56182 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 177 / Thursday, September 12, 2013 / Proposed Rules 

Date Document ADAMS accession number/Federal Register 

citation/URL 

October 2010 .............. Licensing Topical Report, ‘‘Gamma Thermometer System for LPRM 

Calibration and Power Shape Monitoring’’.

ML102810320. 

April 2009 ................... Idaho National Laboratory, ‘‘High Temperature Irradiation-Resistant 

Thermocouple Performance Improvements’’.

http://www.inl.gov/technicalpublications/documents/4235634.pdf. 

February 28, 2012 ...... 2.206 Petition on Vogtle, Units 3 and 4 .................................................... ML12061A218. 

April 30, 2013 ............. Closure Letter to Mr. Mark Leyse re. 2.206 Petition on Vogtle, Units 3 

and 4.

ML13105A308. 

July 12, 2011 .............. Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century .... ML112510271. 

August 2, 2012 ........... Comment Submission (1) from Nuclear Energy Institute .......................... ML12216A082. 

August 6, 2012 ........... Comment Submission (2) from Mr. Mark Leyse ....................................... ML12219A362. 

August 7, 2012 ........... Comment Submission (3) from Exelon Generation ................................... ML12230A296. 

August 22, 2012 ......... Comment Submission (4) from Mr. Mark Leyse ....................................... ML12237A263. 

VI. Determination of the Petition 

During normal operation in a PWR, 

RCS hot leg and cold leg temperatures 

are the primary indications of core 

condition. Measurements of RCS hot 

and cold leg temperatures from safetyrelated instrumentation provide the 

necessary input to a plant’s reactor 

protection system. There are no reactor 

protection or plant control functions 

that use inputs from the CETs. 

Additionally, the CETs are not the only 

source of information relied on to 

initiate reactor operator responses to 

accident conditions. 

The NRC has determined that there is 

no operational necessity for an exact 

measurement of core temperatures at 

various locations throughout the core. 

The petitioner provided no justification 

why the precise knowledge of core 

temperature would enhance safety or 

change operator actions during normal 

or accident conditions. Furthermore, 

there are no reactor protection or plant 

control functions that use inputs from 

the CETs. 

Contrary to the petition’s assertion 

that an OECD report supports a 

determination that CETs have 

limitations, the NRC notes that the same 

OECD report stated that ‘‘despite the 

delay and the difference in the 

measured temperatures, the time 

evolution of the CET signal readings in 

the center section seem to reflect the 

change of the cooling conditions in the 

core and thus the tendency of the 

maximum cladding temperatures quite 

well.’’ The NRC acknowledges the 

limitations of CETs but concludes that 

CETs are sufficiently accurate to support 

appropriate operator action in a timely 

fashion during an accident. The NRC’s 

conclusion is consistent with the 

conclusions of various industry 

organizations that the use of CETs is 

appropriate and safe. 

For these reasons, the NRC declines to 

undertake rulemaking to require 

installation and use of in-core 

thermocouples. Accordingly, the NRC is 

denying PRM–50–105 in accordance 

with 10 CFR 2.803. The NRC’s decision 

to deny the PRM included consideration 

of public comments received on the 

PRM. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day 

of September, 2013. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Richard J. Laufer, 

Acting Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 2013–22234 Filed 9–11–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0859; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–NM–090–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal. 

SUMMARY: The FAA withdraws a notice 

of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that 

proposed to rescind airworthiness 

directive (AD) 2008–06–03, which 

applies to certain The Boeing Company 

Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800 and 

–900 series airplanes; and Model 757– 

200, –200PF, –200CB, and –300 series 

airplanes. The NPRM would have 

rescinded AD 2008–06–03, which 

requires an inspection to determine if 

certain motor-operated shutoff valve 

actuators for the fuel tanks are installed, 

and related investigative and corrective 

actions if necessary. AD 2008–06–03 

also requires revising the Airworthiness 

Limitations (AWLs) section of the 

Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness to incorporate certain 

AWLs. Since the NPRM was issued, we 

have determined that it does not 

adequately address the safety concerns. 

Accordingly, the NPRM is withdrawn. 

DATES: As of September 12, 2013, the 

proposed rule, which was published on 

August 27, 2012 (77 FR 51722), is 

withdrawn. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD action, the 

proposed rule (77 FR 51722, August 27, 

2012), the regulatory evaluation, any 

comments received, and other 

information. The address for the Docket 

Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is the 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; phone: (425) 917–6509; 

fax: (425) 917–6590; email: 

Rebel.Nichols@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We proposed to amend 14 CFR part 

39 with a notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM) to rescind AD 2008–06–03, 

Amendment 39–15415 (73 FR 13081, 

March 12, 2008). AD 2008–06–03 

applies to the specified products. The 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on August 27, 2012 (77 FR 

51722). The NPRM proposed to rescind 

AD 2008–06–03, which requires an 

inspection to determine if certain motoroperated shutoff valve actuators for the 

fuel tanks are installed, and related 

investigative and corrective actions if 

necessary. AD 2008–06–03 also requires 

revising the AWLs section of the 

Instructions for Continued 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 177 / Thursday, September 12, 2013 / Proposed Rules 56183 

Airworthiness to incorporate AWL No. 

28–AWL–21, No. 28–AWL–22, and No. 

28–AWL–24 (for Model 737–600, –700, 

–700C, –800, and –900 series airplanes); 

and No. 28–AWL–23, No. 28–AWL–24, 

and No. 28–AWL–25 (for Model 757– 

200, –200PF, –200CB, and -300 series 

airplanes). AD 2008–06–03 resulted 

from fuel system reviews conducted by 

the manufacturer. The proposed actions 

were intended to prevent an unsafe 

condition from being introduced on 

airplanes affected by AD 2008–06–03. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in considering the proposal 

(77 FR 51722, August 27, 2012) to 

rescind AD 2008–03–03, Amendment 

39–15415 (73 FR 13081, March 12, 

2008). The following presents relevant 

comments received on the proposal and 

the FAA’s response to those comments. 

