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94–837 PDF 2015

FOLLOWING THE TRAIL OF U.S. TAXPAYERS’ DOLLARS ABROAD: ON–BUDGET ASSISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 29, 2015 

Serial No. 114–19 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DeSAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

ANDREW R. ARTHUR, Staff Director, Subcommittee on National Security 

SANG YI, Professional Staff Member 

SHARON CASEY, Deputy Chief Clerk 


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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

RON DESANTIS, Florida, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR. Tennessee 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma, Vice Chair 

WILL HURD, Texas 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts, 

Ranking Member 

TED LIEU, California 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 29, 2015 .............................................................................. 1 

WITNESS 

The Hon. John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 4 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 


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FOLLOWING THE TRAIL OF U.S. TAXPAYERS’ 

DOLLARS ABROAD: ON–BUDGET ASSISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN 

Wednesday, April 29, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Ron DeSantis 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives DeSantis, Mica, Hice, Lynch, and Lawrence. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The Subcommittee on National Security will come 

to order. 

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at 

any time. 

Since 2002, the United States has appropriated more than $107 

billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan. These funds are 

provided to assist once Afghanistan in building its national security 

forces, promoting good governance, conduct development assist, and 

engage in counter-narcotics and anti-corruption efforts. 

For Fiscal Year 2016, the President has requested more than $5.3 billion in additional reconstruction funding for Afghanistan, 

consisting of over $1.5 billion for State U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID efforts and $3.8 billion for the DOD 

to train, equip, and sustain the Afghan National Security Forces, 

which include the Afghan army and police. 

Congress created the Office of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR, to provide independent and objective oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction projects and activities. Two recent reports from SIGAR on personnel and payroll data 

have called into question how efficiently U.S. funds have been 

spent on the Afghan National Security Forces and how effective 

that funding has been. In a January 2015 report, SIGAR found 

that the process used by the Afghan National Police for collecting 

attendance data, which forms the basis of all Afghan National Police personnel and payroll data, has ‘‘weak controls and limited 

oversight.’’ 

To ensure that attendance data is correct, Afghan Police personnel are supposed to sign in and out on a roster daily. According 

to SIGAR, though, even these rudimentary safeguards are not followed. Instead, it was found that commanding officers have been 


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recording and reporting patrolman attendance manually as part of 

daily food provision requirements. Because personnel receive a cash 

stipend to purchase food for each day they work, a lack of oversight 

controls could incentivize commanding officers to falsify officers’ attendance to obtain this stipend. 

SIGAR found no examples of direct oversight during attendance 

data collection and reporting to ensure that such malfeasance did 

not occur, and police personnel could therefore collect pay for days 

that they did not work. Moreover, SIGAR determined that data 

systems used to store, access, transfer and use police personnel and 

payroll data contained incomplete and incorrect data and weak internal controls. Finally, not even the unique identification number 

issued to each member of the force is being used consistently or effectively to track attendance and to pay salaries. 

Similar issues were identified in a report SIGAR issued yesterday on payroll and personnel issues in the Afghan National Army. 

In that report, SIGAR found that the only control in place at the 

unit level to ensure accurate attendance reporting on a day-to-day 

basis, a roster that individual army and air force personnel sign 

daily, was not consistently used across Afghan National Army locations. 

Specifically, although two of the three units that SIGAR visited 

presented signed roster books, the third roster book did not contain 

such signatures. Rather, attendance was verified by checkmarks 

apparently entered by a single individual. Even where rosters were 

used as intended, Government officials did not observe the signing 

of the rosters, review the rosters for verification purposes, or reconcile them against other personnel or payroll data. 

SIGAR found that these weaknesses in Afghan National Army 

attendance data collection process could result in personnel being 

paid for days that they did not work. Further, it found that as U.S. 

and coalition forces draw down in Afghanistan, the U.S. Government will become even more dependent on the ability of the Afghan 

Ministry of Defense to verify the accuracy of the personnel and 

payroll data it collects. Unless and until the Ministry develops the 

capability to ensure and verify the accuracy of this data, SIGAR determined, ‘‘there is a significant risk that U.S. funding for Afghan 

National Army salaries will be wasted or abused.’’ 

The payroll and attendance data collected by the Afghan National Security Forces has two purposes. First, it is collected to ensure that officers are paid for the days they work and are not paid 

for the days they don’t. In addition to ensuring against corruption, 

accurate payroll data helps protect the American public’s money by 

making it more likely that U.S. aid is spent appropriately. 

