55512 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

FIGURE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL–APU ....... ALI 10 DAYS ............................ ALL .................................... APU Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication Operational Check. 

INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the 

airplane is not used in 

revenue service. 

Must be done before further flight with an operational APU if it has 

been 10 or more calendar days since last 

check. 

APPLICABILITY NOTE: 

Only applies to airplanes 

with an MA20A2027 

(S343T003–56) or 

MA30A1001 

(S343T003–66) actuator 

installed at the APU fuel 

shutoff valve position. 

Concern: The APU fuel shutoff valve actuator design 

can result in airplanes operating with a failed APU 

fuel shutoff valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator could 

prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to 

be uncontrollable. 

Perform the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff 

valve position indication (unless checked by the 

flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector). 

A. Do an operational check of the APU fuel shutoff 

valve position indication. 

1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the 

APU using standard practices. 

2. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices. 

3. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle 

Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position. 

4. Make sure there is at least 700 lbs (300 kgs) of fuel 

in the Left Main Tank. 

5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel 

to the ON position and wait approximately 10 seconds. 

6. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel 

to the OFF position. 

7. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel 

illuminates and then goes off. 

8. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as 

required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–11). 

NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25– 

2 if APU is not required for flight. 

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals 

After accomplishment of the maintenance 

or inspection program revision required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative 

actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be 

used unless the actions or intervals are 

approved as an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the 

procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of 

this AD. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; 

email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 7, 2015. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–23120 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0127; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–237–AD; Amendment 

39–18265; AD 2015–19–02] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 

Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. 

This AD was prompted by reports of 

latently failed fuel shutoff valves 

discovered during fuel filter 

replacement. This AD requires revising 

the maintenance or inspection program 

to include new airworthiness 

limitations. We are issuing this AD to 

detect and correct latent failures of the 

fuel shutoff valve to the engine and 

auxiliary power unit (APU), which 


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could result in the inability to shut off 

fuel to the engine and APU and, in case 

of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire 

that could lead to structural failure. 

DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 

2015. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 

0127; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Docket Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 

425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all The Boeing Company Model 

767 airplanes. The NPRM published in 

the Federal Register on March 5, 2014 

(79 FR 12420). The NPRM was 

prompted by reports of latently failed 

fuel shutoff valves discovered during 

fuel filter replacement. The NPRM 

proposed to require revising the 

maintenance or inspection program to 

include new airworthiness limitations. 

We are issuing this AD to detect and 

correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff 

valve to the engine and APU, which 

could result in the inability to shut off 

fuel to the engine and APU and, in case 

of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire 

that could lead to structural failure. 

Record of Ex Parte Communication 

In preparation of AD actions such as 

NPRMs and immediately adopted rules, 

it is the practice of the FAA to obtain 

technical information and information 

on operational and economic impacts 

from design approval holders and 

aircraft operators. We discussed certain 

comments addressed in this final rule in 

a teleconference with Airlines for 

America (A4A) and other members of 

the aviation industry. All of the 

comments discussed during this 

teleconference are addressed in this 

final rule in response to comments 

submitted by other commenters. A 

discussion of this contact can be found 

in the rulemaking docket at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 

0127. 

Clarification of Certain Terminology 

Throughout the preamble of this final 

rule, commenters may have used the 

terms ‘‘fuel shutoff valve’’ and ‘‘fuel 

spar valve’’ interchangeably. Both terms 

refer to the same part. In our responses 

to comments, we have used the term 

‘‘fuel shutoff valve.’’ The term ‘‘fuel spar 

valve’’ is more commonly used in 

airplane maintenance documentation 

and, therefore, we have used that term 

in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) 

of this AD. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the NPRM (79 FR 12420, 

March 5, 2014) and the FAA’s response 

to each comment. 

Requests To Withdraw the NPRM (79 

FR 12420, March 5, 2014) 

American Airlines (AA) stated that 

Boeing’s internal review found that the 

issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 

12420, March 5, 2014) is not a safety 

concern, and Boeing has not 

recommended any interim action on 

this issue. In addition, AA stated that 

Boeing is addressing the issue in the 

long term with a design change to the 

motor-operated valve (MOV) actuator of 

the fuel shutoff valve. 

All Nippon Airways (ANA) stated it 

agrees with a statement in ‘‘767–FTD– 

28–12003 issued by Boeing’’ indicating 

that the combination of the events 

(engine fire and spar valve failures) is 

extremely improbable. ANA requested 

clarification of the rationale for the 

proposed intervals. ANA stated that it 

has operated more than 100 Model 767 

airplanes for approximately 30 years 

and has never had such failure with the 

MOVs. 

