U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: R IC HA RD L. BLA C K

, Deb to r. R IC HA RD L. BLA C K

, A p pellant,

v. KA THLEENA . LEA VITT, Chapter 13 Trustee, A p pellee. BA P N o . N V -18-1351-FBH Bk. N o . 2:14-b k-12402-A BL

OPINION

A rgued and Sub m itted o n N o vemb er 21, 2019

at Las Vegas, N evada Filed – Dec emb er 31, 2019 A ppeal fro m the U nited States Bankruptcy C o urt

fo r the Distric t o f N evada Ho no rab le A u gust Burdette Landis, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 

# FIL ED
D EC 31 2019 SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. BKCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE NI NT H CI RCUI TA ppearanc es: C hristo pher Burke argued o n b ehalf o f appellant Richard L. Blac k; Sarah E. Sm ith argued o n b ehalf o f appellee K athleen A . Leavitt, C hapter 13 Trustee.

Befo r e: FA R IS, BRA N D, and HER C HER , *Bankruptcy Judges. FA R IS, Bankruptcy Judge: INT ROD U CT I ON Deb to r Richard L. Black ob tained c o nfirm atio n o f a chapter 13 1 plan that required him to pay $45,000 tohis c redito r s when he so ld o r refinanc ed his rental pro p erty. Ab o ut three years later, he so ld the pro perty fo r $107,000. He pro po sed to pay $45,000 to his c redito rs and toretain the
exc ess sale pro c eeds fo r him self. C hapter 13 trustee K athleen A . Leavitt (“Trustee”) m o ved to m o dify Mr. Blac k’s c o nfirm ed plan to require him to pay the exc ess sale pro c eeds to his unsecured c redito rs. The b a nkruptc y
c o u rt appro ved the m o d ified plan. Mr. Blac k appeals, arguing that he was no t required to c o m m it the
exc ess pro c eeds to his plan paym ents. He also argues that the Trustee’s
m o tio n was untim ely and that the m o dified plan did no t m eet the statuto r y

*The Honor able Dav i d W. Her cher, U.S . Bankr u ptcy Judge for the Di str i ct of Or egon, si tti ng by desi gnati on.

1 Unless specifi ed other wi se, all chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S

. C. §§ 101-1532, and all “Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder al Rules of Bankr uptcy Pr ocedur e. 2requirem ents fo r plan c o nfirm atio n.

W e ho ld that the Trustee’s m o dified plan was tim ely and c o m plied with the applic ab le statutes. But we agree with Mr. Black that he was entitled to retain the exc ess sale pro c eeds. A c c o rdingly, we R EVER S E
. F A C T U A L BA CK GROU N D A . M r. Blac k ’s bankruptcy c as e O n A p ril 9, 2014, Mr. Black filed a chapter 7 b ankruptcy petitio n that he prepared with the assistanc e o f a b ankruptc y petitio n preparer. He
scheduled real pro p erty lo c a ted in Las Vegas, N evada (the “Pro perty”), valued at $52,300. He claim ed a $52,300 ho m estead exem ptio n in the Pro perty. 2 The chapter 7 trustee objec ted to Mr. Blac k’s c laim ed ho m estead
exem ptio n in the Pro perty, whic h he did no t live in, b ut rented o ut at $850 per m o nth. He also m o ved fo r turno ver o f the rental pro c eeds as
no nexem pt assets. Mr. Blac k rec eived his chapter 7 discharge. Sho rtly thereafter, Mr. Blac k (thro ugh c o unsel) m o ved to c o nvert his chapter 7 c ase to o ne under chapter 13. A m o ng o ther reaso ns, he stated that, when he initially filed his chapter 7 petitio n, he did no t realize that he c o uld lo se the Pro perty. The chapter 7 trustee o ppo sed the m o tio n to c o nvert.

2 Mr
. Black also scheduled a second r esi denti al pr oper ty i n Las Vegas and si mi lar ly clai med a homestead exempti on. 3Befo re ruling o n the m o tio n to c o nvert, the b ankruptcy c o urt

sustained the chapter 7 trustee’s obj ec tio n to the c laim ed ho m estead
exem ptio n in the Pro perty and granted the m o tio n fo r turno ver. The b ankruptcy c o urt later granted Mr. Black’s m o tio n to c o nvert. Mr. Blac k filed am ended schedules. He identified the Pro perty as a rental pro perty and dec reased its value to$44,000. B. T he c hapter 13 plan Mr. Blac k filed his pro po sed chapter 13 plan in which he pro po sed paying $250 per m o nth fo r fifty-nine m o nths, to taling $14,750. He pro po sed an additio nal paym ent o f $41,000 in the fo urth year upo n sale o r refinanc ing o f the Pro perty. The Trustee objec ted to c o nfirm atio n o f the plan. A m o ng o ther things, she argued that “[t]he Plan fails tom eet liquidatio n value [11 U SC § 1325(a)(4)] b ased o n the fo llo wing no n-exem pt pro perty: $44,000 Rental pro perty.” In respo nse, Mr. Blac k filed an am ended plan to address c o nc erns no t relevant to this appeal. He still pro po sed to pay $250 per m o nth fo rfiftynine m o nths. But he inc r eased to $45,000 the lum p sumpaym ent upo n sale
o r refinanc ing o f the Pro perty. A s a b elo w-average-inc o m e deb to r, his applic ab le c o m m itm ent perio d was three years. The plan pro vided: Mo nthly paym ents m ust c o ntinue fo rthe entire c o m m itm ent

