57

Mr. Horn. We thank you for that testimony.
We will now hear from the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration, Jane Garvey. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF JANE GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Ms. GaRvVEY. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairwoman
Morella. Thank you, Chairman Horn and members of the sub-
committee. I’m very pleased to be here today before both sub-
committees to discuss the challenges the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration faces as the countdown to January 1, 2000, continues.

The question on everyone’s mind, and certainly the question on
my mind when I arrived at the FAA last August is: Will the FAA
make it? Can we ensure that the air traffic safety is not com-
promised in the slightest at 12:01 a.m., on January 1, 2000? The
answer to that is, yes, airline safety will not be compromised. En-
suring that we meet this challenge is one of my top priorities.

Let me say that I have been meeting with managers and the key
FAA personnel involved in the year 2000 compliance effort fre-
quently since I became Administrator. I know from these meetings,
and I know from the work that the Inspector General and GAO
have done, that FAA needs to do a better job of managing this
problem. We are behind, and that is unacceptable.

What I’d like to do is to tell you what actions I’ve taken to cor-
rect that. FAA is following the Office of Management and Budget
and the General Accounting Office recommendations for a five-
phased approach for identifying and fixing software date change
issues. These five phases are: awareness, assessment, renovation,
validation, and implementation.

Your concerns and mine, obviously center on mission-critical sys-
tems—those that are vital to the agency’s successful achievement
of its mission. Some of the most mission-critical equipment in the
FAA includes the individual pieces and systems that make up the
Nation’s air traffic control infrastructure. And although the Y2K
issue is broader than that, affecting, for example, the automation
components of FAA’s business m: ment systems, I will focus
my testimony on the status of our efforts to address the mission-
critical systems in the National Airspace System—NAS—and then
discuss the overall agency's Y2K efforts.

The components it make up that NAS architecture are com-
prised of more than 23 million lines of code, 50 computer lan-
guages, and more than 250 computer systems. The Y2K problem
can affect NAS systems in a variety of ways. Software, hardware,
or embedded code in NAS systems can be date sensitive.

For example, let’s look at the Y2K problem we've identified with
our en route surveillance radar. Each of our 20 air traffic control
centers has an air-route surveillance radar equipment or ARSR—
that monitors en route traffic in the system. ARSR has a cool-
ing pump system that turns on automatically to prevent the system.
from overheating. The computer code that initiates the cooling sys-
tem is date dependent, and therefore affected by Y2K. If the code
is not Y2K compliant, the cooling system will not turn on on the
correct day at the correct time and the ARSR could over-heat and
could shut down. If this were to happen, air traffic controllers



23

control can be assured. Avoiding such emergency measures will require stronger, more

active oversight than FAA has demonstrated in the past.

Our report being released today makes a number of specific recommendations to

increase the likelihood that FAA systems will be Year 2000 compliant on January 1 of

that year.’ In summary, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct that

the Administrator, FAA, take whatever action is necessary to expedite overdue

awareness and assessment activities. At a minimum, this would include

= issuing a final FAA Year 2000 plan providing the Year 2000 program manager with
the authority to enforce Year 2000 policies and outlining FAA's strategy for
addressing the date change;

TM assessing how its major business lines and the aviation industry would be affected if
the Year 2000 problem were not corrected in time and using these results to help
tank the agency's Year 2000 activities;

= completing inventories of all information systems and their components, including
data interfaces;

© completing assessments of all inventoried systems to determine criticality and
whether the system will be converted, replaced, or retired;

= determining priorities for system conversion and replacement based on systems’
mission-criticality;

= establishing plans for addressing identified date dependencies;

5GAO/AIMD-98-45, Jan. 30, 1998.
13


COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois ‘TOM LANTOS, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

GARY A. CONDIT, California

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
DC

DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Ilinois

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio DANNY K. DAVIS, Mlinois

MARSHALL “MARK” SANFORD, South JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
Carolina JIM TURNER, Texas

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

PETE SESSIONS, Texas HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee

MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey —

‘VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

BOB BARR, Georgia (Independent)

DAN MILLER, Florida
KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director
DanreL R. Mott, Deputy Staff Director
WILLIAM MOsCHELLA, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
JupiTH McCoy, Chief Clerk
Put SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY
STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman

PETE SESSIONS, Texas CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
MARSHALL “MARK” SANFORD, South ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

Carolina DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J, RUSSELL GEORGE, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
JouN HYNES, Professional Staff Member
BoB ALLoway, Professional Staff Member
MATTHEW EBERT, Clerk
MARK STEPHENSON, Minority Professional Staff Member

aD


117

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, and if I might, Congressman Horn——

Mr. Horn. Yes.

Mr. GRAHAM [continuing]. I'd like to add one more statement.
Mr. Alloway, your extremely competent staff member, made the
statement to me which I believe probably represents a general feel-
ing in the Congress, and that is—and he didn’t mean it in a derog-
atory way, but he indicated that, in general, the belief is that ven-
dors are venal. The vendor has got to be your most important
friend, has got to be your business partner. If you view your vendor
as someone who is out to do you dirt, get rid of the vendor; you
do not need that. Do not put together ironclad Prarentess and war-
ranties that will force a bad vendor to do well; they will not. You
must trust your vendor. You must work with your vendor. You can-
not guarantee and you should not litigate the problem. Litigating
the problem will not solve it. You have got to solve the problem.

Mr. Horn. Well, we thank you. There will be additional ques-
tions that both the Democratic and Republican staffs might submit,
and if so, those questions and answers will be put, without objec-
tion, at this point in the record.

I want to thank every one of you for this hearing. I think there
have been some excellent comments made, and I wish you well, Ad-
ministrator Garvey. You have your hands full. You come well pre-
pared and highly recommended from your experiences in Massa-
chusetts by people in whom T have great faith.

Ms. GARVEY.

Mr. Horn. So I’ll have ‘great faith in you.

Ms. Garvey. Thank you.

Mr. Horn. And the problem is, you’ve got to kick some of that
organization of yours into movement because they’ve had a number
of years when they've known about it, and things seemed to have
just lagged until you’ve gotten here. So I wish you well.

I want to thank the people that worked to prepare this hearing,
starting with J. Russell George, the staff director and chief counsel
of the Government Management, Information, and Technolo;
Committee; Mr. Robert Alloway, who had praise from his uncle,
Mr. Graham—anyhow, I’m just kidding, Bob. Don’t take it seri-
ously—{laughter]—professional staff member on the subcommittee
who was strictly responsible for the hs , along with John
Hynes, professional staff member on the subcommittee, and of
course Matthew Ebert, our able clerk, and David Coher, our intern
and a very fine young man who we've tested over the last year in
my district office as well as here, and Mark Stephenson, a faithful
staff member from the minority and an rt in many of these
areas. And we also would like to—yes, Ric! Russell, the staff
director of the Subcommittee on Technology, and Ben Wu, the pro-
fessional staff member—and I can’t quite read the writing here—
Jeff Grove, professional staff member, and Michael Bell, staff as-
sistant. And we thank our court reporter, Kitty McKenzie. Thank
you very much.

Mrs. MORELLA. May I make one final comment, and thank you
for mentioning the staff, too, because I feel my rod and my staff,
they comfort me and prepare "the papers, in the presence of my con-
stituents; we all feel that way.


Additionally, the Administration is in the process of formally requesting a
reprogramming of funds to assist us in these efforts. We hope to finalize this request and

forward it to our authorizing and appropriating committees shortly.

Madame Chair, Mr. Chairman, I have heard your admonishments to FAA to stay on top
of this issue and ensure that the safety and efficiency of air transportation is not
compromised after midnight on December 31, 1999, I want the FAA to succeed. I am

keeping a close eye on the management of this program to ensure we get the job done.

As I said at the beginning of my testimony, the question on everyone’s mind is, can we
make it? And my answer is yes. It will take perseverance, persistence, vigilance, and
continuity of commitment, which Ray Long, the dedicated personnel working to resolve
the Y2K problem, and I, as FAA Administrator, are committed to providing.

‘That completes my prepared statement. Thank you once again for the opportunity to
appear before you, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have at this

time.


processing is accelerating: recent break-
throughs in chip performance promise
that processor speeds will soon exceed
‘expectations of even the most opti-
mistic technology watcher. Improve
ments in price performance have

brought a number of new
‘uses and hundreds of millions of new

Users to computers.

‘Year/2000 Dwarfs All Projects

‘The conversion from second genera-
‘ion mainframes to IBM's 360 was the
‘most complex, but not the most chal-
lenging conversion the industry has had
to face. In technical terms, the
Year/2000 conversion is. triv
However, inthe 1960s we counted com-
ters in the low thousands. Now we
must consider hundreds of millions of
‘computers ranging from embedded
mir comput chp, some 250 mi

tion personal/business computers, bun-
dreds of thousands of departmental

minicomputers,
tens of thousands of corporate main-
frames and networks of interconnected
heterogeneous systems. This includes
unrestricted networks such as the
Internet. There are tens of billions lines

1

Delay Not An Option
‘There is no way to delay the
‘Year/2000. Problems will begin almost
immediately. Systems will fail simulta-
neously across the nation and the world.
“Therefore, crisis management ona scale
before

the Year/2000, and special programs
will be required to help manage the risk.
While Year/2000 teams struggle
towards compliance, many applications
should be triaged. By mid 1999, crisis
‘management teams must be thoroughly
prepared to handle worst case scenarios.

‘The industry's leading computer
‘manufactures, economists, and consul-
fants are adding their voices to the
‘growing chorus of the concemed. We
may differ on exactly what will be dis-
rupted and how extensive the damage
will be. However, we all agree that this
is the greatest challenge that the com-
puter community bas ever faced.
‘According to a report on Bloomberg TV.
on Friday January 16, seven percent of
software has already failed due to the

iMustrate the problem. In the business
page of The New York Post it was
Teported that some merchants can’t

will be judged by history on how well
‘they faced the problems, and how effec-
tively they led the efforts to ensure their
institution's survival into the 21st cen
tury. By 2010, scholarly and popular
history books, video documentaries,
‘and Harvard Business School Case
‘Studies will chronicle the faifures and
‘successes, using these projects.

does not go beyond 1999. Most credit
‘card companies have not yet been able
to fix their systems to accept dates
beyond the year 1999. This is but one
carly indicator of the Year/2000 prob-
Jem. In addition, major banks have been
‘working on the Year/2000 problem for
four years or more, Most have yet 10

finish.

‘The history of the Information
‘Technology (1/1) industry is full of
missed project schedules. Consultants

project

that studied the issue suggest a miss rate

‘of 80 percent or more. At a Year/2000

‘conference in 1996 of about 150 man-
sionals, the audience

we had the option of extending our

schedule, However, the Year/2000 is

immutable, and there is very litle room
‘maneuvering

‘Although there has been increasing
awareness of the Year/2000 issue in
1996 and 1997, very serious problems
stil ie ahead, Many Yeat/2000 project
managers are not really certain where
they stand on the conversion project,
‘where they are going (what their busi-
ness objectives are), how to get there
‘the tools and resources required), and
how long it will take to become
‘Year/2000 ready. Yet, the survival of
their organization, and vital services to
‘hundreds of millions of people are at
stake,

False Security

For most things are going too well
today to focus on problems two years in
the future. With the exception of Asia.
there is good economic news, the
Federal Reserve seems satisfied that the
rate of inflation is under control, the
stock market, despite its high volatility
keeps trending upward. Unemployment

‘After a period of deep uncertainty,
the information Systems (US) managers
{jobs are now more secure. They are
‘ack to where they wer 10 Yur 26
These are like utility managers provid

ing computing power to thet organiza,
ton, Ther challenges cater round
reacting to today's problems and oppor-
tunities. Atmost all were educated in 8

Sunes and she « drt of tas
science. Furthermore, since few com-
puter executives had to face a project
‘with an immovable deadline, itis not
surprising that they did not have the
‘opportunity to develop the basic skills,
methodology, and needed 10
‘plan and track project schedules objec-
tively.

“The Year/2000 project manager will
‘be confronted with many problems.
One is finding and keeping the profes-


18

In ensuring a safe, secure, and efficient airspace system that contributes to national
security and the promotion of U.S. airspace, FAA administers a wide range of aviation-
related programs, such as those to certify the airworthiness of new commercial aircraft
designs, inspect airline operations, maintain airport security, and control commercial and

general aviation flights.”

Integral to executing each of FAA's programs are extensive information processing and
communications technologies. For example, each of FAA's 20 en route air traffic control
facilities, which control aircraft at the higher altitudes between airports, depends on
about 50 interrelated computer systems to safely guide and direct aircraft. Similarly,
each of FAA's almost 100 flight standards offices, responsible for inspecting and
certifying various sectors of the aviation industry, is supported by over 30 mission-
related safety database and analysis systems. Because of the complexity of these systems
supporting FAA's mission, many of them are unique to FAA, not off-the-shelf systems
that could be readily maintained by vendors.

3General aviation flights are any civil aircraft operations not involving commercial
activities.

3


12

Mon projects art off domly, he FAA sptcnions ‘Se Sea AURORE

are no exception. In order to become Year 2000 ready, dewviey: PMotOR taec: Rasovet
Pian wit PovEcTioN

ia eee tapieneat

‘sustained. Finding the cause and fixing the last 10% of
‘the problems can take 20-30% of the time.
Furthermore, the use of these curves asa planning
‘and schedule tracking tool over time isa highly
reliable indicator of a project's schedule
performance.

‘To give the FAA the benefit of the doubt, we selected ep
the average Beta curve. It shows equal time oa the np am ee me v0 om Tee my am a) We

learning curve and on the completion segment. We then neue) ates
assessed their progress against that curve using our =o
CODE-TRACTM project management tool. The results Tee,

‘were not eacouraging, Even if the FAA stops alipping RES
their schedule, they would miss their deadline by more wee
than 7 mouths. I they coatinue to sip at the same rate, they would inh almost 9% years ate. The FAA. schedules are
open,” and therefore not reliable. I belleve that there is Ute chance that all the FAA's 414 critical applications will be
‘Year 2000 ready by year end, 1999.
According othe GAO report the umber ef application yeni large; more than 275 yt, 18,00 erbeysems and
‘65 millioa tines of code. Forthermore, through November 15, 1997 the Department of Transportation
FAA's large coupler yes were ny 39 tramps program renovate Aug hs uber oben Pr wth
‘data, we will ot have a reliable number uatl ali 65 milion lines of code and the data is analyzed or accounted for.
Furthermore, testing is projected to take more than 50-70% ofa project's schedale. A troog testing dlacipline ls
secured Our Year 200 proj planning metedlogyssaets an appear ht mayb pl the FAA. a order t
maximize overlap with Year 2000 renovation, we recommend that baseline testing begia prior to the reaovatioa of
‘Gives the current situstion atthe FAA, I recommend that baselle testing phases bepin oo later than Juoe, bu.
preferably sooner.

Baseline Test Phase

PEEECEECCCCE:

Baseline Testing is aterm used to define a group of testing related activities that encompass both component/application and eariv
‘system test preparation. I forms the starting point for all the testing tha i o follow. It is key tothe success of the date conver:
‘effort To be most cost . it should be done using ‘This down testing

testing
into manageable segments with clear objectives for each. Since these activities are aot dependent on raking the cade changes 10
the applications. it cam begin early in the date conversion phase. The longer it is delayed, the greater the risk of truncating the
‘esting effort and increasing the risk of introducing errors into the operational system(s),


30

was completed last week under intensive central management and a firm
requirement that the assessment work be finished by January 31.

FAA’s most difficult challenges lie ahead--fixing the problems, including the Host
computer which is used in the En-route Centers to direct high altitude traffic,
testing systems to make sure these fixes work, and putting Year-2000 compliant
systems online. FAA also has new systems scheduled to be operational before the
Year 2000, including major systems like the Standard Terminal Automation
Replacemeht System (STARS), a primary air traffic control system that will
replace-an obsolete system, and the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), a
system that will use satellites for communication, navigation, and surveillance
between air traffic controllers and pilots. Twenty-three newly purchased but not
deployed systems, each costing more than $100 million, had not been determined
by FAA to be Year-2000 compliant as of February 2. FAA must determine very
soon actions needed, if any, to make them compliant. All tasks must be done,
must be done well, and completed well before January 1, 2000, Failure of
mission-critical systems is not a viable option.

With less than 2 years to go, use of the limited remaining time is critical, FAA
must strive to get the fixes done this year, and begin testing as soon as possible.
Funding requirements must also be determined by FAA. The current funding
estimate is at least $162 million without interim replacement of the Host computer
and $322 million with its replacement. These estimates are likely to change as the
magnitude of the problem and the cost of the fixes become.clearer. Congress must
be told what the plan of attack is, and what it will cost to make all mission-critical
systems Year-2000 compliant, including new systems under development. While
money is important, the real issue is time.

The Year-2000 problem is not just a major challenge for Government. The entire
aviation industry, including aircraft manufacturers, airlines, and airports must be
involved. The challenge to FAA is great because its on-time track record for
completing computer and software intensive programs has been poor. FAA’s
scheduled November 1999 date to have the Year-2000 problem fixed brings us
much too close to the “millennium bomb,” a term recently used to describe the
Year-2000 problem by the Government Executive Magazine. This time there is no
room for schedule slippage; the due date is fixed. We urge FAA to move up the
implementation date to have all systems Year-2000 compliant, tested, and
operational no later than June 1999.

Our testimony today will identify actions FAA must take to effectively solve the
Year-2000 problem. They include the need to (1) take prompt action to make
necessary fixes to newly acquired but not yet operational systems,


101

we haven't seen those results, but that’s their problem not our
problem.

Let me ask a few closing questions, here, of really all of you. Mr.
Willemssen, I want to ask you first. If you’re forced to estimate the
percentage of FAA systems that will be fixed and tested by the
deadline, what would that percentage be based on your analysis?

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. If the inistrator follows through on some
of the key areas that we've talked about today—determining prior-
ities; committing to thorough testing end-to-end for mission critical
business processes; more aggressively pursuing external and inter-
nal data exchanges and interfaces; and making sure that we have
contingency Plans. in place, not just for specific systems, but for de-
livering on the mission—and if we continue to see the kind of ag-
gressiveness that we have witnessed very recently, I think there’s
a good chance that for mission-critical systems, we can succeed.

Mr. Horn. We've discussed the contingency plans on a number
of occasions and each one of you has really mentioned it in your
review. You looked at what they call the contingency plan. Or did
you find one?

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. Yes. We have seen them for individual sys-
tems. What we have not seen yet, and I’m not aware that they
exist, are back-up plans for ensuring continuity of operations for a
critical process. it’s more than just disaster recovery for an indi-
vidual system or a component and sliding something else in. If in-
deed you have massive failure, you've got to look for a total system
back-up. What are we going to do next? Are we going to go to a
DOD facility? Are we going to go to another en route center? Those
are the kinds of things you need to look at from a more global per-
spective. And instead of—it’s also important to look at specific sys-
tems, but we’d like to see that more global perspective also.

Mr. Horn. Usually one type of contingency is to keep the current
system and run that. But in this case the current system is the
problem. And what is your advice? That they simply look at options
throughout the Federal Government in terms of large massive com-
puters that maybe have been debugged by that time?

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. And one of those options still has to be with
the existing computers, unfortunately. In some cases I think that
will be the next best step that we do not necessarily want to mini-
mize here. It certainly is less than ideal, but that may indeed be
the only thing that can be done.

Can I make two other quick points, Mr. Chairman? One is: I
think it’s especially crucial that FAA be able to retain a cadre of
key staff that it has who are expert in many of these aging sys-
tems. And if they were to lose those staff, the agency would be at
even greater risk. It’s very important that those staff be retained.

Mr. Horn. There’s no question that that’s a major factor. We've
said from the beginning, as you get closer and closer to that date,
the people with experience will be bought off either by the private
sector or other Federal agencies, in terms of promotions and every-
thing else. So that is a key point you’re making there. Thank you.

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. The other point I want to make is there is a
lot of uniqueness in many of the FAA components—in many of the
FAA systems. There are also a lot of commercial, off-the-shelf prod-
ucts that are, in many cases, very old, that the vendors are no


37

case. FAA needs to validate for itself that there are no Year-2000 problems with
these systems, and initiate corrective actions if problems are found.

Significant Challenges Lie Ahead for FAA on Year-2000 Work.

While FAA still needs to determine the resources needed to fix Year-2000
problems, the critical issue today is time. Being behind with less than 2 years to
go, FAA has to commit to the Year-2000 project with an “absolute sense of
urgency. From what we have observed recently, FAA is now doing so. The most
difficult challenges lie ahead--fixing the problems, testing systems to make sure
these fixes work, and putting Year-2000 compliant systems into operation.

o Prompt decision needed on strategy for addressing the Year-2000 problem in
the aging Host computer

The Host computer is a key part of the system that enables air traffic
controllers to direct high altitude air traffic from the En-route Centers. There
are two issues concerning continued service of the Host computer beyond Year
2000: Can FAA make it Year-2000 compliant, and can FAA find replacement
parts, which are already scarce?

International Business Machines (IBM), the manufacturer, recommended FAA
replace the existing hardware because replacement parts are getting harder to
find, and because IBM lacks the talents and tools to assess the Year-2000
problems in the Host computer. However, FAA maintains the Host computer
can be fixed, and is considering a parallel effort to both repair the existing
computer and replace it with an interim Host before Year 2000. FAA estimates


62

FAA is following the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General
Accounting Office (GAO) recommended five-phase approach for identifying and fixing
‘Y2K (shorthand for Year 2000) software date change issues. These five phases are

awareness, assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation.

Your concems, and mine, obviously center on “mission-critical” systems, those that are
vital to the Agency’s successful achievement of its mission. Some of the most mission-
critical equipment in the FAA includes the individual pieces and systems that make up
the Nation’s air traffic control infrastructure, and although the Y2K issue is broader than
that -- affecting, for example, the automation components of FAA’s business
management systems -- I will focus my testimony on the status of our efforts to address
the mission-critical systems in the National Airspace System (NAS), and then discuss the
overall Agency Y2K effort.

‘The components that make up the NAS architecture are comprised of more than 23
million lines of code, 50 computer languages, and more than 250 computer systems. The
‘Y2K problem can affect NAS systems in a variety of ways. Software, hardware or

embedded code in NAS systems can be date-sensitive.

For example, let's look at a Y2K problem we have identified with our en route
surveillance radar. Each of our 20 air traffic control centers has en route survsillance

radar equipment, or ARSR, that monitors en route traffic in the system. The ARSR has a


33

« The Offshore Flight Data Processing System is used to communicate and
display positioning and flight plan information for aircraft over the oceans.

« The Terminal Doppler Weather Radar System is used to detect microbursts,
gust fronts, wind shifts, and precipitation. This system alerts aircraft of
hazardous weather conditions around airports and provides advanced notice of
changing weather conditions.

The Year-2000 Problem also is Important to the Airline Industry

Airlines and the aviation industry also will be affected by the Year-2000 problems
since many of their operations are date sensitive. For example, airline reservation
systems and fleet maintenance systems operate based on dates, and calculations
using dates, and aircraft have sophisticated on-board computerized avionics
equipment that must be Year-2000 compliant.

At a recent event sponsored by FAA, members of the airline industry raised
concems about how ready FAA, and the industry itself, would be for the Year
2000. In general, airlines were not very confident that the Air Traffic Control
System would work correctly. Regional airlines thought the awareness level--the
first step in addressing Year-2000 problems--among its members was not good.
Airport representatives generally agreed that airports were not as aware of Year-
2000 issues as they need to be.

The industry suggested FAA assume more of a leadership role in directing the
industry’s Year-2000 work. In December 1997, the Air Transport Association
established a Year-2000 program office to coordinate and interface with FAA.
FAA plans to hold another meeting with industry leaders later this month. The


65

challenges presented by Y2K for the entire Agency. Ihave asked Ray Long, who for the
ppast several months has been effectively directing the Y2K efforts for the air traffic
systems, to be the FAA Y2K program manager. Ray has a proven track record managing
the ATS Y2K program. His experience and knowledge of the problem are simply
unparalleled, and will allow the entire FAA to benefit from his leadership immediately. 1
have also expanded the technical support provided by Coopers and Lybrand, our business
partner for the ATS Y2K program, so that the FAA as a whole will benefit from the
stringent and disciplined approach developed for our air caffic systems. I have asked
Ray to focus particularly on the contingency plans that are needed for our mission-critical

systems.

In pulling together this new office, Ray will draw on the many technical talents of all
elements of the FAA to ensure that we have a complete, coordinated, corporate approach
to Y2K, He will also be working directly with his counterparts in the aviation industry so
that the airlines and airports are fully informed and confident in FAA’s progress. Ray has
begun his new assignment and reports directly to me. I intend to remain personally
involved in our progress on Y2K. I have made it clear to all FAA executives that we

must, and we will, meet our obligations to the flying public.

‘Next, we must ensure we have sufficient funding in the rest of this fiscal year, and in FY
1999. To augment the $18 million Congress appropriated for Y2K efforts this year, we
have absorbed approximately $33.2 million of Y2K costs within the Agency.


102

longer going to support. They are not going to tell FAA or anyone
else that they are going to be year 2000 compliant. In looking at
some of the assessment packages last night and this morning, Tsee
for a couple of critical environments there are a lot of C prod-
ucts—commercial off-the-shelf products—where there is some to be
determined on what needs to be done. So that’s another critical
area that the Administrator needs to focus on.

Mrs. MORELLA. Will the gentleman yield on that?

Mr. Horn. And some of them were—just a minute—some of the

them are presumably 2000 compliant. And then when they get the
system in, they aren’t. That was the experience of the agency for
International Development. We gave them and “A” in 1996, and an
“F” in 1997, because they bought the system which was their insur-
ance.
There are a lot of used car salesman in this operation, I’ve found,
in computing. They make a lot of promises. And unless you have
your own test pattern that will check that, that you can get
through January 1, 2000, and it won’t just be a 00, you’re in deep
trouble and a lot of money has been spent. So whatever FAA does,
Tm sure you're bright enough with all your experts around you, to
make sure that they pass that test and you've put them in an oper-
ational mode before you pay the vendor's check.

Excuse me, now, Mrs. Morella.