We infer that AA and ANA requested 

that the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 

2014) be withdrawn. 

We disagree with the commenters’ 

request to withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 

12420, March 5, 2014). We have 

determined that an unsafe condition 

exists that warrants an interim action 

until the manufacturer finishes 

developing a modification that will 

address the identified unsafe condition. 

Boeing did not formally comment on 

whether it considers this issue to be an 

unsafe condition. We have determined 

that, without the required interim 

actions, a significant number of flights 

with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is 

failed latently in the open valve position 

will occur during the affected fleet life. 

With a failed fuel shutoff valve, if 

certain fire conditions were to occur, or 

if extreme engine or APU damage were 

to occur, or if an engine separation 

event were to occur during flight, the 

crew procedures for such an event 

would not stop the fuel flow to the 

engine strut and nacelle or APU. The 

continued flow of fuel could cause an 

uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel 

exhaustion event. 

The FAA regulations require all 

transport airplanes to be fail safe with 

respect to engine or APU fire events, 

and the risk due to severe engine or 

APU damage events to be minimized. 

Therefore, we require, for each flight, 

sufficiently operative fire safety systems 

so that fires can be detected and 

contained, and fuel to the engine strut 

and nacelle or APU can be shut off in 

the event of an engine or APU fire or 

severe damage. 

The FAA airworthiness standards 

require remotely controlled powerplant 

valves to provide indications that the 

valves are in the commanded position. 

These indications allow the prompt 

detection and correction of valve 

failures. We do not allow dispatch with 

a known inoperative fuel shutoff valve. 

Therefore, we are proceeding with the 

final rule—not because of the higherthan-typical failure rate of the particular 

valve actuator involved, but instead 

because the fuel shutoff valve actuator 

can fail in a manner that also defeats the 

required valve position indication 

feature. That failure can lead to a large 

number of flights occurring on an 

airplane with a fuel shutoff valve 

actuator failed in the open position 

without the operator being aware of the 

failure. Airworthiness limitations 

containing required inspections are 

intended to limit the number of flights 

following latent failure of the fuel 

shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the 

appropriate method to correct the 

unsafe condition. We have not changed 

this final rule in this regard. 

Request To Revise Applicability of 

Certain Requirements 

Delta Airlines (DAL) and United 

Airlines (UAL) requested that we revise 

the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 

5, 2014) to limit the applicability 

specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 

3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD 


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to airplanes with fuel shutoff valve 

actuators on which the identified unsafe 

condition exists. 

DAL stated that it would be feasible 

to implement configuration control to 

ensure that part number (P/N) 

MA30A1001 is removed, and does not 

get installed in the engine or APU fuel 

shutoff valve positions in the future. 

DAL stated it would replace any P/N 

MA30A1001 actuators that are currently 

in those locations with actuators of a 

different acceptable part number, which 

would, in turn, alleviate the unsafe 

condition given in the NPRM (79 FR 

12420, March 5, 2014). DAL stated that 

if an operator does not have P/N 

MA30A1001 installed on any engine or 

APU fuel shutoff valve positions, then 

that operator would not be required to 

adhere to airworthiness limitations 28– 

AWL–ENG, 28–AWL–MOV, or 28– 

AWL–APU. 

UAL stated that the proposed AD (79 

FR 12420, March 5, 2014) does not 

specify which part number of the MOV 

actuator is applicable to the proposed 

AD. UAL stated that proposed ADs were 

issued for Model 737NG, 757, 767, and 

777 airplanes to replace the MOV 

actuator with P/N MA30A1001. UAL 

also stated that there are issues with the 

MOV actuator part number, and 

presumes that the proposed AD is for 

MOV actuator P/N MA30A1001. 

We agree with the commenters’ 

request. Only two fuel shutoff valve 

actuator designs are susceptible to the 

unsafe condition specified in this final 

rule, and it would be unnecessarily 

burdensome to require the inspections 

on airplanes that do not have any of the 

susceptible valves installed. We have 

changed the Applicability column in 

figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify that 

the limitations apply to Model 767 

airplanes having fuel shutoff valve 

actuator P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003– 

56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003–66) 

installed at the engine or APU fuel 

shutoff valve position, as appropriate. 

Request To Change the Initial 

Compliance Time for the Operational 

Check 

AA requested that the compliance 

time for the initial accomplishment of 

the actions specified in figure 1, figure 

2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the 

proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 

2014) be extended from 7 days to 60 

days. AA stated that more time is 

needed for publishing the new criteria 

and for distribution of cards and 

manuals/checklists. AA stated that the 

7-day compliance time is not justified 

by the failure rates for this safety 

concern. 