4perio d unless all allo wed unsecured c laim s are paid in full in a

sho rter perio d o f tim e, pursuant to§ 1325(b )(4)(B). If the applic ab le c o m m itm ent perio d is 3 years, Deb to r m ay m ake m o nthly paym ents b eyo nd the c o m m itm ent perio d as nec essary to c o m plete this plan, b ut in no event shall m o nthly paym ents c o ntinue fo rm o re than 60 m o nths. The plan alsopro vided that “[a]ny pro perty o f the estate scheduled under § 521 shall vest in Deb to r upo n c o nfirm atio n o f this Plan.” The Trustee did no t objec t to the am ended plan, and the c o urt
c o nfirm ed the plan. Mr. Blac k faithfully m ade his m o nthly plan paym ents fo r several years. C. T he s ale of the Property Ab o ut three years later, Mr. Black filed a m o tio n to sell the Pro perty (“Mo t io n to Sell”). He stated that he intended to sell the Pro perty fo r $107,000, pay $45,000 to his unsecured c redito rs, and retain $50,689 (the
rem aining am o unt after c o sts o f sale) fo rhim self. The Trustee o ppo sed the Mo tio n to Sell. She stated that she did no t
objec t to the sale o f the Pro perty b ut objec ted to Mr. Blac k retaining any o f the pro c eeds o f the sale. She argued that the pro c eeds were pro perty o f the
chapter 13 estate under § 541 as “property that the deb t o r ‘ac quires after
c o m m enc em ent o f the c a se b ut b efo r e the c ase is c lo s ed, dism issed, o r
c o nverted’” under § 1306(a)(1). She stated that Mr. Black did no t c laiman
exem ptio n in the Pro perty, so he m u st turn o ver all funds stem m ing fro m

5the sale o f the Pro perty to the Trustee fo r distrib utio n to c r edito rs.

The b ankruptcy c o urt fo und that the Pro perty was pro perty o f the estate and that the sale was a reasonab le exerc ise o f Mr. Blac k’s b usiness judgm ent. It granted the Mo tio n to Sell (“Sale O rder”) and o rdered that $49,000 should b e paid to the Trustee and that the rem aining funds sho uld b e held b y Mr. Blac k’s atto rney pending further o rder o f the c o urt. D . T he T rus tee’s m otion to m odify the plan The Trustee filed Mo dified C hapter 13 Plan #3 (“Mo dified Plan”), which am ended Sec tio ns 1.08, 1.09, and 1.10 of the c o nfirm ed plan to
c o m m it the additio nal $52,000 sale pro c eeds to the plan. A s such, the estate
wo uld rec eive: (1) the fifty-nine m o nthly paym ents o f $250 per m o nth, (2) $49,000 fro m the sale o f the Pro p erty pursuant to the Sale O rder, and (3) the additio nal $52,000 sale pro c eeds. She stated that the Mo dified Plan
wo uld require Mr. Black to “pay all dispo sab le inc o m e to the Plan fo r the plan termas well as turn o ver no n-exem pt pro perty o f the estate. The inc reased paym ent will result in an additio nal distrib utio n to filed and allo w ed no n-prio rity general unsec ured c redito rs.” Mr. Blac k objec ted to the Mo dified Plan. He argued that the Mo dified Plan did no t c o m ply with §§ 1329, 1322, and 1325 b ec ause it “do es no t pro po se a new plan paym ent o r plan length. It o nly adds o r adjusts a few
sec tio ns o f the plan. In o ther wo r ds, a deb to r c o uld no t pro p o se a
m o dific atio n in this way and have it c o nfirm ed.”

6He also argued that the pro po sed m o d ific a tio n was untim ely,

b ec ause he had c o m pleted his plan paym ents. He was only required to
c o m p lete a 36-m o nth plan under § 1322(d)(2)(A ) b ut agreed to a 59-m o nth plan. He was fo rty-eight m o nths into his plan term when he so ld the Pro perty and paid the Trustee the rem aining b a lanc e due under the plan fro mthe sale pro c eeds. Thus, he c o m pleted his plan, and the Trustee
c anno t m o dify a c o m pleted plan. Finally, he argued that, under M cD o na ld v. Burgie (In re Burgie), 239 B.R . 406 (9th C ir. BA P 1999), the sale pro c eeds were no t dispo s ab le inc o m e that he m ust c o m m it to the plan, and he c a nno t b e c o m pelled to use the pro c eeds o f the po stpetitio n sale o f prepetitio n real estate to pay c redito rs under a chapter 13 plan. In respo nse, the Trustee argued that the Mo dified Plan satisfied §§ 1329, 1322, and 1325 b ec ause it o nly am ended three sec tio ns and inc o r po r ated the rest o f the c o nfirm ed plan. She also argued that the Mo dified Plan was tim ely b ec ause she filed it b efo re the end o f the 59-m o nth plan term . Even tho ugh Mr. Blac k paid o ff the do llar am o unt due under the plan, the plan was still sub jec t to
m o dific atio n during the full plan term

. Finally, the Trustee argued that the sale pro c eeds were pro perty o f the estate under § 1306 that should b e turned o ver to the Trustee. She stated that Mr. Black o riginally valued the Pro perty at $44,000, b ut later

7ac quired additio nal value in the pro perty. When granting the Mo tio n to

Sell, the b ankruptcy c o urt held that the sale pro c eeds were pro perty o f the estate, soshe c o ntended that they m ust b e turned o ver to the estate fo r distrib utio n. She distinguished Burgie, arguing that in Burgie we c o nsidered whether the sale pro c eeds were dispo sab le inc o m e, which was no t the c ase here. In his reply b rief, Mr. Blac k argued that the Trustee’s Mo dified Plan did no t c o m ply with the applic ab le statutes, b ec ause it failed to ac c o unt fo r his future earnings; to pro ve that he will b e ab le to m ake all plan paym ents; to estim ate paym ents to general unsec ured c redito rs; and toac c o unt fo r the inc reased trustee fee. He also argued that the Mo dified Plan was untim ely b ec ause it was pro po sed o utside o f the “tem po ral windo w” o f the 36-m o nth applic ab le
c o m m itm ent perio d

