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COVER: ('p1 B. J. Bell, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, stands

guard near civilian Haitians between the town of capHaitien and the air field during Operation Uphold

Democracy. The American flag in the background was

raised by local residents as a welcome to the liberating

troops.

DVIC DM-SD-95-01869
A Skillful Show of Strength:

U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 1991-1996

US. Marines in Humanitarian

by

Operations

Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

History and Museums Division

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.

2003
Other Publications in the Series

U.S. Marines in 1-lumanitarian Operations

Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991. With Marines in Operation Provide

Comfort. 1995

Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991. 1995

PCN 190 0041 0600

For aIe by the SuperinlendenL of Documents. US. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstoregpo.gov Phone: Loll free (866) 512-1800; DC urea (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0l

ISBN 0-16-051501-7
Foreword

What Marines did in the Caribbean between 1991 and 1996 was both new and old. It was new

because humanitarian operations were different from combat in Vietnam or Southwest Asia. It was also

new For many because it was "joint," Marines were integrated into joint task forces, especially when they

were called on to care for 1-laitian and Cuban migrants at Guantanamo Bay.

But it was also old and familiar. Generations of Marines have deployed to the Caribbean in one role

or another. Although they would not have recognized the words, Marines in Haiti, Dominican Republic,

or Panama knew the notions of "military operations other than war "and" low intensity conflict" earlier

in the 20th century. It is no accident some of the Marines who went to the Caribbean in the 1990s took

with them a copy of The Small Wars Manual, a Marine Corps classic about unusual challenges on foreign shores written between the two world wars by writers with fresh memories of earlier operations in

many of the same places.

If there was one lesson in the Caribbean, it was that traditional Marine Corps virtues—initiative, discipline, and flexibility—were still as useful and applicable in the final years of the last century as they

had always been. Humanitarian operations did not lack intensity. The challenges some of the Marines

in this story faced were not combat, but on some days they came close, as thin green lines of Marines

confronted crowds of angry and violent migrants at Guantanamo and in Panama, When the Marines of

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force occupied the northern provinces of Haiti in September

1994, they entered an unusual environment that, at least at first, was not war and not peace. They had

to deal with large and usually friendly crowds, as well as a hostile police force and military that disappeared from the scene only after a brief but intense firefight that left a number of Haitian policemen

dead. If there are any overall lessons, they are that the same Marine rifleman has to be ready for combat and military operations other than war, and that it is the leaders of small units, squads, and platoons

who often determine the outcome in ambiguous situations.

The author, Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, began collecting material about migrant operations in the Caribbean in 1992. He was able to draw on the work of others, such as the History and

Museums Division's oral historian, Richard A. Long, who conducted a lengthy interview with the Marine

commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, and to make good use of materials collected by his

counterparts at the Naval Historical Center, Captains Alexander G. Monroe and William R. McClintock,

USNR, who had the good fortune to spend time at Guantanamo during the operation. Colonel Reynolds

then conducted his own interviews of participants and collected additional raw material from various

archives.

When it became clear in 1994 there would be a sequel to the opennion at Guantanamo, the migrant

operations known as Sea Signal and Safe Haven, Colonel Reynolds repeated the process, interviewing

participants, collecting documents, and making the trip to Guantanamo himself, where he was able to

"walk the ground."

The story of the Haitian migrants could not he told without telling the related story of the invasion

and occupation of Haiti in September 1994, when Marines went ashore at Cap-HaItien in the northern

part of that country. To cover that story, Headquarters Marine Corps dispatched an officer on active duty,

Major John T. Quinn II, to join the special purpose task force for a few weeks. Major Quinn did yeoman's work conducting interviews, taking photographs and generally recording events, either on paper

or on tape. He demonstrated anew that the best way to preserve Marine Corps history is to have a fulltime historian on the ground during the operation that is able to focus on recording events as they occur.

ill
Colonel Reynolds is currently serving as the officer in charge of the History and Museums Division's

Individual Mobilization Detachment. His training in history was at Oxford University, where he wrote a

doctoral dissertation about the German army before serving as an infantry officer in the Marine Corps.

Following active duty with 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, he held a variety of reserve billets, including that

of company commander at The Basic School during the Persian Gulf War. 1-Ic is also the author of another historical center publication, Marine Operations in Panama: 1988-1990, and he edits the Iou.rnal of

America's Militaiy Past for the non-profit Council on America's Military Past.

John W. Ripley

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

iv
Preface

When the Chief Historian of the Marine Corps, Benis M. Frank, asked me to work on Operation

Guantanarno Bay in 1992, I reacted like many Marines when they are told they are no longer primarily

riflemen: Wasn't there a combat history that needed doing? But, like a good Marine, I did what I was

told, and as time went on, I grew to like the assignment. That is, I gained an appreciation for the challenges of migrant operations. Being a Marine has never been just about combat, and yes, real Marines

do 'military operations other than war." A close reading of Marine Corps history tells us they always

have. The story of Marine operations in the Caribbean from 1991 to 1996 is an interesting one, worth

telling and from which future Marine commanders can learn.

It is a story I could not have told without the help of a number of people, many of them participants

in the story. Two commanding generals of the humanitarian joint task forces, Brigadier General George

H. Walls, Jr., and General Michael J. Williams, made themselves available for interviews and were willing to share personal papers with me. The same was particularly true of two other officers who served

with General Williams: Colonel John R. Allen and Major Franz J. Gayl. They did what good historians

do: they saved records and wrote about what happened while it was still fresh in their minds. Their conWhen the Marines landed in Haiti in 1915 to restore order, the British diplomat R. M. Kohan cabled a

concise summary of the operation to London:

The landing party put on shore at Fort-au-Prince on the 28th of July was not strong....

A skillful show of strength was, however, made and by at once seizing all points of

military importance, together with practically all government arms and ammunition

and disarming all Haitian military and civilians, the landing force was able to anticipate any serious resistance which might have been offered.

—Quoted in Robert Debs Heini, Jr., and Nancy Gordon I-Ieinl, Written in Blood, The

Story a/the Haitian People 1492-1975 ifioston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978)

trihutions gave life to what might otherwise have been a dry recitation of facts. I would also like to

thank the other Marines, too numerous to mention by name, who made themselves available for interviews. Major John T. Quinn II, who was sent to Haiti by the History and Museums Division in September

1994, would no doubt voice his appreciation for the officers of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task

Force Caribbean who supported him, especially the commander, Colonel Thomas S. Jones, and his operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Greenwood.

I was able to rely on the support and advice of many members of the 1-listory and Museums Division

and wish to express my thanks to them all. The former Director, Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons,

was kind enough to provide guidance in the early stages of the project, as was former Chief Historian

Benis M. Frank. Their support and encouragement over the years has meant a lot to me. My colleagues

Colonel Dennis J. Mroczkowski, USMCR, and Dr. Jack Shulimson read early drafts and gave me the feedback I needed. I am grateful to members of other sections of the Division who provided useful assistance: Danny J. Crawford, head of the Reference Section, and his staff; Frederick J. Graboske, head of

'7
I,,

,'.1

'r

p — •it
Chapter 1

Operation GTMO

Setting the Scene

During the Spanish-American War of 1898,

Sergeant John H. Quick earned the Medal of

Honor when he scaled a rock in southeastern

Cuba while under heavy fire and began directing

naval gunfire from the distant USS Dolphin

toward enemy positions. In an ensuing dispatch

entitled "The Red Badge of Courage Was His WigWag Flag," novelist and part-time war correspondent Stephen Crane captured the moment for posterity, describing Sergeant Quick as the "spruce

young sergeant of Marines, erect, his back to the

showering bullets Iwas] solemnly and intently

wigwagging." The Marines went on to take the

high ground near the large natural harbor known

as Guantanamo Bay, which the U.S. Navy wanted

for a coaling station. This became the prologue

for the modern history of the Marine Corps in the

Caribbean.

In the first part of the 20th Century, the United

States held sway over the Caribbean, largely

because of the strategic importance it attached to

the Panama Canal, which was completed in 1911.

The U.S. generally resisted any threats to the stability of the region.

Guantanamo Bay was leased in perpetuity

from Cuba in 1903 for the Navy, and the harbor

became one of the pivots of U.S. power in the

Caribbean. Playing a traditional role for the Navy,

Marines guarded Guantanamo for the rest of the

century.

In 1915, when Haiti disintegrated into anarchy

in the wake of yet another revolution, the senior

officer present afloat, Admiral William B.

Caperton, sent a message to nearby Guantanamo

requesting a contingent of Marines to restore

order. Within days, the first of what was to

become a long column of Marines landed on
2 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

DVIC DN-SC-88-09710

American sailors and Coast Guardsmen approach a 30-foot. single-masted sailboat in a motor launch

from the USS Whidbey island ([SD 41) in July 1988. The 92 Haitian migrants were taken on hoard and

later transferred to a Coast Guard cutter. In accordance with a standing agreement between the United

States and I-lu itt, the migrants were returned to their homeland.

Haiti's shores with the concurrence of the British

and French governments. For the roughly 2,000

Marines of that first contingent, restoring order

was a matter of protecting the customs service

and keeping the cacos, or bandit mafias, under

control.

Under the provisions of a treaty ratified in late

1915, the U.S. Government would organize a

Haitian police force. Marine and naval officers,

including such famous Marines as then-Major

Smeclley D. Butler, were seconded to the paramilitary Gendarmerie to occupy the senior posts.

Backing them up were Marine noncommissioned

officers and Navy corpsmen. Marines served in

that capacity for nearly 20 turbulent years.

Throughout the 1900s, Marines were committed to operations on either side of Haiti.

Prominent among them were interventions in the

Dominican Republic in 1904, then from 1914 to

1924, and finally, in 1965. When Fidel Castro

seized power in Cuba, the notion of fighting communism so near U.S. soil added another dimension to operations in the Caribbean, and the base

at Guantanamo became an important iconic outpost of freedom. It also proved useful to the modem Navy as a deepwater training facility. The

Marine garrison on the base swelled to regimental proportions during the Cuban missile crisis in

1962, hut generally the contingent of Marines stationed there was much smaller. In the early 1990s,

Marines numbered roughly 450, mostly committed to security and patrolling operations around

the perimeter of the base. The Cubans watched

the Marines and the Marines watched the Cubans

along the heavily mined fence line separating

them.

Jack Nicholson, who played the overzealous

barracks commander in, "A Few Good Men," a

film about Marines at Guantanamo, explained this

mission in vivid terms. Although the film was

heavily fictionalized, there were a few grains of

truth in Nicholson's memorable words, especially

his in-your-face remark that every morning he ate

breakfast 300 yards from 4,000 Cubans" who

were trained to kill him. For the Marines who

spent weeks and months on the line, either in

watchtowers or on patrol in the scrub brush along

the "cactus curtain," it was not an exercise but a

deadly serious form of duty. Occasionally,

Marines would rescue a refugee from the mine-
OPERATION GTMO 3

field or help one through the wire and there was

occasional gunfire, especially if the Cubans started shooting at an escaping refuge. Marines were

authorized to return fire only in self-defense

under strictly enforced rules of engagemenr.'

in 1991, many of these historical themes played

out again. In February, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a

former Catholic priest and charismatic preacher,

took office as the first democratically elected president of Haiti. By September of that same year, the

Haitian military was fed up with his rule and easily overthrew Aristide despite his enormous popularity with the masses. Aristide fled the country

and began a high profile, extremely vocal campaign against the military regime of Brigadier

General Raoul Cedras. The ousted leader eventually made his way to the United States where he

lobbied for action against the regime. The U.S.

Government reacted by declaring an economic

embargo of Haiti, but the move was more to

express support of a democratic Haiti than for

Aristide. Unfortunately, the embargo resulted in

the downward spiral of the already abysmally low

standard of living of most Haitians. The embargo

left the tiny ruling class, which always seemed

able to assure its own comfort, virtually unaffected.

From the day the coup occurred, there were

general fears the country would return to a state

of anarchy, which might threaten the lives of the

estimated 7,000 U.S. citizens living in the island

nation. The new military government fueled those

fears through its enforcement of familiar methods

of repression such as allowing police and soldiers

a free hand to beat real or imagined opponents,

often in front of news cameras. The joint Chiefs

of Staff reacted by asking Admiral Leon A. Ed.ney,

Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CinCLant),

Norfolk, Virginia, to develop a contingency plan

for the evacuation nf American citizens. By I

October 1999, approximately 350 Marines had

departed Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, for

Guantanamo to support the plan. This first contingent of Marines was on stand-by o deploy to

Haiti as the forward element of Joint Task Force

(JTF) 129, the name for which was eventually

ovic DN-sr-93-oo3o6

Haitian migrants board a US. Coast Guard boat. Thousands qf Haitians were intercepted and taken on

board Navy and Coast Guard ships between October and December 1991 They were then transponed to

Naval Station, Guanlanamo Bay, 6'uba, for temporary housing while their legal status was determined.
4 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTI-1

changed to JTF GTMO, a somewhat awkward

contraction of Guantanamo. Brigadier General

Russell H. Sutton was assigned as commander of

the group and he drew his headquarters from the

command element of TI Marine Expeditionary

Force (II MEF).2

Throughout much of the coming year. Marines

would remain on stand-by for a non-combatant

evacuation operation of American citizens in

Haiti. Many of those Marines spent much of that

time living in the barracks at Guantanamo Bay.

The force did not deploy further. By late

November the situation in Haiti appeared to have

settled and the Marines returned to the continental United States.3

There also was some contingency planning for

Joint Task Force i40, the mission of which might

be to occupy Haiti.4 But instead of launching

operations against the island of Haiti, Marines

became involved with Haitians in a way that few

had foreseen. Within a month of the coup, hundreds of Haitians took to the sea in open boats,

most with the general intention of sailing to the

United States in search of a better life away from

economic hardship. This exodus was risky since

few of the boats were seaworthy and. most were

desperately overloaded. One 30-foot fishing boat,

which the U.S. Coast Guard came across as it was

floundering, held some 240 people, including

women and children. Many of the craft could

hardly he called boats; more closely resembled

the fabled makeshift raft Huck Finn used to float

down the Mississippi.

In late October, the Coast Guard, which routinely patrolled the waters in the Windward

Passage between 1-laiti and Cuba, rescued the first
OPERATION GTMO 5

DYIC DN-ST-93-00307

Laundry lines and cots for use by Haitian migrants fill the well deck of the landing ship USS Pensacola

(LSD 38) while docked at Guanlanamo Bay. The Pensacola served as teniporaty housing while tent

camps were being erected on land in late Novem her and early December 1991.

19 Haitians. Perhaps because the word somehow

made it back to Haiti that Americans were picking

up migrants in boats, the floodgates opened wide

and the Coast Guard was soon rescuing everincreasing numbers of migrants at sea. Messages

from that period suggest most of the Coast Guard

and Navy commanders dealing with the growing

migrant problem believed the only practical interim solution was to take them to Guantanamo. By

10 November, nearly 500 migrants were on two

Coast Guard cutters at anchor in the harbor at

Guantanamo. Unfortunately, a cutter is a fairly

small ship, more like a large motor yacht than a

small warship, and the degree of overcrowding—and subsequent unsanitary conditions—was

staggering. A few hundred yards away, those on

shore could see just how bad conditions were

becoming.

The U.S. Government was now faced with

deciding where, and under what conditions, the

migrants should be off-loaded. The Coast Guard

had previously been able to simply return

migrants to Haiti under a bilateral arrangement

known as the Alien Migrants Interdiction

Agreement (AMIA). However, a court challenge to

the AMIA changed that and prohibited the U.S.

Government from returning migrants to Haiti

without ar least reviewing their status in some

way. Guantanamo was nearby and had the advantage of providing a secure holding area without

being in the territorial United States.5

But this stopgap measure only made the situation more critical as time passed and the number

of persons grew. The migrants continued to live

under field expedient shelters on the decks of the

cutters where heat, - dirt, and boredom compounded each other. Various echelons of command debated the problem for nearly two weeks.

Pinally, the Guantanamo base commander,

Captain William C. McCamy, USN, decided conditions on the cutters had become unmanageable

and ordered die base to prepare to house the

refugees ashore. On 22 November, after receiving

authority from Washington, Admiral Edney

authorized Captain McCamy to provide emergency humanitarian assistance" for up to 483

migrants. It was a cautious approval. Although the

message mentioned preparations to deploy a joint
6 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF SI'WNGTI-L 

Photo courtesy of BGen George 13. W~lls, Jr. 

BGen George PI. Wulls, Jr., corn19randedJoint Task 

Force Gj7MO. He stands on the hill ouerlooking 

Camp McCulla: the tempormy borne to thousands 

of Haitian migrants. Guunlanamo Bay is visible 

ilz the background, m is the leeward side of the 

task force to Guantananio Bay to care for the 

migrants, it went on to stipulate it did not "authorize the erection of any new structures for refugees 

aboard GTMO, including tents."G 

For the Marines at the barracks, it was like 

waking up the morning after the Marine Corps 

Ball to find the migrants at their doorstep. l'hey 

saw the cullers in the bay swinging at anchor and 

waiting for a decision. When the conunand in 

Norfolk permitted them to land, the Haitians first 

met the Marines, who were working alongside the 

Navy to prepare for their largely unexpected 

arrival. The Marines' principle focus was on the 

facilities at Camp Bulkeley, an expeditionary 

training camp in the southeast corner of the base 

named after famed torpedo boat conmander, 

Lieutenant John Bulkeley, who IY~ spirited 

General Douglas MacArthur from the Philippines 

in 1942 and gone on to command the base at 

Guantanamo later in his career. 

Camp Bulkeley was largely down to its barebones when the work began. There were a few 

simple whitewashed buildings nestled in the hills 

overlooking the sea, some basic plumbing, and 

concrete slabs designed for tents. Each slab could 

acconxnodate one general-purpose tent housing 

18 to 20 cots, which left virtually no room for privacy. One news storyabout the camp described it 

as "windswept," which only vaguely conveyed 

the small, barren stretch of ground perched on a 

cliff overlooking the Caribbean.; 

A functional system evolved over time where 

the Navy ran the camp inside while the Marines 

provided security outside the perirneter.8 The 

operation ran smoothly, in no small part because 

of an October naval base defensive exercise conducted to test base readiness for handling and 

processing large numbers of Cuban refugees-the 

kind of refugees the U.S. Government had been 

expecting for years.9 

Meanwhile, tlie con~mand echelon at Norfolk, 

recognizing the small force of Marines and sailors 

at Guantanarno could not care for large numbers 

of migrants for an extended period, were looking 

ahead at tlie possibility of deploying a joint task 

force to care for the migrants. The Marines of the 

2d Force Service Support Group (2d FSSG) at 

nearby Camp Lejeune were a natural choice for 

such a mission since the group already had developed mdimentary contingency plans for handling 

a Cuban exodus of up to 2,500 refugees in 

response to an August 1991 request from Admiral 

Paul D. Miller, Commander in Chief, Atlantic 

Fleet, The support group also had sent representatives to Guantanamo in September and October 

for further planning and participation in the 

October defensive exercise.lQ 

Commanding the 2d FSSG was Brigadier 

General George H. Walls, Jr. General \Valls, an 

engineer by training and a universally respected 

officer from Pennsylvania, had recently served 

away from the fleet as a professor of naval science. Many considered him the ideal combination 

of warrior and diplomat, providing firm yet 

humane leaclership and possessing a gift for leading troops and trusting subordinates. Perhaps 

more than anything, it was General Walls' handson leadership that won him respect. He had a 

reputation of being in touch with his troops and 

the situation. A simple anecdote tells of a US 

Army sentry high in a watchtower at Guantanamo 

that found himself answering the general's questions about his work. Not familiar with Marine 

Corps culture, the sentry was pleasantly surprised 

that a general officer would actudly try to look at 

the world from a soldier's point of view.'' 

Among those holding the general in high 

esteem was a dedicated and professional member 

of the Service Support Group. Sergeant Major 

Douglas E. Berry, who was to deploy with the 
OPEKATIOW GTMO 7 

general because of his earlier experience on joint 

task forces. 

When Lieutenant General William M. Keys, 

then commancler of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, 

began to plan for the humanitarian operation in 

Guantanamo in mid-November, he turned to 

General Walls. On or about 20 November, 

General Keys sent the planning order and General 

Walls began to pull together the team he thought 

would be needed for the operation.12 General 

Walls and his subordinate, Colonel Peter R. 

