harmony with each other to give effect to each”. Tunica 

Cty. v. Hampton Co. Nat. Sur., LLC, 27 So. 3d 1128, 1134 (Miss. 2009) (quoting 

Miss. Gaming Comm’n v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 751 So. 2d 1025, 1029 

(Miss. 1999)); see also Goolsby v. Blumenthal, 581 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 1978) 

(“Where the two statutes in question are capable of standing together, there is no 

irreconcilable conflict.”). 

There are scenarios in which §§ 83-11-101(1) (policy requirement) and 83-

11-103(c)(vi) (uninsured-motor-vehicle definition) can be construed in harmony. 

For example, consider a hypothetical using the facts of this case, but in which the 

fireman was acting in reckless disregard for McGlothin’s safety. The firedepartment vehicle would still be an “uninsured motor vehicle” because it was 

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“operated by a person protected by immunity under the [MTCA]”—the fireman. 

But, because, in this hypothetical, the fireman was acting in “reckless disregard” 

for McGlothin’s safety, McGlothin would be “legally entitled to recover” damages 

from the fire department or the city, pursuant to MTCA § 11-46-9(1)(c) (policeand-fire-protection immunity clause); and, therefore, McGlothin would be entitled 

to UM benefits under the statute and policy. This scenario alone defeats 

McGlothin’s claim. 

Another example would be when a city employee (not a fireman or police 

officer protected by the police-and-fire-protection immunity clause of the MTCA, 

§ 11-46-9(1)(c)) is driving a city vehicle in the course and scope of his employment 

and is involved in an accident caused by the city employee’s violating a traffic law. 

The employee would have immunity pursuant to MTCA § 11-46-7(2) (governmentemployee immunity clause), and, therefore, the vehicle would be an “uninsured 

motor vehicle” because it was “operated by a person protected by immunity under 

the [MTCA]”, see § 83-11-103(c)(vi) (uninsured-motor-vehicle definition). The city, 

however, would be liable, because of the general waiver of immunity under MTCA 

§ 11-46-5(1); and, therefore, the insured would be “legally entitled to recover” from 

the city, resulting in the insurer’s being required to pay UM benefits. See Mixon

v. Miss. Dep’t of Transp., 183 So. 3d 90, 94 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (ruling the 

department was not immune because its employee “did not fall within [any] 

exception[ to liability], and [the employee’s] duty to adhere to applicable traffic 

regulations was in no way discretionary”). 

When pressed at oral argument here, McGlothin countered these scenarios 

render § 83-11-103(c)(vi) (uninsured-motor-vehicle definition) meaningless, 

because, in them, the governmental entity’s insurance, in any event, would pay 

the claim. However, as State Farm notes, the MTCA only waives immunity up to 

$500,000. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-15(1)(c). Therefore, for any claim in excess 

of $500,000 for which the governmental entity has waived immunity, the 

governmental entity’s insurance would pay up to $500,000, and then the insured’s 

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UM carrier would be liable for any remainder. See, e.g., City of Jackson v. Perry, 

764 So. 2d 373, 381–83 (Miss. 2000) (holding insurer required to pay remainder of 

damages above statutory cap). 

That these scenarios may not occur very often does not, of course, render 

the two sections repugnant. Furthermore, at oral argument, McGlothin’s counsel 

admitted “repugnant” is not the word he would employ to describe the sections. 

Oral Argument at 35:41–46. Instead, he stated he would describe them as

“confusing”. Oral Argument at 35:50–55. Obviously, the two sections’ being

“confusing” does not equate to repugnancy. Our charge, as noted, is to read them

in harmony, if possible. As shown, it is possible to do so. 

It is true, as McGlothin contends, that the UM Act is to be “construed 

liberally to provide coverage and strictly to avoid or preclude exceptions or 

exemptions from coverage”. Miss. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. Garrett, 487 So. 2d 

1320, 1323 (Miss. 1986) (citation omitted). But “[l]imiting UM coverage is not in 

issue here, . . . for there is no person from whom [plaintiff in this action is] legally 

entitled to recover damages pursuant to the UM policy or the statute; at least, not 

until the legislature defines the required coverage differently”. Medders v. U.S. 

Fidelity & Guar. Co., 623 So. 2d 979, 988 (Miss. 1993) (citation omitted).

Along that line, and regarding McGlothin’s contention that the 2009 

amendment created an exception to the “legally entitled to recover” requirement, 

“[a]n exception must be clear from the language of the statute and cannot be 

created by construction”. Imperial Palace of Miss., 751 So. 2d at 1028 (citing Miss. 

Dep’t of Wildlife, Fisheries & Parks v. Miss. Wildlife Enf’t Officers’ Ass’n, 740 So. 

2d 925, 931 (Miss. 1999)). And, “[t]he statutory language, legally entitled to 

recover, is ‘simply too unambiguous to admit of judicially created exception . . .’”. 

Medders, 623 So. 2d at 989 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Of course, if 

the Mississippi legislature had wanted to exempt “motor vehicle[s] owned or 

operated by . . . person[s] protected by immunity under the [MTCA]” from the 

“legally entitled to recover” requirement, it could have easily and explicitly done 

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so. See, e.g., Miss. Wildlife Enf’t Officers’ Ass’n, 740 So. 2d at 932 (quoting State 

v. Heard, 151 So. 2d 417, 420 (Miss. 1963)). But, it did not.

The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “the clear meaning of the 

phrase legally entitled to recover found in the Mississippi UM statute limits 

the scope of the coverage mandated by the statute to those instances in which the 

insured would be entitled at the time of injury to recover through legal action. 

There is no statutory mandate to provide coverage in instances where the alleged 

tortfeasor is immune from liability”. Medders, 623 So. 2d at 989 (emphasis in 

original) (internal citations omitted). The 2009 amendment did not create this 

statutory mandate. In short, and pursuant to our Erie guess, McGlothin was not 

legally entitled to recover from the fireman, the fire department, or the city, and, 

therefore, is not legally entitled to recover UM benefits from State Farm.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, that part of the judgment in favor of McGlothin 

is VACATED, and judgment is RENDERED for State Farm.

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