. Finally, Mr. Blac k argued that the c o nfirm ed plan pro vided that the pro perty o f the estate wo uld vest in the deb to r at c o nfirm atio n. A dditio nally, the Pro perty was ac quired prepetitio n, so it was no t afterac quired pro p erty c o ntem plated b y § 1306. A fter a hearing, the b ankruptc y c o urt appro ved the Mo dified Plan. It first held that the Mo dified Plan was tim ely. It ac kno wledged that the
c o nfirm ed plan had a “paym ent termo f 59 m o nths fro m and after May 9, 2014, thus in the c o ntext o f Sec t io n 1329(c ), the C o u rt has already appro ved

8a plan paym ent termthat exc eeds the 36-m o nth applic ab le c o m m itm ent

perio d, which is a tem p o ral m inim um . ” Ho w ever, it held that “a b ankruptcy c o urt m ay m o dify a plan at any tim e after plan c o nfirm a tio n so lo ng as the m o d ific atio n o c c urs b efo re the c o m pletio n o f paym ents under the plan.” It then c o nc luded that the paym ents under the c o nfirm ed plan had no t yet b een c o m pleted: “Paym ents under a plan have to c o ntinue fo r the duratio n pro vided fo rin the initial plan, ab sent m o dific atio n, b efo re b eing c o nsidered ‘c o m plete’ fo r purpo ses o f m o dific atio n and discharge.” Sec o nd, the c o urt held that the Mo dified Plan c o m plied with §§ 1329, 1322, and 1325. It held that the Mo dified Plan “inc o rpo rates b y referenc e and leaves unaffec ted the b ulk o f the term s o f the deb to r’s c o nfirm ed plan. It m o difies o nly Sec tio ns 1.08, 1.09, and 1.10 . . . . It co ntains the sam e 59-m o nth planned paym ent requirem ent im po sed b y the c o nfirm ed plan. A nd it requires the sam e $250 m o nthly plan paym ent.” Mo reo ver, it no ted that the Mo dified Plan pro perly pro vided fo r distrib utio n o f the sale pro c eeds, “[a]nd it states that the inc reased paym ent will result in an additio nal distrib u t io n to all filed and allo wed no n-prio rity, general,
unsecured c laim s.” Finally, the c o urt held that the sale pro c eeds must b e turned o ver to the Trustee: Turno ver o f the pro c eeds fro mthe sale o f the W ashingto n A venue pro perty to the Trustee is warranted. Tho se pro c eeds are no t exem pt pro perty o f the b ankruptc y [e]state under 11
9U .S.C . Sec tio n 541(a). The C o urt has c o nsidered the b alanc e o f

the argum ents m ade and the autho r ity c ited b y the deb to r, inc luding witho ut lim itatio n In re Burgie , 239 B.R . 406, N inth C irc uit Bankruptcy A ppellate Panel dec isio n fro m1999, and finds themunavailing and/o r indistinguishab le [sic ] fro mthe issues that are presented here. The b ankruptcy c o urt entered an o rder (“C o nfirm atio n O rder”)
c o nfirm ing the Mo dified Plan. It held that “[t]urno ver o f the pro c eeds fro m the sale o f pro p erty . . . to the Trustee is appro priate b ec ause the pro c eeds
are no texem pt pro perty o f the b a nkruptc y estate under 11 U .S.C . § 541(a).” Mr. Blac k tim ely appealed. JU RISD ICT ION The b ankruptcy c o urt had jurisdic tio n pursuant to28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(2)(A ), (L). W e have jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . § 158. ISSU E Whether the b a nkruptcy c o urt erred in c o nfirm ing the Mo dified Plan.

ST A ND A RD S OF RE V IE W “The c o nfirm atio n o f a m o dified plan is reviewed fo r an ab use o f disc retio n.” Pro

fit v. S a vage (In re Pro

fit) , 283 B.R . 567, 572 (9th C ir. BA P 2002) (c iting Ma x R eco very, Inc. v. Tha n (In re Tha n) , 215 B.R . 430, 433 (9th C ir. BA P 1997)); see D e rnha m -Burk v. M rdutt (In re M rdutt) , 600 B.R . 72, 76 (9th C ir. BA P 2019) (“Mo dific atio n under § 1329 is discretio nary and is reviewed fo r an ab use o f disc retio n.” (c iting Po w ers v. S a vage (In re Po wers) ,