Stenner, who was then commander of Brigade 

Service Support Group 6 and about to become 

director of operations for the task force, drafted a 

table of organization for a JTF at Guantanamo. 

lhey drew heavily from the Marine Corps 

because Marines were, at least initially, a readily 

available and known quantity.15 * 

Given its training and mission, 2d FSSG was 

already organized to establish and run expeditionary camps. Remembering the lessons of the 

so-called Marie1 Boatlift of 1980, when more than 

124,000 Cubans fled their country by boat to seek 

refuge in the U.S. during President Jimmy Carter's 

administration. Marines had worked with those 

refugees, and considering the type of work that 

needed to be done this time, General Walls and 

Colonel Stenner selected Marines and sailors for 

the job who were specialists in food sewice, engineering, and tneclical assistance. From the start, 

they also planned to reach outside the Marine 

Corps to select specialties that were not organic to 

the Service Support Group: such as the highly 

professional civil affairs capability of the U.S. 

Army, to allow other Services to provide a higher 

proportion of replacements when the Marines 

rotated home.14 Initially, they thought the joint 

task force would comprise a few hundred servicemen caring for no more than 2,500 migrants. 

Back at Guantanamo, even though the initial 

483 migrants had been brought ashore, pressure 

continued to mount as more migrants put to sea 

and were rescued by the Coast Guard. A temporary restraining order from the Second Federal 

District Court in Miami on 19 November complicated the situation by closing the option of quick 

repatriation, forcing the migrants to remain guests 

" Sergeant Major Ber~y realized one of the proble~ns the JTF 

would face would be rhe different ways each Service tre3tetl 

its members, and it woulcl be impo~tant for the JTF% personnel pnlicies to he as uniform as possible, especially with 

regard to benefits and discipline. He worked hard to make 

that llappen, reaching out to all of the noncomnuss~oned officers in the JTF. (Hefty inrvw) 

of the armed forces for the time being. With the 

need for the JTF growing, General Walls acted 

quickly on a 22 November pre-deployment order 

stating "U.S. CinCLant is authorized to land 

refugees temporarily aboard NS [Naval Station] 

Guantanamo as a last resort." The order went on 

to direct the deployment of an advanced echelon 

and liaison officer team to Guantanamo to further 

preparations lor the "possible" deployment of the 

JTF.15 On 23 November, the advance party left 

Camp Lejeune. Just two days later on 25 

November, with six cutters in the harbor carrying 

1,415 migrants on board, and another ship 

enroute with an additional 304 migrants, General 

Walls finally received ;I formal deployment order 

and literally packed his 1~ags.l" 

According to the concept of operations, the 

Atlantic Fleet was to deploy a joint task force to 

Guantanamo to conduct temporary emergency 

humanitarian assistance and security operations. 

The order contained 21 number of interesting 

caveats, such as: the force should deploy "so as to 

Back at Guantanamo, even though the 

initial 483 migrants had been brought 

ashore, prPessure continued to mount as 

more migrants put to sea and were rescued by the Coast Guard. 

[be] mostly self-sufficient" without the need for 

support from the Navy base; at the same tune, no 

construction of tents or other temporary facilities 

were permitted until Norfolk obtained the 

approval of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. The next day, as CinCLant authorized the 

Navy and the Coast Guard to offload the additional migrants, General Walls landed in Cuba and 

officially became the commander of Operation 

Safe Harbor; which was renamed two days later 

as Operation GTMO.17 An interesting footnote to 

the order that renamed the operation stated the 

anticipated length of the operation was "in excess 

of 30 days." The footnote indicates many in the 

higher echelons, although reluctant to commit, 

expected the crisis would not blow over quickly. 

General Walls immediately went to work to get 

enough members of his task force on the ground 

to take control of Camp Bulkeley from the Navy, 

which was scheduled to occur 29 November.~s 

Then, working with the Navy, he had to ensure 
8 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Camp Bulkeley could shelter as many as 2,500

migrants and make plans for possible expansion

to another, better location at Camp McCalla, a former airfield on the coast near the heart of the

base. (The camp was named for Commander

Bowman H. McCalla, the commander of the

squadron that had carried Sergeant John Quick to

Cuba. The commander has been described as

generally irascible and a friend of the Marine

appear to occupy it. The task force hoped to

unload all the migrants from the anchored. cutters

by 2 December and. to put them to worlc alongside the Marines, sailors, and soldiers helping to

build their own camps.'9 The intent was to construct adequate facilities for some 12,000 migrants

and phase out Camp Bullceley by 20 December,

keeping those facilities' in reserve or using them

for special purposes. It was soon to become the

Photo courtesy of l3Gen George II, Walls, Jr.

In late 1991, Camp Mc6'alla's rows of tents are clearly visible on the abandoned runway oftheforiner

airfield. The naval base c piers and the area known as "Mainside" are evident in the background,

Corps.) Although initially lacking in many needed

facilities, the former runways, aprons, and

hangars had obvious refugee camp potential. The

migrants would not have to live in an environment of dust and sand, and while the hangars

could not accommodate everyone, they were well

suited as ready-nrnde shelters for many of the

migrants. The Joint Chiefs apparently approved

further construction at the site and work started

on 30 November, which was General Walls 49th

birthday.

Time remained a critical element as the joint

task force worked frantically to keep pace with

the flow of refugees. As soon as U.S. servicemen

erected a shelter, Haitian migrants seemed. to

camp for migrants who had been cleared to proceed to the United States. The overriding theory

was to separate the forwnate migrants from those

who were still in limbo or awaiting repatriation to

Haiti.2"

To meet the deadlines, many of General Walls'

Marines worked 18-hour days. Even those

Marines with other duties found themselves

impressed into the task force, The barracks

Marines, along with an artillery unit that had come

to the base for an exercise, Battery El, 3d

Battalion, 10th Marines, soon came under the

operational control of the JTF, which reached the

strength of 46 officers and 549 enlisted Marines by

30 November. Colonel Gary A. Blair, commanding
OPERATION GTMO 9

DVIC DN-ST-92-05322

After disembarking from the USCG Vigilant (WMEC 617) at Guantanamo Bay, a group of Haitian

migrants board a bus that will carry them to a humanitarian relief center at Camp Mc6'alla. The

migrants' faces convey the sense of apprehension that many felt on their first day at the naval base.

officer of the Marine Barracks and a common

sense leader who got the job done without fanfare, was given comrnand21 Colonel Blair was

especially happy to have Battery I-I under his control since that group had recently returned from

Operation Provide Comfort, a large-scale refugee

operation in Northern Iraq where Marines helped

establish and run Kurdish refugee relocation

camps.22

In addition to the Marines, approximately 400

members of the task force were from other

Services. There were now 1,477 migrants in the

camps and more than 1,000 sat waiting on ships

in the harbor.23 * Although responsibilities shifted,

the Army generally administered Camp McCalla

while the Marines controlled Camp Bulkeley and

o fly the beginning of necember 1991, the joint task force had

banned the use of the term "refugee" for the Haitians at

Guantanamo. They were to be referred to as "migrants" to

avoid the impression, especially when speaking to journalists,

that they had the legal status of refugees. (Maj Theodore R.

McKcldin Ill, Notes on Operation GTMO, Dec00, GTMO/Haiti

collection, McHc)

provided external security in the form of on-call

reaction forces for both camps. Among the many

competing priorities was the urgent need for medical treatment, or at least triage. Many of the

snigrants had never had any kind of medical treatment in their lives, and there was an abundance

of communicable diseases that required immediate treatment to avert the specter of epidemics.

Navy (and later U.S. Air Force) medical personnel

set to work and quickly made enormous strides in

the mahagement of this public health problem.

The corpsmen, nurses, and doctors went aggressively in search of patients and maintained a 24-

hour presence in the camps. A migrant could see

a corpsman any time of the day or night. Migrants

with communicable diseases were treated and, if

necessary. isolated frotn the general population.

Pregnant wotnen—at one time there were some

400 in the camps—received special attention.

These were the first steps in establishing patientpractitioner relationships. One small gauge of the

strength of these relationships was the case of one

migrant who refused to return to Haiti until he
10 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

DVTC DN-ST-92-05576

As pan of the processing at Camp McG'alla, each

migrant received a quick medical checkup. For

many this was the first time in their lives that a

health care provider had seen them.

had completed the prescribed round of dental

work.24

Another early priority, one that received the

personal attention of General Walls, was the

promulgation of a set of rules of engagement.

This document began with a reminder that

"Haitians are not EPWs [enemy prisoners of war].

Treat them humanely with dignity and respect.

Use only the minimum force necessary." General

Walls intended to set the tone for his command's

relations with the migrant.s through the rules of

engagement and his own brand of leadership. He

maintained that tenor throughout his time at

Guantanamo.25

Another important aspect was the development

of the civil affairs concept of operations. Civil

affairs occupied a central role in Operation

GTMO. It dealt with the day-to-day management

of the camps and was conducted by a welltrained and well-prepared group of soldiers from

the Army's 96th Civil Affairs Detachment, 96th

Civil Affairs Battalion.

The plan, already elaborated by U Decemher,

was split into three phases. Phase I covered shortterm actions required over the first 30 days for

migrant security, safety, and welfare. These

included the closeout of Camp Bulkeley, the

refinement of migrant living arrangements to permit the reunification of extended families, providing some means of communication with relatives

in Haiti, and establishing a photo identity system.

Phase Ii was the transition to a steady-state camp

in the period from day 30 to day 120. It included

the provision of religious services, the creation of

a community council, and die employment of

migrants iii construction and maintenance projects. Phase III, which would run from day 120

until the end of the operation, would emphasize

public education, cottage industries, and the publication of a camp newspaper.26

The separation of migrants into various categories was a particularly sensitive issue. Prom the

start, the JTF had been organizing individuals into

categories: families, single males, unaccompanied

minors, "screened—in" for immigration to the

United States, and "screened-out" for repatriation

to Haiti. Most of those who were screened-in

were able to claim they were victims of political

persecution. Some of these categories, while makovic DN-ST-92-05577

A Marine processes paperwork for Haitian

migrants at Camp McGalla. Individuals were

divided into two hasic groups, those slated for

immigration to the United States and those to be

returned to Haiti.
OPERATION GTMO 17 

Photo courtesy of UGen George H. Walls, Jr. 

During a happy moment, BGen George H. Walls meets with "screened-in" Haitian migrants eligible to 

proceed to the United States Hospital-style plastic identification bracelets, visible on the right, werepl-ouided to each miffrunt and became indispensable in keeping track oj'individuals. 

ing perfect sense to planners, were conf~~sing to 

the migrants. For example, the Haitian idea of 

family was the extended fanlily, nor just the 

nuclear family. And grouping single males together turned out to be a force multiplier for malcontents, who grew increasingly vocal in early 

December. 

Unrest at Camp McCalla 

'I'ask force members often felt a degree of 

uncertainty about the future. They did not know 

how long they would be on the island or what, 

exactly, was US Government policy on a range 

of migrant issues. But that confusion was minor 

compared to the uncertainty felt by the migrants. 

From their point of view, life had turned into a 

strange combination of action and inaction that 

started with a dramatic rescue at sea by a warship 

followed by a long wait under difficult conclitions 

afloat. Then, one day, seemingly at random, they 

were transferred to shore, placed in conlpouncls 

bounded by barbed wire and asked to subsist on 

strange food. While it was better to live in a camp 

than on the deck of a ship, there was now even 

more waiting and little hard information on their 

status. Were they on their way to the US.? Or was 

there some less desirable fate in store for them? 

These uncertainties led to various kinds of disturbances in the camps during the period from 5 

to 17 December even though the joint task force 

continued to work tirelessly to implement its 

plans, often ahead of schedule. Already, a camp 

newspaper was being published in the native 

Creole language to provide up-to-date information, a 60-bed hospital for migrants was up and 

running, and a new water system for laundsy had 

been installed. Portable toilets and showers were 

in place and a good lighting system illuminated 

the hundreds of tents austerely divided by rolls of 

concertina wire into compounds--which were 

designated McCalla I, 11, and 111. The screened-in 

migrants had been moved four miles away to 

Camp Bulkeley to await their happy fate. Camp 

McCalla was, almost by definition, a haven for the 

unhappy, the confused, and the angry.27 

While none of the early disturbances were particularly serious, they did nor bode well for the 
12 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH 

future. A 5 December demonstmtion at Camp 

Bulkeley was sparked by complaints the processing was too slow and camp conditions were too 

restrictive. A demonstration at Camp McCalla I1 on 

10 December grew from a lurid rumor the Cuban 

army planned to storm the base and kill the 

Haitians if they were not out of Cuba within five 

days. The mmor spawned after one migrant 

reported hearing the news on a Cuban radio station. The result was near panic. Responding later 

to reporters, Major Donald J. Kappel, the JTF's 

public affairs officer, said: "There were no 

injuries, no violence-just agitation. People were 

yelling and running around the camp. ... Once we 

got wind of this, we told them ... they were safe 

and no one would hurt them."% Nevertheless, 

denlonstrations at IbIcCalla I1 and McCalla 111 continued over the next few days. Marines and soldiers erected additional concertina barriers 

between the various groups as a precaution.z!J 

On the night of 94 December, McCalla IT was 

once again the focus of attention. There was a 

series of meetings in the compound, which 

housed single tnales as well as a few families. The 

meetings began small, with key individuals 

haranguing listeners. Videotapes made by the JTF 

intelligence section 0-2) show organizers speaking and gesticulating to groups seated on the 

ground around them. The leaders made their way 

through the con~pound threatening and cajoling 

others into sharing their viewpoint. A few holdouts that stayed in their tents were aggressively 

harassed; some may have been beaten.30 

The JTF found out the next day just how hr the 

militants were willing to go. General \Valls and his 

staff were in their offices in the small headquarters building on a hill overlooking Camp McCalla. 

Sergeant Major Berry recalled General Walls coming down the passageway and exclaiming, 

"Sergeant Major, they're out of the camp!" Walls 

and Berry, along with the general's aide and driver, quickly covered the shon distance to the camp 

to confront the crowd, which comprised roughly 

500 males from McCalla I1 who had gathered 

along the north and east fences. General \Valls 

attempted to reason with them across the looped 

strands of concertina wire. Some of the clernonstrators were polite, thanking him for his efforts' 

but adding it was time for them to move on. 

Other demonstrators were more hostile, threatenPhoro counesy of RCen Gcorgc H. Wdls, JI-. 

During a less happy moment in eurly December 1991, Haitian migrants protest camp conditions. 

Although conditions at the camp were beuign, maxy vocal migrants were eager to move on to the United 

States and did not t~ndemtand the delay. 
OPERATION GTMO 13 

ing the general if he did not comply with their 

demands. Approximately 50 migrants breached 

the northwest corner of the conce~tina wire, 

apparently planning to start their journey to the 

United States then and there by walking out of 

Camp McCalla and Guantanamo and proceeding 

through Cuba. Some even packed their meager 

belongings and were carrying them in bundles 

and satchels.3l 

As the situation quickly deteriorated, some of 

the migrants began throwing garbage and rocks, 

one object striking General Walls in the head. He 

was not injured, but his cover had heen knocked 

off. He replaced his headgear and moved on, his 

entourage forming a protective ring around him. 

The general remarked to the sergeant major he 

would be happy when the US. Army military 

police (MPs) arrived. Sergeant Major Berry said 

they were already there and pointed to the rear, 

where some 10 meters away the IvIPs stood wearing riot gear with face shields already down. 

Some MPs had dogs with them. (Finding a large, 

shaggy but threatening Belgian Shepherd in their 

path, one group of Haitian "escapees" had simply 

turned around and gone back to the camp shortly before the general's arrival on scene.) An Army 

chaplain, who arrived to lend a hand, fell to the 

ground after a full carton of milk hit him in the 

groin. Another soldier was bitten by a Haitian and 

evacuated. In the words of the official message 

announcing the disturbance to Norfolk, the JTF 

reported the "Haitians employed tent poles, cots, 

cot cross bars [the pieces of wood that stretched 

the canvas tight on the cots], gallon water jugs. 

and broken pieces of asphalt as weapons."i2 The 

migrants also used the cots to breach the lines of 

concertina wire by laying them across the rings of 

wire to form a bridge of sorts over the razor-sharp 

barbs. 

The melee eventually ebbed and the riot was 

contained. Reinforcements arrived from various 

units, including the base and the barracks. Some 

were still wearing shower shoes and civilian 

clothes. In the end, no migrant made it out of the 

McCalla area. 

However, confining the disturbance was not 

the same as defusing it. Within McCalla 11, somewhere between 50 and 250 ringleaders fanned the 

flames and tried to spread the unrest to other 

compounds. They tore down all the generalpurpose tents in their own compound and tried'to 

cross into McCalla 111. They were stopped by a 

group of Marines from the barracks and a detachment from the Senrice Support Group's 8th 

Engmeer Support Battallon who. along w~th Army 

MI'S, formed a perimeter around McCalla I1 That 

did not stop the malcontents from shouting across 

the wire to the migrants In McCalla 111 and 

Within McCalla 11, somewhere between 50 and 250 ringleaders fanned 

the James and tried to spread the 

unrest to other compounds. They tore 

down all the general-purpose tents in 

their own compound and tried to cross 

into McCalla 111. 

attempting to persuade them to join in the protest. 

They also directed their attention to the Haitian 

women and children who happened to be in 

i\?cCalla 11. Some of the post-action repotts inclicated the women and children had been held 

hostage. While this may have been too formal a 

description for their situation, they certainly were 

at the mercy of the malcontents and subject to 

pressure from them, At close of business on 15 

December, the JI'P reported it would keep the 

perimeter intact and, in understated official language, added: "tensions are such [that] it is currently deemed not prudent to reenter the camp to 

ensure internal security."Jj At approximately the 

same time, General Walls asked for reinforcements from the mainland United States.34 

On the evening of 15 December, a representative of the United Nations High Conunissioner for 

Refugees spoke with the rioters, who expressed 

their desire to leave the "prison" camp and talk to 

representatives from the Haitian communily in the 

US. The migrants promised to suspend the rioting 

for 48 hours if the U.S. Government showed signs 

of preparing to move them from Guantanamo to 

the mainland. At the same time, General Walls. 

who labeled the situation "extremely volatile," 

explored means of meeting the more legitimate 

demands-such as allowing migrants who already 

had been screened to proceed to the United 

States.35 The general also made his message clear 

to the men in AkCalla 11. During a brief exchange, 

Walls told one of the malcontents that neither he 

nor, by implication, any of his cohorts were going 

to the United States because they were behaving 

irresponsibly. The general admonished him to 

change his behavior and asked if there were any 

questions. There were none.36 
14 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH 

The events of the night of 15 December set no 

one's mind at rest. The migrants conducted what 

appeared to be a voodoo ritual. Some wrapped 

themselves in white sheets and walked to the four 

corners of their compound, which represented 

the four corners of the earth, to consult with the 

spirits. They then drew strength from the earth by 

lying down on the ground near what appeared to 

be a makeshift voodoo shrine. (A voodoo shrine 

typically includes representations of Christian and 

While the battalion from Camp 

Lejeune was still in the air, General 

Walls' staff was drafting a fragmentary order for Operation ~ake Charge, 

designed to regain control of the camp 

and to restore order within it. 

voodoo religious figures and other objects 

shrouded with symbolic meaning, such as candles 

or glass jars.) The general and his staff worried 

the next step might be a blood sacrifice of some 

sort. One officer thought some of the Haitians 

believed that a sacrifice nrould hasten the arrival 

of the "magical bird" that would take then1 to 

Florida.37 Another officer remembered hearing 

about a threat by the nlalcontents to start throwing babies over the fence if their demands were 

not met within 48 hours.3Gtili. there was some 

semblance of order in the camp, Migrants armed 

with makeshift weapons conducted what 

appeared to be patrols around the perimeter of 

the compound. Once again, the JTF intelligence 

staff filmed the proceedings, in part to make a 

record, and in part to make it easier to identify the 

ringleaders.39 

In the meantime, the reinforcements General 

Walls had requested were on their way. The 

responding unit was the air alert battalion from 

Camp Lejeune, which was at the time, 2d 

Battalion, 8th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel James 

C. Hardee commanding. Hardee's unit began 

deploying a total of 302 Marines and sailors from 

Company F and Company G and the supporting 

battle staff less than four hours after receiving the 

deployment order. The battalion was on the 

ground in Cuba by the early morning hours of 16 

Decetnber.40 

While the battalion from Camp Lejeune was 

still in the air, General Walls' staff was drafting a 

fragmentary order for Operation Take Charge, 

designed to regain control of the camp and to 

restore order within it. The order outlined six 

phases and essentially called for the JTF to establish a series of progressively smaller cordons to 

divide the malcontents into ever smaller and more 

manageable groups.41 

The order stated that, even before the first 

phase, the JTP would conduct deception operations intended primarily to keep the migrants 

occupied until reinforcements arrived. In Phase I, 

scheduled to begin at 0400 on 17 December, the 

most basic cordon and breach of militant defenses nrould occur. The external security units would 

establish a cordon around the camp while the 

internal security units would break into the compound and establish a cordon around the 

migrants in the southeast corner of the camp. In 

Phase 11, the JTF would set up additional cordons 

and sweep the compound for stragglers. In Phase 

111, the MPs would safeguard and transfer families 

that had the bad luck of being located in McCalla 

11. The MPs also would remove anything from the 

camp that could serve as a weapon. Phase IV 

called for putting up new barriers. During Phase 

V, the remaining migrants would be screened and 

searched, followed by the withdrawal of assault 

forces during Phase VI. Lieutenant Colonel Ted W. 

