NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 23-2397

__________________

TRAVIS S. SWEIGART

v.

VOYAGER TRUCKING CORP., KEVIN J. PATTEN, BLUE & GREEN 

TRUCKING & HAIR, LLC, and KEVIN J. PATTEN d/b/a BLUE & 

GREEN TRUCKING & HAIR, LLC

Kevin J. Patten, Blue & Green Trucking & Hair, LLC;

Kevin J. Patten D/B/A Blue & Green Trucking & Hair, LLC,

Appellants

_______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No. 5:21-cv-00922)

District Judge: Honorable Edward G. Smith

__________________________

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

June 28, 2024

Before: JORDAN, SMITH, Circuit Judges, and BUMB, Chief District Judge*

(Filed: July 29, 2024)

* Honorable Renée Marie Bumb, Chief District Judge of the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
2

__________________________

OPINION**

__________________________

BUMB, Chief District Judge.

Plaintiff Travis Sweigart suffered catastrophic injuries when his motorcycle 

crashed into a tractor-trailer. A jury awarded him $25 million in damages. The truck 

driver, Kevin Patten (“Patten”), and his trucking company, Blue & Green Trucking & 

Hair LLC (together, “Defendants”), challenge five discretionary rulings of the District 

Court.1 Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion with respect to any of the 

discretionary issues presented on appeal, we will affirm the jury’s verdict in its entirety.

I.

A. The Accident

In the early morning hours of September 9, 2010, Kevin Patten was driving a fully 

loaded tractor-trailer along Interstate 176 on his way to a landfill in Morgantown, 

Pennsylvania. He exited at the Morgantown Road ramp. He was on his phone. At the end 

of the ramp, Patten saw the headlights of Travis Sweigart’s motorcycle approaching from 

about three football fields away. Patten thought that he had enough time to turn left 

before Sweigart’s motorcycle reached him. Sweigart saw the truck moving toward the 

end of the offramp but did not slow down because he assumed Patten was only inching 

** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

1 Defendant Voyager Trucking Corporation, which hired Patten and his trucking 

company, is not a party to this appeal.
3

the truck forward towards the intersection to get better visibility before making the left 

turn. By the time Sweigart realized Patten was making a full left turn, it was too late. 

Hitting the brakes hard, Sweigart lost control of the bike. The bike rotated 180 degrees, 

skidded backwards, and smashed into the left rear tandem wheels of the truck’s trailer.

The impact caused the motorcycle subframe and seat to crush Sweigart’s pelvis. 

Sweigart’s injuries were horrific. One of the emergency room orthopedic surgeons who 

helped save Sweigart’s life testified at trial that it was “unquestionably the worst pelvic 

fracture that he had ever seen.” [JA509.]

B. The District Court Denies Defendants’ Bifurcation Motion and 

Excludes Evidence of Plaintiff’s Lack of a Motorcycle License and 

Prior Acts of Reckless Riding

Concerned about the jury’s reaction to Sweigart’s gruesome injuries, Defendants 

moved to bifurcate the liability and damages portions of the trial. They argued that issues 

of liability and damage were completely distinct and that without bifurcation, there was a 

real chance that testimony regarding Plaintiff’s injuries would infect the jury’s decision 

as to liability. Plaintiff also moved in limine to preclude evidence (i) that he did not have 

a motorcycle license, and (ii) of videos that showed him recklessly riding his motorcycle 

on one wheel and speeding.

The District Court held oral argument on the pre-trial motions and denied the 

bifurcation motion. While the District Court noted the unusually gruesome nature of 

Plaintiff’s injuries, it reasoned that a jury would be able to follow its instructions and 

separate issues of liability and damages. The District Court also rejected Defendants’

argument that issues of liability and damages were completely distinct. The Court 
4

reasoned that testimony about the location and severity of Plaintiff’s injuries would also 

be an important part of Plaintiff’s liability case because that evidence was relevant to 

whether or not Plaintiff was speeding.