10202 B.R . 618, 623 (9th C ir. BA P 1996))).

To determ ine whether the b ankruptc y c o u rt has ab used its disc retio n,
we c o nduc t a two -step inquiry: (1) we review de no vo whether the b ankruptcy c o urt “identified the c o rrec tlegal rule to apply to the relief requested” and (2) if it did, whether the b ankruptcy c o urt’s applic atio n o f the legal standard was illo gic al, im plausib le, o r witho ut suppo r t in inferenc es that m ay b e drawn fro m the fac ts in the rec o rd. United S ta tes v. Hinkso n , 585 F.3d 1247, 1262-63 & n.21 (9th C ir. 2009) (en b anc ). To the extent the b ankruptc y c o u rt b ased its dec isio n to m o dify a plan o n statuto ry interpretatio n, “whether the b ankruptcy c o urt was
c o r rec t in its interpretatio n o f the applic ab le statutes is reviewed de no vo .” In re M rdutt, 600 B.R . at 76 (c iting Ma ttso n v. H o w e (In re Ma ttso n) , 468 B.R
. 361, 367 (9th C ir. BA P 2012)). “De no vo review requires that we c o nsider a
m atter anew, as if nodec isio n had b een m ade previo usly.” F ra ncis v. W a lla ce (In re Fra ncis) , 505 B.R . 914, 917 (9th C ir. BA P 2014) (c itatio ns
o m itted). D ISCU SSION A . T he bankruptcy c ourt did not err in holding that the M odified Plan was tim ely. Mr. Blac k argues that the b a nkruptc y c o u rt erred in allo wing the plan
m o dific atio n, b ec a use the tim e to seek m o dific atio n expired when he
c o m p leted his plan paym ents early. W e disagree.

11Sec tio n 1329(a) pro vides that, “[a]t any tim e after c o nfirm atio n o f the

plan but before the c om pletion of paym ents under such plan, the plan
m ay b e m o dified” to “inc rease o r reduc e the am o unt o f paym ents o n
c laim s o f a particular c lass pro vided fo r b y the plan[.]” § 1329(a) (em phasis added). A t issue is the m eaning o f “c o m pletio n o f paym ents.” Mr. Black argues that he c o m pleted his plan paym ents early when he m ade the extra $4,000 lum p-sum paym ent with funds that he realized thro ugh the sale o f the Pro perty. C o nversely, the Trustee argues that the fifty-nine m o nths in his plan termhad no t yet expired and Mr. Blac k had no t so ught to m o dify the plan term, so her Mo dified Plan was tim ely. W e have no t squarely addressed this exact questio n, b ut o ur previo us dec isio ns are instruc tive. W e have held that, as a general pro po sitio n, paym ents are no t “c o m p lete” when the deb to r pays themearly, unless the deb to r m o difies the plan pursuant to§ 1329 tosho r ten its term :

A debtor des iringto prepay a c hapter 13 plan and obtain an early dis c h arg e without payingallowed uns ec ured c laim s in full m u s t follow the § 1329 m odific ation proc edure pres c ribed by Rule 3015(g). In exchange fo r a § 1328(a) discharge o f m o re deb ts than c an b e discharged in chapter 7, the deb to r’s inc reases in inc o m e are expo sed to the risk o f b eing c aptured b y way o f § 1329 m o dific atio ns pro po sed b y the trustee o r an unsecu r ed c r edito r. T he debtor c a nnot s hort-c irc uit that expos ure m erely by prepaym ent, but rather m us t obtain a § 1329 plan m odific ation after havingg iv en the

12notic e required by Rule 3015(g)

. 3

F ridley v. F

o rsythe (In re Fridley) , 380 B.R . 538, 544 (9th C ir. BA P 2007) (fo o tno t e o m itted) (em phases added). W e have also rejec ted a chapter 13 plan with an indefinite duratio n, which wo uld have allo w ed the deb to r to “c o m p lete” his plan whenever he paid o ff all prio rity and secured c laim s. In re Esca r cega, 573 B.R . 219 (9th C ir. BA P 2017). C o nstruing F ridley , we stated that “paym ents under a plan have to c o ntinue fo r the duratio n pro vided fo r in the initial plan, ab sent
m o dific atio n, b efo re b eing c o nsidered ‘c o m plete’ fo rpurpo ses o f
m o dific atio n and discharge.” Id. at 239 (c iting In re F ridley , 380 B.R . at 543- 44). Therefo re, Mr. Blac k’s plan paym ents were no t “c o m plete” when he
m ade the lum p-sumpaym ent, b ec ause he did no t m o dify his plan to sho rten its duratio n. Mr. Blac k argues that he was o nly required to c o m plete a 36-m o nth plan and c anno t b e c o m pelled to satisfy the full term o f his 59-m o nth plan. He is wro ng. Bec ause Mr. Black’s inc o m e is less than the applic ab le m edian, his “applic ab le c o m m itm ent perio d ” was thirty-six m o nths. In o ther wo rds, a three-year plan term wo uld have satisfied § 1322(d)(2)(A ). But he pro po sed

3 Cur r ent Rule 3015(h) r equi r es that the pr oponent of the plan modi fi cati on gi v e twenty-one days’ noti ce to the debtor s, tr ustee, and cr edi tor s . 13a fifty-nine m o nth term, prob ab ly b ec a use he c o uld no t affo rd a larger

m o nthly paym ent and therefo re needed m o re tim e to generate plan funding suffic ient to m eet o ther c o nfirm atio n requirem ents. Mr. Blac k’s argum ent is flawed b ec a use the statute do es no ttie the plan m o dific atio n tim e lim it to the “applic ab le c o m m itm ent perio d.” Sec tio n 1329(a) cuts o ff the right to m o dify a plan upo n “c o m p letio n o f paym ents under such [i.e., the o riginal] plan.” If C o ngress m eant to term inate the m o dific atio n right upo n expiratio n o f the applic ab le
c o m m itm ent perio d , it c o uld and wo uld have said exac tly that. A c c o rdingly, Mr. Blac k had no t yet “c o m pleted” his plan paym ents, and the Trustee’s Mo dified Plan, filed within the 59-m o nth plan term, was tim ely. B. T he bankruptcy c ourt did not err in holding that the M odified Plan otherwis e m et the requirem e nts of §§ 1329, 1322, and 1325. Mr. Blac k argues that the Mo dified Plan failed to satisfy the statuto ry requirem ents o f §§ 1329, 1322, and 1325. W e again disagree. Sec tio n 1329(b )(1) pro vides that “Sec t io ns 1322(a), 1322(b ), and 1323(c ) o f this title and the requirem ents o f sec tio n 1325(a) o f this title apply to any m o dific atio n under sub sec tio n (a) o f this sec t io n.” § 1329(b )(1). These requirem ents are “m andato ry plan pro visio ns.” In re Pro fit, 283 B.R . at 575. Mr. Blac k argues that the Mo dified Plan failed to c o m ply with these

