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95–637PDF 2015

AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE

SOUTH CHINA SEA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 23, 2015

Serial No. 114–77

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Patrick M. Cronin, Ph.D., senior advisor and senior director, Asia-Pacific 

Security Program, Center for a New American Security .................................. 6

Andrew S. Erickson, Ph.D., associate professor, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College .............................................................................. 15

Mira Rapp-Hooper, Ph.D., fellow, Asia Program, Director, Asia Maritime 

Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic & International Studies .......... 27

Michael D. Swaine, Ph.D., senior associate, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .............................................................................. 40

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Patrick M. Cronin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 8

Andrew S. Erickson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................. 17

Mira Rapp-Hooper, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 30

Michael D. Swaine, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 43

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Matt Salmon, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Material 

submitted for the record ...................................................................................... 68

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 71

(1)

AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH 

CHINA SEA 

THURSDAY, JULY 23, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry [acting 

chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Folks, we are about 25 minutes late, which is fine. 

The problem is that we have Secretary Kerry and Secretary Moniz 

briefing the Democrats on—I think there is something going on 

here that they are concerned about. 

And so I am just going to deliver what would be my opening remarks. If the gavel hasn’t fallen, then these are unofficial random 

statements that I made for your entertainment before the hearing 

could begin. This is certainly not our first hearing on the South 

China Sea. 

We have got to take it seriously, and yet we shouldn’t get carried 

away. And my fear is that we are making a mountain out a reef, 

just as not only China but I believe four other countries have already added dirt on top of these islets to make them bigger than 

God intended them to be. 

We should remember there is no oil under these islets, and if 

there is it is not ours. And we should resist the tendency of the 

Pentagon to try to reconfigure itself as an entity devoted chiefly to 

fighting China in the South China Sea. I already see that in their 

research and increasingly in their procurement. 

I think it is important that the Pentagon be focused on the conflict we do have, which is with worldwide Islamic extremist terrorism. Those who are—and there is a lot of reasons for people on 

all sides of this to hype its importance. One of the ways you hype 

the importance is you say that $5 trillion of trade goes through the 

South China Sea. 

Well, the vast majority of that is going into Chinese ports or coming out of Chinese ports, which means that China is threatening 

to interdict its own trade—a threat they are not making and that 

I wouldn’t be taking seriously if they did. 

So, first, you have got to count how much trade is going into a 

Chinese port, then how much is coming out. Then you have got to 

be careful not to count trade coming out of a Japanese port as 

South China Sea or relevant ocean area transit, if it is going to a 

2

Chinese port. And when you are done with that, you realize that 

the amount of trade we are talking about is still significant. And 

we still have an interest in demonstrating to China that we believe 

in freedom of navigation. 

No one doubts America’s right to the Hawaiian islands. It is undisputed. But the United States does not assert that we have a 

naval exclusion zone on one-third of the Pacific Ocean, namely that 

portion between San Francisco, or I should say Los Angeles, and 

Hawaii. So the Pentagon would like to see a worthy adversary. 

Every time our military has faced an asymmetrical, non-uniformed enemy, it has been a terrible experience. Sometimes victorious, but always a terrible experience, from the Philippine insurrection about 120 years ago, right through to Fallujah. Every time 

we face a uniformed opponent, from the Spanish War right through 

the Cold War, and one might even say the initial part of the war 

against Saddam Hussein, it has been a heroic experience for our 

military. And so it is not surprising that they are focused on how 

to recreate a situation where their primary adversary is a uniformed state. But the real threats that we face are asymmetric, 

and they don’t come from China. 

Many of my colleagues in this room have had to listen to all of 

my hawkish comments about our trade relationship with China, 

and now they have had to listen to my dovish comments about 

these—they are called islands, but really islets or reefs that are in 

dispute. I think we have to assert freedom of navigation, but we 

also have to just calm everybody down. 

And, finally, I would point out that none of the countries that 

claim these islets are willing to put the kind of money into defending them that they want us to. Japan continues to stick to 1 percent of its GDP. Our expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, is understated, because we don’t include veterans benefits, but that is 

part of the compensation package of our soldiers and sailors. 

So we are spending far more of our treasure and risking our lives 

around the world, and I would hope that our friends in Asia would 

figure out a way to just lower the temperature in all of this. 

I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the ranking member. 

In the interest of time, it would be good order just to make sure 

that the subcommittee is or will come to order. And, at this time, 

the Chair will now recognize itself for an opening statement. And, 

as a reminder, without objection, the members of the subcommittee 

can present brief remarks if they choose to, or they can submit 

them for the record. 

Overlapping territorial claims to the South China Sea have been 

a source of international friction since 2009. And it is no secret that 

China’s claim and actions in the region have been the most aggressive. No one would have guessed that submerged features, rocks, 

and tiny islets seen here—if we can get the photos up, please—seen 

here, would be a source of major tension that it is today. 

During previous hearing, Ranking Member Sherman has asked 

a good question. Why should these rocks and any resources that 

might be under them matter to the United States? It is true that 

these features are themselves insignificant, but the outcome of 

these disputes will decide questions much more important than 

3

who owns what number of ocean rocks and sand, especially if other 

countries are building airstrips and radar towers on them. 

The region is flush with trade routes, fishing areas, and untold 

potential natural and energy resources. Protecting the freedom of 

the seas for commerce and passage while also protecting smaller 

states and U.S. allies from being coerced is absolutely a U.S. priority. 

U.S. leadership in the South China Sea is sorely needed. We 

stand alone as a world power, and our ability to engage China on 

complex issues for which there are no easy solutions, yet our leadership is noticeably absent and inconsistent. Today we will look 

into how the United States can help keep the world’s oceans free 

and open and how China’s activity in the South China Sea affects 

our bilateral relationship. 

We cannot let Beijing unilaterally define new norms of behavior 

at the expense of regional stability and the principles and goals of 

global development and international law. China, with its infamous 

Nine-Dash Line, which is now shown on the screen, claims virtually the entirety of the South China Sea has been the most aggressive and notorious of all South China Sea claimants. 

While China’s intentions remain deliberately unclear, its actions, 

including the construction of artificial islands, the apparent use of 

these features for military purposes, the placing of oil rigs in disputed waters, and the flooding of the region with military and civilian ships are clearly aimed at asserting itself as a maritime power, 

but inconsistent with international law and norms of behavior. 

While China has signaled that they would halt land reclamation, 

China will continue to construct facilities on the features. I hope 

to hear from our panel of experts as to what China might do with 

these facilities. Beijing’s remarks about halting land reclamation 

were also timed to coincide with high-level discussions, and experts 

have already discounted the sincerity of China’s stated intentions. 

Besides superficial concessions, what else can the United States 

do to prevent China’s monopoly on international waters? Other nations laying claim to disputed South China Sea territory, including 

Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, some—that was a 

period at the end of that. Some claimants have also used questionable tactics to state claims to disputed territories. But while China 

may argue it is only playing catch-up to these smaller nations’ history of territory grabs, the speed and scale of China’s activities is 

unparalleled. 

Chinese aggression in the South China Sea threatens regional 

and global security and stability, as well as the peaceful international system of the rule of law and freedom of navigation and 

overflight. 

U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Scott Swift recently expressed that American forces are well equipped and ready to respond to any contingency in the South China Sea. While our allies 

have requested U.S. support and assistance in the region, they may 

not be holding their breath. The Philippines has already proposed 

a 25 percent increase of its defense budget for 2016. Vietnam increased its defense budget by 9.6 percent in 2014. 

With unprecedented increases in defense budgets within the region, is Southeast Asia facing an impending and widespread arms 

4

race? What role does the U.S. have in tempering this escalation? 

The Obama administration and leading experts have all echoed 

concerns about developments in the South China Sea, yet U.S. and 

regional responses have been ineffective in curtailing Chinese expansion. No one involved in these disputes wants a military conflict, but the United States must continue to protect and preserve 

the principle of freedom of the seas, while supporting a peaceful 

resolution of competing territorial claims based on international 

law. 

I remain concerned about activity in the South China Sea, how 

regional developments may undermine stability, and about the lack 

of a unified U.S. voice in assuring the freedom of the seas. We need 

a clear strategy to address the South China Sea. It is my hope that 

our panel will help to develop this framework. For our country to 

forego or complicate this responsibility is a failure of conscience, 

history, and national will. 

Again, members present will be permitted to submit written 

statements to be included in the official hearing record. Without 

objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days 

to allow statements, questions, and extraneous material for the 

record, subject to the length of the limitations in the rules. 

And, at this time, that concludes the Chairman’s opening statement, and I will recognize other members for their opening statements. Mr. Bera, the gentleman from California. 

Mr. BERA. Yes. I thank the chairman. I am going to respectfully 

disagree with my colleague from California, Mr. Sherman, in the 

sense that I do think this is an incredibly serious, you know, issue 

that we need to take up and we have taken up both in this subcommittee as well as discussed in the full committee. 

