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i 

62–994 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–182] 

FIGHTING SUPERBUGS: DOD’S RESPONSE 

TO MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT INFECTIONS 

IN MILITARY TREATMENT FACILITIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

JOHN OPPENHEIM, Professional Staff Member 

THOMAS HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member 

FAMID SINHA, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, September 29, 2010, Fighting Superbugs: DOD’s Response to 

Multidrug-Resistant Infections in Military Treatment Facilities .................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, September 29, 2010 ............................................................................ 25 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

FIGHTING SUPERBUGS: DOD’S RESPONSE TO MULTIDRUGRESISTANT INFECTIONS IN MILITARY TREATMENT FACILITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations ......................................................................... 1 

Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ...................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Collier, Col. James D., USAF, M.D., Assistant Surgeon General, Health Care 

Operations, Office of the Surgeon General ........................................................ 9 

Hospenthal, Col. Duane, USA, M.D., Office of the Surgeon General, Infectious 

Diseases Consultant ............................................................................................. 6 

Martin, Capt. Gregory, USN, M.D., Program Director, Infectious Disease Clinical Research Program ......................................................................................... 7 

Smith, Dr. Jack, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Clinical and Program 

Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs .......... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Collier, Col. James D., joint with Lt. Col. Michael Forgione ........................ 63 

Hospenthal, Col. Duane, joint with Col. Jonathan Jaffin ............................. 45 

Martin, Capt. Gregory, joint with Judith F. English .................................... 52 

Slaughter, Hon. Louise McIntosh, a Representative from New York, Committee on Rules ............................................................................................. 31 

Smith, Dr. Jack ................................................................................................. 34 

Wittman, Hon. Rob ........................................................................................... 29 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Dr. Snyder ......................................................................................................... 77 

(1) 

FIGHTING SUPERBUGS: DOD’S RESPONSE TO 

MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT INFECTIONS IN MILITARY 

TREATMENT FACILITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 29, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Dr. SNYDER. Good afternoon, and welcome to the Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations’ hearing on the Defense Department’s efforts to monitor and control outbreaks of multidrug-resistant infections that have occurred in military hospitals over the past 

several years. 

While the U.S. military has provided high-quality healthcare for 

servicemembers wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, infection outbreaks caused by multidrug-resistant bacteria emerged as a problem early on during military operations. One of the pathogens with 

the most notoriety is Acinetobacter baumannii—incidentally, any 

pronunciations are my own and any resemblance to accurate pronunciations is clearly coincidental, so—Acinetobacter baumannii, a 

group of opportunistic bacteria which can accumulate antibiotic resistance relatively quickly. The only treatments available to fight 

the infections, in some cases, are highly toxic, older drugs that can 

cause harm to a patient’s health. 

According to the DOD [Department of Defense], over 3,300 

servicemembers developed Acinetobacter infections from 2004 to 

2009. While the bacteria are found in the natural environment, evidence suggests that the source of infections was in the military 

hospitals. Contamination in these hospitals placed other patients at 

risk. Outbreaks of multidrug-resistant infections have created management challenges for the military. 

Initially, the source of infections was difficult to identify because 

wounded personnel are evacuated to several treatment facilities before reaching a medical center in the United States. Also, determining the nature and extent of the problem took time because infections did not show up in patients until days after injury, and 

screening and surveillance capabilities were limited. 

Moreover, implementing infection control and prevention measures in combat hospitals are challenging given the physical condi-
2 

tions and limited infrastructure available. The lack of infection control expertise at these facilities, as well as limited experience in 

treating multidrug-resistant infections compounded efforts to manage outbreaks. 

In the past few years, the number of infections in military hospitals has decreased significantly, in part because the total number 

of combat casualties has gone down, but also because DOD and the 

services have implemented measures to strengthen infection 

screening, control, and prevention in the military healthcare system. Steps have been taken to promote awareness of basic infection 

control practices such as using new gloves and gowns with each patient. Guidelines for isolating patients with suspected multidrug-resistant infections and more targeted use of antibiotics were implemented. Additional infection control training is now available to deploying medical personnel. Furthermore, standardized screening for 

multidrug-resistant bacteria has been instituted at the major military medical centers. 

Lastly, research has been conducted, which has led to a better 

understanding of the risks and treatments associated with 

multidrug-resistant infections. 

While considerable progress has been made in controlling infections, the problem has not been solved and new outbreaks will be 

a continuing challenge. According to some service officials, there is 

a need for (1) a more comprehensive surveillance system to monitor 

infections; (2) enhanced training and expertise in infection control; 

(3) a coordinated and sustained approach in research and development; and (4) perhaps an infection control consultant in each combat theater. 

The incidence of drug-resistant infections is a national and global 

problem in both the civilian and military world that has grown dramatically over the past decade in civilian hospitals. According to 

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, almost 100,000 

Americans are killed each year by hospital-acquired infections. 

Health experts warn that the problem could get worse in the next 

several years because there are few new antibiotic treatments expected from the drug research pipeline. Because patients with severe injuries are most susceptible to these infections, DOD and the 

services must remain vigilant in their efforts to monitor and prevent them. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine how the Department 

of Defense has responded to outbreaks of multidrug-resistant infections over the past several years and whether effective surveillance, prevention, and research programs are in place to manage 

this challenge in the future, and what Congress can do to help. 

That concludes my opening statement. 

Congresswoman Louise Slaughter has had an interest in this 

issue of multidrug-resistance for some years now. I would ask 

unanimous consent to include as an addendum to my opening 

statement, a statement from Representative Slaughter. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Slaughter can be found in the 

Appendix on page 31.] 

Dr. SNYDER. And I will now recognize Mr. Wittman for any comments he would like to make. 
3 

STATEMENT OF ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, thank you, Chairman Snyder. And good 

afternoon to our witnesses. Thank you so much for joining us today 

and thank you for your service to our country. 

You know, it is easy to start a debate or to find a contrary view 

on almost every issue that arises here in Washington. The good 

news is that the subject of today’s hearing is that rare exception 

to the rule. You know, there is no political party, no healthcare provider and certainly no patient that wants any part of infection, 

much less the virulent infections that are the subject of today’s 

hearing. 

Multidrug-resistant organisms, or MDROs, are a serious matter 

for both our military and civilian healthcare providers and are with 

us to stay, I fear. 

I understand that infection control demands constant vigilance in 

medical facilities, requiring careful training and strict adherence to 

proper procedures within all areas of military treatment facilities. 

Infection control is particularly difficult in an austere deployed setting with limited supplies, limited access to fresh water, and the 

necessity of handling potentially large numbers of casualties who 

have been living in a field environment. 

I traveled last spring to Afghanistan and after a single day was 

covered in a significant layer of dust. So I can tell you after moving 

through Kandahar Province, I have a deep appreciation for what 

you all have to deal with downrange. And I can only imagine the 

condition of troops living in the field for months at a time, just 

based on my short experience there. 

So I know infection control under such circumstances must be 

daunting. And we are all glad to see that the growing problem of 

Gram-negative bacterial infections in military facilities was identified several years ago, and that considerable progress has been 

made in screening for and controlling these infections. In fact, the 

number of cases of the most virulent bacteria was cut by almost 

two-thirds of military facilities from the peak. My hat is off to you 

on that. 

Still, improvements can be made in enforcing infection control 

protocols and reporting mechanisms and in research for both the 

better treatment and better control procedures. 

We on the committee fully support your efforts in this area, and 

I look forward to hearing from you on how we can help to continue 

to make progress in combating infections of all types. 

I look forward to your testimony today. And again, thank you so 

much for what you have done. And thank you in the future for 

what you will do in addressing this daunting issue. 

And, Mr. Chairman, with that I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. 

Our witnesses today are Dr. Jack Smith, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Clinical and Program Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; Colonel/Dr. Jonathan Jaffin, Director, Health Policy and Services, Office of the 
4 

Army Surgeon General; Colonel/Dr. Duane Hospenthal, Infectious 

Disease Consultant to the Army Surgeon General and Chief of Infectious Disease Service at Brooke Army Medical Center; Colonel/ 

Dr. James D. Collier, Assistant Air Force Surgeon General for 

Health Care Operations; Lieutenant Colonel/Dr. Michael Forgione, 

Infectious Disease Consultant to the Air Force Surgeon General 

and Chief of Medicine at Keesler Air Force Medical Center; Captain/Dr. Gregory Martin, Infectious Disease Consultant to the Navy 

Surgeon General and Program Director of the Infectious Disease 

Clinical Research Program at the Uniformed Services University of 

the Health Sciences; and Ms. Judith English, Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Infection Control Consultant. 

Thank you all for being here. We will—somewhere we have a 

clock that you can see. We will turn the clock on for five minutes. 

When the red light starts flashing, it means five minutes have gone 

by. If you have more things to say, let us know. Otherwise, we will 

get to our questions. We have seven witnesses but only four of you 

actually are doing opening statements. And we will begin with you, 

Dr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JACK SMITH, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR CLINICAL AND PROGRAM POLICY, OFFICE 

OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH 

AFFAIRS 

Dr. SMITH. Thank you, sir. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member 

Wittman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to discuss Department of Defense efforts to address the growing 

challenge of healthcare-associated infections, particularly those 

from multidrug-resistant organisms, or MDROs. 

We greatly appreciate the committee’s interest in this important 

issue and its continued strong support for the dedicated men and 

women of America’s Armed Forces. 

Mr. Chairman, as the committee so well understands, 

healthcare-associated infections, including those from MDROs, are 

a serious problem for the military but also represent a growing 

problem in healthcare facilities across the Nation. These pathogenic organisms, which are predominantly bacteria, have not only 

increased the length of hospital stays but also mortality rates. So 

the problem is quite serious and one that we must continue to address. 

The sources of these bacteria and infections are multifactorial 

with both environment and facility-related factors. In hospital settings, they are most likely to contaminate environmental surfaces, 

equipment such as ventilators and dialysis machines, the hands of 

healthcare workers, visitors and family members, and the respiratory, urinary, skin, and gastrointestinal tracks and wounds of 

hospitalized patients. 

Accumulated data have shown that transmission of MDRO infections in combat-wounded servicemembers who have returned to the 

U.S. does not appear to have a single source or involve a single 

strain of bacteria but, rather, are derived from multiple sources 

and must be addressed as system issues. 

DOD has been actively engaged in measures to screen, surveil, 

prevent, and control infections in military treatment facilities at 
5 

home and on the battlefield. The military health system maintains 

a quality assurance program implemented in all military treatment 

facilities that establishes policies and procedures and requires 

training of our personnel to minimize the risk of infection to patients and staff, control the spread of infection, assess patient care, 

review healthcare records, and manage health resources and risk. 

We have also established an Infection Prevention and Control 

Panel with service subject matter experts as a subcommittee of our 

Military Health System Quality Forum. The Global Emerging Infection Surveillance and Response System, a division of the Armed 

Forces Health Surveillance Center, is a central hub that leverages 

the surveillance and response assets of the services and oversees 

military medical research units and is paving the way for laboratory standardization for microbes of military interest. 

The Multidrug-Resistant Organisms Repository and Surveillance 

Network System, established by the Medical Research and Materiel 

Command, is working to rapidly characterize emerging drug-resistant threats, track and monitor MDRO patients, and reduce the risk 

of healthcare-associated infections, which will aid in the development of a daily alert surveillance system for MDROs of significant 

importance. 

Since December of 2008, the military health system has been 

participating in the Centers for Disease Control’s national 

healthcare safety network. Currently, 33 of our military treatment 

facilities are participating. We are also participating in the American College of Surgeons National Surgical Quality Improvement 

Program, or NSQIP, which is focusing on, among other issues, the 

occurrence of surgical-site infections which could involve MDROs. 