We partially agree with the 

commenter’s request. We have changed 

the initial compliance time to 10 days 

for accomplishing the actions specified 

in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD. The 

compliance time of 10 days is consistent 

with regulatory actions for other 

affected models. We have determined 

that the initial compliance time for the 

inspection represents an appropriate 

time in which the required actions can 

be performed in a timely manner within 

the affected fleet, while still maintaining 

an adequate level of safety. 

In developing an appropriate 

compliance time, we considered the 

safety implications, parts availability, 

and normal maintenance schedules for 

timely accomplishment of the 

operational checks. The operational 

check procedures and the access 

procedures are simple and already 

established. The check itself involves a 

visual inspection of an existing 

prominent design feature that is 

intended to indicate the position of the 

fuel shutoff valve actuator and is 

described in existing maintenance 

documentation. The manufacturer does 

not expect a large number of latently 

failed valve actuators to be discovered. 

Existing parts stores are expected to be 

sufficient, and parts can be repositioned 

in time to support the initial 

inspections. However, under the 

provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, 

we might consider requests for 

adjustments to the compliance time if 

data are submitted to substantiate that 

such an adjustment would provide an 

acceptable level of safety. 

Request To Change the Proposed 

Requirement for the MOV Actuator 

Inspection 

Boeing requested that the proposed 

requirement to ‘‘incorporate the MOV 

actuator inspection into the 

Airworthiness Limitations (AWL) 

Section of the Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness of operator’s 

maintenance or inspection programs’’ be 

replaced with an AD requirement to 

perform the MOV inspection per the 

specific interval in paragraph (g) of the 

proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 

2014). Boeing stated that the MOV 

inspection in paragraph (g) of the 

proposed AD is an interim mitigation 

until a redesigned MOV can be installed 

in the spar valve locations. Boeing 

stated that including the interval 

requirement as the required AD action 

would allow installation of the 

redesigned MOV to be approved as an 

alternative method of compliance 

(AMOC) to the AD, and as a terminating 

action for the repetitive inspections, 

while avoiding the need for regulatory 

approval to remove the AWL from each 

operator’s maintenance or inspection 

program. In addition, Boeing stated the 

AWLs are permanent actions that affect 

operators’ planning and scheduling, and 

that incorporating a temporary AWL 

into the operators’ maintenance 

documents or a Boeing maintenance 

planning data (MPD) document will 

cause confusion among operators. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request. During the development of the 

NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), we 

discussed the impact of an AWL 

revision versus a repetitive inspection 

requirement with Boeing, who, in turn, 

discussed it with a sample of operators. 

At that time, both Boeing and the 

operators indicated that the addition of 

an AWL was the preferred solution 

because it would reduce the record 

keeping required to document AD 

compliance. Affected operators who 

wish to use a repetitive inspection 

requirement in place of an AWL 

revision may apply for approval of an 

AMOC in accordance with the 

provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1) 

of this AD by submitting data 

substantiating that the request would 

provide an acceptable level of safety. 

We have not changed this AD in this 

regard. 

Request To Extend the Daily Inspection 

Requirement 

UAL asked whether there are any 

provisions established by the FAA to 

extend the daily inspection requirement 

if the reliability data are captured. UAL 

stated that there is no valid justification 

for this short time limit that creates a 

burden on airline operations. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request. Our unsafe condition 

determination is primarily driven by the 

potential for a common-cause failure of 

the valve and its position indication— 

and not by a lack of reliability. We are 

aware that this failure has happened in 

service, and we expect that tens of 

thousands of flights will occur with this 

valve failed in the open position 

without indicating the failure unless 

frequent inspections are made. 

Fortunately, the effort required to check 

the valve operation is small for most 

airplanes. For Model 767–200 and –300 

series airplanes, we expect that most 

airlines will have the flightcrew monitor 

a light near the switch they are using to 

shut down the engine. The total time 

needed should be less than a few 

seconds. In addition, new fuel shutoff 

valve actuators are being developed that 

will allow removal of this requirement 

once they are installed. Therefore, we 

have no plans to extend the interval 


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based on updated reliability data. We 

have not changed this AD in this regard. 

Request for Inspection Relief 

UAL noted there is no provision in 

the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 

5, 2014) to allow a waiver of the daily 

inspection requirements if an airplane is 

out of service for any reason or in a 

remote station where the daily 

inspection cannot be accomplished. Air 

Do asked if the daily check must be 

done once a day even if the airplane 

does not have a flight plan. We infer the 

commenters are requesting that we 

revise the proposed AD to allow 

exceptions to the daily check specified 

in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the 

proposed AD. 