You know, these are incredibly important trading routes and will 

become more important as, you know, we increase our trade and 

commerce within the Asia Pacific region. China’s moves both in the 

East China Sea and Senkaku Islands, as well as, you know, their 

moves here in the South China Sea, do need to be addressed and 

need to be addressed in a way that makes China understand that 

there are normal rules of negotiation in terms of when there are 

disagreements like what we are seeing in the South China Sea, 

and those dispute resolution processes have to take these standards of normal dispute resolution. 

In addition, you know, my concern is, as they gain a foothold, as 

they build airfields, you know, as they move additional vessels into 

the region, it is going to be much more difficult to—you know, to 

dislodge this, and it does set a very bad precedent for a region. You 

know, I am very interested in hearing the testimony of the experts, 

what our options are. 

You know, nobody on this subcommittee believes that an armed 

resolution is the right way to go. You know, we firmly believe, you 

know, we should be able to resolve this diplomatically, but we 

should resolve this diplomatically under the normal rules of negotiation. 

In addition, the one thing that I do worry about is, as Vietnam, 

as the Philippines, as other nations that, you know, express some 

claims on these waters put more vessels in the water, more ships, 

the chance of an accidental incident—and we have seen some of the 

5

incidents between China and Vietnam—for an accidental incident 

to escalate becomes a real danger. And that is how we end up in 

an armed conflict, and that is something that we very much want 

to avoid. 

I think I have heard that the United States is continuing to disregard the fly zones, which I wholeheartedly accept. Again, you 

know, these are open zones for, you know, our planes to fly 

through, and they should continue to be open internationally recognized zones for both shipping and air travel. 

So, again, I am very interested in hearing the committee’s testimony. I am certainly interested in hearing the witnesses’ thoughts 

on various options, but I do think we have to speak as a strong, 

unified voice, and, you know, it is important for the United States 

to speak as still the sole superpower, as a superpower that has 

very important allies in the region. And as we start to set the rules 

of commerce for the Asia Pacific region, you know, setting those 

standards is going to be very important. 

So, again, I look forward to the testimony, and I will yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms. 

Meng. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman, and all our witnesses for being here today. The South China 

Sea is a place of great strategic importance for many countries, including the United States. Five-point-three trillion dollars in commerce passes through the South China Sea every year, and stability in the region is vital to continuing economic connections and 

U.S. security interests. 

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea test the stability of 

the region. The recent increase in maritime incidents is a concern, 

because with these incidents comes tension. It is important that 

the disputes be resolved peacefully. All parties involved should 

come to the table to negotiate a fair resolution to the conflict. The 

United States has taken a number of steps to ensure peace and 

stability in the region. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman. 

Today, we are grateful to be joined by a panel of experts from 

the private sector who follow this issue closely. Dr. Patrick Cronin 

is a senior advisor and director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Dr. Andrew 

Erickson is an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College, 

where he is a founding member of the China Maritime Studies Institute. 

Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper is a fellow in the Asia Program at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies where she is director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. And Dr. Michael 

Swaine joins us from the Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace where he is a senior associate in the Asia Program. 

Thank you all for joining us. You will see a series of lights in 

front of you, so we would hope, if you could, to confine your testimony as closely to 5 minutes as you can, and you will see the lights 

coming down. And also, when you speak, of course, push the button 

6

to talk. And then, when you are done, push the button, so that you 

don’t continue to be recorded when you don’t want to be. 

That having been said, we will now turn to Dr. Patrick Cronin 

for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF PATRICK M. CRONIN, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISOR 

AND SENIOR DIRECTOR, ASIA–PACIFIC SECURITY PROGRAM, 

CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. CRONIN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bera, thank you so much for the 

honor to testify on America’s security role in the South China Sea. 

In the past several years, we have entered a period of intensified 

competition in the South China Sea. My view, maritime tensions 

are growing and will persist. 

We may not be comfortable with the volatility that that persistence brings, but it is going to be a fact of life, in my judgment. And 

I think we can manage this below the threshold of military conflict. 

It is certainly important for the U.S. interest to do so. 

But I think the reason the competition continues is largely because it is centered on China’s reemergence as a major power, its 

capacity as a major power, and its desire to expand its influence 

over its neighbors and its adjacent waters in this century. 

Now, the South China Sea is mostly not about rocks, reefs, and 

resources. It is about rules and order, the big order questions here. 

My written testimony enumerates eight essential elements of a 

U.S. foreign policy to deal with the South China Sea. They emphasize our enduring principles of unimpeded access to the global commons and peaceful resolution of disputes. They also include investing in America’s own comprehensive power. This is really about our 

game. What do we bring to the region? Especially through regional 

trade and development, but also by enhancing our diplomatic and 

legal instruments of power. 

The United States needs to deepen and broaden its diplomatic 

and practical support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN. And we should bolster ASEAN-centered institutions 

on four levels, not just one, but four levels, with ASEAN as a 

whole, with ASEAN claimant states, with individual ASEAN members, and with maritime allies and partners in and outside of 

ASEAN, including Australia, India, Japan, and the Republic of 

Korea. 

We should coalesce a maritime coalition of the willing to ensure 

that the South China Sea issues remain on the top of regional diplomacy. We can underscore rules and expectations as well as 

think through in advance a common response to perceived provocation such as a possible air defense identification zone. The 

United States should also support a regional transparency regime. 

I refer to not only the physical infrastructure for gathering information, but also the institutions to process it, and the political 

channels to share it, both within and between governments. 

At the broadest level, by supporting greater transparency of developments in the South China Sea, we can help the region arm 

itself with facts to deal with everything from search and rescue to 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to the fortification of 

islands, to threatening deployments of vessels. 

7

Leveraging our relations with allies, like the Philippines and 

other like-minded states, the United States can build on this general information-sharing regime to create a higher fidelity common 

operating picture for both early warning and contingency response. 

The technical capacity to build such a regime already exist, but 

U.S. leadership will be needed to build the supporting political 

framework. Let us put the spotlight on these stabilizing actions, so 

that we can reinforce the diplomacy at high level, regional, and 

global gatherings. 

The South China Sea is one area that needs more congressional 

fact-finding delegations, including to China. The United States 

should seek to clarify types of behavior that would be objectionable 

and against which the United States would work with others to impose costs. For instance, we should consider opposing the seizure 

of any unoccupied feature by denying access to other claimants, 

sovereignty claims over features that are not islands, spurious military alert zones. And I have a longer list in my written testimony 

Finally, we should enumerate a menu of potential cost imposition 

policy options that transcend reputational and legal costs and make 

clear that bad behavior will incur a price. Congress should require 

the continuous development of such an options menu in a classified 

annex of future interagency regional strategism, but let me suggest 

just a few—multi-national sea and air patrols could emulate recent 

U.S. P–8 overflights to make an emphatic point about what is permitted under UNCLOS. 

If a country wants to build an artificial island for military purposes in disputed waters, and then suggests it might be used for 

civilian purposes such as humanitarian assistance, then during the 

next regional disaster we might test that proposition by landing a 

civilian aircraft on one of the newest runways. 

If China tries to prevent the resupply of BRP Sierra Madre at 

Ayungin Shoal, then the United States might not only offer to resupply that Philippine ship, but it could also consider deploying a 

few Marines on rotation as part of the crew’s training detachment. 

These are pugnacious, but these would be in response to future bad 

behavior. These, and many other moves, are the kind of muscular 

punctuation points designed not to ignite conflict, but rather to 

clarify acceptable behavior and reinforce the kind of rule set the region should and can live by. 

We are looking for an inclusive rules-based system with China. 

In the absence of any substantial costs for bad behavior, however, 

China will be emboldened to carry on with its opportunistic probing 

for regional influence. We need an effective counterweight to keep 

China honest, safeguard access to the global commons for all, and 

uphold the rule of law. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cronin follows:]

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Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks Dr. Cronin for his testimony and 

now recognizes Dr. Erickson for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW S. ERICKSON, PH.D., ASSOCIATE 

PROFESSOR, CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE, U.S. 

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

Mr. ERICKSON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bera, in 2014, China started 

developing land features in the Spratlys and Paracels, with scale 

and sophistication its neighbors simply can’t match, even collectively over time. But most concerning is what China is constructing 

there—militarily relevant facilities, including two 3,000-meter runways capable of serving manifold military aircraft. 

No other South China Sea claimant enjoys even one runway of 

this caliber on the features it occupies. One logical application for 

China’s current activities: Supporting a South China Sea air defense identification zone, or ADIZ, like the one Beijing announced 

over the East China Sea in November 2013. 

The way China announced its East China Sea ADIZ suggests 

that it is reserving the right to treat international airspace beyond 

12 nautical miles as territorial airspace in important respects. My 

colleague Peter Dutton characterizes China’s island-building and 

outfitting activities as a tipping point meriting U.S. response. Militarizing the newly constructed islands, he argues persuasively, will 

alter strategic stability and the regional balance of power. 

Recent activities exemplify broader concerns—that as it becomes 

increasingly powerful China will abandon previous restraint, bully 

smaller neighbors, threaten use of force to resolve disputes, and attempt to change—or else run roughshod over—important international norms that preserve peace in Asia and which underwrite 

the global system on which mutual prosperity depends. 

