IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-0112

Filed March 9, 2016

IN THE INTEREST OF J.S. AND A.S.,

Minor Children,

B.S., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Stephen A. Owen, 

District Associate Judge.

The mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights in two 

children. AFFIRMED.

Nicole S. Facio of Newbrough Law Firm, Ames, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Christopher A. Clausen, Ames, attorney for minor child A.S.

Patrick C. Peters of Payer, Hunziker, Rhodes & Peters, L.L.P., Ames, 

attorney for minor child J.S.

Matthew A. Mauk of Mauk Law Office, Ames, guardian ad litem for minor 

children.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.

Brenda appeals the order terminating her parental rights in her two 

children, A.S. and J.S., ages fourteen and twelve, respectively. At the time of the 

termination hearing, Brenda was incarcerated. On appeal, Brenda contends the 

juvenile court should not have terminated her parental rights because of the 

strength of the parent-child bond and because the children objected to the 

termination of parental rights.

We review de novo proceedings terminating parental rights. See In re 

A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). We examine both the facts and law,

and we adjudicate anew those issues properly preserved and presented. See In 

re L.G., 532 N.W.2d 478, 480 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). We will uphold an order

terminating parental rights only if there is clear and convincing evidence

establishing the statutory grounds for termination of the parent’s rights. See In re 

C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Evidence is “clear and convincing”

when there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the

conclusions of law drawn from the evidence. Id.

Termination of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a 

three-step analysis. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40-41 (Iowa 2010). First, the 

court must determine if a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) (2015) 

has been established. See id. at 40. Second, if a ground for termination is 

established, the court must apply the framework set out in section 232.116(2) to 

decide if proceeding with termination is in the best interests of the child. See id. 

Third, if the statutory best-interests framework supports termination of parental 

rights, the court must consider if any statutory exceptions set forth in section 
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232.116(3) should serve to preclude termination. See id. at 41. The “exceptions” 

to the termination provision are permissive and not mandatory. See A.M., 843 

N.W.2d at 113. “The court has discretion, based on the unique circumstances of 

each case and the best interests of the child, whether to apply the factors in this 

section to save the parent-child relationship.” In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 475

(Iowa Ct. App. 2011).

This case commenced in May 2013 when Brenda was arrested, convicted,

and placed on probation in a residential treatment facility. The children were 

placed with persons believed to be relatives. Since the initial placement, the 

children have been placed into several other foster care placements for a variety 

of reasons not material to the disposition of this appeal. At the time of the 

termination hearing, the children were in a pre-adoptive home. At no point during 

the pendency of this case were the children returned to the care of the mother. 

There were several barriers to reunification. Brenda’s progress in the 

residential treatment facility was extremely slow. She failed to work toward 

independence. She failed to obtain suitable housing or income security for the 

children. Brenda continued to have unhealthy adult relationships. She involved 

the children in unhealthy or inappropriate adult matters. Brenda failed to create 

and maintain a proper parent-child relationship with the children; in particular, the 

children became “parentified” by trying to solve their mother’s housing, food, and 

income needs. She introduced the children to men during her visitations with 

them. She also showed the children sexualized or sexually explicit material on 

social media. 
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This case came to a head in May 2015. A.S. admitted Brenda used her to 

steal several items of value from the Youth and Shelter Services office. Brenda 

was convicted of using a juvenile to commit an indictable offense, in violation of 

Iowa Code section 709A.6, and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 

incarceration not to exceed ten years. At the time of the termination hearing, she 

remained incarcerated with a formal discharge date of December 2019.

Brenda first contends the court should not have terminated her parental 

rights due to the strength of the parent-child bond. Iowa Code section 

232.116(3)(c) provides the court need not terminate the parent-child relationship 

if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be 

detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child 

relationship.” Our consideration is not merely whether there is a parent-child 

bond, “our consideration must center on whether the child would be 

disadvantaged by termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes” the 

parent's inability to provide for the child's developing needs. See In re D.W., 791 

N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010). 

There is not clear and convincing evidence the termination of Brenda’s 

rights would disadvantage the children. First, there is not a strong parent-child 

relationship with the children. The children are both over ten years of age. 

Throughout most of their lives, however, Brenda has been in and out of jail and 

prison and unavailable to parent them. Brenda is a career offender. Her criminal 

history extends back to 1992. She has been convicted of theft on numerous 

occasions, tampering with records, domestic abuse assault on at least two 

occasions, burglary on four different occasions, and ongoing criminal conduct. 
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She was incarcerated from 2008 until 2013 and only had care of the children for 

several months in 2013 prior to them being removed and this case being 

initiated. In short, this family has not resided together for any substantial period 

of time. Second, to the extent there is a bond, it is an inappropriate one. The 

children appear to be in the parental role, providing support to Brenda. Brenda 

uses the children for her own purposes. For example, Brenda had the children 

research apartments for her to find a place to live. On other occasions, the 

children had to pay for lunch during visitation because Brenda had no money. In 

her most recent offense giving rise to her incarceration, she used one of the 

children to perpetrate the theft. Third, termination of Brenda’s rights would be 

beneficial to the children. It would remove them from the toxic environment of 

instability, danger, and lawlessness created by Brenda’s ongoing criminal 

activity. The children are in need of stability the mother admittedly cannot 

provide now or in the immediate or intermediate future. Considering the 

children's long- and short-term best interests and any detriment to the children

from severing the parent-child relationship, we conclude this discretionary 

exception should not serve to preclude termination under the circumstances 

before us. 

Brenda next contends her parental rights should not be terminated 

because the children objected to the termination. Section 232.116(3)(b) allows 

the juvenile court not to terminate when “[t]he child is over ten years of age and 

the child objects to the termination.” This exception does not favor preserving 

the parent-child relationship under the circumstances presented. First, the 

mother manipulates the children by promising them things she cannot deliver—
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the promise of quick release from prison and the hope for immediate 

reunification. Second, the mother has not been available for most of the 

children’s lives, and there is little likelihood she could be available in the

immediate future. The children’s yearning for reunification does not tilt the 

balance away from termination. See In re E.C., No. 14-0754, 2014 WL 3513336, 

at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 16, 2014) (affirming termination where older children 

objected to termination but the guardian ad litem supported termination and 

where mother’s substance abuse precluded her ability to care for the children). 

The termination of the mother’s rights is in these children’s best interest. See In 

re L.P., 370 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); In re D.S., No. 11-1194, 

2011 WL 5868234, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011).

AFFIRMED.