CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

Beyond the Wall

www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx

Chinese Far Seas Operations

Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson, 

Editors
Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

China Maritime Study No. 13

May 2015

President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral P. Gardner Howe III, U.S. Navy

Provost

Dr. Lewis M. Duncan

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Thomas J. Culora

Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and 

editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies

Peter A. Dutton

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ISSN 1943-0817

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Contents

Introduction, by Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson ..............................................1

CHAPTER ONE Multipolarity and the Future of Sea-Lane Security...................7

by Dale C. Rielage

CHAPTER TWO Rimland Powers, Maritime Transformation, and Policy 

Implications for China........................................................13

by Wu Zhengyu

CHAPTER THREE Multipolar Trends and Sea-Lane Security .............................23

by Xu Qiyu

CHAPTER FOUR Chinese Cooperation to Protect Sea-Lane Security: 

Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden................................. 33

by Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange

CHAPTER FIVE Chinese/U.S. Naval Cooperation on Counterpiracy and

Escort Missions ............................................................................... 43

by Zhang Junshe

CHAPTER SIX Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements for the 

Twenty-First Century .........................................................47

by Christopher D. Yung

CHAPTER SEVEN China’s Evolving Overseas Interests and Peaceful 

Competition......................................................................63

by Cai Penghong

CHAPTER EIGHT Freedom of the “Far Seas”? A Maritime Dilemma for China ...73

by Jonathan G. Odom

CHAPTER NINE SLOC Security and International Cooperation......................91

by Wang Xiaoxuan

CHAPTER TEN The U.S.-Chinese Maritime Dynamic: Catalyst for 

Cooperation or Confrontation?...........................................95

by Mark Redden and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

About the Contributors.......................................................................................... 117

The opinions expressed in this publication are the perspectives of the authors and do 

not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its 

components or the views of the government of the People’s Republic of China or 

any of its components.

This volume is the product of a groundbreaking dialogue on sea-lane security held 

between People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and U.S. Navy scholars at the Naval 

War College in August 2013, with additional material from a related conference, “China’s 

Far Seas Operations,” hosted by the China Maritime Studies Institute in May 2012. At 

that time the political climate in China was uncertain, in the shadow of the Bo Xilai 

crisis and of the impending transition of power between the Hu and Xi regimes; accordingly the PLA Navy, though invited to participate in the “Far Seas” conference, ultimately declined to do so. This was not entirely surprising. Attempts by various agencies of 

the U.S. Navy up to that time to engage in discussions to advance maritime cooperation 

between China and the United States had been met with lukewarm responses at best. But 

at a maritime security dialogue in Dalian in September 2012 Senior Capt. Zhang Junshe 

of the PLA Navy Research Institute, a key contributor to this volume and to the success 

of the academic cooperation between our two institutes, approached Peter Dutton to 

tell him that everything had changed. China’s new leadership wanted the PLA Navy to 

engage the U.S. Navy actively and to discuss openly all relevant issues, with the aim of 

advancing cooperation between the two navies. Since that time members of the China 

Maritime Studies Institute have engaged members of the PLA Navy Research Institute in 

discussions on a rich variety of maritime topics, leading to advances in understanding 

between our two institutes and our two navies. 

Much has been written about Chinese sea power in the “near seas” of East Asia—those 

waters located within the chain of islands extending from the Kurils in the north to 

Sumatra in the south.1

 This volume attempts to broaden the discussion by examining 

China’s efforts to shape its navy to meet new and growing needs beyond Asia, in waters 

to which it usually refers as the “far seas,” or “distant seas.”2

 Remote from domestic bases 

of support, the far seas impose a range of logistical and operational challenges on the 

PLA Navy. But this distance from the Chinese homeland also provides new opportunities for cooperation with the other navies of the world, creating a much-needed antidote 

to the growing tensions east of Malacca. 

The five missions of the China Maritime Studies Institute—to research, write, advise, 

teach, and engage—were all advanced through this exchange of scholarship, but none 

Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson

Introduction
2 china maritime studies

more so than the engagement portion of its portfolio. The institute engages with the 

PLA Navy for the purpose of providing the Chief of Naval Operations with an additional pathway to improve the U.S. Navy’s understanding of PLA Navy perspectives. The 

exchange that forms the basis of this volume was rich. Although that exchange cannot 

be captured in this brief introduction in all its aspects, there are several themes that 

the papers published here capture especially well. Every author, for instance, takes for 

granted that a redistribution of power is ongoing that could have profoundly negative 

consequences for sea-lane security if not carefully managed. Additionally, although there 

is general agreement that the U.S. Navy will remain dominant in terms of traditional security, it is broadly accepted that the shrinking size of its fleet means it will increasingly 

need support in stabilizing the global maritime domain from the effects of nontraditional security threats. Finally, there is a general consensus that cooperative U.S.-Chinese 

naval relations could serve as a basis for improvements not only in maritime security but 

also in the overall relationship between the United States and China.

To that end, Dale Rielage begins this volume by reflecting on some of the deepest questions facing the U.S. Navy. He assesses that the aforementioned global redistribution of 

power is brought about primarily by the rise of China rather than any American decline 

but that nonetheless this redistribution of power has the potential to affect sea-lane security. One major factor in China’s growing power is the expansion of its maritime trade, 

which is dependent on sea-lane security. However, Rielage notes, as power transfers and 

diffuses among states, maritime trade ironically becomes a vulnerability, in that shipping 

presents an increasingly attractive target if power shifts lead to conflict. Additionally, the 

same diffusion of technology that accompanies advances in maritime trade also increases access to technology that can be used to deny use of the seas. Rielage concludes that 

dealing with the inevitable mistrust between the United States and China in the midst of 

power change and the PLA Navy’s improving capacity is one of the major challenges of 

our age. To avoid the problems of misperception, he recommends regular communication between navies, maintenance and development of the international legal system, 

and the development of mechanisms for collective action to support sea-lane security.

Wu Zhengyu’s chapter advances the theme of maritime competition introduced by 

Rielage and focuses attention on the impact of China’s maritime development on strategic stability in East Asia. He observes lessons from the previous experiences of similarly 

situated states in terms of geographical position—that is, states with hybrid land and 

maritime interests, such as France and Germany, and a large continental state that chose 

to build maritime power, the Soviet Union. He observes that for many years China’s 

maritime deficiency was an important component of strategic stability in Asia, because 

there was a natural balance of power and interests between China as a strong continental 

state and the United States and its maritime allies. However, the recent growth of China’s 
beyond the wall 3

navy and the development of antiaccess capabilities has upset this balance. Wu observes 

that to ensure its long-term safety and security China must find an appropriate balance 

between land and sea power to avoid antagonizing the United States as Beijing pursues 

its territorial, economic, and security interests in its surrounding seas. 

Xu Qiyu is somewhat less concerned about the possibility of accelerating naval rivalry 

and asserts instead that the historical record suggests that the maritime domain tends 

not to be especially sensitive to power shifts in the international structure. In support of 

this contention he observes that throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 

even as Germany, France, and Russia vied for power on the European continent, Britain 

remained the dominant maritime power. Xu concludes that the American position as 

the dominant maritime power is secure for the foreseeable future but will not be without 

challenges. A shrinking U.S. Navy will be especially ill prepared to cope with nontraditional security threats and will require cooperation from other naval powers. Xu is 

optimistic that such multilateral naval cooperation will help to foster a cooperative, or at 

least collaborative, model of great-power relations. American cooperation in this regard 

assists China to overcome its own mistrust of U.S. intentions. 

Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange and, in the succeeding essay, Zhang Junshe reflect 

on the antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden as a successful example of Chinese 

cooperation with the international community. Erickson and Strange observe that the 

PLA Navy takes a cautious approach to the use of force but has become quite innovative 

in performing the mission. They note that China’s initial preference for individual action 

in coordination with others to perform the tasks associated with suppressing piracy has 

gradually given way to more direct cooperation. Additionally, the Chinese have conducted a tremendous amount of international engagement through a wide array of port 

visits. Zhang proudly recounts the PLA Navy’s accomplishments in the Gulf of Aden 

since it first began antipiracy operations in 2008. Like Erickson and Strange, he argues 

that the Chinese navy’s increasingly “close cooperation” with other navies, including 

the U.S. Navy, has “promoted mutual understanding and mutual trust between the two 

navies” and advanced “a new type of big power relationship between our two countries.”

Six years of antipiracy operations have not been without their challenges for the PLA 

Navy. One such challenge is logistical support. Christopher Yung tells us that the Chinese are having a robust debate over the question of how to provide logistical support 

to the PLA Navy’s increasing far-seas operations, especially in the Indian Ocean. He 

assesses that the most logical, and therefore most likely, decision would be to establish 

dual-use logistics facilities that can support both commercial and military operations. 

He anticipates that such facilities will use local agents to tap into existing commercial 

networks and commercial delivery services so as to provide an efficient method of moving required materiel. This model is attractive because dual-use logistics facilities have 
4 china maritime studies

a small and light footprint, incur low political costs to China, and would not need to be 

defended by the Chinese military.

Cai Penghong observes that China’s recent determination to expand and protect its 

overseas interests reflects a significant break with the nation’s past internal and continental focuses. He observes that the expansion of China’s overseas interests is a natural 

outcome of its economic rise and that disruption to important sea-lanes would threaten 

China’s economic and political stability. At the same time, he expects China to face competition and pressure from the United States, especially in the western Pacific. China, he 

asserts, should not back down under this pressure but should actively compete with the 

United States, without resorting to war. The key that prevents escalation of competition 

to conflict, Cai says, is that China’s overseas interests are, though important, not vital, 

and that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, Cai believes, cooperative competition is the best strategic approach for China to take.

Jonathan Odom and Wang Xiaoxuan in their respective essays shift the focus of discussion to the rule sets that will best serve the interests of peace and stability in the maritime domain as both countries seek ways to manage competition and expand cooperation. Odom observes that China’s current approach to international law of the sea, an 

approach that seeks to restrict military freedoms of navigation in the near seas, may 

not serve Chinese interests well as China moves out into the far seas to undertake naval 

operations there. Without liberalization of its restrictive approach to international law, 

Odom argues, despite its growing capacity the PLA Navy risks remaining ineffective 

at protecting its growing overseas resource and commercial interests and at protecting 

Chinese citizens living abroad from the effects of political instability or natural disasters. 

Accordingly, in Odom’s view, liberalizing its policies regarding freedom of navigation for 

military purposes would best protect China’s interests. Wang seems to agree, to a point. 

While he believes the international community should “establish the concept of freedom of the seas for all,” he is convinced that “self-interested and exclusive control”—a 

reference, presumably, to American global naval dominance—is the “greatest threat” to 

sea-lane security. Wang makes little mention of the maritime legal regime, asserting only 

that the system needs to be improved to support the management of the global maritime 

environment. Wang’s solution is based more on power sharing: joint management of sealanes, cooperative international support for sea-lane navigation systems, and an open 

conversation among coastal states, user states, and maritime powers. Note the difference 

between the American preference for regulating international behaviors (strengthening 

rules and laws) and the Chinese preference (strengthening relationships). This is a recurring theme not just in this volume but in many bilateral discussions between the two 

navies.
beyond the wall 5

Finally, Mark Redden and Phillip Saunders round out the volume with a substantial 

chapter that tackles the competition/cooperation dynamic in the United States–China 

relationship at sea. Redden and Saunders circle back to a theme that the beginning 

chapters address—that if the U.S. Navy and the PLA Navy are able to improve bilateral cooperation substantially, it will have “a significant positive impact on the broader 

relationship.” They are pessimistic about the bilateral talks under the Military Maritime 

Consultative Agreement, because the United States focuses on “tactical-level deconfliction procedures” while China seeks to address “broader political-military issues.” (This 

is the rules/relationship dichotomy returning for a curtain call.) Using this framework, 

Redden and Saunders address the two perspectives regarding military operations in the 

exclusive economic zone. They conclude that for the time being the difference between 

them causes friction but at a manageable level, below a threshold of maximum acceptable operational risk. However, Redden and Saunders are not optimistic that this 

condition will continue indefinitely and conclude that ultimately “U.S. and Chinese . . . 

maritime interactions will help shape broader rules and norms of maritime behavior.”

Perhaps, after all, this is the point of continued direct engagement between the U.S. Navy 

and the PLA Navy. If China’s power continues to rise in the future as it has in recent decades, the history of the twenty-first century will be written in terms of the cooperation 

or competition between the two powerful states whose interests these navies will have 

defended. The United States and China will either develop a common approach to maritime security or slip farther toward competition and probably even into conflict. If we 

hope to avoid the latter future, active, sustained, patient engagement will be required to 

develop either mutually agreeable rule sets or an improved relationship. As one Chinese 

participant noted during the conference, a new type of great-power relationship would 

mean “something completely new, very different from the old US-USSR relationship, 

but also different from the US-UK relationship. It is a new path that will require more 

cooperation, understanding, and the development of mutual trust for China and the US 

to move toward a common goal. The bottom line is that it is like a friendship.” These are 

lofty words, and indeed the chapters in this volume make clear that both American and 

Chinese naval experts desire a relationship defined more by cooperation than by competition. The question that remains to be answered, however, is: On what terms?

Notes

1. Peter Dutton, Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan 

Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities, China Maritime Study 11 (Newport, R.I.: 

Naval War College Press, 2014). 

2. Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy 

and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near 

Seas’ to ‘Far Seas,’” Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009), 

pp. 144–69.

The trend toward multipolarity represents a significant shift in the balance of power 

across the international order. It is a fundamental factor that both the United States 

and China are contemplating as they consider the future. The development of a multipolar global system has become accepted fact among U.S. government leaders. In the most 

recent National Military Strategy, published in 2011, the Department of Defense did not 

use the word “multipolar” but noted that “changing distribution of power” foretold an 

“evolution to a ‘multi-nodal’ world.”1

The Chinese government has apparently arrived at a similar conclusion. Its 2013 defense 

white paper states that “global trends toward economic globalization and multi-polarity 

are intensifying.”2

 In January 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deputy chief of 

the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Qi Jianguo, wrote that “the process of multi-polarity is accelerating.” In outlining China’s future security environment, General Qi observed that 

“the end of the Cold War opened up a new process of global multi-polarity . . . and the 

era where one or two great powers ruled the world should be over and will never return. 

This is an irreversible historical trend.”3

True multipolarity, if it comes to pass, would affect the international security environment in many ways. In the maritime domain, a more variegated distribution of power 

could potentially impact the system of maritime communications that we have taken 

for granted since the end of World War II. Would such change have a net positive or 

net negative effect on sea-lane security? What key factors affecting positive or negative 

change can be identified, and how might they be emphasized or mitigated the better to 

safeguard sea-lane security?

Two points of context deserve mention. First, a shift to multipolarity does not necessarily mean an absolute decline in the resources or capabilities of the existing powers. In 

its 2012 report “Global Trends 2030,” the National Intelligence Council aptly referred 

to multipolarity as a “diffusion of power.”4

 If in most cases decline is relative rather than 

absolute, today’s powers will likely remain prosperous and capable of consequential action at home and abroad. They will, however, face an increasing number of other states 

that share this ability. In our future world, very few capabilities will be exclusive to any 

one nation.

Dale C. Rielage

CHAPTER ONE

Multipolarity and the Future of Sea-Lane Security
8 china maritime studies

Second, the question of sea-lane security in a multipolar world must be placed in the 

context of increasing global dependence on maritime trade. Five hundred years ago the 

approximately thousand vessels trading among the Baltic and Scandinavian states had 

a total load capacity of about ninety thousand tons. Today, that amount of cargo is offloaded in the United States from China every sixty-five minutes and could fit comfortably in a single very large containership.5

 In the postwar period, worldwide trade volume 

has increased an average of 6 percent annually.6

 Economic globalization has allowed 

hundreds of millions of people to participate in complex economic transactions beyond 

their local markets, spreading more widely the benefits, costs, and impacts of commerce. 

The aggregate effect has been a striking increase in the average standard of living. Moreover, increased trade has led to growing global economic integration, which has very 

important security implications. 

Indeed, there is an interesting cause-and-effect question here. Did stable access to the 

sea-lanes underwrite the economic boom that has driven the trend toward multipolarity, 

or do growing powers naturally turn to maritime trade? Whether cause or effect, growing use of the seas is not an adjunct to political multipolarity. The diffusion of power 

that creates multipolarity is in part diffusion of economic power. That diffusion is based 

on a global trading system that must be fueled by raw materials and must move finished 

goods to market. 

Assuming that multipolarity is built on trade and that trade is built on sea-lane security, 

the fundamental question becomes: Is multipolarity self-limiting? Will the system at 

some point threaten one of its core enablers, killing the goose that laid the golden egg?

To answer this question, we need to identify the chief threats to global maritime trade 

and examine how multipolarity may impact them. These threats can be grouped into 

three major categories. First, and most significant, is the possibility of transregional 

conflict. Transregional conflict most commonly involves conflict between great powers, though conflict between significant and distributed coalitions can have the same 

characteristics. These conflicts spread outside their immediate neighborhoods and often 

lead to catastrophic disruption of the international trade system. Examples of this type 

include the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. When these conflicts 

ended, the reconstituted trading system profoundly differed from what had existed 

before. 

Second, use of the sea-lanes is threatened by the much more likely prospect of regional 

conflict. This involves geographically limited contests between regional states (for example, the War of the Pacific, between Chile and a coalition of Bolivia and Peru) or between a great power and a regional state, such as that between the United States and Iran 

in 1987 and 1988. In these cases, impact on trade is tied to geography. If the regional 
beyond the wall 9

conflict occurs in a key area, a crossroads on the global commons, the local disruption of 

trade and resource flows can impact the wider system. 

Finally, a variety of what we refer to as “nontraditional threats” can complicate or restrict 

use of the sea-lanes. These include piracy, terrorism from the seas, and criminal activity. 

How then is the trend toward multipolarity—or, in other terms, the diffusion of power—

likely to impact each of these threats?

Transregional conflict is a high-impact, low-probability event. It is important to recognize that neither multipolar political structure nor economic interdependence is a 

complete antidote to great-power conflict. The European powers entered the twentieth 

century having achieved a level of economic and cultural interconnection that would 

make major war devastating for all the societies involved. They recognized this reality 

and elected war regardless. In some cases, in fact, the war plans of the European powers 

sought to leverage the economic system as a weapon in their struggle. Owing to their 

scale and extent, transregional conflicts jeopardize the viability and structure of the political and economic system itself. Thus, when hostilities cease the players and the rules 

of the system are invariably altered, though in most cases the system endures. 

The presence of several large powers or of multiple alliances in competition increases 

the chances of a conflict extending beyond a region and potentially across the globe. As 

John Mearsheimer observes, “there are more great powers in a multipolar system and 

therefore more opportunities for great powers to fight each other.”7

 With an increased 

probability of alliance ties crossing regions, the prospect of geographic escalation of 

conflict becomes acute.

Regional conflict is the most likely and most dangerous threat to sea-lane security. Ironically, the increasing importance of international trade makes that trade an ever more 

attractive target. The same diffusion of technology that allows more states to produce 

goods and to use the seas for their economic gain also increases access to the technology to deny use of the seas. Recently, in the United States we have begun referring to 

these technologies collectively as “antiaccess/area-denial” weapons systems. The concept 

behind these systems is quite old. Technology, however, has in many cases increased 

their effectiveness and increased their ease of employment, removing practical barriers to their use. Global trade has made these technologies more widely available. Thus, 

in a multipolar world a state is more likely to find freedom of navigation in its region 

militarily significant, to possess the means to impact it, and to decide to employ them in 

wartime. 

Nontraditional threats constitute the third category of threats to sea-lane security. 

Referring to these issues as “nontraditional” is an interesting comment on our current 

international order—viewed across the centuries, piracy and other criminal actions at 
10 china maritime studies

sea are perhaps the most traditional threats to the sea-lanes. In recent years, these threats 

have taken new forms. However, at most they can only complicate or restrict our use of 

the sea-lanes; they cannot deny maritime commerce across a broad area. In most cases, 

they represent friction within the international maritime system and not threats to its 

operation. The nonstate actors who carry out these acts are facilitated either by a breakdown in governance ashore—providing havens for piracy and other criminal activity—

or, more rarely, by the willful assistance of functioning governments. In most cases, the 

limited resources and level of sophistication of the attacks put answering them squarely 

within the capability of most midrange powers. 

The irony is that nontraditional threats—by far the least menacing of the three—are the 

most likely to garner international cooperation. Diffusion of power increases the capacity of states to act against nontraditional threats, while the multipolar system and the 

absence of a single security provider builds incentive for cooperative action. 

To summarize, multipolarity increases the risks to sea-lane security from both transregional and regional conflicts but encourages low-cost cooperation against tertiary 

threats to the system. What deliberate actions, then, can we take to mitigate the risks?

First, we can take measures to minimize the likelihood of naval rivalry between the leading powers. Several years ago, in a chapter of the book Twenty-First Century Seapower,

PLA colonel Xu Qiyu asked whether the emergence of a rising power necessarily leads 

to a shift in the balance of power at sea.8

 He concluded that it need not. In his paper for 

this volume, he suggests that, similarly, the diffusion of power across the international 

system does not necessarily mean a shift in the power structure at sea. I would agree that 

a shift in power at sea is not an absolute rule; however, the dynamics that accompany 

multipolarity make a shift in maritime power structures likely. 

The question hinges on whether each of the major trading nations of the world believes 

it needs a naval force sufficient to guarantee its access to the international sea-lanes. I believe that they do. As rising powers invest in new naval capabilities, they incite concern 

that protection of trade does not reflect the full extent of their ambitions. 

The current proliferation of antiaccess/area-denial weapons, mentioned above, makes 

this calculus more complex. A nation that seeks to guarantee access to the sea-lanes inherently needs the capability to defeat such weapons. That capability, however, is agnostic—that is, it can be perceived as defending peaceful commerce and enabling aggressive 

action. This technological dynamic encourages competition. 

The technology that drives this phenomenon is unlikely to change radically in the next 

several years. Therefore, preventing naval rivalry is ultimately a problem of perception. 

Communication between navies is the first and foremost mechanism of shaping perception. These and other confidence-building measures are well worth exploring.
beyond the wall 11

Maintaining and developing the international legal system are collectively a second 

important action. The current rules-based order has provided stability in the maritime 

domain. Confidence in that regime reduces the incentive for nations to think of the 

protection of their maritime interests as first and foremost a naval problem. Disputeresolution mechanisms offer some chance of binding, nonviolent settlement of maritime 

disputes. Moreover, a broad respect for norms increases the chance of collective action 

against violators, preventing maritime security from being a strictly “self-help” project.

This, however, is an area where the trend line is not promising. While the U.S. Navy 

remains a firm advocate of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

(UNCLOS) as a codification of customary international law, the deep well of skepticism 

in other parts of the American government has prevented its ratification. In the western 

Pacific, the apparent refusal of China to state for its claims in the South China Sea a case 

that is consistent with international law or to accept UNCLOS arbitration with the Philippines fosters a perception within the region that international law is not an effective 

framework for resolving disputes. The second-order effects need to be countered.

Last, we can continue to develop mechanisms for collective action to support sea-lane 

security. Aside from the intrinsic value of combating nontraditional threats, collective 

action of this kind can contribute to traditional security by creating foundations for 

cooperation. There have been some remarkable successes in this arena, but we should 

continue to push what is possible. As Andrew Erickson has remarked, we need to 

“transcend the lowest common denominator.” Time/space-coincident unilateral action, 

as is often the case in the Gulf of Aden, is not true collective action. We also need to 

consider whether the cooperation we have seen in the Gulf of Aden can transcend that 

single region and problem or the success of the effort will spell the end of this maritime 

cooperation. The relatively low level of capability required to contribute allows a broad 

coalition. The United States, India, China, and Japan, as trading nations with established 

or growing naval capacities, should show the way in this process.

In conclusion, true multipolarity, if it comes to pass, will create a world where ensuring 

the security of the sea-lanes will require deliberate positive action by multiple selfinterested nations. It is certain to be a difficult task. It is, however, a compelling and 

consequential task: our ability to maintain the security of the sea-lanes will determine 

nothing less than whether the billions of people across the globe will be able to realize 

their potentials in the years to come.

Notes

1. U.S. Defense Dept., The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011: Redefining America’s Military Leadership (Washington, 

D.C.: Joint Staff, 8 February 2011). 

2. People’s Republic of China, The Diversified 

Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: 

Information Office of the State Council, April 

2013).
12 china maritime studies

3. Qi Jianguo, “Unprecedented Great Changing 

Situation: Understanding and Thoughts on the 

Global Strategic Situations and Our Country’s 

National Security Environment,” Study Times

[Xuexi Shibao], 21 January 2013.

4. U.S. National Intelligence Council, “Global 

Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,” Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, December 2012, 

www.dni.gov/.

5. Harald Grossman et al., Maritime Trade and 

Transport Logistics, Strategy 2030, trans. Susan 

Salms-Moss (Hamburg, Ger.: Hamburg Institute 

of International Economics for Berenberg Bank, 

2006), p. 9, available at www.hwwi.org/. 

6. Ibid., p. 11.

7. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 

Politics, updated ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 

2014), chap. 10. This material is separately available at nationalinterest.org/ under the title “Can 

China Rise Peacefully?” 

8. Xu Qiyu, “Conflict at Sea: How It Happens and 

How It Can Be Avoided,” in Twenty-First Century 

Seapower: Cooperation and Conflict at Sea, ed. 

Peter Dutton, Robert Ross, and Øystein Tunsjø, 

Frank Cass Naval Policy and History Series (New 

York: Routledge, 2012).
Maritime transformation stands out in history mainly for two reasons. First, history 

seems to have been very unkind to such transformations. Except for a few ancient 

cases, no effort at maritime transformation has ever succeeded. Serious attempts at maritime transformation by such great powers as Louis XIV’s France, Wilhelm II’s Germany, 

and imperial Russia / the Soviet Union all failed. Second, maritime transformation 

pursued by modern great powers has without exception led to strategic instability. In the 

cases of Louis XIV and Wilhelm II, their pursuits ended in hegemonic wars. In the case 

of imperial Russia / the Soviet Union, such efforts led to strategic tension and rivalry 

with other great powers. In spite of these ominous precedents, the world is currently 

witnessing another maritime transformation. This time, the protagonist is the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC). Today, China’s turn toward the sea is very much a reality, as 

evident in the stunning output of its shipbuilding industry, its vast and expanding merchant marine, its growing fishing fleet, and especially its increasingly modern navy. 

Though maritime transformation is important in and of itself, to date there has been 

little scholarship on the subject except for a series of separate case studies. Case studies are indispensable for good scholarship, but they mean little if efforts are not made 

to identify patterns and extrapolate strategic lessons from the seemingly unique cases. 

This paper intends to fill this gap by situating China’s maritime pursuit within a larger 

context and drawing conclusions from historical precedents. It first defines maritime 

transformation, expounds its significance, and points out qualitative differences among 

the historical cases. The paper then introduces the “rimland” concept and explores the 

mechanism that led to the historical failures of maritime transformation by the rimland 

powers. Then, using these historical lessons, the paper clarifies the challenges posed to 

the balance of power in East Asia by China’s pursuit of maritime capabilities. Finally, 

the paper applies the historical lessons to China today and illustrates the strategic issues 

that nation must seriously consider if it wants to escape the strategic traps in maritime 

transformation. 

Wu Zhengyu

Rimland Powers, Maritime Transformation, and Policy 

Implications for China

CHAPTER TWO
14 china maritime studies

The Definition and Significance of Maritime Transformation

Maritime transformation is a tantalizingly fuzzy concept. Everyone seems to understand 

it, but no one has satisfactorily explained its meaning. This concept seldom appears 

in monographs on strategy, and the classics of strategy are conspicuously silent on 

the topic. Today, with the rise of China in the nautical realm, more and more policy 

analysts and academics have referred to this concept in a variety of analyses and studies. 

However, almost no effort has been made to define it precisely, and most analysts and 

academics on the subject have largely treated it as self-evident. In this paper, “maritime 

transformation” as a strategic concept specifically refers to the process whereby a continental or coastal state shifts its general strategic orientation and systematically redirects 

resources from land to the seas with the aim of transforming itself from a purely land 

power to a land/sea hybrid.1

Though maritime transformation is a strategic rather than geographic concept, geography is an indispensable factor for it. Maritime transformation does not apply to such 

states as Britain and Japan, which, largely due to geography, already have a maritime 

orientation. Only continental or coastal states have the combination of geographic qualifications and strategic necessity to pursue maritime transformation. This explains why 

the protagonists of maritime transformation throughout history are either continental 

or coastal states. In theory, many indexes can be employed to evaluate whether a state is 

pursuing maritime transformation. However, the most important index is the position 

of the navy in the overall composition of a state’s armed forces. A relatively prominent 

position indicates a shift in strategic concern from the terrestrial domain to the maritime domain. It also implies that the state can pursue maritime transformation purely for 

political or strategic reasons, regardless of economic costs.2

If as a concept maritime transformation only recently began receiving attention in 

the field of strategic studies, as a practice it can be traced as far back as ancient times. 

Persia, Rome, and the Ottoman Empire, to name only the most prominent examples, all 

pursued maritime transformation at the peak of their power. In general, their pursuits 

revealed a continentalist approach to sea power, an approach that stands in marked 

contrast to that of maritime powers in modern Europe. First, all three ancient empires 

became dominant land powers first, after which, by devoting tremendous resources 

to developing sea power, they were able to build substantial navies. Second, all three 

ancient empires achieved command of the Mediterranean or the Arabian Sea, as the case 

was, mainly by conquering the surrounding lands first. In view of this continentalist 

approach to sea power, it is no wonder that Halford J. Mackinder invoked these ancient 

examples to illustrate the inherent superiority of land power over sea power.3
beyond the wall 15

After the center of naval competition moved into the Atlantic and beyond, a few great 

powers—France, Germany, and imperial Russia / the Soviet Union—seriously pursued 

maritime transformation. Though historians of later times have been disposed to lump 

all these cases together, there actually existed qualitative differences in terms of impacts 

on strategic stability between France and Germany as the “rimland” powers and imperial 

Russia / the Soviet Union as the “heartland” power. The maritime pursuits of imperial 

Russia / the Soviet Union did not end in catastrophe, though they did lead to strategic 

tension and rivalry. By contrast, the efforts of Louis XIV’s France and Wilhelm II’s Germany to achieve maritime transformation contributed much to hegemonic wars. Specifically, owing to their geographic situations, France and Germany can be land powers 

or sea powers but not both simultaneously. Otherwise they would upset the European 

balance of power, thus threatening the survival of other states.4

China, although located on the opposite side of Eurasia, is, like France and Germany, a 

typical rimland power in geopolitical terms. For many centuries China was a continental 

power, with a continentalist mentality, in spite of impressive maritime endowments and 

an honorable maritime heritage.5

 However, in the early part of the twenty-first century 

China inaugurated vigorous efforts to achieve maritime transformation, efforts most 

vividly evident in the exponential development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

naval forces. China’s ongoing maritime transformation not only marks the redirection of 

its overall strategic orientation from land to the sea but injects a brand-new factor into 

the East Asian security environment.6

 During the previous decades, China’s neighboring 

countries (as well as the United States) had grown accustomed to accepting China as a 

dominant land power in continental East Asia. However, the situation is changing now, 

and no one can spell out its strategic implications with confidence. 

As mentioned above, maritime transformation pursued by a rimland power tends to 

have a more negative impact on regional strategic stability than that pursued by the 

heartland power. In view of this, the prime challenge faced by China today is how to 

avoid the potential strategic traps involved in maritime transformation, thereby to 

achieve peaceful development. To achieve this objective, we need first to understand the 

mechanism that led to the failures of maritime transformation pursued by past rimland 

powers and, second, to clarify the challenges this pursuit will pose to the East Asian 

regional security order. 

Rimland Powers, Maritime Transformation, and the Balance of Power 

To grasp the strategic implications of China’s maritime transformation, we need to begin 

with the strategic significance of the rimland. After 1945, the dominance of the Cold 

War in world politics disposed students of strategic studies to focus almost exclusively 

on the heartland and ignore the strategic value of the rimland. Nevertheless, it is the 
16 china maritime studies

rimland rather than the heartland that has been the political, economic, and strategic 

center of gravity on the Eurasian continent since the sixteenth century. The states of the 

rimland have been not merely more powerful than the heartland in terms of material 

and human resources but also the sources of greatest concern to modern great powers. Its significance raises an important question: In modern history, why did maritime 

transformations pursued by rimland powers (Louis XIV’s France and Wilhelm II’s 

Germany) all end in failure? The key to this question lies in the intrinsic logic of the 

European classical balance of power. This logic consists of two essential factors: the 

intervention of the dominant maritime power and the grand coalition organized and led 

by the dominant maritime power. 