Mrs. MoRELLA. On the labor intensive part of it, there are also
a lot of cottage industries that are being developed as a result of
this. And I’m curious about how you handle labor problem,
since you mention the, importance a nce of Personnel. Ar. you ple to

yp these experienc people’ you pulli ack people into
the work arena who know those lines of code, formulas, the cobalt,
and whatever is necessary? Are you subcontracting? Are you re-
cruiting new people? I think that’s a whole dimension that we
haven’t really focused on because we really didn’t want to micro-
manage. But I think it’s important.

I also know that there’s a lot of work being doled out off-shore.
I don’t know what FAA’s doing about this. And maybe you'd be able
to enlighten us.

Ms. Garvey. Let me speak a little bit about the personnel issue
because I do think that is critical. Thanks to Congress, we do have
much more flexibility. We have a personnel reform system which
allows us to recruit and to raise some of our pay for some particu-
lar technical areas, and that’s an enormous benefit to us and it al-
lows us to keep some people with some good strong incentives. We
have been fortunate enough to hire some of the IBM employees
who know that system and who are part of this renovation that
we're doing on the Host. And we know how important it is to keep
those employees and to keep them through this project. So, we're
very much aware of that and grateful to Congress for the kinds of
personnel reform that allows us to do that.

Recruiting new people, that’s somet we are going to have to
do, though I was ing to staff the r day about that. It is
tough, as you've suggested. Everyone wants the Y2K guru, if you

ill. So, we are aggressively doing that. But I will say that, at this
point, we are relying very heavily on our technical expertise within


43

replacement. FAA’s estimate does not provide sufficiant coverage for
hardware replacement cost, so there is the potential for additional funding
requirements. Also, the cost to make major projects currently under
development Year-2000 compliant, and the cost to accelerate FAA’s
implementation schedule by at least 5 months, are unknown.

If unexpected problems are identified during testing or implementation, FAA
has to repeat much of the entire exercise--changing program code, retesting,
and implementing new fixes. The closer it gets to Year 2000, the more it will
cost to fix additional problems identified and to repeat such exercises. FAA
should reassess its Year-2000 cost estimates after considering all of these
factors, and inform the Secretary and Congress of its requirements.

Actions FAA Should Undertake to Solve Its Year-2000 Computer Problem.

The FAA Administrator is aware of the need to make sure Air Traffic Control
System computers are fixed and operational well before January 1, 2000. A sense
of urgency has been established, but there are risks even if the work is tightly
controlled and managed. To minimize these risks, we offer the following
recommendations:

« Assign a high priority to complete the assessment work, including the
quality assurance reviews, on existing systems. Also, determine whether or
not systems currently being purchased are Year-2000 compliant and take
appropriate action to fix those that are not. Amend contracts if necessary.

15


85

Mr. Horn. No. 6, “Develop a master schedule for fixing and test-
ing all mission-critical systems.” Have they given you such a mas-
ter schedule?

Ms. Garvey. It has been done for the air traffic control, Mr.
Ghairman. It will be done for the rest of the agency within the next

weeks.

Mr. Horn. Seven is “Promptly identify and secure resources
needed to get the job done.” Now I assume that means new money,
or is that old money?

Ms. GarRvVEY. Well, it’s a little bit of both. We certainly used the
appropriations that Congress has given us. We've also absorbed
some of the cost, about 33 million, absorbed from other parts of
the program. We have a reprogramming request that is now work-
ing its way through the administration and we'll be forwarding
that very shortly to our appropriate committees. That’s for 1998.

Mr. Horn. This is reprogramming the money at the end of the
last fiscal year?

Ms. GaRVEY. This is for 1998; yes, Mr. Chairman. And in——

Mr. Horn. How much did you have over, within FAA, at the end
of that fiscal year?

Ms. GaRVEY. In 1998, we believe the costs were about $89 million
in total. We got—

Mr. Horn. Well, I’m thinking of September 30, 1997, midnight.
How much did you turn back to the Treasury?

Ms. Garvey. I’m sorry, I can’t give you that answer. We'll get
that for you.

Mr. Horn. Can we have that filed for the record? I'd like to
know: No. 1, how much came out of FAA money; how much came
out of the Department of Transportation money? Dr. Raines and I
have agreed from the day he came here as OMB Director, that we
ought to have reprogrammed every single dime we could put our
hands on in the end of the last fiscal year. And if we just let it go
back to the Treasury, somebody isn't asserting leaderstip and exe-
cuting leadership throughout whole administration. So that’s a
common question I’m all agency heads.

Ms. GaRveY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We'll get that informa-

jection.

{The information referred to follows:]

FAA turned back $16 million to the Department of Treasury in Fiscal Year 1997.
Of this amount, $8 million was in the Facilities and Equipment budget, $5 million
was part of the Operations 7 $3 million was part of the Airports budget.

Mr. Horn. “Report monthly to the Secretary and on
progress made toward fixing the Year-2000 problems.” it sort
of a reporting system does the Secretary have to know what’s going
on in his department?


6

dressing the problem, the time table and schedule for completing
corrective actions. We're also going to seek to identify exactly who
within the organization is responsible for directing and managing
the agency’s year 2000 efforts. And, finally, we're going to explore
the contingency plans being developed in the Draconian event that
repair or replacement efforts are not completed for all systems by
the year 2000.

I am pleased that we have with us, as has been mentioned, a
very strong el of committed witnesses concerning the FAA’s
ability to ad the year 2000 problem. The fact that the admin-
istrator of the FAA is before our subcommittees suggests that the
year 2000 problem will receive a higher agency priority in the fu-
ture. I wish to thank her, the other members of our distinguished,
for joining us here today.

I would like to now recognize the ranking member of the Tech-
nology Subcommittee, Mr. Gordon, for any opening comments,
and thank him for the work that he and the subcommittee have
done on this problem.

Mr. GoRDON. Thank you, and I want to add my welcome to ev-

ne who's joined us for the hearing today.

‘oday, we will hear testimony about FAA’s efforts to address the
year 2000 problem. Because FAA is responsible for maintaining the
national air safety system, this hearing isn’t about FAA’s progress
in assessing, revi , and converting thousands of lines of com-
puter code. For the FAA industry and the American public, the
year 2000 problem is an issue of safety and economics.

In order to maintain the safety of our air traffic control system,
there cannot be any unexpected air traffic control glitches at mid-
night January 31, 1999. It is imperative that the FAA and the air-
line industry identify all possible problems before the year 2000,
and I have every confidence that they will identify every potenti:
Y2K problem by then. I don’t believe that the FAA or the airline
industry will allow airplanes to fly, if there is a year 2000 problem
that would compromise the public safety.

However, I feel less confident about FAA’s ability to renovate
and test all of its systems before the year 2000 deadline. FAA’s cur-
rent schedule allows for no slippage. If FAA falls behind, we could
find the national airspace capacity reduced until the computer sys-
tems were repaired and tested.

The economic impact would be tremendous. In 1996, more than
582 million flew on American carriers. Airlines carried more
17 million metric tons of freight, and there were more than 22,500
daily departures. American airline carriers employ half a million
Americans, and had a net profit of $2.8 billion a year. That’s a
snapshot in 1996.

Between now and 2000, FAA estimates that domestic departures
will increase by 7 percent. Any reduction in capacity by the na-
tional airs] would have a dramatic impact on the U.S. economy.
One only to look back at the UPS strike to imagine just a few
of the consequences.

Also, the year 2000 problem, as it affects air traffic and transpor-
tation, is not just a U.S. problem. This problem must be addressed
and coordinated on a worldwide basis. It’s my understanding that
such coordination is only now just beginning, and that many coun-


CONTENTS

Page
Hearing held on February 4, 1998 ..... 1
Statement of:
Garvey, Jane, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration .... 87
Graham, Stanley, senior management consultant, Tech-Beamers, 68
Mead, Ken, Inspector General, Department of Transportation .. 26
Willemssen, Joel, Director, Accounting and Information Management
vision, General Accounting Office ... 9
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the y:
Garvey, Jane, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration:
Information concerning FAA money 85, 104
Memo dated Spetember 22, 1997 106
Prepared statement of 61
Graham, Stanley, senior
prepared statement o 10
Horn, Hon. Stephen, a
California:
Executive order dated Fel 4, 1998 ... 90
Letters dated March 20, and May 1, 1998 109
Mead, Ken, Inspector General, Department of Transportation:
Information concerning target dates 27
Prepared statement of ... 23
Willemssen, Joel, Director, Accounting and Information Management
vision, General Accounting Office, prepared statement of ... ll



40

Control System), and an FAA-wide program office. The FAA-wide program
office reports to the FAA’s Chief Information Officer (CIO). However, the
CIO is three levels down from the FAA Administrator, and has not provided
effective FAA-wide leadership.

The FAA Administrator is aware of the need for strong CIO leadership and is
addressing the issue with her senior staff. The Department also is looking for
candidates to head the Departmentwide CIO Office. Meanwhile, FAA’s
Year-2000 responsibility is divided. The Associate Administrator for Air
Traffic Services continues to be responsible for the Air Traffic Control System,
but not for Air Traffic Control Systems that are not yet operational. The
remaining Year-2000 responsibility recently was elevated from the CIO Office
to the Deputy Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions.

Developing central leadership for FAA’s Year-2000 program is critical because
of the close relationship between its two groups. Also, central leadership is
critical for prioritizing and determining how time and resources should be spent
for fixing Year-2000 problems in FAA’s mission-critical systems.

FAA started its Year-2000 work in mid-1996, and is about to finish its
assessment work. However, the hard and time-consuming work lies ahead.
Fixing non-compliant software code, testing the fix, and implementing
compliant systems require more work, as demonstrated by FAA’s cost
estimates. FAA has spent $8 million on assessing Year-2000 problems.
Excluding the Host, cost estimates for fixing software code and

12


1

Presentation to Congress The Year 2000; At the FAA -The Time for Action is Now!
Handout

‘Thank you Mr. Ch 1 that there isa great deal of tbat used in the United States air
traffic control system could fail after December 31, 1999, if not sooner, due largely to Year 2000 problems, Based on the
GAO report, input from your staff, and Tech-Beamers research, I believe that there ia litte chance that all the FAA's
‘14 ried applications wil be Yenr 200 ready by yearend 199% T agree wih the GAO report tat the enormous
problem with correcting these but » project one. Tect
stern lenied us premier Year 0 servic reide It pleted that ne cas share nit the Science
‘Committee's Subcommittee on Technology and the Government Reform and Oversight Comumittee’s Subcommittee on
Government Management, Information and Techoology and the FAA some of the experiences that we had in managiag
‘major conversions. There are many problems to be addressed by the PAA. One of these isthe requirement for an
ahietve quanioie) metholoy fr panning and racking PAA pret shot, There a proves Way i gather
‘and report such schedule information. I will also make other recommendations that should be helpful ia reducing the
risk due to the FAA's en-route air traffic control system due to antiquated mainframe computing systems.

‘There is ao quick fix ta the FAA,
problem. However, one of the first Fie far Yew Tevet Fermet Teste cr

In general, project planing sod :
toauiee cea

organizations use are antic iadeccieniinan a

From the data Thave wea the PAA = mneerccomtee

project is no different. These lied Maing Phe nl

methods are undisciplined, rely Rencsennert Prewe wal

Largely 00 intuition and hunch, and clined al

tre constrained by eet. Indetry cere te

experts report that 80% or more of packed =

computer projects fail to meet their fercacetoe ia

daetwith the ancton commited. =e

‘Tinto unaceptabe forthe Year oceans

noe semen

Considering the scope af the Year Tormermorrerraet ea

2000 problem athe FAA, they have : -

Title choice bet touse«dscipined ee oe ee

winmmeearoaie
Cae

Uniectonigaconleic iat EEEEESRESSRNER HecsRaRERS
Seer ric Emenee
el
‘major plan activities. _ Setonarce Tot Target
vce tt = 5
Srcccpepticat tc =

Progress of large software projects tend to follow a —
ieaenromrcitae tere
completed is represented to the left of the curves and
Seiitimenewnenee
Sieh vmsenatatyat
evens acaigrcnpmeios rt
highly automated migration aids the can be used to
bridge the applications current data and code
‘without change, and tothe extreme right the initial
pret nto vc it

7M @ 5 6 7 89 50 Ho

a SRR aL A CNT TER


80

ing of the weapons at our.
‘We cannot be deterred by those who
demand ebsolute proof of the problem
before taking decisive action. When the
‘proof is at hand, and it will be in 1999,
it will be too late to win battles that
could have been won. Our casualties
will be greater than they need be.

Dire Consequences

‘This war should not last long. Some
hard failures in our systems will occur
may take several years to become
‘apparent. The consequences of failure
to fix the problem will streak across the
lobe, like tens of thousands tomadoes
disrupting the lives of hundreds of mil-
lions of people by denying them vital

transportation
systems, these will be affected. Every
‘organization will be affected, including

prepared,

compliant systems compromise their
networks. Additionally, many small
businesses and non profit organizations
will not be able to compete for the con-
version staff, or may realize 100 late the
danger of the approaching force and will

fail to make back-up plans.
Many of these organizations will be
‘compromised and fail.

Conclusion
‘There are things to be done.

courage “not invented here” and capi-
talize on the experience of others.
Furthermore, survival isthe frst priori-
‘y. Therefore, many projects should be
deferred or cancelled.

The evidence is accumulating, There
are wake up calls being sounded by
many industry consultns, leading

hardware vendors such as IBM and
Digital Equipment, Governmental lead-
ers such as Congressman Horn,
Congresswoman Morella and SEC
Chairman Levit. Publications such as
the Year/2000 Journal an enlightened
press corps, and print and video media
hhave begun to make a difference. Only
if Government and Industry work
together with an informed population,
‘can we hope to minimize the economic
dislocation and Yeat/2000 casualties.
‘As Robert Alloway of Congressman
‘Hom’s staf suggested; “When the time
‘comes, being right will not be enough.

‘We must influence others to take action

In conclusion, although there is dan-
fer, there is still time to marshal the
resources to help reduce the risk. There
are tools that can help, and time left to
develop emergency backup plans to
mitigate the damage. However, it is
vital to understand the seriousness of

Yearl000 ‘tools and ‘methodologies
while working with, not confronting
vendors. and

management
morale must be rebuilt through rewards
tod recognition ofthe aifiaky of
‘Year/2000 assignments. Crisis manage-
ment procedures must be developed
now, and teams staffed as soon as possi-
ble. Furthermore, every decision maker
must recognize that we live in an imper-
fect world where applications and sys-
tems need repair. That means that even
after the Year/2000 migration is com-
plete, there will still be work to be don
‘The time for action is now!

‘An ertide based on this presentation will appear in the MarciVApril 1908
issue of Yoar/2000 Joumat: PO Box §50547, Datias, TX 75355



FAA AT RISK: YEAR 2000 IMPACT ON THE
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 4, 1998

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

Serial No. 105-141

Committee on Science

Serial No. 105-49

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and
the Committee on Science

oe

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
49-989 CC WASHINGTON : 1998

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-057370-X
a



106

‘ajc ACTION: Policy Statement for Y2K ue: SEP 2? or
Compliance on NAS Systems

fom: Ansociate Administrator for Air me
Traffic Services, ATS-1

Te Associate Administrator for Research and
Acquisition, ARA-1

ATS ‘has begun significant Year 2000 (¥2K) assessment/
modification efforts on current National Airspace Systems.
Completing these efforts expeditiously is of the highest
priority within Airway Facilities (AF).

We need to jointly ensure Y2K compliance of any new system
stem upgrade placed into the NAS from this point
fordard. Accordingly, ATS will not accept for deployment

any systems unless they are certified as Y2K compliant
according to the compliance criteria issued by the AF 2K
Program Office. The certification must be in writing and
signed by the appropriate signatory prior to any joint
acceptance activity.

If, for extraordinary circumstances, compliance cannot be
met prior to the joint acceptance activity, ARA must
develop a plan showing how ARA will make the system Y2K
compliant in accordance with the repair schedule/process
defined by the AF ¥2K Program Office. Funding for the
repair activities will be the responsibility of ARA. Prior
to deployment, ATS and ARA must acknowledge acceptance of
the repair plan through joint signature.

Thank you for your assistance in this critical NAS
activity. “If you have any questions, contact Raymond Long,
Manager of the AF Y2K Program Office, at (202) 366-5342.

R, BELGSR

t

Monte R. Belger




107

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Horn. Mr. Graham, do you have any comments you'd like
to make? Anything bother you in the testimony of the other wit-
nesses? And do you have any suggestions that haven’t been put on
the table?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. I am more concerned about——

Me. Homn. Do you want to get the microphone close to you,
please?

Mr. GRAHAM. Sorry. I am more concerned about the survivability
of the IBM 3083's. We're experienced—we found that one of our
customers actually was using this system, and it was unreliable,
regardless of the fact that it was not year 2000-compliant. The
drives kept going down. They lost data, which they had to recon-
struct. So I am very concerned. IBM has said, I understand, that
by the end of this year they will no longer provide any support at
all for those systems. So I honestly don’t believe that the current
mainframes that are in the centers are a viable alternative beyond
the year 2000.

The other thing that concerns me is that I learned about 30
years ago that people are much smarter than computers, and that
is, they can reason. On the other hand, computers remember what
they are told to do very well. The problem is, until you actually
execute the programs on the systems, you do not know what their
behavior is. A great deal of the remediation is done on static infor-
mation which is really not accurate.

The other thing I’d like to add is in support of Mr. Mead, that
using the banking industry as one example and the securities in-
dustry as another example, 6 months is not enough for the final
test. A lot of the issues that were raised, including the ones by
Mrs. Morella, indicate that there should be a minimum of 1 year
allocated to the final integration testing for the FAA system. So I’m
a great deal more pessimistic than I think many others here. I’m
not suggesting it’s an insoluble problem, but I’m much more pessi-
mistic.

The other thing I'd like to add—and I said it very quickly in my
statement—and that is there is absolutely no way to ensure that
the FAA system, or any other large system in the Federal Govern-
ment or in industry, will be 100 percent year 2000-compliant.
When I managed testing at IBM, we recognized that the number
of paths that appear-in large ap lications are unbounded; that is
infinite; you can’t count them. If you can’t count them, you can’t
test them. Now what you have to do, the management of year 2K,
is to minimize the risk. You cannot eliminate it. You cannot de-
mand from any vendor, or should not demand from any vendor,
that they prove that they are 100 percent year 2000 compliant.

But I also support the idea that you must—must—validate the
vendors’ claims. I don’t care who it is. The vendor, whether it’s
IBM or the smallest vendor on the block, is not in a position to be
able to do the testing that will ensure that your systems work. It’s
just not logical. It’s not feasible.

I think it’s very unlikely, at the 11th hour, that anyone will come
in with a fix for the 3083 systems. I don’t honestly think you
should consider that as a viable alternative beyond the year 2000.


28

Mr. MEaD. Between January 23 and February 2, the number of
assessed systems by air t: ic increased from 100 to 209. The
number of assessments approved by the Quality Assurance Review
Team increased from 86 to 171. Since FAA completed and approved
a significant portion of those assessment and quality assurance re-
views just in the past week, we haven't substantiated the accuracy
of that, and our confidence in the results will be much greater
when all the quality assurance reviews are done and we've had a
chance to validate it.

But, as of February 2nd, FAA data shows that 125 systems were
year 2000-compliant. Our review shows that these were the easy
ones to fix or they had no date processing function. But that means
that 84 systems remain to be fixed.

The truth is that FAA’s most difficult challenges lie ahead: fixing
the problems, including the Host computer, which is really the
heart and soul, and route centers which direct traffic at the higher
altitudes. FAA also is buying new systems that are scheduled to be
deployed before the year 2000. Twenty-three newly purchased but
not deployed systems, each costing over $100 million, has not been
determined by FAA to be year 2000-compliant yet. So that needs
to be a priority item, too.

So with less than 2 years to go, the FAA’s use of remaining time
is critical. FAA must get the fixes done this year and begin testing
as soon as possible. Funding requirements must also be deter-
mined. The current estimate is about $162 million, without replac-
ing the Host computer; it’s about $322 million if it’s replaced.

But I should really stress, while money is important, the real
issue facing all of us is the time one. The year 2000 problem is not
just a major challenge for Government; it’s the entire aviation in-
dustry, including manufacturer of airlines and airports. And the
challenge to FAA is especially great because of its track record in
installing computer hardware and software, and I don’t mean to be
redundant on the point, but I think that persuasively argues for ac-
celerating the implementation target date.

At the end of our prepared statement there’s a set of eight action
items that I won’t belabor here. The Administrator and I have dis-
cussed these. FAA is going to move to implement them. They are
all directed, though, toward three things: accelerating the year
2000 completion and compliance date; establishing central leader-
ship and maintaining a constant sense of urgency; and, finally, re-
Porting to Congress more regularly, so that you are kept abreast
of FAA progress.

you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:]


87

And this also leads to my concern about it on an international
basis. And I’ve asked GAO to make a report on that situation and
what seems to be going on. And one of the things—pieces of infor-
mation—they just came back to me saying, they asked the Depart-
ment of Transportation for information concerning interfaces and
when it came to the FAA that was left blank—that you weren’t
able to provide any information. So they can’t get on with your job.

These are more statements than questions because of the lack of
time. These are concerns. They aren’t going to go away. If you have
anything you'd like to say now, fine. And if not, we'll need to know
more about this in the future.

Ms. GarvEY. I'll be very brief, those are very serious concerns.
We are working closely with ICAO. We have a meeting scheduled
in March with my counterparts in Europe. We have another one
next fall in Montreal with all of my counterparts from across the
world. And one of the issues, in fact at the top of the agenda, is
year 2K. We're working very closely with ICAO who is collecting
some of this information. I will get to you the most current infor-
mation that we have, but you’re absolutely right that’s a critical
and serious concern.

I've met with every one of the CEO’s of all of our major airlines,
and Y2K is one of the first issues that we talk about. Ray Long,
Monte, and others in the FAA, are meeting regularly with the air-
lines individually. We have another meeting set up next Monday
with folks from ATA. We're taking that very seriously.

I think we need to do a little bit more work with airports, but
we're going to do that. I look forward to working with folks in that
industry as well.

Mr. GORDON. We all want you to succeed. It’s important.

Ms. Garvey. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Horn. I think we'll recess now. And we will come back.
Hopefully, we'll make it back by 3:50. ‘So, you’ve got a 20 minute
recess. Sorry to do that to you, but we’re paid to vote. And while
all the work gets done in hearings, it is disruptive, and we apolo-
Bite for voting. Thank you.

SS.

Mr. Horn [presiding]. To continue the hearing, Mr. Gordon had
about 1 minute left, and we'll in the meantime yield to Mr. Gut-
knecht, the vice-chairman of the Subcommittee on Technology, for
his questioning; 5 minutes.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don’t expect to take the
whole time.

This, I guess, is for Mr. Willemssen. If you were to estimate for
us the percentage of FAA systems that will be fixed and tested by
the deadline, what would you estimate the percentage to be?

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. I think it’s difficult, at this point, to come w
with a realistic estimate. What I would encourage FAA and the Ad-
ministrator to do, though, at this point in time, is set priorities at
a very defined level, even within mission-critical. We’re on record
as saying that there is insufficient time left to think that all sys-
tems can be fixed. And therefore, we’ve got to place a priority on
fixing the most urgent systems, so much, to the extent that, if I
were in the Administrator’s shoes, I would put more attention on
thoroughly testing those mission-critical systems before I focused



82

Since his retirement from IBM in 1993, Stan has managed Tech-Beamers. It is a company
whose system specialists: plan, configure, integrate, market, and install advanced computer
based solutions using S/390 products. As a management consultant to a client /server
hardware company, he provided that company’s management advice on integrating
application program development on the desktop with IBM P/370 technology, and managed
the first P/370 technical center. He also designed and developed a PC based business model
for quantifying the cost of computing, and the value of client/server solutions As a member of
the IBM S/390 Developers Association, he managed the testing of a project to port Unix
applications to IBM's S/390 systems. He also prepared and taught the course, an
"Introduction to Client / Server" to IBM personnel in East Fishkill, N.Y.

As a management consultant, he is considered an industry leader in Year 2000 issues and
solutions. He is on the editorial board and has authored several articles on Year 2000 testing
and project management methodologies that appeared in the Year /2000 Journal. He is also a
frequent guest speaker at Year 2000 conferences. In addition, he designed and is product
manager for three Year 2000 project management products marketed by Tech-Beamers.
CODE-TRAC, QwikStart and TEST-TRAC have gained industry approval as best _
methodologies, and appeared in the books on Year 2000 Best Methods edited by the Society
of Information Management and the Association of Information Technology Professionals.


10

84 of the 209 mission-critical systems it initially assessed were
likely to result in catastrophic failure if they were not renovated
and tested. FAA assures that it plans to fix these systems.

As FAA completes its system assessments, it faces difficult deci-
sions about to renovate or replace its systems. One significant ex-
ample is the Host computer system, for which IBM reported
that it has no confidence in the ability of the micro-code to survive
the date cl , and therefore, has recommended that the FAA
purchase new ware.

FAA is now considering both assessing the micro-code and pur-
chasing and implementing new hardware. While this may be a rea-
sonable approach to help ensure success, the purchase of new hard-
ware carries its own set of risks—risks that must be mitigated in
a short period of time.

Overall, should FAA not succeed in making its systems year
2000-compliant, the domino effect on others could be far-reaching.
At a recent meeting with FAA, airline representatives explained
that flights could not even get off the ground on January 1, 2000,
unless the FAA was substantially year 2000-compliant.

Given the many hurdles that FAA faces and limited amount
of time left, planning for contingencies and for operational continu-
ity through turn of the century becomes even more urgent. We
plan to issue an exposure draft of a guide later this month to assist
agencies in performing necessary contingency planning for the year
2000 crisis. Among other things, such planning lays out the specific
steps and detailed actions required to re-establish capability for
mission-critical operations in the event of prolonged disruption,
failure, or disaster.

Despite the risks that FAA faces in reaching year 2000 compli-
ance, we are encouraged by some recent events. For example, it’s
evident that the Administrator has now made year 2000 a top pri-
ority. Further, FAA has agreed to implement all of our rec-
ommendations. In addition, we’re starting to see pockets of more
aggressive action in some segments of FAA. Nevertheless, FAA’s
delays to date and the massive nature of the task at hand put the
agency at great risk. Therefore, it’s important that the Congress
continue its oversight to help ensure that FAA makes it in time.