That is why the U.S. now needs to adjust thinking and policy to 

stabilize the situation and balance against the prospect of negative 

Chinese behavior and influence. Even as China advances, we cannot retreat. The South China Sea is a vital part of the global commons on which the international system depends. Many statistics 

have already been offered to support that very important point. 

We therefore cannot allow Beijing to carve out within these 

international waters and airspace a zone of exceptionalism in 

which its neighbors face bullying without recourse, and vital global 

rules and norms are subordinated to Beijing’s parochial priorities. 

Instead, we must maintain the national will and force structure to 

continue to operate in, under, and over the South China Sea, East 

China Sea, and Yellow Sea, and to preserve them as peaceful parts 

of the global commons for all to use without fear. 

There, given China’s growing power and our own sustained 

power and resolve, we must accept a zone of managed strategic 

friction and contestation. China’s current leadership is clearly comfortable with a certain level of tension, and we must be, too. This 

includes accepting the fundamental reality that we won’t roll back 

China’s existing occupation of islands and other features, just as 

we won’t accept China’s rolling back of its neighbors’ own occupation. 

Most fundamentally, the U.S. must preserve peace and a stable 

status quo in a vital yet vulnerable region that remains haunted 

16

by history. To this end, we must develop and maintain a force 

structure and a set of supporting policies and partnerships geared 

to ensuring access, despite Chinese development of counter-intervention capabilities. 

We must make particular effort to preserve the significant U.S. 

advantage in undersea warfare by emphasizing nuclear-powered 

attack submarines and offensive naval mines. If we are not building at least two Virginia-class submarines per year, we are not 

being serious, and regional allies, partners, and China will see that 

clearly. 

We must also take a page from China’s counter-intervention 

playbook and further prioritize anti-ship cruise missiles. Unless we 

close this very real missile gap, China is poised to outstick the U.S. 

Navy by 2020 by deploying greater quantities of missiles with 

greater ranges than those of the U.S. ship-based systems able to 

defend against them. 

Let me be clear: The U.S. and China can, and will I believe, 

avoid war. Rather, this is about maintaining robust deterrence in 

peacetime and in any crises that might erupt. Specifically, we must 

deter Beijing from attempting to resolve island or maritime claims 

disputes with the use of force or even the threat of force. 

The aforementioned weapon systems, effectively deployed and 

combined with a broader strategy, can repeatedly convince China’s 

leaders that they won’t succeed in their objective if they attempt 

to use military force to seize additional features in waters around 

them, or to prevent U.S. forces from operating in international waters and airspace nearby. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Erickson follows:]

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Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Dr. Erickson. 

Now turn to Dr. Rapp-Hooper for her testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MIRA RAPP–HOOPER, PH.D., FELLOW, ASIA 

PROGRAM, DIRECTOR, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. RAPP-HOOPER. Chairman Perry, Congressman Bera, I am 

honored to have this opportunity to discuss regional states’ responses to China’s recent activities in the South China Sea. My testimony today will summarize my written statement and will focus 

primarily on responses by countries that have sovereignty claims 

and occupy territory, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, 

and Taiwan. I will argue that there are ample opportunities for the 

United States to advance its interest in the South China Sea in 

tandem with other regional states. 

As Ranking Member Sherman noted, land reclamation and construction did not begin with China’s building efforts in 2014. South 

China Sea claimants began to set up outposts in the Spratly Islands in the 1950s, and several have undertaken major island renovations since that time. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and 

Taiwan all do have airstrips of their own on Spratly outposts, and 

all have stationed troops on these islands at some point in time. 

When these other claimants are compared to China, however, the 

size, scope, and speed of their building activities absolutely pales 

in comparison. To paraphrase Secretary of Defense Carter, China 

has gone farther and faster in its construction activities, and this 

first chart that you see up on the screen will help you visualize the 

amount of land that each country has reclaimed. 

By way of comparison, Taiwan has reclaimed approximately 5 

acres over 2 years, Malaysia reclaimed approximately 60 acres over 

30 years, Vietnam 50 to 60 acres over 5 years, whereas China has 

reclaimed at least 2,000 acres over 1 year at seven different locations. 

Since China’s widespread land reclamation activities have become known, other claimants have responded with some modest 

construction activities of their own. More significant, however, are 

the visible diplomatic and military shifts that have taken place in 

the region over the last 18 months. 

Claimant states have sought naval and Coast Guard capabilities 

with clear South China Sea applications. These include Coast 

Guard patrol vessels, transport ships, corvettes, landing crafts, 

anti-submarine warfare helicopters, submarines, and patrol aircraft. Claimant states have also commenced training exercises with 

new partner militaries and drills that are explicitly focused on defense in the maritime domain. 

In the past year, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia have all 

pursued new strategic partnerships in the region. Most obviously, 

an alliance is emerging between Manila and Hanoi, but claimants 

have all forged ties amongst themselves and also with India, 

Japan, and Australia. These patterns leave little doubt that other 

claimants hope to counteract China’s assertiveness in the South 

China Sea, but this will be no easy feat. 

28

After two decades after annual double-digit increases in its defense spending, China’s military budget is six times larger than 

Southeast Asia’s, and its capabilities overwhelm those of other regional states. As this next chart demonstrates, China’s Navy and 

Coast Guard outnumber those of all the other claimants when combined. 

Many regional states also see an interest in maintaining positive 

relationships with China. Several of the South China sea claimants 

are likely to participate in China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative. 

Washington cannot assume that opposing sovereignty claims will 

always beget strictly opposing policies and strategies. 

Regional states share many of the United States’ South China 

Sea concerns, but they are neither unambivalent, nor monolithic in 

their opposition, nor do their worries necessarily translate into coordinated policy responses. Washington must, therefore, take these 

variegated inclinations into account as it advances its interests 

alongside those of regional partners. 

First, the United States should insist that all claimants refrain 

from any major physical changes or militarization of the territories 

they presently occupy. In recent weeks, China has turned to publicizing Vietnam’s land reclamation and construction activities. And 

while these absolutely pale in comparison to Beijing’s, this building 

still feeds China’s narrative that it is playing a defense game of 

catch-up, and this gives it convenient talking points in domestic as 

well as international fora. 

The United States should also define a criteria for what constitutes militarization as opposed to civilian use of an island. And 

these photos you will see up on the screen give you some sense of 

the extent of Chinese land reclamation on both Fiery Cross and 

Mischief Reef on the left, compared to Vietnamese reclamation and 

additions to Sand Cay on the right. Second, the Pentagon’s $425 million Southeast Asia Reassurance 

Fund may provide some much-needed support to the coast guards 

and navies of other South China Sea claimants. Partner capacitybuilding efforts, however, are long-term initiatives that will take 

years to bear fruit, and some states will have trouble absorbing assistance officiently and effectively. Washington should establish a 

mechanism to coordinate partner capacity-building efforts with 

Australia, Japan, and India, so that the support may be mutually 

reinforcing. 

Dr. Cronin already mentioned a number of ways the United 

States can work with ASEAN to share more information, so I will 

conclude my remarks today by emphasizing the importance of the 

United States collecting and publicizing data on freedom of navigation and overflight risks. Multiple countries, including the United 

States, have already been warned away from China’s artificial islands, which are not entitled to national airspace or to territorial 

waters if they were not islands when construction began. 

These incidents should be well documented, shared amongst the 

relevant parties, and periodically publicized, because this data is 

crucial to any judgment about whether U.S. and regional states’ interests are being imperiled by China’s activities. By taking these 

steps, Washington can maximize regional buy-in for its policies and 

advance its South China Sea interests in tandem with other states. 

29

Multilateral approaches alone are unlikely to arrest China’s incremental opportunism. They can, however, help to coalescence some 

much-needed regional consensus in the South China Sea. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rapp-Hooper follows:]

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Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Dr. Rapp-Hooper. 

We now recognize Dr. Swaine for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. SWAINE, PH.D., SENIOR ASSOCIATE, ASIA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. SWAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be invited to testify here today. Since I have only got 5 minutes, I will 

focus on what I think U.S. interests are in the South China Sea, 

and what I think the United States should do under the current 

situation there. 

In my view, the USG’s message on the South China Sea has been 

badly garbled, making it seem as if Washington is opposed to any 

Chinese activities that involve an increase in presence or capability 

in the area with little serious reference to the actions of anyone 

else. There is definitely a dynamic going on here. It is not just China’s behavior. 

The U.S. needs to focus like a laser on its two only really vital 

interests in the South China Sea that it should be prepared to act 

to support via words and action. First is freedom of navigation and 

concerns that China might eventually use its growing position, including land reclamation, to attempt to interdict the activities of 

the U.S. Navy in the open ocean. 

This is not about commercial obstruction. The Chinese have absolutely no interest in obstructing commercial transit in the South 

China Sea and emphasizing this issue is distracting and doesn’t 

serve the interests of the United States. This is about the access 

of the U.S. Navy and other military navies into the area. 