And the Joint Theater Trauma Registry is adding an infectious disease module to study and better understand the risks, interventions, and outcomes associated with combat trauma. 

Standard infection prevention and control practices and standard 

clinical practice guidelines have been established and implemented 

in both garrison military treatment facilities and deployed areas. 

Admission MDRO colonization screening is performed at the four 

major receiving military medical centers for OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] and OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] wounded: 

Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Walter Reed Army Medical 

Center, National Naval Medical Center, and Brooke Army Medical 

Center. Patients are not released from contact precautions or isolation until they screen negative. And screening results are collected, 

reviewed, and reported. 

And DOD partnerships have been established with the VA [Veterans Administration] and the CDC [Centers for Disease Control] 

to address the challenges presented by MDRO and other infections. 

In addition to screenings, surveillance, prevention, and control, 

DOD has numerous studies underway to further our understanding 

of MDRO and other infections to enhance the prevention and control of infections and develop new treatments and therapeutics. 

Several DOD research laboratories receive funding to conduct research on MDROs, including Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, U.S. Navy Medical Research Center, the Institute of Surgical Research, the Armed 
6 

Forces Institute of Pathology, and the four major medical centers 

already mentioned. 

Mr. Chairman, the Department shares the committee’s concerns 

about the threat of multidrug-resistant organisms and we are 

working to improve our preventive measures, treatment, surveillance, and research as we respond to outbreaks of MDRO and other 

infections in military personnel and facilities. 

We appreciate the committee’s interest in this important issue 

and I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 34.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Colonel Hospenthal, I think you are next. You are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF COL. DUANE HOSPENTHAL, USA, M.D., OFFICE 

OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, INFECTIOUS DISEASES CONSULTANT 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL. Chairman Snyder, Representative Wittman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to 

discuss how the U.S. Army operates to prevent and treat 

multidrug-resistant organism infections. 

As you have already pointed out, multidrug-resistant organisms 

have increasingly become a healthcare threat in the U.S. and 

throughout the world. Focus in the U.S. and abroad to control 

these infections has included attempts to prevent transmission 

within our hospitals and other healthcare settings. These efforts 

have been championed by the Joint Commission through patient 

safety goals, and by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention through guidelines and the prevention of MDROs. 

Since the onset of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, infections and colonizations with MDROs, especially MDR 

Acinetobacter and the extended spectrum beta-lactamase producing 

E. coli and Klebsiella, have complicated the care of our injured U.S. 

military personnel. The source of these bacteria in returning combat-injured personnel has not been fully elucidated, but it appears 

that most likely these bacteria are spread nosocomially, both in the 

combat theater, along the journey back to, and within, military 

medical centers in the United States. 

In addition to routine practices and participation and U.S. civilian healthcare standards, which I have mentioned, the military 

healthcare system has responded to the problem with specific efforts focusing on ameliorating the problem in returning injured 

personnel. And these efforts include the admission MDRO screening, which Dr. Smith has discussed; development of specific guidelines to prevent infections in the combat injured; efforts to improve 

infection prevention and control in the combat theaters; establishment of an MDRO repository and surveillance network; and enhanced research efforts. 

Admission MDRO colonization screening is performed, as mentioned, in the four major receiving medical centers. Patients are not 

released from contact isolation until they screen negative. This provides near real-time monitoring in the rates of this colonization 

and potential infections in evacuated personnel to feed back to the 

combat theater. 
7 

Clinical practice guidelines, developed by a consensus conference 

including the Army, Air Force, Navy, and civilian personnel have 

been produced and promoted. These guidelines for the prevention 

of infection after combat-related injuries have focused on limiting 

antibiotic overuse and basic infection control interventions in theater. 

Critical review of infection control practices and challenges in the 

combat theater hospitals was conducted by myself and Colonel 

Helen Crouch in 2008 and 2009. These reviews produced multiple 

interventions to improve our infection control in a deployed setting. 

And this includes a renewed emphasis and focus on basic infection 

control methodologies and practices; development of electronic resources and Web pages; deployment of clinical microbiology and antibiotic control; as well as the establishment at the Army Medical 

Department Center and School, a short five-day course for identified infection control officers for deployed Level III hospitals. 

Also a standardized infection control policy was produced and is 

being staffed currently in the Afghanistan theater. 

The repository established to collect and study MDROs was established in June of 2009. The MDRO Repository and Surveillance 

Network, the MRSN, was established to collect and characterize 

bacterial isolates and provide epidemiological data to manage this 

problem. In conjunction with clinical and transportation data, the 

MRSN could help localize sources of MDROs to enhance and focus 

infection control methods. And data from the Joint Theater Trauma 

Registry will be essential to this effort. 

Over the past several years, the DOD has enhanced and expanded research in the prevention and treatment of MDROs. The 

Army is committed to aggressive efforts to prevent and treat 

MDRO infections. This includes a commitment to continue research 

aimed at understanding, preventing, and treating these infections. 

Additional efforts are underway to prevent transmission of MDROs 

within our military hospitals. We join civilians and other Federal 

agencies in our commitment to combat the spread of MDRO infections. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to address the Army’s efforts. And thank you for your continued support to our Nation’s soldiers. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Hospenthal and Colonel 

Jaffin can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. Captain Martin. 

STATEMENT OF CAPT. GREGORY MARTIN, USN, M.D., PROGRAM DIRECTOR, INFECTIOUS DISEASE CLINICAL RESEARCH PROGRAM 

Captain MARTIN. Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to have the 

opportunity to update you on Navy Medicine’s response to the problem of multidrug-resistant organisms. 

As the Navy Surgeon General specialty leader for infectious diseases and a practicing infectious disease physician at Bethesda 

Naval Hospital, I can assure you this issue is vitally important to 

the Vice Admiral Adam Robinson and to all of Navy medicine. 
8 

One only has to listen to NPR [National Public Radio] or watch 

the evening news to understand that the threat from multidrug-resistant organisms has really become a global issue. The Infectious 

Disease Society of America, the Institute of Medicine, and the 

World Health Organization have all identified resistant infectious 

agents as major public health threats for which a coordinated global effort is urgently needed. 

The DOD has been a national leader in identifying and addressing the MDRO challenge. While focused on the combat injured, 

many of whom have survived overwhelming blast injuries with 

burns and amputations, the reality of treating these infections has 

been sobering. In some cases, MDRO infections have been responsible for persistent infections, leading to delayed healing, amputations, or sepsis. 

MDRO infections in our combat injured were first identified in 

2003 on the hospital ship Comfort and at Bethesda. The Naval 

Hospital began screening of OEF/OIF patients for MDROs and instituted infection control measures to prevent their acquisition and 

transmission among patients and staff. Bethesda screening was 

then adopted in each of the major casualty screening centers in the 

U.S. and in Landstuhl. 

Our Army colleagues deployed an expert team to treatment facilities in theater to assess infection control measures and ensure 

that standard precautions were being adhered to, even in forward 

treatment areas. Their efforts led to changes in practice in all three 

services with cohorting of long-term patients separately from the 

acutely injured patients who were unlikely to harbor MDROs and 

were typically being MedEvac’d back to Landstuhl and CONUS 

[continental United States] Army and Navy facilities. 

Furthermore, infection control training needs were identified and 

a predeployment infection control course made available to each of 

the services. 

The establishment of the MDRO repository and surveillance network to collect isolates will enable a more definitive molecular 

analysis of the relationships among the MDROs, as well as common sources for their acquisition. As our patients transfer between 

hospitals of the different services, all DOD MTFs [Military Treatment Facilities] will benefit from the repository system. 

Most importantly, our patients, their families, and our clinicians 

would like to know what can be done to limit the harm these infections inflict on our wounded warriors. In this regard, Navy 

BUMED [Bureau of Medicine] has funded the Trauma Infectious 

Disease Outcome Study, or TIDOS, to combine surveillance, laboratory, and clinical data from combat-injured patients and follow 

them through their subsequent care in VA hospitals. 

The DOD is uniquely capable to develop a program like TIDOS 

that can monitor a large group of patients and develop evidencebased recommendations that will be utilized not only in the care 

of an injured marine from Afghanistan but also the high school student with an infection after a car accident. 

In the last few weeks, the TIDOS project has expanded to include the VA hospitals, and is now one of the first medical programs to bridge the military to the VA transition. We are enthusiastic that TIDOS will provide the data to assess our treatment of 
9 

combat-related infections and effect changes in practice that will 

improve future outcomes. 

Overall, I feel the response of the DOD infectious diseases and 

infectious control communities to the worldwide threat of MDROs 

is something we should be proud of. Careful surveillance, coordinated interventions, and increased research efforts are helping the 

Navy and the DOD to remain at the forefront in the response to 

MDROs. 

I appreciate the opportunity to have updated you on our efforts 

and look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Captain Martin and Ms. English can 

be found in the Appendix on page 52.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Captain Martin. Colonel Collier. 

STATEMENT OF COL. JAMES D. COLLIER, USAF, M.D., ASSISTANT SURGEON GENERAL, HEALTH CARE OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 

Colonel COLLIER. Chairman Snyder, Representative Wittman, 

good afternoon and thank you very much for this opportunity to 

discuss this critical issue with you today. 

The Air Force is working diligently with our sister services to 

control infectious diseases in theater and in our medical treatment 

facilities. As you are well aware, this problem continues to challenge the medical community in both the public and private sectors 

around the globe. And we appreciate your support in our endeavors 

to address it. 

As I am the last to speak, I will try not to be redundant to the 

previous witnesses, and have submitted my full statement for the 

record. 

In response to the challenge of treating and managing MDRO infections in our returning servicemembers, the DOD has instituted 

coordinated Tri-Service efforts in the areas of infection control and 

prevention, in surveillance, and in research and development. 

I will speak briefly about Air Force infection control initiatives. 

The Air Force is committed to infection control throughout our continuum of care. The most common patients in our Air Force theater 

hospitals to develop MDRO infections are those who remain in intensive care units for extended periods of time. Active Duty ICU 

patients are stabilized and sent to Landstuhl Regional Medical 

Center or CONUS hospitals as quickly as possible. 

In contrast, injured and ill host-nation patients have very limited 

resources for long-term medical care within their country; thus 

they tend to stay longer in our theater hospitals. This population 

is the one most susceptible to MDRO infection and colonization. 

Our theater hospitals have a physician and nurse as the infection 

control officer and representative to provide ongoing oversight and 

promote continuing awareness of infection control standards. They 

conduct surveillance, provide educational briefings on antibiotic-resistance issues and wound management, and emphasize basic infection control efforts to prevent spread between hospitalized patients throughout the deployment rotation. 

The Air Force also has a specific package, the expeditionary infectious disease team, which is available to provide dedicated infectious disease and infection control assets for the theater surgeon. 
10 

As the primary source of patient transportation from theater hospitals to Landstuhl and back to and throughout CONUS, air medical evacuation [AE] is the linchpin of our healthcare continuum. 

Our AE crews are trained annually in infection control. In addition to the usual standard precautions, crews are trained to mitigate the risk of transmitting nosocomial infections in the operational environment. They are trained to disinfect equipment and 

have in-flight kits that contain both spill kits and personal protective equipment. Further, hand sanitizers are placed throughout the 

aircraft cabin. AE personnel are also educated about airflow in our 

different air frames and where best to position patients to avoid 

the spread of infection. 

The Air Force has formal infection control courses that are conducted at Sheppard Air Force Base in Texas. There are three levels 

of training provided: for those assigned to infection control positions, both officer and enlisted on the active duty side; for those assigned as the infection control function and committee chairperson; 

and training specific for our reserve component members. 