14statutes b ec ause it: (1) did no t pro vide the spec ific date o f turno ver o f the

pro c eeds; (2) did no t have a spec ificpro visio n fo r a § 1325(a)(4) liquidation; (3) did no t pro vide a new paym ent am o unt o rnew length; and (4) did no t pro vide pro o f that Mr. Blac k will b e ab le to m ake all plan paym ents under § 1325(a)(6). Mr. Blac k’s argum ents b o il do wn to the assertio n that a party pro po sing a po stc o nfirm atio n plan m o dific atio n m ust sub m it a c o m plete plan. He says that it is no t suffic ient fo r a pro po nent to state o nly the pro visio ns that are to b e m o dified and inc o rpo rate (either im plic itly o r explic itly) the unm o dified pro visio ns o f the o riginal plan. W e agree with the b a nkruptcy c o urt that the Trustee’s Mo dified Plan was pro per in fo rm . It o nly c hanged three sec tio ns o f the c o nfirm ed plan and inc o rpo rated the rest o f the c o nfirm ed plan b y referenc e. Mr. Blac k pro vides no autho rity fo r his argum ent that the Trustee’s inc o rpo ratio n o f the b alanc e o f the c o nfirm ed plan was im pro per. 4 Therefo re, the b a nkruptc y c o urt did no t err in ho lding that the Mo dified Plan satisfied the relevant statuto ry requirem ents. 5

4 We do not mean to pr eclude bankr uptcy cour ts fr om r equi r ing a complete plan in a par ti cularcase orin all cases as a matterof local poli cy. S uch a poli cy mi ght be par ti cular ly appr opr i ate for pr econfi r mati on modi fi cati ons.

5 Mr
. Black also ar gues that the Modi fi ed Plan was actually a moti on for r econsi der ati on. Thi s ar gument i s mer i tless. A pr oposed plan modi fi cati on under§ 1329 i s not the same as a moti on for r econsi der ati on of the or i gi nal confi r mati on or der

. 15C. T he bankruptcy c ourt erred in holding that all of the s ale proc eeds of the Property m us t be c om m itted to the plan. Mr. Blac k c o ntends that the b ankruptcy c o urt erred in c o nfirm ing the Mo dified Plan, which required himto turn o ver to the Trustee the sale pro c eeds in exc ess o f the $45,000 spec ified in the o riginal plan. He c o ntends that the pro p erty o f the estate revested in himupo n plan c o nfirm atio n, so any additio nal value o f the Pro p erty b elo nged to him . W e agree. The parties’ respec t ive po sitio ns undersc o re the tensio n b etween § 1327 on the o ne hand and § 1306 and § 541(a)(6) on the o ther. Mr. Blac k relies o n § 1327(b ), which pro vides that “the c o nfirm atio n o f a plan vests all
o f the pro perty o f the estate in the deb to r.” § 1327(b ). Sub s ec tio n (c ) pro vides that “the pro perty vesting in the deb to r under sub sec tio n (b ) o f this sec tio n is free and c lear o f any c laimo r interest o f any c redito r pro vided fo rb y the plan.” § 1327(c ). The Trustee relies o n two sec tio ns stating that pro p erty ac quired po stpetitio n and pro c eeds fro mthe sale o f estate pro perty are pro perty o f the estate. Pro perty o f the estate inc ludes “all pro perty o f the kind spec ified in such sec tio n [541] that the debtor ac quires after the c om m enc em ent of the c as e b ut b efo re the c a se is c lo sed, dism issed, o r c o nverted . . . .” § 1306(a)(1) (em phasis added). Sim ilarly, the estate inc ludes “ [p]roc eeds, pro duc t, o ffspring, rents, or profits of or fromproperty of the es tate , exc ept such as are earnings fro mservic es perfo rm ed b y an individual

16deb to r a fter the c o m m enc em ent o f the c ase.” § 541(a)(6) (em p hases added).

O ur dec isio n in Burgieapplies. In that c ase, the b ankruptcy c o urt
c o nfirm ed the deb to rs’ chapter 13 plan. Afew days later, they so ught to sell their ho m estead pro perty; the c hapter 13 trustee did no t objec t. The deb to r s so ld their pro perty, paid o ff their first and sec o nd m o rtgages, and
rec eived net pro c eeds o f $63,000. The chapter 13 trustee m o ved to m o dify the plan to require the deb to rs to surrender so m e o f the sale pro c eeds to inc rease paym ents to general unsec ured c redito rs. The b ankruptcy c o urt denied the m o tio n, and the trustee appealed. Sub sequently, the deb to rs purchased a new ho m estead using $43,000 and stated that they intended to use the rem aining $20,000 tosuppo rt them selves and c o m plete their plan paym ents. 239 B.R . at 408. O n appeal, we c o nsidered whether the deb to rs c o uld retain the $20,000 o r whether they had to turn it o ver to the trustee to inc rease the dividend to general unsec ured c redito rs. Id. W e first rejec ted the trustee’s argum ent that the $20,000 c o nstituted dispo sab le inc o m e that the deb to rs needed to c o m m it to the plan. W e stated that “[t]he pro c eeds o f the sale o f a deb to r’s real estate in a chapter 13 c ase never b ec o m e dispo sab le inc o m e fo r the purpo ses o f chapter 13. . . . While a deb t o r m ay vo luntarily use such pro c eeds to m ake paym ents to
c redito rs under a chapter 13 plan, a deb to r c anno t b e c o m pelled to use the pro c eeds fo r this purpo se.” Id. at 409.

