The Honor able Ann Aldrich, United States District J udg e for the Northern District of Ohio, * sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 09a0004n.06 Filed: January

6, 2009 No. 07-5669 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
JAME S R. D URHA M, P etitioner -Appellant,
v. U N IT E D S T A T E S P A R O LE COMMI SSI ON, Defendan t-Appellee.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY
O P I N I O N

Before: M OORE an d SUT TON, Circuit Judges, and ALDRICH, District Judge. * KA RE N NE LSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge. Pe ti ti o n e r - A p p e ll a n t Ja me s R. D u r

h am (“D urham” ) appe als the district court’ s denial of his petition for a wr i t o f h ab ea s corpus filed purs ua nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 41 . T he c ru x o f Dur ham ’s cla im i s th at th e Un ite d St a te s Pa ro le Commi ssion (“the Commission”) err ed in ca lcu l at i n g t he amount of time re maining on his 1983 b an k

- r o b b e r

y c o n v ic ti o n in

th e U
. S. D is tr ict Court f o r th e E a s te r

n D is tr ic t o f

K e n tu c ky . We disag ree , and we there fore AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.I n fac t, Durham’s f irst encounte r wit h the fe dera l criminal-justice sy stem came even e arlier , 1 in 1 97 7, wh e n h e wa s c on vic te d o f i nte rs ta te tr a ns po rt ati on of mot or ve hic le s and

makin g a fa lse statement in obtaining a fire arm. J.A. at 39-40. Durham rec eived a n eig ht-y ear

sentenc e, and the nin e te e n- y e a r s e nte nc e he re c e ive d f or his 19 83 ba

nk ro bb e ry c on vic tio n w a s to ru

n c on c ur re ntl y with the sentenc e for

his 1977 offense . J .A. at 40. 2 I. BACKG ROUND The tale of Durha

m ’s cr i m i n al hi story

and his involvement in the fede ral c riminal-justice sy stem, both before and af ter the e nact m en t o f t h e Sentenc ing Re form Ac t, is a leng thy one. For tunately , the par

ties essentially

do not dispute the facts, and the events of only a short per iod of tim e are re le va

nt t o D ur ham’ s a pp e a l. I n 1983, in the Easter

n District of Ke ntucky , Durham was cha rg ed wit h an d convicted of committing an a

rmed ba nk robber y . J oint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 82, 94. On Dec ember 2, 1983, 1 Durham was sentenc ed to twenty y ear s of imprisonment, but his term was later reduc ed to ninetee n y ear s after

an appe al. J .A. at 94, 96. Dur ham spent the re mainder of the 1980s bouncing back a nd forth betwe en fe dera l custody and par ole. On Janu a ry 22 , 19 92 , Durh a m w a s r e le a se d o n p a ro le su pe rv isi on un til the e xpir a tio n o f h is bank-r obbery

sentenc e on September

22, 2002. J .A. at 101; Resp’t B r. at 3. Durham a g ain violated his pa ro le , a nd on Au g us t 23 , 1 99 4, the C omm iss ion re vo ke d h is p a ro le , c re dit e d h im w ithtim e spent on parole , and set a presumptive parole date of November 25, 1996. J .A. at 102; Resp’t B r. at 4. On Novembe r 22, 1996, just three da y s befor e his presumptive date of pa role, Dur ham
esca ped fr om a halfw ay

house. J.A. at 104; R esp’t B r. at 4. Durha m spe nt 107 day s out of fede ral custody , returningto fede ra l cu s t o d y o n Marc h 9, 1997. Durham’s esca pe led, e ventually , to two new f eder al convictions, b o t h o f whi ch we re to run consec utive to his old, 1983 bank-robber yAs the district court noted, “ Blac k ’s L aw Di cti onar

yde fi ne s nunc pro tunc a s ‘ [a] p hr a se 2 a pp lie d to a c ts a llo we d to be do ne a ft e r the tim e wh e n th e y sh ou ld b e do ne , w itha

re tr oa c tiv e e ff

e c t, i.e., with the same e ffe ct as if r eg ularly done. Nunc pro tunc entry is an ent ry

made now of something a ctually

previously

done to have eff

ect of former date.” J
. A. at 4 7 (Mem. Op. at 11) (q u o t i n g Blac k ’s Law D ic tio na ry 964 (5th ed. 1981))
.