AA requested that the proposed AD 

(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) be 

clarified to specify that daily checks 

only apply when the airplane is in 

operational revenue service. AA also 

stated to restart the interval of 10 days 

or 100 flight hours/50 cycles, whichever 

occurs later, once an APU is returned to 

service from the minimum equipment 

list. 

We partially agree with the 

commenters’ requests. We agree to limit 

inspections to days when the airplane is 

in revenue service or when the APU is 

in operational status because it would 

be unnecessarily burdensome to require 

the inspections on airplanes that are not 

in operation. In figure 1, figure 2, and 

figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we 

have added a note in the Interval 

column to clarify that the operational 

check is not required on days when the 

airplane is not used in revenue service. 

For figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, 

we also specify that the check of the 

engine fuel shutoff valve must be done 

before further flight once the airplane is 

returned to revenue service. In figure 2 

and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, 

we have specified that the check or 

inspection must be done before further 

flight if it has been 10 or more calendar 

days since last check or inspection. 

We disagree with restarting the 10-day 

cycle once an APU is returned to service 

because the APU fuel shutoff valve 

check should not be extended because 

the APU was out of service for a time. 

For the APU, it is likely that this test 

will be done as a matter of course 

whenever it is returned to service. 

Request To Extend the Repetitive 

Interval 

AA, ANA, DAL, and Japan Airlines 

(JAL) requested that the repetitive 

interval be extended for the actions 

specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 

3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD 

(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). 

AA requested that the repetitive 

inspection interval be extended to ‘‘10 

days or 100 flight hours/50 flight cycles, 

whichever occurs later.’’ AA requested 

that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 

12420, March 5, 2014) to add the choice 

of monitoring the disagreement light to 

check the indication and physically 

check the closure of the valve at ‘‘100 

flight hours/50 cycles whichever occurs 

later’’ as an alternative maintenance 

task. AA stated that operators of Model 

767–400 series airplanes identified in 

the NPRM are allowed 10 days to 

inspect the spar valve actuator arm 

when it is fully closed and commanded 

closed. AA stated that the 10 days 

equates closely to ‘‘100 flight hours/50 

cycles.’’ AA also stated that Model 767– 

200, –300, and –400 series airplanes 

have the same actuator valve and 

indication, except that Model 767–400 

series airplanes do not have a 

disagreement light. 

ANA stated it has reviewed the NPRM 

(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), and is 

disappointed with the intervals of the 

operational checks because the intervals 

are daily for engine fuel spar valves on 

Boeing Model 767–200, –300, and 

–300F series airplanes, and 10 days for 

APU fuel valves; the proposed intervals 

will definitely affect its operations. 

ANA stated that it does not have Model 

767–400 airplanes, but that the 

operational effect is the same. ANA 

suggested a compliance time of ‘‘6,000 

flight hours or 22 months whichever 

comes first’’ for both engine spar valves 

and APU fuel valves. 

DAL stated that Model 767–300 and 

–400 series airplanes contain similar 

systems with respect to engine fuel 

shutoff. DAL stated that Model 767–300 

and –400 series airplanes are also 

equipped with the same part number for 

the MOV actuator. DAL stated that, 

therefore, the failure modes between the 

two airplane models should be 

identical. DAL stated that since the FAA 

considers a 10-day interval sufficient for 

Model 767–400 series airplanes, and 

also for the APU fuel shutoff actuator for 

all Model 767 airplanes, it proposes to 

change the interval in figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of this proposed AD to 10 

days. 

We disagree with the commenters’ 

requests. Increasing the check interval 

from daily to every 10 days for the AWL 

task specified in figure 1 to paragraph 

(g) of this AD would result in 10 times 

as many flights at risk of an 

uncontrollable engine fire; the daily 

check has been deemed practical 

because in practice it will mean the 

flightcrew will need to watch a light just 

above the FUEL CONTROL switch as 

they start or shut down the engine. As 

AA stated, Model 767–400ER series 

airplanes do not have the disagreement 

light, so the inspection is more complex. 

As a result, regardless of how desirable 

a daily inspection would be, we 

determined it is not practical to require 

that inspection on a daily basis on 

Model 767–400ER series airplanes. We 

have not changed this AD in this regard. 

