CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities

www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx

Peter Dutton, Andrew S. Erickson, and 

Ryan Martinson, Editors
Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

China Maritime Study No. 11

February 2014

President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral Walter E. Carter, Jr., U.S. Navy

Provost

Amb. Mary Ann Peters

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Robert C. Rubel

Director of China Maritime Studies Institute

and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series

Peter Dutton

Naval War College Press

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ISSN 1943-0817

ISBN 978-1-935352-16-7


Contents

CHAPTER ONE Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft: Beyond Sea Denial .............1

by John Patch

CHAPTER TWO Underwater TELs and China’s Antisubmarine Warfare:

Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness.......................17

by William S. Murray

CHAPTER THREE China’s Second Artillery Force: Capabilities and Missions 

for the Near Seas................................................................31

by Ron Christman

CHAPTER FOUR Aerospace Power and China’s Counterstrike Doctrine

in the Near Seas............................................................................... 49

by Daniel J. Kostecka

CHAPTER FIVE Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas.................................... 61

by David Shlapak

CHAPTER SIX Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in 

China’s Near Seas...............................................................75

by Eric D. Pedersen

CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR: Integrating Aerospace

Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas................................87

by Andrew S. Erickson

CHAPTER EIGHT China’s Surface Fleet Trajectory: Implications for 

the U.S. Navy................................................................... 119

by Timothy A. Walton and Bryan McGrath

Abbreviations and Definitions............................................................................... 132

About the Contributors ........................................................................................ 136

The capstone U.S. Defense Department study on the future operational environment declares, “China’s rise represents the most significant single event on the 

international horizon since the collapse of the Cold War.”1 Understanding and assessing 

changes in China’s traditionally defensive naval strategy, doctrine, and force structure are 

of obvious importance to the U.S. Navy (USN) and other Pacific navies concerned with 

the possible security implications of that rise. This chapter examines the development of 

the Chinese navy’s Houbei (Type 022) fast-attack-craft force and its roles and missions 

in China’s near seas and discusses implications for the U.S. Navy and other navies in 

the region. The author argues that this force, when integrated with People’s Liberation 

Army Navy (PLAN) units and task groups in joint operations, provides an offensive seacontrol capability beyond simple coastal defense (coastal defense here being a limited 

form of sea denial). Indeed, linked fast attack craft operating collectively may present 

a significant potential offensive threat to American capital ships and strike groups well 

beyond the littorals.2

Origins of the Houbei Fast Attack Craft

PLAN doctrine outlined the purpose of the fast-attack-craft force as early as 1950. Beijing sought a modern, lightly armed offshore coastal-defense element to place alongside 

the key PLAN forces, naval aviation and submarines.3 These fast-attack-craft units consisted of relatively fast (thirty-plus knots), single-mission hulls, including subchasers and 

torpedo boats (later, guided-missile boats) that operated in speedboat zhidui (“flotillas”).4

 Early fast attack craft were adequate to the coastal-defense missions of countering 

Nationalist Chinese “invasions” and later, Soviet and American amphibious threats over 

home waters;5 they were available in large numbers and could be rapidly deployed along 

interior lines. They were, however, very limited in endurance and range.6 Nonetheless, 

because PLAN resource limitations precluded the development of large combatants before the 1980s, the occasional maritime clashes that did occur involved fast attack craft—

including the sinking of several adversary fast attack craft and small combatants. 

John Patch

Beyond Sea Denial

CHAPTER ONE

Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft
2 china maritime studies

In the 1980s the PLAN commander, Adm. Liu Huaqing, played an important role in 

changing the service’s mission (and mind-set) from coastal defense to offshore defense—or “near-seas active defense”—with a commensurate change in fast-attack-craft 

roles and missions. Naturally, this doctrinal shift called for a different force to cover a 

much larger area, a force relying less on fast attack craft for coastal defense and requiring more offshore-patrol vessels for longer-duration patrols in the three near seas. Fast 

attack craft still had a significant support role for amphibious operations against Taiwan, 

but other near-seas missions, like protection of sea lines of communication and patrol 

of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), demanded a new force of multimission vessels 

with improved blue-water seakeeping and endurance. During this period, accordingly, 

PLAN fast attack craft, numbering some two hundred by 1990, obsolesced as demand 

decreased.7 As the PLAN cast its gaze beyond the EEZ, however, the need for a modern, 

offensive fast attack craft became apparent. Offshore-patrol vessels persisted, and in 

greater numbers than fast attack craft (they continue their missions to the present), but 

they could not serve as fast attack craft in the modern sense. The Houbei class answered 

that requirement. 

Sources on PLAN requirements for a new fast attack craft are either unavailable or protected, but it seems clear from early acquisition activity that the need for a modern fast 

attack craft had become pressing by around 1998. For example, China sought to acquire 

Molniya-class fast attack craft from Russia in the early 2000s, though the sale never 

reached fruition.8 Houbei hulls began appearing in 2004. 

The Houbei represented a marked change from previous-generation fast attack craft and 

offshore-patrol vessels. It is not just a replacement for the Chinese versions of the Osa 

and Komar coastal-defense fast attack craft; it represents a capability shift decidedly in 

the offensive direction, a shift relevant to the “active defense” aspect of near-seas operations. ONI analysts emphasize Houbei’s “better sea keeping, speed, and mission flexibility” in comparison to the older missile boats.9

 It is certainly not simply an offshorepatrol vessel replacement, as the Type 037 variants are still relatively capable and thus 

not in dire need of replacement; in any case, the Houbeis do not have the offshore-patrol 

vessels’ long range or endurance. 

While still viable for other missions, the older Houjian, Houxin, Haiqing, and Haijiu 

classes cannot serve as modern fast attack craft: they are too slow, most are not data-link 

capable, and none have long-range antiship missiles. The PLAN designed the recently revealed Type 056 corvette to replace the Houjian—with an escort and air-defense mission 

for the farther reaches of the near seas—a development supporting the assertion that the 

Houbei is not a follow-on offshore-patrol type.10 For now, the more than sixty “combat 

operational” Houbeis constitute the sole modern PLAN fast-attack-craft class.11
china

s near seas combat capabilities 3

Houbei within a Changing Naval Strategy

There is no question that the PLAN is evolving to meet expanding regional missions 

and that the Houbei class will play an important role. What is less clear is how China is 

evolving its strategy, doctrine, and operational concepts to meet new near- and far-seas 

requirements.12 The PLAN is transforming its force structure to make it more appropriate for offensive operations beyond the traditional littoral tether. Gaps persist in the 

body of literature with respect to this transformation, but it is possible to assess the part 

that fast attack craft play. Similarly, since the recurring Chinese white papers do not 

move much beyond generalities, open-source material and PLAN operations and exercises provide important evidence on key developments. Finally, the near- and far-seas 

concepts are not really formal “strategies” in the Western sense—indeed, there does not 

appear to be any Chinese naval or maritime strategy comparable to U.S. versions.13 Still, 

it is instructive to use near/far-seas concepts in a strategic sense. 

It is important to note that with an expectation of increasing far-seas missions for larger 

PLAN combatants, fast attack craft will, logically, need to be relevant well outside coastal 

waters. The far-seas concept endorsed since the mid-2000s, for instance, clearly requires 

a PLAN that will operate with increasing reach and with offensive capabilities.14 The 

Center for Naval Analyses assesses that Beijing’s intent to extend its strategic depth for 

active defense is an “expansion of the armed forces’ geographic and functional security 

interests.”15 PLAN development trends in support of far-seas missions include longrange standoff weapons and extended overseas deployments—including the requisite 

sustainment, such as at-sea logistics and overseas bases.16 As PLAN major combatants 

move out of the near seas, then, smaller combatants like the Houbei can be expected to 

fill the gap in the near seas. 

The Houbei missions fit within the recent PLAN emphasis on expanding near-seas missions beyond sea denial (which, of course, is inherently defensive) to sea control. The 

PLAN has naturally focused on sea control for a Taiwan contingency, but recent exercises 

and deployments involving fast attack craft seem to demonstrate a shift to sea-control 

missions in the larger near-seas region. Indeed, RAND assessed in 2009 that PLAN modernization is “specifically designed to allow the PLAN to move over this period from sea 

denial to sea control capabilities in a regional conflict.”17 Many respected China watchers 

have reached similar conclusions, describing these developments as distinctly offensive 

in nature.18

Houbei’s Potential for Offensive Roles and Missions

If the fast attack craft is to be relevant to sea control missions, it must have inherently 

offensive capabilities—and it does.
4 china maritime studies

At first blush, the craft may seem to have only defensive weapons, but it is the Houbei’s 

collective offensive punch that has the most potential for sea control, as opposed to denial. Houbei fits into “green-water active defense,” but some forget that this role involves 

offensive missions in certain circumstances.19 The PLAN clearly designed the Houbei to 

act as an element of a larger combat system or linked network. For example, its largely 

passive electromagnetic and electro-optical sensors provide only localized, line-of-sight 

targeting, preserving the ship’s ability to operate undetected but seriously limiting its 

ability to identify and track targets.20 The Houbei’s surface-search radar cannot provide over-the-horizon targeting (OTHT), and stealthy ships by their nature rarely use 

active sensors in any case. Houbei’s extensive data-link connectivity, however, supports 

long-range coordination with aircraft, submarines, and other warships.21 All this points 

toward a craft optimized to receive over-the-horizon targeting within a larger combat 

network.22 Many sources cite China’s growing open-ocean OTHT capability, making coordinated antiship Houbei operations more possible.23 In 2011, a RAND analyst 

concluded that “China’s greatly improved detection, tracking, targeting, and long-range 

missile systems will soon pose a very real threat to US carrier groups operating to the 

west of Guam.”24 Offensive missions in the far reaches of all three near seas, however, will 

require the numbers necessary to make the Houbei a viable offensive arm of the PLAN. 

If so, the logical implication is that it will be unavailable for coastal-defense missions.

Eight long-range YJ-83 (C803, 135 nm range) antiship cruise missiles provide the 

Houbei’s offensive punch.25 A study by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 

highlighted the YJ-83 and follow-on antiship cruise-missile threat: “Future anti-ship 

cruise missiles are expected to continue to utilize advanced seeker capabilities including the expanded use of millimeter wave seekers and the possible use of coherent radar 

seekers that allow enhanced countermeasure discrimination.”26 Just a single YJ-83 would 

be a serious potential threat to a U.S. carrier or expeditionary strike group, but Chinese 

naval tacticians do not envision single-missile strikes against adversary capital ships.27

Hence, seen as a larger combat system, externally cued Houbeis become much more 

than coastal-defense craft. 

Houbei’s “semistealth,” speed and volume antiship-cruise-missile fires also make it a potentially lethal element within a stratagem of offensive surprise. The importance of the 

Chinese concept of the “assassin’s mace” is well known, but many analysts still associate 

PLAN near-seas capabilities within an antiaccess and area-denial (A2/AD) paradigm—

that is, largely defensive in nature. Alongside an increasing fleet of long-range antiship cruise-missile platforms, the Houbei class provides a distinctly offensive potential 

capability within the active-defense strategy.28 A recent RAND assessment points out 

that Chinese writings stress preemptive attacks on key U.S. power-projection capabilities—including aircraft carriers—prior to or quickly following formal declaration of 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 5

hostilities. This stratagem is designed to disrupt the deployment of forces to the region, 

place Washington in a passive position, and deliver a psychological shock to the United 

States and its allies.29 RAND goes farther, to state that an aircraft carrier with escort, if 

surprised, would be particularly vulnerable to a saturation missile attack. Chinese descriptions of Houbei fast attack craft consistently stress covert, long-range attacks taking 

advantage of stealth, surprise, and standoff ranges. 

A final factor that supports the idea of the offensive nature of the Houbei class is the 

fact that new Chinese coastal-defense cruise-missile (CDCM) capabilities are lessening 

the need for coastal-defense craft, freeing up the Houbei for missions farther out in 

the near seas—though, again, they cannot replicate the roles or missions of offshorepatrol vessels. The YJ-62 CDCM is becoming the coastal-defense workhorse. With its 

reported 160 nm range, it provides China with significant long-range coastal defense, 

well beyond the 20 nm range of the dated YJ-8/C801 antiship cruise missile found on 

older coastal-defense craft.30 Jane’s asserts that as many as 120 of these new systems 

had been deployed opposite Taiwan by 2012.31 With improved OTHT and targetdiscrimination sensors and techniques—such as over-the-horizon backscatter and 

surface-wave radars—the need for an antiship cruise missile or more guided-missile 

craft for coastal defense is arguably minimized (though offshore-patrol vessels are certainly still required).32 The logical implication is that the PLAN will continue to let the 

number of coastal-defense hulls drop as the YJ-62 and follow-on coastal-defense cruise 

missiles and networked intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems 

solidify coverage over the Chinese littoral.

Differing Expert Views

As of 2009, however, ONI did not seem to view the Houbei as an offensive fast attack 

craft, describing it instead as a “coastal defense and near-littoral” patrol craft.33 This 

author argues, however, that the Houbei’s role is potentially much greater than patrol. 

First, China did not design it for long-endurance patrols. The Houbei is no offshorepatrol vessel; minimal fuel capacity, a small crew, marginal “hotel services,” largely passive sensors, and a lack of embarked small craft make it incompatible with patrol duties. 

The U.S. Naval War College’s Andrew Erickson seems to agree, asserting that Houbeis 

are integral to Chinese offensive concepts of operations, whether targeting Taiwanese 

navy surface units in a cross-strait conflict or U.S. carrier strike groups with multiaxis, 

saturation antiship cruise-missile attacks.34 Nan Li, also of the Naval War College, argues 

that the most likely role of the Houbei is “active defense of China’s ‘near seas,’ representing the country’s attempts to gain greater sea control further from its landmass.”35 If the 

Houbei has an offensive role as argued, the A2/AD terminology commonly applied to 

the PLAN may not be fully satisfactory here.36
6 china maritime studies

The PLAN could also use Houbeis for missions other than surface warfare. For example, 

some analysts argue that the Houbei could carry missiles other than antiship cruise 

missiles, possibly antisubmarine missiles or torpedoes. While the Houbei has no antisubmarine sensors, within a linked fleet it could act simply as a “shooter,” just as it can 

in coordinated surface attacks. Antisubmarine missiles fired from a low-signature, fast 

surface craft provide the advantages of surprising enemy submarines, not giving away 

the location of escorting Chinese submarines, and limiting enemy response, in that, as 

analysts assert, the Houbei would be a hard target for torpedo attack.37 Finally, some 

argue that the PLAN could modify the Houbei for land attack cruise missiles, as the missile housing can apparently accommodate C601 and similar weapons of the type.38 These 

possibilities remain speculative, though, as no evidence clearly indicates that the PLAN 

will deploy missiles other than an antiship type on Houbei.

PLAN Houbei Exercise Employment

The greater openness of recent PLAN exercises provides illuminating examples of 

Houbei employment. Indeed, China has expanded its transparency in recent decades, 

as manifested by more openness in official discussions on defense and a noteworthy 

emphasis on new capabilities.39 Some argue that this transparency is purposeful, that 

it “functions as a crucial means of conventional deterrence,” clearly aimed at Washington.40 But even beyond denial and deception, especially in light of Beijing’s deliberate 

embellishment of military capabilities, there is the inherent risk of flawed inferences and 

findings from PLAN exercises. 

Recent exercises demonstrate that the PLAN is gradually accomplishing “near-seas active 

defense” missions, with naval units deploying farther out to provide a defensive barrier, 

but a barrier with an offensive aspect. The PLAN increasingly integrates fast attack craft 

in large-scale, joint exercises and operations. For instance, exercise accounts since 2009 

emphasize multiaxis, nighttime Houbei missile attacks. Dr. Erickson found that during 

June–July 2010 joint “anticarrier” East China Sea exercises, Houbeis played an important 

role with live antiship cruise-missile fires.41

Chinese accounts of these exercises and of their training focus also provide important 

insights into fast-attack-craft roles and missions. An official PLAN description of Houbei training included the following details: 

The flotilla has initially formed up more than ten new tactics including coordinated 

combat operations along with observation and communication stations and early warning aircraft. . . . Since last year, the flotilla has completed missions including a four-vessel 

formation in day/night continuous sailing across fleet boundaries, and formation volley launch of missiles in a complex electromagnetic environment. Not long ago, in an 

opposing-forces training exercise with a formation of the new missile attack craft guided 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 7

by information from a light force in an attack on an enemy formation, a maritime strike 

force composed of a number of new vessels succeeded in a long-range, beyond-line-ofsight attack, hitting their targets precisely.42 

This account obviously indicates coordinated, salvo, antiship cruise-missile strikes 

with external cueing, but it also suggests several secondary missions, such as ISR. Official PLAN media coverage describes Houbei missions as including “maritime defense 

penetration” and “long-range missile attacks,” in coordination with submarines, surface 

units, and aircraft.43 Other PLAN accounts give the fast attack craft a supporting role 

in amphibious operations in the South and East China Seas and in combat operations 

outside “territorial waters.”44 These descriptions indicate missions well beyond coastal 

defense. One point of evidence against longer-range Houbei operations, however, is 

that to date PLAN joint exercises involving the Houbei have fallen within roughly two 

hundred nautical miles of shore bases.

The PLAN Houbei Imperative 

One reason the PLAN developed the Houbei fast attack craft was to counter regional 

surface fleets. Taipei is obviously Beijing’s foremost concern. The majority of Houbeis 

are homeported within easy range of the Taiwan Strait, in the East and South Sea Fleets. 

They are ideal for fast response in a crisis or for saturation antiship cruise-missile attacks 

against Taiwanese combatants in preparation for an amphibious move against the island.45 Taiwan has sixty-one fast attack guided-missile craft, but the eighteen Kuang-Hua 

VIs, with four Hsiung Feng-2 antiship missiles, make up its force of modern fast attack 

craft.46 They represent a capable, if small, sea-denial complement to other Taiwanese surface combatants and CDCMs, but they remain quantitatively and qualitatively inferior 

to the Houbeis.47 Taipei must appreciate this, as its developmental nine-hundred-ton, 

stealthy, catamaran-hull, guided-missile “near-shore frigate,” armed with eight Hsiung 

Feng-3 antiship cruise missiles (with 160 nm range and supersonic speed), is designed 

both to counter the Houbei threat and provide a more capable sea-denial fleet.48

The fleets of other regional states with contiguous waters are also important factors in 

Beijing’s calculations. Vietnam in 2003 purchased from Russia ten Molniya (modernized 

Tarantul export-variant) fast attack craft, each armed with eight SS-N-25 Switchblade 

missiles.49 Alongside the four Gepard-class frigates, this represents a capable Vietnamese 

navy surface threat, both classes having over twice the Houbei’s range and displacement. The even more robust navies of South Korea and Japan are far more capable than 

Vietnam’s of sea control in home waters. While the Philippine navy cannot field even a 

marginal sea-denial force, Manila, like other U.S. allies, expects American support for 

defense against Chinese aggression. The Houbei can operate near all these waters and 

could provide an offensive punch against pro-U.S. Asian navies in a crisis—surely an 
8 china maritime studies

aspect of Houbei’s raison d’être. Yet the PLAN almost certainly acquired the Houbei 

primarily with the USN in mind.

While a detailed assessment of the employment of massed Houbeis against U.S. strike 

groups is beyond the scope of this chapter, the previous discussion should suggest the 

potential threat. One has only to imagine a Taiwan defense scenario with U.S. strike 

groups closing on the region to appreciate the possibilities: stealth and forty-knot-plus 

speed allow the positioning of coordinated, dispersed “wolf packs” hundreds of miles off 

the Chinese coast, hundreds of miles apart, linked with ISR, attack aircraft, and submarines, presenting American warships with multiple-axis fusillades of antiship cruise 

missiles.50

Houbei Class Weaknesses

While an intimidating craft, designed to be a “thorough-bred ship-killer,” the Houbei 

class is not “ten feet tall.”51 Taiwan’s military keeps a close eye on Chinese naval developments and describes Houbei’s limitations in the same way most analysts do: “short range 

at high speed, dependence on target data provided by an external command and control 

network, and reduced stealth at high speed from the stern water plume.”52

The Houbei’s range is indeed a serious limiting factor with respect to its concept of 

operations and deserves special attention. On the basis of all available information, four 

hundred nautical miles is a good rough estimate of the extreme of the hull’s unrefueled range at operational speeds.53 At economical speeds, range increases to as much as 

a thousand nautical miles in good sea conditions, but other factors typically make such 

speeds impractical. Hence, unrefueled, Houbei is relegated to relatively brief missions 

within the near seas. 

Yet two factors mitigate the effects of Houbei’s short legs: the 135 nm range of the C803 

(and follow-on antiship cruise missiles), combined with the Houbei’s own range, and 

the potential use of offshore islands or tenders for logistical support can both extend its 

operational reach.54 The operative term here is “potential”—a detailed review of current 

literature reveals a dearth of information on Houbei logistics or operations beyond a few 

hundred nautical miles. While references to Houbei refueling and berthing at offshore 

islands and South China Sea outposts exist, the PLAN does not appear to possess a nextgeneration class of replenishment vessels for smaller combatants.55 The PLAN would 

surely task its larger replenishment vessels with out-of-area operations supporting 

large combatants, making them less available for fast attack craft. An assessment of the 

existing PLAN inventory suggests that any of the Dazhi, Dalang II, and Dajiang classes 

of submarine tenders / support ships could serve as fast-attack-craft tenders, but this is 

speculative.56 The 2010 Chinese defense white paper does stress, however, that sea-based 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 9

logistics are a priority, that the PLAN is “working to further improve its surface support 

capabilities.”57 It is also possible that Chinese naval leaders would simply accept the risk 

and leave Houbeis to their own devices after a coordinated antiship cruise-missile attack. 

In fact, some analysts assert that these inexpensive craft ($30 million each) are deemed 

expendable.58

Other commonly cited weaknesses are worth addressing as well. One is the limiting 

factor of the small crew on extended operations. Endurance is reduced because watch 

rotations are impossible with a crew of only twelve; human limitations likely prevent 

missions beyond roughly twenty-four hours. “Creative manning” could help alleviate 

this situation, but other factors, such as sea state and operations tempo, exacerbate the 

human factor and make it perhaps as important a limitation as the craft’s unrefueled 

range.59 Another weakness is reliance on air cover to guarantee freedom to maneuver, 

especially in a contest with a more capable navy. Houbeis have only limited air defenses 

of their own—a close-in weapon system and man-portable air-defense missiles—

leaving them vulnerable outside the protection of larger combatants or shore-based 

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).60 Still, recent PLAN exercises with Luzhou and Luyang 

II DDGs and Jankai II FFGs—all with advanced, longer-range SAMs—and land-based 

Su-30MK2/J-11 series aircraft suggest that sufficient air cover might well support the 

employment of Houbei at its maximum range. The PLAN also seems intent on optimizing for area air defense follow-on Chinese warships, such as the recently revealed 

next-generation air-defense destroyer and the refurbished aircraft carrier Liaoning (the 

ex-Russian Varyag). The Houbei’s HN-900 data-link antenna reportedly links it with 

larger Chinese surface combatants, supporting the idea that Houbei could participate in 

coordinated operations under PLAN air/SAM cover.61

The Future PLAN Fast-Attack-Craft Force

Geography and contingency planning likely demand a larger PLAN fast-attack-craft 

force for the coming decades. The vast expanses of China’s near seas, for instance, may 

require fast attack craft in numbers sufficient for crises in more than a single near-seas 

region at once. Because saturation antiship-cruise-missile attacks require multiple 

Houbeis, even eighty craft seem insufficient to the task. Maintenance, short range, and 

crew rest limit how many the PLAN can effectively field at once. While estimates of 

future orders of battle vary, most analysts assert that Houbei production will continue 

apace. China is also building two Houbeis for Pakistan, an indicator both that the hull is 

a proven design and that production will continue.62 Jane’s asserts that the PLAN will acquire as many as a hundred, to equip three flotillas, one for each fleet.63 The South China 

Sea, however, could well prove to be the hub for Houbei operations. As James Holmes of 

the Naval War College asserts, “The South China Sea represents the most likely maritime 
10 china maritime studies

theater for Beijing to deploy armed force, including combined-arms attacks designed to 

saturate and overpower U.S. task groups’ defenses, to realize its geopolitical and strategic 

aims.”64

Economically, China can easily support the expansion and modernization of the Houbei 

force and begin the development of follow-on craft. Chinese journals speculate that future, larger versions of a Houbei-type craft will have a flight deck / hangar and helicopter 

and may serve as a command-and-control and ISR platform.65 Beijing’s defense budget 

continues to grow at roughly 12 percent annually, supporting acquisition, research, and 

development (and most analysts assert that the budget figures are understated).66 Certainly, as China charts its path to global power status, its navy will expand, including the 

fast-attack-craft force. 

A lesser, but still important, factor is the effectiveness of Chinese quality control in warship manufacture and maintenance, not only to ensure a ready naval force at present but 

to provide sustained fleet numbers over decades. The struggles that the United States 

is now facing with this issue demonstrate the priority and funds that fleet maintenance 

must have to ensure full vessel service lives. China began to modernize its shipyards in 

the 1990s and Beijing is building at a frenetic pace—the Type 071 Yuzhao-class amphibious dock transport, for instance, was built in only six months.67 Rapid production with 

relatively new technologies can be a recipe for lifetime hull and machinery problems 

affecting readiness and class longevity. Further, aluminum hulls or superstructures (like 

Houbei’s) carry their own slate of corrosion problems. Indeed, since the PLAN would 

not make Chinese manufacturing and maintenance problems publicly known, it is possible that there is more of a problem than is widely presumed.

Finally, the PLAN still is not yet fully competent in sea control. Fast-attack-craft integration in more complex operations is still nascent and dependent on nearby shore-based 

or island support. The PLAN is still developing naval strategy, doctrine, and operational 

concepts, as well as an officer corps skilled in operational art. Still, PLAN leaders admit 

that these shortcomings exist and seem to be focusing efforts on addressing them, especially with an aggressive training regimen.68

Implications 

At the theater-strategic level, the PLAN fast-attack-craft evolution is part of the larger 

PLAN shift to an offensive-oriented, regional, sea-control navy. This shift has implications for the United States and treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific (Australia, Japan, Korea, 

the Philippines, and Thailand), all increasingly concerned not just with China’s military 

rise but also with its recent aggressive maritime behavior. Conflicting South and East 

China Seas territorial claims could easily lead to clashes involving the PLAN. Official 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 11

U.S. assessments warn that “the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices 

on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.”69 These 

allies may have to choose among options of expanding their own navies, strengthening 

anti-China defensive alliances/coalitions, accommodating the rise of a potentially belligerent China, or a combination thereof. Regional defense agreements also carry significant obligations for Washington, should China assert itself more aggressively in coming 

years. Some American analysts conclude that if the United States and its allies continue 

to balance the expanding PLAN, another costly arms race may result.70 As the Houbei 

class reaches its apex in coming years and the PLAN builds a follow-on fast attack craft, 

the PLAN transformation path will become clearer. 

The PLAN fast-attack-craft evolution holds more specific operational and tactical 

ramifications for the U.S. Navy. The Houbei’s size and partial stealth mean that the 

USN may never locate with long-range sensors the firing platform in a YJ-83 antishipcruise-missile launch prior to or after the fact, making prosecution by surface-launched 

Harpoon difficult at best. Even if located after launch, a Houbei’s speed could quickly 

put it outside the Harpoon engagement envelope. Air-launched Harpoons or aerial 

cueing may be solutions, but operating friendly aircraft or unmanned aerial systems 

within range of China’s growing fourth-generation naval air defenses raises the risks to 

these platforms.71 Hellfire-armed MH-60R helicopters would be similarly vulnerable. 

Houbei prosecution via submarine seems unlikely, as discussed. Recent U.S. government 

assessments of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) suggest that it too will not be up to the 

task of Houbei hunter-killer missions in high-threat waters.72 The most desirable tactic 

is probably class-wide preemptive mining or in-port destruction, but short of a general 

war, this is hard to imagine. More subtle means might involve targeting the battle network that makes the Houbei a viable threat or denying the PLAN the ISR that is vital to 

locating adversary warships. 

Another option is to rethink the long-standing argument for a high-low-mix fleet force 

structure. Since the PLAN fast-attack-craft force is a fleet-scale problem, premised on 

distributed operations of small, single-mission warships, response in kind may well be 

a viable option. Indeed, the USN originally envisioned the LCS as a “Streetfighter” to 

take on warships in the littorals (it has since morphed to a much larger, multimission 

hull). The concept of preserving combat power via distributed, dispersed operations in 

the face of a similar threat, espoused by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Capt. Wayne 

Hughes, seems to make sense.73 Hughes argues that the inherent survivability and 

combat power achieved through a dispersed fleet of smaller, single-mission ships could 

preclude the need for larger warships to deal with multiaxis salvos alone. By extension, 

he would view the current LCS and larger capital ships as potentially too valuable to mix 
12 china maritime studies

it up in high-threat waters. Another advantage that numerous, dispersed, smaller warships 

bring is wide-area surveillance—critical for locating low-signature craft like the Houbei. 

There are obvious operational drawbacks to deploying many small combatants far afield, 

but the USN has mastered them before. Nevertheless, the Navy is clearly committed to the 

LCS, despite official government reports that recommend smaller, single-mission hulls.74

Other considerations would be important for prosecuting the Houbei threat. First, if 

one assumes that USN units cannot locate the Houbei before launch, the Aegis system 

will have to be up to the task of fleet air and missile defense. Ostensibly, carrier air 

wings would augment Aegis, but current air-wing aircraft mix, training, and operations 

are weighted heavily toward strike; their proficiency in eliminating massed, multiaxis 

antiship-cruise-missile salvos should not be assumed. As James Holmes points out, 

“U.S. commanders can expect a 360-degree threat environment” of dispersed, massed, 

multifaceted attacks.75 This scenario is no easy one for the carrier strike group. Further, 

small, agile targets like the Houbei amid a cluttered near-seas environment will demand 

next-generation precision and discriminating terminal guidance for friendly maritime 

standoff weapons. Harpoon’s obsolescence in both range and target discrimination is 

a stark current USN standoff weakness that demands a near-term remedy.76 Wide-area 

target identification is another requirement that seems to need improvement. Stealthy 

unmanned aerial vehicles may offer promising solutions, but an overreliance on technological solutions has proved illusory in the past. In fairness, naval and air theorists 

are currently working on, under the “AirSea Battle” rubric, joint U.S. Navy / Air Force 

approaches to dealing with PLAN A2/AD threats, but the work remains conceptual for 

now.77

This chapter has argued that the PLAN Houbei fast-attack-craft force will play an offensive role within the near seas in a Chinese navy shifting from sea-denial to sea-control 

capabilities. While gaps in the evidence exist, Chinese doctrine and operational concepts, 

accounts of PLAN exercises and operations, and numerous expert studies provide sufficient information to make a balanced assessment. The PLAN seems to aspire to a nearseas sea-control navy within the next decade, and fast attack craft will arguably represent 

an important element within a linked fleet designed to bring the fight to navies in both 

green and blue water. Prudence demands that naval strategists avoid discounting the offensive potential of PLAN fast attack craft in the near seas and that tacticians account for 

these craft long before missile endgame. 

Notes

1. U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating 

Environment (Suffolk, Va.: 25 November 2008), 

p. 24.

2. Opinions vary on the distances associated 

with “coastal” and “littoral,” but for this paper 

they are synonymous and imply ranges out to 

roughly fifty nautical miles (nm). The exclusive 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 13

economic zone extends to two hundred nautical 

miles, and the “near seas” to the First Island 

Chain, or as far as five hundred nautical miles. 

3. See Ting Yu, “Complete Remake or ‘Old 

Medicine in a New Bottle’: A Brief Discussion 

of the Role and Application of the Type 022 

Stealth Missile Boat,” Xiandai Bingqi (Beijing), 2 

September 2008, pp. 35–43.

4. Office of Naval Intelligence [hereafter ONI], 

China’s Navy 2007, p. 39, available at www.fas

.org/. While analysts sometimes include the later 

generation of lightly armed offshore-patrol vessels under the fast-attack-craft rubric, this paper 

will focus on the contemporary fast-attackcraft force, which technically does not include 

offshore-patrol vessels.

5. Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy 

and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near 

Seas’ to ‘Far Seas,’” Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009), 

p. 148.

6. Later offshore-patrol vessels had better range 

and endurance, but this author argues that these 

are not true fast attack craft.

7. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: 

Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, 

D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 8 June 

2011), p. 42. The U.S. Department of Defense 

(DoD) assesses the total fast attack force consisted of eighty-five hulls by 2010: see U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: Military 

and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, 2010), p. 2, available at 

www.defense .gov/.

8. U.S. Senate, Security Issues: Strategic Perceptions,

hearing, U.S.-China Security Review Commission, 3 August 2001, p. 448, available at origin

.www.uscc.gov/. The Molniya is an improved 

version of the Russian Tarantul guided-missile 

patrol craft, with forty-knot-plus speed, a 76 

mm gun, and two SS-N-22, or four SS-N-25, 

antiship cruise missiles. 

9. ONI, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A 

Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics

(Washington, D.C.: Navy Maritime Intelligence 

Center, August 2009), p. 20, www.oni.navy.mil/. 

ONI and other sources indicate that the Australian Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull (SWATH) 

design is particularly well suited for higher sea 

states where monohull vessels would be less able 

to operate.

10. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: China and 

Northeast Asia, s.v. “China: Procurement,” 17 

January 2011, www.janes.com/. 

11. Houbeis are clearly integrated as higher-end 

elements of near-seas operations and exercises, 

whereas older fast attack craft are not. See Joseph Carrigan, “Aging Tigers, Mighty Dragons: 

China’s Bifurcated Surface Fleet,” Jamestown 

Foundation China Brief 10, no. 19 (September 

2010), pp. 2–5. Claims of eighty Houbeis can be 

found in press accounts, though DoD’s 2012 Annual Report to Congress on China reports sixty.

12. While Admiral Liu also envisioned “far seas” 

missions, they were evolutionary in nature and 

in any case would not involve fast attack craft. 

See Daniel J. Kostecka, “From the Sea: PLA 

Doctrine and the Employment of Sea-Based 

Airpower,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 3 

(Summer 2011), pp. 11–30. 

13. James R. Holmes, “China’s Maritime Strategy Is 

More than Naval Strategy,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 11, no. 6 (April 2011), p. 10. 

Senior Chinese navy officials in 2011 revealed 

that a “maritime security strategy is under 

study.” See Russell Hsiao, “Military Delegates 

Call for National Maritime Strategy to Protect 

Expanding Interests,” Jamestown Foundation 

China Brief 11, no. 4 (March 2011), p. 1.

14. Nan Li, “Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and 

Capabilities,” p. 145. Both improved operational 

reach/endurance and offensive capabilities in 

the near- and far-seas concepts are important 

elements of the PLAN transformation relevant 

to fast attack craft. Fast attack craft represent 

one node in a larger network of near-seas forces.

15. Daniel M. Hartnett, Towards a Globally Focused 

Chinese Military: The Historic Missions of the 

Chinese Armed Forces (Alexandria, Va.: Center 

for Naval Analyses, June 2008), p. 14.

16. Nan Li, “Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy 

and Capabilities,” p. 161; Christopher D. Yung 

and Ross Rustici, with Isaac Kardon and Joshua 

Wiseman, China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and 

Potential Solutions, China Strategic Perspectives, 

no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National 

Strategic Studies [hereafter INSS], December 

2010), p. 2, www.ndu.edu/. 

17. Cortez Cooper, The PLA Navy’s “New Historic 

Missions”: Expanding Capabilities for a Reemergent Maritime Power, testimony presented 

before the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission (Santa Monica, Calif.: 

RAND, 11 June 2009), p. 7. 

18. Andrew Yang, The Military of the People’s 

Republic of China: Strategy and Implementation,

UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 17 (Zurich, 

Switz.: May 2008), p. 189, available at www

.ebscohost.com/.
14 china maritime studies

19. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: China and 

Northeast Asia, s.v. “China: Navy,” 9 December 

2010, www.janes.com/. 

20. James C. Bussert, “Catamarans Glide through 

Chinese Waters,” Signal, 3 December 2007.

21. ONI, People’s Liberation Army Navy, p. 18.

22. This is the author’s assessment, based on assertions from ONI and the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense. See U.S. Defense Dept., Annual 

Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s 

Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, 2009), p. 49, and ONI, 

People’s Liberation Army Navy, p. 18. See also 

James Bussert, “Chinese Warships Struggle to 

Meet New Command, Control and Communications Needs,” Signal, February 2009, p. 44, 

www.afcea.org/.

23. For OTHT capability, U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2012), p. 22.

24. Cortez Cooper, Joint Anti-access Operations: 

China’s “System-of-Systems” Approach, testimony 

presented before the U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission (Santa Monica, 

Calif.: RAND, 27 January 2011), p. 12. 

25. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress

(2009), p. 49. ONI lists the range as ninety-five 

nautical miles; see ONI, People’s Liberation 

Army Navy, p. 28. This paper uses the 135 nm 

range found in Thomas Mahnken, The Cruise 

Missile Challenge (Washington, D.C.: Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments [hereafter 

CSBA], March 2005), p. 15. See also U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress (2012), p. 

23. 

26. ONI, People’s Liberation Army Navy, p. 28.

27. L. C. Russell Hsiao, “China Unveils Sea Defense 

System to Counter Aircraft Carrier,” Jamestown 

Foundation China Brief 10, no. 23 (November 

2010), p. 2. Graphics of official Chinese presentations at arms shows portray unmanned aerial 

vehicles and submarines cueing multiplatform, 

antiship cruise-missile salvos directed at U.S. 

carriers.

28. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress

(2010), p. 10.

29. Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: The 

Implications of Chinese Anti-access Strategies

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2007), p. 31.

30. Jane’s World Navies, s.v. “China,” 17 January 

2011, www.janes.ins.com/. See also U.S. Defense 

Dept., Annual Report to Congress (2012), p. 21.

31. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: “Navy: China 

and Northeast Asia,” October 2012.

32. For backscatter and surface-wave radars, Ronald 

O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and 

Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 3 February 2011), p. 37.

33. ONI, People’s Liberation Army Navy, p. 18.

34. Andrew Erickson, “Chinese Anti-ship Cruise 

Missile Firing as Part of Combined Arms Anticarrier Exercises in East China Sea, 30 June–5 

July,” Andrew S. Erickson: China Analysis from 

Original Sources (blog), 6 July 2010, www

.andrewerickson.com/ [hereafter “Chinese Antiship Cruise Missile Firing”].

35. Nan Li, “All at Sea: China’s Navy Develops Fast 

Attack Craft,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (September 2009) [emphasis added].

36. Roger Cliff, a China expert at the RAND 

Corporation, seems to agree. See his Anti-access 

Measures in Chinese Defense Strategy, testimony 

before the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission (Santa Monica, Calif.: 

RAND, 27 January 2011), p. 2.

37. Nan Li, “All at Sea.”

38. Ting Yu, “Complete Remake or ‘Old Medicine in 

a New Bottle.’”

39. Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders, 

Assessing Chinese Military Transparency, China 

Strategic Perspectives, no. 1 (Washington, D.C.: 

INSS, June 2010), p. 4.

40. For quote, “Transparent Drills Add Edge to 

Deterrence” (editorial), Global Times Online

(Beijing), 1 July 2010. 

41. Erickson, “Chinese Anti-ship Cruise Missile 

Firing.”

42. Liao Haifeng, “East Sea Fleet Missile Boat Flotilla Strengthens Building of Combat Power with 

New Equipment,” Renmin Haijun, 9 July 2008, p. 

4.

43. “Military Report,” CCTV-7 (Beijing), 21 November 2010. 

44. Liu Yue-shan, “‘Stealth Assassin’ Goes into 

Action during Four Troop Training Exercises 

within a Month: Frequent Drills of Long-Range 

Strikes,” Wen Wei Po News Center (Beijing), 30 

July 2010. Beijing often asserts that that it has 

the right to regulate foreign military activities in 

its two-hundred-mile maritime EEZ. See Ronald 

O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background 

and Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: 

Congressional Research Service, 22 April 2011), 

p. 82.
china

s near seas combat capabilities 15

45. For Houbei home ports, U.S. Defense Dept., 

Annual Report to Congress (2010), p. 65.

46. Anthony Cordesman and Robert Hammond, 

The Military Balance in Asia: 1990–2010

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 14 September 2010), p. 63; 

and Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: China 

and Northeast Asia, s.v. “Taiwan: Procurement,” 

18 February 2011.

47. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Taiwan’s 

Navy: Able to Deny Command of the Sea?,” 

Jamestown Foundation China Brief 10, no. 8 

(April 2010), p. 9. With a shorter missile range, 

slower speed, very limited stealth protection, 

and small numbers, it could neither achieve a 

crushing first blow against the PLAN nor likely 

survive alone a contest with Chinese fast attack 

craft. 

48. Ch’ian Hsing, “Missile Fast Boat Update: 

Comparison with PLAN Fast Boat,” Defense 

International, October 2009. For range and 

speed, “Hsiung Feng Anti-ship Cruise Missile,” 

MilitaryPeriscope.com, 1 April 2009.

49. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1996–2003, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress 

(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 

Service, 26 August 2004), p. 8.

50. For stealth and speed, ONI, People’s Liberation 

Army Navy, p. 20. For “wolf packs,” “China’s 

Three-Point Naval Strategy,” International Institute for Strategic Studies Strategic Comments 16, 

comment 37 (October 2010), www.iiss.org/.

51. See John Patch, “A Thoroughbred Ship-Killer,” 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 4 (April 

2010), pp. 48–53.

52. Ch’ian Hsing, “Missile Fast Boat Update.”

53. The author’s experience with similar-sized small 

craft provides context and experience for this 

figure, an estimate. This author defines “operational speed” as a combination of low speeds for 

transit and higher speeds and sprints in combat. 

Prudent operations should extend the range. 

Nan Li argues for an operational range of three 

hundred nautical miles; Nan Li, “All at Sea.”

54. The C803’s extended range (reportedly 135-plus 

nm), higher speed (though not likely supersonic, 

as some claim), enhanced countermeasures, and 

reported ability to receive target information 

in flight make this a formidable missile. See 

Mahnken, Cruise Missile Challenge, p. 15. 

55. A single Danyao-class South China Sea replenishment vessel became operational in 2007; 

Jane’s World Navies, s.v. “China.” China does 

not appear to have built any other smaller fleet 

logistics vessels since the 1970s.

56. Eric Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to 

Combat Fleets of the World, 15th ed. (Annapolis, 

Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007), p. 134.

57. People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of the 

State Council, March 2011), available at news

.xinhuanet.com/. 

58. Erickson, “Chinese Anti-ship Cruise Missile 

Firing.” Dr. Erickson concurs that the Houbei 

might be viewed by the PLAN as expendable; see 

Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to 

Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the 

Antiship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009), p. 74. In contrast 

to the estimate of $30 million, Professor Nan Li 

of the Naval War College asserts that the Houbeis 

cost as little as $14.3 million each. See Nan Li, 

“All at Sea,” pp. 2–3.

59. Definitive data are not available on the highest 

sea state in which the Houbei can operate, but 

a safe estimate seems to be sea state 4, based on 

comparison to U.S. trimaran designs, which can 

operate in up to sea state 5. 

60. ONI, People’s Liberation Army Navy, p. 20. DoD 

assesses that they carry eight; U.S. Defense 

Dept., Annual Report to Congress (2010), p. 3. 

61. Bussert, “Chinese Warships Struggle to Meet 

New Command, Control and Communications 

Needs,” p. 44.

62. “Construction of Fast Attack Craft Starts for 

Pakistan Navy,” Pakistan Defence (Dubai), 2 

March 2011, www.defence.pk/.

63. Nan Li, “All at Sea,” p. 3. For the figure of one 

hundred, Stephen Saunders, comp., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2010–2011 (Coulsdon, Surrey, U.K.: 

IHS Jane’s, 2010), p. 149.

64. James Holmes, “China’s Way of Naval War: 

Mahan’s Logic, Mao’s Grammar,” Comparative 

Strategy 28, no. 3 (2009), p. 218.

65. Richard D. Fisher, Chinese Naval System 

Modernization Trends, testimony before the 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, 11 June 2009, p. 16, available at 

www.strategycenter.net/. See also Jane’s Sentinel 

Security Assessment, “China: Procurement.” This 

may be an exploratory effort to address class 

shortcomings.

66. For 12 percent growth, U.S. Defense Dept., 

Annual Report to Congress (2010), p. 41. See also 

Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military: 

Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica, 

Calif.: RAND, 2005), p. xx. 

67. Fisher, Chinese Naval System Modernization 

Trends.
16 china maritime studies

68. Zhou Ming, “Bending the Bow, Sharpening the 

Sword, Being Ready to Fight: An Overall Review 

of the Navy’s Military Work and Force Building 

Achievements in the ‘11th Five-Year Program’ 

Period,” Renmin Haijun, 29 October 2010, p. 5.

69. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: 

Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, 

D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 26 April 

2013), p. 2.

70. Ibid., p. 25.

71. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress

(2009), p. 22.

72. See John Patch, “The Wrong Ship at the Wrong 

Time,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 137, no. 1 

(January 2011), p. 18. 

73. See Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory 

and Practice (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 

Press, 1986). 

74. Duncan Long and Stuart Johnson, “The Littoral Combat Ship: From Concept to Program” 

(National Defense University, Washington, 

D.C., March 2007), p. 2. See also O’Rourke, 

China Naval Modernization (26 April 2013), 

p. 83; Bryan J. Christiansen, “Littoral Combat 

Vessels: Analysis and Comparison of Designs” 

(thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 

Calif., September 2008); and U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: 

Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the 

Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual 

Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: August 2010), p. 

38.

75. Holmes, “China’s Way of Naval War,” p. 230. 

While this threat has many similarities to the 

Cold War Soviet antiship-cruise-missile tactics, 

it involves more-capable missiles, potentially in 

greater numbers. 

76. See John Patch, “Regain ASCM Standoff: 

Improve the Harpoon,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings 136, no. 6 (June 2010), pp. 79–80. 

See also Holmes, “China’s Way of Naval War,” p. 

236.

77. See Jan van Tol, AirSea Battle: A Point-ofDeparture Operational Concept (Washington, 

D.C.: CSBA, January 2010).
Beijing’s impressive program of submarine force modernization suggests an expensive wager on that force’s enduring ability to accomplish vital near-seas missions in 

foreseeable military contingencies. Since the mid-1990s, China has launched or acquired 

more than thirty-five submarines, constituting five new classes of vessels; has essentially 

retired what had been its most numerous class of diesel-electric submarines (SSs); and 

has carved out of solid rock at Yalong Bay, on Hainan Island, an entirely new submarine 

base for new classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and nuclear-powered 

ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs).

This chapter will attempt to assess how China may intend to employ those new submarines. The conclusions drawn from this analysis are admittedly speculative, but they are 

based on facts and are internally reinforcing and coherent; also, they integrate well with 

what is known about other aspects of China’s antiaccess and area-denial forces.1

Current Mission: Taiwan and the Near Seas

Beijing is quite open about what constitutes its vital interests, stating that “China’s 

number-one core interest is to maintain its fundamental system and state security; next 

is state sovereignty and territorial integrity; and third is the continued stable development of the economy and society.”2

 In this oft-stated formulation, “territorial integrity,” 

insofar as it applies to naval affairs, clearly centers on Taiwan, notwithstanding China’s 

recent aggressive behavior into the East and South China Seas. This primacy of interest 

is recognized clearly in the West, as reflected on the first page of the Annual Report to 

Congress for 2010 of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), which notes that much of 

China’s military modernization is consistent with a near-term focus on preparing for 

Taiwan Strait contingencies.

Much, perhaps nearly all, of the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

has clear utility in scenarios involving military coercion of Taiwan. The Second Artillery Corps’s short-range ballistic missiles are a prime example; they offer Beijing a large 

inventory of precision-guided munitions that can with little or no warning cripple or 

William S. Murray

Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness

CHAPTER TWO

Underwater TELs and China’s Antisubmarine Warfare
18 china maritime studies

destroy Taipei’s air force and navy. The newest People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 

surface shipbuilding and weapons developments also seem tailored for a Taiwan scenario; so too, I will argue, is China’s nonstrategic submarine force. But all these segments of 

the PLA likely have, in addition to whatever missions they are assigned against Taiwan’s 

forces, a near-seas mission to deter U.S. Navy intervention, and, if that deterrence fails, 

to destroy reliably strike forces operating within a carrier air wing’s range of Taiwan.3

History and reflexive mirror-imaging would suggest that PLAN submarines can best 

accomplish such a wartime mission by employing torpedoes against opposing surface 

warships. The 1971 sinking of the Indian corvette Khukri by the Pakistani Daphne-class 

diesel-electric submarine Hangor, the 1981 sinking of the Argentine cruiser General 

Belgrano by the SSN HMS Conqueror, and the March 2009 destruction of the South 

Korean navy corvette Cheonan by a single heavyweight torpedo fired from a North Korean midget submarine all attest to the deadly potential of this form of warfare. Further, 

nearly all warships sunk by submarine in World Wars I and II were victims of torpedoes.

Yet there are strong reasons to question why the PLAN submarine force would choose 

this mode as its primary means of antisurface warfare. For one, shooting a torpedo 

(which by maritime standards is a short-range weapon) requires the submarine to operate within lethal range of its adversary’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) weapons and 

sensors. For another, mastering the key tasks necessary for successful open-ocean torpedo attacks against a capable adversary requires visible, rigorous, and extensive at-sea 

practice, preferably in the areas in which battles would be fought. Certainly shore-based 

trainers and computer simulation can assist in developing the necessary skills, but for 

conventional naval war-fighting proficiency there is no substitute for rigorous training 

at sea. China’s submariners probably remain weak in this area, despite recent attempts to 

correct this deficiency. 

A 2009 Office of Naval Intelligence report stated that the PLAN submarine force was 

“placing greater emphasis on long range surface and submarine patrols, which allow expanded opportunities to practice the technical and tactical skills that will be required in 

modern wartime operating environments.”4 The report also notes, “When compared to 

the historical levels of the past two decades, the number of submarine patrols has more 

than tripled.”5 However, the tripling of a very low number produces a number that is still 

low, implying that only a small percentage of China’s submariners benefit from deployments in which they might encounter a future adversary.6

 The overall force’s ability to 

find and destroy warships in the open ocean with torpedoes remains an open question. 

Furthermore, owing to their slow speed and limited endurance, diesel submarines 

(which account for over 90 percent of the PLAN’s submarine order of battle) are 

relatively ill suited to open-ocean, torpedo-based antisurface warfare (ASUW) such as 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 19

might be required in conflict over Taiwan in the near seas.7 Despite much speculation 

to the contrary, air-independent propulsion (AIP) does not significantly alter this stark 

fact, because AIP does not address the fundamental constraint on the conventionally 

powered submarine in the open ocean—its relatively low speed while submerged. Faster, 

quiet, nuclear-powered attack submarines certainly could provide much greater tactical 

flexibility and offset some of these disadvantages. Yet China’s handful of noisy first- and 

second-generation SSNs would not long survive in the deep waters of the near seas 

against a capable adversary. Nor, for the same reasons, could Chinese SSNs be expected 

to perform a meaningful wartime role in more remote settings, such as the Indian 

Ocean, where their lack of stealth would make them vulnerable.

These factors all suggest that China cannot rely on torpedoes as the primary means by 

which to wring maximum combat effectiveness from any of its submarines. Yet China 

has invested heavily in its submarine force and doubtless expects to be able to use its 

submarines effectively, especially in a Taiwan conflict. It is therefore likely that the PLAN 

has committed itself to ASUW by antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). 

Antisurface Warfare via Antiship Cruise Missiles

The evidence for this important shift is somewhat circumstantial but accords fully with 

the technology available to China; with the ASUW mission expected of PLAN tactical 

submarines; with the mode of ASUW adopted by the PLA surface navy, air forces, and 

Second Artillery Corps; with important historical examples; and with the relatively low 

amount of at-sea training conducted by Beijing’s submarines. For example, regarding 

the availability of long-range antiship cruise missiles, China in 2007 took delivery of the 

last of eight Kilo 636M diesel-electric submarines purchased in 2002 armed with (aside 

from modern wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes) the Russian SS-N-27B ASCM.8

This missile can deliver a 440-pound warhead to a range of 120–160 nautical miles 

(nm), with a terminal phase consisting of a Mach 2.9 “zig-zag flight path.”9

Additionally, in 2010 DoD reported that “the Song SS, Yuan SS, and Shang SSN will be 

capable of launching the new CH-SS-NX-13 ASCM, once the missile completes development and testing” and that these three classes of attack submarines, along with the Kilo 

class, will be “capable of firing advanced ASCMs.”10 One can logically surmise that the 

CH-SS-NX-13 antiship cruise missile will represent a significant threat to surface naval 

forces. Until further performance data regarding it are available, observers can only 

speculate about how advanced the missile will be, but there is little reason to believe it 

will not constitute a considerable improvement over the approximately twenty-nauticalmile-range submarine-launched subsonic C-801 ASCM the Song currently carries.
20 china maritime studies

China’s commitment to advanced naval cruise missiles is already clear in its surface 

fleet. Nearly every PLAN surface combatant carries ninety-seven-nautical-mile-range, 

subsonic YJ-83 antiship cruise missiles—typically eight but up to sixteen. The Luyang 

II destroyers are exceptions, carrying eight 151-nautical-mile-range YJ-62s;11 so also 

are the four Sovremenny-class destroyers China purchased from Russia, each with eight 

120-nautical-mile-range supersonic SS-N-22 antiship cruise missiles. This ASCM reliance is reflected especially strongly in the PLAN’s sixty-odd Houbei-class fast attack, 

wave-piercing catamarans, each of which can carry eight YJ-83s.12

Other PLA branches have also wagered heavily on ASCMs. This is indicated by the 

display of land-based, mobile YJ-62 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) during the 1 

October 2009 National Day parade in Beijing.13 The PLA Air Force and PLAN aviation 

have also invested in high-performance ASCMs; many images have appeared on the Internet of B-6 bombers and smaller aircraft carrying ASCMs, including, as of early 2013, 

the supersonic YJ-12.14

China’s emphasis on cruise missiles launched from surface ships, aircraft, and submarines has a notable Soviet/Russian precedent. The Soviets built Sovremenny- and Slavaclass cruisers and deployed both Blackjack and Backfire bombers as means of delivering 

advanced antiship cruise missiles against their most likely opponents. They also built 

specialized submarines of the Echo II, Charlie I and II, and Oscar classes—all of which 

carried large numbers of increasingly advanced ASCMs—to compound the missile 

threat that NATO surface ships faced. The PLA has long equipped its surface ships with 

early-generation antiship cruise missiles. What is different now is that all of China’s surface combatants, many of its aircraft, and all its modern attack submarines are already 

able, or in the near future will be, to carry and shoot advanced, long-range, lethal cruise 

missiles. This is a significant change. 

The Need for Targeting Data

Nearly all tactical methods of accurately firing long-range ASCMs by any vessel or 

aircraft rely on remote targeting.15 Determining the requirements for a surveillance and 

reconnaissance complex adequate to this task and assessing whether China already possesses one or is on path to do so soon are addressed in this volume by Andrew Erickson. 

For present purposes, it seems reasonable to assume that China has assessed what is 

necessary and is investing aggressively to satisfy those requirements. The PLA’s over-thehorizon (OTH) radar development and ever-improving constellation of reconnaissance 

satellites are strong indicators of this;16 the same is true of the fielding by the Second Artillery Corps of the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM). An American vice admiral 

related in January 2011 that China likely has sufficient satellite and non-space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability to support DF-21D employment.17
china

s near seas combat capabilities 21

The targeting data necessary for a DF-21D engagement could also be provided to other 

entities, including aircraft, ships, and submarines carrying long-range antiship cruise 

missiles. As for submarine shooters, there are many ways of delivering such targeting information to patrolling units, including via satellite and by radio transmission, whether 

high- or midfrequency or, especially, very low frequency (VLF). The great advantage of 

VLF signals is their ability to penetrate water to tactically useful depths. This means that 

a receiving submarine does not have to extend an antenna above the ocean’s surface (and 

hence raise its risk of being detected by radar) to receive missile targeting data and firing 

orders, as it would if receiving satellite or high-frequency transmissions (which cannot 

penetrate water). Instead, the VLF radio signal can be received on a buoyant or even fully 

submerged wire antenna, while the submarine itself remains fully underwater.18 There is 

some evidence China has developed a submarine antenna for this purpose. Many of the 

most recent Yuan and Song submarines have what appear to be “bell mouth” openings 

at the top, aft ends of their sails from which wire antennas could be streamed.19 Through 

such an antenna VLF radio waves could convey to the submarine the latitude and longitude of the target, the salvo size and composition of the attack, and the desired time 

of arrival of the missiles. Onboard computers could then determine the launch times 

and missile flight paths necessary to satisfy the orders.20 The submarine crew would have 

only to enter those data into the missiles through the ship’s fire-control system and then 

fire them. In essence, PLAN submarines would be underwater analogs to the Second Artillery’s ballistic-missile TELs. They could deploy in a crisis and hide quietly for extended 

periods until provided with targeting information and ordered to launch.

This mode, or concept of operation, has a number of benefits. It would require relatively 

modest submarine crew proficiency and therefore minimal at-sea training. Much of the 

process could be practiced ashore in computer-assisted training facilities, even alongside 

a pier. All of this is consistent with computer-based training facilities and scenarios demonstrated to Westerners at Qingdao Submarine Academy and with the levels of PLAN 

submarine at-sea training that have been observed. It would also accommodate a rigid 

and centralized command and control of submarines, something that would probably be 

attractive to senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. It also appears consistent 

with an otherwise inexplicable event of September 2010. 

Another New Class of Submarine Launched 

In September 2010, Wuhan shipyard of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) launched a new class of submarine. Internet photos show that this vessel 

incorporates characteristics of the Yuan, Kilo, and Golf classes of diesel submarines. It 

is probably the largest conventionally powered submarine in existence. Perhaps its most 

distinguishing feature is its large, even enormous, sail, approximately twice as long and 
22 china maritime studies

wide as that on the Yuan class. Such a departure from existing norms of submarine 

structure must have a compelling basis in intended function. 

It is possible that this new vessel is simply a replacement for the solitary, fifty-year-old 

Golf conventionally powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSB) that the PLAN has used 

to test and develop JL-1 and JL-2 missiles.21 Yet the Golf emerged apparently shipshape 

from a Lüshun dry dock in July 2009 and received in January 2011 an effusive official 

commendation for its successes in conducting missile tests. A CCTV-1 focus of that 

month depicted the ship in good repair and suggests that it is fully capable of continuing its missile-testing role.22 A Google Earth image dated 29 March 2011 shows the Golf 

tied up across a pier from two Yuan SSs and near two Jin SSBNs at Xiaopingdao. So, the 

Golf appears to have been fully operational as late as 2011. Even if the Golf were soon to 

be decommissioned, the PLAN could test the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile 

(SLBM) with either of its two Jin SSBNs rather than build an entirely new vessel. It is 

therefore likely that the new submarine was built not as a replacement for the Golf or as 

a JL-2 testing platform but for some other role.

Possible insight into that role can be gleaned from a series of detailed drawings of this 

submarine in the November 2010 issue of the Chinese magazine Modern Ships.

23 This 

magazine is published by CSIC, which built the mysterious submarine.24 Two images (in 

a full-color foldout insert) depict ten vertical-launch missile-tube hatches, sized appropriately for cruise missiles, in the aft end of the sail. These images show that the vessel 

also has six horizontal torpedo tubes, arranged in a two-over-four configuration like 

that of the Kilo and Yuan classes. Conceivably, then, this new submarine could launch in 

quick succession sixteen ASCMs (six from the torpedo tubes and ten from the vertical 

tubes in the sail) at a solitary target, perhaps at great range.25 In fact, the author of the 

Modern Ships article observes that “in the course of high-intensity naval combat or to 

attack enemy land targets, medium-range missiles shot from torpedo tubes cannot meet 

requirements” and that “the challenge of making vertical launch tubes [for submarines] 

is not too difficult, but the benefits of this technology for increasing [submarine] combat capability are considerable.” The article adds, “Vertical tubes allow for a large salvo 

shot in a short amount of time . . . affording adversary enemy air defenses no possibility 

to respond.”26 This would be the first submarine in the PLA inventory to have verticallaunch tubes for antiship cruise missiles (or eventually even land-attack cruise missiles).

Still, questions regarding this submarine’s configuration and roles remain. A 13 May 

2011 Internet photo of the submarine in dry dock revealed a large bulge extending 

below the keel directly underneath the sail.27 Soviet (and presumably also Chinese) Golfclass SSBs had similar bulges to accommodate the thirty-nine-foot ballistic missiles that 

the twenty-one-foot-diameter boats carried in their sails. This new keel bulge strongly 

suggests China’s newest diesel submarine could or will carry one or more SLBMs. But 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 23

another photo, posted two weeks later, appears to show twenty hatches along the aft, top 

portion of the sail, on the port side, roughly consistent with artist’s renderings published 

in Modern Ships six months earlier.28 If this vessel does turn out to have ten or more 

vertical-launch tubes in its sail, then it stands to reason that China will build more of 

these or similar submarines and thereby make possible very large salvos of advanced 

ASCMs. 

It also seems logical that this new submarine would benefit from air-independent propulsion. With AIP it could patrol slowly and quietly for a number of weeks (as compared 

to a handful of days otherwise) without loud, position-revealing battery-charging evolutions, all the while waiting for a launch order to be delivered via VLF radio broadcast. 

The submarine’s substantial girth and length provide adequate volume for storage of the 

reagents necessary to support AIP, as well as the space for enhanced quieting measures 

for other machinery. It is unknown whether China’s new submarine has AIP; however, 

credible reports relate that in March 2011 Islamabad was negotiating with Beijing for the 

construction of six AIP-equipped submarines, and in 2013 the Department of Defense 

stated that the Yuan class has AIP. So too could this new submarine.29

The overall implication is that the PLA decided some years ago to pursue a concept of 

operations in which it would deter or destroy hostile surface naval combatants operating 

in the near seas with large numbers of advanced ASCMs launched from land, aircraft, 

and surface ships.30 China’s submarine force is now also embracing this mode of operation, though Western navies’ submarines have not. The PLAN conventional submarine 

force, however, is focused on and optimized for a Taiwan contingency and other nearseas missions and hence can pursue a mode of ASUW substantially different from that 

of most major navies. Equipping the PLAN’s conventional attack-submarine force with 

advanced ASCMs, if supported by robust OTH targeting systems, thus directly supports 

China’s near-seas core interests. 

Future Mission: Defend Sea Lines of Communication? 

It is generally thought that an emerging and probable future mission for the PLAN is 

to defend China’s sea-lanes against a range of challenges. The lower end of threats to 

Chinese maritime commerce is perhaps represented by Somali piracy; since 2008, Beijing has deployed two surface combatants and a replenishment ship continuously to the 

waters near the Horn of Africa as a countermeasure. Yet in the future the PLAN may be 

called on to guarantee the safe transit of commercial shipping through the Indian Ocean 

and East Asian waters against the efforts of a modern navy. This mission would require it 

to protect merchant vessels and surface warships from a diverse array of military threats 

across the breadth of the Indian Ocean’s deep waters, including modern SSNs.
24 china maritime studies

Currently, however, there is little indication that Beijing is preparing for a deepwater 

ASW mission in any meaningful way. For example, the hull-mounted, mediumfrequency sonars of PLAN surface ships are ill suited to open-ocean ASW; only the most 

modern Chinese destroyers and frigates appear to be capable of deploying towed-array 

sonars;31 PLAN aviation’s inventory of ASW helicopters is anemic; and only in 2011 did 

there emerge convincing evidence of even a nascent fixed-wing maritime-patrol-aircraft 

program.32 Perhaps most significantly, there are only two second-generation (but still 

relatively loud, acoustically) Shang-class SSNs in the Chinese fleet, and China’s four remaining first-generation SSNs are probably the noisiest nuclear submarines still in commission anywhere in the world.33 All this means that China’s current SSNs are almost 

certainly incapable of performing effective ASW against their much quieter potential adversaries. The PLAN’s diesel submarines cannot conduct effective wide-area ASW either, 

hampered by their slow speeds and limited endurance. Equally important, China does 

not possess foreign bases from which it could operate or maintain ASW forces, such as a 

large fleet of maritime patrol aircraft it could someday develop. It seems likely, then, that 

the lack of effective expeditionary ASW forces (among other things) will tend to prevent 

China from conducting high-tempo naval warfare in far seas for quite some time. 

Rationally Weak ASW 

Still, one can logically wonder why China’s ASW remains underdeveloped. This is especially perplexing given that the PLA would almost certainly have to expect to confront 

submarines during military operations in the near seas, especially in a Taiwan scenario. 

It also seems strange in view of the difficulty of other military challenges China appears 

to have mastered. Conceivably, Chinese analysts have determined that ASW is simply too 

hard and too expensive, but this seems unlikely and at odds with the aforementioned 

recent evidence of expanded ASW efforts. A more plausible explanation for the ASW 

shortfall could be that the PLA has rationally concluded that it is simply not necessary 

to find and destroy submarines opposing Chinese military operations against Taiwan 

or Taipei’s potential supporters. China’s planners seem to have determined instead that 

in any of the three plausible operational scenarios involving Taiwan—bombardment, 

blockade, and invasion—it would be better to avoid and distract, rather than confront 

and defeat, opposing submarines. 

Scenario One: Bombardment 

There is little that opposing submarines could do to disrupt or defeat a Chinese air force 

or Second Artillery Corps ballistic-missile bombardment of Taiwan. Submarines could 

launch Tomahawk or similar land-attack cruise missiles against airfields or locations assessed as vital for the PLA’s short-range ballistic-missile operations, but many of China’s 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 25

air-defense systems, such as the SA-20s obtained from Russia, are designed specifically to 

shoot down such land-attack weapons. It would be strange too if the number of targets 

in China did not greatly outnumber the cruise missiles that could be brought by submarine to within firing range.34 Absent large numbers of submarine-launched missiles that 

can reliably penetrate Chinese air defenses and a supporting targeting system that can 

detect fleeting mobile targets and rapidly relay the data underwater, submarines would 

appear to be essentially irrelevant to mitigating or preventing a Chinese bombardment 

of Taiwan.35 Consequently, China does not require, and has not developed, robust ASW 

to support a bombardment. 

Scenario Two: Cruise-Missile Blockade

Precision strikes conducted by the Second Artillery Corps followed up with bombing 

attacks by PLA air forces have the potential to destroy outright or deny Taiwan the use 

of its air force and much of its navy.36 Any Taiwan naval vessels that survived such a 

bombardment and safely got to sea to oppose a blockade would be subject to antishipcruise-missile attacks from Beijing’s submarines, major surface combatants, and dozens 

of high-speed Houbei-class YJ-83-carrying, wave-piercing catamarans. These latter vessels, which are optimized for destroying the Taiwan navy and then enforcing a blockade 

against Taiwan, are by virtue of their high speed, shallow draft, and small size essentially 

invulnerable to submarines.37

Beijing’s ASCM-carrying surface combatants, in contrast, are potentially quite vulnerable. However, if PLA submarines are shifting from torpedo-based to ASCM-based 

ASUW, they would no longer have to lurk near blockaded ports but instead could 

disperse widely in the shallow, noisy waters to the west and north of Taiwan. Here 

their mission would be to remain within ASCM range (some two hundred kilometers 

in the case of the SS-N-27B carried by the Kilo class, for example) of blockaded ports 

and silently wait for targeting orders to arrive. This mode of blockade by cruise missile 

would greatly increase the volumes of ocean that would have to be searched for PLAN 

submarines and the necessary time it would take to localize and destroy them. The poor 

acoustic conditions of the shallow waters near Taiwan would afford short detection 

ranges against Chinese submarines, compounding a hunter’s challenges.

Another factor degrading the potential ASW performance of submarines is that some 

waters—this is true of much of the Strait of Taiwan—that are deep enough to permit 

some conventional submarine and surface-ship operations are simply too shallow for 

SSNs. Other waters that are sufficiently deep for SSNs are still shallow enough to force 

them to operate at lower speeds to be sure of their ability to avoid obstacles (including 

defensively laid Chinese mines).38
26 china maritime studies

Short detection ranges and significantly reduced search speeds would greatly extend 

the time required for predatory submarines to accomplish a mission of PLAN attrition. 

Individual ASCM-carrying surface ships and submarines would be sunk, but only slowly. 

Despite tactical successes, dozens of PLAN warships and submarines could survive for 

extended periods, able to enforce a blockade by shooting long-range ASCMs against 

commercial and military ships from shallow waters (that are covered by their own 

shore-based aircraft, surface-to-air, and air-to-air defenses). The net result would be that 

opposing SSNs would be operationally ineffective, at least for a short-to-medium-length 

Chinese blockade against Taiwan. This would allow China to achieve a result similar to 

what it could obtain if it devoted significant effort to ASW, but at significantly less cost 

and effort. 

Scenario Three: Amphibious Assault 

As of early 2013, it is not clear that Beijing really views invasion as a viable means of 

coercing Taipei. Analysts generally agree that the PLAN amphibious force remains too 

small, and there is scant evidence to show that this shortfall is about to be addressed. If it 

were, however (and certainly, amphibious ships could be quickly built in large numbers 

in China’s many shipyards), it is unlikely that submarines, considered in isolation, would 

be an effective counterinvasion mechanism. 

The reasons stem from the limited numbers of weapons that submarines can carry, the 

short ranges at which they could expect to detect and identify amphibious targets, the 

shallow waters of the operating area (and the slow tactical speeds to which submarines 

would thereby be restricted), the large number of interfering secondary contacts China 

could be expected to send across the strait as part of the invasion force (essentially 

torpedo decoys), and the small number of submarines that could likely be devoted to 

counterinvasion operations at the expense of other missions (looking for antiship cruise 

missile–carrying PLAN submarines, escorting carrier strike groups, and so on). One 

could certainly expect aggressively operated submarines to destroy some Chinese amphibious ships, but anticipated attrition could probably be overcome in advance simply 

by increasing the size of the invading force. 

In sum, then, China appears to have multiple coercive options against Taiwan that 

sidestep altogether or limit significantly the effectiveness of any opposing submarines. 

This operational flexibility stems significantly from geography but is greatly enhanced by 

the PLA’s apparent reliance on advanced, long-range antiship cruise missiles and ballistic 

missiles. 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 27

Conclusion

Chinese military strategists appear to recognize that all quiet submarines, whether 

friendly or hostile, are unlikely to be operationally vulnerable to opposing forces. Beijing’s ongoing investment in increasingly modern (and therefore progressively quiet) 

antiship-cruise-missile-firing diesel submarines reflects a determination to overwhelm 

and destroy surface ships operating within at least a hundred miles of the shallow waters 

of the near seas, including Taiwan. This distance is greatly extended and reinforced by 

the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile and by antiship cruise missiles launched from 

surface warships and such aircraft as new variants of the H-6 bomber. PLA reliance on 

large numbers of ASCMs as a means of deterring and defeating opposing surface naval 

forces represents a significant challenge for a potential adversary, and it suggests specifically that the U.S. Navy’s post–Cold War ability to conduct high-volume, uncontested, 

maritime strike operations from surface warships in the western Pacific has ended, at 

least temporarily. 

On the other hand, Beijing’s lack of modern ASW forces—such as maritime patrol 

aircraft, sub-hunting helicopters, low-frequency surface-ship sonars, and quiet nuclear 

attack submarines—suggests the PLAN will for some time continue to cede underwater mastery of the deep or distant ocean areas to the West. This may very well suggest a 

PLA calculated acceptance of losses to opposing SSNs in a Taiwan scenario and a lack 

of intent to conduct high-tech warfare, at least for the near term, in any distant sea. It 

would seem, therefore, to be in the military interest of the U.S. Navy to exploit its current underwater advantages. A logical implication could be an expansion of the types 

and numbers of weapons that could be launched from submarines.

Notes 

1. I thank Christopher Weuve, Gordon Willard, 

Lyle Goldstein, an anonymous reviewer, and 

other Naval War College colleagues for their 

insights and other valued contributions to this 

paper. 

2. Orville Schell, quoting State Councilor Dai 

Bingguo, in “China: Defending Its Core Interest 

in the World,” Asia Sentinel, 9 April 2010, www 

.asiasentinel.com/. See also Michael D. Swaine, 

“China’s Assertive Behavior: Part One: On ‘Core 

Interests,’” China Leadership Monitor, no. 34 

(2011), available at media.hoover.org/. 

3. A carrier air wing’s effective range appears to 

be somewhere between two hundred and four 

hundred nautical miles. See Angelyn Jewell et 

al. USS Nimitz and Carrier Airwing Nine Surge 

Demonstration (Alexandria, Va.: Center for 

Naval Analyses, April 1998), p. 32, fig. 10. 

4. U.S. Navy Dept., The People’s Liberation Army 

Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009), p. 34.

5. Ibid., p. 40. 

6. Regarding the limited number of patrols, see 

Hans Kristensen, “Feb 03 Chinese Submarine 

Patrols Doubled in 2008,” Federation of American Scientists, 3 February 2009, www.fas.org/. 

Additionally, time spent training at sea in local 

waters, though not qualifying as “on patrol,” 

can provide substantial training in wartime 

missions. 

7. Slow, diesel submarines firing torpedoes can, 

however, be highly effective in constrained 

waters, such as choke points or near harbor 

entrances through which their prey must pass. 
28 china maritime studies

8. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, 

D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 17 

August 2010), p. 48, available at www.defense

.gov/.

9. Carlo Kopp, Soviet/Russian Cruise Missiles, 

Technical Report APA-TR-2009-0805 (n.p.: Air 

Power Australia, updated April 2012), www

.ausairpower.net/. See also, for example, Jane’s Naval 

Weapons Systems, s.v. “The Klub Family / Klub 

S Klub N / (91RE2; 91RE1; SS-N-27B [3M54TE; 

3M54E]; SS-N-30B [3M14TE; 3M14E]) / Klub 

K,” www.janes.com/, and Carlo Kopp, “Precision 

Guided Munitions in the Region,” Air Power 

Australia (August 2009), www.ausairpower.net/.

10. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010, pp. 3, 30.

11. Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, s.v. “C-602 

(HN-1/-2/-3/YJ-62/X-600/DH-10/CJ-10/HN2000),” 1 June 2010, www.janes.com/.

12. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010, p. 3; Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, s.v. 

“C-801 (CSS-N-4 ‘Sardine’ / YJ-1/-8/-81) and 

C-802 (CSSC-8 ‘Saccade’ / YJ-2/-21/-22/-82/

-85), C-803 (YJ-3/-83/-88),” www.janes.com/.

13. A TEL is essentially a truck that can carry and 

launch a missile. Targeting data for the missiles 

launched by TELs can be provided remotely 

from a central headquarters; from predetermined data (for fixed, nonmobile targets) digitally loaded into the missile before launch; or, in 

some short-range cases against mobile targets 

(such as ships), from information provided by a 

radar on or deployed with the TEL. 

14. See “YJ-12 Supersonic Anti-ship Missile, Reply 

#7,” ChinaDefense.com, 18 January 2013. 

15. Some aircraft, such as the PLA’s H-6D/HS-M 

Badgers, might have the organic radar and 

horizon height necessary to conduct their own 

targeting. The author is indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this caveat. 

16. See, for example, Ian Easton and Mark A. Stokes, 

“China’s Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air 

and Naval Operations,” Project 2049 Institute

(23 February 2011), project2049.net/. See also 

U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: 

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 

2009 (Washington, D.C.: 25 March 2009), p. 49, 

available at sino.defence.com. 

17. See Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Anti-ship 

Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches Equivalent of 

‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC): Where It’s 

Going and What It Means,” Andrew S. Erickson: 

China Analysis from Original Sources (blog), 12 

July 2011, www.andrewerickson.com/, which 

quotes the 3 January 2011 replies of the Deputy 

Chief of Naval Operations for Information 

Dominance (N2/N6), Vice Adm. David J. 

Dorsett, to questions about China’s ability to employ the missile with targeting data derived from 

satellites, OTH radars, and other sensors. 

18. For a description of a buoyant wire antenna, see 

the brochure “Buoyant Wire Antenna System 

Submarine Communications,” Lockheed Martin,

www.sippican.com/.

19. The newest variants of the Yuan class seem to 

have replaced this bell mouth with an antenna, 

approximately eight feet long, that can be rotated from a horizontal position along the after 

end of the top of the sail to a vertical position. 

Such an antenna could probably also receive 

VLF transmissions while the boat remains fully 

submerged. 

20. This mode of operation is similar to how the 

U.S. SSBN force trained to execute the Strategic 

Integrated Operations Plan. 

21. SLBMs can be loaded in two large-diameter 

missile tubes in the after end of the submarine’s 

enormous sail. 

22. “PLA Navy Submarine Test-Fires Underwater Missile in Distant Seas,” CCTV-1,

31 January 2011, Open Source Center, 

CPP20110131338002. 

23. Wu Hanyu, “Analysis of the Key Technologies 

for the Next-Generation Indigenous Submarine,” 

Modern Ships (November 2010), pp. 8–11. I am 

indebted to Dr. Lyle Goldstein for this translation and citation.

24. Although not guaranteeing accuracy, this does 

increase the likelihood of the images’ being 

accurate.

25. It is certainly possible that such tubes could also 

launch land-attack cruise missiles, but there is 

no credible evidence yet that China is developing a submarine-launched version of such a 

weapon, whereas there is abundant evidence for 

new antiship cruise missiles.

26. Wu Hanyu, “Analysis of the Key Technologies 

for the Next-Generation Indigenous Submarine,” 

pp. 8–11. 

27. See “New QING? Class SSB,” ChinaDefense 

.com, post 203, 13 May 2011. 

28. See “New QING? Class SSB,” ChinaDefense

.com, post 254, 27 May 2011. 

29. For the negotiations, Jon Grevatt, “Pakistan and 

China Discuss Submarine Acquisition,” Jane’s 

Defence Industry, 15 March 2011. For AIP, U.S. 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 29

Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2013 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, 7 May 2013), p. 7, available at www 

.defense.gov/.

30. This shift has been reported officially. See U.S. 

Navy Dept., People’s Liberation Army Navy, pp. 

18–28.

31. See Christopher Carlson, “PLAN Acoustic 

Decoy and Towed Array Deployment Options,” Clash of Arms, 20 October 2012, www 

.clashofarms.com/. 

32. See “Y-8GX6 (Y-8Q) ASW Aircraft (High New 

6),” ChinaDefense.com, reply 20, 16 November 

2011. 

33. U.S. Navy Dept., People’s Liberation Army Navy,

p. 22.

34. The U.S. Navy fired over two hundred Tomahawks into Libya during Operation Odyssey

Dawn. China would presumably present many 

times more targets for such missiles. See John 

Reed, “2,000 Tomahawks Fired in Anger,” 

Defensetech.org, 4 August 2011. 

35. For a carefully considered alternative view, see 

Owen R. Coté, Jr., “Submarines in the Air Sea 

Battle” (paper presented at the 2010 Submarine 

Technology Symposium, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, Md., 

11–13 May 2010), available at web.mit.edu/. 

36. See William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s 

Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review 61, 

no. 3 (Summer 2008), pp. 13–38.

37. The fifty-knot Houbei would likely run any 

torpedo to exhaustion. Its aluminum hull 

would probably not satisfy a torpedo warhead’s 

magnetic arming criteria, and its shallow draft 

would make a contact detonation very difficult 

if not impossible. See John Patch’s article in this 

collection. 

38. This is because SSNs, which are approximately 

fifty feet tall from the bottom of their keels to 

the top of their sails, require vertical operating 

margins to avoid obstacles (such as merchant 

ships) on the surface and on the ocean floor. 

Since its establishment in 1966, the land-based missile force of the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA), the Second Artillery Force, has maintained six “basic battle 

corps” (Bases 51 to 56) at key locations along strategic directions extending outward 

from China’s inland and coastal areas.1 Three of these combat bases (Bases 51, 52, and 

53) are positioned in, respectively, northeast, south-central, and southeast China. These 

three bases have been responsible traditionally for nuclear missions against land targets 

of potential adversaries at points on or near the “First Island Chain”—that is, in the near 

seas.2

Beginning in 1994, the Second Artillery Force added a conventional component to its 

force structure, and most of its conventional units have missions associated with land, 

and more recently maritime, targets in the near seas. Major milestones in conventional force development include the equipping of at least seven Second Artillery Force 

or PLA brigades with short-range ballistic missiles and the forming of at least three 

ground-launched-cruise-missile brigades.3 More recently, the Second Artillery Force has 

equipped some of these units with theater ballistic missiles capable of targeting naval 

ships operating in China’s near seas and beyond.4 Also, a fourth combat base (Base 55), 

in central China, has equipped one of its brigades in Jiangxi Province with new conventional land-attack, ground-launched cruise missiles appropriate for near-seas missions.5

Four of the six Second Artillery Force combat bases now direct seventeen or eighteen 

known deployed brigades responsible for missions in or immediately beyond the near 

seas. In effect, two-thirds of the overall Second Artillery Force unit structure is focused 

on missions associated with the near seas.6 Other brigades positioned in central or 

northwestern China are responsible for strategic nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack missions or operational/tactical missions employing conventional or nuclear 

weapons against regional powers. These deployed brigades can be clustered into four 

force components.

