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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED July 26, 2016

v No. 326588 Wayne Circuit Court ANTONIO RATCLIFF, LC No. 14-002579-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: W ILDER , P.J., and M URPHY and O’C ONNELL , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.
The prosecutor charged defendant with bestiality with a dog, M CL 750.158, and animal cruelty, MCL 750.50(2) and (4). After a bench trial, the trial court convicted defendant of both counts. The court sentenced defendant to three years’ probatio n. Defendant appeals as of right,
and we affirm.

Initially, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidenc e supporting his convictions.
In People v Kanaan , 278 Mich App 594, 618-619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008), this Court add ressed a sufficiency argument in the c ontext of a bench trial, observing :

We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo. When ascert aining whether sufficient evidence was presented in a bench trial to s upport a conviction, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether a rational tr ier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court wil l not interfere with the trier of fact's role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Circumstantial evidence and reasonabl e inferences that
arise from such evidence can con stitute satisfactory proof of t he elements of the
crime. All conflicts in the eviden ce must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. [Citations omitted.]

“[W]hether alleged conduct falls within the scope of criminal law is a question of law subject to review de novo.” People v Cassadime , 258 Mich App 395, 398; 671 NW2d 559 (2003). In People v Haynes , 281 Mich App 27, 29; 760 NW2d 283 (2008), this Court summarized the principles governin g statutory interpretation:-2- The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. We begin this task by examining th e plain language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume tha t the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial cons truction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as writ ten. Unless they are
otherwise defined in the statute or are terms of art or technic al words, we assign the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning. If a s tatute leaves words undefined, we may consult a dictionary to aid our goal of const ruing those terms
in accordance with their ordinar y and generally accepted meanin gs. . . . . Although we must, as far as possible, give effect to every word , phrase, and clause in the statute, we may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from t he words of the statute itself. [Citations, quotation marks, and alteration br acket omitted.]

The evidence was sufficient t o prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant placed his penis in a dog’s anus. In relevant part, MCL 750.158 prohibits the common-law crime of bestiality. 1 Haynes , 281 Mich App at 30. For purposes of MCL 750.158, Michigan co urts have recognized bestiality as including “any sexual connection betwe en a human being and an
animal.” Id .; see also People v Carrier , 74 Mich App 161, 166; 254 NW2d 35 (1977). “To
sustain a conviction under MCL 750.158, ‘sexual penetration, ho wever slight,’ is required.” Haynes , 281 Mich App at 30, quoting MCL 750.159, 2 and citing Carrier , 74 Mich App at 166.

Defendant’s roommate, who had lived with defendant for three y ears, testified that while showering on the morning of March 15, 2014, she heard her dog h owl, that she then left the shower running, and that she proceeded to walk toward the livin g room to investigate. In the living room, the roommate saw defendant with his pants down, on the floor on his hands and knees, kneeling over the dog, which was lying on the floor on i ts back, with its head away from
defendant. Defendant’s roommate testified to her belief that d efendant “was . . . trying to penetrate . . . the dog.” An animal control officer, to whom p olice officers brought the dog on the evening of March 15, 2014, testified that the dog had a swo llen anus and looked very frightened. Police officers testified that they had submitted for DNA analysis defendant’s underwear and an oral swab from the dog. Two forensic animal D NA experts testified that from

1 In MCL 750.158, our Legislature provided as follows:
Any person who shall commit the abom inable and detestable crim e against
nature either with mankind or wit h any animal shall be guilty o f a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 15 years, or if such person was at the time of the said offense a sexually delinquen t person, may be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for an indetermi nate term, the minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of which shall be life.

2 MCL 750.159 provides that “[i]n any prosecution for sodomy, it shall not be necessary to prove emission, and any sexual penetra tion, however slight, shall be deemed sufficient to complete the crime specified in the ne xt preceding section.”-3- the inside of defendant’s underwear, they developed a DNA profi le of a canine, which matched the DNA profile of the dog. The roommate indicated that the do g would not generally have access to defendant’s clothing, which defendant routinely place d in a basement laundry hamper.