As we discussed previously, the 

reason for this final rule is not simply 

a high valve failure rate in the open 

position, but rather a design error that 

allows a single failure within a fuel 

shutoff valve actuator to affect both the 

control of the valve and the indication 

of the valve’s position. Currently these 

failures are only discovered during fuel 

filter changes, which occur every 6,000 

flight hours. ANA’s proposal is to check 

the system every 6,000 flight hours. A 

dedicated inspection every 6,000 flight 

hours would have little impact on the 

number of flights at risk. Indication and 

control of the fuel shutoff valve are not 

independent because of the design error 

in the affected valve actuators. For a 

failed fuel shutoff valve, the valve 

indication system erroneously reports 

that the valve is opening and closing. If 

no action is taken, we anticipate a 

significant number of flights to occur 

with a failed open fuel shutoff valve. 

Without this AD, our risk assessment 

and the manufacturer’s risk assessment 

predict that tens of thousands of such 

flights would occur in the fleet of Model 

767 airplanes. 

In addition to this fuel shutoff valve 

design error, the affected valves have a 

higher-than-typical rate of failure in 

several failure modes. We have received 

several reports of valves failed open 

(discovered only when fuel filters were 

changed), valves failed closed 

(preventing engine start), and valves 

that spontaneously closed in flight 

(causing an engine shutdown). Boeing’s 

long-term solution, a fuel shutoff valve 

actuator design change, is intended to 

address these issues in addition to 

restoring the independence of the 

actuator control and indication features. 

The APU, on the other hand, presents a 

much lower risk and is needed in flight 

on a small number of flights. In 

addition, normal APU starting 

procedures include this check on every 

start, so it is likely that this check is 

already being done on a more frequent 

basis. We have not changed this AD in 

this regard. 

Request To Justify the Proposed 

Inspection Interval 

ANA requested that rationale be 

provided to justify the proposed 

inspection interval, including the 

interval differences between the engine 


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and the APU, and the interval between 

Model 767 and Model 777 airplanes. 

We agree to provide the requested 

rationale. While the potential for the 

problem is the same for Model 767 and 

Model 777 airplanes, the ability to 

check the system functionality is 

different. Both types of airplanes 

warrant a daily check, but we also 

consider the practicality of an 

inspection. On Model 767–200, –300, 

and –300F series airplanes, the 

flightcrew will need to watch the 

disagreement light located just above 

the FUEL CONTROL switch as they start 

or shut down the engine. Model 777 

airplanes, like Model 767–400ER series 

airplanes, do not have a disagreement 

light so the inspection is more time 

consuming. As a result, regardless of 

how desirable a daily inspection would 

be for Model 777 airplanes, we 

determined it is not practical to require 

that inspection on a daily basis. 

In regard to the APU, it is not run on 

every flight, so a properly functioning 

fuel shutoff valve is not needed for 

every flight. We decided to require the 

check every 10 days rather than try to 

monitor APU usage. Also, it should be 

noted that this check is part of a normal 

APU start, so it will likely be done on 

every start; this AD requires that it be 

done at least every 10 days. We have not 

changed this AD in this regard. 

Request To Provide Instructions for 

Compliance With the Extended 

Operations (ETOPS) Requirement 

UAL requested instructions for 

compliance with the ETOPS 

requirement that would meet the 

operational check requirements. UAL 

requested that we revise the NPRM (79 

FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to clarify 

whether standardized procedures will 

be established for inspectors to make 

approvals for all affected operators. UAL 

stated that since the affected airplanes 

have ETOPS approval, the NPRM 

should provide instructions for 

compliance with the ETOPS 

requirements. UAL asked that the FAA 

provide guidance to the principal 

operations inspector (POI) on required 

procedures that would meet the 

operational check requirements. 

We agree that clarification is needed. 

We infer the commenter means that 

checks of the left and right engine fuel 

shutoff valves are done by different 

individuals due to ETOPS maintenance 

requirements. Since none of the 

required inspections include actions 

that could contribute to an engine 

shutdown, there is no common-cause 

engine shutdown potential and, 

therefore, no need for different 

individuals to perform the inspections 

on the left and right fuel shutoff valve 

actuators to meet ETOPS maintenance 

requirements. No additional guidance to 

the POIs is necessary. 

Request To Expand Inspection To 

Confirm Functionality 

DAL requested we expand the 

inspection at the spar for confirmation 

of functionality on Model 767–300 

series airplanes using the same method 

of inspection and the same auxiliary 

power unit position as those for the 

Boeing Model 767–400 series airplanes. 

DAL stated that a check of the actual 

valve position every 10 days would be 

a more effective inspection. DAL stated 

that ‘‘FTD Article 767–FTD–28–12003’’ 

(Boeing Fleet Team Digest) states that, 

‘‘The indication showed the valve had 

closed when it had failed in the open 

position.’’ DAL stated that the flight 

deck indication may not accurately 

reflect functionality. 