The second issue and the second interest of the United States is 

a possible use of force against other claimants that can produce a 

much greater level of tension and push the region toward an emphasis on security over economic growth. Now, both of these interests involve potential violations over disputes regarding international law and process, including three issues, whether manmade islands can be used to create 12 nautical mile territorial seas 

and EEZs, whether a coastal state with EEZs can demand that foreign militaries notify them before transiting or engaging in ISR activities, and of course the resort to force over disputed territories. 

Now, these issues have existed for a long time in U.S.-China relations. The U.S. and China have somewhat different views on 

some of these issues, but the South China Sea problem, combined 

with China’s growing capacity to influence the area, raises their salience. The reason for concern over the form issue, freedom of navigation, derives primarily from China’s lack of clarity in defining 

the nature of its maritime claims within the Nine-Dash Line and 

its rejection of the U.S. position on EEZs, on the use of foreign militaries in EEZs. 

The reason for concern over the latter interest, which is a use of 

force derived from the fact that: A) China has employed force in the 

past to eject other claimants from disputed South China Sea territory; and b) China and others seem to offer little strong support at 

present for adopting a binding code of conduct in the South China 

Sea. Not just China, but ASEAN countries as well are having real 

trouble bringing that about. 

41

So what should the United States do? In the remaining time, let 

me just tick off seven points. The first, I think the U.S. Government needs to significantly tone down its repeated very public protests regarding land reclamation, and focus instead on expressing 

the reasons why it is concerned about the two interests I enumerated above. 

Land reclamation in itself is meaningless. Virtually every claimant has engaged in it, and to say that China is doing more of it 

means very little. Moreover, Washington can’t induce Beijing to 

stop it, if it were to start again, absent a larger stabilization process to which all parties agree. The issue is not the reclamation; the 

issue is what China is doing with the land that it is reclaiming. 

Second, Washington should stop emphasizing military deterrence 

methods to prevent changes in the status quo, thus freezing a situation into one of constant potential conflict, and start focusing instead on the resolution of territorial disputes through negotiations 

between the claimants designed to clarify the nature of claims, first 

of all. 

All the different claimants have different claims, and they are 

having agreement on what those claims consist of. This should be 

followed by the application of UNCLOS principles to sort out the 

territorial and EEZ implications of the claims, perhaps using something like a South China Sea Council modeled after the Arctic 

Council, to try and disentangle these claims. 

Third, at the same time, Washington also needs to make it clear 

privately to Beijing that its continued failure to enter into such 

talks on these issues, and to clarify the nature of its claims to waters within the Nine-Dash Line, combined with its growing presence and capabilities in the area, will increasingly cause the U.S. 

and other states to draw worst-case conclusions and act accordingly 

to hedge against such outcomes. 

So the U.S. would need to maintain its own capacity and the capacity of others to counter possible future attempts by Beijing to 

declare a de facto exclusionary zone, or zones in the area, or to employ force possibly against an ally such as the Philippines. 

Washington should make it clear, fourth, that such hedging 

would require a significant improvement in U.S. defense relations 

in presence with Manila, as well as Hanoi and Malaysia. But this 

augmented activity should be made contingent on China clarifying 

its claims and entering into negotiated codes of conduct with significant progress with the other claimants. 

Beijing must also clearly affirm, in my view, through its words 

and actions, that there is no military solution to these disputes and 

that we will never seek to dislodge rivals forcefully from occupied 

areas. Washington should make it clear that if China undertakes 

such actions and pledges, the U.S. would suspend the above hedging activities. 

Fifth and sixth, regarding negotiations, Washington should stop 

opposing bilateral talks between claimants, including China-Vietnam, China-Philippines, et cetera, and try to broker bilateral settlements between Vietnam and the Philippines and Vietnam and 

Malaysia, so as to reduce the differences among the Southeast 

Asian claimants at the bilateral level with China. That would give 

42

them more leverage in their dealings with China. The U.S. needs 

to really support that process. 

Sixth, in order to reduce tensions and improve the environment 

for negotiations, Washington should work behind the scenes to organize an effort to promote the joint exploration of seabed resources without prejudice to sovereignty, as has already been done 

by several bilateral states in the region. 

And then, finally, while Japan’s efforts to improve the capability 

of Coast Guard units of our allies and friends in Southeast Asia is 

welcomed, Washington should not encourage the Japanese self-defense force to join the U.S. in patrolling the South China Sea. Having the joint self-defense force in the South China Sea where Japan 

has no territorial claims, and its security and freedom of navigation 

are not threatened, would intensify the emerging security dilemma 

between the U.S.-Japan alliance and China and promote instability. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Swaine follows:]

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Mr. PERRY. All right. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your 

testimony. 

I will begin with questions. And, let me see, I think I am going 

to go—I think I will actually start with you, Dr. Swaine. And some 

of this is going to be—quite honestly, I think you have gone 

through because, you know, you are here to kind of describe the situation but also offer some remedy that each of you have as I have 

listened and taken notes. 

But if you could, some of you say, you know, ‘‘Congress needs to 

do this.’’ And we can get into the whys and the why nots, but I 

think the administration also bears some responsibility to do some 

things as well. So if you could, maybe codify like your top three 

things, right, and so we can—I would hope that this subcommittee 

would be instrumental in forming legislation to further our efforts 

and our interests in that regard. 

So with that, in light of China’s aggressive land reclamation over 

the past 18 months, many argue that the United States should 

support its allies and partners in the region through economic and 

military assistance. Others say that the Southeast Asia nations 

must take ownership of their own ongoing disputes with China. 

So the question is: How should the United States navigate the 

correct balance between supporting our partner yet reducing risks 

of dependence and overreliance on the United States? Dr. Swaine. 

Mr. SWAINE. Well, as I mentioned in my remarks, I think—I 

mean, it is a difficult challenge to strike this balance correctly, but 

I think the balance needs to be placed on Chinese actions and expectations of Chinese behavior and what the United States is prepared to do if there isn’t a clarification of the Chinese position. 

As I said in my testimony, I don’t think the United States should 

preemptively begin building up the capabilities of other countries 

in the area, regardless virtually of what China is doing, as a kind 

of insurance policy. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. 

Mr. SWAINE. I think it needs to link what it is going to do in that 

regard of any significance with certain expectations about China’s 

clarification of its behavior. 

Mr. PERRY. Dr. Rapp-Hooper. 

Ms. RAPP-HOOPER. Thank you, sir. I think it is an excellent question, but I would just add on and clarify the fact that risks can 

exist on both sides of the ledger. So when we are considering the 

prospect of giving additional aid to partners in Southeast Asia—for 

example, the Philippines—to build up their naval and coast guard 

capabilities, we are envisioning a process that will take certainly 

years to bear fruit, as I mentioned in my testimony. 

But by improving the Philippines’ Coast Guard capability, we improve the ability of the Philippines to engage in these issues by 

itself and——

Mr. PERRY. So you are not advocating for a mutually exclusive 

kind of policy where we would engage the Philippines in that regard at the disregard of China. I would assume you are talking 

about both simultaneously. 

Ms. RAPP-HOOPER. Absolutely. And it is worth noting that because the United States of course does have a treaty guarantee to 

the Philippines that if the Philippines, with its very modest naval 

50

and coast guard capability were to be pulled into conflict, this engages U.S. commitments and credibility. So there is some U.S. interest in considering the capabilities of the Southeast Asian partners. 

Mr. PERRY. Dr. Erickson. 

Mr. ERICKSON. I want to echo Dr. Rapp-Hooper’s recommendations regarding building partner capacity. That is extremely important. I also fully believe that our deterrence relationship with 

China is both manageable and important, and we need to maintain 

it by consistently funding and keeping on track the weapon systems that I mentioned in my testimony and that I am happy to 

elaborate on further. 

The two other things I would recommend very strongly are to 

continue to pursue access through our freedom of navigation operations pursued proportionately in accordance with international 

law. So based on what specific features enjoy on based on widely 

recognized international legal principles. That is how we should operate close to those features, regardless of what China says, regardless of what China does. That is international law. 

Mr. PERRY. So if I may interject at this moment, have we attempted that? And have we been stopped or thwarted in that? 

Mr. ERICKSON. To the best of my knowledge—and my research 

involves solely unclassified sources, so I recommend getting full 

briefings on all of this—I think we have succeeded thus far in our 

freedom of navigation operations. I think it was valuable to have 

that publicized on CNN, and I believe what was publicized was an 

example of something that we do frequently in international waters 

and airspace around the world, and that we should continue to do. 

If I may, Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize one other very strong 

policy recommendation that I think is extremely important. My colleagues here have emphasized the importance of international law 

access, freedom of navigation, and to me this is part of supporting 

the larger system that we have all described here, and that I believe that you and Mr. Bera have also rightly emphasized in terms 

of this system that we need to support. 

And we need to support it both with our power and our example, 

and that is why I think it is critically important that we join 166 

other nations in finally ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Law 

of the Sea, to take that excuse off the table that China has to 

bludgeon us with even though in a very nuanced and sophisticated 

fashion we adhere to customary international law. 

