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S. HRG. 113–699 

AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF 

MILITARY FORCE AGAINST ISIL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

DECEMBER 9, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Robert Menendez, U.S. Senator from New Jersey ....................................... 1 

Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator from Tennessee ................................................... 3 

Hon. John F. Kerry, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 4 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 8 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

ISIS Jihadis Get ‘‘Slavery for Dummies,’’ by Jamie Dettmer, from The Daily 

Beast, December 9, 2014 ..................................................................................... 63 

(III)

(1) 

AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF 

MILITARY FORCE AGAINST ISIL 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room 

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Boxer, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, 

Durbin, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Corker, Risch, Rubio, 

Johnson, Flake, McCain, Barrasso, and Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. This committee will come to order. Mr. Secretary, we welcome you back to the committee, and we thank you 

for being here today to discuss one of the most important challenges that Congress must meet. 

When you last appeared before this committee in September, you 

asked Congress to authorize the use of military force against ISIL, 

and we have an AUMF that the committee will consider later this 

week. Today we are asking you to provide the administration’s 

views on this text and on your strategic planning to counter ISIL 

along with the range of military authorities you will need to 

achieve your goals. 

This is the most important vote that any member of Congress 

can take. It is a vote that potentially sends America’s sons and 

daughters into harm’s way, and we do not take that responsibility 

lightly. That reality demands our full attention and consideration 

of three issues. First, whether military action to counter ISIL is 

necessary and in the national security interests of the United 

States. I believe that it is, and I doubt anyone on the committee 

would disagree. I believe that the risk of ISIL acquiring a safe 

haven in Iraq or Syria or beyond from which it can create the operational capacity to attack American interests and, at some point, 

America itself demands action. Second, we need to understand the 

political and military goals of this operation, how we expect to 

achieve them, and the timeframe of this campaign. 

Now, I know some may see this as limiting, but at the end of the 

day Americans will not be supportive of an authorization of an endless war. They do not want us to occupy Iraq for decades. They do 

not want an ISIL recruitment AUMF allowing ISIL to claim a jihad 

against Western crusaders that enhances their ability to recruit folVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:16 Aug 26, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE H
2 

lowers who want to fight Americans. In my view, deployment of 

ground troops at this time would be Groundhog Day in Iraq all 

over again. Lastly, we need to hear what authorities the Commander in Chief expects that he will need from Congress to achieve 

his political and military goals of defeating ISIL and closing the region to extremists and terrorists. 

Now, frankly, the process we undertake today is not the one I 

sought. I had hoped to begin this conversation weeks ago so that 

the entire Senate, not just this committee, would have time to consider a comprehensive bipartisan AUMF. But that did not happen, 

and we are here today to begin the process of taking action. I think 

the American people expect their congressional leaders to engage 

fully on this issue, to understand the mission, the parameters, and 

the risks. 

As I have said many times, I am not comfortable with the administration’s reliance on the 9/11 AUMF and the 2002 Iraq AUMF. 

The 9/11 AUMF was adopted to counter al-Qaeda in the wake of 

the September 11 attacks. No member could have foreseen that we 

would still be acting under its authority 13 years later. I do not believe that it provides the authority to pursue a new enemy in different countries under completely different circumstances than existed 13 years ago. 

Congress, rather than the Executive, has the responsibility and 

the authority to authorize military action and to declare war for 

these very reasons. We are the check and balance on Executive 

power regardless of who that Executive is, and if we abandon that 

role, then we will have done a grave disservice to the American 

people. 

The text that I have presented is based on consultations with 

members of the committee and addresses the authorities we understand the White House is seeking. In my view, an ISIL-specific 

AUMF should in broad terms authorize the President to use military force against ISIL and associated persons or forces, meaning 

individuals or organizations, fighting for, or on behalf of, ISIL. It 

should limit the activities of our forces so that there will be no 

large-scale ground combat operations. If the President feels he 

needs that, then he should ask for it and Congress can consider it. 

It should limit the authorization to 3 years, and it should require 

the administration to report to Congress every 60 days. 

As drafted, the text would limit the authorization of force by not 

allowing ground combat operations except as necessary for the protection or rescue of U.S. soldiers or citizens, for intelligence operations, spotters to enable airstrikes, operational planning, or other 

forms of advice and assistance. The authorization would be limited 

to 3 years. 

The President has said that this will be a multiyear campaign, 

but I do not believe that the AUMF should be unlimited. A 3-year 

timeframe would allow this President and a new President time to 

assess the situation and make a responsible decision together with 

the Congress about whether and how to continue military action. 

So that said, Mr. Secretary, we would love to hear from the administration what the framework is, what you see as the U.S.-led strategy to counter ISIL. 

3 

Finally, let me conclude by saying I do not believe that placing 

limitations in this AUMF sends a message of weakness to our enemies. This authorization is intended to provide the authority required by the Commander in Chief to do our part in this multinational effort to defeat ISIL. ISIL is not only an American problem. It is a global problem, and no ISIL strategy can rely on American military power alone. We need to train Iraqi Security Forces 

and Kurdish Peshmerga forces; stand up and train and equip programs for moderate Syrian fighters, which are being authorized in 

the defense authorization bill that the Congress will consider this 

week, work with coalition partners to cut off terror financing and 

foreign fighter flows, and provide humanitarian aid to address the 

urgent, desperate situation of millions in the region whose lives 

have been uprooted. 

We look forward to working with you, Mr. Secretary, and the administration on our mutual goal of degrading and defeating ISIL. 

And, again, we welcome you back to the committee. Let me turn 

to the distinguished ranking member for his remarks, Senator 

Corker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing us to 

move away from what we considered last week, which was an 

AUMF that was an amendment to a water bill. I think that is a 

step forward, and I appreciate you doing that. I want to thank the 

Secretary for being here. I am not sure that—matter of fact, I am 

pretty sure this is not where he would like to be this afternoon, so 

I thank you for coming before our committee. 

And I want to thank the chairman again for trying to set up a 

process this week that was thorough, but that has not occurred, 

and I think everyone understands that some of the things that will 

be discussed obviously are things like boots on the ground, and yet 

we have no defense presentations here. We have no intelligence 

presentations here. 

And I would also say that back in the Syrian issue, the original 

Syrian issue, about a year and a half ago, where we were authorizing something that—these are my words—was going to last about 

10 hours, we were able to go through a process that was much 

more serious than the one we are going to have this week. I think 

all of us know that whatever passes out of the committee this week 

is not going to become law. I agree with some comments that the 

chairman and I had earlier, and that is, well, at least this will be 

a part of a process, and I thank him for saying that, and I agree 

with that. 

At the same time, just for what it is worth, I do not think—I 

know we are not going to get to a place where the House and Senate pass an authorization. And I just want to say we weaken our 

Nation when we begin a process like that and we do not actually 

enact it in law. We weaken our Nation. I think we also hurt our 

Nation when we attempt to pass something out on a partisan basis. 

One of the things about the earlier Syrian AUMF was it had bipartisan support and bipartisan opposition. So, for what it is worth, 

regardless of what happens in these meetings this week, my plan 

4 

of conduct personally is to act in such a way that hopefully will not 

harden positions, but will build for an opportunity for us to act in 

a more full way down the road. 

I do want to say that I think the testimony today will be helpful. 

I listened to the chairman’s comments and then refer to the fact 

that the 60-word authorization that was passed September the 

18th of 2001 has led to some outcomes that people did not anticipate. And that is why from my standpoint I would like to have 

something much more full, much more understood, a strategy that 

is laid out in a way that I understand where we are going prior 

to authorizing a complete authorization. If you look at our Nation 

since World War II, we have had multiple conflicts. It is hard to 

remember one that ended up with a very satisfactory outcome. 

What we do is we tend to start these conflicts without really teasing out from the administration in most cases how we are going to 

actually go about being successful, so we start the process. 

In this particular case, it appears that an AUMF has been offered to start the process that actually limits the Commander in 

Chief’s ability to carry it out. As a matter of fact, what would happen under this authorization is right now we can use all efforts, if 

you will, to go against al-Qaeda, but if we were to pass this authorization as written, we would be saying against ISIS we can only 

do certain things, that somehow we must view them as being a 

lesser evil than the al-Qaeda effort—the al-Qaeda group that we 

have gone after and the Taliban group that we have gone after in 

Afghanistan. 

I hope that, again, we will all conduct ourselves in a manner this 

week that will not harden positions. We are not going to do anything that passes, unfortunately. I do not think that is good for our 

Nation. I think it is better to start this at a time we can finish it 

with a Congress, by the way, that will actually deal with this from 

start to finish. But I do appreciate, again, the chairman deferring 

to this week trying to make the process slightly better. And I certainly appreciate, in spite of the fact we do not have a full presentation, I appreciate Secretary Kerry being here today and making 

the presentation he is going to make. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

Corker, and all my former colleagues, it is really is a pleasure for 

me to be back before the Foreign Relations Committee. 

You know, during my time here, I think we got some things 

right. We certainly wound up wishing we had done some things differently. But I think most of us would agree, and I saw it during 

both parties’ chairmanships, including the years that Senator 

Lugar and I were here, that this committee works best and makes 

the greatest contribution to our foreign policy and our country 

when it addresses the most important issues in a strong, bipartisan 

fashion, and this is one of those issues. The chairman and the 

ranking member have both said that. This is one of the moments 

when a bipartisan approach really is critical. 

5 

As you know, the President is committed to engaging with the 

committee and all of your colleagues in the House and Senate regarding a new authorization for the use of military force—as we 

call it in short, the AUMF—specifically against the terrorist group 

known as ISIL, though in the region it is called Daesh, and specifically because they believe very deeply it is not a state, and it does 

not represent Islam. 

So we are looking for this authorization with respect to efforts 

against Daesh and affiliated groups. And I want to thank Chairman Menendez and the entire committee for leading the effort in 

Congress and for all of the important work that you have already 

done on this complicated and challenging issue. It is important that 

this committee lead the Congress and the country, and I think you 

know I believe that. 

Now, I realize we may not get there overnight. I have heard the 

ranking member’s comments just now, and we understand the 

clock. We certainly will not resolve everything and get there this 

afternoon in the next few hours. But I do think this discussion is 

important, and I think we all agree that this discussion has to conclude with a bipartisan vote that makes clear that this is not one 

party’s fight against Daesh, but rather that it reflects our united 

determination to degrade and ultimately defeat Daesh. 

And the world needs to understand that from the U.S. Congress 

above all. 

Our coalition partners need to know that from all of you, and the 

men and women of our armed forces deserve to know it from all 

of you, and Daesh’s cadre of killers and rapist and bigots need to 

absolutely understand it clearly. That is why this matters. Now, toward that end, we ask you now to work closely with us on a bipartisan basis to develop language that provides a clear signal of support for our ongoing military operations against Daesh. 

Our position on the text is really pretty straightforward. The authorization, or AUMF, should give the President the clear mandate 

and the flexibility he needs to successfully prosecute the armed 

conflict against Daesh and affiliated forces, but the authorization 

should also be limited and specific to the threat posed by that 

group and by forces associated with it. Now, I will come back to 

the question of the AUMF in a minute. But we believe that as we 

embark on this important discussion, context matters. All of us 

want to see the United States succeed, and all of us want to see 

Daesh defeated, so we are united on that. And I want to bring the 

committee up to date on precisely where our campaign now stands. 

Mr. Chairman, less than 3 months ago, perhaps 21⁄2 months, perhaps a little more, have passed since the international community 

came together in a coalition whose purpose is to degrade and defeat 

Daesh. Two and a half months ago it did not exist—not ‘‘it’’ Daesh, 

but the coalition and the 60 countries that assembled recently in 

Brussels. We organized, and I had the privilege of chairing, the 

first ministerial level meeting of the coalition last week in Brussels. We heard Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi describe to us the effort that his leadership team is making to bring Iraqis together, 

strengthen their security forces, take the fight to Daesh, and improve and reform governance. We also heard Gen. John Allen, our 

special envoy to the coalition, review the progress that is being 

6 

made in the five lines of coalition effort: to shrink the territory controlled by Daesh, to cut off its financing, to block its recruitment 

of foreign fighters, to expose the hypocrisy of its absurd religious 

claims, and to provide humanitarian aid to the victims of its violence. 

During the meeting, I have to tell you I was particularly impressed by the leadership activism, and, quite frankly, the anger 

toward Daesh that is being displayed by Arab and Muslim states. 

Governments that do not always agree on other issues are coming 

together in opposition to this profoundly anti-Islamic terrorist organization. And now, to be clear, ISIL continues to commit serious, 

vicious crimes, and it still controls more territory than al-Qaeda 

ever did. It will be years, not months, before it is defeated. We 

know that. But our coalition is measurably already making a difference. 

To date, we have launched more than 1,150 today airstrikes 

against Daesh. These operations have reduced its leadership, undermined its propaganda, squeezed its resources, damaged its 

logistical and operational capabilities, and compelled it to disperse 

its forces and change its tactics. It is becoming clear that the combination of coalition airstrikes and local ground partners is a potent one. In fact, virtually every time a local Iraqi force has worked 

in coordination with our air cover, they have not only defeated 

Daesh, they have routed it. 

In Iraq, progress also continues in the political arena, and this 

is no less important frankly. Last week after years of intensive efforts, the Government in Baghdad reached an interim accord with 

the Kurdistan regional government on hydrocarbon exports and 

revenue-sharing. That has been long sought after, and it is a big 

deal that they got it. It is good for the country’s economy, but it 

is even better for its unity and stability and for the imprint of the 

direction that they are moving in. 

In addition, the new Defense Minister is a Sunni, whose appointment was an important step toward a more inclusive government. 

And with his leadership, and that of the new Interior Minister, the 

process of reforming the nation’s security forces has a genuine 

chance for success. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister is taking bold 

steps to improve relations with his country’s neighbors, and those 

neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey, have 

been responding. Now, I want to underscore, it is too early to declare a new era in regional relations. But countries that had been 

drifting apart or even in conflict with each other, are now in the 

process of coming together and breaking down the barriers that 

were created. And that is helpful to our coalition, and it is bad 

news for Daesh. 

Beating back the threat that Daesh poses to Iraq is job number 

one for our Iraqi partners and for our coalition. But even if the 

Government in Baghdad fulfills its responsibilities, it is still going 

to face a dire challenge because of the events in Syria. Now, if you 

recall, the coalition’s decision to carry out airstrikes in Syria came 

in response to a request from Iraq for help in defending against 

Daesh’s brazen attack. To date, we and our Arab partners have 

conducted over 500 airstrikes in Syria, targeting areas where 

Daesh had concentrated its fighters, targeting on command and 

7 

control nodes, finance centers, training camps, and oil refineries. 

Our objective is to further degrade Daesh’s capabilities and to deny 

it the freedom of movement and resupply that it has previously enjoyed. 

At the same time, we will continue to build up the capabilities 

of the moderate opposition, and here I want to thank the members 

of this committee and many others in Congress who have supported these efforts and supported them very strongly. Our goal is 

to help the moderate forces stabilize areas under their control, defend civilians, empower them to go on offense against Daesh, and 

promote the conditions for a negotiated political transition, recognizing, as I think almost every person has said, there no military 

solution. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, we all know that Daesh is a threat to America’s security and interests. It poses an unaccepted danger to our 

personnel and facilities in Iraq and elsewhere. It seeks to destroy 

both the short- and long-term stability of the broader Middle East, 

and it is exacerbating a refugee crisis that has placed extraordinary economic and political burden on our friends and allies in 

the region. 

One thing is certain. Daesh will continue to spread until or unless it is stopped. So there should be no question that we, with our 

partners, have a moral duty and a profound international security 

interest and national security interest in stopping them. That is 

where the fight against Daesh now stands. A coalition that 21⁄2

months ago did not even exist is now taking the fight to the enemy. 

It was cobbled together by strong American leadership and by 

steady, intensive diplomacy with countries that disagree on many 

things, but all share an aversion to extremism. 

Now, I think all of you would agree, we need to summon that 

same determination to find the common ground here in Washington. And that is why in the hours, days, and weeks to come we 

are determined to work with you, first and foremost to develop an 

approach that can generate broad bipartisan support, while ensuring that the President has the flexibility to successfully prosecute 

this effort. That is the balance. 

What do we envision specifically regarding an AUMF? Importantly, and I think I will lay out today a very clear set of principles 

that I hope will be instructive, we do not think an AUMF should 

include a geographic limitation. We do not anticipate conducting 

operations in countries other than Iraq or Syria, but to the extent 

that ISIL poses a threat to American interests and personnel in 

other countries, we would not want an AUMF to constrain our ability to use appropriate force against ISIL in those locations if necessary. In our view, it would be a mistake to advertise to ISIL that 

there are safe havens for them outside of Iraq or Syria. 

On the issue of combat operations, I know this is hotly debated, 

as it ought to be and as it is, with passionate and persuasive arguments on both sides. The President has been crystal clear that his 

policy is that U.S. military forces will not be deployed to conduct 

ground combat operations against ISIL, and that will be the responsibility of local forces because that is what our local partners 

and allies want. That is what we learned works best in the context 

of our Iraq experience. That is what is best for preserving our coaliVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:16 Aug 26, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE H
8 

tion, and, most importantly, it is in the best interests of the United 

States. However, while we certainly believe that this is the soundest possible policy, and while the President has been clear he is 

open to clarifications on the use of U.S. combat troops to be outlined in an AUMF, it does not mean that we should preemptively 

bind the hands of the Commander in Chief or our commanders in 

the field in responding to scenarios and contingencies that are impossible to foresee. 

And finally, with respect to duration, we can be sure that this 

confrontation is not going to be over quickly, as the President and 

I have said many times. We understand, however, the desire of 

many to avoid a completely open-ended authorization. And I note 

that Chairman Menendez has suggested that a 3-year limitation 

should be put into an AUMF. We support that proposal, but we 

support it subject to a provision that we should work through together that provides for extension in the event that circumstances 

require it, and we think it ought to be advertised as such up front. 

To sum up, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I ask 

for your help in, above all, approving on a bipartisan basis with the 

strongest vote possible because everybody will read messages into 

that vote, an authorization for use of military force in connection 

with our campaign and that of our many partners in order to defeat a terrible, vicious, different kind of enemy. Almost a quarter 

of a century ago when I was here, then a 47-year-old Senator with 

certainly a darker head of hair, President George H.W. Bush, sent 

his Secretary of State, James Baker, to ask this committee for the 

authority to respond militarily to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The 

country was divided. Congress was divided. But this committee 

drafted an authorization, and it passed the Congress with a majority that the New York Times described as decisive and bipartisan. 

And armed with that mandate, Secretary Baker built the coalition 

that won the first gulf war. 

Now, that was a different time, and it was a different conflict, 

and it called for a different response. But it was also this body, this 

committee and then the Senate, at its bipartisan best. And what 

we need from you today to strengthen and unify our own coalition 

is exactly that kind of cooperative effort. The world will be watching what we together are willing and able to do, and this, obviously, is not a partisan issue. It is a leadership issue. It is a test 

of our government’s ability and our Nation’s ability to stand together. It is a test of our generation’s resolve to build a safer and 

more secure world. And I know every single one of you wants to 

defeat ISIL. 

A bold bipartisan mandate would strengthen our hand, and I 

hope that today you can move close to that goal. So thank you, and 

I am pleased to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Kerry follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN F. KERRY

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker—Senators—good afternoon, thank you 

for having me back to the Foreign Relations Committee. 

During my time here, we got many things right, and some things we wish we had 

done differently. But I think that most of us would agree—and I saw it during both 

parties’ chairmanships, including the years Senator Lugar and I were here—that 

9 

this committee works best, and makes the greatest contribution to our foreign policy, when it addresses the most important issues on a strong, bipartisan basis. 

This is one of those issues, and one of those moments, when that approach is 

critical. 

As you know, the President is committed to engaging with this committee and 

your colleagues in the Senate and House of Representatives regarding a new 

Authorization to Use Military Force against the terrorist group known as ISIL and 

affiliated groups. I want to thank Chairman Menendez and the entire committee for 

leading this effort in Congress and for all of the important work you have already 

done on this complicated and challenging issue. 