We partially agree with the 

commenter’s request. We agree to add 

an inspection option for Model 767–300 

airplanes that is similar to the 

inspection for Model 767–400ER series 

airplanes. Therefore, for Model 767– 

200, –300, and –300F series airplanes, 

we have added item D. to figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a 

fourth option to perform a daily 

inspection to verify the fuel shutoff 

valve is closing. However, we disagree 

with extending the inspection interval 

to 10 days. As stated previously, 

increasing the inspection interval from 

every day to every 10 days for the AWL 

task specified in figure 1 to paragraph 

(g) of this AD would result in 10 times 

as many flights at risk of an 

uncontrollable engine fire. 

Request To Add a Requirement To 

Provide Electrical Power Before the 

Operational Check 

UAL requested that we revise the 

proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 

2014) to add a requirement to provide 

electrical power before performing the 

operational check required by figure 3 to 

paragraph (g) of the proposed AD. UAL 

stated that electrical power is required 

to perform the check, and other 

maintenance may be done that could 

deactivate required circuits. 

We agree with the commenter’s 

request because electrical power is 

required. In figure 1 and figure 3 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added 

a requirement to supply electrical power 

to the airplane using standard practices 

when performing the operational check. 

Request To Clarify the Operational 

Check Requirements 

Air Do stated that, if the flightcrew 

performed the operational check, the 

maintenance record is usually not 

created. The commenter questioned 

whether this is acceptable, or whether 

the flightcrew should record it in the 

flight log. 

UAL requested clarification on 

whether the flightcrew will not have to 

record compliance for one of the checks 

and that documentation for each 

inspection on every airplane need not 

be made if relying on flightcrew 

compliance with the proposed AD. 

JAL requested that the FAA 

coordinate with Boeing to include an 

appropriate check procedure in the 

Normal Procedure (NP) section of the 

flightcrew operating manual (FCOM). 

We find that clarification is necessary. 

This AD requires including the 

information specified in figure 1, figure 

2, and figure 3 of paragraph (g) of the 

AD in the maintenance or inspection 

program; however, the actions specified 

in the figures in this AD are 

accomplished, and remain enforceable, 

as part of the Airworthiness Limitations 

of the Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness. Section 43.11(a) of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

43.11(a)) requires maintenance record 

entries for maintenance actions such as 

this inspection. If an operator elects to 

have a flightcrew member do an 

inspection in accordance with the 

applicable airworthiness limitation, that 

same action would be considered an 

operational task—not maintenance— 

and therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not 

apply. Regarding JAL’s comment, an 

FCOM is a Boeing document that we 

neither approve nor control. We have 

not changed this AD with regard to 

these issues. 

Request To Clarify the Requirements 

for Certain Disagreement Lights 

UAL requested that we clarify the 

requirements in figure 1 to paragraph (g) 

of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, 

March 5, 2014). UAL stated that items 

C.6.a. and C.7.a. of figure 1 to paragraph 

(g) of the proposed AD instruct to move 

the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches, 

respectively, to the RUN position, but 

do not instruct to monitor the left and 

right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights, 

unlike item C.6.c. and item C.7.c. UAL 

stated that it presumes it is not required 

to verify the left and right SPAR VALVE 

disagreement lights when the L and R 

FUEL CONTROL switches are moved to 

the RUN position. 

We agree to provide clarification. It is 

not required to verify the left and right 


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SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when 

the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches 

are moved to the RUN position during 

that portion of the operational check. 

We have not changed this AD in this 

regard. 

Request for Clarification on Applying a 

Minimum Equipment List (MEL) 

Maintenance Action 

First Air requested clarification of the 

proposed corrective action for an 

inoperative indication—specifically, 

whether operators could still apply an 

MEL maintenance action and meet the 

intent of the NPRM (79 FR 12420, 

March 5, 2014). First Air stated that the 

operational checks in figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of the proposed AD for 

engine spar valves are predicated on the 

SPAR VALVE light being operative. 

First Air stated that MEL 28–40–02 

provides relief should the indication be 

inoperative. 

We agree that clarification is needed. 

We disagree with providing MEL relief 

for an inoperative fuel shutoff valve 

indication because MEL relief could 

potentially allow the valve to be 

inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue 

operation. However, we do agree to 

provide flexibility regarding verification 

that the fuel shutoff valve actuator is 

operational. We have added item D. to 

figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to 

specify a fourth option to perform a 

daily inspection to verify the fuel 

shutoff valve is closing, which can be 

used when the fuel shutoff valve 

indication does not function properly. 