Of equal importance is the fact that the data is collected to assist 

the Afghan National Security Forces in assessing whether they 

have the manpower that they need to carry out their crucial mission of protecting the Afghani people and, by extension, American 

interests. SIGAR’s findings call into question how effectively U.S. 

taxpayer dollars are being spent in Afghanistan and whether a different scheme for U.S. funding to the Afghan National Security 

Forces is needed to achieve the dual goals of protecting the Afghani 

people and advancing U.S. security interests in Afghanistan. 


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The subcommittee will address these two issues with Mr. Sopko 

today. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, 

the ranking member, for his opening Statement. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to, first of 

all, thank you for holding this hearing to examine the recent audit 

reports issued by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction on the accuracy of the Afghan National Security Forces 

data, and I would also like to thank Inspector General Sopko for 

helping the subcommittee with its work. 

As announced by President Obama on December 28, 2014, the 

U.S.-led international security assistance forces combat mission in 

Afghanistan has not only concluded after over 13 years from its inception. During Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s recent visit to the 

U.S. last month, President Obama announced that the number of 

U.S. forces in Afghanistan will now remain at approximately 

10,000 through the end of the fiscal year. 

The President noted that the majority of these U.S. forces are 

currently deployed in a training and advisory capacity in furtherance of the NATO-led mission, Resolute Support, that began on 

January 1st, 2015, approximately 1,000 U.S. special ops personnel 

supporting regional counter-terrorism operations as well. 

Given that additional training of Afghan National Security 

Forces is now our primary mission in Afghanistan, it is absolutely 

critical that the Afghan government provide the U.S. and our 

NATO partners with reliable and accurate data regarding the size 

and strengthen of the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army. 

As noted by Inspector General Sopko in his April 2015 quarterly 

report to Congress, ‘‘Numbers matter. In Afghanistan, some numbers have a life and death weight to them. Without reliable data 

on Afghan National Security Forces strength, the United States 

cannot determine whether the billions of dollars it has spent on recruiting, training, equipping, and sustaining the Afghan National 

Security Forces since Fiscal Year 2002 has been spent properly or 

accurately calculate what additional funding may be needed.’’ 

Precise data is essential to our determinations of the Afghan government’s ability to provide adequate security for its citizens 

against the Taliban insurgency and attacks by Al Qaeda and other 

terrorist groups. Accurate data also provides a basis for U.S. and 

Coalition decisions on the pace of withdrawal and the scope of our 

counter-terrorism missions. 

Regrettably, the two recent audits conducted by Inspector General Sopko of personnel and payroll records provide good reason to 

doubt the accuracy of Afghan data. In particular, in January 2015, 

audit reports on the Afghan National Police found that there is no 

documentation that unit commanders are accurately reporting personnel attendance or that police personnel are receiving their full 

share of their salaries. Officials appointed by the Ministry of Interior could be taking as much as half of a policeman’s salary. 

According to an audit report on the Afghan National Army released by the Inspector General just today, a daily sign-in roster 

is the only mechanism in place to collect National Army attendance 

data, and it is not used across army posts nationwide. In addition, 


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the Ministry of Defense still calculates National Army salaries 

using a manual process that is highly susceptible to manipulation. 

Furthermore, the audit highlights the irregular use of National 

Army-issued identification cards. This is particularly troubling 

given the incidents of green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan, most 

recently, and regrettably, on April 9th, when U.S. Army Specialist 

John M. Dawson, of Whitinsville, Massachusetts, was killed by an 

Afghan soldier in Jalalabad, and my prayers and thoughts are with 

his family. 

The absence of reliable data on the Afghan National Security 

Forces aggravates the potential for the waste, fraud, and abuse of 

U.S. taxpayer dollars. It also compromises the safety of our remaining U.S. and international troops in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to examining the inspector general’s various recommendations in his report on how to enhance the 

reliability of the critical data and yield the balance of my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

I will hold the record open for five legislative days for any members who would like to submit a written Statement. 

We will now recognize our witness this morning. I am pleased to 

welcome the Honorable John Sopko, Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction. 

Welcome, Mr. Sopko. Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses 

will be sworn in before they testify. Please raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

[Witnesses responds in the affirmative.] 

Mr. DESANTIS. The witness answered in the affirmative. 

Thank you. Please be seated. In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written 

Statement will be made a part of the record. You are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. SOPKO, SPECIAL 

INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you very much, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking 

Member Lynch, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to 

testify today about SIGAR’s recent work on the Afghan National 

Security Forces personnel and payroll systems, and the Afghan 

government’s capacity to manage and account for U.S. on-budget 

assistance. 

Over the past 14 years, the United States has spent approximately $1 trillion and has lost thousands of lives to build a secure 

and stable Afghanistan that will never again be a safe haven for 

terrorists. Of that amount, almost $110 billion has been invested 

to create a capable and competent Afghan government that can 

provide security and basic services to its people. More importantly, 

the United States has committed to spend billions more over the 

years to come to sustain the Afghan government we helped create. 