And, in closing, let me just emphasize, this is not something that 

you have to take from me. I far more recommend that you listen 

to this recommendation from the current President, Secretary of 

State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Heads of the U.S. Maritime Services—Navy, Marine Corps, Coast 

Guard—and all of their living predecessors, from Republican and 

Democratic administrations alike. So please allow me to underscore 

that point. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

Dr. Cronin. 

Mr. CRONIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, to reiterate my remarks, we 

need to leverage and build our comprehensive power, economically 

51

in terms of new development initiatives to show that we bring solutions to the region that really matter. Politically, we need to be 

more engaged. I talked about engaging ASEAN on four different 

levels. We need to build our diplomatic and our legal means. 

But we have to also leverage our power. If we are going to shape 

this region, which is being shaped every day by China’s rise and 

China’s opportunism, we are going to have to leverage our power. 

And we need to do that, including on the military side, by two basic 

types of building partnership capacity. 

One of them is just sharing information, transparency, what Dr. 

Rapp-Hooper does for a living every day, sharing the facts and getting them out there as we saw in these pictures, but also we need 

to build partnership capacity, not because this antagonizes China 

but because a minimal credible deterrent in defense goes a long 

way toward raising the bar toward aggression and toward assertiveness, unilaterally changing the facts on the ground. So we need 

to do that. 

We also, though—and one recommendation I had for the administration, but really for Congress to basically insist, was go ahead 

and ask for a comprehensive interagency approach to, how do you 

impose costs on bad behavior? And I do believe the administration 

needs to be more clear about what exactly constitutes the kind of 

unacceptable behavior, because I do agree with Dr. Swaine we have 

been too general about this issue. 

We do need to be clear about what exactly—let us narrow down 

the set of issues that we think basically violate UNCLOS and international law and the rules, as well as the declaration of conduct 

that ASEAN and China agreed to in 2002, and what is really just 

part of growing, what is just part of the development of the region. 

We do need to narrow down that set, because we don’t object to everything. 

Just the opposite. Effective cooperation with China is very important. We need to insist on qualitative improvement in the relations—effective MOUs on avoiding incidents at sea and in the air, 

insisting that the summit meeting include a very serious discussion 

about intentions in the South China Sea. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you to the panel. 

At this point, I will recognize Mr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, just listening to the witnesses, we all have the same 

goal, which is de-escalate tensions and the real goal of avoiding 

military confrontation, which is not the goal here. 

You know, if I contrast it, just thinking about what—China’s unilateral moves and the East China Sea expanding their air defense 

identification zone, and what our response, the U.S. along with 

Japan, in not recognizing this and actually, you know, conducting 

preplanned operations over that air. That was a proportionately 

strong response, that, you know, in many ways while the tension 

still exists, the tensions in the South China Sea seem very much 

more acute. 

I agree with Dr. Cronin that we have to operate from a position 

of strength in the United States, you know, and that is not, you 

know, with our military, but it is trying to engage these rules of 

52

maritime law and coming up with rules of maritime law, so there 

are mechanisms of dispute resolution. 

It is also empowering I think, again, as each of you mentioned, 

and I think specifically Dr. Cronin, empowering China and the 10 

ASEAN nations to come to terms with what these rules look like, 

and come to terms with, you know, there will continually be disputes that arise over maritime territories. But we have to have 

mechanisms by which to de-escalate and resolve these. 

You know, maybe starting with Dr. Cronin, if you want to talk 

to what it would take to get China and the ASEAN nations to 

agree to what these maritime rules are and what our role could be 

to continue pushing this forward. 

Mr. CRONIN. Nobody I know who is involved in looking at this 

prolonged code of conduct being negotiated between China and the 

10 ASEAN states—it has now dragged on since the 2002 declaration of conduct of the parties of the South China Sea—believes that 

this is going anywhere quickly. Even the Chinese dismissed the 

idea that this could be readily resolved. 

We need to work on multiple tracks. I don’t think we need to 

wait for China. We can encourage the claimant states. We can encourage ASEAN. We can encourage the claimant states and parts 

of ASEAN, plus outside countries like India, Australia, and Japan, 

to go ahead and say, ‘‘This is a voluntary code of conduct.’’ These 

are basically the ways of behavior that we will expect, the upholding of UNCLOS, essentially the principles—and I have enumerated 

them in my full written testimony, 12 different points of law. 

It is not just what Dr. Swaine; there are points of baseline law. 

There are lots of points of law that are being run roughshod over, 

as Dr. Erickson said, that we need to help reinforce. And I think 

we can agree among a key coalition of countries, starting with the 

claimant states, and we have been pushing and helping and facilitating. We can provide more facilitation, by the way. 

This is a foreign affairs issue, legal, political facilitation and help 

to not only allies like the Philippines but partners like Vietnam, 

working with Malaysia, Brunei, the four claimant states of ASEAN, 

in terms of helping them to think through how to come to terms 

with the rule of law. 

Mr. BERA. And is it your sense that if we were to engage in let 

us say a voluntary code of conduct, and invite the claimant states 

to engage, would most of those be willing to participate in this conversation, outside of China? 

Mr. CRONIN. Well, we know that the Philippines and Vietnam 

are at the leading edge of this concern and interest. They are both 

interested, and I think there is an opportunity there. I think Malaysia is extremely interested, but they have always played it very 

carefully because they have the largest trading relationship of any 

ASEAN country with China. Mixed with that, they have their own 

political turmoil going on at the moment. 

Brunei will essentially probably follow Malaysia. So I think there 

is an opening there. I think we can make this happen. 

Mr. BERA. And a goal of this is not to be anti-China. A goal of 

this is to establish norms of trade, norms of maritime law, norms 

of airspace law. 

Mr. CRONIN. Yes, sir. 

53

Mr. BERA. Again, from my perspective, it is not to be anti-China. 

It is to establish these norms of commerce. 

Mr. CRONIN. Mr. Bera, I think you are exactly right. That is exactly what we want. We want rules that we can all live by. These 

are rules, after all, that China has thrived by in many ways since 

opening up at the end of the 1970s. We want to establish those 

rules and adapt them and evolve them for all. We are not trying 

to be unfair, and we have to be very careful to be fair, but we do 

want rules we can all live by. 

Mr. BERA. And if these—and maybe Dr. Erickson or Dr. RappHooper, if these voluntary conversations are moving forward and 

the ASEAN nations are participating, is your thought that China 

eventually would, you know, join this conversation? Whoever wants 

to take that. 

Mr. ERICKSON. That’s an excellent question. I think the conversation can be complex in some ways in terms of how China will participate. But what we really need here is for everyone to live by the 

same rules, regardless of what conversation they have. These rules 

and norms are not a mystery. They already exist. 

What we need to do is make sure that they are enforced and that 

everyone has the confidence and the security that this is how the 

system works. And that is why our power and example can help, 

including through partnership building capacity. These are sovereign states, some allies, which have a fundamental right to their 

own military and paramilitary, coast guard capabilities. 

We do not want to encourage the creation of a world in which 

only big countries get to pursue those things, and the small ones 

just have to cower and accept whatever comes. That is not the 

world we want to see, nor is it the world we have to accept. 

Mr. BERA. And we are in the final stages of negotiating a very 

significant trade deal with many of these claimant nations. It 

would seem to me that part of this trade deal, as we set the rules 

of commerce in the Asian Pacific, would provide us an opportunity, 

an opening by which to also address some of these. Would that be 

an accurate, you know——

Mr. ERICKSON. Just allow me to quickly say I could not agree 

more. TPA and TPP are a critical, constructive, mutually profitable 

part of this. And I think that without productively pursuing those 

avenues we simply can’t have a multi-faceted Asia Pacific policy 

and presence that underwrites all of these other interests that we 

have outlined today. I couldn’t agree more strongly. 

Ms. RAPP-HOOPER. Just to tack on to Dr. Erickson’s comment, 

many of our friends and partners in the region see TPP as a national security issue. They see it not only as a trade deal but as 

a sign of the U.S.’s commitment to the region, an enduring commitment to the region. Even countries that are not negotiating partners in this round of TPP are urging us to pass this deal, because 

they do see it as much more than just a trade deal itself. 

Mr. SWAINE. If I could just comment on the issue of working with 

the other countries in the region, as I said in my testimony, I think 

it is very important for the United States to really begin focusing 

more on the reasons why the ASEAN states themselves have not 

been able to really achieve much in the way of a consensus in how 

they look at the problem of the South China Sea. 

54

I mean, some people would tell you that the main obstacle to a 

code of conduct is not china. It is the fact that the Southeast Asian 

states themselves have no agreement among themselves. Vietnam 

and Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines, they have enormous 

disputes about what their claims consist of, what a code of conduct 

should look like, all of those issues. 

So on that basis, then, it is almost impossible to have a collaborative, as Hillary Clinton said at one time, approach to dealing 

with this issue. That is not going to happen. Unless the Southeast 

Asian countries themselves gain more agreement about how this 

issue—what the meaning of this issue is and how to proceed with 

it, you are not going to see much in the way of coordinated action 

toward the Chinese, and I would dare say you are not going to see 

a whole lot of movement on the part of the Chinese. So I think that 

sort of emphasis and the degree to which the United States can facilitate it is important. 

