PRESENT: All the Justices 

H. CURTISS MARTIN, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 121540 JUSTICE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 

 JUNE 6, 2013 

JAMES GARNER, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

J. Howe Brown, Judge 

 In this declaratory judgment action for determination of 

title to a private alley running between property owned by H. 

Curtiss Martin and Virginia Drewry (Martin) and property owned 

by James and Christine Garner (the Garners), Martin appeals from 

the circuit court's judgment that the Garners hold fee simple 

title up to the centerline of that portion of the alley abutting 

their property. Martin also appeals the circuit court's 

judgment dismissing his claim against other abutting property 

owners seeking a determination as to ownership of the remaining 

length of the alley. Finding no error, we will affirm the 

circuit court's judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 The Garners, who own property located at 122 Prince Street 

in Alexandria, filed an amended complaint seeking a declaration 

that the eastern boundary line of their property is the 

centerline of an abutting eight-foot wide private alley 

extending approximately 90 feet due south from Prince Street. 

Approximately 44 feet of the alley runs between the Garners' 
2

property and the property owned by Martin, which is located at 

118 Prince Street. In their amended complaint, the Garners also 

named as defendants the following owners of properties lying 

adjacent to the alley: David and Helen Kenney; Richard and 

Harriet Melmer, Trustees; Robert Bisson and Sabine Sisk; and 

Charles W. Greenleaf (Abutting Owners). Additionally, the 

Garners named the City of Alexandria, alleging the City was 

requiring them to obtain a judicial determination of their title 

to the portion of the alley abutting their property for the 

purpose of calculating a side yard setback required under the 

City's zoning ordinance.1

 Martin filed an answer disputing the Garners' claim of 

ownership to the centerline of the alley. He also filed a 

counterclaim against the Garners and a cross-claim against the 

Abutting Owners seeking a declaration that the fee underlying 

 

1

 In connection with their desire to construct a home on 

their property, the Garners sought to include the portion of the 

alley in which they claim ownership to satisfy their side yard 

requirement under the City's zoning ordinance. The Board of 

Zoning Appeals determined that the alley could not be so used. 

The Garners appealed that decision to the circuit court and 

those proceedings have been stayed pursuant to an agreement 

between the Garners and the City. The Garners also sought 

variances from the side and rear yard requirements which were 

granted by the Board of Zoning Appeals and upheld by the circuit 

court. Martin has appealed the circuit court's judgment to this 

Court. The determination of Garners' ownership in the alley has 

no bearing on issues raised in the pending zoning appeal. See 

Martin v. City of Alexandria, ___ Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2013) 

(this day decided). 
3

the entire 90-foot length of the alley is owned by Martin. 

Robert Bisson and Sabine Sisk did not respond to the amended 

complaint. Richard and Harriet Melmer filed an answer to the 

original complaint but did not respond to the amended complaint 

or otherwise participate in the circuit court proceedings. 

David and Helen Kenney, Charles W. Greenleaf, and the City of 

Alexandria filed answers to the amended complaint and consented 

to be bound by the findings of the circuit court, waiving their 

rights to participate in the proceedings.2

 At the trial in this matter, Ronald J. Keller, a licensed 

surveyor, testified as to his examination of the chains of title 

to the property located at 122 Prince Street, owned by the 

Garners, and the property located at 118 Prince Street, owned by 

Martin. Based on his examination, the parcels now comprising 

122 and 118 Prince Street were both owned by George Markell, Jr. 

In 1891, Markell conveyed a parcel comprising the western 

portion of 122 Prince Street to Robert Miller. In January 1894, 

Markell conveyed a parcel comprising the eastern portion of 122 

Prince Street to Robert Miller (the Miller deed). The Miller 

deed described the property as running "east on Prince Street 

 

2

 Although Martin only named the Garners in his appeal to 

this Court, the remaining parties named in the amended complaint 

were added as appellees pursuant to Orders entered by this Court 

on March 20 and April 2, 2013. 
4

sixteen feet more or less to an alley . . . with the right of 

way over said alley in common with others entitled thereto."3 In 

May 1894, Markell conveyed the parcel comprising 118 Prince 

Street to William W. Browne and Richard F. Robinson, Trustees 

(the Browne/Robinson deed). The Browne/Robinson deed described 

the property as running "west on Prince Street . . . to an alley 

eight (8) feet wide . . . with right of way over the said alley, 

in common with others entitled [t]hereto." 