3 conviction. First, on the cha rg e of e scape , he re ceive d a thirty -three -month sentence in the Easter n District of Ke ntucky

on October

30, 1997. J .A. at 89. Seco n d , on Fe bruar y 24, 1999, Durham
re ce i v ed an ei gh t -m o n t h s en t en ce i n t h e S o u t h ern Di s t ri ct o f In d i an a on a c h a r g e o f r es i s t i n g, opposing, impeding, intimi dating /interfer ing with a law enfor ceme nt of fice r. J .A. at 89-90. Durha m committed this offense on Fe bruar y 26, 1997, in the period afte r he had esca ped from the ha lfway house and before he returne d to fede ral c ustody on Marc h 9, 1997. Durham then spent the entire period of Ma

rch 9, 1997, to Marc h 2, 2000, in fede ral c ustody . That nea rly thirty -six -month period
was c redited towa

rd, and f ully serve d, his s en t en ce s of imprisonment for two ne w fe dera l
c on vic tio ns . I n its filing in the district court in re sponse to Du rh am ’s h ab eas pe tition, t he Commissi on
a c kn ow le dg e d los ingtr a c k o f D ur ham aro un d th e tim e of

his e sc a pe , a pp a re ntl y no t le a rn ingun til J anuar y 1998 that Durham had re turned to fe dera l custody . J .A. at 64. As a result, the Commissi on held a r escission hea

ring in June 1998. J .A. at 105. The hear ing e x aminer note d that Durham had
es cap edt h re e d ay s p ri o r t o h i s p re s u mp t i v e d at e o f p ar o l e an d t h at h e w as cu rr en t l y

t h en s er v i n g a t h i rt y -t h re e- m o n t h s en t en ce fo r h i s es cap e. J
. A. at 1 0 6
. T h e e x am i n er re co m m en d ed“[ r] es ci n d [ i n g] the ef fec tive date of [parole of] 11/25/96 to r epar ole eff ective 3/12/97, Nunc Pro Tunc, to the fe dera l de ta ine r on ly [Durh a m’ s ne w e sc a pe se nte nc e ].” J.A. a t 10 7. Th e re a so nin g e sse nti a lly se e me d to 2 be that bec a

us e Durh a m esc a

pe d b e fo re se rv ingthe fi na l th re e da y s b e fo re his pr e su mpt ive pa ro le date, the first three day s of his return to fe dera l custody would count towar d that obligation and heAt one point in an administrative appe al, Durha m denied eve r sig ning the cer tificate, J.A. 3 a t 13 9, 13 9- 41 (“ Ap pe lla

nt r e fu se d to sig n a s pe r the re c or d ind ic [at ]es a nd wa ive d th e 19 97 Paro le date ” ) ( Au g . 2 00 2 Pr o Se Ap pe a l of No tic e of Ac tio n) . O n N ov e mbe r 8 , 2 00 2, the Natio na l App e a ls B oa rd a ff ir me d th e Com mis sio n a

nd de te rm ine d th a t Dur ham ha d in fa c t si g ne d th e Paro le Certificate. J .A. at 146. 4 would not start rec eiving cre dit toward his new f eder al sentenc e until his thi rd day back in feder al custody , Marc h 12, 1997. The Com mission ag ree d with the examiner’s re commendation and, on June 29, 1998, issued
a No tic e of Ac tio n r e sc ind ingDurh a m’ s “ pa ro le e ff e c tiv e date of

11 -2 5- 19 96 ” a nd

re pa ro lin g him “ef fec tive on 03-12-1997 nunc pro tunc to the fe dera l detainer only .” J.A. at 108. The 107 day s that Durham spent on esca

pe status wo u l d not be cr edited towar d any sentenc e, id. , and base d on the Commi ssion’s decision, the B urea u of P risons (“B OP”) thus extended the expiration of the sente nce for Dur ham’s bank- robber

y conviction from September 2002 t o a new expiration date of January 7, 2003, J .A. at 93; Resp’t B r. at 5. On J uly 20, 1998, the Commi ssion issued a parole cer tificate g ranting Durham parole, nunc pro tunc , to March 12, 1997; the c ertificate stated that his bank-robber y sentenc e would expire on J anuar y 7, 2003. J .A. at 110; Resp’t B r. at 5-6. Durham did not sign the c ertificate until September 4, 1998. 3 On Marc h 2, 2000, Durham was re lease d from fe dera l c ustody , having fully serve d his new fede ral sente nces of

