Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Wrencher, 2015 IL App (4th) 130522

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

RAYMOND WRENCHER, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-13-0522

Filed

Rehearing denied

April 30, 2015

May 28, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County, No. 07-CF-954; 

the Hon. Heidi N. Ladd, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of 

Springfield, and Thomas A. Lilien and Rikin Shah, both of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Julia Rietz, State’s Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino, David J. 

Robinson, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
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Panel JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 A jury found defendant, Raymond Wrencher, guilty of two counts of aggravated battery 

(720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(18) (West 2006)), for which the trial court sentenced him to a total of 14 

years’ imprisonment (7 years for each count). On direct appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s 

judgment. People v. Wrencher, 2011 IL App (4th) 080619. 

¶ 2 Later, in October 2011, defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, and in April 

2012, appointed counsel filed an amended petition. The amended petition claimed that trial 

counsel, Anthony Ortega, had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise defendant he 

had the option of tendering a jury instruction on a lesser included offense, resisting a peace 

officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a), (a-7) (West 2006)). The postconviction proceeding advanced to 

the third stage, in which, after hearing evidence, the trial court denied the amended petition. 

Defendant appeals. 

¶ 3 We affirm the trial court’s judgment because, in our de novo review, we find the trial 

record devoid of any evidence that could have justified a conviction of resisting a peace officer 

and a simultaneous acquittal of aggravated battery. 

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 5 A. The Information 

¶ 6 The information, filed on June 5, 2007, had two counts, both charging defendant with 

aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(18) (West 2006)). Count I alleged: 

“[O]n June 5, 2007, *** [defendant] committed the offense of aggravated 

battery–Class 2 felony, in that the said defendant, in committing a battery, in violation 

of [section 12-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-3 (West 2006))], 

knowingly caused bodily harm to Officer Gregory Manzana, Champaign Police 

Department, in that the defendant dug his fingernails into Officer Gregory Manzana’s 

hand, knowing Officer Gregory Manzana to be a peace officer, engaged in the 

execution of his official duties ***.” 

¶ 7 Count II alleged: 

“[O]n June 5, 2007, *** [defendant] committed the offense of aggravated 

battery–Class 2 felony, in that the said defendant, in committing a battery, in violation 

of [section 12-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-3 (West 2006))], 

knowingly made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Officer 

Mark Briggs, Champaign Police Department, in that the defendant sp[a]t blood on 

Officer Mark Briggs[’s] hand, knowing Officer Mark Briggs to be a peace officer, 

engaged in the execution of his official duties ***.”
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¶ 8 B. The Evidence in the Jury Trial (June 2008) 

¶ 9 A Champaign police officer, Gregory Manzana, testified that on June 5, 2007, he went to 

408 West Maple Street in response to a report of a domestic dispute. He arrived in a marked 

squad car and in full uniform. He saw a car, in the driveway, with its engine running, and he 

pulled in behind the car so it could not back out. He shone his spotlight on the car, and the car 

appeared to be occupied by four to six individuals. These individuals began exiting the car, and 

Manzana ordered everyone to get back in. 

¶ 10 Defendant ignored the order and continued to walk away. Manzana approached him and 

ordered him to put his hands behind his back. Defendant kept walking, showing no inclination 

to comply. Manzana grabbed him by the arm, and defendant tried to pull away. Another 

officer, Ferguson, grabbed defendant’s other arm. Defendant struggled with them. Over and 

over again, Manzana yelled at defendant to get down onto the ground, but defendant spread his 

legs and braced himself, resisting their efforts to take him down. Finally, Manzana brought 

defendant to the ground by tripping him. The officers then succeeded in forcing defendant’s 

arms behind his back and putting handcuffs on him. 

¶ 11 Several other police officers arrived and kept defendant pinned to the ground while 

Manzana went to check on the woman who had called in. After speaking with her, Manzana 

returned to defendant. 

