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94–942PDF 2015

RETREAT OR REVIVAL: A STATUS REPORT ON

DEMOCRACY IN ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 11, 2015

Serial No. 114–71

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Tom Malinowski, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State ...................................... 3

The Honorable Scot Marciel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau 

of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........................... 5

The Honorable Jonathan Stivers, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia, 

U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................... 6

Ms. Kelley Currie, senior fellow, Project 2049 Institute ...................................... 35

Mr. Murray Hiebert, deputy director and senior fellow, Sumitro Chair for 

Southeast Asia Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies ........ 44

Mr. Peter M. Manikas, senior associate and regional director for Asia programs, The National Democratic Institute ........................................................ 52

Sophie Richardson, Ph.D., China director, Human Rights Watch ...................... 59

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Tom Malinowski, the Honorable Scot Marciel, and the Honorable Jonathan Stivers: Prepared joint statement .............................................. 9

Ms. Kelley Currie: Prepared statement ................................................................. 38

Mr. Murray Hiebert: Prepared statement ............................................................. 46

Mr. Peter M. Manikas: Prepared statement .......................................................... 54

Sophie Richardson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 60

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 70

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 71

Questions submitted for the record to Panel I witnesses by the Honorable 

Matt Salmon, a Representative in Congress from the State of Arizona, 

and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific ...................................... 72

Written responses from the Honorable Jonathan Stivers ................................ 74

Questions submitted for the record to Panel II witnesses by the Honorable 

Matt Salmon ......................................................................................................... 82

Written responses from Mr. Murray Hiebert .................................................... 85

Written responses from Mr. Peter M. Manikas ................................................. 89

The Honorable Alan S. Lowenthal, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 92

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 96

(1)

RETREAT OR REVIVAL: A STATUS REPORT ON 

DEMOCRACY IN ASIA 

THURSDAY, JUNE 11, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:10 p.m., in room 

2171, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. The subcommittee will come to order. Given the 

timing of votes this afternoon, we are expected to go back in for 

votes again pretty soon, I am going to keep my remarks very short 

and submit my entire statement for the record. 

Supporting human rights and democracy has long been a central 

component of U.S. foreign policy. Promotion of democratic values 

facilitates security, stability, and economic prosperity throughout 

Asia and the world. This year the Asia-Pacific region is entering a 

critical period for democracy with a number of elections, government transitions, and internal developments planned in numerous 

countries. 

As the United States continually refines its efforts to ensure 

peaceful, transparent transitions of power and adherence to international law and norms, we must also ensure that our efforts are 

practical and leave meaningful results among Asian democracies, 

that our efforts leave them very robust. Our hearing will provide 

oversight on our Government’s activities to support democracy 

abroad and ensure that while our focus is on military and economic 

rebalance, that we are not going to overlook the importance of democracy and human rights. 

Today we are going to pay special attention to Hong Kong, 

Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia, and the rest of my remarks I am 

just going to submit for the record. We have got such a short 

amount of time, I really want to hear from the witnesses. 

Mr. Sherman, I am going to yield to you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Thank you for holding these hearings. 

For the most part, our Government programs aren’t designed to 

focus on democracy in China, but the thing that I think will be 

even more important to bringing democracy to China is if we are 

able to expose to the Chinese people the incredible levels of corruption in their own regime. We have the capacity to ferret out proof 

of their top government officials and mid-level government officials 

with enormous assets both in and out of China. And I don’t think 

2

there is much that would do more to bring democracy to China 

than exposing this level of corruption. 

We are in a stronger position to push for democracy in other 

countries. In Burma, we face two issues: One, getting the military 

or military-flavored regime to agree to democracy; and, second, trying to get both the democracy advocates that we have sheltered 

and supported for so long, and the military regime to understand 

the importance of minority rights. I am especially disappointed 

that Aung Suu Kyi and others who we have supported so fervently 

have not spoken out and acted to protect the rights and the physical existence of the Rohingya. 

In Thailand, we need to support democracy even if there are, I 

don’t know, more yellow shirts than red shirts or more red shirts 

than yellow shirts and even if the more numerous shirts may represent a policy that we regard as a little too redistributionist or 

adopting economic policies inconsistent with majority economic 

thought here in the United States. 

I look forward to learning what we can do to bring both development and democracy to Cambodia. And as to Hong Kong, the Chinese Government is obviously doing less than promised, and we 

need to expose and pressure that. At the same time, the people of 

Hong Kong do enjoy something closer to democracy than the rest 

of the PRC. And I think that the example of Hong Kong is one that 

the rest of China may choose to emulate. 

I, like the chairman, want to keep my opening remarks short, 

and this is the first time I have concluded them in only 3 minutes. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Some world records. Maybe with that miracle, 

maybe the Republicans might actually win a baseball game tonight, I doubt it, but—just kidding. We have a wonderful panel 

today. I would like to introduce Tom Malinowski, the Assistant 

Secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor. 

And, Tom, we really appreciate the opportunity while we were 

over in Asia to meet with you and get some of your wonderful 

thoughts. It really helped our trip very much as we interfaced with 

some of the leaders over there to get your insights, and I just have 

full support for everything you are trying to accomplish. 

Scot Marciel is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State. 

And a frequent flier here at the committee, Jonathan Stivers, 

USAID’s Assistant Administrator of the Asia Bureau. 

And we are so grateful for the time this decorated panel has 

made for us today. 

And, without objection, the witness’ full prepared statement will 

be made part of the record. Members will have 5 calendar days to 

submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the 

record. 

Mr. Malinowski, I will start with you. 

3

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM MALINOWSKI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, 

AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you so much Chairman Salmon. Very 

good to see you again. 

And, Mr. Sherman, who is also a member of the DRL human 

rights family, thank you so much for inviting us. 

Let me start with some general impressions. Promoting human 

rights and democracy in Asia is something we do because it is the 

right thing to do. It also advances our strategic interests. It helps 

to build more stable societies. It advances our economic goals in a 

number of ways. 

Perhaps most important from my point of view it aligns the 

United States with the aspirations of everyday people across this 

region with—it aligns us with the values that they admire. We 

sometimes get into arguments with governments on these issues, 

but we are fundamentally in agreement with the people of China, 

with the people of Vietnam, with the people of Burma about the 

basic human aspiration to be treated with dignity and fairness and 

with full respect for rights. And that agreement is a strategic advantage for the United States we need to preserve. 

By the same token, the flip side of that is that our strategic presence in Asia, our alliances, our trade agreements, our ability to 

provide security and reassurance also enables us to promote democracy and human rights more effectively. To advance our values we 

need to be the great power that is shaping the agenda, and that 

our allies look to as their most reliable partner because there are 

alternative visions out there. There are alternative agenda setters 

out there. So, to be effective, we have to be present and principled 

at the same time. 

With that in mind, you have asked us to address a few specific 

situations. I am going to say a few words about Burma. I am going 

to throw in a little bit about Vietnam where you and I met recently, and my colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary Marciel, will 

cover some of the other countries that you asked us to focus on. 