We also utilize equivalent civilian infection control courses. The 

new draft of our Air Force instruction, entitled ‘‘Infection Prevention and Control Program’’ has added an optional element, which 

suggests that an active duty officer serve as an infection control assistant and rotate through the infection control office in those facilities that have a civilian infection preventionist assigned. This is 

designed to facilitate actual hands-on management of the infection 

control program in garrison for active duty officers so they may 

gain experience prior to deploying. 

While none of our Air Force MTFs consistently receive combatinjured U.S. personnel at this time, our medics do practice in all 

of the major MTFs responsible for the care of these patients, which 

include forward-based hospitals and, as I mentioned, in our air and 

medical evacuation system. 

An MDRO colonization screening process of OIF and OEF 

wounded, upon admission, is now in place; and, encouragingly, a 

recent review of this data has shown a significant decrease in the 

number and percentage of patients colonized with Acinetobacter 

upon arrival at Landstuhl and the three Level V CONUS facilities. 

While much remains to be done and understood to control or 

eliminate this complex medical dilemma, we continue to work with 

the world’s foremost infectious disease experts to find the answers 

that will prevent future patients from contracting an infectious disease from others in the very environment designed to protect and 

heal them. 

Whether they are our military and family members here in 

CONUS or our wounded warriors in theater, we must find a solution to this constantly evolving challenge. 

We appreciate your support, Mr. Chairman, and that of the committee as we seek to achieve this daunting but critical goal. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Collier and Colonel Forgione 

can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all. I thank you all for being here. 

Colonel Collier, I think you were the only person brave enough 

to try your own pronunciation of Acinetobacter. So we applaud you 
11 

for that. You know—well, Mr. Wittman, I will put ourselves on the 

5-minute clock, whoever the timekeeper is here. 

When you think about what this means for families and individuals who have been wounded, moved to a military facility in country, moved to Landstuhl, come back to the United States, get put 

into one of our military hospitals, have family members probably 

down there by then, and then to develop one of the infections and 

have things go south very rapidly, it must be just heartbreaking 

not only for the family but also for the healthcare providers that 

are trying to take care of this person. 

And, Dr. Smith, I will ask you the question but then I will let 

you defer to whoever you want to. I would like a little tutorial, if 

I could get one, on IED [improvised explosive device] injuries, and 

if the fact of a blast effect, in addition to an open wound, how 

that—if that is a factor in these infections. 

Dr. SMITH. Well, sir, I am certainly not an expert on IED injuries. But as we all know, they have become quite a problem for us 

in DOD during the course of this war. I believe we do have Colonel 

Hospenthal who could perhaps respond to that. 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL. Sure. I mean, certainly the blast injuries 

from IEDs cause tremendous tissue damage and devascularization. 

Initially when we were looking for a source of these MDROs, we 

were concerned whether there are—some of the bacteria in the soil 

and organic debris were actually being lodged up in organic fragments and such. And so certainly it doesn’t look like that is the 

main cause of these MDRO infections, but certainly the damage is. 

The damage that is caused there has to be carefully debrided while 

trying to save tissue, and so devitalized tissue may need the—the 

surgeons may need to go back multiple times to try to debride off 

the dead parts of the tissue, to allow the vascularized surviving tissues to survive, all during the while there is pressure from—or colonization with bacteria, like we have bacteria always on our bodies. 

And in the hospitalized environment, these bacteria are all off in 

these multidrug-resistant bacteria that then colonize these wounds 

and can cause the infections that we see. 

Dr. SMITH. And, Colonel Jaffin, you have some comments concerning this. 

Colonel JAFFIN. Sir, I guess I am the only surgeon at the table. 

But what we see, especially with the large blast injuries, is a lot 

of separation of tissue along the tissue planes, that there is disruption of the vascular supply leading to large amounts of tissue. And 

so in order to minimize deformity and dysfunction, we try and preserve as much of that tissue as we can. 

At the same time, we are caught trying to make sure that we remove all of the tissue that is not viable. That nonviable tissue is 

a great culture medium for any organism. And that is why the importance of the drug—of the infection control measures to prevent 

colonization with the multidrug-resistant organisms. 

Dr. SNYDER. In terms of the availability of research dollars, you 

all have your own budgets, and we have a lot of activity going on 

with NIH [National Institutes of Health]. I don’t have a sense of 

the adequacy of research dollars available to you all for looking at 

this issue. Is it adequate? Is it inadequate? It seems like it actually 

went down over the last couple of years. This is in the area where 
12 

Congress can help. If we are not doing our job, you won’t have adequate research dollars. 

Dr. Smith or anyone else want to comment? 

Dr. SMITH. Yes, sir. I will begin with what is budgeted at the 

DOD level. We have currently in this fiscal year $13.68 million allocated for studies related to multidrug-related organisms or 

multidrug-resistant organisms—I am sorry—$10.25 of that in antimicrobial countermeasures and $3.43 of that in wound infection 

prevention and management. And the other—the services do allocate some research dollars I believe as well to MDROs and infectious-disease issues. And I will let the services speak to those. 

Dr. SNYDER. I think that is your cue. 

Dr. SMITH. Do you have figures for Army, MIDRP [Military Infectious Diseases Research Program] or—— 

Colonel JAFFIN. I can probably take that, sir. For MIDRP, there 

is about $430,000. For the specific on wound infections, there is 

$895,000. U.S. Navy wound infection research also gets money. I 

don’t have the exact number right here. USUHS [Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences] has a little over $4 million. 

For congressional special interest projects on wound infection, 

there is almost $12 million. SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research] project is about $3.7 million. 

Dr. Smith spoke about the Defense health programs and then 

war supplemental intermural projects, there is about another $2.5 

million, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. Anyone else have any comment? 

Dr. Smith, I thought that the upcoming year—you said out of the 

current fiscal year—I thought the upcoming estimate is actually 

going to be a drop of several million dollars, from almost $14 million; is that correct? 

Dr. SMITH. Sir, I don’t have figures for fiscal year 2011 or beyond 

at this point. It is my understanding that money has been programmed for this area of research. And in addition to that, there 

is incremental funding of programs in the outyears. So that if there 

is promising research that has been identified and is ongoing, then 

that is often funded in the year of execution. 

Dr. SNYDER. In your opening statement, you described that, Dr. 

Smith, as vigorous research funding. It doesn’t seem incredibly robust to me. Am I wrong? I mean, it seems like this is a huge problem; it is a huge national and international problem. You have got 

major facilities around the world. It seems like that money would 

be stretched out pretty thinly, pretty rapidly. Is that a fair statement? 

Dr. SMITH. I am not sure that I used the ‘‘vigorous funding,’’ sir, 

when—in my statement. 

Dr. SNYDER. I think you said ‘‘vigorous research.’’ 

Dr. SMITH. We certainly do have funding allocated for research. 

And this is very definitely an important, a vital area of interest for 

the military. But as you pointed out, it is also a national problem 

and we are collaborating with, coordinating with the National Institutes of Health and other organizations that are devoting research dollars to this. We do have to balance our research funding 

in this area with other areas of military research interest. So it is 
13 

in a competitive process. But as I say, we have $13.6 million for 

this year. 

Dr. SNYDER. I think your opening statement on page six says the 

DOD has a vigorous research program. And around here when we 

hear ‘‘vigorous,’’ we automatically think of funding, I guess. 

Mr. Wittman, I went over my time. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will begin with Dr. 

Smith, and I would like to get the perspective, too, of the other 

folks here from the different service branches. I want to focus on 

the element of training and the element of deployed infection control officers downrange. 

First of all, I would like for you to give us an overview about the 

scope and breadth of training that our infection control officers receive and our infection control personnel receive and our medical 

care personnel receive. Both in a deployed situation and back stateside; and then also to determine how are those individuals deployed downrange? What mixture of personnel do we have there? 

Is there a specifically assigned officer in charge of infection control 

at these medical care facilities downrange? Who are those personnel? I understand in the past that there were nurses that were 

assigned as infection control officers. Is that still the case? 

If you could tell us a little bit about the extent of training and 

then how those individuals are deployed in our medical care facilities. 

Dr. SMITH. Yes, sir. Well, I will begin with the policy level and 

work down probably as far as the stateside facilities, and then pass 

it to my service colleagues to speak a little bit more about the deployed environment. 

But, of course, infection control is an element of the training of 

all medical professionals now. So our physicians, our nurses, our 

corpsmen, our technicians, are all being trained in their basic professional training about infection control. 

There also is Joint Commission accreditation of our inpatient facilities and we have ambulatory accreditation of our outpatient 

clinics which have initiatives focused on infection control. Infection 

control programs are a requirement for accreditation in those. And 

along with that goes appropriate training and orientation of staff 

in the facility-level infection control programs. 

I do know that in the predeployment setting, DOD is also providing some additional training for personnel, but would urge that 

we keep in mind that the people who are deploying into the operational setting are the same people who have been providing the 

care back in the medical treatment facilities. 

So certainly the professional, fundamental training, the infection 

control specific training that they are getting and utilizing every 

day in our military treatment facilities is useful as they deploy to 

that operational environment. And there has been pointed out in 

some of the testimony some of the challenges of practicing good infection control procedures and prevention in that austere environment. That is very definitely a critical factor. 

But let me pass to my left and ask whether the services would 

like to comment on the deployed environment. 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL. I would agree with everything Dr. Smith 

has just stated. Certainly as medical healthcare professionals, we 
14 

all receive nearly continuous training in infection control because 

it has become such a big issue throughout the world. 

In the deployed setting, certainly all the medical personnel have 

been working in hospitals and do have the basic training. Our mission in 2008 to review infection control practices and challenges revealed that there really weren’t well-trained, dedicated infection 

control officers in charge of the program at the Level III facilities. 

It wasn’t that the personnel weren’t doing infection control or 

weren’t doing a pretty good job, but the infection control officers 

that we have seen downrange really had not had more training and 

additional training. And often they were nurses, and often they 

really didn’t have dedicated time to do their infection control officer 

duties. 

And that is really the challenge that we identified and focused 

on over the last several years: developing the kind of just-in-time 

five-day infection control officer course and in getting policy 

changed on the Army side to stress infection control. 

Recently there was an EXORD [executive order], actually this 

week, that went through that makes it a requirement that as the 

CSH is—as the Combat Support Hospital breaks into separate 

pieces, rather than operate as one single unit, that each one of 

those pieces or slices as we call them that have inpatients have an 

infection control officer who has been trained in either our five-day 

just-in-time course, or who has experience. 

And I believe this problem has really developed because of the 

operational tempo. We have a lot of hospitals downrange. We have 

been there a long time, and these hospitals are not operating as a 

single CSH. They are broken into multiple segments. And because 

of that, we just did not have enough infection control officers 

trained throughout this. 

Captain MARTIN. I really have to defer to my two previous colleagues because I think most of what they said really refers to all 

of us. Since all of these in-theater hospitals are really Tri-Service, 

we talk constantly. I mean, I am on a constant first-name basis 

with all of these guys; and we know what is going on, who is going 

where, and we have a pretty good handle on the issues. 

I think, as Colonel Hospenthal just brought up, earlier on in the 

war things were a little less organized as far as what we knew was 

going on. And now the focus on infection control is much more evident at all of these facilities, both in CONUS and OCONUS [outside the continental U.S.]. So I think that we are really—have a 

much better handle on ensuring that infection control practices— 

standard practices are being met, even at a much more forward 

setting than we had previously. 