Properly overseeing these funds is essential to ensuring that this 

vast investment in Afghanistan does not go to waste. Every dollar 

we spend now on training, advising, and assisting the Afghans, as 

well as, and I would say more importantly, on oversight should be 


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viewed as insurance to protect our 14-year investment. We at 

SIGAR are concerned that managing and overseeing this massive 

ongoing effort is being left to a decreasing number of U.S. military 

and civilian personnel in Afghanistan. 

With limited resources to conduct the reconstruction mission, 

transparency and oversight are more important than ever, especially now that we appear to have a willing partner in the new National Unity Government of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah. 

Because of our draw-down, U.S. decisionmakers and implementing agencies have become more reliant on obtaining accurate 

and reliable data on the reconstruction effort produced by the Afghan government. This includes basic information on the numbering capacity of Afghan soldiers and police. 

Unfortunately, as my written testimony highlights, neither the 

United States nor our Afghan allies truly know how many Afghan 

soldiers and police are available for duty or, by extension, the true 

nature of their operational capability. Such basic information is especially critical now, as we enter the 2015 fighting season with the 

Afghans being fully responsible for their own security. 

The importance of accurate and reliable personnel data to the 

United States and Afghan governments cannot be overStated. 

Every professional standing army or police force begins each day 

by identifying how many personnel are present for duty and what 

their capabilities are. In Afghanistan, this data will also determine 

the overall amount of U.S. funding for the ANSF. 

I think The New York Times story, that broke just before noon, 

about the Afghan military operations and U.S. military operations 

highlight the importance of knowing what is the capability of the 

Afghan forces. 

As the United States continues to shift its reconstruction funding 

to on-budget assistance, it is also important that this assistance be 

based on accurate and reliable data, and that the Afghan government is able to manage and account for such funds. Again, SIGAR’s 

work shows that the Afghan government still lacks the capacity to 

do so. 

The withdrawal of U.S. military and civilian personnel, as I said, 

is making this even more challenging to manage and oversee the 

reconstruction effort. Likewise, audit and law enforcement agencies 

have substantially reduced the number of staff they have based in 

Afghanistan. For example, the other IGs in law enforcement agencies have reduced their in-country staff by 45 percent, and may reduce it further as the State Department seeks to ‘‘normalize’’ civilian personnel staffing in Afghanistan. By mid-summer 2015, four 

other U.S. investigative agencies have indicated they intend to 

completely leave Afghanistan. 

Since I was appointed Special Inspector General almost 3 years 

ago, I believe SIGAR has conducted highly effective, productive, 

and independent oversight. But our ability to do so may now be at 

risk. Just this past week, the U.S. embassy in Kabul informed 

SIGAR that because of the State Department requirement to normalize or right-size the civilian presence in Afghanistan, SIGAR 

must reduce its staff by 40 percent, from 42 to 25 deployed positions by the summer of 2016. SIGAR was told just Monday, at a 


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senior leadership meeting at our embassy in Kabul, by a senior 

member of the embassy team, that that cut was non-negotiable. To 

be more precise, do not come back with an alternative number. 

We were not consulted about this number, nor were we given any 

explanation for how this arbitrary number was determined. 

Now, I am concerned about the impact these cuts will have on 

SIGAR’s mission and on the U.S. reconstruction mission on a 

whole, because SIGAR is the largest oversight body in Afghanistan. 

While the U.S. reconstruction effort may have declined, compared 

to its highpoint, Afghanistan is still the largest single recipient of 

U.S. foreign assistance, and is projected to remain so for years to 

come. In other words, while our troops may be coming home, the 

checks will still be going over there for some time to come. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Sopko follows:] 


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Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Sopko. 

The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

To what extent does the U.S. Government have oversight over 

the U.S. funding that is paid to the Afghan National Security Force 

personnel? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, our oversight is the two audits report, and I 

would highlight that the appendices at the end that actually lists 

every U.S. agency and international agency and their weaknesses 

is very limited. We have no visibility, really, below what they call 

the core level. 

So at the brigade, the kandak, and the company, we have no visibility; and we have limited visibility even at the corps level. I think 

we are trying as hard as we can. I think General Campbell and 

General Semonite and his team and CSTC-A are trying, but they 

have very limited resources and they have indicated to us they 

don’t have enough people. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So at least for those subordinate units, the U.S. 

Government, we are basically entirely relying on the government 

of Afghanistan to oversee the accuracy and reliability of the payments? 