So, first, Burma, which is, it is first of all a country that has 

come a long way from the absolute military dictatorship that it was 

just a few years ago but is not yet where we need it and want it 

to be. It is undergoing an evolution, not a revolution. Everything 

is being negotiated. It is still operating under the old military constitution. There is still armed conflict, religious tension, the tragic 

situation of the Rohingya minority. 

Our policy has been to support a democratic transition but with 

realism about how far Burma has to go and caution about not moving too fast ourselves. So we have eased sanctions. We haven’t fully 

lifted them. We have encouraged U.S. investment but not with 

military industries. We have welcomed the progress we have seen, 

but we have also continued to speak out about the problems. 

This is a very important year. There will be elections in Burma 

later this year, the first nationwide competitive elections there in 

a very long time. Those elections will have inherent flaws because 

of the system in place. They do, if they reflect credibly the will of 

Burmese people, they do offer a chance to take a step forward. 

4

If the democratic forces do well, for example, they will form the 

next government. They will select the next President. They will 

have the leverage to press for the next stage of reform. So we are 

going to support the elections as best as we can. But we will be 

looking not just at the credibility of that process but at the credibility of the democratic transition that we hope will follow, including, we hope, changes to the constitution that empower civilians 

over the military and that give Burmese people the right to choose 

the President they want. 

And we are also going to continue to press to right the wrongs 

being committed against the Rohingya minority, which President 

Obama, when he was in Rangoon recently, called Burma’s most urgent matter. 

Now, let me say also just a few words about Vietnam, and I want 

to talk about this in the context of the choice that Members are 

going to have to make very shortly on TPA and eventually on TPP 

because that choice is going to have a huge impact on what we are 

going to do going forward. 

And I recognize that it is not an easy choice for many Members, 

especially those who are concerned about human rights and labor 

rights in Vietnam. 

We see exactly what you see in that country. It is still a oneparty state. It is still a country in which people are persecuted for 

political opinions. And it is, again, a country that is not where we 

yet want it or need it to be. 

But going back to the point I made at the outset, we have to be 

present, and we have to be principled. I think the TPP meets both 

of those tests. First of all, it is an example of strategic presence of 

the United States trying to play the leading role in shaping the 

norms and institutions of Asia for a generation to come. If we cede 

that role to others, that is not going to be good for the cause of 

human rights and democracy. 

Second of all, it is principled because built into TPP are a set of 

requirements and expectations unlike in past trade agreements. 

Those requirements and expectations feed into a debate that is underway in Vietnam already between those who want to open up the 

society and those who want to keep it closed. And those who want 

to keep it to make it more open are using the prospect of membership in TPP as their number one argument for moving forward. 

And under the spotlight of that debate, there has been progress, 

more releases, vastly fewer convictions for political offenses, ratification of human rights treaties and the beginning of comprehensive 

legal reform. And most important, a requirement built into the 

treaty that Vietnam allow for the very first time freedom of association, the creation of independent trade unions, breaking the 

Communist Party’s monopoly on trade union organizing, which 

would be a huge deal if we can get it. And those changes will have 

to be made in Vietnamese law before they can enjoy the benefits 

of TPP. 

So is this enough? No, it is not, but it will be significant. It will 

be necessary in terms of what we are trying to achieve. And, without the prospect of TPP, it would not be happening. And TPA, 

which is what you all are being asked to vote for in coming days, 

5

is what keeps that prospect open and thus gives us the leverage 

to keep pressing for more. 

I have focused on this as much as any other human rights issue 

in the world. And I can tell you that this is the entree. This is the 

reason why the Vietnamese Government is willing to listen to us 

on these issues. So I ask you to consider this, not as a leap of faith, 

but as an exercise in leverage in trying to achieve the kind of 

progress that we have been hoping for in Vietnam for a long time, 

but only now I think have a chance to achieve. 

With that, I will turn the rest over to my colleague, Mr. Marciel. 

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Marciel. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL, PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN 

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member 

Sherman, and members of the committee. It is a privilege to testify 

before you today. Promoting democracy and human rights is not 

something we do on the margins. It is an integral part of our daily 

diplomacy in Asia, particularly, of course, in countries that either 

are not democracies, or where democracy is fragile. My generation 

joining the Foreign Service and heading to Asia three decades ago, 

went to a region where democracy were few and, in the case of 

Southeast Asia, were nonexistent. Now, a majority of Southeast 

Asians live in democracies in places like the Philippines, Indonesia 

and Timor-Leste. South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia have democratized as well, and others have made progress along the democratic path. 

In all of these places, the people of those nations deserve the 

credit. They are the ones who made democracy happen. But the 

United States strongly supported all of these democratic transitions, and we are not stopping. I will talk about what we are doing 

in three very different places, Cambodia, Thailand, and Hong 

Kong. 

But, first, if I could, I would add a few words to Assistant Secretary Malinowski’s review of Burma. And I just want to stress 

there that our engagement in Burma and with Burma is all about 

their efforts to achieve a successful democratic transition. That has 

been and remains the focus of our work at all levels. 

On Cambodia, after the 2013 parliamentary election, we, and 

particularly our Embassy in Phnom Penh, were instrumental in 

helping bring the government and opposition together in direct dialogue to resolve a year-long standoff. There is still much work to 

do, but now the two sides sit in Parliament together. And we are 

supporting the Cambodian people as they work to build on these 

gains. We are supporting civil society. We are connecting directly 

with Cambodia’s next generation of leaders. And we stand with the 

Cambodians who are pushing for a voice as new laws are drafted. 

This sends a reminder that democracy isn’t only about free elections. It is also about citizens’ ability to hold their governments accountable. 

Next, Thailand, a long-time friend and treaty ally. We have stood 

for democracy there through a decade of political turmoil, and our 

message to the government since the coup just over a year ago has 

6

been clear. We are eager to see our bilateral relationship restored 

to its fullest potential, but this can happen only when democracy 

is restored. 

Until then, we will hold back certain assistance that has been 

suspended since the coup. But we will continue, however, to operate closely with the Thai on regional and global issues, that serve 

U.S. interests such as health, law enforcement, trafficking, climate 

change, regional security. In our interactions with the Thai, we 

continually stress that it is important for Thailand to have an inclusive political process and to fully restore civil liberties. This is 

essential to the open debate the country needs to have about its political future. 

My third example is Hong Kong, where we have consistently 

voiced our core belief that an open society that respects the rights 

of its citizens and fundamental freedoms is essential to Hong 

Kong’s continued stability and prosperity. We expect the legislative 

council to vote this month on an electoral reform package. While 

Hong Kong has never selected a chief executive through universal 

suffrage, we continue to voice our longstanding position that the legitimacy of the chief executive and of Hong Kong’s overall governance can be enhanced through a competitive election that features 

a meaningful choice of candidates who represent the will of the voters. 

Our position is a matter of principle, so we don’t take a position 

on any particular draft law. We leave that question to Hong Kong’s 

legislators in consultation with the people of Hong Kong. Irrespective of the outcome of any single legislative vote, we will keep supporting Hong Kong’s continued high degree of autonomy, under 

‘‘one country, two systems’’ and the basic law. 

We admire all that so many people in Asia have done to promote 

democracy and good governance. Their work is never complete, but 

in our everyday diplomacy, we will continue to do all we can as a 

friend and as a reliable partner to support efforts to build and 

strengthen democracy. 