The District Court also granted Plaintiff’s in limine motions. The District Court 

explained that although Plaintiff’s lack of a motorcycle license was probative, it was too

prejudicial to admit, especially because there was no actual evidence that Plaintiff did not 

know how to ride a motorcycle. And, with respect to the reckless riding videos that 

Plaintiff had taken of himself just months before the accident, the District Court reasoned 

that introduction of the videos would be impermissible character evidence against 

Plaintiff. Nor could they be introduced as evidence of habit, the District Court held, 

because the videos did not establish that Plaintiff rode his motorcycle with any sort of 

regular recklessness. 

C. The Trial

1. Voir Dire

The parties proceeded to trial. At voir dire, Jury Panel Member #27, like Patten, 

was a commercial trucker and was familiar with the “crazy stuff” motorcyclists do on the 

road. [JA485.] Panel Member #27 indicated that his son suffered from a chromosomal 

disease and was, like Plaintiff, in a wheelchair. When asked by defense counsel whether 

Panel Member #27 could “put [] aside” thinking about his disabled son when “see[ing] 

Mr. Sweigart every day,” Panel Member #27 responded that he could not and that he 

might be “start[ing] out a little bit ahead of [Defendants].” [JA487, 492.] The District 

Court engaged in further colloquy and asked the potential juror whether he could put his 
5

son’s condition and other biases aside to render a fair verdict. Panel Member #27 assured 

the Court that he would and agreed with Plaintiff’s counsel that it would not be fair if the 

jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff just because he was in a wheelchair. The District 

Court denied the Defendants’ challenge to strike Jury Panel Member #27 for cause

stating that there was “no question” after observing the potential juror’s demeanor that he 

could be fair. [JA494.]

2. Defendants’ Motion for a Mistrial 

Plaintiff called his first witness, Dr. Michels, one of his treating emergency room 

orthopedic surgeons. Dr. Michels described Plaintiff’s injuries while displaying a 

medically accurate, but far from lurid, illustration admitted into evidence representing the 

damage inflicted on Plaintiff’s pelvis. The District Court, noticing that Juror #2 appeared 

to have a strong reaction to the evidence, interrupted Dr. Michels’s testimony to ask if 

Juror #2 was feeling well. Juror #2 responded that he was not and fainted. [Id.] In the 

presence of the other jurors, Dr. Michels immediately asked the District Court to call an 

ambulance and stepped into the jury box to render aid to Juror #2. One of Plaintiff’s other 

treating surgeons, Dr. Moshkovsky, who was also in the courtroom, stepped in as well to 

assist. [Id.] The Court called a recess while Juror #2 received treatment. Outside the 

presence of the jury, Juror #2 was taken out of the courtroom and transported to a local 

hospital.

Defendants moved for a mistrial out of concern that the aid rendered to Juror #2 

by Plaintiff’s physician witnesses in the presence of the jury endowed these witnesses 

with a “halo effect” that would unfairly prevent the jury from assessing their credibility 
6

and testimony. [JA515.] Defendants also argued that the other jurors may have been 

improperly influenced by observing Juror #2’s strong reaction to the evidence. The 

District Court disagreed. The Court reasoned that the witness physicians were admitted as 

experts to testify as Plaintiff’s treating physicians and describe Plaintiff’s injuries.

The District Court called the jury back into the courtroom and informed them that 

Juror #2 had been transported to the hospital. In open court, the District Court asked the 

jury by a show of hands whether they could no longer fairly evaluate Plaintiff’s physician 

witnesses after witnessing them rendering aid to Juror #2. No juror raised his or her hand.

The District Court then confirmed that each juror was “prepared to proceed and render a 

fair and just verdict.” [JA523.] Each juror nodded.2 The District Court then dismissed 

Juror #2.3

3. The Verdict and Post-Trial Motions

The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. It found Patten 95% responsible for 

the accident and awarded Plaintiff $25 million in damages. The District Court denied 

Defendants’ motion for a new trial including, relevant here, a challenge to the District 

Court’s jury charge instructing on Pennsylvania’s sudden emergency doctrine. This 

doctrine lowers the standard of care for a party confronted with a sudden and 

unforeseeable occurrence. Defendants argued that the District Court erred in giving the 

instruction because Sweigart did not find himself in a sudden emergency situation; rather, 

2 Defense counsel did not request that the District Court query each juror 

individually. 