Mr. SOPKO. Accuracy, reliability, and the capabilities of the 

troops. We don’t have any visibility at the company level, the 

kandak level, brigade level; and the last time I was in Afghanistan 

I was told by some of the CSTC-A officials that they are actually 

being told don’t even look down there. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So no U.S. personnel involved in taking attendance, overseeing any payments? 

Mr. SOPKO. No. No, sir. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Does the U.S. military in Afghanistan have the 

resources it needs to help the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry 

of Defense improve their personnel and payroll systems, and to better account for on-budget assistance funding? 

Mr. SOPKO. I would say based upon our body of work, and based 

upon my observations, and based upon Statements made to me by 

senior military officials and others, they do not have enough resources. Now, this doesn’t mean you have to change the number of 

troops on the ground; you just have to think out of the box. Maybe 

bring in people on TDY, maybe utilize better resources. But as of 

now they don’t. 

Mr. DESANTIS. With the pending cuts to your staff due to the 

‘‘right-sizing’’ that you alluded to, what do you estimate will be the 

impact on your ability to conduct oversight? 

Mr. SOPKO. It will be adversely impacted, particularly now, when 

we have a willing party in the palace. We are bringing cases, working very closely with General Semonite, bringing fraud cases to the 

attention of the president of Afghanistan and the CEO. They are 

willing to work with us, and now our resources will be limited. I 

can’t say how many audits will be lost or how many investigations, 

but the on-the-ground truth is now we have an opportunity to work 

with a willing partner, and for some reason we have a decision 

being made to make Afghanistan embassy normal. 

Now, sir, I know you have been to Afghanistan; I know some of 

the other members. And this is not meant as being derogatory. Afghanistan is not normal. This isn’t Norway. This isn’t Germany. 


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This isn’t Brazil. This is a country where there is a war going on; 

we have an active insurgency; we have troops’ as well as American 

civilians’ lives being put on the line. But we have a willing partner 

who wants to help and needs our help. So that is my concern right 

now with this normalization of the chief mission, that this may not 

be a wise decision. Very risky. 

Mr. DESANTIS. When we had the Afghan president address the 

joint session, some of my constituents would ask, well, is this a lot 

better than Karzai. So in your experience, at least in terms of the 

ability to have accountability, you do think that there is a significant improvement? 

Mr. SOPKO. I do, sir. And I am not Pollyanna-ish about this. I 

follow the lines of President Reagan: trust but verify. But this 

president, when we uncovered a billion dollar contract in which 

$200 million was being stolen on direct assistance because of fraud 

and because of bribery and because of actually tampering with the 

contracting, we brought the CSTC-A. 

CSTC-A, which is the military command, we went in and the 

president demanded a meeting, a briefing, and he personally got 

briefed on it. He fired generals; he ordered a new commission to 

look at it. But more importantly, he ordered a commission to look 

at changing the entire way they do contracting. This is good news. 

I am cautiously optimistic because of the new unity government. 

And the same thing applied to Abdullah Abdullah, who, the last 

time I was there, he asked to be briefed by me and my staff. My 

staff are working very closely with the new government. We had 

a very little relationship, very small relationship with the prior 

government. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Great. Well, thank you for that. 

My time is expired and I will now recognize the ranking member, 

Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you again, Inspector General Sopko. You are 

doing some great work here. Although I have to say it is very troubling to read your reports, the lack of accountability here. According to your report, and I believe it is correct, we have spent over 

$60 billion training and equipping and maintaining national Afghan security forces since we went into Afghanistan. Is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct, sir, approximately $60 billion. 

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Now, let’s start with the Afghan National Army 

first. Can you tell me how many Afghan National Army personnel 

we have trained? 

Mr. SOPKO. I can’t. We don’t know. There is no way to give you 

that number. 

Mr. LYNCH. How about Afghan National Police? 

Mr. SOPKO. We don’t know. There is no way to give the number 

because the records are so bad. We can tell you what the top level 

numbers are; it is 167,000 for the ANA, which is the National 

Army, and 155,000, approximately, for the police. 

Mr. LYNCH. That is standing right now? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, that is what the plan is that is standing right 

now, but we have no idea how many have been trained. 


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Mr. LYNCH. Well, we have been doing this for 13 years, so can 

you tell me the attrition rate? For instance, in Iraq, because we get 

a quarterly report and we track this, we know that we have spent 

$25 billion in Iraq and we have trained up 938,000 Iraqis for border patrol, police, and military. Now, you spent more than twice 

that in Afghanistan. Different circumstances, obviously, but you 

cannot tell me how many people we have trained? 

Mr. SOPKO. Sir, let me just qualify. I didn’t spend that. 