17W e explained the interplay b etween the “c hapter 13 deal” and the

sale o f a prepetitio n asset:

A n exam inatio n o f the b asicstruc ture o f chapter 13 m akes it c lear that the debtors c annot be c om pelled to us e the proc eeds fromthe s a le of prepetition real es tate to pay c reditors under a c onfirm ed c h apter 13 plan

. In plac e o f liquidating no n-exem pt assets topay c redito rs under chapter 7 o f the Bankruptc y C o de, C o ngress gave individuals with regular inc o m e the o ptio n o f adjusting their deb ts pursuant toa plan under chapter 13. The chapter 13 deal perm its a deb to r to retain all prepetitio n pro perty, inc luding earnings, assets, m o ney in the b a nk and real estate. In exchange fo r keeping all o f these assets, the deb to r m ust c o m m it all po stpetitio n dispo sab le inc o m e to the paym ent o f c redito r s under a chapter 13 plan fo r a perio d o f three to five years. If the deb to r m akes all o f the paym ents required under the plan, all o f the deb to r’s dischargeab le deb ts are discharged, and the deb to r keeps all o f the prepetitio n assets. Pos tpetition dis pos able inc om e does not inc lude prepetition property or itsproc eeds . T his is the c hapter 13 debtor’s barg ain. Creditorsof a c hapter 13 debtor hav e no c laimto any of thes e as s e ts . Id. at 410 (fo o tno te o m itted) (em phases added). W e further held that, “[a]fter c o nfirm atio n o f a chapter 13 plan, a deb to r m ay vo lunteer to pay
c redito rs fro mc apital assets, and thereb y relieve future inc o m e fro mthe
ob ligatio ns under the plan. Ho wever, a chapter 13 deb to r c anno t b e
c o m p elled to do so . ” Id. at 411 (c itatio ns o m itted).
18Finally, we no ted that this rule applied regardless whether the

pro perty at issue was exem p t: “Whether prepetitio n pro perty, so ld b y the deb to r a fter plan c o nfirm atio n, is exem pt is no t direc t ly relevant to the fo rego ing analysis. Under a chapter 13 plan, the deb to ris entitled to keep all o f the deb to r’s prepetitio n pro perty, whether o r no t it qualifies under the applic ab le exem ptio n laws.” Id. Burgieis o n po int. 6 The Panel c o nsidered whether prepetitio n pro perty liquidated po stc o nfirm atio n m ust b e c o m m itted to the chapter 13 plan. The Panel c o nc luded that, solo ng as the deb to rs c o m m it all o f their po stpetitio n dispo sab le inc o m e to the plan and m eet the o ther plan
c o nfirm atio n requirem ents, they get to retain their c apital assets and
c redito rs c anno t reach the pro c eeds o f such. A c c o rdingly, so lo ng as Mr. Blac k satisfies the term s o f his c o nfirm ed plan, he do es no t have to
c o m m it the exc ess pro c eeds fro mthe sale o f the Pro perty to pay his general

6 Mr
. Black ar gues that Burgie i s binding on all bankr u ptcy cour ts in the ci r cui t and that the bankr uptcy cour t er r ed by fai ling to follow i t. The Ninth Ci r cui t has nev er held that our deci si ons ar e binding (under star e deci si s pr inci p les) on any cour t. See, e.g., Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc. , 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Ci r . 1990). We v i ew our selv es as bound by ourpr i or publi shed deci s i ons. Salomon N. Am. v. Knupfer (In re Wind N’ Wave) , 328 B.R. 176, 181 (9th Ci r . BAP 2005) (“[W]e r egar d our s elv es as bound by our pr i or deci si ons, and ‘wi l l not ov er r ule our pr i or r u lings unless a Ninth Ci r cui t Cour t of Appeals deci si on, S upr eme Cour t deci si on or subsequent legi slati on has under mined those r ulings.’” (ci tati ons omi tted)); 9th Ci r . BAP R. 8024-1(c)(1) (also acknowledging abi l i ty of Panel to modi fy or r ev er se i tself si tti ng en banc). We will follow Burgie, and we need not deci de whether star e deci si s also obli ged the bankr uptcy cour t to do so. 19unsecured c redito rs.

The Trustee attem pts to distinguish Burgieb y arguing that the Panel fo c used o n the c harac terizatio n o f the pro c eeds as dispo sab le inc o m e. 7 While the Panel held that the sale pro c eeds were no tdispo sab le inc o m e, the Panel stated its ho lding m o r e b ro adly: “deb to rs c anno t b e c o m pelled to use the pro c eeds fro mthe sale o f prepetitio n real estate topay c redito rs under a c o nfirm ed chapter 13 plan.” Id. at 410. The Trustee urges us tofo c us o n the c harac terizatio n o f the sale pro c eeds as pro perty o f the estate under § 541(a)(6). It is true that the Pro perty was pro perty o f the estate when Mr. Blac k c o m m enc ed his c ase. But when the b ankruptcy c o urt c o nfirm ed the plan, the Pro perty was revested in Mr. Blac k. 8 The c o nfirm ed plan pro vided that “[a]ny pro perty

7If anythi ng, the 2005 amendments to the Bankr uptcy Code str engthen Burgie ’s v i ew that pr oceeds of post-peti ti on asset sales ar e not i n c luded in di sposable income. The ter m “di s posable income” now means “cur r ent monthly i ncome” less cer tai n expenses. § 1325(b)(2). “Cur r ent monthly income” in tur nmeans the debtor ’s av er age monthly i ncome dur ing a si x-month prepetitionper i od. § 101(10A).