Throughout history, the supremacy of the dominant maritime power in the system has 

rested on two pillars: maritime (especially naval) supremacy and the balance of power in 

the core regions of Eurasia (Europe before 1945, Europe and East Asia now). These two 

pillars are symbiotic, or interdependent. If the dominant maritime power hopes to keep 

its overall supremacy in the system, it must have both in its favor.7

 Halford J. Mackinder, 

the most famous British political geographer in the twentieth century, once indicated 

that to defeat an insular sea power, a land power had to meet two requirements: it had to 

be unchallenged on land and had to possess sufficient resources to enable it to construct 

a powerful fleet. Absent those two conditions, a strongly based insular sea power like 

Britain would prevail, as evidenced by the British defeat of Napoleon’s France.8

 Echoing 

Mackinder’s reasoning, Nicholas J. Spykman, an American political scientist, believed 

that the first line of defense for the United States lay in the preservation of a balance 

of power in Europe and Asia. Spykman wrote that “the position of the United States in 

regard to Europe as a whole” is identical to “the position of Great Britain in regard to the 

European continent.” In light of this, “we have an interest in the European balance as the 

British have an interest in the continental balance.”9

The implication of Mackinder’s and Spykman’s geopolitical reasoning is straightforward: 

maritime supremacy and the balance of power in the core regions of Eurasia are symbiotic—that is, both conditions must be met. This constitutes the basic motive for the 

dominant maritime power to intervene intermittently yet regularly into the continental 

balance of power, especially when there appears a hegemonic threat on the continent.10 It 

explains why historically Great Britain always felt compelled to intervene in the continental balance of power and the United States in the twentieth century found it necessary to intervene in two world wars. From the perspective of the dominant maritime 

power, the most threatening challenger is a rimland power with mixed strategic orientations: primarily a land power with continental aspirations but also making serious 

efforts to acquire sea power.11
beyond the wall 17

A rimland power with great maritime capabilities would pose two kinds of threat. First, 

with great maritime capabilities a rimland power could directly threaten the leading maritime power with defeat at sea or invasion.12 In the eighteenth and twentieth 

centuries, respectively, Louis XIV’s France and Wilhelm II’s Germany confronted Great 

Britain with such a scenario. Second, with great maritime capabilities a rimland power 

would be able to deprive the dominant maritime power of its ability to intervene effectively in the continental balance of power.13 That would leave the continental balance of 

power at the mercy of the potential hegemon. 

In a fundamental sense, the rimland powers’ pursuits of maritime transformation and 

their struggles for European hegemony failed largely because of the functioning of the 

European balance-of-power system. The crux of this mechanism was the recurrent 

interventions by the dominant maritime power into the European continental balanceof-power system before a would-be hegemon could unify the region by coercion.14 From 

1648 to 1945 Great Britain was the leading maritime power, on which the survival of the 

European balance-of-power system depended on most occasions. Thus, it was regarded 

as the balancer of the European states system. These interventions usually assumed the 

form of a grand coalition organized and led by the dominant maritime power against 

the challenger.15 It was this sort of intervention by the dominant maritime power that 

ensured the proper functioning of the European balance-of-power system in modern 

history. Since there were parallel interests between the dominant maritime power and 

continental states, the intervention of the dominant maritime power would invariably 

stimulate these states, especially continental great powers, to rise up against the challengers of the status quo (the balance of power) on the continent.16 Furthermore, given 

their economic, financial, and naval supremacy, the leading maritime powers possessed 

the necessary capabilities to help continental allies not only with naval blockade but also 

with economic and financial support to maintain their efforts to wage war. This is the 

essence of the British way of warfare expounded by Sir Basil Liddell Hart.17

Maritime Transformation and Sino-U.S. Relations

Like that of Great Britain in modern history, America’s position as the dominant power 

in the world today still hinges fundamentally on preserving the balance of power in the 

core regions of the Eurasian landmass.18 Since 1905 America’s essential strategic interest 

in East Asia has been to maintain a balance of power on the opposite shore of the Pacific 

Ocean. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States pursued this goal with 

remarkable tenacity. American interest in maintaining a balance of power in East Asia 

led to all of its wars there: the war against Japan, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. 

The essential American interest in East Asia does not lie in any particular configuration. Rather, its overriding concern is with the balance of power per se.19 Refusal to allow 
18 china maritime studies

another power to dominate this region has been a constant of America’s foreign policy 

since it became a great power a century ago. Conforming to classical balance-of-power 

theory, it has put its weight on the weaker side: China (versus Japan) during World 

War II, Japan (versus the Soviet Union) at the outset of the Cold War, and China again 

(versus the Soviet Union) after 1972.20 American strategic interests in East Asia did not 

decline with the end of the Cold War; rather, they have increased, because of the region’s 

growing importance. 

From a geopolitical perspective, East Asia was inherently imbalanced, with China being 

the dominant power, and this was the characteristic feature of the East Asian regional 

system. However, the sphere of influence of imperial China was confined to continental 

East Asia, never expanding effectively into the littoral seas. There have been various explanations for this conservative attitude toward the seas, but the basic reason lies simply 

in imperial China’s maritime inadequacies.21 Though imperial China boasted an honorable heritage of maritime activities, it had never developed enough maritime capabilities 

to allow itself to expand into maritime East Asia. This situation continued into the Cold 

War years. China’s naval development during the Cold War was constrained by U.S. 

dominance of maritime East Asia and later by internal policy debacles and deterioration 

of relations with the Soviet Union. For many years, China’s deficiency in maritime capabilities has been the foundation of strategic stability in the western Pacific and maritime 

East Asia.22 It is for this reason that the United States today stays vigilant against China’s 

maritime transformation, not because China’s growing naval forces threaten the American homeland or sea-lane security. American strategic apprehensions today mainly stem 

from considerations of the consequences of damage from this transformation to the 

status quo in East Asia and the littoral seas. 

From the American perspective, as the dominant land power in continental East Asia, 

China in its pursuit of maritime capabilities will probably pose two strategic challenges 

to American involvement and leadership in East Asia and the world. First, the exponential growth of the PLA Navy and its efforts to build a blue-water fleet (including 

redoubtable submarine forces and amphibious capabilities), combined with powerful 

land-based antiaccess capabilities, will enable China to undermine the existing strategic stability in East Asia, especially in East Asian littoral seas.23 Second, China’s areadenial capabilities, which comprise naval forces and land-based antiship ballistic and 

cruise missiles, create serious doubt about U.S. capabilities to intervene effectively into 

the regional balance of power in East Asia. This doubt will surely rock the American 

bilateral alliance system in East Asia and undermine its strategic credibility among East 

Asian allies.24 Given China’s dominance in continental East Asia, maritime transformation would enable it to become powerful enough to upset the existing balance of power 

in East Asia and the littoral seas, a balance that has depended on China’s deficiency in 
beyond the wall 19

maritime capabilities. This scenario also means that the United States will probably be 

confronted by a regional system—including both continental and maritime East Asia—

that is closed to American political, economic, and cultural influence. This is absolutely 

unacceptable in American eyes.

America’s growing concern with China’s ongoing maritime transformation has much to 

do with the strategic geography of East Asia.25 The East Asian littoral seas lie between 

the continental coastline and the “first island chain,” running south from the Japanese 

archipelago to the Philippines. This expanse of sea is strategically known as the “near 

seas” of East Asia. From China’s perspective, command of the East Asian near seas is 

both natural, in light of geographic location, and justified, given that most of China’s 

maritime territorial and economic interests are located in this body of water. Command 

of the near seas not merely involves the struggle for sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands 

and the Spratly Islands but also will determine whether mainland China and Taiwan can 

be finally reunified; it is also needed to ensure the safety and security of China’s prosperous eastern coastal lands.26 These interests contradict in a fundamental sense those of 

the United States. From the American perspective, the bodies of water bounded by the 

first island chain are integral to the global order underwritten by U.S. and allied naval 

power. These waterways convey the lifeblood of economic vitality to all regional economies in East Asia, including China’s. To complicate matters, America’s East Asian allies—

such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines—are all located inside or along the first 

island chain. Losing command of the East Asian near seas would mean the collapse of 

the American “hub and spoke” alliance system in East Asia.27 It is this contradiction of 

interests that causes Americans to be deeply concerned by recent displays of China’s 

naval capabilities.

The Policy Implications for China

Maritime transformation, defined as an attempt by a state to transform itself from a pure 

land power to a land/sea-hybrid power, is rare in modern history. Only a few states have 

the qualifications to pursue maritime transformation, and among those that have, none 

have succeeded. This partly explains why the study of maritime transformation has not 

received attention by scholars of strategic studies until recently. In light of the few cases 

of maritime transformation in modern history, what strategic lessons can we draw from 

them? What are the policy implications for China if it wants to avoid the failures foretold 

by history? These questions are worth considering, given that China as a rimland power 

faces strategic deficiencies similar to those of modern France and Germany. 

States, like individuals, have natural endowments. This fact explains why the distribution 

of sea power among nations in the world is so uneven. Alfred T. Mahan devoted the entire introductory section to his first book to elaborating the elements of sea power, and 
20 china maritime studies

his conclusion was simple: nautical endowments largely predetermine how much sea 

power a nation can enjoy.28 Compared with a landlocked or island country, a land/seahybrid power like China generally has certain strategic weaknesses: first, the strategic dilemma between facing the land and facing the sea; second, the dual pressure from both 

land and sea; and third, deciding how to allocate limited resources to serve the greater 

national strategy.29 During the past five centuries, as a result of the unique weaknesses 

and constraints of being a land/sea-hybrid power, China missed several precious opportunities to develop itself into a powerful modern state. Despite the security and stability 

of China’s land borders in the post–Cold War period, a situation that has allowed China 

to concentrate its energy and resources on seaborne development, the strategic vulnerabilities of being a land/sea-hybrid power have not absolutely disappeared, once and for 

all. In fact, to ensure its long-term safety and security, China still has to find the appropriate balance between the land and the sea. 

Related to the balance between land and sea, China also needs to reconsider the role of 

sea power in the world today. One basic motive for China’s development of maritime, 

especially naval, capabilities is to ensure the long-term well-being of the Chinese nation. This is partly inspired by the Chinese understanding of Alfred T. Mahan’s classic 

works.30 Mahan’s arguments about sea power and its influence were mainly founded on 

the proposition that “travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper 

than by land.” Though railroads had largely displaced water transport in his own time, 

Mahan maintained that ships still constituted the primary form of carriage for trade and 

would continue to do so in the future.31 From this premise, through a series of historical 

studies, Mahan induced two influential conclusions. First, the maritime economy—

namely, production, shipping, and colonies—was the key to national prosperity. Second, 

the possession of naval supremacy was essential to the protection of national interests 

related to production, shipping, and colonies.32 However, Mahan’s precepts on the close 

connection between sea power and the wealth and prosperity of nations were built on 

the presumption that what had happened in the past was going to occur in the future as 

well. “Mahan largely looked to the past; he gained his lessons from a study of the past 

and used the past for analogies.”33 Chinese elites who seek inspiration from Mahan seem 

to have ignored the historical context of Mahan’s “philosophy of sea power.” 

One major lesson revealed by maritime transformations in history is that the rimland 

powers’ pursuit of maritime capabilities failed largely because of the dual pressure from 

the dominant maritime power and neighboring states. It was this dual pressure, or balancing against the rimland powers, that led to their final failures. This is largely because 

there existed common interests between these two kinds of states to prevent the rise of 

the land/sea-hybrid power located on the rimland. Likewise, as a rimland power, China 

too has encountered, in its recent pursuit of maritime, especially naval, capabilities a 
beyond the wall 21

series of unfavorable or even antagonistic reactions from neighboring states and the 

United States, the dominant maritime power today. Though these unfavorable responses 

do not necessarily mean that China should abandon its maritime-dominant development, it does mean that China must take those responses and concerns into serious 

consideration as it plots the country’s future course. 

The most important issue facing contemporary China’s maritime development is how 

to overcome the pressure from neighboring states, exemplified clearly in the challenges 

China has endured in recent years in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. 

Despite the Chinese government’s repeatedly showing no intent to challenge the existing 

international order, it has faced hostility from other states adjacent to these waters. To 

complicate matters, China has insisted on dealing with neighboring states over maritime 

disputes in bilateral, rather than multilateral, settings and has staunchly resisted the 

involvement of extraregional powers, especially the United States, in its disputes with 

neighboring states over maritime issues. To dispel effectively suspicion and pressure 

from neighboring states, China should strive to establish a series of multilateral institutions, with “all hands on deck” throughout the process. In addition to taking initiative in 

shaping a regionalized system binding China and its neighbors, China probably has to 

tolerate the participation of outside powers (principally the United States). Without the 

guarantees of extraregional powers, China simply cannot form any meaningful institutional mechanism with neighboring countries, especially “second level” powers and 

smaller states. 

Another problem that contemporary China’s maritime development must overcome is 

how to deal with pressure from the leading maritime power and system leader, namely, 

the United States. When China responds to this type of pressure, the issue to which it 

must pay close attention is creating a type of truly open regionalized and globalized 

international order, taking into consideration the historically formed core interests of the 

leading maritime power and system leader. In short, one of the core interests of the leading maritime power and system leader is keeping the Eurasian core regions (especially 

Europe and East Asia) politically, economically, and culturally open to itself and its various allies and followers. Thus, in the foreseeable future China must not only tolerate the 

participation of the leading maritime power and system leader in shaping the regional 

system but establish a truly open ideology. Only by doing this can China effectively 

lessen, if not eliminate, the strategic distrust regarding its long-term intentions widely 

held by the United States and neighboring states. 

Notes

1. Except for historical case studies, only one book 

has focused on maritime transformation, an 

anthology edited by three scholars from the U.S. 

Naval War College. Interestingly, most of its 

contributors treat the concept of maritime transformation as self-evident and give no precise 
22 china maritime studies

definition of it. See Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. 

Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, eds., China Goes to 

Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative 

Historical Perspective (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 

Institute Press, 2009). 

2. The pursuit of maritime transformation in both 

the ancient and modern worlds seems always 

to have been related to the pursuit of power, 

even hegemony, to which the pursuit of wealth 

has been subservient. This is especially true of 

modern great powers that have attempted some 

kind of maritime transformation. See ibid.

3. Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), esp. chaps. 

3 and 4.

4. For French and German pursuits of maritime 

transformation, see Alan James, The Navy and 

Government in Early Modern France, 1572–1661

(London: Boydell, 2004), and Holger H. Herwig, 

Luxury Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888–

1918 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980).

5. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 2nd ed. 

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p. 

3.

6. Jakub J. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical 

Change (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. 

Press, 2006), p. 169.

7. Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance (London: 

Chatto & Windus, 1963), p. 85.

8. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 66.

9. Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World 

Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), p. 

124.

10. Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History 

and Practice (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 115.

11. Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace

(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944), p. 45.

12. Ibid. 

13. Brian W. Blouet, Halford Mackinder (College 

Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 1987), p. 177.

14. Ludwig Dehio, Germany and World Politics in the 

20th Century (New York: W. W. Norton, 1959), p. 

68.

15. Mark R. Brawley, Liberal Leadership (Ithaca, N.Y.: 

Cornell Univ. Press, 1993), p. 2.

16. Dehio, Precarious Balance, p. 102.

17. John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight 

of History (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 

1988), p. 17.

18. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, p. 

457.

19. Robyn Lim, The Geopolitics of East Asia: The 

Search for Equilibrium (London: Routledge, 

2003), p. 2. 

20. David Gompert, Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific (Santa Monica, Calif.: 

RAND, 2013), p. 78.

21. Cole, Great Wall at Sea, p. 5.

22. Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism,” 

International Security 34, no. 2 (2009), p. 80.

23. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, p. 

174.

24. Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing 

U.S.-China Strategic Distrust (Washington, D.C.: 

Brookings Institution, 2012), p. 22.

25. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star 

over the Pacific (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 

Press, 2010), p. 50.

26. Gompert, Sea Power and American Interests in 

the Western Pacific, p. 98.

27. Yoshihara and Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific,

p. 55.

28. Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power 

upon History 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 

1890), pp. 25, 28.

29. Spykman, Geography of the Peace, p. 41.

30. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese 

Naval Strategy in the 21st Century (New York: 

Routledge, 2008), p. 27.

31. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History 

1660–1783, pp. 25–26.

32. Ibid., pp. 28–29.

33. William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1980), p. 274.
Given the diffusion of global power exemplified by the association of five major 

emerging national economies known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 

South Africa) and by the “Group of Twenty” (G20), the return of a multipolar international system looks more certain than it did in the previous decade. In the field of 

international security, many issues are addressed in a multilateral and cooperative way, a 

marked contrast to the past, in which zero-sum contention between great powers was often the norm. Such changes are bound to impact the international security environment 

in myriad ways. At a time when navies are working with each other to combat piracy in 

waters off Somalia, it is natural to wonder to what extent the trend toward multipolarity 

will affect sea-lane security, which for centuries has been under the guard of the world’s 

leading sea power. 

Multipolarity at Sea?

This question is vital. Many assume that the international power structure is reflected in 

all aspects of international affairs, including the maritime domain. However, the historical record suggests that maritime issues, particularly maritime security, tend to be not 

entirely sensitive to shifts in the international power structure. 

Many scholars accept that the world in the era prior to the First World War was multipolar. Great Britain, the dominant country during most of the eighteenth century and the 

nineteenth century, was eclipsed by the United States and Germany in manufacturing. 

Russia also showed its enormous potential when it began its industrialization. In East 

Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the whole Western Hemisphere, Britain’s influence relied increasingly on the goodwill of other major powers. However, this multipolar 

power structure coexisted with Great Britain’s untrammeled supremacy at sea. During 

the last decades of the nineteenth century Britain was not confronted with any serious 

challenge at sea, notwithstanding the poor condition and lack of preparedness of the 

Royal Navy. The French navy, the Royal Navy’s leading competitor in the nineteenth 

century, was much inferior to it in strength and personnel. The Russian navy, the thirdranking navy in Europe, was notoriously inefficient. During this period the Royal Navy 

was also occupied with numerous peacetime functions: suppressing native uprisings, 

Xu Qiyu

CHAPTER THREE

Multipolar Trends and Sea-Lane Security
24 china maritime studies

rescuing slaves and ships in distress, stamping out piracy, stopping smugglers, aiding the 

victims of earthquakes and other disasters, and charting the seas, among many others.1

In brief, the Royal Navy remained dominant at sea in a period of shifting power and 

increasing multipolarity. Security of the strategic sea-lanes was indisputably under the 

control of Britain (“five [strategic] keys that lock up the world,” as Admiral of the Fleet 

John Fisher put it).2

 Neither traditional challenges (from other states) nor nontraditional 

challenges could threaten this dominance. 

Nor could imperial Germany’s naval expansion challenge it. Although the first decade of 

the twentieth century witnessed the relative decline of British national power, with both 

the United States and Germany surpassing it in terms of economic output, Britain’s grasp 

of naval supremacy proved tenacious. A serious naval race between Britain and Germany lasted almost fourteen years. However, by 1912 it had become clear that Germany 

had lost the race, and most rational politicians in the Second Reich privately confessed 

it. In fact, Britain’s control of sea-lane security lasted for more than twenty years after it 

lost its top place in the international power structure. After that, there was only a very 

brief period of multipolarity at sea before the United States achieved naval supremacy 

and became sole custodian of the strategic sea-lanes.

This review of history points to at least two basic implications. First, the emergence of a 

multipolar international power structure does not necessarily lead to a multipolar structure at sea. To the contrary, such transformation has proved to be difficult and much 

delayed. In the past two centuries there was only a very brief period of multipolarity in 

the maritime domain—during the interwar era. Second, sea-lane security relies exclusively on the country whose maritime power dominates the ocean. On the one hand, 

only such a country has sufficient capacity and credibility to safeguard sea-lane security. 

On the other hand, since the responsibility of maintaining sea-lane security belonged to 

the world’s dominant sea power for centuries, such responsibility is treated as a symbol 

of dominance at sea.

From this perspective, the current realities of sea-lane security will not change in 

the foreseeable future. The United States will remain the top sea power, in charge of 

sea-lane security in a broad sense. However, U.S. dominance at sea in a complicated 

world demands further exploration. Joseph Nye has vividly depicted American power 

in terms of a “three-dimensional chessboard”: on the military chessboard, the United 

States undoubtedly retains supremacy; on the economic chessboard, the United States 

already operates in a multipolar world; and on the chessboard of transnational relations, 

by which he means the realm of cross-border transactions, no country is in charge.3

In a similar vein, U.S. dominance at sea, including its dominant position astride the 

international sea-lanes, could be described as a “two-dimensional chessboard”: on the 

chessboard of traditional security, the strength, efficiency, and preparedness of the U.S. 
beyond the wall 25

Navy indisputably make America the dominant power at sea; on the nontraditional 

chessboard, U.S. power seems insufficient to address all the security challenges posed by 

nonstate factors. 

New Elements That Impact Sea-Lane Security

Although the contemporary trend toward multipolarity in the international power 

structure will not lead to a similar trend in the maritime domain, there are some new 

elements that will impact maritime security, especially sea-lane security. 

Rising Stakes

Dependence on international sea-lanes has increased dramatically since the end of the 

Cold War, driven by deepening globalization and the rise of a highly integrated world 

economy. Free and secure sea-lanes have been particularly critical to the expansion of 

economies in the Asia-Pacific region, facilitating transport of raw materials into this 

region and of manufactured goods out to the global market. 

Among those materials, the most significant resource is energy. Asian oil consumption 

has risen far more quickly than that of any other region in the world, growing from 17 

percent of global daily consumption in 1983 to 31 percent by 2009. China in particular 

has seen its dependence on foreign oil rise dramatically since it became a net importer 

of oil in 1993. Another emerging economy, India, has also experienced fast growth in 

consumption of foreign oil. 

The vast majority of oil imported to the Asia-Pacific region is transported by sea, much 

of it passing through the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. For China, Japan, 

and the Republic of Korea, 80 to 90 percent of energy imports from the Middle East and 

Africa pass through the Strait of Malacca and other sea-lanes in Southeast Asia.4

 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, about seven million barrels per day 

of oil and petroleum products (20 percent of world seaborne oil trade) passed through 

the Strait of Malacca in 1993, but in 2011 trade through Malacca exceeded fifteen million barrels per day (one-third of world seaborne oil trade). Moreover, the Strait of Malacca is also the most important channel for liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade. Roughly 

half of world LNG trade passed through it in 2011.5

In brief, with their rapidly expanding, globally integrated economies, the countries of 

the Asia-Pacific region have increasing stakes in sea-lane security. This dynamic will 

inevitably alter the mind-sets of policy makers charged with ensuring the security and 

prosperity of their respective nations.
26 china maritime studies

A Changing Threat Profile

Another new trend germane to sea-lane security is the changing composition of security threats. Historically, sea-lane security faced multiple threats, but state actors were 

often the greatest impediments to free passage at sea, particularly in times of crisis and 

conflict. During the past two decades, however, threats from state actors have declined 

significantly, while those from nonstate threats have increased.

Regional Conflicts. Conflicts between or within littoral countries often pose threats to 

sea-lane security. The Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s is a recent example of state-state conflict detrimental to the free movement of ships at sea. Threats to sea-lane security from 

this conflict led to the involvement of the U.S. Navy, which reflagged and escorted neutral Kuwaiti tankers through the Strait of Hormuz in 1987. Indonesia’s effort to deal with 

a separatist movement in the early 2000s is a case of conflict within a littoral state that 

ultimately threatened international sea-lane security. In 2003, as a part of its campaign 

against Acehnese separatists, the Indonesian government declared parts of the country’s 

territorial waters off Sumatra a maritime exclusion zone, ostensibly to prevent attacks by 

Islamist separatists in Aceh.6

 The Indonesian government’s decision to close Acehnese 

waters to all maritime traffic and foreign-flagged shipping was made reluctantly, but it 

was absolutely within the sphere of sovereignty. 

In the future, regional conflicts will continue to threaten to disrupt international sealanes. For China, the sea-lane most critical to the country’s security is potentially vulnerable to foreign coercive pressure. Some major power might deliberately resort to such 

a strategy to achieve a goal (perhaps entirely unrelated to the sea-lanes themselves).7

Moreover, disputes over unresolved territorial and maritime boundaries have the potential to lead to conflict that could disrupt use of the sea-lanes. 

Nonstate Threats. Natural disasters, piracy (an ancient activity adapted to modern 

conditions), and terrorism represent nonstate threats to sea-lane security. Tsunamis, 

earthquakes, cyclones, and other natural disasters can cause serious disruption to use 

of sea-lanes, usually by damaging coastal infrastructure. Piracy is a growing threat to 

sea-lane security, particularly in the Indian Ocean; in 2009, this region accounted for 

over 50 percent of pirate attacks throughout the world.8

 Threats from terrorism have 

also become increasingly conspicuous, particularly since the 9/11 attack in 2001. The 

sea-lanes across the Indian Ocean have witnessed several actual and attempted terrorist 

attacks, including the suicide bombing of the large crude carrier MV Limburg in 2002. In 

China, scholars and others have become worried about possible attacks in the Malacca 

Strait. Some have even predicted that a suicide-bomb attack on a large oil tanker or LNG 

carrier could cause a lengthy closure of this crucial choke point.9
beyond the wall 27

Diversified Tasks and Changing Fleet Sizes

An increasing variety of threats will inevitably bring a greater diversity of tasks for navies 

to complete. However, the size of the U.S. Navy’s fleet has declined considerably since 

the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the bipolar superpower balance lowered the 

demand for large-scale overseas expeditions, large-scale military presence, and strategic 

strike missions. Meanwhile, the rapid development of key technologies made it possible to retain the navy’s efficiency and fighting power despite a much smaller fleet size. 

Technologies to improve intelligence-gathering capabilities seem to have had the greatest 

effect in this naval transformation. The phrase “network-centric warfare” encompasses 

a geographic and organizational decentralization and the use of advanced communication and sensor systems to achieve distant action with minimal need to mass physical forces. The intelligence-technology revolution also brought about unmanned and 

smart weapon systems, which further reduce the importance of numbers for the navy 

or indeed any military service.10 As a result, over the past two decades the U.S. Navy has 

shrunk to about half the size of the Cold War–era fleet, while achieving growth in its 

efficiency and fighting power.

However, addressing nontraditional threats at sea is often labor-intensive. At present, 

the U.S. Navy, a highly advanced, efficient, and powerful “smart navy” (in comparison 

with the U.S. Navy of the Cold War), is capable of defeating any hostile navy or deterring 

any potential challenges from other states at sea. But owing to its comparatively limited 

physical size it is less fit for coping with nontraditional tasks. 

At the same time, some countries—including India, China, and other Asian states—are 

expanding and modernizing their maritime capabilities the better to safeguard their 

interests at sea. These trends may suggest that a more cooperative model to bolster sealane security is increasingly becoming both feasible and necessary. 

Growing Multilateralism at Sea

Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral cooperation aimed at enhancing sea-lane 

security has increased. Although the U.S. Navy still plays an indisputably dominant role 

in the maritime domain, some tentative steps toward sharing costs and responsibilities 

have already been taken and have been increasingly accepted and encouraged by the 

international community, including the United States. 

In the Gulf of Aden, cooperative antipiracy and escort initiatives by navies from different 

countries are eye-catching, but they take place on more or less an ad hoc basis. In the 

Asia-Pacific region, however, there are several well-developed multilateral mechanisms 

that successfully address threats and problems through cooperative work. In the case of 

the Malacca Strait, the littoral states have introduced such initiatives as trilateral coordinated patrols of the straits, code-named the MALSINDO Malacca Strait Coordinated 
28 china maritime studies

Patrols. Thailand’s later joining in this initiative led to “eyes in the sky” patrols to enhance coordinated aerial surveillance of the straits.11 The ReCAAP is another multilateral effort to increase sea-lane security across Malacca and other parts of Southeast Asia. 

This mechanism includes information sharing, capacity building, and practice sharing 

among member states. It also allows the accession of states and partnership agreements 

with other organizations outside the region.12 Such inclusiveness gives ReCAAP more 

strength to carry out multilateral cooperation in a region with diverse interests and 

competing needs. 

Potential Geopolitical Competition and Distrust between Major Powers

The trend toward multipolarity in the international power structure clearly influences 

the calculations of the major powers. For example, China, with its expanding overseas 

interests, has been investing heavily in the safeguarding of the sea-lanes that are so critical to its security and economic development. However, China’s rapidly growing strength 

has triggered the sensitive problem of “power shift.” Some major powers, including the 

United States, have come to view such developments from a perspective of geopolitical competition. China’s diplomatic and economic efforts to pursue greater support 

from certain littoral countries are described as constituting a “string of pearls” strategy, 

although China itself has never used such a term. While acknowledging that China’s 

purpose is to safeguard the sea-lanes, some scholars, such as Robert Kaplan, still imply 

that these defensive gestures might not be compatible with U.S. supremacy at sea: “The 

Chinese have more and more equities to protect in sub-Saharan Africa. . . . To be sure, 

control and access to sea lines of communication are more important now than during 

Mahan’s years, and American preponderance over such routes may not be destined to 

continue forever.”13

When China indicates that the PLA Navy, or PLAN, must be strengthened to address 

emerging problems at sea, this leads to more worries, although scholars like John J. 

Mearsheimer have argued that “the most dangerous states in the international system 

are continental powers with large armies”; naval power is often believed to be more 

benign than land power.14 In short, the trend toward multipolarity and the possibility of 

a “power shift” increase suspicions among some major powers, suspicions that inevitably 

harm international cooperation on security.

A New Approach: Benefits and Problems 

The five elements described above suggest the increasing feasibility of multilateral cooperation on sea-lane security, although the fifth one is basically negative. The benefits 

of this new approach are obvious enough. In the case of the United States, owing to 

the declining numbers of vessels, the Navy is facing considerable mission stress. More 
beyond the wall 29

international cooperation could not only relieve such stress but also allow the United 

States to counter threats more comprehensively and efficiently. Moreover, a multilateral 

approach would enable America to accommodate newly emerging regional powers in 

regional security structures and help avoid miscalculation.15 Finally, greater multilateral 

cooperation, particularly in the realm of nontraditional issues, will not undermine U.S. 

supremacy at sea. That is, on the “chessboard” of traditional sea power the United States 

will retain all its advantages. 

For China and India, the benefits are also clear. A multilateral approach could effectively 

relieve many of their concerns regarding sea-lane security. Second, since threats at sea 

have multiplied in recent decades, an approach that merges contributions from China 

and India could be more effective in safeguarding sea-lane security. In contributions 

to order in the maritime commons these two countries could find a more effective way 

of securing their own interests while not causing unnecessary concern among smaller 

countries in the region. Third, multilateral cooperation to maintain sea-lane security 

helps build trust among all the parties involved. The national security adviser of India, 

Shiv Shankar Menon, has identified sea-lane security as a possible starting point for collective security efforts in the region, noting that the convergence of interests on the issue 

lends itself to a collaborative approach.16 Fourth, multilateral cooperation of this type 

supports a cooperative/collaborative model for great-power relations. This is particularly 

important for China. Lack of trust between China and the United States continues to 

be a problem, creating the possibility of miscalculation on both sides. The PLA Navy’s 

growing capabilities intensify concerns in the United States that China may seek to undermine American dominance at sea, in spite of the huge gap between the two navies. By 

operating side by side in common causes, the PLA Navy and the U.S. Navy could forge 

trust, at least at the operational level. Confidence and mutual trust will increase gradually with growth in the frequency and intensity of such cooperative operations. In any 

case, cooperation on smaller issues can lower the threshold for cooperation on larger, 

more sensitive ones. 

To achieve this goal, important problems must be worked out. The first is the legality 

and legitimacy of such actions. Multilateral cooperation/collaboration for the purpose 

of securing the sea-lanes has to be consistent with international law. At present there 

are few established guidelines or treaties that address this issue directly. Cooperation in 

the Gulf of Aden sets a good precedent, but this case has yet to be generalized in terms 

of international law. The second problem involves differing levels of capability. Disparities in the naval capabilities of participating nations will make it difficult to cooperate 

efficiently and achieve equality among partners. A third problem is differing interests 

and priorities. Regional powers, external powers, user states, and littoral states all tend 

to approach sea-lane security from different perspectives. They differ not only in their 
30 china maritime studies

respective interests in use of the sea-lanes but also in how they perceive threats and set 

priorities. The final problem involves territorial disputes and strategic suspicions. Such 

problems will hamper collective action, particularly among major powers. 

A Responsible Stakeholder: China and the New Approach 

As mentioned above, China is increasingly dependent on sea-lanes and will benefit from 

international cooperation at sea. China’s naval modernization is driven by “concerns 

about international terrorist organizations, disruptions to the global economy, protection of the ocean as a ‘vehicle for mutual commerce,’ protection of China’s enterprises 

overseas, and its dependence on distant supplies of raw materials.”17 Chinese leaders have 

made it clear that China is a responsible power, and China’s involvement in international 

maritime cooperation reflects this reality. China has supported United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 1816 by sending naval vessels to patrol the waters off Somalia and by 

participating in Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings. In the AsiaPacific region, China has joined most regional maritime security mechanisms and has 

concluded cooperative agreements with the littoral states of the Malacca Strait and with 

Thailand. 

But China should do more in this respect. In a recent book Robert Kaplan criticized 

China’s approach to maritime affairs: “[China] should be concerned mainly with the free 

movement of trade and the preservation of a peaceful maritime system. But China has 

not reached that stage of self-confidence yet. When it comes to the sea, it still thinks territorially, like an insecure land power, trying to expand in concentric circles in a manner 

suggested by Spykman.”18 Maybe he is partly right. At least he points out two essential 

elements that impede China from playing a more important role in cooperation for sealane security.

One is a mind-set shaped largely by history and geography. Historically, China was basically a land power. Geographically or geopolitically, China could be categorized as “land/

sea-hybrid power,” which means that its attention and resources are prone to distraction 

from developments on both land and sea. In the contemporary world, China is confronted with a series of disputes over territorial and maritime rights with neighboring 

countries, which also, without exception, think territorially. So it is difficult for China to 

think like a maritime power—that is, to concern itself mainly with the free flow of goods 

at sea and a sustainable global maritime system. 

The other important point raised by Kaplan concerns the limitations of China’s capabilities at sea. Although the PLA Navy has experienced rapid development in recent years, it 

is still far from a “blue-water navy.” Even if the PLAN’s overseas operational capabilities 
beyond the wall 31

improve markedly, China will not be able to play a leading role in multilateral maritime 

cooperation, because of its lack of an overseas base system. 

There is also a third factor that prevents China from playing a more important role in 

sea-lane security—mistrust between China and the United States. America suspects 

that China’s expanding activities and growing capabilities in the maritime domain will 

eventually challenge U.S. dominance at sea, while China, according to some analysts, is 

wary of initiatives inspired by the United States and sometimes suspects that America is 

strengthening its own strategic position in the western Pacific region under the guise of 

sea-lane security cooperation (in combating terrorism, for example).19

To improve China’s role in multilateral cooperation for sea-lane security, these impediments must be dealt with. China will likely deal with them in the following ways. 

• More participation. China will continue to participate in multilateral cooperation, 

regarding it as the most important approach to safeguarding sea-lane security. As the 

experience and capacities of the PLAN grow, Chinese operations will be increasingly 

integrated into collective international operations. If the PLAN is to be effective in 

that context, its interoperability with navies of foreign partners has to improve. 

• More cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The link between the PLAN and the U.S. Navy is 

crucial to the effectiveness of multilateral sea-lane security cooperation. In the foreseeable future, the best settings for collaboration will be overseas regions, where the 

two countries could both avoid some political sensitivities. In the long run, partnership in the area of sea-lane security will be an important part of military-to-military 

relations and an important element of “new type of great-power relations” (新型大国

关系).

• More attention to mechanisms. With regard to the cooperative approach to sea-lane 

security, China will likely pay more attention to the mechanisms that support such 

cooperation. So far, China has been more a follower in maritime security cooperation than an initiator. As its experience and capabilities improve, however, China will 

be more active in this respect. It will pay attention to the following goals: inclusivity 

and flexibility, respect for sovereignty, effectiveness and efficiency, and full use of the 

existing mechanism.

Notes 

1. The Royal Navy’s status and role in maritime 

security of the late nineteenth century are briefly 

but vividly explored in Arthur J. Marder, From 

the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (1961–70, 1978; 

repr. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 

2013), vol. 1, pp. 6–10. 

2. For the quote, see, e.g., Angus K. Ross, “Four 

Lessons That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from 

the Dreadnought Revolution,” Naval War College 

Review 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2010), pp. 127, 140 

note 21. 

3. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American 

Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t 
32 china maritime studies

Go It Alone (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 

2002).

4. Ian Storey, “Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: 

Two Cheers for Regional Cooperation,” Southeast 

Asian Affairs (2009), p. 36.

5. “Today in Energy,” U.S. Energy Information 

Administration, 4 April 2013, www.eia.gov/.

6. Tibor Kovács, Maritime Security in the Straits of 

Malacca: Risks and Responses, Working Paper 

DWP 12/2005 (Madrid: Doctorado de Economía 

y Relaciones Internacionales, 2005), p. 81, available at www.uam.es/. 

7. Ryan Henry et al., Promoting International 

Energy Security, vol. 3, Sea-Lanes to Asia, Project 

Air Force (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2012), p. 

16, available at www.rand.org/.

8. International Chamber of Commerce, Piracy 

and Armed Robbery at Sea: Annual Report, 2009

(London: International Maritime Bureau, 2010), 

pp. 5–6.

9. Yue Laiqun, “Breakthrough: The Dilemma of the 

Malacca Strait,” Chinese Petroleum Enterprise, no. 

4 (2006), p. 6 [岳来群:“突破马六甲困局,”《中

国石油企业》, 2006年第4期, 第6页].

10. William D. O’Neil, “The Naval Services: 

Network-centric Warfare,” in Transforming 

America’s Military, ed. Hans Binnendijk (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 

2002), pp. 129–58.

11. J. Ashley Roach, “Enhancing Maritime Security 

in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,” Journal 

of International Affairs (Fall 2005), pp. 108–109.

12. Joshua Ho, “Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia: The ReCAAP Information Sharing 

Centre,” Marine Policy 33 (2009), pp. 432–33.

13. Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: 

What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts 

and the Battle against Fate (New York: Random 

House, 2012), p. 222.

14. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 

Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 135. 

15. Henry et al., Sea-Lanes to Asia, pp. 40–41. 

16. Ibid., p. 40. [Menon was replaced in May 2014 by 

Ajit Kumar Doval.—Ed.] 

17. Peter A. Dutton, “Charting a Course: US-China 

Cooperation at Sea,” China Security 5, no. 1 

(Winter 2009), p. 15.

18. Kaplan, Revenge of Geography, p. 215.

19. Henry et al., Sea-Lanes to Asia, p. 46.
Antipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden represent a successful example of cooperation 

between China and the international community to achieve sea-lane security far 

from China’s shores. Over the past six years, Chinese naval ships and personnel joined 

elements of over forty other navies in the fight against Somali piracy. This represents 

the first time that the People’s Republic of China has deployed naval forces operationally 

(as opposed to representationally) beyond its immediate maritime borders. The People’s 

Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) antipiracy escort task forces, typically composed of one 

or more guided-missile frigates and destroyers and a supply ship, have escorted ships 

from China and other nations in armed convoys since the inaugural escort task force 

departed China on 26 December 2008. At the mission’s sixth anniversary at the end of 

2014, fifteen thousand personnel in nineteen PLAN task forces had escorted nearly six 

thousand merchant ships—roughly half of them foreign—in eight hundred batches. The 

task forces had “performed deliveries of eight vessels released by pirates, rescued and 

aided eight vessels under attack[,] . . . saved forty-three vessels from the chase of pirates,” 

and rendered other assistance to five vessels.1

Despite earlier signals that China might halt its contributions, PLAN antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden continue uninterrupted and are likely to persist for the foreseeable future. “So far,” the commander of the PLAN, Adm. Wu Shengli, told one of the 

authors in September 2014, “There is no end in sight for the mission.”2

 On 12 November 

2014 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) extended its mandate for state navies 

to fight piracy off Somalia until 12 November 2015.3

 Already likely to continue contributions, on the strength of policies and past practice, the PLAN became almost certain to 

do so following the announcement in late 2014 that the navy of China’s East Asian rival 

Japan, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, would soon take command of a major 

international antipiracy coalition.4

Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange

Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden

CHAPTER FOUR

Chinese Cooperation to Protect Sea-Lane Security
34 china maritime studies

Understanding China’s Antipiracy Operations: Rules of Engagement 

China’s conduct of antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden is undergirded by robust 

and explicit international-law authorities. The United Nations Convention on the Law 

of the Sea (UNCLOS) clearly authorizes foreign navies to fight piracy outside a coastal 

state’s territorial sea. The UNSC initially passed several relevant resolutions (UNSCRs) 

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter throughout 2008 to construct a legal basis for 

international antipiracy. One of six resolutions mentioning Somali piracy during that 

year, UNSCR 1801, noted international concern with Somali piracy.5

 UNSCR 1816 initially authorized a six-month window in which navies were to use “all necessary means” 

to repress piracy in Somalia’s territorial waters.6

 Later that year, UNSCRs 1838 and 

1844 affirmed international concern over Somali pirates, while UNSCR 1846 explicitly 

mentioned the initial invitiation by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 

for international assistance as well as subsequent calls for UNSCR 1816 to be extended.7

UNSCR 1851 officially extended the right for navies to fight piracy in Somali waters by 

twelve months beginning 2 December 2008, the date that UNSCR 1846 was passed, and 

authorized international navies to pursue pirates from the Gulf of Aden to the shores 

of Somalia and—if conditions warranted—to engage in related activities “in Somalia” 

itself.8

 Since then, the UNSC has passed subsequent resolutions renewing in twelvemonth increments the international community’s authority to repress Somali piracy.9

Renewals have been preceded by letters from the TFG (now the Federal Government of 

Somalia [FGS]) to the UNSC calling explicitly for such action.

China consistently proceeds with great care in taking actions that might be viewed as 

violations of other states’ sovereignty. In addition to the UN mandates, Beijing first 

obtained an explicit invitation to participate in antipiracy operations near Somalia from 

Mogadishu’s ambassador to China, Ahmed Awil.10 It subsequently emphasized that 

international assistance “should be based on the wishes of the [Somali] Government.”11

Combined, these hard assurances constitute the legal mortar of the PLAN’s continued 

antipiracy operations off the coast of Somalia.

The PLAN has pledged a cautious approach to use of force, limited to defense of its ships 

and vessels under its escort. Nonetheless, China’s antipiracy operations have gradually become more expansive and innovative. While initially PLAN task forces escorted 

only mainland China–, Hong Kong–, and Taiwan-flagged merchant vessels, China has 

become increasingly willing to provide recourse for foreign-flagged ships; over half the 

vessels escorted to date have in fact been foreign flagged. The explicit objective is not 

to search actively for pirates and engage in combat with them but rather to escort ships 

and thus deter pirates from attacking them in the first place. PLAN forces will not “take 

the initiative to search for captured vessels and personnel at sea and carry out armed 

rescues.”12 Senior Capt. Ma Luping, director of the Navy Operational Bureau of the 
beyond the wall 35

PLA General Staff, states that PLAN forces will not “normally” enter another nation’s 

territorial seas (i.e., within the internationally recognized twelve-nautical-mile limit) 

to chase pirates.13 While PLAN antipiracy forces have ventured into Somali waters and 

even briefly landed on Somali shores to rescue hostages, there is no explicit evidence 

that the PLAN has failed to honor the spirit of this pledge. Upon the initial deployment 

in December 2008, Rear Adm. Du Jingcheng, the escort task force commander at the 

time, stated that PLAN ships would “independently conduct escort missions” and avoid 

landing on Somali shores.14 Another senior Chinese military official has remarked, “For 

us to use force is a very complex matter[;] . . . it is not just a simple question based on an 

operational requirement. . . . There are political questions—and these are not issues dealt 

with by military commanders alone. Our warships off Somalia are very well aware of 

this. We are fully prepared to use force, but we do not take that step lightly.”15

Cautious rules of engagement imposed on the PLAN reflect China’s desire to minimize 

risks associated with political and legal issues that would arise as a result of engaging 

suspected pirates. A lack of viable legal options for prosecution and the possibility of 

negative political ramifications, particularly in the Muslim world, disincentivize China 

from combating pirates directly. Additionally, killing pirates could put unwanted targets 

on the backs of PLAN vessels or Chinese-flagged commercial ships if pirates sought 

revenge.16

Of course, caution does not necessarily equate to low impact. PLAN antipiracy task 

forces in the Gulf of Aden have adapted to the needs of specific situations while technically operating within the operational confines described above. For example, in 

November 2010 the vessel Taiankou, owned by the China Overseas Shipping Company, 

was attacked by four Somali pirates. The twenty-one crewmen on board evaded capture 

by hiding in the security cabin. Special Forces from the destroyer Xuzhou, in the region 

for antipiracy missions, were dispatched via helicopter and speedboat. PLAN antipiracy 

forces appeared ready to engage, posting snipers and launching flares, flash-bangs, and 

percussion grenades to warn any potential pirates still present as they boarded.17 After 

searching the ship thoroughly, the PLAN forces reported that no pirates had been found 

on the ship and proceeded to free the sailors.18 In 2012, the frigate Changzhou of the 

twelfth escort task force dispatched Special Forces soldiers who briefly landed on Somali 

shores to extract freed hostages from Taiwanese fishing vessel Shiuh-fu.

19 Despite somewhat rigid rules of engagement, the above instances reflect a capacity to react effectively 

to unscripted situations. This emphasis is also ever present in PLAN antipiracy training, which has focused on raising the ability of PLAN crewmen to react to unforeseen 

circumstances.20

The PLAN has managed to improve operationally within its given rules of engagement.21

However, this is not to say that PLAN leaders are, on balance, completely satisfied with 
36 china maritime studies

antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. For example, key legal deficiencies prevent 

China from dealing more effectively with the problem of piracy. One issue is that of 

detaining suspected pirates. China’s antipiracy operations, though the largest of any 

independent deployer in the Gulf of Aden, have never resulted in the detention of a 

suspected pirate and serve only to deter attacks.22 The PLAN and other navies face 

formidable obstacles in this regard, such as accurately identifying pirates at sea, obtaining photographic evidence, securing witnesses to piracy crimes, and collecting evidence 

from victimized ships.23 More broadly, China and states committed to eradicating piracy 

frequently emphasize that the true fight is not on the water but on Somali soil, where 

persistently failed governance and abysmal economic prospects lead otherwise helpless 

Somalis, many of whom were initially commercial fishermen, to engage in piracy. Gen. 

Chen Bingde, then the PLA Chief of Staff, suggested in 2011 that “for counter-piracy 

campaigns to be effective, we should probably move beyond the ocean and crush their 

bases on the land.”24 That said, there are no indications that China, without the explicit 

mandate of the UN or support of the FGS, would undertake measures similar to air raids 

conducted by EU NAVFOR in 2013 to uproot piracy bases on land.

Cooperation with Other Militaries and the Diplomatic Element of Antipiracy 

Operations

Beijing has achieved noteworthy cooperation with the United States and other states in 

the conduct of its antipiracy operations. This is especially remarkable since the majority 

of international navies contributing to the fight against Somali piracy do so under the 

command of multilateral mechanisms, while those of China and some other countries, 

such as India and Russia, coordinate with counterparts in the region but operate autonomously. The primary multilateral antipiracy forces in the region are known as “the Three 

Forces”: Combined Maritime Forces Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), led by the 

United States; Operation Ocean Shield (previously Operation Allied Protector), 

led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and Operation Atalanta, led 

by the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR).

From the outset, while the autonomous navies have conducted antipiracy operations in 

ways fundamentally different from those of the Three Forces, the PLAN has been “ready 

to exchange information and cooperate with the warships of other countries in fighting 

Somalian pirates.”25 At the time of the first deployment, the deployment commander, 

Adm. Du Jingcheng, stated that the PLAN would “not accept the command of other 

countries or regional organizations” but was willing to “facilitate exchanges of information with escort naval vessels from other countries.”26 This statement has held true: the 

PLAN has gradually increased communications with vessels from the United States 

and over twenty other countries and has conducted several shipboard exchanges of 
beyond the wall 37

commanding officers and with CTF-151 staff.27 In recent years a voluntary, multinational antipiracy coordination mechanism known as Shared Awareness and Deconfliction 

(SHADE) has facilitated tighter integration of the antipiracy operations of multilateral 

and independent naval actors, including China, which continues to make meaningful 

contributions to SHADE.

To date, the willingness of the PLAN and other independent navies to synchronize their 

antipiracy operations through the SHADE mechanism has been a bright spot for the 

international fight against piracy. While China was denied chairmanship of SHADE in 

2009, both the international community and China have proactively sought to enhance 

the PLAN’s role in the mechanism. Specifically, China participates in SHADE’s Convoy 

Coordination Working Group, which coordinates escort schedules between navies such 

as those of China, India, Japan, and South Korea.28 SHADE is ultimately chaired by 

Western-centric naval forces; however, China likely prefers to cooperate with it because 

of its voluntary and multilateral nature, whereas other multilateral forces, such as CTF151, are commanded by the United States. Also, there are potential security barriers to 

more direct integration between China and traditional navies in the region; SHADE 

provides an innovative, low-sensitivity platform that has facilitated important breakthroughs in maritime nontraditional security cooperation between China and Western 

states. There are indeed signs of growing teamwork and cooperation; reportedly the 

PLAN deployed antipiracy forces south of the Bab el Mandeb to help fill gaps in patrol 

left by the Three Forces.29 In summary, while SHADE highlights the major differences in 

approaches to dealing with the piracy problem, it also demonstrates a successful formula, 

one involving the mutual support and tolerance of different preferences that are needed to 

foster more institutionalized engagement between China and Western naval forces. 

China has also attempted to coordinate with other navies in the fight against piracy in 

various ways other than SHADE. In 2009 it called for apportioning the Gulf of Aden and 

surrounding waterways into zones that each navy would protect independently, though 

the notion never came to fruition.30 The PLAN has regularly visited and hosted other 

naval task forces, including, as noted, periodic shipboard exchanges with the commanders of CTF-151, NATO, and EU NAVFOR. PLAN antipiracy forces have conducted joint 

exercises with a diverse cohort of international partners, including Pakistan, Russia, 

South Korea, and the United States. A 2010 article in Modern Navy recapitulated the 

PLAN’s underlying approach to international antipiracy cooperation: “While insisting 

on ‘self-direction’ [以我为主] [when] conducting escorts, China’s navy [also] is actively 

expanding international maritime military exchanges and cooperation [and] gradually 

establishing and exploring escort methods and mechanisms with relevant countries.”31

China has been true to its word in this regard and has engaged in various forms of international antipiracy cooperation. For instance, the PLAN previously assigned a surface 
38 china maritime studies

vessel to help monitor the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor jointly with 

CTF-151 forces and has escorted a total of eight UN World Food Programme vessels.32

In 2012, 2013, and 2014, China engaged with the U.S. Navy in joint antipiracy exercises 

in the Gulf of Aden, even amid considerable strategic tension in East Asia between Beijing and other Asian capitals, many of them U.S. security partners.33

Beyond its high-seas piracy deterrence and ship-protection patrols, China has effectively 

leveraged this six-year far-seas antipiracy mission to conduct wide-ranging naval diplomacy. This is significant because China’s deployment and associated activities have allowed it to be a “responsible stakeholder” in international society, particularly in the area 

of maritime nontraditional security.34 When it escorted World Food Programme vessels 

into Somali ports, China ceased being the only permanent UNSC member not to have 

done so. Similarly, China’s willingness to escort thousands of foreign commercial vessels, 

coupled with the PLAN’s frequent exchanges and coordination with other navies in the 

region, has paid important dividends for the PLAN’s image as a capable and peaceful 

contributor to security in the maritime commons. Finally, just as Beijing faces domestic 

pressure to protect its citizens overseas effectively, the PLAN’s deployment sends a signal 

to the rest of the world that China is capable of protecting its perpetually expanding assets throughout the world and ready to do so. 

Implications for Future Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Far Seas

What lessons might we take from China’s Gulf of Aden experience that might be applied 

to future antipiracy missions in the far seas? First, from the above discussion, it seems 

essential for the international community to supply an authoritative legal framework 

that supports international antipiracy and other nontraditional security activities of 

China and other states. Robust legal institutions not only make Beijing more comfortable with deploying forces beyond East Asia but in some cases they may pressure China 

to provide maritime security in porportion to its growing capabilities in the maritime 

arena. Second, China appears open to progressively increasing cooperation with other 

navies in ways that still allow it to characterize its contributions as independent to 

domestic and foreign audiences. While it might still be difficult to integrate the PLAN 

directly into U.S.-led multilateral naval security mechanisms, owing to a conflux of ideological, operational, and security barriers, the navies of America and China can look for 

approaches that are perhaps less expeditious but nevertheless of value. Admittedly, future far-seas PLAN nontraditional security missions, including antipiracy deployments, 

must confront potentially limiting internal tension between decisions to undertake such 

operations and what some consider more pressing needs closer to home.35 For instance, 

Ma Xiaojun, a professor in the Central Party School’s International Strategic Studies 

Institute, states in reference to the Gulf of Aden mission,
beyond the wall 39

Another kind of objective is to do things in a sound and practical way, doing whatever we 

can according to our capability. If you truly have the capability to do long-term escort duty 

off the east coast of Africa, why do you not first subdue the South China Sea pirates? The 

international community, especially ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], 

hopes more that China will make more effort to crack down on pirates in the South China 

Sea region. This possibility is more realistic.36

But if China is to participate in global antipiracy operations, the Gulf of Aden experience 

teaches us that it is likely to do so in its own way. China will likely continue to be cautious about its use-of-force policies, especially where the sovereign prerogatives of other 

states may come into play. This will limit the extent to which Chinese naval forces will be 

willing to compel, rather than simply enhance, security. Nonetheless, the Gulf of Aden 

demonstrates that the Chinese approach to antipiracy can make an effective contribution 

to international efforts. Additionally, as Chinese naval forces become more experienced 

in dealing with unscripted situations, they are likely to continue to become even more 

effective at managing piracy within the strict limits imposed by their rules of engagement. With these caveats in mind, there is every reason to believe that in future piracy 

hot spots—such as the Gulf of Guinea—China will be an active partner, able to make 

meaningful contributions to improving maritime security. 

Notes

1. Sr. Col. Zhou Bo, PLA Air Force, Director, 

Center for International Security Cooperation, 

Foreign Affairs Office, Ministry of National 

Defense, China, “Security of Sea Lines of Communication and International Cooperation” 

(ASEAN Regional Forum Seminar on Sea Lines 

of Communications [SLOC] Security, Beijing, 

8 December 2014). For the quotation, Cdr. Liu 

Xiaobo, “Escort Missions by Chinese PLA Navy 

in Gulf of Aden and Somali Waters,” presented 

to the same symposium. Commander Liu, of the 

PLAN Military Studies Research Institute, is a 

legal adviser for escort missions.

2. Adm. Wu Shengli, discussion with author and 

small group of Harvard administrators, faculty, 

and students at Wadsworth House, Harvard 

University, 20 September 2014.

3. See “date approved until” for United Nations 

Security Council [hereafter UNSC] Resolution 

2184, 12 November 2014, para. 13, in United 

Nations, Security Council Reporting and Mandate 

Cycles, DPA/SCAD/SCSB ref. no. 35 (New York: 

Dept. of Political Affairs Security Council Secretariat Branch), p. 7, available at www.un.org/en/

sc/inc/pages/pdf/sccycles.pdf.

4. “Japan to Send SDF Officer to Take Command of 

Int’l Anti-piracy Force,” Kyodo News International,

18 July 2014, www.globalpost.com/dispatch/

news/kyodo-news-international/140718/japan

-send-sdf-officer-take-command-intl-anti

-piracy-fo.

5. UNSC Resolution 1801, “The Situation in Somalia,” 20 February 2008, daccess-dds-ny.un.org/.

6. UNSC Resolution 1816, “The Situation in Somalia,” 2 June 2008, daccess-dds-ny.un.org/.

7. UNSC Resolution 1838, “The Situation in Somalia,” 

7 October 2008, daccess-dds-ny.un.org/; UNSC 

Resolution 1844, “The Situation in Somalia,” 20 

November 2008, daccess-dds-ny.un.org/; UNSC 

Resolution 1846, “The Situation in Somalia,” 2 

December 2008, daccess-dds-ny.un.org/.

8. UNSC Resolution 1851, “The Situation in Somalia,” 16 December 2008, daccess-dds-ny.un.org/.

9. These include UNSC Resolutions 1897 (2009), 

1950 (2010), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012), and 2125 

(2013). For full and original contents of all UNSC 

resolutions, see “Security Council Resolutions,” 

United Nations Security Council, www.un.org/.

10. 黄立 [Huang Li], 剑指亚丁湾: 中国海军远

洋亮剑 [Sword Pointed at the Gulf of Aden: 

The Chinese Navy’s Bright Far-Oceans Sword] 

(Guangzhou: 中山大学出版社出 [Zhongshan 

Univ. Press], 2009), p. 169.
40 china maritime studies

11. Ibid.

12. 石华, 张倍鑫 [Shi Hua and Zhang Beixin], “中

国海军索马里护航不收费” [Chinese Navy Will 

Protect Ships Free of Charge], 环球时报 [Global 

Times], 24 December 2008, world.huanqiu.com/

roll/2008-12/322933.html.

13. “Warships to Set Off on Friday for Somalia 

Pirates,” China Radio International, 23 December 2008, english.cri.cn/6909/2008/12/23/

189s435892.htm.

14. 白瑞雪, 朱鸿亮 [Bai Ruixue and Zhu Hongliang], 

“护航编队指挥员: ‘编队目前没有上岸计划’” 

[Commander of the Chinese Flotilla for Escort 

Missions Says: “At Present, the Flotilla Does Not 

Have a Disembarkation Plan”], 新华社 [Xinhua 

News Agency], 26 December 2008, www.gov.cn/

jrzg/2008-12/26/content_1188602 .htm. 

15. Greg Torode, “For PLA, Firing on Pirates Is a 

Political Issue,” South China Morning Post, 15 

November 2009, www.scmp.com/article/698428/

pla-firing-pirates-political-issue.

16. Huang Li, Sword Pointed at the Gulf of Aden, pp. 

258–62.

17. “Chinese Cargo Ship ‘Taiankou’ out of Danger 

following Pirate Attack,” 军事报道 [Military Report], CCTV-7 (Mandarin), 22 November 2010.

18. 李高健 [Li Gaojian], 方立华 [Fang Lihua], 

and 姚子宝 [Yao Zibao], “印度洋上的生死营

救--我护航编队营救 ‘泰安口’ 号遇袭货船遇

袭货船营救纪实” [Rescue of Life and Death on 

the Indian Ocean: Account of Chinese Escort 

Task Force’s Rescue of Attacked Cargo Ship 

“Taiankou”], 综合新闻 [General News], 人民海

军 [People’s Navy], 8 December 2010, p. 3.

19. “China’s Escort Ship Picks Up Fishermen Seized 

by Somali Pirates,” CCTV News (English), 0613 

GMT, 19 July 2012; 王志秋 [Wang Zhiqiu] and 

侯瑞 [Hou Rui], “索马里海域大接护--十二批

护航编队常州舰接护 ‘旭富一号’ 渔船船员

纪实” [Big Escort Pickup in the Gulf of Aden: 

Real Account of the Twelfth Naval Escort Task 

Force Changzhou Warship’s Pickup and Escort of 

“Shiuh-fu 1” Fishing Boat Crew Members], 综合

新闻 [General News], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 

25 July 2012, p. 3.

20. 李德, 李根成 [Li De and Li Gencheng], “‘假

戏’ 该如何真作? 海军第九批护航编队反海盗

综合演练闻思录” [How to Make “Fake Axe” a 

Reality? Recording Perceptions and Thoughts 

in the Navy 9th Escort Fleet’s Comprehensive 

Antipiracy Drill], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 29 

August 2011, p. 3.

21. PLAN antipiracy forces, as well as those of other 

navies, may be following the rules of engagement 

more loosely in practice where it is difficult for 

domestic and international audiences to observe.

22. “Malaysia, S. Korea May Prosecute 12 Somali 

Pirates Captured in Raids,” Global Times, 26 

January 2011, www.globaltimes.cn/world/asia 

-pacific/2011-01/616880.html; “France: Pirates 

Captured, Hostages Freed,” CBS News, 11 February 2009, www.cbsnews.com/; “Egyptian Fishing 

Boats Returned Home with 8 Captured Pirates,” 

Xinhua, 24 August 2009, www.chinadaily.com 

.cn/world/2009-08/23/content_8605304.htm.

23. Materials collection is often made difficult by 

the fact that pirates regularly throw potential 

evidence into the sea. 李发新 [Li Faxin], “索马

里海盗活动缘何愈演愈烈” [Why Somali Pirate 

Activities Are Becoming More Intense], 海洋

热点 [Marine Hot Spots], 当代海军 [Modern 

Navy] (May 2011), p. 57.

24. Chen Bingde, “Speech Presented at the U.S. 

National Defense University” (Washington, D.C., 

18 May 2011).

25. “Warships to Set Off on Friday for Somalia 

Pirates.” 

26. Bai Ruixue and Zhu Hongliang, “Commander of 

the Chinese Flotilla . . . ‘Does Not Have a Disembarkation Plan.’”

27. “Commander of Chinese Naval Escort Task 

Force Visits U.S. Guided-Missile Cruiser Chosin,” 

Liberation Army Daily, 23 November 2009, eng 

.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2009-11/23/content

_4106280.htm; “美国151特混编队指挥官访

问 ‘舟山’ 舰” [U.S. CTF-151 Commander Visits 

“Zhoushan”], Xinhua, 2 November 2009, news

.xinhuanet.com/photo/2009-11/02/content

_12372253.htm.

28. Unless otherwise specified, this paragraph relies 

on the meeting minutes of the 24th and 25th 

SHADE meetings.

29. Chen Peiling, “PLA Navy Escort Task Force Mission Presentation” (SHADE Meeting, Bahrain, 

March 2013).

30. 吴末方 [Wu Mofang], “分区护航将是有效反

制海盗的新举措” [Zoned Escorts Will Be an 

Effective Piracy Countermeasure], 本刊特稿

[Special Story], 当代海军 [Modern Navy] (January 2010), pp. 21–23.

31. 李杰, 梁春晖 [Li Jie and Liang Chunhui], “中国

海军舰艇编队护航佳绩令人瞩目--对我海军编

队一年护航行动的回顾与思考” [Great Results 

of Chinese Navy’s Warship Task Force Escorts 

Catches People’s Attention: Reflection and 

Thoughts on One Year of Chinese Task Force 

Escort Operations], 本刊特稿 [Special Story], 

当代海军 [Modern Navy] (January 2010), pp. 

8–13. 
beyond the wall 41

32. Liu Xiaobo, “Escort Missions by Chinese PLA 

Navy in Gulf of Aden and Somali Waters.”

33. Zhao Shengnan, “China, U.S. Navies Implement 

Code of Conduct,” China Daily, 13–14 December 

2014, p. 1, www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2014

-12/13/content_19078226.htm.

34. 顾国良 [Gu Guoliang], “中美关系的积极发

展” [The Positive Development of Sino-U.S. 

Relations], 学习时报 [Study Times], www.china 

.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/xxsb/1187267.htm.

35. Admittedly, such voices were in the minority, and 

the Gulf of Aden deployment had widespread 

official and public endorsement.

36. 刘炎迅 [Liu Yanxun], 陈晓舒 [Chen Xiaoshu], 

王婧 [Wang Jing], 何婧 [He Jing], 李郝然 [Li 

Haoran], and 姚忆江 [Yao Yijiang], “远征索

马里背后: 中国海军挺进‘深蓝’” [Background 

of Expedition to Somalia: China’s Navy Pushes 

Forward to Dark Blue], 中国新闻周刊 [China 

Newsweek], 5 January 2009.

More than 70 percent of the globe is covered by water. With the deepening of 

economic globalization, global seaborne trade continues to expand. As the arteries connecting the world, seas and oceans are becoming more important than ever. The 

security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) has never attracted more attention from 

the international community. SLOC security is a world issue and a global challenge, 

transcending the domain of state or region. 

PLA Navy Counterpiracy and Escort Missions

On 2 June 2008, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1816, giving 

foreign warships the right to enter Somali waters “for the purpose of repressing acts of 

piracy and armed robbery at sea” by “all necessary means.” To fulfill its international obligations, on 26 December 2008 China dispatched three warships—Haikou (hull number 

171), Wuhan (hull number 169), and the supply ship Weishanhu (hull number 887)—to 

the Gulf of Aden. The ships embarked a team of Special Forces operators from the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Marine Corps, equipped with attack helicopters. 

Since then, China has maintained a three-ship flotilla of two warships and one supply 

ship in the Gulf of Aden, assigning ships from the three fleets to the area on a threemonth basis. As of August 2013, the Chinese navy had dispatched fifteen naval flotillas, 

a total of forty warships and thirty-two helicopters, to waters off Somalia to carry out 

escort missions. PLA Navy warships have provided protection for more than six thousand merchant ships, half of which were foreign ships, including four United Nations 

World Food Programme (WFP) ships. In addition, PLA Navy warships have provided 

assistance to tens of foreign ships in trouble, recovered four ships released by pirates, and 

saved more than twenty foreign ships from pursuit by pirates. 

Chinese/U.S. Naval Cooperation on Counterpiracy and Escort Missions 

The international community has made joint efforts to deal with the issue of piracy 

around Somalia. The military response to pirate attacks has brought about a rare show 

Zhang Junshe

Chinese/U.S. Naval Cooperation on Counterpiracy and 

Escort Missions

CHAPTER FIVE
44 china maritime studies

of unity among countries. Numerous countries have sent vessels, aircraft, and personnel 

whose primary mission is to conduct antipiracy activities. They are assigned to the following missions: Ocean Shield (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and 

partner states), Atalanta (the European Union [EU] and partner states), Combined 

Task Force 151 (CTF-151), and the independent missions of Russia, China, the Republic 

of Korea (ROK), India, Malaysia, and others. About forty warships from twenty nations are currently carrying out underway counterpiracy and escort missions. Increased 

policing efforts by Somali government authorities on land combined with the efforts of 

international naval vessels at sea have reportedly contributed to a drop in pirate attacks 

in the Gulf of Aden from eighty-six a year to about thirty, forcing pirates to shift their 

attention to other areas in the wider Indian Ocean.

The PLA Navy escort task forces have achieved close cooperation with other navies and 

organizations. PLA Navy escort task forces have maintained smooth communications 

with other navies in the areas of joint escort, information sharing, operation coordination, and liaison. They have conducted joint escorts with their Russian counterparts, 

carried out joint antipiracy exercises with naval ships of the United States, the ROK, and 

Pakistan, and have coordinated with the EU to protect WFP ships. The PLA Navy has 

exchanged commander boarding visits with task forces from the EU, NATO, Combined 

Maritime Forces, the ROK, Japan, and Singapore. It has exchanged officers for onboard 

observations with the navy of the Netherlands. Countries of CTF-151 share information 

with China and other countries during the monthly Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meetings, a mechanism established in December 2008. China also takes an active 

part in the conferences of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.

As mentioned above, the Chinese and U.S. navies have cooperated well during their 

counterpiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and waters of Somalia. The two navies 

have carried out information sharing, operational coordination, and exchanges of 

visits by task force commanders. On 25 August 2013, they conducted a two-day joint 

counterpiracy exercise involving the U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Mason

(DDG 87), the Chinese destroyer Harbin (hull number 112), and the Chinese auxiliary 

replenishment oiler Weishanhu. The Chinese oiler played the role of a pirated vessel as 

crew members from Mason and Harbin conducted a combined visit, board, search, and 

seizure drill that included a night boarding. Simulated medical emergencies and hostage 

scenarios required the sailors to work together to provide a coordinated response. In 

addition, the crews demonstrated synchronized maneuver techniques during a live-fire 

proficiency exercise, engaging an inflatable target with the five-inch Mark 45 lightweight 

guns and 3.9-inch ENG deck guns. The exercise marked a significant milestone with the 

landing of helicopters on board each other’s ships. 
beyond the wall 45

This joint exercise represented a big step beyond the first counterpiracy exercise between 

U.S. Fifth Fleet and the Chinese navy conducted near the Horn of Africa in September 

2012. The 2012 exercise, which involved USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) and the 

Chinese frigate Yi Yang (hull number 548), lasted about six hours and was limited to a 

basic visit, board, search, and secure exercise, follow-on discussion, and crew lunch.

The August 2013 joint exercise promoted mutual understanding and mutual trust between the two navies. Mason’s commanding officer, Cdr. D. Wilson Marks, was reported 

as saying that throughout the week’s mission, he was struck by how similarly the two navies operated: “‘What my crew found out is they are sailors like we are,’ practicing many 

of the same techniques as they confronted the same challenges, he said.”1

After concluding the counterpiracy exercise with the Chinese navy, members of the Fifth 

Fleet expressed hope that it would lay the groundwork for closer cooperation in ensuring freedom of movement in the Gulf of Aden, other regional waters, and beyond. 

“The U.S. Navy and People’s Liberation Army (Navy) share a common interest in preserving legitimate mariners’ access to, and secure use of, the maritime domain by deterring, 

disrupting and suppressing piracy,” said Vice Adm. John Miller, commander, U.S. Naval 

Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), U.S. Fifth Fleet, Combined Maritime Forces. 

“Both regional and global security environments call for practical cooperation between navies, and this exercise demonstrates a cooperative effort by the U.S. and China to address 

common maritime security challenges.”2

The fruitful cooperation between our two navies in the Gulf of Aden is an important 

step toward building a new type of military-to-military relationship that is commensurate with a new type of big-power relationship between our two countries. 

Notes 

The discussion herein reflects only the author’s 

personal views.

1. Donna Miles, “U.S., Chinese Navies Exercise 

Counterpiracy in Gulf of Aden,” U.S. Department 

of Defense, 26 August 2013, www.defense.gov/.

2. Rob Aylward, “US, China Conduct Counter 

Piracy Exercise,” America’s Navy, 25 August 2013, 

www.navy.mil/.

I

n the thirty-five years since inaugurating its “Reform and Opening” policy, China has 

become increasingly intertwined with the world outside its borders. China is currently the world’s largest trading nation, relying heavily both on foreign supplies of raw 

materials for and on foreign consumers of its manufactured products.1

 Chinese firms, 

answering the call of the government to “Go Out” (走出去), are expanding their overseas investments, and Chinese citizens are traveling the world in ever greater numbers 

in search of business, education, and pleasure. Though generally positive, these developments have increased the country’s vulnerability to events beyond its control. 

Chinese leaders recognize the increasing challenges of safeguarding overseas interests. 

However, official Chinese policy rejects the type of initiatives that would enable the 

country to meet these new needs better—namely, overseas basing of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces. In recent years, growing numbers of Chinese commentators 

have expressed views favoring revision of this traditional policy, suggesting that in due 

time China will have no choice but to take steps to enhance its far-seas support capabilities. This public discussion likely reflects a debate among Chinese policy makers about 

how best to protect the country’s expanding overseas interests. If China ultimately does 

change its long-standing policy eschewing permanent overseas presence, what basing 

model is it likely to choose? This paper will present six possible overseas basing models 

and discuss them in the context of current People’s Republic of China (PRC) foreignpolicy principles and objectives. It will then assess which overseas basing model is most 

congruent with Chinese interests and draw conclusions about what these facilities will 

look like and how they will operate. 

China’s Growing Overseas Economic and Security Interests

Economic data from the past ten to fifteen years highlight China’s increasing transnational economic interests. Statistical data from the African Development Bank, the 

Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and the United Nations illustrate China’s 

increased trade and foreign direct investment in Africa.2

 Chinese trade with Africa grew 

more than tenfold during the 2000–10 period (from U.S.$10 billion in 2000 to U.S.$127 

Christopher D. Yung

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements for the 

Twenty-First Century

CHAPTER SIX
48 china maritime studies

billion in 2010). This makes China the largest trade partner with that continent. 

MOFCOM reports that China’s direct investment in Africa “rocketed” from U.S.$490 

million in 2003 to U.S.$9.33 billion in 2009. MOFCOM has also reported that of all the 

Chinese companies that invested abroad in 2010, 22 percent invested in Africa. The bulk 

of these investments went to manufacturing sectors, followed by distribution, farming, 

fishery, and construction. The data also reveal China’s increasing dependence on petroleum and raw materials from the Middle East and Africa.3

 The Council on Foreign Relations reports that China imports more than half its crude oil from the Middle East and 

receives an estimated one-third of its oil imports from Africa. Its largest African suppliers of oil are now Angola, Sudan, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and 

Nigeria. Lastly, the number of Chinese expatriates residing in underdeveloped countries, 

particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, has grown dramatically in the past two decades.Erica 

Downs of the Brookings Institution has estimated that the number of Chinese expatriates living and working abroad, a sizable number of them in Africa, increased from 3.5 

million in 2005 to 5.5 million in 2011.4

 As the number of Chinese expatriates continues 

to increase, the Chinese government will feel a growing responsibility to protect them 

during periods of political instability.5

Public Discussion of Overseas Bases

Despite official PRC policy, which is to deny the need for overseas bases, there is no 

question that within China the issue of overseas basing and the stationing of PLA troops 

abroad is being energetically discussed. A review of the open press in China reveals that 

there is an unofficial line of thought suggesting the need for overseas facilities. 

Shen Dingli, a professor and well-known columnist in China, lays out the commonly 

accepted rationale for establishing overseas bases: “Setting up overseas military bases is 

not an idea we have to shun; on the contrary, it is our right. Bases established by other 

countries appear to be used to protect their overseas rights and interests. As long as the 

bases are set up in line with international laws and regulations, they are legal ones. But 

if the bases are established to harm other countries, their existence becomes illegal and 

they are likely to be opposed by other countries.”6

 Shen argues that 

there are three international relations we need to tackle with when building overseas 

military bases. First, the relations between base troops and the host countries. It is possible 

to set up military bases as long as the establishment is in line with the host countries’ interests. Second, the relationship between the base troops and the countries neighboring to 

the host country. If the base troops can maintain regional stability, it will be probably welcomed by all the countries in the region. Third, the relationship between the big countries 

in the world. The establishment of the troop bases is sensitive to those big countries which 

have already set up bases abroad.7
beyond the wall 49

Liu Zhongmin, the director of Middle East Studies at the Shanghai International Studies 

University, further develops these arguments.

China also needs to make the international community aware of the fact that overseas 

bases are needed for two purposes: China’s own interests and the country’s assumption 

of more international responsibilities. There is no need to conceal these goals. . . . Some 

countries expect China to undertake more international responsibilities but object to 

China’s plans for overseas bases, which are necessary for bearing such responsibilities. 

This is unreasonable. Keeping silent is no good for removing doubts. For China, the best 

choice is to put the establishment of overseas bases on the agenda as soon as possible, and 

carry out the necessary communications with relevant countries.8

Dai Xu, a retired PLA Air Force officer who writes frequently on military and national 

security issues, has outlined selection criteria to determine which region and country 

should host this facility: “First, we must choose a region where our strategic interests are 

important and concentrated and then select a country that has a friendly, solid relationship with us. Not only can our overseas commercial fleets obtain timely replenishment 

once we have this kind of base, but our commercial interests in the countries and regions 

around our base will also have a stable support point.”9

Six Models of Basing

From the above sampling of the writings of important Chinese commentators, it seems 

likely that Chinese policy makers recognize the merits of overseas basing and probable 

that they are weighing options for establishing a more fixed presence abroad. If China 

ultimately elects to establish overseas facilities, what are they likely to look like? There 

are, generally speaking, six models from which to choose. 

The “Pit Stop” Model

The “pit stop” model is very similar to China’s current approach to supporting overseas 

operations. It represents an effort to maintain military presence abroad without establishing permanent facilities in other countries. Chinese official policy argues the PLA 

Navy (PLAN) does not require permanent access to naval facilities or bases in support 

of “out of area” operations. In a 2010 China Daily article, Rear Adm. Zhang Deshun, 

then Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLAN, stated, “We have no agenda to set up military 

establishments, or threaten establishments of other nations overseas.”10 He indicated that 

the PLAN “has no plans, nor is there a necessity to establish overseas military bases.” 

Other senior PLAN officials have expressed similar views on the subject. Senior Capt. 

Yan Baojian, a naval commander in the South China Sea Fleet, indicates that the navy 

can operate overseas and conduct its “out of area” missions without any military base on 

foreign soil. He further explains that “the naval force can work extensively with China’s 

business operations worldwide for military supplies, in addition to [obtaining materiel 
50 china maritime studies

from] advanced supply ships.”11Additionally, in an earlier article, published in January 

2010, Rear Admiral Zhang noted the PLAN should continue using commercial supply points to obtain rest and entertainment, food, and water; conduct maintenance on 

equipment and ships; and obtain medical treatment.12

The “pit stop” model has the following characteristics: its arrangements are ad hoc; it 

does not involve signing access agreements or status-of-forces agreements with the host 

nation, PLA personnel having the status only of tourists; services rendered are seen 

entirely as commercial transactions; and ships and personnel are given only temporary 

access. 

“Lean Colonial” Network

A “lean colonial” network includes highly specialized bases scattered remotely throughout the world following the establishment of colonies. Nations primarily develop this 

model to fulfill political needs rather than to increase military capabilities. The network 

usually comprises bases within a few days’ sailing distance of each other, but these bases 

are usually not able to resist seaborne attack. Historically, nations build these bases 

to enhance commercial ties with host governments and the local economies of host 

nations, to provide commercial bases to exploit the economic opportunities of foreign 

countries, and to give the impression to a domestic and international audience of a 

global presence. In short, the larger purpose of this model is to further economic and 

political interests; therefore, equipping these facilities with military capabilities is seen as 

unnecessary. 

Imperial Germany’s Pacific base network best illustrates this concept. Germany’s colonies stretched from mainland China to New Guinea. Initially, trading companies helped 

to develop Germany’s overseas possessions, without German government support.13 Yet 

as commercial interests developed, the German government started to provide financial 

support to these colonies.14 These facilities eventually could be relied on to replenish and 

resupply German naval units operating in the Far East, thereby extending Germany’s 

military capability in Asia. Germany viewed these facilities more as sources of pride 

and commerce rather than as viable territorial possessions.15 A “lean colonial” facility is 

entirely civilian in nature, largely unprotected by a country’s military, largely maintained 

by state-sanctioned commercial enterprises, and able to provide “hotel” or support-like 

services for military forces operating abroad.

“Dual-Use Logistics Facility”

Most favorable Chinese commentary on overseas basing highlights the importance of 

a secure and stable supply source for Chinese out-of-area operations. Rear Adm. Yin 

Zhuo, the most prominent of these advocates, indicated in a December 2010 radio 
beyond the wall 51

interview that China needs a permanent naval base overseas to resupply its ships 

contributing to the multinational antipiracy flotilla in the Gulf of Aden. “I believe that 

a relatively stable, relatively solid base for resupply and repair would be appropriate,” 

Admiral Yin said. “Such a base would provide a steady source of fresh fruit, vegetables 

and water, along with facilities for communications, ship repair, rest and recreation, and 

medical evacuation of injured personnel.”16

The retired air force officer Dai Xu made similar points in a February 2009 article: “In 

order to fulfill its responsibilities to the world, China cannot simply maintain friendly 

wishes and symbolic gestures. It needs to have power adequate to protect world peace 

before it will be able to shoulder its international responsibilities effectively and develop 

a good image. The fulfillment of this duty requires a specific supply facility for the 

provision of support.”17 Why is this the case? “Following the bold appearance of China 

taking on international responsibilities by [the Gulf of Aden deployment], this type of 

escorting and peacekeeping task will become a regular duty. How to execute these tasks 

in ever wider sea areas with even lower costs and over longer periods of time is bound 

to become a practical issue that will have to be dealt with by strategic decision-making 

departments.”18 If China ultimately decides to pursue one or more overseas supply bases, 

it will need to decide the scope, nature, and character of these facilities. As the name 

implies, this approach involves establishing facilities abroad that serve both commercial 

and military purposes. 

The “String of Pearls” Model

First articulated in a 2004 Booz Allen Hamilton report for the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment, the “string of pearls” basing model remains one of the 

best-known overseas-facility concepts attributed to China.19 According to this model, 

China seeks to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean through the covert and gradual 

establishment of military facilities on commercial sites. The word “covert” is used advisedly; part of China’s plan would be to develop these facilities secretly, in order not to 

elicit alarm from regional countries. These facilities could be used, first, to assure access 

to energy supplies and raw materials; second, to exert Chinese political influence in and 

eventually to dominate the Indian Ocean region; and third, to deter the United States 

and India from interdicting Chinese shipping from the Persian Gulf. At the time of the 

Booz Allen Hamilton report’s publication, some evidence suggested China was directly 

involved in the construction of naval bases in Burma, had funded construction activities 

in Pakistan, and had invested in facilities in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.20

Other defense analysts later applied this concept to their assessments of China’s grand 

strategy. In 2006, the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute published a 

report that asserted,
52 china maritime studies

Each “pearl” in the “string of pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence. Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a “pearl.” An 

upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago three hundred nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” A container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deep water port in Sittwe, Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as 

is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan. . . . The “pearls” extend from the 

coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, 

across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.21

Some assessments, many coming out of Indian think tanks and defense organizations, 

state unequivocally that China is in fact pursuing a “string of pearls” strategy of which 

the objective is to dominate the Indian Ocean region.22

“Warehouse” Model

The “warehouse” model, developed by the British in the interwar period, demonstrates 

a fifth potential way for a naval power to maintain a fleet far from its home ports. In the 

interwar years, the British, after considering their economic situation and war plans, decided that a few ports with large oil supplies and fully capable repair facilities would best 

maintain their Far East Fleet. The British chose Singapore as their main logistics hub, 

but with war-fighting contingencies in mind rather than logistical reasons.23 This rationale ultimately came back to haunt the British when Singapore fell in 1942. The Russians 

pursued a similar approach in the 1970s when they signed access agreements with the 

Egyptians for permanent access to a well-stocked, comprehensive base in Alexandria.

A “warehouse” model has the following characteristics: one or two large facilities located 

overseas; comprehensive services or “one-stop shopping,” including replenishment, ship 

or aircraft repair, and services; and the trappings of a full-fledged military base, including ordnance storage, troop berthing, training facilities, and permanently stationed 

vessels.

“Model USA”

The current American logistics model is often considered the gold standard for supporting military operations abroad. The territorial network consists of multiple large bases 

that support U.S. naval and air forces and a large number of minor base/port agreements 

that allow for flexible resupply operations. In addition to established infrastructure, the 

United States maintains the largest fleet of auxiliary ships in the world. This gives the 

U.S. Navy unprecedented capability to resupply ships while under way and also allows 

for sea-based logistics to support ground operations. In addition to thirty-plus naval 

bases and naval support facilities, the Military Sealift Command has ninety-nine ships in 

active service that support fleet operations.24 Currently, the United States has a significant base of operations in every major ocean and sea and thus has a logistics system that 

can support operations anywhere in the world. 
beyond the wall 53

PRC Foreign and Defense Policy Considerations

Which of the above models is most congruent with Chinese foreign-policy principles 

and objectives? To answer this question, it is useful to consider the impact each model 

would have on important aspects of current policy. China’s foreign-policy behavior has 

remained relatively stable since the start of the Deng reform era. China has generally 

attempted to focus on a few themes.25 First, China portrays itself as above hegemonic 

and imperialistic behavior. Thus, it rejects such past imperialist practices as establishing 

colonies, occupying huge tracts of host-nation land, or placing large numbers of troops 

in foreign countries. From the Chinese point of view, its policy is both principled and 

nonthreatening to neighboring countries. Second, China eschews interference in the 

internal affairs of other states. This principle too militates against establishing overseas 

bases or maintaining large numbers of troops abroad. Third, China has long been cognizant of the realities of the international system. Since the early 1990s it has striven to 

walk a delicate line, that of assuming greater status and power while avoiding confrontation with the United States. The “peaceful rise” theory and the concept of a “New Type of 

Great-Power Relationship” embody this aim.26

With these overarching foreign policy principles in mind, the Chinese leadership must 

formulate policies and create military capabilities that address emerging threats abroad. 

Given the anticolonialism fundamental to China’s approach to foreign policy, we can 

rule out, at least for the near to middle term, the possibility that it will opt for a “lean 

colonial” network, “Model USA,” or the “warehouse” model—all of which would require 

establishing control over foreign territory and permanently stationing large numbers of 

PLA personnel abroad. 

Among the remaining three models, which would best enable China to achieve its overseas objectives? 

At present, China’s relatively modest overseas operations—connected with counterpiracy 

in the Gulf of Aden—are already placing stress on the country’s logistical and support 

system. The current “pit stop” model, with its frequent rotations of task forces, its reliance on foreign commercial transactions to perform routine maintenance and repair, 

and its absence of access agreements, is proving an extremely inefficient and ineffective way of supporting military operations. Interviews with high-ranking PLA officers 

reveal that the Chinese themselves recognize this.27 Moreover, given reliance on foreign 

partners for facility security, institutionalization of the “pit stop” model would probably 

entail an unacceptable degree of risk. 

Accordingly, the “dual use” and “string of pearls” models both would represent significant improvement over the “pit stop” model. Moreover, they would not involve major 
54 china maritime studies

revision to fundamental principles guiding Chinese foreign policy (see table 1). The next 

section will discuss in detail their comparative strengths and weaknesses. 

“Pit Stop” 

Model

“Lean

 Colonial”

 Network

“Dual-Use

 Logistics

 Facility”

“String of

 Pearls”

 Model

“Ware-

 house”

 Model

“Model

 USA”

Signifi cantly 

threatens 

China’s 

peaceful rise 

image?

No No No No Yes Yes

Poses a risk to 

China’s relationship with 

host nation?

No No No No Yes Yes

Neighboring 

countries feel 

threatened?

No Yes No No Yes Yes

Helps China 

address a 

wide range 

of military 

contingencies?

No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Helps China 

protect its 

overseas 

economic 

interests?

No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Relatively 

inexpensive 

to execute?

No Yes No No No No

Likely to 

satisfy the 

expectations 

of ordinary 

Chinese 

citizens?

No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Would be 

grossly objectionable to 

the U.S.?

No No No No Yes Yes

Well protected against 

external 

attack?

No No No No Yes Yes

Are required 

transportation assets 

limited?

Yes Yes No No Yes No

Table 1. PRC Considerations When Choosing an Overseas Basing Model
beyond the wall 55

The “Dual-Use Logistics Facility” versus the “String of Pearls”

The “dual-use logistics facility” and “string of pearls” models share many similarities. 

China would use facilities of either sort for both commercial and military purposes to 

support power projection farther from its shores. The philosophy behind how China 

intended to use such facilities would distinguish the two. The “dual-use logistics facility” 

model implies that China would use the facilities as forward operating logistics platforms from which it could support nontraditional security operations, possibly including 

special forces operations ashore, to combat terrorists and other threats to China’s overseas interests and citizens. The “string of pearls” model, by contrast, would have China 

developing overseas facilities covertly, with the intent to use these facilities ultimately to 

engage in major combat operations with India. The best way to determine which model 

the Chinese are likely to pursue is to examine thoroughly the physical evidence and the 

current characteristics of China’s overseas military operations. 

Past analyses have demonstrated that there is very limited evidence of Chinese military 

use of the “string of pearls” sites.28 To cross-check these conclusions, this paper examines 

the physical evidence to see to what extent “string of pearls” port facilities have military 

utility. To be sure, any port facility has some military utility. However, whether these 

facilities could support PLAN forces in the kinds of missions and tasks that the “string 

of pearls” model assumes is another question. In short, are the current facilities on the 

Coco Islands, Hambantota, Chittagong, and Gwadar capable of supporting PLAN major 

combat operations in the Indian Ocean region? 

Bases supporting major military operations require certain physical features. Table 

2, drawn from U.S. requirements for such facilities, provides a general framework for 

understanding what Chinese overseas bases would have to look like to be in line with the 

“string of pearls” model.29

A close examination of the features of one of China’s major naval bases—Zhanjiang 

Naval Base, in Guangdong Province—reveals that it meets most of these requirements, 

suggesting that the Chinese employ a similar standard for base facilities.30

Among “string of pearls” sites, only Chittagong meets most of the criteria listed.31 Thus 

far, then, there is little physical evidence to suggest that the candidate “string of pearls” 

sites are being prepared by the Chinese for future major combat operations in the Indian 

Ocean / South Asia area.32

It is also useful to examine current PLAN and PLA operational patterns of behavior to 

discern whether the Chinese military is “preparing the battle space.” Examination of the 

ports and facilities the PLA is currently using to support its operations in the Gulf of 

Aden shows that China is already developing a network of facilities and bases to support 

its logistics operations.33 However, these sites do not involve any of the purported “string 
56 china maritime studies

of pearls” sites. The ports that China uses most to support its counterpiracy operations 

include Salalah, Aden, Djibouti, and Karachi. To date, there is no evidence of a longterm basing agreement between the PLAN and any of its host nations. Furthermore, the 

Chinese make only limited use of these facilities. In many instances, China dispatches 

a single replenishment ship, which restocks its own stores and then replenishes the 

remainder of the naval task force at sea. When other PLAN vessels pull into port, the 

duration of the visit is usually no longer than a few days. 

For ship replenishment, the PLAN currently relies on commercial facilities in countries 

that would be decidedly neutral should China and India become engaged in a shooting war. This behavior does not reflect the behavior of a country preparing for major 

conflict. If China wanted to pursue a more significant basing relationship with a host 

country, it would most likely repeatedly visit a single military site to accustom its forces 

to working with an ally against an identified adversary. Finally, the number of forces 

involved in each of these out-of-area deployments remains too paltry (from three to five 

ships) to signify a PLAN preparing for major combat against India.34

Recommended Port Infrastructure

3 berthing spaces 1,000 linear feet each

Minimum water depth of 35 feet

30–45 acres of open storage

4 rail off-loading spurs of 1,000 feet of straight track each

4 rail/truck end ramps

Gatehouse/security

Access to port-owned interchange yard to support switching 2 trains per day

Suitable area to land/service helos (~5 acres)

2 container handlers

Adequate interior roadways to port facilities

Offi ce space with adequate utilities and communication service

Processing area for 30 trucks

Wash rack that meets U.S. Dept. of Agriculture requirements

Terminal Access

Close proximity (<10 mi) to interstate highway system

Access to at least one major commercial rail carrier

Water channel access width of 500 feet and depth of 35 feet

Access to commercial rail interchange yard (if port-owned facilities are inadequate)

Table 2. Defense Department Criteria for Commercial Port Support for Major Military Operations
beyond the wall 57

No Clear Strategic Rationale for a “String of Pearls” Strategy

An assessment of the strategic rationale for a “string of pearls” strategy strongly suggests 

that China would not pursue this approach. First, to pursue the “string of pearls” strategy 

openly, the PLAN would need to abandon supposed covert activities in South Asian 

commercial ports and then openly and continuously build up its military forces there. 

In the process, China would risk the “peaceful rise” image it has studiously cultivated 

for many years. Unquestionably, were China secretly conducting such activity, sooner or 

later it would have to reveal its true intentions by openly building up its forces at these 

“string of pearls” sites. This type of buildup would require a long lead time. China would 

therefore have to sacrifice its “peaceful rise” image long before it was ready to dominate the Indian Ocean and take on India in a conventional conflict. Second, because of 

geographical constraints, if China stationed naval and air forces at the “string of pearls” 

sites, these forces would be highly vulnerable to Indian air and missile attacks. Some 

Indian analysts have pointed out that Chinese naval and air forces would find themselves 

consistently at a numerical disadvantage to the Indian military, which could, because of 

the closer proximity of its own main bases, more easily concentrate its forces.35 Third, 

the stationing of Chinese military forces at the “string of pearls” sites would isolate these 

forces at great distances from China—making them unavailable for a hypothetical maritime conflict with the United States or one of China’s other rivals in East Asia. 

More fundamentally, analysis of Chinese discussion of the country’s overseas interests 

reveals that nontraditional security threats currently have top priority. Barring a major 

shift in Chinese assessment of the international security environment, this hierarchy of 

interests is likely to remain in place for some time. Therefore, we can assume that consideration of overseas facilities will focus on the following military missions: protection 

of citizens and property abroad; noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian 

assistance, and disaster relief; counterpiracy and the protection of sea lines of communication; and counterterrorism, as well as, possibly, counterinsurgency operations. 

The Specific Characteristics of a “Dual-Use Logistics Facility”

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the Chinese are most likely to 

pursue the “dual-use logistics facility” model. If China does adopt it, what would this 

approach to overseas support look like? Information gleaned from interviews with 

professional logisticians and military operators who have experience operating in similar 

“dual-use facilities” in the Asia-Pacific region provide some insights.36

Chinese logistics needs will depend on what types of missions the PLA undertakes to 

advance its interests. Assuming a focus on nontraditional security threats, logisticians 

interviewed for this study arrived at the following conclusions:37 
58 china maritime studies

• Overseas facilities are unlikely to be heavily engaged in warehousing activities. Instead the facility would likely focus on developing robust and redundant distribution 

networks to replace damaged parts easily and quickly.

• Facilities will most likely develop relationships with local agents, who would work 

with commercial vendors like DHL or FedEx and local logistics assets (through husbanding agents) to move materiel.

• Facilities would likely involve light footprints (a hundred to five hundred personnel).

• Bases are likely to involve a network that incorporates a division of labor among a 

few smaller installations (air operations, ship support, coordination of all logistics 

support, etc.).

• The operating and political conditions under which the facility will be run are likely 

to be extremely constraining. The host country, for example, might not authorize a 

port visit until forty-eight hours prior.

• A military base would not need to install sensitive communications or other types of 

equipment (weapon systems or radars), since the Chinese could perform these functions at commercial facilities. However, the PLA would need to ensure access to these 

facilities by its technicians.

Conclusion

China is likely to expand PLA missions and overseas deployments to protect its growing economic and political interests abroad. To support these missions effectively, China 

will eventually need to consider establishing some kind of overseas military presence. 

Six possible alternate basing and facilities models exist, but on examination of these options in light of a Chinese foreign and domestic policy filter, only two of the models—a 

“string of pearls” model and a “dual-use logistics facility”—are compatible with Chinese foreign-policy goals and could provide the support necessary genuinely to protect 

China’s overseas interests. 

From the physical evidence, it is reasonable to conclude, first, that there is minimal 

physical evidence to suggest that the facilities being developed in Hambantota, Gwadar, 

and the Coco Islands will be used to encircle India and support a PLA effort to conduct 

conventional war in South Asia; and second, that the operational patterns of behavior of 

the PLAN in the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean do not suggest China is “preparing the battle space” for a conflict in that area. The argument for the “string of pearls” is 

rejected because, given what is known about Chinese foreign-policy and national-security 

interests, such a strategic calculus appears very unlikely.
beyond the wall 59

Accordingly, if and when the PRC decides to establish overseas bases, it will most likely 

pursue a “dual-use logistics facility” model. China’s overseas bases will be characterized 

less by warehousing functions and more by a web of regional distribution relationships 

between the base and suppliers. This type of facility will involve a light footprint of 

Chinese personnel on the base, will require a distinct division of labor between logistics 

hubs in the overseas facilities system, will likely involve heavy use of local husbanding 

agents, and will be characterized by dual-use activities. 

At such time as China establishes overseas bases or finalizes long-term access agreements to overseas military facilities, the United States–China relationship will surely be 

tested. This development would provide both opportunities for military and security 

cooperation and challenges to the political influence of the United States and its partners 

in South Asia, and possibly outside the region as well. China’s increasing presence in the 

Indian Ocean should not be viewed as an attempt to encircle India. Instead, China is 

extending its reach into the Indian Ocean region and the Persian Gulf area to protect its 

growing interests abroad. 

Notes

This chapter is drawn from a larger study on the 

subject of Chinese overseas basing and facilities 

requirements published by National Defense 

University Press in the China Strategic Perspective series.

1. “China Eclipses U.S. as Biggest Trading Nation,” 

Bloomberg, 10 February 2013, www.bloomberg 

.com/.

2. See “China,” African Development Bank Group,

www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/topics/

partnerships/non-regional-member-countries/

china/. See “Africa Becomes Hotspot for 

Chinese Outbound Investment,” Ministry of 

Commerce: People’s Republic of China, 29 April 

2011, english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt_fuva/

lanmuc/201104/20110407524886.shtml. For 

additional data on Chinese foreign direct 

investment in Africa between 2001 and 2010, 

see United Nations [hereafter UN], Economic 

Development in Africa: Report 2011 (New York: 

UN Conference on Trade and Development / UN 

Industrial Development Organization, 2011), p. 

78, available at unctad.org/.

3. See Christopher Alessi and Stephanie Hanson, 

“Backgrounder: Expanding China-Africa Oil 

Ties,” Council on Foreign Relations, 8 February 

2012, www.cfr.org/. A Brookings Institution 

report also highlights China’s increasing dependence on imported oil and consequently the 

vulnerability of China’s economic growth by virtue of this dependence. The report notes that 50 

percent of China’s imported oil comes from the 

unstable Middle East and that over 85 percent is 

transported long distances in such strategic shipping lanes as the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz 

and Suez Canal; see Zhang Jian, China’s Energy 

Security: Prospects, Challenges, and Opportunities,

Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies Report 

(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, July 

2011), p. 8. 

4. See Erica Downs, testimony before the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, 

Hearing on China’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and 

Players, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 13 April 2011. 

An estimated 750,000 Chinese workers reside in 

Africa according to some press reports; see Richard Spencer, “Chinese Workers Seek Fortunes 

in Africa,” Telegraph, 12 February 2008, www 

.telegraph.co.uk/. 

5. [Li Wen], “国安委设立: 从富到强历史性转

变的重要标志” [National Security Council: 

An Important Marker in China’s Historical 

Transformation from Wealthy to Powerful], 人

民网 [People’s Daily Online], politics.people.com 

.cn/n/2014/0127/c1001-24240398.html.

6. Shen Dingli, “Don’t Shun the Idea of Setting Up 

Overseas Military Bases,” China.org.cn, 28 January 2010, www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-01/28/

content_19324522.htm.

7. Ibid. This argument was also presented to the 

author in an interview on 24 April 2012. 
60 china maritime studies

8. Liu Zhongmin, “Overseas Bases Needed for 

Much More than Cruising Sailors,” Global 

Times, 21 May 2010, opinion.globaltimes.cn/

commentary/2010-05/533918.html.

9. Dai Xu, “China Should Establish Overseas Base,” 

Beijing Huanqiu Shibao, 3 February 2009, p. 11, 

mil.huanqiu.com/top/2009-02/363027.html.