Ron Christman

Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas

CHAPTER THRE

China’s Second Artillery Force
32 china maritime studies

First, a long-standing theater nuclear force of at least four brigades is equipped with intermediate-range ballistic missiles or medium-range ballistic missiles armed with single 

nuclear warheads.7 These units are subordinate to Base 51 or 52. An additional, Base 53, 

brigade can be an element of this component, depending on whether it is responsible 

for a secondary task of holding at risk targets in the near seas in addition to its primary 

missions against India. A sixth (Base 52) nuclear brigade is a candidate for near-term 

conversion to a conventional variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missiles (see 

figure 1).8

A conventional tactical-missile force of at least seven operational brigades is positioned 

opposite Taiwan and equipped with short-range ballistic missiles.9 Five of these brigades 

are commanded by Base 52. Two others are apparently being reassigned from the ground 

forces to the Second Artillery Force’s Base 52.10 This component can include an eighth 

brigade, given uncertainty about whether one Base 52 unit is equipped with a new missile system of either short or medium range.11 See figure 2.

The Second Artillery Force reportedly has formed at least two missiles brigades 

equipped with conventional ground-launched cruise missiles positioned in southern 

China.12 Base 53’s 821st Brigade is being equipped with ground-launched cruise missiles; it is garrisoned in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Base 55 is also 

apparently forming a new brigade, the 824th,in Jiangxi Province, reportedly equipped 

Figure 1. Theater Nuclear Force
china

s near seas combat capabilities 33

with ground-launched cruise missiles.13 Fragmentary reports indicate Base 53 may form 

a second ground-launched cruise-missile brigade in Yunnan Province, in southwestern 

China.14 See figure 3.

Finally, the Second Artillery Force has formed at least one operational brigade positioned in eastern China and equipped with new-type, land-based, conventional theater 

ballistic missiles capable of targeting naval ships operating within or beyond the First 

Island Chain.15 The Second Artillery Force is equipping units in eastern China with 

conventional medium-range ballistic missiles capable of attacking land targets, to 

include airfields. Base 51’s 822nd Brigade is reportedly equipped with new mediumrange DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles and DF-21C medium-range ballistic missiles.16 Base 53 is also forming a new unit, the 825th Brigade, in Guangdong Province 

at Qingyuan, apparently equipped with either of these systems or newer DF-16 

ballistic missiles.17 Base 52’s 811th Brigade is a candidate to convert its medium-range 

ballistic-missiles inventory from older nuclear to newer conventional CSS-5 variants.18

See figure 4.

The rough, order-of-magnitude inventory assigned to these four components comprises 

1,300–1,800 ballistic or cruise missiles and 300–350 associated transportable or mobile 

launchers.19 Fourteen different delivery-system variants are represented in this inventory—four equipped with single nuclear warheads and ten with conventional unitary 

Figure 2. Conventional Short-Range-Ballistic-Missile Force
34 china maritime studies

Figure 3. Ground-Launched-Cruise-Missile Force

Figure 4. Conventional MRBM Force
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s near seas combat capabilities 35

warheads or optimized submunitions. Thirteen variants are designed to attack land 

targets, with one newer system variant, the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile, designed 

to attack naval targets at sea. Each of the four combat bases is equipped with a mix of 

nuclear and conventional missiles. However, their operational brigades are equipped 

exclusively with either nuclear or conventional missiles.

Military Capabilities

In crisis or wartime, Second Artillery Force assets with missions in the near seas provide 

the PLA and senior leaders with formidable military capabilities, whether in terms of 

their effectiveness in achieving operational objectives, technical performance characteristics, or ability to contribute to broader political objectives. 

Theater Nuclear Force Capabilities

China’s theater nuclear arsenal enables Beijing to hold at risk civilian or military targets 

throughout the near-seas areas with nuclear weapons. These missile systems were assigned to Second Artillery Force units in the 1970s or 1980s (CSS-2s) and in the 1990s 

(nuclear CSS-5s).20 Potential enemy targets in the near seas would likely be located in 

South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines.21

Liquid-fueled, single-stage CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (DF-3s and 

extended-range DF-3As) are capable of delivering single two-to-three-megaton nuclear 

warheads to land destinations 2,500 to 2,800 kilometers (km) away with accuracy at the 

level of a one-to-three-thousand-meter circular error probable (CEP), depending on the 

variant.22 Their flight trajectories would be navigated by inertial strap-down guidance, 

and their prelaunch survivability would be limited by lengthy launch procedures and 

the presence of large contingents of ground-support vehicles. Nonetheless, CSS-2s are 

likely to fly depressed trajectories, complicating the problem of enemy ballistic-missile 

defenses systems that are simultaneously engaging other ballistic missiles with higher 

reentry angles.

Solid-propelled, two-stage, road-mobile CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missiles (DF21s) and extended-range DF-21As are capable of delivering single five-to-six-hundredkiloton nuclear warheads to land destinations 1,700 to 2,700 km away with an accuracy 

of one to four hundred meters CEP, depending again on the variant.23 Nuclear CSS-5s 

would navigate in flight by inertial gyroscope guidance, aided by onboard computers. 

The system’s use of solid-propellant rocket motors probably would enable it to achieve 

rapid acceleration and high initial speed, thereby reducing its time in the boost phase of 

flight and thus making it more difficult to shoot down during that period.24

China’s possession of theater-range nuclear delivery systems provides it a tool for deterring nuclear threat or attack. Given the range of these weapons relative to the distances 
36 china maritime studies

to key U.S. allies in the near-seas area, Beijing can also rely on those weapons to intimidate these allies in a crisis or war, thereby weakening the credibility of extended deterrence on which those allies may rely—according to Second Artillery commentators 

(see below).25 In a 1999 article, Maj. Gen. Lu Haozhong, then president of the Second 

Artillery Force’s Command Institute, asserted that “‘attacking strategy’ and ‘attacking 

alliances’ are an important part of nuclear deterrence.”26 Second Artillery Force thinking 

on how to attack alliances via deterrence emphasizes tailoring deterrence to the “target,” 

depending on whether alliance partners have differing attitudes toward a war.27 That is, 

as one former Second Artillery deputy commander has asserted, if attitudes differ, Chinese deterrence should focus on the dominant country, the one that has the “hard-line 

attitude.” When attitudes in an alliance are the same, “deterrence should be directed first 

at those countries whose foundation of social and political support is relatively weak.” 

China’s inventory of theater nuclear missiles can play an important role in countering enemy nuclear threats or attacks in near-seas contingencies. They provide potential 

nuclear options with more credibility than the use of longer-range intercontinental 

or submarine-launched ballistic missiles against strategic homeland targets of foreign 

nuclear powers. Should nuclear deterrence fail, these weapons enable China to inflict 

damage against area targets in the near-seas region, to include population, government, 

and industrial centers, as well as against soft military targets—including forward U.S. 

bases and staging areas.

Finally, this theater nuclear force affords China options for implementing the equivalent 

of American nuclear “flexible deterrent options” (FDOs).28 The Second Artillery Force 

intends its nuclear forces to be an active part of China’s regional military strategy rather 

than a passive backdrop to the nation’s development of conventional missile forces with 

antiaccess and area-denial capabilities. The Second Artillery Force views nuclear-force 

deterrence as an integral factor in conventional missile strike campaigns. This doctrine 

assumes Chinese missile operations will take place under nuclear deterrence or threat 

conditions—that is, conventional operations “will necessarily involve the Second Artillery Force nuclear missile unit’s deterrence activities.”29

In a conventional strike campaign, the Second Artillery Force intends to apply the “law 

of steadily increasing the strength of nuclear deterrence to prepare for the transition” 

to unlikely but possible nuclear counterattack operations.30 From the Second Artillery 

Force’s perspective, nuclear missile and warhead units should be the “basic deterrence 

forces” used to deter nuclear threats or attacks and to contribute to the waging of China’s 

political and diplomatic struggles during a conventional missile strike campaign. See the 

table.
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s near seas combat capabilities 37

Conventional Tactical Missiles

China’s tactical missile arsenal of 1,050 to 1,150 CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic 

missiles has been assigned to Second Artillery Force units at different stages since 1993, 

with most CSS-6 and CSS-7 missiles being distributed to deployed units from 1999 

through 2005.31 On the basis of these units’ current disposition and these missiles’ assessed ranges, the weapons are capable of attacking targets throughout Taiwan. 

The Second Artillery Force is currently equipped with three different solid-propelled, 

road-mobile, one- or two-stage CSS-6 short-range ballistic-missile variants.32 The original CSS-6 is capable of delivering a unitary high-explosive (HE) or armor-piercing warhead or incendiary submunitions to a land destination six hundred kilometers away with 

System Type and 

Designator

Mission Target Estimated Range Payload

DF-3 IRBM nuclear land 2,500 km 2–3 mt nuclear

DF-3A IRBM nuclear land 2,800 km 2–3 mt nuclear

DF-21 MRBM nuclear land 1,700 km 500–600 kt nuclear

DF-21A MRBM nuclear land 2,800 km 500–600 kt nuclear

DF-15 SRBM conventional land 600 km HE, armor-piercing, 

incendiary

Extended-Range 

DF-15 SRBM

conventional land 950 km HE, enhanced-blast, 

runway-penetrator

DF-15 MaRV 

SRBM

conventional land 950 km multiple unitary 

warheads and 

submunitions

DF-11 SRBM conventional land 350 km HE, FAE

DF-11A SRBM conventional land 350–530 km multiple unitary 

warheads and 

submunitions

DF-11B SRBM conventional land unknown unknown

New SR/MRBM conventional land 800–1,200 km enhanced-blast and 

runway-penetrator

CJ-10 GLCM conventional land 1,500+ km HE (blast)

DF-21C MRBM conventional land 1,700 km HE, armor, FAE, and 

electromagnetic 

pulse(?)

DF-21D MRBM conventional naval 1,500–2,000 km antiship

Second Artillery Force Missile Systems and Their Basic Characteristics

Notes: Chinese-assigned designators.

GLCM = ground-launched cruise missile 

IRBM = intermediate-range ballistic missile 

kt = kiloton 

MaRV = maneuverable reentry vehicle 

mt = megaton 

SRBM = short-range ballistic missile
38 china maritime studies

an accuracy of three to six hundred meters CEP. An extended-range CSS-6 variant can 

deliver a unitary HE and enhanced-blast warhead or runway-penetrator submunition 

to a land destination 950 kilometers away with an accuracy of thirty-five to fifty meters 

CEP. A further CSS-6 variant has the same range as an extended-range CSS-6 variant but 

would deliver a terminally guided submunition that would maneuver to a land target 

using sensors, thereby increasing its accuracy to a ten-to-thirty-meter CEP and enhancing its chances of defeating terminal-phase defenses. The first CSS-6 short-range ballistic 

missile relied on digital and computer-aided inertial guidance, whereas later variants 

turned to Global Positioning System (GPS), indigenous satellite navigation, or terminal 

radar, adding fins for in-flight navigation.

The Second Artillery Force is equipped with two versions of the solid-propelled, roadmobile, single-stage CSS-7 short-range ballistic missile, the DF-11 and DF-11A.33 A 

third, the DF-11B, may exist, but the evidence is less clear than for the first two. The 

original CSS-7 missile can deliver a unitary HE or fuel-air explosive (FAE) warhead 

to a land target 350 km away with an accuracy of five to six hundred meters CEP. The 

improved DF-11A can deliver a unitary warhead or submunitions to a land target 350 to 

530 km away with an accuracy of less than two hundred meters CEP. The original CSS7’s guidance is similar to that of a CSS-6; however, the DF-11A uses combined inertial 

and satellite (GPS or indigenous) navigation.

According to recent announcements by the government in Taiwan, China has tested 

and begun deploying a new solid-propelled, road-mobile ballistic missile with assessed 

ranges of eight hundred to a thousand and a thousand to 1,200 kilometers.34 It allegedly would be capable of damaging runways or delivering enhanced-blast submunitions 

against a target. The eight-hundred-to-one-thousand-kilometer-range version of this 

missile would be capable of hitting targets in the central mountains of Taiwan near eastcoast bases, whereas the thousand-to-1,200-kilometer version would have an antiaccess 

role, according to Tsai Der-Sheng, director of the Taiwan National Security Bureau. 

Some Taiwan commentators opine that it would be more difficult for Taiwan’s PAC-3 

(Patriot) units to intercept this longer-range missile than China’s other, short-range 

ballistic missiles, since it would achieve a higher altitude and therefore a higher reentry 

velocity.35

Conventional Land-Attack Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles

Over the last five years, China has enhanced its near-seas ballistic-missile options by establishing the world’s largest inventory of extended-range, ground-launched cruise missiles.36 The Second Artillery Force’s cruise-missile brigades are equipped with between 

two hundred and five hundred Changjian 10 (CJ-10) ground-launched cruise missiles, 

according to the Department of Defense’s report Military and Security Developments 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 39

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010.

37 These cruise missiles are capable of 

delivering unitary HE warheads out to a range of 1,500 to two thousand kilometers, with 

an accuracy of ten meters CEP.38 This missile relies for guidance on a combination of 

inertial navigation, GPS, and terrain comparison.39 CJ-10 missiles can strike from any 

direction and in a low-altitude trajectory, presenting a challenge for the defender. The 

CJ-10 would be launched from a three-canister, road-mobile launcher.

Conventional Theater Ballistic Missiles

As stated in the 2010 Defense Department report, “the PLA is acquiring conventional 

MRBMs [medium-range ballistic missiles] to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval targets, including aircraft carriers, 

operating far from China’s shore out to the first island chain.”40 Over the last six years, 

the Second Artillery Force has gradually equipped operational brigades with three solidpropelled, road-mobile, two-stage, ballistic-missile variants of the CSS-5 MRBM. China 

is developing these missiles and other measures to deter or counter intervention by third 

parties, including the United States, in any cross-strait crisis.41

Positioning these missiles in eastern China provides Beijing with military options for 

striking regional air bases, logistics facilities, and other infrastructure in the near-seas 

area. The combination of CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missiles and conventional 

theater ballistic missiles puts at risk all U.S. air bases in South Korea (Osan, Kunsan) and 

Japan (Kadena, Misawa, and Yokota), as well as alternate staging locations in the area. 

China’s antiship ballistic missiles could also threaten U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups, 

potentially forcing them to operate at longer ranges from the Chinese coast.42

The Second Artillery Force’s conventional, road-mobile, theater ballistic missile most 

likely to be used against enemy air bases would the DF-21C. This MRBM reportedly 

can deliver unitary HE warheads or various submunitions (armor-penetrating, FAE, 

and possibly electromagnetic-pulse) to land targets roughly 1,700 km away with a CEP 

of less than fifty meters.43 At least one unit, the 822nd Brigade, at Laiwu, in Shandong 

Province, reportedly is equipped with DF-21Cs. Nongovernmental Western experts have 

also identified a few other Second Artillery Force brigades as potential candidates for 

DF-21Cs; however, some are also candidates for DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles or 

even DF-16s.

China’s first-generation, road-mobile DF-21D antiship ballistic missile reportedly would 

rely on overhead and over-the-horizon sensors to locate and track moving ships, as well 

as for midcourse and terminal guidance to maneuver a warhead toward an aircraft carrier.44 It reportedly can deliver a warhead to a naval target as far out as at least 1,650 km. 

China’s English-language Global Times recently claimed the nation’s first antiship ballistic missile was “deployed with the army.”45 In December 2010, Adm. Robert Willard, 
40 china maritime studies

then Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, stated in an interview with a Japanese media 

outlet that the antiship ballistic missile had reached “initial operational capability.”46

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau director recently declared that China has developed 

and deployed a new ballistic-missile system with short- and medium-range flight capabilities. A third DF-21 conventional variant, the DF-21B, may eventually be deployed in 

eastern China. However, the only reports of its existence allege that it is deployed in the 

northwest.47

Missions and Scenarios

Most Second Artillery Force planning over the last fifteen years has focused on employing missiles for deterrent, coercive, or war-fighting purposes in a conflict with Taiwan. 

However, recent friction over territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the 

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the presence of U.S. naval assets variously in the Yellow Sea 

and the Sea of Japan raise questions regarding how land-based missiles can be used in 

those scenarios. 

Taiwan Strait Crisis or Conflict Scenarios

The Second Artillery Force’s conventional missiles clearly have missions directly relevant 

to Taiwan Strait scenarios. Two types of missile operations can be employed in crises: 

missile “deterrence” and the threat or use of missiles in a “surgical strike.” The PLA 

defines “deterrence fire support” as the use of firepower assets, including conventional 

missiles, in activities designed to “instill fear in our adversary by a show of force or 

by demonstrating our resolve and readiness to use our fire support forces” in a “war 

of nerves between the enemy and us.”48 The goal of instilling fear is to “coerce” the 

adversary into refraining from taking hostile actions or into abandoning its military 

objectives. Actions the PLA would consider include a show of force—drawing pointed 

attention to the “physical existence of fire support”—or execution of “a small portion” of 

fire-support operations, short of full-scale fire-support attacks.49

The Second Artillery Force was used on two separate occasions in 1995 and 1996, in 

show-of-force launches near Taiwan during the run-up to its first presidential election. 

Such deterrent operations could be initiated again, if cross-strait frictions were renewed. 

The PLA concept of threatening or using conventional missiles or other firepower assets 

during local wars in a “surgical strike” as a form of “strategic deterrence” could be applied in a Taiwan Strait contingency.50 The PLA in its writings points to selective strikes 

against Taiwan as potential responses to “provocative activities” or “threats” by Taiwan 

or as a form of firepower support for combat operations designed to seize the offshore 

islands.51
china

s near seas combat capabilities 41

PLA and Second Artillery Force campaign-level doctrine has identified specific wartime 

missions for the latter relevant to a Taiwan contingency—to include preparatory or 

direct “fire support” to joint PLA operations and an “independent conventional missile 

strike campaign” by Second Artillery Force units against key enemy strategic or campaign targets. In a joint PLA campaign, initial operations by other services usually are 

intended to seize air, sea, ground, and information superiority on the battlefield as a 

necessary precondition for follow-on operations against specific operational objectives.52

The PLA and the Second Artillery Force have identified specific fire-support missions 

and targets for Second Artillery Force operations in support of a wide range of campaigns by the other three PLA services.53

Also, an independent conventional Second Artillery Force campaign could be organized to perform a selective “warning strike” against some sensitive target in Taiwan.54

Potential targets of a selective warning strike include important civilian industrial and 

nuclear power bases, as well as urban targets, such as political and economic centers. In 

a war with Taiwan, the Second Artillery Force would also be assigned responsibility for 

contributing to PLA efforts to deter or counter foreign military intervention, to include 

American military action to help Taiwan defend itself. 

According to the Second Artillery Force’s definitive campaign-level doctrinal document, antiship ballistic missiles could be used in five ways against carrier strike groups 

(CSGs): “firepower harassment strikes” involving direct attack on carrier battle groups; 

intimidation salvos in front of a CSG, as “a warning shot”; a combination of PLA Navy 

interception of a CSG and intimidation salvos; the use of penetrating submunitions and 

concentrated firepower assault to destroy carrier-borne planes or control towers (masts 

and antennas) and to damage other critical and vulnerable positions; and a disabling 

electromagnetic attack on a CSG’s command-and-control system, including antiradiation or electromagnetic-pulse submunitions against Aegis radars.55

Second Artillery Force operations against U.S. air bases could include a combination 

attack, wherein ballistic-missile attacks would deliver unitary warheads that crater runways and thus fix aircraft in place for destruction (if unsheltered) by follow-on cluster 

munitions.56 Cruise missiles can destroy aircraft shelters and damage fuel and maintenance facilities. According to a recent assessment, the Second Artillery Force’s current 

conventional missile inventory is sufficient to close down the five U.S. air bases that are 

less than 1,100 km from Chinese territory of the six bases in East Asia (Guam being the 

sixth).57

Other Scenarios in the Northern and Southern Near Seas 

There is considerably less evidence of a role for the Second Artillery Force in operations 

designed to defend Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity at other points on the 
42 china maritime studies

maritime periphery. China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors over the South China 

Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have been lesser contingencies for the PLA compared to the Taiwan scenario over the last fifteen years. 

Nonetheless, ongoing efforts by the Second Artillery Force to form new missile units, 

position them in southeast China, and equip them with new ballistic- or cruise-missile 

systems are increasing its ability to range major portions of the South China Sea with 

conventional missile firepower. Additionally, the Second Artillery Force’s formation of 

new units in central and northeast China and its reequipment of existing nuclear units 

with conventional theater ballistic missiles enhance its ability to engage maritime targets 

in the Yellow Sea or the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu area of the East China Sea, as well as 

land targets in northeast Asia.58 Recent fragmentary comments by PLA officials and Chinese experts suggest that the PLA and the Second Artillery Force are likely to incorporate 

conventional missiles into China’s courses of action in the northern and southern near 

seas in the years ahead.

It is important to look back briefly at one of the more obscure reasons why China 

developed conventional missiles in the 1980s and early 1990s. When China first considered using mobile, solid-fueled missiles to carry conventional warheads, it reportedly initiated a program to develop and field a two-stage, mobile DF-25 missile with a 

maximum range of 1,700 km. The purpose of the DF-25 would reportedly have been to 

defend the Spratly/Nansha Islands in the South China Sea.59 The thinking at the time 

was that a conventionally tipped ballistic missile, if accurate enough, could provide 

quick fire support over long distances to PLAN operations in the Spratlys. China did not 

possess aircraft carriers or air-refueling capabilities at the time; the DF-25 was viewed as 

compensating for China’s inferiority in the air balance. In the late 1980s, Beijing reportedly even ordered an acceleration of the DF-25 program to serve as a stopgap measure 

until China fielded sea-based naval air and air-refueling capabilities.60 In the 1990s, the 

PLA apparently kept alive plans to recapture islands in the Spratly group via amphibious 

operations, with the DF-25 held in reserve, as a last resort. 

We are beginning to see fragmentary signs of assessment by some Chinese officials and 

experts of the merits of conventional Second Artillery Force missiles in any PLA force 

package assembled to defend peripheral sea interests in areas other than Taiwan. Commenting on recent press articles about how the Second Artillery Force was establishing 

new missile bases in southeast China, Shanghai-based military expert Ni Lexiong said 

in August 2010 that the development “was a hint that the missile force would play a role 

in defending Beijing’s core interest in the South China Sea.”61 During the same month, 

a Shanghai-based expert on sea power, Mao Yao, argued that one of the first steps China 

should take in response to tensions with the United States over the South China Sea was 

to “improve long-range strike systems,” including CJ-10 cruise missiles and space-based 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 43

reconnaissance satellites, “to create a situation in which space power and land power 

suppress sea power.”62

A few months earlier, PLA expert Liu Jiangping had sketched out a potential role for 

Second Artillery Force units in “countermeasures” to protect national security and core 

interests in response to indications of American and South Korean joint exercises in the 

Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan and to official U.S. commentary on China’s South China Sea 

claims. According to Liu, the Second Artillery Force could coordinate with PLA Navy 

operations in the South China Sea or with ground, naval, or air force operations in the 

Yellow Sea.63 Depending on the timing of a threat and changes in its severity, “the Second Artillery is the quickest in support,” compared to other PLA services, and “its missile 

guidance data can be reloaded in a few minutes.” Liu’s emphasis on the Second Artillery 

Force’s ability to respond quickly with fire support is the same rationale that was reportedly used to justify a conventional DF-25 role in defending the Nanshas in the 1980s and 

early 1990s. 

These fragmentary indications are not matched by any major increase in indicators that 

China is carving out a greater Second Artillery Force role in plans for these peripheral 

sea areas. Nonetheless, the PLA and Second Artillery Force are likely to consider an 

increased role for the latter in these plans over time. This role is likely to possess the following characteristics.

Small-Scale Operations. A limited expenditure of conventional missile firepower, limited 

especially in comparison to the requirements of supporting an amphibious landing on 

Taiwan and follow-on maneuver. In some cases, the Second Artillery Force’s role can 

be restricted to shows of force or selective warning strikes—especially against smaller 

militaries.

Independent Second Artillery Force Campaigns. Deterrent fire support and surgical 

strikes in crises in peripheral sea areas, which can be independent operations parallel to 

any PLA joint or service campaigns.64 The same logic would apply to selective warning 

strikes by Second Artillery Force units on sensitive targets in wartime. 

Support to Other PLA Services. The Second Artillery Force can support joint or individual PLA service operations to achieve air, ground, naval, and information superiority. On the basis of a review of the PLA National Defense University’s 2006 Science 

of Campaigns, the following campaigns can be implemented in peripheral sea area 

operations other than Taiwan: joint blockade, landing, or anti-air-raid campaigns; PLA 

Navy “sea-force group”; sea-lane interdiction; offense against coral island reefs; sea-line 

guarding; naval base defense campaigns; and PLA Air Force air offensive or air defense 

campaigns.65
44 china maritime studies

Concluding Thought: New Ways of Warfare?

Are Second Artillery Force capabilities, such as DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles, enabling new ways of warfare in the near seas and beyond? The answer is clearly yes, in the 

sense that when the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile achieves full operational capability, an antiship-ballistic-missile capability will have been successfully fielded for the first 

time by a country’s armed forces. Earlier efforts by the Soviet Union and the United 

States to develop such capability did not yield a deployed weapon system and were 

halted by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 

However, the use of land-based offensive missiles against ships has precedents. Landbased cruise missiles were launched at ships in previous wars, to include two Iraqi 

Silkworms from a land site in Kuwait against the battleship USS Missouri (BB 63) in February 1991, during the first Gulf War.66 Land-based ballistic missiles have also been fired 

over water against land targets: Libya fired Soviet-supplied Scud-B short-range ballistic 

missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa in 1986.67

Nonetheless, China’s evolving land-based missile force, missions, and capabilities for 

the near seas pose important challenges for American and allied defense postures and 

military capabilities, at all levels of warfare. Operationally, the Second Artillery Force’s 

expanding and modernizing capability against potential land and maritime targets in 

the near seas reinforces the insightful observation of Wayne Hughes that the offense, 

defense, and “staying power” of a ship or force all need to be evaluated together in estimating combat power in a new tactical era characterized by missile warfare.68

The Second Artillery Force has established a sophisticated operational strategy to ensure 

that its deployed units survive in combat. This strategy relies on “maneuvering operations” between fixed operational and support positions as the chief pattern for operational deployment and on “mobile operations” as the main combat mode. In combat, 

Second Artillery Force operational units will rely on a satellite warning system to exploit 

gaps in enemy reconnaissance; operate at night and in adverse weather or low-light 

conditions; maintain a quick operating tempo when preparing to launch or redeploying 

postlaunch; and utilize multiple field operating areas and widely dispersed positions. 

Tactically, enhancements to land-based missiles are creating opportunities for China 

to combine several different tactics and technical capabilities in more effective attacks 

against defended targets. Operational counter-countermeasures to ballistic-missile or air 

defenses are likely, in addition to various technical penetration aids frequently discussed 

by Chinese analysts assessing China’s ability to defeat missile defenses. 

To look forward, American and allied missile and air-defense operators and systems 

are likely to have to cope with many forms of structured attacks, such as timed arrivals and salvo launches; wide-azimuth attacks; shaped trajectories; mixed unitary and 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 45

submunition payloads; coordinated ballistic- and cruise-missile launches; antiradiation 

homing missiles; electronic attack measures by other PLA services to enable Second 

Artillery Force missiles to penetrate defenses; PLA special-operations actions against 

ground-based missile-defense radars, command vehicles, and crews; and, eventually, 

multiple missiles launched against moving targets, including ships. Enemy forces and 

ships operating in the area, local installations or infrastructures, and critical network 

nodes are very likely to be hit. This vulnerability to China’s land-based missile power 

reinforces for its potential adversaries the importance of developing and operating forces 

and systems able to absorb damage and continue fighting. 

Finally, the continued existence of a theater-nuclear-force component of China’s missile 

posture for the near seas and the integral role of nuclear FDOs in the Second Artillery 

Force’s conventional missile campaign doctrine raise important questions regarding 

the cost and risk Beijing would be willing to incur in prosecuting military operations 

at various points in the near seas. Definitive Second Artillery Force doctrine calls for 

nuclear deterrence activities (signaling, etc.) in parallel with conventional missile campaigns. The extent to which senior Chinese civilian leaders are aware of or endorse the 

nuclear dimension of Second Artillery Force conventional missile campaign planning is 

unknown. 

In any event, actual implementation by the Second Artillery Force of these nuclear FDOs 

could create conditions for escalation of a conventional war, even if they are designed 

merely to “check” enemy nuclear intimidation without resorting to first use of nuclear 

weapons. China’s adversaries could misinterpret nuclear-deterrent actions as the generation of nuclear forces to a state of combat readiness and take corresponding countermeasures. These Second Artillery Force concepts highlight the unintentional risks and 

costs possibly associated with countering China’s antiaccess and area-denial strategy in 

the western Pacific. 

Enemy operations against land-based Chinese missile forces probably would occur as 

the Second Artillery Force’s nuclear deterrence activities were going forward. Indications of Chinese nuclear activities would telegraph to adversaries the risks associated 

with counter–missile forces operations against Second Artillery Force units in mainland 

China. Should these indications result in enemy restraint in targeting missile units, 

Second Artillery Force units would operate in conditions of virtual sanctuary, thereby 

enhancing China’s leverage. Conversely, however, if its enemies “fight through” China’s 

nuclear deterrence, follow-on Second Artillery Force operations would be complicated. 

China would be confronted with a choice between escalating its mode of nuclear signaling and confining its missile operations to conventional means of war.
46 china maritime studies

Notes 

1. “Second Artillery Force,” sec. 4 of Fundamental 

Artillery Tactics (Changsha, PRC: National Defense Technology Univ., February 2001), p. 295.

2. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, The 

People’s Liberation Army as Organization, reference volume 1.0 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 

pp. 530–36.

3. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, 

D.C.: 17 August 2010), p. 66, available at www 

.defense.gov/. See also the data sheet “DongHai 

10 (ChangJian 10) Land-Attack Cruise Missile,” 

China’s Defence Today, updated 3 October 2009, 

www.sinodefence.com/.

4. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010, p. 2.

5. Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, “Evolving 

Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: 

Implications for Stability in the Taiwan Strait 

and Beyond,” Project 2049 Institute (27 May 

2010), p. 15, project2049.net/. 

6. Ibid., pp. 80–91.

7. The four brigades in this component are the 

806th, 810th, and 816th Brigades of the 51st 

Base and the 807th Brigade of the 52nd Base. 

Ibid.

8. Ibid., pp. 13–14.

9. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010, p. 66. 

10. See the last section of Mark Stokes, “Expansion 

of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan,” AsiaEye (blog), blog.project2049 

.net/. 

11. Ibid.

12. Stokes and Easton, “Evolving Aerospace Trends 

in the Asia-Pacific Region,” pp. 14–15. 

13. Ian Easton, “The Assassin under the Radar: 

China’s DH-10 Cruise Missile Program,” Project 

2049 Institute, Futuregram 09-005 (1 October 

2009), p. 4, project2049.net/.

14. “Donghai 10 Land-Attack Cruise Missile,” 

China’s Defence Today, www.sinodefence.com/. 

15. Mark Stokes, “China’s Evolving Conventional 

Strategic Strike Capability: The Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Challenge to U.S. Maritime Operations in the Western Pacific and Beyond,” Project 

2049 Institute (14 September 2009), project2049 

.net/.

16. For more on these units see Stokes and Easton, 

“Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific 

Region,” pp. 12–15.

17. The formation of this unit and its likely weapon 

system have been reported in a recent Project 

2049 blog posting as Unit 96219 of the 53rd Second Artillery Force Base; Stokes, “Expansion of 

China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite 

Taiwan.” Taiwan’s National Security Bureau director, Tsai Der-Sheng, told Taiwan’s legislature 

in mid-March 2011 that China was deploying a 

new ballistic-missile system designated the DF16, with a range of eight hundred to a thousand 

kilometers, or more; Wendell Minnick, “China 

Ramps Up Missile Threat with DF-16,” Defense 

News, 21 March 2011. 

18. Stokes and Easton, “Evolving Aerospace Trends 

in the Asia-Pacific Region,” p. 13.

19. See U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China 2010, p. 66, table. 

20. See the data sheets “Dong Feng 3 (CSS-2) 

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile” [updated 

27 February 2009] and “Dong Feng 21 (CSS-5) 

Medium-Range Ballistic Missile” [updated 

4 June 2010], China’s Defence Today, www 

.sinodefence.com/. 

21. John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, 

Goals,” International Security 17, no. 2 (Fall 

1992). 

22. “Dong Feng 3 (CSS-2) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile.”

23. “Dong Feng 21 (CSS-5) Medium-Range Ballistic 

Missile.” 

24. Clayton K. S. Chun, “Ballistic Missile Fundamentals: How Ballistic Missiles Work,” chap. 1 in 

Thunder over the Horizon: From V-2 Rockets to 

Ballistic Missiles (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 

2006), p. 15. 

25. For an earlier reference to China’s intent to 

“decouple” the United States from its allies in the 

region, especially Japan and South Korea, “by 

using the threat of theater nuclear weapons,” see 

page 41 in Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, “The 

Chinese Strategic Rocket Forces: Transition to 

Credible Deterrence,” in China and Weapons 

of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United 

States, Conference Report CR-99-05 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service and 

National Intelligence Council, April 2000). The 

conference was held in Washington, D.C., 5 

November 1999.
china

s near seas combat capabilities 47

26. Maj. Gen. Lu Haozhong and Senior Col. 

Zhang Jinxi, “Contemporary Strategy of 

Nuclear Deterrence” [in Chinese], Zhongguo 

Junshi Kexue (Beijing), 20 May 1999, Foreign 

Broadcast Information Service [hereafter FBIS] 

CPP20010206000162. 

27. Lt. Gen. Zhao Xijun, “‘Victory without War’ 

and Modern Deterrence Strategy” [in Chinese], 

Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (Beijing), 31 October 

2001, pp. 55–60, FBIS CPP2011228000132. 

Lieutenant General Zhao was then deputy commander of the Second Artillery.

28. FDOs, in U.S. military lexicon, are “planning 

construct[s] . . . that begin with deterrentoriented actions carefully tailored to produce a 

desired effect.” U.S. Defense Dept., Department 

of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, 

D.C.: 8 November 2010), s.v. “Flexible Deterrent 

Options,” available at www.dtic.mil/. 

29. Yu Jixun, ed., The Science of Second Artillery 

Campaigns (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army 

Press for the People’s Liberation Army Second 

Artillery Corps, March 2004), p. 127.

30. Ibid., p. 232, for both this quoted phrase and the 

next.

31. For arsenal size, U.S. Defense Dept., Military 

and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China 2010, p. 2. 

32. “Dong Feng 15 (CSS-6/M-9),” China’s Defence 

Today, www.sinodefence.com/. 

33. “DF-11/M-1 (CSS-7) Short Range Ballistic Missile,” China’s Defence Today, www.sinodefence 

.com/. 

34. “Summary of Articles from the Taiwan Ministry 

of National Defense Newspaper Ch’ing-Nien 

Jih-Pao [Youth Daily News] for 17 March 

2011,” Open Source Center [hereafter OSC],

CPP20110318108001, 17 March 2011. 

35. J. Michael Cole, “Grand Missile Bargain in Making” (editorial), Taipei Times, 6 April 2011, OSC, 

CPP20110406968005. 

36. Stokes and Easton, “Evolving Aerospace Trends 

in the Asia-Pacific Region,” p. 14.

37. See U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China 2010, p. 31. 

38. “DongHai 10 Chang-Jian 10 LACM,” China’s 

Defence Today, www.sinodefence.com/. 

39. Wendell Minnick, “China Tests New LandAttack Cruise Missile,” Defense News, 21 

September 2004. 

40. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010, p. 31.

41. Ibid., p. 29. 

42. Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, USAF (Ret.), China’s 

Active Defense Strategy and Its Regional Impact,

statement to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C., 

27 January 2011, available at www.uscc.gov/.

43. “Dong Feng 21C (CSS-5 Mod-3) MRBM,” 

China’s Defence Today, www.sinodefence.com/. 

For the CEP estimate, see Stokes and Easton, 

“Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific 

Region,” p. 13.

44. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010, p. 30. 

45. Zhang Han and Huang Jingjing, “New Missile 

Ready by 2015,” Global Times, 18 February 2011.

46. Yoichi Kato, “China’s New Missile Capability 

Raises Tensions,” Asahi Shimbun, 27 January 

2011.

47. Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile 

Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan.” 

48. “Special Fire Support,” chap. 12 in Modern 

Firepower Warfare (Changsha, PRC: National 

Defense Science and Technology Univ., 2000), 

sec. 1, “Psychological Fire Support.”

49. Ibid.

50. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., Science 

of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science, 

2001), p. 182.

51. “Special Fire Support.”

52. Campaign Theory Study Guide (Beijing: National 

Defense Univ. Press, 2003), question 52. 

53. For specific missions see Andrew S. Erickson 

and Lyle J. Goldstein, Chinese Aerospace Power: 

Evolving Maritime Roles (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 

Institute Press, 2011), pp. 317–19.

54. Li Yuankai, “High Technology and Modern 

Warfare,” in Fundamental Artillery Tactics, chief 

ed. Li Yuankai, 1st ed. (Beijing: Military Art 

and Literature, 1998), sec. 4, “Second Artillery 

Force,” OSC, CPP20061220320004.

55. Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using 

the Land to Control the Sea: Chinese Analysts 

Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile,” Naval 

War College Review 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009), 

pp. 60–61.

56. Marshall Hoyler, “China’s ‘Antiaccess’ Ballistic 

Missiles and U.S. Active Defense,” Naval War 

College Review 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2010), p. 86.
48 china maritime studies

57. See Jeff Hagen, written testimony for U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission 

Hearing on China’s Emergency Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities, 

20 May 2010; available as a table prepared by 

the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission staff in 2010 Report to Congress of 

the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission (Washington, D.C.: 1 November 

2010), pp. 89–90.

58. Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile 

Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan.” 

59. Lewis and Huai Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile 

Programs,” p. 31.

60. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization 

in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 

Univ. Press, 1994), p. 227.

61. Minnie Chan and Greg Torode, “PLA Opens 

Missile Base: South China Sea in Range,” South 

China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 7 August 

2010, OSC, CPP20100807706001.

62. Mao Yao, “Three Approaches to Defending Sea 

Power in the South China Sea” [in Chinese], 

Dongfang Zaobao (Shanghai), 11 August 2010, 

OSC, CPP20100812038001.

63. Liu Yueh-Shan, “Leading Role of Second Artillery in Defending China’s Maritime Rights” [in 

Chinese], Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), 29 July 

2010, OSC, CPP20100729788006 [emphasis in 

the following quotation supplied]. 

64. Li Yuankai, “High Technology and Modern 

Warfare.”

65. Zhang Yulang, chief ed., The Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense Univ. Press, 

May 2006), table of contents.

66. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics and Coastal 

Combat, 2nd ed.(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 

Press, 2000), pp. 149–68.

67. W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in Modern 

Conflict, Washington Papers (Washington, D.C.: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

1991), p. 15.

68. Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, p. 

168.
In order to defend the security of the national territory, marine 

territories and the waters within the First Island Chain, this 

proactive defense strategy does not mean that our navy only stays 

within the First Island Chain. 

REAR ADM. ZHANG ZHAOZHANG, APRIL 2009

The aim of this chapter is to examine recent developments in China’s ability to use the key constituents of aerospace power—aircraft and conventional missiles—to 

achieve strategic objectives in the near seas.1 The chapter will discuss aerospace power 

in the context of China’s maritime defense strategy, including its historical foundations; analyze China’s current doctrine for use of aerospace power in the near seas; and 

consider recent advances in Chinese aircraft and conventional missile capabilities as they 

pertain to this doctrine. This chapter does not address all aspects of China’s aerospace 

capabilities that are necessary for dominance in the near seas. Instead, it analyzes some 

of the more visible and higher-profile aspects of China’s growing capabilities necessary 

for defending China’s expanding maritime strategic depth. 

Aerospace Power and Coastal Defense 

Aerospace power has been fundamental for defending the near seas of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since its founding.2

 While air and naval operations did not play 

significant roles in the Chinese Civil War, immediately thereafter the victorious forces 

were threatened by hostile air and naval forces from the maritime sphere. In 1949 the 

regime was ill equipped to defend its eleven thousand miles of coastline and more than 

six thousand islands against attack and harassment from Nationalist Chinese air and 

naval forces, let alone protect the PRC against the aircraft carriers of the powerful U.S. 