That concludes a summary of my statement. I'd be pleased to ad-
dress any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Willemssen follows:]


52

by Coast Guard as fully assessed as of October 28, 1997, and found none was
fully assessed in accordance with Departmental criteria. At least one of the seven
mission-critical systems will not be fully assessed until July 1998. In computing
the assessment completion percentage for the November 14 report to OMB, the
Department included 100 percent of the Coast Guard systems as fully assessed.
However, the Department noted those systems were being revisited, and the
updated ‘status would be included in the quarterly report to OMB in
February, 1998.

As of October 28, 1997, FAA was reporting 47 percent of its mission-critical
systems were fully assessed. We found FAA included systems in the Y2K
assessment percentage that it deemed already compliant or having no Y2K
implications, which is contrary to OMB guidelines. For assessment purposes,
OMB requires reporting only on mission-critical systems that need repair. Based
‘on our inquiries, GAO guidance, and an FAA reassessment, 150 systems were
reclassified as mission-critical and were included in the November 14 report to
OMB for the first time.

On November 14, 1997, the Department reported to OMB that FAA was
38 percent complete on its assessments. This was based on 12 of 32 systems being
repaired. However, as noted in the November 14 report, FAA had 329
mission-critical systems which needed to be assessed. Accordingly, the 38 percent
was significantly overstated when considering FAA’s entire universe of
mission-critical systems.

Compliant Systems

On May 15, 1997, the Department reported 18 systems were Y2K compliant. We
reviewed eight of these systems, and as of August 13, 1997, found no evidence
that these systems were properly assessed, tested, and certified as being Y2K
compliant. Based on our findings, the Department reported, in its August 15
report to OMB, that none of its systems was Y2K compliant because they did not
meet the departmental criteria for compliance. Subsequently, at least one
mission-critical system, included in our sample and reported as Y2K compliant,
was found to be noncompliant. The OAs were researching the other 17 systems
for Y2K implications.

As of October 31, 1997, the OAs reported to the Department that 98 of 368
systems were Y2K compliant for reporting to OMB on November 15. We again
tested for evidence of compliance on 79 systems and found 43 systems, deemed
Y2K compliant by the OAs, did not have proper evidence of being evaluated and
certified as being compliant. Based on our results and certifications provided by


94

Mr. Meab. Or slow it down. I think, for my money, I'd devote my
energies—my driving energies—to fixing that Host and replacing it
as expeditiously as possible.

Mrs. MORELLA. I don’t know whether it’s been mentioned, about
IBM feeling that they don’t really have the ability to repair it, ren-
ovate, and yet-——

Ms. GarVEY. If I could just comment on that. I Spent a good deal
of time with one of the senior executives from IBM, talking with
him a week ago, really at length about this issue. And he was most
supportive of the two-tracked approach for some of the reasons that
Mr. Mead mentioned. He said you really have to get it repaired and
renovated at the same time that you are trying to aggressively
move forward on the—

Mrs. MORELLA. In the hopes that one of them is going to work.

Ms. GARVEY. Well, again, it’s the belt and suspenders approach,
and we think that’s the prudent and a wise thing to do. might
also mention there is a team working today, offsite, just devoted to
the whole issue of Host and how quickly can we move that sched-
ule up. So, I think in the next few days, we'll have even more defin-
itive answers than we have today.

Again, I will mention that we’re working very closely with Mr.
Mead’s office on this issue.

Mrs. MORELLA. Because I would wonder how you are trying to
avoid FAA’s past mistakes in procuring new computer systems and
software programs while you are replacing the Host.

Ms. GarvVEY. I think one—that is certainly, I’m well aware of the
track record and well aware of the challenges. I think one of the
ways that we're trying to approach this is, again, putting the right
kind of resources to it, establishing some very clear timeliness, es-
tablishing some clear benchmarks, involving people even outside
the agency to help solve the problem. And I believe that’s an ap-
proach that will work. I’m certainly paying a great deal of attention
to it and know it’s an issue that’s extremely important.

Mrs, MORELLA. I know you're paying attention to it, and that’s
critical.

May I ask Mr. Willemssen a question, too?

Mr. Horn. Sure.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Willemssen, based on what you know, what’s
the chance that the FAA will not complete all of its renovations
and its testing activities by the deadline, honestly?

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. If the pace that we have seen over the last,
since we did this job, continues, we don’t think FAA would make
it in time. If the pace consistent with the flurry of activity over the
last week or two continues, then we have a much brighter hope
that, indeed, we are going to make it in time-for the mission-criti-
cal systems.

Mrs. MORELLA. Under the worst case scenario, what reductions
in capacity to the national air-space system would be necessary?
And, I wonder how a reduction would affect commercial airlines in
the industry? It seems to me you've got a concept of intra-operabil-
ity that’s critical that we need to look at too.

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. I totally agree with you. And that’s why I
would, again, encourage FAA to set Priorities in terms—the highest
priority, I assume, might be along lines of the mission of sepa-


73

Integral to each of the FAA's: are pr

techusiges These yeu epee on 00 ner lated computers fst fe error sly gee ad rect
aircraft. What males the FAA problem particularly serious is that the FAA is running computers that are between 20-25
years old.

‘What makes the situation even more difficult is that special instructions have been added to the FAA computers. The
Agency also has it's owa proprietary computer operating system software that is used uo where else ia the world.

In order to reduce the risk to the integrity of the FAA fight control system, I recommend the establishment of 2 pilot
project on & cluster of “Year 2000 Time Machines.” The first step would be to replicate the FAA's current operating
system on a computer like an IBM R/390, and to pilot test selected FAA systems operation in a “Year 2000

‘computer environment. We previously used such a computer to replace similar ones that are central to the FAA's en-
route system.

‘The nest step is to make provisions for attaching the radar detection hardware and flight controller's displays to several
of the systems and check out the Flight Control Systems applications. Following that, the FAA could use Year 2000
software vendor tools to bridge current data and current applications to make them Year 2000 ready. These tools selected
‘should require little or no program changes. The following step should be renovating and testing changes tothe critical

‘After that is the can be judged by the FAA as to their suitability for

‘operation.

‘The recommendation | propone are ues quick Prthermar, heres no way t completely tet appiatoy st
as air traffic coatrol ‘of logical paths cannot be Th will come with

{00% gurantee Rowcrermbat I ropon coal be Wil in our search fran tcapenve ad pret! sor teres
solution. One that could help the FAA malataia their vital services, Thank you for the opportunity to testify, I hope that I

been hep 1 the FAA and the Science Commaer'sSabcommies m Tecknelgy sed the Grverement Refer
and Oversight C ‘00 Gov



34

increased interactions on this issue between FAA and all parts of the industry is
one step in the right direction.

FAA got a.very late start on the Year-2000 problems. About 6 months ago, FAA
began addressing these issues with a sense of urgency. Consequently, FAA is
behind schedule on assessing its systems for Year-2000 problems, ‘determining
what needs to be fixed, and deciding how to solve these problems. The following
chart shows the target dates established by OMB, the Department, and FAA for
completing Year-2000 tasks. It also shows the cost estimates for the Department
and FAA, excluding the cost to replace the interim Host computer.

‘YEAR-2000 OMB DOT FAA DOT FAA
PHASES AND TASKS ‘TARGET | TARGET | TARGET | COST cosT
(Includes
FAA)

Assessment—Determine the 6/97 8/97 1/98 $10M $8M
Scope of Year-2000 Problems

Renovation~Fix Year-2000 | 9/98 9/98 12/98 | $99M $90M
Problems

Validation—Test the Fix 1/99 1/99 1199 included included
Below) Below)

Timplementation—Implement [3/99 [3/99 111/99 |S74M _ _|So4M

‘Year-2000 Compliant

Systems $183M | $162M

Recently FAA has been working very hard to complete its assessment work. To
its credit, FAA implemented a two-step approach for Air Traffic Control Systems
that has been effective. First, the assessment is done by system owners in the


46

EXHIBIT A

Total number of mission-critical systems
(As of February 2, 1998)

Operating Total Number Number
Administrations of Already
: Mission-critical Compliant
BTS 1 0
FAA 430 125
FHWA 9 0
FRA 4
FTA [)
MARAD 14 O
NHTSA 27 ie)
RSPA 27 0
SLSDC 10 4
USCG 78 25
OIG [)
OST O
STB 1
TASC 0
Totals 617 159

18


115

B279744

reported that it has no confidence in the ability of the HCS processor's
microcode (low-level machine instructions used to service the IBM 3083) to
survive the millennium date change because it no longer has the skills or tools
to properly assess this code. If there are date dependencies in the processor's
microcode, HCS could malfunction or shut down, thereby forcing FAA to
operate with the degraded flight processing capabilities provided by its backup
system and potentially reducing air traffic capacity. IBM has therefore
recommended that FAA purchase new HCS hardware.

EAA PLANS TO REPLACE HCS

Because of concems about the availability of spare parts and the Year 2000
issue, FAA initiated the Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement
program to replace all HCS processors in its 20 en route centers and training
and technical support centers by October 1999.° Software and peripheral
equipment replacements, which will occur in the later phases of this program,
are scheduled for completion by mid-2001. FAA believes this phased approach,
with a total system life-cycle cost estimate of about $607 million through 2008,
will provide the lowest risk for fast processor replacement and will provide for
replacement of other hardware components prior to their end-of-service dates.

While we agree that FAA must act quickly to resolve its HCS spare parts and
Year 2000 issues, this acquisition does not come without risks-risks that FAA
must mitigate in ‘a short time. In our February 4, 1998, testimony, we reported
on several HCS hardware acquisition risks. One of these is the risk of delays
and problems resulting from deploying HCS concurrently with FAA's new
Display System Replacement (DSR). When upgrading parts of a safety-critical
system such as HCS and DSR, it is simpler and safer to upgrade one part at a
time. Another risk lies in the difficulty associated with deploying new hardware
to 20 en route centers in less than 2 years. In commenting on a draft of this
report, FAA officials concurred that this is a risk but stated that they are
mitigating it by using a phased approach that will allow them to deploy the
hardware first and the software and peripheral equipment replacements late.

‘The Department of Transportation's Inspector General is initiating two
assignments that will address FAA's progress in mitigating these risks. The first
is a review of the Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement's cost,
schedule, and risks. The second is a review of FAA's plans for concurrently
deploying systems, including HCS and DSR, in 1999 and 2000. Additionally, we
have initiated a review of FAA's plans for assuring business continuity should

“PAA also plans to replace non-HCS equipment in four Oceanic en route centers.

5 GAO/AIMD-98-138R FAA's Host Computer System


51

office served primarily as the collection point for reporting progress to OMB and
Congress, but was not verifying data reported by the OAs as of
November 14, 1997.

Systems Inventories

Identifying all systems is the first, and key, step for assessing the scope of Y2K
work and estimating resource needs. At the start of our audit work, the
Department's Y2K inventory included 717 systems. To determine the accuracy of
this data, we compared the OA systems in their Y2K inventories (717) with other
systems inventories, such as the Information Resource Management 5-Year Plan.
We identified 306 systems that were not included in the Y2K inventory. Of these,
232 were in FAA and the remaining 74 were in the other OAs.

As of October 31, 1997, the OAs included 55 of the 306 OIG-identified systems in
their inventory. Fourteen of the fifty-five systems were determined by the OAs to
be mission-critical. The remaining 251 OlG-identified systems were being
reviewed for possible inclusion in the Y2K inventory.

We also found the OAs were not fully assessing electronic equipment for Y2K
implications. We identified at least 10,000 electronic equipment items that were
not fully evaluated for Y2K problems with embedded micro-chips. Embedded
micro-chips, which are used in electronic devices, such as communication or
navigation systems, could be programmed with time and date mechanisms which
could potentially create Y2K failures. The OAs were researching these items for
Y2K implications.

Completed Assessments

The Department's reported percentage of complete assessments was overstated in
its May 15 report to OMB, and in its proposed reports for August and November.
The August and November reports to OMB included adjustments based on our
results. For example, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) reported its
Office of Airline Information as being 100 percent assessed. We found little
documentation or evidence supporting completion of assessment efforts. BTS had
not prepared adequate renovation or contingency plans, and had no documentation
supporting cost estimates. As a result, the Department reported the BTS
percentage of completion as zero in the November 14 report to OMB.

In its August report, the Coast Guard reported assessment work was 100 percent
complete, although it had not yet determined whether 27 of its mission-critical
systems had Y2K problems. We reviewed seven mission-critical systems reported


47

EXHIBIT B
FAA MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.
‘Acronym Development Project Description Program
Costs
‘WSCS ‘Voice Switching and Control System $1,453M
DSR Display System Replacement 1,055M
STARS | Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
940M
‘ASR-9 | Airport Surveillance Radar Model 9 332M
FM “Traffic Flow Management 795M
MODE-S _| Mode Select-discrete addressable secondary radar system with
dataclink 454M
LRR "ARSR-4 Long Range Radar Replacement
409M
TDWR _| Terminal Doppler Weather Radar System
384M
‘NIMS ‘NAS Infrastructure Management System 379M
WAAS __| Wide Area Augmentation System 261M
ITws Integrated Terminal Weather System 276M.
‘Osps Oceanic System Development and Support
264M
‘ASOS ‘Automated Surface Observing System 252M
RCE. Radio Control Equi 248M
‘ASDE-3 | Airport Surface Detection 243M
‘COMMO | Automated Radar Terminal System 196M
NARTS
OASIS | Operational & Supportability Implementation System
175M.
PRM Precision Runway Monitor 128M.
WARP __| Weather and Radar Processor 126M
TVSR/ET | Enhanced Terminal Voice Switch/Terminal Voice Switch
vs Replacement 112M
NEXRAD* | Next Generation Radar 285M
‘ADLS* | Acronautical Data Link System 279M.
° ‘gh 5 133M

*Not found in FAA’s Year-2000 System Inventory Listing as of January 23, 1998

19


76

The Year/2000 Problem:
The Time for Action is Now!

‘My name is Stanley Graham, I am a
senior management consultant with
Tech-Beamers, Inc. My company was
formed and staffed largely by former
IBM ers. We are considered leaders in
‘the application of advanced computer
technology and the Year/2000 problem.
Tam a computer industry veteran of 38
‘years, with significant experience in
‘major computer conversions and test-
ing. I hope to bring to the Year/2000

‘sense to the application of mathematics
‘and science 10 real world problems.
Therefore, 1 believe that I bring a

of view to the Year/2000

‘Year/2000 and how to apply these solu-
ons to the FAA system’ Yeor/2000
project.

‘spite improvements in aware-

Jness of the Year‘2000 problem

‘over the last two years, little
progress has been made in implement-
ing the solutions. For example, the data
through November 15, 1997 indicates
that of FAA’s some 150 large complex
systems (including the FAA) are only
three percent complete through pro-

By Stanley Graham

gram remediation stages. Furthermore,
Thelieve that in the Year/2000 there will
be widespread disruption of services
thoughout be worl hat inloes vial
air transport and travel world wide.
‘There is a perception that the
‘Year/2000 is only a mainframe prob-
Jem. It is not. Although many main-
frame systems may fail, departmental
systems, workgroup servers, and net-
works that connect industries will fail
as well. Information sharing networks
for authorities, and person to person
ication will be compe

organizations will also
fail, Without the resources to fix the
problems, the shock to these
‘tions will often be fatal. It is likely that
‘the problems will begin by widespread
loss of electrical power and disruption
‘of transportation systems world-wide.
‘These will be directly attributable to
‘Year/2000 problems in the software that
drives the computers and the embedded
‘microcomputers that manage the grids
of widely disbursed, interconnected
utilities and transportation networks

Business PC’s and personal computers
st home will not escape the Year‘2000
problem, The Internet will not be

‘These failures forthe most pat,

failures.” While almost all computers
will continue to operate, bad data will
‘be broedcast through a network of inter-
<onmecied computing tems This will

Even though not all the is in,
‘those of us who are closest to the prob-
Jem believe the time for decisive action
isnow.

Despite breakthroughs in the under-
lying technology, since the 1960's litte

systems,
Seine egy of or
‘and governmental infrastructure and

works tar povide servos for ot
basic needs. In some cases bad data will
remain hidden in massive data banks
only to surface at some unexpected time
inthe fumure.

Need Decisive Action Now
Unless we take decisive action now,

computer systems in large corporations
and all levels of goverament will fail.
‘Computer systems in small businesses

last 38 years. Breakthroughs in the den-
sity of packaging data has dramatically
Altered the amount of information that
‘can be stored inside the computer and is.
readily accessible on line. The speed of


86

Ms. GARVEY. Well, I will tell you that the Deputy Secretary is
part of our monthly meeting. Each one of the administrators meets
with the Deputy Secretary, and that is always the first item of
business for reporting to the Deputy Secretary. And we do that
then, each of the modes, on a monthly basis. The Deputy Secretary
is particularly interested in the FAA. As a matter of fact, he and
I spent New Year’s Eve at the war room to see it in operation, to
see how it was being done.

Mr. Horn. My last question to you, and then I'll yield to Mr.
Gordon, and then we have a vote after that: do you have any com-
ments to make on what the GAO has said, what the Inspector Gen-
eral has said, what the private consultant has said, that you heard
and didn’t agree with? This is your chance to get it on the record.

Ms. GaRVEY. Well, I will say, and I will say this emphatically,
T’ve actually said it to them both personally, I think the help that
we've received from GAO and the IG has been extraordinarily help-
ful. There is a sense of collaboration and we really want to get this
done. We want to approach it in the right way. And if we’re miss-
ing something, we need to know it. And I think we've got a very
productive and good working relationship.

T’ve not had a chance to meet Mr. Graham before. We had a little
conversation during the break, and I look forward to talking with
him in a little more detail about some of the suggestions that he
has made as well.

Mr. Horn. Mr. Gordon, your time to question; 5 to 6 minutes,
and then we've got to vote and we'll recess again. We have two
votes, one is a 15-minute vote we’re in now, and then that’s fol-
lowed by a 5-minute vote. But we should be back within 20 min-
utes.

Mr. GorDON. Administrator Garvey, by virtue of only being at
the FAA for 6 months, you have the advantage of saying that much
of the, unfortunately, I guess, well-founded criticism of the FAA is
somebody else’s mess. But that won’t last for long. This is, as you
well know and have stated, a very important matter. If FAA does
not make their deadlines, it will be a black mark that you will
carry forever in your life, and it’s going to be—I think devastating
is too strong a word—but it’s going to be a critical impact to this
country. I don’t think that planes are going to fall from the sky.
We're not going to see it in that kind of, hopefully, life and death.
But this country is going to be brought to a stand-still, and it will
be devastating. It’s very, very important, and you know that.

And that’s why we need regular reports. And we can’t take a
Polyanna approach to this. If there are problems and you have to
have more help, or if it’s not working, we don’t want to hear “I’m
sorry,” after the problem has met us.

I guess one of the concerns I have is the interface. I know you
have talked some about that. It seems that there’s been a stro!
effort to try to deal with the internal systems, but I’m conce:
about the thousands of interfaces that you’re going to have to deal
with. We need to know more about that.

Tm also concerned about interaction with the other stakehold-
ers—the airline industries, the airport authorities. It doesn’t help
if part of it’s fixed and the rest isn’t.


41

testing/implementing Year-2000 compliant systems are $90 and $64 million for
FY 1998 and FY 1999, respectively.

The Air Traffic Control System is a complex and inter-dependent system.
FAA has to analyze millions of lines of code and thousands of pieces of
hardware for their individual Year-2000 problems, but also must ensure the
systems will continue working together after Year-2000 fixes. FAA’s recent
experience with the Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS) illustrates
the complexity of the Air Traffic Control System and highlights the importance
of comprehensive testing. ETMS displays the location of aircraft on a national
and local scale to alert controllers when traffic exceeds certain limits. About 2
years ago, FAA found it had to upgrade ETMS software because the operating
system software was unable to process times and dates after November 2,
1997. FAA developed a fix to the operating system software and successfully
tested the fixes. However, just 1 month before the November 2 deadline, FAA.
found the fix did not work with the application system software. As a result,
FAA had to initiate an emergency task to make the last-minute change.

The testing of all Year-2000 fixes and recommissioning the entire Air Traffic
Control System is something FAA has never undertaken. FAA’s plan is to
construct an integrated test environment to perform end-to-end (i.e., from radar
to the air traffic control screen) testing of the Year-2000 fixes for the Air
Traffic Control System. We fully support this endeavor. To effectively
manage this process, a master schedule (for repairing, testing, and
implementing Year-2000 fixes for all mission-critical systems) is needed to
ensure coordination among inter-dependent systems and to facilitate
management, including early detection of schedule slippage.


ill

United States
General Accounting OMice
‘Washington, D.C. 20548

‘Accounting and Information
‘Management Division

B279744

May 1, 1998

‘The Honorable Stephen Horn
Chairman
Subcommittee on Government
Management, Information and Technology
Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight
House of Representatives

Subject: Air Traffic Control:_FAA Plans to Replace Its Host. Computer System
Because Future Availability Cannot Be Assured
Dear Mr. Chairman:

During the February 4, 1998, Joint Hearing of the House Government Reform
and Oversight Committee's Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information and Technology and the House Science Committee's Subcommittee
‘on Technology on the "Federal Aviation Administration at Risk: Year 2000
Impacts on the Air Traffic Control System," you requested that we provide, for
the record, an assessment of FAA's Host Computer System (HCS). Our review
objectives were to determine (1) whether HCS has been meeting availability
requirements and (2) what issues affect FAA's ability to ensure HCS' availability
in the future.’

‘To address these objectives, we analyzed HCS performance and outage data for
the past 3 calendar years and the 5-year Host hardware maintenance and
sustainment assessment by Lockheed Martin, FAA's HCS sustainment
contractor. We also analyzed documents supporting FAA's Host and Oceanic
Computer System Replacement program. In addition, we interviewed officials
from FAA, Lockheed Martin, and International Business Machines (IBM)
Corporation. IBM provided the HCS hardware in the mid-1980s, and its
subsidiary currently provides HCS maintenance for Lockheed Martin. We did

System availability is defined as the time that a system is operating
satisfactorily, expressed as a percentage of the time the system is required to be
‘operational.

GAO/AIMD-98-138R FAA's Host Computer System


COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin, Chairman

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York GEORGE E, BROWN, Jr. California RMM*

HARRIS W. FAWELL, Ilinois RALPH M. HALL, 7

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland BART GORDON, ‘Tennessee

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania JAMES A. TRAFICANT, Jr., Ohio

DANA ROHRABACHER, California TIM ROEMER, Indiana

STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan

JOE BARTON, Texas PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania

KEN CALVERT, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan** LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan

DAVE WELDON, Florida ZOE LOFGREN, California

MATT SALMON, Arizona MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota BILL LUTHER, Minnesota

MARK FOLEY, Florida DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan

THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina

CHARLES W. “CHIP” PICKERING, NICK LAMPSON, Texas
Mississippi DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

CHRIS CANNON, Utah ELLEN 0. TAUSCHER, California

KEVIN BRADY, Texas VACANCY

MERRILL COOK, Utah VACANCY

PHIL ENGLISH, Pennsylvania
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.,
Washington
TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma
PETE SESSIONS, Texas
Topp R. SCHULTZ, Chief of Staff
Bary C. BERINGER, Chief Counsel
Parricia 8. SCHWARTZ, Chief Clerk /Administrator
Vivian A. Tesstert, Legislative Clerk
Roserr E. PALMER, Democratic Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland, Chairwoman
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
BART GORDON, Tennessee
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan
DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan
PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania
CHRIS CANNON, Utah MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
KEVIN BRADY, Texas ELLEN 0. TAUSCHER, California
MERRILL COOK, Utah

*Ranking Minority Member
**Vice Chairman

a


104

Ms. GaRVEY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Horn. Do you have reprogramming authority as Adminis-
trator, or do you have to go to the Secretary?

Ms. Garvey. We go through the Department, Mr. Chairman. I
will say that the Secretary has been very supportive of this and
asked what the needs are and has been very supportive of our ef-
forts.

Mr. Horn. Now, has there been any problem with sign-off by ei-
ther authorizations or appropriations subcommittees in Congress?

Ms. GaRVEY. The information is currently with OMB. They are
reviewing it for us. And they have promised us that they will get
it to the appropriate committees very, very shortly, and very soon.

Mr. Horn. In the budget the President submitted to us on Mon-
day, what is the appropriation, if any, that FAA is asking for that
is relevant to this particular problem?

Ms. GARVEY. We have asked for $36 million, Mr. Chairman, in

the President's budget for 1999.
Mr. MEAD. Mr. Chai , on the appropriations front, a very in-

teresting phenomena, I haven’t seen it occur too frequently: al-
though deliberations are about to begin on FAA fiscal year 1999
appropriations, there are a number of very important issues that
have surfaced not just on the Y2K issue that have a bearing on
what’s going to happen to the 1998 appropriations. There is the
STAR thing, which is the display for the controllers; there are some
security issues; the year 2000 issue; there’s the WASP program, all
of which may bear on this.

I think it’s going to be a real stretch to do it all through re-

Programming, myself, but we'll see.
ir. HORN. Where are we on fiscal year 1997’s money? Was there
any carry-over, or is it all fiscal year 1998 money that’s relevant?

Ms. GARVEY. I’m going to need to get back to you on 1997. I'm
only aware of the 1998, that’s what I’ve been focused on.

Let me just also be sure that——

Mr. Horn. Well, if you could just file it for the record on the
1997, 1998, and the prospective 1999.

[The information referred to follows:]

In Fiscal Year 1997, FAA obligated $9 million for Y2K.

In Fiscal Year 1998, FAA designated $18 million of the Facilities and Equip-
ment appropriation, and $37.7 million in the Facilities and Equipment reprogram-
ming package for Year 2000 issues. Another $34.2 million is absorbed within exist.
ing pi z for Fiscal Year 1998. .

‘or Year 1999, FAA has requested $36 million for Y2K, as part of the Fa-
cilities and Equipment appropriation, while another $14.9 million would be ab-
sorbed in existing programs.

‘The total cost estimate from Fiscal Years 1997-09 is $149.8 million.

Ms. Garvey. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. And one other point on
the 1999. I gave you the number of $36 million, which is true for
year 2K; that is separate from the Host issue. In the 1999 budget
for Host; it’s $52 million.