imprisonment thanks to the nunc pro t unc pa ro le de vic e that pe rm itt e d h im t o beg in service of his new f eder al sentenc es on Marc h 12, 1997. I t appea rs that Durha

m was ar rested ag ain on Octobe r 30, 2000, and returned to custody
. J .A. 133. On J une 26, 2002, the Commission conducte d a re vocation hea r in g c o n c e r n in g Durham’s parole violations that occurr ed betwe en Mar ch 2000 and Oc tober 2000. J
. A. at 130-34. The he aringexaminer deter mined that Durham “was5

arr ested on 10/30/2000 and has been in c ustody since that time.” J.A. at 133. During a portion of that period in custody

—from August 22, 2001, to Nove m b er 2 9 , 2001—Durham was in custody specific ally on a C ommissi on war rant for a parole vi olation. J .A. at 113, 116; Resp’t Br
. at 6-7. The hear ing examiner rec ommended revoking Durham’s parole and als o rec ommended that “[n]one of the time spent on parole shall be cre dited.” J .A. at 133. Although Durham ha d only been r elea sed fr om f e de ra l c us tod

y on Marc h 2 , 2 00 0, be c a

us e of the Com mis sio n’ s nunc pro tunc Paro le Certificate, Durha

m had technic ally

been “ on parole ” si nce March 12, 1997. J .A. at 126 (A pril 1, 2002, Warrant Application) (stating Durham was “Release d” on “Mar ch 12, 1997”) . There fore , on Ju ly 2 , 2 0 0 2 , w h e n th e Co mm is s io n c o n c u r r e d w it h th e e xa mi n e r ’ s r e c o mm e n d a ti o n an d is s u e d a d e c is io nr e v o k in g D u r

h a m’ s p a r o le a n d

f in d in g th a t “ [n ]o n e o f

th e ti me s p e n t o n p a r o le s h a ll be
cre dited,” J.A. at 135, the period of unc redited, or forf eited, time extended all the way back to March 12, 1997. Se e als o Resp’t Br . at 8 (stating that the Commiss ion’s decision mea n t t hat Durha m

“ fo rf e it[e d] all of the tim e sp e nt on paro le ” ). Th e Com mis sio n did cr e dit Durh a m withthe “ [t]ime spent in confineme nt from 09-04-2001 to 11-29-2001 .
. . toward service of the maximum sentenc e.” Id. Durham appea led t he C ommissi on’s action to the National Appea ls Boa rd (“NAB ”), J.A. at 138-45 (Appe al), whic h aff irmed the Commission’s decision. J .A. at 146. I t rejec ted Durh am ’s
c on te nti on

that “ y ou we re no t pa

ro le d o n M a rc h 1 2, 19 97 be c a us e y ou re fu se d to sig n y our p a ro le
c e rt i f i c a t e , ” n o t i n g t h at“ [y ]o us i g n e d t h e c e rt i f i c a t e o n S e p t e m b e r

4 , 1 9 9 8 s t a t i n g t h a ty o uf u l ly understood y our conditions of par ole.” Id. T h e NA B al so clarif ied that Durha

m should rece ive custody cre dit for the per iod betwee n Aug ust 22, 2001, and Novembe r 29, 2001, whe n his custody was due to a Commiss ion warr ant (the Comm ission had credited Durham only with the time betwee n6

September 4, 2001, a

nd November

29, 2 0 0 1 ). Id. ; se e als o J .A. at 135. As a result of the Commi ssion and the NAB ’s ac tions, “the BO P c alculate d the expiration of Durham’s [1983 bank robber y ] sentence a s November 17, 2007.” Resp’t Br
. at 9 (citing J .A. at 85). The ne w ca lculation thus ex tended the e x piration date of Durham’s 1983 s en t en ce by near ly five y ear s—from January 7, 2003, to November

17, 2007. That per iod corre sponds to the amount of time “on par ole” that the Commi ssion declar ed “not c redited,” or forfeited, which in Durham’s case beca me, on ac count of the “nunc pro tunc” paro l e cer tificate that he sig ned in September 1998, the more tha

n five-y ear pe ri od be tw e e n M a rc h 1 2, 19 97 , a nd May 1, 20 02 , whe n h e wa s a rr e ste d o n th e wa

rr a nt f or his parole violation (minus the roug hly three -month period in late 2001 that the Commiss ion did credit). On Dec ember