Seventh Fleet. Even before the founding of the People’s Republic, its future leaders recognized the need for strong naval and air forces.3

 This need soon became apparent, when 

in June 1949 the Kuomintang (KMT) government on Taiwan declared a blockade of 

coastal mainland ports and KMT naval and air forces began attacking coastal shipping 

and ports, as well as laying mines in river estuaries.4

Daniel J. Kostecka

Aerospace Power and China’s Counterstrike Doctrine in 

the Near Seas

CHAPTER FOUR
50 china maritime studies

Over the course of the 1950s the PLA experienced mixed success in protecting China’s 

coastline. In 1949, communist forces captured Hainan Island, the second-largest KMTheld island; most of the smaller offshore islands fell in the early 1950s. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was successful too in stopping KMT raids on the mainland and on 

merchant and fishing fleets. However, KMT forces stubbornly held Jinmen and Matsu, as 

well as a few additional islands, such as Taiping (Itu Aba) in the South China Sea, and in 

this period the PLA was never a serious threat to invade Taiwan. Throughout the 1950s, 

PLA naval and air forces were impotent against powerful U.S. elements operating in China’s near seas, as evidenced by the Seventh Fleet’s role in resupplying Jinmen in 1954–55 

and in evacuating KMT troops and civilians from the Dachen Islands in 1955, as well as 

in escorting KMT vessels resupplying Nationalist-held offshore islands in 1958.5

Despite a clear need to defend China’s near seas, resource constraints meant that coastal 

defense represented the extent of the operational capabilities of the PLA’s sea and air 

forces. The overall focus of the PLA Navy (PLAN) on coastal-defense versus longerrange operations is evidenced by the deployment of thirteen coastal-defense artillery 

regiments in 1951, the primary focus of naval aviation on air- and ground-based defense 

of fleet bases, and the disbanding of the PLAN marines in 1957, only three years after the 

force was established.6 While PLAN aviation and aircraft of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 

flew several hundred sorties during campaigns of the 1950s, they were primarily relegated to coastal air defense, under strict rules of engagement. On a positive note, the 1950s 

ended with the KMT air force no longer operating at will over Fujian and Guangdong 

Provinces, thanks to a permanent presence of PLAAF and PLAN aviation along China’s 

eastern and southern coastlines.7 Overall, though, while China’s air forces demonstrated 

the capacity to defend the nation’s airspace against KMT aircraft, they could do little 

to counter American air and naval operations in the near seas, as demonstrated by the 

Seventh Fleet’s operations in and around the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s and the freewheeling nature of U.S. Navy and Air Force air support to United Nations forces during 

the Korean War.8

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s PLA air forces continued to emphasize coastal air 

defense and possessed little ability to exert influence in China’s near seas. The KMT air 

force on Taiwan continued to fly reconnaissance aircraft over the mainland; several of 

these were shot down, and PLAN fighters based on Hainan shot down a small number 

of U.S. Navy and Air Force fighters that strayed too close to Chinese airspace during the 

Vietnam War.9 Nevertheless, some combat operations by the PLA in the 1970s called on 

China’s air forces to push beyond the coastal-defense paradigm. In 1974, PLAN fighter 

aircraft flew thirty-eight sorties in support of operations to seize the Paracel Islands from 

South Vietnam, a mission that to this day represents the longest-distance opposed landing operation executed by the PLA. Further, in the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 51

PLAN aircraft flew 751 sorties in support of fleet units operating off Vietnam’s coast (no 

information is available regarding the types of missions flown).10

Development of the Near Seas Defense Strategy

The need for China’s air forces to push their operations farther out over water gained urgency in the 1980s as China’s naval strategy changed under the leadership of a dynamic 

new PLAN commander. Building on developments of the 1970s, in 1982, Adm. Liu 

Huaqing directed the Naval Research Institute to develop a regional naval strategy, which 

would become known as “Near Seas Defense” (or, more commonly, “offshore defense”), 

that would move the PLAN beyond the coastal-defense paradigm.11 Like all PLAN commanders prior to 1996, Admiral Liu had been originally an army officer; however, in a 

military often dominated by the “great infantry” concept, he was more than just an infantryman serving in a naval billet. Liu proved to be an aggressive and forward-thinking 

maritime strategist, and by developing the strategy of Near Seas Defense and pushing for 

continued modernization, he laid many of the intellectual and technical foundations of 

the PLAN of the early twenty-first century.12

While Near Seas Defense is defined a variety of ways and is often generically associated with operations within China’s two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic 

zone, Admiral Liu himself defined Near Seas Defense as operations within and outside the “First Island Chain,” running from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines. Liu 

defined Near Seas Defense as a regional strategy specific to China’s maritime claims and 

interests; he did not advocate replicating American or Soviet global naval capabilities. 

Instead, he made comparisons to the 1980s-era naval strategies of Great Britain, France, 

Germany, Italy, and Japan.13

It is noteworthy that Liu’s articulation of offshore defense is far closer to what Alfred 

Thayer Mahan advocated for the United States than most realize. U.S. Naval War College 

scholars James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara state, “Close study will reveal that Mahan 

never counseled naval war for its own sake. Far from espousing an open-ended American naval buildup, he urged the U.S. Navy to assume the strategic defensive in vital 

waters, chiefly the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, expanses that would provide 

America its ‘gateway to the Pacific’ once the Panama Canal opened.”14

Just as Mahan argued that the control of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico was 

essential to promoting American development and defending maritime commerce and 

that the Caribbean Sea was the strategic key to America’s maritime frontiers on the 

Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Liu held out the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas as 

troves of resources and protective screens for China’s own development.15 Where Mahan 

viewed such key geographic points as Cuba and Jamaica as essential for controlling 
52 china maritime studies

access to the Caribbean and thus the soon-to-be-completed Panama Canal, offshore 

defense is concerned with the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea because of their 

location along strategic sea-lanes linking China to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well 

as their overall importance in protecting the South China Sea, which Liu designated 

“the southern gate of our motherland.”16 Additionally, while Liu wrote about Taiwan in 

regard to the need to reunify it with the homeland, subsequent Chinese strategists have 

discussed Taiwan much as Mahan discussed islands like Cuba, Jamaica, and Hawaii and 

their importance to the United States as keys to controlling maritime communications 

and protecting maritime interests, or, if in the hands of foreign power, as barriers threatening trade and development.17

However, for all his strategic vision, Admiral Liu developed China’s naval strategy in a 

time far removed from that of Mahan, and he had to contend with something Mahan 

did not—the dominance of airpower in the maritime battle space. When the strategy of 

Near Seas Defense was first put in place in 1986, the PLAN’s lack of credible air defense 

for its surface ships and the obsolescence and short range of the fighter aircraft equipping both the PLAAF and PLAN meant that little could be done to protect China’s near 

seas against a serious opponent.18 Beyond that, a lack of long-range precision-strike 

(LRPS) capability on the parts of the PLAN and PLAAF, as well as China’s missile force, 

the Second Artillery Force, meant that the PLA could do little in terms of offensive 

operations against an enemy’s air and naval forces during a conflict on the maritime 

periphery. 

As the 1980s gave way to the 1990s, however, the need for the PLAN to be able to execute 

a near-seas defensive strategy became crystal clear. The collapse of the Soviet Union 

eliminated a large-scale threat that the Central Military Commission even in 1985 had 

correctly recognized was diminishing. Operation Desert Storm and subsequent U.S.-led 

operations against Iraq and in the Balkans throughout the 1990s demonstrated the effectiveness of LRPS technology. It became clear to PRC leaders that an enemy equipped 

with LRPS weaponry could launch it against China’s densely populated and economically vibrant coastal provinces from air- and sea-based platforms outside the range of 

China’s defenses. Further, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, during which the United 

States deployed two aircraft carrier groups in the vicinity of Taiwan as a show of support 

against PRC missile drills intended to intimidate the island during its first democratic 

elections, served as a harsh lesson to China’s leaders regarding its vulnerability to an 

enemy with a first-class military.19

A Counterstrike Doctrine for Near-Seas Defense

In terms of potential conflicts in China’s near seas, a Taiwan contingency is the foremost 

issue on the minds of many strategists on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. While China 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 53

has developed the capability to conduct robust firepower strikes and blockades against 

Taiwan, at this time the PLA does not possess the ability to invade it. Therefore, in a time 

of crisis, China’s overall goal is to deter Taiwan from moving toward a formal declaration of independence while possessing the capability to punish Taiwan severely should 

it do so anyway and to prevent the United States from intervening on its behalf, by 

threatening U.S. forces and bases throughout the western Pacific.20 However, by focusing on the development of multimission platforms and weapons that could execute 

large-scale coercive and punishment operations against Taiwan, the PLA as a whole is 

quietly evolving into a balanced and flexible force capable of conducting missions across 

the spectrum of military operations, including such nonwar operations as the ongoing 

counterpiracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden and the use of PLAN and PLAAF assets 

to evacuate Chinese citizens from Libya in 2011. Additionally, the counterstrike capabilities the PLA is developing to deter or defeat American intervention in a Taiwan scenario 

are just as applicable for countering U.S. intervention in other contingencies in China’s 

near seas. Late 2010 statements by high-level American officials regarding U.S. interests 

in the South and East China Seas and inflammatory Chinese rhetoric over the possible 

participation of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) in exercises in the 

Yellow Sea highlight potential areas of tension between Beijing and Washington in the 

western Pacific.21

The operational conceptual element of this emerging counterstrike doctrine is known as 

“noncontact warfare.” While sometimes incorrectly characterized as a “Sun Tzu–esque” 

method of winning without fighting, noncontact warfare is in fact nothing more than 

the employment of long-range precision-strike systems from outside an enemy’s defended zone against key nodes throughout the strategic and operational depths of an enemy’s 

“system” (see below).22 Science of Military Strategy (2005) discusses at length the need to 

conduct nonlinear standoff attacks against key points and centers of gravity across the 

breadth and depth of an enemy’s system. Primary targets include command-and-control 

systems and logistics facilities. In fact, Science of Military Strategy argues that an enemy’s 

primary combat forces should be attacked only after the destruction of information and 

logistics capabilities, because the combat capabilities of the main operational forces will 

thus be significantly weakened. The goal is not the wholesale destruction of an enemy 

but the paralysis of its combat forces by robbing them of essential information and 

supplies. Analogies are drawn to the destruction of a body’s brain and central nervous 

system.23

For American planners, the relevant aspect in this line of thought is that in a conflict between the United States and China in East Asia, the first American targets the PLA would 

go after might not be carrier strike groups or the runways and parking aprons at Kadena 

Air Base on Okinawa. Instead, the PLA might single out the replenishment vessels that 
54 china maritime studies

supply the strike groups at sea, as well as land-based logistics and command-and-control 

targets. A December 2005 article in the PLAN newspaper 人民海军 (People’s Navy) 

discusses the need for constant at-sea replenishment as one of the primary weaknesses 

of U.S. carrier strike groups.24 With regard to broader counterstrike operations, the air 

bases that receive the most attention from the PLA in the early stages of a conflict are 

likely to be those where the United States bases airborne tankers and command-andcontrol aircraft and similarly high-value assets. 

It is noteworthy that the PLA’s counterstrike doctrine is not particularly new. Airpower 

theorists have been claiming since the 1920s that strategic strikes against key targets 

can paralyze an enemy’s war effort. In fact, the best articulation of how the PLA defines 

its counterstrike doctrine can be found not in any book or article in Chinese but in an 

article entitled “The Enemy as a System,” by Col. John Warden of the U.S. Air Force (now 

retired) in the Spring 1995 edition of Airpower Journal. Warden, one of the architects 

of the U.S.-led coalition air campaign in Desert Storm, represents potential enemies as 

a five-ring model, the rings representing, from the inside out, “Leadership,” “Organic 

Essentials” (such as electricity), “Key Infrastructure,” “Population,” and “Fielded Forces.” 

In terms similar to those used now by the Chinese, Warden describes a properly executed 

air campaign as one of nonlinear attacks against key targets to induce strategic and 

operational paralysis, thereby making engagement of an enemy’s military forces either 

unnecessary or the result of which at least virtually a foregone conclusion.25 Not surprisingly, Warden’s views on airpower are known to the Chinese. Noted PLAAF general and 

military commentator Liu Yazhou calls Warden the “[Giulio] Douhet of our time,” while 

the five-ring model receives prominent mention in the 2002 book Air Raid and Anti–Air 

Raid in the 21st Century.

26

The notion of forcing strategic and operational paralysis on an enemy through longrange precision air and missile strikes is controversial, to say the least, and the issue will 

not be debated in these pages. For now it is sufficient to say that the PLA has developed 

and is refining a counterstrike doctrine based on classic airpower theory and applied 

with a growing array of precision-strike weapons. Operationally, this doctrine flows 

from the strategic framework articulated in Science of Military Strategy. Further, Air Raid 

and Anti–Air Raid calls for organizing counterstrike forces under the command of a 

“Counterattack Operations Group.” The forces assigned to or at least coordinated by this 

group include the fighter and attack aviation of the PLAAF and PLAN, conventional 

ballistic- and cruise-missile units, attack helicopters, surface ships, submarines, and special operations forces.27 Key targets include command-and-control systems, logistics, air 

bases, aircraft carriers, and missile launchers. For aerospace forces, Air Raid and Anti–Air 

Raid, the 2004 Study on Joint Firepower Warfare Theory, and the 2006 Science of Campaigns detail missile and air counterattack operations against command-and-control 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 55

systems, air bases, air defenses, and logistics facilities, with an emphasis on large, fixed 

targets. Command-and-control systems are specifically called out as important targets 

for missile and air strikes, by virtue of their functions as nerve centers and force multipliers. When coordinated strikes are not possible owing to enemy aircraft carriers and air 

forces operating out of range of the PLA’s own air forces, as the book Science of Second 

Artillery Campaigns highlights, long-range conventional missiles in strikes against enemy 

bases and carrier groups are important.28

The Modernization of the PLA’s Counterstrike Air and Missile Forces

To defend China’s near seas and execute the PLA’s ambitious counterstrike doctrine, the 

PLA has over the past two decades invested a great deal in modernizing the counterstrike 

capabilities of the PLAN, the PLAAF, and the Second Artillery Force. The result has been 

the fielding of an impressive array of short- and medium-range conventional ballistic 

missiles and of ground- and air-launched cruise missiles; a variety of precision-guided 

land-attack munitions and the combat aircraft necessary to employ them; and highly capable antiship cruise missiles that can be fired from surface ships, submarines, maritime 

strike aircraft, and shore-based launchers. As part of this modernization program, the 

Second Artillery Force is also in the process of fielding the DF-21D (based on the CSS-5 

airframe), a medium-range ballistic missile specifically designed to target U.S. aircraft 

carriers at sea.29 While across the board the PLA is not as capable as the U.S. military, the 

PLA’s concentration on the development of specific counterstrike capabilities enables it 

to develop pockets of excellence in such areas as conventional ballistic missiles, submarines, antiship cruise missiles, and electronic warfare. This allows it to threaten opposing 

forces in the western Pacific with a high-risk calculus in times of tension or war, particularly as those forces approach China’s near seas.30

For counterstrike aviation forces in the PLAN, the past decade has seen PLAN aviation 

transition from an air force primarily concerned with coastal air defense to a modern 

offensive maritime strike force. In the 1990s the PLAN took delivery of a small number 

of early models of the J-8II interceptor and JH-7 maritime strike aircraft; today, through 

acquisition of new blocks of these airframes and upgrades to older systems, the PLAN 

fields five regiments of the JH-7/JH-7A and two regiments of the J-8II. The PLAN also 

operates one regiment of Russian-built Su-30MK2 Flanker multirole maritime strike 

fighters; since late 2010 it has taken delivery of the indigenous, fourth-generation J-11B 

Flanker and J-10 interceptors.31 The JH-7/JH-7A is the PLAN’s workhorse maritime 

strike fighter and has evolved into a highly capable two-seat maritime strike fighter able 

to employ the YJ-83K antiship cruise missile and advanced electronic warfare systems. 

Complementing the JH-7/JH-7A units, the single Su-30MK2 regiment can employ 

antiship and antiradiation variants of the Russian-made Kh-31.32 The J-8II, while based 
56 china maritime studies

on an older-generation design, has radar and avionics upgrades that enable it now 

to employ modern beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles; its range can be extended 

through refueling from the PLAN’s small inventory of H-6 tanker aircraft.33 The J-11B 

and J-10 combine with the Su-30MK2s to provide the PLAN with the ability to extend 

air defenses to PLAN task groups beyond China’s coastal waters. 

Complementing the PLAN’s inventory of fighters and strike fighters are two regiments 

of H-6 maritime strike bombers, based on the 1950s-era Soviet Tu-16 but upgraded to 

employ modern antiship cruise missiles. There is also a single regiment of J-7E shortrange interceptors.34 While not a global expeditionary force, PLAN strike aviation is a 

modern regional one, capable of covering from its bases on the Chinese mainland the 

near-seas defense areas defined by Liu Huaqing as extending beyond the First Island 

Chain.35

The Second Artillery Force is arguably the primary arm of the PLA tasked with counterstrike operations in China’s near seas. The 2008 white paper on China’s national 

defense states, “The conventional missile force of the Second Artillery Force is charged 

mainly with the task of conducting medium- and long-range precision strikes against 

key strategic and operational targets of the enemy.”36 According to the U.S. Department 

of Defense, as of late 2009 the Second Artillery had deployed over a thousand CSS-6 

(six-hundred-kilometer range) and CSS-7 short-range (three hundred kilometers [km]) 

ballistic missiles within reach of Taiwan, including a growing number with precisionstrike capability. Additionally, the Second Artillery reportedly possesses up to a hundred 

CSS-5 medium-range (1,750 km) ballistic missiles—their numbers are increasing—as 

well as up to five hundred DH-10 ground-launched cruise missiles (1,500 km). While 

the shorter-range ballistic missiles can hit only a limited target set beyond Taiwan, the 

growing numbers of conventionally armed and precision-strike-capable CSS-5s and 

DH-10s demonstrate the PLA’s desire to be able to extend its counterstrike options 

throughout China’s near seas.37 In addition to conventional precision strikes against 

land targets, the Second Artillery, owing to the development of the DF-21D, now has a 

maritime mission against U.S. carrier strike groups. This system, under development for 

several years, is now operational, according to Adm. Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. 

Pacific Command.38 In fact, a role for the Second Artillery in maritime strike operations 

was documented in the PLA’s counterstrike doctrine about a decade ago: Air Raid and 

Anti–Air Raid discusses the use of ballistic missiles in “surprise attacks at sea.”39 Study 

on Joint Firepower Warfare Theory states that land-based missile and naval forces should 

integrate high- and low-altitude missile attacks against aircraft carriers at sea and calls 

for attacking aircraft carriers in port.40

In addition to PLAN aviation and the Second Artillery, the PLAAF also plays an important role in counterstrike operations in the near seas. Over the past decade the PLAAF 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 57

has grown from a force primarily concerned with short-range air defense of its homeland to one capable of extending China’s air-defense envelope out over the water and increasingly able to conduct long-range precision-strike missions.41 A growing portion of 

the PLAAF comprises modern fighter aircraft, such as the imported Su-27 Flanker and 

indigenous fighters like the J-11B Flanker, the J-10, and upgraded variants of the J-8II. 

Additionally, the PLAAF employs the multirole Su-30MKK Flanker imported from Russia, as well as several regiments of the JH-7A strike fighters, equipped with the KD-88 

land-attack cruise missile.42 Aside from its growing inventory of fighters and strike fighters capable of extended operations over China’s near seas, the PLAAF is upgrading its 

inventory of H-6 bombers to employ the YJ-63 and DH-10 land-attack cruise missiles. A 

significant element of this effort is the development of the H-6K, a new extended-range 

variant of the H-6 that, with the long-range DH-10, can threaten American bases, such 

as Guam, in the “Second Island Chain.”43 As the PLAAF’s inventory of long-range aircraft armed with long-range standoff missiles grows, its capacity to expand the counterstrike envelope of China’s Near Seas Defense strategy will grow as well. 

Carrier Aviation

Another key element of China’s maritime aerospace power trajectory is the PLAN’s 

aircraft carrier program. In August 2012 the PLAN commissioned, as Liaoning, the refurbished Cold War–era, Russian, Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier at Dalian shipyard. The 

ship’s air group is taking shape. The PLAN’s developmental carrier fighter is a domestically produced, carrier-capable variant of the Russian-designed Su-27 Flanker known 

as the J-15.44 The first deck landing of the J-15 on Liaoning took place in late November 

2012. The J-15 is likely to have avionics, radar, and weapons capabilities similar to the 

land-based J-11B.

Liaoning is equipped with a ski-jump launch mechanism, and there is a strong possibility that at least the first domestically produced Chinese carrier will be likewise equipped. 

Accordingly, the PLAN is procuring and developing rotary-wing airborne early warning 

(AEW) platforms. According to Russian press and Internet reporting, China is taking 

delivery of up to nine Ka-31 AEW helicopters, while online photographs indicate China 

has fielded a prototype AEW variant of the Z-8 medium-lift helicopter.45 At this point it 

is unknown which will be chosen as the primary AEW helicopter for the PLAN’s aircraft 

carrier force. It is possible the PLAN sees an indigenous platform based on the Z-8 as a 

long-term solution, with Ka-31s imported from Russia serving as gap fillers. 

It is unlikely China is developing aircraft carriers with the intent of employing them 

against U.S. Navy carrier strike groups in the Central Pacific in a twenty-first-century 

rehash of the battle of the Philippine Sea. However, this does not mean the PLAN’s 

future aircraft carrier force poses no potential problem for U.S. forces in a conflict in 
58 china maritime studies

and around China’s near seas. In a regional conflict, land-based strike aircraft such as the 

JH-7A, H-6, J-11B, or Su-30MKK/MK2, as well as conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, could be called on for offensive strikes, negating the need for the carrier’s air group 

to provide U.S.-style offensive force projection. In this case, a carrier and its air group 

would complement land-based aircraft, extending situational awareness and air defense. 

PLA doctrine clearly indicates that providing air cover to landing operations in such 

areas as the South China Sea is one of the primary wartime missions of PLAN aircraft 

carriers. Both the 2000 and 2006 editions of Science of Campaigns discuss the importance of carriers in providing air cover to amphibious invasions against islands and reefs 

beyond the range of land-based aircraft.46 The PLA textbook Winning High-Tech Local 

Wars: Must Reading for Military Officers states that one or two aircraft carrier groups 

should protect amphibious forces engaged in long-distance landing operations and that 

they should be stationed 100–150 nautical miles from the shore to provide air support to 

landing forces.47

Further, although future PLAN carriers may not represent much in the way of offensive 

strike potential against U.S. carrier groups in a conflict, they could still play a key role in 

bringing combat power to bear against U.S. forces. While Adm. Liu Huaqing provided 

a specific geographic definition for Near Seas Defense, some PLAN officers now view 

the concept as an evolving one that extends farther out into the Pacific Ocean as the 

PLAN’s ability to operate its forces with “the requisite amount of support and security” 

increases.48 Simply put, Near Seas Defense is about more than operating within the First 

Island Chain. If China’s near seas are to be truly secure, the reach of the PLA’s aerospace 

forces must extend beyond the First Island Chain, to engage hostile forces as far out to 

sea as possible. While Air Raid and Anti–Air Raid in the 21st Century does not specifically 

envision aircraft carriers in a counterstrike role, it does call for fighter units to provide 

air cover to surface ships and for surface ships to attack enemy aircraft carriers.49 Given 

that even China’s most modern land-based fighter aircraft cannot provide persistent air 

cover beyond the First Island Chain, an aircraft carrier could be employed in support of 

counterstrike operations to provide air defense and antisubmarine protection to surface 

ships, to get the latter within weapons range of a U.S. carrier group.

Conclusion

As the PLA continues to modernize its forces and develop its counterstrike doctrine, its 

ability to expand its operations in support of China’s Near Seas Defense strategy will 

increase. A significant element of this growing counterstrike capability is represented 

by, collectively, the aerospace forces of the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery. With an 

increasingly capable inventory of fighter and strike aircraft, conventional ballistic missiles, ground- and air-launched cruise missiles, and eventually fully operational aircraft 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 59

carriers, the ability of the PLA’s aerospace forces to threaten U.S. naval and air forces and 

bases in the western and Central Pacific will continue to grow. However, in a military 

dominated by what some officers call the “great infantry” concept, the PLA is inhibited 

in its ability to integrate its counterstrike capabilities into a joint force that is greater 

than the sum of its parts. While the PLA’s ability to extend its strategic depth in the conduct of near-seas defensive operations is impressive and has grown significantly over the 

past decade, weaknesses and capabilities gaps still exist, and these will continue to limit 

the PLA’s capacity to defend China’s near seas. 

Notes 

An earlier version of this chapter appeared as 

“China’s Aerospace Power Trajectory in the Near 

Seas,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 3 (Summer 2012), pp. 105–21.

1. Cai Wei, “Dream of the Military for Aircraft 

Carriers,” Sanlian Shenghuo Zhoukan, 27 April 

2009.

2. Office of Naval Intelligence [hereafter ONI], 

The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern 

Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Washington, 

D.C.: Navy Maritime Intelligence Center, August 

2009) [hereafter Modern Navy with Chinese 

Characteristics], p. 7. 

3. “Brief History of China’s People’s Liberation 

Army Navy,” Xinhua, 15 April 2009, english 

.peopledaily.com.cn/.

4. Bernard D. Cole, “The People’s Liberation Army 

Navy after Half a Century: Lessons Learned 

in Beijing,” in Lessons of History: The Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army at 75, ed. Laurie 

Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel 

(n.p.: CreateSpace, July 2003). 

5. Ibid.; David A. Graff and Robin Higham, A Military History of China (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 

March 2002), p. 275. See Bruce A. Elleman, High 

Seas Buffer: The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950–1979,

Newport Paper 38 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War 

College Press, 2012), available at www.usnwc 

.edu/press/.

6. “Brief History of China’s People’s Liberation 

Army Navy”; Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall 

at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, May 

2001), p. 21. 

7. Kenneth W. Allen, “The PLA Air Force 

1949–2002: Overview and Lessons Learned,” 

in Lessons of History, ed. Burkitt, Scobell, and 

Wortzel.

8. For Seventh Fleet operations generally, Elleman, 

High Seas Buffer, esp. chap. 3. 

9. Kenneth W. Allen, People’s Liberation Army 

Naval Aviation Status, Relationship with the PLA 

Air Force, and Prospects for the Future (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, April 2003), 

p. 18.

10. Ibid.

11. Cole, Great Wall at Sea, p. 166.

12. ONI, Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,

p. 6.

13. Liu Huaqing, The Memoirs of Liu Huaqing (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army, 2004), chap. 16.

14. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “A Chinese 

Turn to Mahan,” Jamestown Foundation China 

Brief 10, no. 13 (June 2009).

15. Liu Huaqing, Memoirs of Liu Huaqing, chap. 16.

16. Ibid.

17. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., Science of 

Military Strategy (Beijing: Academy of Military 

Sciences, June 2005), pp. 442–43. 

18. ONI, Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, 

p. 5.

19. Ibid., p. 6.

20. Ibid., pp. 7–9.

21. Ashish Kumar Sen and Bill Gertz, “Obama Calls 

on China to Restrain North Korea,” Washington 

Times, 24 November 2010; Cheng Guangjin and 

Wu Jiao, “Sovereign Waters Are Not in Question,” China Daily, 31 July 2010, www.chinadaily 

.com.cn/.

22. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., Science of 

Military Strategy, pp. 459–61.

23. Ibid., pp. 463–66.

24. Liu Xiasen, “Seven Fatal Weaknesses of U.S. 

Aircraft Carriers,” People’s Navy, 9 December 

2005. 

25. John A. Warden III [Col., USAF], “The Enemy 

as a System,” Airpower Journal (Spring 1995).
60 china maritime studies

26. Cui Changqi, ed., Air Raid and Anti–Air Raid 

in the 21st Century (Beijing: Liberation Army, 

2002); Liu Yazhou [Lt. Gen.], “Iraq War: Impact 

to Soviet-System Military,” Dongfang Wang, 30 

May 2004. 

27. Cui Changqi, ed., Air Raid and Anti–Air Raid in 

the 21st Century.

28. Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Missile Strategy and 

the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing,” Naval War College 

Review 63, no. 3 (Summer 2010).

29. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, 

D.C.: 17 August 2010), available at www.defense 

.gov/.

30. Ibid.

31. “Fighters Continued,” Chinese Military Aviation,

28 April 2011, cnair.top81.cn/.

32. “Attack Aircraft,” Chinese Military Aviation, 28 

April 2011, cnair.top81.cn/.

33. “Fighters,” Chinese Military Aviation, 28 

April 2011, cnair.top81.cn/; “H-6U Tanker,” 

China’s Defence Today, 17 January 2009, www 

.sinodefence.com/; Bill Gertz, The China 

Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets 

America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000), 

pp. 236–37.

34. “Attack Aircraft.”

35. ONI, Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,

p. 24.

36. China’s National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: January 2009), www.china.org.cn/.

37. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010.

38. Yochi Kato, “U.S. Commander Says China Aims 

to Be a Global Military Power,” Asahi Shimbun,

28 December 2010, www.asahi.com/english/.

39. Cui Changqi, ed., Air Raid and Anti–Air Raid 

in the 21st Century; Wang Zaigang, “Nemesis 

of Aircraft Carriers,” Naval and Merchant Ships

(February 2005).

40. Hu Limin and Ying Fucheng, Study on Joint 

Firepower Warfare Theory (Beijing: National 

Defense Univ. Press, 2004).

41. China’s National Defense in 2008.

42. “Fighters Continued”; “Attack Aircraft”; 

“Fighters.”

43. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010; “Attack Aircraft.”

44. Kanwa Asian Defense, “China Making First J-15 

Ship-borne Fighter” [1 May 2010] and “J-15 

Flying Shark” [7 July 2010], Chinese Military 

Aviation, cnair.top81.cn/; “J-15 Next-Generation 

Carrier-based Fighter Caught on Camera,” 

YouTube video, 8 July 2010, www.youtube.com/.

45. Mikhail Kukushkin, “Kamov Is Counting on the 

Small One,” Vremya Novostey, 8 February 2010; 

“Z-8 AEW Helicopter Unveiled,” China Defense 

Blog, 19 October 2009, china-defense.blogspot 

.com/; “Z-8 AEW Super Frelon,” Chinese Military Aviation, 11 November 2009, cnair.top81 

.cn/. 

46. Wang Houqing, Science of Campaigns (Beijing: 

National Defense Univ. Press, May 2000); Zhang 

Yulang, Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National 

Defense Univ. Press, May 2006).

47. Wang Qiming and Cheng Feng, Winning HighTech Local Wars: Must Reading for Military 

Officers (Beijing: Military Translation, August 

1998).

48. ONI, China’s Navy 2007 (Washington, D.C.: May 

2007), p. 26, available at www.fas.org/.

49. Cui Changqi, ed., Air Raid and Anti–Air Raid in 

the 21st Century.
Among the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) impressive achievements over the past 

two decades has been the modernization of its fleet of fighter aircraft. Combined 

with progress made in other areas, this has substantially increased China’s ability to 

challenge U.S. forces for control of the air over its littoral areas. This chapter will discuss 

some of the key components of this improvement, including aircraft, weapons, training, 

and support capabilities. 

But first, it is useful to put the changes in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force 

(PLAAF) in an appropriate context. To do so, think back fifty years and imagine an 

encounter in 1961 between typical Chinese and American fighter pilots. The PLAAF 

airman would probably have flown a J-6, a variant of the MiG-19, and the U.S. Air Force 

pilot an F-100. These two jets had broadly comparable performance and similar avionics 

and weapons. As regards their equipment, the two aviators would have been roughly on 

par with each other.

Now visualize a similar meeting thirty-five years later, in 1995. The American pilot 

would most likely have been flying an F-15, F-16, or F/A-18—a sophisticated “fourth 

generation” fighter featuring cutting-edge radar and avionics, as well as advanced “fire 

and forget” air-to-air missiles.1 The PLAAF pilot, on the other hand, most likely would 

still be flying a J-6, armed with a Chinese copy of a Soviet copy of a first-generation, 

short-range U.S. air-to-air missile. The American pilot would have enjoyed an overwhelming qualitative advantage in aircraft, electronics, and weapons.2

Advance twenty years to the present day. The United States would most likely be represented by the same F-15 equipped with somewhat updated versions of the same sensors, 

avionics, and missiles. The PLAAF, meanwhile, could meet it with a J-10 or J-11, both 

modern fighters comparable in performance to the fourth-generation American jets. 

The Chinese pilot would likewise have at his disposal weapons and other equipment that 

reflect rough parity with those found on the typical U.S. fighter.3

David Shlapak

CHAPTER FIVE

Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas
62 china maritime studies

Performance and Force Size

A second comparison is illustrated in figure 1, which depicts two key performance 

parameters of a fighter aircraft. Along the x axis is plotted weight-to-thrust (w/t) ratio—

the weight of the aircraft divided by the thrust of its engine(s), measured in kilograms 

per kilonewton (kg/kN). This ratio is important in determining the fighter’s ability to 

accelerate and climb. On the y axis is wing loading, which is the weight of the airplane 

divided by the size of its wing, measured in kilograms and square meters, respectively. 

Wing loading helps determine how well the fighter turns. Together, the two parameters 

reveal a great deal about an aircraft’s maneuverability in both the horizontal (bank and 

turn) and vertical (climb and dive) dimensions. A lower value is better for each factor, so 

the farther down and to the left an aircraft lies, the better.

Unsurprisingly, the U.S. Air Force’s most advanced fighter, the F-22—seen in the figure’s 

lower left corner—is superior on both counts. Up in the top right are the F-16C and the 

F/A-18E/F, which trail the pack in these two regards. Clustered in the middle are five 

aircraft: the F-15C, F-15E, F-35, J-10, and J-11. These fighters are in more or less the 

same space on these two important performance characteristics. The “typical” modern 

Chinese fighter is as good in these areas as, or better than, the “typical” American jet.

Figure 2 shows how the size and composition of the PLAAF fighter fleet have changed 

since 1990. The first thing to note is the dramatic shrinkage in the number of China’s 

fighters. Between 1990 and 2010 almost 3,500 obsolete aircraft—70 percent of the 

Figure 1. Characteristics of Chinese and U.S. Fighters

Sources: IHS Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft: In Service (2012), www.ihs.com/, and author estimates.
china

s near seas combat capabilities 63

force—were retired, mostly after 1995. As a comparison, the U.S. Air Force’s fleet of 

fighter-bombers dropped from a Cold War level of 3,620 in 1990 to 2,650 in 2010—a little over 25 percent. That the PLAAF was willing to shed so many of its aircraft indicates 

the scope of its modernization efforts as much as does its acquisition of modern aircraft. 

Over roughly the same period, the PLAAF’s fighter fleet has undergone a remarkable 

modernization. As the chart shows, in 2000 only 2 percent of PLAAF fighters were 

“modern,” “fourth generation” aircraft, comparable to the American F-15 and its contemporaries. Little more than a decade later, almost one in three of China’s fighters can 

be considered modern. In fact, only the United States and Russia own more fourthgeneration fighters than does the PLAAF; China has more modern fighters than Britain 

and France combined. Also, in 2011 China joined the United States and Russia as the 

only countries to fly a stealth aircraft, with the J-20.

The Operational Geography of the Near Seas

How China’s air-combat capabilities over the near seas look depends on just how “near” 

those seas might be. Taiwan’s proximity to the mainland, for example, works to the 

PLAAF’s advantage. Its fighters could comfortably reach Taiwan from bases several hundred miles inland, increasing the number of bases (and therefore aircraft) that could be 

Figure 2. Size and Composition of the PLAAF Fighter Force, 1990–2010

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: 1990–91, 1995–96, 

2000–2001, 2005–2006, 2011).
64 china maritime studies

involved and requiring that attacks on those bases have to penetrate deeper into Chinese 

territory, thereby being exposed to more of China’s air-defense network. Other potential 

operating areas, however, are farther afield from the mainland. Even the South China 

Sea—scene of multiple confrontations between China and other claimants to those 

waters—is far enough away to pose challenges to PLAAF operations today. 

Figure 3 illustrates these differences. The PLAAF fighter base closest to Taiwan is 

Zhangzhou, which is about 215 nautical miles from Taipei. The PLAAF base at 

Nanchang Xiangtang is roughly 260 nautical miles inland but still only about 360 

from Taipei.4

Figure 3. Operational Distances: Taiwan versus South China Sea
china

s near seas combat capabilities 65

In contingencies farther south, distances would be longer. Hainan Island is the Chinese 

territory closest to the Spratly Islands; the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) aviation base there, at Sanya, is 625 nautical miles from Mischief Reef in the Spratlys. On the 

mainland, the PLAAF base at Guilin is about 230 nautical miles from the coast—roughly 

comparable to Nanchang Xiangtang’s location relative to the water—but 970 from Mischief Reef. 

These greater distances mean, inter alia, longer missions, which consume fuel, cockpit 

hours, and maintenance resources at an accelerated pace. Absent a credible in-flightrefueling capability, aircraft based at locations like Guilin would have to forward-deploy 

to be able to reach any fight taking place in or around the Spratlys. 

Other factors also reduce China’s ability to project combat airpower into the South 

China Sea. China’s arsenal of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and land-attack 

cruise missiles represents a serious and growing threat to Taiwan’s air bases and to U.S. 

forces operating out of Okinawa and other locations relatively close to the mainland. 

However, these missiles would be of less use farther south, where opposing airpower 

would be based at greater distances from China and U.S. fighters could be flying primarily from aircraft carriers. 

Along with added aerial tanking capability, Chinese aircraft carriers could contribute 

significantly to the PLA’s combat capabilities in the South China Sea and beyond. The 

PLAN’s first carrier, Liaoning, has made several training voyages, and China began 

experimental flight operations from it in late 2012. It will provide the PLAN the opportunity to gain experience with the complexity of carrier operations while China builds 

its first indigenous flattops over the coming years. With a complement of J-15 fighters, 

Liaoning could offer an early capacity for projecting airpower deep into the South China 

Sea against the less capable navies of the local nations.

Training

China has modernized its doctrine and approach to training as it has its hardware. For 

example, China reportedly has created at least three “blue force” or “aggressor” squadrons to help make air-combat training more realistic.5

 Consisting of a mix of J-11, J-10, 

and J-7 aircraft, the force is meant to emulate the performance of the F-15, F-16, and 

MiG-21 fighters, respectively, in training missions against other PLAAF pilots.6 The 

PLAAF’s training curriculum has also begun to emphasize flying over water, as well as 

flying at night, in weather, and in complex electronic-warfare environments. As one 

expert writes, “Compared to other air forces world-wide, the PLAAF would be considered professional and well trained. In terms of flight hours, safety standards, night-time 

flying, debriefing, and overall training subjects, the PLAAF is likely approaching NATO 

standards.”7
66 china maritime studies

We should expect the PLAAF to continue along this path, producing well-trained 

aircrews capable of effectively utilizing their modern aircraft and weapons. Regarding 

platforms, we should anticipate a continuing evolution in which the new replaces the old 

and the newer augments the new. The PLAAF and the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) 

are already updating their newest aircraft, including the J-10, J-11, and JH-7. This is not 

surprising; the Chinese have incorporated a dazzling array of updates into their old J-6, 

J-7, J-8, and Q-5 aircraft, often modernizing them until very late in their operational 

careers. The PLAAF’s final modernized version of the J-7 (MiG-21), for example, was 

apparently in production until only a few years ago.8

To summarize, while the bulk of the dramatic changes in the PLAAF’s force structure 

may be over, we will likely continue to see improvements building on improvements 

fairly rapidly and for some time to come.

Key Capabilities and Limitations

For many years, the rigidly controlled, tightly scripted, and operationally primitive training received by PLAAF aircrews was seen as a crippling shortcoming that would have 

doomed them in combat against any competent adversary. As noted above, evidence 

suggests that this is changing. The PLAAF does, however, continue to confront operationally important challenges that could impede its performance in combat. 

Airpower begins on the ground, where sorties are planned, prepared, and launched. The 

U.S. Air Force and Navy have invested heavily in the ability to generate sorties efficiently 

and thus make the most of their available aircraft. There is, in contrast, little evidence 

in the open literature that the PLAAF has practiced generating large numbers of sorties 

rapidly, let alone doing it more than once in a day or for multiple days. It is likewise 

thought that the PLAAF may not have much practice in restoring air-base operations 

after being attacked. In a shooting war against a competent adversary, this shortfall could 

be very damaging. 

Once in the air, an American pilot would enjoy extensive support from airborne warning 

and control system (AWACS) aircraft, refueling tankers, and other enabling assets. China 

has long remained very limited in these areas, but this too appears to be changing. The 

PLAAF has begun deploying AWACS-type aircraft of its own along with other specialized electronic warfare (EW) aircraft. Ownership of the appropriate platforms, though, 

is only the first step to an operationally useful capacity. Flight crews and mission crews 

must be trained, and their capabilities must then be integrated with combat operations, 

a job that likewise demands substantial training. Like China’s nascent carrier-aviation 

arm, the PLAAF has miles to go before it becomes expert in its airborne-early-warning 

and electronic-warfare operations. It is, however, clearly on the road. 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 67

These limitations may be of less import in scenarios in which operational geography allows the PLA to suppress its adversary’s airpower by pummeling its bases. If these attacks 

enable China to achieve freedom of action in the air early in a conflict, the PLAAF will 

be less challenged to operate at the frontier of its capabilities than if its pilots had to fight 

their way through robust, intact defenses. Relatedly, China’s plenitude of short-range 

ballistic missiles would be less useful in a contingency farther abroad, which would 

leave the PLAAF and PLAN aviation to do more of the heavy lifting in any counterair 

campaign.9

Respective Roles of the PLAAF and the PLANAF in the Near Seas

While PLAN aviation has been modernizing less aggressively than the PLAAF, its capabilities are nonetheless improving. New maritime strike aircraft like the Su-30 and JH-7 

are bringing increasing levels of performance and sophistication to China’s naval air 

arm. Naval versions of the J-10 and J-11 are also being brought into the inventory and 

will probably eventually replace the PLAN’s old J-7 and J-8 fighters, although, as with 

the PLAAF, likely not on a one-for-one basis. The J-15 fighter will eventually come into 

service aboard China’s aircraft carrier. It will certainly be used extensively for training 

before going to sea operationally, and some J-15s could be assigned to shore-based units 

in the interim.