I realize we may not get there overnight—and we certainly won’t resolve everything and get there this afternoon. But I think we all agree that this discussion 

must conclude with a bipartisan vote that makes clear that this is not one party’s 

fight against ISIL but rather that it reflects our unified determination to degrade 

and ultimately defeat ISIL. Our coalition partners need to know it. The men and 

women of our armed forces need to know it. And ISIL’s cadres of killers, rapists, 

and bigots need to understand it. 

Toward that end, we ask you now to work closely with us on a bipartisan basis 

to develop language that provides a clear signal of support for our ongoing military 

operations against ISIL. 

Our position on the text is pretty straightforward—the Authorization—or 

AUMF—should give the President the clear mandate and flexibility he needs to successfully prosecute the armed conflict against ISIL and affiliated forces; but the 

Authorization should also be limited and specific to the threat posed by that group 

and by forces associated with it. 

I will return to the question of the AUMF in a minute, but as we embark on this 

important discussion, context matters. All of us want to see the United States succeed and ISIL to be defeated, and I want to bring the committee up to date on 

where our campaign now stands. 

Mr. Chairman, less than 3 months have passed since the international community 

came together in a coalition whose purpose is to degrade and defeat ISIL. This past 

Wednesday, in Brussels, we organized and I had the privilege of chairing the first 

ministerial-level meeting of that coalition. We heard Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi 

describe to us the effort that his leadership team is making to bring Iraqis together, 

strengthen their security forces, take the fight to ISIL, and improve and reform governance. We also heard General John Allen, our special envoy, review the progress 

that is being made in the five lines of coalition effort: to shrink the territory controlled by ISIL, cut off its financing, block its recruitment of foreign fighters, expose 

the hypocrisy of its absurd religious claims, and provide humanitarian aid to the 

victims of its violence. 

During the meeting, I was especially impressed by the leadership, activism and 

quite frankly, the anger toward ISIL that is being displayed by Arab and Muslim 

states. Governments that do not always agree on other issues are coming together 

in opposition to this profoundly anti-Islamic terrorist organization. 

Now, to be clear: ISIL continues to commit vicious crimes and it still controls 

more territory than al-Qaeda ever did. It will be years, not months, before it is defeated. But our coalition is already making a big difference. 

To date, we have launched more than 1,100 air strikes against ISIL targets. 

These operations have reduced ISIL’s leadership, undermined its propaganda, 

squeezed its resources, damaged its logistical and operational capabilities, and compelled it to disperse its forces and change its tactics. It is becoming clear that the 

combination of coalition air strikes and local ground partners is a potent one. In 

fact, virtually every time a local Iraqi force has worked in coordination with our air 

cover, they’ve not only defeated ISIL; they’ve routed ISIL. 

In Iraq, progress also continues in the political arena. Last week, after years of 

intensive efforts, the government in Baghdad reached an interim accord with the 

Kurdistan Regional Government on hydrocarbon exports and revenue-sharing. That 

is good for the country’s economy but even more for its unity and stability. In addition, the new Defense Minister is a Sunni whose appointment was an important 

step toward a more inclusive government. With his leadership and that of the new 

Interior Minister, the process of reforming the nation’s security forces has a genuine 

chance for success. 

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister is taking bold steps to improve relations with his 

country’s neighbors—and those neighbors including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and 

Turkey—have been responding. It’s too early to declare a new era in regional relations, but countries that had been drifting apart are in the process of coming 

together. That’s helpful to our coalition and bad news for ISIL. 

10 

Beating back the threat that ISIL poses to Iraq is job No. 1 for our Iraqi partners 

and for our coalition. But even if the government in Baghdad fulfills its responsibilities, it will still face a dire challenge because of events in Syria. 

If you recall, the coalition’s decision to carry out air strikes in Syria came in 

response to a request from Iraq for help in defending against ISIL’s brazen attack. 

To date, we and our Arab partners have conducted over 500 airstrikes in Syria, 

targeting areas where ISIL has concentrated its fighters and on command and control nodes, finance centers, training camps, and oil refineries. Our objective is to further degrade ISIL’s capabilities and to deny it the freedom of movement and resupply it had previously enjoyed. 

At the same time, we will continue to build up the capabilities of the moderate 

opposition. And here I want to thank the members of this committee and many others in Congress who have so strongly supported these efforts. Our goal is to help 

the moderate forces stabilize areas under their control; defend civilians; empower 

them to go on the offensive against ISIL; and promote the conditions for a negotiated political transition. 

Mr. Chairman, we all know that ISIL is a threat to America’s security and interests. It poses an unacceptable danger to our personnel and facilities in Iraq and 

elsewhere. It seeks to destroy both the short and long term stability of the broader 

Middle East. And it is exacerbating a refugee crisis that has placed a terrible economic and political burden on our friends and allies in the region. 

One thing is certain. ISIL will continue to spread until it is stopped. So there 

should be no question that we, with our partners, have a moral duty and a profound 

interest in stopping them. 

That is where the fight against ISIL now stands. A coalition that 21⁄2 months ago 

did not even exist is now taking the fight to the enemy. It was cobbled together by 

strong American leadership and by steady, intensive diplomacy with countries that 

disagree on many things, but share an aversion to extremism. I think all of you 

would agree: we need to summon that same determination to find common ground 

here in Washington. 

That is why, in the hours, days, and weeks to come, we are determined to work 

with you first and foremost to develop an approach that can generate broad, bipartisan support, while ensuring the President has the flexibility he needs to successfully prosecute this effort. 

What do we envision? Importantly—we do not think an AUMF should include a 

geographic limitation. We don’t anticipate conducting operations in countries other 

than Iraq or Syria. But to the extent that ISIL poses a threat to American interests 

and personnel in other countries, we would not want an AUMF to constrain our 

ability to use appropriate force against ISIL in those locations if necessary. In our 

view, it would be a mistake to advertise to ISIL that there are safe havens for them 

outside of Iraq and Syria. 

On the issue of combat operations: I know that this is hotly debated, with passionate and persuasive arguments on both sides. The President has been clear that 

his policy is that U.S. military forces will not be deployed to conduct ground combat 

operations against ISIL. That will be the responsibility of local forces because that 

is what our local partners and allies want, what is best for preserving our coalition 

and, most importantly, what is in the best interest of the United States. 

However, while we certainly believe this is the soundest policy, and while the 

President has been clear he’s open to clarifications on the use of U.S. combat troops 

to be outlined in an AUMF, that does not mean we should preemptively bind the 

hands of the Commander in Chief—or our commanders in the field—in responding 

to scenarios and contingencies that are impossible to foresee. 

Finally, with respect to duration, we can be sure that this confrontation will not 

be over quickly. We understand, however, the desire of many to avoid a completely 

open-ended authorization. I note that Chairman Menendez has suggested a 3-year 

limitation; we support that proposal, subject to provisions for extension that we 

would be happy to discuss. 

To sum up, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I ask for your help and 

support in approving—on a bipartisan basis—an Authorization for Use of Military 

Force in connection with our campaign and that of our many partners to defeat a 

terrible and dangerous enemy. 

Almost a quarter-century ago, when I was a 47-year-old Senator with a darker 

head of hair, President George H.W. Bush sent his Secretary of State, James Baker, 

to ask this committee for the authority to respond militarily to the Iraqi invasion 

of Kuwait. The country was divided. Congress was divided. But this committee 

drafted an authorization and it passed the Congress with a majority that the New 

York Times described as ‘‘decisive and bipartisan.’’ Armed with that mandate, Secretary Baker built the coalition that won the first gulf war. 

11 

That was a different time and a different conflict that called for a different 

response. But it was also this body at its bipartisan best—and what we need from 

you today, to strengthen and unify our own coalition. The world will be watching 

what we together are willing and able to do. This is obviously not a partisan issue; 

it is a leadership issue. It is a test of our government’s ability and our Nation’s ability to stand together. It is a test of our generation’s resolve to build a safer and 

more secure world. I know every one of you wants to defeat ISIL. A bold, bipartisan 

mandate would strengthen our hand, and I hope we can move closer to that today. 

Thank you, and now I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might 

have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me just say 

there is, I think, undoubtedly, and I will let members express 

themselves, there is a bold, bipartisan view that we need to defeat 

ISIL. I think there is no debate about that. Virtually every political 

element of the spectrum, from those who might be considered 

dovish to those who might be considered hawkish and everybody in 

between, I think has a common collective goal of defeating ISIL. 

Now, I must say that the administration has not sent us 5, 6 

months into this engagement an AUMF. And had the administration sent us an AUMF, maybe we would be better versed as to 

what the administration seeks or does not seek, and that would be 

the subject of congressional debate. But that has not happened. 

And with reference to my distinguished ranking member’s comments, you know, if we wait for that and it is not forthcoming by 

this or any other administration, then the absence of getting an 

AUMF from the executive branch and Congress not acting because 

it is waiting for an AUMF from the Executive would, in essence, 

create a de facto veto of the constitutional prerogative and responsibilities that the Congress has. And so, there are many of us on 

the committee who in the absence of receiving an AUMF for the 

purposes of understanding the administration’s views felt that it is 

Congress’ responsibility to move forward and define it. 

Now, no one has worked harder in the last 2 years as the chairman of this committee to make this a bipartisan effort, not just on 

that AUMF, but across the spectrum, and I am proud to say that 

working with the ranking member we have virtually passed out 

every major piece of legislation on some of the most critical issues 

on our time from the AUMF, on Syria, and the use of chemical 

weapons, to OAS reform, to North Korea, to Iran. On a whole host 

of issues, they have been bipartisan. Virtually every nomination, 

except, I think, for three of hundreds, have largely been on a bipartisan basis. So there is no one who has driven harder in this process. 

But there are some principled views here that may not be reconcilable. And it starts with when the administration itself, and I 

think you have reiterated what you said earlier in your previous 

visit here, that the President has been clear that his policy is that 

the United States military forces will not be deployed to conduct 

ground combat operations against ISIL, that it will be the responsibility of local forces because that is what our local partners and allies want, what is best for preserving our coalition and, most importantly, what is in the best interests of the United States. 

Now, there are those members of the committee and in the Congress who have a much different view than that. They would have 

a very robust and open-ended use of combat forces in this regard. 

And if the administration wants that, then it should come forth 

12 

and ask for that. But based upon your testimony and based upon 

what the President wants, or has said that he wants, I reject the 

characterization of my text as something that is constraining to the 

President. My text gives the administration the ability to do everything it is doing now and then some. 

The text makes clear that activities on the ground for the protection and rescue of members of the U.S. Armed Forces would be allowed; that activities on the ground in support of intelligence collection and sharing would be allowed; that activities on the ground 

to enable airstrikes by identifying appropriate targets would be allowed; that activities on the ground that support operational planning would be allowed; and that activities on the ground, including 

advice and assistance through forces fighting ISIL in Iraq or Syria, 

would be allowed. Obviously airstrikes would be allowed. 

So everything that the administration is doing and has said that 

it seeks to do and has said, using the President’s own words when 

he said, which we incorporated into the AUMF when he said—the 

President articulated five lines of effort in the campaign to counter 

ISIL, including supporting regional military partners, stopping the 

flow of foreign fighters, cutting off ISIL’s access to financing, addressing urgent humanitarian needs, and contesting ISIL’s messaging. 

Nothing in this AUMF constrains the administration or the 

President’s efforts in any of that regard. Now, indeed authorizing 

U.S. ground troops is a subject of debate here, but my text precludes America from being dragged into another unlimited and 

unending war in the Middle East. It does preclude the deployment 

of large-scale combat forces, which was done in Iraq, I think, at 

great cost and far too great a cost in my view. 

So unless I hear something differently, how would you have us 

reconcile the view of some members of this committee who want 

combat forces to ultimately enter into Iraq and maybe Syria as 

well, versus the President’s own stated view that that is not what 

either we or our allies want? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me say I 

am not characterizing your bill negatively whatsoever. I think it is 

very close to what the President could support, with the exception 

of a few of the things that I mentioned, but those are a few. I 

mean, you have done a good job of pulling together a broad authorization. And there is a sort of fundamental core that the administration would absolutely support. What I mentioned are a few 

things that we think we ought to be able to reconcile with some 

work amongst ourselves. 

But I think that the President feels, first of all, that with respect 

to when and the timing of this, I am here to work with you on behalf of the administration to get this done. And the President has 

said all along he wants an AUMF, and there is nothing in the law 

that requires the administration to be the initiator of that. And as 

I have pointed out to you, there is past record of this committee 

taking the lead in drafting it. We are delighted to have your draft, 

and we think it is a good draft. 

But, as I suggested to you, we believe, number one, in principle 

and, number two, in practice in certain situations there are limitations on the choices to the President because none of us can imagVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:16 Aug 26, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE H
13 

ine all of the circumstances that may arise. You know, would a hostage attempt have been permitted? What happens if chemical 

weapons fall into the hands of ISIL, or about to, and there is an 

emergency need to prevent that from happening because there is 

a cache that was not reported that we discovered through intelligence? 

The CHAIRMAN. The response to that would be an open-ended authorization that would give the President the wherewithal to do 

any of those and any other things, and, well, not only this President who has 2 years on his term, but whoever would be elected 

by the American people as the next President of the United States 

for another year under the authorization as we envision it. And the 

reason we gave 3 years is because the President himself has said 

this is a multiyear campaign. We would get past this administration. We would give a year to the new President to come forth and 

talk about how the war should be prosecuted. 

Secretary KERRY. But let me suggest this, Mr. Chairman, because, again, we want to get a broad-based vote. You said some of 

this may be irreconcilable. You know, I am not sure that it ought 

to be irreconcilable because the President could not have been more 

clear about his policy. No one that I know of is in some favor of 

some open-ended effort, and we have just accepted the idea of the 

limitation of time with some capacity for review that we ought to 

work on together so it is sensible. But, you know, it seems to me 

that there is no way to go through all of the hypotheticals, and you 

simply wind up tying the hands—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it sounds to me like you are making a case 

for a rather open-ended authorization, which if that is what the administration wants, it should say it. But, you know, I would just 

simply—— 

Secretary KERRY. No, no, no, absolutely—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I would simply say to the Secretary that, in fact, 

the very elements of what the President described as the strategy 

has been rejected by members, particularly on the other side of the 

aisle, saying they do not believe that that is a strategy that can 

succeed. That is a question of debate, but they believe that is not 

a strategy that can succeed. 

Secretary KERRY. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN. And they believe, as I am sure you will hear as 

this unfolds, that there are those members who believe that the 

only way to achieve with this strategy is to have combat forces and 

the President having the wherewithal to issue those. So, yes, we 

cannot imagine every single circumstance, and we think the language has made it sufficiently broad for the President to engage in 

everything—— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, here’s what—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. But the use of long-term combat 

troops on the ground, which, of course, is totally different than 

what the President has said. 

Secretary KERRY. What I suggest, Mr. Chairman, because I think 

it is a much better way of trying to resolve this because we are not 

going to be able to exhaust all hypotheticals and resolve that sort 

of philosophic debate, is if we sit down very specifically and work 

14 

through what may be the best balance of this that might be able 

to bring people from both sides to the table. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we would—I am always—— 

Secretary KERRY. The important thing is a broad-based—— 

The CHAIRMAN. We are always open to that, and, in fact, we have 

shared several drafts with the White House chief counsel on this 

issue as we have with the rest of the administration. But to be very 

honest with you, we get relatively little in response, so if there is 

a desire to have language that can accomplish the mutual goal, we 

are certainly willing and open to receive it. But in the absence of 

it—the absence of language does not—is not going to create a permanent veto of the committee’s actions, of the Members of the Senate’s actions, and the administration needs to know that. But—— 

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman, I want you to know 100 percent, President Obama has no intention of sending combat troops 

in, but he believes, and I believe, and I think all of us share the 

sense that there is a way to come together to work through how 

do we resolve this difference in a way that is not open-ended, but 

I think putting a time limit on it is serious statement about the 

administration—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you know, there is a famous movie that 

says show me the money. I would say show me the language, and 

maybe we could get there. 

Senator Corker. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let us work on it. That is the point. 

Senator CORKER. I find this conversation interesting. I would say 

that I do believe that what the Secretary just said is true, and that 

is that if we sat down, understood what authority the President, 

the White House, Secretary of State is seeking, I believe there is 

a way for us to craft legislation that would be bipartisan, but, more 

importantly, craft legislation that the administration supports. I 

mean, passing legislation—passing a bill out of this committee or 

an authorization is one thing. Passing something on the House and 

Senate floor is quite another. And the only way that is going to 

happen is if the administration is firmly behind what we do. 

And, again, I would just say to every member here, I think it is 

harmful to our Nation to begin the process of an authorization and 

not see it through to the end, and I thought the last effort harmed 

us greatly. And so, again, I understand the frustration by the 

chairman. I realize he has tried to have witnesses up here. It has 

not occurred. But I do believe sitting down with the Secretary and 

sitting down with the general counsel at the White House as we 

did last time, I believe that we can come up with authorization 

that passes the test for the bulk of the members of this committee 

and actually enacted into law. 

Let me ask this question. Do you believe the administration 

today has the authorities that it needs to carry out the operations 

that it is carrying out? 

Secretary KERRY. Very clearly, yes. 

Senator CORKER. So I will say there are some members of this 

committee that believe otherwise, and believe that the best way we 

can be effective in making ourselves relevant is just to pass legislation that makes what you are doing legal, and somehow that 

makes us relevant. That is beyond me. I do not see how that is the 

15 

case. It seems to me that part of what is missing here is an understanding, so I do not think I am in the place that the chairman 

characterizes many of the folks on our side of the aisle. 

What I would like to understand is how we are going to go about 

ensuring that we have an outcome here that is worthy of the effort. 

Again, I go back to what I said in the opening comments. We have 

had multiple efforts since World War II that just candidly did not 

end well. They did not produce the outcomes. That is how you 

made your name in the public world was talking about that. And 

I would just say that for all of us to conduct a situation where we 

pass an AUMF, I think it would be good to understand how the administration is going to go about it. 

And so, let me ask you this. Is the strategy evolving, yes or no? 

The strategy of how you are going to go about this evolving. 

Secretary KERRY. Well—— 

Senator CORKER. Are you building—are you building on successes right now to try to more—are we going to go against Assad? 

Let me just ask you that question since—— 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. Well, let me—look—— 

Senator CORKER. Do we plan to militarily go against Assad? 

Secretary KERRY. Not at this moment, no. 

Senator CORKER. Do we—do you think—— 

Secretary KERRY. Can I—let me answer the question a little 

more fully so you understand. When you say do we plan to go militarily against Assad, do we, the United States, plan at this moment 

to attack Assad as part of this? No. We are asking—— 

Senator CORKER. Not as part of this. 

Secretary KERRY. We are not asking for—we are asking for an 

ISIL-oriented authorization. 

Senator CORKER. Are you going explicitly ask—are you going to 

explicitly ask for that? 

Secretary KERRY. Let me just finish. But we are heavily engaged, 

thanks to you and the passage of the $500 million authorization 

and now the training and equip effort that is—all the ground work 

is being laid now, in addition to other things that you are aware 

of, to support those who are engaged in the fight against Assad directly. And many of our coalition partners are particularly focused 

on the Assad component of the equation. So when I say are we the 

United States? No, and certainly not as part of this authorization, 

but as part of the policy. But let me—let me try to help you here 

a little bit here on this. We—— 

Senator CORKER. Help me this way. Are you going to ever explicitly seek an authorization from Congress? 

Secretary KERRY. We are seeking authorization now with respect 

to—— 

Senator CORKER. You are—and if you do not receive that authorization, will you continue the operation? That is an explicit seeking. 

So are you—— 

Secretary KERRY. The authorization for what we are doing now 

in both Iraq and Syria? 

Senator CORKER. That is correct. 

Secretary KERRY. Absolutely we will continue it because we believe we have full authority under the 2001 AUMF and parts of the 

2002. But here is where I want to help if I can. 

16 

Senator CORKER. Good. 

Secretary KERRY. If Congress passes a new Daesh-specific 

AUMF, we will support the inclusion of language in the new 

AUMF that will clarify that the Daesh-specific AUMF rather than 

the 2001 AUMF is the basis for the use of military force. And I 

think that will comfort to a lot of people. Number two, we will also 

support the repeal of the 2002 AUMF as part of an effort to clarify 

that the ISIL-specific AUMF would be the only source of legitimacy 

for the use of military force against Daesh. And, therefore, we 

would live under the confines of what we pass here. And I think 

that is a pretty, you know, clear and important addition to this discussion. 