Hashinloto, commander of the US Army's 504th 

Military Police Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington, 

was to take control of the internal security force 

while Colonel Blair would assume control of all 

Marines present, including the newly arrived 2d 

Battalion, 8th Marines. 

When identified in the course of Operation 

Take Charge, ringleaders would be detained and 

held for removal to a segregation facility, Camp 

VII, which was a cross between a holding facility 

and a brig. But the order placed specific limits on 

the use of force. The emphasis was to be a show 

of force, with actual force to be used only when 

necessary. Specific guidance was tailored to various threats the members of the JTF might face. 

Most of the troops in the operation would carry 

only riot gear, such as shields and batons. 

Migrants who were slow to move during the operation were to be helped to their feet and encouraged to move where directed. If they still did not 

move, they were to be subdued: restrained with 

plastic flexicuffs, and left for the snatch team. 

Violent resisters were to be subdued; cuffed, and 

placed face down in a prone position. If migrants 

n~shecl the line, troops were to use shields to 

push them off and escalate to batons only if nec- 
OPERATION GTMO 15

DVIC DN-ST-92-05451

As camp lift returned to normal following several days of disturbances, members of the US, Army's 82d

Airborne Division Band perform for the migrants on Ghn stmas Day 1991.

essary. If groups of migrants broke through the

line, the troops on the line were to remain in formation and allow the snatch teams to handle the

intrusion. All things considered, it was a very

carefully planned operation that left little to

chance and clearly indicated the commander's

intent of control and restraint.

When the time came for the operation to begin

in the early morning of 17 December, the Haitians

in the camp were nearing exhaustion. Many were

actually asleep when 0400 rolled around. This

was part of the JTF plan: to strike when the

migrants were at the end of their tether. There is

no question the Haitians were taken completely

by surprise, and it was not a pleasant surprise.

Grim-faced Marines, some holding rifles with

fixed bayonets, encircled the camp. Marine engineers wearing flak jackets and helmets and armed

with breaching tools moved swiftly to make gaps

in the wire through which the Army MP5,

equipped with riot geat; entered the compound.

The stunned migrants offered no resistance, and

the first—and potentially most difficult—phase of

the operation was over in nine minutes.42

The JTP immediately proceeded to Phases II

and III. It took some 30 minutes to transfer families to McCalla IV, which cleared the way for the

removal of all cots, tents, poles, and tent stakes.

The Phase IV construction of a new barrier

around Mcçalla II began within five hours of the

start of the operation. All the male migrants in the

camp were carefully searched and screened

before being either returned to the camp or

moved to Camp VII. The process included a

check against the data collected on video by cameramen from the J-2 during the unrest. Whatever

the destination, each migrant received two blankets and a cot—albeit a cot without wooden

crossbars. As General Walls noted in his message

to Norfolk, life in McCalla II would only return to

normal once migrants show a willingness to

obey basic camp rules."4

The air alert battalion from Camp Lejeune continued to play a significant role, especially in reinforcing the exterior perimeter of McCalla II while

the new barrier was being erected. When releasing the battalion on 23 December to return to

Camp Lejeune, General Walls wrote the group

had "conducted the joint operation with all the

professionalism and spirit that U.S. Marines are

known to possess."44

On the same day, the Commandant of the

Marines Corps, General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., came

to see what his Marines had accomplished.
16 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

General Mundy recognized the recent efforts of

all Marines at Guantanamo and discussed how

Operation GTMO might end. The same message

that announced the Commandant's impending

arrival discussed plans to repatriate migrants to

Haiti, stating the JTF was to begin to prepare

migrants for repatriation.45

The plan showed the same refrain that had

persisted throughout the operation. The preference, especially at the senior levels of command

in Norfolk and Washington, was for the operation

to end as soon as possible so units of the JTF

could move on to other work. That point of view

was especially important for small Services such

as the Marines, which found its resources drained

significantly by the operation. But as rime went

on, it became clear the types of challenges

Marines faced at Guantanamo would become part

of the operational realities in the post-Cold War

era.

Anticlimax and Repatriation

New year's Day 1992 came and went without

any resolution of the situation. At the end of

December, there were some 7,000 Haitian

migrants at Guanranamo. A month later, that number had swelled to more than 11,000. Then, on 31

January, the Supreme Court vacated lower court

stays that had kept President George H. \V. Bush's

administration from forcibly repatriating migrants

to Haiti. The day following the court action, JTF

officers spread the word among screened-out

migrants and asked for volunteers to go home on

the first boats. Even if no one volunteered, there

was no doubt the U.S. would repatriate screenedout migrants. "For the most part, they took it very

calmly," General Walls commented to reporters,

adding the migrants "understand that [the court's

decision] allowed for involuntary repatriation."46

The JTF was soon loading migrants onto Coast

Guard cutters bound for Port-au-Prince, where

they disembarked under international supervision

in accordance with carefully crafted agreements

between the 1-laitian and U.S. Governments, as

well as various international organizations. The

goal was to protect the remrning migrants, and

arrangements were made for United Nations and

Red Cross representatives to monitor the process

along with Haitian and U.S. officials.

OVIC DN-ST-92-05828

Among the prominent visitors to camp Mcc'alla. was the Chainnan of the Joint chiefs of Staff Gen ('olin

L. Powell, shown here in February 1992 listening to Marine GySgt Ronald Antoine as he inteiprets for

one of the migrant leaders, Pastor Edme Lexidan.
OPERATION GTMO 17

DVIC DN-ST-93-00308

AtPort-au-Princc where Coasi Guard cutters had

dropped them off; repatriated 1-laitian migrants

wait for transportation back to their villages and

an unknown reception.

While most screened-out migrants went peacefully, often relieved the boredom and uncertainty

of life at Camp McCalla had come to an end, there

were a few dramatic moments, especially when

reporters were on hand. 'Kill me now," wailed

one migrant, flailing his arms. "If I go back to

Haiti, they will kill me. ... No! I don't want to go

back to Haiti!"48

To keep order on the cutters, the JTF deployed

Marines in their traditional role as shipboard security detachments. Prominent among the Marines

selected for this duty were teams from the 2d and

3d Platoons of the Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security

Team (FAST) Company, Atlantic, based in

Norfolk, Virginia.49 Marines from the barracks at

Guantanamo sometimes rode the ships in 10-man

detachments, but whenever the FAST Marines

were present, the mission of the barracks Marines

was simply to provide pier-side security at

Guantanamo.5°

The seagoing Marines faced a unique set of

challenges in their work. The experiences of the

Marines and Coast Guard crew of the cutter

Tampa (WMEC 902) on one of the later runs from

Guantanamo to Port-au-Prince offer a vivid illustration of those challenges. After being embarked

at Guantanamo, many of the 96 migrants on

hoard were belligerent; claiming they had been

told the destination was Miami, not Port-auPrince. They went on a hunger strike—a more or

less pointless gesture since the trip to Haiti lasted

a mere 12 hours. When the ship docked in Portau-Prince in a light rain around 1100 on 29 April,

all the migrants refused to go ashore. As members

of the press looked on, one of the women started

to scream, as if in great pain. At the same time,

the ship's company began to carry the migrants'

possessions ashore. At this point, about 65

migrants left the ship to regain their possessions.

Through a linguist attached to the JTF, the

ship's officers negotiated with the remaining

migrants, who said they would rather die on

board the Tampa than as victims of the military

regime ashore. The negotiations eventually

reached an impasse, and the ship's company

shifted gears, preparing to use a semblance of

force by charging the ship's fire hoses. That threat

enabled the Coast Guard crew to escort one of

the migrants off the ship. When he cried out to

onlookers that they "use force," one of the Haitian

policemen on the pier countered ominously, 'We

have force here, too." But the tension was broken.

There was even a ripple of laughter, and the rest

of the migrants filed ashore without incident. Two

of the migrants went so far as to bend down and

kiss the dock. By 1440, the last busload of

migrants had left the dockyards.'

Representatives of the American Embassy at

Port-au-Prince who were at the pier later reported that most of the migrants with whom they had

spoken said they were glad to be home, and it

was only a few malcontents who had caused the

trouble. The embassy did not rest at that, and in

the coming weeks, looked hard for signs of retribution against the returnees, but found none.52

Simply repatriating the Haitians at Guantanamo

did not end the operation. It seemed for every

Haitian the Coast Guard deposited on the pier at

Port-au-Prince, another set sail, hoping to be

picked up by the Coast Guard and he taken to the

Navy base in Cuba where they could vie for a

chance of becoming a political refugee and going

to the United States. If anything, the influx of

migrants grew in the spring of 1992, and Camp

McCalla often came close to capacity, which was

still 12,500, despite repatriations of more than

1,000 migrants per month.
18 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

DYIC DN-ST-92-05826

A Marine talks with Haitian migrants at Camp McC'alla. Many Marines were on friendly terms with their

charges, but Joint Task Force rules forbade any conduct that went beyond a strictly professional relationship, let alone fraternization.

As time went on, members of the JTF became

more adept at running the camp. From interception at sea, through processing and screening, to

subsistence and immigration or repatriation, the

operation had become largely trouble-free. This

was possible because of the solid groundwork

laid by Genera! Walls and his troops.53 *

Water—irs sources, use and disposal—was a primary concern for Marine engineers in Operation GTMO. Most of the

Haitian migrants hart never had such free arcess to clean,

potable water. They bathed in it, washed their clothes in it. and drank it—24 hours a day! This created a challenge in the

form of eontrnlling runoff, the 'gray water" of soap residue

antI dirt. The engineers welcomed the arrival of an Air Force

"ditch witch," which enabled the rapid digging of drainage

ditches tu the edge of the steep cliff, which was Camp

McCalla's western perimeter. From there the water dropped

into Guantanamo Bay. An Israeli-made reverse-osmosis purification plant produced all of the water at Guantanamo. The

capacity of the plant was large enough for the relatively small

numbers of migrants in Operatinn G'l'MO. Rationing water

was never an issue in 1991, but it was to become a critical

issue a Few years later. (Maj Theodore R. McKeldin lit, Notes

on Operation G'fMO, Dec00, GTMO/Flaiti collection, MCHC)

Operation GTMO always had been intended as

a temporary expedient, not as an alternate means

of processing potential immigrants. It occurred to

policy makers in Washington that, in at least one

sense, the camp at Guantanamo was part of the

problem because its very existence appeared to

attract many migrants who might otherwise have

stayed home. As a result of that view, rhe Bush

administration decided in late May 1992 to try a

different approach. By an Executive Order dated

24 May, the President directed the Coast Guard to

rescue and repati-iate migrants directly to Port-auPrince without an intermediate stay at

Guantanamo.54 A few clays later, the aclministra—

tion announced it would phase out the tent city

on the base to keep from enticing Haitians to flee

their homeland55 It seemed tile administration

had found a solution to the problem through

direct repatriation coupled with camp closure,

thus removing the incentive for a Haitian to leave

home.

The administration's approach had the desired

effect, and the number of migrants at
OPERATION CTMO 19

Guantanarno began to dwindle as no new

migrants arrived. All that remained were migrants

scheduled for departure, either to return to Haiti

or, for the lucky minority, to start a new life in the

United States. By 6 June, the number of migrants

had fallen to 8,035 and would drop to only 2,003

by 21 June. On 14 June, the joint task force cointhem. The French word on the tent flap, "maleur"

"unhappiness."

mander distributed the redeployment order. The

order called for the dismantling of Camp McCalla

and the consolidation of remaining migrants at

Camp Bulkeley. When the migrant population

dropped close to 1,000, which it did by 30 June,

the JTF shifted its flag to Camp Bulkeley and

relieved the Marine component of its responsibility for that camp. This freed many Marines to do

other work or to return to the United States.

Before returning home, Marines from Camp

Lejeune worked hard to make Camp McCaIla a

memory by dismantling and storing tents, wire,

and other equipment. Camp McCalla was closed

on lOJuly.56

The number of members assigned to the joint

task force continued to shrink as the migrants

departed. By 18 August, there were only 268

(usually spelled a little differently), is translated as

members of the JTF caring for 293 migrants at

Camp Bulkeley. Those 293 Haitians were in legal

limbo. Most had been screened and would have

been free to travel but for one major obstacle:

about 230 of them were HJV-positive. The rest

were their family members. Under U.S. law, it was

nearly impossible for anyone who was infected

with the virus to enter the country.57

There followed almost a year of stalemate, with

the migrants behind wire at Camp Bulkeley and a

DVIC DF-SI-99-06023

A group qf Haitian migrants stand outside their tent at (amp Mccalla. Time appears to hang heavy on
rump JTF caring for diem. A composite Marine MF

company from Camp Lejeune provided security at

Camp Bulkeley for much of that time. When MP

platoons rotated, barracks Marines stepped in for

them. The quick reaction force also was dispatched whenever there was a call for reinforce,

ments' Two Marine officers commanded the JTF

during this period, Brigadier General Richard I.

Neal, from 22 June to 18 August 1992, and

Colonel Lawrence R. Zinser, from 15 December

1992 to 11 March 1993.5

In 1992, the quick reaction force deployed several times. The most notable deployments

occurred in July and August when violent protests

broke out among the migrants who, bored and

restless, wanted the U.S. Government to resolve

their status one way or the other. Airing concerns

at regularly scheduled town meetings failed to

relieve tensions. There was, after all, little the JTF

could do about policies laid down in Washington.

During the disturbance on 17-1 8 July, the

migrants destroyed a fire truck and injured 14 Air

Quick reaction forces ranged trom squad-sized to whatever

size force was needed to contain the situation safely. The

torces comprised well-equipped Marines who could deploy

within minutes to quell any disturbance.

Force security policemen severely enough that

they required treatment at the local naval hospital. The injuries were inurred in part because

security policemen had exercised so much

restraint when facing the migrants.59

A month later, on 29 August, there was an even

more intense disturbance. This time the migrants

burned seven SEAhuts (Southeast Asia huts, a

temporary barracks used extensively during the

Vietnam War) to call attention to their plight. They

got attention, but not the kind they wanted. Once

again, as in December 1991, the commanding

officer of the Marine Barracks, now Colonel John

T. Murray, a bluff Irish-American described by

one of his subordinates as a Marine's Marine,

organized a task force to restore order. tn a

scaled-down version of Operation Take Charge,

Colonel Murray quickly organized 450 to 500

Marines and sailors into an effective force, which

was able to restore order in the camp without a

single Haitian or U.S. casualty.6 Nevertheless, the

JTF still had to foot the $12,500 bill for damage

caused by the migrants.6'

In the aftermath of the disturbances, further

quality-of-life improvements were instituted to

transform the camp into a temporary community.

There were upgrades in plumbing and electricity

20 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

D\TIC DN-ST-99-06028

Migrants go about their daily routine at camp Mc6'alla. in the summer of 1992. Many made the best qf

an increasingly frustrating situation, while others displayed outright anger at their fate.
OPERATION GTMO 21

and migrant participation in the camp's administration was increased. In a related move on 21

September, the JTF closed Camp VII, the segregation facility for malcontents, and opened Camp

Bulkeley's gates from 0800 to 2000. There really

was nowhere for the migrants to go, hut it was a

welcome gesture.62

The payoff was that, as the stalemate dragged

on into 1993, migrant protests became somewhat

less violent. The next protest, which began at

1300 on 29 January after the migrants had conferred with lawyers from the United States, was a

hunger sthke. which was monitored closely by

medical personnel. The hunger strike lasted

through February and into March and attracted

the attention of dignitaries like the Reverend Jesse

L. Jackson and Rhode Island Senator Claihorne

Pell. Jackson vowed to join the hunger strike if

the administration did not relent and allow the

Haitians to enter the United States. But Congress,

which continued to vote by wide margins to ban

immigration by anyone who was HTV-positive,

tied the administration's hands.3

There followed a variety of peaceful protests, a

"break-out" attempt by 10 migrants (who landed

in the base brig), and the burning of 12 more

Sketch by capt Burton E. Moore, Jt. (Marine corps Mr collection)

A portrayal of Marines and refugees entitled "The Old Gunny is not Pleased" combat artist Capt Burton

Moore depicted the 29 June 1992 event where Haitians were denied access to one qf the holding compound buildings at Camp Bulkeley and the resulting confrontation with known trouble makers.
22 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH 

camp shelters. As lawyers and courts in the U.S. 

continued to ponder the migrants' fate, the month 

of May saw another, shorter hunger strike-this 

one only 12 days-and a rock-throwing incident 

on 30 May. Events finally turned in the migrants' 

favor. Some of the migrants entered the United 

States through various loopholes in the law, and 

on 8 June a US district judge in New York ruled 

in favor of allowing the remaining migrants to 

At the end of the day, the statistics for 

Operation GTMO alone told a dramatic 

story. The JTF had processed more than 

30,000 migmnts, 10,791 of whom had 

entered the US. while some 23,833 were 

repatriated to Haiti. 

enter the U.S. as parolees.6.i It was an empty victory for many of the migrants infected with the 

AIDS virus. Years later, they still had not regularized their status or fit into society. Their relationship with the established Haitian communities in 

New York and Miami remained ambivalent at 

best, and they were almost as isolated as they had 

I~een at Guantanamo.65 

Apparently exhausted by the process, the 

administration did not object, and promised to 

remove the remaining migrants from Guantanamo 

within two weeks. Armed with this decree, the 

JTP lost no time in preparing for its deactivation. 

By 23 June 1993, the command was down to 60 

troops and happy to turn Camp Bulkeley back 

over to the Navy base. The JTF was formally deactivated and relinquished control of its headquarters facilities in the early morning of 30 June. The 

last of its members started for home the next day, 

leaving the most frustrating part of Operation 

GTMO behind them.66 These events coincided 

with diplon~atic initiatives to return President 

Jean-Beltrand Aristide to power and end the 

ongoing crisis in Haiti. 

At the end of the day, the statistics for 

Operation GTMO alone told a dramatic story. The 

JTF had processed more than 30,000 migrants, 

10,791 of whom had entered the U.S. while some 

23,833 were repatriated to Haiti. The cost of the 

operation was recorded as $58,463;000.6' 

What were the implications of Oper~t' ]on 

G'I'MO for the Marine Corps? One was straightforward: that migrant operations were not an anomaly, but a mission for the 1990s. General Walls 

commented this was the kind of mission that only 

the military could execute on short notice-with 

its capability for a quick, orderly, coordinated air 

and ground response to a humanitarian crisis.@ It 

also called for a degree of force--or at least the 

threat of force-applied with skill and restraint to 

preserve order.@ While Operation GTMO was 

something of a departure from the missions of the 

Cold War, a Marine looking back at the history of 

the Corps can find many of the elements of Operation GTMO in earlier operations: ambiguous situations-a strange mixture of humanitarian, 

police, and mililary operations-that called for 

creativity, flexibility, and good small unit leadership. 

The related conclusion that migrant operations 

were a harbinger of things to come was evident 

in the after-action reports. The JTF engineer officer, for example, fornlally suggested that Marine 

Corps civil affairs officers design and maintain offthe-shelf plans for the construction of small, medium, and large camps for varying periods of time. 

Other suggestions stressed the usek~lness of military occupational specialties in migrant operations, such as a strong intelligence staff, which a 

commander needed lo monitor the camps, and an 

independent combat service support organization, 

as opposed to a smaller logistics section, or J-4, 

within the joint staff. But perhaps the most important lesson for Marines was "jointness." No one 

service could go it alone in migrant operations, 

and it turned out that jointness was neither as difficult nor unpleasant as some Marines had 

feared.70 Although the JTF w~s a pick-up team 

and, as such, had an inherent handicap, many of 

the Marines who went to Guantanamo Bay had 

previously worked together at Camp Lejeune. 