While Chinese military thinking extols the importance of fighting jointly, the PLA still 

has much to do to achieve this goal fully. In the near term, then, PLAN aviation will 

probably undertake most maritime strike operations, building the necessary packages 

from its own fleet of fighters and attack aircraft. It will deconflict, but not integrate, with 

PLAAF operations. The PLAAF, on the other hand, will loom larger in the overall fight 

for control of the air over both the land and littoral seas. The PLAAF would also probably be counted on for supporting capabilities like aerial refueling.

The Enabling Value of Air Superiority

Of little strategic value in and of itself, control of the air makes it possible to conduct a 

variety of other operations with fewer constraints. With air superiority, ground forces 

and surface naval forces may maneuver more freely, and air forces can employ platforms, 

weapons, and tactics that would not be survivable or effective in other circumstances. 

In the maritime domain, control of the air reduces the threat to surface forces—both 

directly, by limiting the sizes, kinds, and azimuths of possible attacks, and indirectly, by 

permitting maritime-patrol and airborne-early-warning aircraft to fly with greater freedom. This in turn allows naval forces, especially aircraft carriers, to focus their attention 

on operations other than self-defense, operations that could, of course, include helping 

win air superiority elsewhere. 
68 china maritime studies

For the last twenty years the U.S. military has had the luxury of instant and total air 

dominance in its combat operations. In the first Gulf War, Iraq’s inability to mount any 

offensive air missions, whether strike or reconnaissance, secured the buildup of forces 

for the “left hook” that swept through that nation. Iraq’s lack of intelligence data and the 

difficulty with which it moved its forces can both be credited to the total control of the 

air enjoyed by the coalition from the opening minutes of the war. 

The 1982 British campaign to retake the Falkland Islands from Argentina, meanwhile, illustrates the implications of not controlling the air during a maritime operation. Fifteen 

of the thirty-three Royal Navy surface combatants and amphibious vessels committed 

to the fight were sunk or damaged. The British also lost ten Harrier fighters, almost 30 

percent of the aircraft employed.10

As was the case for Argentina, China need not secure total control of the air to cause 

troubles for an adversary’s surface forces. In even contested airspace, important forcemultiplying assets—maritime-patrol, airborne-early-warning, and tanker aircraft, for 

example—would be forced to operate farther back, limiting their ability to locate and 

attack PLAN submarines, provide warning of incoming air attacks, or extend range and 

on-station time for American combat aircraft, respectively. This degradation of situational awareness and combat capacity would put Navy surface ships at increased risk of 

a surprise attack and reduce the amount of offensive combat power being generated. 

Denying U.S. forces control of the air or seizing superiority (even if temporary and 

geographically limited) itself would allow China to limit the freedom of action enjoyed by 

American surface forces and to threaten current naval concepts of operations. With their 

control of the air contested, U.S. warships would find themselves compelled to pay more 

attention to protecting themselves; this would leave fewer assets to project power ashore, 

which for the past two decades has been the U.S. Navy’s focus in regional warfare. 

China’s New Stealth Aircraft

The long-rumored PLAAF next-generation fighter was revealed to the world on the occasion of its purported first flight in January 2011. The flight came as a surprise to many 

observers who had agreed with then–Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that China 

would “have no fifth-generation aircraft by 2020” and only “a handful” by 2025.11

The J-20 seems to be a large airplane, and its appearance shows that substantial care was 

taken to shape the jet for low-observable (LO) characteristics. At this point, all performance specifications are speculative, but the J-20 is thought to have two capacious 

internal weapons bays and possibly to be capable of “supercruising” flight—flying above 

Mach 1 without using its afterburners. In both regards, the aircraft would resemble the 

U.S. Air Force F-22; its larger size suggests, however, that it may have been designed with 
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s near seas combat capabilities 69

either a larger internal payload or longer range than the F-22, or both. It may thus be a 

true multirole fighter, with a substantial strike capability.

Once in service, the J-20 would overmatch every other fighter plane deployed in East 

and Southeast Asia. As Kopp and Goon write, “With sufficiently good stealth performance to defeat air defense radars in the L-band through Ku-band, the aircraft could 

easily penetrate all air defense systems currently deployed in Asia.”12

The J-20’s impact on the China–United States balance seems less certain. By the end of 

the current decade, all three U.S. tactical air forces—the Air Force, Navy, and Marine 

Corps—should be receiving F-35 fighters in some quantity. Along with the F-22, these F35s will give the United States an inventory of several hundred stealthy, fifth-generation 

fighters. We are a long way from knowing enough about the J-20’s performance and 

China’s plans for producing it, if indeed the design is meant to go into serial production. 

Will it be sufficiently stealthy to truly compete with the F-22 or F-35? How would the 

PLAAF integrate the J-20’s employment with its large numbers of nonstealthy aircraft? How many J-20s will China eventually build? It will be years before we have clear 

answers to these and many other important questions about the new fighter. We can 

say, however, that if the J-20’s debut does little else, it serves as another testament to the 

increasing capability and sophistication of China’s aerospace industry.13

An operational stealth fighter would, as noted above, immediately become the most advanced aircraft deployed by any East Asian power. Air forces that today fly aircraft similar to China’s Flankers and J-10s—such as those of India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, 

and Taiwan—could find themselves for the first time a generation behind the PLAAF. 

However, India is working with Russia to develop its own stealth fighter, based on 

Sukhoi’s T-50/PAK FA design; Australia is committed to buying fourteen F-35s and may 

purchase up to a hundred; and Japan is considering the F-35 as a candidate to replace up 

to sixty-five obsolete F-4EJ fighters. Like the J-20, none of these jets will be operational 

until much later in the decade, but they could redress the technological balance between 

these countries and China.

The story is different for the air forces of Indonesia, Taiwan, and all the other militaries 

in China’s neighborhood. None have any likelihood of acquiring fifth-generation capabilities anytime soon. When the J-20 enters service, as noted, it will instantly overmatch 

any fighter in these air forces’ inventories, likely adding to China’s military leverage in 

many of its neighborhood disputes. 

With regard to the United States, the J-20 will at the least confront the American military 

with, in effect, the dilemma that the U.S. Air Force has for twenty years been imposing 

on adversaries—how to defend against low-observable aircraft. This may prove, however, 

less dramatic than it sounds. The United States is currently flying its third generation of 
70 china maritime studies

LO combat aircraft (the F-35) and has been working with stealth technology since the 

1980s. This makes it possible that U.S. aircraft, especially the F-22 and F-35, will prove 

“stealthier than thou” compared with the J-20, permitting the United States to maintain 

a margin of advantage even against an indigenous Chinese stealth fighter. 

All those years of developing, testing, and operating LO aircraft should also have resulted 

in the most comprehensive understanding of how to defeat stealth. While there is little 

open discussion of the subject, ideas have emerged. Active electronically scanned array 

(AESA) radars are intended to track small targets like cruise missiles. The F-35’s AESA 

has, mounted on a test bed, reportedly succeeded in locating the F-22 and even in jamming the latter’s radar. Sources have described the potential of low-frequency radars 

(that is, in the very high and ultrahigh frequency bands) in detecting fighter-sized LO 

targets.14

To the extent that the J-20 turns out to be viable in a squabble versus the United States, 

it would add a dangerous new element to China’s capabilities in a near-seas contingency. A stealthy strike fighter featuring good range and payload could help achieve air 

superiority over certain maritime areas or reduce the need for classical “air superiority” 

by being able to operate in airspace that is otherwise denied, just as the F-117 and B-2 

have done for the United States in its recent wars. Depending on the sizes and kinds of 

weapons that might be carried, the J-20 could be an effective surface-attack platform out 

to several hundred nautical miles at sea—farther, if aerial refueling were used to extend 

its “legs.”

Other Ongoing Developments

In terms of its impact on maritime considerations, a new Chinese aircraft of nearly as 

much interest as the J-20 is the J-15, a carrier-based fighter adapting—and according 

to Chinese sources, improving—the Russian Su-33 design. Intended to operate from a 

ski-jump-equipped ship, the J-15 reportedly made its first flight in August 2009; its first 

flight off a land-based ski jump took place in May 2010. Unlike the Su-33, which was 

conceived strictly as an air-to-air fighter, the J-15 may be intended as a multirole aircraft. 

Having performed its first carrier landings and takeoffs in late 2012, China has begun 

taking steps toward operational deployment. While a single, short-deck carrier would 

make very little difference in a conflict with the United States, the Liaoning/J-15 combination would extend China’s reach into places like the South China Sea, where the 

nation’s tactical airpower is today somewhat range limited. In these areas, any credible 

carrier-air capability could overwhelm competitors like the Philippines and Vietnam, 

whose navies and air forces are small, ill equipped, and outdated.
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s near seas combat capabilities 71

In recent years China has also displayed a dizzying array of unmanned aerial vehicles 

and models of them at air, defense, and trade shows; most seem not to have entered 

production. The unmanned aerial vehicles shown run the gamut from a copy of the 

Vietnam-era Firebee reconnaissance drone to the Xianglong high-altitude, longendurance (HALE) unmanned aerial vehicle, which bears a passing resemblance to the 

U.S. RQ-4 Global Hawk.

China is fielding or developing a range of special-purpose “force multiplier” aircraft 

as well. For example, the PLAAF has long sought to acquire an airborne early-warning 

and control platform along the lines of the E-3 AWACS. A program to buy four A-50I 

aircraft—a Russian Il-76 airframe equipped with Israeli radar and mission equipment—

collapsed in 2000 when Israel succumbed to U.S. pressure and dropped out of the deal. 

After this disappointment China moved forward with its own program, also based on 

the Il-76 platform but with an indigenously developed mission suite. At least four of 

these KJ-2000 AWACS aircraft are in active service with the PLAAF, providing its first 

sophisticated airborne battle-management assets.15

Another area of interest to the PLAAF is aerial refueling, which is a necessary competence if China intends to extend the reach of its airpower more deeply into its neighboring seas and oceans. Today the PLAAF possesses a fairly rudimentary capability, owning 

about twenty-four H-6U tankers equipped with a “probe and drogue” refueling pod 

under each wing. Relatively few of China’s combat aircraft can be refueled in the air: 

some late-model J-8s have probes fitted, and a fixed probe can be installed on the J-10. 

The PLAAF’s Su-30s have retractable refueling probes, but their system is reportedly not 

compatible with the H-6U.16

In 2005, China ordered thirty-four newly built Il-76 Candid transports and four Il-78 

Midas tankers from Russia, but none have been delivered to date.17 Instead, Russia has 

begun delivering ten refurbished Il-76s.18 The PLAAF needs not only additional tankers but also more strategic airlifters to realize any aspirations it might have for powerprojection capabilities. A new large transport aircraft, sometimes called the Y-20, is 

under development; it made its first flight in January 2013.19

The PLAAF has also developed about a dozen specialized platforms based on the Y-8 

four-engine turboprop transport.20 This Gaoxin series includes another airborne earlywarning and control aircraft, a maritime surveillance variant, an airborne command 

post, and a number of platforms for various electronic-warfare functions, such as jamming and signals intelligence.
72 china maritime studies

The Future

China’s airpower will continue to develop, increasing its capabilities across a wide range 

of contingencies, including ones in the near seas. What changes might we see in the 

coming years?

Patterns already in evidence will most likely continue in many areas. Newer jets will 

steadily replace older combat aircraft; the J-7 and Q-5 will gradually follow the J-6 into 

retirement, to be replaced by J-10s, J-11s, and JH-7s. Since newer aircraft will not replace 

older ones on a one-for-one basis, the PLAAF will continue to shrink. It is not clear what 

China’s leadership believes to be the “right size” for its modernized air force, but it is 

likely that the most dramatic reductions have already been made.

As new models replace old, they will be updated steadily. The PLAAF has never hesitated 

to modernize and improve its inventory, and there is no reason to expect that to change. 

Already the PLA has developed multiple variants of the basic Flanker airframe, deployed 

a J-10B upgrade to the J-10A, and fielded at least one improved version of the JH-7. 

At least two brand-new combat aircraft appear likely to become operational before the 

end of the decade. Both the J-15 and J-20 represent dramatic breakthroughs for Chinese 

airpower—Beijing’s first carrier-based fighter and its first stealthy jet, respectively. It 

will be interesting to see how many of each the PLA procures and how they come to be 

operated.21

The PLA will likewise continue improving its airborne early-warning and EW capabilities. More KJ-2000 AWACS will probably be built, and we should see additional examples of the Gaoxin group of EW aircraft. Unmanned aerial vehicles will play a big role in 

these missions as well.

More advanced weapons will continue to accumulate in PLA stockpiles. China already 

operates several modern air-to-air missiles, including the AA-12 and PL-12 mediumrange air-to-air weapons. As we look ahead, it has been reported that China is working 

on at least three new air-to-air missile designs: an extended-range ramjet-powered version of the PL-12; a short-range active-radar-homing missile; and the PL-ASR, an 

infrared-seeking missile employing thrust-vector controls that would provide greater 

agility.22 The PLAAF may also be interested in very-long-range air-to-air missiles, often 

referred to as “AWACS killers,” for their presumed intended targets. The YJ-91—the 

Chinese adaptation of the Russian Kh-31 antiradiation missile—has been bruited as a 

candidate, as has the Russian Novator RS-172. Given China’s conviction that information will play a predominant role in future combat, a weapon capable of attacking command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms 

from extended ranges would seem to make sense. 
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s near seas combat capabilities 73

Conclusion

It is hard not to be impressed with the progress made in recent years by the PLAAF. Not 

too long ago it was an unsophisticated congeries of ancient aircraft and weapons, its pilots poorly trained and poorly supported. As late as the early 1990s it was likely too weak 

to have defended China’s home airspace effectively against even a modestly competent 

modern adversary. 

In the early to middle 1990s, as Chinese doctrine changed from focusing exclusively on 

territorial defense to contemplating limited power projection, the PLAAF found itself 

confronting a number of daunting learning curves that led from where it was to where it 

needed to be to fulfill its new missions. At least in terms of its major items of equipment, 

it has largely met these challenges and appears now at least to understand the ones that 

are left, even if it is not necessarily poised to overcome them immediately. 

The revolution in the PLAAF’s order of battle is over. It has made up the three decades 

separating the MiG-19 and the Su-27 in fifteen remarkable years, and it continues to 

progress. Whether the PLAAF can close the gaps that remain between its capabilities 

and those of the world’s most advanced air forces remains to be seen. Given how it has 

transformed itself over the last twenty years, however, one would be foolish to bet too 

heavily against it.

Notes

1. The PLAAF counts fighter “generations” differently than does the United States. China would 

consider an F-15 or one of its contemporaries a 

“third generation” aircraft.

2. The last F-100 was retired from the U.S. Air 

Force in 1979, while the J-6 left PLAAF service 

only in 2009.

3. In some areas the PLAAF jet might actually have 

an edge on the U.S. fighter. For example, the J10B and Flanker variants are equipped with passive infrared search and track (IRST) systems. 

These sensors can permit a pilot—without emitting a radar signal—to detect another aircraft by 

“seeing” the heat from its engines, the friction 

produced as it moves through the air, or the heat 

signature from the launch of a powered missile. 

Sukhoi claims that the OLS-35—developed 

for its Su-35 advanced Flanker—has a fronthemisphere detection range of fifty kilometers 

and a range of ninety in the rear hemisphere. 

While the OLS-27 and OLS-30 fitted in China’s 

Su-27/J-11s and Su-30s, respectively, are less 

capable, no current-generation U.S. fighter has 

an IRST at all, nor will the F-22 incorporate one. 

The F-35, however, will mount an IRST, and 

programs are under way to backfit one on some 

F-15C and F/A-18E/F aircraft.

4. Bases farther inland have the advantage of being 

more secure against attack, since more of China’s 

defended territory would have to be overflown 

to reach them.

5. “‘Bad Guy’ Su-30MKK of the PLAAF 8th Flight 

Academy,” China Defense Blog, 2 February 2010, 

china-defense.blogspot.com/. 

6. Jane’s World Air Forces, s.v. “China,” updated 30 

November 2012, www.janes.com/. India continues to operate a number of MiG-21s, along with 

its newer MiG-29s and Su-27s and -30s.

7. Wayne A. Ulman, China’s Emergent Military 

Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities,

testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, 111th Cong., 2nd 

sess., 20 May 2010, available at www.uscc.gov/.

8. Hence Ken Allen’s memorable observation that 

China operates “the most highly perfected obsolete aircraft in the world.” Andrew J. Nathan and 

Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty 

Fortress (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), p. 146.
74 china maritime studies

9. China could, over time, increase its holdings of 

medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in an effort to present a more lethal threat 

to distant enemy bases. Longer-range missiles 

are more expensive than shorter-range ones, but 

this is certainly a possible course of action.

10. Ship losses from Max Hastings and Simon 

Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: 

W. W. Norton, 1983), app. A. Air losses from 

Rodney A. Burden et al., Falklands: The Air War

(Poole, Dorset, U.K.: Arms and Armour, 1986).

11. Robert H. Gates (speech delivered at the 

Economic Club of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., 16 July 

2009), available at www.defense.gov/. 

12. Carlo Kopp and Peter Goon, Chengdu J-XX [J20] Stealth Fighter Prototype: A Preliminary Assessment, Technical Report APA-TR-2011-0101 

(n.p.: Air Power Australia, 3 January 2011), 

www.ausairpower.net/. Bill Sweetman, “Chinese 

J-20 Stealth Fighter in Taxi Tests,” Aviation 

Week, 3 January 2011. 

13. A second stealthy Chinese fighter, dubbed the 

J-31, flew for the first time in late 2012.

14. David A. Fulgham et al., “Chinese J-20 Vulnerable,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 

January 2011; Carlo Kopp, Russian/PLA Low 

Band Surveillance Radars (Counter Low Observable Technology Radars), Technical Report 

APA-TR-2007-0901 (n.p.: Air Power Australia, 

updated April 2012), www.ausairpower.net/. 

15. The delivery of an additional two KJ-2000s was 

reported in 2008. Cliff writes, “China operates at 

least a dozen AEW&C [airborne early warning 

and control] aircraft,” a number that probably 

includes the Y-8-based model mentioned later in 

this discussion. Roger Cliff, The Development of 

China’s Air Force Capabilities, testimony before 

the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, CT-346 (Santa Monica, Calif.: 

RAND, 20 May 2010).

16. Gabe Collins, “Air Time: Increasing China’s 

Aerial Range,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 12 June 

2008.

17. “Delivery Terms for Il-76 Aircraft to China May 

Be Revised,” RIA Novosti, 7 March 2007, available at GlobalSecurity.org/.

18. Alexander Zudin, “Russia Delivers Refurbished 

Il-76s to China,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 January 

2013.

19. Robert Johnson, “China’s Heavy Transport 

Plane Makes Its First Flight,” Business Insider: 

Military & Defense, 28 January 2013, www 

.businessinsider.com/. 

20. The Y-8 is a Chinese version of the Soviet An-12 

transport, very similar to the U.S. C-130 Hercules, which itself has served as a platform for a 

variety of special-mission aircraft.

21. It also remains to be seen whether the PLA will 

choose to deploy any J-15s ashore or to employ 

them strictly from aircraft carriers.

22. Carlo Kopp, PLA Air-to-Air Missiles, Technical Report APA-TR-2009-0802 (n.p.: Air 

Power Australia, updated April 2012), www 

.ausairpower.net/.
The nature of Chinese activity in the near seas has changed drastically over the past 

five years, and this change will affect China’s command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) requirements, as well 

as the efficacy of the infrastructure that had been developed under the old model. What 

was once largely the province of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy is now shared 

by the “five dragons” of China’s maritime law-enforcement agencies. However, this 

change seems to have occurred without an associated transfer of C4ISR systems from 

the military to these agencies. As a result, the maritime law-enforcement agencies either 

are left at the mercy of the PLA Navy for whatever information it chooses to provide or 

must develop their own capabilities to collect the same information. 

This chapter examines the tools that China—largely the PLA—has at sea and on shore 

to build a picture of activity in the near seas and how that picture is distributed to those 

who need it, both inside and outside the originating organization. 

C4ISR Functions in the Near Seas

Over the past few years, China has placed increased emphasis on advancing its interests 

in the near seas with an increasingly robust set of maritime law-enforcement agencies, 

as opposed to the PLA Navy. These agencies include the Maritime Safety Administration 

and a newly consolidated China Coast Guard under the State Oceanic Administration, 

which includes the former China Marine Surveillance, the Bureau of Fisheries’ Fisheries 

Law Enforcement Command, the older, more limited China Coast Guard, and the General Administration of Customs. A detailed review of each of these agencies’ functions 

is beyond the scope of this chapter, but their growing importance in the overall defense 

of China’s maritime rights and interests is illustrated by their inclusion in the 2010 

iteration of China’s defense white paper.1 China appears to be establishing a pattern of 

treating increasingly large portions of the near seas as its maritime territory and is thus 

using maritime law enforcement to administer it rather than solely depending on the 

PLA Navy to defend it. 

Eric D. Pedersen

Land- and Sea-Based C4ISR Infrastructure in China’s 

Near Seas

CHAPTER SIX
76 china maritime studies

Executing the missions China has assigned to its maritime forces in the near seas is no 

small task. Senior PLA officials often assert that China has a three-million-squarekilometer “territorial sea area.”2

 Whether China means this to be territorial waters as 

defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the country’s exclusive economic zone, or some other definition is unclear; Chinese officials have never 

explicitly stated where that extent reaches or what it means. But the sheer size is suggestive. Three million square kilometers can encompass virtually the entire near-seas area, 

including the Bo Hai, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the entire area of the South 

China Sea encompassed by the “nine-dash line.” Regardless of the type of sovereignty 

or jurisdiction the Chinese claim in these waters, it is evident they need to be able to 

monitor activity in them and that they feel they are still short of that goal. Early in 2011, 

a senior official for one maritime law-enforcement agency stated that China’s maritime 

surveillance capability remained “weak,” given the large area of responsibility.3

The efforts of the PLA Navy and the various maritime law-enforcement agencies to enforce China’s claims in the near seas have been well documented over the past two years. 

News reports have detailed China Marine Surveillance patrols in the South China Sea, to 

include run-ins with Vietnamese patrol ships. China Marine Surveillance documented 

a nearly fivefold increase in the number of foreign ships it monitored between 2008 and 

2010.4 The Bureau of Fisheries’ Fisheries Law Enforcement Command reportedly established regular patrols to the disputed Senkaku (or Diaoyu) Islands in December 2010, 

following an intense controversy in which Japan briefly detained a Chinese fishing boat 

crew that had rammed a Japan Coast Guard ship.5

In order for these agencies to accomplish the missions that they have apparently been 

given by the Chinese government, they have embarked on shipbuilding programs. 

Also, in late 2012 as many as eleven ships were transferred from the PLA Navy to China 

Marine Surveillance and the Bureau of Fisheries’ Fisheries Law Enforcement Command.6

 But the mere addition of ships is not enough for these agencies to succeed in 

areas increasingly far from shore. They must build a picture of activity in the areas 

they are charged with patrolling, to provide their commanders with the information 

necessary to deploy their assets intelligently, and they must find a way to disseminate 

their orders and required situational awareness to the patrol ships responsible for carrying those orders out. They too, like the PLA Navy, need an increasingly sophisticated 

C4ISR system. 

This emphasis on the expanding role of the maritime law-enforcement agencies should 

not lead one to believe that the PLA Navy has ceded all missions in the near seas, however. There are still many missions that it is responsible for executing, either independently or in coordination with maritime law enforcement. Besides routine training, the 

PLA Navy does its share to remind the region of Chinese claims to disputed waters. In 
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s near seas combat capabilities 77

February 2010, the PLA Navy’s first amphibious dock landing ship, Kunlunshan, trained 

in the South China Sea and held a ceremony to leave “sovereignty monuments” at James 

Shoal, China’s southernmost territorial claim.7 James Shoal is nearly a thousand nautical miles from the nearest point on the Chinese mainland and represents the farthest 

reaches of the near seas. It is a true challenge to monitor maritime activities across such 

a vast area. In the next section we will examine the land- and sea-based tools the PLA 

Navy and the maritime law-enforcement agencies are developing to build a picture from 

their coastline to James Shoal. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

The main purpose of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR, systems 

in China’s near seas is to gather information about who is operating where. The PLA 

Navy must know in order to guard the country from attack, and the maritime lawenforcement agencies must know in order to fulfill their myriad of functions, from the 

more mundane enforcement of pollution laws to the more ominous assertion of China’s 

maritime sovereignty claims. Many of the systems China’s maritime agencies use to keep 

track of the at-sea picture were originally developed for the PLA Navy’s core mission of 

coastal defense. 

Active Radar Systems

Conventional coastal radars are limited by the radar horizon, which varies depending 

on antenna height and target size but is around twenty nautical miles, as a good rule of 

thumb.8 Such a short range is inadequate for two reasons. First, it is hardly far enough 

to view activity much farther out than the twelve-nautical-mile limit, certainly not to 

the breadth of China’s near seas. Second, it would take several hundred such radars to 

cover China’s coastline, over 7,800 nautical miles long.9 However, there are several types 

of over-the-horizon radars (OTHRs) that China is using to increase the surveillance area 

significantly. These most notably include high-frequency surface-wave radars (HFSWRs) 

and sky-wave OTHRs.10

HFSWRs use the longer propagation of lower-frequency electromagnetic waves to detect 

targets much farther out than conventional radars can. As with many complex systems, 

exact performance depends on many factors, but a detection range on the order of a 

hundred nautical miles appears achievable.11 The height of a particular ship strongly 

influences the target-return strength, which has limited the usefulness of radar as a longrange ship-tracking system.12 However, China appears to have been investigating this 

area closely. A study partly funded by the national 863 Program tested tracking of targets 

using a multiband system, and the results compared favorably with simultaneous tracking by the Automatic Identification System (discussed below).13 The experiment report 
78 china maritime studies

stated the multiband system was designed to detect targets to 150 kilometers, though its 

full range was not used in that particular trial.14

Sky-wave OTHRs are designed to track targets even farther from shore than HFSWRs. 

While little is known about China’s sky-wave OTHR, some characteristics can be inferred from similar systems already in use. Both the United States and Australia currently 

operate sky-wave radars—the United States primarily for detection of drug-smuggling 

aircraft, and Australia for monitoring of air and sea activity by the Royal Australian 

Air Force.15 Sky-wave OTHR bounces signals off the ionosphere, achieving very long 

ranges, on the order of 1,600 nautical miles. Since the energy approaches the target from 

a nearly vertical angle, it is thought to be especially useful in detecting low-flying and 

even stealth aircraft. Its dependence on Doppler for target discrimination makes aircraft 

much easier targets for it than ships, and variations of the ionosphere greatly affect its 

performance.16 The description of China’s system in the 2011 report Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China appears to confirm these broad 

estimates, stating that China’s sky-wave system “allows [China] to carry out surveillance 

and reconnaissance over the western Pacific.”17 The extreme range of sky-wave systems 

and the fact that there are many other ISR options available for coastal areas suggest that 

this system is primarily designed for use in the outer edges of the near seas, even into the 

far seas.

While both the HFSWR and sky-wave have practical applications, they have serious drawbacks as well. China may be looking at a hybrid surface/sky-wave radar to maximize the 

benefits of both and eliminate some of their problems. This system would use a sky-wave 

radar transmission—that is, it would bounce the signal off the ionosphere—but the receiving antenna would detect the returns via surface-wave propagation. This would theoretically produce extended ranges compared to an HFSWR, allow for surface and air target 

detection, and maintain some of the stealth detection capabilities of the sky-wave radar.18

Passive Electronic Surveillance

In addition to shore-based active radars, China uses land-based electronic surveillance to 

aid in monitoring its coastal waters and airspace, though to what extent is unclear. At the 

2005 International Defence Exhibition China displayed information on a ground-based 

passive detection system similar to the Kolchuga system (originally Soviet, now Ukrainian). The exhibition display claimed the system could triangulate electronic emissions 

from ships and aircraft to ranges between two hundred and three hundred kilometers.19

Self-Reporting Mechanisms

China also uses two types of self-reporting mechanisms to monitor ships in its claimed 

waters. The best known is the international standard Automatic Identification System 
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s near seas combat capabilities 79

(AIS), which is required on most commercial vessels by the International Maritime Organization.20 The AIS transmits ships’ data, including position, course, and speed, on a 

VHF band; the data are available to any ship or shore station with the appropriate equipment. This system not only helps commercial ships avoid collisions but enables port 

traffic management and gives maritime law-enforcement patrol ships and shore stations 

clear pictures of the ships around them. Saab installed China’s coastal monitoring system 

for AIS and in 2010 was awarded a contract by the Maritime Safety Administration to 

provide a similar network for major in-shore waterways.21 AIS is extremely useful for 

vessel monitoring, though it provides a relatively short-range (less than a hundred nautical miles) picture, owing to the limitations of VHF propagation. 

Some may argue that the second type of self-reporting system should properly be 

considered space based, but it has critical sea- and ground-based components. It is also 

a uniquely Chinese system and appears to be a critical method of tracking the Chinese 

fishing fleets, so this section would be incomplete without mention of it. This is the 

Beidou satellite navigation system, which some term the “Chinese GPS.” There is a 

critical difference in its operation, however. A traditional global positioning system uses 

signals from satellites to calculate positions on the earth. Beidou, however, is an active 

system; a user transmits information via satellite to a ground station, which calculates 

the position of the user and transmits it back. This active system allows for monitoring of users’ locations and permits users to transmit other data to the ground station as 

well. This system has been put into place on over twenty thousand Chinese fishing boats, 

enabling their location to be constantly monitored by fisheries authorities.22

Systems that self-report ship identifications and positions like AIS and Beidou have 

obvious advantages for enforcing domestic laws and managing international maritime 

traffic. They also help sort out a complex radar picture, allowing the PLA Navy and 

maritime law-enforcement agencies to concentrate patrol efforts on identifying radar 

contacts having no associated AIS or Beidou data. 

Tactical Assets

Besides the largely shore-based systems described above, the PLA Navy and each of 

the maritime law-enforcement organizations maintain tactical assets that patrol their 

respective areas of responsibility and represent the final options in any ISR network. If 

activity is unclear or there is a hole in ground-based monitoring systems, the only thing 

to do is to go out and take a look. Besides traditional surface-search radars, it can be 

assumed that many of the PLA Navy and maritime law-enforcement ships possess AIS 

systems that would help supplement the wide-area radar picture.

The PLA Navy is also beginning to develop some very sophisticated ship-based radars 

that provide much greater awareness than traditional air- and surface-search radars. 
80 china maritime studies

The Luyang II–class destroyers incorporate China’s first ship-based phased-array radars, 

similar to the U.S. Aegis AN/SPY-1 system.23 China’s destroyers of the Sovremenny and 

Luyang I and II classes deploy the Russian Mineral-ME system, which possesses both active and passive detection systems, as well as an integrated data link for sharing targeting 

information.24

PLA Navy ships, in addition, would have passive electronic support measures (ESM), 

which can intercept and identify other ships’ radar signals. It is unclear from publicly 

available materials whether maritime law-enforcement ships have such systems, but they 

are less likely to; with thousands of commercial ships all using off-the-shelf radars, it 

is unlikely that an ESM system would be very useful. It makes more sense for the PLA 

Navy, which would have special interest in the more unusual signatures of foreign military radars that could be operating in a given area.

In sum, China’s ground- and sea-based ISR capabilities fall into three primary areas. 

The first is ground-based radar, which, with new OTHRs, can provide an accurate 

picture of activity but not identifying information. The two self-reporting mechanisms 

discussed can provide detailed information on contacts, but AIS is limited by range, 

and Beidou is fitted only on Chinese vessels. Finally, the various patrol ships must help 

cover the remaining area, but they are limited by numbers. Thus, for the near seas, while 

ground- and sea-based ISR systems can provide persistent and accurate surveillance out 

to perhaps a hundred nautical miles from shore, the farther reaches must be monitored 

either by patrol ships or by air- and space-based assets, which are less constrained by the 

distances involved but also more intermittent in their coverage. 

Command, Control, Communication, and Computers

C4ISR does not stop with developing networks of sensors to gain awareness of areas 

of responsibility. C4ISR also includes the mechanisms for fusing such information, 

enabling command decisions, and disseminating those decisions to subordinate units. 

This portion of the C4ISR equation is usually less visible and less concrete than the ISR 

systems themselves, and thus it is often examined less thoroughly. 

Creating a Fused Picture

For the extensive ISR assets described in the previous section to be most effective, the 

information from all must be fused to present a cohesive picture. This would allow 

commanders in the various organizations to make informed decisions regarding the 

best use of their respective forces. This is not a trivial matter, particularly across multiple 

organizations. The most efficient use of China’s ISR assets would be to fuse information 

from every sensor into a single picture, and then to disseminate it to each agency, which 

could filter it to display the data required. However, this would be exceedingly complex 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 81

and would require a level of coordination and standardization among multiple agencies 

that does not exist at this time. It appears that some common data may be shared, but 

to what extent is unclear. Basic data such as those from a coastal radar network are the 

type most likely to be shared, while more specialized data, such as electronic surveillance 

or reporting from individual patrolling units, are probably kept within the originating 

agency unless there is a specific need to share. Each agency must therefore use its own 

assets to fill in gaps as it requires. 

Descriptions of how such data fusion occurs are difficult to come by, particularly for the 

PLA Navy. However, foreign observers have been allowed into some coordination centers 

of the maritime law-enforcement organizations. One of the best descriptions of such a 

facility comes from Professor Lyle Goldstein of the U.S. Naval War College, who visited 

the Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration Rescue Coordination Center in 2007.25 He 

describes a modern ship-tracking facility that is supplemented by eleven radar stations 

and two other tracking stations.26 But even the primary Rescue Coordination Center, in 

one of China’s busiest ports, shows seams, gaps in information. For example, the Rescue 

Coordination Center could display the locations of its own assets, but it apparently did 

not have up-to-date information on where China Coast Guard ships were.27

With a few such exceptions, little is known about exactly how and where data are fused 

among the various agencies. The author postulates that each major division of each organization likely has a data-fusion center to support the decisions of that division’s commander. The PLA Navy, State Oceanic Administration, and the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command each have three major organizational break points, described as North 

Sea, East Sea, and South Sea areas or fleets.28 These relatively large divisions would make 

sense for these agencies, whose responsibilities are spread throughout the near seas. 

In contrast, the China Coast Guard and Maritime Safety Administration, whose missions are concentrated closer to the coast, have a larger number of smaller areas of 

responsibility. Both agencies have flotillas or subordinate bureaus in each of the eleven 

coastal provinces; the Maritime Safety Administration also has bureaus in the port of 

Hong Kong, as well as in Heilongjiang and Hubei to manage major inland waterways.29

The maritime pictures for each of these agencies would likely be more detailed in the 

near coastal areas, offering much less insight into activities in the farther reaches of the 

near seas.

Coordinating Activities

As China places more importance on its near-seas claims and the agencies that enforce 

them, cooperation between those agencies becomes more important. Besides promotion 

of economy of resources, there appear to be increasing areas in which several entities 
82 china maritime studies

have key interests. These common interests drove a recent consolidation of maritime 

agencies under a single agency to deal with frequent coordination problems.

The first hint of how limited cooperation was under the former system is the diversity 

of ministries that controlled the various maritime agencies. Prior to the spring of 2013, 

there was no common chain of command below the State Council level for any two 

of the major civilian maritime agencies. The State Oceanic Administration, Bureau of 

Fisheries’ Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, Maritime Safety Administration, China 

Coast Guard, and the General Administration of Customs fell, respectively, under the 

Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Public Security, and the State Council.30 To include the PLA Navy, 

one had to go all the way to the Politburo to find a common decision-making body, as 

only that entity includes senior members of both the State Council and the Central 

Military Commission. 

At the 2013 National People’s Congress, many of these agencies were restructured so 

as to fall under the State Oceanic Administration as a new, consolidated China Coast 

Guard.31 Additionally there is, as noted, growing evidence that the PLA Navy, the new 

China Coast Guard, and the Maritime Safety Administration are beginning to share 

information and coordinate in specific areas. But the mechanisms for that cooperation 

likely had to be approved at the highest levels. Such a burdensome chain severely limits 

the flexibility of the maritime agencies in attempting to respond to emerging situations 

in a comprehensive manner. 

This wide separation of chains of command has obvious implications for the coordination of activities, but also it gives rise to uncoordinated decisions that seem innocuous 

but could result in significant hurdles down the road. Different organizations are apt to 

develop different ways of processing and exchanging information. For example, even if 

the Maritime Safety Administration were authorized to share its AIS data with the new 

China Coast Guard, if the latter’s networks were not able to accept and process those 

data, significant investments in both time and expense might be required. Similar challenges could occur in the realm of communications. Various ships and aircraft could 

presumably communicate on standard marine frequencies, but secure communications, 

data transfer, and participation in multipoint nets would not be possible unless prior 

coordination ensured compatibility of equipment and procedures.

Over the past several years, there have been signs that some improvement in coordination is beginning to take place. The 2010 iteration of China’s defense white paper 

mentioned for the first time the roles of the civilian maritime enforcement agencies 

and hinted at formal coordination between the PLA and civilian agencies when it stated 

in the same section that “all military area commands, as well as border and coastal 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 83

provinces, cities and counties, have commissions to coordinate border and coastal 

defenses within their respective jurisdictions.”32 The State Oceanic Administration appeared to have a more formal relationship with the PLA Navy than the other maritime 

law-enforcement agencies, which may have contributed to its selection to lead the new 

China Coast Guard. In 2008, the deputy director of the State Oceanic Administration’s 

China Marine Surveillance organization announced it would become a “reserve unit” of 

the PLA Navy.33

In addition to the examples above, an incident clearly illustrates that the barriers between the various maritime agencies can be overcome for particular situations. When 

the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) was harassed in the South China Sea on 8 March 

2009, ships from three different organizations were on the scene. Two fishing trawlers 

conducted the most dangerous maneuvers, but ships from the State Oceanic Administration, Bureau of Fisheries’ Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, and the PLA Navy 

were all in the immediate vicinity.34 Such a coordinated action among three agencies had 

not been seen before and has not been seen again since, but it is illustrative of the type of 

action that can occur if the appropriate authorities are given. 

Implications for the Future

Over the coming years, C4ISR management will be a determining factor regarding 

whether China can effectively execute its maritime missions in the near seas. To execute 

those missions successfully, China must be able to build an accurate picture of activity and, when necessary, to coordinate actions between agencies both at sea and ashore. 

These are not easy tasks, given the vast expanse of the near seas and the disparate nature 

of the organizations potentially involved. 

The ground- and sea-based ISR assets described in this chapter highlight some of the 

very complex issues with building a fused picture over such a vast and diverse area. They 

hold certain significant advantages over air- and space-based systems, but on their own 

they cannot provide the complete picture. 

A chief advantage of ground- and sea-based systems over airborne and most space-based 

systems is persistence. Ground-based radar, electronic surveillance, and AIS stations can 

monitor their areas continuously, and they have access to large communication “pipes” 

that can get vast amounts of information to fusion centers quickly. Sea-based platforms 

provide a bridge between shore-based assets and the more mobile air and space assets. 

They can loiter for days at a time, and they provide information of arguably greater 

fidelity than can any other ISR platform.

The tyranny of distance continues to be the primary enemy to accurate information. 

Systems that, like OTH radars, can observe vast areas at extended ranges provide little 
84 china maritime studies

in the way of identification regarding the types of ships they are observing. Yet systems 

that provide more complete data, such as AIS or visual observation by patrol ships, are 

limited to the narrow slices of the near seas that they are able to observe at one time. 

The only system that appears to provide detailed information over a wide area—the 

Beidou—does so only for Chinese ships equipped with appropriate and working 

equipment and is therefore of limited use in identifying what the PLA Navy and maritime law-enforcement agencies are most interested in—foreign or illegal activity. 

With vast areas to enforce, coordination between agencies can only increase the efficiency of their efforts, which could set the stage for more contentious interactions 

with ships from regional countries or even the United States. Increasing awareness of 

foreign activities throughout China’s claimed waters and more efficient use of evergrowing maritime-agency fleets will enable China to enforce its claims more stringently. Increased interaction with foreign ships farther from mainland China could spark 

at-sea incidents that result in unintended escalation of tensions at best and regional 

conflict at worst. 

At the end of the day, increased C4ISR capabilities throughout the near seas are a 

magnifying glass for China’s maritime policies. Where those interests are in harmony 

with those of other regional actors, China will bring welcome abilities to bear, but where 

those interests diverge, increasingly dangerous situations could arise.