Senator CORKER. So, do you plan to send us a draft that does 

these things from which to work off of? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, in all fairness, we think that the chairman has a draft, which obviously there are some differences of 

opinion about parts of it. We have a difference of opinion about 

part of it. For instance, there is a component which is more of a 

technical fix which refers to the—includes the forces that are included in—you know, associated forces. And we believe that the 

fighting alongside language that has been interpreted out of the 

2001 AUMF is important to a full explanation of how we can fight 

this effectively. So there are technical fixes like that. But the fundamental draft that the committee has is a fair starting point, and 

we propose we work from there. 

Senator CORKER. So what you are proposing is that the administration begin to engage more fully with Congress to develop an 

AUMF using some language that has been drafted, but to edit and 

change that in such a way that you believe more fully addresses 

the issue we are talking about. Is that correct? 

Secretary KERRY. I am not proposing, Senator. I am here doing 

it. 

Senator CORKER. Okay. 

Secretary KERRY. And we are ready to—— 

Senator CORKER. And so, what do you think would be the appropriate timeframe to work through all of that? I know that many of 

us would like—— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I think over the course of the next days. 

I mean, let us—I do not think it is going to be finished by Thursday or Friday, but I think that we could engage in this effort over 

the next days, and as we come back in early January, let us—— 

Senator CORKER. And do you think it would be helpful—— 

Secretary KERRY. Believe me, we are anxious to operate with— 

this helps everybody. 

Senator CORKER. Yes, I actually—— 

Secretary KERRY. This is an important effort for the Congress, an 

important effort for the country—— 

Senator CORKER. Other than not explicitly asking for an authorization, to be candid, I very much appreciate what you are saying, 

and think it is exactly the way we should go about it, and I appreciate you coming up here. I know there are Members on the other 

side of the aisle that feel very differently about that and feel that 

we should act this week, and I understand that and appreciate it. 

I plan to conduct myself in a way, again, that we do not harden 

17 

ourselves against each other prior to the first of the year when we 

are a little more closer to the line. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, if we could do it in the next days, we 

are not trying to not do it. 

Senator CORKER. Well, I mean, I think most of us would like to 

hear from the Pentagon. I mean, you are talking about boots on the 

ground, and I think that would be a helpful thing to hear about. 

And I think having some intelligence briefings, and typically, 

again, we would sit down with the general counsel from the White 

House and the State Department to work through the language. 

But I appreciate you coming here. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator CORKER. And I understand where we are, and hopefully 

we will move toward a real bipartisan authorization that most of 

us can get behind. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. Secretary Kerry, thank you for the 

work you do. You know, I believe President Obama has the authority to go after ISIL because I voted to give any President the authority to go after the outgrowth of al-Qaeda, so I feel he has got 

it. But having said that, this is a threat to humanity that I do not 

think humankind has seen before, so I am assuming you understand why many of us want to go on record on this. 

As a former Senator, can you just understand that, not getting 

into the details, which I personally think our chairman, working 

specifically with all of us here, and particularly Senator Kaine, has 

worked so hard to get something that I think reflects exactly what 

the President said he wanted. But I will not get into the details 

with you because, you know what, that is our job to vote. Now, it 

is your job to do something else, and you do it well, but we have 

got to do our job. 

So I just say from the standpoint of a former Senator, you understand then why so many of us would like to go on record on this 

threat. Is that correct? 

Secretary KERRY. Absolutely, Senator. I have total respect for it, 

and I understand it, and I welcome it. 

Senator BOXER. Right. 

Secretary KERRY. The President does, too. I mean, again, I want 

to—— 

Senator BOXER. Because let me be clear—— 

Secretary KERRY. The President wants an AUMF. 

Senator BOXER. Well, let me be clear. He may have it from a majority of this committee today, and I am hoping it can be bipartisan. The last time he got it was more of a bipartisan vote, and 

it had to do with Syria, and this committee acted with our chairman and ranking member. And we set forward an AUMF that had 

limitations on it, and it had a tremendous impact. We did not wait 

to talk and talk and talk because we knew that Assad had these 

chemical weapons, and as a result of our vote, even without it 

going to the floor—I say to my friend, Senator Corker, even without 

it going to the floor, it had a salutary effect on what happened. 

So I want to talk to you about an amazing hearing I had with 

Senator Paul this morning about ISIL, about their brutality and 

their abuses specifically. We had an amazing panel, including a 

18 

woman who is the only Yazidi Member of Parliament, talk to us 

about what it is like. And I want to place in the record an article 

that appeared today in the Daily Beast, and it is taken from sort 

of a question and answer—it is unbelievable—that answers questions of the recruits as they come into ISIL, or Daesh, or whatever 

we want to call them. And I will defer to you eventually on what 

we settle on. But can I put this in the record? 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Senator BOXER. Okay. I am going to give you a sample. These 

questions are disgusting, so I just want people to not to be upset 

with me, but I think we cannot, you know, not talk about this. So 

here is one question: ‘‘Can all unbelieving women be taken captive?’’ Answer: ‘‘There is no dispute among the scholars that it is 

permissible to capture unbelieving women.’’ Question: ‘‘Is it permissible to have intercourse with a female captive?’’ Answer: ‘‘It is permissible to have sexual intercourse with a female captive.’’ And 

then they quote Allah because if you do you are free from blame. 

Question five: ‘‘Is it permissible to have intercourse with a female 

captive immediately after taking possession [of her]?’’ Answer: ‘‘If 

she is a virgin, he [her master]’’—her master—‘‘can have intercourse with her immediately after taking possession of her. However, if she is not, her uterus must be purified [first].’’ 

This is disgusting garbage. And I will tell you, I understand your 

desire to put this off, to control it. I need to be on record because 

of what I am learning. Then they say their ‘‘knife will continue the 

strike the necks of Americans.’’ They will ‘‘quench their thirst for 

American blood.’’ This language is evil. It is vicious. And as Assistant Secretary Tom Malinowski from your administration, said 

today, when it comes to being terrorists, they are in a league of 

their own. So, and I know there are—Senator Johnson was there. 

He asked really good questions, and basically he was making a 

good point. He said, look, there are so many other groups out there. 

So he is concerned, and he will speak for himself. But my point is, 

and I made the point today, I was a kid growing up in the inner 

city, and if you got the biggest bully on the block, that helped a 

lot with the rest of the bullies. 

So I just want to make a point to you. I have read what our 

chairman has written. There is a lot of room here for flexibility. 

Please look at it, Mr. Secretary. I think it is very important. 

I did not vote to go to war in Iraq, and I treasure the fact that 

I voted no. This cannot be boots on the ground, another invasion, 

and the rest. It cannot be. And if it is, I will not vote for it. But 

I think what the President is doing, which is to work with others 

on the ground, particularly, for example, the Kurds, and hopefully 

we can do it with the Syrian moderates. I know there is a lot of 

debate about whether there are any moderates left. Some say there 

are, some say there are not. But I think that we are on the right 

track here. 

And I am sad, frankly, that we have not been able to work with 

you to craft something together, but I understand you want to do 

more work. You want to bring in more parties. I have no problem 

with that. But I just want to say to you, I hope you understand the 

passion with which everyone that I have talked to views this question. And I hope the administration will not take it as some kind 

19 

of act of—an unconstitutional act if we go ahead today without you, 

because if you read the Constitution, it is clear what our responsibilities are. 

And I just hope you will take it if we do pass this, and I hope 

we do, to codify exactly what the President said, that instead of 

being concerned about it, as I think you are a little concerned 

about it. Hopefully you can embrace it, and that you can work with 

us to make it better. But I do not think we should put this off because I am done—I have got to go on record. My constituents expect me to go on record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. John—Mr. Secretary, thank you for coming 

today. We do truly appreciate you coming here to talk to us about 

this. We have been anxious to do it for some time. So that the 

record is clear here, you are here in front of us today on behalf of 

the President of the United States asking for an AUMF, is that correct? 

Secretary KERRY. Correct. 

Senator RISCH. Okay. Is there a reason this has taken so long? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we asked for an AUMF last time I was 

here in September, and we are prepared to work and have an 

AUMF. 

Senator RISCH. But this is a different situation now than you 

were here in September. 

Secretary KERRY. I know, but, you know, Senator, I think you 

have got to look at what has been going on here. Mosul fell 6 

months ago tomorrow. And the first thing the President did, and, 

in fact, we started reacting in January, we took our ISR flights up 

from 1 a day—from 1 a month to 60 a day way back. We started 

pouring in additional supplies, and we realized, you know, that we 

had a different kind of threat. No one quite anticipated the fold 

that took place in Mosul and so forth and the march toward Baghdad, but since then that has been stopped in its tracks, pushed 

back. 

And the point I am making is that the first step was to get a 

government in Iraq that you could work with. 

Senator RISCH. But I guess—— 

Secretary KERRY. And so there was a period of months there, and 

then we got into September, and since then we have said we want 

an AUMF, and we are prepared to work to do it. 

Senator RISCH. Well, you know, this is the first time anybody has 

come in front of this committee to ask for an AUMF. A letter from 

the President would have been responded to, and certainly if someone like yourself would have come up here and said, look, this is 

what we want to do. But I guess what aggravates me about this 

is, you know, our enemies have got to be looking at this and saying, 

look at what is going on over there, because this should not be— 

this is not a Republican-Democrat thing. This really is not a first 

branch versus the second branch thing, although certainly there 

are some undertones of that. 

But we need to work together on this thing. I am with the chairman on, I guess, feeling aggravated that this thing is playing out 

like this. We ought to all be pulling the wagon together on this. 

This is a serious American problem, not a Congress versus PresiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:16 Aug 26, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE H
20 

dent problem, not a Republican-Democrat problem. So you can understand our frustration on this, and admittedly we do have a difference in what the roles are of each party. 

The Founding Fathers were very wise when they put in the 

hands of the first branch of government the power to declare war, 

and not give it to the second branch, which is the military branch— 

one of their responsibilities is military. So we take this seriously, 

and I think the American people take this seriously. It has certainly served us very well over the years. But let me ask this. If 

Senator Menendez’s passes, if his resolution passes, will the President sign that? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I have not asked the President whether 

he will sign it or not because the President is hopeful that since 

we generally agree with it, we can work through the differences 

that do exist. And the President wants to preserve the flexibility 

that he believes we need, and that is within the prerogative of the 

President. But he is prepared to work with you to try to see—we 

are all prepared to work to try to arrive at an understanding of 

how we can do that. 

Senator RISCH. And obviously we have—we have some disagreements in that regard since he—if he believes that the 2001 resolution gives him the authority to do what he is doing now, we have 

a basic disagreement on that, and that, again, is why I think the 

Founding Fathers gave us, the first branch of government, the authority to do this. And I guess the question—what would be your 

opinion as to whether or not the President would sign Senator 

Menendez’s resolution if we pass this this week? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I am not going to, at this point, suggest 

that I will share with you the advice I will give the President with 

respect to whether he should veto it or not veto it or what his 

choices might be if it came to the President. I really think that we 

are missing the point, though, Senator Risch, if that is sort of the 

road we go. From the moment I opened my mouth here today I 

have said to you, and I meant this as does the President, we do 

not want a bare minimum majority here, and I do not think you 

want one that way. We need to have a resounding vote in which 

we are all agreed that we have got the right mix here, and we 

ought to all be committed to working toward that. I am. 

This should not be a, you know, a partisan vote or even an ideologically divided one. I am convinced we can get there. I mean, generally speaking, the chairman’s proposal, as I say, has covered a lot 

of the bases, but we think the President does need some flexibility 

that is not reflected in it. I think he is owed that constitutionally, 

though we are not here to make the constitutional argument because we do not want to get trapped into that. 

We want to try to get into a place where we find a reasonable 

way to have the level of flexibility necessary that meets the needs 

of everybody to know you are not voting for something open-ended, 

you are not creating a slip—you know, a loophole for the President 

to do something you do not want him to do. I do not think anybody 

wants to get into a long-term ground operation here, but we also 

do not want to hamstring the generals and the commanders in the 

field and the President who is the Commander in Chief from their 

21 

ability to be able to make some decision they need to make. And 

that does not need to take you into a long-standing operation. 

Senator RISCH. Let me ask you this. Are you concerned at all 

about the mechanics of this? I mean, it is highly unlikely we are 

going to be able to pass an AUMF through both houses during this 

week. And so, then we are gone until the first of the year. What 

message do that—are you concerned about the message that that 

sends? 

Secretary KERRY. You know—— 

Senator RISCH. Because I am with you. I mean, everybody needs 

to get behind this in one fashion or another and get to express 

their opinions on it. But here we are now where the request is before us, but it is probably not going to get done. How does that affect things, in your opinion? 

Secretary KERRY. To be truthful with you, Senator, I do not believe that that is going to be read as anything except what it is, 

which is a legitimate process and discussion to get the right end 

result, and I do not think anybody has any doubt that we are going 

to get the end result. The fact is that we are going to continue this 

operation because the President and the administration are absolutely convinced, and I respect your opinion, we have the authority. 

There is no question about it because the 2001 resolution addressed itself to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. The 

courts have actually already decided this in the context of our habeas decisions that have been made. So all three branches of government are actually in agreement fundamentally that the 2001 

AUMF applies to al-Qaeda. 

ISIL, Daesh, you know, again, I prefer Daesh because I know 

that the Arab world has a real meaning with that, and I think we 

ought to respect that. But the fact is that they fully understand 

that we are on the track we are on, and in my judgment, everybody 

knows that this group merely changed its name. But it was alQaeda in Iraq, and it has been al-Qaeda in Iraq from 2004, 2005, 

and on, and everything it has done is al-Qaeda in Iraq. And there 

is no question that we authorized this government to go after alQaeda wherever they were. And we are doing that in Yemen. We 

are doing that in Iraq. We are doing that now in Syria, the 

Khorasan group. Those are all part of the same, and that authorization fits. 

But we agree—we have—we have an argument—I mean, there 

is a nonargument here. We agree with you that it is better to have 

a new AUMF, and I have come to you and said we will absolutely 

scuttle the—you know, we would like to refine the 2001 for the period of time we need it, but we will show that this particular authorization is not based on 2001 any longer. It is based on what 

we are doing here. And that is, I think, a major statement frankly. 

Senator RISCH. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would just remind all colleagues that amendments are in order, so if there are those who believe there is a better way to perfect the present text, we certainly can take it up, and 

consider it, and debate it, and vote on it. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. I think 

your testimony has been extremely helpful, and I thank you for 

22 

that. There is much more in agreement here than in disagreement. 

I think there is total agreement that Daesh or ISIL is a barbaric 

terrorist organization, that we are right in our campaign against 

them, and that Congress and administration are on the same pages 

in regards to the legitimate use of force to stop this evil, and to 

stop its funding, and to stop its ability to cause instability in the 

region. So we are in agreement on that. 

We are also in agreement that Congress and the administration 

need to work together. We are always stronger when we speak with 

a united voice. We are now in agreement that we need an authorization for the use of military force that will allow you to continue 

to conduct the campaign the President has stated that he is doing. 

I think there is agreement on that. There is agreement on the 2001 

and 2002 authorizations—that 2002 needs to be repealed, and 2001 

needs to be modified as it relates to Daesh. We are in agreement 

on that. We are also in agreement with the administration that it 

should be a time-limited authorization. So I really do think there 

is a great deal that we agree on, and I thank you. Your testimony 

has helped us. 

But understand that there are some fundamental differences, 

and I really do think those fundamental differences rest with the 

separation of powers and the branches of government. I do believe 

in the War Powers Act. I do believe that Congress has the constitutional responsibility to declare war and to authorize the use of our 

military forces. I do believe that, and I do believe there have been 

too many months that have gone by and Congress has a responsibility to weigh in. 

So here is, I guess, the point I want to make, and I would love 

to have your response. The reason why I am so concerned about 

the language that we put in this authorization being too broad is 

the explanation you have given that the 2001 authorization clearly 

authorizes the use of force against Daesh. Let me just read the authorization. I was part of Congress at the time, as several members 

of this panel were. ‘‘The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 

or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 

the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any further 

attacks and acts of international terrorism against the United 

States by such nations, organizations, or persons.’’ 

I go through reading that because I think back that if we would 

have thought after 13 years and after so much of our military battles that were taking place in Afghanistan and Iraq, that this authorization could be used today in the way that it is being used, 

I think Congress would have drafted different authorization in 

2001. So I think it is our responsibility to make sure that we draft 

this authorization appropriately, recognizing that the President has 

article 2 powers to deal with the unexpected uncertainties. 

If we are going to give you authority to deal with everything we 

do not know about, then we might as well just repeal the War Powers Act and change the Constitution and give the administration 

all this power. You can always come back to Congress and seek additional authorization. So I guess I would urge you and would like 

to get your response as a former member of this committee, former 

23 

chairman of this committee. Yes, we want to work together. We 

agree on what we are trying to accomplish, but you must recognize 

the responsibility that we have in this Congress in the authorizations that we pass, and help us draft an authorization that allows 

you to do what you need to do. But it will not cover every contingency in the world because that why we meet and we are here, and 

we can modify authorizations. 

So it would be extremely helpful if you could help us with that 

language—particularly in the two areas that seems like we are in 

disagreement on geography and contingencies on the use of forces. 

And I would hope that you would give us further clarification on 

those two points so that we can be together and speak with a 

united voice. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, I appreciate and respect your 

position and your long history of clarity on these kinds of issues in 

the Senate and the work we did together on these things. But I do 

disagree with you with respect, and respectfully, that the 2001 

AUMF does not authorize this, and let me just tell you why. 

I think you know that what happened started in 2001; 2002 you 

kind of get going with the program; 2002 and 2004 it was continuing. We had, as you know, a Presidential race in 2004 that had 

a certain debate about this issue. And the fact is that it was in 

2004 specifically that ISIL came into our focus and was targeted 

as what it was, and at that time, Osama bin Laden publicly endorsed the group as the al-Qaeda official affiliate in Iraq. And so, 

we—you know, had a formal affiliation with al-Qaeda, and that is 

when we began to take it on. We did take it on. Our troops in Iraq 

took it on. We were fighting it all of that time. It is a little late 

to come back and say we did not have the authorization to fight 

it in 2014 when a whole bunch of folks died fighting it and we put 

our efforts into it. 

Now, they changed their name. Are we going to suggest that any 

group out there has the right to veto your authorization of use of 

force because they changed their name? That would be ridiculous. 

It would give terrorist organizations the right to get out from under 

just by changing a name. This is the same group. These are the 

same people with the stamp and imprimatur of support by Osama 

bin Laden, and we have been fighting them since 2004. 

So I do not think there is a question about 2001, but we are actually wasting our time to go back and fight about 2001. Why do I 

say that? Because, number one, we agree we have to refine it. 

Number two, we agree we need an AUMF. Number three, we want 

an AUMF that becomes the exclusive vehicle of authority not relying on—— 

Senator CARDIN. Yes, I said we agree on that, but where we need 

help are the two areas where we disagree. I do not want to—— 

Secretary KERRY. On geographic location you said. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, there is no geographic limitation—only 

one area. Thanks for correcting me. It is just really one area then 

it seems like. 

Secretary KERRY. Right. 

Senator CARDIN. I am a little bit confused then. If that is the 

only area we are in disagreement—— 

24 

Secretary KERRY. Well, there are two areas that I have singled 

out. One is in the definition regarding associated forces. We believe 

that that requires you to make a definition of ideological association or other kind of affiliation, and we believe that gets very complicated, certainly for a commander in the field or for an instant 

decision about retaliation or so forth. So we want something that 

encompasses the notion of fighting alongside with, which is the language that has been used in the interpretation of the 2001 AUMF. 

And that is what we have applied today in our application of force. 

That is not there. So we wanted the clarity with respect to that, 

but that is more of a technical fix. 

The biggest sort of challenge here is what is the appropriate level 

of restraint on the President of the United States as Commander 

in Chief, and Congress’ micromanaging of what the military can do 

and cannot do in the context of its fights. That is all. And none of 

that should challenge the fundamental prohibition the President 

has placed on himself that he does not plan to send combat forces 

in to be part of this battle against Daesh. So I think there is a way 

here to protect you with some kind of notification perhaps, a requirement. 