¶ 12 Manzana testified: 

“A. He was yelling[,] and he was still on the ground[,] there in the street. At that 

point[,] *** we decided to go ahead and move him to the squad car. I took his right 

hand with my left hand and grabbed his right arm with my right hand, like around the 

bicep, and we picked him up, brought him up to his feet. 

 Q. What happened next? 

 A. At that point[,] he looked me directly in the eye, kind of–he tensed up, I could 

see his jaw clench, his shoulders kind of tensed up, next thing I know [,] he started 

squeezing my hand and gripping into it and digging his nails into my fingers. 

 Q. What happened next? 

 A. *** I tried to pull my hand away[,] and his grip was too strong. I couldn’t pull it 

away, so I gave him a couple of diversionary strikes to the stomach[,] and he 

immediately let go, and I was able to pull my hand off. 

 Q. Now[,] when the defendant *** had a hold of your hand, did that cause you any 

pain? 

 A. Yes. 

 Q. Could you explain? 

 A. *** [H]e was squeezing the heck out of my hand there, and it felt *** like his 

nails were cutting into my skin there, and it just [was] like *** somebody is just trying 

to crunch your hand there ***.”

¶ 13 Manzana testified that after defendant let go of his hand, the tips of his middle ring finger 

and little finger of his left hand were red and throbbing and he had a cut on the inside of his 

little finger. People’s exhibit No. 4 was a photograph of a small laceration on the tip of 

Manzana’s little finger. He testified that defendant had inflicted this injury. 
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¶ 14 After Manzana freed himself from defendant’s grasp, other police officers escorted 

defendant to the squad car. Defendant sat down in the squad car but refused to put his legs in. 

He kicked at officers. Manzana warned him to stop resisting or he would use pepper spray. 

Defendant replied to go ahead, and he resumed kicking at the officers. Manzana gave him a 

one-second burst of pepper spray. 

¶ 15 Mark Briggs testified that after Manzana applied the pepper spray, defendant stopped 

kicking at the officers but still refused to put his legs inside the squad car. An officer went 

around to the driver’s side, grabbed defendant by the arms, and pulled him the rest of the way 

into the squad car so that they could shut the rear passenger door. Defendant immediately 

started thrashing around and kicking. Concerned that defendant might kick out the windows, 

Briggs asked the other officers if they had leg restraints. They had none with them. Leg 

restraints had to be brought to the scene. In the meantime, Briggs talked to defendant and tried 

to calm him down. 

¶ 16 When the leg restraints arrived, defendant stepped out of the squad car as directed. Briggs 

testified: 

“I turned him around, had him face the trunk. He is standing on the driver’s side of the 

car at this point. Officer Shipley stepped up, applied the leg restraints, double[-]locked 

them so they wouldn’t tighten down on his ankles, and then[,] all of a sudden[,] 

[defendant] turned and spit a mouth full of blood and pepper spray across the front of 

my shirt.”

¶ 17 Briggs identified People’s exhibit No. 1 as a photograph of his uniform shirt. He testified 

the photograph was taken immediately after defendant spat on him and that it showed blood on 

the front of the shirt and down the left sleeve. 

¶ 18 Defendant took the stand and denied digging his fingernails into Manzana’s hand and 

denied spitting on Briggs. He insisted he had no knowledge of how blood had got on Briggs’s 

shirt.

¶ 19 The jury found defendant guilty of both counts of aggravated battery. 

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 21 A. Is the Claim Forfeited? 

¶ 22 In his amended petition for postconviction relief, defendant claimed that his trial counsel, 

Anthony Ortega, rendered ineffective assistance by neglecting to give him some important 

advice. The omitted advice was that, in the jury instruction conference, defendant could tender 

an instruction on a lesser included offense, resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a), (a-7) 

(West 2006)). The supreme court has held it should be the defendant’s personal decision 

whether to tender a jury instruction on a lesser included offense. People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 

2d 224, 229-30 (1994). Obviously, defendant could not have made that personal decision 

unless he was aware of the option of tendering such an instruction. He accuses Ortega of being 

ineffective by failing to advise him of that option. 