3

Juror #2 later returned to the courtroom after leaving the hospital and the District 

Court, outside the presence of the other jurors, formally dismissed him. 
7

he created a sudden emergency situation by recklessly failing to reduce his speed upon 

noticing Patten’s truck. The Court denied Defendants’ post-trial motion and entered 

judgment against Defendants. This timely appeal followed.4

II.

A. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying 

Defendants’ Request To Bifurcate

A district court, in its sound discretion, “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or 

to expedite and economize ... may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues 

[or] claims....” FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). We trust district courts with “broad discretion” in 

deciding whether to bifurcate issues of damages and liability. Idzojtic v. Pa. R.R. Co., 456 

F.2d 1228, 1230 (3d Cir. 1972). Thus, we will only overturn a denial of bifurcation for an 

abuse of discretion. Barr Lab’ys, Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys, 978 F.2d 98, 105 (3d Cir. 1992).

Defendants argue that the District Court abused its discretion in denying 

bifurcation because the catastrophic nature of Plaintiff’s injuries made it impossible for a 

jury to impartially separate issues of damages and liability. We disagree. Bifurcating a 

trial into separate liability and damages sections is the exception, not the rule. See Lis v. 

Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[S]eparation of issues for trial 

is not to be routinely ordered.”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) Advisory Committee 

Notes). Defendants offer no persuasive reason to apply the exception here other than that 

this case, like many personal injury cases, involved serious injuries. But to hold that a 

4 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

We have final order jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1291.
8

trial court abuses its discretion in denying bifurcation just because a case involves serious 

personal injuries would flip the presumption against bifurcation on its head. Indeed, it 

would require courts to grant bifurcation any time a case involved serious personal 

injuries. Cf. Nester v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2018) (affirming denial of 

bifurcation in personal injury suit where owner was run over by vehicle while it was 

unmanned, rendering her a quadriplegic). The wide discretion inherent in Rule 42(b) does 

not require such a result. Lis, 579 F.2d at 824 (“Thus, a routine order of bifurcation in all 

negligence cases is a practice at odds with our requirement that discretion be exercised 

and seems to run counter to the intention of the rule drafters.”).

Here, the District Court specifically instructed the jury to keep issues of damages 

and liability separate. See Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 530–31 (3d Cir. 2008) 

(affirming denial of bifurcation where district court instructed jury to compartmentalize 

evidence). The Court also instructed the jury that sympathy could play no part in deciding 

whether Plaintiff met his burden of proof and, crucially, that the mere fact that injuries

occurred did not mean that Plaintiff was entitled to recover damages. We must “presume 

that the jury follow[ed] such instructions” to “compartmentalize the evidence.” United 

States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 776 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Hangarter v. Provident Life 

& Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that because 

evidence of liability and damages often overlap, “the normal procedure is to try 
9

compensatory and [] damage claims together with appropriate instructions to ... the 

jury[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

5

Defendants cite no case where we have found a district court to have abused its 

discretion in denying a bifurcation motion. And the primary case they do cite, Estate of 

Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2016), is distinguishable.6In Estate of 

Diaz, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court abused its discretion to deny bifurcation 

where graphic and prejudicial evidence of the plaintiff posing with firearms and 

displaying gang signs had little to no relevance with respect to either liability or damages.

Id. at 603. Here, by contrast, testimony regarding Plaintiff’s injuries was relevant for both 

liability and damages. Defendants’ theory of the case was that Plaintiff was liable (and 

his injuries so terrible) because he was speeding and did not have time to break. Plaintiff 

denied that he was speeding and introduced testimony from his treating surgeons that his 

injuries were not consistent with a high-energy impact caused by speeding. 

5 Defendants argue that these instructions were insufficient because they were 

“general” and did not “expressly direct[] the jury to compartmentalize” damages and 

liability evidence. [Reply Br. at 7 n.1.] But Defendants never appear to have asked for a

more specific curative or limiting instruction, nor do they challenge the lack of such an 

instruction on appeal. 