Mr. LYNCH. Oh, no, no, no. Of course you didn’t. 

Mr. SOPKO. I wish I had a budget that big. 

Mr. LYNCH. No, no, no. I apologize. I apologize. Our Country has spent over $60 billion in taxpayer money doing all this training 

and equipping and maintaining them. And you are telling me 

today, because of the way we account for things over there, you 

can’t tell me how many folks we have trained? 

Mr. SOPKO. I will check with my auditors, who are smarter than 

I am, but I think that number is beyond our capability. 

[Pause.] 

Mr. SOPKO. No, we can’t. 

Mr. LYNCH. OK. All right. That is sad. That is sad. But that is 

the way it is. I don’t doubt your answer, I don’t. And on top of this, 

I know that a number of weeks ago we had a little bit of a situs 

with General Campbell in Afghanistan because he wanted to keep 

some of the reports classified. We had been getting these reports 

on the amount of money spent and number of people trained up, 

and we had been getting those regularly from Iraq and fairly regularly from you as well, and your predecessor as well, and then General Campbell didn’t want to give us that information anymore. 

That is No. 1. 

I know we had a back and forth, and now they realize they made 

a bad decision and they have reversed that, and now they are going 

to supposedly continue to give us this information. He said the reason I wanted to keep it classified and not tell us or the American 

people was that he thought the enemy might get ahold of it, how 

much money we are spending over there, and that would weaken 

security. So now he has agreed that he is going to give us that information. 

But, in addition to that, now he is reducing the number of personnel with your group, from 40 to 25, is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. It is not General Campbell; this is coming from the 

State Department, because we actually fall under Chief of Mission 

rules when we are in State. So, no, it is not General Campbell. 

Mr. LYNCH. OK. 

Mr. SOPKO. We are working very closely with his team. 

Mr. LYNCH. But there will be less people tracking this information for us, doing oversight? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. LYNCH. And just so you know, Congress is also subject to 

limitations getting in there now, as well, so we are doing less oversight because of the limitations of assets there, we are told. So we 

can’t do that oversight anymore. That is a troubling development. 

With the amount of money we are spending over there, it is a disgrace that we don’t have an accountable system. I think a lot of 

this money is being stolen. 


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We are having a fight in Congress right now over the budget 

about how much money our overseas contingency operations should 

get, and here is all this money being stolen. I commend you on 

your work. We just have to figure out a way to stop this. Maybe 

it is coming to a point where we just stop all the funding going over 

there, and that is the way we solve this. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SOPKO. Could I respond, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. HICE [presiding]. Yes, sir, please. 

Mr. LYNCH. Please. 

Mr. SOPKO. Mr. Lynch, my only concern about that, and I can 

understand your frustration, the reality of the situation on the 

ground is, if we stop funding, probably the Afghan National Security Forces will collapse, the Afghan government will collapse, and 

the entire $1 trillion investment will be lost. So I caution you, sir, 

on that. 

Mr. LYNCH. We will visit that again, but thank you. I appreciate 

that. 

Mr. HICE. The gentleman yields back. 

The chair will now recognize himself for 5 minutes. 

Along these lines of the attendance records that you have referenced a few times, this certainly goes far beyond just mismanagement of taxpayer dollars. There is obviously a lot at stake in all 

of this figuring. When the U.S. and Afghan officials are planning 

offensive or defensive military operations and they have inaccurate 

numbers with which they are working with in terms of personnel 

and whatever location they are, what are the national security implications? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, the most serious implication would be that a 

corps or a kandak or brigade would be a hollow brigade that 

doesn’t really exist. And I can only allude to, although it is not a 

totally exact comparison, but to what happened in Iraq, where it 

was discovered that those were hollow brigades and that a lot of 

the troops were ghost, they didn’t exist; they were created out of 

thin air so that the officers could steal the salary and steal everything else. So I assume that is the biggest concern that we would 

have and you would have, and General Campbell would have. 

The other concern is if we don’t know who is showing up, we 

don’t know what their qualifications are. Are they medics? Are they 

trained medics? Are they literate? Are they weapons specialists and 

all that? They may just not exist. 

And you know as well as I do, if you are in the military, you have 

a roll call every morning. Well, we don’t have basic roll call. We 

don’t know who shows up at that roll call. And the same applies 

to the police. 

I know we have incidents right now in Baltimore. I am certain 

every morning in Baltimore there is a roll call in every one of those 

precincts so the chief of the police, the station precinct knows who 

is there. We don’t know in Afghanistan. 

Mr. HICE. Well, obviously, the results of that could be enormous, 

and you referenced the trillion dollar investment. How is the Afghan National Security Forces operating right now, in this season, 

without U.S. military support, are they holding? 