Finally, let me emphasize that trade and investment, especially 

TPP, are important, are key to supporting a U.S. economy and to 

our efforts to promote democracy in the region. Thank you and I 

look forward to your questions. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Stivers. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JONATHAN STIVERS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY 

FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. STIVERS. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, and Mr. Crowley, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify today on the role of USAID in 

strengthening democracy, human rights, and governance in Asia. 

The vital importance of these areas has always been close to my 

heart and the forefront of my nearly two decades of work as a staffer in the House of Representatives. 

The House Foreign Affairs Committee has long been at the forefront on democracy and human rights issues, and some of the 

strongest voices on human rights in U.S. history have done their 

best work on this panel. 

7

Mr. Chairman, this hearing is in furtherance of that tradition, so 

thank you for your leadership in holding this hearing. 

Dr. Martin Luther King once said that ‘‘The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.’’ This is certainly true in 

Southeast Asia which has made significant progress over the last 

30 years. There is a unique situation in each country of the region 

to either preserve, consolidate, or build democratic institutions. 

The United States stands as a partner in helping the people in 

Asia live in freedom and prosperity, including in countries with significant democratic challenges such as Burma and Cambodia. 

In the fight to alleviate extreme poverty, it is essential to effectively address the underlying structural problems with governance 

that hold back many developing countries from realizing their potential. The solutions to challenges will ultimately come from the 

people of the region themselves, and our best chance in promoting 

democratic change is to empower the reformers in these countries 

by helping them build resilient institutions that are transparent 

and accountable to the people. 

The promotion of democracy, human rights, and good governance 

is front and center in our development assistance to the region. 

And efforts not necessarily branded as democracy promotion, help 

advance that goal as we build systems and capacity to address 

overwhelming development challenges, including support for health 

and food-security sectors. 

Our development assistance engages directly with the people and 

helps give them a voice in determining their own livelihoods and 

future. For the purposes of this hearing, I will focus my remarks 

on the countries of Burma and Cambodia. 

In Burma, this is a pivotal year. Closely calibrated with our diplomatic efforts, our assistance is intended to strengthen institutions 

of democracy. USAID is helping to prepare for the November elections by building the capacity of the election commission; training 

domestic election observers; supporting voter registration and education; and strengthening the capacity of political parties. 

USAID continues to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities, including significant assistance for the Rohingya 

population, refugees, and displaced people along the ThailandBurma border and other conflict areas of Burma. Over the past 2 

years the U.S. Government has provided more than $109 million 

in humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people in Burma and the 

region. And we continue to provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, asylum seekers in 

the areas of health, nutrition, water, sanitization, and hygiene. 

An emphasis on civil society is prevalent through all of our work, 

from media freedoms to land policy to health and agriculture. And 

we are supporting organizations that are holding the government 

accountable to continued reform; advocating for local needs and priorities; and resisting discrimination and violence. 

To date, USAID has supported over 300 vocal civil society organizations who are empowering ordinary citizens to bring change to 

their country. 

In Cambodia, promoting democratic governance and human 

rights continues to be our highest priority. U.S. assistance to 

human rights NGOs have strengthened their skills necessary to adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:22 Sep 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\061115\94942 SHIRL
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vocate effectively for change. While not fully respected by the Cambodian Government, Cambodian civil society has grown in strength 

and inclusiveness. Since the 1990s, we have supported civil society, 

and we continue to prioritize assistance to this sector. Cambodian 

civil society, with USAID support, has pressed for action on key 

issues, such as support for human rights, by providing legal representation, trial monitoring, and advocacy support to over 1,000 

jailed activists. 

Our longstanding support for anti-trafficking is paying dividends 

with a new report finding significant decreases in trafficking of 

underaged girls. The reduction was achieved in large part by civil 

societies’ sustained efforts. 

In part, due to U.S. support, garment workers negotiated a 28-

percent increase in minimum wage that was approved last year. 

Community mobilization and legal support resulted in the government returning land to more than 700 families in Siem Reap 

Province, providing them with land tenure security and improved 

livelihood options. And advocacy resulted in a pardon and release 

of 10 female land activists recently who had been imprisoned for 

protesting their community from being evicted due to real estate 

development projects. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, democracy, human rights, and good 

governance are not only central to the Asia rebalance policy but to 

our development approach in Asia. I appreciate the opportunity to 

testify today. I look forward to hearing your thoughts and any 

questions. 

[The prepared joint statement of Mr. Malinowski, Mr. Marciel, 

and Mr. Stivers follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I have a question for anybody on the 

panel that feels adequately prepared to answer the question: An 

Irrawaddy news article from 2014 highlighted that U.N. agencies, 

USAID, and some of AID’s contractors were spending millions of 

dollars a year on rent payments to members of Burma’s military 

elite, their families, and their cronies. And the case has highlighted 

the USAID contractor Development Alternatives International, 

DAI, reportedly renting a home from the family of Khin Nyunt, the 

former head of Burma’s military and intelligence, and UNICEF 

was spending approximately $87,000 a month to rent a mansion 

owned by another former junta leader and minister in the current 

government. 

These rents amounted to direct transfers of U.S. assistance funds 

into the coffers of people who thwarted democracy, abused human 

rights in Burma for decades. What are the steps that USAID and 

its contractors have taken to address the rent problem as well as 

issues with individuals who are on the SDN list that the USG inadvertently paid money to during Secretary Kerry’s visit to ASEAN 

Summit in 2014? And please also share with the committee the 

current monthly rate USAID is paying for its own rented space outside the Embassy compound, including the resident of the chief of 

mission, and who the property owners are. We would also appreciate if you could provide similar information for the 10 largest contractors USAID is funding in Burma this fiscal year. 

And Mr. Stivers I know you may not be prepared to throw down 

on all of that right now, but if you want to answer in writing afterwards, then that is fine too. But if you have any statements or anybody on the panel wants to address that, I would love to hear what 

your thoughts are. 

Mr. STIVERS. Sure, thank you, Mr. Chairman. In terms of that 

situation from 2014, I remember it back then. It is my understanding that that situation was resolved, but let me check on that 

and get you the facts on that. But I agree with you that it is absolutely essential that all of our contractors and all of our contracts 

have the highest standards in terms of where they are getting rent 

from and the buildings that they are occupying. And I can assure 

you that in our contracting, we take a very close look and make 

that a high priority. But I will get you more details. 

Mr. SALMON. And Mr. Stivers, if you could look at, you know, 

just the question that I asked. We would be happy to give that to 

you in writing, too. Just get us an answer back. I would really appreciate it. It would be very helpful. 

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.] 

Mr. SALMON. One other question and then, in the interest of 

time, I want everybody to ask their first question. But one other 

question is regarding China. It frames issues regarding political developments in the area where it considers itself sovereign. Whether 

elections in Hong Kong, the DPP’s projected win next year in Taiwan, and the protests for rights in Xinjiang and Tibet, and in 

terms of its core interests. 