¶ 23 The State’s initial response is that because defendant failed to raise this claim on direct 

appeal, we should regard this claim as forfeited. See People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22. 

On direct appeal, however, the record had nothing to say, one way or the other, as to whether 

Ortega had explained to defendant his right to tender a jury instruction on the lesser included 

offense of resisting a peace officer. Unless defendant could have pointed to some evidence in 
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the record that Ortega had indeed omitted this advice and that defendant consequently was 

ignorant of his right, it would have been impossible for him to raise the claim on direct appeal. 

In an appellate brief, when making representations and arguments, a party must cite the 

pertinent pages of the record. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6), (h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). “[G]enerally, a 

party may not rely on matters outside the appellate record to support his or her position on 

appeal.” Kildeer-Countryside School District No. 96 v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers’

Retirement System, 2012 IL App (4th) 110843, ¶ 21. (Matters of which a court may take 

judicial notice are an exception. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. New 

York Central R.R. Co., 339 Ill. 201, 206 (1930).) Because an appellant generally is limited to 

the record, omitting a claim in the direct appeal will not result in a forfeiture of the claim in a 

subsequent postconviction proceeding if the record on direct appeal did not provide the means 

of raising the claim. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22. Thus, we disagree with the State’s 

contention of forfeiture. 

¶ 24 B. Is Resisting a Peace Officer a Lesser Included Offense? 

¶ 25 Omitting to tell defendant about the option of tendering a jury instruction on resisting a 

peace officer was ineffective assistance only if tendering such an instruction would have been 

legally meritorious. In other words, Ortega can be faulted for omitting such advice only if he 

could have argued to the trial court, correctly, that resisting a peace officer was included in 

aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(18) (West 2006)). See People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 

228, 246-47 (2000). 

¶ 26 As we will discuss more fully in a moment, that is not the only proposition Ortega would 

have had to argue to the trial court. He also would have had to argue, correctly, that at least 

some slight evidence had been adduced to support a jury instruction on resisting a peace officer 

as an alternative to aggravated battery. See People v. Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (2002); People 

v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 132 (1997). But let us first consider the question of whether resisting 

a peace officer is included in aggravated battery. 

¶ 27 Section 31-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 defines the offense of resisting a peace 

officer as follows: “A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one 

known to the person to be a peace officer or correctional institution employee of any 

authorized act within his official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.” 720 ILCS 

5/31-1(a) (West 2006). Thus, the Class A misdemeanor of resisting a peace officer has two 

elements. First, the defendant knowingly resisted or obstructed the peace officer’s 

performance of any authorized act within his or her official capacity. Second, the defendant 

knew the peace officer was a peace officer. 

¶ 28 Now we will compare those statutory elements to the greater offense, aggravated battery 

(720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(18) (West 2006)), as it is described in the charging instrument. See 

Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d at 8. That is, we will use “the charging instrument approach.” People v. 

Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 112 (1994). (By contrast, if the question were whether the one-act, 

one-crime rule allowed convictions of multiple offenses, all of them charged, we would use the 

“abstract-elements approach,” which would be strictly a comparison of statutory elements. 

People v. Stull, 2014 IL App (4th) 120704, ¶ 63.) Under the charging instrument approach, the 

charging instrument need not expressly allege all the elements of the lesser offense; it is 

enough if the elements could be reasonably inferred from the language of the charging 

instrument. Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d at 8. 
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¶ 29 Again, count I of the information reads as follows: 

“[O]n June 5, 2007, *** [defendant] committed the offense of aggravated 

battery–Class 2 felony, in that the said defendant, in committing a battery, in violation 

of [section 12-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-3 (West 2006))], 

knowingly caused bodily harm to Officer Gregory Manzana, Champaign Police 

Department, in that the defendant dug his fingernails into Officer Gregory Manzana’s 

hand, knowing Officer Gregory Manzana to be a peace officer, engaged in the 

execution of his official duties ***.”

