### RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO

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NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY , Plaintiff

- Respondent ,

v. J.C. , Defendant

- Appellant , and M.C. and J.A.C.,
Defendants

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________________ ___ ___ _ ____ IN THE MATTER OF M.I.C., G.M.C., J.E.C. and E.C. , M inors.

___________________________

Submitted October 3, 2018

- Decided Before Judges Koblitz and Mayer

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court

. " A lthough it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited

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October 26, 20182 A

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- 17T2 On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. F N

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. Joseph E. Krakora , Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Joan T. Buckley, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Gurbir S. Grewal, At torney General, attorney for respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Sara M. Gregory, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief )

. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian , attorney for minor M.I.C. (M. Alexis P ollock, Deput y Public Defender, on t he brief )

. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian , attorney for minors G.M.C., J.E.C. and E.C. (Karen Ann Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on the statement in lieu of brief )

. PER CURIAM Defendant J .C. 1 appeals from a June 8, 2016 fact

- finding determination , by a preponderance of the evidence, that he sexually abused his stepdaughter,
M ary , over the course of at least seven years from when she was less than six until she was thirteen years old

. See N.J.S.A. 9:6

- 8.21(c)(3). Defendant argues that the trial court erred in relying on inadmissible hearsay and ignoring relevant

1 We use initials and pseudonyms to identify the parties to preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38

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exculpating evidence. We disagree and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Bernadette N . DeCastro's comprehe nsive written opinion. Mary did not testify, although she gave detailed statements to the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office detective and the evaluator s at the regional child abuse diagnostic center, Audrey Hepburn Children's House (AHCH) . B oth the
female detect ive and Dr. Anthony D'Urso, the supervising psychologist at AHCH, testified at the fact

- finding hearing. Dr. D' U rso explained the evaluation procedure and results in great detail, finding that Mary's allegations, expressed in "age

- inappropria te detail," were supported by his clinical findings. Mary had reported the sexual abuse when she was eight years old, but had recanted at that time. She reported to AHCH a progressive pattern of abuse as she got older. Mary experiences flashbacks and wa s diagnosed as suffering from post

traumatic stress disorder.
Our Supreme Court has made clear that previous statements made by the child relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect are admissible in evidence; provided, however, that no such statem ent, if uncorroborated, shall be sufficient to make a fact finding of abuse or neglect. Thus, a child's hearsay statement may be admitted into evidence, but may not be the sole basis for a finding of abuse or neglect

. [ N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v . P.W.R. , 205 N.J. 17, 32

- 33 (2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) .]4 A

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"[T]he corroboration requirement must reasonably be held to include indirect evidence of abuse. Such evidence has included a child victim's precocious knowledge of sexual activity, a semen stain on a child's blanket, a child's nightmares and psychological evidence. " N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. Z.P.R. , 351 N.J . Super. 427, 436 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting State v.
Swan , 790 P.2d 610, 615

- 16 (Wa sh . 1990).
Our review o f the trial judge's decision after a fact

- finding hearing , as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6

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. 44, is limited. " We ordinarily defer to the factual findings of the trial court because it has the opportunity to make first

- hand credibility judgments about the witnes ses who appear on the stand; it has a 'feel of the case' that can never be realized by a review of the cold record. " N

. J

. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P. , 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)

. We defer to Judge
DeCastro's e xpertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare , 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998), and we are bound by her factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M. , 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)

. After reviewing the record, we concl ude that the trial judge's factual findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those facts, her legal conclusions are unassailable.5 A

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Defendant's arguments regarding the admissibility of certain evidence and the judge's purported failure to consider inconsistencies in Mary's prior
statements and other gaps in the evidence are without sufficient merit to require discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11

- 3(e)(1)(E). "[R] ulings to admit or exclude evidence are generally subject to a wide degree of discretion. " Jacobs v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. , 452 N.J. Super. 494, 502 (App. Div. 2017)

. The judge's evidentiary " ruling is not disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion." Dinter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 252 N.J. Super. 84, 92 (App. Div. 1991). Sufficient credible evidence supported the finding of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Affirmed.