Requests To Clarify ‘‘Different Unsafe 

Condition’’ 

FedEx, American Airlines, and Boeing 

requested clarification of the different 

unsafe condition introduced by the 

actions required by AD 2008–06–03, 

Amendment 39–15415 (73 FR 13081, 

March 12, 2008). Boeing also stated that 

the NPRM (77 FR 51722, August 27, 

2012) does not indicate if the different 

unsafe condition is applicable to all 

actuator locations required by AD 2008– 

06–03. 

We agree that clarification of the 

different unsafe condition is necessary. 

AD 2008–06–03, Amendment 39–15415 

(73 FR 13081, March 12, 2008), 

addresses the potential for an electrical 

current to flow through certain motoroperated shutoff valve actuators into the 

fuel tank. The new motor-operator valve 

(MOV) actuators are required by AD 

2008–06–03 for three locations on 

Model 737 airplanes and six or seven 

locations on Model 757 airplanes 

(depending on configuration); and that 

AD addresses an unsafe condition 

related to Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88’’ (66 FR 

23086, May 7, 2001), Amendment 21– 

78, and subsequent Amendments 21–82 

and 21–83). 

However, the new motor-operated 

shutoff valve actuators have been found 

to have a risk of latent failure. At two 

of the locations on Model 737 airplanes 

and at three locations on Model 757 

airplanes, this actuator failure could 

result in a different unsafe condition— 

i.e., an inability to shut off fuel flow to 

an auxiliary power unit (APU) (on 

Model 757 airplanes only) or engine 

during an engine fire. This latent failure 

is not a safety risk in the other three to 

four locations. 

We have determined that AD 2008– 

06–03, Amendment 39–15415 (73 FR 

13081, March 12, 2008), should not be 

rescinded, but should continue to 

require actions that address SFAR 88- 

related safety. Because AD 2008–06–03 

does address a significant safety risk, it 

is not in the interest of safety to rescind 

that AD. For the new MOV actuators, we 

are considering further rulemaking to 

address the certain locations where a 

latent failure of the actuator could result 

in a failure to shut off fuel flow during 

an engine fire. 

Request To Extend Compliance Time 

Allegiant Air supported the proposed 

rescission (77 FR 62833, August 27, 

2012) and requested that, if the FAA 

decided not to adopt the rescission, the 

FAA provide an extension of the 

compliance time required by AD 2008– 

06–03, Amendment 39–15415 (73 FR 

13081, March 12, 2008), by using a 

‘‘global’’ alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC). Allegiant Air 

stated that the proposed rescission has 

brought uncertainty to operators of the 

affected Model 737 and 757 airplanes. 

We infer the subject of the uncertainty 

involves an operator still needing to 

schedule time to do the required actions 

prior to the compliance time required in 

AD 2008–06–03. 

We disagree. We have not received 

any AMOC requests to extend the 

compliance time. We also have not 

received justification to extend an 

AMOC to all the airplanes affected by 

AD 2008–06–03, Amendment 39–15415 

(73 FR 13081, March 12, 2008). 

However, under the provisions of 

paragraph (i) of AD 2008–06–03, we will 

consider individual operator requests 

for approval of an extension of the 

compliance time if sufficient data are 

submitted to substantiate that the new 

compliance time would provide an 

acceptable level of safety. We have 

determined that no change to AD 2008– 

06–03 is necessary. 

FAA’s Conclusions 

Upon further consideration, we have 

determined that the NPRM (77 FR 

51722, August 27, 2012) does not 

adequately address the safety concern. 

Accordingly, the NPRM is withdrawn. 

Withdrawal of the NPRM (77 FR 

51722, August 27, 2012) does not 

preclude the FAA from issuing another 

related action nor commit the FAA to 

any course of action in the future. 

Regulatory Impact 

Since this action only withdraws an 

NPRM (77 FR 51722, August 27, 2012), 

it is neither a proposed nor a final rule 

and therefore is not covered under 

Executive Order 12866, the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act, or DOT Regulatory 

Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, 

February 26, 1979). 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Withdrawal 

Accordingly, we withdraw the NPRM, 

Docket No. FAA–2012–0859, Directorate 

Identifier 2012–NM–090–AD, which was 

published in the Federal Register on August 

27, 2012 (77 FR 51722). 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 5, 2013. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2013–22187 Filed 9–11–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

16 CFR Part 312 

RIN 3084–AB20 

Children’s Online Privacy Protection 

Rule Proposed Parental Consent 

Method; Imperium, LLC Application for 

Approval of Parental Consent Method 

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission 

(FTC or Commission). 

ACTION: Request for public comment. 

SUMMARY: The Federal Trade 

Commission requests public comment 

concerning the proposed parental 

consent method submitted by 

Imperium, LLC (‘‘Imperium’’) under the 

Voluntary Commission Approval 

Processes provision of the Children’s 

Online Privacy Protection Rule. 

DATES: Written comments must be 

received on or before October 9, 2013. 

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may file a 

comment online or on paper, by 

following the instructions in the 

Request for Comment part of the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section 

below. Write ‘‘Imperium Application for 

Parental Consent Method, Project No. 

P–135419’’ on your comment, and file 

your comment online at https://

ftcpublic.commentworks.com/ftc/

pmcoppaimperiumapp, by following 

the instructions on the web-based form. 

If you prefer to file your comment on 

paper, mail or deliver your comment to 

the following address: Federal Trade 

Commission, Office of the Secretary, 

Room H–113 (Annex E), 600 

Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, 

DC 20580. 


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