Mr. Horn. And that really has nothing to do with the Y2K, but
it eles, becpuse it will be adapted. But you have needed that for
years,

Ms. GaRVEY. That is correct. That’s been part of our capital pro-
gram, Mr. Chairman.


64

comprehensive quality assurance process in place to ensure that every NAS system is

‘Y2K compliant.

Our deadline for assessing all NAS mission-critical systems was January 31, 1998, and I
am pleased to report that we have met this deadline. Of the 209 mission-critical systems
in the NAS, 125 have been certified as Y2K compliant. ATS has completed the quality
assurance reviews for 171 of their mission-critical systems, and expects to complete the
remaining 38 reviews by February 10. We now have an accurate picture of what we need
to do to make the air traffic control system Y2K compliant. Renovation efforts are now
underway and we expect this to go more quickly because we conducted a comprehensive

assessment,

‘That's the air traffic portion of the picture. As to the Y2K effort for the rest of the FAA,
assessment of 216 of our 221 mission-critical systems is now completed, with 5

remaining to be completed.

As|I stated earlier, the GAO and the IG have advised that the FAA is not as far along as it
should be, and that the core issues plaguing the Agency are the lack of an overall Agency-
wide Y2K plan, and the lack of strong, centralized leadership on this issue.

T agree, and I have taken the following steps to address this concern. I have identified a

new Agency lead to bring discipline, consistency and management direction to the


50

identifying interfaces among systems, estimating cost. and developing renovation
and contingency plans. The OMB milestone for completion of assessments was
June 1997. The Department’s milestone for completing assessments was August
1997 for all OAs, and December 1997 for the air traffic control systems in the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). OMB did not issue waivers to extend the
assessment milestone. OMB also initiated quarterly reporting requirements. The
Department had submitted three quarterly progress reports to OMB; May 15,
August 15, and November 14, 1997.

Audit work on the Department’s Y2K assessments was performed between May
and November, 1997. Our scope initially did not include FAA because the
General Accounting Office (GAO) was reviewing FAA as part of its
Governmentwide Y2K oversight. GAO completed its work and had an exit
conference with FAA on October 2, 1997. On October 17, 1997, we expanded the
audit scope to include FAA. In performing the audit, we used guidelines
developed by the CIO Council Subcommittee on Year 2000. The audit was
conducted in accordance with Government Auditing Standards prescribed by the
Comptroller General of the United States.

RESULTS-IN-BRIEF

We validated information in the Department’s May submission to OMB, and the
data provided by the OAs to the Department’s CIO office for the August and
November reports. We identified six areas which were brought to management's
attention before the August and November reports were finalized. Overall, we
found the Department had not accurately reported its Y2K status to OMB on
May 15, and may have continued to do so if the data reported by the OAs to the
Department had not been audited independently. As issues identified by the audit
were brought to management's attention, the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and the
Department's Acting CIO initiated corrective actions promptly, and proposed
reports to OMB were adjusted.

Departmental Strategy

Formal guidance establishing the Department’s strategic plan for dealing with
Y2K matters was issued by the Department’s Acting CIO, but not until
September 19, 1997. At the Department level, the Y2K coordinator’s office was a
one-person operation, without support staff proficient in technical and operational
issues concerning Y2K. Departmental guidance was limited and untimely. For
example, the Department had not defined what constituted mission-critical systems
or what to include in total inventory (systems, equipment, and electronics). This
was addressed in the guidance on September 19, 1997. The Department's Y2K


99

I will tell you, we’ve had some discussions even internally about
management—something that I know I’ve heard from the GAO—
and our decision at that time was really to wait until we were clos-
er to the assessment being completed to make some changes. And
we've done that. And again, something we talked about in the fall
but we said, “let’s get through the assessments, let’s get through
this phase and then see where we are.” And I think we’ve made
the right decision in that area.

Mr. Horn. Has the Secretary ever mentioned this issue to you,
or any other executive in Transportation?

Ms. Garvey. The Secretary mentions it quite frequently. As a
matter of fact, he told me that he was at an event over first
of the year, and he said he was with industry and many industry
people were mentioning it as well. So we've talked about that.

And as I mentioned a little bit earlier, the Deputy Secretary is—
it’s the top of all of our agendas when we meet with him once a
month. It’s the first question he asks us. Where are you on the year
2K? You know, what’s the progress to date? Ken, you may want to
add to that.

Mr. Meap. I'll just relay a humorous incident. You know, I
haven't been at DOT that long myself. I arrived there toward the
end of June. And it wasn’t too long thereafter that the Secretary
and the Deputy Secretary told me, they said, “Well you know, in
the executive branch we have to file reports with the Office of Man-
agement and Budget.” GAO, of course, doesn’t. And anyway, he
pointed that one of the reports that they have to send over is about
Y2K compliance. And it’s Presented for the Secretary’s signature to
the Director of OMB. And they wanted assurances that what he
was were representing about the Department was accurate. So we
built a team under the leadership of Ms. Leng, and that, in truth,

think, was a real eye-opener for me, when we could see what the
actual status was in the Department. And we're continuing that ef-
fort. And I hope that the Administrator—I believe that the Admin-
istrator—has found that helpful as well.

Mr. Horn. Well, as I think I’ve told some of you this story, that
you should be right at the top with Social Security if the Federal
Highway Administration in 1989 had listened to a top woman pro-
fessio: that brought this to their attention, and they just dis-
missed it. And there was no way, apparently. And maybe there
isn’t now in Transportation, because Mr. Pefia told me he didn’t
know anything about it—where this ever comes up the manage-
ment decisionmaking hierarchy so the Secretary, when he has a
meeting of his management group can turn and say, “Well any of
you have other problems.” Certainly the FAA Administrator is the
major user of critical systems within Transportation. And the ques-
tion would be who else is involved. They never did that. They could
have been right where Social Security is if they just listened to
somebody that knew what they were talking about. And they never

I yield 5 minutes on the second round here to our co-chairman,
Mrs. Morella.

Mrs. MorELLA. Thank you. I was trying to briefly scrutinize this
Executive order and I know that you just got it and we really just
got it. And I’m delighted that we do now have it before us. And it


24

developing plans for validating and testing all converted or replaced systems;

= crafting realistic contingency plans for all business lines to ensure the continuity of
critical operations; and

= developing a reliable cost estimate based on a comprehensive inventory and
completed assessments of the various systems’ criticality, and how their needs for

modification will be addressed.

Officials of both FAA and the Department of Transportation generally agreed with our
findings, conclusions, and recommendations. FAA's CIO stated that FAA recognizes the
importance of addressing the Year 2000 problem and plans to implement our

recommendations.

This concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any questions that

you or other Members of the Subcommittees may have at this time.

(511442)

14


20

compliant because of the many system interdependencies. Airline representatives
further explained that flights could not even get off the ground on January 1, 2000,
unless FAA was substantially Year 2000 compliant~and that extended delays would be
an economic disaster. Because of these types of concerns, FAA has now agreed to meet
regularly with industry representatives to coordinate the safety and technical

implications of shared data and interfaces.

PLACING JANUARY 1, 2000, READINESS AT RISK

One result of delayed awareness and assessment activities is that the time remaining for
renovation, validation, and implementation can become dangerously compressed.
Renovation, validation, and implementation activities are the three critical final phases in
correcting Year 2000 vulnerabilities. Renovation involves converting, replacing, or
eliminating selected systems and applications. Validation entails testing, verifying, and
validating all converted or replaced systems and applications, and ensuring that they
perform as expected. Implementation involves deploying, operating, and maintaining
Year 2000-compliant systems and components. Contingency plans are also implemented,

if necessary.

10


103

the FAA and the folks at Coopers and Lybrand, who are an enor-
mous help to us and a terrific business partner.

I want to just mention one other point the chairman raised, and
that is the issue of validation of the equipment we are buying. That
is a very serious issue and we learned, as you suggested, the hard
way, that just taking the word of the contractor isn’t always the
most appropriate action and that you really do have to do an inde-
pendent evaluation in validation. And we are doing that with all
of the equipment that we purchase.

Mr. Horn. Has the General Services Administration been of any
help to ou in that area, in validation?

Ms. GaRVEY. We are actually using, I believe, one of their con-
fractors, as a matter of fact, to help with that. So, yes, they have

en.

Mr. Horn. Let me ask you this question: I’m told that FAA is
an unusually decentralized agency. The regions are fairly autono-
mous, and the history of field-Washington headquarters coopera-
tion is not particularly great. Is that a fair characterization? And
how does it affect year 2000 conversion?

Ms. GaRVEY. That is certainly an issue I’ve heard and the fact
that the regions are decentralized—that they have a good degree
of power—and autonomy is something, that we’ve been aware of.
And I think that’s why, frankly, when Mr. Long was appointed,
why we thought it was important—even as a part of broadcast to
all of our 48,000, employees today, in the 60 centers that are
hooked in—it was important for them to hear directly from me that
this a key part of the management team reporting directly to me.
And really, when he makes a request, we've got to have it.

So, I think that message has nm communicated and we'll con-
tinue to communicate that as well.

I will say, having visited many of the centers, they know how im-
portant this is and they are working very hard to get the right in-
formation into the right place at headquarters. I think we've got to
give them central focus points so that they know where it has to
go and who they should be reporting to on this issue.

Mr. Horn. Did you have a plan sent to you around December 1,
that was presumably the plan for how you reach those goals and
solve the year 2000 problem?

Ms. Garvey. We've certainly had a plan for air traffic control
that I think has been very successful. And frankly, that’s one of the
reasons why Mr. Long was chosen, because he’s got a good proven
track record.

Mr. Horn. And you approved that plan, did you? Or his——

Ms. GARVEY. Well, I’ve been briefed on it and I didn’t necessarily
have to sign anything. I was made aware of it. Yes, very much
aware of it and feel very comfortable with the work that they have
been doing. Those really are the goals and the timelines that you’ve
all talked about in the hearing.

Mr. Horn. Now, as I understand it, from your staff, the Federal
Aviation Administration intends to pay for all of the year 2000 ef-
forts with existing funding. Now, I heard mentioned in a previous
round of a reprogramming situation. And apparently there will be
a reprogramming package coming forward, but everything will be
within your current budget. Is that correct?


32

display equipment, and telecommunication networks. Working together, the
system software and hardware capture flight plans and the location of flying
aircraft, transmit this information to a mainframe computer, display these locations
on air traffic controller screens, and tag the locations with aircraft identification.
Based on information displayed, controllers then provide instructions to the pilots
through communication links.

The (-2000 Problem i t ir Traffic Control

Every piece of software and hardware in the Air Traffic Control System has to be
assessed for Year-2000 problems. When Year-2000 problems are found, either the
software and hardware must be fixed, or the computers and software have to be
replaced. The fix or replacement must then be tested to make sure the systems will
properly interface with all components of the Air Traffic Control System. This is
an enormous task; however, it has to be done, and must be done well. Otherwise,
key components of the Air Traffic Control System could malfunction. If this
happens, controllers might not be able to tell the exact altitude and speed of
aircraft or the distance between aircraft, which could cause flights to be delayed or
grounded.

Here are examples of three mission-critical systems for air traffic control that have
been diagnosed with Year-2000 problems and must be fixed.

© The systems used in the En-route Centers consist of 4,000 pieces of hardware
and software, including the Host mainframe computers, that allow air traffic
controllers to manage aircraft flying at high altitude.


113

B279744

HGS HAS NOT BEEN MEETING
AVAILABILITY REQUIREMENTS

For the last 3 years, HCS has not met its availability requirements. FAA has
specified an HCS system availability requirement of 99.998 percent. HCS did
not meet this requirement in 1995, 1996, and 1997, with average availabilities of
99.972 percent, 99.984 percent, and 99.982 percent, respectively. It also did not
meet it in the first 2 months of 1998, with an average availability of 99.992
percent,

HCS' availability rate is driven by unscheduled outages. Unscheduled outages
‘occur for a variety of reasons, including equipment failures, loss of power,
software problems, and weather effects. Of the 29 unscheduled outages in 1997,
FAA data show that 34.5 percent were due to software, 27.6 percent were due
to hardware, and 37.9 percent were due to an assortment of other reasons, such
as loss of power, weather effects, and unknown causes.

SPARE PARTS SHORTAGE AND
‘XEAR_2000 ISSUE AFFECT HCs'
EUTURE AVAILABILITY

One key issue affecting HCS' future availability is the shortage of critical spare
parts. Given that HCS hardware is approaching the end of its expected life
cycle, IBM calculated end-of-service dates for each HCS subsystem based on
failure rates, available spares, engineering support, plant maintenance, and
projected demand. IBM stated that after the end-of-service date, it will maintain
the system on a "best effort" basis and the government will be responsible for
furnishing any spare parts that become unavailable. Under this scenario, FAA
predicts it will encounter longer system outage times-thereby reducing the
availability of en route automation systems and threatening air traffic services.

IBM identified eight key hardware units, including the main processor, that will
reach their end-of-service dates on or before December 31, 1999. FAA is most
concerned about the main processor, which is projected to reach its end-of-
service date by September 30, 1998. One key component, the Thermal
Conduction Modules (TCM), drives this end-of-service date.” Even more
‘specifically, one module of TCM, known as CLVM,’ is projected to be depleted

*TCM is an IBM-patented technology for packaging electronic circuits for
efficient heat dissipation.

“According to FAA officials, the meaning of the "CLVM" acronym has been
forgotten over time, though it may stand for Cache Link Volatile Memory.

3 GAO/AIMD-98-138R FAA's Host Computer System


KENNETH M. MEAD

Inspector General
U.S. Department of Transportation

Mr, Mead was nominated by the President to be the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), and was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on May 27, 1997. As the head of
the Office of Inspector General, he is responsible for leading the program of audits, evaluations
and investigations to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. He advises the Secretary of
Transportation and the Congress on the best practices and deficiencies found, and recommends
‘ways to strengthen the management of DOT’s programs and operations. In establishing the goals
for the oversight programs, Mr. Mead directed the highest priority be given to transportation
safety, followed by improving the effectiveness and efficiency of DOT’s operations.

Prior to becoming Inspector General, Mr. Mead served at the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) for 22 years. As the Deputy Assistant Comptroller General for Policy, he was responsible
for providing policy guidance on GAO audits and evaluations, overseeing GAO's external peer
review, quality control program, and performance measurement system. Prior to that, as Director
of Transportation and Telecommunication Issues, he directed reviews that resulted in recognized
improvements to the safety and efficiency of DOT’s operation in numerous areas, involving
aviation, surface, Coast Guard, rail, and shipping. Mr. Mead also served as an Associate and
Assistant Director in the transportation area, Assistant Director for GAO's Office of Quality
Assurance, and as Senior Attorney with GAO's Office of General Counsel.

Mr. Mead received his baccalaureate degree from Southern Connecticut University, and his Juris
Doctor degree from the University of South Carolina. He is also an alumnus of the Federal
Executive Institute's Executive Excellence Program, and of Harvard University’s Senior Policy
Fellows Program.

A veteran, Mr. Mead served in the U.S. Naval Submarine Service.

Among the awards he has received are GAO’s Distinguished Service Award, the Meritorious
Service Award, and the rank of Meritorious Executive in the Senior Executive Service. He is an
active member of the District of Columbia Bar and the American Numismatic Association.

‘Mr. Mead resides in Alexandria, Virginia, with his wife, Elizabeth, and their daughters Jennifer
and Hillary.



110

sere ave yey UBS UL _IVOI MACMMES 15 € be

year 2000, We agree. FAA has submitted a reprogramming request to fund the
Host replacement project. While it is questionable whether FAA will have the
replacement Host computers in all 20 enroute centers by January 1, 2000, it is
clear that FAA does not plan to continue using the 3083 computers long after
that date, We are initiating an audit of FAA’s replacement program, Our
objectives are to (1) monitor FAA’s program cost and schedule baselines, and
risk mitigation efforts, and (2) evaluate whether the Direct Access Radar
Channel will be capable of serving’as the primary air traffic contro system unti]
the Host replacement is completed.

If I can answer any questions or be of further assistance, please feel free to contact
me on (202) 366-1959, or Raymond J. DeCarli, Deputy Inspector General, on
(202) 366-1964.

KLE

Kenneth M. Mead
Inspector General


14

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26

Mr. Horn. I thank the gentleman, and we will now move to the
Inspector General of the Department of Transportation, Mr. Ken
Mead. Welcome-again.

STATEMENT OF KEN MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. MEapD. Thank you, sir. Members of the subcommittees, let
me summarize my statement.

We've been reviewing the Department’s year 2000 progress since
May 1997, and we've issued two reports. FAA has about 70 percent
of the mission-critical systems in the Department of Transpor-
tation. About 90 percent of the year 2000 repair and renovation
costs will be allocable to the FAA.

I don’t think there are too many ways of saying this, but FAA
got a very late start on fixing the year 2000 computer problem. In
fact, it was not until about 6 months ago that FAA began address-
ing the year 2000 issue with a sense of urgency. I should hasten
to point out that that is about the time Administrator Garvey took
office.

FAA is way behind schedule on assessing which of its systems
have year 2000 problems, determining what needs to be fixed, and
testing and implementing solutions. The good news is that it is not
too late. Strong central management and a continuing sense of ur-
gency are absolutely the keys to success.

The assessment work identifying systems with the problems and
diagnosing those problems is about finished, although it is 7
months after the target date specified by the Office of Management
and Budget. Much of the assessment work on the air traffic control
system was, in fact, completed this past week under intensive cen-
tral management and a firm requirement established by the ad-
ministration that the assessment work be finished by January 31.

Td like to refer to a set of charts. You each have them in front
of you, I believe. They’re on page 6 and 7, respectively, of my pre-
pared statement as well.

This first chart compares FAA’s target dates with OMB target
dates for addressing the year 2000 problem. I’d like to focus on the
first one: the assessment.

The assessment date established by OMB was 6/97. FAA’s target.
date was 1/98. They met it.

Moving to the bottom milestone, implementation, that refers to
the date after which all problems have been identified, fixed, test-
ed, fixed again, tested, and implemented. OMB’s target date for the
Government in general today is March 1999. FAA’s date is Novem-

r 1999.

T’ve been following this agency for nearly 12 years, and it’s out
of observations about their computer systems, their progress, and
meeting milestones, that I would say that 11/99 is too close a call,
and that it should be accelerated, if at all possible, to June 1999.

Td like to refer to the next two charts. You can see that a large
number of assessments were completed in just the last week.
They’re shown in red.

[The information referred to follows:]


92

Set. 4, Responsibilities of Interagency and Executive office Councils.
interagency councils and councils within the Executive Office of the President,
including the President's Management Council, the Chief Information Officers
Council, the Chief Financial Officers Council, the President's Council on
Integrity and Efficiency, the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency,
the National Science and Technology Council, the National Performance Review,
the National Economic Council, the Domestic Policy Council, and the National.
Secuzity Council shall provide assistance and support to the Chair wjcr the
Chair's request. °

Sec. 5. Judicial Review. This Executive order is intended only to improve the
internal management of the executive branch and does not create any right or
benefit, substantive or pro-cedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party
against the United states, ite agencies, or instrumentalities, its officers or
employees, or any other person.

WILLIAM J. CLINTOW

‘THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 4, 1998.

ee

Back to summary page

& @&

To comment on this service:



7

tries have not even started addressing the year 2000 computer
problem.

Currently, GAO is working on a request I made to have them re-
port on international awareness, international meeting, and
progress on addressing this problem. I would urge the FAA to take
a more active and vigorous role in working with other countries.

During this hearing I want to focus on three questions. The first:
FAA’s track record is poor in producing or procuring new computer
systems and software-intense programs online. What specific steps
does the FAA need to take to meet the ambitious schedule for its
year 2000 program.

Second, in order to meet the year 2000 challenge, the entire avia-
tion industry must be involved and thousands of interfaces must be
checked. t level and t: of coordination must FAA do with
private industry to ensure the smooth transition of fixing the Y2K
problem, and what are the overall test strategies and plans that in-
volve all these non-FAA stakeholders?

And, finally, what are the international implications of the year
2000 problem for air traffic? What specific actions need to be taken,
and what contingency plans need to be drafted? I agree with the
Ing; yy General’s assessment, that it is not too late to fix the
problem. However, FAA must have better and stronger manage-
ment and must work with a sense of urgency. Given the public’s
reliance on air traffic, air travel, and the critical safety function of
the air traffic control system, failure is unacceptable.

I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before the sub-
committee today, and I look forward to listening to your comments.

Mr. Horn. I thank the gentleman, and I now wish to yield for
an opening statement to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. sions,
a very active member of the Subcommittee on Government Man-
agement, Information, and Technology. Mr. Sessions.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. My comments will be
very brief.

‘irst of all, let me welcome the panel that is before us today.
What you are hearing from us on this side is what I believe is seri-
ous and I think we're trying to treat the matter as such, and I be-
lieve that we’re looking to you for the answers. We are all in re-
ceipt of the GAO’s report. I believe we're all concerned.

will tell you that I don’t think in any way we can put ourselves
in your shoes. We're looking for you to solve the matter, but what
we're looking for today is for you to be forthright with us, and also
to let us know about the things that are roadblocks to you imple-
menting what you need. I hope that your testimony today—I know
it will be truthful, but I hope that you will be candid with us also.

In particular, as chairman of the Results Caucus, I had two
members of the Results Caucus who were working with the FAA,
Representatives Jon Fox and Pat Danner, who are trying to work
carefully with the FAA to implement their own computer problems
that they have throughout the agency. I would like to say that they
are intensively interested in what you’re going to say today in ad-
dressing not only these Y2K problems, but also the other computer
problems that beset the agency.

So, I come here today looking forward to hearing from you, and
want you to know that the people on this side of the dais are in-


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81

Bio Brief

STAN GRAHAM

The Vice President of Tech-Beamers, Inc. is a highly regarded professional with more than 35
years experience of innovation and contribution to many leading fields of information
technology. Major strengths communicating expertise and providing guidance to technical
professionals, information system management, and business executives.

EXPERIENCE

As chairman of the IBM S/360 conversion task force, he defined the strategy and product
requirements for converting from second to third generation computers. As operations
manager of the Poughkeepsie Pogramming Cnter, he managed the largest commercial data
center in the world. As the program manager for the IBM client/server strategy, he chaired the
interdivisional task force that defined the market requirements and quantified the opportunity
of client/server for mainframe-network connected systems. These requirements, after
validation through extensive customer studies, were encapsulated into the S /390 client/server
strategy and are still being applied to gauge IBM's client/server products.

On the headquarters staff of the Vice President of Scientific and Technical Computing, he
defined and validated the market for open and heterogeneous systems and tracked the growth
of IBM's large scientific and commercial processors and operating systems. He also managed
all the user publications for IBM's Distributed Systems in Kingston, New York. As the
laboratory director's liaison to MIT, he participated in early studies on the use of optical media
(laser disks), and human factors in the IBM San Jose Human Factors Lab. He was also a
‘guest lecturer for the New York University Management Institute and American Management
Association, and Director of IBM's world-wide Council on Computer Assisted Learning. As
the systems test planning manager, he defined and applied new test technology to the
measurement and tracking of both the quality and schedules for mainframe operating systems
and applications

As the technical center manager for VM/370, he and his team were responsible for the
announcement of VM/370 and support of VM’s first customers. As program manager and
business strategist for the MVS system, he evaluated and quantified the business value of
advanced computing technologies for new mainframe opportunities. He was also liaison to
several IBM laboratories including: IBM Research in Yorktown Heights, NY, the Science
Centers in Boston, MA, Los Angeles, CA, and Tokyo, Japan, the Image Processing
Development Laboratory in Bethesda, MD, and Multimedia Products in Atlanta, GA.


3

ing all of its 430 mission-critical systems; what percentage of ca-
pacity can the FAA support? For 1 month? For 3 months? What
contingency plans has the FAA develo) for manual operation?
What percentage of capacity can the FAA sustain, and for how
long?

I look forward to the testimony of today’s experts and FAA offi-
cials to help Congress answer these critical questions. This after-
noon, as a common panel, we will hear from Joel Willemssen, the
Director of the Accounting and Information Management Division,
General Accounting Office, Congress’ audit and program audit arm;
Ken Mead, Inspector General, Department of Transportation; and
Jane Garvey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration. She
is accompanied by Richard Boe, Acting Manager of the FAA Year
2000 Program Office; and, finally, an outside consultant, Stanley
Graham, a senior management consultant, vice president, Tech-
Beamers Inc.

I now yield to the ranking minority member, Mrs. Maloney of
New York.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to thank you
and the chairlady for calling this joint hearing.

The image of planes falling out of the skies because we’ve been
unable to solve a simple computer problem is one that none of us
wants to entertain. I am pleased that we will be receiving assur-
ances today that planes will not be falling out of the skies. How-
ever, thousands of Americans may be inconvenienced for days or
weeks or months if the air traffic control system cannot handle the
load, and that is unacceptable.

This week President Clinton announced that John Koskinen is
teturning to Government as a Special Assistant to the President.
He will leading the administration’s effort to make sure that
critical systems governmentwide are repaired before the year 2000
arrives. I have worked with Mr. Koskinen before in the past. He
is an excellent administrator, and I thank the President for bring-
ing in a person of his calibre for this assignment.

ight note that Chairman Horn and I called upon the Presi-
dent, ugh Executive order, to create a czar to oversee the year
2000 problem, and he has responded with disappointment. It is
also my understanding that Sally Katzen will be working with Mr.
Koskinen on this project. That, too, is excellent news. . Katzen,
who served as Administrator of the Office of Information and Regu-
latory Affairs, is known for her ability to get things done, and I am
sure that her involvement in this project will be a positive force
change in getting it done. I only hope that they will put the FAA
on the top of their list of agencies that need help and they need
to get on the right schedule.

The General Accounting Office report and the testimony from the
Inspector General are extremely disturbing. Both indicate that
things are seriously behind schedule at the FAA. I am, however,

leased that the IG is pushing for a June 1999 completion date.
it seems to me is a much safer target than the November 1999
date in FAA’s original plans. All of yu experts who have testified
before us have said that you should allow 6 months for thorough
and complete testing.