Senator CARDIN. Just let me point out for the record, a 3-year authorization goes into the next administration, so—— 

Secretary KERRY. And we thought that was appropriate. 

Senator CARDIN. And we agree, but it is important to be very 

clear about the authorization. 

Secretary KERRY. And we thought it was appropriate that it gave 

whoever is the next President a year to be able to get in place, get 

all their people in place, make the judgments necessary, but then 

have some kind of trigger that requires it to be, you know, evaluated in some way. I mean, we are yet to sort of finalize all that. 

I do not want to do it here now, but let us work on precisely what 

that ought to be, how it works for both of us so you have a sense 

that you have got what you need, which is a restraint on the openendedness, and the President has what he needs is the flexibility 

to be able to do this properly. And that is a great constitutional 

balance I think. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just for the record, and I think Senator Cardin 

recognizes this, but since there are others who will be reporting 

and many who are listening, we have no geographic limitation in 

the AUMF that we have written. So that, of course, is not an issue. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being 

here today, Mr. Secretary. At the outset let me say that I have 

shared your concern about the release of the CIA report today that 

was put out by the Senate Intelligence Committee, and I would 

hope, and I am sure, that the State Department is taking all the 

appropriate measures to safeguard the security of our personnel in 

our facilities around the world. 

Let me now pivot to the subject of today’s hearing. Today you 

have outlined a pretty clear objective, which I understand that it 

is to degrade and destroy ISIL and all of the groups that are fighting alongside ISIL. You have also outlined the kind of authorization you would seek, although your point is you do not believe that 

you require authorization, that you have it existing. You think we 

25 

act stronger when we have that authorization, and I agree with 

that point. 

You have outlined what that authorization should have it: no geographic limits, which two of the proposals here do not, maybe all 

three; no intention to use ground troops, but you do not want it 

ruled out. You agree that at a minimum you do not want to telegraph the limits that we have. And third is, you do not—you do 

not—well, you are open to a 3-year time constraint. And last, but 

not least, that it is important that the definition of who the target 

is be broad enough to encompass affiliated groups or groups fighting alongside ISIL, which I think is critical because of the emergence, for example, of an ISIL associated group in Libya now that 

is operating in a completely ungoverned space. They do not have 

Assad to fight. There is no one to fight there. And there is the potential for the emergence of other such groups in North Africa, not 

to mention the potential for an alliance with the Pakistani Taliban, 

or the Afghanistan Taliban, or Haqqani network, or any other 

groups that are in the area. 

So here is my question. With such an objective as you have defined today and such a clear idea of what the authorization should 

look like, I do not understand why the administration has not come 

forward and presented that as other administrations have done in 

the past at least as a starting point for this committee to debate, 

because what happens in the absence of that language is what we 

have here now—three proposals on behalf of Congress that attempt 

to micromanage military tactics. And I oppose all three for that 

purpose. 

That is not Congress’ role to micromanage military tactics. Congress’ role is approve or disapprove of the use of force or to fund 

or not fund if you do not disagree with it. And the other problem 

I have with it is that it clearly telegraphs to ISIL, to our enemies, 

what we will not or will do, where we will do it or where we will 

not do it, and how long we are going to do it for, which I think also 

takes a lot of the advantage away from our engagement. 

But I blame all of this on the lack of Presidential direction and 

Presidential leadership. I do not understand why, with such a clear 

idea about what an authorization should contain, that has not been 

presented to this committee as far back as September. And here is 

the other thing that is really problematic. This is a complicated crisis or a complicated conflict. As you have talked about repeatedly 

today, it involves a coalition, but this coalition includes people that 

want us to target Assad. Their participation in the coalition is partially because they think it will extend to getting rid of Assad. How 

does that fit into this equation? 

Part of our plan here is to work alongside of moderate rebel elements, but these rebel elements are being bombed by Assad and 

being attacked by Jabhat al-Nusra, and they may not be around for 

us to arm and train if they continue to take this beating. How does 

that fit into this equation? What about the Shia militias? We heard 

testimony today that these Shia militia are going into non-ISIL 

communities and attacking Sunnis, burning down their homes, 

wiping out their neighborhoods. How does that figure into all of 

this and into Iran’s influence there? 

26 

And last, but not least, the Kurds and the role they have played, 

which, by the way, we heard testimony today in Senator Boxer’s 

subcommittee about the role the Kurds have played in providing a 

safe haven to the Yazidis, and to the Christians, and to other oppressed groups, and they have also been highly effective fighters. 

All of these complex pieces, and the administration has failed to 

put together a comprehensive strategy that we can understand 

about how it all fits together. And for the life of me, I do not understand why with such a clear idea of what the authorization should 

look like you do not have anyone over there that could type that 

up real quick and send it over here so we can begin a debate and 

then amend or work on it. 

I think this committee seeks that sort of Presidential leadership 

on a matter of this magnitude. Certainly previous administrations 

have drafted such language. There is nothing. And in that vacuum 

steps in all these proposals because the members of this committee 

are frustrated at the lack of direction. So I just do not understand 

when would we see language. Does the White House intend to draft 

something up and send it to us as a starting point for the sort of 

discussion that you seek? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, I was around here long enough 

to know that even if the President sent up some language, there 

would be just as many bills and just as much debate on what he 

sent up. So let us not kid each other, I mean, seriously. It is the 

same debate one way or the other. I mean, if you want to sit there 

and say, well, the President did not show leadership, the President 

could say, well, the committee could have begun, drafted it 3 

months ago or 2 months ago. I mean, it could go both ways. Let 

us not get trapped in that. 

Senator RUBIO. But the President is the Commander in Chief. 

Secretary KERRY. Yes, he is, and he is doing what he is supposed 

to do, which is putting together a coalition and beginning to win 

the fight. 

Senator RUBIO. But if he wants the authority to win the fight, 

he has got to tell us what the fight looks like. 

Secretary KERRY. Because let me clarify. I made a statement before about, you know, the sole basis that we would make this. What 

we would make it is the authoritarian current state-of-the-art 

basis, but as I have also said to you, the President does not need 

that to have the authority to do what he is doing because he believes, and I believe, and I think constitutional scholars would tell 

you, he has the authority constitutionally, and he has the authority 

with respect to the 2001 AUMF, as I have shown you. 

But that aside, he is going further to try to provide the precise 

clarity that you are looking for, and saying that he will put language in here that makes it clear that the AUMF, as passed, will 

be the designated authority with respect to what we are doing with 

respect to Daesh. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, where is the language? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we have said to you very—I think I have 

said two or three times today that we think the Senator—the chairman, the Senator from New Jersey has made a strong proposal. I 

have not come up here and attacked provision after provision after 

provision. I have said to you we have a couple of differences in it. 

27 

They are not incidental. It obviously an important difference this 

question of what are the limitations, and it is fundamental between 

the two sides of this dais, I think. 

What we are suggesting is we try to work that through in a way 

that balances it adequately for both sides so we could get the kind 

of vote that I think could be important. This vote could, in fact, 

with the proper effort, become the preliminary down payment on 

what happens subsequently. That would be a good outcome if it 

were possible. 

So my respectful suggestion is in answer to your several comments about the strategy, et cetera, the President has a strategy. 

General Allen is leading that effort for our coalition in terms of the 

diplomacy. And GEN Lloyd Austin and CENTCOM are doing an 

extraordinary job with respect to the military component. But there 

are other components: the foreign fighters, the humanitarian, the 

de-legitimization of ISIL with respect to their religious claims, the 

financing which is being shut down. There are a whole series of 

broad-based efforts that are underway and in place today. 

Senator RUBIO. I know my time has expired. Just for clarity purpose, so the administration’s position is that the AUMF they would 

like to see is the chairman’s language with some amendment. 

Secretary KERRY. With some changes, that is correct. With some 

efforts we work on hopefully together to try to work this through. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Mr. Secretary, for being here today and for all of your efforts on 

behalf of this country. 

Much of our discussion this afternoon has been around the authority of Congress versus the authority of the President. But I 

would suggest that this debate is important for another reason because I think this debate is also about the right of the American 

people, the people that we all represent, to know what is entailed 

in this country’s use of military force against ISIL, including the 

scope and duration of that. And one of the things that has been 

said here this afternoon is that we weaken our country rather than 

strengthen it when we begin a process, like the discussion we are 

having today, that we know cannot be concluded. 

I would actually argue the opposite, and that is that this debate 

strengthens our resolve in this country, and that our enemies looking at the debate should not be confused and assume that this is 

weakness that we are having these debates, but rather it is one of 

the things that makes this country so strong, our ability to debate 

issues of war and peace. It is part of what our democracy is about. 

You said, and I think several of us have agreed with this, that 

if the committee worked with the White House and understood 

what the administration wants, that we could probably craft language with some back and forth that we could all agree to, or at 

least the majority of the committee—a bipartisan majority could 

agree to. I certainly agree with that. And we have talked about a 

process in the committee that would have this hearing today, have 

some time this week to actually discuss it among ourselves. And we 

were hoping to work with some members of the administration in 

a classified setting to hear more about what is currently underway 

with respect to the war against ISIL. 

28 

So I guess I would say to you if we are all committed to having 

that kind of discussion about what should go in the AUMF, should 

we assume that there are members from the Department of Defense and from the intelligence communities who could also be part 

of working with us on that kind of a back and forth? And is that 

something that we could get set, because my understanding is that 

one of the challenges has been a commitment from folks to actually 

come and answer some of the questions and the concerns that this 

committee has had. 

Secretary KERRY. I cannot imagine why that cannot be worked 

out. I mean, I do not know what the schedules are. I know Secretary Hagel was not available because he was overseas, I think in 

Iraq and elsewhere. So that availability obviously was challenged. 

But I am confident—I cannot imagine that—you know, as I have 

said, the administration is prepared to work with you, and we will 

work out the schedules and see what is doable. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you. I think that would be very 

helpful as we are talking about trying to get something that can 

be garner bipartisan support. 

Secretary KERRY. And I understand the desire obviously to hear 

from the intel and hear from the, you know, DOD. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, I appreciate that. I think it is very important for us to have this debate, for the committee to act and to 

work with the administration and see if we can find acceptable language. But to do it in a way that is not open-ended so that we are 

not, as the committee has said in the past, waiting indefinitely for 

language that may never come from this administration. 

So let me ask some specific questions relative to what is going 

on with the current operations of our fight against ISIL, recognizing that you may or may not be able to answer some of these 

questions. But can you talk about the moderate opposition at this 

point relative to the Syrian regime and the extremists? And there 

have been a number of reports that that opposition has—is in the 

process of totally collapsing. Is there any intention to expedite the 

training and assistance efforts to the moderate Syrian opposition 

groups? 

Secretary KERRY. The answer is, ‘‘Yes,’’ there is a great deal of 

effort to try to expedite at this point in time. The opposition in the 

south is actually doing fairly well right now, and it is a problem 

for the Assad regime. But a lot of the fight that is so critical is in 

the north, and there Aleppo is a challenge, and it is one that we 

are very, very well aware of. We are working with the Turks right 

now, having long discussions in order to work through a number 

of different thoughts about how best to deal with that. There is 

ISIL up there, there is al-Nusra up there, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the 

opposition, and then you have the regime. 

And so, the President is considering a number of different options with respect to the north, but we are working through those 

details. General Allen was over there recently meeting with the 

Turks at some length of discussion about trying to focus in and 

narrow down who could do what how and so forth. But it is all on 

a fast track because everybody understands the opposition there is 

challenged. 

29 

Regrettably, a couple of different opposition groups, and there 

are a number of different opposition groups, did not fare well in 

their battles, and some—one or two of them actually sort of folded 

into al-Nusra, which is disturbing and something that folks are 

looking at carefully. But by and large they have survived. They are 

holding on. They have been the entity that has been fighting for 

almost four years now, and we are increasingly doing a number of 

things to try to make a difference, some of which we cannot lay out 

here in this committee in open session, some of which are a part 

of the training effort that we want to get underway. 

And happily, the Turkish base for that training and the Jordanian base for that training are complete and ready, and we are 

starting to get, you know, that moving. We still have to get more 

going with respect to—Kuwait is only in the beginning stages, and 

the Saudi training component needs additional infrastructure work, 

et cetera, in order to be ready. 

But believe me it is very, very important to get a number of 

things in place as rapidly as possible because while they are doing 

well in the south, the north is a challenge. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. My time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I turn to Senator Johnson, I do not want 

there to be any impression here by members of the committee that 

we have not tried to engage with the administration and solicit and 

elicit both opinions and witnesses. To the Secretary’s credit, he is 

the one person that has been here on several occasions, and we appreciate that, and I am convinced that as part of his history here, 

he recognizes the importance of that. 

And he has made himself available, although I do not feel that 

he has the wherewithal to talk about every dimension of this, no 

matter how well versed he is or how well he has tried. There are 

intelligence questions here, there are military questions here, but 

this is what we have. 

Now, for timeline purposes, let us understand that the first War 

Powers notification came to us in June, in June. And then we had 

the Secretary appear here on September 17 to testify on the antiISIL strategy. Then on September 23, we had War Powers notification, making it very clear that this would be a multiyear effort, 

September 23. And then on November 5, the President actually 

went before Congress and requested authorization for military operations against ISIL. 

So going back to that period of time, this committee, and certainly the Chair, has engaged the administration going back to October when staff had conversations, when we met with the White 

House counsel to go over a draft of language. And in fairness, we 

just did not get specificity of responses. So when we talk about ‘‘let 

us work together,’’ there has been an effort to try to achieve exactly 

that. 

I do not want anybody here to think that there has not been an 

effort or for the public to think, wow, it seems that they are doing 

Rambo here by themselves. There has been an effort here. And the 

fact is that requests were made for this hearing, as well as for classified hearings, for others beyond the Secretary to be able to further inform. Those were not—for whatever reasons, logistics, whatever, travel, were not being able to be pursued. So based on the 

30 

Senator’s questions, I do not want anybody to think here that that 

effort has not been made. 

Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I 

just want to pick up a little bit on what the chairman was talking 

about, the efforts this committee has made. I remember our hearing on May 21 where we had the counsel from the Department of 

Defense and the counsel from the Department of State. We talked 

about an authorization for use of military force, and at that point 

the administration was saying they wanted to engage with the 

Congress. And then later on, I think July 23, a number of us did 

go down to the White House, to the counsel’s office, and we discussed that authorization. 

I recall is two things from that meeting: that the White House 

counsel was finding a somewhat tenuous connection to previous authorizations, and so they were looking and interested in having a 

new authorization. I think I left that meeting with the impression 

that the ball was in the administration’s court to draft something, 

and that is my question. 

After all that time, why? Just simply why has the administration 

not sent us a draft proposal, because it has really been pretty much 

the history of previous Presidents. I would think that would make 

sense that the Commander in Chief would like to lay on the table 

an authorization that he would want to pursue with the actions 

that he believes are necessary to keep this Nation safe. Why has 

the President not given us the draft? It would have cleared up so 

much confusion. So I just simply ask—answer the question, why? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, as I have said, I think we have a pretty 

good draft. 

Senator JOHNSON. No. Why has the President not sent a draft? 

Why did he not write it up himself, or you, or his Secretary of Defense? 

Secretary KERRY. It is my understanding there have been about 

seven meetings, and I do not know. I was not present in any of 

those meetings, but the seven meetings have discussed the draft. 

The chairman himself said they went and talked about the draft. 

There is not requirement for the President to send it up. 

Senator JOHNSON. But would it not make it a lot—okay. 

Secretary KERRY. I do not know if it, but as I said earlier to Senator Rubio, would it have made life easier? Would it have changed 

the debate? It is the same debate. You have language in front of 

us which we are now working with, and the President has said that 

by and large it is pretty good. This is not the first time that the 

committee has exerted leadership to put language together that the 

President has asked for and welcomed. 

Senator JOHNSON. Again, I will not get an answer. That is fine. 

The reason I think we need to review past authorizations is because I think there are legitimate differences to whether or not, for 

example, the 2001 authorization really does apply right now. Let 

me read why. It is all past tense. It is talking about nations, organizations, persons he determined, planned, authorized, committed, 

or harbored. Those are all past tense. There is nothing in here talking about associated forces. It is kind of describing them. 

31 

But there is legitimate concern about whether or not that actually does authorize its current use. And, again, my understanding 

in the White House, they seemed also to be grappling with the tenuous connection between the current use of military force and that 

authorization. But I want to go back a little bit further because I 

think exploring this language and exploring the history makes 

sense. 

In World War I and World War II, we actually had a total of two 

declarations of war in World War I and six in World War II, the 

authorizations were pretty open-ended. They gave the President 

the authority he needed to defeat the enemy. In World War I, it 

was a declaration of war against Germany, and this is what the authorization said: ‘‘to bring the conflict to a successful termination.’’ 

And even in the 2001 authorizations, the President was authorized 

to use ‘‘all necessary and appropriate force.’’ That is what past 

Presidents wanted in terms of authorization, the authority to be 

Commander in Chief and to accomplish the goal. 

Here is my question. Has President Obama deviated from the 

goal he stated to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIS? 

Secretary KERRY. Not in the least. 

Senator JOHNSON. What is the goal of this process then? I mean, 

is it to have a bipartisan authorization? Is it to have members be 

able to put themselves on the record, or is it to produce an authorization that gives the President the congressional authority to actually accomplish that goal? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, it is obvious. Senator, the purpose of the 

AUMF is to authorize in its new and modern context, its state-ofthe-art context, the challenge that we now face with a very different kind of extended threat, if you will. And I think the discomfort that has been exhibited on both sides of the aisle with the reliance on 2001, which we believe absolutely withstands any judicial 

scrutiny whatsoever and is legitimate. But the discomfort that exists should be clarified. And the American people, the President believes, are owed a 2014 commitment, not a 2001 commitment. 

Senator JOHNSON. I completely agree, and the other thing the 

American people are owed is for the President to draft what that 

authorization should look like so we have something to work from. 

What I would argue as well is that we need an authorization because this is a different kind of enemy. This is not a nation-state 

that is going to be pretty obvious what it is going to look like when 

they are defeated. We need to have a discussion about what defeat 

looks like. We need to define that term. 

I would also argue what we need is we need an authorization 

that is good not only for President Obama, but a future President, 

because I agree with President Obama: this is not going to be a 

war or a conflict that ends quickly. So that is why I am looking to 

the Commander in Chief, I am looking for what he believes he 

needs and what his successor or successors might need to grapple 

with and take the actions they need to take to keep this Nation 

safe with this brand new—over the last decade or two—this brand 

new threat, not a nation-state, but an ideology that wants to kill 

Americans. 

Secretary KERRY. The President would agree we should, and that 

is exactly what we are trying to do. 

32 

Senator JOHNSON. Well, again, I will look forward to the draft because it would make this process just a whole lot easier. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, again, we are pretty close as we are sitting here. I think we just have to sit down and work through the 

differences. The President has said that in general terms this is a 

pretty good—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Does the President really believe that ISIS or 

the new name, Daesh, will be defeated in 3 years? Does he really 

believe that is the case? 

Secretary KERRY. No, the President has said this is going to take 

a long time. 

Senator JOHNSON. Why would we limit ourselves to a 3-year time 

period then? Why would you want to hamstring his successor having to come back before—I am sorry—this dysfunctional body? Let 

us face it. We had this hearing in May of this year, and now we 

are back here in December. This is not going to be concluded with 

authorization for the use of military force. We will take a show 

vote, but this will not give President Obama the authority that he 

needs and that his successors will need. Why would he even agree 

to a 3-year limitation? Is that a responsible thing for a President 

to do? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, first of all, look, it is hard to 

have the argument both ways the way you are trying. If it is dysfunctional, maybe then there is a real reason why the President did 

not send it up. I think that is not the reason, and I do not mean 

to make fun of it. He is not—that is not the reason, and that is 

not where it is. The President—for 21⁄2 months now we have been 

preoccupied in trying to focus on putting together the strategy, implementing the strategy, building the coalition, and doing what we 

have needed to do. There have been seven meetings during that 

time. I do not know what happened at those meetings, but there 

have been seven meetings. 