That familiarity allowed them to quickly establish 

a working infrastmcture for the humanitarian 

operation. 

There also was a deep sense of personal satisfaction for Marines who had served in the JTF, 

many of whom would rememl~er Operation 

G'I'MO as one of the highlights of their careers. 

Marines traditionally respond well to a challenge, 

especially under the right leadership. The work at 

Guantanamo was hard and the hours long, but 

along with the other members of the JTF, the 

Marines created something out of nothing, and 

that was very satisfying. Adding to that sense of 

satisfaction, the accomplishments of the operation 

were obtained whle contributing to a humanitarian cause. Most Marines in Operation GTMO were 

doing more than just following orders, they were 

genuinely committed to helping others in need." 
Chapter 2 

Operation Sea Signal 

Processing Haitian Migrants o~~Jamaica 

Although Operation GTMO eventually sputtered to an end and its joint task force disbanded, 

the underlying tensions in the region persisted. 

The illegal regime in Haiti did not loosen its grip 

on power despite international pressure, which 

inclildecl an ineffective embargo that continued to 

rnake the even poorer and more desperate 

without weakening the wealthy elite the embargo 

was designed to punish. In July 1993, the United 

Nations brokered an agreement, known as the 

Governor's Islancl Accord, whereby the Haitian 

military wodd cede power peacefully to ousted 

President Jean-Bertrancl Aristide. However, little 

came of the accord after an embarrassing confrontation in October when an advance party of 

United Nations peacekeepers on hoard the 

Harlan County (LS1' 1196) opted not to land at 

Port-au-Prince in the face of a threatening dernonstration. Meanwhile, the Cuban economy conlinued to deteriorate in step with speculations about 

Cuban leader Fidel Castro's health and the durability of his regime. These factors provided ample 

potential for new waves of migrants in the Eastern 

Caribbean in late 1993 and early 1994. 

2cl Force Service Support Group (2d FSSG) at 

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, was, in a sense, 

the successor organization to JTF GTMQnot 

only because the cadre of that JTF originated from 

the unit, but also because a service support group 

comprised the expertise and resources required 

for nligrant operations. As such, it was logical for 

2d FSSG to hold many of the GTMO records and 

be the institutional memory of the operation. It 

also made sense that 2d PSSG would be tasked 

w~th planning for future pnt refugee operatlons 

Under the overall cotn~nand of U S Atlant~c 

Comm:~nd (USACom), as Conunandel 111 Chtef, 

Atlantlc (CunCLant) was now known, 2d FSSG 

worked n~h the Navy base at Guantanarno to 

prepare and maintain contingency plans for 

migrant operations. To that end, a lengthy 7- to 

10-day conference was held at Camp Lejeune in 

early 1994 to discuss potential migrant operations.1 

No Marine was surprised in April 1994 when 

various commands at Camp Lejeune were warned 

of a rising tide of Haitian migrants. But the administration's policy was hazy at best, making it 

impossible to sunply pull an operational plan off 

the shelf and implement it. What did emerge 

clearly from Washington was a general reluctance 

to repeat Operation GTMO-that is, to maintain 

Department of Defense I'horo !USMC) 

BGen Michae1.r. Williawrs commandedJoint Tmk 

Force 160, which in muny ways was Lhe successor 

of Joint Tusk Force GTMO. Described a- a mun 

who WMS "cool in the hot seat" at Guuntanarno, he 

later uttained Jvur-star rank as Assistant 

Cornmandan~ oj'the iWurine Cops. 
hospital ship Was pressed into service to assist as a

profile rejiects its original design as a tanker

refugee camps surrounded by barbed wire on an

American base. The goal was to avoid the lengthy

stalemate JTF GTMO experienced when faced

with HIV-positive Haitians, not to mention the

had press from photos of heavily armed .Marines

and soldiers confronting angry migrants across

billowing rolls of concertina wire. As the tide of

new migrants began to flow, the procedure was

to keep them moving in an orderly fashion, either

to the U.S. or back to Haiti, but not to pitch

camp 2

In April and May, the outlines of the operation

began to emerge. By mid-May, U.S. Marine Corps

Forces, Atlantic, had issued a kind of warning

order to Headquarters II Marine Expeditionary

Force (II MEF) at Camp Lejeune stating that, like

his predecessor, President William J. Clinton had

decided that "genuine Haitian refugees fleeing by

boat ... Iwouldi not he directly returned to Haiti"

Instead, the migrants would be screened at "a

facility in the region" or "on vessels anchored off

shore." The exact location would depend on the

outcome of diplomatic initiatives)

Even before the plan took final shape, Atlantic

Command directed TI MEF to provide a joint task

force commander and a Marine component for

the nascent Joint Task Force 160 (fTP 160). On 24

May 1994, then Brigadier General Michael J.

Williams became commander, fTP 160, and

Lieutenant Colonel (colonel select) Douglas C.

.Redlich became commander, Marine Forces 160

(MarFor 160). Under his command was Lieutenant

Colonel John R. Allen, the head of 2d Battalion,

4th Marines. JTF 160 soon received a set of "he

prepared to" missions, which included providing

shipboard security for migrant processing, establishing a facility for migrant processing on Grand

Turk Island, and maintaining a presence at

Guantanamo to support such initiatives. By early

June, elements of JTF 160 were on the ground or

on ships somewhere in the theater.4

Like General Walls before him, General

Williams was a fortuitous choice. Originally from

Baltimore, Maryland, he was a graduate of the

U.S. Naval Academy who became a Naval Aviator

and was to become Assistant Commandant of the

Marine Corps. He brought to the job a combination of compassion, common sense, and determination. A story about the general and the operation in People magazine was aptly tided "Cool in

24 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

uvic DN-sT-89-02605

A starboard view of the USNS Comfort (T-A1-J 20) as it traveled through the Panama Canal. In 1994, the

screening platform far Haitian migrants. The ship s
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 25

the Hot Seat." Reporting that General Williams

had remained "unflappable" sitting on a "tinderbox" of thousands of refugees, the article pointed

out this was not his first effort to create something

nut of nothing; during the Gulf War, he had

turned a stretch of desert wasteland into a working air base.

The initial focus for General Williams was shipboard processing. To serve as the processing center, the Navy offered the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20),

an enormous ranker that had heen converted into

a hospital ship. After a tortuously complicated set

of negotiations, Jamaica agreed to permit the

C'omJbrt to anchor in her waters while processing

migrants. 1-lowever, the Haitians were to remain

on hoard ship at all times. In concept, Coast

Guard cutters would intercept hoadoads of

migrants in the Windward Passage and transport

them to the C'ornjbri at anchor near Kingston. On

the ('omfort, the Immigration and Naturalization

Service would conduct medical screenings and

interviews. The Haitians were to quickly be

screened-in for immigration to the United States

or screened-out for repatriation to Haiti. If

screened-in, the migrant would fly to

Guantanamo for further processing. Migrants that

were screened-our would be returned directly to

Haiti by Coast Guard cutter or, if the cutters were
26 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

DYIC DN-ST-98-02]44

An aerial view qf the Windward Piers at Guantanamo Bay showing the chartered vessels Mediterranean

Sky (left) and Ivan Franko. A former Russian troopshzp. the Ivan Franko was soon known among

Marines as a dirty, substandard option for billeting.

overloaded, would wait on the Ukrainian cruise

ship Gruzza, which the JTF had leased for the

operation at a cost of $30,000 per day. Gruziya

was a well-run ship, accustomed to meeting the

demands of European and American passengers.

She would have sewed the JTF well, but her contract expired befote the JTF began to operate, and

her successor, the Ivan P anko, would prove to

he much less capable of meeting the demands of

the operation. A company of Marines from 2d

Battalion, 4th Marines, and the battalion's battle

staff, including Lieutenant Colonel Mien, would

he on the ships to maintain order.6 *

There was nothing wrong with the operational

concept. It was straightforward and fit the mission. But there were flaws in the details and the

execution, and those flaws became apparent soon

after the first migrants arrived on board the

comfort on i6 June. The assumption was that 500

Maj John L. Shissler III noted that American intelligence

Lracked the movements of the Ivan Franko to see where the

Soviets might be sending troops. It was one ot the ironies of

the post-Cold War period that she was now "on our side."

(Shissler intvw)

migrants could he processed each day, a number

that proved wildly optimistic. The ship was configured for handling trauma patients rather than

for diagnosing infectious diseases, from which

many of the Haitians suffered. Medical personnel

had to screen for diseases such as tuberculosis,

and the limited number of x-ray machines created

a bottleneck. Another problem was finding a

place on the ship to house patients with infectious

respiratory ailments. The ship's self-contained

heating, ventilation and air conditioning system

made it difficult to isolate air-borne infections. In

fact, the very nature of the ventilation system

made it highly probable that air-borne infections

would spread throughout the ship. It was a nowin situation: migrants had to be taken below

deck to be examined for respiratory infections.

Once there, the mere act of breathing could put

any infection into the circulated air of the ventilation system and rapidly spread it throughout the

ship. Eventually, someone found a portable x-ray

machine that worked outdoors. The machine was

set up on the flight deck and put to work under

less than optimal conditions.
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 27

DVIC DM-ST-97-01593

LtColJohn K Allen, commanding officer of the 2d

Battalion, 4th Marines, gives a guided tour of the

Comfort to special presidential envoy to Haiti; the

Honorable William Gray. The tour demonstrated

the route a 1-laitian migrant would take when

delivered for screening.

There were related problems of disposing

potentially infectious human waste, and of producing enough fresh water to accommodate both

the migrants and the members of the JTR Genera!

Wi!liams entered a virtual catalogue of problems

in his diary, starting with the observation that

"[nlothing maritime is easy." He noted that sheltered anchorages for super tankers and large

ships like the comfort pose unique difficulties for

the types of sma!l craft needed to ferry migrants

to and from their destinations; big ships and litt!e

boats did not mix we!l. To further complicate matters, the same anchorages typically did not have

the same services as regular ports, which usually

offer services such as water taxis, barges, sewer

and water connections, and floating supplies.8

As a result, migrant camps sprouted on the

Comfort's weather decks, principal!y the helicopter pad. Using a hodgepodge of crates, pallets,

tents, camouflage netting, and portable toilets, the

task force erected shelters for the migrants. A special enclosure was erected to house migrants

showing signs of tuhercu!osis, 12 percent of the

total population. The enc!osure was surrounded

by ad hoc ny!on fencing and guarded by a Marine

who stood upwind from the migrants and warned

anyone who approached of the potential danger.

Temporary communities took shape and leaders

emerged. To Allen, it !ooked like the infamous

Civi! War prison camp at Andersonville. But he

and the Haitians made it work.

Photo courtesy of Ltcol John R. Allen

A tent camp Jbr Haitian migrants was set up on the helicopter flight deck f the Comfort. It was a hot,

austere, and boring place.
28 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

PhuLo courtesy of LCol John It. Allen

The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, provided meal service on the flight deck of the Comfort. The individual

serving the meal is himself a migrant who volunteered to assist the Marines.

A studious Marine who had first made a name

for himself commanding the rigorous Infantr

Officer's Course at Quantico, Virginia, Allen was a

devotee of the Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual,

a guidebook written earlier in the century for

small unit leaders in the jungles of Central

America facing unusual challenges ranging from

civil unrest to guerrilla warfare. The manual was

based on the assumption that small wars are conceived in uncertainty, [and] ... demand the highest

type of leadership directed by intelligence,

resourcefulness, and ingenuity." That concept

helped Colonel Allen recognize the value of

working with the migrant community leaders.

When he appeared on deck, he would make a

point of showing respect for the leaders by sitting

and eating with them in their communities.

Lieutenant Colonel Allen also ensured the Marines

shared some of the hardships with the migrants.

For example, Marines maintained a presence

among the migrants during the heat of the day,

which was intensified by the steel deck, and during the routine tropical downpours.10

There were additional unusual challenges. One

being the Ivan Franko, the only option for housing some of the Marines along with migrants who

had been screened-out, was a filthy former Soviet

troopship. Everyone on the Ivan Franko lived in

fetid squalor under far worse conditions than

existed on the comtbrt"

In late June, accusations of murder on the high

seas began to surface. The story, which unfolded

bit by bit, involved a boat filled with Haitians

who, like many others, hoped to get to Florida.

During the voyage, food supplies—mainly flour

mixed with seawater—on the hoat dwindled and

a gang of migrants took it upon thentselves to

reduce the numher of people on hoard. One

woman reported the men tried to throw' her husband overboard. When she resisted, crying des-
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 29

perately, the gang moved on in search of another

victim. Another man, who was from a different

village than most of the other migrants on the

hoar, reported he had kept a low profile to avoid

the gang. All told, the gang allegedly murdered

seven migrants. With the help of military lawyers,

eight suspects were identified and confined until

late July. The JTF ultimately sent the suspects

hack to Haiti for trial under the laws of that nation

on the grounds the murders had occurred on a

Haitian vessel.12

In early July, the 2d Marine Division took steps

to limit the potential for violence at sea, at least

on board U.S. ships. The division began by

deploying small detachments of Marines to Navy

and Coast Guard ships to provide security during

Operations Able Manner and Able Vigil, the codenames for the interdiction of migrants at sea,

which lasted through August.13

As the operation continued, it became clear the

Jamaican option was not working. There were

simply too many Haitians. JTF 160 already had

made the decision to send. some migrants directly

to Guantanamo, even before screening, when the

lines on the comfort were too long. At about the

same time, the Clinton administration concluded

the policy of rescuing and interviewing migrants

was apparently encouraging Haitians to become

sea-borne migrants. As such, the policy was

abruptly changed to stem the flow of migrants,

just as the Bush administration had done a few

years earlier. The new policy stated that migrants

When a cutter with migrants arrived alongside the comfort,

the typical routine was for Luis A. Moreno, an officer with the

u.s. state Oepartnient, anti LtCol Allen to hoard. Speakiog

through an interpreter, they would brief the migrants, who

tentled to be buoyant anti hopeful and often cheered as

Moreno and Ltcol Allen outlined the routine on the comfort.

But the mood was noticeably subdued on one of the cutters,

prompting Moreno and Licol Allen to ask for an explanation.

The interpreter already had heard parts of the story and told

the colonel one migrant boat had been overcrowded and

some of the men had decided to throw "excess" ofigrants

overboard. At one point, the interpreter gestured tn a woman

sitting alone in the helicopter shelter on the flight deck clutching her baby and rocking back and forth. "She was next," he

said. Ltcol Allen asked the interpreter if he knew who the

perpetrators were, and when he said yes, Ltcol Allen called

for the reaction force, which was waiting on the comfort.

Dressed in helmets, body armor, and riot gear, the force came

streaming onto the cutter. After briefing the noncommissioned

officer in charge of the detail, Ltcoi Allen pointed nut the first

suspect and the Marines laid hands on him. The effect was

electric. The previously suhcltted migrants leaped to theit feet,

pointed to the others the interpreter had named and began

cheering when they were led away. (Ltcol John R, Allen

memo to atirhor, 5MarOC, hereafter Allen Memorandum)

rescued at sea could opt either for return to Haiti

(where they could, in theory, apply for a visa at

the American Etnbassy) or go to a "safe haven,"

not further defined but supposedly a refuge of

some sort outside 1-laiti. Migrants would he

allowed to stay at the safe haven as long as the

Ced.ras regime persisted.14

Faced with the new policy and the continuing

flow of migrants, General Williams decided not to

receive any new migrants on the Comfort, and on

6 July he moved his flag to Guantanarno, where

he had to deal with 108 would-be illegal Chinese

immigrants. The Chinese migrants had been

caught in the Coast Guard's nets and briefly put

in the JTF's charge, a bizarre additional burden for

the already harried task force.15

Joint Task Force 160 began to flow resources

only to Guantanamo, and not to Jamaica. Once

the Coast Guard ships and C-130 aircraft stopped.

transporting migrants to Jamaica, everyone in the

JTF was ready for the comfort to raise anchor, sail

to Guantanamo, and unload its migrants at the

ovlc DM-ST-98-02127

A corporal from company G, 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines, can-las a young Haitian mrrant off the

Comfort. The child was one of the last migrants to

leave the ship.
GTMO, it produced the databases and the plastic

migrants.

Navy base. However, the Jamaican government

said the Comfort could not leave Jamaican waters

because the U.S. Government committed to use

Jamaican facilities for a specific purpose and period of time. The State Department was nervous

about offending Jamaican sensibilities and was

slow to resolve the deadlock. This made the situation on the C'omfbrt very difficult because it left

approximately 1,000 Haitians marooned on the

ship, and the longer the deadlock drug on, the

angrier the migrants became.18

Lieutenant Colonel Allen soon had a riot on his

hands, One very hot day around noon he was

summoned to the flight deck to find two files of

Marines in full riot gear facing an unruly crowd,

Four Marines reinforced them with shotguns waiting di reserve. Two Haitians were delivering heated speeches to the group. Using the proven technique of separating the leaders from the crowd,

Allen ordered his Marines to "snatch" the troublemakers. A burly 220-pound body builder stepped

forward, put one of the troublemakers in a bear

bracelets, which enabled the J7F to track individual

hug, and wrestled him to the steel deck. The

Marines then scuttled him out of sight.'

The action sent a shock wave through the

crowd. Not only did it deprive them of their

leader, but it sent a message the Marines meant

business. In response, many of the Haitians simply fell to the deck and cried in frustration.

Nothing they tried seemed to work. Allen followed up with a humanitarian "combined arms"

team made up of psychological warfare specialists, chaplains, and civil affairs officers, all of

whom helped to contain the situation.'8

Since there is no easy Haitian translation tor "Marine," members otJoint Task Force i60 originally used the French word

for soldier when addressing the Haitian migrants. But the

Haitians did not understand exactly who the Marines Were, so

the U.S. servicemen switched to the word "Marine" itself, and

the migrants reacted with respect. They remembered the

Marine constabulary, which had policed Haiti some 60 years

earlier. Soon, all migrants knew it was Marines who rode the

"the ghost ship," as they called the white-painted comfort.

(Allen intvw)

30 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTh

ovic nM-ST-98-o21 26

A Navy chief warrant officer, who was a Deployed Ma.cs Population Identification and Tracking System

(DMPITS) expert, checks rosters received from the Comfort as migrants shqt to the control of Joint Task

Force 160 ashore. The system was a vital component ofJTF operations. Having evolved since Operation
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 31

After a few more days of stalemate, there was

a solution of sorts. A senior Jamaican diplomat

attended a ceremony on board the comfort on 20

July. He praised the joint humanitarian contributions of the Haitian and American governments to

resolve the plight of the migrants. Even though

the diplomatic impasse between Jamaica and the

U.S. had not clearly been resolved, the JTF treated the ceremony as closure and the comfort simply pulled anchor and sailed to Guantanamo.

Once there, the Haitians resisted disenibarking,

saying they wanted to stay in the care of their

familiar Marine protectors rather than facing the

unknown soldiers waiting on the pier. Marine officers and Red Cross officials eventually persuaded

the migrants they had to disembark. But before

they left, they presented Lieutenant Colonel Allen

with a hand-lettered certificate of appreciation

signed by the camp leaders attesting the Marines

had accomplished their work.'9

Soon after their arrival at Guantanamo, Mien

and his Marines staged an unusual ceremony. As

part of a long-planned reorganization, their battalion was to he re-designated 2d Battalion, 6th

Marines, part of a famous regiment that had

fought at Belleau Wood and been the military

home of the legendary Spanish-American War

hero Sergeant John H. Quick. On 23 July,

Lieutenant Colonel Allen and the regimental commander, Colonel Richard A. Huck, led a route

march from the pier where the Gomjbrt had

docked to Cuzco 1-lills, where Sergeant Quick had

earned the Medal of Honor for signaling the fleet

while under fire. With Quick's sword at hand,

Colonel Hock furled 2d Battalion, 4th Marines'

battle colors and replaced it with 2d Battalion, 6th

Marines' colors. A few days later, Allen left

Company F at Guantanamo with JTF 160 and led

the rest of the battalion back to Camp Lejeune for

what would prove to be only a short respite from

migrant operations for his troops.2°

The Camp at Grand Turk

The most exotic sidelight in the history of

Marines in the Caribbean in the 1990s was the

plan to process Haitian migrants in the Turks and

Caicos Islands, a dependent territory of the United

Kingdom occupying a glistening stretch of ocean

between the Bahamas and I-laid, Within the territory, JTF planners focused on Grand Turk Island.

it was an unusual place for most Marines.