109

@

Department of Tha gett Gone tee of mapecar Gana
us Washington, OC. 20590

‘Office of the Secretary
‘of Transportation

March 20, 1998

The Honorable Stephen Hom

Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

‘Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am submitting this information for the record, as you requested in the
February 4, 1998, hearing entitled, “Federal Aviation Administration at Risk: Year
2000 Impacts on the Aix Traffic Control System.” You asked the General
Accounting Office (GAO), the Inspector General, and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to address this question: Is Mr. Graham’s point accurate with
reference to the JBM equipment?

Mr, Stanley Graham of Tech-Beamers, one of the panel members, expressed
concerns about the survivability of the IBM 3083 machine--i.e., the Host computer
‘used in enroute centers to control high altitude air traffic. The following paragraphs
address the points raised by Mr. Graham.

. one of hii ers. 1083 i iable--the
i i Jos We obtained FAA’s maintenance records,
which indicated a low system failure rate for the Host computers. During the
past 3 years (1995 through 1997), the Host computers for al] 20 enroute centers
combined had a total outage of 44.5 hours out of 526,600 hours of service time
(ie., Jess than one tenth of one percent of down time). Please note that this rate
represented “total” system failures~i.e., when both the primary and backup Host
computers were out of service. As stated in my testimony, there are two Host
computers at each enroute center. If one fails, the processing is automatically
switched to the other machine. This redundancy was designed to mitigate the
impact of system failures,


a waste of precious time, resources, and
dollars focusing on the infinite set of
‘conditions that might arise. Many prob-
Jems that can be solved will be missed.
Breaking insoluble problems into solv-
able parts is required. Compliance will
be the goal, but frustration and failures
‘will further erode project schedules.
Unless otherwise instructed, project
‘managers will establish dates by fiat,
without having thought through the
dependencies and how each part of the
project plan fits together. (See Figure
1.) Project managers will routinely
underestimate the time for testing,
Many will conclude that itis not worth,
the effon, ignoring the admonitions of
‘the auditors, experts, and consultants
who urge them to increase their focus
‘on testing. Many will assert that they
will make their schedule, while at the
‘same time they position themselves to
deflect blame onto others if they miss
their commitments. Given no clear
quantitative plan, those responsible for
auditing the project will make straight
line extrapolations. They can demon-
strate, based on the project’s history,
sto projec will not meet echot-

"oth he project managers and au
tors are better served if they used a fam-
ily of curves that experience has shown
is useful in planning and tracking pro-
ject schedules. These curves are known
as “Beta” curves, (See Figure 2.) These
‘curves are a highly reliable indicator of
projects’ schedule performance. Use of
such a methodology can provide an
objective view of the status ofa project,
nd the quanti of slp erly enought

take corrective action.

‘Tech-Beamers CODE-TRACTM and
TEST-TRACTM tools implement this
methodology. The “Beta” curve is used
to represent the planned schedule, an
important step. It is helpful to recognize
that successful and failed projects look
the same at the outset. Both experience
“learning curve" (a period of relative-

serious problem, one that project man-
agers invariably face, From observa-

9

tions over the last several years,
‘Year?2000 projects will be no different
The assumes. when
‘making good progress that it will con-
tinue at the sume rate. It does not. Most
invariably find that the last 10 percent
of the problems can take 20-30 percent
‘of the time. This is why edict driven
schedules connected by 2 straight line
from start to finish just does not work.
(Gee Figure 3.)

fect world. Considering the progress to
date on the Year/2000 problem and the
‘amount of time that is left, the best that
‘can be expected are solutions that main-
tain an acceptable level of vital services
‘as we enter the new century.

‘Almost all those that have studied the
problem seriously over the last several

may be helpful to think of the

Impossible To ESSE ann

Guarantee
Compliance
‘Testing is pro-
jected to take 50-70
percent or more of a
roject’s schedule.
Unfortunately,
there is no way t0
completely test any

major tion

for Yeu72000 wom ee sm me

readiness. The Percent of Tise

number of logical

bats is infnice AA A ee Oe
(beyond counting). Figure 2

Therefore, it is not

responsible to guarantee that any appli-
cation is 100 percent Year/2000 compli-
ant, Failure to rec-

ognize this will
lead to confronta-
tion and  finger-
pointing. Instead,
vendors and their

Furthermore.
‘every day computer Figure,
applications that :
have been operating for years experi-
‘ence problems; some ofthese problems
‘could have been avoided, others not.
Manual workarounds and overrides are
‘an every day occurrence. Therefore, we
must recognize that we live in an imper-

‘YEAR2000 JOURNAL,

‘Year/2000 problem as if it were a glob-
‘al war. There are bound to be many
‘casualties, many organizations and

institutions will not survive beyond the
‘Year/2000. The enemy isthe inevitable
passage of time, our inability to compre-
fend the scope of the tet to coord
nate the solutions, the history of failures
to meet deadtines, and a lack of under-



105

Mr. Horn. Now, any comments, Mr. Willemssen? We're going to
wind this up. Any more questions? Mr. Mead? Mrs. Morella has a
question.

Mrs. MORELLA. Just one final question: The Inspector General
has mentioned that the FAA has not yet concluded that any of its
air traffic control systems that are currently in development and
acquisition, in that phase, are Y2K-complaint. My question is: Does
FAA have a process that is in place to ensure that the new prod-
ucts and systems that are under development are Y2K-compliant?
And I am thinking of STARS and W. , since we are very inter-
ested in that, particularly at National Airport?

Mr. MEAD. No, most of the testimony on the progress today has
dealt with the air traffic side. The way it was set up at FAA, until
just this recent change, the air traffic side, their management of
‘Y2K problems did not deal with air traffic equipment that was
under development. That was being held elsewhere in the organiza-
tion. The Administrator may feel differently on this, but I don’t
think that they had as disciplined a process as they need to have
for the newer systems, and they can install that now, although I
hasten to add that the contractors are warranting that everything
will be OK, but FAA——

Mrs. MORELLA. So they don’t have it now, but they are going to
have it, they say? [Laughter.]

Ms. GaRVEY. Now I will do a double-check on this, but in asking
this very question yesterday, I understand from staff that we do,
in fact, do a validation of the equipment that comes in. But let
me—lI will go back and ask again. I’m always—when the Inspector
General ‘and I have slightly different information, I’ve learned that
it’s very good to double-check. So I will do that, but I do under-
stand there was a policy statement made, a statement made last
March, which said that all of the new equipment that comes in
must, first of all, be Y2K compliant and we will do an independ-
ent—validation of that. But let me double-check to make sure my
information is accurate.

(The information referred to follows:]

See attached memorandum form Monte R. Belger, Associate Administator for Air
Traffic Services, to the Associate Administrator for Research and isitions at
FAA, concerning Y2K compliance of new equipment to be deployed into the National
‘Airspace System (NAS) (R207,


90

Ge) Whe Hose Priging Froom

February 4, 1998
EXECUTIVE ORDER

Message Creation Date was at 4-FEB-1998 12:

‘THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Presa Secretary

For Inmediate Release February 4, 1998

‘The Anerican people expect reliable service from their Government and deserve
the confidence that critical government functions dependent on ele
ayateme will be performed accurately and in a timely manner. Because of a
design feature in many electronic systems, a large number of activities in the
public and private sectors could be at risk beginning in the year 2000. Sone
computer systems and other electronic devices will misinterpret the year "00"

2 1900, rather than 2000, Unless appropriate action is taken, this flaw,
known as the "Y2K problem," can cause systems that support those functions to
compute erroneously or simply not run, Minimizing the ¥2K problem will require
a major technological and managerial effort, and it is critical that the United
States Government do its part in addressing this challenge.

Accordingly, by the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered
as follows:

Section 1. Policy. (a) Tt shall be the policy of the executive branch that
agencies shall:

(a) assure that no critical Federal program experienc

disruption because of
the Y2K problem;

(2) assist and cooperate with State, local, and tribal governments to address
the Y2K problem where those governments depend on Federal information or
information technology or the Federal Government is dependent on those
governments to perform critical missions;


58

would have to monitor and separate air traffic the old fashioned
way—by altitude and time. This would slow down the system, as
some of you have suggested, while air traffic is either re-routed or
deliberately delayed to maintain safety. Obviously, our goal is to
ensure that these problems—that the delays that could result—do
not happen.

In order to meet that goal, last June, FAA’s Office of Air Traffic
Services, the line of business in the FAA responsible for the oper-
ation and maintenance of the NAS, established a centralized, spe-
cialized war room, if you will, staffed with technical experts from
across the country who have been brought together to tackle the
Y2K problem for our air traffic systems. The effort has been led by
a senior manager whose been assigned to this challenge full-time.
ATS also published Y2K project plan that details the specific steps
required to implement the five-phase strategy for addressing the
Y2K problem. In addition, we published a repair process and stand-
ard guidelines detailing the specific repairs that are to take place.
Everyone working on this system, and they come from across the
country, is being held strictly accountable for following the specific
steps for following the timelines laid out in the published guide-
lines.

In addition to a clear plan for accessing and repairing the sys-
tem, ATS has a comprehensive quality insurance process in place.
And I want to mention that the quality assurance process is for
every line, not just a random sampling, but for every one of the
systems.

Our deadline, as the Inspector General said, for assessing the
mission-critical systems was January 31. I am pleased to report
that we’ve met tt deadline. Of the 209 mission-critical systems,
as the Inspector General said, 125 have been certified as Y2K com-
pliant. We have completed the quality assurance reviews for 171 of
these mission critical systems. We expect to complete the remain-
ing 38 reviews by February 10, and we’re working very closely with
the IG pnd his staff to make sure that quality assurance is as it
show. .

We do have, we believe, an accurate picture of what needs to be
done to make the air traffic control system Y2K compliant. Renova-
tion efforts are now underway. We expect this to go more quickly
and we ex to be completed by December 31 of this year.

That’s the air traffic portion of this picture. As for Y2K for the
rest of the FAA: assessment of 216 of our 221 mission-critical sys-
tems is now completed. The chart that you see shows five remain-
ing. But, I will tell that you as of last night, they are now com-
pleted.

As I stated earlier, the GAO and the IG have advised the FAA
that we are not as far along as we should be, and that the core
issues plaguing us are: a lack of an overall agencywide plan, and
the lack of a strong centralized leadership on this issue. I agree,
and I want to tell you the steps I've taken to address this concern.

We've identified a new agency lead to bring discipline, to bring
consistency, and to bring management direction to the challenges

resented. We’ve asked Ray Long, who for the past several months
is been effectively dealing with the Y2K effort for air traffic sys-
tems, to be the program manager. He’s got a proven track record


54

current results to the Department’s CIO office and senior Y2K officials in each of
the OAs.

The Department recognized the need to better manage its Y2K program. As a
result, these key actions have been taken:

* On October 1, the Secretary issued a memorandum to Heads of the OAs
requiring (i) appointment of a senior executive for Y2K, (ii) project
management plans detailing schedules, priorities, costs, financing plans, and
contingencies, (iii) the Department’s CIO to immediately report on unfinished
system assessments, and (iv) acceleration of the validation phase from
December 31, 1999, to July 31, 1999,

© The Deputy Secretary developed a monthly tracking system which measures
OA progress of assessments, renovation, validation, and implementation. The
Deputy Secretary has made Y2K a high priority, and is requiring senior-level
management accountability.

© The CIO office issued departmental criteria on mission-critical systems. On
September 19, 1997, the Department's Acting CIO issued specific guidance on
what constituted completion of each Y2K phase. For the assessment phase, the
Acting CIO required a total inventory, an evaluation of Y2K for each inventory
item, identification of all systems interfaces and data exchanges, estimated cost
for fixing Y2K problems, a renovation plan, and a contingency plan for all
systems. The Acting CIO also required OAs to ensure that all information
technology procurement documents have the required FAR language requiring
‘Y2K compliance.

© The proposed reports submitted by the OAs to the Department’s CIO office
were adjusted, based on the audit results, before finalizing the August 15 and
November 14 reports to OMB.

Conclusion

The Department is behind schedule in completing its Y2K assessments. Since our
memorandum to the Deputy Secretary on August 1, 1997, the Department has
initiated a series of actions, with direction coming from the Secretary, Deputy
Secretary, and Acting CIO. As a result of this high-level involvement, progress is
being made, but much more needs to be done. As of November 14, 1997, total
systems inventories were not developed and assessments for mission-critical
inventory were not complete. Timely completion of assessment work by the OAs,


16

to fill this position as soon as possible. Further, its strategic plan--defining program
management responsibilities and providing an approach to addressing the millennium
challenge--has yet to be made final. A draft of this plan was provided to the
Administrator on December 1, 1997, and we understand that it is now being revised.
Until an official agencywide strategy is available, FAA's executive management will not
have the approved road map they need for achieving Year 2000 compliance. The lack of
a formal agencywide strategy also means that FAA's program manager position lacks the
authority to enforce Year 2000 policies. As a result, each line of business within the
agency will have to decide if, when, and how to address its Year 2000 conversion,

irrespective of agency priorities and standards.

Additionally, FAA's inventory of all information systems and their components is still
evolving. According to a Year 2000 program official, FAA's inventory of 741 systems
was completed on December 29, 1997. However, we have found that the inventory
changed on at least three occasions since then and, by January 23, 1998, had reached 769

systems.

Other crucial tasks include an assessment of the criticality of the systems in the
inventory, and deciding whether they should be converted, replaced, retired, or left as is.
On January 30, 1998, we were told by a Year 2000 program official that all outstanding,
systems assessments were to be received that day, but that review and validation of

these assessments would continue during February. Assessing the likely severity of


45
e Continue reporting to the Secretary on the progress made toward fixing
Year-2000 problems, and provide the same information to Congress on a

monthly basis.

Madam Chairwoman and Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. I would be
pleased to answer questions.

WwW


49

2 Memorandum

U.S. Department of
‘Transportation
Office of the Secretary
of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Subject: ACTION: Report on Assessing the Date: December 18, 1997
Year 2000 Computer Problem, DOT

Report bmber: FF-199§-53
Mh Reply To
From: eH Weintrob ann Of

Assistant Inspector General for Auditing

To: Michael P. Huerta

‘Acting Chief Information Officer

BACK' AND OBS

This report is the first in a series of reports on the Department of Transportation
(DOT) efforts to address the Year 2000 (Y2K) Computer Problem. Our objective
was to evaluate Departmentwide strategy, and Operating Administration (OA)
plans, for ensuring automated information systems and applications are Y2K
compliant by the end of calendar year 1999.

Until recently, most computer systems and applications were designed to use two
digits to designate the year. As the year 2000 approaches, these systems and
applications may not be able to operate properly because they cannot differentiate
between the year 2000 and 1900, since both would have the same two digit
representation “00.” Consequently, some systems may abort or provide erroneous
data.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department's Acting Chief
Information Officer (CIO) established milestones for completing the Y2K project.
For reporting purposes, OMB recognizes five Y2K phases: (i) awareness,
(ii) assessment, (iii) renovation, (iv) validation, and —_(v) implementation.
Awareness of Y2K issues is an ongoing process in the Department. This report
addresses the assessment phase.

In the assessment phase, agencies are required to determine the vulnerability of
computer systems and applications to Y2K problems, and develop plans for
correcting deficiencies. Requirements of the assessment phase include completing
a systems inventory, evaluating the hardware and software environment,


sionals that are vital to the success of
the conversion. In addition to retain-
ing their current employees, staffing
the Year/2000 projects is certain to be
1 challenge. It is already a problem,
and will only get worse as was report-
ed in the January 13 edition of The
‘New York Times article “Software Jobs
Go Begging.” In addition, corporate
executives must re-learn the lessons of
respect for the individual that was a
common practice when the computers
‘were introduced.

The Historical View

In the 1960s, the computer industry
was in its infancy, programmers were
drawn from diverse disciplines; at IBM
primarily mathematics, music, and the
liberal arts. Programming was a craft,
not a profession. Machine instructions
‘were coded by hand. If we wanted tools,
we had to invent them, We were forced
to repeat information over and over
‘again. We struggled over how to pack-
age data inthe tightest space possible as
80 columns in a punched card offered
litle room for programming commands
and data, certainly not the redundant
19%x four-digit date. Changes were
‘made in batch mode. The ability to
‘make and test changes immediately
were a programmers dream, somewhere
far off in the future. When we made
coding errors (and we all did), we wait:
44 hours or more to get the corrections
re-coded and run back through the sys
tem. Key-punch errors were a source of
consternation. Despite these frustra-
tions, we accepted each new challenge,
convinced that no technical problem
‘was 100 difficult to solve. Those who
seek to find blame for the Year/2000
problem may select our generation
However, it is more than likely that
‘given the information that we had, they
would have made the same decisions.

‘comfortable with computers. Most take
for granted the benefits of interactive

18

computing. However, they suffered
pains that most in my generation did not
experience. Many have been treated as
liabilities and unnecessary expenses.

They have suffered the pain of layofts
and their families severe distocations
over the last five years.

‘Some in the Hudson Valley unable to
pay their mortgages, dropped off their
keys atthe Credit Union secking entire-
ly new careers and ‘wher-
ever they could find them. Wal-Mart,
McDonalds, local real-estate offices,
and driving delivery trucks were for
‘many the kind of jobs they secured. It is
conly within the last two years that the
situation has tumed around. It is not
surprising that they, as well as many of
the mainframe professionals in other
‘organizations in other parts ofthe coun-
try, no longer share
the optimism and
loyalty to their orge-
nizations of the
teams in the 60's

any war, willl be
essential to help

these professionals
if they wish to survive.

‘Most in the industry now realize that
there is no “silver bullet" and there
Benoa fn he Yur Z000 pb

that allow for a more orderly transition.
‘There are also “time machines” to
replace ancient mainframes, to aid in
remediation and testing, and to pilot test

networks of Year/2000 ready proces-
sors. Despite improvements in produc-
tivity as high as 400 percent, few of
‘these tools have gained wide accep-
tance. Since there is so litle time left,
‘Year/2000 conversion teams should be

to use and, if necessary,
adapt the tools for their own organiza
tion’s use.

Intelligent planning, project disci-
pline, hard work, and intelligent risk
‘aking is required. The objective should
‘be reasonable, not perfect solutions.
CIO's must be told that since there is no
perfect solution, their assignment is to
‘maintain the vital services of the onga-
nization. Project managers should be
counseled that if they see us through the
crisis, they will be suitably recognized
and rewarded even if some errors get

not place a manager's job in the balance
if some mistakes are made in the
process. These are the field comman-
ders making dozens of decisions a day,
with inadequate resources and time,

Fixing An Insoluble Problem
Project managers are being told to fix

that are certain to follow. There will be


uN

Ms. Chairwoman, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittees:

We appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
efforts to address the Year 2000 problem--a situation in which. systems could malfunction
or fail because the "00" in the year 2000 may be indistinguishable from the "00" in 1900
unless these systems are modified or replaced. With only 696 days remaining until
January 1, 2000, federal agencies must act now to ensure that critical systems continue to

operate. There may be no more urgent federal information systems priority.

Hundreds of critical FAA computer systems make its operations possible; without these
specialized systems, FAA could not effectively control air traffic, target airlines for
inspection, or provide up-to-date weather conditions to pilots and air traffic controllers.
However, many of these systems could fail to perform as needed when using dates after
1999, unless proper date-related calculations can be assured. The implications of FAA's
not meeting this immovable deadline are enormous and could affect hundreds of
thousands of people through customer inconvenience, increased aitline costs, grounded

or delayed flights, or degraded levels of safety.

FAA's progress in making its systems ready for the year 2000 has been too slow. At its
current pace, it will not make it in time. The agency has been severely behind schedule
in completing basic awareness activities, including establishing a program manager with
responsibility for its Year 2000 program and issuing a final, overall Year 2000 strategy.
Further, FAA does not know the extent of its Year 2000 problem because it has not

completed key assessment activities. Specifically, it has yet to analyze the impact of its


53

the OAs, the Department reported 36 systems to OMB as compliant in its
November 14 report. We agree the 36 systems were Y2K compliant.

Estimated Cost for Y2K Fixes

The $92 million estimate in the May 15 report to OMB for fixing Y2K problems
was unsupported. We found cost estimates did not include all mission-critical
systems, and many estimates for non-mission-critical systems were based on
unsupported estimates. Based on our work and ongoing Departmental initiatives,
the estimated cost to fix Y2K problems had increased to $265 million in the
August 15 report and $266 million in the November 14 report.

As of November 14, 1997, the OAs were still developing their systems inventories,
and FAA was still assessing the Y2K implications for 265 of its mission-critical
systems. For example, the current Y2K cost estimate to fix the “host” computers
for the air traffic control system was $783,000 (this Y2K project is separate from
the ongoing “host” replacement project to be completed by the year 2005).
However, the En Route Integrated Products Team Leader told us the total Y2K
cost may be an additional $40 million if the computers have to be replaced because
of ¥2K problems. Based on the magnitude of ongoing work, the estimated cost to
fix Y2K problems is not reliable.

Computer and Service Contracts

On January 2, 1997, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) interim rule on
Y2K compliance was established to ensure Federal agencies procure products that
were Y2K compliant. We judgmentally sampled contract documents from all
OAs, and identified five OAs that were not consistently providing the appropriate
2K language in their contracts despite the Y2K requirements. For example, the
Coast Guard was purchasing helicopter roto-tuner test equipment without
specifying this equipment must be Y2K compliant. Seventy-five roto-tuners
previously purchased by Coast Guard were noncompliant, and require upgrades.
Coast Guard had not yet determined the cost of upgrading the roto-tuners.

Actions Taken by the Department

To ensure accurate reporting to OMB on August 15 and November 14, we worked
closely with the Department's CIO office. We also provided our interim results to
the Department's CIO office on July 21 and August 13, 1997. We provided

formal comments to the Deputy Secretary on August 1, 1997, and to the
Department’s Acting CIO on August 13, 1997. On November 12, we provided our




10

Presentation to Congress The Year 2000: At the FAA -The Time for Action is Now!
13098

‘Thank you. Mr, Chairman, hope o be of help to your committees on the FAA Year 2000 challenge. Based on information
‘supplied by the GAO and your staff, coocluded that many ofthe FAA's 414 critical applications will nat be “Year 2000
ready” by the end of 1999. [agree with the GAO thatthe problem atthe FAA is indeed a project management oae,

however with technical complications. Furthermore it appears that the FAA doesnot have an objective methodology for
planning and treckiog their Year 2000: project schedules.

My experience evaluating the schedule performance of several hundred projects has shown thatthe progres of

software projects tend to follow a family of curves known as Beta Curves, The perceat completed is represented tothe left
‘of the curves and elapsed time ia represented atthe bottom ofthe chart. The curve at the extreme left shows the progress
that might be expected from the use of highly automated migration abds. The curve atthe extreme right illustrates pilot
‘esting using manual remediation.

“Most projects start off slowly, the FAA applications are no exception. In order to become Year 2000 ready, the FAA must
significantly accelerate their progress during the nest few moaths. However even when they do, experience shows that ths
‘higher rate will not be sustained. Findiag the cause and fixing the last 10% of the problems can take 20-30% of the time.
Furthermore, the use ofthese curves as « planning and schedule tracking tool over tinse isa highly reliable indicator of a
Droject’s schedule performance.

‘To give the FAA the benefit ofthe doubt, we selected the average Beta curve. It shows equal time oa the learning curve and
‘00 the completion segment. We then asscased their progress against that curve using our CODE-TRACTM project
‘management tool. The results were not encouraging, Even if the FAA stops slipping thelr schedule, they would miss their
‘deadline by more than 7 months. If they continue to sip atthe seme rate, they would finish almost 9 % years late. The FAA
schedules are “open,” and therefore not reliable.

‘According (0 the GAO report, the number of application systems is large; more than 87S system, 18,000 mubsystemns, and
‘65 milli lines of code. Furthermore, through November 15, 1997 the Department of Transportation reported that the
FAA's large comples systems were oaly 3% through program remediation. Although this number should rise with later
data, we will aot have a reliable number uti ll 65 milion lines of code and thelr data have been analyzed or accounted

Purthermore, testing s projected to take more than 50-70% of a project's schedule, A strong testing discipline is required.
methodology

‘Grenthccrren amon the PANY ecommncad tha anc tng pane boi ser tua Sos, ber peeably
sooner.

Integral to executing each of the FAA's applications are information p

These: 08 80 inter just for the Syrem nsf gue and iret sirree Wat,
‘makes the FAA problem particularly serious is that the PAA is running computers that are between 20-25 years old.
‘What unakes the situation even more difficult is that special instructions have been adéed to the FAA computers. The
Agency also has it’s own proprietary computer operating system software that is uted a0 where elae in the world.

In order to reduce the risk to the integrity of the FAA fight control system, 1 recommend the establishment of a pilot
project on a chuster of “Year 2000 Time Machines.” The fir step would be to replicate the FAA's curreat operating
system 00 1 computer such as the IBM R390, and to pilot teat selected FAA systems operation in this “Vear 2000 Ready”
‘computer environment. We previously used mich a system to replace similar computers that are ceatral to the FAA's en-

route system.

‘The wext sep isto make for attaching the radar: hardware and fight, 's lsplays to several
ofthe systems and check out the Flight Coatrol Systems applications. Following that, the FAA coold use Year 2000
software vendor tols to bridge current data and current applications to make them Year 2000 ready. These tools selected
should require ite or no program changes The following sep should be remediating and testing changes to the critical
‘After that i ‘the can be Judged by the FAA as to their mitability for

operation.

‘The recommendation | propote arene quick fix. Frthermor, there sn way complet test pplication a5
‘complex as air traffic cootroL The ‘of logical paths cannot be will come with 2
{errs guerant Howcvr what props cola be Nel near such fran nepenie sod prac ot est
solution. It could help the FAA maintain their vital services. Thank you for the opportunity to testify, [hope that Ihave
been helpful to the FAA and to your committees,



25

Mr. Willemssen is Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems, within GAO's
Accounting and Information Management Division. In this position he is responsible
for GAO's reviews of information technology management at many of the federal
government's major departments and agencies, including the Departments of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, HUD, Interior, Labor,
‘Transportation, Veterans Affairs; and EPA and SSA.

Mr. Willemssen joined GAO in 1979, and since that time has participated in and led
numerous computer systems reviews in a wide array of federal agencies. His
evaluation experience is predominantly in assessing major modernization efforts,
telecommunications, software management, performance evaluation, requirements
management, acquisition approaches, systems maintenance, and business process
reengineering.