I also have with me Ms. Judy English, who is your Navy infection control leader consultant. And any comments about specific 

things that you would want to bring up from—she is an infection 

control nurse, and I think she is one of the only nurses we have 

in here. And it has been an important thing for Judy to be at 

BUMED because I think it emphasizes just how important infection control is to the Navy both in CONUS and OCONUS. 

Ms. ENGLISH. Thank you. Thank you, sir. 

The Navy infection prevention and control arena has been trying 

in CONUS to civilianize. So that at this point in time, 68 percent 
15 

of our infection preventionists are civilians. And I have a monthly 

video teleconference and digital conference online that is two times 

in the day, so people all over the world can sign on. And this is 

for management and education purposes. And we do this continuously, as well as the usual getting together. 

We are also working with the Army and the Air Force as members of the TMA [TRICARE Management Activity] Infection Prevention and Control Panel. And we are now going over the data 

that Army, Navy, Air Force are all entering into the CDC’s National Health Care Safety Network relevant to central line-associated bloodstream infections and ventilator-associated pneumonias 

in babies through the elderly in critical care. 

And now the Navy is working with the Navy-Marine Corps and 

Public Health Center with beta testing sites to document all 

MDROs that are in CHCS [the Composite Health Care System], so 

that as soon as the Centers for Disease Control can accept HL7 

[Health Level 7] download of these data, the entire Navy MTFs 

[medical treatment facilities] and DTFs [dental treatment facilities] 

will immediately go into downloading all of the MDROs, working 

with DOD and CDC. And this will be another benchmark data that 

is not as high as the pulsed-field gel electrophoresis that is going 

on. But this is the best that we can do without higher technology. 

This will be a 21st-century technology download as soon as CDC 

can accept these data. 

Colonel COLLIER. Thank you. I think in the Air Force we mirror 

our sister services in our in-garrison performance, although, because of the small size of most of our facilities, it is a dual-hatted 

position. Downrange, we also dual-hat it, but those personnel have 

to have passed the training level required of an infection disease 

preventionist to get that position in our downrange hospitals. 

The only additional place where we carry out additional training 

then is our air medical evacuation business. And the air medical 

evacuation crews do receive additional training in order to understand how that works on an otherwise dirty airplane. 

So, yes, sir, thank you. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. 

Maybe I will start with you, Colonel Collier, and go the other 

way, or maybe you can speak for the whole group. But in terms of 

the development of new drugs—I mean, those are expensive research projects to try to come up with a new drug. How much are— 

is the military or military patients involved in research looking for 

the next generation or a new kind of drug to deal with these infections? 

Colonel COLLIER. Sir, I am not able to answer that question, but 

I would ask my colleague if he has some input. 

Colonel FORGIONE. Thank you. As far as the Air Force’s position 

in that, we do participate in clinical trials through the Infectious 

Disease Clinical Research Program that is stood up at USUHS and 

is NIH-collaborative as well. And so we do occasionally have patients that will participate in large multicenter trials. As far as a 

direct research initiative in the Air Force looking for new drugs, we 

do not have that service at this time. 

Captain MARTIN. This is kind of a difficult question because the 

DOD is not really set up well to develop new antimicrobial agents. 
16 

That is really probably such an expensive and difficult undertaking 

that ‘‘Big Pharma’’ is really the only ones with pockets deep enough 

and with the ability to develop a lot of new antimicrobial agents. 

Whereas the DOD, especially the Army, has developed all the antimalarials we have, and we have a pretty good system for looking 

at that. 

It would really not be in our best interest for the DOD to start 

looking at the very basic science needed to do a lot of the regular 

antimicrobials. So what we have done, I think, is focus more on 

some of the things that we can work on. And that is the clinical 

side of it. 

So we are doing some testing on some agents that are not approved in the United States now that have been funded, some Japanese products, and some other drugs that are really second- and 

third-line drugs we are using for some of these. We are looking at 

doing some studies with those clinically. 

I think the more important thing is that we are able to collect 

a lot of these different isolates. We are allowed to. With our repository services and whatnot, able to molecularly characterize these. 

And then when other universities that have the ability to do this 

ask for isolates, we are able to send them out. We are able to send 

a lot of multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter isolates out because we 

have a large collection of them, because we have been able to hold 

them. And these are clinical isolates that they actually need. 

So we partner with a lot of our civilian organizations. Dr. Smith 

talked about a lot of the funding. A lot of that funding actually 

goes out to civilian universities to do studies that we are really not 

equipped to be able to do. We are trying to focus more on the clinical end of things and directly with patients. 

Colonel JAFFIN. Mr. Chairman, one of the things that we try and 

do in DOD medical research is we try and target those areas that 

the civilian sector is not targeting. There is an extensive, and has 

been mentioned, an extremely expensive program in Big Pharma to 

look for new antimicrobials. We have a few agents that we are 

looking at, some polypeptides and things like that. 

But the main focus is to partner—to try to expand the indications for the new agents that a pharmaceutical company may be 

working with to try and target the specifically difficult organisms 

or organisms that are not seen commonly in civilian practice. And 

again, as Captain Martin mentioned, it is that partnership and the 

working with Big Pharma and other universities to enable to leverage our research dollars and our research interests with theirs. 

Dr. SMITH. Yes, sir. And if I may comment, I agree with what 

has been said by my colleagues to my left. There are a few specific 

areas of research that DOD is pursuing that may have some particular military usefulness with human albumin and plastic coatings of orthopedic implants, predatory bacteria microbial biofilms 

for the treatment of burns and wound infections, and a look at 

Staph aureus [Staphylococcus aureus] toxoids. 

So I think what we do have is a need for collaboration, coordination across many sectors, with DOD focusing on those areas of particular military interests, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. Do you think that the—you mentioned—I guess, 

you, Colonel Jaffin, mentioned Big Pharma dealing with this issue. 
17 

Are you convinced that there is adequate research going on in the 

private sector on resistant organisms? I mean, when you start looking at a specific Gram-negative bacteria that has resistance, the 

number of cases—it can be devastating to a person, devastating to 

a hospital to have to deal with it. 

Are the economics there to make it worthwhile for a company to 

invest in that kind of research, not being sure you are going to find 

a solution? 

Dr. SMITH. Sir, I am unable to comment on what Pharma may 

be investing in. 

Dr. SNYDER. Well, we are talking about—you talked about you 

thought you had a specific niche, implying that the rest of it is over 

in the private sector. I am not convinced that there is adequate research going on in this area, looking for the next generation. 

Colonel Hospenthal, do you have a comment? 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL. I mean, from the non-DOD side, certainly 

the Infectious Disease Society of America which we are—the three 

consultants are members of—have identified this as a problem in 

getting new drugs, as has a similar counterpart in the EU [European Union]. There isn’t that many drugs in the pipeline. I 

think—— 

Dr. SNYDER. If I can interrupt. That is actually what led to this 

hearing today, it was because, I don’t know, sometime in the last 

couple of years I became convinced that this is an example where 

the military is inheriting a problem, whether it is lack of foreign 

language skills or whatever it is, and you are having to try to figure out how to solve it, but this is going to be a tough one to solve. 

The reason there is not adequate dollars in the civilian side, is 

because it is going to take a huge amount of money to find a new 

drug, or two or three, for a relatively small number of cases, without much financial payoff. So then the question becomes, well, 

should we actually be beefing it up, should that perhaps be a role 

that we could play? 

So I am interrupting you, but that is what led to this discussion. 

Because I don’t see them in the pipeline either. 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL. Well, because of the cost and because of 

the Big Pharma story, we have chosen to focus really the DOD research dollars on the wound, the colonization itself, the biofilms 

that are in the wound that allow these bacteria to, you know, survive and develop resistance. 

So it isn’t that we are not doing research on antimicrobials. We 

mostly have focused on topical antimicrobials in the wound, immune response in wounds, and how can we make that—and a 

wound has to have bacteria in it. We have bacteria all over our 

body. So how can we keep the numbers of the bacteria down and 

not produce superbugs in those wounds? That has been the focus 

that we have chosen with the research dollars over the last several 

years. 

Captain MARTIN. You know, I just want to add to that, as you 

suggest, any microbial pipeline is really pretty empty. I mean, we 

don’t have many new things coming down the line that look very 

promising for these really bad bugs. And as Colonel Hospenthal 

said, we are able to look at some other things, other than 
18 

antimicrobials to treat these. And I think vaccines have been a portion of it. 

So we have a major problem with Staph aureus infections in the 

military, especially in recruit settings, just because they are common skin flora. And MRSA [Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 

aureus], widely known all over, is a big problem for us as well. So 

we are partnering with Pharma and looking at Staph aureus vaccines and doing those trials actually in troops in boot-camp type 

settings to see does this actually work in our setting. What we need 

in DOD, not what we need in end-stage renal disease patients in 

an ICU [incentive care unit] somewhere, but what we need in 

DOD. 

So there are other vaccine-type candidates. We have to look at— 

something was mentioned a little bit about phage, where viruses 

that will attack bacteria have been looked at. All of these are important other avenues besides antimicrobials that we are trying to 

pursue. And, again, looking at the clinical end, where the science 

meets the patient; because that is what we are having to deal with 

as the clinicians involved in caring for these patients. 

Ms. ENGLISH. And this whole lack of medication. People can’t 

take a pill or have an IV [intravenous line] to kill the bug that they 

have, that we got so used to over the last few decades has brought 

us back to bedside care and scrupulous adherence to standard precautions. And if anybody shows any symptoms of something that 

might be contagious, we put a barrier between the healthcare provider and those moist body substances from the time they come 

back from overseas. And we use a long-acting chlorhexidine gluconate that stays on the skin for bathing these wounded warriors 

when they come back. 

And we find out as soon as we can that they are colonized or infected, so that we go back to basics to keep them as healthy as possible and not to share their bugs among themselves. It is real hard 

to keep marine buddies away from each other when one of them 

is isolated and their buddy is in an ICU and is not isolated. But 

you know, in special circumstances, we have dressed up a marine 

dad so he could go in to see his baby born when he had 

Acinetobacter, when he had to do it on a video screen, and he and 

mom were able to know that they were there for each other. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think all these different pieces of the issue are very interesting in how they fit together and how we make sure that we are successful in the end. 

One of the critical elements, I believe, is the system of surveillance; how do we look at reporting and tracking these multidrugresistant organisms; how do we do that in our medical facilities? 

And let me ask this. Can you all talk—and we will begin with 

Dr. Smith—talk a little bit about the current surveillance system? 

Is it adequate? What is it focused on? Has it developed through the 

years? 

I know that the Army, I believe, has a system of tracking infections. I wanted to know a little bit about is that maybe a model 

that should be used across all of our medical facilities? And this is 

both downrange and deployed facilities and nondeployed facilities 

back here stateside. 
19 

So just a little bit about that in looking at the Army’s multidrugresistant organism repository and surveillance network to see if 

that is maybe a paradigm that could be used or what are the other 

services using as far as that effort to track and keep up with these 

organisms and the infections that go along with them? 

Dr. Smith, I will begin with you and then I would like to get the 

other panel members. 

Dr. SMITH. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

I think we have—I would have to say we have a developing system of surveillance. It certainly has gotten better and better over 

time. And I mentioned a number of the elements of that network 

of surveillance. 

We are utilizing our Armed Forces Health Surveillance Network. 

The Global Emerging Infections System is out there gathering information from our overseas labs. We are participating now in 

NSQIP, the National Surgical Quality Improvement Program, 

which has a focus on infectious complications of surgery. We are 

participating in the National Health Care Safety Network through 

the CDC, which gives us part of the picture. So we have a great 

deal of information that is beginning to be available to us. And the 

NHSN [National Healthcare Safety Network] and the NSQIP are 

relatively new for us. We are still looking at how we utilize those 

data. 

