In The Matter Of: 

COMAIR, INC. 

Respondent 

SERVED: July 30, 2014 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

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DocketNos. FAA-2014-0318 

FAA-2014-0319 

Case Nos. 2011S0271013 

2011S0271015 

ORDER DENYING 

RESPONDENT'S AND FAA'S MOTIONS 

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On June 2, 2014, the FAA filed two Complaints against the Respondent, Comair, Inc., under 

Docket Nos. FAA-2014-0318 and FAA-2014-0319. 1 The two Complaints charge Comair with 

multiple violations of the federal aviation regulations, and request a total proposed civil penalty in 

the amount of$487,500. 

On July 2, 2014, in lieu of filing an answer, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss of 

Comair, Inc. [sic] ("Motion to Dismiss"). 

On July 11,2014, the FAA filed one document containing two motions and a response. This 

document was entitled Motion to Strike, Motion to Deem Allegations Admitted, and Response in 

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. The document in its entirety will be referred to as the FAA's 

"Response." The individual Motions in this FAA Response will be referenced by short title (e.g., 

"Motion to Strike" and "Motion to Deem"). 

On July 17, 2014, the Respondent filed one document containing one answer and a reply. 

This document was entitled Answer In Opposition to Complainant's Motion to Strike and Motion to 

Deem Admitted, and Reply to Complainant's Response In Opposition To Respondent's Motion to 

Dismiss. The document in its entirety will be referred as the Respondent's Reply. The individual 

1 There has be~n no order of consolidation of the two actions. Nevertheless, the actions appear to be linked for these 

motions, since the parties have filed identical motions in both case files. As a result, the Order issued here is identical 

for each case. Therefore, both docket numbers have been listed on this Order, but two separate Orders- one for each 

separate file- have been issued. 
Answer in Opposition to the FAA Motions in this FAA Response will be referenced by short title 

(e.g., "Opposition"). 

On July 23,2014, the FAA filed its Reply In Support of Motion to Strike and Motion to 

Deem Admitted ("FAA Replies"). 

In reviewing the parties' Motions, Responses, Opposition, and Replies, all evidence, 

arguments and legal authority have been read and considered. However, only certain highlights are 

addressed in this Order. 

A. General Factual Summary 

The Respondent alleged that Comair, Inc. ceased all revenue flight operations on September 

29, 2012. However, it maintained its Air Carrier Certificate in order to continue operating and 

allow itself time to conduct an "orderly transfer of aircraft" to leaseholders and other entities. (Mot. 

Dismiss, Exh. 1). On December 13, 2011 the FAA served the Respondent with two Notices of 

Proposed Civil Penalty ("NPCP"). (Mot. Dismiss 2.) Four (4) days later, on December 17, 2012, 

the Respondent contacted the FAA and voluntarily surrendered its Air Carrier Certificate. (Mot. 

Dismiss, Exh. 1.) That same day, December 17, 2012, the FAA served the Respondent with notice 

that the "effective date" of its Certificate surrender was December 27, 2012. (Id. at Exh. 2.) On 

December 28, 2012, the day immediately following the Respondent's effective date of Certificate 

surrender, the Respondent was merged into Delta Airlines, Inc. (Mot. Dismiss, 1 fn. 1.) 

Approximately five months later, on May 17,2014, the FAA served the Respondent with 

two Final Notices of Proposed Civil Penalty.- (Complaints, 1.) Four ( 4) days later, the Respondent 

served the FAA with Requests for Hearing (Requests for Hearing, 1.) On June 2, 2014, the FAA 

filed the two Complaints at issue here. The Respondent's Answer was due on or before July 3, 

2014. On June 27,2014, the FAA declined to agree to an extension ofthe July 3, 2014 deadline. 

On July 2, 2014, one day before the filing deadline, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. 

B. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 

1. Brief Summary of Parties' Arguments 

The Respondent asserted that once the FAA accepted its Air Carrier Certificate surrender, 

the FAA was estopped from pursuing a civil penalty action, because the FAA had not "reserve[d] 

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the right to pursue this enforcement action". (Mot. Dismiss 2.) As legal grounds supporting its 

Motion to Dismiss, the Respondent asserted that the language ofFAA Order 2150.3B was 

controlling. "The FAA is barred by its own internal rules and policies from prosecuting the 

Complaint filed against Comair in this matter" because the FAA had accepted the Respondent's 

voluntary surrender of its Air Carrier Certificate. (Mot. Dismiss 2.) 

As part of its Response, the FAA asserted that FAA Order 2150.3B was not relevant to the 

facts in this case, because the Respondent's certificate surrender had not involved a certificate 

action.2 (Response 2.) In addition, the language of FAA Order 2150.3B was guidance for FAA 

employees only, and did not prohibit pursuit of a civil penalty action. (Response 2.) 

2. Applicable Section of FAA Order 2150.3B 

The overall purpose of FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14, ~10(b) (May 1, 2012) is to provide 

"guidelines" to FAA employees for "handling a certificate holder's voluntary surrender of a 

certificate." FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14, ~10(a) (May1, 2012). As part of these guidelines, FAA 

employees are directed to be "alert" for indications a certificate holder is attempting to "avoid 

certificate action."Id. at ~10(b). The FAA employees are also directed to "refuse the voluntary 

surrender of a certificate" if there is an investigative or enforcement action pending. (I d.) 

Consequently, before determining whether to accept a certificate holder's voluntary 

surrender of a certificate, FAA investigative personnel review actions in the EIS and 

other databases showing investigative or enforcement activity. If the EIS or ariy other 

database reveals that the certificate holder is the subject of an enforcement 

investigation or enforcement action, FAA investigative personnel refuse the 

certificate holder's attempt to voluntarily surrender a certificate and continue with an 

investigation and recommend enforcement action, if appropriate. 

FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14, ~10(b) (May 1, 2012). 

3. Discussion and Analysis 

In essence, the Respondent argues that FAA Order 2150.3B, which is the FAA's 

Compliance and Enforcement Program, covers all enforcement actions, not just certificate actions. 

2 The word "certificate" is typically used as a short-hand reference to an air carrier's certificate of public convenience 

and necessity, which is issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 41101. An 

air carrier's "certificate" grants the air carrier economic authority to conduct air transportation. An air carrier's failure 

to comply with regulations may result in a "certificate action" by the DOT that might limit, suspend, or revoke the air 

carrier's authority to conduct air transportation. 

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(Mot. Dismiss, 1.) According to the Respondent, the language of FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14, ~lO(b) 

is broad-based, and serves to estop the FAA from bringing or pursuing any civil penalty actions 

against any air carrier after the FAA accepts the surrender of an air carrier's Certificate. In this 

case, it would mean that the FAA's service of the two December 13, 2011 NPCPs on the 

Respondent would be "trumped" or rendered moot by the FAA's subsequent acceptance, effective 

December 27, 2011, of the Respondent's voluntary surrender of its certificate. In cases as a whole, 

it means that an air carrier could potentially avoid enforcement action, if an FAA employee fails to 

follow the guidelines in FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14, ~10(b), or in the alternative, fails to exercise 

sufficient diligence in following internal agency guidelines. 

Even if it is assumed that FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14, ~10(b) covers all FAA enforcement 

actions (instead of just certificate actions, as asserted by the FAA), there is no language in Chapter 

5, paragraph lO(b) that prohibits the FAA from initiating or pursuing civil penalties after an air 

carrier voluntarily surrenders its certificate. In fact, the FAA Administrator has held that "the 

surrender of the air carrier operating certificate does not obviate the need for the imposition of a 

substantial civil penalty with punitive and deterrent effect where there is a finding of regulatory 

violations." In re Folsom's Air Service, Inc., F AA-2004-17277, FAA Order No. 2008-11 at 19-20 

(Nov. 6, 2008). See In re Lifelite, FAA Order No. 200-28 (Dec. 21, 2000) (an air carrier's surrender 

of its operating certificate does not shield it from a civil penalty action). Part ofthe rationale for the 

Administrator's position is that there is nothing in the regulations that precludes an air carrier, who 

voluntarily surrenders its operating certificate, from applying for a new operating certificate. The 

Administrator seeks to estop such air carriers from trying to avoid civil penalties for past violations 

while continuing to operate in the future. See Folsom's, FAA Order No. 2008-11 at 20. 

The Respondent argued for a reasoned interpretation of FAA Order 2150.3B, but did not 

provide any further authority in support of its position. While the Respondent's arguments 

regarding the scope and application of the FAA's internal guidelines are certainly creative and 

zealously made, they are not persuasive. 

[rest of page left blank] 

Page 4 of 11 
C. FAA's Motion to Strike 

1. Brief Summary of Parties' Arguments 

In its Response, the FAA moved to strike the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss on several 

grounds. The FAA asserted that "[n]o reasonable person, much less a reasonable attorney, could 

conclude that Paragraph 10(b) of Chapter 5 ofFAA Order 2150.3B has the meaning Respondent 

asserts." (Response, 3.) The FAA also asserted that the Motion to Dismiss was a "frivolous" motion 

that had been "filed for purposes of delay". (Response 4.) As support for this argument, the FAA 

demonstrated that the Motion to Dismiss was filed shortly after the FAA had declined the 

Respondent's request for a waiver of the deadline to file an answer. (!d. at Ex. A.) The Respondent 

did not dispute this evidentiary proffer. However, in its Opposition and Reply, the Respondent 

asserted that the FAA's Motion to Strike should be denied in its entirety, because the Respondent's 

Motion to Dismiss "was proper in all respects." (Reply, 1.) 

2. Legal Authority Cited by the Parties 

The FAA cited 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(f)(4) as authority for its Motion to Strike the 

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Section 13.218(f)(4) provides in part: 

Any party may make a motion to strike any insufficient allegation or defense, or any 

redundant, immaterial, or irrelevant matter in a pleading. 

14 C.F.R. § 13.218(f)(4) (emphasis added). 

Section 13.202 defines a pleading as "a complaint, an answer, and any amendment of these 

documents permitted under this subpart." 14 C.F.R. § 13.202. In its Opposition and Reply, the 

Respondent argued that its Motion to Dismiss was properly filed under 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.209(a) and 

13.218(f)(2)(ii), which specifically allow a respondent to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of filing an 

answer (i.e., a defensive pleading). 

3. Actual Scope of 14 C.F.R. § l3.218(f)(4) 

As identified above, the FAA cited 14 C.P.R.§ 13.218(f)(4) as authority for its Motion to 

Strike, but the language of 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(f)(4) is specific to pleadings. It is clear that the 

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is not a defense pleading. Instead, it is a motion filed in lieu of a 

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defense pleading. Thus, 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4) does not appear on its face to be the proper 

support for the FAA's Motion to Strike. 

To help determine the scope of relief offered by 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4), the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure may be utilized as helpful guidance. See In re Boris Kirola, FAA Order No. 94-

39, 1994 WL 899655 at *3 (Dec. 9, 1994). The language of14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4) appears to 

generally follow the language in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), which provides in part: 

The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, 

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(f). 

Like the language of 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4), motions to strike pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

Proc. 12(f) are specifically limited to the pleadings. See, e.g., Sidney-Vinstein v. A. H. Robins Co., 

697 F.2d. 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Crisp, 190 F.R.D. 546, 550-51 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 

3, 1999). Striking a pleading is the ''primary procedure for objecting to an insufficient defense," and 

was "designed to reinforce the requirement that pleadings be "simple, concise, and direct." 5C Fed. 

Prac. & Proc. Civ. §1380 (3d ed.) It is the equivalent of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for legal 

insufficiency. Steven Baicker-McKee, Federal Civil Rules Handbook 487 (Test for Striking 

Defenses) (2013). Thus, extrinsic material outside of a pleading, such as "motions, affidavits, briefs, 

and other documents" is not subject to Rule 12(f). 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §1380 (3d ed.) Even 

when a Rule 12(f) motion is properly raised against a pleading, striking such a pleading is 

considered a "drastic remedy" which should be rarely granted. 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 

471 (2014). See also 61A Am.Jur.2d Pleading §446 (May 2014). 

However, some federal courts have expanded the use of Rule 12(f) to strike pre-trial 

affidavits and other motion materials, because ofthe "legal insufficiency" of the materials. 5C Fed. 

Prac. & Proc. Civ. §1380 (3d ed.) In essence, these courts have expanded the use ofRule 12(f), in 

part because the review of material under Rule 12(f) is the same as in a summary judgment motion, 

i.e., "in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Brown v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc. 913 

F.Supp.2d 881, 888 (N.D. Cal. 2012). This expansive use ofRule 12(f) remains controversial, 

however, and has not been widely adopted. Martin v. Town of Westport, 558 F.Supp. 2d 228, 230 

(D.Conn. 2008)(Rule 12(f) is limited to pleadings). Instead, courts have recommended that a 

motion to strike a pre-hearing motion or other extrinsic material be considered as either an 

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opposition to the pre-hearing motion, Bond v. ATSI/Jacksonville Job Corps Center, 811 F. Supp. 2d 

417, 421 (D.D.C. 2011) (a motion to strike is an improper vehicle for challenging a motion), or as a 

motion for summary judgment, Steven Baicker-McKee, Federal Civil Rules Handbook 493 

(Extrinsic Materials) (20 13). 

4. Other Applicable Legal Authority -14 C.P.R. § 13.207(b) and (c) 

Based on the substance of the FAA's argument and its reference to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11(b)(1) (Response, 3), the FAA's Motion to Strike is better taken under 14 C.F.R. § 

13.207(b), (c) which provides in relevant part: 

(b) Effect of signing a document. By signing a document, the attorney of 

record ... certifies that the attorney ... has read the document and, based on 

reasonable inquiry and to the best of that person's knowledge, information, and 

belief, the document is-

* * * 

(2) Warranted by existing law or that a good faith argument exists for extension, 

modification, or reversal of existing law; and 

(3) Not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive ... not made to cause 

unnecessary delay ... , or for any other improper purpose. · 

(c) Sanctions. If the attorney of record ... signs a document in violation of this 

section, the administrative law judge ... shall: 

(1) Strike the pleading signed in violation of this section; 

* * * 

(3) Deny the motion or request signed in violation of this section; 

(4) Exclude the document signed in violation ofthis section from the record; 

* * * 

14 C.F.R. § 13.207(b) and (c). 

5. Discussion and Analysis 

a) Motion to Strike Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(/)(4) 

As noted earlier, the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is not a defensive pleading. Rather, it 

is a pre-hearing motion filed in lieu of defense pleading, pursuant to 14 C.F .R. § § § 13 .209( a) and 

13.218(f)(2)(ii). The court is limited to striking only pleadings under 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4), and 

such strike action against a party's pleadings should be granted sparingly. Utilizing the caselaw and 

guidance found under Rule 12(f), FAA's Motion to Strike is best considered as an "Opposition" to 

Page 7 of 11 
the Respondent's pre-hearing Motion to Dismiss. For ease in review, however, the FAA's 

Opposition will continue to be called a Motion to Strike. 

b) Motion to Strike Pursuant to14 C.F.R. § 13.207(c) 

In its Motion to Strike, the FAA asserted that the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was both 

"frivolous" (i.e., "unreasonable") and filed solely to cause unnecessary delay. The FAA requested 

sanctions provided under 14 C.F.R. § 13.207(c)(3) and (4), i.e., denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and 

its exclusion from the record. 

The FAA Administrator has previously recognized the similarity between 14 C.F.R. § 

13.207 and Fed. R. Civ. P. ll(b)(l), which provides similar sanctions for material filed without 

merit or to cause unnecessary delay. In re Boris Kirola, FAA Order No. 94-39, 1994 WL 899655 at 

*3 (Dec. 9, 1994). Courts have provided various standards of review for alleged violations of Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 11(b)(l), such as, whether the legal position has "no chance of success," Fishoffv. Coty, 

Inc., 634 R.3d 647, 654 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Morley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 66 F.3d 21,25 (2d Cir. 

1995)), whether a reasonable attorney in like circumstances could not have believed his actions 

were legally justified, Burns v. George Basilikas Trust Trust, 599 F.3d 673, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(citing In re Sargent, 136 F.3d 3.49, 352 (4th Cir. 1998)), and whether the frivolous nature of the 

claim is unequivocal, Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc., 605 F.3d 1319, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 201 0). 

Baicker-McKee, supra, at 401-02. See also, Steven Baicker-McKee, Federal Civil Rules Handbook 

401-402 (Standard of Culpability) (20 13 )(Rule 11 (b)( 1) intended to regulate bad faith filings-such 

as "actions 'akin to contempt"'). 

Thus, to address the FAA's requests for sanctions under Section 13.207(c), a review of the 

merits and timing of the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is needed. 

c) Merits of the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 

As noted earlier herein, this court does not find the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 

ultimately persuasive. That does not mean, however, that the motion was unreasonable, or that it 

did not have merit. It is well-established, in the history of our adversarial system, that even when an 

Page 8 of 11 
attorney vigorously advocates3 for a client, not all the motions or new legal theories raised will be 

successful. To sanction a party for raising new issues would create an untenable "chilling" effect in 

the adversarial system. See, e.g., Ario v. Underwrit{ng Members ofSyndicate 53 at Lloydsfor 1998 

Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277,297 (3d Circ. 2010)(sanctions should be applied only in 

"exceptional circumstances" where a motion is "patently unmeritorious.") 

Clearly the Administrator has generally expressed the need to pursue civil penalty actions 

against air carriers who have surrendered their operating certificate. But there has been no decision 

directly addressing the scope or applicability of the language contained in FAA Order 2150.3 B, 5-

14, ~10(b). The guideline language states that if the FAA seeks to "continue" an enforcement 

action, then the air carrier's proffer of voluntary certificate surrender should be "refuse[ d]." (!d.) 

The guideline language is broadly written, and could easily be perceived by the public to encompass 

all "enforcement investigation or enforcement action." FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14, ~10(b). 

This court does not agree with the FAA's assertion that the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 

was "frivolous." A frivolous motion is one without basis in fact or law. A "frivolous" motion should 

be firmly distinguished from a motion that raises a new issue or defense. Indeed, an attorney has a 

professional duty to creatively issue-spot the facts and law in each case. 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at 

Law§ 139; Model Rules ofProfl Conduct R. 1.1. Good advocacy often requires persistent 

examination of rules and case law, as well as the proffer of novel legal arguments. 

Rule 11 sanctions are reserved for correcting litigation abuse and should not be 

"applied to adventuresome, though responsible, lawyering which advocates 

creative legal theories." 

Steven Baicker-McKee, Id. at 402, citing Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 94 (3d 

Cir. 1988). 

In this case, the language of FAA Order 2150.38, 5-14, ~10(b) indicates a potential broad 

scope of inclusion, with a course of action that "should" be taken by the FAA - indicating a 

potential finality if an air carrier's certificate surrender is accepted (and not refus~d). In the absence 

of any bright line rule, definitive case, or an express statement in FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14, ~10(b) 

3 Vigorous advocacy may occur during all phases of litigation. This means that an advocate may engage in settlement 

discussions while at the same time preparing and advancing legal positions that may narrow or resolve issues in 

preparation for trial. 

Page 9 of 11 
regarding other future enforcement actions, it was well within good advocacy for the Respondent to 

have raised this issue in its Motion to Dismiss. 

d) FAA 's Assertion of Purposeful Delay. 

It was undisputed that the Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss after the FAA declined to 

agree to an extension of time for the Respondent to file an Answer.4 The FAA characterized this 

litigation choice as a deliberate attempt to cause unnecessary delay. 

The Respondent's deadline for filing an Answer was July 3, 2014. (Response, Exh. A at 1.) 

On Friday, June 27,2014, the FAA told the Respondent it was declining to agree to an extension of 

the July 3, 2014 deadline. (!d.) The FAA was perfectly free to exercise that choice on its own 

behalf. The Respondent then had several choices. It could file an Answer on or before July 3, 2014, 

seek an extension of time over the FAA's objection pursuant to 14 C.P.R. § 13.213(b), or file a 

Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 14 C.P.R.§§ 13.209(a) and 13.218(f)(2)(ii). 

The Respondent chose to file a Motion to Dismiss on July 2, 2014 pursuant to 14 C.P.R. § 

13.209(a) and 14 C.P.R.§ 13.218(£). It was free to exercise that choice on its own behalf. Based on 

the facts in this case, there has been no showing of "unnecessary delay" pursuant to 14 C.P.R. § 

13.207(b). The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was a legal option authorized by the regulations, 

was properly filed by the Respondent within specified time limits, and raised a creative legal theory 

that was within the scope of good advocacy. 

D. FAA's Motion to Deem Allegations Admitted 

The FAA's Motion to Deem was contingent upon its Motion to Strike being granted. (FAA 

Response, 4; FAA Reply, 4-5.) Pursuant to 14 C.P.R.§ 13.207(c), the FAA sought to exclude the 

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss from the record. If such exclusion were granted, then the 

Respondent's failure to file an Answer on or before July 3, 2014 would have placed the Respondent 

in default status in the proceeding, pursuant to 14 C.P.R. § 13.209(£). Because the Motion to Strike 

is denied, the Motion to Deem must also be denied. 

4 The parties refer to this agreed extension as a "waiver of time." (Response, Exh. A at 1.) Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. 

§ 13.213(a), the parties may "agree to extend for a reasonable period the time for filing a document under this subpart." 

Such agreements should be submitted in the form of a draft order for the Judge's approval. 14 C.F.R. § 13.213(a). 

Absent an agreement, the movant may file a written motion for extension of time, "not later than 7 days before the 

document is due unless good cause for the late filing is shown." 14 C.F.R. § 13.213(b). 

Page 10 of 11 
E. Conclusion and Order 

Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.205(a)(6), (8), and 13.207, and after reviewing all relevant 

caselaw, regulations, statutory authority, and being fully advised; 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 

2. The FAA's Motion to Strike is denied. 

3. The FAA's Motion to Deem Allegations Admitted is denied. 

4. Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(f)(2)(ii), the Respondent shall file an answer to the 

Complaint and shall serve a copy ofthe answer not later than 10 days after the date of 

receipt of this Order. 

ivan 

U.S. A mmistrative Law Judge 

Attachment: Service List 

Page 11 of 11 
Docket No. FAA-2014-0319 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

SERVICE LIST- BY U.S. MAIL 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence A venue, S. W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2Wl0005 

Mr. Christopher R. Stevenson 

Complainant's Counsel 

Office of the Regional Counsel, AS0-7 

ONE. COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region 

1701 Columbia Avenue 

College Park, GA 30337 

TEL: 404-305-5200 

FAX: 404-305-5223 

Mr. Robert P. Silverberg 

Respondent's Counsel 

1101 30th Street, N.W. Suite 120 

Washington, DC 20007 

Mr. Ryan Gumm, VP of Flight Operations 

Comair, Inc., Respondent 

82 Comair Blvd. 

Erlanger, KY 41018 

Judge J.E. Sullivan 

U.S. Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-6941 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

Mr. James McClain 

Delta Air Lines, Inc. 

P.O. Box 20706 Dept. 982 

Atlanta, GA 30320 

5 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000, Washington, 

DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.