 The circuit court ruled that the Garners own in fee simple 

up to the centerline of the 44 feet 4 inches of the alley 

abutting their property at 122 Prince Street. The circuit court 

further ruled that Martin owns in fee simple up to the 

centerline of the same 44 feet 4 inches portion of the alley 

abutting their property at 118 Prince Street. In addition, the 

circuit court dismissed Martin's claim seeking a determination 

as to ownership of the remaining length of the alley, ruling 

there was no justiciable controversy as to the Abutting Owners. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Ownership of Portion of Alley Abutting 

Garners' Property 

 

3

 In 1905, Miller conveyed the parcels comprising 122 Prince 

Street to Charles Kircherer. The description of the property 

placed the eastern boundary line at the centerline of the alley. 

This description has been used in the subsequent deeds contained 

in the chain of title to 122 Prince Street. 
5

Martin argues the circuit erred in ruling that the Miller 

deed, under which the Garners claim their title, conveyed title 

to the centerline of the alley. 

 It is an established rule in Virginia that a conveyance of 

land bounded by or along a way carries title to the center of 

the way, unless a contrary intent is shown. Cogito v. Dart, 183 

Va. 882, 889, 33 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1945) ("the boundary on a way, 

public or private, includes the soil to the center of the way if 

owned by the grantor and there are no words or specific 

descriptions to show a contrary intention"); see also Williams 

v. Miller, 184 Va. 274, 278-79, 35 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1945); 

Richmond v. Thompson, 116 Va. 178, 184-85, 81 S.E. 105, 107 

(1914). This established rule of construction is not limited to 

public rights-of-way but applies equally to conveyances of 

property bounded "on a private way." Cogito, 183 Va. at 889, 33 

S.E.2d at 763. 

 In Williams, we applied the general rule to hold that a 

grant of land bounded by an abandoned road carried title to the 

center of the road. 184 Va. at 275-76, 35 S.E.2d at 127-28. In 

reaching our conclusion, we noted that in describing the 

property as bounded "[o]n the west by the old public road now 

closed," the deed "speaks for itself" and "contains no 

limitation." Id. at 278-79, 35 S.E.2d at 128-29 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, there being no language 
6

in the deed showing a contrary intent, "this general rule must 

be applied." Id. at 279, 35 S.E.2d at 129. 

 Similarly, the Miller deed unambiguously conveys property 

bounded by an alley without any reservation or limitation. The 

deed specifically describes the boundaries of the property as 

extending "to an alley, running north and south and leading into 

Prince Street, thence south forty four feet four inches." Since 

there is no language in the deed showing a contrary intent, the 

Miller deed conveyed title to the centerline of the alley.4

 We reject Martin's contention that the language in the 

Miller deed granting a "right of way over said alley in common 

with others entitled thereto" shows an intention by the grantor 

to retain ownership of the entire alley. Under the general rule 

of construction, the Miller deed granted ownership in only four 

feet of the eight-foot wide alley. In granting a right of way 

over the alley, the deed conveyed an easement over the four feet 

retained by the grantor. In fact, Martin's position is 

inconsistent with the language in the Browne/Robinson deed, 

which also includes the conveyance of a right of way over the 

 

4

 We note that the Brown/Robinson deed, under which Martin 

claims ownership of the alley, likewise describes his property 

as running "to an alley." Martin has advanced no legal 

rationale or principled reason as to why this language conveyed 

any greater ownership rights to the alley than the language 

contained in the Miller deed. 
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alley. Had the grantor intended to retain ownership of the 

alley when he conveyed the property in the Miller deed, it would 

have been unnecessary to include a right of way over the alley 

in the Browne/Robinson deed. 

 Therefore, we hold the circuit court properly ruled that 

the Garners own in fee simple up to the centerline of that 

portion of the alley abutting their property at 122 Prince 

Street.5

 B. Ownership of Remaining Portion of Alley 

Martin argues the circuit court erred in ruling there was 

no justiciable controversy with regard to his claim of ownership 

of the remaining length of the alley. 

"A circuit court has the power to issue declaratory 

judgments under Code §§ 8.01-184 through -191. Pursuant to this 

authority, circuit courts may make 'binding adjudications of 

right' in cases of 'actual controversy' when there is 

'antagonistic assertion and denial of right.'" Miller v. 

Highland County, 274 Va. 355, 369–70, 650 S.E.2d 532, 538–39 

(2007) (citing Code § 8.01-184; Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. Mill 

 

5

 Martin also assigns error to the circuit court's reliance 

on two deeds recorded in 1794 and its disregard of the merger of 

the fee underlying the alley. Because the circuit court's 

judgment is supported by the language of the Miller deed, which 

all parties agree is determinative of Garners' ownership of the 

alley, discussion of these assignments of error is unnecessary. 
8

Two Assocs. P'ship, 259 Va. 685, 692, 529 S.E.2d 318, 323 

(2000); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hosp., 245 Va. 