Notes

1. People’s Republic of China, China’s National 

Defense in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of 

the State Council, March 2011), p. 17, available 

at news.xinhuanet.com/. For an overview of 

China’s maritime enforcement agencies, see Lyle 

J. Goldstein, Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: 

Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving 

Maritime Enforcement Capabilities, China Maritime Study 5 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 

April 2010).

2. “Major General Luo Yuan Discusses US-ROK 

Military Exercise in the Yellow Sea,” Renmin 

Wang, 13 July 2010.

3. “China Adds Patrol Ships to Safeguard Maritime Interests,” Xinhua, 6 January 2011, news 

.xinhuanet.com/. 

4. “China Marine Law Enforcement Bulletin, 

2008,” State Oceanic Administration, 30 March 

2009, available at www.soa.gov.cn/. Wang 

Qian, “Maritime Surveillance Forces Will Expand,” China Daily Online, 2 May 2011, www 

.chinadaily.com.cn/. 

5. Kyle Mizokami, “China to Establish Permanent Patrols near Senkakus,” Japan Security 

Watch: New Pacific Institute, 20 December 

2010, newpacificinstitute.org/. 

6. “Stronger Fleet for Fishery Administration,” 

EastDay.com, 17 November 2010, english

.eastday.com/; Li Xiaokun and Wang Qian, “Expansion of Fleet to Safeguard Sea Rights,” China 

Daily, 28 October 2010, www2.chinadaily

.com.cn/; “Four Surveillance Ships Join Diaoyu 

Islands Patrol,” China Daily, 7 January 2013, 

www.china.org.cn/.

7. Hou Yaming, “Up Close to China’s Warship No. 

1,” Beijing Jianchuan Zhishi, 1 July 2010, p. 18.

8. Radar horizon in nautical miles is roughly calculated as 

 1.23(√height of radar + √height of target),

where the height is in feet.

9. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook

(Washington, D.C.: 6 April 2011), available at 

www.cia.gov/. 

10. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 85

of Defense, 17 August 2010), p. 2, available at 

www.defense.gov/.

11. Laura Pederson and John Barrick, “HF Surface 

Wave Radar: Revisiting a Solution for EEZ Ship 

Surveillance,” EEZ International (Spring 2004), 

p. 1, www.codar.com/.

12. Ibid., p. 2.

13. The 863 Program is also known as the State 

High-Tech Development Plan.

14. Xiaojing Huang, Biyang Wen, and Fan Ding, 

“Ship Detection and Tracking Using Multifrequency HFSWR,” IEICE Electronics Express 7, 

no. 6 (25 March 2010), p. 411.

15. Jane’s C4I Systems, s.v. “Relocatable Over-theHorizon Radar (ROTHR) (AN/TPS-71),” 12 

November 2010, articles.janes.com/; Michael 

Sinclair-Jones, “JORN Assures Early Warning 

for Australia,” Defence Systems Daily, 29 February 2000, available at classic-web.archive.org/. 

16. Xin Guo et al., “Signal Processing of Sky 

Wave Over-the-Horizon Radar,” in 2002 IEEE 

International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, 

and Signal Processing (n.p.: 2002), vol. 4, pp. 

3956–59, doi:10.1109/ICASSP.2002.5745523. 

17. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2011 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, 2011), p. 3, available at www.defense 

.gov/.

18. Jiang Wei, Deng Weibo, and Yang Qiang, “Characteristics Analysis of First-Order Sea Clutter 

for Over-the-Horizon Hybrid Sky-Wave Radar,” 

Journal of Computational Information Systems 7, 

no. 4 (April 2011).

19. Richard Fisher, Jr., “Notes from AeroIndia and 

IDEX,” International Assessment and Strategy 

Center, 28 February 2005, www.strategycenter 

.net/.

20. “AIS Transponders,” International Maritime 

Organization, www.imo.org/. 

21. “Saab Transpondertech Wins China Waterways 

Contract,” Baird Maritime, 10 September 2010, 

www.bairdmaritime.com/.

22. “Advantages and Disadvantages of Beidou Navigation Satellite System,” CNTV, 11 April 2011, 

english.cntv.cn/.

23. “Type 052C (Luyang-II Class) Missile Destroyer,” China’s Defence Today, 28 February 

2009, www.sinodefence.com/.

24. Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide 

to World Naval Weapons Systems, 5th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. 273.

25. Goldstein, Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea, p. 9.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 10.

28. Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese 

Characteristics (Washington, D.C.: August 

2009), p. 12, www.oni.navy.mil/; “Subordinate 

Bodies of the SOA,” The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China [hereafter 

Central People’s Government], 29 September 

2005, english.gov.cn/; “China Fisheries Law 

Enforcement Command,” China’s Defence Today, 

14 March 2009, www.sinodefence.com/. 

29. “China Coast Guard,” China’s Defence Today, 21 

March 2009, www.sinodefence.com/; “Subordinate Bureaus,” Maritime Safety Administration,

n.d., en.msa.gov.cn/.

30. “State Oceanic Administration,” Central People’s 

Government, 1 October 2005; Goldstein, Five 

Dragons Stirring Up the Sea, pp. 6, 9, 15; General 

Administration of China Customs, 2009 China 

Customs (Beijing: 2009), p. 1, english.customs 

.gov.cn/.

31. “China Maritime Agencies Brought under One 

Body,” South China Morning Post Online, 20 

March 2013, www.scmp.com/.

32. People’s Republic of China, China’s National 

Defense in 2010, p. 17.

33. “Sea Patrol Force to Get More Muscle,” 

People’s Daily Online, 21 October 2008, 

english.peopledaily.com.cn/. 

34. Associated Press, “U.S. Protests Harassing of 

Navy Ship by Chinese,” China on NBC News

.com, 9 March 2009, www.msnbc.msn.com/. 

While the fishing trawlers appeared to be civilian, examination of photos shows several characteristics unusual compared to typical fishing 

vessels in the area: the trawlers are flying at least 

three Chinese flags, they appear freshly painted, 

and they have minimal equipment on deck.

China’s progressively more potent naval platforms, aircraft, and missiles are increasingly capable of holding U.S. Navy platforms and their supporting assets at risk 

in the near seas and their approaches. Central to maximizing Chinese ability to employ 

these systems—and hence to consolidating China’s aerospace combat capabilities over 

the near seas—are its emerging command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. These systems will enable 

the Chinese military to strengthen coordination, cueing, reconnaissance, communications, and data relay for maritime monitoring and targeting, as well as to coordinate 

Chinese platforms, systems, and personnel engaged in these roles. Particularly important 

will be effective utilization of ISR, the collection and processing of information concerning potential military targets. Many platforms and systems can support such operations; 

this chapter focuses on those dedicated to such purposes, with the exception of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters, both of which are growing in importance but on which data are more difficult to verify at this time.

The successful achievement of high-quality real-time satellite imagery and targetlocating data and fusion, as well as of reliable indigenous satellite positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), would facilitate holding enemy vessels at risk via devastating 

multiaxis strikes involving precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles launched from 

a variety of land-, sea-, undersea-, and air-based platforms in coordinated sequence. 

Emerging space-based C4ISR capabilities could thus greatly increase China’s capacity to 

assert its interests militarily in, over, and beneath the near seas. Beijing has a clear strategic rationale and corresponding set of programs to master the relevant components, 

particularly for “counterintervention” operations in and around its near seas. Doing so 

could finally enable the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to translate its traditional approach of achieving military superiority in specific times and areas, even in a context of 

overall inferiority (以劣胜优), into the maritime dimension.

Andrew S. Erickson

Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over the Near Seas

CHAPTER SEVE

Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR
88 china maritime studies

China has many ways to mitigate its limitations in C4ISR and target deconfliction for 

kinetic operations within the near seas and their immediate approaches, and potentially 

also for nonkinetic peacetime operations farther afield. Conducting high-intensity 

wartime operations in contested environments beyond the near seas, by contrast, would 

require major qualitative and quantitative improvements, particularly in aerospace, and 

impose corresponding vulnerabilities.

This chapter reviews dedicated Chinese air- and space-based ISR systems, examines 

one relevant operational scenario (tracking hostile surface ships in and around the near 

seas), considers China’s remaining limitations, and concludes by assessing strategic 

implications for China’s military and the U.S. Navy.

China’s C4ISR Foundation and Emphasis

The PLA decided that it was necessary to develop “an integrated C4ISR system” in the 

early 1990s.1 This was motivated by observations of U.S. prowess in Operation Desert

Storm, the U.S. role in the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, and the 7 May 1999 Belgrade 

embassy bombing. The subsequent development of network-centric warfare added 

further impetus. In addition to the cumulative impact of these events, it was perhaps 

physical destruction and damage to sovereignty by the Belgrade bombing that most 

strongly reinforced Jiang Zemin’s visionary thinking concerning the future of warfare 

and catalyzed the support of other top leaders for decisive investment to realize this 

goal. Accordingly, in May 1999, China initiated the 995 Program (995 工程) to support 

megaprojects for the development of “assassin’s mace” weapons, which promised disproportionate effectiveness vis-à-vis a top military power, such as the United States, despite 

China’s overall technological inferiority.2

Essential to the integration and employment of the assassin’s mace weapons thus developed since the late 1990s, Chinese C4ISR capabilities have improved markedly in parallel. This has occurred as part of a larger effort at “informatization,” facilitated in part by 

development in civilian information technology and the telecommunications industry. 

As of China’s 2008 defense white paper, the PLA aspired to establish a foundation for 

informatization by 2010, achieve major progress by 2020, and realize informatization 

by 2050.3 In 2000, the PLA issued a manual, or outline (纲要), detailing the construction of “command automation systems,” or “military information systems that possess 

command and control, intelligence and reconnaissance, early warning and surveillance, 

communications, electronic countermeasures, and other operational and information 

support capabilities with computers as the core.”4

Over the next decade, “the PLA began to develop and field airborne and space-based 

ISR technologies, and it was during this time that Chinese military analysts began to 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 89

consider the requirements and applications of C4ISR systems to be used by the PLA.”5

Today, in Larry Wortzel’s assessment, “China’s military reconnaissance capability is 

probably similar to the capabilities of Western sensor systems of the 1990s, a location 

to about ten meters in accuracy, clock geosynchronous signals to within 50 nanoseconds, and velocity to within 0.2 meters per second.”6

 The Central Military Commission 

(CMC) and the General Staff Department (GSD) command center are linked redundantly with alternate command posts, military region headquarters, and subordinate 

units operating up to, and in some cases beyond, the “First Island Chain.”7 While the 

PLA has not achieved the level of situational awareness of its American counterpart, 

which can extend data-sharing to the individuals in many respects, all the PLA Navy’s 

(PLAN’s) “major combat ships are networked and can share data. In the PLA Air Force, 

a majority of newer fighter aircraft are able to share data and be part of an information system managed by the PLA’s own airborne early-warning aircraft. For the ground 

forces, it looks like automation and information age systems have penetrated down to 

the regimental level.”8

According to the U.S. Department of Defense, as of 2012 “the PLA [was] focused on 

developing C4ISR systems that will allow the military to share information and intelligence data, enhance battlefield awareness, and integrate and command military forces 

across the strategic, campaign, and tactical levels. A fully integrated C4ISR system, as 

envisioned by PLA leaders, would enable the PLA to respond to complex battlefield 

conditions with a high level of agility and synchronization.”9

More broadly, developing a “high-resolution earth observation system,” to include an 

“airborne remote sensing system” and a “national satellite remote sensing (ground) 

network system,” is among sixteen national megaprojects prioritized in China’s Eleventh 

Five-Year Plan (2006–10) and the “Outline of National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology Development” (2006–20).10 This priority guarantees top leadership 

support and tremendous institutional, financial, and human resources.

Near-real/real-time C4ISR is facilitated increasingly by China’s integrated Qu Dian (区电) 

military C4ISR system, which enables civilian and military leaders to communicate with 

forces in-theater using secure fiber-optic cables and both high-frequency and very-highfrequency communications and microwave systems, as well as related wireless networks 

and data links. These latter include airborne radio and communications relay and secure 

PLA voice/data communications provided by Fenghuo/Zhongxing/Shentong communications satellites. According to China’s 2010 defense white paper, “The total length of the 

national defense optical fiber communication network has increased by a large margin, 

forming a new generation information transmission network with optical fiber communication as the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications as assistance.”11

This system may be the equivalent of the U.S. Joint Tactical Information Distribution 
90 china maritime studies

System; China has developed, and possibly deployed, a related Triservice Tactical 

Information Distributed Network (三军战术数据分发系统).12 These capabilities are 

currently structured to support near-seas operations. Extending high-intensity coverage 

much beyond the near seas, however, would be far more difficult in many respects.

Airborne ISR

Aircraft play an essential role in maritime reconnaissance because they are typically easier and cheaper to acquire than satellites and also because they can be rapidly redirected 

to new areas of priority in a fluid tactical environment. China’s fixed- and rotary-wing 

aircraft and UAVs contribute to peacetime signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT); in wartime they would support air defense and 

antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Breakthroughs in the Beidou/Compass satellite system 

(discussed later) and high-speed data links, as demonstrated by China’s airborne earlywarning aircraft systems, are enabling rapid Chinese UAV progress.13 Table 1 details 

major dedicated, manned, aerial C4ISR platforms. Sources for details on UAVs may be 

found in endnote 14 below.14

China employs a growing variety of aircraft as dedicated ISR platforms. If developed 

successfully, they could give China important aerial battle-management capacity. While 

the role of rotary-wing aircraft is limited, fixed-wing ISR aircraft, as indicated in table 1, 

are numerous and diverse; hence they are covered in detail below.

To support the effective use of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation, China 

is attempting to improve its airborne ISR capabilities, in part by developing several 

variants of airborne early-warning (空中早期, AEW) aircraft. These include two major 

indigenous platforms meant to build on previous efforts. 

Following cancellation of Israel’s Phalcon sale amid mounting American pressure in 

2000, China purchased A-50 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft, a 

modified Ilyushin Il-76, from Russia. China has been developing the KJ-2000 indigenous 

AWACS-type aircraft, based on the Russian A-50 airframe, to conduct surveillance, 

perform long-range air patrol, and thereby coordinate naval air operations. The KJ-2000 

has phased-array radar, data processing, Identification Friend-or-Foe (distinguishing 

friendly, hostile, and unknown tracks), C3I (command, control, communications, and 

intelligence systems), and data-link capability—all Chinese developed.15 According to 

Carlo Kopp, “this system employs radar technology two generations ahead of that used 

by the US Air Force’s E-3C AWACS.”16 A mid-November 2007 exercise held jointly by the 

South Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet in the South China Sea reportedly included employment of one or more KJ-2000s.17 Four or more KJ-2000s are reportedly operational 

with the PLAAF’s 26th Air Division.18
china

s near seas combat capabilities 91

Table 1. Selected Chinese Manned Airborne ISR Platforms

Type Manufacturer Role Number 

in Service

Location First 

Delivery

fi xed 

wing

PLAAF Y8T / Gaoxin 4 Sha’anxi Aircraft 

Corporation

(SAC [Sha’anxi])

command 

post (C3I)

3 Nanjing 

Military Region 

(MR), 76th 

Air Regiment, 

26th Air Division, WuxiShuofang?

2007

B-4052/737-300 Boeing, U.S. / 

Xi’an Aircraft 

Company 

Limited (XAC) 

modifi ed

command 

post (C3I)

2 ?

KJ-2000 (A-50 

Mainstay / 

Il-76MD)

Beriev, Russia / 

XAC-modifi ed

airborne 

early 

warning 

and control 

(AEW&C)

4–5 Nanjing MR, 

76th Air Regiment, 26th Air 

Division, WuxiShuofang?

2004

Y-8W/KJ-200 SAC (Sha’anxi) AEW&C 4–5 Nanjing MR, 

76th Air Regiment, 26th Air 

Division, WuxiShuofang?

2007

H-6B/HZ-6 XAC reconnaissance/ELINT1+ ? 1979

H-5/HZ-5 Harbin Aircraft 

Manufacturing 

Corporation 

(HAMC)

ISR 7 ? 1966–82

Su-30MKK 

Flanker

Sukhoi, Russia reconnaissance/

surveillance (SAR 

capability on 

one airframe 

demonstrated 2003)

73* ? 2000

JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter / 

bomber 

(confi guration variant, 

e.g., with 

BM/KZ-900 

SIGINT pod)

83* ? 2004

Y-8H XAC reconnaissance/

surveillance

2? ?

Y-8CB / Gaoxin 1 

Karakoram Eagle

SAC (Sha’anxi) reconnaissance/

surveillance, 

COMINT

6 Nanjing MR, 

EW Flight 

Regiment, 10th 

Air Division, 

NanjingDajianchang?

2005–

2009
92 china maritime studies

Type Manufacturer Role Number 

in Service

Location First 

Delivery

J-8F/JZ-8FR Shenyang 

Aircraft 

Corporation

(SAC 

[Shenyang])

tactical 

reconnaissance/

surveillance

24 Shenyang 

MR, 3rd/4th 

Independent 

Fighter Reconnaissance 

Regiment, 

30th Fighter 

Division, 

Shenyang 

Yuhuntun; 

and/or 78th 

Reconnaissance Regiment, Suzhou; 

and/or 

Jinan MR, 1st 

Independent 

Fighter Reconnaissance 

Regiment, 

31st Fighter 

Division, 

Wendeng?

?

J-8I/JZ-8 SAC (Shenyang) reconnaissance/

surveillance

24 ?

J-8/JZ-6 SAC (Shenyang) reconnaissance/

surveillance

48 Guangzhou 

MR, 2nd 

Independent 

Fighter Reconnaissance 

Regiment, 

42nd Fighter 

Division, Taihe; 

and Nanjing 

MR, 3rd 

Independent 

Fighter Reconnaissance 

Regiment, 

29th Fighter 

Division, 

Suzhou? 

1976

Y-8G / Gaoxin 3 SAC (Sha’anxi) SIGINT 

and/or 

communications relay

10 Shenyang 

MR, 3rd/4th 

Independent 

Fighter Reconnaissance 

Regiment, 

30th Fighter 

Division, 

Shenyang 

Yuhuntun; 

and/or Nanjing 

MR, 30th Air 

Regiment, 

10th Air Division, Anqing 

North?

before 

2011

Table 1. (continued)
china

s near seas combat capabilities 93

Type Manufacturer Role Number 

in Service

Location First 

Delivery

Y-8EW / Gaoxin 8 SAC (Sha’anxi) dorsal 

satellite 

communications dome 

+ antennas; 

ELINT?

N/A At China 

Flight Test 

Establishment, 

April 2011

Tu-154M/D 

Careless

Tupolev, Russia EW/ELINT/

SIGINT

4 102nd Air 

Regiment, 

34th Transportation Division, 

BeijingNanyuan?

1998

HD-6 XAC EW 1+ ?

Y-8XZ/ECM, 

Gaoxin 7

SAC (Sha’anxi) EW 2 Nanjing MR, 

30th Air 

Regiment, 

10th Air Division, Anqing 

North; and/

or Shenyang 

MR, 4th 

Independent 

Electronic Warfare Regiment, 

Shenyang 

Yuhuntun; 

and/or Nanjing 

MR, 30th Electronic Warfare 

Regiment, 

10th Bomber 

Division, 

Nanjing 

Dajiaocang?

2007

PLAN Y-8J/W/WH, 

KJ-200,

Gaoxin 5

SAC (Sha’anxi) AEW&C 4–6 North Sea 

Fleet (NSF), 1st 

Independent 

Air Regiment, 

5th Fighter 

Aviation 

Division, 

Liaoyang?

1998

H-5/HZ-5 

(Il-28 Beagle)

HAMC ISR 7–24 NSF, 5th 

Bomber Aviation Regiment, 

2nd Bomber 

Aviation 

Division?

1966–82

JH-7A XAC strike fi ghter/ 

bomber 

(confi guration variant, 

e.g., with 

BM/KZ-900 

SIGINT pod)

75* ? 2004

Table 1. (continued)
94 china maritime studies

Type Manufacturer Role Number 

in Service

Location First 

Delivery

JH-7 XAC strike fi ghter/ 

bomber 

(confi guration variant, 

e.g., with 

BM/KZ-900 

SIGINT pod)

50–65* ? 1998

Y-8JB/DZ, 

Gaoxin 2

SAC (Sha’anxi) SIGINT, 

reconnaissance/

surveillance, 

and/or

ELINT

5 NSF, 1st/3rd 

Independent 

Air Regiment, 

5th Fighter 

Aviation Division, Liaoyang; 

1 in South 

Sea Fleet, 7th 

Independent 

Air Regiment, 

Sanya/

Yaxian?

2004

Sh-5 HAMC maritime 

patrol / 

surveillance

4 NSF, 3rd Independent Air 

Regiment, 5th 

Fighter Aviation Division, 

Tuandao?

1986

Y-8X SAC (Sha’anxi) maritime 

patrol / 

ASW

5 NSF, 1st Independent Air 

Regiment, 5th 

Fighter Aviation Division, 

Liaoyang?

1985

Y-8Q / 

Gaoxin 6

SAC (Sha’anxi) ASW 1–5 NSF, 1st Independent Air 

Regiment, 5th 

Fighter Aviation Division, 

Liaoyang?

rotary 

wing

PLAN Ka-31B Kamov, Russia AEW 8 ? ?

Zhi (Z)-8YJ/SA321 Super FrelonChanghe Aircraft Industries 

Group; 

French technology, license 

production

AEW 2 ? ?

Notes:

Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources.

Owing to the profusion of constantly evolving Y-8/Gaoxin variants—many of which overlap in function—as 

well as extreme difficulty in determining where a given aircraft is deployed at a given time, data in this table 

must be interpreted with particular caution.

* Many of these may not be ISR-focused/equipped.

Sources: “Chinese SIGnals INTelligence (SIGINT) Air Vehicles,” Command Information Systems, China, IHS

Jane’s, 23 December 2013, www.janes.com; Institute for International Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 

2013 (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 286–95; “China: Air Force,” Jane’s World Air Forces, 4 June 2013, www

.janes.com/; “Air Force, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: China and Northeast Asia, 17 Septem- ber 2013, www.janes.com/; “World Navies: China,” Jane’s World Navies, 4 October 2013, www.janes.com/; 

“XAC KJ-2000,” Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 8 July 2013, www.janes.com/; “SAC Y-8 (Special Mission 

Versions),” Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 7 July 2013, www.janes.com/; “XAC H-6,” Jane’s All the World’s 

Aircraft, 8 July 2013, www.janes.com/; “Kamov Ka-31 Helix B,” Jane’s Fighting Ships, 11 February 2013, 

www.janes.com/; Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper, Modern Chinese Warplanes: Combat Aircraft and Units 

of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation (Houston, Tex.: Harpia, 2012), pp. 83–87, 110–12, 219. And see Erickson, “China’s Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities,” pp. 114–15, 117, 120.

Table 1. (continued)
china

s near seas combat capabilities 95

China’s Y-8 medium-range transport airframe, derived from Russia’s Antonov An-12 

Cub transport and produced under license by the Sha’anxi Aircraft Industry (Group) 

Corporation, is the basis for eight Gaoxin ISR variants.19 They perform such missions as 

electronic intelligence (or ELINT—variant one; and possibly an eighth variant), SIGINT 

(variant two), SIGINT and/or communications relay (variant three), electronic warfare 

/ electronic countermeasures / C3I (variants four and seven), airborne early warning 

(variant five), and ASW (variant six).20 Tupolev Tu-154 variants perform similar roles.

China’s smaller KJ-200/Y-8 Balance Beam maritime patrol, electronic warfare, airborneearly-warning and control aircraft, with its electronically steered, active, phased-array 

radar (similar in appearance to, but larger than, Sweden’s Ericsson Erieye active phasedarray radar), complements the KJ-2000 by performing tactical AEW and ELINT more 

economically.21 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft crashed on 4 June 2006, killing forty people and possibly setting back the program.22 But the program appears to be 

back on track, and Carlo Kopp believes that the KJ-200’s technology is “two generations 

ahead of the mechanically steered technology used by the US.”23 On 12 March 2010, a 

PLAAF KJ-200 may have been spotted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force near 

the Miyako Strait.24 Like the KJ-2000, the KJ-200 is reported to be in service with the 

PLAAF’s 26th Air Division;25 the PLAN has apparently taken delivery of its first KJ-200s 

as well.26

In addition to its two dedicated AWACS platforms, and the numerous and diverse Y-8 

Gaoxin variants detailed above, the PLAAF and PLAN have reconnaissance regiments 

with a wide range of other specialized aircraft. Relevant fixed-wing types include a 

number of H-6s, derivatives of Russia’s Tu-16 Badger, which also conduct reconnaissance and ELINT.27 As part of a late-2003 exercise, an Su-30MKK fighter used a new 

synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to surveil the length of Taiwan.28 A portion of the PLAN 

and PLAAF’s JH-7A strike fighter / bombers, together with the older JH-7 variant still 

employed by the PLAN, are apparently outfitted with BM/KZ-900 SIGINT pods.29

Beyond the strictly military dimension, as China strengthens its maritime lawenforcement forces and consolidates the majority of them under the State Oceanic 

Administration, their airborne surveillance capabilities may grow apace. On 5 March 

2009, a Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted twelve fly-bys of USNS 

Victorious (T-AGOS 19), operating in international waters in the Yellow Sea, at an altitude of four hundred feet, range five hundred yards; the following day, a Y-12 conducted eleven fly-bys of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23), operating in international waters 

in the South China Sea, at an altitude of six hundred feet and a range of between a 

hundred and three hundred feet.30
96 china maritime studies

Space-Based ISR

Space capabilities underpin China’s current naval and other military capabilities for the 

near seas. The successful achievement of reliable indigenous satellite navigation and 

high-quality real-time satellite imagery and target-locating data will greatly strengthen 

PLA capabilities. While still purchasing supplementary imagery, Beijing is combining 

foreign knowledge with increasingly robust indigenous capabilities to produce significant advances in maritime C4ISR.

China has developed a full range of military, civilian, and dual-use satellites of various 

mission areas and sizes. While they still face difficulties involving reliability and life span, 

these systems are improving rapidly.31 China uses a variety of satellites to link sensors 

to shooters and to support related network functions. China’s second data-relay satellite, Tianlian-1-02/B, provides “near real-time transfer of data to ground stations from 

manned space capsules or orbiting satellites”;32 Tianlian-1-03, launched on 25 July 2012, 

further extends and strengthens this capacity.33 China’s ground stations and Yuanwangclass space-event support ships add important telemetry, tracking, and command capacity. China is moving cautiously with respect to establishing overseas ground stations but 

plans by 2030 to have established “network nodes” at the North Pole, at the South Pole, 

and in Brazil as part of a “Digital Earth Scientific Platform.”34 The Fenghuo-1 communications satellite and its identically named follow-on reportedly support military operations.35 China has made great progress in small-satellite development; its satellites under 

five hundred kilograms now boast high performance, in addition to low weight. The 

9.3 kg Tiantuo-1 nano-satellite, launched on 10 May 2012, receives signals from China’s 

shipborne Automatic Identification System.36 The Shijian series of experimental satellites 

is testing new technologies. Satellite surveying and mapping are being exploited by a 

variety of services, including the PLAN. One South Sea Fleet unit developed a reportedly 

combat-relevant “Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime Terrain Digitized Satellite 

Surveying and Mapping.”37

Maritime Surveillance Satellites

China’s reconnaissance-capable satellites include electro-optical (EO), multi- and hyperspectral, and radar, especially SAR. Maritime-relevant variants include Fengyun (FY), 

the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS), Ziyuan (ZY), the Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC), Haiyang (HY), Huanjing (HJ), and Yaogan (YG) satellites. 

Chinese sources categorize the Shenzhou (SZ) manned spacecraft, which remain as 

orbital modules after their crews return to earth, and the Tiangong (TG) space-station 

module launched in 2011, as relevant to reconnaissance.38 Fengyun weather satellites 

provide visible, IR, and microwave imaging. Possible future launches include FY-2G and 

-2H in 2014, FY-3D/PM1 and FY-4 M in 2015, FY-3E/AM1 in 2017, FY-3F/PM2 in 2019, 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 97

FY-3G/AM3 in 2021, FY-3H/PM3 in 2023, and FY-4 O at an unspecified date. FY-2H 

and FY-4 O and M will be geostationary; all others have polar orbits. Three satellite 

series are particularly relevant to maritime monitoring. The CBERS polar near-real-time 

electro-optical satellites, with 2.7-meter resolution, are used for military observation. 

CBERS-3 and -4 follow-ons, with resolution halved to ten meters through PAN-MUX 

optical sensors, may be launched as early as 2013. Yaogan satellites are already so numerous that they must be addressed separately (in the next section).

Ocean surveillance, a significant focus of Chinese satellite development, has been 

prioritized at the national level as one of eight pillars of the 863 State High-Technology 

Development Plan.39 China launched its first three Haiyang polar maritime observation satellites in 2002 (no longer operational), 2007, and 2011. Roughly a dozen further 

Haiyang ocean-monitoring satellites are planned, in three sets over the next decade, with 

HY-1E/F possibly set for launch at this writing in 2013, HY-2C in 2015, HY-1G/H in 

2016, HY-3B in 2017, HY-2D in 2018, and HY-1C/D, HY-2B, and HY-3A at unspecified 

dates.40 Initial follow-ons will have three-meter resolution. China’s Huanjing visible-, 

IR-, multispectral-, and SAR-imaging constellation is designed, once eight additional 

satellites join the three already in polar orbits beginning in 2013 or later, to form a complete image of China every twelve hours.41 Table 2 surveys maritime-relevant remotesensing satellites currently in orbit.

High-Resolution Reconnaissance, Possible ELINT Satellites: Yaogan 

China’s Yaogan series of twenty-three advanced, paired SAR and EO remote-sensing satellites, operating in near-polar, sun-synchronous orbits, “may provide multiwavelength, 

overlapping, continuous medium resolution, global imagery of military targets.”42 The 

series was reportedly “implemented” (实施) by China National Space Administration, 

though this nominally civilian organization lacks the institutional autonomy of the U.S. 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration.43 With its high-resolution (five-meter) 

L-band SAR, Yaogan-1 was China’s first synthetic-aperture-radar satellite. SAR Yaogans 

are optimized for monitoring “ocean dynamics, sea surface characteristics, and coastal 

zones” (海洋动力, 海表特征, 海岸带), as well as “observing sea-surface targets and 

shallow-water bathymetry” (海面目标, 浅海地形等观测).44 EO Yaogans, which appear 

to be based on the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)–2000 small-satellite 

“bus” (that is, standardized “backbone” platform on which the satellite is built), monitor land and sea areas, including “coastal zones” (海岸带), with resolution as fine as a 

half-meter.45 Sometimes using orbit maneuver capability, Yaogans have attained a variety 

of orbits, some lower than five hundred kilometers to increase resolution.46 A major Chinese study on the nation’s remote-sensing satellites states that Yaogan satellites are “very 
98 china maritime studies

Table 2. China’s Currently Operational Earth Observation Satellites

Satellite NORAD ID International CodeContractor Launch Date/

Time (UTC)

Launch Site

FY-2D 29640 2006-053A Shanghai Institute of Satellite 

Engineering, Shanghai Academy 

of Spacefl ight Technology (SAST)

2006.02.18

16:53:00

Xichang

FY-2E 33463 2008-066A SAST 2008.12.23

00:54:00

Xichang

FY-2F 38049 2012-002A SAST 2012.01.13

00:56

Xichang

FY-3A/

AM

32958 2008-026A SAST 2008.05.27

03:02

Taiyuan

FY-3B/PM 37214 2010-059A SAST 2010.11.04

18:37:00

Taiyuan

CBERS-2 28057 2003-049A CAST 2003.10.21

00:00:00

Taiyuan

CBERS-2B 32062 2007-042A CAST 2007.09.19

03:26:00

Taiyuan

ZY-2B ? ? ? 2002.10.27 Taiyuan?

ZY-2C 28470 2004-044A ? 2004.11.06

03:10:00

Taiyuan

ZY-3 ? ? ? 2012.01.09

03:17:00

Taiyuan

DMC/

BJ1/

Tsinghua

28890 2005-043A ? 2005.10.27

06:52:00

Plesetsk 

(Russia)

HY-1B 31113 2007-010A ? 2007.04.11

03:27

Taiyuan
china

s near seas combat capabilities 99

Launch Vehicle Orbit; Perigee 

× Apogee (km); 

Inclination (°); 

Period (min.); 

Semimajor Axis 

(km)a

Mass (kg) Primary 

Sensors

Resolution (m) Ocean 

Applications

CZ-3A geostationary;

35,784.7 ×

35,805.4; 1.6°;

1,436.2; 42,166

1,380 VISSR-2 ? sea temperature, 

color, meteorology; images every 

30 min.

CZ-3A geostationary;

35,784.7 ×

35,807.4; 1.2°;

1,436.2; 42,167

1,390 VISSR-2;

visible and 

infrared highresolution cloud 

imagery

? sea temperature, 

meteorology; 

images every 

15 min.

CZ-3A geostationary;

35,774.1 ×

35,806.5; 1.3°;

1,435.9; 42,161

1,369.0 Stretched Visible 

and Infrared Spin 

Scan Radiometer

? sea temperature, 

meteorology; 

images every 

15 min.

CZ-4C polar; 

828.1 × 841.2;

98.6°; 101.5; 

7,205

2,295 MERSI ocean 

color, VIRR IR 

sensors; MWRI 

microwave 

radiometer

? sea color, 

temperature, 

wind speed, 

coastal zones, 

meteorology

CZ-4C polar; 

833.2 × 836.2;

98.8°; 101.5; 

7,205

2,299 VIRR, MERSI, 

MWRI; 11 

instruments 

capable of global, 

all-weather, 

multispectral, 

3-dimensional, 

quantitative Earth 

observations

? sea color, 

temperature, 

wind speed, 

coastal zones, 

meteorology

CZ-4B polar;

781.4 × 782.6;

98.2°; 100.3; 

7,152

1,600 CCD, infrared 

multispectral 

scanner (IRMSS), 

WFI

20 coastal zones

CZ-4B polar;

746.6 × 791.5;

98.3°; 100.1; 

7,140

1,500 CCD, WFI, HR 20 (CCD), 

2 (HR)

coastal zones

? polar ? HR, PAN-MS 2 (HR), 

5 (PAN-MS)

land, coastal 

zones

CZ-4B polar ? HR, PAN-MS 2 (HR), 

5 (PAN-MS)

coastal zones

? polar 2,630 HR, PAN-MS, 

CC DX2; 3 

high-resolution 

panchromatic 

cameras, IRMSS

2 cameras (front/

rear-facing): 

3.5 m (spectral). 

Ground-facing 

camera: 2.1 m 

(spectral). IRMSS: 

6.0 m (spectral).

coastal zones, 

high-resolution 

remote sensing, 

stereo mapping

Cosmos 

(Russian)

polar ? PAN-MS 32/4 coastal zones

CZ-2C polar;

787.4 × 811.2;

98.4°; 100.7; 

7,170

? COCTS, CZI;

ocean color, IR, 

temperature 

sensors

? sea color, sea 

temperature, 

coastal zones
100 china maritime studies

Satellite NORAD ID International CodeContractor Launch Date/

Time (UTC)

Launch Site

HY-2A 37781 2011-043A ? 2011.08.15 ?

HJ-1A 33320 2008-041A ? 2008.09.06

03:25:00

Taiyuan

HJ-1B ? ? ? 2008.09.06

03:25:00

Taiyuan

HJ-1C 38997 2012-064A ? 2012.11.18

22:53:00

Taiyuan

SZ-1 25956 1999-061A ? 1999.11.19

22:30:00

Jiuquan

SZ-2 26664 2001-001A ? 2001.01.09

01:00:00

Jiuquan

SZ-3 27397 2002-014A ? 2002.03.25

14:00:00

Jiuquan

SZ-4 27630 2002-061A ? 2002.12.29

16:40:00

Jiuquan

SZ-5 28043 2003-045A ? 2003.10.15

01:00:00

Jiuquan

SZ-6 28879 2005-040A ? 2005.10.12

01:00:00

Jiuquan

SZ-7 33386 2008-047A ? 2008.09.25

13:10:00

Jiuquan

SZ-8 37859 2011-063A ? 2011.10.31

21:58:00

Jiuquan

SZ-9 38461 2012-032A ? 2012.06.16

10:37:00

Jiuquan

SZ-10 39179 2013-029A

2013-029H 

(orbital 

module)

? 2013.06.11

09:38:00

Jiuquan

Table 2. (continued)
china

s near seas combat capabilities 101

Launch Vehicle Orbit; Perigee 

× Apogee (km); 

Inclination (°); 

Period (min.); 

Semimajor Axis 

(km)a

Mass (kg) Primary 

Sensors

Resolution (m) Ocean 

Applications

? polar;

973.3 × 973.7;

99.4°; 104.4; 

7,344

? microwave radiometer, altimeter, 

scatterometer

? ocean surveillance: sea surface 

winds, wave 

height, and water 

temperatures

CZ-2C polar;

632.8 × 672.9;

97.8°; 97.6; 7,023

? CCD; optical, 

infrared cameras; 

SAR; hyperspectral imager

30 sea color, 

red tide, vegetation, oil spills, 

coastal zones, sea 

temperature

CZ-2C polar ? CCD; optical, 

infrared 

cameras; SAR

30 sea color, coastal 

zones, sea 

temperature

CZ-2C polar 890 ? ? 1st radar satellite in China’s 

environment & 

disaster monitor 

constellation, 

operating w/

HJ-1A/1B optical 

satellites

CZ-2F 195 × 315;

89.6; 42.6°;

0.00905

7,600.0 ? ? ?

CZ-2F 330 × 346;

91.3; 42.6°;

0.00119

? ? ? orbital module 

conducted 

zero-gravity 

experiments

CZ-2F 332 × 337;

91.2; 42.4°;

0.00037

? ? ? orbital module

CZ-2F 196 × 329;

89.8; 42.4°;

0.01001

? ? ? ?

CZ-2F ? ? ? ? ?

CZ-2F 342 × 350;

91.46; 42.4°;

0.00059

? ? ? orbital module 

conducted 

scientifi c research

CZ-2F 329 × 336;

91.2; 42.4°;

0

? ? ? ?

CZ-2F ? 8,080.0 ? ? ?

CZ-2F ? ? ? ? ?

CZ-2F ? 7,800.0 ? ? left orbital module
102 china maritime studies

useful for monitoring dynamics of the ocean environment and maritime monitoring” 

(对于海洋动力环境和海洋监视监测十分有用).47

Yaogan-9; Yaogan-16A, B, and C; and Yaogan-17A, B, and C constellations may constitute a 

vital part of a larger long-range ship-tracking and targeting ISR network. Flying in triangular 

formation in similar orbits at identical inclinations, each constellation apparently contains 

an electro-optical surveillance satellite, a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite, and 

possibly an electronic/signal intelligence satellite. Designed for location and tracking of 

foreign warships, the satellites collect optical and radio electronic signatures of naval vessels that are used in conjunction with other information by the Chinese Navy. . . . They are 

thought to be able to find and track large Western warships, providing accurate positioning data for targeting by land-based antiship ballistic missile systems.48

This is similar to the first and second generations of the U.S. Navy’s White Cloud Naval 

Ocean Surveillance System, which reportedly detected surface vessels by sensing their 

electronic emissions, identifying them on the basis of their operating frequencies and 

transmission patterns, and locating them using triangulation and time distance of arrival.49 In a trio of Yaogan satellites, then, one satellite would monitor a wide expanse of 

ocean but could not locate emitting ships precisely; two satellites together would locate 

emitting ships, albeit still imperfectly; and the inputs of a third satellite would locate 

emitting ships precisely. The ships’ locations would then be transmitted to the relevant 

parts of the PLA reconnaissance-strike complex.50 The Yaogan-9 system has apparently 

been superseded by the -16 and -17 systems, as Yaogan-9B has apparently fragmented 

into two pieces.51 See table 3.

China possesses dedicated ELINT and SIGINT satellites.52 China reportedly launched an 

ELINT satellite program, the 701 Program, in the late 1960s. Following a lengthy hiatus, 

during which its primary ELINT capabilities were land-based and airborne, China 

has redeveloped interest in dedicated satellite-based ELINT applications, and Chinese 

experts have conducted considerable research in this area.53 As Mark Stokes and Ian 

Easton point out, China may have long launched “unidentified ELINT sensors attached 

to other satellite payloads, and recent launches simply represent an increase in dedicated 

systems.”54 China’s Shijian satellites, particularly the -6 series, launched in four pairs 

from 2004 to 2010, are believed by some Western sources to perform SIGINT missions.55

Satellite NORAD ID International CodeContractor Launch Date/

Time (UTC)

Launch Site

TG-1 37820 2011-053A ? 2011.09.29

13:16:00 

Jiuquan

Table 2. (continued)
china

s near seas combat capabilities 103

These might include time distance of arrival and frequency distance of arrival of 

electronic signals received, as well as other geo-location techniques, to triangulate the 

position of U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) and other ships at sea for near-real-time 

tracking and targeting.56

Supporting PNT: Beidou/Compass Satellites 

By offering reliable location signals, PNT facilitates command and control and also 

monitoring of friendly forces and targeting of enemy ones. The PLA regards autonomous reliability in this area as vital. A retired senior PLA official alleges that PLA 

analysis has concluded that unexpected Global Positioning System (GPS) disruption 

likely caused the PLA to lose track of the second and third missiles of a three-missile 

salvo fired into the East China Sea 18.5 kilometers from Taiwan’s Keelung naval port in 

March 1996, as part of a larger effort to deter what Beijing perceived to be pro–Taiwan 

independence moves. “It was a great shame for the PLA . . . an unforgettable humiliation. 