Mr. Willemssen has received many awards throughout his career, including GAO's
Meritorious Service Award. He received bachelor's and master's degrees in business
administration from the University of Iowa, and has completed the executive level
program in information systems at UCLA.


68

Mr. Horn. Well, we thank you.

And Mr. Graham, we’re delighted to have you here as an outside
consultant who has looked at this problem in a number of agencies.
Stanley Graham is senior management consultant for Tech-
Beamers, Inc. Mr. Graham.

STATEMENT OF STANLEY GRAHAM, SENIOR MANAGEMENT
CONSULTANT, TECH-BEAMERS, INC.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I hope to be of help on FAA’s year 2000 challenge. Based on in-
formation supplied by the GAO and your staff, I've concluded that
many of the FAA’s 414 critical applications, will not be year 2000
ready by the end of 1999.

I agree with the GAO that the problem at the FAA is indeed a
project management one, however, with technical complication.

‘urthermore, it appears that the FAA does not have an objective
methodology for Planning and tracking their year 2000 project
schedules.

My experience evaluating the schedule performance of several
hundred projects has shown that the progress of large software
projects tend to follow a family of curves known as beta curves. The
percent complete is represented to the left of the curve and elapse
time is represented to the bottom of the chart. The curve at the ex-
treme left shows the progress that might be expected from the use
of a highly automated migration aid. The curve at the extreme
right illustrates pilot testing using manual renovation.

Most projects start off slowly. The FAA applications are no exce]
tion. In order to become year 2000 ready, the FAA must signifi-
cantly accelerate their progress during the next few months. How-
ever, even when they do, experience shows that this higher rate
will not be sustained. Finding the cause and fixing the last 10 per-
cent of the problems can take 20 to 30 percent of the time. Further-
more, the use of these curves as a planning and schedule tracking
tool over time is a highly reliable indicator of a project’s schedule
performance.

To give the FAA the benefit of the doubt, we selected the average
beta curve. It shows equal time on the learning curve and on the
completion segment. n we assess their progress inst the
curve using our code-track Project management tool, results
were not encouraging. Even if the FAA stops slipping their sched-
ule, they would miss their deadline by more than 7 months. If they
continue to slip at the same rate, they would finish almost 9.5
years late. The FAA schedules are open, and therefore, not reliable.
As a result, I believe there is little chance that the FAA’s critical
applications will be eet 2000 ready.

ding to the GAO report, the number of applications systems
is large. More than 875 systems, 18,000 subsystems, and 65 million
lines of code. Furthermore, through November 15, 1997, the De-
partment of Transportation reported that the FAA’s large, complex
systems were only 3 percent’ ugh program renovation. oug!
this number should rise with later data, we will not have a reliable
number until 65 million lines of code and their data have been ana-
lyzed and accounted for.


61

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANE F. GARVEY, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATOR, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SUBCOMMITTEE
ON TECHNOLOGY, AND THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND
OVERSIGHT, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION, AND
TECHNOLOGY, CONCERNING THE TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES PRESENTED
BY THE YEAR 2000. FEBRUARY 4, 1998.

‘Chairwoman Morella, Chairman Horn, and Subcommittee Members:

am pleased to be making my first appearance before both Subcommittees this afternoon
to discuss the challenges the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) faces as the

countdown to January 1, 2000 continues.

‘The question on everyone’s mind -- and certainly the question on my mind when I arrived
at the FAA last August ~ is: will the FAA make it? Can we ensure that air traffic safety
is not compromised in the slightest at 12:01 am. on January 1, 20007 And the answer to
that question is yes. Aviation safety will not be compromised. Ensuring that we meet

this challenge is one of my top priorities.

Thave been meeting with my managers and the key FAA personnel involved in the Year
2000 compliance effort frequently since I became Administrator. I know from these
meetings, and from the work that the Inspector General and General Accounting Office
have done, that FAA needs to do a better job of managing this problem. We are behind,
and that is unacceptable. Let me tell you what actions I have underway to correct that.


18

examples is FAA's Host Computer System--the centerpiece information processing
system in FAA‘s en route centers-which runs on IBM mainframe computers. Key
components of the Host include its operating system, application software, and
microcode--low-level machine instructions used to service the main computer. While
FAA officials expressed confidence that they have resolved any date dependencies in the
Host's operating system and application software, IBM reported that it has no confidence
in the ability of its microcode to survive the millennium date change because it no
longer has the skills or tools to properly assess this code. IBM has therefore

recommended that FAA purchase new hardware.

Given these concerns, FAA~in an attempt to help ensure success and minimize risk--is

considering moving in two directions simultaneously: It is continuing its assessment of

the microcode with a plan to resolve and test any identified date issues, while at the

same time preparing to purchase and implement new hardware, called Interim Host, at

each of its 20 en route centers before January 1, 2000. Yet the purchase of new hardware

carries its own set of risks--risks that FAA must mitigate in a short period of time.

These are at least fourfold.

= First, Lockheed Martin, currently the Host software support contractor, will be
responsible for porting the existing Host operating system and application software
to the new hardware. This software conversion requires extensive testing to ensure

that air traffic control operations are not affected. Unexpected problems in testing


35

field. Then, an internal quality assurance review (QAR) team, assisted by the
consulting firm Coopers & Lybrand, reviews the assessment results for adequacy.

As shown in the following two charts, a large number of assessments of Air
Traffic computer systems was completed last week. Between January 23 and
February 2; the number of assessed systems by Air Traffic Services increased by
109, from 100 to 209. Furthermore, the number of air traffic mission-critical
systems also decreased by 25, from 234 to 209.

FAA’s Status as of January 23, 1998

Mission- ‘Approved | Year-2000

Organization critical | Assessed | by Quality | Compliant
Assurance

Air Traffic Services 234 100* 86 86
Administrative 107 93 N/A 0
Acquisition & 48 26 N/A 0
Research
Others 15 12 NIA 0
Total - All FAA 404 231 86, 86

* Estimated since actual statistics were not available.

FAA’s Status as of February 2, 1998

Mission- ‘Approved | Year-2000

Organization critical | Assessed | by Quality | Compliant
Assurance

Air Traffic 209 209 171 125
Services
Administrative 122 122 N/A 0
Acquisition & 84 80 N/A 0
Research
Others 15 14 N/A 0
Total - All FAA 430 425 171 125



55

and increased oversight by the Department’s CIO office, are essential to ensure the
Department is ready to begin solving its Y2K problems.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend the Department’s Acting CIO, in addition to continuing the
ongoing initiatives, obtain additional support staff to ensure the Department’s Y2K
program has the necessary resources to properly oversee the work remaining on
this important project.

Manager

The Department's Acting CIO reviewed this report on December 9, 1997. He

concurred with the recommendation and stated that implementation actions will be
taken by March, 1998. No further response to this report is required.

We appreciate the cooperation and assistance provided during the audit. Please
contact me on (202) 366-1992, or John Meche on (202) 366-1496, if you have
questions concerning this report.


21

FAA has started to renovate some of the systems it has already assessed. However,
because of the agency's delays in completing its awareness and assessment activities,
time is running out for FAA to renovate all of its systems, validate these conversions or

replacements, and implement its converted or replaced alternatives.

FAA's delays are further magnified by the agency's poor history in delivering promised
system capabilities on time and within budget, which we have reported on in the past.
FAA's weaknesses in managing software acquisition will also hamper its renovation,

validation, and implementation efforts.*

Given the many hurdles that FAA faces and the limited amount of time left, planning for
operational continuity through the turn of the century becomes ever more urgent. To
ensure the ability to carry out core functions, such planning defines assumptions and
risk scenarios, operational objectives, time frames, priorities, tasks, activities, procedures,
resources, and responsibilities. Such planning also lays out the specific steps and
detailed actions that would be required to reestablish functional capability for mission-

critical operations in the event of prolonged disruption, failure, or disaster. We plan to

RCED-94-188, Homa 23, 1950) HightRisk Sees _An Overview (CAO/EIR 354, February
1995); and High-Risk Series: Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9,

February 1997).

‘A

ation Rake (CAO/AIMDS77, Mar, a
iW



88

on even renovation activities on some of the lower-priority activi-
ties and systems.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Willemssen, you can’t hit a target you don’t
have. What would you say is a realistic target?

Mr. WILLEMSSEN, Pardon? A realistic——

Mr. GUTKNECHT. A realistic target, what percentage?

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. I would say, we need as a realistic target to
try and hit 100 percent of mission-critical systems and the focus
needs to be on those systems. And the non-mission critical systems
I would, frankly, not put as much attention on at this point in
time.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. What would you feel is critical? In talking with
Mr. Horn over on the House floor, we were talking about this, what
would you feel would be an adequate—see I believe in setting tar-
gets and then assessing how you are doing in terms of hitting tar-
gets. It seems to me, it might be helpful, if we had periodic reports
on what you have accomplished in the last period—whether it’s a
month, 6 weeks, 2 months, whatever—and then what do you expect
to accomplish in the next period of time. Do you think that’s a rea-
sonable way to proceed? And is that an appropriate oversight meth-
odology for the Congress to take?

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. It would be an excellent way to proceed. And
I would also encourage FAA, as they are doing that, to think in
terms not just of individual systems, but as a key business process.
Let’s say, for example, separating airplanes in the en route envi-
ronment and looking at it from end-to-end in all the systems and
data transfers that occur in between. It could be from the receipt
of a flight plan to the receipt for the information in the cockpit.
You’ve got to look at it from an end-to-end perspective to make
sure that everything is addressed in a full integrated environment
and tested that way also.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Ms. Garvey, it looked like you perhaps wanted
to jumpin and comment on that question.

is. GARVEY. Well, I would just reiterate what you've said, which
is the need to have timeliness and benchmarks and a clearly laid
out plan. I mean, our goal is to get those 234 mission-critical ele-
ments fixed and repaired by December 31 of this year. I think the
suggestion from GAO about priorities even within that is some-
thing that I know Mr. Long is looking at and we'll continue to work
with him on that issue. And we’re very happy, and should be, giv-
ing you monthly reports which will outline exactly the kind of
progress that we’ve made. But our goal, again, is to get those 234
repaired by December 31.

ir. GUTKNECHT. But we don’t really need—and I would just say
this from my perspective, and I think on behalf of members of this
committee—we don’t need volumes of information.

Ms. GaRVEY. Absolutely not.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. I mean, if you could put it on two ages and
report once a month, I think that would be extremely helpful.

is. GARVEY. Mr. Vice Chairman, I like one-pagers, so I agree
with you, we will do that.

Mr. GRAHAM. I believe it is both the right thing to ask, and in
a very net way, I described the methodology that may be useful.


Even with a well structured integrated test environment, FAA has no assurance
all Year-2000 fixes will work as intended because field conditions are different
from a test environment. The task is further complicated by the fact that local
software changes have been made to the Air Traffic Control System. FAA has
over 8,000 employees maintaining the Air Traffic Control System. The
software developed or changed by local maintenance teams could result in
different conditions from site to site. As a result, Year-2000 fixes working in a
test environment may not work properly when implemented in the field.

FAA’s November 1999 target completion date for implementing all Year-2000
fixes for all mission-critical systems leaves little cushion for schedule slippage
or corrective actions to solve problems unique to individual sites. FAA’s track
record for solving hardware and software problems does not instill a high
confidence level that the fixes can be made on schedule. To avoid a crisis
situation in November 1999, we recommend the FAA Administrator move the
date by which all systems have been fixed, tested and operational, to no later
than June 1999. FAA has informed us they will look for opportunities to move
up implementation dates after the assessment and quality assurance work is
completed.

Year-2000 cost,
Until all assessment work is approved, the cost estimates to fix Year-2000

computer problems remain uncertain. FAA’s current cost estimate of $162
million does not include $160 million for the interim Host computer

4


Tech-Beamers,Iinc.

System Leckeosegy Project Experts

Ui an seen ton oon

Technology

This confirms that, to the best of my knowledge neither Tech-Beamers, Inc nor Stanley
Graham has not received any Federal Government Funding related to the matters to which
1 am testifying.

ad Gt

Stanley Graham
Vice President and Senior Management Consultant


60

and a continuity of commitment, which I believe we will bring to
this issue. And I want to say to all of you, as sincerely as I can,
that I am dedicated to providing that commitment. I am dedicated
to resolving the Y2K challenge.

That completes my prepared statement, and thank you once
again for the opportunity to appear here before you today.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Garvey follows:]


84

Mr. Horn. You've been very helpful.

Let us proceed to questions. We'll have 5 minutes for each mem-
ber of the panel. rr myself, the co-chairwomen Mrs. Morella,
and then we'll alternate between Democrats and Republicans.

Let me begin with taking the Inspector General’s report, Admin-
istrator Garvey—the gentleman sitting to your left—and he makes
some interesting comments on page 2 and 3. He said, “Our testi-
mony today will identify FAA actions that must be taken to effec-
tively solve the year 2000 problem.” I’m going to skip the first one,
but I’m going to start in at two on the top of page 3. The Inspector
General says: the FAA must “expeditiously appoint a person with
strong technical leadership and authority to manage the year 2000
program.”

I take it you’ve done that. Is that correct?

Ms. GaRVEY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Horn. That’s Mr. Long, is it?

Ms. GaRVEY. Yes, it is.

Mr. Horn. All right. No. 3, “Make a prompt decision on the Host
computer fixes.” Where are we on that?

Ms. GARVEY. Well, again, we've been working very closely with
the Inspector General, Mr. Chairman. We are on a two-parallel, or
taking a two-track approach. We are repairing and making the ex-
isting system Y2K compliant as we look at a more aggressive re-
placement of the Host system.

T’ve talked with the IBM people myself, personally, about some
of the issues that they have raised, and we believe the belt and
suspenders approach, a two-tracked approach, is the right ap-

roach, and I believe the Tnspector General agrees with us on that,
ut I don’t want to speak for him.

Mr. Horn. Mr. Mead, do you agree?

Mr. MEaD. Yes. Neither—both approaches are probably nec-
essary, but you would not want to look at the replacement of the
Host as a backup by the year 2000 for the repair of the Host.

Mr. Horn. Go ahead.

No. 4 would be “Develop a suitable contingency plan for the Host
computer in case the planned efforts fail.” Now, do you feel you
have a suitable contingency plan?

Ms. GARVEY. We believe, Mr. Chairman, that we do have a suit-
able contingency plan. In fact, the issue of contingency plans is
something that we've talked a great deal about with both GAO and
the IG, and with members of your staff. We believe we've got a
good contingency plan in place. Some others have raised questions
about it because of the interconnectedness of the system—do we
need something even more. We're going to take a look at that. In
fact, that’s one of the first issues that Mr. Long will be looking at.

Mr. Horn. The other—point 5 is “Have an independent review
of plans to fix and certify the existing Host computer?” Do you feel
your two-tracked system solves that, or what?

Ms. GARVEY. Well, we feel that that’s part of it. But I will tell
you that we also have on board an independent firm—as a matter
of fact, they were just lined up at the end of the assessment pe-
riod—to do an independent validation of all of our systems, includ-
ing the Host.


29

Madam Chairwoman, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittees:

We appreciate the opportunity to testify today. With all the recent publicity, most
people know that many computer systems and software applications had been
programmed with a two-digit year field. Computer systems programmed in this
way will not be able to differentiate between the year 2000 and 1900, since both
would have the same two-digit representation of “00.” If the computer systems,
including those used by air traffic controllers, are “confused” by an “00” year
field, they could shut down or provide inaccurate information. Because of its
critical safety function and the public reliance on air travel, any failure in the Air
Traffic Control System is unacceptable.

We have been reviewing the Department’s Year-2000 progress since May 1997,
and have issued two reports.’ The General Accounting Office also has been
reviewing FAA as part of its Governmentwide oversight of Year-2000 problems.
FAA has about 70 percent of the mission-critical systems in the Department, as
shown in exhibit A. Our testimony today will address four areas:

© The importance of Year-2000 problems in the Air Traffic Control System,
© The status of actions to fix the FAA Year-2000 problems,
© Challenges ahead for FAA on Year-2000 work, and

e Actions FAA should undertake to solve its Year-2000 computer problems.

Before addressing these areas in detail, I will summarize our overall message and
findings.

FAA got a very late start on fixing Year-2000 computer problems. It was not until
about 6 months ago that FAA began addressing the Year-2000 issue with a sense
of urgency. Consequently, FAA is behind schedule on assessing which of its
systems have Year-2000 problems, determining what needs to be fixed, and testing
and implementing solutions. The good news is that it is not too late. Strong
central management and a continuing sense of urgency are the keys to success.

Every piece of computer software and hardware must be assessed for problems,
fixed as needed, and tested for Year-2000 compliance. The assessment
work--identifying systems with Year-2000 problems--is almost finished, although
it is 7 months after the target date specified by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). Much of the assessment work on the Air Traffic Control System

1 Management Advisory on Year 2000 Computer Problems, FAA, Report Number FE-1998-027,
November 26, 1997, and Assessing the Year 2000 Computer Problem, DOT, Report Number
FE-1998-053, December 18, 1997.


5

As a result, the FAA is just discovering the full extent of the year
2000 problem by completing an assessment of their systems, a step
that the Office of Management and Budget suggested should have
been completed over 8 months ago. I regret to say that historically
the FAA’s track record for completing large computer and software-
intensive projects has been very poor.

The year 2000 project, however, is one project that must not fall
behind schedule. With less than 23 months to go until the relenting
deadline of January 1, 2000, the FAA is quickly running out of
time. It’s absolutely critical that the agency proceed expeditiously
to complete critical renovation, validation, and implementation ac-
tivities on schedule. At the same time, we must also face the seri-
ous possibility that the FAA will not meet its new ambitious sched-
ule. For this reason, the FAA must also develop plans for this con-
tingency.

esterday the House considered H.R. 1271, the FAA Research
Engineering and Development Act of 1997, and included in the leg-
islation was a provision from my subcommittee regarding a sense
of Congress urging the FAA to give high priority to correcting the
year 2000 problem in all of its computer systems, and to develop
a plan and budget to correct that problem. legislation also re-
quires the agency to develop contingency plans in the event that
certain systems are unable to be corrected in time. I’m pleased to
inform everyone that that bill has cleared both the House and the
Senate, and is right now on the President’s desk for his signature.

Now while the FAA, as well as the rest of the Federal Govern-
ment, scrambled to assess and fix the year 2000 problem, the lack
of leadership and coordination on this issue from our Nation’s Chief
Executive has been keenly felt. I can’t help but wonder if the FAA
would not currently be in their difficult position if they originally
had the benefit of the President’s direction and oversight.

My good friend from California, Congressman Horn, and I, and
our ranking members, have been holding hearings on this impor-
tant issue now for over 2 years. We've insistently and consistently
called for the establishment of a senior-level official to coordinate
the Federal Government efforts and for an Executive order vesting
that official with the power to hold agencies accountable, and to
make correcting the problem a top agency priority. Despite these
warnings and pleas from Congress, the President and the adminis-
tration neglected to take action on this important issue.

Now in the past few days, we’ve seen signs from the White
House that our recommendations may not have fallen completely
on deaf ears. Although a formal announcement has yet to be made,
we understand the ite House will soon be officially designating
the year 2000 czar to direct national efforts to address this prob-
lem. I understand it will be, as has been mentioned, John
Koskinen, whom we all have a great deal of respect for. I also un-
derstand the President will be issuing that Executive order in the
very near future. We welcome these actions by the President. We
know that they’re necessary to substantially enhance our Nation’s
ability to correct the year 2000 problem in a timely and effective
manner.

This afternoon at this hearing we’re going to examine the FAA’s
year 2000 strategy and plan, the progress the FAA has made in ad-


44

Appoint, by the end of February, a central Year-2000 program manager
with sufficient technical background and authority to direct remaining
work, who reports directly to the Administrator.

Promptly decide on the strategy for addressing Year-2000 problems in the
aging Host computer. If the parallel repair/replacement option is selected,
milestones should be established for repair and replacement work at each
En-route Center. The Secretary and Congress should be advised of the
impact this will have on the implementation schedule for other systems
FAA is acquiring.

Develop a suitable contingency plan for directing high altitude aircraft in
case both the Host repair and replacement efforts are not completed by
‘Year 2000.

Have an independent review of plans to fix and certify the existing Host
computer. The staff involved with this must have a sufficiant expertise of
IBM 3083 system architecture.

Develop, by the end of March 1998, the master schedule for fixing all
mission-critical systems. The plan should contain a goal to have all
mission-critical systems fixed, tested, and fully operational no later than
June 1999.

Determine, by mid-March 1998, the resources needed for repairs,
replacements, comprehensive testing, and for an earlier Year-2000
implementation date; and notify the Secretary and Congress of the resource
requirements.


4

The year 2000 problem at the FAA is a symptom of a much deep-
er problem throughout the Government: the inability of agencies to
modernize their computer systems. Computer modernization in the
FAA has been a problem for some time now, and they are not
alone. The IRS has failed repeatedly their attempts to upgrade its
systems, and this morning we read in the pa rs that the latest ar-

itect of computer modernization at the has resigned. I ho)
that Mr. Koskinen will turn his attention to this fundamental pro!
lem. If we cannot upgrade the computers at the FAA, the IRS, and
Social Security, and the Health Care Financing Administration,
which runs Medicare, we face extremely serious consequences, even.
more so than the year 2000 problem ever posed.

Again, I thank the chairman for calling this hearing, and this is
one, I might add, of a series of hearings that Mr. Horn has called,
and he has kept a scorecard on agency response. Unfortunately,
most of the agencies have failed in their ability to get modernized,
and we are glad that he is focusing today on the FAA.

‘hank you.

you.

Mr. Horn. I thank the gentlewoman, and now am delighted to
yield to a very distinguished colleague, who is the chair of Sub-
committee on Technology of the House Committee on Science. Mrs.
Morella is co-chairman of this hearing, and she and her staff are
to be commended for their cooperation and work with our staff.

So the gentlewoman from Maryland.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, and welcome to the sixth in a series of hearings
that the Technology Subcommittee has held on the year 2000 com-
puter problem, and this is the fourth time that we've had the pleas-
ure of working cooperatively with our colleagues from the Govern-
ment Reform and Oversight Committee’s Subcommittee on Govern-
ment Management, Information, and Technology, led by Chairman
Steve Horn, and the ranking member, Carol, laloney.

Today’s hearing focuses on the efforts of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration to address the effects of the year 2000 problem on its
computer and information systems. We have all read recent news-
pa r accounts describing the catastrophic potential of the year

problem on passenger and cargo air transport. While these
disastrous possibilities may hold true unless immediate corrective
action is undertaken, I think it’s very important to underscore that
I believe it is a capacity issue and not a safety issue. The flying
ublic should be assured that the year 2000 problem will not en-
Ranger the safety of passengers in the air.

If the mission-critical components of our Nation’s aviation are
not year 2000-compliant, aircraft will simply not be authorized to
leave the ground. I’m confident that the FAA and the industry will
not take any risks that could jeopardize aviation safety. While safe-
ty may not be an issue, the economic of an FAA Y2K failure could
be significant.

As we'll soon hear from the General Accounting Office and the
Department of Transportation Inspector General, the FAA’s re-
sponse to the year 2000 problem has been fragmented and slow.

Tm encouraged by recent efforts, it is clear that this problem
only now is receiving the urgent priority it deserves from the high-
est levels in the agency.


38

it will cost about $2 million for the repair job, and about $160 million for an
interim replacement.

FAA and IBM are at odds regarding the difficulties in evaluating and fixing
Year-2000 problems in the Host computer. IBM has claimed the Host
Year-2Q00 problems could not be properly assessed. In a letter dated
October 2, 1997, IBM stated “Analysis of 3083 microcode (a machine
language) involves reviewing hundreds of thousands of lines of microcode
written in several different protocols.... IBM does not have the skills
employed today that understand the microcode implemented in the 3083 well
enough to conduct an appropriate Year-2000 assessment. In addition, the tools
required to properly analyze the microcode do not exist.”

FAA has done limited testing on the Host computer microcode. To date, FAA
has identified a Year-2000 problem with the computer’s cooling system. FAA
still must complete an analysis of the microcode, but, at this point, the FAA
program office is maintaining that the microcode can be fixed. FAA hired one
technical expert to work on the microcode assessment, and is searching for
other technical experts. Within the next 90 days, FAA plans to make a
decision on whether the Host can be repaired. If it can, FAA plans to self-
certify the Host with the help of technical experts.

Replacement of the Host requires “rehosting” the mainframe computer. This
involves taking the software from the existing computer and installing it into
the replacement machine. This sounds simple, however, the reality is that
rehosting a highly sophisticated and customized system like the Air Traffic
Control System is a complex undertaking. The last time FAA rehosted these
mainframe computers, the process took about 3 years. Another key concern is

10


118

But I wanted to point out that the FAA has recognized that
they've done a poor job managing the problem, and Ms. Garvey has
stated that she intends to raise the problem to the highest levels
within the FAA. And although they’re way behind where they
should be, I think that they have shown us a very aggressive
schedule and an intention to address the problem. I appreciate that
commitment very much.

And even if they hit all of their goals and milestones on schedule,
they may not complete the project until November 1999. We know
that the FAA has a poor track record on managing major Projects,
but this is one where the deadline cannot slip. We hope that we
don’t need any kind of contingency plans. But like the GAO and
the IG, we think that the FAA must establish priorities, work expe-
ditiously to complete the problem.

And I think this has been a terrific panel. You’ve all worked to-
gether. We need every one of you for the kinds of contributions and
oversight that you've given. I appreciate it very much. Thank you.

Mr. Horn. Well, I certainly share Mrs. Morella’s remarks, and
I think one of our problems in this whole area is that, since 1966
until today, the administration simply has not taken the kind of
leadership that it should have taken in getting people moving in
this area. Thus, we're down to the crunch of less than eight quar-
ters to go, and the number of days I noted in my opening state-
ment. So it’s going to be a tough battle, if we’re going to satisfy the
needs of the American people with a results-oriented government
in this area.

Thank you very much for coming.

With that, we’re adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., “the subcommittees adjourned subject
to the call of the Chaire)

[@)


17

systems failures is crucial as well, yet FAA only recently began to examine the likely
impact of Year 2000-induced failures; this assessment is due to be presented to FAA

management this month, February 1998.

