* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 96-30454

(Summary Calendar)

_________________

VINCENT LAPRIME,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CHARLES C FOTI, JR; BORDELON, Warden; 

RUDY BELISLE, Assistant Warden; J LECOUR,

Chief Warden; DEPUTY SCARBROUGH; DAVID

WALTERS, JR, Deputy; THELMA DAVIS; 

DONNA RAULS; L PEARCE; DR LOFONTANT,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Louisiana

(95-CV-3709-A)

September 26, 1996

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Vincent Laprime, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil

rights action. We affirm.
2 The magistrate judge used November 5, 1995, as the date Laprime filed

his complaint because that was the date on which Laprime signed the complaint,

and thus presumably delivered it to prison officials. See Cooper v. Brookshire,

70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1995), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied,

77 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that complaint is filed as of date prison

authorities receive complaint from plaintiff for forwarding to clerk of court).

Laprime does not challenge this date.

-2-

I

On November 5, 1995, Laprime filed the instant action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 alleging that Foti, Sheriff of

Orleans Parish, and other employees of the sheriff’s department

violated his civil rights when they failed to transport him to

physician-ordered medical appointments, ignored his requests for

medical treatment, provided him with inadequate medical

treatment, confined him to cell areas in which he was susceptible

to injury by other inmates, and exacerbated existing injuries to

his hands and wrists through the use of excessive force. 

Laprime’s complaint alleges that the injuries of which he

complains occurred between August 4, 1993, and September 21,

1994. Laprime also contends that these actions necessitated

surgery on one of his wrists on November 14, 1994. 

The district court referred to a magistrate judge

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The

magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation advising

dismissal of Laprime’s complaint with prejudice for failure to

comply with the applicable statute of limitations. The district

court adopted the report and recommendation over Laprime’s

objections. 
-3-

II

Laprime argues that the district court erroneously dismissed

his claim for failure to satisfy the applicable statute of

limitations. He contends that his cause of action did not accrue

until at least the date of his surgery because on that date he

became aware of “critical facts” regarding “how the surgery would

be performed.” Laprime also asserts that he learned that he

would be permanently disabled as a result of the surgery only

after it was performed. We review de novo a district court’s

grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6). Bulger v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48,

49 (5th Cir. 1995).

There is no federal statute of limitations for actions

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jackson v. Johnson, 950

F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1992). Rather, “[i]t is well established

that federal courts borrow the forum state’s general personal

injury limitations period.” Id. In Louisiana, the applicable

period is one year. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (West 1994);

Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988); see also

Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793, 794-95 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Since

article 3492 is Louisiana’s only statute of limitations for

personal injury actions, we find no error in the district court’s

application of that article’s one-year prescriptive period to

Elzy’s § 1983 action.”).
-4-

Although we look to Louisiana law to determine the

applicable limitations period, federal law governs when a cause

of action under § 1983 accrues. Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d

254, 257 (5th Cir. 1993). Under federal law, a cause of action

arises when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the

injury that is the basis of the action. Id. “The statute of

limitations therefore begins to run when the plaintiff is in

possession of the ‘critical facts that he has been hurt and who

has inflicted the injury . . . .’” Id. (quoting Lavellee v.

Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1980)).

Here, Laprime’s complaint alleges that Defendants injured

him on various dates between August 4, 1993, and September 21,

1994. He alleges no civil rights violations subsequent to

September 21, 1994. Moreover, Laprime alleges that on September

21, 1994, his physicians informed him of the need for surgery. 

As a result, Laprime’s cause of action accrued at the latest on

September 21, 1994.

Laprime’s contention that his cause of action accrued on the

day of his November 14, 1994, surgery has no merit. Facts

regarding “how the surgery would be performed” and Laprime’s

subsequent realization that he would be permanently disabled as a

result of the surgery pertain to the consequences of the alleged

civil rights violations, not to the alleged violations

themselves. As noted, a cause of action under § 1983 accrues
-5-

when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that

is the basis of the action. Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 257. The

allegations of Laprime’s complaint reveal that he knew of his

wrist and hand injuries as early as August 4, 1993, and as late

as September 21, 1994. Accordingly, the § 1983 action Laprime

filed on November 5, 1995, was untimely and the district court

properly dismissed it.

AFFIRMED.