Now, on the other hand, the United States needs to be aware of 

the fact that the more it becomes deeply engaged and involved in 

the efforts in a high visibility way the more difficult it is going to 

be to achieve an objective. And the reason for that is because 

Southeast Asian states on their side look to the United States to 

do a lot of the heavy lifting. And that takes the burden off of them, 

so they don’t have to be quite as responsible in moving forward and 

making certain concessions, because they think the United States 

might be backing them. 

Secondly, it makes the Chinese more defensive, because they 

think, ah, the United States is really creating all of this behind the 

scenes, or in front, and that is in their view the primary obstacle 

to reaching any kind of understanding is because of U.S. involvement in the issue. 

Now, you don’t have to accept their Chinese argument by any 

means. I am just telling you the dynamic, though, is such that calculations on both sides, Chinese and Southeast Asian, are such 

that U.S. involvement could not—would not necessarily in every 

case be a facilitator. And anybody who is involved in this has to 

be very sensitive to that. 

Mr. BERA. I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. 

The acting Chair now recognizes the chair of the subcommittee, 

Mr. Salmon, the gentleman from Arizona. 

Mr. SALMON. Thanks a lot. Appreciate you all coming today. This 

is such an important issue, not just to our country but to many of 

our allies in the region as well. 

I am going to ask you to speculate a little bit. Maybe it will be 

based on knowledge. Maybe it will be based on, I don’t know, supposition. But what do you really think that at the end of the day 

China’s motives are in doing this island building? What are their 

intentions for placing offensive armaments on these islets? Do you 

think that there is any serious concern about that? Or do you think 

that they are just trying to find natural resources that are valuable? What do you think that they are after? 

Dr. Cronin, do you want to start? Yes. 

Mr. CRONIN. Chairman Salmon, thank you very much for your 

leadership and the excellent question. It is supposition. We don’t 

55

know. We don’t know. My speculation is that there is a great deal 

of opportunism going on right now. China is making it up as they 

go along. 

But this is driven by very long-standing claims and new-found 

capabilities and opportunity. And we are giving them more opportunity than they ought to have as they rewrite the rules and create 

the facts on the ground. So the Nine-Dash Line, which isn’t based 

on contemporary and international law, needs to be held to a point 

of law. 

What are they doing with arms on these artificial islands? They 

are partly intimidating the neighbors. They are partly declaring 

their seriousness of intent to these claims. They are staking out administrative control. They are trying to preempt international legal 

proceedings, in my view, in terms of the Philippine arbitration case 

next year that may come to fruition. 

They will have already built, as we have seen by Dr. Rapp-Hooper’s statistics, 2,000 acres added on to these roofs. And adding 

arms that Dr. Erickson talked about allows them to say, ‘‘Look, we 

are not only administering; we control these. These are de facto 

ours. We are not moving, and that is our intent.’’ It is about regional order and about respect from their perspective. It is about 

claiming their role in the region of the world. 

But capabilities matter, intentions may change, so these intentions right now which may be, even if they are very defensive and 

even if they are very much driven by history and a fear of what 

the others have done, it is not fair that others started to build runways before they built a runway. I can understand the need for nationalism on the part of China. And we are trying to damp-down 

this nationalism, and I don’t think fortifying these artificial islands 

with military arms is helping, which is why Dr. Rapp-Hooper is 

talking about trying to hold the line on new armaments going out 

there. 

But, unfortunately, if China does go down the road of building 

up its military, building up its coast guard, building these forward 

staged artificial islands as bases, that they will create new capabilities still in terms of the ability to project power beyond what we 

often refer to as the first island chain out to the second island 

chain. 

Now, they may have no serious intent in the political center right 

now on that. Those are certainly those in the PLA who think about 

it. But just because you are in the military and you think grand 

thoughts doesn’t necessarily make it policy. So we don’t know what 

their long-term intentions are, but we have to keep up with the 

day-to-day capabilities. 

We need to be more engaged. I take Dr. Swaine’s point that engagement is a double-edged sword, and we have to be very careful 

about America’s role, especially in Southeast Asia. I have argued 

elsewhere that we can’t go faster than the Southeast Asians in 

terms of trying to facilitate peace. 

But at the same time, America has to be engaged every day in 

Southeast Asia. If I look out to the mid-century point of this century, Southeast Asia continues to grow. Indonesia goes prospectively to become the ninth largest economy, to the fourth largest 

economy in the world in this period of time. This is a very vital set 

56

of global waterways and economies that we are engaging. We need 

to be engaged for our own benefit and our future. 

Mr. SALMON. I think you have answered a large part of what my 

next question was going to be, but there have been some that have 

asserted that this really isn’t America’s interest, that it is just a 

bunch of meaningless rocks and sand, and it is nothing that we 

should be too concerned about. What would you say to that? 

Mr. CRONIN. My opening line, sir, before you arrived was that 

this is not most about rocks, reefs, and resources. It is about rules 

and order. But for us, for the United States, it is about opportunity. 

It is about the opportunity to continue to spread freedom and commerce that are at the root of the American republic from our founding. 

We started to trade with Asia very early after our founding. We 

are going to have to stay engaged with the most dynamic economies of this world, which are in the Indo-Pacific. The latest IMF 

report shows what region is growing faster than any other? No surprise, Asia Pacific. What has grown faster since 1980? Asia Pacific. 

What is going to continue to grow faster than other regions, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers’ latest forecast for 2050? Asia Pacific. 

So if the United States wants to get on the bandwagon with the 

future of this global economy and stay strong and prosperous and 

free, we must be more engaged, and that includes the economies 

and the people of Southeast Asia already three—well, two-thirds of 

1 billion people, but it is going to go up. Already $4 trillion in purchasing power parity of GDP. That is supposed to go way up between now and the next few decades. 

This is vital for us. That is why things like the Trans-Pacific 

Partnership is a vital stepping stone to immediately second round 

talking to everybody, including to try to reconcile the different systems that are being built in global trading. Everything is changing. 

We have to be part of it, shape it, benefit from it, and bring our 

values and interests to this region. 

Mr. SALMON. Dr. Rapp-Hooper, you made a comment about TPP. 

And I am sorry if I am paraphrasing, but it happens to coincide 

with my deeply held beliefs that TPP is far more than a trade 

agreement. 

And what I see, a lot of our allies in the region believe—and having visited with them and talked with them as well—is that they 

worry that with a big void of American leadership in the region different rules, whether they are rules of the road for maritime space, 

whether they are rules of the road for trade, military engagement, 

different rules of the road will be crafted, and they will be crafted 

by others than the United States, and maybe it won’t end up being 

a very pretty picture at the end. Do you have any thoughts on 

that? 

Ms. RAPP-HOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I think that characterization 

is very apt. As I mentioned, I think a number of our allies and 

partners, including those who are not necessarily negotiating partners in this round of TPP, feel very strongly that this is a metric 

of American engagement and interest in the region over the long 

haul and see it as symbolically very important as a national security issue, not just as a trade deal. 

57

I would also like to add some brief additions to Dr. Cronin’s comments on the use of these islands, why China might be building up 

these islands. I think his assessment is absolutely correct. I would 

note that China, without these islands, did not before necessarily 

have the ability to engage in long-term, long-standing patrols in 

the southern parts of the South China Sea. 

It has a limited resupply and refueling capability. So having an 

air base on Fiery Cross Reef, possibly having a second air base on 

Subi Reef, which may be coming in the next several months, gives 

it the ability to sustain more of a presence in the South China Sea. 

And, again, that goes to Dr. Cronin’s point about the ambiguous 

Nine-Dash Line claim and China’s ability to hold on to that claim. 

These islands would theoretically be quite vulnerable in the case 

of an actual conflict, but they do potentially give China the ability 

to assert its claims in peacetime. And this gets to the essential 

question that you asked as to what America’s interests are when 

it comes to the South China Sea. 

I agree with Dr. Swaine that the United States should absolutely 

focus its rhetoric on a few items, which include freedom of navigation and overflight. Absolutely essential. And the fact that disputes 

should not be resolved using coercion, and this is absolutely what 

is at stake with this island building and the possibility of greater 

Chinese assertiveness from the islands. 

Mr. SALMON. That having been said, what kind of a grade would 

you give our response or our leadership in the region on these 

kinds of issues? How are we doing? And any of you. Dr. Swaine, 

you wanted to make a comment. How do you think we are doing? 

Mr. SWAINE. Well, it depends on what aspect of the policy and 

the objectives you are looking at, but I would say overall we are 

kind of at a B, B-minus. I think there has been very poor message 

discipline from the U.S. Government. There has been statements 

made by U.S. officials that I think have not been vetted, that have 

been unnecessary, in some ways inflammatory, have given the 

wrong impression about what U.S. policy is. 

I think there needs to be more discipline in doing that. I think 

there also needs to be greater clarity. As I said in my statement, 

there needs to be greater clarity in exactly what the United States 

is objecting to. 