Senator JOHNSON. Well, let me ask you. Why not? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let me just—let me just—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Why are you not aware of what happened in 

those seven meetings? 

Secretary KERRY. Because I am not in those meetings. Those are 

in the White House. That is White House counsel. I work—— 

Senator JOHNSON. They are not giving you a briefing or sending 

you a memo? 

Secretary KERRY. I think, Senator, let me just come to your other 

question, which I believe was—you asked about the timeframe, 

would we limit it? Why would we limit it? And if you listened carefully, what I said is I am not in favor of that limitation without 

the ability to have the renewal. But I am trying to balance. 

Look, what we are trying to do here, I think all of us—let us not 

get dragged down into a sort of, you know, unnecessary debate 

here. We want to build the strongest vote possible. We want to see 

if we can meld the differences into something that is acceptable to 

both sides. That has often happened here historically, and certainly 

when I was here in 1991 and other times when we did this, we did 

that. We ought to be able to do it now. There is a balance of interests. 

33 

Now, some people have an interest in protecting the complete 

open-endedness of the Presidential authority as they deem it to be 

given under the Constitution, and there are others here who, by 

virtue of experience and, you know, bad experience, want to have 

a little restraint, and they are trying to balance. We think we are 

offering a way to try to figure out how you do that, which is to give 

a sort of fixed period of time during which you will have the 

chance, the Congress, to take stock of it so it is not purely openended, but also so it is a responsible process that I will not end unnecessarily. There will be a review of some kind, and that is what 

we ought to sit down and work out. 

How does that work? What is the appropriate way to do that? 

What is the trigger, so that there is a respectful assessment of 

where we are, what is happening, of how it has been implemented, 

and that it is not, in fact, open-ended and dangerous and dragging 

us on into an open-ended ‘‘war.’’ So I think that is what we are trying to balance. A lot of that comes out of the experience of Iraq or 

even Afghanistan. People are worried about it. They do not want 

it to be that again, and everybody is sensitive to that. So I think 

we are just trying to find the appropriate balance between those 

things, and I think, as I say, the chairman’s mark is a good starting place, and we should work off of that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, and thank you, 

Ranking Member Corker. And thank you, Secretary Kerry. 

Secretary KERRY. I would think you would have an administration say the chairman’s mark is a good starting place. It does not 

happen that often. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Secretary Kerry, and thank you for 

your hard work and your leadership in assembling and helping 

steer the coalition against ISIL. And thank you for your presence 

with us today. I am relieved we are having this debate and that 

we are having it in the open. I believe the American people deserve, and our values demand, exactly this sort of a robust and 

open debate, and I think that Congress should not adjourn until we 

vote on an AUMF. 

We have raised important and difficult issues, and as you, Mr. 

Secretary, just commented, it is in large part because of the difficult history of the lessons learned from the cost, and the reach, 

and the scope, and the complexity of our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 2001 and 2002 authorizations that were the 

foundation in some ways of those actions that there are real concerns here. And I think this is the sort of debate, the sort of give 

and take between executive and legislative branches that our 

Founders imagined. We have to, in many way, reexamine and reset 

that relationship. 

Let me also just put on the table, I think, an important issue 

that has not been touched on so far, an issue that is vitally important not just for this committee, but for Congress to consider. The 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to a CRS report that just 

came out, there was a total of about $1.69 trillion requested to pay 

for the cost of those two wars. And as other members have commented, the Congress has two ways to restrain the Executive in 

34 

the conduct of long wars. First, the authorization or declaration of 

war, and second, how we fund them. And it is my hope, my expectation, that we cannot write another blank check for war, as was 

unfortunately the case under previous Presidents and previous 

Congresses for previous conflicts. 

Now, paying for war is not fiscally, but also morally responsible. 

It is not right to expect that the only people who sacrifice would 

be our troops and their families. And so, expressly having a conversation about how to offset the cost of this war through a reduction in spending or an increase in revenue or both will help Americans have a more direct connection to the conflict and an awareness of its impact, not just in terms of our spending, but our steadily growing national debt. 

I am aware this responsibility does not fall just on this committee, but it is the duty of the Congress, as we debate the scope 

and the strategy for this conflict, to also look squarely at its cost 

and how to pay for it. And so, I will continue to raise that issue 

as we move forward with the debate about the AUMF. 

Let me, Secretary Kerry, if I might, first just bear down on an 

issue that I do not think I have heard a clear and concise answer 

to. So, if we are trying to come up with an AUMF that recognizes 

some of the challenges of the 2002 AUMF and that puts some restraint on the use of ground troops, and that strikes you as unacceptable in this effort, as you put it, to balance restraint against 

an open-ended conflict while allowing the President, the Commander in Chief, the flexibility to prosecute this conflict successfully. I think one of the reasons there remains real hesitation, real 

resistance to just an open-ended commitment to conduct of any 

kind is that we have not had a full debate or discussion about the 

strategy. We cannot go home and clearly defend what the strategy 

is, although you laid out the five core areas in which there is ongoing and effective activity. 

Could you accept an AUMF that was limited in time, as you discussed previously, and that initially had a limitation on large-scale 

ground combat, but required and examination of strategy and then 

a reconsideration of the AUMF to remove that limitation on the 

Commander in Chief’s scope to conduct this and prosecute this 

war? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I think by implication the way the administration is looking at it, there is some restraint because the 

President has been pretty clear. And there is no current scenario 

that he would imagine where—I mean, if you are putting a restraint in time, you are automatically not getting into a long-term 

activity. So the 3 years is, in fact, the best automatic limitation on 

this problem of long term. 

And if you have the right kind of formula for the trigger or for 

the—you know, I can think of several now, but I am not going to 

go into them now. I do not think it is appropriate to do that here, 

but we could—you know, we could certainly sit down and bang out 

the ways that balance the interests that create a sufficient level of 

review so you are certain you are going to get your whack at it, 

but it is not—you know, it is not self-limiting so that the wrong 

message is sent, and you are not going to prosecute the war. You 

35 

know, some people still have—struggle with that terminology. But 

that is where I think it is. 

So I would suggest there is a balance, and I think we can work 

that out. I do not think you have to have the ground troop limitation by virtue of the 3-year piece. 

Senator COONS. Well, Mr. Secretary, I join many of my colleagues in both expressing a desire for a bipartisan AUMF, and for 

a more robust and more broad discussion and debate about the 

strategy and what the direction is going to be. But I do want to 

make it clear that I support the conduct of this conflict against 

ISIL, that I think they are a real and present threat to the United 

States and our allies in the region, and I do think we should be 

supporting our armed forces. But weeks have turned into months 

since the War Powers notifications came up here, and I think this 

Congress needs to be more actively engaged in being accountable 

for authorizing this conduct. 

Let me move to one more question with the time I have. It was 

announced today roughly 1,500 soldiers from the international coalition against ISIL will join roughly 3,100 Americans in the train 

and equip mission in Iraq to train the Peshmerga and the ISF. 

How else will our coalition partners assist in the campaign? In a 

previous conflict in the region, many of our partners contributed 

significantly to the financial cost of the operations. Will we be complementing this training role with financial contributions from our 

allies and partners, and can you give us any further update on 

your expectations around ground troops? I was encouraged by your 

comment that many of our allies and the administration believe 

that non-U.S. ground troops are mostly likely to be effective in this 

conflict and in this context. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, the answer, Senator, is that—the answer 

is, ‘‘Yes,’’ a number of countries are committed to providing financial input as well. To some degree, some of them, it depends what 

we choose to do. But the answer is, yes, they are prepared to provide financial assistance, and already are in some ways. For instance, the training facilities in some of their territory they are 

taking of. 

In addition to that, there will be a variance between countries as 

to who is doing what. As you know, five Arab nations are flying 

with us in the missions over Syria—Saudi Arabia, United Arab 

Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar. And in addition to those 

five, we have countries from all over the world who are contributing one way or the other, whether it is to training, providing direct assistance, providing humanitarian assistance, providing 

equipment, providing arms, and, in some cases, presence on the 

ground in the case of a number of our close allies in the actual 

training activities. Australia is a case and example, Great Britain, 

others are doing that. So there is a full-fledged, broad-based engagement by many different countries in many different activities. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, and thank you for being here, Mr. 

Secretary. You are a very good diplomat. You have mentioned that 

the President does not need to outline his AUMF because we have 

36 

one here, the chairman’s mark. But then in your testimony you 

very clearly state, pretty clearly at least, diplomatically that we 

need to do far better than that. 

And Senator Johnson went through some of the AUMFs that we 

had or those facsimiles from World War II. If you go beyond that, 

I am looking at a few of them here. The one in 1955 with regard 

to defense of Taiwan, the President ‘‘authorized to employ the 

armed forces as he deems necessary.’’ In 1957 in the Middle East, 

‘‘authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations.’’ 1964, Southeast Asia, ‘‘take all necessary measures to repell 

any armed attack.’’ Then we come to this one where the President 

is authorized ‘‘subject to the limitations in subsection (c).’’ 

I would submit that that is not very comforting to our allies, and 

it is not a very strong AUMF. In fact, it more accurately may be 

an authorization for the use of not too much military force. When 

you signal to our enemies and to our allies that we are not going 

to use ground troops, and we certainly do not want to. We may not 

anticipate that we will. But to put that aside and say we are not 

going to just does not strike me as wise. 

The President as Commander in Chief can certainly have that 

policy, but he can change his mind as conditions warrant. It is far 

more difficult once the Congress has spoken to go back to the Congress and say now conditions have changed on the ground, and we 

need a new AUMF. What do your enemies do in the meantime? 

What do our allies do in the meantime? 

So I would respectfully say that when my colleagues here are 

saying that the President needs to show more leadership and actually put an AUMF together and present it to the Congress, one 

that is in keeping with the history and what we need for the future. All of us can draft our own. I have drafted mine. I will be glad 

to give you a copy. But that does not substitute for one that will 

come from the President and for him to make the strong case to 

Congress that this is what we need. That is what we need. As you 

put it, our allies deserve it. They need it. Our enemies need to understand it, and we need this country together. 

So, again, I would ask you why in this context can we not get 

the President to submit his AUMF. And all due respect to the 

chairman and others who have tried to put something together 

here that can pass, I would submit that it is not worth it to get 

something that so limits our President in his options, that it is not 

comforting to our allies, and it is too comforting to our enemies. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, thank you for your comments. 

Listen, I said at the outset that the problem that the President and 

the administration has with this is this question of the limitations 

and restrictions, so, I mean, I have been very clear. But I have also 

said we think there is a way to try to work with you. We do not 

want to, you know, sit here and stop all capacity to be able to get 

a strong resolution by simply being stuck in a place where we say 

that, you know, we are not going to accept any kind of appropriate 

calibration of this. So we think that there is a way to try to figure 

that out. 

Now, I do not disagree with you. I do not want your second example—what was the second one you said about the prior use of 

force authorizations? You went back to the fifties? 

37 

Senator FLAKE. It was something in 1957, the Middle East. 

Secretary KERRY. Yes, 1957, Middle East, yes. Well, certainly at 

least from ’64, which Senator McCain and I are pretty familiar 

with, onto Iraq and others, I think there has been a strong reaction 

in the country that unfettered openness has resulted in some bad 

judgments that have cost the country an awful lot of money and 

other assets. And I think that the tension here in this debate obviously is between those who are willing to provide that full constitutional authority that the President can make those decisions and 

should not have any restraint at all, with those who are cautioned 

by the past and want to have some adequate congressional restraint, reflecting the reluctance of the American people to get into 

another open-ended deal. 

Senator FLAKE. I would say—— 

Secretary KERRY. So how do you balance that? And I think there 

is a way to balance that. Part of the balance comes in this 3-year 

duration notion with Congress’ preordained and defined input. It 

seems to me that is a pretty measured way to try to do it. Now, 

maybe there is some other notification requirement that we could 

work through here and so forth. 

I do think, and the President feels, and I know that the members 

of the military feel very strongly, that in terms of actually implementing—I mean, we all have decided we have got to defeat these 

guys. Everybody is agreed that we have to degrade and defeat 

ISIL. And I do not think that Congress is going to sit here and say 

that, well, we are going to tell you exactly step for step how you 

are going to do that. That is what we have the professional military 

for. 

Senator FLAKE. If I may—— 

Secretary KERRY. And we need to make sure that, you know, 

there is a balance here between the President’s rights as Commander in Chief and the military’s ability to implement and 

achieve our goal. That is the balance we are looking for. 

Senator FLAKE. I would say post-1964, you mentioned there has 

been an attempt to balance this because of some situations we have 

had. Those have been more on—any conditions that have been with 

the AUMF has been on the—we can only authorize the use of force 

after all diplomatic measures have been exhausted. That is typically what is done on the front end, but once we commit ground 

troops, or our military forces, I should say, then in virtually every 

case that I have seen, unless I am not aware of others, we have 

never tied the President’s hands or, as you put in here, that we do 

not preemptively bind the hands of the Commander in Chief. And 

I just do not think it would be wise to do so here. And so, thank 

you for your testimony. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator. Appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator 

Menendez, and thank you, Secretary Kerry. Senator Menendez, you 

really pushed to get us here to this point. I mean, and I know the 

ranking member did, too, and so that is important. And, Secretary 

Kerry, we would not be here without you because we needed at 

least one witness to try to address this, and I really appreciate you 

helping us work through it. 

38 

I have a couple of questions just about how things are going now. 

Maybe you cannot answer them. The success of our United States 

strategy in Iraq appears predicated on the shift of Sunnis away 

from the Islamic State and toward cooperation with the government. And to what extent is that shift occurring, if at all, right 

now, and what factors will determine the extent of the alteration 

in allegiances? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, that is a very good question and an appropriate one because essential to the ability to be able to be successful in Iraq will be inclusivity of the Sunni population, the commitment of the Sunni tribes, the tribal leaders to take on this fight, 

and to ultimately join with the national army in order to push ISIL 

out. That, I believe, is a work in progress. Not ‘‘I believe.’’ That is 

a work in progress. 

There are currently a number of battalions that are in training. 

You know, those battalions as they move out of training will allow 

those that are experienced and held together to go out into the 

field. There is work being done with the tribal leaders right now. 

The tribes—a certain number of people that are coming together to 

provide a Sunni fighting force as part of it. There is a plan to be 

implemented to put in place a national guard which will be more 

reflective of people and where they live so that there is an inherent 

investment by them in defending that community, which there did 

not exist in previous—— 

Senator UDALL. Is the shift taking place, and to what extent? 

That is what I really want to get at the heart of. 

Secretary KERRY. That shift is beginning to take place. It is beginning to take place. It is in its early stage. I do not want to promise you something that is beyond where it is, but it is beginning, 

and it is legitimate, and there have been successes. The Baiji area 

has been—the refinery has been—you know, it is not complete yet, 

but it has been a success thus far in pushing ISIL back. The Amirli 

relief effort that took place. The Mosul—the Haditha Dam, the 

Mosul Dam. These are areas where there have been clear successes. And there are increasing other efforts that are taking place. 

So we believe that there are very promising signs. It is too early 

to stand up and down and shout, but it is moving in the right direction. And we feel confident that it is the right strategy. 

Senator UDALL. Now, when we announced that we were going 

to—when the President announced degrade and destroy ISIL, a 

number of groups around the world in Islamic countries pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. How should the authorization of force 

treat groups who have pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State, 

including, as of December 2014, groups in Algeria, Libya, Egypt, 

Yemen, and Saudi Arabia? 

Secretary KERRY. They should be associated forces. They fit 

under that category. 

Senator UDALL. So they—okay. Now, and you have outlined here 

the three areas of authorization of force. One of them is duration. 

And you mentioned in your testimony, Secretary Kerry, a provision 

that provides for an extension under certain circumstances. So you 

are willing to go with 3 years, and just as an aside I am much closer to Senator Paul with 1 year. But assuming you are willing to 

go with the 3 years, who is the extension the choice of? Is it the 

39 

administration or the Congress, or do you want a provision that 

just allows the administration under specific circumstances to go 

forward? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, that is where it has to be—I mean, that 

is the precision of the language that we have to sit down and work 

through. And I would want White House counsel and others obviously to weight in very heavily on that. 

Senator UDALL. But this is a policy question. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, it is always policy question. Congress always has the ability to cut off money for something. 

Senator UDALL. Right. 

Secretary KERRY. I mean, you have the power of the purse no 

matter what is stated, and the President has the power of the Commander in Chief and Executive authority. And he will make his decision, and that is the debate. My thought is that if you sit down 

and work this through, you will come up with an equation that 

works effectively. 

Senator UDALL. But you will not today say that provision should 

be Congress revisiting it at 3 years or the administration—— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I think the administration deserves first 

crack. There is no question about that, but it ought to be done in 

a way—— 

Senator UDALL. So it is not a real 3 years. You want a longer 

duration. 

Secretary KERRY. No, I said first crack at it. I mean, I do not 

think Congress is going to sit here and say, yes, you ought to continue it, and the Executive is saying I am not going to order my 

troops to do that. Clearly the Chief Executive, Commander in 

Chief, is going to make a decision as a matter of the administration’s foreign policy and its war fighting policy. But there needs to 

be, obviously I would assume for you, some manner of weighing in 

on that. And how that is effected and what the language is is precisely what we ought to be working through. That is not for me to 

casually throw it out here this afternoon, and I think that would 

be, you know, inappropriate. But I know there is a way to balance 

this. 

Senator UDALL. And I think the important thing is that Congress, whatever the period of time, needs to reweigh back in, be involved, be engaged in terms of where we are at that particular 

point. And in the three areas you outlined on the authorization of 

force, my opinion is what we are talking about is an open-ended 

authorization. There is no geographic limitation. I think there 

should be geographic limitation. I do not think we should allow the 

administration to go into Libya or a number of other countries surrounding this area. 

Secondly, this language ‘‘no boots on the ground,’’ the President 

has used that language very specifically over and over again. That 

should be in the resolution. It should be strong. And if you want 

to have boots on the ground, you should come back to the Congress 

in order to continue with a war with American troops on the 

ground. 

And as far as the duration, I mentioned that earlier. I think one 

year would be more appropriate because it has been very difficult 

for us to get the information we need in order to find out whether 

40 

we should be moving forward or not. And then just as a final issue 

here, I want to mention the issue of paying for this. There is no 

doubt that we are starting a third war in this particular region. 

You do not have to look very far to know that it is a war to look 

at Kobani, look at the troops that are fighting, look at the air 

strikes. 

And one of the biggest questions with all wars is how do you pay 

for them, and up until Iraq and Afghanistan, the generation that 

fought a war paid for the war. And I believe we started a policy, 

which was a very misguided policy. We put Afghanistan, we put 

Iraq, we put them on the credit card. So as the President prepared 

to present a plan to the Congress to pay for this war, the President 

says it is going to be lengthy. It is going to be 3 years. Is he willing 

to put forward war bonds, war surcharge, a terrorism tax like some 

have called for? Is he willing to put anything on the table in order 

to pay for this? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, the President has put on the table—the request for $1.52 billion was additional resources for the Department of State/USAID to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. We 

have put additional funding requests in. There is $520 million foreign—— 

Senator UDALL. I am talking about paying for it with a war—like 

all the other wars that have been paid for, not putting—— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, this is paid for within the context of the 

current budget and the process. 

Senator UDALL. Well, I take it—I take it you are not—— 

Secretary KERRY. And that is what we are doing. But in addition 

to that, let me just say one thing, though, Senator, if I may. Look, 

I respect the notion that you have an opinion about 1 year and 

strong feelings about—you know, strong feelings about the geographic area, et cetera. But I will say to you, if you limit this geographically, you are saying to—and we did not limit al-Qaeda geographically. And we have been able to do very real damage to alQaeda and keep plots from hitting us—the Christmas bombing 

plot, other plots that have come out of other places than Pakistan 

or Afghanistan. And I think one of them came out of Yemen, another out of another location, Northern Africa. 

I mean, we have been able to do those things because we are not 

limited by geographic authority. And I will tell you that we would 

have a much bigger problem today if we were, and it would be terrible to send a message to these guys, you have a safe haven over 

here and safe haven over here. And if we do not take this seriously—I mean, this is bigger than just where it is in Iraq and 

Syria. 