30, 2002, Durham was re lease d on parole and sig ned a parole certific ate. The
cer tificate stated an expiration date of Nove mber 17, 2007, for the ninetee n-y ear

sentenc e for

bank
ro bb e ry that he re c e ive d in 19 83 , a nd be low his sig natur e , Durh a m wr ote that he “ [s]ig ne d in pr ote st of date .” J.A. at 147. Durham has continued to circ ulate in and out of custody , and ac cordingto the Respondent’s Br ief he is nex t eligible f or par ole on Fe bruar

y 2 7 , 2 0 0 9 , and as of

November

26, 2007, the expiration date for D urham’s 1983 se ntence is J anuar y 15, 2012. Resp’t Br . at 10; J .A. at 177. On July 26 , 2 00 6, Durh a m fi le d a pe tit ion fo r a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s p ur su a nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 2241. J .A. at 8-15. Durham essentially contested the manner in whic h the Commiss ion ext ended his sentence based on the forf eited par ole time, argu i n g t h at “the Par ole Commiss ion acted improperly

on J uly 20, 1998, in enteringan orde r ‘nunc pro tunc’ r estoring Durham to parole during the time when he was ser

ving his feder al s entenc e in fede ral custody .” J .A. at 14 (Pet. at 7). Durham argued the e ffe ct was to “ improperly extend[ ] hi s s en t ence past his expi ration full term date.” Id.7

Durham noted that, pursuant to re g ulation, “[a] gra nt of parole shall not be dee med t o be oper ative
un til a c e rt if ic a te of pa

ro le ha s bee n de liv e re d to the pr iso ne r. ” 28 C.F .R. § 2 .2 9( a ); J.A. a t 14 (P e t.
a t 7) (c iti ngre g ulatio n) . D ur ham th e re fo re arg

ue d th a t “[ c] on tr a ry

to t he c la im o f t

he Paro le Commi ssion, [ parole ] di d not become e ffe ctive until September 4, 1998. At the bottom of the ‘ nunc pro tunc’ or der is the f

ollowing se ntence : ‘The above- named person was rele ased on the 12th day of Mar ch 1997 with a total of 2, 1 2 7 d ay s re m aining to be serve d.’ This computation theory was without foundation.” J.A. at 14 (Pet. at 7). Durha m theref ore r equeste d “a he aringto take evide nce to establish when Dur

ham completed h i s sentenc e as the rec ords of the Par ole Commiss ion are fra ug ht with error .” Id. On Novembe r 3, 2006, the Commi ssion f iled an answe r to his petition. J .A. at 62-77. The Commi ssion arg ued that “[b] eca use [Durham’s] pa

role was revoke d [i n 2002], in part f or convic tion of a c rime that he c ommitt ed while on pa role whic h was punishable by a ter m of imprisonment, he
mus t f or fe it a ll o f t

he tim e sp e nt o n p a ro le fo llo wi nghis pa ro le g ran t on

Ma rc h 1 2, 19 97 un til his return to f

eder al custody .” J.A. at 70 (Answer at 9). The Commi ssion also noted that D u rh am’s conviction in I ndiana state court, for conduct that occur

red be tween Ma

rch 2000 a

nd October

2000, “wa s th e b a s is f

o r f o r f e it u r e o f a ll o f th e ti me [D u r

h a m] s p e n t o n p a r o le , w h ic h e xte n d e d the expiration date of his sentenc e fr o m J anuar y 7, 2003 to November

17, 2007. There fore , the Commi ssion properly

forf eited [Durham’s] street time whe n it revoked his par ole in 2002.” J.A. at 73. On Marc h 28, 2007, the district c ourt denied Durham’s petition. J .A. at 37-53. The district court he ld that Durham wa ived h i s ch al l en ge to the September 1998 parole cer

tificate be cause he sig ne d it , J.A. a t 48 , a nd c on tin ue d to c on sid e r his pe tit ion on the me ri ts b ut d e nie d r e lie f b e c a us e8

i t found the use of

the nunc pro tunc c e rt i f

i c a t e a c c e p t a

b l e , c i t i n g a n u np u

b l i s h e d o r d e r i n a

Sixth Circuit case , Milton-Vales v. LaManna , 2 F. App’x 480 (6th Cir. 2001) ; J .A. at 49. The district court he ld t hat it “ a g re e [d] wi th t