ADIZs, on their own, are unobjectionable. The United has very 

large ADIZs. Japan has a very large ADIZ. The Chinese establishing an ADIZ, in and of itself, is not or should not be objectionable. It is about why they do it, when they do it, and how they use 

it. The same thing, as I just said, with land reclamation. The same 

thing with their presence in the South China Sea. 

It is not the fact that they are there. They are going to be there. 

The fact is, what are they going to do with their presence? And if 

the Chinese are not clear enough about the basis of their claims 

to these areas and these waters, which has implications for how 

they then act, then it is a very difficult thing to determine exactly 

what is the best policy. 

And as I said in my statement, the United States will be more 

inclined to have to hedge. And worst case, I think it is highly unlikely the Chinese are going to launch a military offensive to seize 

the entire Spratly Islands by force, ejecting all of the other claimVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:58 Sep 02, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\072315\95637 SHIRL
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ants from their positions. By the way, the Vietnamese have the 

majority position in the South China Sea, in the Spratlys. 

I think it is highly unlikely that they would do that. I think that 

their objective is much more, A, they feel they don’t have enough 

leverage in the area. They feel they have been catching up. And I 

think to some degree—I mean, that is the Chinese position, but to 

some degree I think it is true. And they have tried to catch up their 

position there. 

But, B, I think they see that their presence is a bigger presence, 

ultimately. They are going to have more capability, ultimately. And 

they want to establish a set of incentives, both positive and negative, and by ‘‘positive’’ I mean economic incentives and other positive things they can offer the other claimants, and ‘‘negative’’ in the 

sense of strong deterrent capability that will allow them to eventually make some kind of a deal. 

Again, not based on force, not based on military invasion, but 

they want to be able to have the predominant position in the area, 

so that they can have some kind of negotiated settlement that 

would be to their advantage. I would say that is their ideal. They 

hope that they could get that. Now, in the meantime, I think they 

can exist with the current occupation of the areas, but the question 

is, under what conditions going forward? And I think that is a lot 

of what the diplomacy consists of. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Anybody else want to comment? 

Mr. CRONIN. Yes. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the leadership 

and focus that you are bringing to this vital region. It is tremendously important. Allow me to share my brief personal assessment 

of what I think are some of the challenges we have run into in our 

policy over the last few years, some areas in which we haven’t performed the way we need to to further our interests and to support 

the global system in this vital region. 

In the early years of the current administration, as made more 

difficult of course by the global financial crisis, I do think some unfortunate mistakes were made in terms of messaging, especially in 

optics, but words and optics matter. And we appear to be playing 

into Chinese rhetoric that made us look weaker and more distracted than would be effective in galvanizing allied and partnership support in the region, as well as maintaining a robust and stable deterrence relationship with China. 

Two particular things. Some people dismiss these as just words, 

but I think these were a genuine mistake. First of all, several U.S. 

policymakers invoked an academic concept that China’s paramount 

leader Xi Jinping himself invoked, a so-called Thucydides trap. 

This idea that based on previous history, if the rising power China 

and the existing power of the U.S. didn’t make heroic efforts, do 

something very different, we couldn’t avoid what would otherwise 

be an inescapable historical pattern of ruinous conflict. 

I think that way of thinking is terribly misinformed. If you compare 1914 and 2014 plus, I think you can only argue that we are 

susceptible to the same type of historic risks if you don’t believe in 

the transformative power of nuclear weapons, international institutions, financial markets, transnational production chains. These 

are all part of the global system many—or positive parts of the 

59

global system that we now all benefit from and that we should seek 

to defend. 

So by appearing to agree with some of this rhetoric that was supported by China’s own leader, we appear to be willing to yield to 

China’s principle positions, and thereby contributed to emboldening 

Beijing to push back, to push harder, to probe, to see what China 

could achieve. 

If you look at really decades, but including in recent years with 

high fidelity on various incidents, there is a pattern of China’s 

leaders acutely attuned to their perception of changes in—even 

small changes in relative power and policy, and probing anew 

whenever they think there might be a change there. So we made 

that worse by appearing to embrace that rhetoric. 

On a related note, we also made it worse by appearing to associate ourselves with what Chinese leaders initially rolled out as a 

new type of great power relations. This, too, appeared, although not 

fully defined, and we shouldn’t have appeared to sign on to something that we didn’t clearly have defined. But there is ample evidence to suggest that China’s leadership, again, saw this as a way 

of saying that the U.S. had to yield to certain Chinese core interests in order to avoid a conflict in this new era. 

So words matter. We initially did not do a good job with that. We 

have done much better with that, but we are still not fully out of 

the words on that, and we are paying the price for that to some 

extent. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. PERRY. Dr. Swaine? 

Mr. SALMON. I think we are out of time, but go——

Mr. PERRY. I actually have another question. 

Mr. SALMON. Okay. Well, go ahead. And if you want to comment, 

then please go ahead. 

Mr. PERRY. Just to let the panelists know, I think we are expecting votes anytime. So as long as me and the chairman want to go 

back and forth and you are willing to stay here, we could run it 

to the end. 

Moving to a little bit of a different topic, and I don’t know your 

familiarity, but China has announced its China Sea air defense 

zone in 2013. Is the U.S. prepared for a scenario in which China 

announces a second ADIZ over parts of the South China Sea? And 

what would the likely U.S. response to such an action? I would 

start with Dr. Erickson, if you don’t mind. 

Mr. ERICKSON. Thank you very much for that extremely pertinent question, Mr. Perry. I think there is a very good chance that 

within the next 2 years that will no longer be an abstract question. 

Fortunately, I think the U.S. Government is very much on track 

to address this issue, because the solution in my view is to continue 

to pursue freedom of navigation and operate everywhere that is 

necessary for us in accordance with established, widely recognized 

principles of international law. 

I think we have all seen the footage from the P–8 Poseidon aircraft that embarked—wisely embarked—a CNN reporter. We are 

already doing what we need to do in the event of China’s declaration of an ADIZ over some parts of the South China Sea, namely 

treat it for what it is. It is in no way territorial airspace, and it 

60

is only relevant in terms of the coastal state issuing instructions 

to aircraft, if there is evidence that those aircraft intend to enter 

China’s actual territorial airspace. 

I agree with Dr. Swaine earlier. There is no rule against China 

establishing an ADIZ, and perhaps some of the U.S. messaging on 

that was a little bit garbled. I think we could do better. It was the 

way in which they rolled out the East China Sea ADIZ: China’s 

military used the phrase, ‘‘Defensive emergency measures’’ would 

be used if aircraft entering this zone declined to comply with Chinese demands. 

Well, that is simply against the basic principles of international 

law, and I would note that China has never conclusively taken 

back, walked back, those very inflammatory and destabilizing 

words. So if China—if and when China—announces an ADIZ over 

the South China Sea, the U.S., in my view, is going to be prepared 

to continue what we have already done—freedom of navigation. 

And I don’t believe that China is going to challenge that in a disruptive way, and I think we can all continue to go about business 

as usual. But that is what it is going to take. 

Mr. PERRY. Oh, boy. Okay. Dr. Rapp-Hooper? 

Ms. RAPP-HOOPER. Thank you so much for your question. I will 

just tack on to Dr. Erickson’s remarks and note that I also do agree 

that the administration and the U.S. Government, by virtue of 

these freedom of navigation exercises, is doing its part toward objecting to the most objectionable parts of a potential ADIZ in the 

South China Sea. 

We have also seen some recent statements by friends and allies 

in the region who suggested that they, too, would object to an air 

defense identification zone if China should declare one and attempt 

to enforce it in ways that are inimical to international law. That 

includes certainly Japan, it includes Australia. 

So one other thing that the United States could do in advance 

of China’s declaration of a South China Sea air defense identification zone is to prepare a multilateral groundwork to object to exercise if China is to try to implement an ADIZ in a way that runs 

counter to international law. That is, not to have the United States 

being the only country that flies through the airspace or transits 

the waters, but show that this is a problem for the region and for 

the rules-based system as a whole. 

Mr. SWAINE. Just a couple of comments on this. I think the Chinese could very well announce an ADIZ for the South China Sea 

at some point. Their policy right now is that they have no intention 

of doing this at the time. They haven’t committed that they will 

never do it. But they have never stated that an ADIZ is anything 

approaching territorial airspace. In fact, their objection to Japanese 

sorties that were sent up against Chinese aircraft in the ADIZ was 

that Japan treated it like territorial airspace. 

The Chinese position on this I think would have to be measured 

by what exactly they are including in an ADIZ, because an ADIZ 

should have a relationship to a territorial airspace or territory. It 

is a buffer zone before you enter into that area. 

Now, if the Chinese establish an ADIZ across the entire South 

China Sea, what is the territorial area that requires them to establish that ADIZ of that size? If they say it is everything in the NineVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:58 Sep 02, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\072315\95637 SHIRL
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Dash Line, then they are essentially stating that the Nine-Dish 

Line is territorial airspace, territorial waters. And if they state 

that, they will be in complete violation of international law, and 

they will be taking an action which I think will be unanimously opposed, and they would have to take the consequences of that happening. Therefore, I think it is unlikely that they will do that, because they are not going to make that statement about the NineDash Line area. 