The services, as you have heard, do have some other parts of that 

picture. But before I turn it over to them, let me say that they participate in our quality forum, which is run across service lines at 

the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] level. So we do have 

our Infection Prevention Control Panel with the subject matter experts coming together to look at what can we see, what do we identify as problems, and what do we need to do about them in terms 

of both treatment, prevention, further surveillance, and also the research picture? 

So let me turn it over then to service representatives to address 

their specifics. 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL. Well, this is certainly a huge problem. And 

the biggest issue that I see that is difficult to actually fix here is 

that if we had a single thing to track and follow around this would 

be a whole lot easier. We could make it a reportable thing, call it 

brucellosis, and things would be much easier. 

Even the CDC doesn’t see this as something that is easy to put 

your arms around, because there are dozens of genus of these 

Gram-negative rods, there is probably 200 species of these Gramnegative rods, and there are literally probably thousands of different genetic elements that cause these resistance patterns. 

So if you put all of those combinations together, they are hard 

to even decide what we are tracking and what we are looking to 

track with surveillance methodologies. And so even to pick out 

what we want to look for is difficult. 

Certainly the Marine and Navy Public Health Center is working 

this through the CHCS data, but it is very difficult. CDC guidelines, because of this, really are to identify issues at your own facility and individualize your response and whether you conduct surveillance by doing cultures or by doing syndromic versus diagnostic 

results. 
20 

Certainly because of this and because of the fact that a lot of 

these don’t even track by ICD–9 [International Classification of 

Diseases, 9th revision] codes, there is not an ICD–9 code for 

Acinetobacter, is one of the reasons that we actually put together 

the standardized screening at Landstuhl, National Naval, Walter 

Reed, and BAMC [Brooke Army Medical Center] is just so we could 

have an idea of how many of these Acinetobacters and how many 

of these other MDROs are coming through the door from the combat theater, from Landstuhl as they transfer into the U.S. 

So with the MRSN [Multidrug-resistant Organism Repository 

and Surveillance Network], the hope would be that this will help 

provide some answers with some tracking data from the JTTS 

[Joint Theater Trauma System] and JTTR [Joint Theater Trauma 

Registry]. The MRSN is housed as an Army program currently, but 

it has always been thought of as being a DOD program over the 

long term. And certainly my Navy and Air Force colleagues were 

involved and still are involved in running that program. That program is based at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, but 

it certainly gets National Naval Medical Center isolates, Landstuhl 

isolates, et cetera. 

Captain MARTIN. Just to add on to what Colonel Hospenthal 

said, I think that this is also an issue of trying to track these 

things where you don’t know if a patient is colonized or infected. 

We get asked how many of these you have. Well, do you count the 

one that the same patient has had multiple times in the lab over 

a long period of time? It becomes really difficult to track. 

We have been able to, and it was just alluded to through the 

Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center looking at the CHCS 

computer system that is used DOD-wide, now able to really look at 

the—they are trying to get all the hospitals to report resistance the 

same way so they can look at this. 

But this whole question about the recent superbug coming out of 

India, NDM–1, we are asked how much of this are we seeing in the 

Navy and Marine Corps? We are very quickly able to go through 

and say, we are not seeing any of this; we haven’t seen any isolates 

of this. We could go through and look at all of the stuff in the repository and say, there is not any of this. 

The study I talked about, TIDOS, the Trauma Infectious Diseases Outcomes Study, is really collecting all of these specimens 

from everybody, Army, Navy, Air Force. Even though it has a 

Navy-funded program, most of the work is actually done at Army 

hospitals. All of those isolates are collected, we are able to save 

them and see what is going on, and have a pretty good handle now, 

which we really didn’t have five or six years ago on what is going 

on with MDROs. 

Ms. ENGLISH. Infection control-wise, in the Navy and Army for 

patients who have MDROs or some other epidemiologically important pathogen, since the BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] is 

coming soon, Walter Reed and National Naval Medical Center have 

become closer and closer, and we have devised identical protocols. 

And we put, for bed management, if a patient has ever had an 

MDRO, we have them listed. We note that in AHLTA and/or CHCS 

[the patient electronic health record] so the bed manager will note 

when they come back to the clinic or as an inpatient and puts them 
21 

on appropriate transmission-based precautions. And this is communicated among the different services, and as people are sent to San 

Antonio to go back closer to home. But inside the Beltway is where 

this started. 

We also devised a clearance culture protocol using the Infectious 

Diseases and Infection Prevention people from Walter Reed and 

National Naval Medical Center in congruence with the Centers for 

Disease Control, because it is so hard to keep people on isolation 

precautions when they feel better, they are not dripping anymore. 

Do we have to stay here? Can’t I go visit my buddy? And we devised a protocol so that there are three screenings, at least 72 

hours apart, when the person has been off all antimicrobial therapy 

for the bug for at least 72 hours. And this was agreeable to all 

three places. And that was a first, to get people off isolation without having to wait weeks or months. 

Colonel FORGIONE. I think, as all the folks up here have expressed, that this is really a process in evolution. And I think we 

have some very good basic surveillance going and some platforms 

that are going to help us to answer a lot of these questions. 

With these MDROs, it is a little different than some of our triedand-true reportable diseases, like tuberculosis, where we have a 

very long history of managing this, very good guidelines of how we 

do it, and it is all reported. I think we are still defining what an 

MDRO infection is in some places and what colonization versus 

true infection means. 

And as the network that I think we have set up across the services continues to evolve, we will be able to provide better answers 

and then provide maybe guidelines out there that would then better define exactly what these entities are and how to address them. 

Captain MARTIN. Sir, can I add one thing? Also not to toot our 

own horns, but I think in infectious disease, infection control communities in the DOD are probably one of the more united groups 

of anywhere in medicine in the DOD. We cross-train at Bethesda 

and Walter Reed. We are Army and Navy. In San Antonio we are 

Army and Air Force. We swap staff around frequently. We have a 

very good idea of what is going on. 

And so when we talked about this before, it was hard for us to 

separate out what we would do in each service, because we really 

do this very much in a unified fashion, which I think is the best 

way for our patients and the best way overall for the way we want 

to go with this. 

Dr. SNYDER. And for the sake of our transcriptionist, that ‘‘staff’’ 

was with a double F, and not with a P–H kind of thing. 

I wanted to ask Ms. English, you talked very eloquently about 

really getting in the prevention aspects of it. Have you seen a difference over time, over the last several years, once an infection has 

been diagnosed in terms of how well patients have done as you 

have tracked that over the last six or seven years, once they are 

diagnosed with an infection? 

Apparently not a dramatic improvement. 

Captain MARTIN. I think that is a tough question and I think it 

is a very good question. I think that we are much more sensitive 

to the fact that we have to be ready to treat an MDRO right up 

front much more quickly. So we tend to collect our samples and 
22 

maybe more broadly treat with antimicrobial therapies up front 

than we would have before, which may give us a day or two jump 

on this before material comes back from the lab. 

And we also have a pretty robust discussion among ourselves 

about how do you want to tackle this one. You know, this patient 

has renal failure, and on top of it has this MDRO and these other 

issues going on. Because these are tough, tough clinical cases to 

handle very frequently. 

So I think we are a little faster to be able to get that together 

than maybe we were at first when we were a little more shocked 

by these. I don’t know if you have any comments to add, Colonel 

Forgione, or—— 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL. I would agree with that. We have also 

made ourselves and our surgical colleagues aware that just looking 

for bacteria because it might be there is not always the best idea. 

So we do not swab wounds like we used to when we first started 

thinking about Acinetobacter and just treating the colonization. So 

we really have become more sophisticated into only treating folks 

who clearly have infections. That way we are not exposing our folks 

to some of these older and more toxic agents. 

Overall, I think patients are doing better. But that is my anecdotal—my opinion. The TIDOS study certainly will give us that 

data on how folks were treated, what works best. The orthopedic 

groups in the military and across the civilian are doing some larger 

studies for prevention with irrigation pressures, irrigation fluids, 

irrigation additives for most of these. 

Most of these are traumatic extremity injuries. So there is major 

funding for that research that is being done multicenter and internationally. And I certainly think that data will help us as well. We 

have developed prevention guidelines that talk about peri-injury 

antibiotics, debridement, irrigation, et cetera. That is a DOD, 

Army, Air Force, Navy program. We are actually in the middle of 

revising those guidelines and doing an update for prevention. 

And I guess one side note, during all of this we noticed that 

minocycline was actually an effective old drug for at least the 

Acinetobacters. And we did work with the company that actually 

owned the license for intravenous minocycline to get it back on the 

market. It was never—it is still approved. It is now available again. 

Dr. SNYDER. Colonel Hospenthal, I want to make sure I understand what you are saying about the irrigation. On the studies on 

the irrigation, are you saying that sometimes there is inadequate 

irrigation in terms of cleansing, or you can fire-hose it away to 

where you devitalize some tissue? 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL. Right. Probably the latter is more important. I mean no one really knows how much irrigation fluid to use. 

But is that really important? If you need to use it, how much you 

need to get all the visible junk out of there. 

More important is the pressure. There is a division among surgeons, and in the literature, both basic research and animal research and clinical trials, that high pressure is better because these 

explosive IED blasts push things up in there and we need to get 

them out so they don’t become a nidus of infection, versus high 

pressure is really only used to chisel away at bones and take out 

bone marrow, and you shouldn’t be using high pressure and caus-
23 

ing more tissue damage that then might get infected. So trying to 

sort out which of those actually is the better approach is being 

funded as a clinical trial. 

And then there is the debate, you know, naturally you are thinking if I am pushing fluid up in there, wouldn’t it be better to have 

some antimicrobial or antiseptic compound in that fluid? Well, the 

research on that is all over the board as well. A lot of the things 

that we would put in fluid to irrigate actually kills bacteria, but it 

also kills growing and granulating tissue. And so it may cause delayed healing that then does get infected. So there are research 

projects into looking at additives for irrigation fluid as well. 

Dr. SNYDER. I can’t let you all get out of here today without at 

least having you respond to the following question. I had a discussion this morning with somebody who works on the Hill, expressing 

their disappointment about going to the doctor yesterday with 

about a day and a half of a cold, and the doctor just flat-out refused 

to give them antibiotics. And this person was incensed that that 

was the case, and probably was doctor shopping. 

Any one of you want to comment on the issue of the proper use 

and overuse of antibiotics and its relationship to these challenges 

you all are talking about today? 

Colonel JAFFIN. Sir, I think you have hit the—one of the big 

problems around the world is that the expectation that anything 

that you go to a doctor for needs antibiotics to cure. We have aggressively taught that to all our healthcare providers, all our 

healthcare team, that you only use antibiotics when clinically indicated, and you use the most specific antibiotic for that particular 

organism to prevent the growth of drug resistance. 

Captain MARTIN. I think it is a very, very interesting question. 

And I have found kind of a dichotomy. That here in the U.S., because people now have heard about the overuse of antibiotics, in 

some people it has been easier to tell them you don’t need an antibiotic for this. 

I think, as the Colonel just mentioned, the problem is in a lot of 

the rest of the world—and I have lived and worked overseas before 

in Latin America, and we are seeing this now with the bugs coming 

out of India. A lot of the other world, the rest of the world, you can 

just go and buy antibiotics. And people frequently do, and take a 

day or two, or a dose or two of all kinds of antibiotics. 

So we see some of the most resistant bugs coming out of the developing world, where you wouldn’t expect that they would have 

ready access to some of these, but they do. So we see whether it 

is multidrug-resistant Salmonella infections out of Southeast Asia 

or sexually transmitted infections. Big problems with this. And a 

lot of it is inappropriate use of antibiotics. I think we have a lot 

of inappropriate use in the U.S. still, not nearly what we had before. 