Without the thorough definition of a program's scope and requirements that only such
inventorying and assessment can provide, cost estimates are uncertain at best, as the
agency acknowledges. FAA's current Year 2000 program cost estimate of $246 million
will likely change once the agency more accurately identifies its inventory and

determines how it will go about making its systems Year 2000 compliant.

On the basis of our discussions with FAA personnel, it is clear that FAA's ability to
ensure the safety of the National Airspace System and to avoid the grounding of planes
could be compromised if systems are not changed. FAA's organization responsible for
air traffic control reported that 34 of the 100 mission-critical systems it initially assessed
were likely to result in catastrophic failure if they were not renovated. FAA plans to
renovate all of these systems. As of January 30, 1998, assessments of another 140

mission-critical air traffic control systems were continuing.

The Host C 5 Critical 1 ion Processing Li

As FAA completes its systems assessments, it faces difficult decisions about how to

renovate, retire, or replace its date-dependent systems. One of the most significant


12

systems’ not being Year 2000 compliant, inventory and assess all of its systems for date
dependencies, make final its plans for addressing any identified date dependencies, or

develop plans for continued operations in case systems are not corrected in time. Until
these activities are completed, FAA cannot know the extent to which it can trust its

systems to operate safely using dates beyond 1999.

Delays in completing awareness and assessment activities also leave FAA little time for
critical renovation, validation, and implementation activities--the final three phases in an
effective Year 2000 program.’ With under 2 years left, FAA is quickly running out of

time, making contingency planning even more critical.

As our report being released at this hearing today makes clear, FAA's delays to date are
cause for serious concern? Given the rapid approach of the millennium, such delays can
no longer continue. My statement today will examine (1) FAA‘s reliance on information
processing, (2) where the agency stands today, (3) what remains at risk, and (4) what we
recommend must be done to increase the likelihood that FAA systems will be Year 2000

compliant by January 1 of that year.

"Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, September
1997).



FAA AT RISK: YEAR 2000 IMPACT ON THE AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1998

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOv-
ERNMENT MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION, AND TECH-
NOLOGY, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND
OVERSIGHT, JOINT WITH SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECH-
NOLOGY, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

Washington, DC.

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, in room 311, Cannon
House Office Building, Hon. Stephen Horn (chairman of the Sub-
committee on Government Management, Information, and Tech-
nology) and Hon. Constance A. Morella (chairwoman of the Sub-
committee on Technology) presiding.

Present: Representatives Horn, Morella, Sessions, Davis of Vir-
ginia, Gutknecht, Maloney, Gordon, and Stabenow.

Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and
Technology staff present: J. Russell George, staff director and chief
counsel; John Hynes and Bob Alloway, professional staff members;
Matthew Ebert, clerk; and Mark Stevenson, minority professional
staff member.

Subcommittee on Technology staff present: Richard Russell, staff
director; Michael Bell, staff assistant; Jeff Grove and Ben Wu, pro-
fessional staff members; and Mike Quear and Jim Wilson, minority
professional staff members.

Mr. Horn [presiding]. A quorum bei: resent, the joint hearing
of the Subcommittee on ernment Management, Information,
and Technology and the Subcommittee on Technology will come to
order.

Our subcommittee be; hearings on the year 2000 computer
roblem in April 1996. We have continued to raise the issue in

‘ing after hearing, a series of press conferences, progress report
cards from A to F, and grades for each Cabinet agency, and even
letters and personal conversations with the President by the rank-
ing Democrat on the committee, as well as myself.

'e have repeatedly called on the White House and the President
to establish a high-profile, governmentwide leader to coordinate the
Federal year 2000 effort. We now have word from the President’s
office that this is finally going to happen. A task force called the
President’s Council on the Year 2000 Conversion will be headed by
John Koskinen. Mr. Koskinen is the former Deputy Director for
Management at the Office of Management and Budget, and very
respected by Members on both sides of the aisle and on this sub-
committee. We’re delighted that the President has recognized the

1)


108

Mr. Horn. Well, I think you’ve made an excellent point, and I'd
like to have the General Accounting Office, the Inspector General,
and the FAA to give me a formal letter, which I can put in the
record at this point of the hearing, as to: Is Mr. Graham’s point ac-
curate with reference to the IBM equipment? Because we need to
know that; you need to know that, and I think he’s made some very
helpful comments and suggestions there. But just to round it out,
we might even ask IBM in the process. So I think that’s a helpful
comment. And, I know from my own experience in the university
world, you’re absolutely right on separate validation by other than
the vendor. You really need to take a look at what’s happened in
the rest of the executive branch. We need to have those experiences
shared with other agencies, as to how they test this equipment to
make sure it conforms with what the goal of this whole project is.

(The information referred to follows:]


800 indepencence Ave. $v

US Department Washington. D.C. 2089¢
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
stration:
Jane F. Garvey
Administrator

Federal Aviation Administration

Jane F. Garvey, the 14th Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration was
swom in August 4, 1997. She became the first Administrator confirmed by the Senate
to serve a five-year term as opposed to serving at the pleasure of the President.

‘With an outstanding career in public service and extensive administrative experience,
Garvey brings to the FAA a strong commitment to ensure the world’s safest skies
become even safer.

‘As Administrator, Garvey manages a 48,000-person agency with worldwide impact
and presence in promoting aviation safety and security. The FAA regulates and
oversees aviation safety and security, conducts cutting edge research and development,
and operates the world’s largest air traffic control system.

Prior to being named FAA Administrator, Garvey was Acting Administrator of the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). She served as Deputy Administrator of
FHWA from April 1993 until February 1997. FHWA, also an agency of the U.S.
Department of Transportation, has an annual budget of $20 billion and works in
partnership with the states to maintain the safety and efficiency of the Nation’s roads
and bridges.

A creative leader at FHWA, Garvey chaired FHWA’s Innovative Financing Initiative,
which resulted in more than $4 billion in transportation investment in more than 30
states—projects that in many cases would not have been otherwise built.

Prior to joining FHWA, Garvey served as director of Logan Intemational Airport, one
of the Nation’s busiest aviation facilities. From 1988 to 199i, she was Commissioner
of the Massachusetts Department of Public Works. Before that, Garvey was Associate
Commissioner in the Department of Public Works, where she directed construction
activities and developed environmental initiatives.

Garvey holds degrees from Mount Saint Mary College and Mount Holyoke College. She
has participated in the Fellowship Program for Public Leaders at Harvard University.

aad


22

issue a guide later this month, in exposure draft form, to assist agencies in ensuring
business continuity by performing necessary contingency planning for the Year 2000

crisis.

BUT URGENT ACTION ESSENTIAL

FAA's delays to date put the agency at great risk. The coming millennium cannot be
postponed, and FAA will continue to be hamstrung until all inventorying and
assessments have been completed. Once the degree of vulnerability has been
determined, a structured, five-phase approach with rigorous program management—such
as that outlined in our assessment guide’--can offer a road map to the effective use of

available resources, both human and financial.

But time is short. Should the pace at which FAA addresses its Year 2000 issues not
quicken, and critical FAA systems not be Year 2000 compliant and therefore not be ready
for reliable operation on January 1 of that year, the agency's capability in several
essential areas--including the monitoring and controlling of air traffic~could be severely

compromised. This could result in the temporary grounding of flights until safe aircraft

7GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, September 1997.
12


8

tensely interested in you being successful. We'll ask tough ques-
tions. That’s our job, but we're also interested in knowing what we
can do to be of benefit to you, so that the safety of our skies is ap-
parent to all travelers the American public.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

Mrs. MORELLA. I'd now like to recognize the vice chair of the
Technology Subcommittee of the Science Committee, the gentleman
from Minnesota, Mr. Gutknecht.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I'll be
brief as well. I certainly don’t want to be redundant to what my
colleagues have said, but I think we do need to underscore the im-
portance of this hearing and the importance of this issue.

T also want to remind members, as well as the people who are
here for this hearing today, that we have been ha’ arings on
the year 2000 problem for several years, and at first I think it was
difficult to get People to take this whole issue seriously. I feel a lit-
tle bit like Wi ers, and, you know, Will Rogers said, “All I
know is what I read in the newspapers.” And what I read in the
newspapers today is not good.

Let me just read the it sentence of a story which appears in
today’s USA Today: “The Federal Aviation Administration is so far
behind in its efforts to fix the year 2000 computer glitch that half
the Nation’s air fleet have to be ded during the earliest
days, weeks, or atresia m lennium,” Will Roge 4

low that’s a pretty ing statement, and as rs said,
“All we know is what we read in the newspapers.” I think we have
to be honest with ourselves. We are looking down the barrel of a
potential disaster, but unlike hurricanes and earthquakes, we
ow exactly when this disaster is going to arrive, and more impor-
tantly, that it can be averted.

And I would echo the statement of Mr. Sessions: We want to be
constructive, but we also want to make it clear that, on behalf of
the general public, the traveling public, we have to ask some tough
questions, and we have to absolutely insist that real action is being
taken by the FAA. As was said earlier, we have not always been
very pleased with the speed, I guess I'd have to say, of the reforms
that ve been taking place at the FAA. We hope that we t ood
answers today, but I can guarantee you that, on of the
Science Committee, we're going to continue to press on this issue
because we believe it’s a very serious matter—as I say, a disaster
that can be averted.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Horn. I thank the gentleman.

If the witnesses will rise and raise their right hands, we will
swear you in. Do we have all the witnesses there? Now those that
accompany you, Administrator, are they goi: speak at
cause F they are, I'd just as soon swear ‘1m fo.

Ms. GaRVEY. They are available to answer questions.

Mr. Horn. Why don't we get them all at once? Come forward to
the table, those that are going to speak.

{Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. Horn. You all have affirmed.

Now will the gentlemen behind you give us their names for the
recording here, so we know who has been sworn in. We only have


‘YEAR-2000 ‘OMB DOT FAA DOT FAA
PHASES AND TASKS TARGET | TARGET | TARGET | COST cost
(Includes
FAA)
Assessment--Determine the 6/97 8/97 1/98 S10M $8M
Scope of Year-2000 Problems
Renovation--Fix Year-2000 | 9/98 9/98 12/98 SOOM $90M
Problems
Validation--Test the Fix 1/99 1/99 7199 Cnctuded
Below)
Implementation—Implement | 3/99 3/99 11/99 $74M.
Year-2000 Compliant _
Systems $183M
FAA’s Status as of January 23, 1998
Mission- ‘Approved | Year-2000
Organization critical | Assessed | by Quality | Compliant
Assurance
Air Traffic Services 234 100* 86 86
Administrative 107 93 NIA 0
‘Acquisition & 43 26 NA 0
Research
Others 15 12 N/A 0
Total - All FAA 404 231 86 86
* Estimated since actual statistics were not available.
FAA’s Status as of February 2, 1998
Mission- Approved | Year-2000
Organization critical | Assessed | by Quality | Compliant
Assurance
Air Traffic 209 209 171 125
Services
Administrative 122 122 N/A Y
Acquisition & 84 80 N/A 0
Research
Others 15 14 N/A 0
Total - All FAA 430 425 171 125



96

they are up to snuff? They may not be right under the supervision
of the FAA, but you are constantly communicating with them.

Ms. GARVEY. In addition, Congressman, to the international ef-
forts that we’ve mentioned a little bit earlier, we are in very close
communication with our colleagues at the airlines, close commu-
nication with ATA, working with them hand-in-hand, and I believe
that that kind of cooperation is going to continue. We are working
with individual airlines, but again, as well as collectively. I believe
there is a meeting scheduled even on Monday to meet with ATA
and talk about ways to make sure that we are communicating and
are coordinating our efforts.

Mr. Davis. Is there any apparatus—it may have been raised be-
fore—that on the date, on January 1 and right around there, that
the flights may be limited and testing back and forth to see how
it works? Do you expect—I don’t know what you expect in terms
of ticket sales at that point for flights back? I'd expect that you
would actually have a lot of people taking trains or driving, maybe

Ms. GARVEY. You may very well be right, Mr. Congressman. I
will tell you that Ray Long, who is our program mi r, is going
to be returning home that day to California after working on this
assignment. T have said that I would like to accompany him. But
I will tell you, I did try to &et a ticket and they did tell me that
they are not yet ready to take reservations for that day. I intend
to be traveling on that day. And actually, I may invite someone
from the press to accompany me.

Mr. Davis. I don’t know if you have any takers or not.

Is it true that some insurance companies are considering declar-
ing exclusions on electronic equipment on aircraft because of con-
cerns over it being 2000 compliant?

Ms. GaRVEY. I’m not aware of that issue. But Mr. Mead or Mr.
Willemssen?

Mr. Davis. If an airline were to lose insurance coverage for elec-
tronic systems, that would have an impact, obviously, on the whole
operations level. But you're not aware of anything at this point?

Ms. GaRVEY. I’m not aware of anything, but we can certainly ask
that question when we meet with the airlines early next week.

Mr. Davis. And you noted, I guess, that in terms of dealing with
the foreign countries, that at least we are having some interaction
with them at this point. What is their status? I guess different
countries are at different levels in terms of where they are moving
toward this. Can you give us any overall assessment?

Ms. Garvey. I think that’s really an accurate assessment. De-
pending on which country we are talking about, I think they are
at various degrees of success with that issue. Mr. Mead, you may
have some other observations. I know Japan is doing very well, we
were visiting there recently.

Mr. MEAD. I think it is fair to say that the next wave of attention
on FAA’s part ought to be on the foreign air traffic control systems.
That’s an area of huge growth in the airline industry. And foreign
air traffic systems vary tly. Some are more modern than ours,
some are more archaic. are all over the map. And I, frankly,
don’t know what the status is of foreign air traffic control systems


89

And I'll be in contact with Ms. Seymore to see if we can work that.
out.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Well, if we could accomplish nothing else than
to get regular reports, updates, with targets, and what we're ac-
complishing month-to-month, I think that would at least push the
ball down the field in the right direction.

With that, I would yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Horn. I thank the gentleman. I might add, before I ask the
co-chairman for her 5 minutes, scheduling congressional hearings
sometimes gets results. I have before me the Executive order of t!
President, dated February 4, 1998, on what will happen in terms
of the year 2000 conversion. So that’s progress. We’ve asked for
this for about a year and it will be inse: in the record without
objection.

{the information referred to follows:]


9

two of you on the list, and that’s Mr. Gray and Mr. Boe. So we as-
sume they were there. Mr. Gray is which? And Mr. Boe?

Ms. GARVEY. Actually, they are not here. The FAA representa-
tives are——

Mr. Horn. OK, let’s just announce the names of who’s sworn in,
so we have it.

Mr. Lona. I’m Raymond Long.

Mr. Horn. OK. Can you get a a “microphone?

Mr. Lona. Surely. I’m Raymond Long with the FAA.

Mr. BELGER. And I’m Monte Belger with the FAA.

ir. HORN. I’m sorry, I couldn’t hear the last part.

Mr BELGER. Monte Belger, B-E-L-G-E-R.

Mr. Horn. Yes, and there was the identification?

Mr. BELGER. With the Federal Aviation Administration.

Mr. Horn. OK. Who else?

Mr. DEGAETANO. Dennis Degaetano, also with the FAA.

Mr. Horn. OK. Anybody else?

Ms. LENG. Rebecca Leng with Office of the Inspector General.

Mr. Horn. OK. Anybody else?

Mr. RHODES. Keith Rhodes, General Accounting Office.

Mr. Horn. OK, those are the ones that will be permitted to tes-
tify, and we will now begin with one of our favorite witnesses, and
that’s Joel Willemssen, the Director of the Accounting and Informa-
tion Management Division, the General Accounting Office. Mr.

illemssen.

STATEMENT OF JOEL WILLEMSSEN, DIRECTOR, ACCOUNTING
AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT DIVISION, GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. Thank you, Mr. Horn, Mr. Chairman, Chair-
woman Morella, Ranking Member Maloney, Ranking Member Gor-
don. Thank you for inviting us to testify today on FAA’s efforts to
address the year 2000 computing crisis. As requested, I'll briefly
summarize our statement.

The challenge before FAA in resolving its year 2000 problem i is
huge, given how critical information systems are to FAA oper-
ations. Unfortunately, FAA’s progress in meeting this challenge
and in making its systems ready for the year 2000 has been too
slow. The agency has been severely behind schedule in completing
basic awareness and assessment steps. Delays in completing
awareness and assessment leave FAA with relatively little time for
essential renovation, validation, and implementation activities—ac-
tivities that we and others consider to be more difficult and time-
consuming than awareness and assessment.

In particular, we believe it’s imperative that FAA devote the nec-
essary time and resources to test its fixes. As a report being re-
leased today points out, FAA’s delays are cause for serious concern
and can no longer continue. Such lelays are further magnified by
FAA's poor history in delivering promised system capabilities on
time.

It’s becoming increasingly clear that FAA’s ability to ensure the
continued operations of the National Airspace System could be
compromised if systems are not changed. For exam] ple, FAA's orga-
nization responsible for air traffic control told us 2 days ago that


95

rating aircraft in the en route, track-on, and tower environments,
and understanding all the systems in relationships and external
parties to providing that mission and making sure it’s done as it
should be. And I think if there is focus on those kind of top prior-
ities, that FAA has a Rood chance of making it in time. Again, with
the caveat, we strongly encourage that there be thorough testing
of all the year 2000 fixes in as operational a setting as possible
with as many different test scenarios as possible.

Mrs. MORELLA. Have you all done any synchronizing with foreign
airliners?

Ms. GARVEY. We have had some very direct communications with
ICAO which is, of course, the international agency that would be
focusing on this and many other issues. I mentioned a little bit ear-
lier, that I will be meeting with my counterparts from Europe in
March, and next fall we'll be meeting also with all of my counter-
parts from the rest of the world in Montreal. And this will be one
of the top issues. But our staffs are working very closely with the
ICAO, the international organization, to really synchronize, as
you’ve suggested, and coordinate all of our efforts.

I think that takes a great deal of effort. And I think we're going
to need our colleagues at State as well to help us. Very often, it
may not have the same priority in some of the other countries, so
we really want to make sure that we keep on those issues.

Mrs. MORELLA. We’d like you to keep us posted, because we even
hear that there are some international airliners that said they
would not go into the United States if they felt there would be
some kind of a problem. They evidently feel that they are in pretty
good shape in terms of compliance. So it would be good to get your
report.

(r. Chairman, I yield back for other speakers.

Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.

And I now will yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia,
Mr. Davis.

Mr. Davis. I missed the testimony, so I get to ask a few ques-
tions.

Let me just say that I was at a Y2K conference today, and the
whole emphasis and the concern has been on the FAA, quite frank-
ly. T the first plane out, we’ve had previous hearings.
Everybody's a little bit nervous because in some of these other
agencies, if they miss the deadline, if they mess it up, you are de-
layed in getting a check or getting processed. FAA is life and death.
And so for that reason, the pressure is really on. And if you look
at the report cards the chairman has given you before, and I don’t
know what you can do to make us more comfortable except to keep
coming back and give it the kind of scrutiny and high-level super-
vision that it deserves, but it is a very unforgiving time period, at
this point. And as we've talked before, we have to have this tested
and I think have some independent audit of this, as we look for-
ward and make sure it’s working. And it’s not just the FAA, it’s ev-
erybody you interact with, which makes it even more complicated
in terms of the testing back and forth.

What are we doing with some of the systems that you are talking
to through computers that we're interacting with to ensure that



100

does look to be reaching out to the private sector and other govern-
mental entities, as well as also foreign. It says, “Communicate with
foreign counterparts to raise awareness and generate cooperative
international arrangements." And the council on the year 2000 con-
version, called the Council, lead by a chair, who obviously will be
John Koskinen, and then a vice-chair, which I think will probably
be Sally Katzen, overseeing all the various activities.

I know that you will have a critical role in this council and it will
be very interesting to also get your response as 5 you look at the Ex-
ecutive order to see if it needs to be strengthened in any way.

Tm just very pleased that finally the President has come out
with what we been calling for for a very, very long time—the
Executive order.

I just wonder if there is anything we haven’t asked you that you
would like to tell us. We’ve commented on the fact it it’s been
very late in starting; a track record that is not good, even after the
start; problems, particularly with the Host computer at the 20 en
route areas; the concept of intra-operability. Is there something
that we haven’t mentioned or asked you that you feel would be ap-
propriate that you would like to share with us? Are there problems
that we haven’t mentioned, except for contingency plans? I direct
this to anybody on the panel who would like to make any other
comments,

Mr. Meap. I have just one item.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Mead.

Mr. MeEap. I’m an admirer of goals and objectives that you can
almost touch. And for that reason, I would just reiterate what’s in
our prepared statement about the timeline for getting ready for the
year 2000. I do believe November 1999 is cutting it way too close.

Mrs. MORELLA. When ‘yon think about the fact that there are less
than 23 months left, and if in fact you need 12 months to validate,
then that only leaves, it leaves like 10¥2 months really left in order
to do the renovation. That is assuming that you've already done all
of the assessments that are necessary, too. So it’s an unrelenting

leadiline.

As somebody had once said when we talked about what’s happen-
ing in other countries—one of the hearings that we had was on the
global implications—and someone said they had submitted a sur-
vey to all of the countries in the General Assembly about what they
were doing about the millennium bug. And somebody answ 5
“we can spray any thing, any time.” Indeed, it is far more serious
than that. And I appreciate your being here the reparations
you've done, the meet you’ve had with us. And I look forward
to hearing from you as you continue to progress. And I appreciate
the Inspector General, GAO, having the private sector here, and
Ms. Garvey, I particularly appreciate your commitment and perse-
verance. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Horn. Well, we thank you. And I’m delighted to finally find
out what the United Nations did do. We, I think in the summer
of 1996, wrote the Secretary General and thought that he right
want to bring this up among the various nations. And we had a
great response from Mr. Gorbachev, but he wasn’t in power in Rus-
sia, but he at least got them to circularize the Russian cabinet. And


116

B279744

its systems not be replaced, renovated, or working correctly in time for the year
2000.

On April 24, 1998, we obtained agency comments on a draft of this letter from
officials at FAA and the Department of Transportation (DOT), including the
director of FAA's Year 2000 program office, FAA's en route integrated product
team lead, and DOT's information technology division manager. ‘These officials
generally agreed with the facts presented. FAA officials also commented on
particular language in the draft letter, and these comments have been
incorporated into the letter as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this letter to the Ranking Minority Member of your
‘Subcommittee and the Chairwoman and Ranking Minority Member of the
‘Subcommittee on Technology, House Committee on Science; the Secretary of
‘Transportation; the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration; the
Department of Transportation Inspector General; the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget; and other interested parties. Copies will also be made
available to others upon request.

If you have any questions on the material in this letter, please contact me at
(202) 512-6253 or Colleen Phillips, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-6326. We can
also be reached by e-mail at willemssenj.aimd@gao.gou and
phillipsc.aimd@gao.gov, respectively.

Sincerely yours,

bLbboma—

{Joel C. Willemsen
Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems

(611449)

6 GAO/AIMD-98-138R FAA's Host Computer System


63

cooling pump system that turns on automatically to prevent the system from overheating.
The computer code that initiates the cooling system is date-dependent and therefore
affected by Y2K. If the code is not Y2K compliant, the cooling system will not tum on at
the correct day and time, and the ARSR could overheat and shut down. If this were to
happen, air traffic controllers would have to monitor and separate aircraft the old-
fashioned way, by altitude and time. This would slow down the system while air traffic
is either re-routed or deliberately delayed to maintain safety. Obviously, our goal is to

censure that these problems, and the delays that could result, do not happen.

In order to meet that goal, last June, FAA’s Office of Air Traffic Services (ATS)--the line
of business in the FAA responsible for the operation and maintenance of the NAS
established a centralized, specialized “war room,” staffed with technical experts from
across the country who have been brought together to tackle the Y2K problem for our air
traffic systems. This effort has been led by a senior manager who has been assigned to
this challenge full time. ATS also published its Y2K project plan that details the specific
steps required to implement GAO’s five-phase strategy for addressing the Y2K problem.
In addition, ATS published its Y2K repair process and standards guidelines, detailing the
specific repairs that are to take place. Everyone working on the Y2K issue for ATS
systems has been held strictly accountable for following the specific steps and timelines
laid out in these published guidelines to ensure consistency and coordination of all

repairs. In addition to a clear plan for assessing and repairing systems, ATS has a


69

Furthermore, testing is projected to take 50 to 70 percent of a
projects schedule. A strong testing discipline is required. One year
2000 project planning methodology suggests an approach that may
be helpful to the FAA. In order to maximize overlap of the year
2000 renovation, we recommend that baseline testing begin prior
to the renovation of Prosrams. Given the current situation at the
FAA, I recommend it base testing phases begin no later than
June, but preferably sooner.

Integral to executing each of FAA’s applications are extensive in-
formation processing and communication technologies. These sys-
tems depend on 80 interrelated computers just for the en route sys-
tem to safely guide and direct aircraft.

What makes the FAA problem particularly serious is that the
FAA is running computers that are almost 20 years old. What
makes the situation even more difficult is the special instructions
that have been added to the FAA computers. The agency also has
it’s own proprietary computer operating systems software that is
used nowhere else in the world.

In order to reduce the risk of the integrity of the FAA flight con-
trol system, I recommend the establishment of a pilot project on a
cluster of year 2000 time machines. The first step would be to rep-
licate the FAA’s current operating system on a computer such as
the IBM R390, and to pilot test selected FAA systems operation on
this year 2000-ready computer environment. We previously used
such a system to replace similar computers that are central to the
FAA’s en route system.

The recommendations I propose are not a quick fix. Furthermore,
there is no way to completely test applications as complex as air
traffic control. The number of logical paths cannot be bounded.
Therefore, no solution will come with 100 percent guarantee. How-
ever, what I propose could be helpful in your search for an inexpen-
sive and practical short-term solution. It would help the FAA main-
ae vas for the opi ify. I hope I have been hel

you for opportunity to testify. I hope we been help-
ful to the FAA and your subcommittee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:]


14

FAA also has numerous, complex information processing exchanges with various
external organizations, including airlines, aircraft manufacturers, general aviation pilots,
and other government agencies, such as the National Weather Service (NWS) and the
Department of Defense. Over the years, these organizations and FAA have built vast
networks of interrelated systems. For example, airlines’ flight planning systems are
linked to FAA's Enhanced Traffic Management System, which monitors flight plans
nationwide, controls high-traffic situations, and alerts airlines and airports to bring in
more staff during busy periods. As another example, FAA facilities rely on weather
information from NWS ground sensors, radars, and satellites to control and route

aircraft.

