United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

April 20, 2006

Before

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 04-2004

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

Plaintiff-Appellee, District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

v. No. 02 CR 583

WILLIAM L. BIANUCCI, Charles R. Norgle, Sr.,

Judge.

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER

William L. Bianucci appealed his sentence of forty-six months' imprisonment

for one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and thirteen counts of

making false statements to a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. He contended

that the district court violated the Supreme Court's dictate in United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We ordered a limited

remand to ask whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence

under an advisory regime. United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483-84 (7th Cir.

2005). The district court has now indicated that it would have ordered the same

sentence for Bianucci had it known that the Guidelines were advisory rather than

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-2004 Page 2

mandatory. Both Bianucci and the government have now filed responses to the

district court's statement. Bianucci argues that the district court erred on remand

by failing to consider and apply all of the statutory factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a). In particular, Bianucci complains that the district court failed to consider

the statutory factor prohibiting unwarranted sentencing disparities, failed to

discuss the fact that Bianucci did not personally profit from his offenses, and failed

to consider several compelling personal circumstances that he claims justified a

sentence below the Guideline range. 

Bianucci's sentence was at the bottom of the applicable guidelines range and

is therefore presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606,

608 (7th Cir. 2005). He has not provided any persuasive reason to rebut that

presumption. First, the district court properly set forth the factors it considered

relevant under section 3553(a), including the nature and circumstances of the

offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need to promote

respect for the law, the need to provide just punishment for the offense, the need to

afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public

from further crimes of the defendant. Second, the court specifically noted that

Bianucci's offense caused a $3 million loss to the bank and that he engaged in more

than minimal planning in defrauding the bank. The court found the sentence was

necessary to promote respect for the law and the integrity of the banking system. 

The court also found the sentence was adequate as a deterrent to others and was

appropriate in every other respect. 

Although it is true that the court did not specifically address the issue of

unwarranted sentence disparity, 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(6), there is no need to address

a frivolous argument. See United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005)

(we will not increase sentencing courts' work by requiring discussion of frivolous

arguments). The sentencing disparity here was not unwarranted but was entirely

due to the fact that Bianucci's co-defendant pled guilty and cooperated with the

government and Bianucci put the government to its proof at a jury trial. United

States v. Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2006) (a sentencing difference is not

a forbidden disparity if it is justified by legitimate considerations, such as rewards

for cooperation). Nor was the court required specifically to discuss the apparent

lack of personal profit and Bianucci's qualities as a father and family man. The

court was clearly moved by the enormous loss to the victim, which was the same no

matter whose pocket was lined by the proceeds. We do not require the district court

to discuss the application of the statutory factors in checklist fashion. Dean, 414

F.3d at 729. "Judges need not rehearse on the record all of the considerations that

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists; it is enough to calculate the range accurately and explain

why (if the sentence lies outside it) this defendant deserves more or less." Dean,

414 F.3d at 729 (quoting United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 472-73 (7th Cir.),
No. 04-2004 Page 3

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 636 (2005)). Brevity does not matter so long as the record

makes clear that the judge gave the relevant factors "meaningful consideration." 

United States v. Brock, 433 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). It does. Therefore, the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.