The evidence gave rise to a rea sonable inference that defendan t’s penis penetrated the dog’s anus. Defendant’s roommate did not see defendant’s penis . But moments after hearing the dog howl, she saw the dog lying on its back with its head a way from defendant, who had his pants partially down, and defenda nt was on his hands and knees above the dog. Later that night, the dog still had a swollen anus. And two forensic animal DNA experts matched the canine profile from the interior of defendant’s underwear to the profi le from the dog. Viewing the circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, de ferring to the trial court’s cr edibility and evidentiary-weight assessments, and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in fav or of the prosecution, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding beyond a reasonable doub t that defendant had committed the offense of bestiality under MCL 750.158.

With respect to the animal cruelty conviction, the prosecutor charged defendant with “negligently allow[ing] an animal to suffer unnecessary neglect , torture, or pain.” The prohibition of this conduct appears in MCL 750.50(2)(f), which criminalizes “[n]egligently allow[ing] any animal . . . to suffer unnecessary neglect, tort ure, or pain.” 3 In MCL 750.50, our Legislature penalized to varyi ng degrees a broad range of condu ct toward animals. In MCL 750.50(1)(h), the Legislature def ined “neglect” as failing “to sufficiently and properly care for an animal to the extent that the animal’s health is jeopardized.” Because MCL 750.50 does not specifically define “torture” or “pain,” we would generally be permitted to consider dictionary
definitions of these terms to aid in our construction. However , the term “pain” is selfexplanatory, and we see no need t o contemplate or reach the “to rture” provision.

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the record pro ved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant inflicted pain on the dog. Shortly before the roommate observed defendant partially naked on the floor above the dog, she heard the dog h owl. The animal control officer testified that later that evening, she noticed swelling around the dog’s anus. We detect no error in the trial court’s finding tha t the howling by the dog and th e anal swelling suffered by the dog proved beyond a reasonable doubt tha t defendant inflicted pain on the dog.

Finally, defendant contests the validity of his sentence, argu ing that because animal cruelty constitutes a misdemeanor, the trial court could impose only a probationary term of two

3 In his appellate brief, defenda nt fails to address that the pr osecutor charged him with violating MCL 750.50(2)(f), or the trial cour t’s analysis finding that he violated subsection (2)(f). Defendant’s brief instead addresses a different subsection, MCL 750.50(2)(b), which prohibits a person from “[c]ruelly driv[ing] , work[ing], or beat[ing] an an imal.” When an appellant fails to dispute the basis of the trial court’s ruling, we need not even consider granting the relief being requested. Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys , 263 Mich App 364, 381; 689 NW2d 145 (2004). Regardless, sufficient evidence supports defendant’s c onviction under subsection (2)(f).-4- years. Therefore, defendant argues, if this Court sets aside h is felony bestiality conviction, remand for resentencing on the animal cruelty count is warrante d. We have affirmed the bestiality conviction. Accordingly, defendant’s argument fails , but we shall briefly examine the sentence. Bestiality is a felony, MCL 750.158, and pursuant to the plain language of MCL 771.2(1), “if the defendant is convicted of a felony, the proba tion period shall not exceed 5 years.” The trial court also convicted defendant of misdemeano r animal cruelty, MCL 750.50(4)(a), and under the plain language of MCL 771.2(1), “if the defendant is convicted for
an offense that is not a fel ony, the probation period shall not exceed 2 years.”

The order of conviction and sentence and the order of probatio n identify the two statutes underlying defendant’s convictions , but refer to a single, thre e-year term of probation, which is a lawful term of probation given defendant’s felony bestiality co nviction. The record does not establish that the trial court imposed a separate three-year te rm of probation for defendant’s
misdemeanor conviction. Resen tencing is thus unwarranted.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder /s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell