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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 

AT SEATTLE 

CENTRAL TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL, 

INC., 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

MOVERS PAK-MAN, INC., PATRIOT 

INTERNATIONAL FORWARDING, INC., 

MICHELLE HAYES, BONNIE HAMLETT, 

and DARRELL HAMLETT, 

Defendants. 

CASE NO. C05-1919C 

ORDER 

This matter has come before the Court on Defendant Michelle Hayes’s 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. (Dkt. No. 9.) Defendants Movers Pak-Man, Bonnie Hamlett and 

Darrell Hamlett joined in Defendant Hayes’s motion. Having carefully considered the papers filed by 

the parties, the Court has determined that no oral argument shall be necessary. For the reasons that 

follow, the Court hereby DENIES the motion. 

Defendant Hayes brings her motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

which permits a court to dismiss a cause of action if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court will grant dismissal only if “it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley 

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v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). While a court must accept all material allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, conclusory 

allegations of law or unwarranted inferences of fact urged by the nonmoving party are insufficient to 

defeat a motion to dismiss. Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition, a court’s 

obligation to construe allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party does not mean 

that those allegations must be construed in a light favorable to the nonmoving party, if such a 

construction cannot reasonably be made. 

In the present case, Defendant Hayes contends that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed as 

time-barred by the 18-month statute of limitations contained in 49 U.S.C. § 14705. This statute 

provides that “A carrier providing transportation or service . . . must begin a civil action to recover 

charges for transportation or service provided by the carrier within 18 months after the claim 

accrues.” 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a). However, Plaintiff’s complaint does not seek to “recover charges 

for transportation or service” within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, the Court does not 

find that the causes of action asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint are subject to the statute of limitations 

contained in 49 U.S.C. § 14705. 

Defendant Hayes also argues that Plaintiff’s claims are not properly before the Court because 

“[i]n order for [Plaintiff] to recover on any of its claims for misrepresentation, fraud, breach of 

fiduciary duty, and alter ego, CTI must . . . be able to show that it is a creditor of Patriot and prove 

the exact amount of those claims.” (Hayes Reply 4–5.) Defendant Hayes asserts that in order to 

qualify as a “creditor,” Plaintiff must have a judgment in hand. 

As a preliminary matter, Defendant Hayes’s argument pertains only to Plaintiff’s claim under 

the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), WASH. REV. CODE ch. 19.40. None of Plaintiff’s 

other claims (among them garden-variety claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation) 

require that Plaintiff be a creditor. 

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Second, Defendant Hayes’s argument that Plaintiff would only properly be considered a 

“creditor” for the purposes of its UFTA claim if it had a judgment against Defendants in hand is 

without merit. The statute defines “creditor” as “a person who has a claim,” and defines “claim” as 

“a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 

contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.40.010(3)–(4). In the present case, Plaintiff’s complaint clearly alleges 

facts which, if true, would lead to a finding that Plaintiff has a “claim”. Accordingly, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff’s complaint alleges sufficient facts regarding its creditorship for UFTA purposes to 

survive Defendant Hayes’s motion to dismiss. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint survives Defendant 

Hayes’s motion to dismiss. 

Finally, Defendant Hayes argues that as to herself, Plaintiff may only recover $76,997.18, the 

amount allegedly fraudulently transferred to her by Patriot. Plaintiff’s prayer for relief clearly states 

that this sum is the only sum it seeks from Defendant Hayes in terms of avoiding alleged fraudulent 

transfers. Defendant Hayes offers no reason why she may not be held liable for an amount above 

and beyond the $76,997.18 on the basis of Plaintiff’s other claims (if Plaintiff prevails). Accordingly, 

the Court declines to limit Defendant Hayes’s liability to the amount of the alleged fraudulent 

transfer. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

 SO ORDERED this 9th day of August, 2006. 

 

 

A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

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