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Mr. SOPKO. I am probably not the best person to answer that, 

but on my latest meetings over in Afghanistan we had positive responses from General Campbell on their operations. But I am not 

an expert and we don’t have the capability to actually do that assessment. 

But apparently they had a very good or pretty good operation in 

Helmut. They now are up north in, I believe, the Kunduz Valley 

and doing an operation. I don’t know how well they are doing, I 

can’t really tell you. There was some newspaper articles recently 

about that from the local press which gave you mixed results. And 

I think The New York Times article actually talked about that we 

may be coming back in to help the Afghans. 

This is an important year, sir. I can just say that. 

Mr. HICE. I would certainly agree with you. You mentioned also 

fraud and bribery. Just how deep is the corruption? 

Mr. SOPKO. Oh, I think the corruption is endemic in the country. 

I think President Ashraf Ghani recognizes it, and the CEO, and 

they are trying to do something about it, and that is why it is so 

critical now to be working with that government. We actually have 

a willing partner for a change, so we are hopeful that more can be 

done. But it is an overwhelming task. 

Mr. HICE. So with the corruption, though, that is there, although 

there appears to be attempts to correct some of it, can they be 

trusted to conduct oversight of salary payments, attendance, that 

type of thing? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, that is why we are encouraged that General 

Semonite and his team are trying to design a system that will protect the money and protect the contracts, and that is why we are 

encouraged that we are working with General Semonite on our 

team with the palace on trying to design contracts and design a 

system that can make a difference. 

Mr. HICE. Are we talking an electronic system? 

Mr. SOPKO. Electronic systems where we can—I was very encouraged. Yesterday my staff received a 4-hour briefing from a member 

of the Pentagon. They finally decided they have heard us and they 

are bringing in experts who know how to design H.R. systems. 

They have never done that before. 

Basically, General Semonite and his team have been doing the 

best they can, but they are war fighters. We finally have convinced 

the Pentagon to devote the resources to design an H.R. system. 

This should have been done years ago. They didn’t. Well, now we 

have an opportunity and a willing government to respond, so I am 

encouraged by that. 

Mr. HICE. Well, you would think as long as the U.S. is making 

so many of the payments for personnel and so forth, that, with the 

money flow going in, they would want that relationship to be 

healthy and that they would want to address some of the abuse, 

the fraud, and that type of thing. Is that an accurate assessment? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. The new government is interested in that, and 

they have not only spoken on it, but actually carried out some 

deeds that we are impressed with. So, again, trust but verify. But 

at least with the National Unity Government we have somebody 

who is very willing to change the way things have worked in Afghanistan for a number of years. 


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Mr. HICE. All right, sir, thank you. My time has expired. 

The chair will now recognize the representative from Michigan, 

Mrs. Lawrence, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, Mr. Sopko, for being here today. Ensuring that the 

daily attendance of Afghan police and military personnel is collected and recorded in an accurate manner is essential. I do want 

to say about your Statement that an H.R. system is put into place, 

my career prior to coming here to Congress involved almost 30 

years in HR. So I find it unacceptable and hard to understand how 

we are paying people without having an H.R. system that validates 

who we are paying. 

But with that being said, we know we can’t have an effective personnel and payroll system if we don’t know who showed up for 

work, simple roll call, and how often they were there. You agree, 

you made that Statement. So let’s look at the ANA signature reporting for a moment. 

In the report being released today, SIGAR found that the only 

control in place at the unit level to ensure accurate reporting on 

a day-to-day basis was a sign-in roster. Do I have that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct, ma’am. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. But this roster was not used by everyone. As I 

understand it, officers used it, but enlisted personnel did not. 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. OK. I also understand that SIGAR found that 

the ANA-issued identification numbers are not consistently used to 

track attendance. Is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct also, ma’am. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. But is it a fact that all of the personnel are actually issued an identification number? 

Mr. SOPKO. We don’t know for sure. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. OK. So I know that SIGAR visited two military 

units and reviewed their roster books. I understand what you 

found regarding the lack of oversight and weakness in data collection was concerning, and you have kind of outlined it. These weaknesses in attendance data collection process could result in personnel being paid our Federal tax dollars, being paid for days, for 

work that didn’t happen either without knowledge of a supervisory 

personnel. 

Make me understand and State again how can we pay someone 

and the supervisory personnel is not connected with that payment. 

Can you explain that to me? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, there are multiple payroll systems; there are 

multiple electronic systems that don’t talk to each other. We assume if you are an employee you have an ID card. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Yes. 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, it turns out that they are not all issued cards; 

the cards aren’t always put into the system. It also turned out that 

they have never collected any of the cards of the people who have 

left. And that is serious not from a security point of view, which 

I think the chairman alluded to, but you have people walking 

around with ANA Army ID cards and police ID cards in the country, meaning you can sign them up and collect. 