That’s how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] navigation and 

positioning system, no matter how huge the cost. Beidou is a must for us. We learned it 

the hard way.” Retired PLA general Xu Guangyu adds that China’s Beidou and Yuanwang 

systems guarantee that “there is no chance now for the U.S. to use its GPS to interfere in 

our operations at all.”57

Fearing that it might lose access to PNT provided by U.S. GPS and Russian GLONASS 

(Global Navigation Satellite System) systems in the future, and having been denied 

access to the military mode of Europe’s nascent Galileo system, China is developing its 

own—Beidou/Compass (北斗卫星导航定位系统).58 The director of the China Satellite 

Navigation and Locating Applications Management Center, Yang Baofeng, terms it “the 

Launch Vehicle Orbit; Perigee 

× Apogee (km); 

Inclination (°); 

Period (min.); 

Semimajor Axis 

(km)a

Mass (kg) Primary 

Sensors

Resolution (m) Ocean 

Applications

CZ-2F ? 8,506.0 ? ? ?

Notes:

Question marks indicate information not available in reliable open sources.

a. Data from “Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions,” ITPROSTAR, which are typically more detailed, are 

used by default, except in the case of Shenzhou spacecraft, which ITPROSTAR does not include. For Shenzhou 

spacecraft, data are from “National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog,” NASA, nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/. 

Contrary to the general column heading, orbit values from NASA for Shenzhou spacecraft are for periapsis, 

apoapsis, period, inclination, and eccentricity. 

Sources: He Mingxia et al.,“Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988– 2025),” pp. 91–103; “Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions,” ITPROSTAR, www.n2yo.com/; “National 

Space Science Data Center Master Catalog,” NASA, nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/; “Fengyun Series,” Jane’s Space 

Systems and Industry, 2 July 2012.
104 china maritime studies

Table 3. Yaogan Satellites Currently Operational: Notional Specifications

Yaogan # Military 

Designation

NORAD ID International 

Code

Contractor Launch Date/

Time (UTC)

2 JB-6-1 31490 2007-019A DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2007.05.25

07:12:00

3 JB-5-2 32289 2007-055A SAST 2007.11.11

22:48:00

4 JB-6-2 33446 2008-061A DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2008.12.01

04:42:00

5 JB-8-1 33456 2008-064A DFH / CAST 508 Institute / 

Xi’an Institute of Optics and 

Precision Mechanics

2008.12.15

03:22:00

6 JB-7-1 34839 2009-021A SAST 2009.04.22

02:55:00

7 JB-6-3 36110 2009-069A DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2009.12.09

08:42:00

8 JB-7-2? 36121 2009-072A SAST / Changchun Institute 

of Optics, Fine Mechanics and 

Physics (CIOMP)

2009.12.15

02:31:00

9A/B/C ? 36413,

36414/38303,

36415

2010-009A,

2010-009B/G,

2010-009C

DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2010.03.05

04:55:00

10 JB-5-3 36834 2010-038A SAST 2010.08.09

22:49:00

11 JB-6-4 37165 2010-047A DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2010.09.22

02:42:00

12 JB-8-2 37875 2011-066B DFH / CAST 508 Institute / 

Xi’an Institute of Optics and 

Precision Mechanics

2011.11.09

03:21:00

13 JB-7-2 37941 2011-072A SAST 2011.11.29

18:50:00

14 ? 38257 2012-021A CAST 508 Institute /

CIOMP

2012.05.10

07:06:00

15 ? 38354 2012-029A CAST 508 Institute /

CIOMP

2012.05.29

07:31:00

16A/B/C ? 39011,

39012,

39013

2012-066A,

2012-066B,

2012-066C

DFH / CAST 508 Institute 2012.11.25

04:06:00
china

s near seas combat capabilities 105

Note: Question marks indicate data unavailable in reliable open sources.

Sources: He Mingxia et al., “Chinese Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors (1988–

2025)”; “Yaogan Series”; “Yaogan 9B,” “Yaogan 9B DEB.” Other data from “Real Time Satellite Tracking and 

Predictions,” and “National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog”; data and format from ITPROSTAR,

which are typically more detailed, are used by default.

Launch Site Launch Vehicle Orbit: Perigee 

× Apogee (km), 

Inclination (°), 

SSO Time on 

Descending 

Node

Transmission 

Frequency 

(MHz)

Mass (kg) Type

Jiuquan CZ-2D 631 × 655,

97.8, 13:30

2,216.527 800? EO; HR, 

PAN-MS

Taiyuan CZ-4C 627 × 629,

97.9, 06:00

2,212.809 2,700 L-band SAR

Jiuquan CZ-2D 640 × 660,

97.9, 11:00

2,216.525 800? EO; HR, 

PAN-MS

Taiyuan CZ-4B 488 × 495,

97.4, 10:30

2,220.5 2,700 L-band SAR

Taiyuan CZ-2C 511 × 513,

97.6, 10:00

? 2,000? L-band SAR

Jiuquan CZ-2D 630 × 666,

97.8, 15:00

2,216.527 800? EO; HR, 

PAN-MS

Taiyuan CZ-4C 1,200 × 1,211, 

100.5, 09:30

2,266.3 1,040 L-band SAR

Jiuquan CZ-4C (9A) 1,089 × 

1,106, 63.4;

(9B) 1,060 × 

1,076, 63.4;

(9C) 1,089 × 

1,107, 63.4

2,218 (9B) 1,000? (9A) EO; HR, PAN-MS/

SAR/ELINT?

Taiyuan CZ-4C 615 × 629,

97.8, 06:00

? 2,700 L-band SAR

Jiuquan CZ-2D 627.3 × 657.4, 

98.01, 09:00

2,216.527 800? EO; HR, 

PAN-MS

Taiyuan CZ-2D 488 × 498, 

97.41, 10:29

? 2,700 EO

Taiyuan CZ-2C 504 × 511,

97.11, 01:56

? 2,000? SAR

Taiyuan CZ-4B 472 × 479,

97.2, 14:14

? 2,700? EO

Taiyuan CZ-4C 1,201 × 1,206, 

100.1, 14:30

? 1,040 EO

Jiuquan CZ-4C (16A) 1,080 × 

1,089, 63.38, 

106.93 min.;

(16B) 1,078 × 

1,090, 63.38, 

106.93 min.;

(16C) 1,032 × 

1,081, 63.38, 

106.33 min.

? 1,000? (16A) EO/SAR/ELINT?
106 china maritime studies

largest scale, most complex, most technically demanding, and most widely applicable 

space-based system in Chinese aerospace history.”59 Beidou/Compass provides PNT to 

an accuracy of ten meters, 0.2 meters per second, and ten nanoseconds, respectively;60

it also offers “differential” and “integrity” services.61 Initially, unlike other PNT systems, which transmit signals directly, it transmitted signals indirectly, through a central 

ground station, although the PLA General Armament Department’s newspaper recently 

reported that “after providing passive navigation and locating service, Beidou became 

more and more like the GPS system.”62 It also boasts a unique short-message communications system.63 A Chinese aerospace expert contends that the system affords China 

numerous civil and military benefits and constitutes “an important measure to grab and 

retain favorable orbital position resources . . . for the purpose of ‘carving up the domain 

before other competitors do’” [也是 “占位” 的需要].64

Twenty satellites have been launched thus far; sixteen remain operational. An initial 

two-satellite constellation was launched in 2000. Regional navigation and communications coverage, encompassing mainland China, neighboring countries (such as 

Pakistan, where it has been tested), and the near seas, was achieved in 2012;65 service 

commenced in early 2013. Starting in 2014, a second series will be launched.66 By 2020, 

a thirty-five-satellite constellation (five geostationary earth orbit, twenty-seven inclined 

medium earth orbit, and three inclined geostationary orbit [IGSO]) will provide global 

coverage.67 IGSO satellites’ high-inclination orbits improve coverage at high latitudes. 

Satellites launched thus far are manufactured by CAST. They weigh typically 2,300 kg at 

launch and 1,150 kg on station after maneuvering to initial orbit with a liquid apogee 

motor. They are three-axis stabilized and have twin solar arrays. The initial satellites 

were based on the DFH-3 bus; this changed to the -3A variant from Beidou-G2 on and 

to the -3B variant from -M3 on. All satellites have been launched from Xichang, from its 

Launch Complex 2 starting with Beidou-2/Compass-M3. See table 4.

The PLA is already using China’s PNT system extensively. During long-distance exercises, Second Artillery units employ Beidou to track vehicles and communicate.68 The 

North Sea Fleet headquarters information chief, Lei Xiwei, has stated that in February 

2013 “Beidou provided positioning, security and protection” for the destroyer Qingdao

and frigates Yantai and Yancheng in a South China exercise.69

Detecting and Tracking Maritime Targets

An emerging network of air- and space-based sensors promises to improve radically the 

targeting capabilities of the PLAN and other services with which it may operate, such as 

the Second Artillery. This critical linchpin, long limited by Beijing’s lack of relevant sensor platforms, promises to give the PLA unprecedented ability to monitor surface vessels 

on China’s maritime periphery and thereby facilitate their precise targeting with cruise 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 107

Table 4. Beidou/Compass Satellites Currently Operational: Notional Specifications

Satellite NORAD 

ID

International

Code

Launch 

Date/ 

Time (UTC)

Launch 

Vehicle

Orbit Capabilities Status

Beidou-1C 27813 2003-

021A

2003.05.24

16:34:00

CZ-3A geostationary 

(GEO): 110.5°E

20 m 

positioning 

accuracy

operational

Beidou-2A/

CompassM1

31115 2007-

011A

2007.04.13

20:11:00

CZ-3A medium earth orbit 

(MEO) /

experimental:

perigee × apogee 

21,519 × 21,545 

km, inclination 55.3°, 

period 773.4 min.; by 

2010.03: 21,524.7 × 

21,553.5 km, 56.1°, 

period 773.4 min.

signal transmit carrier 

frequencies: 

1,195.14–

1,219.14 

MHz, 

1,256.52–

1,280.52 

MHz, 

1,559.05–

1,563.15 

MHz, and 

1,587.69–

1,591.79 

MHz;

ground communications 

w/1 master 

control station, 2 upload 

stations, 30 

monitor 

stations

experimental: 

1st MEO 

satellite in 

series

Beidou-2C/

CompassG1

36287 2010-

001A

2010.01.16

16:12:00

CZ-3C GEO: 140°E; 

initial transfer orbit: 

perigee × apogee 

196 × 35,620 km, 

inclination 20.5°

? operational

Beidou-2D/

CompassG3

36590 2010-

024A

2010.06.02

15:53:00

CZ-3C GEO: 83.8°E; 

initial transfer orbit: 

perigee × apogee 

205 × 35,647 km, 

inclination 20.5°

? operational

Beidou-2/

CompassIGSO-1

36828 2010-

036A

2010.07.31

21:30:00

CZ-3A geosynchronous 

(GSO): perigee × 

apogee 35,674.5 

× 35,901.5 km, 

inclination 55.1°, 

period 1,435.8 min.; 

mean longitude of 

subsatellite ground 

point 118°E

? operational

Beidou-2E/

CompassG4

37210 2010-

057A

2010.10.31

16:26:00

CZ-3C GEO: 159.9°E ? operational

Beidou-2/

CompassIGSO-2

37256 2010-

068A

2010.12.17

20:20:00

CZ-3A GSO: perigee × 

apogee 35,714 

× 35,856 km, 

inclination 55.24°, 

period 1,436 min.; 

mean longitude of 

subsatellite ground 

point 118°E

? operational
108 china maritime studies

Satellite NORAD 

ID

International

Code

Launch 

Date/ 

Time (UTC)

Launch 

Vehicle

Orbit Capabilities Status

Beidou-2/

CompassIGSO-3

37384 2011-

013A

2011.04.09

20:47:00

CZ-3A GSO: perigee × 

apogee 35,721 

× 35,880 km, 

inclination 55.3°, 

period 1,435.9 min.; 

“fi gure 8” ground 

track centered over 

118°E

completed 

IGSO coverage with 

3 satellites 

in equally 

spaced planes; 

marked 

establishment 

of basic navigation and 

positioning 

network

operational

Beidou-2/

CompassIGSO-4

37763 2011-

038A

2011.07.26

21:44:00

CZ-3A GSO: perigee × 

apogee 35,706 × 

35,878 km, inclination 55.2°, period 

1,436.0 min.; “fi gure 8” ground track 

with intersection 

node over 95°E

? operational

Beidou-2/

CompassIGSO-5

37948 2011-

073A

2011.12.01

21:07:00

CZ-3A GSO: perigee × 

apogee 35,704 

× 35,866 km, 

inclination 55.18°, 

period 1,436.02 

min.; “fi gure 8” 

ground track

Beidou 

system’s 

basic structure 

established; 

tests; trial 

service began 

2011.12.27

operational

Beidou-2/

CompassG5

38091 2012-

008A

2012.02.24

16:12:00

CZ-3C GEO: 58.68°E ? operational

Beidou-2/

CompassM3

38250 2012-

018A

2012.04.29

20:50:00

CZ-3B MEO: perigee × 

apogee 21,460 × 

21,594 km, inclination 55.16°, period 

773.2 min.

? operational

Beidou-2/

CompassM4

38251 2012-

018B

2012.04.29

20:50:00

CZ-3B MEO: perigee × 

apogee 21,456 × 

21,601 km, inclination 55.11°, period 

773.21 min.

? operational

Beidou-2/

CompassM5

38774 2012-

050A

2012.09.18

19:50:00

CZ-3B/E MEO: perigee × 

apogee 21,462 × 

21,592 km, inclination 55°, period 

773.2 min., revs/

day: 1.9

? operational

Beidou-2/

CompassM6

38775 2012-

050B

2012.09.18

19:50:00

CZ-3B/E MEO: perigee × 

apogee 21,476 × 

21,573 km, inclination 55.1°, period 

773.1 min., revs/

day: 1.9

? operational

Beidou-2/

CompassG6/G2R

38953 2012-

059A

2012.10.25

15:33:00

CZ-3C GEO: 80.1°E completed 

regional network; service 

commenced

operational

Table 4. (continued)

Note: Question marks indicate information unavailable in reliable open sources.

Sources: “Beidou/Compass.” Other data from “Real Time Satellite Tracking,”and “National Space Science Data Center Master Catalog”; data and format from ITPROSTAR, which are typically more detailed, are used by default.
china

s near seas combat capabilities 109

and ballistic missiles, potentially in combination—a devastating multiaxis, saturation 

approach envisioned widely by Chinese analysts but requiring mobility, speed, range, 

and precise coordination. 

To achieve its near-seas operational objectives, the PLA must thus coordinate multiple 

sensors and weapons among multiple services to provide comprehensive communications and a common operational picture. Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability 

of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets. For instance, 

a DF-21D antiship ballistic missile might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed 

roughly at the position of a CSG, as determined partly on the basis of satellite data. 

Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSG—by, for instance, supplying 

position updates.70

The Beidou/Compass navigation satellite system can be used to improve the precision 

of Chinese ballistic missiles. China’s combination of land-based radars and satellites—

perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of UAVs and launches of satellites or 

microsatellites—might be sufficient to track and target CSGs within a certain zone off 

China’s coastal waters from which it is believed essential to exclude them in combat.

Examination of the orbits, inclinations, and periods of imaging satellites offers a basic 

sense of their coverage.71 By 2009, China had approximately twenty-two imaging satellites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG.72 This 

number was insufficient for continuous satellite coverage, in terms of revisit times for 

specific ocean areas, but since then China has added significant numbers of Yaogan 

satellites of multiple types, and on 26 April 2013 launched the first in a new series of 

Gaofen satellites.73 In 2009, civilian experts estimated that China would launch sufficient 

satellites to achieve coverage regionally (eight to twelve civilian satellites, plus additional 

military) by 2015 and globally (a further eight to twelve civilian, plus additional military) by 2020;74 these estimates may require adjustment, given recent launch numbers. 

Even before 2020, China’s emphasis on small satellites and small solid-fueled rockets 

may allow it to achieve a satellite surge capability. China’s low-cost launchers (e.g., the 

Kaituozhe) may offer a combination of rapid turnaround and efficiency. The development of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (China’s fourth, scheduled to open in 

2014) indicates a commitment to cutting-edge facilities. 

The Challenge of Bureaucratic Coordination

Targeting enemy surface ships is a tremendously complex and difficult process. China 

would likely use its Qu Dian integrated C4ISR system for this purpose. Qu Dian would 

have to incorporate real-time sensor inputs into a multisensor data correlation and fusion process, then transmit the result to commanders and shooters. Even with complete 
110 china maritime studies

coverage of relevant maritime zones, data transmission (i.e., from satellites to ground 

stations), imagery readouts by analysts (increasing in time consumption with size of area 

examined), and transmission of targeting data to the shooter will impose time delays. 

Software and data management requirements will be complex. Command and control 

will likely pose particular challenges: the PLA will have to coordinate both among the 

many service elements that “own” various ISR sensor and ground station architectures 

and that within the chain of command would authorize their prioritization and use, and 

with the release authority (CMC, supreme command, or campaign command) for the 

weapons systems that would employ their inputs.75 Because of these ongoing challenges, 

the U.S. Department of Defense judges that “the PLA will need to overcome deficiencies 

in system integration and interservice coordination.”76

Examples of related difficulties have already emerged, as well as of some progress toward 

surmounting them. In perhaps the best test of C4ISR and data-fusion capabilities to 

date, China’s large-scale response to Sichuan’s 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake 

included the use of an AWACS aircraft to coordinate air traffic and of satellite imagery 

and ground-mapping radar and other remote-sensing aircraft, as well as a UAV, to survey damage.77 Upon receiving these data, the National Earthquake Relief Headquarters 

“swiftly transmitted them to the frontline relief troops.”78 Chen Li, minister of water 

resources, said that “analyzing satellite and other aerial images” would allow officials 

to assess flooding risks stemming from “damaged reservoirs, hydropower plants, and 

dikes.”79 On 17 May the PLA, having reportedly detected “water rising to dangerous 

levels” in multiple Beichuan County lakes “using one of its most advanced satellites,” 

ordered evacuation of the area.80 China’s massive resource deployment still left the PLA 

and other government organizations involved hampered in their efforts by Chinese satellite imagery that was deficient in quality and quantity, as well as by problems with data 

transfer, management, processing, and integration.81

Despite these apparently serious limitations in 2008, the PLA’s response to the lesschallenging 2010 Yushu earthquake seemed to reflect significant “lessons learned.” For 

instance, the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing 

Science used “Beijing-1 microsatellite data, with moderate spatial resolution and large 

sensor ground width . . . to analyze the environment background for the earthquake.”82

While China still uses imagery from foreign as well as domestic satellites, the large number of increasingly advanced satellites of many categories that China has launched since, 

together with its clear rationale to develop and integrate the relevant C4ISR architecture, 

suggests that its capabilities are now far greater. In January 2013, China Daily went so 

far as to claim that “China’s first high-resolution, stereo mapping satellite Ziyuan III,” 

launched on 9 January 2012, “meets international standards, ridding the country of its 

reliance on imports of satellite images.”83
china

s near seas combat capabilities 111

Despite this recent progress, China’s ISR coordination challenge is illustrated by the 

present organization of its satellites as well as by the PLAAF’s efforts to assume control 

over them. Peacetime ownership and operational control of some satellites and applications are divided among more than a dozen government, university, and civil organizations.84 Seventy-five percent of satellites are normally run by nonmilitary organizations; 

wartime authority-transfer dynamics remain unclear.85 Even granting the ability to 

transition smoothly to military control in wartime—a significant assumption—China’s 

satellites and other space assets face uncertainty regarding service jurisdiction.86 A new 

Space Force is rumored to be in development;87 for now, the PLAAF appears to be best 

placed to assume authority over space assets. 

Yet at present the PLAAF is not known to control any space assets. Indeed, the General 

Armaments Department (GAD), the GSD, and even the Second Artillery and the PLAN, 

to some extent, may be resistant to such a transfer of authority to the PLAAF, and institutional rivalry may complicate matters.88 The GAD controls all orbital satellite operations yet lacks a combat role. The PLA already controls launch sites, the Second Artillery 

is heavily involved in missile programs, and various technical institutes are responsible 

for satellite development, so there will likely be extensive debate and negotiation within 

the PLA and civilian leadership concerning the ultimate control of various space assets 

(a process that took place earlier in the United States). Furthermore, there is not yet any 

clear evidence in open publications that the PLA has formally adopted space theory, 

doctrine, missions, or regulations, so what would govern the actions of whatever organization ultimately consolidates control is likewise unclear.

Air-breathing platforms face their own coordination challenges, given their distribution 

among the PLAAF, PLAN aviation, and even to some extent army aviation. Insufficient 

open-source information is available to determine how the PLAAF and PLAN aviation 

work together and divide responsibilities in various operational scenarios. As the PLAN 

assumes a robust deck-aviation mission, a critical question arises about the extent to 

which naval air assets (land- or sea-based) will receive direction from PLAAF assets like 

the KJ-2000. As long as the PLAN operates ski-jump carriers, it is unclear how much 

their air groups will contribute to the overall ISR picture, since ISR aircraft are typically 

underpowered relative to their weight and sophisticated versions would have difficulty 

launching via ski jump. This type of Chinese carrier will not be operating robust fixedwing ISR assets like the American E-2 or S-3. Even with three carriers in the fleet, PLAN 

aviation would still be a primarily land-based air force. How, and to what extent, it will 

integrate with the PLAAF remains a key uncertainty.

Doctrine and regulations flow downward and technology upward in PLA bureaucratic 

processes, but there is insufficient lateral movement. Technological incompatibility remains a challenge owing to decentralized development, and software problems are even 
112 china maritime studies

more significant than hardware problems. Institutional stovepiping remains a major 

barrier to integration and joint operations, neither of which has been achieved fully. 

The PLA’s joint organizational structure is still under development and still does not 

penetrate effectively to lower levels. Lingering ground-force dominance is a significant 

impediment; the gradual rise in funding and status of the nonground forces is helping to 

remedy this but is proceeding only slowly. Training is not yet sufficiently joint, and there 

is no permanent joint training structure. The lack of a permanent joint organization 

at the military region level exacerbates these problems.89 Finally, PLA commanders are 

tempted—and PLA theoretical writings, at least, are succumbing to the temptation—to 

use technology and command automation to centralize operations further. Ironically, 

this is precisely contrary to the goal of efforts to empower lower-level officers to make 

decisions in real time, a reform regarded as essential by many militaries that have actually fought “local limited wars under informatized conditions”—an experience that 

China lacks entirely. These factors, not the technical parameters of satellites and other 

sensors, will likely constitute the primary limitations on the effectiveness of Chinese ISR 

system employment. The place to watch for institutional innovation may be the Jinan 

Military Region, which is a logical “joint reform test bed,” because it has all services 

represented, as well as a fleet headquarters, but lacks the strategic urgency of the Nanjing 

and Guangzhou Military Regions, which are responsible for the East China Sea (including Taiwan) and the South China Sea, respectively.90

Geostrategic Implications

China’s air- and space-based surveillance platforms—together with their supporting 

infrastructure, human and otherwise—are improving rapidly but remain incomplete 

and are experiencing growing pains. As Larry Wortzel emphasizes, “The duration on station of its AWACS aircraft is short, their range is limited, and not all of them are capable 

of aerial refueling. Most of the PLA’s combat ships and aircraft can engage in networked 

operations but can handle only a limited number of targets. In addition, not all of the 

weapons they carry can receive the networked combat data.”91 As a result, “neither the 

PLAAF, nor the rest of the PLA, can field and operate a fully digitized force that can take 

advantage of an integrated picture of the battlefield and apply weapons in a fully coordinated manner.”92 Improvements in these areas will bring their own problems, increasingly subjecting PLA forces to some of the very same vulnerabilities that they are targeting 

so efficiently in U.S., allied, and friendly militaries that might operate close to China.

Institutional wrangling for control of China’s space assets continues. The sprawling, 

stovepiped nature of the many military services and organizations that control the 

satellite/C4ISR architecture further complicates the horizontal and vertical interservice, 

interlevel, and military-civilian bureaucratic coordination necessary for real-time data 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 113

fusion to support kinetic operations. While China may be able to employ a variety of 

strategies to conduct centralized non-space-based C4ISR operations near its territory, it 

may find it difficult to attain similar results farther afield, where information assurance 

is more elusive.

Despite these ongoing challenges, counterintervention affords China a strategic defensive posture along interior lines and a different and considerably easier C4ISR task than 

that of the United States. The PLA can mitigate ongoing limitations in jointness and 

challenges in command and control and in target deconfliction by employing landlines, 

high-power line-of-sight communications, advanced planning, and geographic and temporal segregation. China’s emerging C4ISR capabilities are already undergirding growing 

counterintervention capabilities that are in turn changing the balance of military power 

on the nation’s maritime periphery. In the near seas, at least, China’s military awareness, 

coordination, and targeting capabilities must already be taken seriously.

Notes

1. Kevin Pollpeter, “Towards an Integrative 

C4ISR System: Informationalization and Joint 

Operations in the People’s Liberation Army,” 

in The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the 

Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, ed. 

Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle, Pa.: 

U.S. Army War College and National Bureau of 

Asian Research, 2010), p. 196.

2. Tai Ming Cheung, “Science and Technology in 

Chinese Thinking on Security and Development: Techno-nationalism and S&T Innovation 

as Seen through Its Technology Development 

Programs” (presentation at “IGCC 2012 Summer Training Workshop on the Relationship 

between National Security and Technology in 

China,” La Jolla, Calif., 10 July 2012).

3. People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: Information Office of the 

State Council, January 2009), available at merln 

.ndu.edu/.

4. Pollpeter, “Towards an Integrative C4ISR System,” pp. 196–97.

5. Ibid.

6. Larry M. Wortzel, The Dragon Extends Its Reach: 

Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles, Va.: 

Potomac Books, 2013), p. 41.

7. Ibid., p. 27.

8. Ibid., p. 149.

9. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: 

Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012), p. 8. 

10. Huadong Guo and Ji Wu, eds., Space Science 

& Technology in China: A Roadmap to 2050

(Beijing: Science, 2010), p. 37.

11. People’s Republic of China, China’s National 

Defense in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of 

the State Council, 31 March 2011), available at 

news.xinhuanet.com/.

12. Pollpeter, “Towards an Integrative C4ISR System,” p. 204.

13. “China’s UAV into a Period of Fast Progress,” 

People’s Daily Online, 7 February 2013, english 

.peopledaily.com.cn/.

14. For details, including regarding UAVs, see 

Andrew Erickson, “China’s Modernization 

of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities,” in 

Strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s Military Challenge, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner 

(Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian 

Research, 2012), pp. 72–74, 119–25; and Andrew 

S. Erickson, Hanlu Lu, Kathryn Bryan, and 

Samuel Septembre, “Research, Development, and 

Acquisition in China’s Aviation Industry: J-10 

and Pterodactyl UAV,” in Kevin Pollpeter, ed., 

Getting to Innovation: Assessing China’s Defense 

Research, Development, and Acquisition System

(La Jolla, CA: University of California Institute 

on Global Conflict and Cooperation, January 

2014), pp. 62–66, igcc.ucsd.edu/.

15. “KJ-2000 Airborne Warning & Control System,” 

China’s Defence Today, www.sinodefence.com/.

16. Carlo Kopp, “China’s Eyes in the Skies,” Diplomat, 11 August 2010, thediplomat.com/.
114 china maritime studies

17. “Navy, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: China and Northeast Asia, 9 December 

2010, www.janes.com/.

18. Carlo Kopp, “The PLA-AF’s Airborne Early 

Warning & Control Programs,” Air Power Australia, 3 May 2011.

19. Other Y-8 Gaoxin variants not yet seen in the 

PLA, or not intended for PLA use, are as follows. 

The T0518 AEW aircraft reportedly underwent testing at China Flight Test Establishment, Yanliang, in 2005. Following a 2006 

Sino-Pakistan joint development agreement 

to develop a “mutually suitable” AWACS, it 

was demonstrated at Pakistan’s Chaklala Air 

Force Base in March 2007. Pakistan’s air force 

reportedly ordered four ZDK-03 AEW aircraft 

in September 2008, with one delivery per year 

envisioned for 2011–14; two airframes have 

been confirmed in Pakistan to date. Finally, the 

KZ-800 aircraft is a possible ELINT variant for 

PLA use. “SAC Y-8 (Special Mission Versions),” 

Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 8 July 2013, www

.janes.com/.

20. “Yun-8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft,” China’s 

Defence Today, www.sinodefence.com/.

21. “Y-8 ‘Balance Beam’ Airborne Early 

Warning Aircraft,” China’s Defence Today,

www.sinodefence.com/.

22. See, for example, “Observation Post of Military 

Situation,” Military News, Phoenix TV, 21 June 

2006.

23. Kopp, “China’s Eyes in the Skies.”

24. Torbjørg Hemmingsen, “Enter the Dragon: 

Inside China’s New Model Navy,” Jane’s Navy 

International, 20 April 2011, www.janes.com/.

25. Coatepeque, “PLAAF 26th Specialized 

Division,” China Defense Blog, 14 April 2009, 

china-defense.blogspot.com/; “China Y-8 AEW 

Aircraft,” Chinese Military Aviation, 1 April 

2008, cnair.top81.cn/. 

26. “KJ-200 in Service with PLA Navy,” Alert 5 

Military Aviation News, 18 August 2011, alert5 

.com/.

27. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: 

Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007), p. 6. 

28. “China: Air Force,” Jane’s World Air Forces, 4 

June 2013, www.janes.com/.

29. Andreas Rupprecht and Tom Cooper, Modern 

Chinese Warplanes: Combat Aircraft and Units 

of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation

(Houston, Tex.: Harpia, 2012), pp. 110–12.

30. Barbara Starr, “Chinese Boats Harassed U.S. 

Ship, Officials Say,” CNN.com, 5 May 2009. 

This may have been a China Marine Surveillance (中国海监), as opposed to a PLAN, 

aircraft; China Marine Surveillance has several 

Y-12s. See “China Marine Surveillance Harbin 

Y-12-II (B-2087),” www.flickr.com/photos/

kentaroiemoto/4318168187/. 

31. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress

(2012), p. 9. 

32. 董英隼 [Dong Yingsun], “我中继卫星系统初

步实现陆海空天电多维应用” [Our Relay Satellite System Tentatively Realizes Land, Sea, Air, 

Outer Space, and Electronic Multidimensional 

Applications], 中国军工报 [China Military 

Industry News], 3 November 2012, p. 1. For the 

quotation, U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to 

Congress (2012), p. 9. 

33. “Tianlian 1-03,” “Real Time Satellite Tracking 

and Predictions,” ITPROSTAR, www.n2yo.com/

satellite/?s=38730.

34. Huadong Guo and Ji Wu, eds., Space Science & 

Technology in China, p. 76.

35. “FengHuo 1 (ChinaSat 22/A) Tactical Communications Satellite,” China’s Defense Today, www

.sinodefence.com/.

36. 刘俊, 王握文 [Liu Jun and Wang Wowen], 

“国防科大在微小卫星研制领域取得重要突

破” [National University of Defense Technology 

Gains Important Breakthroughs in the Field of 

Microsatellite Research and Development], 解

放军报 [Liberation Army Daily], 10 May 2012, 

jz.chinamil.com.cn/.

37. Wu Xiaofeng and Deng Ping, “《海上数字化

地形卫星测绘技术规程》通过专家评审” 

[“Stipulated Technical Procedure for Maritime 

Terrain Digitized Satellite Surveying and Mapping” Passes Experts’ Evaluation], 人民海军

[People’s Navy], 6 June 2009, p. 1.

38. Unless otherwise specified, data in this paragraph derived from 贺明霞, 贺双颜, 王云飞, 

杨倩; 中国海洋大学海洋遥感研究所 [He 

Mingxia, He Shuangyan, Wang Yunfei, and Yang 

Qian; Ocean Remote Sensing Research Institute, 

Ocean University of China]; 唐军武, 国家卫星

海洋应用中心 [Tang Junwu, National Satellite 

Oceanic Application Center]; and 胡传民, 中

国海洋大学海洋遥感研究所, 美国南佛罗里

达大学 [Hu Chuanmin, Ocean Remote Sensing 

Research Institute, Ocean University of China, 

and University of South Florida], “中国卫星海

洋观测系统及其传感器(1988–2025)” [Chinese 

Spaceborne Ocean Observing Systems and 

Onboard Sensors (1988–2025)], 中国海洋大学

学报 [Periodical of Ocean University of China] 

41, no. 12 (December 2011), pp. 93–95.
china

s near seas combat capabilities 115

39. For details of relevant programs, see Li Deren, 

“Chinese Earth Observation Missions” (presentation, Dragon 1 Final Results and Dragon 2 

Kick Off Symposium, Beijing, 11 April 2008; Li 

is affiliated with the National Remote Sensing 

Center of China and Laboratory for Information 

Engineering in Surveying, Mapping and Remote 

Sensing [Wuhan University]), and Pan Delu, 

“Present and Future Chinese Satellite Missions 

for Ocean Remote Sensing” (presentation, 

ESA-MOST Dragon Programme 2nd Advanced 

Training Course in Ocean Remote Sensing, 

15–20 October 2007, Hangzhou, China).

40. He Mingxia et al., “Chinese Spaceborne Ocean 

Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors 

(1988–2025),” pp. 93–95.

41. “Satellites Will Help Predict Disasters,” China 

Daily, 31 March 2009, www.chinaview.cn/.

42. “Yaogan Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, 12 November 2013, www.janes.com/.

43. He Mingxia et al., “Chinese Spaceborne Ocean 

Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors 

(1988–2025),” p. 92.

44. Ibid., pp. 100–101.

45. Ibid., p. 97. For the “small sat bus,” “Yaogan 

Series.” 

46. “Yaogan Series.”

47. He Mingxia et al., “Chinese Spaceborne Ocean 

Observing Systems and Onboard Sensors 

(1988–2025),” p. 93.

48. “Yaogan Series.”

49. Ibid. For Chinese analysis of White Cloud, the 

Soviet Cosmos satellite system, and maritime 

monitoring satellites more broadly, see 黄汉文

[Huang Hanwen], “海洋目标天基地综合感和

技术” [Space-Based Comprehensive Awareness 

Technology for Marine Targets], 航天电子对

抗 [Aerospace Electronic Warfare] 27, no. 6, pp. 

11–13, 48.

50. Maj. A. Andronov, “Kosmicheskaya Sistema 

Radiotekhnicheskoy Razvedki VMS SShA ‘Uayt 

Klaud’” [The U.S. Navy’s “White Cloud” Spaceborne ELINT System], Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye 

Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review], no. 7 

(1993), pp. 57–60. Available in translation by 

Allen Thomson at www.fas.org/.

51. “Yaogan 9B DEB,” “Real Time Satellite Tracking 

and Predictions,” ITPROSTAR, www.n2yo

.com/satellite/?s=38303. 

52. Richard P. Lawless, Statement before the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 23 April 2004, 

available at iipdigital.usembassy.gov/.

53. Ian Easton and Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval 

Operations,” Project 2049 Institute (23 February 

2011), p. 4, project2049.net/.

54. Ibid., p. 10.

55. “ShiJian 6 Scientific Research Satellite,” China’s 

Defence Today, www.sinodefence.com/.

56. Hemmingsen, “Enter the Dragon”; Easton and 

Stokes, “China’s Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)

Satellite Developments,” p. 14.

57. “Beidou a Milestone in Decreasing Dependence on US: Global Times,” Want China 

Times, 1 January 2013, www.wantchinatimes

.com/; Minnie Chan, “‘Unforgettable Humiliation’ Led to Development of GPS Equivalent,” 

South China Morning Post, 13 November 2009, 

available at www.asiafinest.com/.

58. For access to GPS and GLONASS, 伍轩 [Wu 

Xuan, Academy of Space Technology, China 

Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation], “北斗导航八大战略意义--发展北斗卫

星导航系统, 将进一步推动航天强国建设, 也

为中国航天的后续发展提供相应的技术储

备” [Eight Major Strategic Significances of the 

Beidou Satellite Navigation System: Developing 

the Beidou Satellite Navigation System Will Give 

Greater Impetus to Construction of China into a 

Space Power and Will Prepare Relevant Technical Reserves for Subsequent Development of 

China’s Spaceflight Industry], 瞭望 [Liaowang], 

no. 44 (29 October 2012), pp. 8–10. For relevant 

Chinese training, see 楼勇军, 王军 [Lou 

Yongjun and Wang Jun], “沈空航空兵集团复杂

电磁环境下练功放” [Shenyang Military Region 

Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and 

Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environments], 空军报 [Air Force News], 26 May 2010, 

p. 1.

59. 扬志远 [Yang Zhiyuan], “中国北斗耀星空—写

在中国北斗导航系统走进百姓生活之际” 

[China’s Beidou Glitters in the Starry Sky: 

China’s Beidou Satellite Navigation System Enters the World of Ordinary People], 中国军工报

[China Military Industry News], 3 January 2013, 

p. 3. For further documentation of complexities involved, see 李筱梅 [Li Xiaomei], “高为

广: 心系北斗不了情” [Gao Weiguang: Forever 

Dedicates Heart and Soul to Beidou], 中国军工

报 [China Military Industry News], 1 December 

2012, p. 3. For progress in related research and 

programs, see 魏锦文 [Wei Jinwen], “10项关键

技术助力 ‘北斗’ 卫星导航系统组网” [10 Key 

Technologies Assist in “Beidou” Satellite Navigation System Networking], 中国军工报 [China 

Military Industry News], 3 November 2012, p. 1, 

and 詹先龙, 刘瑞华, 杨兆宁 [Zhan Xianlong, 
116 china maritime studies

Liu Ruihua, and Yang Zhaoning], “北斗系统格

网电离层延迟算法研究” [A Study on the Grid 

Ionospheric Delay Algorithm in Beidou], 航天

控制 [Aerospace Control] 30, no. 1 (February 

2012), pp. 15–19.

60. “Beidou/Compass,” Jane’s Space Systems and 

Industry, 20 November 2012, www.janes.com/.

61. “The 16th Beidou Navigation Satellite Was Sent 

into Space by a Long March–3C [Changzheng3C] Carrier Rocket Launched at 2333 Yesterday 

from Xichang Satellite Launch Center,” 军事报

道 [Military Report], CCTV-7 (Mandarin), 1130 

GMT, 26 October 2012.

62. Yang Zhiyuan, “China’s Beidou Glitters in the 

Starry Sky,” p. 3.

63. Cheng Yingqi, “Navigation System Set to Soar,” 

China Daily Online, 20 February 2013, www

.chinadaily.com.cn/.

64. Wu Xuan, “Eight Major Strategic Significances 

of the Beidou Satellite Navigation System,” p. 10. 

65. For Pakistan, Jiang Lianjv and Yang Baofeng, 

“China’s Beidou Satellite Navigation System 

Goes Global,” Liberation Army Daily, 23 November 2012, english.peopledaily.com.cn/.

66. Yang Zhiyuan, “China’s Beidou Glitters in the 

Starry Sky,” p. 3.

67. 安普忠 [An Puzhong], “范长龙在解放军卫星

导航定位总站考察时强调, 房峰辉一同考察,

推动北斗卫星导航系统向更高层次更高水

平发展” [Fan Changlong Inspects PLA Satellite 

Navigation and Positioning General Station, 

Fang Fenghui Goes on the Inspection Tour with 

Him, Call for Developing the Beidou Satellite 

Navigation System to a Higher Standard], 解

放军报 [Liberation Army Daily], 29 December 

2012; “Beidou/Compass.”

68. For tracking vehicles, 李德全, 冯金源 [Li 

Dequan and Feng Jinyuan], “车行千里 ‘一线

牵’” [“Tethered” on the Whole of a ThousandMile Drive], 火箭兵报 [Rocket Forces News], 4 

December 2012, p. 3. For communicating, 董志

文, 冯金源 [Dong Zhiwen and Feng Jinyuan], 

“某旅整建制远程机动锤炼应急能力” [Brigade Tempers Its Whole-Unit, Long-Distance 

Movement Contingency Capabilities], 火箭兵报

[Rocket Forces News], 9 October 2012, p. 2; and 

周传刚, 陈才, 陈海军, 葛松 [Zhou Chuangang, 

Chen Cai, Chen Haijun, and Ge Song], “紧贴实

现战构建信息平台--二炮部队强力推进通信

战备能力建设设纪实之二” [Building Information Platforms with Close Adherence to Actual 

Combat: Part Two of Record of Second Artillery 

Units Forcefully Advancing Communications 

Combat-Readiness Capability Construction], 

火箭兵报 [Rocket Forces News], 12 December 

2012, pp. 1–2.