Senator UDALL. I know—— 

Secretary KERRY. And secondly, let me crystal clear. We did not 

start this. We are not about to start a third war. Osama bin Laden 

started this on 9/11/2001, and he has continued it in absentia obviously through what al-Qaeda does. ISIL, Daesh, is an extension of 

al-Qaeda. It is part of the same thing. It is clear what they want 

to do, and it is a risk and danger to all of the region, which is why 

we have this extraordinary coalition. 

This is not the United States of America trying to start something, and there is not a country in the region that is not looking 

41 

to us for leadership right now and working with us and grateful 

for what we are doing here, because they are at risk—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the region, Syria, Israel. You run the list—Jordan. Ask 

any of them. That is why they have publicly stepped up and they 

are part of this effort. 

So I think we have to understand this is the fight of the generation. That is what I believe certainly, and President Obama believes it. And we need to understand what a big challenge it is, and 

it is going to take a lot more than just trying to deal with it 

through this military component. There is no ultimate military solution, though we have to fight back, against the Daesh. But if a 

lot of young kids out there are left to their own devices and do not 

have options for jobs, and education, and a decent life, and opportunity, and respect, and dignity, and so forth, this is going to continue. And the United States and our allies need to work at that 

side of the ledger also. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator—— 

Senator UDALL. Well, that is something that we can agree on, 

and I know my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, let me say I agree with your comments 

about the parameters of an AUMF, but, you know, this is really 

kind of a charade we are going through because the Congress of 

the United States is not going to act in the next couple of days, because I have been involved in many AUMFs, and not a single one 

was generated from the Congress. 

The reason why the Constitution calls the President the Commander in Chief is because he is supposed to lead, and if he wants 

an authorization for the use of military force, then he should lead 

and tell us what he wants that authorization to be. And, frankly, 

for you to say that, well, we welcome it or whatever it is, of course, 

is an abrogation of the responsibilities of the President of the 

United States as Commander in Chief. So as we go through this 

charade, whether we have a vote or not in the next day or so before 

we go out is—almost makes it all irrelevant. 

But I would hope in January working with the new chairman 

and the new ranking member and other members of this committee 

that the President of the United States would present an AUMF 

to the Congress and to this committee, and we could work together 

on it. But it has got to be led by the Commander in Chief, and, 

frankly, that is how the system works, and that is how it has 

worked every time. 

Now, I would like to switch gears real quickly. Here is a Washington Post, ‘‘U.S. Backed Syrian Rebels Thwarted by Fighters 

Linked to al-Qaeda.’’ ‘‘Time is Running Out For Obama in Syria.’’ 

‘‘Western Backed Syrian Rebels Are in Danger of Collapse Before 

Help Arrives.’’ All of these facts are well-known to media experts, 

and the rebels are on the verge of collapse; they are getting beaten 

very badly. And one of the major reasons why they are getting 

beaten very badly is because they are subject to barrel bombing 

and air attacks from Bashar Assad. 

So I guess my question to you again is what I asked you the 

time—and by the way, Ambassador James Jeffrey says times is not 

on our side—reconsider the no U.S. combat formations on the 

42 

ground decision because you may have to either renege on that or 

you may have to fall off your very important mission of destroying 

ISIS. I think there is a gap between the two. 

Ambassador Ford, ISIS is not something which drone strikes or 

F–16 strikes is going to contain because the Islamic State, let us 

face it, it is a state. So you do not destroy a state with drone 

strikes. You are going to require boots on the ground. 

So what we are seeing, I would say to you, Mr. Secretary, is the 

incrementalism that I saw in the Vietnam war. We are seeing decisions made in a tight circle in the White House. We are seeing 

them incrementally implemented. We see, what, 200 troops, additional troops, then 500 more, and then 1,000 more. 

Meanwhile, our Syrian rebels honestly do not understand why 

you will not protect them from Bashar’s intense bombing campaign, 

and we are not attacking Bashar Assad. And we are asking these 

young people to fight and to die, and Bashar Assad, as you should 

know, is their major enemy, and we are not doing anything to stop 

Bashar Assad from barrel bombing them and slaughtering them. 

Which—and this is the guy that has killed 200,000. This is the 

guy that has caused 3.5 million refugees. This is the guy that still 

has 150,000 people in his prisons in which he has treated with 

great atrocities. 

Still one of the great mysteries to me in my life is these photos 

that were smuggled out by a guy named Caesar, got no response 

from the President of the United States or, frankly, from you. 

Should have been a casus belli. 

So here we are with the rebels being routed because they are 

being attacked not only by Bashar Assad, but also extremist organizations called ISIS and others. And they are in the verge of collapse at least in one part of the country. 

So now you are telling me we have a strategy to defeat Bashar 

Assad, and we have a strategy to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria, 

even though we are treating them as two separate battles, at least 

as far as strategy is concerned. Maybe you can respond to that and 

tell me what—how you justify morally telling young Syrians to go 

and fight in Syria and yet allow them to be barrel bombed by 

Bashar Assad, whose intensity of air strikes vastly increase those— 

are greater than those of U.S. air strikes on ISIS. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, thank you. 

Look, I think everybody is—there are certain frustrations here. 

We all understand that, and I will come back to Syria in one quick 

moment. But in point of fact, if I can correct you, you are not correct that when we have been here, there have not been instances 

where authorizations did not originate right here in the committee. 

The year before I came here, on the Lebanon in 1983, it did. In 

1991, when I was here, it originated here in the committee. George 

Herbert Walker Bush sent 350,000 troops to the Middle East to respond to the invasion of Kuwait. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I will be glad to argue with you about it, 

but it is led—it has been led by the Presidents. I would appreciate 

if you would go on and—— 

Secretary KERRY. No, no. 

Senator MCCAIN [continuing]. Justify how we can continue the 

massacre of brave young Syrians. 

43 

Secretary KERRY. I will come back to it, Senator. But I am going 

to answer the question. 

Senator MCCAIN. I did not ask a question. I made a statement. 

Secretary KERRY. And it was incorrect. 

Senator MCCAIN. Now please move on—— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, your statement was incorrect, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN [continuing]. To the slaughter in Syria, please. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, look, I am not going to sit here like a 

ping pong ball. I think that your statement was incorrect, and you 

know, everybody is accountable for what they say, and so are you. 

The fact is you are incorrect. 

On January 8, 1991, Bush sent a letter here requesting it to 

adopt a resolution, and a few days later, Congress gave him what 

he asked for. And Congress originated it. 

Senator MCCAIN. Yes, and he—and I was there, and he came 

over with a proposal. So go ahead. 

Secretary KERRY. Did not come over—— 

Senator MCCAIN. He did come over with a proposal. You and I 

can argue about that if you want to. I was here, too. He came over 

with a proposal. 

Secretary KERRY. He did not, and the record will show that. 

Senator MCCAIN. The record will show that he did, if it was—— 

Secretary KERRY. And again, in Somalia in 1993, the committee 

likewise did it. And I served on the committee. I think I know what 

happened back then. 

And Senator Biden, now Vice President, was on the committee, 

and we know what happened. So we can let the record speak to 

that. 

With respect to what is happening, I think I was up front and 

stated that in the north they are seriously challenged. We understand that, and we have said that. 

But the fact is that more is being done and more is being done 

than I can talk about here in this hearing, but the fact is that 

there are greater capacities being provided to the opposition. And 

our hope is that when we work things through with the Turks and 

over the next days, certain decisions will be made that, in fact, will 

provide greater capacity. But, yes, they are challenged today in the 

north. 

But here is a reality. What we are doing to train them, the opposition, and what is being done with respect to ISIL, because the opposition, particularly in the north, has been fighting ISIL, and they 

have been fighting al-Nusra, and they have been fighting the regime. 

What we are doing—— 

Senator MCCAIN. And we are allowing them to be barrel bombed. 

Secretary KERRY. We are not allowing them to be barrel bombed. 

Senator MCCAIN. We are not preventing them from being barrel 

bombed. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, is the committee ready to vote? 

How many votes are there in this committee for American forces 

to now go in—— 

Senator MCCAIN. That is not my answer. My answer is to give 

them the weapons they need, which they do not have. 

Secretary KERRY. I just said to you that—— 

44 

Senator MCCAIN. They do not have those weapons. It has been 

3 years. It is 200,000 dead. I said—— 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, I just said to you there are things we 

cannot—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I said the last year when we were at—you were 

going to hit the trifecta. You hit it on Syria, you hit it on the Palestinians-Israelis, and now you are going to hit it on Iran. And now 

we are still not giving these people the support they need and deserve while 200,000 of them have been butchered. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, we are in the process right now, and 

I think you know this, there are certain things that are happening. 

And I do not think—I think it is a little disingenuous to suggest 

that nothing is being considered and nothing is happening when it 

is. 

And the fact is that in a classified setting, you can go through 

precisely what is taking place, and I think you will have a better 

sense of what the options are. 

Senator MCCAIN. I am sure there is young people that are dying 

in Syria are pleased to know that things are happening that we 

cannot even talk about. Disgraceful. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, I mean, the rules of the Senate—— 

Senator MCCAIN. My time has expired. 

Secretary KERRY. Now the rules of the Senate, you know, classified information is classified information. I mean, if you want to 

fight about that, you can. But—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I am not talking about classified information. 

The CHAIRMAN. Time. 

Senator MCCAIN. I want to know why we have not helped them 

for the last 3 or 4 years. They are fighting for freedom. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the Senator has expired. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, we are helping them. 

Senator MCCAIN. Appreciate it. 

Secretary KERRY. We might not be helping them to your satisfaction, but there is a lot of help being given to them. 

Senator MCCAIN. Not to their satisfaction. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you and the ranking member and Secretary Kerry for taking this 

process so seriously. 

I do not think this is a charade. I think whether or not we pass 

this through the House and through the Senate in the next few 

days, this has been a forcing mechanism. Without a submission 

from the administration, for whatever reason they may have, we 

needed this process. We needed these deliberations in order to get 

to a text that while it may not pass through both houses in the 

next few days, will be much more easily passed in January because 

of the work that this chairman and this committee has done and, 

hopefully, the discussions that Secretary Kerry is prepared to be a 

part of. 

Two quick points, the second leading into a question. And I think 

what we are talking about here is a distinction between what the 

administration believes to be preferable, an authorization, and 

what many of us believe to be necessary, which is an authorization. 

45 

And just by way of explanation as to why many of us think that, 

I do think there is a difference in terms of what we believe ISIS 

to be. Many of us, respectfully, do not believe this is just a matter 

of a name change. This is an organization whose name is different, 

but who had a very specific tactical and strategical difference with 

al-Qaeda. There is a change in hierarchy. 

And many of us worry that if a change in name and a change 

in tactic and a change in strategy and a change in hierarchy does 

not prompt us to pass a new authorization, we are not sure how 

we ever get out from underneath the original 2001 AUMF, which 

is why we think this is vitally necessary. 

My second point is on this question of limitations. Senator Flake 

and Senator Johnson rattled off a list of authorizations that were 

fairly open-ended in nature, and that certainly has been the practice often of this Congress. But I can rattle you off a similar list 

of authorizations that the Congress has passed that have limitations. 

You can start in the 1790s with our authorizations for action 

against the French navy. But fast forward to 1983, the authorization for military force in Lebanon, 1993 in Somalia, 2013 the authorization passed by this committee, all of them had different 

kinds of limitations. Limitations on time, limitations on tactics. 

And so, it really is just a question of whether we think that the 

policy that we are talking about is so important that it should be 

in statutory language. And I think that is what you are hearing 

from many of us on this committee, that we understand that it is 

preferable to have a bipartisan bill, that in most circumstances, it 

is probably preferable to grant substantial deference to the administration. 

But occasionally, there are questions that are so important that 

they are deserving of a statutory limitation, and that is why I 

think we are having to struggle over this question of ground forces 

because many of us believe that the deployment of ground forces 

in the Middle East today would essentially be fighting a fire with 

gasoline. That if we have learned anything from the last 10 years, 

it is that the massive deployment of American forces create twice 

as many foreign fighters and extremist fighters as they eliminate 

in the long run, and they provide a crutch for domestic governments to stand down and let us do all the work while they continue 

to stew in their dysfunction. 

And I think part of our worry is that the reason why we do not 

have a Department of Defense witness here today is that there is 

substantial disagreement within the administration, that there is 

an element of the military which would like to have a serious conversation about the deployment of ground forces. 

And we take—and I take at least—I will speak for myself. I take 

the I think you have termed it as a prohibition from the President 

incredibly seriously. I do not doubt for a second that you and the 

President are committed to keeping ground forces out of this equation. But many of us worry that that balance could tip or that the 

next administration could think differently. 

And so, I guess my question would just be simple. It would be 

helpful to hear a little bit more about why you think, why the policy is such that you think it would be a bad idea, that it would be 

46 

counter to our policy of degrading and defeating ISIL to insert 

ground forces into the equation? Because we sort of just take that 

for granted, but that clearly is a debate that is happening within 

foreign policy circles, within this committee, within the administration. 

And I think it would be helpful just to hear how strongly that 

view is held within the Department of State and the Department 

of Defense and within the White House. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, thank you for a very articulate 

statement of what the tensions are here, what is at stake, and I 

do not disagree with you. I think it is important for Congress to 

have that statutory statement of some kind or another. 

And I assure you, President Obama, who served on this committee for, you know, 4 years and Senator Biden, then-Senator 

Biden, now Vice President, who served on this committee for about, 

what is it, you know, 30 years or near, both are huge supporters 

of the War Powers Act, as I am. He has lived by it, even in situations where he did not feel like he had to necessarily strictly send 

up, he sent it up. He always moved on the side of caution and of 

compliance. 

And they believe it is important to have an appropriate authorization of military force. But as President of the United States, he 

also believes that his constitutional authority is vital and his ability as Commander in Chief to fully empower his military to be able 

to effect what he needs should not be micromanaged and restrained 

in a way that might eliminate, might eliminate some option they 

may need at some point in time. 

It would be hard to imagine, given the experience of Iraq and all 

that we learned about our forces on the ground and these reactions 

of people indigenously that you talk about, that, you know, that 

someone is going to voluntarily say we ought to have major ground 

force for a long period of time. 

I mean, what we are really talking about is protecting against 

exigencies, emergencies, certain circumstances that may or may 

not arise. For instance, like the rescue effort, tragically that did not 

work, of Luke Somers the other day. Would that have been envisioned within it? I do not know. I do not think so. But there are 

other circumstances that may arise, and we cannot predict them 

all. Nobody can. 

So all we are trying to do is preserve, and I think, as again I say 

the duration, the timeframe here is such. And I think you, yourselves, you have to trust your own power in the Congress and the 

ability of Congress, if there were suddenly movements to do this, 

I cannot imagine it being funded. I cannot imagine that, you know, 

there is not going to be a hue and cry that would be overwhelming 

in reaction to that, absent some, again, extraordinary circumstances that merited that kind of response. 

But do you want to pre-guess that? Do you want to predetermine 

what you—then you are tangled up in a statutory knot and trying 

to get out of it. I think the better part of wisdom here is to try to 

maintain an adequate level of flexibility, but at the same time preserve your prerogative through the duration of time, et cetera. 

Now the administration has said the President is prepared to 

have his people sit carefully, work through this language, try to see 

47 

how to balance these equities. You know, what he wants is the 

broadest vote possible. Get everybody in a place where they are 

comfortable, if that is achievable, and I think it ought to be. 

Senator MURPHY. I appreciate that. I think the more that you review the chairman’s draft, you will see that that specific hypothetical that you posed is covered by one of these exceptions. And 

I would imagine almost every other hypothetical that could be presented is going to be covered by the exceptions in the draft. 

But I look forward to that process. I do not think there is reason 

to be as scared of these limitations as you may be, given what has 

already been drafted. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, if they are all covered, maybe it is better 

to say something about no enduring activity or no enduring 

ground—I mean, there is a way to cover it maybe with one sentence. Let us think about other ways of doing. 

All I am saying is, folks, let us agree to try to find a way to talk 

this through without posturing. 

The CHAIRMAN. As I turn to—as I turn to Senator Barrasso, let 

me just say on that particular issue, page 5 of the draft AUMF 

says that troops are permitted for the protection or rescue of members of the U.S. Armed Forces or United States citizens from imminent danger posed by ISIS. So it envisioned that—— 

Secretary KERRY. But I have other examples—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure we could throw out 100 and I am not 

sure that there would be language that could cover all 100 of them. 

But we were certainly—as I say, I am happy to see the language, 

if that can be envisioned. 

Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Today’s hearing on the authorization of the use of military force 

against ISIL, I believe, is critically important. Declaring war or authorizing the use of military force is one of the most serious responsibilities of Congress. There can hardly be a task more weighty and 

solemn than sending our Nation’s sons or daughters into harm’s 

way to protect our interests. 

So I believe President Obama has an obligation to Congress and 

to the American people to spell out the direct threat posed by ISIL, 

to outline his strategy for comprehensively destroying ISIL, and request the authorities he needs to successfully complete the mission. 

I believe ISIL is a threat to our homeland, and I support efforts 

to eliminate this terrorist threat. 

Our committee is debating the authorization for the use of military force while the President has already been taking offensive 

military actions against ISIL for months. President Obama has not 

submitted a request outlining that authorization that he is seeking 

from Congress. 

Normally, when the executive branch wants an authorization for 

the use of military force, it formally requests that legislative authorization and then is actively involved in negotiating over the 

language and advocating its passage. That is how the 2001 AUMF 

was developed. But we see no similar effort on behalf of the Obama 

administration. 

48 

So in the absence of the administration’s specific request or submission of a proposal for authorization, some Members of Congress 

are more interested in placing limitations in the AUMF and tying 

the hands of the President and our Nation’s generals. Whether it 

is geographical or operational limitations, I think these limitations 

are misguided and dangerous. 

Congress should either be authorizing the use of force or not authorizing force. Congress should not try to micromanage a war 

through an authorization. 

So if the administration had provided military and intelligence 

witnesses, and the chairman has already made a comment about 

your willingness to come forward, but not having all of the abilities 

to answer all of the questions. You know, I would have asked how 

the limitation of the use of ground troops would impact the military’s planning and the ability to respond to conditions on the 

ground. 

So since they are not here, I ask you how do we ensure that any 

AUMF continues to allow the United States to strike and destroy 

ISIS should it expand outside of any limitations which may be included in an AUMF that is being offered? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, that is precisely why we are trying to 

work out this question of the limitations. Because I cannot answer 

it otherwise. 

Senator BARRASSO. So you believe that there should not be limitations? 

Secretary KERRY. I said we are prepared to embrace a clarification, a process by which there is an understanding of how we can 

balance these equities. It may require some kind of restraint that 

we feel would not abrogate the Commander in Chief responsibilities. I think there is a way to work at it, and that is what we are 

offering to try to do. 

But you know, or example, what about non-U.S. hostage or prisoner? I mean, that might be a situation. You can run through all 

kinds of things here. The point is we are just trying to preclude 

sending restraint messages to folks that we are trying to defeat 

and degrade and at the same time balance the equities of the concerns people have about the open-endedness that we have lived 

with in the past. And it is a legitimate concern. 

I think everybody ought to try to help find the way to work that 

through, and in the doing so, we can ensure that we have the kind 

of broad-based bipartisan resolution that we deserve. 

Senator BARRASSO. Do you think there are additional specific authorities that the administration needs that they currently do not 

have to degrade and destroy ISIL? 

Secretary KERRY. At this point in time? You mean the authorization we are giving at this point? 

Senator BARRASSO. Yes. 

Secretary KERRY. No. I think the President feels that he has the 

full authority, both constitutionally and through the current 

AUMF. But we acknowledge that it needs refining. We acknowledge that there is a gap in time and a sufficient differential in 

what we are fighting that the American people are owed a more 

precise articulation that meets the current moment, and that is 

what the President is saying we should have. 

49 

Senator BARRASSO. Mr. Secretary, your predecessor, Hillary Clinton, recently stated in a speech at Georgetown University that 

America needs to show respect for our enemies and empathize with 

their perspective and point of view. 

ISIS terrorists are not going to simply go away. We cannot ignore 

them and hope that they will embrace our values. And we certainly 

cannot empathize and show respect to people who have brutally 

murdered brave Americans. 