About eight-miles long and one-mile wide,

Grand Turk is, in the words of one Marine, an

"austere paradise" at the eastern end of a string of

low-lying limestone islands dotted by extensive

marshes and mangrove swamps.2t Only 2 percent

of the territory is arable, which gives the visitor an

idea of its severity. One of the territory's principal

cash crops was salt, evaporated from seawater

intentionally trapped on land that was at or below

sea level.

The capital of the territory was Cockburn

Town, which reminded the same Marine of the

Combat Town training area at Camp Lejeune. a set

of partially completed houses that generations of

Marines have fought over. Cockburn Town had

little to offer apart from a scattering of concrete

buildings, some of which appear to he permanently under construction. Among the buildings

were one or two hotels, including the Kitina

Hotel, which had a relaxed, barefoot charm.

There also were a number of dive shops that

sewed the many divers who found paradise in the

deep clear water. Three to four hundred meters

offshore was a 7,000-foot deep wall for divers to

explore, which made the absence of luxury

ashore almost irrelevant.

The Turks and Caicos Islands were one of

Britain's few remaining dependencies and had a

OYL—- h$u,v

Ceo CeKZ//4 '.'-c

avl oecotI4 o vec deocee

4T4oniC' .v.oT,,'e

7c4,j yui/vctr ott4'ech/4)

,Z O4MJ 4. /YQ7n'/,cer'etr /aa 'r4,,ie

a'

courtesy ot Ltcol John R. Allen

A hand-lettered "Certfficate of Merit," written in

French and signed by six Haitian migrants, was

presented to the Marines on the Comfort.
32 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

civil service run largely by the British, Remnants

of the Colonial Service, the civil servants were

largely white and included a governor appointed

by the Queen. The islands largely black population dominated the legislature. While there was

little ethnic tension on the islands, there were

occasional brief outbursts of violence with racial

overtones, such as when poor black citizens

expressed frustration with prosperous and sometimes overbearing white bar owners in the summer of 1994. While that attitude created some

anticipation among Marines, they generally found

all of the islanders to be more than friendly. The

locals could not do enough for their military visitors, literally opening their homes and businesses

to them.22

Partly because it was a British dependency—

the British government being generally receptive

to American overtures and the local government

remembering the benefits of having one of the

lend-lease American bases on Grand Turk—the

U.S. Government, with Joint Task Force i6o at the

forefront, conceived the contingency plan to

process Haitian migrants on Grand Turk. When it

became clear the Jamaican option, by itself,

would be inadequate, the Grand Turk option

took on new luster.23 On 3 June, the Clinton

administration applauded the general declaration

by the government of Turks and Caicos Islands

that it would allow the U.S. to process migrants

on its territory, and the JTF soon dispatched officers to the island on a reconnaissance mission.24

From 6 to 8 June 1994, Major Brian J. Vincent,

executive officer of JTF 160s Marine component,

visited potential sites on Grand Turk. He first surveyed, and rejected, a truly desolate 405-acre tract

that had been a salt flat in the 1950s and 1960s

that the island government had proposed. Then,

despite the limited port facilities and small airfield, Major Vincent saw potential for an ashore

migrant support facility (AMSF) for as many as

2,500 migrants at the southern tip of the island.

Even so, the chosen site was unprepossessing: a

52-acre patch of rocks, scrub brush, and tangle

weed that was far from level.25

When Major Vincent reported his findings to

MarFor 160 headquarters, which had been established at Guantanamo Bay, the staff discussed

various courses of action and began to draft operations plans and orders. One draft directed a small task force to deploy to Grand Turk rapidly

"to construct, support, sustain, and provide security for the AMSF." Along with the ashore migrant

support facility, the task force would operate a
OPEEATION SEA SIGNAL 33

migrant processing center, dividing migrants into

the now familiar categories of unscreened,

screened-in, and screened-out. The order defined

success as the "secure, peaceful, and orderly processing of Haitian migrants."26

A red-letter date for the Grand Turk operation

was 19 June 1994, when MarFor 160's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Redlich, also became commander, Joint Task Force Grand Turk Island, and

a colorful, popular Sergeant Malor, Royce S.

Restivo, became the senior noncommissioned

officer of the small JTFI In one of the many reorganizations that would occur during this deployment, the JTF absorbed much of MarFor 160

headquarters, along with Company C, 8th

Marines, which had been attached to 2d Battalion,

4th Marines. The principal Army component on

Grand Turk was the 401st Military Police

Company. There also were a number of small but

vital detachments from other Services, including

the 56th Air Transportable 1-lospital from the Air

Force and some very hard-working Seabees from

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7427

Within hours of his appointment, Lieutenant

Colonel Redlich flew to Grand Turk to conduct

his own site survey. He was another in the line of

energetic, hands-on, common sense Marine leaders working on migrant operations during these

years, and he wanted ro see for himself exactly

what had to he done. Assisting in the start-up

phase was General Williams' lawyer, Lieutenant

Colonel John M. McAdams, Jr., a problem solver

and the kind of lawyer the Marines needed.

General Williams was thinking of McAdams when

he quipped, tongue in cheek that "you don't want

to get too close to your lawyer, hut you never

want to deploy without him."28

One of the first steps was to reach a detailed

understanding with the local government, which

had some reservations about having Haitian

migrants on the island for any length of time. The

prospect of more illegal or semi-legal 1-laitian

migrants was troubling to them given the location

of the islands. Haitian migrants, albeit in small

numbers, had been coming ashore for years. The

population of the island was about 3,000, and

now the U.S. Government wanted to house as

many as 2,500 Haitians in a camp on Grand Turk.

The islands' government also had its own agenda.

In return for its cooperation, the Turks and Caicos

Islands wanted the U.S. military to undertake a

number of civil engineering projects, such as the

Photo courtesy of Ltcol John M. McAclarns, Jr.

Cockburn Town was the capital of Turks and Caicos Islands, a British overseas territory where JTF 160

planned to conduct migrant operations. Note the sign jbr the Supreme Court of the territory over the staircase. There was definitely a kind of island charm about the local government.
renovation of the abandoned U.S. Navy base at

the northern tip of Grand Turk and improvements

to a pre-existing facility for Haitians.

Although a basic memorandum of understanding between the governments of the United

States, United Kingdom, and Turks and Caicos

was signed on 18 June, a number of issues

remained unresolved. For example, it was unclear

whether the proposed site for the migrant facility

was on private or public land, and the local

government attempted without success to involve

the JTF with a local citizen in this long-standing

dispute. Another issue was whether the American

servicemen should be armed. The chief constable,

a retired British policeman who had not fired a

shot in anger in some 30 years of active service,

successfully argued for stringent safeguards on

the issue. Even though it was not a smooth

process—in mid-July parts of the memorandum

would be renegotiated—Lieutenant Colonel

Redlich found the overall task of dealing with the

local government to be an enjoyable and challenging departure from his normal routine.29

With the legalities more or less settled, the

mini-JTF could turn to the business at hand. It was

an enormous undertaking for the 700 to 800

Marines, sailors, airmen, and soldiers who served

on Grand Turk. Since the islands had little or

nothing to offer in the way of infrastructure or

goods and services apart from salt—and there

was a limit to the amount of salt the JTF needed—

a phenomenal amount of equipment and supplies

had to be imported.

Once the Navy mad.e the essential deliveries,

the Seabee construction crews began their work.

They cleared and graded more than 50 acres and.

started to build an infrastructure for the camp.

There were other tasks which planners might

have taken for granted at other locations, such as

providing for water purification and desalinization, and establishing a field kitchen and dining

facility that could feed more than 3,000 people.3°

There was a race against time in June and July,

and the advance elements of the joint task force

worked at a nearly superhuman pace. The basic

question remained: would the camp on Grand

Turk be ready soon enough to take the overflow

from Jamaica, or to replace the Jamaican effort

altogether? This was important because the

policy-makers still wanted to avoid a sequel to the

34 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

ovic DM-ST-08-02 128

Robert Hall, the Minster of Immigation1, Labor, and Public Works of Turks and Caicos, signs the memorandum of understanding between the United States and the island lerri!oiy which would allow JYF 160

to construct and operate a camp for migrants. A US. State Department representativç, Richard Devine

(left), and the local Chief Minister, Charles Misick, look on.
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 35

open-ended Operation GTMO. The rear echelon

of the JTF at Guantanamo could support the operations on Grand Turk or in Jamaica, but it was

better not to use Camp McCalla or Camp Bulkeley

for large numbers of migrants.

In late June, like Redlich before him, General

Williams visited the island to judge the situation

for himself. His first impression was that he had

somehow landed in Lonesome Dove, an expeditionary air base in the Gulf War named for the forlorn Texas cow town in a Larry McMurtry novel.

"For most of the hours of the day," McMurtry had

written in Lonesome Dove, "and most of the

months of the year, the sun had the town trapped

deep in the dust, far out in the chaparral flats, a

heaven for snakes and horned toads There

was not even a respectable shade tree within

miles."3'

But through the dust, General Williams was

able to see the outlines of the facility taking

shape. "There are almost no buildings on the

island ... [but] ... [flirst steps are taken. ... [Seabees]

are there pushing dirt. "32 By the time he was

ready to leave the island, General Williams was

satisfied Lieutenant Colonel Redlich would push

the right issues. To maintain the pressure, Redlich

and his staff moved to Grand Turk from

Guantanamo on 26 June.

Nevertheless, doubts about Grand Turk persisted, especially in the general's mind. The general

questioned Redlich about the status of the camp

and was told a barebones facility could be in

place by 29 June, but only if the mission's muchneeded airlift resources were diverted from

Guantanamo. General Williams once again noted

that Grand Turk did not appear to be a workable

solution for large numbers of migrants. "[It] is

more expensive per capita than comfort since it is

not expandable and will require a huge logistics

effort." Given the scale of that effort, this was a

significant understatement. His interim conclusion

was that "Iwle are [simply) delaying the

inevitable"—that is, housing and processing

migrants at Guantanamo,33

It was during the next few days that General

Williams became acutely aware of the continuing

problems in Jamaica, and of the hundreds of

Haitian migrants often literally just over the horizon waiting to be rescued. That led to more discussions about alternatives for processing the

migrants in a variety of places as diverse as

Surinam, Guantanarno, Panama, and later, St.

Photo courtesy of Ltcol John M. McAdaois, Jr.

Ready/or business but wanting for customers, the migrant camp, which Marines and Sea hees worked so

hard to construct on Grank Turk, sits idle in the summer of 1994.
36 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Lucia, not to mention tiny and remote Dominica.

There also was talk about a long-term bilateral

agreement with the BahamasM

Given the continuing uncertainties of the situation, neither the Grand Turk nor the Jamaica

operation ended as the Guantanamo operation

shifted into a new and higher gear. General

Williams decided to give himself the maximum

amount of flexibility by formalizing the system of

maintaining three subordinate !0it task forces—

As General Walls had noted two years

earlier, the military used concertina

wire Jbr fences because that is what it

had, not because it was the material of

choice.

the one at Guantanamo, which was becoming the

main effort after all, as well as the JTFs on Grand

Turk and off Jamaica. Each subordinate commander would have the freedom to conduct operations as he saw fit, while General Williams

would reserve for himself issues of resource allocation and overarching policy.35

A few days later, on 9 July, General Williams

was unhappy to learn the facility on Grand Turk

was not going to open on time. (The target date

was 12 July.) On 10 July, he was equally unhappy to learn the Turks and Caicos government did

not want any Haitian migrant to spend more than

seven clays on the island. General Williams concluded this limitation would make Grand Turk

more of a liability than an asset, since it meant

migrants would have to go from there to other

intermediate destinations—just the kind of situation the general wanted to avoidl.36

The scale, complexity, and cost of the work on

Grand Turk weighed heavily on the debit side of

the ledger. Lieutenant Colonel Redlich's troops

had been continuhig their Herculean efforts to

meet the challenge of turning the chaparral flats

into a working camp on schedule. On 26 June,

there were only four general-ptirpose tents ready

for migrants. Six days later, there were 145 such

tents neatly arranged in 10 separate compounds.

Continuing to work at full speed, the Seabees

eventually constructed 11 elaborate concrete

latrines, complete with running water and underground pipes leading to a treatment plant. When

the final tally was made, the Seabees had laid a

staggering total of 10,000 feet of pipe to meet all

of the camp's plumbing needs. Subsequent

reports referred to the latrines as 'the finest engineering achievement of the JTF."

As if they had not already done enough, the

Seahees continued the work of constructing and

maintaining roads in and around the migrant facility, which meant harvesting, transporting, and

compacting more than 5,000 cubic yards of coral.

All members of the JTF pitched in to lay 40,000

linear feet of concertina wire to fence rhe individual compounds from one another. As at

Guantanamo, the intent was not to create a prison, but to create and maintain administrative

units. As General Walls had noted two years earlier, the military used concertina wire for fences

because that is what it had, not because it was the

material of choice.

Looking offshore, the Navy and Coast Guard

addressed the island's hydrographic problem,

which made it difficult and dangerous for deep

draft and V-hulled vessels to approach. Without a

solution to this particular problem, the Coast

Guard could not deliver migrants to the AMSF,

which was the prerequisite for the entire exercise.

If migrants could not come ashore, all the other

work was for nothing. In short order, the two

Services agreed on the installation of a 200-foot

extension of the existing pier by adding two 100-

foot floating barges. The Navy's Underwater

Construction Team 1 ultimately performed the

work, sinking chains and moorings to anchor the

barges.

One of the final steps to ready the camp for

occupancy was for virtually all hands to go on

line and sweep the area, picking up any foreign

objects that could injure the migrants, or that

migrants could use to injure their custodians in

the event of a disturbance. Some of the lessons of

Operation GTMO were clearly not forgotten.

When it was over, The New York Times stated the

cost of erecting the tents and repairing the infrastructure of Grand Turk was $18 million.3H The

result of all this hard work was that, on the

evening of 11 July, Redlich and assorted local

dignitaries gathered in the glare of a dozen

mobile military light generators, not too different

from stage lights, and declared die camp "complete."39

But complete did not mean operational and.

ready to receive migrants. The local government

had yet to ratify the requisite enabling legislation,

and there was still no sign of the representatives

of the various civilian agencies of the U.S.
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 37

OVIC DN-ST-98-02147

Guantanamo Bay's (amp Phillips, which had a capacity of approximately 2,000, served as billeting for

many members ofJTF 160. It was far from sumptuous, bra it was better than other encampments. There

was a degree of comfort, with some air-conditioned spaces, recreational opportunities, a messhall, and

a bathhouse.

Government who would actually determine the

migrants' status. (JTF 160 existed to run camps,

not for deciding who was qualified to immigrate

to the United States.) The small task force on

Grand Turk entered the first of many weeks of

uncertainty and waiting after the intensive work

of making the camp ready. Although there was a

certain sense of anticlimax, the time was not

uneventful.

The highlight of the first week of waiting was

a story ahout the camp in the London-based

tabloid The Evening Standard with the sensational headline, "I Find Secret Invasion Base."

Possibly convinced he had found a staging area

for the invasion of Haiti, visiting British journalist

Howard Smith wrote the story. He studiously

avoided talking to anyone in an official capacity

who might have set him straight.4°

The JTF attempted to remedy the situation by

establishing a link with the British Foreign and

Commonwealth Office (FO), and by granting

Smith an exclusive two-hour interview (of course,

there were no other journalists clamoring for a

story about Grand Turk). During that interview,

Redlich's public affairs officer stressed the humanitarian mission of the small base, but it was a

pointless effort. The headline on Smith's next

story, published on 14 July, read "The Marines

That The FO Says Do Not Exist." in part, the story

exposed the work of the public affairs officer. As

Smith wrote: "Marine Lieutenant Pete Mitchell,

acting as spokesman, had launched a charm

offensive to calm fears about the role of the base."

Three days later, Smith left the island, never to

return, although he did make one call to

Lieutenant Mitchell for an update. In the words of

the command chronology: "he was given a cordial, although, we are certain, frustratingly unsubstantive response."4'

On 11 July, the Commandant of the Marine

Corps, General Cad E. Mundy, Jr., and the

Commander of Marine Forces,. Atlantic, Lieutenant

* The press officer who gave Smith a complete briefing and

tour of the facilities was lstLt Peter 5. Mitchell.
38 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

General Robert B. Johnston, a familiar face from

Desert Storm where he served as General H.

Norman Schwarzkopts chief of staff, appeared at

Guantanamo Bay and requested to visit the operations at Grand Turk and Jamaica, The whirlwind

tour of the entire joint task force included a

"windshield" tour of Grand Turk. Accompanied

by the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, 1-larold

G. Overstreet, the Commandant gathered the

Marines on Grand Turk in a box formation in their

spacious galley tent and told them he was awed

by their accomplishments. The Commandant was

quick to acid they needed to stay flexible, since

the future of the camp remained uncertain.

Despite that message, Marine morale remained

high; the Marines' sense of accomplishment and

the Commandants praise were genuine. General

Williams also had consistently conveyed the same

Back at Guantanaino, General

Williams reflected on the camp and its

future. "Camp is ready," he wrote,

"but we made a dust bowl when we

cleared it. It will be awfulfor migrants.

Still no word on whether we'll use the

place. ACOM wants to put it in caretaker [status]."

message. Recording the Commandant's visit in his

diary, the general noted he was "proud of the

troops and their Work,"4

Back at Guantanamo, General Williams reflected on the camp and its future. "Camp is ready,'

he wrote, "but we made a dustbowl when we

cleared it. It will be awful for migrants. Still no

word on whether we'll use the place. ACOM [U.S.

Atlantic Command] wants to put it in caretaker

[status]."43 Caretaker status was shorthand for

holding Grand Turk in reserve in case other facilities could not handle the flow. For planners, the

erratic flow of migrants was puzzling: on one day,

1,000 new migrants arrived and on the next there

were none. But the overall numbers appeared to

be dropping.

A few days later, as Lieutenant Colonel Redlich

prepared to acknowledge the local government's

enabling legislation, which was finally ready for

signature, General Williams asked him to prepare

for two contingencies: migrant processing and

caretaker status. Reflecting on the kind of "mission creep' that occurred on Grand Turk—first

there was a concept, then a survey, followed by

initial efforts which in turn called forth further

efforts, costing money and manpower bit by bit

until the sum total was large, even prohibitive—

the general noted: "I think I have been caught up

in the emotion of the place: we built it, we'll use

it. fBut] if the migrant flow doesn't pick up, we

don't need the place. [In any case] we ought to

preserve the ability to open it." In a message to

Grand Turk, he stressed his decision did not

reflect a lack of confidence in Redlich and his

troops. On the contrary, he went on record as

being "immensely proud" of them.45

It was more than a little ironic that, at the camp

on Grand Turk on 19 July, the day after General

Williams had told Redlich to prepare for caretaker status, a group of dignitaries gathered in a temper tent—an innovative expeditionary tent that

was usually air conditioned—to celebrate another

milestone in the history of the on-island facility.

The dignitaries included representatives from the

Department of' State, their British counterparts

from the Foreign Office, and of course the press,

though without Mr. Smith of The Evening

Standard. Their purpose was to watch the Chief

Ivlinister of Turks and Caicos, Oswald 0.

Skippings, sign the Immigrant (Haitian Migrant

Temporary Detention) Notice of 1994, which

occurred with suitable fanfare. Recllich then

offered a tour of his domain, which included a

demonstration of the capabilities of the deployable mass population identification and tracking

system, a computerized system for keeping track

of the migrant population through the use of irremovable bracelets with embedded bar codes that

were now an accepted and important part of

migrant operations. Grand Turk was finally open

and ready for business, but there were no customers.4

Much of the pressure on Grand Turk eased, but

members of the task force did not sit idle, Some

of the troops, especially the Marine infantry

detachment from 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, and a

group of Army military police used the time to

train, focusing on civil disturbance contingencies

and preparing to run a migrant camp. Others

found new missions. Captain Suzanne Ainsworth,

USAR, of Civil Affairs Direct Support Team 53,

was a licensed veterinarian. Together with other

volunteers, she launched an animal health campaign, which included emergency surgery on a

cat that had somehow been impaled on a giant

fishhook. The surgery occurred on a table outside
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 39

DVIC DN-ST-98-02139

H6'3 Jeff Mueller of the 2d Force Service Support

Group s medical battalion gives a I-Iaitiain child

her required shots at Camp McC'aila. Two tents

were set up to adminster the three immunizations.

a local restaurant with improvised instruments.