¶ 30 Count I expressly alleges that defendant knew Manzana to be a peace officer. See 720 

ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2006). Count I does not expressly allege, however, that defendant 

knowingly resisted or obstructed Manzana in his performance of an authorized act in his 

official capacity. See id. Nevertheless, count I alleges that defendant committed a battery, 

defined as knowingly causing bodily harm or knowingly making physical contact of an 

insulting or provoking nature (720 ILCS 5/12-3 (West 2006)). In context, the knowing 

causation of bodily harm could be only the gouging with fingernails. Count I alleges that when 

defendant gouged Manzana with his fingernails, defendant knew Manzana was engaged in the 

execution of his official duties. When executing his official duties, Manzana necessarily was 

performing an authorized act in his official capacity. See 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2006). 

Executing a duty entails doing some kind of act. Being gouged by fingernails increases the 

difficulty of whatever act one happens to be doing at the time. Therefore, a reasonable 

inference, from count I, is that defendant knowingly resisted or obstructed Manzana in his 

performance of an authorized act in his official capacity by digging his fingernails into 

Manzana’s hand, knowing him to be a peace officer engaged in the execution of his official 

duties. See Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d at 8. We conclude, then, in our de novo review of this issue (see 

People v. Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d 353, 361 (2006)), that the lesser offense of resisting a peace 

officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2006)) is indeed included in count I, which alleges the 

greater offense of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(18) (West 2006)). 

¶ 31 Now let us turn to count II. Again, it reads as follows: 

“[O]n June 5, 2007, *** [defendant] committed the offense of aggravated 

battery–Class 2 felony, in that the said defendant, in committing a battery, in violation 

of [section 12-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-3 (West 2006))], 

knowingly made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Officer 

Mark Briggs, Champaign Police Department, in that the defendant sp[a]t blood on 

Officer Mark Briggs[’s] hand, knowing Officer Mark Briggs to be a peace officer, 

engaged in the execution of his official duties ***.”

¶ 32 Spitting on someone is an act of contempt or provocation, not, typically, an act of 

resistance or obstruction. We cannot reasonably infer that when defendant spat on Briggs’s 

shirt, he knew he thereby would obstruct Briggs from doing anything. All we can reasonably 

infer is that he knew Briggs would be disgusted and provoked. Therefore, because an essential 

element of resisting a peace officer–knowing resistance or obstruction–cannot reasonably be 

inferred from the language of count II, resisting a peace officer is not included in count II, 

although it is included in count I. See Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d at 8. 
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¶ 33 C. Was There Some Slight Evidence To Support 

 an Instruction on Resisting a Peace Officer? 

¶ 34 The analysis does not stop with the conclusion that resisting a peace officer is included in 

count I. The claim of ineffective assistance also depends on another, separate question: In the 

jury trial, was any evidence adduced, even “[v]ery slight evidence” (Jones, 175 Ill. 2d at 132), 

that would have supported a conviction of resisting a peace officer in lieu of a conviction of 

aggravated battery as alleged in count I (see People v. Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d 475, 486 (1995))? 

“[A] court must examine the evidence presented at trial to determine whether a jury could 

rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense, but acquit on the greater offense.” Id.

(There is, perhaps, a contradiction between the generous criterion of “[v]ery slight evidence”

(Jones, 175 Ill. 2d at 132) and the more demanding criterion of rationality (Landwer, 166 Ill. 

2d at 486), but this appeal does not require us to address that contradiction.) 