6 Defendants also briefly mention McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 980 F.3d 937

(4th Cir. 2020), where the Fourth Circuit vacated a district court’s denial of bifurcated 

trials on liability and punitive damages and remanded for the limited purpose of 

determining the proper amount of punitive damages without considering certain financial 

evidence of the defendant corporation’s parent companies’ ability to pay. But in McKiver, 

the district court failed to instruct the jury that the inflammatory financial evidence, 

which exposed the jury to the parent companies’ ability to pay, while properly admitted 

for purposes of liability, could not be considered in determining whether punitive 

damages should be imposed. Id. The Fourth Circuit also recognized that bifurcation was 

not required and that an instruction to compartmentalize the evidence would have also 

been proper. Id. at 974–76.
10

Finally, even assuming the District Court bifurcated the trial, the jury would still 

have known that this was a horrific accident. The jury would have seen Plaintiff in a 

wheelchair. And they would have known that he slammed into a truck while riding a 

motorcycle. We therefore cannot conclude that Defendants have met their burden of 

demonstrating that the District Court abused its discretion with respect to bifurcation.

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying 

Defendants’ Request for a Mistrial

“We review a denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Savage, 85 F.4th 102, 124 (3d Cir. 2023). Defendants argue that once Juror #2 

fainted from hearing the testimony of Plaintiff’s extensive injuries and Plaintiff’s 

physician witnesses came to his aid, “the damage was done.” [Reply Br. at 12.] The 

District Court was therefore required to declare a mistrial, Defendants argue. [Reply at 

12.] 

Here, too, we disagree. The District Court sufficiently questioned the remaining 

jurors who each affirmed that his or her impartiality was not affected. When a juror has a 

strong reaction to graphic evidence and there are concerns that the juror’s reaction may 

impact the impartiality of the remaining members of the jury, it is not an abuse of 

discretion to deny a mistrial motion upon questioning the jury and confirming that they 

can remain impartial. See United States v. Black, 369 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2004) 

(no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial where district court questioned jurors who all 

affirmed that their impartiality was not affected by another juror fainting from a 

gruesome autopsy photograph). Here, the District Court’s determination that each juror 
11

was sincere in affirming that he or she could remain impartial is entitled to due deference. 

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 396–97 (2010). 

Defendants cite to state court cases where a court granted a mistrial based on 

medical assistance rendered to a juror by a physician-witness. These cases are 

distinguishable. Each arose in the context of a medical malpractice trial and involved the 

defendant-physician rendering aid to a juror. Heidt v. Argani, 214 P.3d 1255 (Mont. 

2009) (defendant-doctor assisting juror who became ill during graphic closing argument); 

see also Campbell v. Fox, 498 N.E.2d 1145 (Ill. 1986) (same); Reome v. Cortland Mem’l 

Hosp., 152 A.D.2d 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (same). As the Montana Supreme Court 

explained, the effect of seeing a “defendant doctor reacting to a real-life situation and 

apparently successfully delivering life-saving care” is “immeasurable.” Heidt, 214 P.3d at 

1259. Here, by contrast, Plaintiff’s treating physicians were not defendants in a civil 

malpractice case—they were admitted as experts and testified as Plaintiff’s treating 

physicians, describing Plaintiff’s injuries to the jury. The performance of their medical 

duties in treating Plaintiff was not at issue in this case. Thus, their rendering aid to Juror 

#2 did not endow them with any prejudicial “halo effect” that caused irreparable damage 

to the integrity of the trial. We will not disturb the District Court’s denial of the mistrial

motion.

C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Failing to Strike 

Jury Panel Member #27 For Cause

Our review of a ruling on a motion to strike a juror for cause is for “manifest 

error—a most deferential standard.” United States v. Nasir, 17 F.4th 459, 467 (3d Cir. 
12

2021) (citing Skilling, 561 U.S. at 396). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, jury 

selection is “particularly within the province of the trial judge,” who has the benefit of 

physically observing a potential juror, listening to their answers, observing their 

mannerisms, and ultimately deciding whether they can be fair and impartial in a given 

case. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 386. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has cautioned 

against “second-guessing the trial judge’s estimation of a juror’s impartiality.” Id.

(quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594–595 (1976)).