69. Cheng Yingqi, “Navigation System Set to Soar.”

70. For detailed analysis, see Andrew S. Erickson, 

Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications, Occasional Paper (Washington, D.C.: 

Jamestown Foundation, May 2013), available at 

www.jamestown.org/.

71. They must be based in low earth orbit, remain 

in constant motion, and thus take snapshots of 

predesignated areas at periodic and predictable 

revisit times. Shifting orbits could temporarily and slightly improve coverage but would 

consume precious fuel.

72. Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile: Developments and Missing Links,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 

(Autumn 2009), pp. 87–115, appendix pp. A-1 

and A-2. 

73. “中国高分观测” [The China High-Resolution 

Earth Observation System] (Beijing: Earth 

Observation System and Data Center, China 

National Space Administration, 2013).

74. Ibid., pp. 102–103.

75. In addition to the PLAN (which controls sea, 

undersea, and some air assets) this will include 

the PLAAF (which controls most air assets), the 

Second Artillery (which controls most ballistic 

missiles), and the ground forces (which have 

apparently been given some ballistic missiles 

and which may face further organizational 

challenges if they restructure away from their 

present seven-military-region organization).

76. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress 

(2012), p. 8. 

77. For imagery, Li Zepeng and Liu Xinyi, “Providing Remote Sensing Imagery: Producing Satellite Cloud Imagery—Information Technology 

Strengths of Unit 78006 Play Role in Earthquake 

Rescue and Relief Effort,” Zhanqi Bao, 21 May 

2008, p. 5. For remote-sensing aircraft, 张彦军, 

沙志亮 [Zhang Yanjun and Sha Zhiliang], “胡

总书记指挥抗震救灾用的遥感图是他们拍

摄的; 温总理部署抗震救灾工作用的遥感数

据信息是他们提供的. 一组组准确数据, 一幅

幅清晰图片, 海航某团遥感飞机中队为打赢

抗震救灾这场硬仗立不了特殊功劳—灾区上

空 ‘奖状’ 号” [“Jiangzhuang” Planes Flying in 

the Sky above the Quake-Stricken Area: They 

Took the Remote-Sensing Photomaps Used 

by General Secretary Hu to Direct the Quake 

Rescue and Relief Effort; They Provided the 

Remote-Sensing Data Used by Premier Wen to 

Deploy the Quake Rescue and Relief Work; The 

Remote-Sensing Airplane Squadron of a Naval 

Aviation Regiment Rendered Special Meritorious Deeds for Winning This Tough Battle of 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 117

Quake Rescue and Relief by Providing Many 

Sets of Accurate Data and Many Clear Pictures], 

人民海军 [People’s Navy], 21 May 2008, p. 1. 

For UAV damage surveys, 夏志宇 [Xia Zhiyu], 

“‘华鹰’ 翱翔抗震救灾” [“Golden Eagle” Seismic 

Defense Soaring and Helping People in the Disaster], 兵器知识 [Ordnance Knowledge] 249, 

no. 7 (July 2008), pp. 20–21; Martin Andrew, 

“New Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace 

and ISR,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9, 

no. 2 (22 January 2009).

78. “15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake 

Relief Efforts,” Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army 

Daily], 22 May 2008, english.chinamil.com.cn/.

79. “Damaged Water Projects in China’s Quake Area 

‘Need Special Care’,” Xinhua, 15 May 2008, news

.xinhuanet.com/.

80. “Resolve Needed in Next Phase of Quake 

Tragedy,” editorial, South China Morning Post

(Sunday Morning Post edition), 18 May 2008, 

available at www.scmp.com/.

81. “15 Chinese Satellites in Space Help with Quake 

Relief Efforts.” 

82. Wang Futao, Zhou Yi, Wang Shixin, Wang Litao, 

and Wei Chengjie, “Investigation and Assessment of Seismic Geologic Hazard Triggered 

by the Yushu Earthquake Using Geospatial 

Information Technology,” Disaster Advances 3, 

no. 4 (October 2010), p. 3, www.slrss.cn/. See 

also S. Zheng et al., “Assessment of the Degree 

of Building Damage Caused by the 2010 Yushu, 

China Earthquake Using Satellite and Airborne 

Data,” Geomatics, Natural Hazards and Risk 2, 

no. 2 (2011), pp. 141–57, www.tandfonline

.com/.

83. “China No Longer Reliant on Satellite Image 

Imports,” Xinhua, 10 January 2013, www

.chinadaily.com.cn/.

84. These include GAD, responsible for launch 

facilities and on-orbit command and control; 

GSD, responsible for their military operations; 

such nonmilitary organizations as the State 

Oceanic Administration, the China Meteorological Agency, the National Committee for 

Disaster Reduction, the Ministry for Land and 

Resources, and the Science and Technology 

Ministry; such state-owned enterprises as ChinaDBsat, APTgroup, and Asiasat; and civilian 

universities, such as Tsinghua and Zhejiang.

85. Hagt and Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic 

Missile,” pp. 87–115, appendix pages A-1 and 

A-2. 

86. Ibid., pp. 96–98.

87. For an apparently official Chinese denial of this 

possibility, see “China Grounds ‘Space Force’ 

Talk,” People’s Daily Online, 6 November 2009, 

english.peopledaily.com.cn/.

88. A group of five hundred Second Artillery 

researchers has studied “outer space security 

strategy” and “space operations,” according to 二

炮指挥学院 [Second Artillery Command College], “新世纪院校教学改革回顾” [Looking 

Back on Reform of Teaching at Academies and 

Schools in the New Century], in 辉煌年代: 回

顾在改革开放中发展前进的第二炮兵 [Glorious Era: Looking Back on Second Artillery 

Development and Advances in the Reform and 

Opening Period, 1978–2008], ed. 第二炮 [Second Artillery Political Department] (Beijing: 中

央文献出版社 [Central Literature], 2008), p. 

578.

89. Pollpeter, “Towards an Integrative C4ISR System,” p. 207.

90. Ibid., p. 218.

91. Wortzel, Dragon Extends Its Reach, p. 44.

92. Ibid., p. 72.

In 2011, Liu Huaqing (刘华清), the “father” of the modern Chinese navy, passed away. 

As the former commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and one-time vice 

chairman of the Central Military Commission, Liu devised a strategy of “offshore 

defense” (近海防御) that not only laid the intellectual groundwork for the transformation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into a credible fighting force but also 

guided the Chinese Communist Party as it took to the sea.

Liu led the PLAN beyond China’s Cold War continentalist period, advocating “blue water” capabilities beyond the “First Island Chain” (第一岛链). These capabilities were to 

complement the great-power status of a nation emerging from the “Century of Humiliation” and preparing for its “Century of Seapower.”1

 Liu’s vision of China becoming an 

oceanic nation is in ascendancy. For instance, the work report of the Eighteenth Party 

Congress (drafted by Xi Jinping, now the general secretary) called for the party to “build 

China into a maritime power”;2 similarly, PLAN commander Wu Shengli (吴胜利) now 

proclaims that “China is an ‘oceanic nation.’”3

The PRC clearly seeks major naval power, but to what extent, and to what end? Analysis 

of the character and composition of China’s current and future naval fleet yields insights 

into these important questions. This chapter examines recent developments among 

China’s surface combatants, considers the future trajectory of China’s surface fleet, and 

discusses implications for the U.S. Navy. 

Steel in the Water

The PLAN boasts the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious 

warfare ships in Asia (table).4 Combining licitly and illicitly imported technology with 

indigenous development, the PLAN has rapidly narrowed technology and capability 

gaps between itself and other modern navies. It is now pursuing quality over quantity, 

while still seeking cost-effective systems. 

Timothy A. Walton and Bryan McGrath

Implications for the U.S. Navy

CHAPTER EIGHT

China’s Surface Fleet Trajectory
120 china maritime studies

Any analysis of the trajectory of the 

PLAN surface fleet must consider the 

capabilities of its sensors and weapons and how they compare to similar 

U.S. Navy capabilities. This analysis 

will focus on six key capability areas: 

antiair warfare (AAW), antisurface 

warfare (ASUW), antisubmarine 

warfare (ASW), helicopter operations, 

carrier operations, and amphibious 

capabilities. 

Antiair Warfare 

Historically a weak area for the PLAN, 

the antiair warfare capabilities of the 

surface fleet have significantly improved 

over the last decade, now featuring midand long-range surface-to-air missiles 

(SAMs). This affords the PLAN a new 

area-air-defense (AAD) capability, allowing it to operate more confidently 

farther from land-based radar and air 

coverage and to venture into far seas. In 

contrast, current war-fighting concepts 

favor a more cautious surface campaign—using guided-missile destroyers 

(DDGs) as AAW pickets, for example—

from within the First Island Chain, a 

campaign that sensibly takes advantage 

of China’s land-based antiaccess and 

area denial (A2/AD) network. 

U.S. AAD capabilities, with the SM-2, SM-3, and forthcoming SM-6 weapons, generally 

still retain a significant edge over Chinese systems in terms of range, sensor networking, 

and battle management. 

The PLAN has twenty-eight destroyers in active service with varying levels of AAW proficiency. The import of four Sovremenny-class destroyers (Type 956, 956-EM) from Russia aside, the Chinese shipbuilding industry has improved its ability to create modern 

and competitive naval combatants through the iterative and methodical construction of 

Selected Elements of the Chinese Surface Fleet

Ship Type/Class In Service

Destroyers 28

Type 052D 1

Type 052C 7

Type 051C 2

Type 052B 2

Type 051B 1

Type 956, 956-EM 4

Type 052 2

Type 051 9

Frigates 49

Type 054A 16

Type 054 2

Type 053 variants 31

Corvettes (Type 056) 9

Missile boats 175

Type 022 83

Other types 92

Amphibious warfare ships 56

Type 071 LPD 3

Type 072-III LST 9

Type 073-IV LSM 11

Other large & medium 

landing ships

33

Aircraft carriers 1

Hospital ships 6

Fleet replenishment auxiliaries 8

Mine warfare vessels 27

Submarine chasers 75
china

s near seas combat capabilities 121

various destroyer classes. Notably, the Type 051C Luzhou DDGs integrate a phased-array 

radar and a vertical-launch system equipped with forty-eight Russian SA-N-20 missiles 

(range about 120 kilometers), the PLAN’s first true area-defense SAM. The Type 052C 

Luyang II class features a stealthy design and an automatic detect-and-track, multidimensional, phased-array system embedded in the forward superstructure that integrates 

with forty-eight vertically launched HHQ-9 SAMs (approximately ninety kilometers). 

China’s most modern major surface combatant is the new Type 052D, currently under 

construction. With an expected initial run of at least four ships, some observers expect 

eventual series production—indicating a high level of design maturity.5

The PLAN has forty-nine frigates and is rapidly modernizing its inventory. In 2005, 

the PLAN adopted the stealthy Type 054 frigate, with the limited-range, Crotale-based 

HHQ-7 SAM (about twelve kilometers). The Type 054A has a stealthy hull form and the 

HHQ-16 SAM (forty to seventy-five kilometers);6 it is now in series production. 

In addition to AAD SAMs, modern PLAN surface ships are equipped with a variety of 

capable terminal defenses, such as the eighteen- or twenty-four-round FL-3000-N SAM 

and the Type 730 30 mm close-in weapon system (CIWS). See figure 1.

Figure 1. Selected AAD Missiles of the PLAN and U.S. Navy

Source: Doug Richardson, ed., Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, www.janes.com/. Graphics by Delex Systems, Inc.
122 china maritime studies

Antisurface Warfare 

Chinese antisurface warfare capabilities have also greatly improved over the last decade. 

Relative to the U.S. Navy, ASUW is likely the area where the PLAN is comparatively 

strongest. It has developed potent, distributed potential striking power by fielding overthe-horizon-targeting systems and outfitting its range of small and large surface combatants with advanced, longer-range supersonic and subsonic antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) 

having improved electronic systems, multiaxial attack coordination, and terminal 

evasion maneuvers. The PLAN inventory includes the 240-kilometer-range SS-N-22, the 

YJ-62 (220-plus kilometers), the YJ-82 (180 kilometers), and the YJ-83 (160 kilometers).7

The PLAN has over eighty small surface combatants and missile craft specializing in 

ASUW. The Type 022 Houbei is China’s newest fast attack craft. Stealthy and seaworthy, 

it is well suited for swarming cruise-missile attacks. Additionally, the PLAN is aggressively procuring the Type 056 class of 1,500-ton light corvettes to replace older Type 037 

vessels and provide an intermediate class between the Type 022 and the Type 054A. 

In contrast to the PLAN, the U.S. Navy has deemphasized ASCMs in its surface fleet. 

While some of the Arleigh Burke–class destroyers (hulls 51–78) and the Ticonderoga-class 

cruisers field RGM-84 Harpoon missiles, the newer DDGs (hulls 79 and later) rely on 

the SM-2 for inside-radar-horizon surface-to-surface missile engagements. The Littoral Combat Ship—relying as it does on warfare modules—has no ASCM native to its 

“seaframe,” though the initial ASUW module will integrate a short-range (less than ten 

kilometers) missile. See figure 2.

Antisubmarine Warfare

Antisubmarine warfare has not been a core competence of the PLAN, though the Chinese have made a number of recent improvements. Additional improvement in systems, 

unit-level training, and coordinated operations, however, will be required if the PLAN 

hopes to operate with an acceptable level of risk outside the near seas. Hull-mounted 

medium-frequency sonar, ASW mortars, and torpedoes are commonly found among 

PLAN surface combatants, providing a modest antisubmarine capability highly dependent on ship operating patterns and bathymetric conditions. 

In recent years, the PLAN has increased the use on its new multirole DDGs and guidedmissile frigates (FFGs) of two key components of U.S. Navy surface ASW superiority: 

modern towed-array sonars and embarked helicopters, principally the Z-9C and the Russian Ka-28. The coordinated use of passive towed-array sonar and ASW helicopters will 

allow the PLAN surface fleet to utilize more effective ASW tactics in a variety of environments. Commensurately, the role of the “submarine chaser” type has diminished. For 

example, even the Type 056 corvette, which lacks a helicopter hangar, has a towed sonar 

array that offers a definite improvement over the Type 037 Hainan-class subchasers.8
china

s near seas combat capabilities 123

Naval Helicopters

Modern naval surface operations heavily rely on helicopters. PLAN aviation has increasingly utilized helicopters for shore-based operations and deployments aboard surface 

combatants. Nonetheless, the PLAN has recognized that demand for the aircraft has 

outpaced procurement, especially in disaster relief and in the Gulf of Aden deployments, 

in which the three-ship flotillas have only carried two helicopters.9

Demand for helicopters will continue to rise as the PLAN fields surface combatants with 

hangars for extended helicopter operations and as Chinese carriers take to the sea. The 

People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force primarily operates three helicopter types for 

a variety of missions: the Z-9C, the Ka-28, and the medium-lift Z-8.10 Moreover, it has 

imported Ka-31s for the airborne-early-warning (AEW) mission and is funding a Z-15 

project to replace the Z-9s and a “ten-ton helicopter project” to replace the Ka-28s. Of 

note, the Z-9C, the Ka-28, and the Ka-31, when properly equipped, may serve as a datalink relay for over-the-horizon ASCMs.11

The PLAN has significantly fewer helicopters than the U.S. Navy. Moreover, even Chinese proponents of increasing the number of helicopters deployed on board ships tend 

to focus on potential scouting and attack operations. Vertical replenishment is covered 

Figure 2. Selected SAMs of the PLAN and U.S. Navy

Source: Richardson, ed., Jane’s Missiles and Rockets. The SM-2 Block IV’s forty-kilometer range is radar-horizon 

limited. Graphics by Delex Systems, Inc.
124 china maritime studies

only briefly in most Chinese analyses and that on port-to-ship operations, instead of 

intra–task force supply. 

Amphibious Capabilities

Amphibious warfare has retained an important role in the PLAN, given Chinese aspirations to incorporate Taiwan. The PLAN maintains the capability to transport approximately one mechanized division using fifty-six ships.12 It has replaced older tank landing 

ships with the new Type 072-III Yuting II class and the Type 073-IV Yudeng-class 

medium landing ship. In active service, the PLAN also has three Type 071 Yuzhao-class 

amphibious transport docks, which are based on the U.S. San Antonio class.13 These 

ships, capable of carrying large helicopters and air-cushion landing craft, may indicate a 

growing capability for amphibious operations in distant theaters. 

Aircraft Carriers 

Perhaps most representative of China’s naval ambitions—and a dream of Liu Huaqing—

is its aircraft carrier program. After years of deception and denials, the PLAN has publicly 

announced that it desires aircraft carriers. Although Chinese officials have not revealed 

a fleet size, one Chinese general recommended “at least three”;14 unconfirmed reporting 

has stated the PLAN intends to build two new carriers along the lines of Liaoning, the 

refitted ex-Varyag, followed by two larger and nuclear-powered carriers.15 Operational 

proficiency aside, a navy of four carriers would be formidable in the region.

HQ-10 SAMs and the new Type 1030 CIWS guns have been installed on Liaoning,

increasing the likelihood that China will consider it more than just a training ship. In 

terms of flight training, over the last several years China has produced a cadre of pilots 

to operate off carrier decks at Liaoning mock-ups ashore in China. Additionally, training 

at the NITKA Center in Ukraine and on Brazil’s Clemenceau-class aircraft carrier has 

allowed the PLAN to gain experience from other nations. Regarding carrier aircraft, the 

PLAN has developed the carrier-capable Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark, an unlicensed variant of the Su-33.16 There has also been speculation that China’s new J-31 stealth fighter 

could be carrier capable.17

The J-15 (or other aircraft) would operate using a STOBAR (short takeoff but arrested 

recovery) ski-jump system on Liaoning. This will likely restrict its maximum takeoff 

weight. For this reason, future Chinese carriers may incorporate a CATOBAR (catapultassisted takeoff but arrested recovery) system. Although the PLAN has Russian Ka-31s 

suitable for the AEW mission, a more-capable fixed-wing AEW project based on the Y-7 

airframe, which would likely require catapult launch, may be in development.18

In the near term, the PLAN’s aircraft carrier will support national pride more than 

immediate operational requirements. The PLAN will require additional DDGs, FFGs, 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 125

helicopters, and logistics ships (possibly all organized under a new expeditionary command structure), not to mention a proficient carrier air wing, in order to integrate truly 

the striking power of the aircraft carrier into its fleet. Chinese observation of and training with the carriers of other states will accelerate this process. 

From assessment of the current capabilities of the PLAN, it is clear the PLAN is rapidly 

developing world-class capabilities in all combat areas.19 Compared with U.S. Navy surface combatants, PLAN surface combatants, armed with a diverse array of very capable 

ASCMs across the surface fleet, are more capable in ASUW. PLAN capabilities in AAW, 

ASW, and force integration are inferior to those of the U.S. Navy. 

The Three Fleets: Possible PLAN Trajectories

In light of the PLAN’s acquisition and deployment of new platforms, the United States 

and Asian states must consider whether the Chinese surface force has an overarching 

trajectory. It is widely accepted that the PLAN has demonstrably improved both its naval 

capabilities and its capacity to exert from the Chinese mainland control over the near 

seas. What remains subject to debate is the objective of these capabilities. The second 

half of this chapter explores this question.

The Taiwan Fleet

If the ultimate aim of China’s naval development is solely to constrain the U.S. option 

of intervening in a mainland China / Taiwan war, such a goal appears to be increasingly within reach. Characterized increasingly in the United States as an A2/AD strategy, 

Chinese integration of land, sea, air, and space surveillance and strike capabilities has 

produced an environment in which U.S. naval forces would find themselves considerably 

challenged to operate meaningfully to support Taiwan under relevant timelines. This is 

troubling to many, including American defense planners, who are bound by the Taiwan 

Relations Act. 

Chinese interlocutors have often supported the view that A2/AD capabilities are 

solely focused on the question of Taiwan and that “if the U.S. could abandon Taiwan, 

[China] would cease development of A2/AD capabilities, and other difficult issues 

could be solved.”20 However, the versatility (and thus utility) of the People’s Liberation Army’s A2/AD capabilities and the fact that China has other, growing security 

concerns besides Taiwan strongly suggest that resolution of the Taiwan issue would not 

remove the impetus for continued naval development.
126 china maritime studies

The East Asia Fleet

If the PLAN were modernizing to establish China as the regionally dominant naval 

power (superior even to the United States), with control over its near seas, the PLAN 

would likely look much as it does today, though certain capabilities would have to be 

improved. The East Asia Fleet would operate mostly within the near seas but would also 

need a limited capability in the far seas (between the First and Second Island Chains) 

and for distant operations. This fleet would help deter the entry of U.S. forces into the 

region, enable the coercion of neighboring states, allow the establishment of faits accomplis relating to maritime territorial disputes, and generally establish China as a regional 

hegemon. 

To realize fully such a fleet, the PLAN requires additional expeditionary surveillance to 

extend coverage and targeting, pushing the U.S. culmination point in battle farther from 

China’s shores. Second, it may require expeditionary troops, such as its marine corps, 

to seize, hold, and man such surveillance sites on islands in dispute. Third, it requires 

amphibious shipping to project expeditionary power. Fourth, it requires coordinated 

AAW capabilities to protect itself from airborne attack. Fifth, it requires comprehensive 

ASW capabilities to protect its amphibious and carrier assets from submarines. Lastly, 

it requires additional submarines of its own to contest U.S. surface forces and aircraft 

carriers. 

The Global Navy Fleet

Were China to seek a globally influential navy, one capable of imposing local sea control 

wherever it wished and capable of protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to 

and from its dispersed economic interests, this would be consistent with some interpretations of the final stage of Liu Huaqing’s “three-step strategic plan,” according to which 

by 2020–50 China would reach military parity with developed countries.21

To reach such a point, several decades of consistent effort would be needed, and a 

number of capabilities would have to be enhanced. First, the modest underwayreplenishment logistics force of the PLAN would need to expand. There is significant 

indication that the Type 903 project aims to improve capabilities in this area rapidly.22

Second, the PLAN would need to establish a network of facilities and basing arrangements astride its areas of operation. Given China’s pledge never to base military forces 

outside China, the PLAN could seek facilities arrangements, “places, not bases.” 

Alternatively, it could cooperate at a given location with the host country, which would 

claim Chinese forces were only visiting. Third, helicopter operations from surface 

ships for intra–task force resupply and a host of other missions—among them ASW—

would need to increase greatly. Fourth, coordinated, fleet-level ASW capabilities would 

need to achieve a higher level of proficiency for the PLAN to operate safely in distant 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 127

waters. Fifth, the PLAN would need to develop a carrier fleet, or an alternative airasset-generating platform, that could provide constant surveillance and striking power. 

Lastly, the PLAN would require additional nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to 

threaten adversary SLOCs credibly. 

What Is the Surface Fleet’s Trajectory?

On the basis of assessment of the three fleet constructs and of the PLAN’s current 

capabilities and trends, it appears that China aims to achieve a regionally dominant and 

globally capable navy in the next decade, a navy falling somewhere between the East 

Asia Fleet and the Global Fleet. The surface fleet will continue its ASUW expertise while 

improving its AAW and ASW capabilities, in that order. The PLAN focus will remain 

on potential conflicts in the near seas while it creates a limited set of capabilities useful 

in more distant scenarios. Faced with national development priorities in this period of 

“strategic opportunity,” China is unlikely to assume the high cost of full transition to 

a globally influential, power-projection navy in the near term. Instead, it might slowly 

integrate carrier groups in a “hybrid” force focused on the western Pacific but capable 

of limited force projection. Nonetheless, if China’s perception of its comprehensive national power and the favorable local correlation of forces continues to increase, Chinese 

naval aspirations will also gradually ascend, and the navy will shift to a more balanced, 

sea-control force rather than a sea-denial one. 

What are some of the challenges China will face as it strives for a regionally dominant 

and globally capable navy? One potential factor affecting the growth trajectory of the 

surface fleet could be the state’s shipbuilding capacity and fiscal resources. However, 

critical examination reveals robust capacity on both fronts. Backed by a prosperous 

commercial industry, China’s military shipbuilding capacity and capabilities may pose a 

far more significant challenge in a long-term competitive dynamic than once did those 

of the Soviet Union. Moreover, China’s moderately paced naval development has not 

strained the capabilities of shipyards or forced the nation to choose between expanding 

the navy, on one hand, and other components of the “national fleet,” such as civil maritime organizations, on the other. On the contrary, the other elements of the national 

fleet are greatly increasing production while naval production also increases. Another 

possible challenge to the surface fleet’s trajectory could arise if the PLAN encountered 

production difficulties with more advanced designs. However, the success of the Type 

052C and the Type 054A suggest that China is quite capable of producing world-class 

surface combatants. 

Strategic choices among “joint” capabilities could also shape China’s shipbuilding strategy and larger maritime defense strategy. If the PLAN chose to rely on the shore-based 

A2/AD complex to deliver ASUW strikes over long range, it could conceivably reduce the 
128 china maritime studies

number of surface combatants, as fewer would be necessary to meet planning needs. We 

assess this as unlikely, for three principal reasons. First, it is improbable that the openocean surveillance “scouting effectiveness” of the A2/AD complex will be reliable enough 

in wartime conditions to merit reducing shipboard sensors and weapons.23 Second, 

institutional inertia on the part of the PLAN in connection with the current shipbuilding program would be difficult to overcome rapidly. Third, China’s emerging operating 

patterns make a reduction in surface combatants unlikely; in fact, they may increase in 

number, thereby constituting a greater portion of the fleet. 

The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence anticipates that the PLAN’s total order of battle 

will remain relatively steady, with the surface force maintaining seventy major combatants through 2020.24 By 2016–17, as Chinese sea-denial capabilities reach a high level of 

effectiveness, the PLAN may gradually begin to adopt a sea-control fleet design that will 

likely require greater numbers of surface combatants. Additionally, such missions as extended operations in distant seas, SLOC protection, response to nontraditional threats, 

and possibly noncombatant evacuation operations will require larger numbers of new, 

large DDGs and FFGs on station, though marginal efficiencies arising from the multimission capabilities of modern ships may decrease the need slightly. 

Analysis of the PLAN surface-fleet trajectory suggests that certain leading indicators 

could serve as “wild cards,” factors that might put in question analytical assumptions 

and possibly the fleet trajectory. If China conducts a major expansion of its modest 

underway-replenishment program (as it may now be doing), that could point to PLAN 

ambitions to operate farther from China.25 Furthermore, if the PLAN were to expand 

its SSN program, that might indicate an interest in conducting sea-denial or SLOCinterdiction operations at significant ranges, also putting into question its trajectory. 

Implications for the U.S. Navy and East Asian Allies

The United States has adopted with China a hedging approach that seeks to maximize 

cooperative opportunities for engagement while maintaining credible, forward-stationed 

combat power in the Asia-Pacific. The interaction, both cooperative and adversarial, 

of the U.S. Navy and its Asian allies and partners with the PLAN has increased in the 

last several years, and China’s neighbors have expressed reservations over the direction 

of its “peaceful development,” specifically the trajectory of its military forces. Chinese 

actions—including harassment of U.S. Navy ocean-surveillance vessels, condescension 

toward other countries at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, Beijing’s response to North 

Korea’s sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan, and serious confrontations at 

sea with Korean, Filipino, and Japanese maritime forces—have been the source of much 

anxiety in the region.
china

s near seas combat capabilities 129

In turn, the Barack Obama administration has renewed its attention on the region, with 

a “rebalance to the Asia-Pacific” that dedicates increased intellectual capital and resources 

to efforts in the region. Hope for cooperation with the PLA springs eternal. However, 

American diplomatic engagement with China over the last several years has progressed 

and regressed as Chinese leaders interrupt military exchanges and confidence-building 

measures in response to such U.S. actions as arms sales to Taiwan. Additionally, the 

prospects remain very low for an “Incidents at Sea–style” agreement or cooperation in 

the distant seas tending to influence China’s intentions away from revisionist efforts to 

counter the security architecture in the Pacific. 

Faced with the likely trajectory of the Chinese surface fleet and of the PLA as a whole, 

the U.S. Navy must analyze how it can efficiently and effectively respond to the challenges that the United States and its Asian allies and partners will face. In a period of 

long-term strategic competition, the U.S. government must examine changes in force 

structure, posture, and operations to meet the rising challenge. Chief among these initiatives is the counter-A2/AD Air-Sea Battle Concept, which will likely result in significant 

improvements in U.S. force posture, strategy, and tactics in the Asia-Pacific. 

In developing Air-Sea Battle, the services face the challenge of operating close to and 

within China’s A2/AD network, confronting the perils embodied in Adm. Horatio 

Nelson’s adage that “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” Yet allies, access, and interests may require the United States to do just that. Strategic force dispersal and increased underway 

refueling and reloading may significantly improve the survivability of U.S. forces. But in 

addition to moving some forces out, the United States must find novel ways to dig others 

in. It could explore subtle ways to create conditions in which U.S. forces are intermixed 

(in an undemanding way) with the forces of our allies, thus increasing the risk for China 

of horizontal escalation with multiple U.S. allies. 

In terms of credibly threatening the Chinese center of gravity, an extended blockade at 

sea and on land, primarily targeting energy flows, has been considered as an option.26

While an extended blockade would play a role in a major war, the latent strategic effects 

of such a campaign would not be felt in China for weeks or perhaps months, making it 

a questionable deterrent to possible Chinese moves to establish a fait accompli in the region. Moreover, such an approach might spark fears of abandonment among allied states 

and weaken the very security architecture the United States is working to defend. 

Thus the United States must learn not only to “lay siege” to the fort but also to (in varying degrees) assault it. Fortunately, the Asia-Pacific is not a blank slate. Working to maximize cooperation with allied and partner states, the U.S. Navy could greatly inhibit the 

freedom of the PLAN, “penning in” the Chinese fleet. Nelson’s warning applies as much 

to the PLAN as it does to the U.S. Navy. The undersea domain could be surveyed with 
130 china maritime studies

overhead and underwater infrastructure—thereby turning dangerous proximity to the 

Chinese mainland into an advantage—and the U.S. Navy could develop ways to block 

straits if necessary, using mines; mobile, ground-launched ASCMs; and other methods. 

Moreover, as expressed in the Joint Operational Access Concept, the United States could 

leverage external lines of operation to conduct credible, multiaxial strikes.27

As for programs, the U.S. Navy could support a variety of new weapons aimed at 

countering the A2/AD challenge, with such platforms and capabilities as antiship missiles, ground-based offensive fires, long-range unmanned vehicles, aerial and undersea 

infrastructure and weapons, electronic warfare, and electromagnetic and directedenergy weapons. The U.S. Navy could also seriously explore sea-based conventional 

intermediate-range ballistic missiles to complicate PLA planning. Launched from 

ships, these weapons would count against neither the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces Treaty nor New START limits on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. A submarine variant would significantly alter the calculus of Chinese planners with respect 

to the threat of American SSNs. 

Notes 

1. 陈映侨, 杨志荣 [Chan Kiuying and Yang 

Zhirong], “科学发展观与海军全面建设” 

[Scientific Development and Navy Building], 国

防科技 [National Defense Science and Technology] 29, no. 1 (2007), pp. 26–30. 

2. Shinji Yamaguchi, The 18th Chinese Communist 

Party Congress and Xi Jinping (Tokyo: National 

Institute for Defense Studies, 2012), available at 

www.nids.go.jp/.

3. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, Red Star 

over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to 

U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 

Institute Press, 2010), p. 18.

4. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

2010, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, 

D.C.: 17 August 2010), p. 31, available at www

.defense.gov/.

5. Feng, “2012 in Review,” China-PLA Blogspot, 28 

December 2012, china-pla.blogspot.com/.

6. Office of Naval Intelligence [hereafter ONI], The 

People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy 

with Chinese Characteristics (Washington, D.C.: 

August 2009), available at www.fas.org/.

7. Ibid., p. 29.

8. 邱贞玮 [Qiu Zhenwei], “近海控制到远洋作

战: 中国海军需求的转变” [Near Seas Control 

to Offshore Operations: The Chinese Navy’s 

Changing Requirements], 现代舰船 [Modern 

Ships] (January 2011), pp. 25–28. 

9. Feng, “Future of Chinese Naval Helicopter,” 

China-PLA Blogspot, 14 February 2010, 

china-pla.blogspot.com/.

10. 张文斯 [Zhang Wensi], “兼职的海上猎手: 

‘海武直’-9 武装直升机” [Part-Time Marine 

Hunter: Naval WZ-9 Armed Helicopters], 现代

舰船 [Modern Ships] (May 2010), pp. 37–41.

11. 胡宝良 [Hu Baoliang], “现代海战离不开舰载

直升机” [Modern Navy Can’t Do without Shipborne Helicopters], 国防科技 [National Defense 

Science and Technology] (December 2007), pp. 

25–29. 

12. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s 

Navy in the Twenty-First Century, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p. 95.

13. ONI, People’s Liberation Army Navy, p. 20.

14. Agence France-Presse, “Chinese General: 

Country Needs 3 Carriers,” DefenseNews, 30 July 

2011, defensenews.com/.

15. Russell Hsiao, “Is China’s Carrier Aviation 

Program Kicking into High Gear?,” Jamestown 

Foundation China Brief 11, no. 7 (22 April 

2011). 

16. David A. Fulghum, “New Chinese Ship-Based 

Fighter Progresses,” Aviation Week, 28 April 

2011. 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 131

17. Bill Sweetman, “China’s New Stealth Fighter: 

Not a Repeat from December 2010,” Aviation 

Week, 16 September 2012.

18. Feng, “Top Stories of 2010 for PLAN,” ChinaPLA Blogspot, 30 December 2010, china-pla

.blogspot.com/. 

19. Cole, Great Wall at Sea, p. 113.

20. Eric Sayers and Gaoyue Fan, AirSea Battle: An 

Exchange, PacNet 17 (Honolulu: Pacific Forum 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

17 March 2011), csis.org/.

21. Qiu Zhenwei, “Near Seas Control to Offshore 

Operations,” pp. 25–28.

22. “New Type 903 AOR Replenishment Oiler,” 

China Defense Blog, 7 May 2012, china-defense

.blogspot.com/.

23. Michael McDevitt and Frederic Vellucci, “Two 

Vectors, One Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 137/4/1,298 (April 2011), p. 32.

24. ONI, People’s Liberation Army Navy, p. 46.

25. “Guangzhou HuangPu’s Milk Cow,” China 

Defense Blog, 15 January 2013, china-defense

.blogspot.com/.

26. Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval 

Blockade of China,” Journal of Strategic Studies

(February 2013). 

27. U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept

(Washington, D.C.: January 2012), available at 

www.defense.gov/.
Abbreviations and Definitions

A A2/AD antiaccess / area denial 

AAD area air defense

AAW antiair warfare

AESA active electronically scanned array

AEW airborne early warning

AIP air-independent propulsion

AIS Automatic Identification System

ASBM antiship ballistic missile

ASCM antiship cruise missile

ASUW antisurface warfare

ASW antisubmarine warfare

AWACS airborne warning and control system [or the U.S. 

 Airborne Warning and Control System, in the E-3 Sentry]

C C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence 

 systems

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, 

 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

CAST China Academy of Space Technology

CATOBAR catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery

CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite

CDCM coastal-defense cruise missile

CEP circular error probable

CIWS close-in weapon system 

CMC Central Military Commission
china

s near seas combat capabilities 133

COMINT communications intelligence

CSG [aircraft] carrier strike group

CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation

D DDG guided-missile destroyer

DMC Disaster Monitoring Constellation

DoD Department of Defense [U.S.] 

E EEZ exclusive economic zone

ELINT electronic intelligence 

EO electro-optical

ESM electronic support measures

EW electronic warfare

F FAE fuel-air explosive

FDO flexible deterrent option

FFG guided-missile frigate

G GAD General Armaments Department

GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya 

 navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema)

GPS Global Positioning System

GSD General Staff Department

H HALE high-altitude, long-endurance

HE high explosive

HFSWR high-frequency surface-wave radar

I IGSO inclined geostationary orbit

IRST infrared search and track 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
134 china maritime studies

K kg/kN kilograms per kilonewton

km kilometers

KMT Kuomintang [Chinese Nationalist Party]

L LCS Littoral Combat Ship

LO low-observable

LRPS long-range precision strike

M MRBM medium-range ballistic missile

N nm nautical mile

O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence [U.S.]

OTH over-the-horizon

OTHR over-the-horizon radar

OTHT over-the-horizon targeting

P PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy

PLANAF People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force

PNT positioning, navigation, and timing

PRC People’s Republic of China

S SAM surface-to-air missile

SAR synthetic aperture radar

SIGINT signals intelligence

SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile

SLOC sea line of communication

SS diesel-electric submarine

SSB ballistic-missile submarine
china

s near seas combat capabilities 135

SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine

SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine

STOBAR short takeoff but arrested recovery

SWATH Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull

T T-AGOS tactical auxiliary general ocean surveillance ship

TEL transporter-erector-launcher

U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

USN U.S. Navy

V VHF very high frequency

VLF very low frequency

W w/t weight-to-thrust
About the Contributors

Ron Christman is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the new Standards and Evaluation 

Cell of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). From December 2012 to June 2013, he 

served as the deputy director of the Regional Command West Fusion Center, Camp 

Arena, Herat, Afghanistan. Prior to this assignment, from 1987, he served in a number of positions within DIA related to Asian security issues, missile force affairs, and 

defense resourcing and planning support.

Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime 

Studies Institute at the Naval War College. His current research focuses on American 

and Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea and the strategic 

implications to the United States and the U.S. Navy of Chinese international law and 

policy choices. He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a juris doctor from the 

College of William and Mary, a master of arts (with distinction) from the Naval War 

College, and a bachelor of science (cum laude) from Boston University.

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department 

at the Naval War College, and a core founding member of the department’s China 

Maritime Studies Institute. Erickson received his doctorate and master of arts in international relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated 

magna cum laude from Amherst College with a bachelor of arts in history and political 

science.

Daniel J. Kostecka is a senior analyst for the U.S. Navy. He has a bachelor of science 

degree in mathematics from Ohio State University, a master of liberal arts in military 

and diplomatic history from Harvard University, a master of arts in national security policy from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at 

the University of Kentucky, and a master of science in strategic intelligence from the 

National Intelligence University. Kostecka has been published in the Naval War College 

Review, the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, and the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings; his articles have been translated into Chinese, Japanese, and French. Kostecka 

served as an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air Force 

Reserve, with the rank of lieutenant colonel. 
china

s near seas combat capabilities 137

Ryan Martinson is research administrator at the China Maritime Studies Institute. He 

holds a master’s degree from the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a bachelor of science from Union College. Martinson has also studied at Fudan 

University, Beijing Language and Culture University, and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. 

He previously served as Deputy Director of the China Exchange Initiative. 

Bryan McGrath is the founder and managing director of the FerryBridge Group LLC, a 

defense consultancy. He is a retired naval officer who commanded USS Bulkeley (DDG 

84) and served as the team leader for and primary author of the 2007 “A Cooperative 

Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.”

William S. Murray is an associate research professor and the director of the Halsey 

Bravo research effort in the Warfare Analysis and Research Division of the Naval War 

College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He joined the U.S. Navy in 1983 immediately after graduating cum laude from the State University of New York at Buffalo 

with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering. Professor Murray served on, and 

qualified to command, nuclear-powered submarines. In 1994 he received a master of 

arts degree from the Naval War College. Professor Murray has served on the operations staff at U.S. Strategic Command and as a member of the faculty of the Naval War 

College’s Strategic Research Department. He retired from the Navy with the rank of 

lieutenant commander in 2003. He is the coeditor of China’s New Nuclear Submarine 

Force and China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies, both published by the Naval Institute Press. He has published articles in International Security,

the U.S. Army War College Parameters, Comparative Strategy, the U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Undersea Warfare, and the Naval War College 

Review. 

John Patch is a career intelligence analyst and qualified surface warfare and joint 

specialty officer. He is a former Army War College associate professor and chairman of 

the U.S. Naval Institute Editorial Board. He currently teaches intelligence studies for 

the American Military University and serves in the Intelligence Community. 

Eric Pedersen is a senior analyst for the U.S. Navy. He served as an active-duty U.S. 

Navy officer for thirteen years and still serves in the Navy Reserve, with the rank 

of lieutenant commander. Pedersen has a bachelor of science degree in systems 
138 china maritime studies

engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy and a master’s in strategic intelligence from 

American Military University. 

David A. Shlapak is a senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation in Pittsburgh, 

Pennsylvania. In his nearly thirty years in the national-security field he has led studies 

on topics ranging from nuclear strategy to counterterrorism and homeland defense. 

He has for the last fifteen years worked extensively on issues relating to Asian security 

and U.S. defense posture in the Pacific region.

Timothy A. Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting, Studies, and Analysis. Specializing in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics, he provides the U.S. government, 

industry, think tanks, and international partners with assistance in strategic planning, 

concept-of-operations development and analysis, requirements and capabilities analysis, and capture shaping.