Filed 11/21/23 A.R. v. Bar-Lev CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

A.R.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

NAOMI YAEL BAR-LEV,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D080144

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-

 00030596-CU-HR-EC)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Sharon L. Kalemkiarian, Judge. Affirmed.

Naomi Yael Bar-Lev, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

A.R., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Naomi Yael Bar-Lev appeals from the trial court’s January 3, 2022 

order (1) granting the petition of then 17-year-old A.R. for a civil harassment 

restraining order (see Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6); and (2) denying Bar-Lev’s 

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California 

Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
2

cross-petition for a restraining order against A.R. and A.R.’s mother, Victoria 

R. Bar-Lev is the longtime girlfriend of A.R.’s father, Chris R., Victoria’s 

former husband. Chris and Victoria, who divorced in 2013, have two 

children, A.R. and C.R. There are four appeals currently pending in this 

court involving these same parties.2

Bar-Lev is appearing in propria persona as she did in the trial court. 

Although self-represented, we are not permitted to excuse Bar-Lev from 

following the rules of appellate procedure. (See Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 

12 Cal.App.5th 19, 31 [“ ‘as is the case with attorneys, [self-represented] 

litigants must follow correct rules of procedure’ ”]; accord Nwosu v. Uba

(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 (Nwosu) [a self-represented “ ‘party is to 

be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater 

consideration than other litigants and attorneys’ ”].)

A trial court’s judgment or order is presumed correct and it is the 

appellant’s burden on appeal to affirmatively show error. (Denham v. 

Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“ ‘All intendments and presumptions 

are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and 

error must be affirmatively shown.’ ”]; accord Jameson v. Desta (2018) 

5 Cal.5th 594, 608−609.) To make this showing, the appellant must present 

meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to facts in the record and 

authority to support the claim of error. (Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 

2 See D080206 (Victoria R. v. Bar-Lev, case No. 37-2021-00031657-CUHR-EC [civil restraining order issued for Victoria and her minor son C.R.

against Bar-Lev]); D080337 (Chris R. v. Victoria R., case No. D540635

[Chris’s appeal from denial of his petition for a domestic violence restraining 

order against Victoria]); and D080340 (A.R. v. Chris R., case No.

21FDV03545E [Chris’s appeal from denial of his cross-petition for a domestic 

violence restraining order against daughter A.R.]).
3

215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457; see Cal. Rules of Court,3 rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) 

[briefs must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to 

the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears”]; 

id., (a)(1)(B) [briefs must state each “point under a separate heading or 

subheading . . . and support each point by argument and, if possible, by 

citation of authority”].)

In addition, the appellant’s factual summary must be limited to

“significant facts . . . in the record” (rule 8.204(a)(2)(C); CIT

Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 

537, 539, fn. 1 [“it is well established that a reviewing court may not give any 

consideration to alleged facts that are outside of the record on appeal”]); and 

must include “ ‘ “all the material evidence on the point and not merely [his or 

her] own evidence” ’ ” (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246).

Bar-Lev’s opening and reply briefs fail to satisfy these minimal 

procedural requirements. Her statement of facts does not include citations to 

the record and contains substantial legal argument. It is also decidedly onesided, omitting the facts relied on by the trial court when it found by clear 

and convincing evidence that Bar-Lev was disturbing A.R.’s peace. Further 

still, Bar-Lev’s arguments are not supported by citations to any legal 

authority, and several of those claims⎯against the trial judge and court staff, 

law enforcement, and the City of San Diego⎯appear to have little if anything 

to do with the issues in this case. Consequently, we conclude her arguments 

are forfeited. (See Champir, LLC v. Fairbanks Ranch Assn. (2021) 

66 Cal.App.5th 583, 597 [“ ‘Rather than scour the record unguided, we may 

decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged on appeal when it is not 

supported by accurate citations to the record.’ ”]; accord Keyes v. Bowen 

3 All further “rule” references are to the Rules of Court.
4

(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655 [an argument is forfeited if an appellant fails 

to “present[ ] legal authority on each point made and factual analysis, 

supported by appropriate citations to the material facts in the record”]; 

Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game Com. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1043, 

1051, fn. 9 [“[I]f the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant 

defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.”].)

Bar-Lev also failed to raise in the trial court most, if not all, of the 

arguments she makes on appeal, including many she asserts for the first time 

in her reply brief. This is another ground to support forfeiture of her 

arguments on appeal. (See Greenwich S.F., LLC v. Wong (2010) 

190 Cal.App.4th 739, 767 [failure to raise an issue in the trial court forfeits 

the claim of error on appeal].) As explained in Neighbours v. Buzz Oates 

Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, footnote 8, “ ‘[o]bvious 

considerations of fairness in argument demand that the appellant present all 

of his [or her] points in the opening brief. To withhold a point until the 

closing brief would deprive the respondent of his [or her] opportunity to 

answer it or require the effort and delay of an additional brief by permission. 

Hence the rule is that points raised in the reply brief for the first time will 

not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present them 

before.’ ”

Furthermore, Bar-Lev’s arguments show a misunderstanding of our 

role as an appellate court. As a court of review, we do not reweigh the 

evidence or reassess witness credibility, and make new findings more 

favorable to the appellant when a trial court’s findings are supported by 

substantial evidence. (See Reynaud v. Technicolor Creative Services USA, 

Inc. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1015 (Reynaud) [“ ‘Where findings of fact are 

challenged on a civil appeal, we are bound by the “elementary, but often 
5

overlooked principle of law, that . . . the power of an appellate court begins 

and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial 

evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the findings below.’ ”].)

Here, the trial court credited A.R.’s testimony and relied on 

documentary evidence of “numerous social media posts by . . . Bar[-]Lev 

about A.R. that the [c]ourt found to be disturbing of A.R.’s peace.” (See Code 

Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(3) [defining “[h]arassment” as “unlawful 

violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of 

conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or 

harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose”].) The court 

acknowledged Bar-Lev’s First Amendment right to post information, but 

found by clear and convincing evidence that such posts “went beyond these 

rights,” causing A.R. harm. Based on our own review of the record, we 

conclude these findings are supported by substantial evidence. (See 

Reynaud, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.) For this separate reason, we 

reject Bar-Lev’s claim the court erred in granting A.R.’s petition.

Finally, in denying Bar-Lev’s cross-petition, the trial court found no 

proof of service accompanied the petition and A.R. testified she was never 

served with the petition. The court also found that, even if properly served, 

Bar-Lev did not establish by clear and convincing evidence she was in need of 

protection from A.R. Substantial evidence supports these findings. (See 

Reynaud, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.)4

4 In light of our decision, we deny Bar-Lev’s March 22, 2023 motion to 

augment the record to the extent we deferred ruling on certain requests, as 

set forth in our April 12, 2023 order.
6

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s January 3, 2022 order is affirmed.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.