So do you believe, as Secretary of State, that a key solution to 

our enemies such as ISIS and al-Qaeda is ‘‘showing respect’’ and 

‘‘empathizing with their perspective and point of view’’? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, you know, I missed the first part of the 

quote. I apologize. What was it? Empathize? 

Senator BARRASSO. Hillary at Georgetown recently said that 

America needs to show respect for our enemies and empathize with 

their perspective and point of view. 

Secretary KERRY. Yes, well, I do not think she was referring— 

I am confident. I know she was not referring to a group like Daesh. 

I think she is—you know, I think in terms of what she meant, 

there is no question in my mind, she is referring to those out there 

with whom we are not actively fighting or engaged in war but who 

are behaving in ways that are clearly opposed to our interests. 

And there are plenty of people in that status, regrettably, whether it is in the Middle East in certain countries or in other parts 

of the world. I mean, we have a lot of tensions right now with Russia, and it is clear that any analysis of what is happening in 

Ukraine and how you deal with it or in other parts of the world 

requires you to look very carefully at all their posturing and where 

it comes from and what may be involved and how one might be 

able to defuse it. 

So I have no doubt that does not include a group like Daesh, and 

I think it would be unfair to insinuate that it does. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Before I turn to Senator Kaine, you know, a lot has been made 

here about placing restrictions on AUMFs and the suggestion that 

there is no precedent for Congress doing that. That is simply not 

true. 

The fact is, is that most AUMFs historically have limited the 

type of forces deployed into harm’s way, the geographic scope, and 

the period of time. It is declarations of war, which is not what we 

are doing, nor what the administration has asked us for, that have 

typically authorized the President to use all military means available to the United States for unlimited duration. 

My text is clearly not a declaration of war, nor has the administration asked us for a declaration of war, and several of my colleagues have noted this. But you know, some of the AUMFs that 

have included restrictions are the 1993 Somalia AUMF, which authorized United States Armed Forces in a limited way to protect 

United States personnel and assist in the short-term security of 

U.N. units; the 1983 Lebanon AUMF that prohibited offensive actions. 

The 2013 Syria AUMF that passed through this committee, I 

think one of its high-water marks, in a bipartisan way expressly 

50 

did not authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces on the 

ground in Syria for the purpose of combat operations. 

We have a span of nearly 30 years, to take recent history, in 

which AUMFs have had limitations. So the suggestion that having 

limitations is a historical aberration, that is just simply not the 

case. 

Senator Kaine, who has been greatly involved in this issue, and 

along with Senator Paul, their amendments have driven us to 

this—to this moment. 

So, Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretary Kerry. You have not been before us to 

receive the thanks of this committee for some of your diplomacy, 

the diplomatic efforts to help reform the Government in Iraq, the 

diplomatic efforts to break the electoral impasse in Afghanistan. I 

want to thank you for those because those efforts were important. 

I want to thank you for your efforts on behalf of the administration to build the coalition that is fighting against ISIL. Senator 

King and I went to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar in early October 

and went to the CAOC, Combined Air Operations Center, and we 

witnessed the coalition in action. Full-screen videos, data coming 

in, United States, Saudi, UAE, Dutch, Belgian, French, Canadian, 

United Kingdom, Qataris trading information, making decisions together in both the Syrian and Iraqi theaters. Very, very impressive. 

You deserve our thanks for that. But we cannot do military action without Congress, and we are currently in what the administration has described, beginning in late August, as a war against 

ISIL. Those were the phase that both Secretary Hagel has used, 

the President has used it. Since we moved from the immediate protection of U.S. Embassy personnel in Baghdad and Erbil, an effort 

to take back a dam in the middle of August, the President said we 

have gone on offense against ISIL. 

Yesterday, we passed 4 months. We are in month 5 of an air 

strike campaign that has involved 1,100 plus air strikes, as you 

testified; 1,500 combat train and assist advisers on the ground in 

the theater, another 1,500 authorized to go. The cost of this to the 

American taxpayer has now been in excess of $1 billion. 

And three American troops have been killed supporting Operation Inherent Resolve, and I just think we ought to at least mention their names. October 1, Marine Corporal Jordan Spears from 

Memphis, Indiana. October 23, Marine Lance Corporal Sean Neal 

from Riverside, California. December 1, Captain William H. Dubois 

of New Castle, Colorado, an Air Force captain. 

We are at war, and Congress has not yet really done a darned 

thing about it. 

I respect the comments that the ranking member, Senator Corker, who I deeply respect, said earlier about the process of this is 

not ideal. It was not ideal when Senator Paul and I tried to file 

an AUMF as an amendment to an international water bill last 

week, but if we had not done it, we would not even been doing this 

at all until January. 

Congress has been silent about this. I do not think we weaken 

our Nation so much with an unwieldy process as we weaken our 

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51 

bility that Congress has, which is to engage around the declaration 

at the beginning, not 5 months in, at the beginning about whether 

we should initiate war. 

Constitutionally, it is required. I am driven by a more important 

value. I do not think it is fair to ask people, like these three, to 

risk their lives, to give their lives in a mission if Congress has not 

had a debate and put their thumbprint on it and said this is in the 

national interest. If we are not willing to do that, how can we ask 

people to risk their lives? 

I think it would be foolish to leave here this week or next, to adjourn, wait until January when we come back. January 8, the first 

week we are back, we would now be into the 6th month of war 

without Congress taking any action. 

This is not about a quest to just seem relevant. For those of us 

who do not believe that the 2001 or 2002 authorizations give this 

a legal authority, every day we have been on offense without Congress we believe is an unauthorized war. We believe it is a congressional abdication of our oath of office and of our fundamental constitutional responsibilities. 

There is a difference of opinion between the executive and the 

legislature on this. But remember, this is about an argument about 

what power the legislature gave to the Executive in 2001 and 2002, 

and you might not be surprised to know that those of us in the legislative branch have a pretty strong opinion about what that power 

was and what it was not. 

I do not think we can wait until January or February. So we 

should act. The administration has not done your own draft? Hey, 

we have got a deadline tomorrow to file amendments to this one. 

First degree amendments at 9 a.m. Second degree amendments at 

6 a.m. 

You say we are close. Offer your own wordsmith and I am sure 

the chairman will make sure that when we talk about it, we can 

consider the administration’s position. But we cannot afford to wait 

and get into the 6th month of a war without Congress saying a 

mumbling word about this. 

I think I know the answer to this, but I do want to put it on the 

record, and I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question about whether the President or the administration’s position 

have changed from what the President has said. And I am going 

to read you five statements. 

August 9, 2014. ‘‘Number one, I have been very clear that we are 

not going to have United States combat troops in Iraq again.’’ 

September 10, 2014. ‘‘As I have said before, these American 

forces will not have a combat mission. We will not get dragged into 

another ground war in Iraq.’’ 

On that same date, ‘‘It will not involve American combat troops 

fighting on foreign soil.’’ 

September 17, 2014. ‘‘The American forces that have been deployed to Iraq do not and will not have a combat mission. They will 

support Iraqi forces on the ground as they fight for their country 

against these terrorists. I will not commit you and the rest of our 

armed forces to be fighting another ground war in Iraq.’’ 

And finally, on September 18, 2014. ‘‘I will not commit our troops 

to fighting another ground war in Iraq or in Syria.’’ 

52 

Has the President’s position or has the administration’s position, 

as evidenced by these clear and unequivocal statements, changed? 

Secretary KERRY. No. 

Senator KAINE. Let me address the constitutional question that 

the chairman brought up a minute ago because I do think it is important. Is there precedent for restrictions or limitations in authorization? Senator Murphy dealt with this as well. 

I would recommend to all my colleagues an article, ‘‘Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,’’ authored by Jack 

Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley, May of 2005 in the Harvard Law 

Review. It is an extensive review of the constitutional power of 

Congress with respect to military authorizations. 

And it begins with a case that went to the Supreme Court dealing with the quasi wars that Senator Murphy mentioned against 

the French naval authorities in the 1790s. Congress granted limited authorizations. 

The authorizations ‘‘did not authorize the President to use all of 

the armed forces of the United States or to conduct military incursions beyond specified military targets, and they limited the geographical scope of the authorized conflict to the high seas.’’ Navy 

only. No ground troops. 

Most authorizations to use force in U.S. history have been of this 

limited or partial nature. The constitutional argument on this is 

clear. The President’s intent, as stated repeatedly to the American 

public and the military, is clear. There has been no change in that 

position, according to your testimony today. 

The language in the chairman’s mark is not a restriction at all. 

It is attempting to carry out exactly how the President has described the mission. And as far as exigencies and contingencies go, 

I give a lot of praise to the chairman for trying to listen to all of 

us, listen to the administration through those seven conversations, 

and put a mark together that—that covers the contingencies or exigencies that we can think of. 

And finally, the President always has the power under Article II 

to use any forces, including ground forces, to repel an imminent 

threat to the United States by ISIL or by any other group or nation. That power is absolute. No one on this committee questions 

it. But in terms of putting restrictions into this, it has been done 

since the 1790s without any constitutional suggestion. 

I would hope you might offer some thoughts tomorrow as we are 

contemplating amendments so that Thursday we can do this. But 

I do not think we can wait until the 6th month of this war without 

Congress to finally begin to express the will of the Article I branch. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Paul. 

Secretary KERRY. Can I just make a comment quickly? 

The CHAIRMAN. Quickly. 

Secretary KERRY. I will not take long, Senator Paul. 

Just very quickly, first of all, that is a very articulate summary 

and argument with respect to your particular position on it. I think 

historically in most AUMFs and most debates about whether we 

should be using force or not, depending on who is President and 

depending on the balance in the Senate and the House and so 

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53 

ple come in and say, hey, Presidential power and the Article II and 

know there have been restraints. And that is going to apply to 

every situation, as it does here, as we are now debating. 

The question is, is there an effective way to achieve this goal 

that, given the balance of interests, et cetera, in this situation at 

this moment, given this particular fight, could achieve the goal? 

Differently perhaps from the way it has been laid out, but without 

losing the impact or the effect. 

I think there may be some ways, and I suggested a couple. One 

is through the duration. Another may be through some kind of language that talks about no enduring combat operation or whatever, 

but that is different and that avoids having to get into this specific 

discussion of all the kind of instances, which you are trying to 

cover, Mr. Chairman, respectfully, in this. 

So I would just say to you, with all genuine effort to try to 

achieve this goal of getting a maximum vote, I would just suggest 

that maybe a better way than kind of just doing it by amendment 

is to pre-work the amendment or to find out if you could come together and get an agreement so that you are doing it either by consensus or agreement on that amendment rather than just fighting 

out the amendments, and you have a vote, and it is up or down. 

And you still do not resolve the fundamental problem. 

So all the administration is saying to you is we want an AUMF. 

Yet whatever has happened to date—I am not going to go backward—we would like to work it through in a way with you that 

comes out with the strongest possible result. Because the goal here 

is to get a result that has an impact for our allies, for our troops 

on the field who are deployed, and particularly for the coalition and 

for ISIL itself to understand our intent. 

And I do not want to see that diminished by whatever amendment process may flow without the adequate input. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Paul. 

Senator PAUL. Thank you, and thank you for your testimony. 

I think there is no greater responsibility for any legislator than 

the debate over when we send our brave young men and women 

to war. The Constitution is quite clear that this responsibility lies 

with Congress. 

Madison wrote in The Federalist Papers when describing the 

congressional authority requirement, he wrote that the executive 

branch is the branch most prone to war, and therefore, we have 

with studied care vested that power in the legislature. 

I think for 5 months, we have been derelict in our duty. I think 

we have had great leaders in our past. When FDR came the day 

after Pearl Harbor, he came before a joint session of Congress to 

ask for war. George W. Bush came within 2 weeks after 9/11 to a 

joint session of Congress with the same request. 

I think this President has been derelict. But I think at the same 

time, there is enough blame to go around for Congress, who has 

also been derelict in their duty. There has been some gnashing of 

teeth that some Senators had the temerity to offer this as an 

amendment to the water bill. Had we not offered this as an amendment to the water bill, there would be no debate over war at this 

point. 

54 

So I accept that blame as a badge of honor and pledge to continue in the new Congress and to amend any bill that comes before 

the Foreign Relations Committee with the use of authorization of 

force until we do finally have a debate and a vote before the full 

Congress, as we should. 

There was some discussion, and you have said the administration is opposed to a geographic limit. Some on our side are basically 

for no limits at all. But after watching what has happened in the 

last 15 years and watching the gymnastics, the mental gymnastics 

that tries to use an authorization of force that was intended to be 

used against those who attacked us on 9/11, to say ISIS has anything to do with them I think is an absurd notion and an argument 

for why we need to be very careful what authorization we give and 

very strict in what authority we give to the President. 

For example, the administration, through your testimony, says 

they believe no geographic limit. Senator Udall brought forward a 

great example. He said you know what? There are groups in Libya, 

Algeria, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia who have pledged allegiance to 

the Islamic State, and I am going to give you a chance to revise 

your answer because you very quickly said, of course, that is why 

we need no geographic limit. 

Okay. Tomorrow, Medina. Medina, Saudi Arabia, pledges their 

allegiance to ISIS. This resolution will authorize you to bomb Medina, Saudi Arabia. Is that the message you want to send to the 

world that you want the authority, the unlimited authority to attack geographically anywhere in the world if someone pledges their 

allegiance to the Islamic State? 

That is absolutely why I cannot vote for any resolution that does 

not have a geographic restraint, and realize the message we send, 

if that is the message we are sending, that if Medina or Mecca 

pledges allegiance to the Islamic State, they are open to being 

bombed by the United States. That is a very, very scary and I 

think a wrong-headed message to be sending to the Middle East. 

Your comments, please? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, my comment is, Senator, I think there is 

a responsibility to pick logical and legitimate kinds of options, 

number one. And number two, to make a presumption in the sanity 

of the President of the United States, nobody is talking about 

bombing everywhere. 

Senator PAUL. Let us be very explicit and limit it then. 

Secretary KERRY. No. Senator, that is precisely what the Constitution—you are a student of the Constitution, and you pride 

yourself in upholding it and being a strict constructionist. And 

being a strict constructionist, I do not think you should put those 

limitations on the power of the Executive. 

If you want to get into it as a declaration of war, you certainly 

have the right to try to do that. But I would counsel you also that 

no declaration of war has taken place since World War II. Since 

World War II. 

And no President has come here, including George Bush, who 

you cited erroneously as having done so. He did not come and ask 

for a declaration of war. He asked for an authorization for the use 

of force. 

55 

Senator PAUL. I did not say he came for a declaration of war, but 

he did come as a leader before the joint session of Congress. 

Secretary KERRY. But let me just finish. Let me be crystal clear 

here. You know, if you are going to be strictly constructionist and 

adhere to the Constitution in terms of what you are arguing about 

the right, declaration of war, it would be a mistake to ask for a declaration of war. You want a, you know, use of military force because a declaration of war has only been used against states. 

Senator PAUL. I am really not making that argument. I am making the argument currently for a limit of geographic nature to 

whether it is a use of force or a declaration of war, that it should 

be limited because here is the problem. You are sending a message 

to the Middle East that no city is off limits, that if any city in the 

Middle East declares an allegiance to the Islamic State that you 

would be justified and you would have the authority to bomb them. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, that statement is being made without 

any input or, frankly, consideration for the limits and strictures 

within which the United States of America is currently operating. 

We have some of the most extraordinary self-imposed restraints on 

our checklists for where and when and how we might use force 

even where we have been authorized to use force. 

And you need to review that. You need to go find out what restraints our military is currently operating under. 

Senator PAUL. There is a very important restraint, and that is 

the Constitution that says Congress initiates war. You went to war 

in Libya without congressional authority. You have now been at 

war for 5 months without constitutional or congressional authority. 

Secretary KERRY. We did not go to war in Libya. It depends how 

you look at these. I mean, this term of ‘‘war’’ is, frankly, I 

think—— 

Senator PAUL. Oh, I forgot. That was kinetic action? 

Secretary KERRY. I think that we are not going to war in the way 

that we went to war in Iraq. We are not going to war in the way 

that we went to war in Afghanistan. 

We are engaged in what people want to call a war and can call 

a war certainly, and we have. But it is very restrained and different in scope. 

Senator PAUL. But that is why we should be very explicit. 

Secretary KERRY. Which is why—which is—let me just finish. 

Which is why we are in favor of an authorization for use of military 

force which defines what it is. 

Senator PAUL. Right. 

Secretary KERRY. But this is different. I mean, you need to look 

at the checklist our people go through with respect to whether or 

not they might take a shot at somebody. You need to look at the 

restraints the President of the United States has put on our military—let me finish. 

Senator PAUL. This is not about whether you are restraining. It 

is about the division of power and the balance of power between 

the branches of Government. 

Secretary KERRY. No, it is bigger than that. It is really bigger 

than that. It is not just about the division of power. It is about 

what you are trying to achieve and how you can achieve it. And 

also about how you use power. 

56 

But if you do not look at what you are trying to achieve and 

what the methodologies are, the tools that you have at your disposal, you are not going to get very far. 

Senator PAUL. Let me ask one quick question to finish, and that 

was last year when you came before the committee for the Syrian 

AUMF, you said that there is no problem in our having a language 

that has zero capacity for American troops on the ground within 

the authorization the President is asking for. 

This was against a regime that some would argue is more formidable than ISIS, has greater assets for fighting war, and would be 

a much more significant opponent, or at least equally as significant 

as ISIS, but many would argue much greater. And there, you were 

willing to accept that you would have a prohibition on ground 

forces, but today you are unwilling to accept a prohibition on 

ground forces. 

How would you compare the relative strength of the two opponents, and why would you accept no ground forces against the Syrian regime that has an air force and has many more weapons at 

its command and a larger army than ISIS? 

Secretary KERRY. Are you going to let me answer this in full? 

Senator PAUL. Absolutely. 

Secretary KERRY. Because I want to answer it. Very specifically, 

because it is an entirely different situation, what we were asking 

for in the case of the limited authority to have a limited strike 

against Assad at that time was entirely focused on degrading his 

capacity to deliver chemical weapons and sending a limited message. And we came here with great specificity about the serious 

limitations on what we were seeking. 

So asking for—allowing that restraint at that time had no imposition on the capacity to carry out the mission. The mission was 

going to be without troops, without ground forces. It was designed 

that way. It would have been executed that way, and we were losing absolutely nothing whatsoever in the potential because we had 

no intention of putting forces in to do what we were going to do 

and achieve what we were going to achieve. 

Now we achieved—— 

Senator PAUL. But that sounds similar to your statements that 

you have made about this war. 

Secretary KERRY. No. Because the President acknowledges, as 

any President would, as all of our military would, ask any of the 

people who are being asked to implement this strategy whether 

they feel comfortable knowing that they have been limited and 

what option might or might not be available to them if they have 

to do it. 

Now the President has made it clear it is not his policy. And I 

have never seen anybody more adamant about that and more clear 

in every statement he has made. They were all quoted by Senator 

Kaine. Five times or four times in the month of September, he has 

reiterated it. 

But that does not mean that you want to take away what might 

be conceivably necessary at some point in time in certain circumstances. The President is absolutely clear about his policy. 

But I have to say to you that by virtue of the President’s decision 

to use force, and thank you to this committee for voting and having 

57 

made clear Congress was moving in that direction, guess what? Instead of 1 or 2 days of bombing in order to send a message that 

you should not use these, we have got to deal with Russia to get 

100 percent of the weapons out. 

And that is because you did not limit it. You left it open, and 

there was a question that we might, in fact, do what we said we 

were going to do. 

That was—actually, that is another moment where for the first 

time in history during a conflict, we have removed all the known 

declared chemical weapons from a country. And believe me, thank 

God we did. Because today ISIL is in there controlling half the 

country, and imagine what would happen if they would gain control 

of those chemical weapons. 

So it is a completely different situation, Senator, where you have, 

you know, a very limited goal, limited stated, and you are willing 

to live under it. And the Executive says I will live under it. 

Here, you have an Executive who does not have as limited a goal, 

but who has said already he is going to limit his means of achieving the goal but does not want to be hamstrung in every other way 

with respect to the constitutional authorities that I know—— 

Senator PAUL. But for those of us who believe—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator’s time—— 

Senator PAUL [continuing]. Another Iraq war, that is why we are 

concerned about limiting this. 