And the example you brought up is I think the most common 

one. I mean, busy physicians who have six and a half minutes to 

see a patient, sometimes it is easier to pull out the prescription pad 

and give them what they want than it is to talk them through the 

fact that they have a viral infection. 

Ms. ENGLISH. Excuse me. But on the other hand, this weekend 

starts the 2010–11 flu season. And if your colleague had a fever 
24 

above 100.4 and upper respiratory symptoms, he would be wise to 

consult with his primary care provider to receive oseltamivir if he 

hasn’t received his flu shot by now. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Just one additional question. This is a little bit in 

the weeds. But I noticed, Ms. English, you made reference to 

pulsed field as one of the treatments. I know I was intrigued by 

some of the research that is going on out there with actually accelerating wound healing with that technology. And I know that in 

my previous life in working in public health, there was a lot of research there as far as food safety, and having it as an antimicrobial 

agent in food preparation. 

But I would be interested to hear a little bit more from you about 

the future of that technology and the applicability there as far as 

infection control. 

Captain MARTIN. I think there was a little confusion. What she 

was talking about was pulsed-field gel electrophoresis characterizing organisms, which is a different thing than what you are talking about, which is also being looked at. 

And in fact in the new hospital, the new Bethesda that we are 

building, they are looking a lot at using some pulses of ultraviolet 

and whatnot to knock down contamination in operating rooms and 

in other rooms. So that is another moving area that is really important, especially when you are talking about organisms that are 

even becoming resistant to some of the topical antimicrobials that 

we use. So that is ongoing research as well. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for your time today, and thank you 

for the work that you do. I will leave it as an open-ended question 

for the record. If any of you have anything additional you would 

like to add, please send it to the staff here in the next week or so, 

and we will get it to the Members and also include it as part of 

the record of this hearing. 

I hope as time goes by, as you all continue your thinking about 

these issues, if you see a further congressional role in this, I hope 

you will let us know, because we would be very receptive to doing 

what we can. If it is a funding need or whatever it is, we would 

certainly be glad to look at it if you see some additional needs there 

that are not being met that Congress can play a role in. 

Thank you all very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER 

Dr. SNYDER. What does the Department of Defense need in order to have sufficient surveillance capabilities to identify and monitor multidrug-resistant infections 

throughout the military healthcare system? Should the Army’s Multidrug-resistant 

Organism Repository and Surveillance Network (MRSN) be expanded to become a 

department-wide capability? If so, what policy and resources are needed to make 

this happen? 

Dr. SMITH. The Department of Defense currently has sufficient surveillance capabilities to identify and monitor multidrug-resistant infections throughout the military healthcare system. We do not believe it’s necessary to expand Army’s 

Multidrug-resistant Organism Repository and Surveillance Network to become a department-wide capability. When necessary, we will consult Congress on the need for 

additional resources and authority. 

Dr. SNYDER. Shouldn’t MDROs be made reportable medical events in DOD and 

service surveillance systems such as the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance 

and Response System (GEIS)? Why aren’t they? 

Dr. SMITH. Although including selected Multidrug-Resistant Organisms as reportable events could have helped quantify the size of the issue, TRICARE Management 

Activity’s Infection Prevention and Control Panel, which includes Service representatives and infectious disease experts, felt that in most circumstances tracking the 

infections was unlikely to affect the treatment and outcome for individual patients 

because patterns are monitored and acted upon by infectious disease and infection 

control practitioners among others at the local level. The panel also felt that electronic systems would soon be available (e.g., Multidrug-resistant Organism Repository and Surveillance Network System) that can be mined to help answer questions 

related to the size of the issue. The Department of Defense (DOD) determines which 

medical events are included in the DOD Tri-Service Reportable Events Guidelines 

only after reviewing recommendations from the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, other public health 

organizations, International Health Regulations from the World Health Organization, and after soliciting advice from Infectious Disease experts throughout the Department. 

Dr. SNYDER. What resources and policy are needed to provide military treatment 

facilities, particularly those in deployed areas, adequate standardized laboratory 

testing capabilities to identify and characterize MDROs? 

Dr. SMITH. At this time, the Department of Defense does not need additional resources and policies to standardize laboratory testing capabilities to identify and 

characterize Multidrug-Resistant Organisms (MDROs). We will consult and work 

with Congress if resources and policy changes are necessary. 

Dr. SNYDER. Over the past several years military research and development related to MDROs has been funded through several different Department, service, and 

congressional programs and initiatives. Why hasn’t there been a long-term, stable 

funding source for MDRO-related research? Is there a need for a more coordinated 

and sustained research and development program (i.e., a program of record) focused 

on MDROs? If so, who should be responsible for it? 

Dr. SMITH. There has not been long-term, stable funding for Multidrug-Resistant 

Organisms (MDRO)-related research because in the years immediately preceding 

Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom, there was no military medical research in the area of MDROs. Military personnel who suffer combat-related 

injuries are at significant risk of developing acute and chronic infectious complications. Prior to 2008 and preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring 

Freedom, there was no military medical research in the area of MDROs. 

In view of the fact that more in-depth research was required on MDROs, DOD 

established an intramural program of research on wound infections. In 2010 and 

subsequent years, the Defense Health Program (DHP) has increased funding for 

medical research to address wounded warrior focus areas to include wound infections. Research and development activities sponsored under the DHP represent a 

long-term sustainable program for preventing or inhibiting infection with MDROs. 
78 

Moving forward, the Department will ensure there is a coordinated and sustained 

biomedical research and development program. To address this, DOD has established the Armed Services Biomedical Research Evaluation and Management 

(ASBREM) Committee. The ASBREM Committee serves to facilitate coordination 

and prevent unnecessary duplication of effort within DOD. The ASBREM is chaired 

by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. The ASBREM Committee includes Senior Executive representatives from the Services, and acquisition executives. Given 

the establishment of ASBREM, in future, it may serve as an oversight committee 

for managing the research and development focused on MDROs. 

Dr. SNYDER. What are the principal knowledge gaps and priorities for military research and development related to MDRO infections? 

Dr. SMITH. The principle knowledge gaps and priorities for military research and 

development related to Multidrug-Resistant Organism infections include the following Defense Health Program-sponsored activities in basic and applied research: 

Basic research in wound infection prevention and management is focused on the 

following knowledge gaps and priorities: 

— Identification and characterization of host immune response biomarkers, 

particularly those predictive of infection, to aid in clinical decisionmaking 

(e.g., optimal wound closure time); 

— Development of capabilities for early detection of antimicrobial resistance 

and characterization of antimicrobial resistance patterns in wound-colonizing and infecting organisms; 

— Development of tools to detect and identify nosocomial pathogens; and 

— Discovery of novel environmental treatments to prevent and/or eliminate 

pathogen contamination from military medical settings. 

Basic research in antimicrobial countermeasures is focused on the following 

knowledge gaps and priorities: 

— Identification and characterization of microbial virulence factors and other 

potential therapeutic targets of metabolic or signaling pathways associated 

with wound infection and biofilm processes; 

— Identification of novel therapeutics (e.g., drugs) to mitigate wound infection 

and biofilm processes; and 

— Discoveries applicable to polymicrobial infections and topical treatment approaches. 

Applied research in wound infection prevention and management is focused on 

the following knowledge gaps and priorities: 

— Development of an in vivo model for polytrauma/blast wound infection; 

— Identification and characterization of host immune response biomarkers, 

particularly those predictive of infection, to support clinical wound-management decisions (e.g., optimal wound closure time); 

— Development of tools for early detection of antimicrobial resistance and characterization of antimicrobial resistance patterns in wound-colonizing and infecting organisms; 

— Development of tools to detect and identify nosocomial pathogens; and 

— Development of novel environmental treatments to prevent and/or eliminate 

pathogen contamination from military medical settings. 

Applied research in antimicrobial countermeasures is focused on the following 

knowledge gaps and priorities: 

— Development of strategies to mitigate the action of microbial virulence factors and other potential therapeutic targets of metabolic or signaling pathways associated with wound infection and biofilm processes; 

— Development of novel therapeutics (e.g., drugs) targeting microbial virulence 

factors and/or other pathway components to mitigate wound infection and 

biofilm processes; 

— Preference is for topical treatment therapies applicable to polymicrobial infections, although novel treatment approaches are also encouraged (e.g., 

chelators, antibody, phage, antimicrobial peptides, quorum-sensing inhibitors, lysine, and host immunoaugmentation including antibody); and 

— Preference is for projects with facile applicability for advanced development 

leading to Food and Drug Administration-approved products. 
79 

Dr. SNYDER. According to the Navy’s statement, coordination of surveillance, 

treatment, and research efforts regarding infections in combat injured has taken 

years to develop and is only in the last year coming to fruition. Why did it take 

so long to achieve this level of coordination? What ‘‘lessons-learned’’ are being implemented to prevent future delay in similar situations? 

Dr. SMITH. The question is referring to the development of TIDOS (Trauma Infectious Diseases Outcome Study) that has been developed at the Uniformed Services 

University’s Infectious Diseases Clinical Research Program (IDCRP). 

While we understand the congressional concern, the delay between recognizing 

the problem and initiating a new program was not a failure to achieve coordination 

among the Services. With the establishment of the IDCRP in 2006, seed money from 

the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases became available to initiate 

TIDOS. Shortly thereafter, IDCRP investigators were able to demonstrate the critical data that TIDOS would provide clinicians treating the war injured. Navy Medicine provided funding for TIDOS in 2009 after the program’s value was properly assessed for its ability to generate evidenced based data to improve how we deliver 

care. Adequate funding for TIDOS has been planned through 2011. 

We will continually review our efforts to fund clinical research programs to best 

respond to emerging needs across the enterprise. 

Dr. SNYDER. DOD recently established a new research program—the Wound Infection Research Program—which was funded at about $14 million in 2010. Why is 

the Department only requesting about $2 million dollars for this program in 2011? 

Dr. SMITH, Colonel JAFFIN, Captain MARTIN, Ms. ENGLISH, Colonel COLLIER, and 

Colonel FORGIONE. When DOD established the Wound Infection Research program 

in FY 2010, we did not have the multiyear funding option to spread the cost over 

multiple years. Therefore, the upfront cost in FY 2010 included two to three years’ 

worth of medical research. The FY 2011 cost reflects smaller adjustments we need 

to achieve long-term research planning. 

There has not been long-term, stable funding for Multidrug-Resistant Organisms 

(MDRO)-related research because in the years immediately preceding Operation 

Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom, there was no military medical research 

in the area of MDROs. Military personnel who suffer combat-related injuries are at 

significant risk of developing acute and chronic infectious complications. Prior to 

2008 and preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom, there 

was no military medical research in the area of MDROs. 

In view of the fact that more in-depth research was required on MDROs, DOD 

established an intramural program of research on wound infections. In 2010 and 

subsequent years, the Defense Health Program (DHP) has increased funding for 

medical research to address wounded warrior focus areas to include wound infections. Research and development activities sponsored under the DHP represent a 

long-term sustainable program for preventing or inhibiting infection with MDROs. 

Moving forward, the Department will ensure there is a coordinated and sustained 

biomedical research and development program. To address this, DOD has established the Armed Services Biomedical Research Evaluation and Management 

(ASBREM) Committee. The ASBREM Committee serves to facilitate coordination 

and prevent unnecessary duplication of effort within DOD. The ASBREM is chaired 

by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. The ASBREM Committee includes Senior Executive representatives from the Services, and acquisition executives. Given 

the establishment of ASBREM, in future, it may serve as an oversight committee 

for managing the research and development focused on MDROs. 