Nonetheless, Defendants ask us to second-guess the District Court’s assessment of 

Panel Member #27’s impartiality. We will not. The District Court, observing Panel 

Member #27’s demeanor, stated that there was “no question in [its] mind” that the juror 

could be fair and impartial. [JA494.] Defendants argue that Panel Member #27 “openly 

admitted that because of his son’s [disability and wheelchair use], he could not be fair 

towards Defendants[.]” [Opening Br. at 33.] But while Panel Member #27 stated that he 

could not put aside thinking about his son while looking at Sweigart, he denied that his 

son’s condition—which, as the District Court noted, was due to a chromosomal disorder, 

not a car accident—would prevent him from being impartial. Indeed, Panel Member #27 

stated unequivocally under questioning by the District Court that he could be fair to both 

Mr. Sweigart as well as the Defendants. Defendants characterize the District Court’s 

colloquy with Panel Member #27 as “forceful.” [Opening Br. at 36]. But when a juror 

admits concerns about partiality, it is the district court’s responsibility to ask follow-up 

questions “to determine whether [the juror is] actually biased.” Nasir, 17 F.4th at 468. 

The District Court did so and, listening to Panel Member #27’s answers, concluded that 
13

there was no doubt that he could be a fair and impartial juror. Without the benefit of what 

the District Court saw and heard, we cannot, on a cold record, reverse its decision 

declining to strike Panel Member #27 for cause.

D. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Instructing the Jury 

on the Sudden Emergency Doctrine

Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not have benefited from an instruction on 

Pennsylvania’s sudden emergency doctrine. This doctrine provides that a “person 

confronted with a sudden and unforeseeable occurrence, because of the shortness of time 

in which to react, should not be held to the same standard of care as someone confronted 

with a foreseeable occurrence.” Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. 1995). The 

sudden emergency doctrine only applies “to a party who suddenly and unexpectedly finds 

him or herself confronted with a perilous situation which permits little or no opportunity 

to apprehend the situation and act accordingly.” Id. Defendants argue that the doctrine 

does not apply because trial testimony established that it was Plaintiff—not Defendants—

who created the emergency by failing to reduce his speed. 

We review the District Court’s instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine for 

abuse of discretion, to “determine whether, taken as a whole, the instruction properly 

apprised the jury of the issues and the applicable law.” Donlin v. Philip Lighting N. Am. 

Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 78–79 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Dressler v. Busch Entm’t Corp., 143 

F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 1998)). Even where a jury instruction contains a mistake, that 

instruction does not constitute a reversible error unless “it fails to fairly and adequately 

present the issues in the case.” Id. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14

We find no error with the District Court’s jury instructions. Consistent with 

Pennsylvania law, the District Court properly balanced the sudden emergency doctrine 

with an instruction on Pennsylvania’s assured clear distance ahead rule. The clear 

distance ahead rule requires “a driver to control the speed of his or her vehicle so that he 

or she will be able to stop within the distance of whatever may reasonably be expected to 

be within the driver’s path.” Lockhart, 665 A.2d at 1180 (emphasis omitted). As the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained, “where the evidence is such that reasonable 

minds could differ as to whether a sudden emergency actually existed, both [the sudden 

emergency and the assured clear distance ahead] charges should be given.” Id. at 1183.

Here, reasonable minds could differ as to whether a sudden emergency existed. 

Sweigart testified that he did not see Patten’s truck until he was approximately 550 feet 

from the intersection. At that point, Patten’s truck was creeping towards the intersection. 

Sweigart did not reduce his speed because he believed that Patten would come to a 

complete stop prior to turning left through the intersection. By the time Sweigart realized 

Patten was indeed making a turn, he only had 3.2 seconds to brake. Defendants’ own 

crash reconstructionist conceded that Sweigart could have been travelling at a lawful 

speed prior to hitting the brakes. So, because Plaintiff introduced testimony creating a 

reasonable factual dispute regarding whether he found himself in a sudden emergency 

situation, the jury could have found either that Plaintiff was thrust into a sudden 

emergency or that he was driving at a speed greater than would permit him to bring his 

motorcycle to a stop within any clear distance ahead of the truck. We thus find no error in 

the District Court’s instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine charge.
15

E. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding Evidence 

of Plaintiff’s Lack of a Motorcycle License and the Reckless Riding 

Videos

Defendants argue that the District Court erred in excluding evidence of Plaintiff’s 

lack of a motorcycle license and videos of Plaintiff riding his motorcycle recklessly. 