Another of her projects was the castration of local

stallions. Grand Turk was overpopulated with

wild horses and donkeys, which roamed the

island freely, posing threats to motorisLs and eating the little bit of greenery that managed to push

its way through the rocky soil.

The jTF's Roman Catholic chaplain,

Commander Joseph R. Lamonde, USN, was similarly active, finding and ministering to a number

of outcasts on the island. These included a handful of Haitian and Cuban migrants who had

almost literally washed ashore and had remained

in legal and social limbo. The six Cuban migrants

were held in the detention facility at the northern

end of the island. They had no legal status or

prospects for a better future. Father Lamonde,

sometimes accompanied by Captain Ainsworth in

her civil affairs capacity, visited them often, providing spiritual nourishment and health and comfort items. There was another project that bears

mention. Lieutenant Colonel Redlich was lucky

enough to have among his officers an excellent

conmund historian, the cheerful, energetic, and

athletic Captain Franz J. Gayl, who served as

operations officer on Grand Turk. Captain Gayl

used the time to give life to an unusually complete and colorful command chronology, turning

the normally dry recitation of facts into a document that transports the reader to the island and

lets him feel the dust and sweat and pride of

accomplishment.48

When the day's work was done, there was

some unusual liberty, especially for those who

liked the water. The local boatmen would bring

their boats onto the beach, and a Marine could

literally step out of his uniform and into a marine

adventure of a different kind. Even the liberty on

land was not bad—a few beers and a simple meal

at a friendly establishment like the Kitina.49

By late July, Joint Task Force Grand Turk

Island was definitely on a downward glide path.

Fhases I and II of the contingency plan for caretaker status began on 25 July. The air transportable hospital was redeployed, along with a

number of personnel. This caused some distress

to the government of Turks and Caicos, which

sought reassurances the U.S. Government would

complete the program of public works per the

agreement. The local officials were even ready to

agree the AMSF could be used as a safe haven

and allow migrants to stay on island longer than

seven days,50

But there was ample room for migrants at

Guantanamo, and the migrant facility on the

island continued to ramp down. The approach of

Tropical Storm Chris, which appeared headed for

Grand Turk in mid-August, accelerated the final

phases of the withdrawal. There was a surge of C130 cargo aircraft and the USS Whidbey Island

(LSD 41) appeared off shore, fortuitously empty.

Through more hard work, the ship's company

and the rump JTF loaded most of its remaining

asset.s and personnel, which numbered about 150

at this point, onto the ship."

In the end, the storm did not hit the island, but

the U.S. Government kept most, if not all, of its

promises to the government of Turks and Caicos.

Various facilities were upgraded, and even the

request to remove the elaborate plumbing facilities the Seahees had built was fulfilled. When the

last U.S. serviceman left, there was only an empty,

dusty plain where the canip had been.52

The story of the small but accomplished JTF

was almost over. When there was a surge in the

numbers of Cuban migrants during August, planners in Norfolk briefly considered ordering a

return to Grand Turk. But after all that had happened, General Williams deemed this a "nutty

idea." Thankfully for him, it did not go very far.

By 30 August it was almost forgotten. 1-lis professional life full enough with one large migrant

camp, General Williams breathed a sigh of relief

and noted in his diary: "Heard that the TCI [Turks

and Caicos Island] camp may not happen. Be still

my heart."53

Back at Guantanamno Bay

Guantanamo remained a flurry of activity while

events in Jamaica and on Grand Turk unfolded. In
40 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

May, Marines from the barracks were busy

preparing Camp Bulkeley for possible use by

Haitian migrants. They also administered the

camp for a handful of migrants who came ashore

at Guantanamo before the JTF took charge in late

June. Guantanamo then became the temporaiy

home for the Marine support components of JTF

Guantanamo was directed primarily by the Army

component of the JTF under the command of

Colonel Michael Pearson. The Army's job was to

establish and operate the processing center for

screened-in Haitians at Camp McCalla. Marines

provided the external security outside the confines of the camps. Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th

ovic DN-ST-98-02151

This scene at Camp Mccalla in. the summer of 1994 is reminiscent of similar scenes two year eadier Like

their predecessors, the new wav& of Haitian migrants adapted to camp procedures. Here they watt

behind concertina wire Jbr daily supplies.

160, including Combat Service Support

Detachment 160 (CSSD-160) and elements of 2d

Battalion, 4th Marines. From a deserted hangar at

the north end of McCalla Field, these units

worked to support fellow Marines in Jamaica and,

later, on Grand Turk. The living conditions were

rudimentary at first, consisting of tents pitched in

the dusty sand around Camp Bulkeley. Later,

when the Air Force added a modicum of civilization to the JTF, the units moved to air condi

tioned, air-transportable accordion shelters at

Philips Park, a more habitable community much

closer to Mainside than the isolated Camp

Bulkeley at the far reaches of the hase.5

While General Williams was in Jamaica,

Marines, temporarily attached to 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines, trained continuously for that mission.n

The barracks Marines' primary mission was protecting the base and they remained the security

force of last resort at Guantanamo. They were

authorized to use deadly force to protect vital

installations from external threats, which once

again included migrants, and any assistance they

could lend to General \Villiams' JTF was secondary. The JTF, of course, viewed the Marines' mission priorities in reverse, a difference that would

surface in the coming months.

The Army's processing center for screened-in

refugees at Camp McCalla became more imporrant as the operation in Jamaica waned and the
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 41

DvIC DN-sT-98-0071. I

LtGolRocinev L.Johnson, commander ef the US. Armyc 720th Military Police Battalion, talks to Haitian

migrants who fumped the concertina wire of Camp McGalla to stage a peaceful protest rally.

responsibility for processing all refugees shifted to

Guantanamo Bay. By late June, General Williams

was referring to Guantanamo as "a major center"

in its own right and a place that could accommodate up to 12,500 migrants at any one time, a previously unexpected figure.56 Guantanamo became

a sale haven in early July following a change in

the Clinton administration's policy, which gave

rescued migrants only two options; return to Haiti

or go to a safe haven. Migrants could stay at a safe

haven until the dangers at home had abated,

however long that took. Even with the change of

policy, the Navy and Coast Guard still were rescuing 2,000 to 3,000 migrants per day. Those not

wanting to return to 1-laiti became guests of the

JTE for an indefinite period.5

General Williams established a migrant policy

at Guantanamo based on a common sense set of

priorities that followed the theory of psychologist

Abraham 1-1. Maslow's hierarchy of needs—that is,

you do not care about shelter until you have

enough to eat, you do not care about recreation

until you have shelter, and so forth. Once the

migrants had been rescued from drowning, the

first priorities would be simple: food and water,

shelter, and a cot. Those were Williams' indispensable minimums for every migrant. Once those

needs were satisfied, refinements such as sewage

and bathing, hare necessities anywhere else, were

addressed. These presented a real challenge for

the base because of antiquated water and sewage

systems. In one of his messages to Norfolk,

Williams said he would "set up makeshift camps

without facilities," adding that conditions, which

had never been particularly good, were "becoming very austere for the migrants."58

The desperate struggle to stay ahead of the

flow of migrants continued throughout the first

half of July. Members of the JTF worked 14-hour

days, seven days a week, performing myriad tasks

from pitching camps to patrolling perimeters to

emptying portable toilets, often in stifling heat.

The resulting living conditions did not improve

for some time. As one reporter described it: "The

migrants live in more than 1,500 tan and green

tents that carpet an old runway and the tarmac

alongside, consuming most of the available flat

space. ... Each rent is crammed with cots, and rolls

of concertina wire wind through the vast encampment dividing the refugees into seven communities of 2,000 to 3,000 each."59

It was difficult just to feed everyone on time,
42 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

let alone to provide the appropriate Caribbean

food. In one of the nearby hangars, U.S. officials

sat behind rows of desks explaining to refugee

after refugee the options of returning to Haiti or

living in a safe haven, possibly in another country

in the region. (The administration's diplomatic initiative to find other countries willing to assist continued.) Not surprisingly, relatively few, about 30

percent according to one estimate, opted to return

home. To the migrants, anything seemed better

than living in their impoverished homeland under

military rule,6°

Often adding to the burden of running the

operation was the stream of visitors who came to

Guantanamo, not always to help. Although the

JTF had an open door policy and left the press to

draw its own conclusions, one reporter pressed

General Williams to admit he was running "a concentration camp."6' Very senior officers, including

rhe incumbent Chairnian of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, and the

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General

Mundy, came in droves and offered both support

and criticism/2

General Shalikashvili increased the heat on the

JTF by speaking in terms of handling 28,000

migrants, which represented. another massive

upward shift in numbers. Adding to the pressure

of such high-level scrutiny, General Williams cliscovered a few days later that one of his own officers was jumping the chain-of-command and calling the White House directly with problems. The

officer was immediately relieved. Along similar

lines, a well-meaning but misdirected offer from a

lawyer at a nationally recognized law school

offered to send. 50 lawyers to Guantanamo to

work with migrants. The JTF, pointing out that its

problems did not stem from a shortage of lawyers,

politely rejected the proposal.63

Throughout the process, General Williams and

his subordinates worried about the security of the

camps. They remembered the challenges and

migrant demonstrations General Walls had faced

and wanted to avoid similar outbreaks, especially

since the current operation was so much larger

and more complex. Fortunately, the initial disturbances were relatively minor; complaints about

the food, some heated words and arm-waving

about inaction by the U.S. Government, and a

threat to go on a hunger strike if the U.S. did not

Dvtc DN-ST-98-00709

Surrounded by military police in riot gear, migrants chanted and danced to deliver their message. There

was no violence.
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 43

DV1C DM-ST-97-01836

The "disruptive" Haitians are surrounded by military police from the 402st and 64th Military Police

companies, loaded onto buses, and taken to an isolation camp where they were closely monitored.

invade Haiti.64 As time went on, conditions did

improve somewhat. In the second half of the

month, there actually were days when the migrant

population did not increase. The numbers hoverecl around an increasingly manageable 20,000,

and the JTF was able to make progress in turning

the camps from makeshift shelters into small communities complete with village economies, a semblance of self-government, elementary schools,

preventive medicine programs, and, ultimately, a

Creole-language radio station and newspapers.

The migrants themselves learned how to run the

kitchens and helped cook the food to their own

taste, which eliminated one obstacle.6

Near the end of the month, the JTF and the

barracks Marines met to define their respective

roles in case of a disturbance, an ever-present

possibility despite the improving conditions. As

General Williams commented in his diary, there

was "no question that it will get ugly if we can't

continue to show continuous improvement."66 His

comment applied mostly to living conditions on

the base, but he also considered a solution to the

political stalemate and ambiguous immigration

policy as one of the needs of the migrant population. After all, the U.S. Government was essentially detaining a large group of Haitian migrants

in a hot, boring place for an indefinite period.

Two days after General Williams made his prediction, there was a peaceful protest in the camps.

Army troops contained the disturbance without

much difficulty, but it was a harbinger of things to

come.67 On 1 August, there was a more threatening disturbance during which migrants brandished, hut did not use, a variety of homemade

weapons. According to intelligence officers,

Haitians leaders, particularly Jean-Claude Petit,

were organizing the migrants and focusing their

efforts in Camps 1 and 3. General Williams noted

the "camps [are] clean, but political activists are

intimidating [the] rest of the population."6

Pressures came to a head on the morning of 13

August when several camps "came out of the

wire" in a near riot. More than 100 of the migrants

who escaped dove into the bay next to Camp

McCalla and began to swim to the leeward side of

the base thinking they were swimming to Cuba,

from which they might have a better chance of

making it to the United States. The barracks reacted by deploying to quell the disturbance. Marines,
44 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

fully camouflaged and heavily armed with bayonets fixed on their rifles, lined the leeward shore

along the fence that separated the base from

Cuba. The sight of the barracks Marines terrified

the unfortunate migrant swimmers, most of whom

turned around and started to swim back to Camp

McCalla, which was no small feat considering the

camp was a mile away and they were swimming

against the current. As they came ashore, security

forces from both the JTF and the base put plastic

flexicuffs on the wrists of the escapees and

returned them to custody. The incident was over

by 1300. General Williams was satisfied with the

performance of his troops, noting they had done

"a fantastic job of keeping their cool under tough

circumstances." But the apparent overreaction by

the base and the barracks during the incident lead

the general to seek to "clarify [the] boundary

between [the] base and [the] JTF." 59

The camps were quiet the following day, but

there was a challenge from another quarter. The

o\Oc DM-ST-94-02618

Loaded with more than 2,600 Cuban migrants

picked up at sea in the waters between cuba and

the Florida Keys, the dock landing ship USS

Whidbey Island (ISD 41) heads Jbr the camps at

Guantanaino Bay.

Norfolk-based U.S. Atlantic Command asked

General Williams to explain what caused the

unrest. He wrote a somewhat wry unofficial

answer in his diary, which states the unrest was

"the proximate result of putting 1.5.000 people on

a hot runway in Cuba for two months in the

summer."7° Three days later, Williams and his staff

faced yet another challenge as die first hurricane

of the year began to form in the Atlantic,

Although hurricanes generally bypassed

Guantanamo, the potential danger was real, and

many staff officers turned their attention to contingency planning for bad weather. If the hurricane struck the base, the JTF could be faced with

a very bad situation. The plan, in a nutshell, was

to find hardened shelters for as many migrants as

possible, and to evacuate the rest, assuming that

Atlantic Command could surge enough shipping

and aircraft to Cuba to do the job in rime. General

Williams reflected it was "a good plai, hut there

[was] ... no way to make it anything hut ugly."71

Fortunately, the weather did not create a significant problem. l-Iowever, a storm, albeit a figurative storm, did strike the base. It was as though

the JTF was on a training exercise and the controllers were pushing to see how well the force

could. perform. Just when it seemed. the JTF was

gaining on the challenge posed by the Haitian

migrants, there loomed the mind-numbing specter

of thousands of Cuban migrants.

Stressing the System with Cuban

Migrants

Partly in response to a degree of unrest at

home, and partly to rid himself of malcontents,

Cuban President Fidel Castro decided in midAugust not to detain would-he Cuban migranrs

determined to float to Florida. Accompanying his

decision was a press campaign stating die United

States was encouraging illegal immigration by

enforcing the trade embargo and allowing all

arrivals to stay, whether they came with a visitor's

visa on a chartered airplane or simply waded

ashore in the Florida Keys. This might not have

been the Immigration and. Naturalization Service's

description of its policy, but it did reflect reality:

few Cuban migrants had ever been turned away.

But, as if to spite Castro, the Clinton administration changed that policy. Janet Reno, the Attorney

General, broadcast a message to the people of

Cuba who were contemplating migration, saying,

"You will not be processed—not he processed—

for admission to the United States." She added, in
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 45

DVlC DN-ST-98-00715

While the cuban migrants were enroute to Guantanamo, Marines worked hard to set up tents to house

them. TheJ7F also erected tents to house the personnel who would care for the Cuban migrants once they

arrived.

a phrase that likely gave General Williams pause,

"You are going to Guantanama"72 *

No one in Cuba seemed to believe the message

at first, and a cottage industry sprouted on Cuba's

north shore: non-recreational rafting. The

refugees assembled a bizarre assortment of rafts,

often by lashing together inner tubes, lumber, and

a wide variety of other materials to create moderately seaworthy products. Some of the rafts bad

sails; recycled motors powered others. Many had

nothing but makeshift paddles. Asked by an

American reporter about his intentions, a Cuban

migrant on the beach pointed to his raft and said,

More than one commentator noted the inconsistency

between U.S. policy on Haitian migrants (who were usually

encouraged to rettirn home) and cuban migrants (almost all

of whom were welcome to stay in Florida once they arrived).

In this case, however, the clinton administration wanted to

control the flow of cuban migrants to prevent a recurrence of

the so-called Mariel l3oatlift of 1980, when castro had allowed

a large number of undesirables to leave Cttha and make their

way to Florida. See, for example, J. A. Pitts, "Migrants

Resettlement Operations" (Miami: southcom unpublished

Mantiscript, Supplement Nr. 2 to U.S. Southcom History,

31Jan98).

"Of course, I would rather go in an airplane, but

this is the way Cubans get to the United States."73

That is how thousands of migrants set sail from

Cuba's north coast. Most would be intercepted at

sea by the Coast Guard and the Navy and taken

to Guantanamo, perhaps not the last place on

earth they wanted to go, but probably a close

contender for that distinction."

Told to prepare for up to 10,000 Cuban

" It did not take long for the JTF to learn just how much the

cubans did not want to go to Guanranamo. Rescued by the

frigate uss cloth (FF0 11) in late August, some 500 cubans

told the crew they would resist, by force if necessary, landing

in Cuba. Ltcol Douglas C. Redlich tasked Ltcol John R. Allen's

battalion, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, with defusing the situation. Ltcol Allen planned a show of force on the pier and sent

one of his officers, Capt William R. Costantini, along with

chaplain Joseph R. Lamonde of Grand Turk fame, in a Boston

whaler out to meet the ship and report on the situation. Once

on board the clark, Lamonde changed into his cassock and

clambered into the tipper works of the ship, literally appearing to the migrants from on high in his flowing black robe.

The tactic worked. The migrants shifted from anger to respect

and listened to the priest who, through his presence ot mind

and grace under pressure, averted what might have been an

ugly fight. (Allen Memoranclctm)
46 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

DVIC DN-ST-97-Ol.840

More than 600 Cuban.s on hoard the Guided Missile Cruiser USS Vicksburg (CG 69) arrive at

Guantanarno Bay on 23 August 1994. They were the first to arrive after the US. Navy assumed the

responsibility of transporting Cubans from the US. Coast Guard.

migrants, General Williams rapidly redeployed his

forces, deciding in short order that Camp McCalla

would house the Haitian migrants, who would

come under control of the Army component of

the JTF. Lieutenant Colonel Redlich's Marines,

who had been preparing the overflow site on

nearby Grand Turk Island, would care for Cuban

migrants in and around the inhospitable Camp

Bulkeley a few miles away. The Marines soon

became the core of Joint Task Group Bulkeley

with the same commander and the same mission

and reinforcements from other Services.

General Williams' policy was to keep the

1-laitians and the Cubans apart while making

every effort to treat the two groups equally.5 To

meet the demands of the two-pronged mission,

Although Camps McCalla and Bulkeley were miles apart, the

Cul,ans presence did not escape the Haitians' notice. Be-fore

long, the Haitians were protesting that Cubans were receiving

better treatment. Gen Williams' response was to bus l-laitian

representatives to the Cuban camps and let them see for thcniselves that the newcomers were, in Fact, worse off, living in

dusty camps without plumbing, and eating MREs (meals ready

to eat—the latter day combat meals). (Williams inrvw)
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 47

DVK DN-ST-98-00730

Lcpl Charles ('riscione from Company J 2d Battalion2 6th Marines; passes out bottled water to Cuban

migrants waiting for Deployable Mass Population Identification and Tracking Systems braceleis.

the joint task force would have Io grow dramatically. General Williams' initial estimate, which

proved to he conservative, called for the addition

of about 3,800 military personnel. Those already

on board would have to pull double duty until

reinforcements arrived. After finishing their regular jobs, they put up tents and surrounded them

with concertina wire to create camps. When the

Cubans began to arrive, virtually everyone,

including new arrivals and old hands, worked

around the clock to unload the ships and keep

pace with the flow.

The first loads of migrants came ashore at 0300

on 22 August. Their numbers exceeded 9,000 by

25 August and grew to 14,000 by 27 August. Even

when the flow slackened on succeeding days, the

JTF continued to build an infrastructure for a possible total of 45,000 and then 60,000, a staggering

new number put into play by Atlantic Command.

To make room for the migrants and generally

reduce the strain on the resources at hand,

Norfolk ordered the evacuation of non-essential

Guantanamo base civilians and dependents by

the end of the month.

The arrival of large numbers of Cubans

changed the security equation and added some

troublesome new questions. Was there now both

an internal and an external threat? Did the Cuban

government somehow intend to coordinate

aggression from the fence line by instigating a

breakout from one or more of the camps? For the

newly arrived commander of the barracks,

Colonel John M. Himes, this was a definite possibility, and he requested reinforcements to enable

him to fight effectively on two fronts: to hold the

fence line and to protect the base's vital installa-
48 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

tions from rampaging migrants. To hold the fence

line, Colonel Himes deployed his troops forward,

shifting the emphasis from manning guard towers

to a kind of mobile defense with active patrolling.