24, 35, 426 S.E.2d 117, 123 (1993); Erie Ins. Group v. Hughes, 

240 Va. 165, 170, 393 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1990)); see also Code 

§ 8.01-191 ("This article['s] . . . purpose is to afford relief 

from the uncertainty and insecurity attendant upon controversies 

over legal rights."); Charlottesville Area Fitness Club 

Operators Ass'n v. Albemarle Cnty., 285 Va. 87, 98, 737 S.E.2d 

1, 6 (2013) (citing City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 

229, 135 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1964)); Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. 

Ratliff, 175 Va. 366, 368-69, 8 S.E.2d 303, 304 (1940). 

[A]n actual controversy is a prerequisite to a court 

having authority. If there is no actual controversy 

between the parties regarding the adjudication of 

rights, the declaratory judgment is an advisory 

opinion that the court does not have jurisdiction to 

render. The prerequisites for jurisdiction, an actual 

controversy regarding the adjudication of rights, may 

be collectively referred to as the requirement of a 

"justiciable controversy." 

Fitness Club Operators, 285 Va. at 98, 737 S.E.2d at 6. 

"The controversy, therefore, must be one that is 

'justiciable,' meaning a controversy in which there are 

'specific adverse claims.'" Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 245 Va. 

at 35, 426 S.E.2d at 123 (quoting Shanklin, 205 Va. at 229, 135 

S.E.2d at 775). "[T]he declaratory judgment statute . . . 

'contemplates that the parties to the proceeding shall be 
9

adversely interested in the matter as to which the declaratory 

judgment is sought.'" Chick v. MacBain, 157 Va. 60, 66, 160 

S.E. 214, 216 (1931) (quoting Patterson v. Patterson, 144 Va. 

113, 120, 131 S.E. 217, 219 (1926)). 

[T]he question involved must be a real and not a 

theoretical question; the person raising it must have 

a real interest to raise it; he must be able to secure 

the proper contradicter, that is to say, someone 

presently existing who has a true interest to oppose 

the declaration sought. 

Patterson, 144 Va. at 120, 131 S.E. at 219 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Additionally, a controversy is "justiciable" only if the 

claim is "'based upon present rather than future or speculative 

facts, [that] are ripe for judicial adjustment.'" Blue Cross & 

Blue Shield, 245 Va. at 35, 426 S.E.2d at 123 (quoting Shanklin, 

205 Va. at 229, 135 S.E.2d at 775). The "proof and allegation" 

must aver a controversy beyond "the realm of speculation." 

River Heights Assocs. v. Batten, 267 Va. 262, 268, 591 S.E.2d 

683, 686 (2004); see also Fitness Club Operators, 285 Va. at 98, 

737 S.E.2d at 6–7; Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 

591, 318 S.E.2d 407, 412 (1984). 

In Martin's pleadings, he seeks a declaration that he owns 

the fee underlying the entire length of the alley. He does not 

allege, however, that the Abutting Owners have asserted an 

ownership interest in the alley. Although Martin alleges 
10

generally that "[e]ach of the Abutting Owners and/or their 

predecessors in interest have from time to time blocked, stopped 

up, and/or interrupted" the alley "and/or disputed Martin & 

Drewry's rights as owners of the fee underlying" the alley, 

there is no allegation detailing a specific violation of 

Martin's alleged rights in the entire alley. (Emphasis added.)6 

Indeed, the Garners do not claim ownership of any portion of the 

alley other than that portion abutting their own property which 

was adjudicated by the circuit court. 

Thus, with respect to the portion of the alley not abutting 

the Garners' property, Martin's pleadings do not allege "present 

facts" evidencing a "specific adverse claim" between parties 

with "true interest to oppose" Martin's claim to ownership of 

the alley. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 245 Va. at 35, 426 S.E.2d 

at 123 (quoting Shanklin, 205 Va. at 229, 135 S.E.2d at 775); 

Patterson, 144 Va. at 120, 131 S.E. at 219. See also Chick, 157 

Va. at 66, 160 S.E. at 216. Contrary to Martin's argument, the 

fact that the Abutting Owners "were before the court and the 

relevant deeds were in evidence," is insufficient to establish a 

justiciable controversy between the parties. Accordingly, the 

circuit court did not err in dismissing Martin's claim seeking a 

 

6

 The Abutting Owners who did file pleadings have not 

asserted an ownership interest in the alley. 
11

declaration of ownership as to the remaining length of the 

alley. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 

the circuit court. 

Affirmed.