he USP C th a t it s nunc pro tunc order should ha ve the same r etroa ctive eff ect of making [Durham’s] parole ef fec tive as if ente red on the ear lier date .” J.A. at 53. Durham’s counsel filed a notice of appea l, a nd Durham, a cting pro se, filed a separ ate letter to the district court. J.A. at 5 7
. Af t er oral ar g ument, Durham and the Commissi on both filed
a dd iti on a l le tte r b ri e fs a t th e re qu e st o f t he pa ne l. We now consider D urham’s a ppeal, a s the district c ourt corr ectly noted that a ce rtificate of appea lability

is unnece ssary

to appea l the denial of a petiti on for habeas corpus filed under § 2241. 28 U. S.C. § 2 25 3( c )( 1) ; Massey v. Chandler , No. 97-5389, 1998 WL 6 9 1 0 9 (6 t h Cir. 1998) (unpublished); J.A. at 156-57. II. AN AL YSI S Durham’s appea l involves es s en t i all y a sing le issue: whether the Commiss ion acted improperly

in 1998 in issui ng Durham a nunc pro tunc cer tificate of parole that purported to g rant him parole a s of Marc h 12, 1997. As a preliminary matter, the Commi ssion c ontends that Durham waived a ny challeng e to the n u n c pro tunc ce rtificate of par ole by signingthe ce rtificate , and we addre ss that issue first. We hold t h at Du rh am h as not waive d his challeng e to the Commissi on’s
a c tio ns . A. P r e se r va ti on o f the Iss ue The district court “deter

mine[d] that [Durham’s] signature s [on t he September 1998 and Dec ember

2002 cer tificates] constituted knowing a nd voluntary

agr ee m ent wit h the terms of the Certificates.” J.A. at 48. I n support of this determination, t he dis trict court c ited our unpublished9

order in Phillips v. United States , No
. 9 5 -3823, 1996 W L185791 (6th Cir. 1996). I n Phillips , an
a pp e a l c on te sti ngthe de nia l of a mot ion fi le d p ur su a nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 55, we held that a d e f e n d an t’ s s ig n a tu

r e o n a p le a a g r e e me nt, coupled

with the advice of her

attorney and the tria l jud g e ’ s c ar e f

u l e xp la n a ti o n o f th e p le a a g r e e me n t a n d th e r ig h ts to b e w a iv e d , s u f fice d to waive certain rig hts. Id. a t * 1
. T h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t s i g n e d t h e p le a a g re e me nt i n Phillips wer e manife stly

dissimi lar to those in which Dur ham sig ned the pa

ro l e ce rtificate s, and Phillips does not support the district court’ s holding. The district c ourt further cited two opinions in c iv il case s iss u ed b y d i s t ri ct cour ts in our circuit; those ca ses held that a pa rty waived va

rious rig hts due to sig ning a contra ct. Those case s also obviously do not suppor t the d i s t ri ct court’s deter mination. The Commission dedicates slightly more than a

pag e of its brief

to defe nding the district
c o u rt ’ s d e t e r

m i n at i o n a n d

c i t e s o n l y Phillips and one a dditional case, Nagi v. United States , 90 F.3d 1 3 0 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 6 ). R es p ’t Br
. at 1 1 (c i t i n g Nagi ). I n Nagi , another appea l of the denia l of a § 2255 motion, w e h e ld th a t a d e f e n d a n t w a iv e d a n o b

je c ti o n to b e in g s e n te n c e d a c c o r d in g to the 1988 Manual of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, i nstead of the 1987 version. Id. at 136. Unlike Durham, the defe ndant in Nagi had the se rvice of counse l and also appe are d befor e a U .S. District J udg e for both a plea a

nd a sente ncing hear ing. A g ain, we f ind Nagi easily

dis t i n gu i s h able f

rom Durham’s case
. Ba sed on the re cord, which consists only of copie s of the sig ned docume nts, we ca nnot
c on c lud e that D ur

ha m w a ive d a

ny c ha lle ng e to t

he Com mis sio n’ s a c tio ns a nd cal cul a tio n o f h is sentenc e. The Supreme Court has long held t hat “wa iver is ordinar ily an intentional re linquishm ent
or abandonme nt of a known r ight or privileg e,”

J oh ns on v . Ze rb st , 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), and that10