The shift in tactics would, Colonel Himes thought,

make it easier to cope with the influx of Cubans

over the land border while minimizing the clangers to migrants who tried to make their way to

freedom through the Cuban and American minefields along the fence line. Accordingly, most barracks Marines moved to the field for a workweek

under austere, near-wartime conditions. If they

were able to return to the barracks on the weekend, they would spend the time on standby in the

event migrants took advantage of a slightly

relaxed routine on Saturday or Sunday.5

The barracks did not simply wait for the worstcase scenario to occur, but exercised for the contingency. On 10 and 17 August, Colonel Himes

conducted tactical exercises with troops of the

barracks' migrant defense operations plan, finalized in late July. The exercises, one for Camp

McCalla and another for Camp Bulkeley, were

realistic, though somewhat pessinlistic in assumptions. The plans assumed JTF security forces had

been unable to contain hordes of migrants, some

of whom were preparing to set fire to General

Williams' headquarters while the remainder were

streaming toward the heart of the base. The objective was to cut migrants off before they reached

any vital installations. Every Marine rehearsed

until he knew his role by heart, as well as the allimportant rules of engagement?6

General Williams, meanwhile, saw things differently. While the Marine barracks was on a

near-wartime footing, JTF 160 was on a humanitarian mission in an ambiguous siruation with illdefined threats. For General Williams, the security missions of the barracks Marines and the JTF

were distinct, and it concerned him to hear

Colonel Mimes say his troops were authorized to

use deadly force. The general wanted to ensure

everyone understood the authorization was tied

strictly to the defense of certain vital installations

on base, not to containing any disturbance by

migrants that might pose a threat to the base later

on. He did not want anyone to use excessive

force against the migrants, and thereby create an

international incident. Nor did he see a heightened external threat. Rather, the general continLied to focus on the kind of internal disturbances

he (and Generals Walls before him) had already

faced, and he rejected the suggestion the JTF

should assume responsibility for the security of

DvIc DN-ST-98-00731

LC'pi Sabata Mixon and SrAJennfer Brown use a

rivet gun to attach an identification and tracking

brave/ct to a cuban child. Young or old; a/I

Cuban migrants recevied bracelets.

the base and of the camps.77 Although the base,

rhe barracks, and the JTF would continue to

exchange liaison officers and discuss contingency

plans, General Williams intended to rely primarily on JTF assets for security. This meant its Army

Gen Williams outranked the base commander, a Navy captain who also commanded the JTF's small Naval Force

(NavFor), which was made up largely nf base personnel. In

that capacity, he reported directly to the general. Playing the

two roles was, at times, difficult for the captain because the

base's long—term interests often clashed with those of the JTF,

which was a shott-term but very demanding tenant capable of

ruining a lot uf real estale.
OPERATION SEA SIGNAL 49

and Marine components, soon to be augmented

by the rest of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, under

Colonel Allen, which had performed so well in

Jamaica and would become the core of Joint Task

Group Bulkeley's external security element. It

also meant the general did not intend to rely on

guns and wire alone. As he commented on 27

August, "I can lower frustrations by 50 percent if

I can get showers and adequate water for the

people. "78

Most of Lieutenant Colonel Allen's battalion

had spent the intervening weeks back at Camp

Lejeune. Allen and his staff, especially his operations officer, Major John F. Stone, knew they

might have to re-deploy to the Caribbean for

another migrant operation. With that prospect

looming, they used the time at Camp Lejeune to

evaluate the lessons learned on the comfort off

Jamaica and to study the history of an uprising at

a U.S. Army prisoner of war camp that held

Chinese soldiers duting the Korean War. Major

Stone concluded that the rules of engagement for

civil disturbances had to he "ironclad." Like the

barracks Marines, everyone in 2d Battalion, 6th

Marines, had to know how much force could he

used and when to use it. Since it was likely the

JTP would deploy the battalion over a wide area,

the small unit leaders needed to be comfortable

applying the rules of engagement and making

decisions on their own.79

Within hours of its return to Guantanamo on 26

and 27 August, the battalion faced the first in a

long series of challenges. Men of 2d Battalion, 6th

Marines, waited on the pier to escort Cuban

migrants to the rifle range, an overflow camp

north of Camp Bulkeley that was literally built

around them overnight. This became Camp Mike.

Under the command of First Lieutenant Thomas

M. Mirande, the Marines did a superb job not only

of building the camp in the physical sense, but of

making it into a working community. In the days

to come, the payoff for Lieutenant Mirande's good

work at Camp Mike would he realized, as it

became one of the few camps where there were

no uprisings.80

Apart from Camp Mike and Camp Bulkeley

propet, Joint Task Group Bulkeley built, maintained, and ran other camps. One of the

camps, the Radio Range, was located nearby

along the coast and comprised a long-range radio

antenna farm. The other camp was a few miles

north at the golf course.

By now the process was becoming routine for

General Williams' troops. They erected concertina

wire around the individual camps, each holding

2,000 to 3,000 migrants living in general-purpose

tents, and built cyclone fences around groups of

camps. Small trailers with water tanks, known as

water buffaloes, and portable toilets were brought

in while the camps waited for better plumbing.

The evolution was successful in large part

because the migrants organized themselves and

pitched in to help. But it was still difficult to overcome the inherent limitations of the place.81 When

General Williams inspected the Radio Range, he

found the camps were built on "two to three feet

of dust" and commented the Cubans at the golf

course were in "the least harsh place."82

General Williams also noted the presence of a

number of troublemakers among the migrants,

including what he called the "gang bubbas," a

hardcore criminal element that traveled with the

van of the migrants, perhaps by Cuban governmnent design. According to one estimate, this lot

made up five percent of the migrant population.

Immigration and Naturalization Service agents,

who watched them disembark, already knew

some of them. A few were on first name terms

with the agents from previous encounters such as

the Mariel Boatlift incident when Castro emptied

mental hospitals and prisons in a challenge to the

President James E. Carter, Jr., administration more

than a decade earlier. Others were recognizable from their tattoos; one of the more interesting

JTP documents was a field guide to deciphering

the meaning of Cuban tattoos. Immigration officers recommended those with certain tattoos be

identified and segregated. The JTF agreed and

instituted a requirement for all young males to

strip to the waist for a tattoo check. If tattooed,

they were segregated from the rest of the population.83 In the days to come, Genera] Williams

maintained the policy of trying to separate the

good guys from the bad guys, especially since

many of the bad guys were very assertive and

tried to take over some of the camps. It was a

policy that made eminent sense.84

By the beginning of September, there were

some 20,000 Cubans from all walks of life—from

white-collar professionals to blue-collar workers

to criminals—in the Marine area of operations at

Guantanamo.83 The JTF met the demand for food

and water most of the time, but in Major Stone's

words, "it was a logistical nightmare." 86 When the

JTF was unable to keep everyone fed and

watered, the Cubans reacted. There might be a

few placards, some chanting, and threats to propcity or personnel. In response, the Marines would
50 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

deploy a reaction force and contain the demonstration by talking and working with the migrants.

On 6 September, for example, a crowd of 500

Cubans started throwing rocks at soldiers in one

of the camps and then vandalized a nearby vehicle. The arrival of a reaction team from the external security force quickly stabilized the situation.

It was a generally successful approach as long as

the Cubans believed their patience would eventually earn them passage to Florida.
Chapter 3

Crisis

Out of the Wire at Guantanamo

Joint Task Force i6o devoted significant

resources not only to containing disturbances, but

also to predicting and preventing them. Military

intelligence specialists from all Services spent

long hours every day inside the camps, typically

working in two-man teams that included at least

one linguist. They had specific requirements,

which usually centered on force protection—was

anyone planning a demonstration, a breakout, or

a violent act of any kind? Information collection

methods were straightforward. Typically, the

teams would approach one of the camp leaders

anti engage him in conversation, ask questions

antI then follow up on any leads. The migrants

were cooperative most of the time, and the information they shared went into reports to JTF headquarters where analysts pored over the information and presented conclusions to the staff. This

process helped minimize disturbances. In one

case, the intelligence specialists found indications

a group of migrants, upset over an impending

move from one camp to another, planned to seize

members of the JTF and hold them hostage. With

this information in hand, the JTF made the easy

decision to increase security for the move, which,

in the end, occurred without incident.1

The intelligence specialists, along with the

infantrymen or military policemen (MPs) who

patrolled the camps, also uncovered evidence of

less dramatic problems. For example, migrants

often pointed out the troublemakers among them,

such as those who were making weapons or planning crimes. Weapons included gaffs, crossbows,

and shanks (primitive knives). Sonic of the

weapons had relatively innocent purposes. The

crossbows, for example, were designed to hunt

banana rats, a small animal that looked like an

opossum but tasted like chicken and was a delicacy for the Cubans. Other weapons were intended to harm members of the JTF or other migrants.

Some migrant women, fearful of heing raped, carried shanks in their hrassieres. Once again voicing

his concern about criminal migrants, the commander of JTF 160, Brigadier General Michael J.

Williams, commented in his diary on 7 September

"Lots of crime in the Cuban camps, even in the

Photo courtesy of Ltcol John R. Allen

The cuban migrant camps were situated in the

southeastern corner of the Guantanamo Bay

naval base. The road out of the camp leads to

Mainside, a few miles to the northwest through

uninviting scrub brush hills, To the south are

steep cliffs dropping off into the sea, and not far to

the east is the boundary with cuba.
52 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

family camp. We need to work harder to get the

had guys out of the camps and into detention "2

Another option intended to relieve tensions at

the camp was to move some of the migrants out

of Guantanamo to other safe havens. This policy,

never clearly defined by the Clinton aclministration, was even murkier to the migrants.

Nevertheless, a fair number of migrants volunteered to go to safe havens in Panama and elsewhere, apparently on the assumption that some

movement, especially off the island, was better

than none. The process did not move swiftly at

first, but it was underway by 6 Septemher.3

Meanwhile, the JTF was facing a water crisis.

Despite the delivery of thousands of tons of hottIed water, an ever-expanding capacity for producing drinking water by reverse osmosis and the

Navy base's own impressive efforts, demand for

potable water continued to outpace supply as

more Cubans poured in to the base, In the tropical heat of mid-summer, which in Guantanamo

A related issue was how to treat mentally unstable and

potentially dangerous migrants who, in the end, were sedated

and kept apart from the general population. See BGen

Williams intvw, 19Aug94 (office of the comniancl Historian,

IJSACom, Nortolk, virginia).

tended to be a dry heat, the lack of water created

a figurative tinderbox waiting for a match.

Washington provided the flame when the

administration reaffirmed the safe haven policy,

stating the American government would continue

to offer migrants a safe haven from political and

economic persecution but would not allow them

to enter the United States. Those who did not like

the policy were free to return home to Cuba or

Haiti,4

General Williams knew the announcement

meant trouble. Apart from the policy on repatriation, there was nothing new. All the migrants had.

heard it before, but most were unwilling to

believe it and continued to nourish the hope the

administration would make some kind of exception for them. JTF officers believed that Radio

Marti, a Florida-based radio station controlled by

Cuban exiles 'that operated with the support and

approval of the U.S. Government, made a bad situation worse by hammering the message home in

excited terms.5

Some of the migrants apparently concluded the

U.S. and Cuban Governments had agreed on a

policy of forcible repatriation. They were correct

only in that the two governments were working
on an agreement whereby the Cubans would stop

the migrants from setting out to sea while the U.S.

would realign its immigration procedures.6

While the first disturbances were more about

watet; the safe haven policy soon became the

umbrella under which all cliscontentments

merged. On 9 September, this discontentment

erupted on several fronts and presented the JTF

with a rapid-fire series of challenges. First,

migrants being held at Magazine Number 121, an

obsolete ammunition bunker complex, commandeered a water buffalo and used it as a battering

ram to knock down the surrounding fence. The

quick reaction force from 2d Battalion, 6th

Marines, responded and contained the disturbance without force.7 Two more breakouts followed in short order. The first involved 120

migrants at the golf course and the other 200

migrants at Camp Bulkeley. In both incidents,

Marines were able to persuade migrants to return

to their camps. A short time later, 500 migmnt.s at

the Radio Range breached the wire with picnic

tables and headed toward nearby Camp Bulkeley.

They began throwing rocks at members of the

JTF, who tried to restrain them, and the quick

CRISIS 53

reaction force deployed, once again and blocked

the way to Camp Bulkeley. Chaplains then moved

in and. succeeded in calming the migrantsM

It had been a day of relatively small incidents

strung one after another. For individual Marines

and the command staff, the events of the day had

been tiring but manageable. The next day, 10

September, would play out to be a much more

challenging time. Marines on the front lines and

their commanders were about to he tested for

stamina, the ability to manage potentially explosive situations and their personal willingness to

enter the fray. If mismanaged, the incidents of 10

September could have resulted in death or injury,

led to a crisis between Cuba and the United

States, and done significant damage to a commander's career. It was one of those days when

senior officers earned their "extra pay."

The USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), known to

many from its recent assist at Grand Turk,

steamed into port with approximately 2,500

migrants on board, hut the migrants could not be

unloaded. The JTF was too busy reacting to serious disturbances. The first was on the golf course,

which was tactically controlled in large part by

ovic DN-ST-98-00742

An aerial view of the ,golf course camps looking toward Mainside and the bean of the base. Chapel [11.1.1

i.s at the upper right close to the bay. The hills separating the .Bulkeley/Radio Range area from the golf

course and Mainside are clearly visible on the left.
54 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STKENGTH 

Army units under Joint Task Group Bulkeley. That 

there was a serious disturbance on the golf course 

came as something of a surprise since the family 

camps in that area were typically more stable and 

quiet, especially compared to the camps for single males. The location of the golf course also 

made this disturbance more ominous since it was 

much closer to Mainside than Camp Bulkeleyl 

which was located a few miles south on the other 

side of uninviting, cactus-covered hills. 

The disturbance began in the early afternoon 

around 1300 when 2,000 to 3,000 migrants garhered at the wire and breached the outer ring of 

concertina. Word of the breach spread quickly, 

and within minutes, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas 

C. Redlich, in his capacity as commander of Joint 

Task Croup Bulkeley, was at the site unhappily 

watching the Cubans stream out of the camp. One 

of his officers, Captain Franz J. Gayl, the officer 

who had chronicled the operation on Grand TLI~~. 

characterized his attitude as "doggone it." Captain 

Gayl also was stmck by the migrants' purposefulness. It was almost as if the mob's leaders had 

carefully planned the outing. They were heading 

directly for the main area of the base and there 

was no milling around or confusion.9 

Lieutenant Colonel Redlich concluded the 

migrants were determined to be hrard. He was 

willing to listen to migrant demands, but he preferred it happen within the confines of a camp. 

He quickly decided to halt the flow of migrants 

from the golf course and ordered the Army military police units to seal the breach. The result was 

a short, unpleasant confrontation with migrants, 

who wanted to leave the camp. But the tllin line 

of MPs held and migrants on the wrong side of 

the fence eventually returned to their tents.10 That 

still left some 3,000 migrants outside the fence, 

and they continued toward Mainside and a battalion of waiting Army troops. But that unit was 

unable to halt the flow and the migrants went 

through and around their formation.ll 

By then, Colonel John M. Himes, the barracks 

commander, was standing on top of John Paul 

Jones Hill, the high ground that overlooked the 

golf course and allowed the colonel to monitor all 

radio traffic on the base. He had seen the Cubans 

strean~ing out of their camps and decided to 

"react the barracks Marines," which meant to 

recall his companies from the fence line separating the base from Cuba and deploy them against 

the migrants. Mindful of his mission to protect the 

viral installations of the base, Colonel Himes 

orclel-ed his troops to set up positions to channel 

the migrants in a safe direction away from 

M. dmbide. ' : 12 

Lieutenant Colonel John R. Allen, in command 

of most of Redlich's external security forces from 

2d Battalion, 6th Marines, had a similar experience. He was reconnoitering the high ground 

between Camp Rulkeley and the golf course 

when he spottecl the dust cloud raised by rhe 

escaping Cubans. He then moved close enough to 

see the migrants braking down the fence and 

streaming out of the camps. His action was to call 

the local Amy battalion commander on the radio 

for help, hut that officer had already committed 

his reserves and was about to be overrun. Allen 

then called Redlich and General Williams and told 

them he would use his troops to help cordon off 

the area and provide a reserve. 13 '" 

In the meantime, the commander of Kifle 

Security Company Windward, Captain Neal F. 

Pugliese, together with two junior officers and 

about 100 Marines, l~ad deployed around the 

McDonald's, a landmark located on Sherman 

Avenue, a main artery which led to the Mainside 

area and the Navy base headquarters. One of the 

Marines in that force recalled the approaching 

mob looking like the front view of a marathon 

starting line. The Marines were surprised to see 

base civilians and dependents going about their 

normal business as if it were just another day in 

small-town America. Captain Pugliese put his 

troops on line in riot formation and began to 

advance, quickly closing the distance between the 

two groups. Some of the Cubans were almost jogging, with the more vocal migrants egging the 

crowd toward the Marines in riot gear. Many of 

the Marines from the fence line still wore camouflage face paint, and all of them were carrying 

~16 rifles with fixed bayonets, though magazines 

had not been locked in the weapons. They had 

augmented their defenses with "1)ragon's 'Seeth" 

and tetrahedrons, slightly more forbidding versions of the cones that road crews use to channel 

traffic on construction sites. One of the platoon 

commanders, First Lieutenant Robert P. Salasko. 

worried that one or more of the Marines might 

lose his nerve; the odds were, after all, about 30 

to I. He soon discovered his worry was misplaced. All of the Marines were eager to move forward. When the otficers ordered the riot step, the 

* The internal security forces were respons~hle for wlml tuppencd within any particular camp, while the external securiry 

forces were responsible for what happened outside the cow 

fines of the camps. 
CRISIS j5 

Photo courresy of LrCol John R. Allen 

Marines protect their installation from Cuban rnigmrzts at the Rudio Range in mid-September Here, a 

reactionfwce blocks an exit. 

Marines "trooped ancl stomped" towards the 

migrants with energy and determination.l'i 

There was some pushing, shoving, and shouting when the leading edge of the mob hit the 

Marine line. Using tactics they had learned and 

rehearsed, Marines identified the crowd's leaders 

ancl dispatched snatch teams to neutralize them, 

which meant pulling them from the crowd, binding their wrists with plastic flexicuffs, and depositing them on the ground. The Marines continued 

to move forward, sometimes stepping over and 

around the cuffed troublemakers. The migrants 

responded with a barrage of rocks and more 

pushing and shoving. A migrant then grabbed a 

Marine's rifle. True to his training, the Marine 

reacted by giving the migrant a butt stroke, followed by a downward slash. With stab wounds to 

the upper arm and the flesh outside the rib cage, 

the migrant fell bleecling to the ground.15 

The sight of blood had an immediate impact. 

Some of the migrants began running from the 

Marine "white sleeves," so called because the 

Marines rolled the sleeves of their camouflage 

utilities out, showing lighter colored material: 

while the Army did the reverse. Other migrants 

turned passive. Medical personnel stepped in to 

evacuate the injured migrant to the naval hospital, 

where he made a complete recovery from his 

wounds.'~ But a number of migrants continued to 

advance, racing for a small bridge across ;In intermittent creek to the north, which led to the patch 

of high ground known as Chapel Hill. There was 

more pushing and shoving, and the Marines bayoneted two more aggressive migrants, inflicting 

superficial wounds. The Marines cuffed at least 

one of them hand and foot and left him, subdued, 

on the ground. The migrants who were still standing reacted by launching another barrage of 

rocks. The Marines again snatched and cuffed the 

apparent ringleaders. The migrants finally aclmitted defeat, shouting, "No ma, white sleeves! No 

more!" and the violence ebhecl.17 

Captain Pugliese decided to let the situation 

cool and orclered the Marines to fall back and 

allow the migrants to continue moving laterally 

toward Chapel Hill. Hundreds of migrants took 

the opportunity and climbed up the hill to the 

church on top. Somewhat isolated by dense brush 

and water, this was not key terrain. Colonel 

Himes later rememberecl hoping that letting the 
56 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRFI"iCTH

migrants occupy "holy ground' would calm

theni.