10. Cui Xiaohuo, “Navy Has No Plan for Overseas 

Base,” China Daily, 11 March 2010. 

11. Ibid.

12. 张召忠 [Zhang Zhao Zhong], “中国是否在海

外建军基地” [Will China Establish Overseas 

Military Bases?], China Think Tank, 26 January 

2010, www.chinathinktank.cn/ShowArticle

.asp?ArticleID=16730&Article Page=1.

13. W. O. Henderson, “Germany’s Trade with Her 

Colonies, 1884–1914,” Economic History Review

8, no. 1 (1938), p. 7. This description excludes 

Germany’s base in Qingdao. 

14. Ibid.

15. Hermann Hiery, The Neglected War: The German 

South Pacific and the Influence of World War I

(Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai‘i Press, 1995), p. 1.

16. Associated Press, “Overseas Base Needed: 

China,” Straits Times, www.straitstimes.com/. 

17. Dai Xu, “China Should Establish Overseas Base.” 

18. Ibid.

19. Juli A. MacDonald, Amy Donahue, and Bethany 

Danyluk, Energy Futures in Asia: Final Report

(McLean, Va.: Booz Allen Hamilton for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, November 2004).

20. Sudha Ramachundran, “China’s ‘Pearl’ in Pakistan’s Water,” Asia Times Online, 17 March 2005, 

www.atimes.com/; “China Helping Myanmar 

Build Defence Base,” Hindustan Times, 1 May 

1993; “PRC Reportedly Building Bases on Burmese Islands,” Sankei Shimbun, 28 June 1994. 

21. Christopher Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the 

Challenge of China’s Rising Power across the Asian 

Littoral (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 

Strategic Studies Institute, July 2006), p. 3.

22. Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria, Breathing Fire: China’s Aggressive Tactical Posturing,

Issue Brief 12 (New Delhi: Centre for Land 

Warfare Studies, October 2009), p. 5.

23. Great Britain’s imperial defense policy in the 

Far East centered on the “Singapore Strategy,” 

in place since 1919 and considered the empire’s 

plan for contingencies involving war with Japan. 

See Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939–1945,

vol. 1, The Defensive (London: Her Majesty’s 

Stationery Office, 1954). 

24. “About Military Sealift Command,” Military 

Sealift Command, sealiftcommand.com/.

25. These were highlighted in China’s April 2013 

defense white paper. See Information Office of 

the State Council of the PRC, The Diversified 

Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: 

16 April 2013), available at www.china.org.cn/

government/whitepaper/node_7181425.htm. 

26. [Zhang Xiaoming], “对新型大国关系的一种解

读” [An Interpretation of the New Type of GreatPower Relationship], 国际政治研究 [Journal of 

International Studies] 35, no. 1 (February 2014), 

pp. 49–58.

27. Interviews conducted in Beijing in April 2012 

at PLA National Defense University. Gen. Chen 

Bingde, the PLA Chief of General Staff, too alluded, in a speech at National Defense University 

in May 2011, to the operational strain and the 

inefficiency of supporting the Gulf of Aden task 

forces.

28. See William Ashton, “Chinese Bases in Burma: 

Fact or Fiction?,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7, 

no. 2 (July 1997), p. 323, as cited in Andrew 

Selth, “Burma, China and the Myth of Military 

Bases,” Asian Security 3, no. 3 (2007), p. 300; and 

Billy Tea, “Unstringing China’s Strategic Pearls,” 

AsiaTimes, 11 March 2011, www.atimes.com/.

29. See U.S. Defense Dept., Engineering and Design 

of Military Ports: Unified Facilities Criteria, UFC 

4-159-02 (Washington, D.C.: 16 January 2004), 

pp. 3-1 to 3-4, 7-1 to 7-2, 8-1 to 8-3, 12-1 to 12-6, 

and 13-1 to 13-2.

30. World Port Source was used to examine the port 

features of Zhanjiang: www.worldportsource

.com/ports/review/CHN_Port_of_Zhanjiang_2532

.php. For more information on this assessment 

please refer to Christopher D. Yung and Ross 

Rustici, with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin, “Not an 

Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing 

Requirements in the 21st Century, China Strategic 

Perspectives 7 (Washington, D.C.: National 

Defense Univ. Press, 2014).

31. We used the following sources to examine the 

port features of Gwadar, Hambantota, Chittagong, and Coco Islands: “Port Profile,” Gwadar 

Port Authority, www.gwadarport.gov.pk/portprofile

.html; Chittagong Port Authority, portal.cpa

.gov.bd; Sri Lanka Ports Authority, www.slpa

.lk/port_hambantota.asp?chk=4; Chittagong

Development Authority, www.portal.cda.gov.bd/; 

Indoburmanews.net, www.indoburmanews.net/

archives-1/2009/november-2009/coco-islands

-to-open-for-tourism. For more information on 

this assessment please refer to Yung and Rustici, 

“Not an Idea We Have to Shun,” pp. 35–37.
beyond the wall 61

32. For the detailed assessment of these sites see 

Yung and Rustici, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun,”

pp. 35–37.

33. A detailed assessment of the PLAN’s current 

network of facilities and current operational 

behavior can be found in Daniel J. Kostecka, 

“Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging 

Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” Naval 

War College Review 64, no. 1 (Winter 2011), p. 

65.

34. Ibid.

35. Iskander Rehman, “China’s String of Pearls and 

India’s Enduring Tactical Advantage,” Institute 

for Defence Studies and Analyses, www.idsa.in/

idsacomments/ChinasStringofPearlsandIndias 

EnduringTacticalAdvantage_irehman_080610.

36. Capt. Ronald Carr, USN, Cdr. Brian George, 

USN, and Cdr. William Clarke, USN, all of the 

OPNAV N4 (Material Readiness & Logistics) 

staff, and all of whom served at Logistics Force 

Western Pacific in Singapore, interviews; Col. 

George Topic, USA (Ret.), Chief of Staff, Center 

for Joint and Strategic Logistics, National Defense University, interview; all 16 March 2011. 

37. Ibid.

The first phase of efforts to locate flight MH370 ended on 30 April 2014. During this 

nearly two-month period, China deployed eighteen naval vessels, thirteen aircraft, twenty-one satellites, sixty-six merchant ships, and twenty fishing boats to search 

1.3 million square kilometers of maritime space in the southern Indian Ocean.1

 The 

operations, which stretched from the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca to the 

southern reaches of the Indian Ocean, represented an unprecedented case of Chinese 

maritime forces conducting large-scale missions in distant waters.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the other forces involved in these far-seas 

operations were tasked with protecting China’s overseas national interests, actually a 

new concept in China’s political dictionary. The concept of overseas national interests 

reflects a break with earlier discourse on China’s national interests. In Mao’s time, China 

had a revolutionary mission to expand ideology. Now, the country is preoccupied with 

concerns for access to natural resources, the safety of overseas nationals, and the security 

of overseas investments.

This paper will begin by defining the scope of China’s overseas national interests and 

discussing the primary external threats to these interests. It will then examine the basic 

principles that will guide China’s approach to managing and mitigating these threats and 

present three possible paths that China may follow in the mid-to-long term: the freerider strategy, peaceful competition, and military diplomacy. The paper will conclude by 

arguing that the peaceful-competition approach is most likely to accord with traditional 

Chinese foreign policy principles and place the country in the best position to safeguard 

its expanding overseas interests. 

The Scope of China’s Overseas National Interests

China has traditionally conceived of diplomacy as an extension of domestic politics. 

Thus, the concept of overseas national interests in the Chinese context should be considered as a continuation of domestic policy by diplomatic means. That is, Chinese efforts 

abroad serve domestic development. 

Cai Penghong

China’s Evolving Overseas Interests and 

Peaceful Competition

CHAPTER SEVEN
64 china maritime studies

In my view, it is useful to divide China’s overseas interests into the following three 

categories: national political interests, national economic interests, and overseas Chinese 

citizens’ interests. 

Overseas political interests stem from the need for the Party to strengthen its ruling 

status and the socialist political system at home.2

 These interests are closely connected 

with the external political environment, China’s political status therein, and the country’s 

role in the process of shaping the international order. As a rising power seeking political 

influence and attractiveness (谋求政治影响力和吸引力), China recognizes the importance of working with other states to build new international mechanisms such as the 

BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Conference on Interaction and 

Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA).3

 President Xi Jinping and his team have 

resolved to make China a strong power. China can achieve this goal only if it is accepted 

by other countries, big and small, remote and proximal. Achieving global acceptance will 

be beneficial to consolidating the Party’s ruling status at home. The United States should 

respect China’s core interests that involve its political system.4

 This is a vital part of the 

new model of major-power relations proposed for China and the United States. In Xi’s 

view,

China and the United States must find a new path—one that is different from the inevitable confrontation and conflict between the major countries of the past. “And that is to 

say the two sides must work together to build a new model of major country relationship 

based on nonconflict, nonconfrontation, mutual respect and win/win cooperation for the 

benefit of the Chinese and American peoples, and people elsewhere in the world.”5

In the economic realm, China’s overseas national interests include both commercial and 

security interests. Since the early 1980s China has carried out a policy of opening up to 

the world, and this has led to growth in economic interests abroad. These include export 

trade, imports of raw materials, overseas investment, and overseas tourism. In particular, China’s economic development has depended on selling Chinese manufactures to 

overseas markets, meeting internal demand for energy and other economic inputs, and 

pursuing returns from regional and global investments. 

The Chinese government also feels responsible for the safety of Chinese nationals living 

and working abroad. Citizens who are working outside China have the right to ask the 

government in Beijing to protect them from attacks. In the last ten years this cohort has 

increased dramatically, creating a new sense of responsibility for the Chinese government. Whether Chinese citizens are treated fairly while living abroad is regarded not 

only as a domestic matter but also as a barometer gauging the extent to which China is 

respected in the world. Thus, concerns for their safety and respect have become regarded 

as important elements of China’s overseas interests. 
beyond the wall 65

Potential Threats to China’s Overseas Interests

Concern for the security of China’s overseas interests began almost fifteen years ago, 

when China initiated its “going out” strategy (走出去战略). The first two or three decades of the new century are expected to be a period of both new opportunity for peace 

and development and also of complication, contradiction, and possibly turbulence. 

A major source of potential threats to China’s overseas political and security interests is 

political rhetoric from Western critics, who suggest that China is translating its rising power into increasing assertiveness. Tensions arising from territorial disputes and 

traditional anticommunist ideology or hostile forces (敌对势力) threaten stability 

around China’s border. China is depicted as a menace, despite its clear desire to contribute to global peace and security. China, like any other country, makes efforts to develop 

defensive weapons systems. However, its systems are labeled as “antiaccess/area-denial,” 

or “A2/AD,” weapons, descriptions that depict them as threatening to American ships. 

The menacing rhetoric of some American hawks is extremely counterproductive. It 

undermines China’s ability to play a constructive role in regional and global settings. The 

remarks by the Chinese foreign minister at the ASEAN Regional Forum on 23 July 2010, 

though they have been described by Western commentators as “assertive,” received the 

support of people all around the country.6

International terrorism, including Islamic fundamentalism and Pan-Turkism, also 

threatens China’s overseas interests. Terrorism has increasingly become “a matter of 

prime importance” for national security as China presses ahead with its modernization 

drive. After the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Central Asia became a power vacuum, creating conditions for the reemergence of terrorism. Moreover, 

Central Asia lies along a belt of national/religious friction and conflict that extends from 

the Balkans through the Caucasus, especially Chechnya, and Afghanistan. This belt is a 

traditional “silk route” connecting China with Central Asia and Europe, particularly the 

Caspian Sea oil resources that China demands. 

Overseas threats to economic interests constitute the second challenge China will confront in the next decade or more. Economic interests are extremely important, because 

they are foundational to many other national interests. Military power, for instance, rests 

on the foundation of a strong economy. 

To sustain development, China needs secure sea-lanes and unfettered freedom of navigation. China now is the second-largest economy and the world’s largest trading power. 

China’s rapid economic growth has come to depend heavily on imported raw materials, 

especially oil. Secure sea lines of communication are vital to the shipment of China’s 

export and import trade. Any disruption of the sea-lanes or strategic straits like the Strait 

of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz would threaten China’s economic development and 
66 china maritime studies

hamper realization of the “China Dream.”7 Oil imports have increased dramatically since 

1993, when China first became a net oil importer. In 2011, China imported about 5.1 

million barrels per day of crude oil.8

 Oil imports now constitute roughly 20 percent of 

China’s total oil consumption per year. About 40 percent of China’s total oil imports need 

to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Any disruption to commercial shipping there or 

along any other strategically important strait would be hard for China to endure.

Seaborne commerce is now equivalent to over 10 percent of China’s gross domestic 

product. Despite the importance of trade to China’s economy, China does not have the 

capacity to protect its commercial vessels in the event of a conflict. To be sure, China has 

handled, and will continue to handle, low-level threats to its seaborne commerce. Piracy, 

for instance, will remain a threat but can be mitigated, because it is a common target. 

But some activities conducted by naval ships of the United States, India, and Japan cause 

anxiety for China, because Chinese ships, commercial and naval, are sometimes stalked 

in the economically vital western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The Philippines is increasingly becoming a source of uncertainty. The United States supports its deliberately 

provocative actions against China and has cooperated with it to set up special stations 

to monitor China’s ships—developments harmful to China’s interests but that must 

nevertheless be tolerated. In April 2014, President Obama visited four Asian countries, 

including the Philippines. This trip appears to have been an effort to compensate for 

his absence from Southeast Asia during the government shutdown in 2013. It signaled 

American commitment to protect its allies in Asia. The Philippines and the United States 

signed a new ten-year “enhanced defense agreement” that allows American forces back 

to Philippine military bases and facilities, including airfields and seaports. This move 

has a very serious geopolitical consequence for China: China must now confront the 

threat posed by strengthened American military surveillance of China’s naval ships and 

the sea-lanes of the South China Sea. 

China also faces threats to its overseas investments. As a newcomer to overseas investment and a state with strong impetus to invest overseas, China has been forced to seek 

out investment opportunities in countries with unstable political environments, with all 

the risks this entails. For instance, the Libya revolt, which erupted in early 2011, was a 

disaster for Chinese investments there. Iran is another risky location in which China has 

investments in oil fields. Some Chinese oil companies are desperate to do business there, 

but the future remains unstable. Indeed, China is now experiencing a huge loss in Iran 

because of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012, a new sanction 

against Iran that also impacts other countries’ financial institutions and banks, including 

their operations in the United States.9

To what extent is China able to handle these challenges? At present China does not 

have enough capacity to safeguard its overseas interests. China’s political and economic 
beyond the wall 67

interests abroad are insecure. In the age of globalization, the challenges of coordinating political and security interests with commercial interests are harder to overcome. 

International financial crises have increased the intensity of political and commercial 

competition among countries, particularly between emerging economies and developed 

economies. In the view of some Chinese experts, the United States is an envious, declining power and seems bent on putting up a last-ditch struggle for its survival.10 They have 

argued that the final struggle made by an injured tiger is the most fearsome and threatening. Others, however, have different points of view, regarding the United States as the 

most benign empire ever to have existed.11 The ten-year fight against terrorism and the 

2008 financial crisis have had an adverse effect on the American economy, but its hard 

power remains unrivaled, and its soft power will continue to be strong enough to attract 

almost all countries. 

New China (i.e., the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) has existed for sixty-five years. 

During this time, China’s conceptions about national interests have gone through different stages. In early periods after the founding of the PRC, China was more concerned 

with protecting political power and securing the country from foreign invasion. Now 

China does not expect a great-power war to take place in the near future. With that 

judgment, China, therefore, currently emphasizes economic development. In the next 

decade or more China will continue to experience dramatic growth. To enable this economic growth, China needs to take steps to maintain a favorable strategic environment. 

China will meet challenges and difficulties that threaten its national interests. If China 

cannot handle these challenges well, it will face the possibility of economic stagnation or 

perhaps even some unexpected crisis that will cause grave harm to its interests and lead 

to political instability. Obviously, these are not outcomes China wishes to see. 

China’s Policy Options 

To some, China appears to be an influential country capable of being a regional and 

global power. However, given its geographic position facing the Pacific Ocean and given 

that China’s territory remains divided by the Taiwan Strait, China is vulnerable. As 

China rises, its overseas interests will continue to expand. China’s foreign policy must 

adjust with the changing situation. The next decade will be an important period for 

China’s foreign policy and diplomatic strategy. How is China likely to respond? 

First, China’s foreign policy will strictly follow the Party’s strategy. In 2021, China will 

mark the hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. That 

will be a significant event for China, because the first Chinese dream is expected to be 

realized in that year.12 China’s diplomacy will seek to advance the Chinese dream. 
68 china maritime studies

Second, China’s foreign policy will keep pace with internal development. This means 

that it will need to consider how best to serve domestic reform and opening up, with 

particular concern for how to ensure development interests and achieve the goal of 

building a moderately prosperous society. China is developing quickly and has made 

many noteworthy achievements, but China’s diplomacy will remain moderate and 

humble. China still has a long way to go to catch up to the level of the United States and 

other Western countries. 

Third, China will seek out ways to play a constructive role in the changing regional 

and global architecture. China will continue to maintain that the world is undergoing 

profound and complex change and that peace, development, cooperation, and win-win 

outcomes have gathered momentum. However, China will make sure to protect national 

interests during this period of change. 

These principles will serve as a basic guide for China as it considers how to make foreign 

policy serve its evolving overseas interests and its internal interests. As a rising country, 

China will encounter competition and pressure from the current hegemon, which, to advance its own national interests, particularly in the western Pacific, will adopt any means 

to limit China’s expansion—notwithstanding its many friendly remarks. 

In the future, China will need to make a decision about which approach will best enable 

it to deal with these threats and serve China’s development interests. There are three 

likely models. Ultimately, which model China selects will depend on the strategic vision 

of China’s new leadership. The first possible approach is to continue employing the 

“free rider” strategy. During the last thirty years, China has gained a lot from the freerider approach. Therefore, it will likely continue this approach to safeguard its overseas 

interests. Doing so will encourage China to go farther in its cooperation with the United 

States and other Western states. Among the advantages of this approach is that China 

will not become a rival to the United States and will encounter less resistance from 

outside in its modernization process. The disadvantage is that the free-rider approach 

will require China to make some concessions in the areas of core interests and overseas 

interests. 

Peaceful competition through smart diplomacy is a second possible approach. This 

is a less cooperative approach than option number one, but it still may be regarded as 

peaceful—acknowledging, though, that peace does not necessarily mean that there will 

be no competition or dispute. Peaceful competition is a possible scenario for big powers 

that have different approaches to dealing with politics and regional and global affairs but 

whose differences do not constitute grounds for war. Both sides have acknowledged the 

need to deter weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. For this approach to work, both sides need to be rational, recognizing the undesirability of war. All 
beyond the wall 69

states have their strengths. How to use these strengths to pursue national interests is an 

art. States must, through fair competition, use their strengths to find opportunities for 

cooperation and to advance their national interests. 

The third possible approach would be to increase support for military diplomacy. Some 

misunderstand Hu Jintao’s “new historic missions” to mean military preparations for 

ensuring overseas interests. They therefore advocate that the Chinese military should 

follow China’s expanding overseas interests—that is, wherever Chinese citizens and 

Chinese interests exist, the Chinese army should be present (国家的利益延伸到什么地

方, 我们的军队就要保护到什么地方).13 China, like many other countries, cannot send 

its military wherever it wants. Instead, it must conduct military and smart diplomacy to 

improve its relations with others. Indeed, both military forces and diplomats serve the 

same mission, to protect and serve China’s interests. China’s diplomacy should play an 

important role in helping the PLA to be pragmatic and cooperative, expanding the PLA’s 

participation in regional and international security organizations, consulting regularly 

with major powers and neighboring countries to exchange military activities, and enhancing maritime escort operations. 

The PLA’s strategic thinking—adherence to the principles of being just, reasonable, 

comprehensive, and balanced; standing for effective disarmament and arms control; and 

endeavoring to maintain global strategic stability—is basically consistent with China’s 

diplomatic thinking. Sometimes the diplomatic environment constrains naval operations 

at sea, but at other times the navy’s operational thinking may exert some pressure on 

diplomacy. The problem is that China lacks adequate mechanisms to coordinate actions 

of different government departments. China’s recent establishment of the National Security Commission (NSC) will give the top leadership greater direct control over security 

affairs, enabling President Xi Jinping to coordinate better the civilian and military sides 

of the foreign and security apparatus. If China decides to pursue this approach, both the 

military side and the diplomatic side must enhance communication and understanding. 

That is, the military side needs to consider the diplomatic situation, and the diplomats 

should understand the military dimensions of national security. The coordinative and 

consultative relationships are essential in peacetime, because each must play a role in 

implementing grand strategy. 

The expansion of China’s overseas interests is a natural outcome of China’s economic 

rise. Chinese statesmen say that China’s rise will deviate from traditional patterns in 

which rising powers have tended to pursue hegemony. I believe that if China develops 

to the point that it is really accepted as a benign power, it will achieve hegemonic status. 

President Xi maintains that China should always be a student, willing to learn from the 

experiences of others.14 In my view, China will continue in this modest spirit, remaining 

open to study the approaches of advanced countries. China’s pursuit of overseas interests 
70 china maritime studies

will undoubtedly encounter resistance, not only from the current hegemon but also 

from an array of countries associated with the hegemon, whether allies, old partners, 

or new partners. Therefore, to become a prosperous, developed country, China must be 

a democratic, harmonious, and stable country, and its diplomacy must also adhere to 

these principles. Only in this way will China contribute to global peace. Therefore, in my 

view, peaceful competition is the most preferable approach. 

Peaceful Competition and China’s Overseas Interests

China consistently states that it pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and 

independent development. This belief in independence at the heart of PRC identity is a 

powerful factor influencing which approach the country’s leadership is likely to adopt. 

As some have argued, China cannot continue taking the free-rider approach, because it 

reduces the country’s freedom of action. According to this view, China, as a great power, 

cannot always rely on other powers for its survival. Moreover, following in the wake of 

others can only reduce China’s own influence. Therefore, given China’s preference for independence, we can foresee that China will eventually abandon the free-rider approach 

to safeguarding its overseas interests.

Peaceful competition, then, is the most rational approach for China to adopt. The approach is peaceful but accepts the likelihood of disputes and quarrels with other states. 

Peaceful competition reflects a mainstream value in the international society—that is, 

shunning the use of military force and making states that do use force pay a price for 

their actions. Peaceful competition is realistic, because big powers like the United States 

and China lack the resolve to use military force against each other. They understand that 

both sides would suffer intolerable loss in the event of a military clash. 

Conclusion

China’s overseas interests include ensuring access to energy resources and foreign markets, protecting the safety of overseas Chinese, and advancing political interests at home. 

China’s overseas interests, while expanding and facing some unexpected threats, are not 

vital and probably will not become vital but will remain very important in the foreseeable future. Moreover, for some time to come Beijing will lack the capacity to control 

the environment beyond China’s border and will find it particularly hard to manage the 

situation in the far-sea regions. As a great country learning from others, China needs 

time for learning and understanding advanced civilizations and, in particular, generally 

recognized and established international practices and laws. China’s policy is to abide by 

international law and refrain from using military force. China will continue to seek resources domestically and globally, and because China will choose to remain a part of the 

current international system, its actions will not challenge the international community 
beyond the wall 71

by ignoring current international laws and regulations. To safeguard China’s overseas 

interests better, however, China’s foreign policy will need to change. The concept of national interest is not a fixed attribute; Chinese policy must change as its interests evolve. 

There are several options open to China, but ultimately cooperative competition best 

accords with Chinese principles, aims, and interests.

How will Chinese desires to safeguard overseas interests affect China’s maritime strategy? President Xi has repeatedly expressed his desire to build China into a maritime 

power. While chairing a group study session of the Political Bureau of the Communist 

Party of China Central Committee to discuss a maritime great-power “roadmap,” Xi 

highlighted the importance of protecting the country’s maritime interests.15 However, his 

first priority will undoubtedly remain ensuring the stability of the internal order.16

Notes 

The opinions expressed herein are solely those of 

the author and do not necessarily represent the 

views of the Shanghai Institutes for International 

Studies.

1. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on the Malaysian Side’s Statement on the 

MH370 Flight Incident,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2 May 2014, 

www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/

s2510_665401/t1152034.shtml.

2. Hu Jintao stressed that diplomacy conducted 

well is an important element for enhancing the 

Party’s capacity to rule (“胡锦涛强调, 做好外

交工作, . . . 是加强党的执政能力建设的重

要内容”). “The Tenth Meeting of Diplomats 

in Residence Abroad Held in Beijing,” People’s 

Daily, 30 August 2004, www.people.com.cn/

GB/14576/14554/2751683.html. 

3. BRICS is a grouping of the fast-growing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 

Africa. China was the host of the fourth summit 

of CICA, held in Shanghai on 21 May 2014.

4. Xi Jinping remarks, “We should respect each 

other’s core interests and major concerns”; “Xi 

Jinping’s Speech (Full Text) in the US Friendship Groups Welcome Luncheon,” Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 

16 February 2012, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/

ziliao_611306/zyjh_611308/t905507.shtml. As 

China’s State Councilor Yang Jiechi declared after 

the Sunnylands summit in 2013, “Having respect 

for each other” means that the United States and 

China should “respect each other’s social system 

and development road, respect each other’s core 

interests and significant concerns.” This author 

wonders whether the United States would accept 

that definition.

5. Xi Jinping’s remarks when meeting President 

Obama in California, 8 June 2013, available at 

www.whitehouse.gov/.

6. Most Chinese praised Foreign Minister (now 

State Councilor) Yang Jiechi for his steadfast 

refutation of then-secretary Clinton’s remarks 

critical of Chinese policy in the South China 

Sea. Many believe that American interests lie on 

the other side of the Pacific Ocean and therefore 

were surprised at her remarks, interpreting them 

as a signal that the United States might be in the 

process of changing its South China Sea policy. 

Even retired PLA officers known for hard-line 

views praised Yang’s performance.

7. The goal of the “China Dream” is to bring about 

economic prosperity and national renewal and to 

advance the Chinese people’s well-being.

8. See the U.S. Energy Information Administration,

www.eia.gov.

9. According to official statistics, in 2010 Chinesecontracted investment in Iran totaled $120 

billion. See Wang Peng, “Sanctioning Iran 

Influences China,” China’s Chemical Industry, 1 

December 2011, p. 5.

10. Zhang Hong, “Noise Cannot Deter China from 

Marching Forward,” People’s Daily (overseas version), 1 March 2014, gb.cri.cn/42071/2014/

03/01/2225s4443284.htm. See also 龙永图

[Long Yongtu], “China’s Rise Makes the Whole 

World Envious,” Sohu, 12 August 2013, business.

sohu.com/20130812/n383983951.shtml (Long is 

the former vice minister of commerce), and 刘志

标 [Liu Zhibiao], “Cool Thinking: The Complicated Situation China Faces in Its Peaceful Rise,” 

中国教育报 [China Education], 2 May 2008, 

p. 3 (Liu is dean of Economy College, Nanjing 

University).
72 china maritime studies

11. 张沱生 [Zhang Tuosheng], interview, World 

Knowledge, no. 9 (2010). 

12. The second dream will come true in 2049, when 

the People’s Republic of China celebrates its 

centenary.

13. Luo Yuan, quoted in “New Era: China’s Global 

Role and Multiple Challenges,” www.News

.cn, news.xinhuanet.com/observation/2011

-03/09/c_121164897_3.htm.

14. “Xi Jinping Holds Discussion with Foreign 

Experts, Stressing That China Should Always Be 

a Great Country Learning from Others,” People’s 

Daily, 24 May 2014, p. 1.

15. Wang Qian and Zhang Yunbi, “President Xi 

Vows to Protect Maritime Interests,” China Daily,

1 August 2013.

16. From the NSC conference held in Beijing on 15 

April 2014, one can easily discern Xi’s preference 

for internal over external issues.
For more than a decade, China has challenged U.S. military operations and activities 

in and over the waters of East Asia.1

 As China has attempted to restrict those activities through national legislation, military operations, civilian law-enforcement patrols, 

diplomatic protests, and public statements, the matter has also been repeatedly discussed 

during official dialogues and in academic forums. Some American commentators have 

pointed out that a rising China would benefit in the future if it embraced the full scope 

of rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea guaranteed to all nations under international 

law.2

 Such unsolicited assurances offered by voices of one nation to the ears of another, 

however, might be negatively interpreted as “You will thank me later,” with all the associated implications. 

Over the past few years, this author has participated in episodic discussions of this issue 

with Chinese representatives, sometimes in an official capacity with Chinese military 

delegations and on other occasions in a personal capacity with Chinese academics. During one official event, the author was called on to provide an explanation of the U.S. government’s perspective on the legal basis for military activities beyond the territorial seas 

of any coastal state. After that presentation, one of the military officers of the Chinese 

delegation approached the author during the subsequent coffee break and joked that he 

wanted to hire the author to argue China’s position. This quip reflected a professional 

compliment shared between two brothers in arms who each have a responsibility to act 

in what they consider to be the best interest of their respective nations. It also showed 

that respectful individuals are willing to listen to perspectives that might differ from 

what they had assumed to be the only acceptable one. 

In other, unofficial conferences and workshops that have included Chinese maritimelaw experts, this author has provided substantive presentations about the U.S. Freedom 

of Navigation Policy. A core component of these presentations has been to identify and 

dispel a series of common myths about that policy. Dispelling some of these myths has 

answered some of the Chinese participants’ questions before they even had a chance to 

Jonathan G. Odom

A Maritime Dilemma for China

CHAPTER EIGHT

Freedom of the “Far Seas”?
74 china maritime studies

ask them. Ultimately, some of these Chinese maritime-law experts came to realize that 

a rising China should well consider some of the merits of the American perspective on 

matters of law of the sea, as the substance of that position could benefit China now and 

in the future. In short, some of the national interests of the United States and China 

might not be as divergent on these matters as some in China had assumed. The People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) currently faces a major dilemma—it must reconcile longstanding adherence to a restrictive maritime regime in the “near seas” with expanding 

interests in the “far seas” that would be better served by a much more liberal approach.3

China’s Maritime Perspective 

The sixty-five-year history of the PRC reveals a state with a deeply ambivalent attitude 

toward maritime freedom. If anything, the PRC has taken positions reflective of a coastalstate mind-set. For example, China wants to be able to draw straight baselines along its 

entire coastline and claim the resulting—very extensive—enclosed waters as off limits to 

the ships of other nations.4

 Additionally, China wants to be able to draw straight baselines around the Paracel Islands and the Diaoyu Islands and claim even more internal 

waters.5

 Although China has never fully clarified the meaning of its “nine-dashed line,” 

at least one Chinese official has made comments suggesting that China wants “indisputable sovereignty” over the waters within the South China Sea.6

 China prefers that foreign 

warships not have the right of innocent passage in China’s territorial sea.7

 China also 

wants to control security in its contiguous zone.8

 China wishes that it enjoyed sovereignty of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) equivalent to that which it enjoys over its 

territorial seas and internal waters.9

 China also wishes that it enjoyed a legally protected 

and enforceable security interest in its EEZ.10 Finally, China would prefer to enjoy twohundred-nautical-mile territorial seas;11 that other states enjoyed only a limited freedom 

of passage through its EEZ;12 and that other states were prohibited from conducting military activities in its EEZ.13 Taken together, these national preferences show that China 

desires to control all foreign activities, especially foreign military activities, within much 

of what it calls its “near seas” (jinhai).

14

To effectuate control of those “near seas,” China leverages all instruments of national 

power, including the law.15 Over the past fifteen years, China has been developing a 

strategic concept it calls “legal warfare.” At a 1996 Beijing seminar on international law, 

then-president Jiang Zemin urged, “Our leaders and cadres, especially those of high 

rank, ought to take note of international law and enhance their skills in applying it. . . . 

We must be adept at using international law as ‘a weapon’ to defend the interests of our 

state and maintain national pride.”16 Since 2003, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has 

been operationalizing the concept of legal warfare.17
beyond the wall 75

Consistent with President Jiang’s call to use international law as a weapon, one of the 

PLA’s official textbooks defines legal warfare to include “activities conducted by using 

the law as the weapon and through measures and methods such as legal deterrence, legal 

attack, legal counterattack, legal restraint, legal sanctions, and legal protections.”18 The 

textbook further discusses “legal restraint” in terms of “shrink[ing] enemy’s political 

space” and “restrain[ing] and limit[ing] enemy’s combat operations”—implying that 

China should use law to restrain the actions of other nations geospatially, as in the maritime and air domains.19

While China’s concept of legal warfare devotes significant attention to the law of armed 

conflict, the PLA textbook on legal warfare expressly notes that the concept also involves 

the “international laws of . . . the ocean.”20 Additionally, the textbook specifically identifies domestic maritime laws, such as China’s Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 

Zone, which also serve as the “armory of legal warfare.”21

The net result is that China has developed and maintains a comprehensive network of 

restrictive maritime claims spanning all of its maritime zones.22 In fact, China is one of 

only seven nations in the world that has adopted a “full house” of restrictive maritime 

claims.23 This employment of legal warfare is composed of restrictive national laws and 

regulations, coupled with a restrictive interpretation of international law. 

