COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

KATHLEEN PADILLA 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1388-98-1 PER CURIAM 

 JANUARY 26, 1999 

NORFOLK DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge 

 (Allan D. Zaleski; Weisberg & Zaleski, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 (Bernard A. Pishko, City Attorney; Martha G. 

Rollins, Deputy City Attorney, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Kathleen Padilla appeals the decision of the circuit court 

terminating her parental rights to her son. Padilla contends 

that the trial court erred by (1) finding that the Norfolk 

Division of Social Services (DSS) presented sufficient evidence 

to support the termination of her parental rights; (2) admitting 

into evidence a psychological evaluation report of Padilla; and 

(3) allowing the court appointed special advocate (CASA) to 

testify as to her recommendation. Upon reviewing the record and 

briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without 

merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the 

trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 "When addressing matters concerning a child, including the 

termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests." 

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development, 13 Va. App. 

123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). 

 "In matters of a child's welfare, trial 

courts are vested with broad discretion in 

making the decisions necessary to guard and 

to foster a child's best interests." The 

trial court's judgment, "when based on 

evidence heard ore tenus, will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it." 

Id. (citations omitted). "Code § 16.1-283 embodies 'the 

statutory scheme for the . . . termination of residual parental 

rights in this Commonwealth' [which] . . . 'provides detailed 

procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents and 

their child,' balancing their interests while seeking to preserve 

the family." Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 

538, 540 (1995) (citations omitted). 

 The trial court terminated Padilla's parental rights under 

the provisions of Code § 16.1-283(C)(1). That provision states, 

in pertinent part: 

 The residual parental rights of a parent 

 . . . of a child placed in foster care as a 

result of court commitment . . . may be 

terminated if the court finds, based upon 

clear and convincing evidence, that it is in 

the best interests of the child and that: 

 (1) The parent . . . [has], without 

good cause, failed to maintain contact with 

and to provide or substantially plan for the 

future of the child for a period of twelve 

months after the child's placement in foster 

care notwithstanding the reasonable and 

appropriate efforts of social, medical, 

mental health or other rehabilitative 

agencies to communicate with the parent . . . 

and to strengthen the parent-child 
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relationship . . . . 

Code § 16.1-283(C)(1). Proof that a parent "failed, without good 

cause, to communicate on a continuing or planned basis with the 

child for a period of twelve months" is prima facie evidence of 

the conditions set out in subdivision (C)(1). Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(3)(a). 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

 Padilla contends that DSS failed to present evidence 

sufficient under Code § 16.1-283 to support its motion to 

terminate her parental rights to her son, Paul. We disagree. In 

February 1993, Padilla's youngest child died as a result of 

septic shock caused by severe neglect. DSS obtained an order 

removing Padilla's six children from her custody. The children 

were placed in foster care because the home was unsafe and 

unclean. At the time he was placed in foster care, Paul was 

seven months old and was severely developmentally delayed. 

 DSS provided numerous services to Padilla with the goal of 

returning Paul to her custody. DSS provided home-based services, 

which included twenty-four-hour crisis support, transportation 

assistance, therapy, financial assistance, and parenting classes. 

 Padilla improved her situation, and two of her six children were 

returned to her custody in 1994. 

 Despite the efforts of DSS to promote the parent-child 

relationship, Padilla failed to maintain contact with Paul. 

Helen Johnson, a DSS social worker, testified that she attempted 
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to set up meetings between Padilla and Paul throughout 1995 and 

1996, but Padilla did not respond. In July 1996, Padilla 

indicated she was unavailable to visit Paul because she was 

looking for a job. Padilla did not inquire concerning Paul and 

sent no cards, letters, or gifts to him. In her testimony at 

trial, Padilla indicated that she thought she saw Paul two times 

in 1994, two or three times in 1995, and might have visited with 

him once in 1996. 

 In 1995, DSS changed the goal of Paul's foster care plan to 

adoption. This Court affirmed the changed goal in a previous 

appeal. See Padilla v. Norfolk Div. of Soc. Servs., 22 Va. App. 

643, 472 S.E.2d 648 (1996). 

 Paul has been in the same foster home over six years. He 

has recovered from his early delays and is now on an appropriate 

grade level in school. Paul suffers from attention deficit 

disorder and displays characteristics indicative of 

obsessive-compulsive disorder. Paul's foster mother testified 

that she is in contact daily with Paul's school because he needs 

consistent and constant supervision of his behavior. Paul has 

bonded with his foster family. Paul's therapist opined that 

removing Paul from his foster family would be detrimental to 

Paul. 

 The trial court found that DSS proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that Padilla failed, without good cause, to 

maintain contact with Paul while he was in foster care and that 
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it was in Paul's best interests to terminate Padilla's parental 

rights under the provisions of Code § 16.1-283(C)(1). The trial 

court's decision is fully supported by the evidence. 
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Admission of Evidence

 Padilla contends that the trial court erred by admitting 

into evidence the report of her psychological evaluation 

conducted by Dr. Raleigh Phillips. We disagree. 

 The juvenile and domestic relations district court required 

mother's evaluation by order entered August 16, 1994. In January 

1995, when Padilla appealed the juvenile court decision to the 

circuit court, a copy of the psychological evaluation was 

included in the transmitted records as a file exhibit. Padilla 

objected to the report as inadmissible hearsay. 

 Code § 16.1-245.1 allowed the introduction of the report in 

the juvenile court proceeding. Because the report was previously 

made a part of the file in the juvenile court and the juvenile 

court documents were admitted in evidence, we find no error in 

the trial court admitting the report of the psychological 

evaluation into evidence. 

 Padilla further contends that the trial court erred when it 

allowed the former CASA worker to testify whether she believed 

Paul should be returned to Padilla. Code § 9-173.8(2) 

specifically authorizes a CASA worker to make recommendations 

concerning a child's welfare in reports to the court. While 

Paul's placement was intertwined with the inquiry before the 

court, the ultimate issue to be decided was the separate question 

whether to terminate Padilla's parental rights. The CASA 

worker's opinion regarding Paul's placement did not intrude on 
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the trial court's obligation to decide whether to terminate 

Padilla's parental rights. Therefore, we find no error in the 

trial court's admission of the CASA worker's recommendation. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.