For the United States, each of these issues reflects our own core 

interests in the advancement of democracy, civil society, and 

human rights across the People’s Republican of China, particularly 

in Hong Kong, where its history and special ‘‘one country, two sysVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:22 Sep 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\061115\94942 SHIRL
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tems’’ status has allowed for a degree of freedom, liberalism, and 

pluralism to take root and flourish. 

What are the administration’s plans to express solidarity with 

Hong Kong’s democracy activists as part of a principled approach 

to summitry with China this year? Can Congress and the American 

people expect a public expression of support that will be heard by 

democracy activists in Hong Kong, China, and elsewhere? 

Mr. Marciel, you made some great opening comments about the 

whole universal suffrage issue in Hong Kong. We were there. We 

met with several of the activists. And I am very, very concerned 

that the freedom fighters over there are feeling a little bit lonely. 

And I just want to know what we can do to further embolden democracy there? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think, broadly speaking, in our relations with China and our 

very regular conversations with China, human rights and democracy issues come up. We raise them often, certainly, about human 

rights concerns in China itself to begin with. 

In terms of Hong Kong, as I said, we have been strong supporters of the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ and the basic law, as you 

know. We have said that Beijing’s decision last August in terms of 

the way of nominating potential candidates for the chief executive 

office, we said could have gone further in providing Hong Kong’s 

5 million potential voters a meaningful choice of candidates. So we 

have said that publicly. And we have said that the legitimacy of 

the chief executive will be greatly enhanced if the chief executive 

is elected by universal suffrage in accordance with the basic law, 

and the aspirations of the Hong Kong people, and the election provides for a genuine choice of candidates. So I won’t try to predict 

exactly when we will say things, but that has been our consistent 

position privately and publicly, and I expect we will continue to express it. 

Mr. SALMON. Well, I, for one, am really pleased that you said it 

in your opening statement, and I am pleased that you have reiterated that in relationship to my question. And it is not just my 

question for you. I think we are all kind of grappling as Members 

of Congress, too, walking that fine line of not, you know, we certainly don’t want to upset the apple cart with our one-country policy that we would adhere to, really, for decades, and decades, and 

decades. 

But by the same token, I think that there were certain representations that were made in 1997 when the transition occurred that 

haven’t completely been realized. And I met with stalwarts when 

I was over there like Anson Chan and Martin Lee. And, you know, 

they believed that certain things were going to happen and they 

are still waiting. And I think that any voice that we can give collectively as a Congress, as the administration, to keep that idea alive 

as far as universal suffrage and selection of their chief executive, 

I think that that is really, really important to them. And so thank 

you very much for that. 

And I am going to yield to Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I didn’t think we would be talking about fast track here, but I 

do need to make a few comments. 

28

Mr. Marciel, when you say this will strengthen the American 

economy, I think you are a little outside of your expertise. The 

trade policy of the United States the last 30 years has led us from 

being the greatest creditor nation of the history of the world, the 

greatest debtor Nation in the history of the world. We have lost 

well more than 5 million jobs. We have eviscerated the middle 

class, and now we are being asked to double down on what is a 

trade policy so bad that it is able to stagnate wages in the greatest 

country, to the greatest workers in the world; a trade policy that 

is able to do all that to what is otherwise the greatest economy and 

the greatest workers in the world. 

As to Vietnam, obviously, they are going to show the greatest, 

nicest human rights face right up until the ink is dry. Labor leaders, I am sure if this deal goes forward will not be arrested for 

being labor leaders. They will be arrested because drugs are planted on them. They will be arrested, if you really want to scandalize 

the world, because they will plant child pornography on them. And 

Vietnam, certainly, does not have the judicial independence to defend its rights regime sufficient to expose a well-designed regime 

conspiracy to jail a labor leader. And I think the labor leaders 

there will surely understand that. 

As for the United States being able to do anything right now, you 

can do as much as you will ever been able to do because we are 

in negotiations. Your successor will soon realize that as powerful 

as DRL is, the Nike lobbyists are far more powerful. And once profits from Vietnam hit $10 billion, $20 billion, $30 billion, your successors will find it more convenient to talk about Thailand and 

Burma. 

I saw this happen with Iran where administration after administration refused to apply the Iran Sanctions Act because of commercial interests right up until the time when they were close to a nuclear weapon. I will agree with you, if Vietnam develops a nuclear 

weapon, then we may be able to generate more interest. 

But let’s focus on China. What undermines totalitarian regimes 

often is the sunlight of information. Mr. Marciel, is it our policy or 

should it be to acquire information relevant to Chinese citizens and 

to publish it, whether that be about the real levels of pollution in 

Chinese cities or the real level of foreign assets owned by Chinese 

leaders? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you, Congressman. 

I guess I would start by saying that, you know, in China, as elsewhere, we are strong believers in and advocates for freedom of expression, freedom of information, transparency. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I am asking you, would we do more and that 

is use the CIA to expose—to gather the information that needs to 

be exposed? I am sure that we are going to advocate for the Chinese journalists. The Chinese journalist doesn’t have the CIA’s investigative power. The Chinese, arguably, just hack us pretty 

badly. Certainly, the CIA could publish a report a week about the 

Swiss chateaus owned by this or that comrade. 

Mr. Malinowski, do you have a comment, Deputy Assistant Secretary? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I would point to a different agency of our Government because I am not sure in——

29

Mr. SHERMAN. When I say ‘‘the CIA,’’ I mean all of our information-gathering capacities. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Yeah, I am a very big believer in the general 

principle that you just outlined, that the greatest weakness of authoritarian states writ large around the world is corruption. That 

is the thing that units the most people in demanding the rule of 

law, demanding democratic government, ordinary people, as we 

have seen everywhere. 

And we do have tools in our Government that we—that are in 

some cases not as well developed as they should be, but that are 

becoming better developed to try and fight corruption throughout 

the world. I am not just going to make this about——

Mr. SHERMAN. I am not saying we should fight it. China is a 

strategic adversary. We should be using it. The more corruption in 

China, the less likely it is that China surpasses us or intimidates 

us. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. And where I was heading with this is that we 

have, for example, anti-kleptocracy unit in our Justice Department, 

which I would think could use more resources to do this kind of 

work all over the world, whether it is FIFA or whether it is Russia 

or whether it is China or the Middle East. It is apolitical, and so 

no one can accuse it of serving a particular foreign policy interest 

of the day, and that is important because it is more credible. But 

it is very, very powerful. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to get to one other question, but if you 

think that the average Chinese citizen will regard one agency of 

the U.S. Government as being more apolitical than another, you 

give them and us an awful lot more credit than I think. 

And the democratic activists in what the State Department still 

calls Burma, we protected them. We used sanctions. We were effective. They now share some degree of power. What have we done to 

call in a chit or two, and say that we need to see those who advocate for democracy and majority rule also advocate minority rights 

in the area of the Rohingya? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. We, all of us at this table, and many others in 

the administration, have had that conversation with them repeatedly, from the level of Aung San Suu Kyi—I have spoken to her 

personally about this, as have others, including President Obama—

all the way down to the rank and file activists. 