It is easy to see, then, that should FAA systems not be Year 2000 compliant, the domino
effect would be far-reaching. In fact, representatives of major airlines are concerned that
even if their own systems are ready for the millennium, they could not fly until FAA's

systems were Year 2000 compliant.

To assist agencies in resolving the Year 2000 problem, we have prepared a guide that

discusses the scope of the challenge and offers a structured, step-by-step approach for


97

and what they are doing to comply with the Y2K. It is something
that deserves attention.

Mr. Davis. I mean, sooner or later somebody has to put that list
together and come back—probably sooner rather than later—and
do some kind of assessment of who we're dealing with. Because
that is what I would guess one of the more likely problems is when
you are crossing over international boundaries with different sys-
tems where some kind of accident electronically could occur.

Ms. Garvey. Mr. Davis, we will provide for the record the infor-
mation we have to date and let you know of some upcoming con-
versations and meetings as well.

Mr. Davis. OK. I think the rest I'll probably glean from your tes-
timony. But I appreciate your being here today. I just would add
that the concerns that I hear on this when they talk about Federal
agencies, politically you always worry about Social Security—and
they started this long before anybody else, and there are political
ramifications to that. But in your case it is life-or-death ramifica-
tions. I know you are aware of that, but we’re going to continue to
ask to hear from you and look up dates as we move forward, be-
cause it—but I thank you for being here today.

Mr. Horn. I thank the gentleman for that very crucial question.
Mr. Gordon had raised it. Unfortunately he had another commit-
ment and couldn’t come back. Just how are you going to assess
what your interconnections are from international airlines? Be-
cause, if they still have bugs in their systems, you’re going to have
bugs in the system is the way I understand it. And what are you
doing to make that assessment?

Ms. GaRVEY. Well, let me say, the first step which is what ICAO
is doing now which is collecting the information of what is happen-
ing in the other countries ——

Mr. Horn. When you use that phrase, you’re talking about the
International Civil Aviation Organization.

Ms. Garvey. That’s right. ’'m sorry, Mr. Chairman, yes. So the
first step is that issue. And the issue of validation is not one I
know the answer to. And I will work with our staff and find out
how we're going to handle that. I think Mr. Mead is right. It’s
going. to be our next real Pressure point. And I expect that at the

larch meeting with our European counterparts it will be a good
part of our agenda and a part of our discussion.

Mr. Horn. Earlier in this decade, one of your predecessors plus
a lot of career civil servants and others ran up a bill of $4 billion
developing a new computer system. And my first year in Congress,
1993-1994, Mr. Oberstar, the very able chairman of the Aviation
Subcommittee, took Mr. Mica and myself out to look at that oper-
ation. And you walked in the room and you knew right away some-
thing was wrong because everybody there had a new bright idea,
they adopted it and there was just no management or anything.
And that’s why they ran up $4 billion.

And at the time I said, “Have you ever talked to Lufthansa.” And
everybody looked at me sort of blank. And it happens to be that
last year I had a chance to go up in the Lufthansa tower in Berlin.
And I asked the president of Lufthansa who knew what had hap-
pened there and I told him the story. I said, “Has anybody from
the FAA ever been in here looking at this?” He said, “No. Nobody’s


19

and certifying the new system for use in real-time operations may also become
apparent.

= Second, the Interim Host will have to be deployed concurrently with FAA's new
Display System Replacement (DSR), compounding the risk of delays and problems.
When upgrading parts of a safety-critical system such as the Host and DSR, it is
simpler and safer to upgrade one part at a time.

= Third, deploying the Interim Host to 20 en route centers in less than 2 years will be
very difficult. As a point of reference, FAA's Display Channel Complex Rehost took
almost 2 years to deploy to just five centers.

© Fourth, by moving quickly to purchase the Interim Host, FAA may not be purchasing
a system that best meets its long-term needs. For example, alternative mainframe
systems may provide more communications channels--something the Host currently

depends on peripheral systems to provide.

External Organizations Also Concemed About
EAA Year 2000 Compliance

Extemal organizations are also concerned about the impact of FAA's Year 2000 status on
their operations. FAA recently met with representatives of airlines, aircraft
manufacturers, airports, fuel suppliers, telecommunications providers, and industry
associations to discuss the Year 2000 issue. At this meeting participants raised the

concer that their own Year 2000 compliance would be irrelevant if FAA were not


Office of Inspector General

Audit Report

Assessing the Year 2000 Computer Problem

Department of Transportation

Report Number: FE-1998-053
Date Issued: December 18, 1997

or TRANS,

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ont CEPAR

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States OF



93

Mr. Horn. And now, for the co-chairman and the chairwoman of
the Subcommittee on Technology, 5 minutes to Mrs. Morella.

Mrs. MoRELLA. OK, thank you.

I wanted to thank you for the testimony and thank you for the
charts we saw, which show that when you want to do it you can.
lam sure there have been people meeting and working around the
clock for this kind of achievement. May it continue that we see
those results.

I was in Farmington, MN, with Mr. Gutknecht a while ago and
we actually saw the Host computer at the en route center there.
And I’m curious about how soon does the Host need to be replaced?
I guess, Ms. Garvey, you’d the best one to answer that.

Ms. Garvey. Chairwoman, it is a question that we are obviously
looking at very carefully. We are taking a parallel approach at this
time. We are really taking a two-tracked approach, if you will. We
are looking at an aggressive replacement of the Host. We’ve always
known we needed to replace the Host, and the question has been
when. We are also making the system Y2K compliant. So we're
really taking an aggressive approach to both—a belt and suspend-
ers approach.

Mrs. MORELLA. I’m aware of it. Yes, Mr. Mead, I'd love to have
you answer that.

Mr. MEAD. They need to get started very soon on the replace-
ment of the Host. Here’s why. Inside each en route center, of which
there are 20, there are 2 Host computers. In each Host computer
there are two devices—or two components—called TCMs, which I
think are thermal conducting devices—anyway, it’s a component,
it’s rare. There are about 96 of these in the United States that
need to be working. There are seven spares left. In the last 3 years,
FAA has had to replace nine of them. Now, it may be that in addi-
tion to the seven, there are a few out there that can be cannibal-
ized from Host computers that aren’t in the en route centers—they
are, say, at the tech center. But that’s not very many spares. They
don’t make these anymore.

And I think that’s one factor that independent of the year 2000
problem that is a driving rationale behind accelerated replacement
of the Host computer. But, I also would caution, I think it is very
unlikely that you would have a replacement for the Host computer
installed in all 20 en route centers by January 1, 2000.

Mrs. MORELLA. Right. So, in other words, you honestly believe it
cannot be replaced by January 1, in the year 2000. And I know
that you are using the double-pronged approach, with new equip-
ment and then renovation. And I know that you've got that patch.
If the patch fails, what do you do?

Mr. MeaD. Well, maybe some others want to contribute to that.
There is a backup even to that called the DARC system. The DARC
system is workable, but when it’s working, the controllers have to
slow down traffic fairly dramatically. And it’s also a system that
does not identify flights by name, at least that’s my recollection. It
will show that there’s a plane there, but it won’t show what par-
ticular flight.

Mrs. MORELLA. So you might have to curtail an awful lot of traf-
fic.


31

(2) expeditiously appoint a person with strong technical leadership and authority to
manage the Year-2000 program, (3) make a prompt decision on the Host computer
fixes, (4) develop a suitable contingency plan for the Host computer in case the
planned efforts fail, (5) have an independent review of plans to fix and certify the
existing Host computer, (6) develop a master schedule for fixing and testing all
mission-critical systems, (7) promptly identify and secure resources needed to get
the job done, and (8) report monthly to the Secretary and Congress on the progress
made toward fixing Year-2000 problems.

We are-working closely with the FAA Administrator and her senior staff. We will
continue to monitor this issue, and advise the FAA Administrator, the Secretary,
and the Congress of problems and recommended solutions.

Background

OMB established a five-phase approach for addressing Year-2000 computer
problems. According to the OMB schedule, agencies should have finished the
second phase, which is to analyze existing systems for the scope of Year-2000
problems, by June 1997. In the next phase, agencies will fix Year-2000 problems
by repairing existing software code or acquiring replacement systems. The OMB
target for completion of this phase is September 1998. Then, the fix has to be
tested to ensure it works as intended, including interfaces with other systems.
Testing should be completed by January 1999. After successful testing, agencies
will implement Year-2000 compliant systems to support their operations. OMB’s
target date for full implementation is March 1999.

As of February 2, 1998, FAA has identified 430 mission-critical systems, of which
209 currently support the Air Traffic Control System. The remaining mission-
critical systems primarily involve administrative services (122 systems) such as
payroll, or systems that are in the acquisition and research process (84 systems)
such as STARS. The 209 mission-critical systems are used by 17,000 air traffic
controllers to direct and control over 40 million flights annually. The Air Traffic
Control System contains thousands of inter-dependent radars, computers, special


15

reviewing and assessing an agency's readiness to handle this challenge. The guide
describes in detail five phases, each of which represents a major Year 2000 program
activity or segment. The first phase, awareness, entails gaining executive-level support
and sponsorship and ensuring that everyone in the organization is fully aware of the
issue. During this phase a Year 2000 program team is also established, and an overall
strategy developed. The second phase, assessment, entails assessing the likely Year 2000
impact on the enterprise, identifying core business areas, inventorying and analyzing the
systems supporting those areas, and prioritizing their conversion or replacement.
Contingency planning is also initiated, and the necessary resources identified and

secured.

FAA recognizes that the upcoming change of century poses significant challenges. It
began Year 2000 problem awareness activities in May 1996, and within 3 months had
established a Year 2000 product team and designated it the focal point for Year 2000
within FAA. A Year 2000 steering committee was also established. Since then, the
product team and steering committee have conducted various awareness activities and
have briefed FAA management. In September 1996 the product team issued the EAA

Gui D 000 Date C .

Yet FAA was late in designating a Year 2000 program manager and its initial program

manager recently retired. FAA has not yet selected a permanent replacement and needs

4GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, September 1997.
5


59

jnanaging the air traffic control program. His experience, his
knowledge of the problem are simply unparalleled, and it will allow
the entire FAA to benefit from his leadership immediately.

We've also expanded the technical support provided by Coopers
and Lybrand. They are our business partner in this effort and
we're getting excellent technical advice from Coopers in this arena.
And we want Coopers and Lybrand to be able to provide that same
kind of support to the FAA as a whole so that all of us will benefit
from the stringent, the disciplined approach developed for our air
traffic systems.

In pulling together this new office, Ray will draw on the many
technical talents of all elements of the FAA to ensure that we have
a complete, a coordinated, a corporate approach to Y2K. And he
will be also working directly with his counterparts in industry to
make sure that industry and airports are fully informed and con-
fident in the FAA’s progress.

Mr. Horn. I’m going to have to suspend for a minute. We have
a vote on the floor and the clock is ticking. So all Members, we’re
in recess for approximately 12 to 15 minutes. We will return re-
laxed. And after you finish your statement, Mr. Graham will be
next, and then there will be questions of the whole panel. Thank
you very much.

We're in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. Horn [presiding]. The session is resumed. There might be
another vote coming up shortly, so bear with us as we go through

ese.

We now will have the finishing of the Administrator's state-
ment, and then we'll move to Mr. Graham. Please proceed Ms. Gar-

vey.

Nis. Garvey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I'll be
very brief and Just, again, to reiterate what I said previously, our
new director of the program is Ray Long. and he’s Begun his new
assignment. He reports directly to me. We just had an opportunity
by satellite to make that announcement to all of the managers and

of the employees of the FAA, and I’m delighted that he’s part
of the team.

Next, we really must ensure that we've got sufficient funding in
the rest of this fiscal year and in fiscal year 1999. To augment the
$18 million Congress has appropriated for Y2K efforts this year, we
have absorbed approximately $33.2 million of Y2K costs within the
agency. Additionally, the administration is in the process of for-
mally requesting a reprogramming of funds to assist us in these ef-
forts. We hope to finalize this request and forward it to our author-
izing and appropriating committees shortly.

(r. Chairman, I have heard your wise counsel to me and to the
FAA to stay on top of this issue and to ensure that the safety and
the efficiency of air transportation is not compromised after mid-
night on December 31, 1999. I want very much for the FAA to suc-
ceed. I know you want us to succeed, and I appreciate your gener-
ous offer of help and support.

As I said at the beginning of my testimony, the question on ev-
eryone’s mind is, can we make it? And my answer is, yes. It will
take perseverance; it will take persistence; it will take vigilance


112

B279784

not independently verify the performance data provided by FAA. We conducted
‘our work from February 1998 through April 1998 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

OVERVIEW OF FAA's
HOST COMPUTER SYSTEM

Air traffic controllers in FAA's 20 en route centers control aircraft over the
continental United States in transit and during approaches to some airports.
HCS is the key information processing system in FAA's en route environment.
It processes radar surveillance data, processes flight plans, links filed flight
plans with actual aircraft flight tracks, provides alerts of projected aircraft
separation violations (.e., conflicts), and processes weather data.

HCS consists of hardware, a unique operating system, and application software.
HCS hardware components are divided into three major categories of
equipment: (1) the processor subsystem, which consists of a main processor
(IBM 3083), a processor controller (IBM 3082) that checks the temperature and
status of the main processor, a coolant distribution unit, and a power
distribution unit, (2) the direct access storage subsystem, which consists of disk
control units and disk drives, and (3) the peripheral subsystem, which includes
modems and printers.

FAA uses two processor subsystems in each of its en route centers to mitigate
the impact of system failures, If the primary HCS processor fails, processing is
automatically switched to the support processor. When both HCS systems are
unavailable, FAA's Direct. Access Radar Channel (DARC) system provides
backup radar data processing functionality; however, it does so with a
degradation in flight data processing capabilities. Specifically, DARC provides
basic data pertinent to an aircraft's identification, position, altitude, and speed,
but it does not provide automated flight plan processing, controller hand-off, or
a safety alert processing capability, which alerts controllers to impending
conflicts between aircraft.

From 1986 to 1988, IBM installed HCS hardware in FAA's 20 en route centers as
well as its training and technical support centers. At that time, IBM projected
that this equipment would have a service life of 10 years. Since HCS was
installed, FAA contracted with Lockheed Martin for HCS hardware maintenance.
Lockheed Martin, in turn, subcontracted the work to an IBM subsidiary.

2 GAO/AIMD-98-138R FAA's Host Computer System


114

B279744

first. TCM technology was discontinued by IBM in the late 1980s and the
manufacturing and refurbishing facilities were dismantled. IBM holds all
patents on TCM technology and no other manufacturers or vendors are licensed
to make or repair them.

In June 1997, Lockheed Martin conducted a worldwide search to identify
alternative sources of these parts and reported it could not locate a shelf
inventory of TCMs and found no way to guarantee the availability of parts for
the HCS main processors (IBM 3083).

Given the six spare CLYM parts it had in inventory on March 4, 1998, and worst-
case usage projections,’ FAA estimated that the inventory of this part will be
depleted early in 1999. Using best-case usage projections, the inventory will be
depleted in late 1999.

‘To prolong the life of the current inventory of spare parts, in December 1997,
FAA implemented a more conservative replacement policy for TCM parts.
Under this new policy, TCM parts are not automatically replaced after
experiencing two minor problems, as they were under the prior policy. Instead,
‘each minor problem is reported and analyzed, and each part is evaluated to
determine its ability to continue operations. Additionally, once the current,
inventory of spares is depleted, FAA plans to cannibalize parts from HCS
processors located at its training and technical support centers. FAA estimated
that it would be able to obtain 26 CLVMs through this cannibalization effort.
However, even with cannibalization, FAA states that HCS cannot be maintained
beyond 2001.

A second key issue that could affect HCS’ availability is the Year 2000 computer
problem. While FAA officials expressed confidence that they have resolved
date dependencies in HCS' operating system and application software, IBM

Basically, CLVM is the module that provides memory storage for the other TCM
modules,

“Worst-case usage projections assume that actual part usage rates over the past
8 years will increase by 50 percent each year in the future.

“In the past, parts were replaced after experiencing 1 serious or 2 minor
problems. Best-case usage projections assume that in the future, parts will not
be replaced to correct minor problems, and that the replacement rate for
serious problems over the past 3 years will increase by 50 percent each year.

4 GAO/AIMD-98-138R FAA's Host Computer System


2

importan ce of this issue, and we eagerly welcome Mr. Koskinen to
effort.

When he arrives on the job, he will find some good news and
some bad news. The news, to use that trite expression, is that
progress is being made. Some agencies, such as the Social Security
Administration, will probably be ready in time. After all, Social Se-
curity began its conversion in 1989. The bad news is that other

mcies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration, will prob-
ably not be year 2000 compliant before the immovable deadline
now less than 23 months, just 695 days away.

We are here today to encourage the FAA to work harder. We
must insist that the FAA meet its publicly announced schedules.
We will help in any way we can to improve the productivity of the
FAA in fixing and testing its year 2000 problems. Only executive
leadership in the Government, in ‘Transportation, and in the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration can provide the necessary organiza-
tion, management, and leadership to solve the problem before us.

The General Accounting Office has pointed out in its report that
the FAA has not met administration’s schedule for several
milestones. Each agency was expected to complete a full assess-
ment of its computer systems by July 1997. The FAA reportedly
finished this assessment just 3 days ago. This degree of schedule
slippage is of grave concern. I want to learn why it has occurred
in the past to be convinced that it will not occur in the future. I’m
skeptical about tigers that change their stripes. How can I believe
today's FAA schedules when previous FAA schedules have been so

far off?

The numbers here are very large. As of February 2, according to
the FAA’s own account, there are 430 mission-critical systems, and
305 of them are in need of repair. So far, only 22 systems, or 7 per-
cent of the total, have been fixed, tested, and implemented—leav-
ing the other 93 percent still undone.

Is the FAA si lule for fixing these systems realistic? Are the
skilled people available? How much will this cost? I know these are
difficult questions to answer because the FAA only finished its as-
sessment 3 days ago, but they must be answered.

Systems testing is always a problem because you can never be
sure that you’ve found all the bugs—only 99 percent of them. The
FAA has an especially difficult testing problem. How do you thor-
oughly test a nationwide system as large and as complex as the air
traffic control system while it is still ranning every day with thou-
sands of flights coming and going?

I know the FAA considers safety the No. 1 issue. In fact, I think
safety is the No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 issue at FAA. I believe that
the pilots, airlines, air traffic controllers, and the FAA will keep
flights grounded unless they are absolutely sure it is safe. I’m told
that the mantra in the airline industry is, quote, “when in doubt,
ground it.” And as a uent flyer, every other week, from Los An-
geles to Washington and then back to Los Angeles, I strongly agree
with that policy, even if it means that I sit on the ground occasion-
ally. That never bothers me.

lowever, I want to know what capacity the FAA can sustain
without its sophisticated computer systems. If the FAA has to run
portions of the air traffic manually; if the FAA does not finish fix-


91

13) cooperace wich the privace sector operators of criticai national and local
systems. including the banking and financial system, the telecommunications
system, the public health system, the transportation system, and the electric
power generation system, in addressing the ¥2K problem; and

(4) communicate with their foreign counterparts to raise awareness of and
generate cooperative international arrangements to address the Y2K problem.

(b) As used in this order, "agency" and "agencies" refer to Federal agencies
that are not in the judicial or legislative branches.

Sec. 2. Year 2000 Conversion Council. There is hereby established the
President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion (the "Council*) .

more

(a) The Council shall be led by a Chair who shall be an Assistant to the
President, and it shall be composed of one representative from each of the
executive departments and from such other Federal agencies as may be determined
by the Chair of the Council (the “Chair*).

(b) The Chair shall appoint a Vice Chair and assign other responsibilities
for operations of the council as he or she deems necessary.

(c) The Chair shall oversee the activities of agencies to assure that their
syatems operate smoothly through the year 2000, act as chief spokesperson on
this issue for the executive branch in national and international fora, provide
policy coordination of executive branch activities with State, local, and
tribal governments on the Y2X problem, and promote appropriate Federal roles
with reapect to private sector activities in this area.

(a) The Chair and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall
report jointly at least quarterly to me on the progress of agencies in
addressing the ¥2K problem.

(el The Chair shall identify such resources from agencies as the Chair deems
necessary for the implementation of the policies set out in this order,
consistent with applicable law.

Sec. 3. Responsibiliti

of Agency Heads. (a) The head of each agency shal:

(2) assure that efforts to address the Y2X problem receive the highest
priority attention in the agency and that the policies established in this
order are carried out; and

(2) cooperate to the fullest extent with the Chair by making available such
information, support, and assistance, including personnel, as the Chair may
request to support the accomplishment of the tasks assigned herein, consiatent
with applicable law.

(b) The heads of executive departments and the agencies designated by the
Chair under section 2(a) of this order shall identify a responsible official to
represent the head of the executive department or agency on the Council with
sufficient authority and experience to commit agency resources to address the
Y2K problem.


36

The number of assessments approved by the QAR team increased by 85, from 86
to 171. FAA must still rm 38 mission-critical air traffic systems through its
quality assurance process. Since FAA completed and approved a significant
portion of its assessments and quality assurance reviews in the last week, we have
not substantiated the accuracy of its reported numbers. Our confidence in the
results willbe much greater when all quality assurance reviews are completed and
we have had the opportunity to validate these numbers. According to FAA
management, all QARs should be completed by mid-February 1998. We are
encouraged by the sense of urgency FAA is now applying to this process.

As of February 2, FAA data shows that 125 of the 171 systems subjected to
quality assurance reviews were Year-2000 compliant. Our review of these
systems showed they were easy ones that had no date processing function, or
could be fixed quickly. Much of the hard work for FAA is still ahead.

Projects under Development had not been determined to be Year-2000 liant

An additional concern is that FAA has not yet concluded that any of its Air Traffic
Control Systems currently in the acquisition and research phase are Year-2000
compliant. There are 23 major projects under development, each costing more
than $100 million. These projects are listed in exhibit B. We plan to do more
work in this area during our ongoing audit.

On January 30, we reviewed contracts for WAAS and STARS, two major
development projects. Although these systems have not been determined by FAA
to be Year-2000 compliant, we were advised that the contractors have warranted
that these systems will comply. We are in the process of making sure this is the


98

ever been in here.” Now, they bought their system from Raytheon,
an American firm. It’s in Boston. It works well. And I must say,
I don’t understand why we can’t learn from other people that are
doing very highly technical things and solving the problem. Be-
cause, as I say, your predecessors ran up the tab for $4 billion.

IRS did the same. We're holding a hearing on that in a week or

80.

And it just seems to me you've got a real problem in that agency
in terms of getting. the support staff to the Administrator to face
up to a lot of questions, especially the ones I’ve gone over with the
Inspector General who I think is a very helpful man to know per-
soni .

And I am worried about those international connections. Luft-
hansa is probably ahead of us with new equipment and everything
else. On the other hand, we need to check Latin America, Asia, Af-
rica, you name it, in order to make sure all the hard work you are
doing is not for naught.

Now, I feel compelled to ask you one question. You've been on
the job 6 months. As you look back, do you feel your staff let you
down on this issue? And when did they first bring it to your atten-
tion’

Ms. GARVEY. Well, let me say, yes, I have been on the job 6
months, and it’s been a very exciting 6 months, I might add. I
guess the only point that’s been made at the table, and this is said
with great respect because I have a lot of respect for GAO, but I
really believe that the flurry activity has been much longer than
a couple of weeks.

I mentioned a little bit earlier that we spent New Year’s Eve, the
Deputy Secretary and I, at the control center. And there was a lot
of activity at that point.

I think people have been working very hard since I’ve been there
on this issue. I think we did get a very late start, but I have great
confidence in Mr. Long. I’ve got great confidence in the air traffic
control people who are working on this issue, and t_ confidence
in the people we've assigned to other elements. We will get this
done. I am determined to do that. I wish I could promise you 100
percent success. I think that would be foolhardy, today, but I can
tell you that it will receive my highest priority, and I believe it will
receive the staffs highest priority as well. I want to give them the
leadership that they need to get it done.

Mr. Horn. When was your attention first focused on this prob-
lem? Did your staff give you any sort of briefing when you came
on board and was this one of the issues?

Ms. GaRVEY. We did discuss it a little bit in preparation, frankly,
for my confirmatio: ing. So there was some, certainly, atten-
tion at that point. The IG and I received a briefing in a little bit
more detail in the fall, and that certainly was a key point for us.
And there is no doubt that a hearing of this sort is very helpful
in helping us focus some efforts as well. The GAO report was very
active in the fall months, in just about November, and so getting
the results at that time was important as well. So I would say the
fall, particularly October and November as we were getting some
of the reports from both the IG and the GAO, was a time of real
focused activity.


39

that both the replacement and repair efforts will demand the attention of the
same FAA employees who are responsible for rolling out other new equipment.
FAA must try to fix the Host and promptly make a decision on its replacement.
Regardless of the decision, FAA must work toward repair of the existing Host
because FAA’s track record for replacing systems is poor, and rehosting in less
than 2 years at all centers is extremely optimistic.

It should be recognized that even if FAA decides to adopt a parallel approach
to the Host problem--i.e., fix and replace concurrently, there are risks. In order
to mitigate the risk, FAA needs to have a contingency plan. FAA’s current
contingency plan for the Host computer is another system--the Direct Access
Radar Channel system (DARC). If the Host computer cannot function, DARC,
assuming it is Year-2000 compliant, will enable the Air Traffic Control System
to continue displaying aircraft location on the controller’s screen. However,
controllers will not be able to tag the aircraft with flight identification and will
have to space aircraft further apart. This would slow air traffic. This is not the
best solution, but it needs to be available in the event that the existing Host
cannot be made Year-2000 compliant, and rehosting cannot be accomplished in
sufficient time to be fully operational prior to January 1, 2000. FAA needs to
ensure that DARC is Year-2000 compliant and that the operational procedures

for its use are current.

FAA has not established central leadership for Year-2000 work.

The Host computer issue illustrates an underlying problem with FAA’s Year-
2000 program: a lack of strong leadership. While OMB guidance required
agencies to establish Year-2000 program offices by December 1996, FAA did
not take action until June 1997. Then, FAA established two program
offices--an Air Traffic Services program office (responsible for the Air Traffic

ll