“[p] resuming waiver from a silent rec ord i s impermissible,” Carnley v. Cochran , 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962). The Commi ssion has not advanc ed suff icient evidenc e to support the conclusion that Durh a m’ s si g natur e on

the pa ro le c e rt if ic a te s amo un te d to vo lun tari ly , k no wi ng ly , a

nd int e lli g e ntl y
re lin qu ish inghis ri g ht t o c ha lle ng e the e ff e c t th os e c e rt if

ic a te s w ou ld h a ve on

c alc ulatin g his sentenc e. B. W he th e r The Co m m iss ion ’s Nun c Pr o T uncP arole Ce rtificate Was Im proper 1. Le ga l St anda r ds “We re view de novo a

district court’s de nial of a pe tition for the writ of habe as cor pus filed
u n d e r 2 8 U
. S. C. § 2 2 41.” R o s ales-Garc ia v. Holland , 322 F.3d 386, 400- 01 (6th Cir. 2003) (e n ba nc ); see also Dietz v . U.S. Parole Comm’n , 260 F. App’ x 763, 766 (6th Cir. 2008). Th e pro per sta

nd a rd of re vie w f or e va luatin g the Com mis sio n’ s a c tio ns in t his c a se is a murkier question, but we conc lude that we should re view Dur ham’s cla im de novo. I n Hack ett v. U.S. Parole Comm’n , 851 F.2d 127, 129- 30 (6th Cir. 1987), we stated t hat our “ scope of revie w over
a de c isi on by the Pa ro le Com mis sio n is e xtre me ly lim ite d” and qu ote d a pp ro vin g ly

fr om a Se ve nth Circuit decision that “a

pplied a limited ‘abuse of discretion’ standa

rd when revie wing decisions of t h e P ar o le Commiss ion.” I n Ha c k e tt , h o w e v e r , th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s c la im w a s “ th a t t

h e Co mm is s ion imp ro pe rl y

se t th e re le a se date o ut side the ra ng e e sta bli sh e d und e r t

he re c omm e nd e d p a ro le g uidelines and that the Commission erred by relying on evidence which wa s not produced at trial and was spec ifically

reje cted by

the sentenc ing judg e.” Id. at 128. Durham ’s cl ai m is clearly very differ ent. His claim is that the Commis sion acted imprope rly and in violation of a fe dera l reg ulation b y i s s u i n g a nunc pro tunc parole cer tificate a nd acc ording ly

treating Dur

ham’s date of par ole as Marc h 12, 1997, and th at d oing so inc rea sed the amount of time forfe ited and extended the11

expiration date of Du

r h a m’ s s e n te n c e . Durham’s claim essentially raises a question of law—whe ther the Commi ssion’s a ctions complied with r eleva nt f eder al regulations—and in similar c ircumstance s
our sister circ uits have applied a de novo standard of revie w. See Hutchings v. U.S. Parole Comm’n , 201 F.3d 1006, 1008- 09 (8 t h C i r. 2000) (“ Whether the Commission had jurisdiction t o revoke Hu tc hin g s ’ p a

r o l e a n d wh e t h e r t h e C o m m i s s i o n ’ s p r o c e e din g s v iol a te d H utc hin g s’ du e pr oc e ss r ig hts
are qu e sti on s of la w, a nd we the re fo re re vie w d e no vo .” ); W allace v. Christensen , 802 F.2d 1539, 1551, 1552 n.8 (9th Cir. 1986) (e n banc) (stating t h at “[ a] claim that the Commissi on has ac ted outside its statutory limit s ty pically involves an issue of statutory construction which w e re view de novo” and that “[t] he C ommissi on, like other ag encie s, is thus bound by its own reg ulations so long as they rema in in force ”)
. I n addition, our unpublished order in Milton-Vales supports review ing Durham’s claim de novo. I n Milton-Vales , the petitioner “ alleg ed that the Par ole Commiss ion had miscalculate d the leng th of his fede ral parole -violator sentenc e and the amount of time that he had
serve d befor e beingparole d.” Milton-Vales , 2 F. App’x at 480. We beg an our a naly sis by ref err ing to “ [a ] de novo revie w of the re cord.” Id. I n light of a ll these dec isions, we conclude that a de novo sta nd ard of re vie w a pp lie s to Durh a m’ s c la im. 2. Ana lys is Although D urham’s br iefing is not a model of clar ity and s ee m s to espouse a numbe r of theories f or re lief, we understand the crux of Durham’s complain t to be as follows. F eder al regulations provide that par ole is not operative until the deliver y to the prisoner o f a cer