Some of them have done the right thing. And my bureau, among 

the programs that we support in Burma are programs that work 

with democratic activists who are trying to promote tolerance in 

that society, including with respect to the Muslim minority and the 

Rohingya minority. You have seen just what we are up against in 

terms of the deep-seated social prejudice and the discrimination 

that flows from it. It is a much harder problem to deal with than 

if we just had an evil government that was repressing people. 

But it is, as President Obama said, in many ways the most urgent problem because if I can think of anything that could derail 

this entire democratic transition over time, it is the ability of irresponsible forces in that country to divide people on the basis of religion and race. So we are absolutely seized with it. I will not claim 

to you that we have solved the problem because, obviously, we have 

not. But it is our, I would say, top priority. 

30

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Ms. Meng. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. 

Welcome to all of our witnesses who are testifying here today. 

Assistant Administrator Stivers, thank you once again. I am losing track of how many times you have come to testify before us. 

Mr. STIVERS. Four. 

Ms. MENG. I applaud USAID for making great strides and 

prioritizing and focusing on gender equality and women’s economic 

empowerment. As I listened to you discuss USAID’s democracy 

work, while democracy, gender equality, and women’s economic empowerment go hand in hand, but USAID-funded mission programs 

targeting democracy and human rights in Asia have dramatically 

decreased over the past several years with funds instead directed 

to Presidential initiatives. 

While we understand that some democracy funding may be attached to the initiatives, those programs don’t deal directly with 

the democracy and human challenges that many countries now 

face. Does USAID have plans to increase human and labor rights 

funding, and democracy support in the region and how is USAID 

integrating these democracy priorities with your gender equality 

and women’s economic empowerment agenda? 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you for that question. The Fiscal Year 2016 

budget request includes increases in democracy and governance 

funding for almost every country in East Asia. And the requests 

over the last few years have done the same. 

It is not a secret that the overall cuts to foreign assistance in recent years have had an impact on overall discretionary funding, 

which is primarily democracy and governance funding, and economic growth funding. And so there are a number of issues in the 

final budget that is concluded by the administration and both 

Houses of Congress that have affected our discretionary spending 

and our flexibility to provide the democratic and governance funding that does so much, especially in support of civil society. 

In Burma and Cambodia, for example, we are doing so much to 

support civil society including promoting gender empowerment and 

fighting against trafficking. We are supporting many organizations 

that work on those sorts of issues. But the funding is an issue 

when we consider the budget. 

Ms. MENG. You mentioned Burma. There are many, many concerns. There is a sense that the situation is getting out of hand. 

I believe that the State Department has called for a free and fair 

elections in Burma this year. My understanding is that 25 percent 

of the seats in the future Parliament are explicitly reserved for 

members of the military, and those seats are filled by military appointments. Even more concerning is that the military can effectively veto any major changes because those changes require 75 

percent of parliamentary majority. How do you reconcile this setup 

with the call for free and fair elections and have you raised this 

with Burmese Government? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Sure. As I mentioned in my opening statements, there are inherent flaws in this—in these elections, inherent flaws in the system. You mentioned a couple of them, the 25 

percent allocation to the military, so it is an election for 75 percent 

31

of the seats, not for 100 percent. I would add that the Parliament 

that will be selected in these elections will not be fully empowered 

vis-a`-vis the military because the military still has the ability to 

appoint some of the most important ministers in the country, interior, defense, so they control the muscle. 

And all of this is—and of course, the problem that Aung San Suu 

Kyi, by virtue of her foreign birth is barred—I am sorry, the foreign citizenship of her sons, is barred from seeking the presidency, 

which is also a provision in the constitution. 

So these are inherent flaws, and they are not likely to be resolved before the election takes place. That said, it is possible, not 

guaranteed, but it is possible that the elections will allow the people of Burma to express their will and to elect candidates of their 

choice in a very competitive process. The democratic forces in the 

country, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, are all in. They are 

going to compete in these elections. If they do well, if they end up 

with a majority in the Parliament, which they can do if they win 

two-thirds of the seats—that is how the math works, and they are 

capable of doing that—then they get to pick the next President, 

which will not be Aung San Suu Kyi under the system, but they 

will get to choose who it is. They will form the next government. 

And you can see in that scenario that they will have a lot of political leverage to be able to negotiate changes to that constitution 

to fix the problems that we have just been discussing. 

So that is the hopeful scenario. It is not by any means guaranteed. But that is what we have been encouraging, not just credible 

elections but a credible, democratic transition following the elections to fix those structural problems in the system. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Lowenthal. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Mr. Malinowski, I want to thank you 

personally for your tireless work on human rights, especially in 

Vietnam. I generally appreciate the open dialogue that we have 

had, and the work that you have done, and I went along with the 

chair, visiting Vietnam, and getting a chance to see you. 

I want to talk about something that you mentioned in your testimony here that I think has—and, you know, the thing that we will 

be actually looking at and voting on very soon. And that is the—

although you talk about the TPP, right now, we, as you know, we 

will be voting on the TPA, the promotion authority. But you say 

in your submitted testimony that the TPP agreement will include 

a requirement that Vietnam guarantee freedom of association by 

allowing workers to form genuinely independent trade unions. 

Can you expand to us on what that cause really will look like, 

and how are we going to be able, the United States and others, to 

hold Vietnam accountable? And has there been—has Vietnam 

taken any steps today, before the TPP goes into effect, to actually 

develop independent trade, or is this something that they are saying they will do in the future? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Congressman. 

Those are very, very important questions that we have been. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. That is right, those are the critical questions 

for me in terms of labor issues. 

32

Mr. MALINOWSKI. In terms of where they are now, let me start 

there. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Yes. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Vietnam, as you know, does not have legally—

does not legally recognize independent trade unions. There is one 

Communist Party affiliated trade union that is supposed to represent all of the workers of the country and that, you know, puts 

on shows, and helps with vacations and doesn’t really do very 

much, although they are now beginning to feel a little bit of pressure. 

Interestingly, in the last few years, there has been a growth of 

unrecognized. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. That is right, labor strikes. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. There have been many strikes which have been 

organized by, you know, what we would call a local trade union. 

It is just not recognized as such. And then in a number of recent 

cases, the government has reacted appropriately. They have negotiated with the workers. They have in some cases given into their 

demands. And I think this is partly because of the spotlight of TPP, 

but I think it is also because there are deep changes within the Vietnamese society that the government is trying to understand and 

keep up with. 

So there is free associating going on in Vietnam, but there is not 

freedom of association in the sense that what people are doing is 

not yet guaranteed, recognized, protected within the law. 

So what TPP requires, not just of Vietnam but all of the members, is compliance with the internationally recognized labor right 

of freedom of association. In the specific negotiations we are having 

in terms of how to effectuate that commitment, the details of that 

are being hammered out. And it is not an easy negotiation because 

what we are asking of Vietnam is meaningful. If it weren’t meaningful, they would have agreed to it months ago, but they know 

that what we are asking them to do would be, in effect, revolutionary in that system. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. That is right. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. It would be, and you know, you will see the details when it is agreed, and it is not yet agreed. 

But it will have to include, we have said this, a legal guarantee 

that workers in factories and enterprises around Vietnam will be 

able to form their own unions, elect their own leaders, set their 

own policies, decide on their own whether, and when, and how to 

go on strike, communicate with each other, factory to factory. And, 

again, all of this will have to be—it can’t be a promise. It is going 

to have to actually get done in law. 