Strategic use of legal warfare in China’s “near seas,” however, raises several questions. Is 

this a proper use of law, particularly international law? What, if any, risk does this strategic approach pose to China’s overall national interests? Does this impact the maritime 

rule set that governs China’s “far seas” operations? To answer these questions, it is useful 

first to consider the nature and characteristics of the established international legal order 

that frames the maritime rule set. 

The Rules-Based International Order 

While early PRC legal experts derided the existing international legal order as “bourgeois,” modern Chinese legal scholars now tend to recognize the importance of all nations, including China, being led to “understand and abide by the rules of the international community.”24 At the same time, senior Chinese officials have indicated a desire 

to make the existing international legal order—presumably including the maritime rule 

set—“fairer.”25

While fairness is an admirable and desirable characteristic in many situations, it is also 

an ambiguous and subjective concept often assessed in the self-interested eye of the 

beholder. Thus, a more objective and realistic goal of all nations would instead be to uphold, support, and promote a “just” international order.26 Although the ideals of fairness 

and justness can sometimes lead to similar results, there are objective characteristics of 
76 china maritime studies

the existing rules-based international order that help ensure its justness. They include 

the following.

Multisource 

The body of international law, including the law of the sea, underpinning the existing 

international legal order is derived from more than one source. Of the possible sources 

of international law, conventional law and customary law are generally recognized as the 

most important.27 Much of the law of the sea is derived from the text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but a significant portion is derived 

from customary law. 

In many ways, customary international law is a reflection of world history. For centuries, nations have enjoyed freedom of the seas beyond the territorial seas of any coastal 

state.28 These freedoms have included, for example, the collecting of intelligence and the 

conducting of surveillance by militaries.29 In the three decades since the negotiation of 

UNCLOS and its establishment of the EEZ as a new, economic-focused maritime zone, 

naval forces of the world have continued to conduct noneconomic activities in and over 

the EEZs of coastal states. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of states either have 

openly supported this freedom of the seas or have taken no state action (i.e., national law 

or regulation) to restrict foreign military activities in their respective EEZs.30

Multiagreement 

The body of international law, including the law of the sea, is derived from more than 

one treaty or convention. UNCLOS is not the only source of conventional law that forms 

the maritime rule set. Another set of obligations arises from the Convention on the 

International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (the COLREGs).31 As one of 

the most widely joined international conventions, COLREG obligates member nations 

to ensure that their vessels—both government and flagged vessels alike—operate safely 

at sea through adherence to a detailed regime of specific safety rules.32

The U.S. government has demonstrated its respect for the portion of the maritime rule 

set derived from the COLREGs in multiple ways, such as codifying those legal obligations into national laws and regulations;33 directing U.S. Navy and Coast Guard personnel to follow them;34 imposing civil penalties against civilian mariners of U.S.-flagged, 

nongovernment vessels who violate them;35 setting a leadership expectation that commanders at sea will follow them;36 instituting a robust educational and training program 

for its Navy officers;37 and holding Navy commanders and personnel to account for 

violations.38
beyond the wall 77

Intent 

The existing international legal order emphasizes respect for the intent of applicable 

treaties and conventions. The rules of treaty interpretation state that the terms of a treaty 

should be given their “ordinary meaning.”39 If the text of the treaty is “ambiguous or obscure,” then “supplementary means of interpretation” may be consulted.40 Such supplementary means include “the preparatory work of the treaty” and “the circumstances” of 

the treaty’s conclusion. 

Requiring nations to respect the intended meaning of treaties is understandable and 

prudent. Otherwise, one nation or a discrete minority of nations could—after the fact—

upset the will of the majority of states parties to a convention by unilaterally imposing 

that minority’s self-interests and, in effect, renegotiating the original bargain long after 

the parties have all left the bargaining table. 

No formal preparatory work was ever published for UNCLOS. Other resources of the 

negotiating history of UNCLOS, however, have been compiled and should be consulted 

in ascertaining the intent of words, phrases, and rules that might arguably be ambiguous or obscure. These resources include the comprehensive commentary compiled by 

the Center for Oceans Law and Policy at the University of Virginia’s School of Law.41

These commentaries show, for example, that the EEZ concept was intended to accommodate a trend among some coastal states to expand the breadth of their territorial seas 

to control more economic resources.42 They also record that the nations negotiating the 

text of UNCLOS considered and deliberately rejected the effort by a group of nations to 

incorporate a coastal-state “security interest” into the EEZ regime.43 Both of these points 

are significant in understanding what UNCLOS says—and does not say—about the 

authority of coastal states to restrict foreign military activities.44

Context 

The existing international legal order respects the context of applicable treaties and conventions. The rules of treaty interpretation state, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good 

faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 

their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”45 In other words, a nation must 

not interpret the words and terminology of a treaty out of context. On a more practical 

level, licensed attorneys know they must never argue the law out of its proper context, 

lest they instantly lose credibility in the courtroom.46

This principle has been violated by some coastal states seeking to limit military activities within the EEZ. For example, some have argued that foreign military activities in a 

coastal state’s EEZ violate UNCLOS, on the grounds that such activities are not a “peaceful use” of the ocean or intended for a “peaceful purpose.”47 These two phrases “peaceful 

use” and “peaceful purpose,” however, are found outside the section of UNCLOS focused 
78 china maritime studies

on the EEZ regime and also apply to the high seas.48 Additionally, one of these UNCLOS 

articles makes clear that “peaceful” simply means to follow the purpose of Article 2(4) of 

the United Nations (UN) Charter and refrain from the threat or use of force. These two 

broad-brush, aspirational references to “peaceful” do not summarily trump the intricate 

legal regime deliberately established by the convention in its entirety. Moreover, any 

reasonable person who reads these UNCLOS provisions in their proper context would 

know that these two “peaceful” references were never intended to bar all military activities in the EEZ, much less all military activities on the high seas. Otherwise, all nations 

would in effect be prohibited from having deployable militaries. 

Multilateral Bargained Package 

The body of law underpinning the existing international legal order, especially the portion of the maritime rule set reflected in UNCLOS, reflects a bargained compromise 

among many nations. Since taking nearly a decade to negotiate, UNCLOS has been 

signed and ratified by 162 of the 193 member states of the United Nations. Some of these 

states parties are coastal states, some are maritime states, and some have interests from 

both perspectives. The convention reflects a grand bargain among all the states that had 

seats at the bargaining table, including the United States and the PRC.49 As in any bargain, no nation at the UNCLOS negotiations received in the deal everything it wanted. 

At the final session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, President Tommy T. B. Koh identified several observations shared among the negotiators that highlight 

the nature of the bargained deal. One observation was that no individual nation was 

“fully satisfied” with the UNCLOS bargain, as it had been structured to accommodate 

competing interests.50 Another observation was that the convention was a “package” 

deal; nations were not allowed to follow selectively certain provisions while disregarding 

others. In short, no compromise is perfect. The only sense in which an agreement can be 

perfect is that one nation receives everything it wants, and then it is perfect for only that 

nation—which sounds a lot like the “unequal treaties” of the nineteenth century that the 

PRC has forever scorned.51

Transparency 

As the UN secretary-general stated in 2004, the rule of law requires measures to ensure 

“legal transparency.”52 While he was referring to domestic rule of law, international 

law too depends on transparency, in its own special way. Because international law is a 

consent-based regime, nations cannot provide informed consent to the official actions 

of other nations if those actions and their legal justifications are not transparent. This 

sequential process, requiring transparency, is what underlies the long-accepted “persistent objector” concept of customary international law.53
beyond the wall 79

The United States supports transparency about matters involving the international legal 

order, including the maritime rule set. Evidence of the U.S. government’s transparency 

on law-of-the-sea matters includes the publication of its article-by-article UNCLOS 

“commentary”;54 its Maritime Claims Reference Manual;55 its annual freedom-ofnavigation reports;56 and the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations.

57

All these official U.S. publications are freely available on the Internet. 

Consistency 

As the Reverend Desmond Tutu of South Africa once opined, “If we want international 

law to hold any meaning,” the international community must begin by ensuring that 

international law is “applied uniformly across all countries.”58 In terms of the international law of the sea, the president of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 

has reminded the UN General Assembly about the importance of “ensuring uniform 

and consistent application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”59

Similarly, the legal adviser to the United Nations has also emphasized “the importance of 

uniform and consistent application” of UNCLOS.60

Uniform application and interpretation of international law arguably include two elements: first, that the body of law applies equally to all nations, and second, that each 

nation is internally consistent in its application of the rules of that body of law. In a 

speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2010, then–Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

highlighted the importance of this precept with an interesting choice of words—a “just 

international order that emphasizes rights and responsibilities of nations and fidelity 

to the rule of law.”61 By definition, “fidelity” means a state of continuous faithfulness or 

loyalty.62 In terms of international law and relations, “fidelity” could mean faithful and 

consistent following of a particular rule set not only when it promotes the nation’s interests but also when that same rule set might arguably undermine the nation’s interests. 

The U.S. commitment to this concept of uniformity and consistency in the maritime rule 

set has been doubted by some foreign commentators. For example, retired rear admiral 

and military strategist Yang Yi from China has asked, “Just imagine if China were to 

send submarines into an American Exclusive Economic Zone. America’s reaction would 

be even more intense, and it would be all over the major news media.”63 Admiral Yang’s 

assumption, however, is mistaken. As recent as the summers of 2009 and 2010, the 

United States has not challenged the right of Russian air and maritime forces to operate 

in and over the American EEZ.64 More recently, the issue arose again regarding potential 

military operations by the Iranian navy near the United States. When the commander of 

the Iranian navy threatened to conduct operations off the U.S. coast, a Pentagon spokesman publicly stated, “We’ve been pushing freedom of the seas for years and the Iranian 

navy can go wherever it wants.”65 Most recently, the Department of Defense reported 
80 china maritime studies

that China had conducted naval activities in the EEZ around Guam and Hawaii but 

emphasized that “the United States considers the PLA Navy activities in its EEZ to be 

lawful.”66 Such words and actions are those of a nation that honestly believes in its legal 

position on matters involving the law of the sea, to the extent that it does not challenge 

the right of other nations to exercise those same rights and freedoms within its own 

maritime zones. 

China’s Expanding Maritime Interests 

To say that China’s relations with the rest of the world have changed in the past several decades would be a gross understatement. Since the late 1970s, PRC leaders such 

as Deng Xiaoping and his successors have transformed China’s inward-looking and 

inefficient economic system into one that leverages the full productive potentials of 

its massive population. With vision and foresight, they have put the nation on a path 

of economic success, and the industries and corporations of other nations have begun 

to choose China increasingly as their preferred hub for manufacturing. The collective 

result is that China and its people have derived tremendous benefits from the country’s 

participation in the global economy. 

China’s economic ascendance, however, has not come without costs and challenges. 

Like the United States in its industrial age of the late 1800s and Japan in the 1920s and 

1930s, China depends heavily on its ability to obtain raw materials and energy to fuel its 

growing industries. The energy resources located within China’s borders are insufficient 

to sustain the nation’s needs. Since the beginning of the new millennium, China’s leaders 

have had the foresight to recognize that China must look outward for additional sources 

of energy and not to limit that search to the immediate neighborhood of Northeast Asia. 

Instead, China has turned to distant locations like Africa, Oceania, and South America, 

establishing beneficial relationships with nations in these regions with abundant natural 

resources. 

These developing relationships between a rising China and these resource-rich nations 

are presumably unlike the one-sided relationships that China decries in the “unequal 

treaty” era of the past. Instead, the PRC and its representatives have sought to ensure 

that these relationships are not exploitative in nature but rather multidimensional and 

beneficial to each state party involved. For example, the PRC has invested heavily in improving the infrastructure of many of these nations. Additionally, Chinese corporations 

have sent many highly skilled employees to these distant nations to support and train 

the host-nation workforces. As a result, a once-isolated Chinese nation and its people are 

becoming integrated into the global community. With such global integration, however, 

China’s people and interests abroad are subject to more risk and as a result need protection. 
beyond the wall 81

In addition, China, like every nation in the global economy, is heavily dependent on 

international commercial shipping. China’s shipping industry both exports its products 

to the world and imports raw materials and energy. Advances in the information age 

have made world communications virtually instantaneous. Sheer physics, however, 

prohibits similar advances in transportation. Ship transits can take days and sometimes 

weeks, depending on the port of destination. Problems at any port or choke point along 

the way can jeopardize the flow of resources and goods, to the detriment of both China 

and other nations. Threats to China’s global shipping interest could impede its economic 

success. 

Meanwhile, China’s dependence on international shipping places it at the mercy of its 

geographic location. China does not enjoy the geographic endowments of the United 

States—that is, two borders composed of thousands of miles of coastline and adjacent 

maritime zones. Moreover, even with the one lengthy coastline it does enjoy, it lacks the 

maximum potential maritime zones afforded under UNCLOS; transmaritime neighbors 

like North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam are also entitled to share in the limited maritime space in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea corridors. 

Perhaps the greatest geographic challenge in the maritime domain for China, however, is 

the limited number of choke points through which vessels and aircraft can ingress into 

and egress from the region en route to and from mainland China ports. To the north is 

the Sea of Japan, as well as the straits between the islands of Japan. To the southeast are 

the sea-lanes through the archipelagic state of the Philippines. To the south, through 

the South China Sea, are the sea-lanes through Indonesia, the other archipelagic state of 

the region. Finally, also to the south are the Straits of Singapore and Malacca. In recent 

years, PLA military strategists have agonized over strategic vulnerabilities within “the 

first island chain” and “second island chain.”67 Also worth considering, however, is that 

the existence of these potential choke points makes it necessary for Chinese military and 

commercial vessels not only to depart China’s “near seas” but also to operate freely in the 

“far seas.” 

China’s Maritime Dilemma 

One of the benefits of China’s rapidly expanding economy is that the nation has been 

able to invest heavily in its military, including in its naval forces. The role those naval 

forces will play in promoting, preserving, and protecting China’s people and its interests around the world is driven partly by the capabilities developed by those forces. At 

a certain point, however, technological capabilities become less determinative, and the 

policies governing how China will operate those forces in particular maritime areas are 

likely to determine the trajectory of China’s rise. 
82 china maritime studies

As noted, China’s military cannot protect all of China’s people and interests just by operating in China’s “near seas”; it must operate in China’s “far seas.” Therefore, a nation once 

focused almost exclusively on coastal-state interests now recognizes that it has increasing 

user-state interests in the “far seas.” China is steaming closer and closer to a potential 

dilemma: making the right choice could help ensure its economic rise, but making the 

wrong one could impede or slow down continued success. 

Consider the following hypothetical situations. What if other nations in the world 

decided to follow China’s lead and enact restrictive claims over all of their maritime 

zones? More specifically, what if many of the African nations decided, on the basis of a 

“security interest” as coastal states, to restrict the ability of China’s naval forces to secure 

the sea lines of communication near the African coast? What if all of China’s South 

China Sea neighbors, or East China Sea neighbors, or Yellow Sea neighbors decided to 

enact comparably restrictive regimes in their maritime zones? What if Japan decided to 

enact straight baselines around all its islands, regardless of size, and to claim the waters 

within the baselines as internal waters? As China seeks to use its national maritime laws 

as a “weapon” to protect its interests, the world could see an “arms race” wherein other 

coastal states in East Asia see no option other than to employ the law as their weapon of 

choice. What would China do? How would it react? 

Essentially, China would have three options, depicted in the figure. 

China could uphold the existing restrictions in its “near seas” and comply with all restrictions by coastal states in its “far seas” operations, regardless of the nature and extent 

of those restrictions. That is, China could ask permission from or provide notification to 

each of these coastal states when its naval forces need to pass through each state’s territorial sea or conduct operations in and over its EEZ. This approach would be consistent 

with what China demands in its own maritime zones; if consistently practiced, it could 

generate some trust for China in the international community. The drawback, however, 

is that some of these coastal states might deny permission or aggressively oppose China’s 

operations when notified. Alternatively, coastal states could initially grant permission 

to Chinese requests or not oppose them at the time but later decide to withdraw that 

consent. 

If China did not diplomatically or operationally challenge those improper restrictions, it 

would be conceding that in certain sections of the “far seas” China’s military forces could 

not protect its national interests. 

A second option would be to uphold the existing restrictions in the “near seas” and 

challenge excessive restrictions by coastal states on China’s “far seas” operations. The disadvantage of this approach is that China would draw international criticism that it was 

hypocritical or following a double standard. For example, China has already drawn some 
beyond the wall 83

criticism because it challenges the U.S. military freedom to conduct activities in and 

over China’s EEZ, whereas China is known to conduct military activities in and over the 

EEZs of other nations.68 As China seeks to build confidence among other nations that it 

is truly committed to “peaceful development,” such duplicitous behavior could generate 

mistrust and doubt from other nations at a critical moment in history.69

A third option would be for China to relax its existing restrictions in its “near seas” 

and challenge excessive restrictions by coastal states on its “far seas” operations. This 

approach would uphold the characteristics of the existing international legal order: 

respecting all sources and instruments of international law, as well as the intent, context, 

bargained compromise, transparency, and consistency of the existing maritime rule set. 

It also would enable China’s military forces to conduct its “far seas” operations effectively 

and secure its interests around the globe. 

China’s “Far Seas” Operations

China’s “Near Seas” 

Operations

Restrictive Position Liberal Position

Restrictive 

Position

Positives: Increased 

control to protect 

security interests near 

China’s coast; increased 

trust within international 

community for China’s 

consistent position, but 

any inconsistent actions 

would damage that trust 

Negatives: Minimal 

respect for existing 

international legal order; 

reduced mobility for 

PLA to protect China’s 

interests abroad

Positives: Increased control to protect security 

interests near China’s 

coast; increased mobility for PLA to protect 

China’s interests abroad

Negatives: Increased 

mistrust within international community 

for China’s inconsistent 

position; minimal respect 

for existing international 

legal order 

Liberal 

Position NOT A VIABLE OPTION

Positives: Maximum 

respect for existing 

international legal 

order; increased mobility for PLA to protect 

China’s interests abroad; 

increased trust within 

international community 

for China’s consistent 

position 

Negatives: Reduced 

control to protect security interests near China’s 

coast

Potential Positions for China’s “Near Seas” and “Far Seas” Operations
84 china maritime studies

From an analysis of these options, it is reasonable to conclude that China’s national interests would be best protected if it adopted a consistent, liberal position on maritime freedom. However, the potential loss of control in the “near seas” will remain a big obstacle 

for Chinese policy makers as they consider this option. How have the United States and 

other countries balanced the competing interests of freedom and security? 

The Coexistence of Maritime Security and Freedom 

As outlined above, the one perceived risk for China of adopting a consistent, liberal 

position on maritime freedom is the lessening of control to protect security interests 

in its “near seas.” That risk, however, can be mitigated via lawful means in the existing 

rules-based order. 

Make no mistake—a nation may identify security interests in waters adjacent to its land 

territory. For example, in a region proximate to American territory (i.e., the Arctic), the 

United States has stated that it has “broad and fundamental national security interests.”70

At the same time, however, the U.S. document Arctic Region Policy opens with an overarching caveat that this policy “shall be implemented in a manner consistent . . . with 

customary international law as recognized by the United States, including with respect 

to the law of the sea.” Regarding security interests of coastal states, the negotiating history of UNCLOS is clear: though a handful of nations attempted to insert a reference to 

the coastal state’s security interests in the “due regard” clause of the EEZ, that effort was 

roundly defeated during the negotiations.71 Thus, states such as the United States and 

China may have security interests in and over the waters adjacent to their respective land 

territories, but they must find ways to protect those security interests legally, without 

violating the maritime freedom of other nations. 

One proper way for a coastal state to preserve its security interest without violating the 

maritime freedoms of other states is to exercise its own freedoms. Of note, the freedoms 

of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea reflected 

in UNCLOS are afforded to “all States,” including to coastal states.72 Just as a foreign 

military vessel or aircraft may conduct operations or activities in and over the EEZ of a 

coastal state, so too may that coastal state intercept foreign military vessels and aircraft 

operating in those same areas.73 Consequently, the U.S. military maintains and occasionally exercises the right to intercept foreign military vessels and aircraft, like those from 

Russia, that are conducting operations in and over the U.S. maritime zones. At the same 

time, the United States is committed to a just international order that emphasizes not 

only the rights of nations but also their responsibilities.74 Such responsibilities include 

the obligation of all states to exercise “due regard” for foreign vessels and aircraft exercising their lawful freedoms and uses in and over a coastal state’s EEZ. The negotiating 

history of UNCLOS shows that the standard of due regard requires all states “to refrain 
beyond the wall 85

from activities that interfere with the exercise of ” other states’ freedoms.75 In particular, 

this means nations must comply with other safety obligations, such as those reflected in 

the COLREGs, and other internationally developed safety and communications standards, such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). In short, freedom of 

navigation and safety of navigation go hand in hand. Therefore, the freedoms of a nation 

are at risk when a coastal state authorizes, or fails to punish the masters and crews of 

its government and flagged vessels for, unsafe navigational practices that jeopardize the 

lives, property, and freedom of navigation of vessels and aircraft from other states. 

The existing maritime rule set was not dictated by any single nation but rather was developed by the community of nations in a fair, just, and orderly process over an extended 

period of history. That is, the maritime rule set was developed deliberately and fairly by 

the community of nations over more than a decade of negotiations. The customary-law 

component of the maritime rule set was developed over decades—for some rules, over 

centuries. Together, this international rule set incorporated the interests of coastal states 

and user states, large states and small states, and struck a balance between maritime 

freedom and maritime security.76 There is one maritime rule set that applies equally to all 

nations beyond their territories. Therefore, every nation must adhere to that rule set consistently and uniformly, including in its maritime zones, in the maritime zones of other 

coastal states, and on the high seas. Otherwise, there is truly no international legal order.

Notes 

1. Examples of China’s challenges to U.S. military 

activities in and over the waters of East Asia 

include the following: On 1 April 2001, a PRC 

PLA Air Force fighter collided with a U.S. Navy 

EP-3 approximately fifty miles southeast of 

Hainan Island; Elisabeth Rosenthal and David E. 

Sanger, “U.S. Plane in China after It Collides with 

Chinese Jet,” New York Times, 2 April 2001. On 9 

March 2009, one PLA Navy ship, two PRC government civilian vessels, and two PRC-flagged 

fishing vessels surrounded the surveillance ship 

USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) approximately 

seventy-five miles south of Hainan Island; “U.S. 

Accuses the Chinese of Harassing Naval Vessel,” 

New York Times, 9 March 2009. In June 2010, 

when the U.S. military announced plans to 

conduct combined exercises with Republic of 

Korea (ROK) forces in the Yellow Sea to demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance 

following the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea’s unprovoked sinking of ROKS Cheonan,

a spokesman for the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs (MFA) stated, “We firmly oppose foreign 

military vessels and planes conducting activities 

in the Yellow Sea and China’s coastal waters that 

undermine China’s security interests”; Patrick 

Goodenough, “China Bristles at Prospect of U.S. 

Aircraft Carrier in the Yellow Sea,” CNSNews

.com, 12 July 2010.

2. See, e.g., Peter Dutton, Scouting, Signaling, 

and Gatekeeping: Chinese Naval Operations 

in Japanese Waters and the International Law 

Implications, China Maritime Study 2 (Newport, 

R.I.: Naval War College Press, February 2009), 

p. 27; Patrick J. Neher, Raul A. Pedrozo, and J. 

Ashley Roach, In Defense of High Seas Freedoms,

RSIS Commentaries (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam 

School of International Studies, 24 March 2009); 

and James Kraska, “Sovereignty at Sea,” Survival

51 (June–July 2009), p. 17. 

3. “Near seas” and “far seas” are not internationally recognized terms but rather phrases used by 

China in its maritime strategy literature; see Nan 

Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and 

Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to 

‘Far Seas,’” Asian Security 5, no. 3 (1 May 2009). 

Therefore, throughout this paper both phrases 

will be given in quotation marks, to denote that 

status.

4. Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 

(promulgated by the Standing Committee of the 

National People’s Congress, 25 February 1992, 
86 china maritime studies

effective 25 February 1992) [hereafter Law on the 

Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone], art. 2. See 

Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of the Territorial 

Sea (15 May 1996) [hereafter Declaration on the 

Baselines of the Territorial Sea], available at www

.un.org/.

5. For the Paracels, see Declaration on the Baselines 

of the Territorial Sea. For the Diaoyus, see Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic 

of China on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of 

Diaoyu Dao and Its Affiliated Islands (10 September 2012).

6. See, e.g., “China Warns on South China Sea Oil,” 

Economic Times, 15 September 2011, quoting 

an MFA spokesperson: “I would like to reaffirm 

that China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over 

the South China Sea and the island[s]” [emphasis 

added]. For meaning of the nine-dashed line, see 

Permanent Mission of the PRC to H.E. Mr. Ban 

Ki-moon, Secretary-General, United Nations, 7 

May 2009, available at www.un.org/.

7. See Tao Cheng, “Communist China and the Law 

of the Sea,” American Journal of International 

Law 63 (1969). See also Yann-Huei “Billy” Song, 

“China and the Military Use of the Ocean,” 

Ocean Development and International Law 21 

(1990), p. 216; Declaration on the Baselines of the 

Territorial Sea; Law on the Territorial Sea and 

Contiguous Zone, arts. 2, 6; Jeanette Greenfield, 

China and the Law of the Sea, Air, and Environment (Germantown, Md.: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 

1979), pp. 38–39; Michael Carr, “China and the 

Law of the Sea Convention,” Australian Journal of 

Chinese Affairs 9 (1983), pp. 35–36; and Zhiguo 

Gao, “China and the Law of the Sea,” in Freedom 

of Seas, Passage Rights, and the 1982 Law of the 

Sea Convention, ed. Myron H. Nordquist, Tommy 

K. B. Koh, and John Norton Moore (Boston: 

Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), pp. 273, 284–85. Of 

note, at the time Gao wrote this chapter he was 

the executive director of the China Institute for 

Marine Affairs, a research arm of China’s State 

Oceanic Administration. Currently Gao is a 

judge on the International Tribunal for the Law 

of the Sea. 

8. Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 

art. 2; Carr, “China and the Law of the Sea Convention,” p. 41.

9. See, e.g., “Violation of China’s Sovereignty Never 

Allowed,” ChinaDaily.com.cn, 10 March 2009. 

For more information on the USNS Impeccable

incident, see generally Jonathan G. Odom, “The 

True ‘Lies’ of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who Disregarded International 

Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) 

Should Be Concerned,” Michigan State Journal of 

International Law 18 (2010), p. 411.

10. See “Spokesman Zhu Bangzao Gives Full Account of the Collision between US and Chinese 

Military Planes,” Xinhua, 4 April 2001, available 

at wcm.fmprc.gov.cn/pub/eng/topics/3755/

3756/3778/t19301.htm.

11. Greenfield, China and the Law of the Sea, Air, 

and Environment, p. 56; Carr, “China and the 

Law of the Sea Convention,” pp. 35–36.

12. See, e.g., “Violation of China’s Sovereignty Never 

Allowed”; and Huang Zuoping, “Troubled Waters,” Beijing Review, 7 June 2009.

13. Ma Zhaoxu, MFA spokesperson, at a regular 

press conference, 10 March 2009. See also “China 

Opposes Any Military Acts in Its Exclusive 

Economic Zone without Permission,” Xinhua, 26 

November 2010, and Huang Zuoping, “Troubled 

Waters.” 

14. Qin Gang, MFA spokesperson, at a regular 

press conference, 8 July 2010; Rear Adm. Zhang 

Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea 

Fleet, quoted in Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor 

Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part Two: 

The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership 

Monitor 35 (Summer 2011). For a thorough discussion of China’s use of the phrase “near seas” 

in its defense strategy, see Nan Li, “Evolution of 

China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities.”

15. Another example is China’s technological development and military buildup of antiaccess and 

area-denial capabilities along its mainland coast. 

For a summary of those capabilities, see U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: Military 

and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: 2011), pp. 

28–29.

16. Dong Wang, China’s Unequal Treaties: Narrating 

National History (Lanham, Md.: Lexington 

Books, 2005), p. 128 [emphasis added]. See also 

“Jiang Zemin Urges International Law Studies,” 

Xinhua, 9 December 1996.

17. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress,

2011, p. 26.

18. Song Yunxia, ed., Under Informatized Conditions: 

Legal Warfare (Beijing: Military Science, 2007), 

p. 7 [emphasis added]. See also Jin Hongbing, 

“Legal Warfare: Sharp Tool to Seize the Opportunity to Grab the Initiative,” Renmin Haijun

[People’s Navy], 29 May 2006.

19. Song Yunxia, Under Informatized Conditions, p. 

124.

20. Ibid., p. 23.

21. Ibid., p. 24.

22. Ibid.
beyond the wall 87

23. Only six other nations in the world have a “full 

house” of excessive maritime claims: Bangladesh, 

Burma, India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. 

See U.S. Defense Dept., Maritime Claims Reference Manual, DOD 2005.1-M (Washington, D.C.: 

2005).

24. Wang Zonglai and Hu Bin, “China’s Reform and 

Opening-Up and International Law,” Chinese 

Journal of International Law 9 (2010), p. 193. For 

the “bourgeois” legal order, Jerome A. Cohen and 

Hungdah Chiu, People’s China and International 

Law: A Documentary Study (Princeton, N.J.: 

Princeton Univ. Press, 1974), vol. 1, p. 29.

25. In general, China has indicated its intent to 

work within existing international systems. For 

example, in a 2007 report President Hu Jintao 

stated that China would “work to make the 

international order fairer and more equitable,” 

implicitly affirming that China would work 

within the existing international legal order: 

Evan Medeiros, China’s International Behavior: 

Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2009), p. 49 (quoting Hu Jintao). Similarly, the assistant minister 

of foreign affairs, Shen Guofang, stated in a 2007 

speech that “China should enhance its ability 

to determine the agenda and its ability to make 

use of the rules by playing a substantive role 

in all kinds of consultations and the writing of 

international rules. It should show even more 

initiative in participating in international affairs 

and in building the multilateral system”; ibid., p. 

42 (quoting Shen Guofeng).

26. National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 

White House, May 2010), p. 12, available at www

.whitehouse.gov/.

27. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International 

Law, 6th ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 2003), p. 

5; Lori Fisler Damrosch et al., International Law: 

Case and Materials, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West 

Group, 2001), p. 59. For possible sources, Statute 

of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 

1945, art. 38, available at treaties.un.org/.

28. See William J. Clinton, “Message from the President of the United States: Letter of Transmittal,” 

Senate Treaty Document 103-39, 1994, pp. 3–4, 

repr. U.S. State Dept., Dispatch Supplement 1

(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, 

1995), vol. 6; see also J. Ashley Roach and Robert 

W. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, International Law Studies 66 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War 

College, 1994), p. 242.

29. Clinton, “Message from the President of the 

United States,” p. 16.

30. See U.S. Defense Dept., Maritime Claims Reference Manual.

31. Convention on the International Regulations 

for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), 20 

October 1972, 28 UST 3459, 1050 UNTS 16, as 

amended by Amendments to the International 

Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 19 

November 1981, 35 UST 575, 1323 UNTS 353.

32. It is worth noting that unlike some international 

treaties and conventions, such as UNCLOS, there 

is no exception or exemption in the COLREGs 

for sovereign immune vessels.

33. Title 33, U.S. Code (USC), secs. 1601–606.

34. U.S. Navy Dept., U.S. Navy Regulations (Washington, D.C.: 1990), art. 1139; U.S. Homeland 

Security Dept., U.S. Coast Guard Regulations,

COMDTINST M5000.3B (Washington, D.C.: 

1992). 

35. 33 USC 1608 and 46 USC 2301.

36. “Interview Transcript: Admiral Gary Roughead,” 

Financial Times, 18 January 2011.

37. U.S. Navy Dept., Navigation, Seamanship, & Ship 

Handling, course material (Newport, R.I.: Surface 

Warfare Officers School). 

38. See, e.g., Chief of Naval Operations, “Memorandum for All Flag Officers and Officers in 

Command,” 2 October 1976, Washington, D.C.; 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Court of Inquiry 

into the Circumstances Surrounding the Collision between USS Greenville (SSN 772) and Japanese M/V Ehime Maru That Occurred off the 

Coast of Oahu, Hawaii on 9 February 2001,” 13 

April 2001; “Greeneville’s Skipper Reprimanded, 

Allowed to Retire,” Cable News Network.com, 23 

April 2001.

39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 

May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art. 31(1).

40. Ibid., art. 32. 

41. Myron Nordquist, ed., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, 7 

vols. (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985–2010). 

42. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 491–510.