8 In i ts S ale Or der, the bankr uptcy cour t stated that “THE COURT FINDS that the pr oper ty i s pr oper ty of the estate . . . .” The Tr ustee states that Mr . Black di d not appeal fr om the S ale Or der and i mpli es that i t i s too late for hi m to take i ssue wi th the cour t’s r uling that the Pr oper ty was pr oper ty of the estate. But Mr . Black was the pr ev ai ling par ty on the Moti on to S ell. He cannot be compelled to appeal fr om the S ale Or der, ev en i f i t contained, in par t, an unfav or able finding. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S . 692, 703-04 (2011) (“As a matterof pr acti ce and pr udence, we hav e gener ally declined to consi der cases at the r equest of a pr ev ai l ing par ty, ev en when the Consti tuti on allowed us to do so. Our r esour ces ar e not well spent super intending each wor d a lower cour t utter s en r oute to a fi nal j udgment in the peti ti oning par ty’s fav or .” (ci tati ons omi tted)); Deposit (continued...) 20o f the estate scheduled under § 521 shall vest in Deb to r upo n c o nfirm atio n

o f this Plan.” Sec tio n 1322(b )(9) expressly perm its such revesting: the plan
m ay “pro vide fo r the vesting o f pro p erty o f the estate, o n c o nfirm atio n o f the plan o r at a later tim e, in the deb to r o r in any o ther entity.” R evesting
m eans that Mr. Black o wned the pro perty o utright, free o f his c r edito rs’
c laim s. S ee Ca l. Fra nchise TaxBd. v. Jo nes (In re Jo nes) , 420 B.R
. 506, 515 (9th C ir. BA P 2009) (ho lding that the estate term inates upo n plan c o nfirm atio n and c o nc luding “that ‘vests’ [under § 1327(b )] m eans ab so lute o w nership,
no t m ere po ssessio n”); In re Niles , 342 B.R . 72, 75 (Bankr. D. A riz. 2006) (“[T]he intervening plan c o nfirm atio n fundam entally c hanges the ‘pro perty
o f the estate’ landsc ape. Here, the plan was c o nfirm ed and the pro perty

8 (...continued) Guar. Nat’l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper , 445 U.S . 326, 333 (1980) (“Or din a r i ly, only a par ty aggr i ev ed by a j udgment or or der of a di str i ct cour t may exer ci se the statutor y r i ght to appeal ther efr om. A par ty who r ecei v es all that he has sought gener a lly i s not aggr i ev ed by the j udgment affor d ing the r eli ef and cannot appeal fr om i t.” (ci tati ons omi tted)). Mor eov er, the cour t’s finding was unnecessary. S ecti on 5.04(a) of the confi r med plan r equi r ed Mr . Black to seek cour t author i zati on to sell r eal pr oper ty v alued at ov er $5,000. Because thi s plan pr ov i s i on i s not li mi ted to pr oper ty of the estate, the bankr uptcy cour t di d not need to deci de whether the pr oper ty belonged to the estate. An unnecessary findin g has no pr eclusiv e effect on subsequent liti gati on. See United States v. Good Samaritan Church , 29 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Ci r . 1994) (“Deter minati ons whi ch ar e i mmater i al to the j u dgment below hav e no pr eclusiv e effect on subsequent li ti gati on, especi ally i f they cannot be appealed. The j udgment was enti r ely fav or able to appellants so we hav e no j ur i s d i c ti on ov er the appeal. To the extent that the di str i ct cour t or der was not fav or able to appellants, i t does not bind them in subsequent li ti gati on.” (ci tati on omi tted)). 21revested in Deb to r at that tim e.”).

The Trustee argues that, even tho ugh Mr. Blac k o wned the Pro perty prepetitio n, the apprec iatio n o f its value (fro m$45,000 to$107,000) is pro perty that he ac quired po stpetitio n under § 1306. She cites a First C irc uit
c ase, Ba rbo sa v . S o lo m a n , 235 F.3d 31 (1st C ir. 2000), fo r the pro p o sitio n that the apprec iatio n in value o f prepetitio n pro perty is pro perty that the estate
ac quired po stc o nfirm atio n, despite the vesting pro visio n in the c hapter 13 plan. W e ac kno wledge that there is a split in autho rity o n this po int. Co m pa re Ba rbo sa, 235 F.3d at 37, a nd In re S ura tt, C ase N o . 95-6183-HO, 1996 W L 914095, at *3 (D. Or. Jan. 10, 1996) (allo wing m o dific atio n o f chapter 13 plan to ac c o unt fo r po stc o nfirm atio n apprec iatio n in pro perty), w ith In re S m i th , 514 B.R . 464, 472 (Bankr. N .D. Tex. 2014) (“Even if the po st-c o nfirm atio n apprec iatio n in value was pro perty o f the estate, the apprec iatio n is no t dispo sab le inc o m e [that c o uld b e m a de availab le to
c redito rs in the analo go us chapter 12 c o ntext.]”), a nd In re Niles , 342 B.R . at 75 (when c o nsidering whether pro perty is pro p erty o f the estate upo n
c o nversio n fro mchapter 13 to chapter 7, “the value o f the estate’s interest in the [po stpetitio n apprec iatio n] pro c eeds fro mDeb t o r’s sale o f the pro perty do es no tinc lude any o f the no nexem pt sales pro c eeds”). In o ur view, the revesting pro visio n o f the c o nfirm ed plan m eans that the deb to r o wns the pro perty o utright and that the deb t o r is entitled to any