Accordingly, Defendants argue, “[t]he jury was unable to evaluate relevant evidence 

bearing on Plaintiff’s own negligence.” [Opening Br. at 44–45.]. “The admissibility of 

evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge, and admissibility rulings will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 

184, 215 n.21 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 

F.3d 521, 525–26 (3d Cir. 1995)). We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the 

District Court’s evidentiary rulings.

1. Plaintiff’s Lack of a Motorcycle License

The District Court, on the record at oral argument, balanced, under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 403, the probative value of Plaintiff’s lack of a motorcycle license against its 

prejudicial effect. “[W]hen a court engages in a Rule 403 balancing and articulates on the 

record a rational explanation, we will rarely disturb its ruling.” United States v. Finley, 

726 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. 

Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (The District Court’s “discretion is construed 

especially broadly in the context of Rule 403.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

District Court concluded that introduction of Plaintiff’s lack of a license, while probative, 

was simply too prejudicial to be admitted because there was no evidence that there was a 

causal connection between the accident and Plaintiff’s lack of a license and no evidence 
16

that Plaintiff did not know how to drive a motorcycle at the time of the accident. 

Defendants articulate no basis in the record or law that persuades us to the contrary. 

Defendants argue that they should have been afforded a fair opportunity to counter 

Plaintiff’s competency to operate a motorcycle. But the District Court did afford 

Defendants that opportunity, just without evidence of Plaintiff’s lack of a license. Indeed, 

Defendants introduced evidence to convince the jury that Plaintiff lacked motorcycle 

competency, eliciting on cross-examination that Plaintiff (i) had no formal motorcycle 

training, (ii) was a self-taught motorcyclist, and (iii) that he did not read his motorcycle’s 

owner’s manual. We will not disturb the District Court’s reasoned decision to exclude 

evidence of Plaintiff’s lack of a motorcycle license.

2. Plaintiff’s Reckless Riding Videos

Nor will we disturb the District Court’s discretionary decision to exclude video 

evidence of Plaintiff riding his motorcycle recklessly. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)

prohibits the admission of prior bad acts for the purpose of showing that an individual has 

a propensity or disposition to act in accordance with his prior bad acts. Ansell v. Green 

Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, admission of Plaintiff 

recklessly popping “wheelies” and speeding in the months before the accident could not 

be introduced to show that Plaintiff was driving recklessly on the morning of the 

accident. See Sparks v. Gilley Trucking Co., Inc., 992 F.2d 50, 53 (4th Cir. 1993) (Rule 

404(b) should have prevented the introduction of evidence of plaintiff’s prior speeding 

tickets)
17

Recognizing as much, Defendants instead argue that the videos are evidence, 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 406, of Plaintiff’s habit of riding recklessly. Not so. 

Habit evidence under Rule 406 reflects a “semi-automatic” repeated response in a 

specific situation. Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). The 

videos of Plaintiff’s reckless riding offered only snapshots of how Plaintiff rode his bike

on a few occasions. Evidence of habit must be both “regular” and “specific.” See FED. R.

EVID. 406 Advisory Committee’s Note (describing “habit” as a “regular response to a 

repeated specific situation”). The videos were neither. They did not establish, for 

example, that Plaintiff always sped on Morgantown Road—where the accident

occurred—or that he always sped early in the morning on Morgantown Road, or any road 

for that matter.

7 Plaintiff’s stunts and speeding simply cannot show that he was stunting 

or speeding every time he rode his bike. We thus find no abuse of discretion with respect 

to the District Court’s exclusion of the reckless riding videos.

VI. 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

7 One video did involve Plaintiff speeding on Morgantown Road on a Sunday 

afternoon. While that video would have been probative, albeit inadmissible under Rule 

404(b), of the fact that Plaintiff sometimes sped on Morgantown Road, it could not, 

alone, establish any habit of Plaintiff speeding on Morgantown Road.