Dr. SNYDER. To what extent does the Department of Defense formally coordinate 

and share information with the Department of Veterans Affairs on the surveillance, 

prevention, and treatment of MDRO infections? How is this done? 

Dr. SMITH. Currently, there are no formal coordination efforts between the DOD 

and VA on the surveillance, prevention, and treatment of MDRO infections. However, there are collaborative efforts underway between the Department of Defense 

(DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) under the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases/Uniformed Services University Infectious Diseases 

Clinic Research Program which have established a long-term research protocol, entitled ‘‘Trauma Infectious Diseases Outcomes Study,’’ to study interventions and outcomes in our combat wounded who develop multidrug-resistant organism (MDRO) 

infections. Patient recruitment for this protocol began in June 2009. 

Dr. SNYDER. What does the Department of Defense need in order to have sufficient surveillance capabilities to identify and monitor multidrug-resistant infections 

throughout the military healthcare system? Should the Army’s Multidrug-resistant 

Organism Repository and Surveillance Network (MRSN) be expanded to become a 
80 

department-wide capability? If so, what policy and resources are needed to make 

this happen? 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL and Colonel JAFFIN. The Department of Defense should continue to maintain and strengthen established infection prevention and control policy 

and practice at the local military treatment facility (MTF), Service, and Department 

levels. Staffing and support resources along with implementing policy are needed in 

order to effect adequate identification and surveillance of MDRO infections throughout the military healthcare system. The Army’s MRSN could be expanded throughout the Department to better coordinate and enhance MDRO surveillance, characterization, and response. 

Dr. SNYDER. Shouldn’t MDROs be made reportable medical events in DOD and 

service surveillance systems such as the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance 

and Response System (GEIS)? Why aren’t they? 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL and Colonel JAFFIN. MDRO infections are currently tracked 

at the individual medical treatment facility level as suggested by the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other professional organizations. As opposed to other reportable diseases (e.g., cholera or measles), MDROs are an ill-defined group of organisms. If MDROs were reportable the definition of an MDRO and 

the diagnostic procedures would have to be constantly updated. The term MDRO is 

chiefly used to discuss multidrug-resistant (MDR) Gram-negative bacteria even 

though current CDC definitions include Gram-positive organisms (e.g., methicillinresistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE)). 

MDROs potentially include hundreds of individual species and resistance genes. 

Many of the resistance mechanisms can only be identified by specialized laboratory 

testing such as gene sequencing. Due to new resistance mechanisms and predominant bacterial species continuing to emerge, Gram-negative MDRO infections are 

not currently reportable events in U.S. civilian or military sectors. 

Dr. SNYDER. What resources and policy are needed to provide military treatment 

facilities, particularly those in deployed areas, adequate standardized laboratory 

testing capabilities to identify and characterize MDROs? 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL and Colonel JAFFIN. Most military medical treatment facilities (MTF) outside of the combat zones have adequate capabilities to identify and 

characterize MDROs. The larger deployed MTFs have been provided clinical microbiology assets and equipment. 

Dr. SNYDER. Since the outbreak of MDRO infections, what additional infection 

control and prevention training and education do medical personnel in deployed 

military treatment facilities receive? Please describe the nature and extent of the 

training, what personnel are required to take it, and where and how often it is provided. Are there plans to expand infection control training and education? 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL and Colonel JAFFIN. Additional infection control training 

was added to the Joint Forces Combat Trauma Management Course at Fort Sam 

Houston, Texas. This training is provided to personnel staffing level III deployed 

medical treatment facilities such as the Army’s Combat Support Hospitals (CSHs). 

Additionally, a 5-day short course was established to train Infection Control Officers 

who are responsible for infection control programs within these hospitals. Because 

a single CSH may split to operate in multiple locations, a September 2010 Army 

Execute Order requires the CSH to assign an Infection Control Officer at each location that provides inpatient care. 

Dr. SNYDER. Do all deployed military treatment facilities have trained and qualified infection control officers? If not, why? What policy or resources are needed to 

ensure there is not a shortage of military healthcare personnel trained and experienced in infection control? 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL and Colonel JAFFIN. Reviews of the combat theater hospitals 

in 2008 and 2009 found that not all had trained and qualified infection control officers (ICO). There is a shortage of personnel trained and qualified to serve as ICOs 

at all deployed medical treatment facilities (MTF). To remedy the shortage of qualified ICOs, a 5-day short course was established to train personnel who are responsible for infection control programs and have been identified to serve as Infection 

Control Officers at the CSH. Because a single CSH may split to operate in multiple 

locations, a September 2010 Army Execute Order requires the CSH to assign an Infection Control Officer at each location that provides inpatient care. Department of 

Defense staffing policy should be revised to require trained and qualified ICOs at 

all level III deployed MTFs (i.e., deployed hospitals). 

Dr. SNYDER. According to the Army’s statement, critical reviews of infection control practices and challenges in combat theater hospitals were conducted in 2008 

and 2009, which led to improved infection control efforts. Are there plans to conduct 

such reviews on a regular basis in the future? If so, who will conduct these reviews, 
81 

how often will they be conducted, and where will the results be reported to? If not, 

what policy and resources are needed to establish this process? 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL and Colonel JAFFIN. These reviews have been and continue 

to be planned and conducted ad hoc by the Infectious Disease and Infection Control 

Consultants to the U.S. Army Surgeon General with the support of the U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM) Surgeon. The informal plan is to continue these reviews on 

an annual basis with results communicated to the CENTCOM Surgeon, the three 

Services Surgeons General offices, and through presentations and publications to deploying healthcare providers. These reviews will be conducted on a routine and regular basis, ideally in conjunction with standardized theater infection control practices and establishment of an infection control theater consultant. 

Dr. SNYDER. What are the principal knowledge gaps and priorities for military research and development related to MDRO infections? 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL and Colonel JAFFIN. For military research and development 

related to MDRO infections, principal knowledge gaps existed in diagnostic and 

treatment products and programs have been established to mitigate these gaps. 

Principal research priorities focus on addressing knowledge gaps in addition to research on prevention strategies and technologies. Programs established to address 

these knowledge gaps and priorities include the Military Infectious Diseases Research Program—Wound (MIDRP–W) and the Infections Diseases Clinical Research 

Program (IDCRP). The MIDRP–W focuses on wound infection research. The IDCRP, 

a joint program between Department of Defense (DOD) and National Institutes of 

Health, focuses on the design, conduct and publishing of collaborative clinical infectious disease research of importance to the DOD and the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases through an effective research network that rapidly responds to evolving infectious disease threats. 

Dr. SNYDER. According to the Navy’s statement, coordination of surveillance, 

treatment, and research efforts regarding infections in combat injured has taken 

years to develop and is only in the last year coming to fruition. Why did it take 

so long to achieve this level of coordination? What ‘‘lessons-learned’’ are being implemented to prevent future delay in similar situations? 

Colonel HOSPENTHAL and Colonel JAFFIN. Since multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter 

were first discovered as infecting patients on the United States Naval Ship Comfort 

at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, several ad hoc groups have helped to coordinate the Department of Defense response to MDROs. This initial discovery and 

identification did not include all MDROs, only Acinetobacter. The work and coordination of these ad hoc groups have grown over the subsequent years to what exists 

today. Implemented lessons learned include the rapid identification and assessment 

of the class of infection along with rapid dissemination of findings to other services 

and Department of Defense infectious disease oversight organizations. 

Dr. SNYDER. What does the Department of Defense need in order to have sufficient surveillance capabilities to identify and monitor multidrug-resistant infections 

throughout the military healthcare system? Should the Army’s Multidrug-resistant 

Organism Repository and Surveillance Network (MRSN) be expanded to become a 

department-wide capability? If so, what policy and resources are needed to make 

this happen? 

Captain MARTIN and Ms. ENGLISH. The collection of Multidrug-resistant Organisms (MDROs) specimens from the National Naval Medical Center Bethesda for 

the MRSN is already occurring and could be expanded to other Navy military treatment facilities (MTFs). Most Navy MTFs have an MDRO identification and surveillance capability and the Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center (NMCPHC) 

is expanding the central monitoring of CHCS (Composite Health Care System) laboratory input to eventually include all Navy MTFs. 

Dr. SNYDER. Shouldn’t MDROs be made reportable medical events in DOD and 

service surveillance systems such as the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance 

and Response System (GEIS)? Why aren’t they? 

Captain MARTIN and Ms. ENGLISH. No, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have not recommended tracking MDROs in this manner. Diseases 

that are reportable are connected to individual patients whereas MDRO isolates 

may be from clinical specimens, colonization surveillance, environmental samples. 

Data regarding the resistance profiles of bacteria are best gathered in an 

antibiogram (spreadsheet describing the antibiotic susceptibility of bacteria from a 

facility’s microbiology lab that is updated periodically). Collection and review of the 

data from Navy MTFs on a regular basis allows for MDROs to be tracked more effectively. The Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center (NMCPHC) is tracking 

the resistance profiles of bacteria at Navy hospitals electronically by collecting data 

from the laboratory computer input into CHCS (Composite Health Care System). 
82 

Dr. SNYDER. What resources and policy are needed to provide military treatment 

facilities, particularly those in deployed areas, adequate standardized laboratory 

testing capabilities to identify and characterize MDROs? 

Captain MARTIN and Ms. ENGLISH. Much of the initial identification of MDROs 

can be performed with standard microbiology techniques (with the addition of some 

commercially available test strips) and does not require high-tech capacity. The ability to provide reliable data regarding MDROs in the deployed areas requires a basic 

microbiology laboratory, not only with the basic capabilities currently in place, but 

also a trained microbiologist/micro lab tech to interpret the laboratory data and 

guide further testing. 

The provision of even a basic microbiology in a far forward-deployed setting is 

often not possible. In these cases, identification of MDROs could also be achieved 

by shipping the MDRO suspect isolates on to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center 

or CONUS facilities where these organisms can be more reliably evaluated. 

Fully characterizing MDROs requires highly advanced laboratory abilities and 

could not be done in the deployed setting and is best performed at a centralized site 

such as that functioning with the Multidrug-resistant Organism Repository and 

Surveillance Network (MRSN). 

Dr. SNYDER. Since the outbreak of MDRO infections, what additional infection 

control and prevention training and education do medical personnel in deployed 

military treatment facilities receive? Please describe the nature and extent of the 

training, what personnel are required to take it, and where and how often it is provided. Are there plans to expand infection control training and education? 

Captain MARTIN and Ms. ENGLISH. Infection Control is a universal part of the 

training of all medical, dental and nurse corps officers as well as hospital corpsmen. 

The Navy does not require special training in infection control and has no specialized prevention training specifically for those deployed, but does have several programs to train Infection Preventionists (IPs). We have reemphasized basic infection 

control in the deployed military treatment facilities and requests for additional 

training, as needed, are strongly encouraged. 

IPs in charge of infection prevention and control programs must receive documented education in basic concepts of infection surveillance, prevention, and control 

from an accredited program providing continuing education credits. Navy Medicine 

holds monthly video teleconference/digital conference online (VTC/DCO) meetings 

hosted by the BUMED Infection Control Consultant. These sessions are offered to 

all medical treatment facility/dental treatment facility (MTF/DTF) IPs. They provide 

education on infection prevention/control topics as well as updates related to current 

literature and Joint Commission surveys. 