22po stpetitio n apprec iatio n. When the b ankruptc y c o urt c o nfirm ed

Mr. Blac k’s plan, the Pro perty revested in Mr. Blac k. S ee In re Jo nes , 420 B.R
. at 515. A s such, it was nolo nger pro perty o f the estate, so the apprec iatio n did no t ac c rue fro mestate pro perty. C f

. S chwa ber v. R e ed (In re R eed) , 940 F.2d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1991) (“ No doubt D ebtor’s argu m e nt that apprec iation enured to himwould hav e m erit if his entire interes t in the
res idenc e had been s et as ide or abandoned to him; it was no t.”(em phasis added)). 9 Mo reo ver, we have already c o nsidered and rejec ted the fram ewo rk underpinning Ba rbo sa . The First C irc uit reaso ned that, despite the language in the plan revesting pro perty with the deb to r upo n plan c o nfirm atio n, “[t]he estate do es no t c ease to exist ho wever, and it c o ntinues to b e funded b y the Deb t o rs’ regular inc o m e and po st-petitio n assets as specified in
sec tio n 1306(a).” 235 F.3d at 37. A c c o r dingly, po stc o nfirm atio n apprec iatio n
o f real pro perty c o uld b e used to inc rease the payo u t to unsecured
c redito rs. Ho wever, we squarely rejec ted Ba rbo sa ’s appro ach in Jo nes . W e

9 If the plan di d not v est the Pr oper ty i nMr . Black, the r esult would likely be di ffer ent. See Klein v. Chappell (In re Chappell) , 373 B.R. 73, 83 (9th Ci r. BAP 2007), aff’d sub nom. Gebhart v. Gaughan (In re Gebhart), 621 F.3d 1206 (9th Ci r . 2010) (In a chapter7 case, wher e pr oper ty does not r ev est in the debtor , “[u]nderwell-settled Nin th Ci r cui t law, any postpeti ti on appr eci ati on in v alue in the r esi d ence in excess of the maxi m u m amount per mi tted by the exempti on statute i nv oked i nur es to the benefi t of the estate.”); § 541(a)(6) (a bankruptcy estate i ncludes “[p]r oceeds, pr oduct, offspr ing, r ents, or p r ofi ts of or fr om pr oper ty of the estate . . . .”). 23ac kno wledged Ba rbo sa ’s “m o dified estate preservatio n appro ach,” 420 B.R

.

at 513, b ut o pted instead fo rthe “estate term inatio n appro ach,” which pro vides that “all pro p erty o f the estate vests in the deb to r at
c o nfirm atio n[,]” id. at 514. On appeal fro mo ur dec isio n, the N inth C irc uit affirm ed, ho lding that “under the plain language o f § 1327(b ), the pro perty
o f the estate revests in the deb to r upo n plan c o nfirm atio n, unless the deb to r elec ts o therwise in the plan. Bec ause [the deb to r] did no t elec t o therwise, she o nc e again b ec a m e the o wner o f her pro p erty at c o nfirm atio n, exc ept as to tho se sum s spec ific ally dedic ated to fulfillm ent o f the plan.” Ca l. F ra nchise TaxBd. v. K

enda ll (In re Jo nes) , 657 F.3d 921, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (b u t dec lining to ado pt a particu lar appro ach to determ ine when and to what extent pro perty revests with the deb to r ). Finally, the Trustee’s argum ent and the Ba rbo sa dec isio n are hard to square with the wo r ding o f § 1306(a)(1). In no rm al speech, o ne wo uld no t say that, when a perso n’s assets inc rease in value, that perso n “ac quires” an additio nal interest in the asset. W e m u st fo llo w the N inth C ircuit’s dec isio ns and o u r o w n pub lished dec isio ns, rather than the First C irc uit’s dec isio n in Ba rbo sa . 1 0 A t m o s t, the

1 0 Barbosaalso di ffer s fr om the pr esent case in that the bankr uptcy cour t and Fi r st Ci r cui t wer e both concer ned that the debtor s had under

- r epor ted the v alue of thei r homestead in or der to str i p off a second mor tgage. The bankr uptcy cour t char acter i zed the debtor s’ scheme as “unsav or y” and a “mani pulati on of the [Bankr u ptcy] Code.” Barbosa, 235 F.3d at 34-35 (quoti n g In re Barbosa, 236 B.R. 540, 551-52 (Bankr . D. Mass. (continued...) 24$45,000 o f sale pro c eeds that Mr. Black pro m ised to his c redito rs rem ained

pro perty o f his estate. CONCL U SION The b ankruptcy c o urt erred in requiring Mr. Blac k to dedic ate the
exc ess sale pro c eeds o f the Pro p erty to his unsecured c redito rs. W e R EVER SE the C o nfirm atio n O rder.

1 0 (...continued) 1999)). The Fi r st Ci r cui t noted that the debtor s r eali zed “appr eci ati on in v alue of almost 215% of the sti pulated v alue of the pr oper ty,” and stated that the debtor s’ tacti cs wer e “anti theti cal to the bankr uptcy system.” Id. at 41. Her e, the Pr oper ty was unencumber ed, and ther e i s no ev i dence that Mr . Black ei ther ar ti fi c i ally under v alued the Pr oper ty or engaged i n mani pulati v e tacti cs. 25