tificate of parole
. 28 C.F.R. § 2.29(a)
. I n Durham’s case , that delivery occur red on Septe mber 4, 1998. The
ce rt i fi ca t e, however, pur

ported to g rant pa

role nunc pro tunc with an ef fec tive date of

Marc h 12, 1997, approximately

eig hteen months ea

rlier. The Commi ssion thus treated Durham as being“on12

parole ” fr om March 12, 1997, e ven th o u gh Du rh am was in fa ct in fede ral c ustody serving new f e d e r a l s e n te n c e s f

o r e s c a p e a n d r e s is ti n g a

la w e n f o r c e me n t o f

f ic e r , w it h h is p e r io d

in c ustody beg inning on Ma

rch 9, 1997, a

nd extending to Marc h 2, 2000. I n its letter brief, the Commi ssion states that employ ing the nunc pro tunc pa ro le c e rt if ic a te
was ne cessa

ry for Dur ham to finish the service of his new fe dera l sentence s as soon as possible. The Commi ssion ex plain s t h at , had the Commission not used the nunc pro tunc parole cer tificate, Durham “would have s pent additi onal t ime in prison” because “[i] f [Durham] had not been pa roled until S ep t em b er 4, 1998, [t he date of deliver y of the pa role c ertificate,] he could not have be g un serving his escape sentenc e until this date.” Comm’n L etter B r. at 2. The Commi ssion states that “[a]s a result , D u r

h a m w o u ld

n o t h a v e b e e n p a r o le d

u n ti l Au g u s t 2 4 , 2 0 0 1 , e ig h te e n mo n th s late r than his actua l relea se date ” of Ma rch 2, 2000. Durham a cce pts this poi nt that the nunc pro tunc pa ro le c e rt if ic a te pe rm itt e d him t o e xpe dit e service of his new f

eder al sentenc es and e njoy an earlier relea se date, stating in his letter br ief that “he w ould have be en in prison an a dditional 17 months ” but for the use of the nunc pro tunc
c e rt if ic a te . Pe t’ r L e tte r B r. a t 2. B ut D ur ham’ s le tte r b ri e f t

hen ass erts th a t w e sh ou ld e sse nti a lly vie w the se ve nte e n- mon th p e ri od fo llo wi ng hi s act

ua l r e le a se fr om p ri so n in Marc h 2 00 0 a s ti me spent fulfilling w hat he c laims was the re mainder of his new fe dera l sentence s. Id. at 2-3. On the basis of that leg al fiction, Durha m then offe rs an a lternativ e ac counti ng for the f ollowing va

rious p e r i o d s o f

t i m e t h a th e s p e n ti n a n d o u to f c u s t o d y. I n consideration of the fac t that both the Comm ission and Durham und er s t an d that the Commi ssion’s use of the nunc pro tunc pa ro le c e rt if ic a te a ff or ded Durh a m th e su

bs tanti a l be ne fi t of expediting the se rvice of his new f eder al sentenc es—as we ll as essentiall y p ro v i d i ng him the13

opportunity

simult aneously

to serve time on pa

role towa rd his 1983 bank-robbe ry conviction—we decline to f

ind e rror in the Commi ssion’s a ctions in this case . Fur thermore , we are unable to acc ept Durham’s argument that we must view the sevente en months following his r elea se in Marc h 2000
a s ti me sp e nt f

ulf ill ing h is n e w f

e de ra l c on vic tio ns “ be c a us e of the mis take of

the Paro le Commi ssion” and his furthe r alter native ac counting of his time in and out of custody
. Pet’r L etter Br . at 3. Althoug h Durham did not waive anyc ha lle ng e to th e Co mmissi on ’s c a lc ulatio n o f h is sentenc e by

ag ree ing to a

nd signingthe nunc pro tunc pa ro le c e rt if ic a te , thi s c ha lle ng e is m e ri tle ss. Ac co rd i n gl y , we AF F IRMt h e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt d e nyingDurh a m’ s p e tit ion fo r a wr it of ha be a s c or pu s. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fo re going r easons, we AF F IRM the district court’s judg ment denying D urham’s pe tit ion fo r a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s.