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It is hard to explain how messed up this system is. If you look 

at the appendices, we listed—I am not trying to defend the system. 

This is something that has been identified going back years by the 

GAO, DOD IG, State Department IG, we have done it three times. 

Finally I think we have gotten their attention. By we, I think the 

Afghans want to fix it because I think they are concerned. I can’t 

speak for the president, but I believe he is concerned that he 

doesn’t know how many soldiers he has out in such a province. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Now, I have only a few minutes, so can you 

please tell me how the recommendations that are being made with 

the subcommittee would improve things? Can you tell me your 

sense of expectation? 

Mr. SOPKO. Essentially all of our recommendations to DOD have 

been accepted and they are moving on them, so we are encouraged 

by that. Our recommendations to you and the committee is to keep 

watching DOD, and bring us back and bring them in, if necessary, 

to see if they are implemented. They have promised to do this. 

Trust but verify. Let’s see if they do it. 

Importantly, I think you have to look at the staffing and capabilities of our military in Afghanistan and whether they have adequate 

resources to do this. When we did our audits, we talked to our military, and they basically told us they don’t have the bodies to do 

adequate oversight. That is why we are doubly concerned that the 

largest oversight body of the U.S. Government is being cut by 45 

percent in Afghanistan, by the State Department, without consultation. 

And the other issue is we are an independent inspector general. 

Since 1978, independent inspectors general determined their staffing level and where they are located. Now we get an edict from the 

State Department that basically says this is your number, live with 

it. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. I want to tell you thank you so much for your 

testimony, and you have my commitment that I will join with the 

members of this subcommittee to keep an eye on it. Thank you. 

I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The chair will now recognize the ranking member from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for five more minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Maybe in this overseas contingency operation we can put an 

amendment in that would maintain the current level of oversight 

by the Special Inspector General in Afghanistan. We could try to 

do something like that. 

Mr. SOPKO. We would appreciate any help you can provide us, 

sir. And I am certain my other brethren and the other IGs would 

appreciate that help too. 

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Absolutely. 

The $61 billion that the American taxpayer has paid so far, and 

that is as of March 31, 2015, does that include the $900 million 

that was stolen out of Kabul Bank? That was also for paying personnel; that was salaries. 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, technically, that money was generated by the 

Afghans. 


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Mr. LYNCH. That is the third version I have heard. I actually 

went to a classified briefing in Afghanistan. I have been there 14 

times, I think, but one of my earliest ones after they robbed the 

bank, this is the president’s brother and the vice president’s brother, this is when the $900 million went missing, I was told at a classified briefing then that none of that was U.S. money. Then, a couple years later, I was told all of it was U.S. money. So maybe you 

can enlighten me a little bit on whose money was that. 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, the best way to explain it is in one of our 

charts we talk about how we lose visibility over—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. I only have 3 minutes. 

Mr. SOPKO. OK. I will do it quickly. Once the money goes to salaries, it is the Ministry of Finance, it is no longer U.S. money. 

Mr. LYNCH. They are not getting it from tax money; they are getting it from donors. 

Mr. SOPKO. I agree totally with you, sir. They only raised $2 billion, and it cost $8 to $10 billion to keep that country afloat. So 

it is mainly being supported by us. 

Mr. LYNCH. OK. 

Mr. SOPKO. That is why it is so critical. And I know I don’t want 

to take your time, Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. You already have, my friend. 

Mr. SOPKO. OK. 

Mr. LYNCH. Look, look, here is my problem. When we did this in 

Iraq, we did the exact same thing and we were having folks walk 

away with weapons, sell their weapons to militant groups. We 

came up with a system in Taji, the weapons depot, where we took 

a picture of the soldier when they came out of training, we did a 

retina scan so they couldn’t fool us. We had a good ID. We had the 

number of his weapon assigned to that; we had an ID card that we 

had. And we knew who these folks were. 

Why did we get away from that in Afghanistan? 

Mr. SOPKO. I don’t have an answer, sir, but we don’t have that 

visibility anymore. 

Mr. LYNCH. It would seem to me that it would be pretty easy to 

measure the scale of robbery in Afghanistan of U.S. taxpayer 

money by just taking four or six units. You have the payrolls that 

are coming in, so just pick six or eight of them, go in there and 

do actual ID on them and watch where the checks go. And once you 

realize that there are a whole lot more checks being paid out in relation to how many people are actually on the job, you will know 

how much you are being ripped off. 