Request for Clarification Regarding the 

FUEL CONTROL Switch 

UAL requested that a statement be 

included in the proposed AD (79 FR 

12420, March 5, 2014) to clarify that it 

is not required to cycle the L and R 

FUEL CONTROL switches, as specified 

in Boeing Airplane Maintenance 

Manual (AMM) 28–22–00, for the ALI 

task specified in figure 2 to paragraph 

(g) of the proposed AD. 

We agree with the commenter’s 

request. We have added a note in figure 

2 to paragraph (g) of this AD stating that 

it is not necessary to cycle the FUEL 

CONTROL switch to do the inspection. 

Request To Correct a Typographical 

Error 

UAL requested that a typographical 

error be corrected in the NPRM (79 FR 

12420, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that 

figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the NPRM 

states, ‘‘Item C.4 instructs to make sure 

Land R ENG START selector switches 

on the overhead panel are in the OFF 

position.’’ UAL stated that this is a 

typographical error and the selector 

switches should be L and R ENG START 

selector switches. 

We agree and have corrected the 

typographical error in figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD accordingly. 

Paragraph C.4. of figure 1 to paragraph 

(g) of this AD, as it appeared in the 

NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), 

has been re-designated as paragraph C.5. 

of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD. 

Additional Changes Made to This AD 

In the Description column of figure 2 

to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have 

removed the phrase ‘‘refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–00’’ with regard to 

performing an inspection of the fuel 

spar valve MOV actuator position. 

In paragraph C.7.a. in the Description 

column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD, and in paragraph A.5. in the 

Description column of figure 3 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added 

wording specifying to wait 

‘‘approximately’’ 10 seconds once the 

FUEL CONTROL switch is in the RUN 

position or the APU selector switch on 

the overhead panel is in the ON 

position. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting this AD 

with the changes described previously 

and minor editorial changes. We have 

determined that these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 

12420, March 5, 2014) for correcting the 

unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, 

March 5, 2014). 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of this AD. 

Interim Action 

We consider this AD interim action. 

The manufacturer is currently 

developing a modification that will 

address the unsafe condition identified 

in this AD. Once this modification is 

developed, approved, and available, we 

may consider additional rulemaking. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 450 

airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............ 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. $0 $85 $38,250 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 


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(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2015–19–02 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–18265; Docket No. 

FAA–2014–0127; Directorate Identifier 

2013–NM–237–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective October 21, 2015. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all The Boeing 

Company Model 767–200, –300, –300F, and 

–400ER series airplanes, certificated in any 

category. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 28, Fuel. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports of 

latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered 

during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing 

this AD to detect and correct latent failures 

of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and 

auxiliary power unit (APU), which could 

result in the inability to shut off fuel to the 

engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, 

an uncontrollable fire that could lead to 

structural failure. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection 

Program 

Within 30 days after the effective date of 

this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection 

program, as applicable, to add airworthiness 

limitation numbers 28–AWL–ENG, 28–AWL– 

MOV, and 28–AWL–APU, by incorporating 

the information specified in Figure 1, Figure 

2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD 

into the Airworthiness Limitations Section of 

the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. 

The initial compliance time for 

accomplishing the actions specified in Figure 

1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD is within 10 days after accomplishing 

the maintenance or inspection program 

revision required by this paragraph. 

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL–ENG ...... ALI DAILY ................................

INTERVAL NOTE: The 

operational check is not 

required on days when 

the airplane is not used 

in revenue service. 

The check must be done 

before further flight once 

the airplane is returned 

to revenue service.

767–200, –300, and –300F 

airplanes.

APPLICABILITY NOTE: 

Applies to airplanes with 

an actuator installed at 

the engine fuel spar 

valve position having 

part number (P/N) 

MA20A2027 

(S343T003–56) or P/N 

MA30A1001 

(S343T003–66). 

Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position 

Indication Operational Check. 

Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar 

valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed 

fuel spar valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to 

an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the 

potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. 

Perform one of the following checks/inspection of the 

fuel spar valve position (unless checked by the 

flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector): 

A. Operational Check during engine shutdown. 

1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar 

valve actuator. 

a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, 

verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on 

the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

airplane maintenance manual (AMM) 28–22–11). 

2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel 

spar valve actuator. 

a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, 

verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on 

the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–11). 

B. Operational check during engine start. 

1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar 

valve actuator. 


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FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued 

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand is moved to the RUN (or RICH) position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light 

on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–11). 

2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel 

spar valve actuator. 

a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand is moved to the RUN (or RICH) position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement 

light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and 

then goes off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–11). 

C. Operational check without engine operation. 

1. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices. 