Additionally, each MTF/DTF is encouraged to send IPs to current, up-to-date 

courses. Examples include: EPI 101 (Fundamentals of Infection Surveillance, Prevention and Control) courses by Association for Professionals in Infection Control 

and Epidemiology (APIC); Courses in Healthcare Epidemiology cosponsored by the 

Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America and the Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention (SHEA/CDC); Annual Fellows Course in Hospital Epidemiology and 

Infection Control at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland; the Statewide Program for Infection Control and Epidemiology (SPICE) at the University of 

North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 

Dr. SNYDER. Do all deployed military treatment facilities have trained and qualified infection control officers? If not, why? What policy or resources are needed to 

ensure there is not a shortage of military healthcare personnel trained and experienced in infection control? 

Captain MARTIN and Ms. ENGLISH. All Medical, Dental, and Nurse Corps officers 

along with enlisted Hospital Corpsmen have training in infection control and infection control has been re-emphasized in all Navy facilities as the increase in MultiDrug Resistance Organisms (MDROs) has occurred. There is not a specific designation for infection control officers in the Navy. Military treatment facilities in deployed settings assign a medical department officer to be responsible for infection 

control. The hospital ships USNS Comfort and USNS Mercy, each have assigned infectious diseases staff who are subject matter experts in infection control, and other 

ships with a large medical department may also deploy with an infectious diseases 

physician. 

The Navy has not experienced a shortage of military healthcare personnel trained 

and experienced in infection control. 

Dr. SNYDER. According to the Army’s statement, critical reviews of infection control practices and challenges in combat theater hospitals were conducted in 2008 

and 2009, which led to improved infection control efforts. Are there plans to conduct 

such reviews on a regular basis in the future? If so, who will conduct these reviews, 
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how often will they be conducted, and where will the results be reported to? If not, 

what policy and resources are needed to establish this process? 

Captain MARTIN and Ms. ENGLISH. We are continually working to improve how 

we deliver healthcare in all our medical facilities. Continuously reviewing and revising how we do business helps us ensure we are evaluating and implementing best 

clinical practices. The Army’s recent review of Infectious Disease and Infection Control was a good example of how we have learned and adapted to conditions in-theater. It was evident from the review that there was a need to reemphasize basic 

infection control practices. This approach has had a positive impact for not only our 

patients in-theater, but also for those in CONUS. In addition to our renewed emphasis on basic infection control, the Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center 

(NMCPHC) is electronically tracking the resistance profiles of bacteria at Navy Military Treatment Facilities. Navy Medicine will continue to conduct additional reviews as appropriate and in collaboration with our partners in-theater. 

Dr. SNYDER. What are the principal knowledge gaps and priorities for military research and development related to MDRO infections? 

Captain MARTIN and Ms. ENGLISH. The principal gap in MDRO-related research 

is the lack of available drugs in the development pipeline to effectively treat these 

infections. This problem is not specific to the military as it affects civilian facilities 

worldwide. The need for an international focus on development of new drugs for 

these infections is outside the research capabilities in the U.S. military at this time. 

The military has chosen to focus its intramural research efforts on areas of specific 

concern for clinical care of the injured warfighter. 

The Navy has focused funding on the clinical aspects of MDRO infections in war 

injuries. The two focus areas are: 

1. Developing enhanced surveillance and electronic reporting from Navy laboratories of MDROs to determine the source of these organisms and minimize 

their acquisition and spread among patients and staff. 

2. Assessing what treatment and management strategies for wound infections 

with MDROs are associated with the best outcomes through the TIDOS 

(Trauma Infectious Disease Outcome Study). 

Dr. SNYDER. According to the Navy’s statement, coordination of surveillance, 

treatment, and research efforts regarding infections in combat injured has taken 

years to develop and is only in the last year coming to fruition. Why did it take 

so long to achieve this level of coordination? What ‘‘lessons-learned’’ are being implemented to prevent future delay in similar situations? 

Captain MARTIN and Ms. ENGLISH. The question is referring to the development 

of TIDOS (Trauma Infectious Diseases Outcome Study) that has been developed at 

the Uniformed Services University’s Infectious Diseases Clinical Research Program 

(IDCRP). 

With the establishment of the IDCRP in 2006, seed money from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) became available to initiate 

TIDOS. Shortly thereafter, IDCRP investigators were able to demonstrate the critical data that TIDOS would provide clinicians treating the war injured. Navy Medicine provided funding for TIDOS in 2009 after the program’s value was properly assessed for its ability to generate evidenced based data to improve how we deliver 

care. Adequate funding for TIDOS has been planned through 2011. 

The delay between recognizing the problem and initiating a new program was not 

a failure to achieve coordination among the Services. Navy Medicine has a strong 

working relationship with the Army and Air Force in the area of infection control. 

Our efforts to uncover the Multidrug-Resistant Organism problem were successful 

and subsequent efforts to fund clinical research programs have been addressed. 

Navy Medicine is currently funding TIDOS and is continuously reviewing priorities 

to best respond to emerging needs across the enterprise. 

Dr. SNYDER. What does the Department of Defense need in order to have sufficient surveillance capabilities to identify and monitor multidrug-resistant infections 

throughout the military healthcare system? Should the Army’s Multidrug-resistant 

Organism Repository and Surveillance Network (MRSN) be expanded to become a 

department-wide capability? If so, what policy and resources are needed to make 

this happen? 

Colonel COLLIER and Colonel FORGIONE. Expansion of the Army’s MSRN to become a DOD-wide program would provide sufficient surveillance to identify and 

monitor these infections. We would work with the Army to determine what resources would be needed to make this a reality. 

Dr. SNYDER. Shouldn’t MDROs be made reportable medical events in DOD and 

service surveillance systems such as the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance 

and Response System (GEIS)? Why aren’t they? 
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Colonel COLLIER and Colonel FORGIONE. The CDC’s National Healthcare Safety 

Network and The Joint Commission requires programs to track and control 

healthcare-associated infections (from catheters, ventilators, etc.) and has specific 

definitions for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE), Gram-positive infections. Certain MDROs are not reported due to their diverse species and broad range of resistance mechanisms; these 

make them complex to characterize. While mandatory reporting of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms (MDROs) across the DOD would be challenging to establish and 

maintain, such a program would allow for coordinated surveillance and response. 

The first step will be to define which MDROs will be tracked. 

GEIS has supported the clinical laboratories that perform MDRO screening for 

our four major military medical centers who receive combat-wounded U.S. personnel 

using funds within the currently established current screening program. A DOD 

program as suggested in question one could potentially improve oversight in reporting MDROs across the DOD. GEIS focuses predominantly on emerging infections 

overseas. Dr. SNYDER. What resources and policy are needed to provide military treatment 

facilities, particularly those in deployed areas, adequate standardized laboratory 

testing capabilities to identify and characterize MDROs? 

Colonel COLLIER and Colonel FORGIONE. USAF military medical treatment facilities (MTF) outside of the deployed areas are adequately equipped and staffed to perform bacterial identification and antibiotic sensitivities; emerging Multidrug-Resistant Organisms (MDROs) will be referred to designated DOD referral labs for advanced testing and characterization. Larger deployed MTFs should receive supplemental clinical microbiology assets and equipment. A DOD program policy to standardize deployed clinical microbiology assets would enhance surveillance and is essential to standardized analysis, interpretation and reporting of emerging MDROs. 

Dr. SNYDER. Since the outbreak of MDRO infections, what additional infection 

control and prevention training and education do medical personnel in deployed 

military treatment facilities receive? Please describe the nature and extent of the 

training, what personnel are required to take it, and where and how often it is provided. Are there plans to expand infection control training and education? 

Colonel COLLIER and Colonel FORGIONE. All USAF medics receive annual training 

in infection control (IC) practices and principles as part of their normal duty assignment. Medics identified to deploy receive refresher IC training at various training 

courses (i.e. EMEDS, CCAT, etc). Individuals identified to deploy as the infection 

control officer are required to complete the 5-day Infection Control Course. Also 

there is a specific joint course available: ‘‘Infection Control in the Deployed Setting,’’ 

which deploying IC officers are required to take. There are no plans to expand these 

requirements. 

Dr. SNYDER. Do all deployed military treatment facilities have trained and qualified infection control officers? If not, why? What policy or resources are needed to 

ensure there is not a shortage of military healthcare personnel trained and experienced in infection control? 

Colonel COLLIER and Colonel FORGIONE. Yes, the USAF provides an officer who 

has completed the infection control basic course to manage infection control at Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) facilities. 

Dr. SNYDER. According to the Army’s statement, critical reviews of infection control practices and challenges in combat theater hospitals were conducted in 2008 

and 2009, which led to improved infection control efforts. Are there plans to conduct 

such reviews on a regular basis in the future? If so, who will conduct these reviews, 

how often will they be conducted, and where will the results be reported to? If not, 

what policy and resources are needed to establish this process? 

Colonel COLLIER and Colonel FORGIONE. According to the Army Infectious Disease 

(ID) Consultant there are no formal plans for regular reviews of the infection control 

practices and challenges in deployed level III medical treatment facilities (MTF), but 

plans are currently underway for a review of the Afghan theater operations in winter of 2011 by the Army ID Consultant. The USAF has no plans to conduct a theater 

review in the coming year. We agree that there is a need to conduct routine and 

regular reviews, and support a joint team concept, using standardized theater infection control practices. The Air Force Surgeon General is working to have AFIA, our 

inspection agency, review infection control practices and outcomes at our hardened, 

sustained, MTFs in theater. 

Dr. SNYDER. What are the principal knowledge gaps and priorities for military research and development related to MDRO infections? 

Colonel COLLIER and Colonel FORGIONE. The Joint Program Committee-2 (JPC– 

2) used Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Health Program e-funds for approximately 32 

Multidrug-Resistant Organisms (MDRO)-focused research projects in five DOD lab-
85 

oratories, in five civilian university laboratories, and in four companies in the commercial sector. The Military Infectious Diseases Research Program (MIDRP)/JPC2 

current gaps for MDROs are: 

a. Wound Infection Prevention & Management: Fundamental research to prevent 

infections and inform clinical wound management. 

b. Antimicrobial Countermeasures: Fundamental research for discovery of tools 

to treat MDRO wound infections. 

c. Wound Infection Prevention & Management: Applied research for development 

of tools to prevent wound infection and inform clinical wound management. 

Dr. SNYDER. According to the Navy’s statement, coordination of surveillance, 

treatment, and research efforts regarding infections in combat injured has taken 

years to develop and is only in the last year coming to fruition. Why did it take 

so long to achieve this level of coordination? What ‘‘lessons-learned’’ are being implemented to prevent future delay in similar situations? 

Colonel COLLIER and Colonel FORGIONE. There was coordination initially at the 

level of the infectious diseases specialists from the time the problem was identified 

initially on the USNS Comfort at the start of the Iraqi War in 2003 and the three 

services mobilized to tackle this challenging problem. Over the last seven years and 

despite the absence of a central coordinating body, the services created a relatively 

robust response to the issues despite the challenges outlined in these questions and 

our previous testimony. The infrastructure and research initiatives initiated to date 

laid the groundwork upon which we may build a more vigorous and improved DOD 

response in 2010 and beyond. 

The Air Force Medical Service has not been faced with many patients with 

Multidrug-Resistant Organism (MDRO) infections; so, as a service, the issue has not 

required significant resources. However, our significant participation in transporting 

wounded joint/coalition patients via the patient movement system (Air Evacuation 

and through our theater hospitals (Balad, Bagram)) and the guarantee that we will 

be similarly involved in future conflicts mean we must join the joint effort to address MDROs. To that end, we will continue to place competent and trained infection control officers at our Military Treatment Facilities and we support making the 

Army’s Multidrug-Resistant Organism Repository and Surveillance Network 

(MRSN) a DOD program and the use of the Global Emerging Infectious Surveillance 

and Response System (GEIS) as a database to track and analyze MDRO infections. 

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