I think we did one pilot program a while back. I don’t know why 

we haven’t continued that, but it is pretty depressing that we are 

losing good Americans like the young man that got killed a couple 

weeks ago from Massachusetts, Mr. Dawson, and others. We are 

trying to do the right thing here and we are being robbed blind, 

as far as I can tell from the reports that you have provided. 

Do you have any suggestions on what we can do? I mean, I know 

you don’t want to cutoff funding, but it would seem that if we are 

paying all this money, the American taxpayer, we have a little bit 

of leverage here. In other words, we are not going to pay the money 

unless we have an accountable system where we can actually track 

where the money goes, because I think a lot of these—look, you are 


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absolutely right when you tell me that corruption is endemic. It is 

absolutely the rule, it is the rule in Afghanistan. It is the rule. Corruption from top to bottom, inside out, backward forwards. Total 

corruption. 

We have to try to operate within that system, but not be robbed 

blind. We have to be a little bit more responsible, I think. And 

CSTC-A, as far as I am concerned, they are complicit in this because they haven’t put in place a system where we can catch these 

people, or at least discourage the level of theft that is going on. It 

is extremely discouraging, to say the least. 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, Mr. Lynch, can I respond, and can I take time 

from somebody else to respond? Because I have been stealing his 

time already, Mr. Chairman. 

I think you are directly on point. But the thing we can do is conditionality. We can condition. You are right, we have the piggy 

bank. I have been harping on conditionality for 3 years. I was originally told we could never do that, but CSTC-A is now, we have a 

new team in there which is doing conditionality. And when I met 

with the president of Afghanistan, he said he believes in conditionality; he will go along with conditionality. So the reality on the 

ground has changed a little bit, and that is why I am cautiously 

optimistic. 

I am usually Dr. Doom, but I am cautiously optimistic. That is 

why it is counterintuitive to now cut oversight, to cut our resources 

to the bone in the State Department, at AID, as well as with the 

military, who have to oversee all this money. 

The Secretary of Defense just announced he wants to increase 

our support for the military in Afghanistan by 50 percent, a 50 percent military increase. Well, that means more money, more guns, 

more contracts. You are not increasing CSTC-A at all. So that is 

the disconnect. 

You know, we can’t do programs by press release, and that is the 

problem here. 

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Chairman, you have been very generous and indulgent, and I appreciate that. Thank you. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you very much. 

Votes have been called, so we are going to need to hurry up. I 

do have another couple of quick questions, if you could be quick on 

your responses. 

Are you familiar with the new embassy construction project? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. 

Mr. HICE. OK. From what I understand, there are ballooning 

costs taking place. There are a thousand desks, for instance, in 

that embassy, according to the GAO’s briefing last year. And yet 

you described a moment ago 40 percent cuts. How do we equalize 

this? Is there a way to? 

Mr. SOPKO. There is a way to equalize it, but I think you have 

to do it smartly. I think putting a number out of the air and dictating it is not the way you do this. That is not the way you would 

do it in business. I don’t know why we are doing it in Afghanistan, 

by pulling a number, not just for me, but for everybody else, and 

saying design a program around it. We should look at what our 

program needs are and then design the number of bodies to fit 

that. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HICE. How does this fit with our oversight over our direct assistance? 

Mr. SOPKO. The building, sir? 

Mr. HICE. Yes, the whole complex. 

Mr. SOPKO. Oh, the complex? I will be honest with you. That 

complex is something we haven’t looked at; that is a State Department inspector general’s job to look at that. I think he is actually 

reviewing the construction there, but I don’t know. 

Mr. HICE. OK. Well, I know that you are an oversight body, but 

what type of mechanisms would you recommend to have stricter 

control with what is happening here? Do you have recommendations? 

Mr. SOPKO. I am happy to provide them to you. Stricter controls 

for the State Department? 

Mr. HICE. U.S. dollars that are provided for direct assistance. 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, for direct assistance, sir, I think we have to use 

conditionality. We have to design the programs realizing we are 

dealing with a corrupt regime, so we have to have people in place 

to review them. If we don’t get access to records, we don’t get access to facilities, then I think seriously we should consider cutting 

the program. And I think that is what CSTC-A is starting to do; 

if they don’t see the Afghans living up to it, they are cutting some 

of the money. I think that is critical to do. 

But you have to have somebody there to see and verify whether 

they are doing what they are doing. So if you cut all the oversight 

staff, or gut them, or gut all the CSTC-A staff, or gut the AID and 

State staff, then how are you going to know if you are getting the 

money stolen or not? 

Mr. HICE. OK, very good. Well, listen, I want to thank you for 

your witness today and for appearing before us. If there is no other 

business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ 


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