All of that said, I have got no illusions, and I agree with Congressman Sherman that if all of that is done, we are not going to 

be in a place where this is settled. Of course, it is going to remain 

unsettled precisely because it is meaningful. There will be forces on 

the other side that push back. What I asked myself is as somebody 

who is promoting this change, which by definition will take time 

in Vietnam, are we going to be better off? Are the Vietnamese 

workers going to be better off—civil society—a year or two from 

now if this right is guaranteed in Vietnamese law or not? 

33

Absent this process, TPA now, if we get it, TPP, it will not be 

guaranteed because the political incentive to do this revolutionary 

thing, absent the benefit of joining TPP, is not great enough for the 

Vietnamese Communist Party. So will we be better off in that 

stage? Will they be empowered to demand even more rights? Will 

we be empowered to demand more of the Vietnamese? 

My answer to that question is yes, which is why what I am urging you to do. And I am actually not asking you to vote for TPP 

because there is no TPP. I am asking you to keep this process 

going and to keep the prospect of TPP alive by voting for the authority, which will then allow us to spend the next few months, not 

only negotiating the agreement with the labor chapters as strong 

as possible, but also trying to get more people out of prison, trying 

to get reforms to the criminal code and other things that are needed to take Vietnam two or three steps further down that road. And 

then we are going to have to keep on fighting, absolutely. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

I will submit the rest of my questions in writing. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much. I am going to ask one more 

quick question and I will allow everybody else to ask another quick 

one. We probably don’t have a lot of time, but how well is State 

coordinating with DOD on Thailand, which has historically played 

a major role in managing the U.S.-Thailand relationship? In 

March, the U.S. Pacific Command indefinitely postponed what was 

to have been the first planned meeting for next year’s Cobra Gold 

exercises? Was this a signal to ruling junta? What do you think 

about using Cobra Gold to encourage the military government to 

move toward elections? And what options exist to hold multilateral 

exercises elsewhere in the region? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We actually have a 

very good coordination with DOD, with the Pentagon, as well as 

with the NFC. So our policy on Thailand is decided through an 

interagency process, including a meeting this week that we already 

had where we touched on this. So it is an interagency process. 

And on Cobra Gold, specifically, we decided, as you know, for this 

Cobra Gold earlier this year, we decided last year to hold it because of its importance to us. But also, frankly, regionally, it is a 

multilateral exercise. So we decided to hold it in a scaled-down 

version with an enhanced focus on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief. 

At this point, what we decided going forward is to go ahead with 

the preparation for 2016 Cobra Gold. For the same reasons, also 

would be scaled down in light of the political situation in Thailand. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. The news reports show refugees fleeing to 

Malaysia, Indonesia, and they say it is a combination of 

Bangladeshis and Rohingya. But do we have any view as to is it 

more one or more of the other that are on those ships? And, also, 

why would Bangladeshis be fleeing their homeland at this particular time? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you, Congressman. 

I will say a couple of things first. I don’t think we have exact 

numbers—nor the U.N.—have exact numbers yet. But overall——

34

Mr. SHERMAN. I mean, is it 10 percent Bangladeshis or 80 percent Bangladeshis? 

Mr. MARCIEL. I think somewhere in between. The best information we have is that it is a mixed, probably majority Rohingya from 

Burma but a significant minority Bangladeshi. Again, we don’t 

have exact numbers, but that is our best sense. 

And, also, our best sense is that those leaving Bangladesh tend 

to be looking for better, more economic opportunities whereas those 

leaving Rakhine State in Burma, it is a combination of, you know, 

a bad economic situation, but also discrimination, persecution, lack 

of rights. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Why would Bangladeshis be leaving Bangladesh 

at this particular time and be willing to take these enormous risks? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Yeah, I mean, the particular time has to do actually with the weather. There is something——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, this particular year. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. There has been a traditional outflow of 

Bangladeshis who are fleeing for poverty, who are seeking opportunity and willing to take some risks. 

I think one reason why it is difficult to answer this question is 

because there may be Rohingyas from Burma who, when asked 

where are you from, will say they are Bangladeshi because they 

fear they are going to be sent back somewhere, and they would 

rather be sent back to Bangladesh. It is very complicated. 

There are also, I think among the Rohingyas, there are people 

who have voluntarily fled because the situation in their country is 

so intolerable, but we have also seen reports including from Human 

Rights Watch—and maybe you will be able to ask them in the next 

panel—that some have actually been seized by traffickers, that, you 

know, these trafficking networks that are at the heart of this, 

colluding often with corrupt officials in various countries, will actually go and nab people because they can sell them down the line. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And they are nabbing people in Bangladesh? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. In Burma. I have seen testimonies that suggest 

that some of the—testimonies of people who have landed in Malaysia, Thailand, suggesting that that is what happened to them. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So we hear reports that they have to pay thousands of dollars to get on the ships, and they are saying, in other 

cases, they not only pay nothing, but they are literally captured. 

A significant number are coming from Bangladesh, where they 

don’t face religious persecution. It is just bad economics in Bangladesh. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Yes, so it is a complicated mix. But I think, 

you know, what it comes down to for us is, what do we do about 

it? And the initial, obviously, our initial instinct was we had people 

on the high seas who are at imminent risk of death. At that point, 

we are not distinguishing where they are from. Our focus was getting the Indonesians, the Malaysians, and the Thais to allow boats 

to land and to be proactive, to go out and do search and rescue, 

which we, I think, in a relatively short period of time, managed to 

convince many of them to do. We did our own search and rescue 

in the form of surveillance flights. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I think you have gone beyond my question, and 

I have gone beyond my time, but thank you very much. 

35

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

I think we are going to adjourn this panel and bring the next one 

up. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate it very much. 

Mr. SALMON. I thank the panel for coming today. 

We are very fortunate to be joined by Kelley Currie, a senior fellow with the Project 2049 Institute, where she has worked on democracy, human rights, and rule of law in the Asia Pacific for over 

6 years. 

Murray Hiebert—did I pronounce that right, Murray? 

Mr. HIEBERT. Yes. 

Mr. SALMON. He is a senior fellow and deputy director of the 

Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asian Studies, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies. 

Peter Manikas has served as senior associate and director of Asia 

programs at the National Democratic Institute for the past 20 

years. 

And Dr. Sophie Richardson is Human Rights Watch’s China director. 

And Ms. Currie, we will start with you. Let me just explain the 

situation. We are going to probably have votes in about 10 to 15 

minutes. I am going to try to get through all of your testimony. We 

probably won’t get to questions today, which disappoints me, but 

maybe if we could have members submit questions to you in writing, that would be very, very helpful. 

And Ms. Currie. 

STATEMENT OF MS. KELLEY CURRIE, SENIOR FELLOW, 

PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE 

Ms. CURRIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, 

and members of the committee for giving me the opportunity today 

to speak about the state of democracy in Asia, specifically with regard to the situation in Burma. 