¶ 35 This is not to say we should indiscriminately troll through the record for any evidence at all 

of resisting a peace officer. Due process limits us to the conduct that count I alleges. See 

Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d at 12. So, a more precise way of framing the question is as follows: Would 

it have been rationally defensible to find that by knowingly digging his fingernails into 

Manzana’s hand, defendant committed the offense of resisting a peace officer but not the 

offense of aggravated battery? (Because the act of obstructing Manzana had to be knowing for 

purposes of resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2006)), the act that did the 

obstructing, digging his fingernails into Manzana’s hand, had to be knowing.) The answer is no 

because by knowingly digging his fingernails into Manzana’s hand, defendant necessarily 

committed aggravated battery. Digging his fingernails into Manzana’s hand, for purposes of 

resisting a peace officer, necessarily caused “bodily harm,” for purposes of aggravated battery, 

because to “dig,” by definition, is to “drive down so as to penetrate”–in this instance, the skin 

(Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 323 (10th ed. 2000)). Thus, it would have been 

rationally impossible to acquit defendant of aggravated battery as alleged in count I while 

convicting him of resisting a peace officer. It follows that although resisting a peace officer 

was indeed included in count I, as defendant argues, Ortega nevertheless was justified in 

refraining from presenting to defendant the option of tendering a jury instruction on resisting a 

peace officer, because not even the slightest evidence would have supported a conviction of 

resisting a peace officer and a simultaneous acquittal of aggravated battery as alleged in count 

I. Although there was evidence that defendant resisted Manzana by digging his fingernails into 

Manzana’s hand, that very act sealed his conviction of aggravated battery. 

¶ 36 In sum, defendant’s theory that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included 

offense of resisting a peace officer (and hence his theory of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel) stumbles on the second step, the step of “examin[ing] the evidence presented at trial 

to determine whether a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense, but 

acquit on the greater offense.” Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d at 486. 

¶ 37 A case on which defendant relies, People v. Pedersen, 195 Ill. App. 3d 121 (1990), skipped 

that crucial second step and consequently fell into error. In Pedersen, the information charged 

the defendant with aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, ¶ 12-4(b)(6)) “ ‘in that he 

kneed Bruce Dayno in the groin and bit Bruce Dayno on the finger[,] knowing Bruce Dayno to 

be a peace officer engaged in the execution of his official duties.’ ” Pedersen, 195 Ill. App. 3d 

at 129. The bite inflicted a cut on Dayno’s finger, for which he received treatment at the 

hospital. Id. at 124. The Second District reasoned that although the information did not 
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expressly state that the defendant had committed an act that resisted or obstructed Dayno in the 

performance of his duties, a reasonable inference was that the kneeing and the biting had 

resisted or obstructed Dayno. Id. at 129-30. Therefore, the Second District concluded that 

resisting a peace officer was included in aggravated battery as described in the information. Id.

at 130. 

¶ 38 So far, so good, but then the Second District proceeded immediately to the further 

conclusion that the defendant was entitled to an instruction on resisting a peace officer: 

“Therefore, we agree with the defendant that *** resisting arrest is a lesser included 

offense of aggravated battery. The defendant was entitled to an instruction on the lesser 

included offense of resisting a police officer, and, therefore, the judgment must be 

reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.” Id.

¶ 39 The problem with that passage is it forgets to consider whether a conviction of resisting a 

peace officer and a simultaneous acquittal of aggravated battery would have been rationally 

possible, given the evidence. See People v. Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d 497, 507 (1986). If the 

defendant resisted Dayno by inflicting a bite injury on his finger, it is hard to see how he could 

have been acquitted of aggravated battery. As in the present case, the very act that would 

constitute resisting a peace officer would merit a conviction of the greater offense. There 

would have been no point in giving the jury an instruction on the lesser included offense of 

resisting a peace officer unless, on the basis of the evidence, the jury could have rationally 

convicted the defendant of that offense in lieu of aggravated battery. 

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 41 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, and we award the State $50 

in costs against defendant. 

¶ 42 Affirmed.