43. Ibid., pp. 558–60.

44. Tommy Koh, comment during Workshop 

Discussion on Freedom of Navigation, quoted 

in Consensus and Confrontation: The United 

States and the Law of the Sea Convention, ed. Jon 

Van Dyke (Honolulu: Law of the Sea Institute, 

1985), pp. 303–304. See also Elliot L. Richardson, 

“Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea,” Foreign 

Affairs 58 (1980), p. 916, and Jorge Casteneda, 

“Negotiations on the Exclusive Economic Zone 

at the Third United Nations Conference on the 

Law of the Sea,” in Essays in International Law 

in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs, ed. Jerzy 
88 china maritime studies

Makarczyk (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 

p. 622.

45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 

31(1) [emphasis added].

46. For arguing out of context, Model Rules of 

Professional Conduct (Chicago: American Bar 

Association, 2013), rule 3.3(a); International 

Criminal Court, Code of Professional Conduct for 

Counsel (The Hague: 2005), arts. 24(3) and 24(1), 

available at www.icc-cip.int/.

47. Dr. Ren Xiaofeng and Senior Col. Cheng 

Xizhong, “A Chinese Perspective,” Marine Policy

29 (2005), pp. 142–44; Ji Guoxing, “The Legality 

of the Impeccable Incident,” China Security 5, no. 

2 (Spring 2009). 

48. United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 [hereafter 

UNCLOS], art. 301 (peaceful use), art. 88 (peaceful purpose), and arts. 55–75 (EEZ). 

49. To date, the United States has not yet acceded as 

a party to UNCLOS; however, the United States 

has long considered its legal regime to reflect 

customary law. See “Statement on United States 

Oceans Policy,” 10 March 1983, Public Papers of 

the Presidents, vol. 1, pp. 378–79.

50. Tommy T. B. Koh, “A Constitution for the 

Oceans” (remarks by president of the Third 

United Nations Conference on the Law of the 

Sea, December 1982), available at www.un.org/.

51. For a comprehensive discussion of the “unequal 

treaties” movement in China, see generally Dong 

Wang, China’s Unequal Treaties.

52. United Nations, The Rule of Law and Transitional 

Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General (New York: Security 

Council, 23 August 2004).

53. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law,

p. 11.

54. Clinton, “Message from the President of the 

United States.”

55. U.S. Defense Dept., Maritime Claims Reference 

Manual.

56. “DoD Annual Freedom of Navigation (FON) 

Reports,” Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,

policy.defense.gov/. 

57. U.S. Navy Dept., Commander’s Handbook on the 

Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M (Washington, D.C.: July 2007). 

58. Rev. Desmond Tutu, “Antiwar Thinking: 

Acknowledge Despair, Highlight Progress on 

‘Moral Preemption,’” Christian Science Monitor,

20 March 2003.

59. P. Chandrasekhara Rao, President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, “Statement 

on Agenda Item 40(A): Oceans and Law of the 

Sea” (plenary of the 54th session of the United 

Nations General Assembly, 22 November 1999).

60. See United Nations, Technical Assistance Provided 

by the Division of Oceans Affairs and Law of the 

Sea (New York: Office of Legal Affairs, updated 

21 July 2010), available at www.un.org/.

61. “Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Shangri-La 

Dialogue, International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, Singapore,” U.S. Department of Defense,

4 June 2010, www.defense.gov/.

62. Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984), s.v. “fidelity.”

63. Wang Wen and Huang Fei, “Rear Adm. Speaks to 

U.S. Officials: U.S. Is Greatest Threat to China,” 

23 April 2010, trans. Brian Tawney, available at 

watchingamerica.com/WA/2010/05/02/rear

-admiral-speaks-to-u-s-officials-u-s-is-greatest

-threat-to-china/.

64. For air forces, Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” 

Washington Times, 7 July 2010. For maritime 

forces, Philip P. Pan, “Russian General Calls 

Submarine Patrols near U.S. East Coast Routine,” 

Washington Post, 6 August 2009.

65. Justin Fishel, “Iranian Navy Sending Ships near 

U.S. Waters,” Fox News, 28 September 2011; 

Hashem Kalantari, “Iran Says Could Deploy 

Navy near U.S. Coast: Report,” Reuters, 27 September 2011.

66. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: 

Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: 

2013), p. 39.

67. See Nan Li, “Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy 

and Capabilities.” 

68. See generally Raul “Pete” Pedrozo, “Preserving 

Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to 

Conduct Military Activities in China’s Exclusive 

Economic Zone,” Chinese Journal of International 

Law 9 (2010), pp. 16–17; Dutton, Scouting, 

Signaling, and Gatekeeping; Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2010 (Tokyo: 2010), pp. 

61–62; and U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to 

Congress, 2013, p. 39.

69. For quoted phrase, PRC State Council, China’s 

Peaceful Development (Beijing: Information Office, September 2011).

70. Arctic Region Policy, National Security Presidential Directive 66 (Washington, D.C.: 9 January 

2009), available at www.geopoliticsnorth.org/. 

71. Nordquist, United Nations Convention on the Law 

of the Sea 1982, vol. 2, pp. 558–60.
beyond the wall 89

72. UNCLOS, arts. 58(1) and 87(1).

73. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, “National 

Security and Interception Procedures,” chap. 5 in 

Aeronautical Information Manual (Washington, 

D.C.: 11 February 2011), sec. 6. 

74. “Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Shangri-La 

Dialogue.”

75. Nandan and Rosenne, United Nations Convention 

on the Law of the Sea 1982, vol. 2, p. 86.

76. Koh, “Constitution for the Oceans.”

I

t gives me great pleasure to attend this workshop on the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). I would like to thank the Naval War College for this opportunity.

The arteries connecting all of the world’s continents, seas, and oceans have become more 

important than ever. However, we are now facing a number of problems involving SLOC 

security. It is necessary, then, that we discuss and respond to these challenges. I’d like to 

share some of my views with you on this topic.

What Are the Threats to SLOC Security?

Threats to SLOC security can be categorized as either natural or man-made. Natural 

threats refer to bad hydrological and weather conditions and all other natural risks. 

These include hurricanes and tsunamis. Man-made threats comprise a variety of actions, 

such as various types of naval blockades and embargoes; threats and attacks launched 

by terrorist groups, pirates, and armed robbers against ships and navigational aids; and 

accidents (e.g., collisions).

There is a saying, “When confronted with natural disasters, man can react and survive; 

but man-made sin is unforgivable.” We do not fear maritime threats or risks from nature. 

Human beings have a naturally adventurous spirit and are capable of avoiding natural 

disasters. With scientific and technological developments in such areas as shipbuilding, 

navigation, hydrometeorological observation, and forecasting, these capabilities will 

continue to improve. However, when confronted with man-made security threats to 

SLOCs, the international community needs to find an effective response.

Why We Need to Eliminate Exclusive Control of the Straits and Passageways

There are 130 navigable straits in the world, and forty of these are major passageways of 

international navigation. These straits are of great importance in the political, economic, 

and military sense and therefore are vital to the strategic interests of sea powers. 

Both history and reality show that the concept of self-interested and exclusive control, 

and the conflicting SLOC security strategies it has spawned, has brought great disaster 

to mankind. This, in fact, has become the greatest threat to SLOCs. Therefore, I suggest 

Wang Xiaoxuan

CHAPTER NINE

SLOC Security and International Cooperation
92 china maritime studies

that the international community make joint efforts to eliminate this “control and anticontrol” threat to SLOC security.

The first step toward this end should be to establish the concept of freedom of the sea for 

all and to develop and manage SLOCs jointly. Doing so will pave the way for sustainable 

development of the world economy and promote the well-being of all human beings. It 

will also be in line with the natural property of the seas as a medium of communication 

between the peoples of the world.

Second, the international society should begin research on SLOC navigation support 

systems. This would lay the groundwork for establishing reliable navigation supporting 

systems and regulations based on a security guarantee jointly provided by the coastal 

states, user states, and maritime powers. Thus, the free navigation of all the SLOCs 

would be ensured around the clock, without bias or barrier, and with certain expectations of support.

Finally, military exchanges and dialogues between the coastal states, user states, and 

maritime powers need to be further enhanced. Military-to-military confidence-building 

mechanisms based on equality, mutual benefit, and respect need to be established as 

a way to promote international cooperation, realize complementary advantages, and 

contribute to SLOC security.

How to React to Regional Unrest, Maritime Terrorism, and Piracy

Regional unrest, maritime terrorism, and piracy frequently threaten SLOCs. Response to 

them is vital to SLOC security. The international society needs to use political, diplomatic, military, and legal methods and means to manage and control crimes stemming from 

regional unrest and conflict and from maritime terrorism and piracy.

First of all, the social origins of regional unrest and conflicts, maritime terrorism, and 

piracy should be eliminated. The international society should strive to resolve the basic 

welfare issues of the people living in the world’s underdeveloped regions and work to 

alleviate world hunger and poverty.

Second, the international maritime security environments need comprehensive management. The United Nations and its specific offices, such as the International Maritime Organization, should make more efforts to maintain global maritime security and enhance 

SLOC security, recognizing them as issues influencing international peace and security. 

The regional organizations should also be encouraged to play more important roles in 

security, including providing security shelters for SLOCs in certain sea areas. International maritime laws and marine commercial law systems should be improved to provide 

legal and system support for management of the global maritime security environments.
beyond the wall 93

Third, “a common but different responsibility system for international maritime security” should be set up. Efforts need to be made to distinguish the responsibilities and 

obligations of flag nations and port nations, coastal states and users, and regional states 

and sea powers for maintaining ship safety and security. 

Fourth, nations need to perfect their maritime control systems and strengthen their 

maritime forces.

Finally, I would like to say that China’s economy heavily depends on the development of 

foreign trade. The shipping industry shoulders the biggest burden of transporting products and resources to and from China. According to statistics, 80 percent of our foreign 

trade by value and 90 percent by weight is transported by marine shipping. The rapid 

development of China’s foreign trade and the continuous growth of China’s shipping 

market have integrated China with the rest of the world. We increasingly pay attention to 

the safety and security not only of Chinese ships but also of the other ships of the world. 

Working to maintain the safety and security of sea lines of communication must rely on 

long-term efforts from all members of international society—no individual country or 

handful of countries can succeed in doing it. We look forward to seeing more effective 

cooperation between our two countries as part of a common effort to ensure the safety 

and security of strategic sea lines of communication.

The United States and China have a complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous relationship wherein substantial and expanding areas of cooperation coexist with ongoing 

strategic tensions and mutual suspicions. China’s rising economic and military power 

raises concern in the United States about how a stronger China will behave. Chinese 

leaders describe a “trust deficit” that impedes bilateral cooperation; some of them 

believe the United States is encircling China and seeking to contain its rise. Mutual suspicions and the competitive elements of the relationship have deepened in the last few 

years.1

 One specific manifestation of these competitive dynamics involves disputes and 

incidents when U.S. and Chinese military forces are operating in proximity in the western Pacific, and especially when American aircraft and ships are operating in China’s 

exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 

Over the last fifteen years, a number of high-profile incidents involving American surveillance and military survey platforms operating within China’s EEZ have highlighted 

this issue. These include the April 2001 collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft and a 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Air Force J-8 fighter, the USNS Bowditch incidents 

in March 2001 and September 2002, the USNS Impeccable and Victorious incidents in 

2009, and a December 2013 incident where a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 

ship cut in front of USS Cowpens while the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning was conducting operations. All involved aggressive maneuvers by PLAN or paramilitary (Fisheries 

Law Enforcement Command and State Oceanic Administration) forces operating close 

to U.S. surveillance and military survey platforms to deter the American assets from conducting their missions. The incidents occurred within China’s EEZ, which is international 

waters and airspace. Chinese intercepts of U.S. military and military-associated units 

operating within China’s EEZ are routine, but the provocative and dangerous nature of 

these episodes makes them stand out. In the EP-3 incident, the Chinese pilot’s maneuvers resulted in a collision that damaged the U.S. EP-3 and resulted in the loss of the 

Chinese aircraft and its pilot. Each incident raised tensions between the two militaries 

Mark Redden and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

Catalyst for Cooperation or Confrontation?

CHAPTER TEN

The U.S.-Chinese Maritime Dynamic
96 china maritime studies

and damaged military-military cooperation. The disputes have become ongoing sources 

of friction in the military-to-military relationship.

These episodes have occurred despite a number of tactical- and higher-level mechanisms 

designed to reduce the chances of dangerous encounters between American and Chinese 

units. Both countries are party to schemes that have codified “rules of the road” and 

have established communication protocols intended to minimize the risks arising when 

air and maritime units operate in proximity to each other. A number of formal militaryto-military dialogue regimes provide venues to address and rectify the causes of such 

incidents. Given that mechanisms exist to prevent dangerous interactions, why do they 

still occur? Is it due to shortcomings in the protocols, or is it an issue of compliance? If 

it is a compliance issue, what motivates China to deviate from established international 

rules and norms? Whatever the cause of the problem, could new or different procedures 

or policies help avoid future incidents?

Operational air and maritime interactions between U.S. and Chinese military forces 

may appear to be a relatively minor issue, but the ambiguous blend of cooperation 

and competition in the United States–China relationship gives them disproportionate 

weight in shaping the course of future relations. Similar interactions between American 

and Soviet forces during the Cold War occurred in the context of a global political and 

military confrontation, a circumstance very different from today’s more positive United 

States–China relationship. In that earlier, adversarial context, both the United States 

and the Soviet Union endured the loss of aircraft and more than a hundred airmen, in 

addition to damage to ships, as an inevitable part of the Cold War military competition. 

Even so, the risks of incidents escalating into a broader conflict and a desire to reduce 

the operational risks of air and maritime interactions eventually led both sides to seek 

agreement on rules and norms for managing dangerous interactions. The result was the 

1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), which provided tactical procedures and an 

arbitration mechanism that proved invaluable in reducing the number and severity of 

confrontations between U.S. and Soviet forces.

The United States and China enjoy a much more positive relationship, one that includes 

substantial areas of economic, political, and security cooperation. The two countries 

are not global rivals or antagonists. Both sides have strong incentives to seek a positive 

future, and senior political leaders in both countries have articulated the importance 

of cooperative bilateral relations. If the U.S. and Chinese militaries can substantially 

improve operational cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, this would 

have a significant positive impact on the broader relationship. Conversely, if competition and rivalry at the operational level intensify, the repercussions could have a negative 

impact that goes well beyond military-to-military relations. In that context, a collision or 
beyond the wall 97

incident that resulted in significant loss of life could be amplified to have a much larger 

negative impact on the broader relationship.

Existing Norms and Rules for Maritime and Air Interactions

A first step in identifying why risky incidents are occurring between American and Chinese military and paramilitary units is to determine whether shortcomings exist in the 

protocols designed to prevent such incidents. In addition to higher-level formal security 

dialogues, such as the Strategic Security Dialogue and Defense Consultative Talks, there 

are at least three maritime regimes that provide means to control interactions between 

U.S. and Chinese units. On the bilateral level there is the Military Maritime Consultative 

Agreement (MMCA), an initiative formalized in 1998 “to reduce the chances of confrontation between the two militaries in the air and on the sea.”2

 MMCA’s periodic workinggroup sessions, attended primarily by senior field-grade and junior flag-rank officers, in 

many ways mirror the INCSEA working-group format. A key difference is that MMCA 

is “vaguer, lacking the detailed ‘rules of the road’ provisions found in the earlier accord.”3

This has produced differing expectations of what MMCA can and should achieve. For 

the United States, the focus is primarily on the development of tactical-level deconfliction procedures; for China, MMCA is a venue to address broader political-military 

issues. 

In addition to MMCA, the United States and China participate in two multilateral protocols designed to deconflict maritime operations. The first is the Code for Unplanned 

Encounters at Sea (CUES), a product of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).4

CUES “offers a means by which navies may develop mutually rewarding international 

cooperation and transparency and provide leadership and broad-based involvement 

in establishing international standards in relation to the use of the sea.”5

 CUES offers 

“safety measures and a means to limit mutual interference, to limit uncertainty, and to 

facilitate communication when naval ships or naval aircraft encounter each other in an 

unplanned manner.”6

 CUES is voluntary in nature and does not carry the same authority 

as an international treaty or agreement; as such, it is not legally binding on participating 

countries. CUES also suffers from lack of an arbitration mechanism. CUES specifically 

states that “the WPNS will not arbitrate disputes arising from incidents between naval 

ships or naval aircraft or from the use of CUES.”7

 Responsibility for arbitration is left to 

the individual states. 

The other relevant maritime program is the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs). Promulgated by the International 

Maritime Organization, COLREGs are international maritime rules of the road designed 

to eliminate collisions between vessels operating on the high seas. It carries legal authorities not contained within WPNS or CUES. 
98 china maritime studies

For the air domain, the situation is more problematic. Universally agreed and codified 

procedures covering interactions of military aircraft in international airspace do not 

exist. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) rules are explicitly formulated 

for the civil aviation sector and also address interactions between civil and state aircraft (defined as military, customs, and police aircraft).8

 ICAO procedures for aircraft 

intercepts only cover state aircraft intercepts of civil aircraft; no ICAO provisions address 

state-state interactions of aircraft in international airspace. 

What does exist is a community of practice developed over decades that provides a 

precedent for potential use in the U.S./Chinese situation. The case of the United States 

and Soviet Union / Russia, particularly following INCSEA implementation, offers a 

good example. “Due regard for the safety of forces” is a fundamental tenet by which 

NATO countries and Russia operate when their military aircraft are in proximity. The 

need for due regard is most acute in situations where smaller, maneuverable fighter-type 

aircraft operate in proximity to larger, less maneuverable platforms (a situation typical 

of intercepts of surveillance aircraft and representative of the vast majority of United 

States–China air interactions). American officials have occasionally commented on the 

aggressive nature of Chinese intercepts of U.S. aircraft, but the sheer number of U.S. 

flights and stated intercepts conducted without incident or comment indicates some 

degree of acknowledgment and use of the basic tenets of professional airmanship and 

due regard on the part of PLA Navy Air Force units and their pilots.9

Despite their individual limitations, MMCA, CUES, and COLREGs, taken as a whole, 

provide sufficient clarity to prevent dangerous encounters in the maritime domain by 

military and other state assets. The three programs yield a robust set of overlapping 

rules and procedures that mitigate shortfalls in the individual programs. They produce a 

comprehensive, interconnected set of controls that in principle provide the United States 

and China satisfactory tools to deconflict maritime operations. The air domain is less 

codified, but a community of practice and a history of compliance with due regard on 

the part of the Chinese demonstrate that deconflicted operations can be conducted here 

as well. The problem lies not with the rules (for maritime operations) or history of practice (for air operations) but rather in the motivations that sometimes drive the Chinese 

to noncompliance with their provisions. Understanding these motivations requires a 

deeper look at the two countries’ perspectives on surveillance operations.10

From the American standpoint, military operations (more specifically surveillance 

operations) within China’s EEZ are part of a broader military strategy toward China. 

The United States seeks to increase cooperation with China and its rapidly improving 

military, while simultaneously shaping Chinese choices and preparing for the possibility of a negative relationship. The impetus for this approach comes from the marked 

growth in China’s comprehensive national power and limited transparency about China’s 
beyond the wall 99

future military capabilities and strategic intent. Given this lack of transparency, a robust 

surveillance and monitoring program focused on understanding the capabilities and, 

to the degree possible, the intent of a potential military rival is a reasonable response. 

Surveillance and survey operations improve clarity, reduce uncertainty and ambiguity, 

and thus work toward reducing risk in a relationship. For the U.S. military, this logic is 

an ingrained part of an organizational culture reinforced by decades of similar operations against the Soviet military during the Cold War, although surveillance operations 

are by no means associated only with adversarial relationships. Such operations, from 

the U.S. perspective, are both appropriate and legitimate, based as they are on customary 

international law and the standard interpretation of such key international legal regimes 

as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Chinese perspective on surveillance operations in its EEZ is influenced by China’s 

geostrategic focus, view of potential threats, and mind-set shaped by a history of foreign 

intervention. For much of the period since the People’s Republic was established in 1949, 

Chinese leaders had a continental focus. Outside of Taiwan contingencies, potential 

threats from the Soviet Union and India dominated Chinese strategic thought and military planning. With the emergence of the Taiwan independence movement, economic 

development of China’s southeast coast, and changes in the global geopolitical environment starting in the 1990s, China shifted its strategic military focus away from continental defense and toward defense of its maritime and air approaches in the western Pacific. 

These approaches, in and through China’s EEZ, were now considered more critical to the 

nation’s security than they had been before. 

Territorial integrity and sovereignty carry significant weight in the political psyche 

of Chinese leaders and of the population writ large. One legacy of China’s “century 

of humiliation”—a period in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked by 

frequent foreign intervention—is an acute sensitivity to real or perceived threats to 

Chinese sovereignty. U.S. surveillance operations in China’s EEZ are interpreted in this 

context, as encroachments on Chinese sovereignty and threats to national security. The 

Chinese have instituted a multifaceted response, which includes harassment of select 

U.S. military assets, legal maneuverings (promoting a different interpretation of portions of UNCLOS and applying domestic laws to these air and maritime regions), and 

a strategic communications campaign with domestic and international components. 

The Chinese argue that American surveillance operations in the western Pacific are not 

consistent with a cooperative, mutually beneficial bilateral relationship and are a relic of 

an adversarial Cold War mentality that has no place in the present United States–China 

relationship. 

The contrast in perspectives could not be starker. For the United States, surveillance 

and military survey operations are routine, nonthreatening, legal, and appropriate. For 
100 china maritime studies

China, they are hostile, threatening, illegal, and inappropriate. China’s harassment of 

U.S. naval vessels and aircraft conducting surveillance and survey operations is intended 

to reinforce these concerns and produce a change in American behavior by raising the 

costs and risks of such operations. This is a classic example of what Thomas Schelling 

described as a “threat that leaves something to chance,”where one actor uses the possibility of an accident or incident as a means of shaping and deterring the other actor’s 

unwanted behavior.11 China views the United States as more concerned than China 

about the safety of its personnel (and thus more risk averse), and it regards the risk of a 

collision or incident escalating into a major conflict as limited and acceptable. As one 

PLA officer stated in a dialogue with American counterparts in Beijing in March 2011, 

“We care about the safety of our people, but we care about national security more.” This 

logic explains Chinese willingness to disregard established rules and norms for maritime 

and air interactions and the ineffectiveness of appeals to mutual concern for the safety of 

sailors and airmen. 

Factors behind the U.S.-Soviet INCSEA Agreement

Despite the very different political context of U.S.-Chinese relations, the example of 

how the United States and Soviet Union handled this issue may provide insight into the 

factors that prompt states to decide to manage dangerous air and maritime interactions. 

Military incidents began during the concluding days of World War II and remained 

prominent features of the Cold War until the implementation of INCSEA in 1972. Over 

this period, dangerous interactions between U.S. and Soviet forces had two distinct 

phases, demarcated by changes in the power-projection capabilities and operational patterns of Soviet military forces. The first phase (1945–60) was dominated by interactions 

within the air domain.12 Air incidents were direct results of U.S. intelligence initiatives 

to monitor Soviet military developments during a period of increasing Cold War tension. American collection operations included both photo- and electronic-intelligence 

missions conducted along the periphery of the Soviet Union and, for a period of time, 

within Soviet airspace. Additional U.S.-Soviet incidents came about as a result of the 

Korean War.13 In total, more than a hundred American and Soviet airmen were lost as a 

result of these incidents.14 Maritime interactions were less prominent during this phase, 

owing to the coastal nature of the Soviet navy and the limitations of its overall capabilities, which were significantly inferior to those of the U.S. Navy. By the early 1960s the 

balance between air and maritime incidents began to shift toward a greater number of 

dangerous maritime encounters. This dynamic was driven by enhanced Soviet navy 

capabilities (including the introduction of intelligence collection ships, known as AGIs, 

into the Soviet inventory starting in the 1950s), more out-of-area deployments, and 

increased Soviet maritime commercial activity (including a large Soviet fishing fleet 
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operating near the United States and increased Soviet merchant activity to and from 

Cuba).15 The eventual elimination of direct overflights of Soviet territory by U.S. aircraft 

and the growing relevance and use of space-based reconnaissance assets contributed to 

the decreased frequency and severity of air incidents. 

The general pattern of increasingly dangerous maritime interactions continued throughout the 1960s, growing proportionally with the expanding reach and capabilities of 

the Soviet navy. Growing concern over the severity and escalatory potential of these 

incidents eventually led the United States to propose talks with the Soviets to address the 

problem and seek resolution. Initial efforts were rebuffed, but American statements of 

concern were among a number of factors that led to a marked downturn in the number 

of maritime incidents starting in late 1968 and lasting throughout 1969.16 This positive 

development proved short-lived, as the pace of dangerous and provocative interactions 

increased again in 1970. Starting with the Soviet navy’s Okean 70 exercise, a large-scale 

exercise involving over two hundred Soviet vessels in multiple locations participating 

in simulated war-fighting scenarios, harassment incidents, aggressive maneuvering, 

and intelligence-collection operations by both countries were once again on the rise.17

However, rather unexpectedly (from the American perspective), in late 1970 the Soviets 

finally acceded to U.S. desires to discuss these incidents at sea.18

Three issues motivated both sides to seek agreement: heightened concern over the 

escalation potential of future incidents, a growing parallelism in the nature and scope 

of each side’s surveillance operations, and a burgeoning détente between the United 

States and Soviet Union. While there is insufficient information to determine the precise 

weighting of these factors in driving the two sides toward mutual restraint, available 

evidence suggests that escalation control was likely the most important. Mutual restraint was especially important given the zero-sum and global nature of U.S.-Soviet 

geopolitical competition (occurring against a backdrop of rapidly expanding nuclear 

arsenals), a competition that produced a tightly coupled system wherein an incident in 

one area could escalate into a broader confrontation or provoke a response in a different geographic or functional area. By the early 1970s the United States and the Soviets 

had developed a shared appreciation of the potential negative consequences of military 

incidents, including the risk of escalation to the nuclear level. These parallel interests developed despite the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union 

and associated intense military competition. 

A number of factors contributed, in turn, to a common understanding of the escalation potential. First was the shift from air incidents to maritime incidents. Despite 

the seriousness of the air incidents in the 1940s and 1950s, both sides appear to have 

concluded that their escalation potential was minimal. Air incidents typically involved a 

small number of aircraft operating in known geographic locations. Moreover, pilots on 
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both sides were under direct and constant command of ground controllers. These conditions allowed both sides time for rational decision making, which reduced the escalation 

potential. However, as both sides came to realize in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these 

conditions did not necessarily apply in the more crowded maritime domain. The previously mentioned Okean 70 exercise demonstrated the potential for large concentrations 

of U.S. and Soviet maritime forces to operate close to each other. Individual incidents, 

which were growing in frequency and severity throughout the run-up to INCSEA, might 

not remain isolated but could instead spill over and draw in nearby military forces. Tactical and operational dynamics in the maritime domain could produce rapid escalation 

that decision makers on both sides might not be able to control. Moreover, the expanded 

global presence of the Soviet navy meant that such incidents might occur anywhere in 

the world. Increasingly, the key for the United States and Soviet Union was not in isolating incidents but in developing means to prevent them. 

The rise of concerns about maritime incidents was exacerbated by the expanding combat 

power of the Soviet navy, which increased the potential escalation consequences and 

may have emboldened the Soviet navy during encounters with the U.S. Navy. At the 

same time, David Winkler cites this narrowed gap in capabilities as a factor allowing the 

Soviet navy to engage in INCSEA negotiations on a more even footing.19

A third issue heightening concern about escalation was Soviet trepidation over the 

ability of inexperienced ship commanders to operate in proximity to U.S. Navy units 

when deployed far from home. During INCSEA negotiations, a Soviet interpreter stated 

privately that “Soviet naval leaders worried that some of these young officers did not 

possess the maturity or the ship-handling skills required for command, and this could 

lead to undesirable consequences.”20 The interpreter went on to state that “this underlying concern explained the Soviet decision to accept the long-standing American offer 

to implement some controls.”21 These three issues heightened Soviet concerns that a 

maritime incident could escalate into an unwanted broader confrontation or conflict.

At the same time, growing parallelism in the surveillance operations conducted by both 

countries and the détente of the early 1970s demonstrated that mutual military restraint 

could produce tangible benefits. In the early phases of the Cold War the United States 

possessed a decided advantage in the ability to collect air and maritime intelligence. The 

United States had access to an extensive network of European and Asian bases, while 

Soviet basing options were constrained. The coastal nature of the Soviet navy precluded 

it from conducting extended, out-of-area intelligence missions against the United States 

or its military forces. This dynamic began to change in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 

owing primarily to increasing Soviet inventories of AGIs and Tu-95 Bear aircraft. Soviet 

intelligence-collection missions off both coasts of the United States, within North 

American air-defense identification zones, and against U.S. maritime forces deployed 
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around the world became commonplace in the run-up to INCSEA, and in many ways 

they mirrored U.S. intelligence-collection missions. The Soviet collection missions 

presumably provided valuable intelligence on American military capabilities and intentions. However, the Soviet forces conducting these missions were just as vulnerable to 

U.S. harassment as were American surveillance units operating in and around the Soviet 

Union and against Soviet forces in distant areas. Increased parity in the scope and nature 

of each side’s intelligence-collection missions and the mutual vulnerability of collection 

assets produced a common interest in behavioral norms that reduced operational risk 

while allowing both sides to continue valuable collection activities.

The final major causal factor favoring agreement between the United States and Soviet 

Union was a modest improvement developing in the broader political relationship between the countries. The period of INCSEA negotiations saw the signing of the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty and agreement between the United States and the Soviet 

Union to begin bilateral discussions on nuclear arms limitations. An agreement covering 

incidents at sea followed these breakthroughs and contributed to this positive political 

momentum.

Winkler highlights two lesser but not insignificant issues that may also have contributed to Soviet interest in INCSEA. First was the vulnerability of the expanding Soviet 

commercial fleet. Despite its vast increase in quantity and quality in the 1960s, the 

Soviet navy still lacked the ability to deter the U.S. Navy from monitoring, tracking, and 

potentially interdicting Soviet commercial vessels around the world. Codifying norms 

of behavior in international waters and airspace would afford the Soviets some degree 

of protection from potential harassment by U.S. forces. The Soviet navy may also have 

derived domestic benefit from INCSEA, in the form of service prestige and political 

influence, as a result of its formal relationship with the U.S. Navy. As the only branch of 

the Soviet military to have such contact with its American counterpart, it could lay claim 

to being a nominal equal to the U.S. Navy, bolstering its position vis-à-vis the other 

branches of the Soviet military in the competition for resources.

Comparison between U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese Military Encounters

As noted, the U.S.-Soviet Cold War relationship and the contemporary U.S.-Chinese 

relationship are very different, most notably in the absence of a global zero-sum competition between the United States and China and a much lower risk of military incidents 

escalating into broader conflicts. Notwithstanding, the potential economic and political 

consequences of U.S.-Chinese incidents are more pronounced than in the Cold War 

case. Nevertheless, there is value in examining similarities and differences between the 

two cases with an eye to how they affect incentives and behavior. We focus on six factors: 

perceived risk of escalation, the degree of parallelism in surveillance operations, the 
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political context of military competition, the relative capabilities of the respective militaries, interservice rivalry and civil-military relations, and the importance of commercial 

shipping. 

Perceived Risk of Escalation. Judged objectively in context of the broad U.S.-Chinese relationship, the dangerous military encounters considered in this paper have a much lower 

risk of escalating into a broader military conflict (much less a nuclear conflict) than 

did U.S.-Soviet incidents during the Cold War. U.S.-Chinese air and maritime incidents 

have been much less severe, whether measured in terms of loss of life, loss of aircraft, 

or damage to ships. There is no clear trend toward increasing severity of incidents. 

(Open-source information does not permit a judgment about trends in the frequency of 

incidents or close calls.) Maritime incidents involving China have a somewhat different 

character, in that there are fewer navy-to-navy incidents and more interactions involving 

Chinese paramilitary assets. The relatively limited losses make the risks in the current 

situation more tolerable to China.

Geographic differences also reduce escalation risk. At present, dangerous U.S.-Chinese 

military interactions are geographically limited, occurring mainly in China’s EEZ or 

nearby waters (e.g., the Yellow Sea). Conversely, interactions between the U.S. and 

Chinese navies in distant waters, such as during counterpiracy operations in the Gulf 

of Aden, have been cooperative and professional. This contrasts with Cold War incidents, which were initially limited to areas around the Soviet Union but became global 

as the Soviet navy’s exercises and operational deployments expanded and were equally 

contentious in all areas. The underlying Cold War political competition, the clash of 

ideologies, and the struggle for dominance between two opposed political systems had 

no geographic bounds. It is unclear whether top Chinese civilian and military leaders 

share Soviet concern about the increased escalation risks caused by inexperienced commanders and crews operating in distant waters. The cautious, step-by-step approach the 

PLAN has taken to extraregional deployments may reflect concern about the quality of 

naval commanders, but thus far the pace and scope of deployments have been limited 

enough to allow handpicking of captains and crews.22 If PLAN extraregional deployments increase significantly, there may be more concern about proficiency of, and the 

potential for less control (and thus greater escalation risk) over, naval assets deployed far 

from China’s coasts. But at present, these deployments are in cooperative settings where 

the risk of dangerous incidents with the American military is minimal.