Now, they could make an ADIZ, but it all depends upon the conditions that they do it under. If they notify people in advance, if 

they state clearly exactly what the limits of it are and if that complies with law, and if they state clearly what the process is by 

which you can—by which they are going to enforce it, as they could 

attempt to do, then you can deal with that problem. 

If they do it without informing anybody, they include the South 

China Sea as the whole, they make the implication that they have 

declared it as territorial airspace, then you have got a real problem. But it is not just the simple fact that they may declare an 

ADIZ. It really depends on what it is. 

Mr. PERRY. Have any other countries continued to—I imagine all 

of the other countries in the neighborhood have continued to fly in 

the current ADIZ with impunity, so to speak? Or is it just the 

United States that continues to——

Mr. SWAINE. So you mean the East China Sea ADIZ? 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. SWAINE. Well, actually, airliners—the Chinese asked for notification for any sort of airliners it would cross through the air defense identification zone, even if they weren’t going to enter into 

Chinese airspace. Airlines, including American airlines, do this. 

Mr. PERRY. But is that kind of validating, like the quiet title to 

the airspace over time, by complying with what is——

Mr. SWAINE. Well, just one point on this. The Chinese are not 

unique in requiring or asking that foreign countries declare or notify them even when they are just transiting an ADIZ. They are not 

unique in that regard. 

The United States believes an ADIZ should only be functioning 

if you are going to go and enter the airspace. Some other countries, 

including Japan, vis-a`-vis Taiwan, require Taiwanese aircraft to 

notify the Japanese government when they are going through their 

Japanese ADIZ. So the Chinese are not unique in——

Mr. PERRY. But is the Japan situation unique, and China using 

that opportunity to say, ‘‘Well, we want to do the same thing,’’ 

without having any really relevant claim? 

Mr. SWAINE. Well, what the Chinese did here—and I think it did 

relate to Japan—is they said Japan has an ADIZ. And have you 

ever seen a map of Japan with its ADIZ? It is very big. It extends 

out to about 130 kilometers from the Chinese coast. And the Chinese said, ‘‘Okay. We have this dispute with the Japanese. We are 

trying to assert our administrative authority around the Senkaku 

Islands. We are going to have an ADIZ.’’

The Chinese claimed that it didn’t have to do with Japan, but 

that’s baloney. It had to do with Japan. 

Mr. PERRY. I will turn to Chairman Salmon. 

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Mr. SALMON. Yes. It looks like we have been buzzed for a vote, 

but I just have one quick question. There are no quick questions 

around here, right? Xi Jinping is going to be here after the August 

recess. September. September he is going to be here. 

This is a really golden opportunity for us to raise some of these 

issues in a constructive way, I believe, with him. I know that obviously the President will be meeting with him, but several Members 

of Congress will have access to him as well. If you were in our spot, 

how would you approach it? 

Mr. CRONIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It is a very important opportunity. Obviously, President Xi and President Obama both want 

a successful summit meeting. Both want to be seen as successful 

stewards of major power relations, and they have more on the 

agenda later in the year, especially at Paris over climate change 

where that is expected to be an area of cooperation between the 

two capitals and the two administrations. 

We have a chance, therefore, to raise, in advance of the summit 

and at the summit, a serious discussion about the South China 

Sea. We need to get more specific about what we object to, what 

we are trying to prevent, including an ADIZ, about what our interests are and what our purposes are, and why other countries 

throughout the region have a right to be involved in upholding law, 

international law, the rule of law, and access to the global commons. 

We ought to be coordinating with other countries in the region 

in advance as well to make sure that we don’t, unfortunately, create the perception that we are just negotiating with China on what 

some are advocating should be a sphere of influence effectively for 

China. Just the opposite; we are trying to tamp down the tensions, 

so that all can continue to benefit. 

We also need to be investing, though, in our long term. This is 

not going away this fall. This is going to be here for the rest of the 

century. We need to build up our regional expertise, our history, 

our geography, our cultural air, sea, law, expertise, through education, in our government. And this committee can help do that, 

sir, with its leadership. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ERICKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a very important 

opportunity. Our engagement with China, indeed, is important, 

and in fact is based on many mutual interests. But we need to 

stand up for our own interests in this process. Part of that is getting the rhetoric right, the wording right. 

And following what I call the Hippocratic Oath of International 

Relations: First, do no harm. In our messaging, don’t use the term 

‘‘Thucydides trap.’’ Don’t use the term ‘‘new type of great power relations’’ or ‘‘new type of major country relations’’ or ‘‘new model of 

relations,’’ et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Instead, China can say 

what it wants. We encourage freedom of speech. We want to promote this. But then we should advance our own formulations, our 

own positive ideas. 

Under Bob Zoellick, the ‘‘responsible stakeholder’’ concept was 

one such very positive aspect. And, frankly, I think the current administration early on missed an opportunity to continue to put out 

its own formulation, and instead ‘‘new type great power relations’’ 

63

came in to fill the void. So the substance behind the words matters, 

but so, too, do the words. 

Thank you. 

Ms. RAPP-HOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I think that in this very important summit the United States should take the opportunity to 

communicate not only its interests in broad abstractions but, as my 

colleagues have mentioned, what those actions are that China may 

take that may be inimical to those interests. 

So, again, we often have a tendency to speak in terms such as 

freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, but it is important to 

highlight that the reason that this P–8 video that was released by 

CNN was so worrisome was because it suggested that freedom of 

navigation and freedom of overflight could already be in jeopardy. 

That is, because a U.S. aircraft was warned away from an artificial 

island, told that it was approaching a military zone. 

So being specific about the types of warnings, the types of actions 

that would cause the greatest concern in the United States is an 

absolute must. Additionally, I think this is a really important opportunity to lay down some criteria for what constitutes militarization of an island versus what constitutes civilian use of an island. 

And this is not just applicable to China, but, rather, to all of the 

claimants who may have facilities and outposts in the Spratly Islands. This is because if we are ambiguous, if we don’t clarify this 

criteria, there is the possibility that China will continue to advance 

its militarization of the islands very quickly, or that it may install 

dual use equipment that may be destabilizing, that may take other 

claimants by surprise, and that this may proceed in fits and starts 

in ways that can be deeply destabilizing to things such as Code of 

Conduct negotiations. 

So taking this opportunity to clarify intentions on both sides, to 

specify intentions on both sides, I think is absolutely the order of 

the day. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. SWAINE. I agree with my colleagues about the importance of 

this issue, and I think it should definitely be raised during the Xi 

Jinping visit to the United States. It is really that significant an 

issue. This could become a serious source of a deterioration in this 

relationship over these rocks and islands in the South China Sea, 

of a relationship that is gigantic, where these two powers are really 

joined at the hip in many ways. 

So the two countries have to work to avoid that. I don’t think it 

is going to happen if you have a staged discussion of this issue between two sides with generic talking points. You will just get the 

same exchange of information that we have had before. 

I think Obama needs to sit down with Xi Jinping, with a small 

number of staff, and talk seriously about this issue, talk about 

what U.S. concerns are, talk about what the United States would 

see as unacceptable in certain ways, and then talk about ways in 

which the two sides can reassure each other that these things are 

not going to happen. And the Chinese can express their views as 

well. 

When Kerry was in Beijing not long ago, Xi Jinping apparently 

told him, ‘‘We have no desire or intention to do things that will provoke or upset the United States.’’ Well, they should follow up on 

64

that and take him up on this and try to engage him directly on 

this. 

One last point. I really disagree fundamentally with my friend 

Andrew’s view about the new type of great power relations. I don’t 

think there is any problem with that concept. I think it in fact captures what China and the United States should be doing. We don’t 

have to accept the Chinese definition of what that means. Just because the Chinese raised it doesn’t mean for some reason we 

shouldn’t be supporting it. 

We want to see a region evolve here where in fact there is a clear 

avoidance of the kind of power rivalries that you will get from a 

rising power that is in some ways a non-status quo power in the 

Western Pacific, and a dominant power, the United States. 

In my view, the level of American predominance that we have 

enjoyed for 70 years in the Western Pacific is and will erode. We 

will lose our position, relatively speaking, to the Chinese. Yes, we 

have to keep up deterrence capabilities. Yes, we have to defend our 

most vital interests and will. But at the same time, our image and 

our capability as the predominant maritime power in the Western 

Pacific, in my view, is going to be gone. 

The Chinese will have capabilities that will call into question 

that surety of that American position. The question is: What do we 

do about that? And, to my mind, the strategy should be thinking 

about how you can transition to a stable balance of power in the 

Western Pacific. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PERRY. The acting chair thanks the panelists. Thank you 

very much for the great discussion. It was kind of great not to have 

so many people here, so Matt and I could ask all the questions. But 

we appreciate your interest and your involvement, and we look forward to working with you in the future as well as the other members. And at this time, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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