Secretary KERRY. I well understand that. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know both of you would like to engage in a debate, but I have to get to another member. 

Just for the record, the Syria AUMF did, obviously had a limitation on ground forces, did not have a limitation as to the other 

wherewithal that the administration wanted to prevent chemical 

weapons. 

Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your excellent work on behalf 

of our country. We thank you for your incredible service over these 

last 2 years. 

I am one of the few members of Congress who voted for the authorization of military force in 2001 and who voted for the authorization of military force in 2002. When I look back at that, I never 

contemplated that it would authorize 2.5 million American military 

personnel to go to Iraq and Afghanistan. I never would have envisioned that 670,000 of them would now be declared officially disabled, that 270,000 of them would be treated for post traumatic 

stress syndrome, that the health care bills would now have risen 

to over $1 trillion, separate from the $1 trillion spent on those conflicts. 

So it is a very timely debate that we are having for all of us, 

huh? We need to just turn the page and move on to this next stage 

because the use of those old authorizations do a disservice to this 

institution and to this country. 

So from my perspective, obviously, we are trying our best as a 

Congress to ensure that we do not invoke the law of unintended 

consequences, as we did with those first two authorizations of military force. I never imagined that George Bush would interpret the 

58 

2002 authorization the way he did, but he did. And even as we debate this authorization, it will go into the next Presidency. 

And so, we have to be careful necessarily. And so, I think that 

is why we are all being very cautious here because we have lived 

through this recent American history, and we do not want to repeat 

it. 

So from my perspective, Mr. Secretary, I am looking at Iraq right 

now, looking for some hope. You have had some breakthroughs. 

They have named a Sunni Defense Minister, and there seems to be 

some progress that would obviate the need for American combat 

troops on the ground in Iraq. 

Could you talk a little bit about that and the hopes that you have 

that the Iraqi Sunnis would start fighting ISIS and stop fighting 

the Iraqi Security Forces? Could you just talk a little bit about that 

and how hopeful you are that we are on the correct path in that 

country to reseal the Syrian-Iraqi border? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, thank you. Thank you, Senator, and 

thank you for your generous comments. And I appreciate your comment very much about your vote and what you did or did not contemplate, and I certainly would agree with you, having been here 

then and voting in that period of time. 

Which is why President Obama and Vice President Biden really 

are both so committed to an AUMF that appropriately reflects 

where we are today. And I know he believes very deeply that we 

will be stronger as a country if we have this broad vote that I have 

talked about. 

So I would say to all of you, notwithstanding the passion with 

which you approach this sense of the mistakes that may have been 

made and the open-endedness of war, et cetera, I do believe there 

are ways to craft this so that it is not open-ended and so that there 

are the sufficient levels of clarifications about administration, et 

cetera, without getting into something that is going to be impossible to get that broad vote from. And I ask you to keep that in 

mind. 

What we get for a vote here is a very important part of what we 

are trying to achieve. The unanimity, the breadth and scope of support is a message to everybody involved in this—the coalition, our 

troops, you know, our closest allies, and even to the people we are 

fighting. 

So I appreciate your focusing on Iraq because, in fact, we were 

deeply involved from the moment the President made the comment 

that we have to know we had a government we could work with 

in order to be able to commit to doing something. Because anything 

we tried to do in Iraq if we had not had a governmental transformation would never have worked, and we would be in a really 

difficult situation here. 

Who knows whether ISIL would have been in Baghdad or whether Iran might have decided to go even further in to be involved, et 

cetera. There are whole bunch of major strategic permutations that 

could have unfolded, but we became deeply engaged diplomatically, 

and a superb team worked hard, working with our allies in the region to help the Iraqis be able to make the choices they made. And 

they made them. 

59 

It was difficult. They got a new speaker. The current speaker 

gave up his position and moved out. That took a lot of effort, and 

that opened up the door to the selection of a Kurd President. And 

that opened up the door to the selection of a new Prime Minister. 

And when Ayatollah Sistani and others weighed in, there were 

a whole series of events that took place that brought about this 

change in government. And just last week, we were in Brussels 

with the new Prime Minister, Prime Minister Abadi, speaking to 

some 60 entities and countries about his efforts to bring people together, to recognize there was no room for the kind of sectarian divide that had torn the place apart previously. 

Now Iran plays a hand here. It has got to be stated. There is an 

impact in Iraq with Iran because Iraq is 80 percent Shia, and there 

are interests. And historically—and other interests, I might add, 

religious sites, other kinds of things. 

So, hopefully, the Shia militia, with whom the current administration is currently working to try to restrain them from violence 

against Sunni, and the Sunni tribal chiefs can come together with 

confidence that the military is evolving in a way that together with 

their concept of a national guard and with new respect within the 

government itself for an inclusivity and participation, that can 

unite people around the goal of focusing only on getting rid of 

Daesh. 

Our feeling is that the training is coming along, that with the oil 

deal and other measures being taken, there is a constant effort 

being made to try to unite the government. There are still tensions. 

Importantly, regional efforts are taking place. When we had the 

meeting in Jeddah, which was the beginning of the organization of 

the coalition within the region, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Saud al-Faisal, promptly stated, ‘‘We will recognize the new 

government. We will open up diplomatic relations, and we will exchange visits.’’ That is happening. 

Prime Minister Davutoglu of Turkey visited Iraq. The Emirati 

Foreign Minister, Abdullah bin Zayed, visited Iraq. So there is a 

regional shift taking place. 

Now we obviously hope it holds. We will work diligently with 

them. But this combination of training with the military, 

desectarianizing—I mean undoing the sectarian divide that has 

taken place, building confidence among the Sunni is going to be a 

long process, but it has started. And it is having some impact, and 

it has the potential of having a profound impact on Iraq itself. 

Senator MARKEY. And may I just say, John, that that is what the 

American people want. They want a diplomatic resolution of this 

issue amongst the people who live in both Iraq and in Syria and 

the surrounding countries. That is what they want more than anything, and they do not want another open-ended opportunity for a 

commitment of another 2.5 million Americans into that region. 

Because the potential is there for that, and there are some members on this committee, in fact, who believe that it should be openended. And I just think that that debate is the debate that we have 

to have this time before we go more deeply. 

Secretary KERRY. I appreciate it, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator—— 

Senator MARKEY. And I thank you for your great service. 

60 

Secretary KERRY. Can I just say that President Obama deserves 

credit, Mr. Chairman—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are going to have to synthesize 

this because we have been here 31/2 hours, and I still want to get 

to Senator Durbin. 

Secretary KERRY. Fifteen seconds. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead. 

Secretary KERRY. President Obama deserves credit for having 

made the decision, which I think was key, that he was not going 

to move until they began to make the moves to put a government 

change in place. And that is really what leveraged this entire effort, and I think he deserves credit for having done that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Durbin will have the last word here in 

questions. 

Senator DURBIN. My apologies, Mr. Secretary. We have a hearing 

on the state of civil rights in America that was scheduled that coincided with this, and I presided and could not attend this. But I 

have had a pretty good summary of what happened from my staff. 

Secretary and Senator, you can recall the debates in 2001 and 

2002, and some of us who voted against the invasion of Iraq but 

felt that we did the right thing in voting to go after al-Qaeda, I do 

not think anybody envisioned we were voting for the longest war 

in the history of the United States of America and that our pursuit 

of al-Qaeda would take us into this situation today. 

And apparently, some within the administration believe that my 

vote then was an approval for what we are doing today. Whether 

I agree or disagree with the President’s actions today, I think that 

is a stretch to call this an al-Qaeda operation, even after al-Qaeda 

has disavowed Daesh or ISIS, whatever the current nomenclature 

is. 

Mr. Secretary, what it gets down to is this. The President has 

said there will be no ground troops. When General Dempsey came 

and testified before Congress and said there may be ground troops, 

the administration was quick to correct him and say we have no 

plans for ground troops. 

Many of us believe that we ought to stand by the President’s 

public statement about no ground troops when it comes to the authorization of use for military force. Our fear is that if we do not, 

either this President or some future President will drag us into another deep, long-lasting, bloody, almost pointless conflict. 

I am troubled that that is the new position of the administration 

to want authority for ground troops. I thought that issue was clear. 

Secretary KERRY. It is. It is absolutely clear. There is nothing 

that has changed. The President does not intend to, not planning 

to. There is no thought in his head of using ground troops. 

Senator DURBIN. Why then object to our saying that clearly in 

the authorization for use of military force? 

Secretary KERRY. Because what is contemplated by that, I think, 

Senator, is clearly this notion that we are not going to do some big 

deployment and get involved in an enormous war. But if there is 

some one-time operation that requires X, Y, or Z. Now you have 

tried to cover some of them. You have tried to make that clear. 

You are already accepting that. But the issue is can you provide 

an adequate guarantee of an exception for everything that may or 

61 

may not arise in that context only? There is no effort here to slide 

or try to change this. There is not going to be a big—there is no 

effort to do that. 

But all we are suggesting is we think there is a capacity to clarify, to try to work this through in a way that could bring both sides 

of this dais together in an effort to have a more powerful message 

in this vote and a clearer AUMF. And I think we can achieve that. 

Senator DURBIN. I will just say the chairman and ranking member have been so patient, and I am not going to ask any further 

questions other than to say, Mr. Secretary, this is important, critically important. It is not just important in terms of those whose 

lives will be at risk and what we are trying to achieve in the Middle East. But it has an importance that relates to our constitutional responsibilities, each of us. 

Secretary KERRY. Absolutely. 

Senator DURBIN. And I think that if we do not assert ourselves 

and our constitutional responsibility when it comes to this conflict, 

we are remiss. I do not want to be condemned by future generations for walking away from this responsibility. If we can work out 

an agreement, fine. If we cannot, we still have a responsibility to 

pass this authorization. I hope we do it before we leave. 

Secretary KERRY. We have three former members of this committee who are asking for the authorization who agree with you 

but would like to see us do it in a way that gets the vote we talked 

about. 

Senator DURBIN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker, final remarks? 

Senator CORKER. I want to thank you for having the hearing. I 

think this is much better than what was contemplated last week. 

I want to thank the Secretary for coming in today and providing 

some principles that I really believe we can all build on. 

And I do applaud the President and you for making sure that in 

Iraq we had a different government situation there before we committed. I think that was a good thing. 

I do want to say again I think that we can get to a place where 

there is that broader support. I really believe that. I am going to 

say something that my friends on this side of the aisle will disagree 

with. The reason we are here is a total failure of the President to 

lead on this issue and to send something up here. 

And so, we find ourselves divided when, in essence, we all want 

the same thing. We want to authorize the President to be able to 

do the things that are necessary to deal with ISIS. I mean, I think 

we are united there. And the reason we are in this cluster, which 

is where we are, is because the President has not really sought 

that authorization. 

Now today you came closer, not quite all the way there. But you 

came closer to asking for an explicit authorization. Came closer. A 

better approach to me would be for you to send up the language 

that I think people have asked for, and there might be some common ground here, more than we think. 

But the one piece that I think is missing by not asking explicitly 

is we do not have the opportunity to really delve into the strategy 

of this, and that, you know, we are talking about limitations in 

writing. But one of the things that we have not had the opporVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:16 Aug 26, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE H
62 

tunity to do, and I think anyone who attended the classified briefing we had a month ago with military leadership and others, I do 

not think anybody left there believing that we understood how we 

were going to deal with ISIS. I mean, I think there were a lot of 

gaps that we did not understand. 

So what is missing is not just the document, but it is also what 

is missing is when you seek something explicitly, we have the opportunity to probe how you are going to go about doing that. Now 

we just heard from leaders in the region, several of us with a meeting. I know there is tremendous division over the Assad issue. 

Assad is the magnet for ISIS in the first place. 

So I do hope that we will continue. I hope that you will send up 

explicit language. I hope that we will have the opportunity to understand how we are going to go forward. 

One of the reasons we ended up in a 12- or 13-year war is there 

was not any of this discussion on the front end. It did not happen. 

But it is not just the language. It is actually understanding how 

we are going to go about dealing with this, and that is a massive 

missing element here. 

So I want to thank the Secretary for being here. I think he has 

conducted himself fairly well, except for evading the issue of the explicit request. I thank him for the principles. 

I do look forward to working with you to achieve, in spite of all 

the things that I just said, to achieve a more broadly bipartisan 

support of something that I think we all agree needs to be undertaken. But I do not think you have yet come to us in a way that 

is appropriate in making that happen. 

But I thank the chairman for having this. 

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman, can I—I am surprised by that. 

I want to get a bigger, a better grade from you, Senator. I quote 

my own testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. He is a tough grader. So, you know? 

Secretary KERRY. We ask you now to work closely with us on a 

bipartisan basis to develop language that provides a clear signal of 

support for our ongoing military operations against ISIL. The authorization should give the President the clear mandate and flexibility he needs to successfully prosecute the armed conflict against 

ISIL and affiliated forces. 

We have requested that we work together for an AUMF. We are 

requesting an AUMF. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Secretary, well, I look forward to working 

with you a little more closely. 

Secretary KERRY. Do I get a better grade? 

Senator CORKER. A little more explicitly. I will grade on the 

curve and give you a little bit better ‘‘attaboy.’’ 

Secretary KERRY. The curve? The curve goes up, not down. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I am not even going to go there. Let me just say 

I want to thank you as well on behalf of all of the members. You 

know, you have a great deal of respect here, and you have acquit 

yourself most admirably today, even though I think some of these 

questions are beyond the role of the Secretary of State. And yet you 

have done a very admirable job of trying to explain to the comVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:16 Aug 26, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE H
63 

mittee where we are at, where we want to go, and how, hopefully, 

we can get there. 

I certainly continue to welcome, as I have for months in my efforts to try to develop language that can put the administration in 

a place that is in synch with the Congress toward our collective 

goal. And I have no—no concern about our collective goal. Our collective goal is to defeat ISIS, and I am convinced that we will. 

But I also think that there is a very compelling reason for Congress to act and to express itself, as Senator Kaine has said, 

months after we already sent sons and daughters of America into 

harm’s way. 

I think this hearing has helped us crystallize some of the core 

issues that are still in difference between the legislative and executive branch, and I would hope that we could find a way to broach 

them. However, it is the chair’s intention to continue a markup on 

Thursday. If we can work from here to Thursday to further narrow 

those, those would be great. 

But there is a majority of this committee’s desire to express 

themselves on a vote on an authorization of the use of military 

force. I am going to honor that view and move forward, and we will 

see where we end up from there. 

I am not so sure that we are going to end this week in the session in the Senate. And if we do not, then I would actually argue 

that there should be a broader debate in the Senate as well. But 

in any event, we look forward to working with you, Mr. Secretary. 

And with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:29 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

[From The Daily Beast, Dec. 9, 2014] 

ISIS JIHADIS GET ‘‘SLAVERY FOR DUMMIES’’ 

(By Jamie Dettmer) 

They’ve enslaved thousands of Yazidi women—and now the militants 

must follow ‘‘rules’’ laid out in an awful new list of dos and don’ts, from 

treatment of virgins to reasons for beating. 

Whom can you enslave? What can you do with female slaves? Can you beat them 

and have sex with them? The militants of the self-styled Islamic State, never shy 

to parade their gruesome, atavistic interpretation of the Quran and its place as they 

see it in the modern world, have now answered those questions. 

In a long list of the dos and don’ts governing the enslavement and treatment of 

women and girls captured by jihadi warriors, ISIS includes details of ′′permissible′′ 

sexual practices with female slaves. The new rules follow widespread reports this 

summer of the jihadis enslaving women from the Yazidi religious minority seized 

during the militants’ lightning offensive in northern Iraq. 

Issued Dec. 3 by ISIS’s ‘‘Research and Fatwa Department,’’ the rules are laid out 

in question-and-answer format—a kind of ‘‘Slavery for Dummies.’’ It is permissible 

to beat slaves, trade them, and offer them as gifts, to take virgins immediately and 

to have sex with a pre-pubescent girl, ‘‘if she is fit for intercourse,’’ whatever that 

means. 

According to Nazand Begikhani, an adviser to the Kurdistan regional government 

and researcher at the University of Bristol Gender and Violence Research Center, 

ISIS has kidnapped more than 2,500 Yazidi women. Yazidi activists, meanwhile, say 

they have compiled a list of at least 4,600 missing Yazidi women, seized after they 

were separated from male relatives, who were shot. 

64 

The women were bussed, according to firsthand accounts of women who have 

managed to flee, to the ISIS-controlled cities of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, 

and chosen and traded like cattle. Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq say they 

have freed about 100 Yazidi women. In October, ISIS justified its enslavement of 

the women-and of any non-believing females captured in battle—in its English-language digital magazine Dabiq. Islamic theology, ISIS propagandists argued, gives 

the jihadis the right, much in the same way that the Bible’s Ephesians 6:5 tells 

‘‘Slaves, obey your earthly masters with fear and trembling.’’ 

The difference, of course, is that there is no rampaging Christian terror army enslaving women and waving the Bible around now to justify such abuse, although 

there have been individual Western cultists widely dismissed as cranks or madmen 

who have sought biblical justification for abuse of women. 

In September, 120 senior Muslim scholars, including Sheikh Shawqi Allam, the 

grand mufti of Egypt, and Sheikh Muhammad Ahmad Hussein, the mufti of Jerusalem and All Palestine, issued a lengthy letter condemning ISIS as un-Islamic. ‘‘It 

is forbidden in Islam to ignore the reality of contemporary times when deriving legal 

rulings,’’ they argued. And they condemned the mistreatment of the Yazidi and the 

denial of women’s rights. 

Below—courtesy of the Washington, D.C.-based the Middle East Media Research 

Institute, a nonprofit organization that monitors extremism-are some highlights of 

the ISIS rules governing the enslavement of women and how slaves should be treated. 

Question 1: What is al-sabi? 

Al-Sabi is a woman from among ahl al-harb [the people of war] who has 

been captured by Muslims. 

Question 3: Can all unbelieving women be taken captive? 

There is no dispute among the scholars that it is permissible to capture 

unbelieving women [who are characterized by] original unbelief [kufr asli], 

such as the kitabiyat [women from among the People of the Book, i.e. Jews 

and Christians] and polytheists. However, [the scholars] are disputed over 

[the issue of] capturing apostate women. The consensus leans toward forbidding it, though some people of knowledge think it permissible. We [ISIS] 

lean toward accepting the consensus. 

Question 4: Is it permissible to have intercourse with a female captive? 

It is permissible to have sexual intercourse with the female captive. Allah 

the almighty said: ‘‘[Successful are the believers] who guard their chastity, 

except from their wives or (the captives and slaves) that their right hands 

possess, for then they are free from blame [Quran 23:5-6]’’. 

Question 5: Is it permissible to have intercourse with a female captive immediately after taking possession [of her]? 

If she is a virgin, he [her master] can have intercourse with her immediately after taking possession of her. However, is she isn’t, her uterus 

must be purified [first]. 

Question 7: Is it permissible to separate a mother from her children through [the 

act of] buying and selling? 

It is not permissible to separate a mother from her prepubescent children 

through buying, selling, or giving away [a captive or slave]. [But] it is permissible to separate them if the children are grown and mature. 

Question 9: If the female captive was impregnated by her owner, can he then sell 

her? 

He can’t sell her if she becomes the mother of a child. 

Question 13: Is it permissible to have intercourse with a female slave who has 

not reached puberty? 

It is permissible to have intercourse with the female slave who hasn’t 

reached puberty if she is fit for intercourse; however, if she is not fit for 

intercourse, then it is enough to enjoy her without intercourse. 

Question 16: Can two sisters be taken together while taking slaves? 

It is permissible to have two sisters, a female slave and her aunt [her 

father’s sister], or a female slave and her aunt [from her mother’s side]. But 

they cannot be together during intercourse, [and] whoever has intercourse 

with one of them cannot have intercourse with the other, due to the general 

[consensus] over the prohibition of this. 

65 

Question 19: Is it permissible to beat a female slave? 

It is permissible to beat the female slave as a [form of] darb ta’deeb [disciplinary beating], [but] it is forbidden to [use] darb al-takseer [literally, 

breaking beating], [darb] al-tashaffi [beating for the purpose of achieving 

gratification], or [darb] al-ta’dheeb [torture beating]. Further, it is forbidden 

to hit the face. 

Æ