Common concerns about the risks of escalation (and the importance of reducing that 

risk) do not presently exist in the U.S.-Chinese situation to the degree necessary to 

induce mutual restraint. Not only are the number and severity of current incidents much 

less than in the Cold War, but American concern about the potential for escalation is 

much more pronounced than it is for the Chinese. However, in addition to traditional 
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issues of escalation, both the United States and China have much to lose if a military 

incident turns into a major bilateral political issue that damages U.S.-Chinese economic 

and international cooperation. Nevertheless, the Chinese appear to judge that this risk 

too is acceptably small.23

Parallelism in Surveillance Operations. Although China has and employs air and naval 

surveillance assets, it has only a limited ability to duplicate U.S. maritime and air surveillance operations and lacks the ability to monitor American maritime activities on a 

global basis. This mismatch in operational capabilities means the United States benefits 

more than does China from the lack of restrictions on such activities and that China 

sees limited value in accepting U.S. surveillance activities in its EEZ, because it is less 

able to undertake parallel, reciprocal operations that might yield equal dividends. This 

mismatch hinders the ability of both sides to reach consensus on the legitimacy and appropriateness of the operations. 

Political Context of Military Competition. This category consists of three elements: the 

nature of the military-to-military relationship, the influence of nationalism on security 

decision making, and the ability of the respective militaries to address operational issues 

separate from broader political considerations. In terms of the “mil-to-mil” relationship, the United States–China case has more cooperative elements than the United 

States–Soviet Union relationship. There is no Cold War parallel to such cooperative U.S. 

Navy/PLAN endeavors as counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, joint exercises, 

port visits, or personnel exchanges. This cooperation is a potential foundation on which 

to pursue agreement over military encounters on the high seas and in international 

airspace. Although both the United States and China seek to maintain a stable relationship, most observers see the competitive elements of the relationship as increasing faster 

than the cooperative side. The opposite was true in the U.S.-Soviet relationship before 

INCSEA, where détente encouraged a new emphasis on cooperating in pursuit of common interests (such as nonproliferation) and finding ways of managing competition.

Nationalism, with its potential impact on decision makers, also differs greatly between 

the two cases. In the U.S.-Chinese situation, perceived American encroachments on Chinese sovereignty have produced nationalistic calls from the Chinese public and military 

for tougher responses. This pressure provides the PLA and Chinese decision makers 

incentives to take hard rhetorical positions on the issue and makes compromise more 

difficult. The Cold War produced a very different dynamic, with Soviet leadership more 

concerned about the potential for inducing a “rally around the flag” sentiment within the 

American population as a result of its harassment activities.24 In that case, the potential 

influence of nationalism on domestic populations favored compromise.
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Regarding the ability to separate military and political issues, China has been unwilling to decouple the specific military issue of EEZ operations from overarching political 

issues. Unlike the Soviets, China remains steadfast in linking specific military issues to 

the broader political context; this has made it impossible for the MMCA to agree on 

operational procedures that work around underlying political disputes. This may partly 

be a function of the importance of sovereignty in the Chinese context. The issue is not 

more or less effective counterintelligence; rather, it is tied up with Chinese conceptions 

of the importance of sovereignty and the PLA’s special role in defending that sovereignty. 

Chinese strategic culture favors a top-down approach to security issues. Chinese officials 

repeatedly emphasize that a mutually beneficial political environment is a precondition 

for dealing with contentious military issues.25 The United States, its perceptions colored 

by experience during the Cold War, believes that a bottom-up approach focused on 

common interests remains viable and that solutions to difficult military problems can be 

achieved despite broader, irresolvable political disputes.

Relative Military Capabilities. With its naval modernization efforts and development 

of shore-based antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, China is reducing the U.S. 

military advantage, but this effect is geographically limited to waters near China. The 

PLAN’s shift from a purely coastal navy to a force with more-potent regional capabilities mirrors the increased Soviet emphasis on maritime capabilities starting in the 

1950s.26 The current situation roughly resembles the Cold War circa the early 1960s, 

with a somewhat more active Chinese regional naval presence. Improvements in PLAN 

capabilities have not created the relative balance that existed between the U.S. and Soviet 

navies in the immediate run-up to INCSEA.

Interservice Rivalry and Civil-Military Relations. The INCSEA agreement arguably raised 

the Soviet navy’s status and clout in interservice politics and was compatible with the civilian emphasis on détente. However, it is not clear that the PLAN and Chinese paramilitary forces would derive similar benefits from an agreement. The opposite is likely true: 

the frontline role of the navy and paramilitary forces in defending Chinese sovereignty is 

a source of clout in interservice debates, generates public support, and justifies increased 

resources for naval modernization.

Importance of Commercial Shipping. China is much more dependent on ocean-borne 

commerce than the Soviet Union ever was. China’s foreign trade was 47 percent of 

gross domestic product in 2012, and China has become the world’s largest exporter and 

second-largest importer.27 Some 80–90 percent of this trade is carried by ship.28 Chinese 

writers acknowledge the potential vulnerability of Chinese merchant shipping (and of 

China-bound third-party shipping) to piracy, terrorist action against choke points, or 

interdiction. Chinese national-security writings acknowledge that PLAN capabilities 

are insufficient to protect Chinese sea lines of communication and cite this as a strategic 
beyond the wall 107

vulnerability. However, the United States does not monitor and track Chinese commercial vessels as it did Soviet vessels, and the American policy emphasis on freedom of 

navigation means the U.S. Navy does not harass or threaten Chinese merchant ships. 

The three most important factors that contributed to Soviet interest in an INCSEA 

agreement (concerns about escalation risk, broadly parallel air and maritime intelligence 

and surveillance operations, and warming political relations) do not presently exist in 

the U.S.-Chinese situation to the degree necessary to induce mutual restraint in maritime and air interactions within China’s EEZs and nearby waters. The interservice and 

civil-military benefits the Soviet navy derived from negotiating an INCSEA agreement 

with its American counterpart are absent (or even reversed) in the China case. The 

narrow geographic focus of U.S. operational disputes with China and the limited scope 

of Chinese out-of-area and surveillance operations also pose challenges for creating 

parallel interests that support operational restraint. Some of these factors are likely to 

change over the next ten to fifteen years as Chinese global economic interests and naval 

modernization efforts produce a larger, more capable PLAN that is more active inside 

and outside the region. However, waiting for Chinese interests and attitudes to change is 

not an attractive solution, given the potential for a military incident to damage bilateral 

relations badly.

There are also some positive factors that were absent in the U.S./Soviet Cold War case. 

First, the U.S.-Chinese relationship has many more positive and cooperative elements, 

including deep economic interdependence, a degree of strategic cooperation on global 

and regional security issues, and extensive social, educational, cultural, and societal ties. 

Both countries have a lot to lose if military competition intensifies and damages this 

cooperation. Second, the United States and China are not engaged in a global, zero-sum 

ideological competition; bilateral disputes are narrower and more functionally or geographically focused. The limited geographic scope of disputes may provide opportunities 

for creative approaches. Third, China is more integrated into the global economy and 

more dependent on maritime trade than the Soviet Union ever was; this produces common interests in freedom of navigation, protecting maritime commerce, and keeping sea 

lines of communication open (even if the two countries disagree about some aspects). 

Fourth, China is more concerned about projecting a positive and cooperative international image.

The Chinese Calculus on EEZ Issues 

The foregoing analysis suggests that American policy makers cannot mechanically apply lessons from negotiating the INCSEA agreement with the Soviet Union to current 
108 china maritime studies

disputes with China over air and maritime operations. If the problem is selective Chinese noncompliance with international rules and norms in order to advance nationalsecurity interests, American policy makers need to understand the underlying Chinese 

policy calculus, how it may change over time, and potential means of influencing that 

calculus to produce different behavior. Otherwise, disparities in risk calculations and the 

lack of parallel interests are likely to embolden the PLA and Chinese paramilitary forces 

to continue aggressive behavior within China’s EEZ. 

While the Cold War factors may be of only limited use in the present U.S.-Chinese situation, it may still be possible to structure parallel interests in ways that support mutual 

restraint. The primary hurdle is China’s perceived sovereignty and national-security concern stemming from the U.S. operations in its EEZ. Assuming the United States will continue these operations, the success of any initiative will depend on reducing or offsetting 

this concern. Doing so will require approaches that either moderate Chinese sovereignty 

and security concerns or offset them by raising the weight of other strategic factors in 

the overall Chinese decision-making calculus on EEZ military operations. (The Chinese 

calculus is also likely to change independently over time as the nation’s overseas interests 

continue to grow and PLA operational activities expand.) 

On the basis of Chinese policy objectives, official statements, patterns of behavior, and 

logical inferences based on specific military surveillance operations, our analysis identifies seven decision-making variables. In addition to the sovereignty/security concerns 

discussed above, the variables are intelligence/counterintelligence, geostrategic political 

considerations, PLA domestic factors, global-commons access, escalation control, and 

impact on United States–China relations. Although an ideal model should indicate the 

relative weights of these factors, that would be difficult, because of the opaqueness of 

Chinese decision making. We therefore employ a simple binary model (see the table) 

that identifies variables and examines whether they offset or reinforce China’s sovereignty concerns. 

Intelligence/Counterintelligence. This variable captures how formal international rules 

and informal norms of behavior affect China’s ability to gather needed strategic and 

tactical intelligence and to limit the ability of potential adversaries to collect intelligence. 

The ideal circumstance for China would involve permissive rules for Chinese operations and restrictive rules for others’ operations in China’s EEZ or other sensitive areas. 

PLA officers have expressed particular concern about U.S. efforts to use air and naval 

surveillance to collect “battlefield intelligence” on PLA capabilities and the operational 

environment in the western Pacific. Given the gap in American and Chinese military 

capabilities, the PLA has strong incentives to deny the U.S. technical intelligence on such 

systems as submarines, air defenses, and advanced electronic-warfare systems. At the 

same time, China needs to collect information on the military capabilities of potential 
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adversaries and on the operational environment, including in disputed waters and in the 

EEZs of other countries. This need will likely grow over time as PLAN operational activity increases and expands in geographic scope.

Geostrategic Considerations. This variable encompasses at least four aspects. The first 

involves China’s attitude toward the American strategic role in Asia. Despite Chinese assurances that it accepts the United States as an “Asia-Pacific power” and does not oppose 

U.S. alliances “if they are not aimed against China,” many Western analysts believe that 

China’s long-term objective is to erode American influence in Asia. Successful Chinese 

efforts to constrain the U.S. military’s ability to operate in an A2/AD environment could 

reduce U.S. regional influence and loosen bonds between the United States and its 

regional allies and partners. This would enhance China’s ability to achieve its regional 

objectives, including favorable settlement of territorial disputes in the South and East 

China Seas.

A second consideration involves China’s need for a stable external environment that 

allows a continued focus on domestic economic and social development. China values 

cooperative external relationships and a positive public image as helping ensure that 

external issues do not disrupt internal progress. Aggressive efforts to challenge U.S. military operations in the western Pacific risk unsettling the regional security environment 

and reducing China’s ability to focus on internal development.

Variable Impact on Chinese Sovereignty/

Security Concerns

Relative Weight

Sovereignty concerns Same High

Intelligence/counterintelligence Reinforces Medium

Geostrategic political 

considerations

U.S. role in Asia Reinforces Medium

Stable external environment Moderates High, but EEZ operations have 

limited impact

Shape rules and norms Reinforces Low

Positive Chinese image Moderates Medium, but EEZ operations have 

limited impact

PLA domestic factors Mixed High

Global-commons access Moderates High, but EEZ operations have 

limited impact

Escalation control Moderates High, but EEZ operations have 

limited impact

U.S.-Chinese relations Moderates High, but EEZ operations have 

limited impact

Variables in China’s Calculus on EEZ Activities
110 china maritime studies

A third consideration involves China’s broad desire to shape international rules and 

norms. China has benefited immeasurably from most of the rules and norms in the 

current international system, but some Chinese leaders and scholars want to modify 

some existing rules and norms to serve Chinese interests better. Efforts to articulate and 

enforce China’s position on what military operations are appropriate and legal within 

EEZs are consistent with this perspective. 

A fourth consideration involves China’s efforts to project a positive international image 

as a responsible power that is making positive contributions to regional and global security. Actions that damage this image or that portray China as a disruptive power that will 

challenge or threaten international stability are viewed negatively.

Domestic Factors. An aggressive posture by the PLAN and Chinese maritime paramilitary forces against U.S. operations in China’s EEZs plays well with nationalistic elements 

of the Chinese decision-making hierarchy. This can bolster the relative importance of 

the PLAN in comparison with the other branches of the PLA, affording it greater opportunity in the competition for resources. Nevertheless, the PLAN also seeks to show that 

it can protect China’s overseas interests and safeguard Chinese economic development 

as part of the “new historic missions.” Some of these missions require cooperation with 

foreign militaries, including the U.S. Navy. 

Global-Commons Access. Assured access to the global economy for resources and markets is an absolute necessity for continued Chinese economic growth and development. 

Given how much of China’s trade is seaborne, the PLAN is likely to place increasing 

emphasis on “far seas” operations to protect China’s sea lines of communication against 

a range of state and nonstate (piracy, terrorism) threats. Chinese attempts to deny the 

American military access to select portions of the western Pacific air and maritime domains sets a precedent that may be applied to restrict China’s future access as well. 

Escalation Control. China shares an interest in preventing dangerous air and maritime 

encounters with U.S. military assets from escalating into a broader conflict, but as noted, 

Chinese leaders and officers tend to regard the risk of such escalation as limited and 

manageable.29 So long as Chinese decision makers view escalation risks as limited, this 

factor will have limited weight in the Chinese decision-making calculus.

Relations with the United States. A constructive relationship with the United States is important for China’s continued economic development and ability to achieve its national 

objectives. However, despite the damage the 2001 EP-3 incident did to bilateral relations, 

Chinese civilian and military leaders tend to regard as minimal the risk of a military 

incident escalating to the point where it does irreparable damage to bilateral relations.
beyond the wall 111

Alternative Futures 

The importance of sovereignty and other variables detailed in the above decisionmaking model highlights a number of ways in which the Chinese policy calculus might 

change over time. China’s integration into the world economy is creating new Chinese 

economic interests around the world, many of them heavily dependent on uninterrupted 

maritime commerce. The growing presence of PRC investment, workers, and students 

around the world creates concrete interests that may be threatened by political instability or natural disasters. Chinese naval modernization efforts are also producing a larger, 

more capable PLAN that is more active inside and outside the region. Over time, this 

combination of expanding interests and improving capabilities may produce a considerable change in the Chinese policy calculus, including in Chinese perspectives on 

maritime interactions generally and EEZ operations specifically. 

One way of thinking about the potential impact of U.S.-Chinese maritime interactions is 

to consider how both countries weight their political, economic, and military interests. 

This approach yields a range of alternative futures for United States–China maritime 

relations; we consider three illustrative examples below.

A Cooperative Maritime Future

This path would be driven by the dominance in the decision-making calculus of both 

countries of political and economic issues over military issues. General alignment of 

American and Chinese political and economic interests could drive both sides to establish an acceptable modus vivendi for EEZ military operations. Military concerns would 

be seen as an obstacle to the more important benefits realizable through economic 

and political cooperation. Eventual resolution of the EEZ issue would pave the way for 

more-cooperative military-to-military relations aligned with the positive political and 

economic character of the overall relationship. Four distinct cooperative relationships 

are possible, depending on the degree of compatibility between American and Chinese 

political and economic interests and the degree to which cooperation in these areas 

shapes national security and military considerations: 

• Benign maritime partnering: American and Chinese maritime forces actively cooperate to resolve issues affecting common interests. These collaborative efforts advance 

broader interests of the international community in areas such as counterpiracy 

operations, humanitarian affairs and disaster relief, and commitment to keeping sea 

lines of communication open. The geographic scope of such cooperation is driven by 

the global distribution of Chinese interests and by the Chinese military capacity to 

operate in distant regions. 
112 china maritime studies

• Assertive partnering: Similar to the option above, except that the United States and 

China are much more willing to initiate cooperative actions that do not necessarily 

benefit all international actors. Critics complain that U.S.-Chinese cooperation has 

the look of a maritime “G-2.” 

• Limited partnering: This would involve a degree of maritime partnering significantly 

lower than in the first two options. Strong economic/commercial interests compel 

some form of resolution of the military EEZ operations issue, but the convergence of 

political interests allows only a limited degree of maritime cooperation. 

• Passive partnering: Relatively small overlap of political and economic/commercial 

interests and weak trust constrain active maritime cooperation. However, there is sufficient convergence on interests that one country “permits” unilateral actions by the 

other in pursuit of its maritime objectives. 

An Ambivalent Maritime Future 

This future implies a more equal weighting of economic, political, and military interests 

in each side’s decision-making calculus. The United States and China continue to “muddle through,” with no definitive solution to the EEZ military operations issue. Maritime 

military/national-security issues between the United States and China periodically arise, 

but political and economic common interests in preserving cooperation are sufficient to 

keep crises in check. This future might include a geographic differentiation of maritime 

interactions, with competitive dynamics dominating in the western Pacific but greater 

cooperation in more-distant regions (where PLA power-projection capabilities are 

greatly diminished). The fundamental question is whether this arrangement would be 

politically viable over the long term. As PLA capabilities improve, the competitive aspect 

prominent in the western Pacific might spread and inhibit cooperation in other areas. 

The ambivalent political relationship and limited political basis for military cooperation 

suggest that a major military incident could push relations in an antagonistic direction.

An Antagonistic Maritime Future

This future is one where military/national-security concerns weigh more heavily in the 

decision-making calculus and common economic and political interests are insufficient 

to produce cooperation. The competitive aspect of the military relationship becomes increasingly dominant, though there may be geographic variation due to the limitations of 

the PLA’s global power-projection capabilities. While incentives may still exist for cooperative maritime endeavors in areas outside the western Pacific, the highly competitive 

aspects of the military relationship in the waters closer to China would overwhelm them. 

This could become a new “Cold War at sea” with a greatly elevated probability of crisis 

escalation and heightened operational risk for both countries. In a more antagonistic 
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relationship, the military necessity for the United States to conduct operations in China’s 

EEZ would likely increase, despite the heightened risks of confrontation and escalation. 

To the degree that the Chinese continue harassment of U.S. military forces operating in 

international waters in the western Pacific, the United States might look, in conjunction 

with regional allies, to pursue similar measures against PLA forces operating in the EEZs 

of other states.

A cooperative maritime future likely requires the development of a United States–China 

modus vivendi on the issue of EEZ operations, but a range of solutions is imaginable. 

Some options might involve China converging on U.S. perspectives, as a China with 

expanding global interests and a more active military sees less value in restrictions on 

what militaries can do in other EEZs. A PLA officer suggested in June 2013 that China 

might respond to U.S. reconnaissance activities by “sending ships and planes to the 

U.S. EEZ,” acknowledging that China has already done so “a few times.”30 China’s recent 

military activities within the EEZs of other countries—including naval activity around 

Guam and Hawaii—suggest that Chinese naval operations are becoming more parallel 

to American operations.31 It is also possible to imagine a more transparent and cooperative China, such that the United States feels less need to conduct surveillance in China’s 

EEZ. The nature of the modus vivendi is likely to have a significant impact on how other 

maritime powers interpret UNCLOS with respect to EEZ military operations. Chinese 

compliance with more generally agreed-on norms of maritime behavior might compel 

the handful of countries (especially India and Brazil) with restrictive interpretations to 

modify their stances to align more closely with the interpretations held by the United 

States and most other countries. Conversely, American acceptance of strong limitations 

on EEZ surveillance operations may induce a broader sense of hyperterritoriality with 

respect to maritime boundaries, whereby operations in any country’s EEZ are treated 

in a restrictive manner akin to the regime of the territorial sea. In this case, restrictive 

interpretations of UNCLOS may become more widespread, heightening the chance of 

conflict between other countries. 

Conclusion

The continuing pattern of dangerous U.S.-Chinese air and maritime incidents in China’s 

EEZ is not the product of a lack of clear international rules and norms. Rather, it is the 

result of China’s restrictive interpretation of what military activities are allowed inside its 

EEZ and its willingness to violate established rules and norms to uphold that interpretation. It is not self-evident that this is a major problem. Current American operations are 

not producing unacceptable levels of operational risk or causing excessive damage to 

bilateral relations. 
114 china maritime studies

Nevertheless, it is not clear that this tolerable status quo will continue indefinitely. 

China has the ability to increase significantly the level of harassment of U.S. assets; a 

“threat that leaves something to chance” may produce a collision or accident that causes 

significant loss of life, with unpredictable consequences that seriously disrupt important 

economic and political aspects of the relationship. Moreover, in the future China may 

expand its definition of “unacceptable” military activities in ways that constrain U.S. 

operations. One PLA National Defense University officer has argued that “China sees 

the maritime area as part of its defensive perimeter” and “will try to stop U.S. military 

operations that it views as a threat to its national security.”32 Conversely, if China follows 

the Soviet pattern—which is by no means guaranteed—its expanded naval capabilities 

and operational deployments may eventually produce more parallelism in intelligence 

operations and greater interest in reducing operational risks through mutual restraint. 

China’s April 2013 proposal to establish U.S.-Chinese working groups on military 

confidence-building measures produced a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 

“rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters,” announced by President 

Xi and President Barack Obama in November 2014. The MOU draws on international 

rules including UNCLOS, COLREGs, CUES, and ICAO; calls for an annual assessment 

meeting under the MMCA to exchange papers on operational safety and review air and 

maritime encounters; and is designed to include annexes governing surface-to-surface 

encounters (approved in 2014) and air-to-air encounters (to be approved in 2015).33 The 

bilateral agreement is a good step forward, but the test will be where and how consistently the PLA applies these rules. If China tries to define all its EEZ claims as “territorial 

waters” and the PLA operates by the agreed rules only on the high seas or in the EEZs of 

other countries, the agreement will be unlikely to have much positive effect in stabilizing 

U.S.-Chinese relations. 

Regardless of how the United States and China ultimately resolve their dispute over operations in EEZs and which alternate maritime future emerges, it is clear that American 

and Chinese actions and maritime interactions will help shape broader rules and norms 

of maritime behavior. This raises the question whether a restrictive interpretation of 

permissible EEZ operations is really in China’s best interest. Are the short-term, tactical 

benefits that might be realized worth the long-term strategic costs that may be incurred? 

Even leaving aside the potential for a military incident or accident that damages longterm Sino-U.S. relations, it is not clear that a stronger China with global economic and 

security interests should favor restrictive rules on military operations inside EEZs.

Notes 

1. See Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S./China Strategic Distrust, John L. 

Thornton China Center Monograph Series, no. 4 

(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, March 

2012).
beyond the wall 115

2. Kevin L. Pollpeter, U.S./China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship, MG-143-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 

2004), pp. 20–21.

3. Kurt M. Campbell and Richard Weitz, “The Limits of U.S./China Military Cooperation: Lessons 

from 1995–1999,” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 

(Winter 2005–2006), p. 174.

4. CUES was originally proposed in June 2003 as 

the “Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, Review Supplement.” A revised version was adopted 

by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in April 

2014, as the “Code for Unplanned Encounters at 

Sea,” version 1.0, 22 April 2014, news.usni.org/. 

References in the text are to the 2014 document, 

which is similar to the 2003 draft.

5. Ibid., sec. 1.1.2.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., sec. 1.6.1.

8. Peter A. Dutton, “Caelum Liberum: Air Defense 

Identification Zones outside Sovereign Airspace,” 

American Journal of International Law 103 

(2009), p. 692. 

9. See, for instance, comments by former Secretary 

of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in ibid., p. 706.

10. For purposes of this paper, surveillance operations include military survey operations.

11. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1981), 

chap. 8; Schelling, Arms and Influence (New 

Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), chap. 3.

12. David Winkler, Cold War at Sea: High-Seas 

Confrontation between the United States and the 

Soviet Union (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 

Press, 2000).

13. Ibid., p. 14.

14. Ibid., p. 7.

15. Ibid., pp. 28–40.

16. Ibid., p. 68.

17. Ibid., p. 63.

18. Ibid., p. 68.

19. Ibid., p. xx.

20. Ibid., p. 91.

21. Ibid.

22. The PLAN requires participation in a fourteenday training program at the Naval Command 

College in Nanjing for commanders headed to 

the Gulf of Aden for counterpiracy operations.

23. Given that decision making in China is complex 

and involves a multitude of actors and organizations, each with its own motivations and 

interests, it is far from certain that there is a 

unified Chinese view of escalation potential and 

risk to the broader bilateral relationship. 

24. Winkler, Cold War at Sea, p. xx. 

25. However, in a March 2012 dialogue, one PLA officer suggested that China needs to place greater 

emphasis on “bottom up” approaches to help 

manage competitive dynamics.

26. For a persuasive argument that great powers tend 

to develop blue-water naval capabilities, see Peter 

M. Swartz, “Rising Powers and Naval Power,” 

in The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, 

Evolving Roles, ed. Phillip C. Saunders et al. 

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 

2011), pp. 1–22.

27. See Dai Daohua, “Implications of China’s Declining Foreign Trade Dependence,” Bank of China 

(Hong Kong) Ltd. Economic Review (March 

2013). Dai argues that because of the appreciation of China’s currency since 2005, this figure 

understates China’s trade dependence.

28. For estimates, see “Sea Change in Thinking 

about China’s Navy,” China Daily, 23 April 2009, 

and Bernard Cole, Great Wall at Sea, 2nd ed. 

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2010). In 

2009, six of the world’s ten busiest ports were in 

China; see United Nations, Review of Maritime 

Transport, 2009 (New York: United Nations 

Conference on Trade and Development, 2009).

29. Chinese military officers and analysts also see the 

potential for escalation of incidents and accidents 

in the Taiwan Strait as limited; this view reduces 

their assessment of the practical value of crossstrait confidence-building measures. See Phillip 

C. Saunders, Project Strait Talk: Security and Stability in the Taiwan Strait (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center 

for Nonproliferation Studies, 27 July 2000), and 

Bonnie Glaser, Building Trust across the Taiwan 

Strait: A Role for Military Confidence-Building 

Measures, Freeman Chair Report (Washington, 

D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2010), available at csis.org/. 

30. Rory Medcalf, “Maritime Game-Changer Revealed at Shangri-La Dialogue,” Diplomat, 2 June 

2013.

31. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2013, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, 

D.C.: [2009]), p. 39, available at www.defense

.gov/.

32. Author’s discussion with officer at the PLA 

National Defense University in March 2012.
116 china maritime studies

33. “Memorandum of Understanding between the 

Department of Defense of the United States of 

America and the Ministry of National Defense 

of the People’s Republic of China Regarding the 

Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime 

Encounters,” 12 November 2014, insidedefense

.com/.
About the Contributors

CAI Penghong is a senior fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies 

and the Center of Maritime Studies, China International Study Fund, as well as professor in the Graduate School of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, in China. His research and teaching interests focus on international relations and security in East Asia, 

with an emphasis on China’s foreign policy, security strategy, and maritime security in 

Asia. Cai was a fellow at the East-West Center, Hawaii, in 1992–93 and visiting scholar 

at the Graduate School of Pacific Studies and International Relations, University of 

California, San Diego, in 1995. He graduated from Fudan University in 1982 with a 

degree in international politics. 

Peter A. DUTTON is professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island. Professor 

Dutton also serves as an adjunct member of the faculty of New York University School 

of Law and is an Affiliated Distinguished Scholar at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute. His 

research focuses on American and Chinese views of international law of the sea and 

the legal and strategic dynamics of the maritime disputes in the East and South China 

Seas.

Dr. Andrew S. ERICKSON is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department at the Naval War College and a core founding member of the department’s China 

Maritime Studies Institute. Since 2008, he has been an associate in research at Harvard 

University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Erickson has served as a 

scholar escort on a five-member congressional trip to Beijing, Qingdao, Chengdu, and 

Shanghai. He has also helped escort the commander of China’s navy and his delegation 

on a visit to Harvard. Erickson runs the China research websites www.andrewerickson

.com and www.chinasignpost.com.

Ryan D. MARTINSON is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies 

Institute. He holds a master’s degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of 

Law and Diplomacy and a bachelor of science from Union College. Martinson has 

also studied at Fudan University, the Beijing Language and Culture University, and 
118 china maritime studies

the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. He previously served as deputy director of the China 

Exchange Initiative. 

Cdr. Jonathan G. ODOM, JAGC, USN, is a judge advocate (i.e., licensed attorney) on 

active duty in the U.S. Navy. At the time of the China Maritime Studies Institute’s 

“China’s Far Seas Operations” conference, he was serving as the deputy legal adviser 

to Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, headquartered in Hawaii, with a portfolio 

focused on oceans law and policy, the law of armed conflict, and the legal aspects of 

maritime security. In his personal capacity, he has spoken at many international and 

U.S. academic forums and has been published on matters related to the international 

law of the sea, the international law of armed conflict, national security strategy, maritime policy, and homeland defense. He earned a bachelor of arts with distinction in 

history from Duke University and a juris doctor from Wake Forest University.

Mark REDDEN retired from the Navy in 2012 in the grade of captain, having completed twenty-eight years of service as a naval flight officer. Highlighting his Navy career 

were assignments as the Navy’s 2005 Federal Executive Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and as a Senior Military Fellow at the National Defense 

University’s Center for Strategic Research, during which time he contributed to the 

China Maritime Studies Institute’s 2012 “China’s Far Seas Operations” conference. He 

currently serves as a program manager in the National Security Analysis Department 

at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. He holds an MS in applied science from the Naval Postgraduate School and an MA in national security and 

strategic studies from the Naval War College; he is pursuing an MS in applied physics 

at Johns Hopkins University. 

Capt. Dale C. RIELAGE serves as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for U.S. Third 

Fleet. He has served as Seventh Fleet Deputy Intelligence (N2), Senior Intelligence Officer for China at the Office of Naval Intelligence, and director of the Navy Asia Pacific 

Advisory Group. 

Dr. Phillip C. SAUNDERS is director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military 

Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, both 

part of National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunders previously worked at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he 

was director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program from 1999 to 2003; he served 
beyond the wall 119

as an officer in the U.S. Air Force from 1989 to 1994. Dr. Saunders is coauthor, with 

David Gompert, of The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Era 

of Vulnerability and coeditor of books on Chinese military influence on national security policy, China-Taiwan relations, the Chinese navy, and the Chinese air force. He 

has published numerous book chapters and articles in journals. Dr. Saunders attended 

Harvard College and received his MPA and PhD in international relations from the 

Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. 

Austin M. STRANGE is a PhD student in Harvard University’s Department of Government. In addition, he is a research associate at the Institute for the Theory and 

Practice of International Relations, and he was previously with the China Maritime 

Studies Institute. He holds an MS from Zhejiang University and a BA from the College 

of William and Mary.

WANG Xiaoxuan is the director of the Naval Research Institute and a senior captain in 

the People’s Liberation Army Navy. His past positions include professor at the Dalian 

Naval Academy and researcher and deputy director at the Naval Research Institute. 

His research interests include national security and maritime and naval strategy. Wang 

has completed numerous important research projects for the central government and 

the military. 

Dr. WU Zhengyu is professor of international politics at the Renmin University School 

of International Studies in Beijing, China. Dr. Wu’s research focuses on strategic studies, East Asian security, and international relations theory. His most recent book is 

Geopolitics and Grand Strategy. He holds a PhD in the history of international relations 

from Nanjing University. 

Dr. XU Qiyu is the research fellow in the Institute for Strategic Studies of the National 

Defense University, specializing in regional security and maritime security, and a 

researcher at the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies. He has 

published many academic articles and books, focusing on international politics and 

regional security. Dr. Xu received his MA in 2000 at the People’s Liberation Army 

National Defense University and his PhD in international politics from the Chinese 

Academy of Social Sciences. He worked as visiting scholar in the Institute of Security 

and Development Policy in Stockholm. 
120 china maritime studies

Christopher YUNG is a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, National Defense University. He is the author of China’s Out of Area Naval 

Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles and Potential Solutions and was coeditor, with Phillip Saunders, Michael Swain, and Andrew Yang, of The Chinese Navy: 

Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles. He received both his MA and PhD from the 

School of Advanced International Studies, at Johns Hopkins University.

ZHANG Junshe is a researcher at the Naval Research Institute and a senior captain in 

the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Zhang’s research interests include national security, Sino-U.S. relations, and world military affairs. In the past he was a staff officer and 

department head in the People’s Liberation Army Navy Headquarters Department; 

deputy naval attaché at the Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C.; and deputy director 

of the Naval Research Institute. From 2009 to 2012 he was the Chinese chair of the 

Research Group on Naval Power Expansion at the Council for Security Cooperation in 

the Asia Pacific, in which capacity, along with the Japanese and Indian co-chairs, he 

chaired meetings in Singapore, New Zealand, and China.