There is no denying there have been changes in Burma over the 

past 5 years. When I started working on human rights and democracy in Burma 20 years ago as a young congressional staffer working on the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, I could not have 

imagined that I would be sitting here today, having spent time in 

Burma and meeting with the people I was trying to get out of jail 

at that time, people like Min Ko Naing and Aung San Suu Kyi and 

others. 

Likewise, when I was running the International Republican Institute’s Burma program with shoestring funding, operating out of 

safe houses on the Thai-Burma border, I can’t imagine—I couldn’t 

have imagined that IRI and NDI and other organizations would be 

operating from offices in downtown Rangoon today with the permission of the government and working openly with political organizations to—in advance of an upcoming election. So while these 

relative economic and political changes certainly have taken place, 

it is tempting, after so many years of brutally repressive military 

rule, to use the negative standards of the bad old days to judge the 

current situation. 

But doing this would communicate to the Burmese that they 

don’t deserve the same kind of genuine democracy, real economic 

opportunity, or real human rights that we take for granted. InVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:22 Sep 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\061115\94942 SHIRL
36

stead, we must measure Burma’s progress both against the democratic aspirations of the Burmese people, flagrantly denied since 

1990, and against the objective standards of genuine democratic 

governance. 

Unfortunately, the same countries, including the United States, 

that spent more than two decades supporting those democratic aspirations and standards seem to have decided that the reforms to 

date are good enough, despite how far they fall short of what we 

would accept for ourselves. 

Let’s be clear, they have fallen short. Just 1 month prior to the 

outbreak of violence in Rakhine State in May 2012, the Burmese 

nation and the world celebrated the sweeping victory of Aung San 

Suu Kyi and the NLD in by-elections. 

In the wake of this historic event, the United States lifted its 

sanctions on Burma. And President Obama made the first trip to 

Burma by a sitting President of the United States. Yet since that 

trip, reforms have stopped cold. The situation has steadily worsened for civil society, political activists, and those who refuse to accept the government’s terms for their transition to discipline flourishing democracy. This is the big concern, I think, that many of us 

have. What is this transition going towards? It is not really the 

government’s intention to have a transition to genuine democracy. 

They want to transition to an electoral authoritarian system with 

a thin veneer of democracy on top of it. 

As we look to the elections planned for this fall, there is no prospect that they can be genuinely free and fair. Because the constitutional and bureaucratic framework under which they are being 

held is so heavily tilted toward the military and the incumbent regime, even if the NDL ‘‘wins,’’ as Assistant Secretary Malinowski 

laid out, and captures a majority of the votes, they will not be able 

to form a government and take political control of the country and 

the government. Their political leader cannot be elected President. 

Regardless of the election results, the military will remain in control of Burma’s political, bureaucratic, and economic powers. This 

is why the country’s democratic forces have been so focused on reform of the 2008 constitution. But there has been no movement on 

that. And that is totally at the discretion of the military and the 

government. 

When Burma began liberalizing in 2010, many thoughtful Burmese democrats expressed concerns about becoming ‘‘another Cambodia,’’ a donor or China-dependent, electoral authoritarian backwater. Today, these same people are equally concerned about not 

emulating Thailand, the country next door that has the superficial 

trappings of economic development and democracy, but which is actually controlled by an elite with shallow commitments to liberal 

values. Among Burmese Democrats, the seemingly cyclical military 

interventions in Thailand’s democracy point out the dangers of contemplating a long-term similar role for the Burmese military. 

When it announced the pivot to Asia, the Obama administration 

declared its intent to strengthen U.S. Ties with all the governments of the region. 

The 2010 reforms in Burma created new opportunities to fulfill 

that rhetoric. Unfortunately, the Obama administration has de-emphasized democratic values in its policy approach in the misguided 

37

belief that this will facilitate improved relations. They have replaced a policy of principled disassociation with Burma with one of 

unprincipled engagement. This pragmatism in the service of a 

transactional relationship may seem rational in the short term. But 

the situation in Thailand show that, ultimately, there is no shortcut. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Currie follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Hiebert. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MURRAY HIEBERT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

AND SENIOR FELLOW, SUMITRO CHAIR FOR SOUTHEAST 

ASIA STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. HIEBERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was asked to speak about Thailand. Obviously, Thai democracy 

took a big hit on May 22, 2014, when the military ousted Prime 

Minister Yingluck following 6 months of protests. Hence, the National Council for Peace and Order, as the new government was 

called, moved quickly to prohibit political activities, censor the 

media, try dissidents in military courts, et cetera. 

Analysts basically think Thailand, especially the Thai elite, view 

themselves as going through a historical political transition that 

has existential stakes for Thailand. The military, analysts say, has 

assumed military control to ensure that it manages the royal succession when that takes place down the road. And these people also 

say that it is unlikely we are going to see real elections in Thailand 

until there is this succession. 

So when the military took over, it replaced civilian courts with 

military courts. It ordered newspapers to stop writing articles critical of the military. Satellite, television, and radio stations were 

shut. And access to many Web sites were blocked, as were meetings of more than 500 people—excuse, more than 5 people. On May 

22, when they commemorated the first anniversary of the coup, officials arrested over 40 activists in various parts of the country for 

staging peaceful rallies to mark the military takeover. 

The military has come out with a draft constitution, which is 

now being circulated. I think most Democrats would say that it 

falls far short of what observers would consider minimally credible 

for democracy. And the military also keeps pushing back the date 

for new elections. Elections that had been scheduled for early 2016 

are now said to be delayed at least until August or September. 

The other thing which was alluded to previously was the whole 

issue of human trafficking, human smuggling. I know it is not directly a democracy issue, but it is critically a human rights issue. 

The Thai military, after being put on the Tier III list last year, has 

started an investigation. They have arrested some people. They 

found bodies in makeshift camps along the Thai-Malaysia border. 

And this is obviously a situation that has been going on for years 

and an issue that will need to be addressed. 

Thailand is a country that has had very long relations with the 

United States, dating back to 1833. It is a key country in Southeast 

Asia, ASEAN, it is very central. The U.S. And Thailand cooperate 

in so many areas. Thailand has the biggest U.S. Embassy in the 

region. The U.S. does much of its regional activity from Thailand. 

So you have to try and think of a country that had democracy 

quite a bit of the time over the last four decades, you know, whether we can criticize the democracy, but it is at least an attempt, and 

then it has been interrupted by military coups. So trying to think 

about how the U.S. can respond and try to engage the Thais when 

they are in the midst of what they see as a very difficult transition 

45

that goes far beyond democracy and a military coup is to try assign 

a high-level Thai envoy. This would be somebody who would represent the administration but would travel frequently to Thailand 

to consult with them, to keep them, not to say we concur and agree 

with everything but that we are trying to deepen our understanding of your concerns and listen to the perspectives of Thailand’s key players. 

The other thing we absolutely have to keep doing is continue 

pressing the military to rescind the orders restricting freedom of 

expression and freedom of assembly and those kind of issues, and 

also revoke the Penal Code article 112 on lese majeste. 

And then the other one, which I already alluded to, is really the 

military has to put an end to human trafficking, establish an independent investigation, release the results, and bring justice to 

those perpetrating these abuses. 