2. Make sure all fuel pump switches on the Overhead 

Panel are in the OFF position. 

3. If the auxiliary power unit (APU) is running, open 

and collar the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP 

(C00372) circuit breaker on the Main Power Distribution Panel. 

4. Make sure LEFT and RIGHT ENG FIRE switches 

on the Aft Aisle Stand are in the NORMAL (IN) position. 

5. Make sure L and R ENG START Selector Switches 

on the Overhead Panel, are in the OFF position. 

6. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar 

valve actuator. 

a. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds. 

NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the 

ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant 

control stand to stay illuminated. 

b. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand to the CUTOFF position. 

c. Verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on 

the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–11). 

7. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel 

spar valve actuator. 

a. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL 

switch is in the RUN position or the APU selector 

switch on the overhead panel is in the ON position. 

NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the 

ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant 

control stand to stay illuminated. 

b. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand to the CUTOFF position. 

c. Verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on 

the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–11). 

8. If the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP circuit breaker 

was collared in step 3, remove collar and close. 

D. Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator position. 


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55520 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued 

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

NOTE: This inspection may be most useful whenever 

the SPAR VALVE light does not function properly. 

1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the 

quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. 

NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 

2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar. 

NOTE: The Fuel Spar Valve actuators are located behind main gear doors on the rear spar. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine 

fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that 

is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 

28–22–11). 

3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the 

quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. 

NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 

4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar. 

NOTE: The Fuel Spar Valve actuators are located behind main gear doors on the rear spar. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine 

fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that 

is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 

28–22–11). 

FIGURE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) ACTUATOR INSPECTION

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL–MOV ...... ALI 10 DAYS ............................

INTERVAL NOTE: The inspection is not required 

on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service. The inspection must be done 

before further flight if it 

has been 10 or more 

calendar days since last 

inspection. 

767–400ER series airplanes.

APPLICABILITY NOTE: 

Applies to airplanes with 

an actuator installed at 

the engine fuel spar 

valve position having 

part number (P/N) 

MA20A2027 

(S343T003–56) or P/N 

MA30A1001 

(S343T003–66). 

Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator 

Inspection 

Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar 

valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed 

fuel spar valve actuator would prevent fuel shutoff to 

an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the 

potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. 

Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator 

position. 

NOTE: The fuel spar valve actuators are located behind main gear doors on the rear spar. 

1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the 

quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. 

NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 

2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine 

fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that 

is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 

28–22–11). 

3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the 

quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. 

NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 

4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine 

fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that 

is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 

28–22–11). 


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FIGURE 3 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL–APU ....... ALI 10 DAYS ............................

INTERVAL NOTE: The 

operational check is not 

required on days when 

the airplane is not used 

in revenue service. The 

operational check must 

be done before further 

flight with an operational 

APU if it has been 10 or 

more calendar days 

since last check. 

ALL ....................................

APPLICABILITY NOTE: 

Applies to airplanes with 

an actuator installed at 

the APU fuel shutoff 

valve position having 

part number (P/N) 

MA20A2027 

(S343T003–56) or 

MA30A1001 

(S343T003–66). 

APU Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication Operational Check 

Concern: The APU fuel shutoff valve actuator design 

can result in airplanes operating with a failed APU 

fuel shutoff valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator could 

prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to 

be uncontrollable. 

Perform the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff 

valve position indication (unless checked by the 

flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector). 

A. Do an operational check of the APU fuel shutoff 

valve position indication. 

1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the 

APU using standard practices. 

2. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices. 

3. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle 

Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position. 

4. Make sure there is at least 1,000 lbs (500 kgs) of 

fuel in the Left Main Tank. 

5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel 

to the ON position and wait approximately 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL switch is in the 

RUN position or the APU selector switch on the 

overhead panel is in the ON position. 

6. Move the APU Selector switch on the Overhead 

Panel to the OFF position. 

7. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel 

illuminates and then goes off. 

8. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as 

required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–02). 

NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25– 

02 if APU is not required for flight. 

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals 

After accomplishment of the maintenance 

or inspection program revision required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative 

actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be 

used unless the actions or intervals are 

approved as an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the 

procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of 

this AD. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; 

email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 7, 2015. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–23119 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2013–1071; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–204–AD; Amendment 

39–18264; AD 2015–19–01] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model 777 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by 

reports of latently failed fuel shutoff 

valves discovered during fuel filter 

replacement. This AD requires revising 

the maintenance or inspection program 

to include a new airworthiness 

limitation. We are issuing this AD to 

detect and correct latent failures of the 


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