And then in trying to find ways to support the democratic principles of governance, one of the ideas that we have talked about in 

my office is whether it would be useful to try to put together a private eminent persons group of senior former officials, maybe private sector people, very prominent people who could talk to the 

Thais. They would talk to prominent Thais not in the military right 

now, about 5 years down the road, what they would like to see 

U.S.-Thailand relations look like. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hiebert follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Manikas and Dr. Richardson, I am going to have a very 

truncated time frame. We just got buzzed for votes. 

Is there a way that you could maybe abbreviate your comments? 

Because I just have one question that I would really like to get out 

there. Would that be all right? 

Mr. MANIKAS. Sure. 

Mr. SALMON. And I am so sorry for the way things operate sometimes around here. But I know you are used to it. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PETER M. MANIKAS, SENIOR ASSOCIATE 

AND REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR ASIA PROGRAMS, THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 

Mr. MANIKAS. Thank you. I have submitted written testimony, so 

if I could just make a few brief points about Hong Kong, Thailand, 

and Burma in the context of the region as a whole. 

Mr. SALMON. That would be great. 

Mr. MANIKAS. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think that any single trend, 

neither retreat nor revival, defines the direction of democracy in 

the region. 

We have recently seen a military coup followed by a ban on political activity in Thailand. In Hong Kong, the government in Beijing 

has remained intransigent, insisting on its version of universal suffrage. In Burma, progress toward political reform has stalled as 

critical elections approach, although constitutional reform remains 

a possibility. 

However, more positive and I believe a longer term trend has 

seen citizens demand more open and competitive political systems 

in countries such as Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Recent 

elections in those countries saw entrenched ruling parties face significant challenges by a reinvigorated opposition. 

In Indonesia, there was a historic change in leadership which 

could deepen the nation’s regional influence as a model for democracy. In demographic terms, urbanization, the existence of a youth 

bulge, and the rapid growth of social media will also likely increase 

demands for greater democratic accountability. 

One important challenge that has emerged is the restrictions 

being placed on activities of civil society organizations. For example, in Cambodia, the new election law limits the ability of electionmonitoring groups to criticize the government during the election 

period. And a proposed NGO law is under consideration that would 

deny registration to organizations that would harm national unity, 

culture, and the traditions of Cambodia. 

In mainland China, a proposed law would limit the ability of 

local groups to receive foreign funding and would place the regulation of foreign NGOs under the ministry of state security. 

In Burma, many NGOs are unsure of their legal status and uncertain of what activities they can engage in without violating the 

law. 

In Hong Kong and Malaysia, civil society groups are being intimidated and accused of promoting American values. 

Some international groups which work in the areas of human 

rights and democracy too have been accused of exporting an American model of democracy. I am not sure why it is referred to as an 

53

American model. The people of Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, the 

Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan have embraced democratic 

governance and demonstrated that democracy is fully compatible 

with Asian values. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I think that the response of the international community to the changes that are occurring should be a 

persistent engagement to support democratic reforms and to assist 

those who are advancing the democratic process, in the high hopes 

that the international community will continue its efforts to support reformers inside and outside of government in pursuing the 

goals and aspirations of people throughout the region who are seeking to improve their lives by improving their governments. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Manikas follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Dr. Richardson. 

STATEMENT OF SOPHIE RICHARDSON, PH.D., CHINA 

DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Sure. I will take Peter’s 2 minutes. I am going 

to be really quick here. 

Chairman Salmon, I think it is manifestly the case that the arc 

of history is not bending toward justice in mainland China. And I 

think the jury is really out on the direction that Hong Kong is taking. 

The core issue here is not complex: The right to vote and the 

right to run are equally important. And you don’t get to claim 

democratic reform by giving one while undercutting the other. 

We can have a much longer discussion about this. But since I 

was asked to comment specifically on how the U.S. is doing, I think 

it is fair to say that while the U.S. has diagnosed the correct problems, I think it has been deeply reticent about being very forceful 

about those. If you compared, for example, the forcefulness and the 

frequency of American rhetoric, democracy in Hong Kong to democracy to other parts of the world, you would see a pretty significant 

gap. 

And I think that if the U.S. is willing to say, as the previous 

panel did, that chief executives in Hong Kong lack legitimacy because they haven’t been popularly elected, I really look forward to 

people making that point about Xi Jinping. I think there are many 

steps that the U.S. could take: Speaking of more frequently; being 

seen to be meeting with a full diversity of actors in Hong Kong; I 

think having codels visits helps enormously. 

And I certainly hope that you will take from this hearing your 

concerns and formulate them to the administration in advance of 

the S&ED and Xi Jinping visit. Thanks. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Richardson follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. You really hit on the issue that I wanted to ask the 

question on anyway. And anybody is free to give me their thoughts 

on it. But some observers think that the U.S. Government should 

do a lot more to promote democracy in Hong Kong. 

Every time we do, China says: Hands off, it is a domestic issue. 

What are some of the things that you think that the U.S. Government should do? And what kind of concrete steps? I mean, it is 

great that we make statements in hearings like this and when we 

have private meetings with them. But the needle isn’t really moving. And can we step things up? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I think the reality with China is that you 

could, the U.S. Could, in theory, throw everything and the kitchen 

sink at it and the Chinese Communist Party might not be moved. 

I do think that is a reality. 

That said, I think there is a great deal more that the U.S. can 

do. And if you think comparatively, you know, when you look at, 

for example, the initial photographs of Occupy, all I can think of, 

for example, was Ambassador Victoria Nuland at Maidan Square 

handing out bread to demonstrators. Or you read a jointly penned 

op-ed by the President and the President of Tunisia talking about 

democratic reform. And you wonder how many people the administration even tried to imagine a world in which such an activity 

could be pursued with a peaceful government critic from China or 

from Hong Kong. I think people have gotten badly ground down by 

Chinese Government reticence. But there are plenty of examples of 

how the U.S. promotes democracy and defends rights in somewhat 

less hostile environments that could very effectively be pursued. 

Mr. SALMON. This is something I would like to even put a little 

more flesh on the bones with you. Maybe we could privately meet 

and talk about some of your ideas. I really don’t want to give short 

shrift. This is a wonderful panel. And I am so sorry that we 

couldn’t just spend hours and hours because I know I would probably learn a lot. Thank you so much for being here today. 

Ms. CURRIE. On the last question, can I add something to 

Sophie’s comment? 

Mr. SALMON. Yes. 

Ms. CURRIE. Thank you. The fact that we don’t really engage 

China on democratization in the mainland, actually, it is a huge 

problem not just for our engagement with China but it undercuts 

our efforts to promote democracy elsewhere in the region. 

The other countries in the region aren’t clueless about the fact 

that we are not raising this with China. We are putting pressure 

on them to do something that we won’t even talk to the Chinese 

about. And I think that in order for us to really address this in 

Hong Kong, it has also got to be part of a package of addressing 

it with China writ large. And we don’t do that anymore. It used 

to be a standard feature of U.S. diplomacy to talk about political 

reform in China. And it has completely dropped off the agenda. 

Mr. SALMON. You are a great straight man because that is exactly what our hearing next week is going to address. Thank you 

very, very much. We are thinking alike there. 

This meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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