Realizing they were being isolated but unwilling to give up, a large group of male migrants

spotted a gap in the Marine encirclement and

tried to break out in the direction of Camp

McCalla. A particularly alert squad from Company

G, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, standing a few hundred yards away, watched and analyzed the

Cubans' movements and saw where they could

cut them off on a small incline. On their own initiative, in 100 degree heat, the heavily laden

Marines double-timed to the top of the slope,

arriving there seconds before the migrants. There

was a violent hand-to-hand struggle with both

sides trading blows and suffering minor injuries.

But the Marines quickly achieved violence

supremacy and forced the Cubans to fall hack.19

After closing the break in the fence, Lieutenant

Colonel Recllich had returned to his humvee and

simply watched the progress of the crowd. He

saw the migrants settle around the church, gathering in a huge semicircle in the garden in front

of a concrete patio attached to the building. The

crowd started to chant slogans. Redlich took a

chance and stepped up onto the patio to address

the crowd. The Cubans apparently understood he

was not die commanding general, hut that he had

something to do with day-to-day discipline. They

would not let him speak, greeting him instead

with jeers and making it cleat they wanted to hear

from the commanding general.20

Recllich then drove to .JTF headquarters at

Camp McCalla to get General Williams, who readily agreed to go to the hill occupied by the

migrants. After the two officers devised a strategy

for dealing with the crisis, General Williams said

he really had to talk to the migrants. It was now

between 1600 and 1700.21

The Cubans cheered when the general arrived

and walked briskly to the patio, wearing his

everyday utility uniform, unarmed and escorted

only by Lieutenant Colonel Redlich, Captain Gayl,

his driver, and JTF 160 Sergeant Major Douglas E.

Berry (who was still sergeant major of the 2d

Force Service Support Group at Camp Lejeune

and had been with General Walls three years earlier when that officer had faced rioting Haitian

migrants). While a number of migrants waved

homemade banners demanding visas, liberty and

family reunification, migrants in the front ranks

called for silence. An interpreter conveyed the

migrants' demands to General Williams, which

plight; immediate messages to Washington conveying their demands; clarification of the rumor,

apparently stemming from the Radio Marti broadcast, that die JTF would forcibly repatriate

migrants to Cuba; representation by CubanAmerican lawyers; and pennission to remain on

Chapel Hill until Washington responded to their

demands for expedited immigration processing.22

What General Williams told the migrants in

reply was the truth, without embellishment. The

first promise was easy. He would provide

Washington with full information about the

volatile situation at the camp. Speaking through

an interpreter, he told the migrants he would convey their message to the policy-makers and make

sure they were heard. Next, he promised that

within two days the migrants would be able to

meet face-to-face with the media, a statement

consistent with his "full and open disclosure"

media policy. William made a point of reminding

the Cubans he was a military man and his job was

to follow orders, not make policy. He understood

their plight. In a way he and his troops were prisoners of the same situation. They had the same

kind of living quarters as the migrants—perhaps

somewhat better, but not much so—and they

would be there as long as the migrants.23

This massage, conveyed in General Williams'

low-key, even-handed style, brought the house

down. There were a few migrants who looked

very hostile and seemed intent on driving him

from the podium. They made Captain Gayl, who

was a large, muscular officer, very nervous, and

he made sure he stayed between them and the

general. But most of the Cubans were wildly

enthusiastic, cheering and applauding William.s as

if he had promised deliverance instead of telling

them there was only so much he could do for

them. Seeing their reaction, General Williams

decided to capitalize on the situation and invited

the migrants to walk back to the camp with him.24

Literally thousands agreed, and in the gathering

twilight, the general led his unusual flock off the

hill and back to the golf course roughly one mile

away. During the walk. friendly migrants moved

close to the general to touch him, pat him on the

back and shake his hand, shouting "Viva el

General!" and "You are our General." A few disapproving Cubans picked up rocks and golf balls

along the route and appeared inclined to throw

them at the Marines, This situation worried one

young Marine platoon commander to the point of

ordering his troops to intervene, but General

included: immediate U.S. press coverage of their Williams signaled the lieutenant to hold his posi-
tion and casually picked up one of the balls himself, putting it in his pocket. His action, and the

admonitions of fellow migrants, probably kept the

troublemakers from following through with plans

to throw the objects.25

Marines from 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, shadowed the column of migrants on both sides.

Lieutenant Colonel Redlich, who walked alongside General Williams, ordered the Marines to

stow their bayonets, invert their rifles and stay a

reasonable distance from the crowd. Captain Gayl

concluded: 'the scene resembled a 1960s-era civil

rights march more than anything else."26

Once in sight of the camp, General Williams

and his tiny staff mounted a small knoll and invited the column to form a circle around him. He

thanked the migrants for returning peacefully to

the camp with him and repeated the promises he

had made on Chapel Hill. He and Redlich then

led the migrants through the front gate, and after

receiving several dozen more handshakes, they

left the area.27

For hours after General Williams' departure,

migrants continued to straggle into the camp.

Unfortunately, many appeared to he carrying

cloth satchels filled with rocks. A few hundred

migrants stayed on Chapel Hill, staging a kind of

sit down protest. Williams decided simply to leave

them where they were and build a camp around

them. His troops strung wire around the bottom

of the hill while a group of angry troublemakers

shouted obscenities at them. Although security

officers took note of their identities, the JTF took

no action against the sit down strike. Since the

general gave the order not to feed the migrants on

Chapel Hill until they returned to their camps, the

demonstration fizzled to an end when hunger

overcame anger.28

But this was far from the end of the JTF's troubles. Tlnngs had not been quiet in the Camp

Bulkeley/Radio Range area during the golf course

crisis. Some 5,000 migrants in those camps had

decided they were tired of confinement and threw

picnic tables across the wire or simply demolished fence posts and gates and walked out of

their camps. There was little violence, although

there was some looting of food and equipment.

Some of the hotheads appeared to be preparing

for the inevitable confrontation with the security

forces by arming themselves with steel rebar

cluhs and rocks and telling liaison officers they

were ready to fight and die for their freedom. As

the sun set on the area, Captain Gayl remembered, "Radio Range Road closely resembled

cmss 57

Havana's version of the Boardwalk" as thousands

of migrants strolled outside the wire. Tongue in

cheek, he called it the "camps without walls"

phase of the operation.29

Given the disparity in numbers and the challenges at the other end of the base, there was little the JTF could do. Major John E. Stone, 2d

Battalion, 6th Marines' operations officer, took 40

Marines and tried to impose a modicum of control

on part of the area in the eady evening. He

remembers the eerie scene, backlit by searchlights, as he deployed his Marines across one of

the roads in the area. Soon a sea of migrants,

many shouting and talking excitedly in Spanish,

washed in and around his position, wedging the

Some of the hotheads appeared to he

preparing for the inevitable confrontation with the security forces by arming

themselves with steel rebar clubs and

rocks and telling liaison officers they

were ready to fight and die for their

freedom.

Marines in a gap hetween two of the camps. His

troops looked to him for guidance, and in his

head, Major Stone quickly ran through everything

he had learned in his years in the Marine Corps.

Neither prepared to use deadly force to stop the

migrants, nor willing to back down and leave the

migrants with the impression the Marines could

he intimidated, it was a quintessential "What now,

Lieutenant?" moment.3°

During the tense standoff between the shouting migrants and the vastly outnumbered Marines,

some of the migrants at the rear of the crowd

found another way around the Marine position by

simply proceeding behind one of the camps.

Once the remaining migrants realized there was a

way out, they quickly withdrew from the situation. The major was relieved his dilemma had

resolved itself. At this point, he was quite willing

to let the migrants walk off into the night.3'

Lieutenant Colonel Redlich appealed for calm

and order through the camp spokesmen.32 His

security forces protected his command post as

well as the air transportable hospital, which was

sandwiched between migrant camps, and nearby

Camp Quick, where Lieutenant Colonel Allen's

Marines had pitched their tents. He had decided,
58 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTI-I

Photo courtesy of Li Col John ft Allen

The "camps without wa/Is" phase of the operation: ignoring camp boundaries; cuban migrants roam the

Radio Range area at will.

wisely as it turned out, to place his command post

in Camp Quick, which the Marines proceeded to

protect with extensive wire obstacles and riflemen

on the perimeter with loaded M16s tipped with

bayonets. Other security forces maintained blocking positions between the Camp Bulkeley area

and Mainside.33

Then came 11 September, not a good day. At

0626, the JTF staff notified the barracks the golf

course might erupt again and positioned forces in

and around the Mainside areas to contain any

renewed threats to base facilities. But nothing

happened on that front. At 0815, a report came in

of tension building at the chapel, but not much

happened. there either.:34 Then, less than two

hours later, approximately 3,000 migrants with a

spearhead of troublemakers and homemade banners left Camp .l3ulkeley through the remains of

the camp's west gate and headed north on

Magazine Road toward the naval ammunition

magazines. Initial reports indicated the migrants

wanted to link up with their compatriots at the

golf course, news that had an electrifying effect

on the staff of the JTF who envisioned that scenario as their worst nightmare come true.35

Word of the impending crisis spread quickly

along radio networks and phone lines. Colonel

Himes drove to the high ground between Camp

Bulkeley and the golf course. From there lie could

see the migrants streaming toward him and lie

directed a platoon of his Marines under Captain

Pugliese to cut them off. Since Pugliese and his

Marines were a few miles away, they first had to

find transportation. The captain decided to conimandeer one of the refurbished school buses the

base used for its transportation system. The bus

driver, a Jamaican civilian, refused, telling the captain he had to make his scheduled run. Pugliese

found a way to make it clear he would not take

"no" for an answer, and the bus driver decided it

would be best to do what the captain wanted.i1

A few minutes later, as the bus rounded. a corner in the sandy hills dotted with cactus plants

and abandoned ammunition hunkers, the Marines

once again found themselves facing thousands of

migrants heading their way. Captain Pugliese

deployed his troops, who looked as fearsome as

they had the day before with rifles and riot gear,

across the road between two small hills and put

out wire harriers on the flanks. Seeing the
Marines, the migrants shouted. "It's the white

sleeves!' and slowed to a halt. They then sat

clown and said they would not move until their

demands had been met.37

A stalemate developed and lasted until

Lieutenant Colonel Mien appeared, seemingly out

of nowhere, along with Lieutenant Colonel Randy

Garver, an Army MP officer who had been a corpora] in the Marine Corps at Khe Sanh and "spoke

the same language" as his Marine counterparts.

Allen and Garver were alone without any troops

since both of their battalions were still committed

to containing the disturbances at the golf course.

For some four hours in the hot sun, the pair of

officers tried to persuade the migrants to return to

their camps. In the end, they told the crowd, less

politely, it was their choice: they could return to

the camp on their own, or they could wait until

the Marines forced. them to return at gunpoint.38

Colonel Himes had arrived at the same conclusion

and ordered his troops to prepare to use tear gas.

The barracks Marines had donned their gas masks

at about the same time as General Williams

arrived on the scene with a visiting member of the

National Security Council, who was more than a

little concerned about the repercussions and the

safety of all U.S. personnel on the scene. Williams

briefly addressed the migrants, hut this time they

did not respond .39

The standoff continued as the hot day wore on.

The Cubans did not move, but the Marines did

not use any tear gas.4° In the late afternoon, Major

Stone led a platoon-size reaction force of Marines,

mostly from Company E. 2d Battalion, 6th

Marines, and under the command of Captain

William R. Costantini, in search of a terrain feature

he could use to cut the Cuban column in two. The

migrant column was now strung-out in segments

between Camp Bulkeley and the platoon from the

barracks along Magazine Road.. Once again, the

uninviting hills to the left and right of the road

boxed the migrants into a narrow channel, making it difficult for them to leave the road and go

around the Marines. Major Stone and Captain

Costantini worried the migrants would sit down

on the pavement, which would have made it difficult to resolve the situation in their favor. Not

unlike Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain of the 20th

Maine when his ammunition ran out at Gettysburg

and the only other options were surrender or

retreat, Major Stone ordered Captain Costantini to

fix bayonets and advance.

Amazingly, the 40 or so Marines started to

drive the crowd of thousands back toward the

CRISIS 59

beach. Troublemakers in the crowd reacted with

a hail of rocks, but the Marines deployed their

snatch teams, catching and cuffing more than a

few of the rock-throwers before continuing their

advance. At one point, it looked as though the

retreating migrants might stampede and trample

the migrants still coming out of the camps and

heading toward the clash. Seeing this, the major

directed Captain Costantini to slow the advance of

his Marines. The men responded expertly to

Costantini's commands. Easing the rate of

advance allowed the migrants to retreat without

panicking into the outer perimeter of the Radio

Range complex of camps. Costantiriis men literally slammed and locked the gate behind them. The

Marines then turned and advanced in the direction of the migrants caught between them and the

barracks Marines. Despite the enormous disparity

in numbers, this was too much for most of the

migrants, who quickly decided to return to their

camps. The troublemakers spent the night in

administrative segregation, separated from the

general population.12

As if to keep the JTF on its toes, in the late

afternoon of 11 September, Haitian migrants at

Camp McCalla staged a demonstration, which,

thankfully, turned out to be a relatively minor

affair.13 But the day's work was still not done.

Once again, an unexpected challenge arose for

the weary Marines and their comrades in arms.

When Lieutenant Colonel Allen returned to the

command post at Camp Bulkeley, Lieutenant

Colonel Redlich handed him a message warning

of an imminent tropical storm. Instead of relaxing

with a well-deserved hot meal, all the Marines of

2d Battalion, 6th Marines, turned to preparing the

camps for the storm. They lashed tents to the

ground, cleared away loose debris, and did what

they could to ready the camps for bad weather.

Redlich and Allen asked the migrant leaders to

forget their differences and work together in the

common cause. Many of the Cubans complied

with the request, hut a significant few did not.

When the troublemakers started to stone a detail

from Company G, Allen ordered all his troops to

return to the safety of Camp Quick and let the

Cubans fend for themselves when the storm

struck.44

Unfortunately, the darkness and the confusion

made it possible for migrants to loot the nowabandoned air transportable hospital, removing

an assortment of equipment such as rehar,

scalpels, syringes, and tent poles, all items with

excellent weapon potential. It appeared. there was
60 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

an armory tent where the Cubans were taking the

material anti honing their weapons. The storm,

when it came during the night, was relatively

mild, with winds not exceeding 30 miles per

hour.45

Back Behind Wire

Prospects were bleak when the Marines awoke

on the morning of 12 September. Lieutenant

Colonel Allen remembered feeling "very low"

because the JTF had lost control of the situation

the day before. But he soon told his operations

officer he was determined to retake the camps

and reestablish control. Allen discussed his plan

with Lieutenant Colonel .Redlich, who approved it

and placed him in tactical command of all security forces at Camp Bulkeley, a force comprising

five U.S. Army and Marine infantry units and four

Army MP companies. Around 1000 a rapid planning process began for Operation Clean Sweep,

which was to be launched at 1700.46

In the meantime, another water shortage blossomed into a crisis. One of the causes of the

shortage was migrant sabotage to the pipelines.

The response was to shut off water to Camp

Bulkeley until plumbers could repair the damage.

This did not sit well with the migrants in the blistering heat, who thought the outage was retribution for two days of demonstrations. More than

800 migrants left their areas at Camp Bulkeley

and gathered on the road to the Radio Range

between the command post for the complex and

Camp Quick. There they erected a blockade of

concertina wire and camp cots. The migrants

declared their intention to maintain the blockade

until the JTF restored water to them.4

The response was restrained. While a quick

reaction force stood. by inside the gate to Camp

Quick, the JTF called for additional water trucks.

But it would take hours for the trucks to arrive.

Agitators, meanwhile, began to harangue the

crowd, which swelled as time went on. A group

of migrants decided to pass the time by assaulting

Army MPs, who cuffed and detained two of the

most violent antI vocal migrants. The MPs sent

one of the migrants immediately to the Magazine

121 detention area. For some reason, the other

remained under guard behind the command post.

A rumor he had been abused spread like a brushfire on a diy hillside. As a result, the mob attacked

the small wooden house that stood in a clearing

by itself. Mostly, the migrants threw rocks at the

thin line of soldiers and Marinas defending the

Photo courtesy of cot Doughts c. Redlich

ItCol Douglas C. Redlich frighD, commander of

joint Task Group .Bulkeley, with his executive officer, Ma/ Ri/an/i Vincent, stand on a hill overlooking the cuban migrant camps. Itcol Redlich

played a leading role in JTF 160, establishing the

camp on Grand Turk Island, which was never

used, and then particpating in the operations to

reestablish order when the cuban migrants rioted

in September .7994.

headquarters. In all, there was a lone platoon of

Army MPs, along with the officers and noncommissioned officers of the staff for Camp

Bullceley.

Captain Gayl, who was assigned to the command post, was the right man in the wrong place

when the violence began, caught literally

between the command post and the Cubans along

with one other officer. With one riot shield

between them, the two tried to take shelter from

the barrage of rocks, which quickly began to shatter the shield. The two officers dashed, nne after

the other, back to the command post, almost literally between the shower of rocks. Miraculously

unhurt, they joined the defenders, who included

Sergeant Major Royce S. Restivo. As the mob

surged forward, sometimes striking the MPs'

shields with their fists and bodies, Sergeant Major

Restivo rotated between the MP positions outside

the command post, filling gaps and motivating the

defenders.9 It was, to say the least, an exhilarating event.

At this point, the reaction force, Marines from

Company G, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, arrived

and waded into the crowd from the rear while

migrants in front of the command post appeared

ready to make a rock-throwing all-out charge

using picnic tables as battering rams. One of the

MPs took the initiative and counterattacked, driving his squat, modernistic humvee into the picnic

tables and forcing the migrants hack, if only
CRISIS 61 

briefly. They reacted by turning their attention to 

vandalizing nearby vehicles. Two courageous 

members of the command post staff ran forward 

in a vain attempt to thwart their efforts, which led 

to a frenzied response by the migrants. A 

renewed-and greater-hail of rocks fell on the 

defenders, who retreated on order, to positions 

inside the command post. Seemingly out of 

nowhere, an Air Force policewoman appeared 

with her guard dog and positioned herself inside 

the commanding officer's empty office, ready to 

order her dog to bite the first migrant to invade 

that space. Moments later, rocks started to crash 

through the windows and litter the tloor. It then 

occurred to Major Brian J. Vincent, now executive 

officer of the staff at Camp Rulkeley, to release 

the detainee still being held in the conunand post. 

This placated most of the rioting migrants, many 

of whom simply ebbed away.50 

The defenders then telephoned Redlich, who 

was discussing Operation Clean Sweep with 

General Williams at his headquarters on McCalla. 

Redlich authorized the use of pepper spray, and 

General Williams promised immediate water 

relief. Moments later; the reaction force from 2d 

Battalion, 6th Marines, succeeded in clearing the 

roadblock and literally fighting and clubbing its 

way through a still very hostile crowd to the cornmand post. The siege was over. Six Marines had 

incurred minor injuries. LieuLenant Colonel Allen 

visited the injured Marines at his battalion aid station, and seeing their injuries reinforced his determination to set things right.51 

As the crisis at the command post ended, the 

JTF was applying the finishing touches to the plan 

for Clean Sweep. Around 1400, Redlich returned 

to his headquarters and prepared to deliver a 

warning to all Cuban camp leaders before launching the operation. He directed they come to his 

office at 1500 to hear the warning, which had 

been carefully drafted and translated into Spanish 

to minimize the potential for misunderstandings. 

Redlich's points were simple: the migrants had 

disappointed him and General Williams by taking 

advantage of their good will: they had violated 

rules and regulations designed for the safety and 

security of all; further assaults against US persons 

or property would not be tolerated; and finally, 

I'horo courtcay of LtCol John R. -4llcn 

On 12 September 1994, ,well-eqw@ped Man'nes stepped ?#to conduct Operation Clean Sweep, subduing 

unndy Cuban migrants in one camp @er another. Riot control techniques demonstrated a strong presence, cuhich preuented jz~rther escalation. 
62 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH 

DVIC DN-ST-98-02142 

Mwines encountered strong hostility ,from Cuban migrants at Camp Hunt on 12 September during 

Opemiion Clean Sweep, which aimed at reestablishzng order in the area. 

any migrant not within their assigned camps at 

1700 that evening would face apprehension and 

indefinite administrative segregation.52 

The migrant leaders found the tone of 

Kedlich's decree out of character for him and 

somewhat ominous. The word spread quickly 

among the Cubans, and by 1655 the quiet before 

the storm hacl settled on Guantanamo. Kadio 

Range Road was strangely empty, clear of all but 

the most hard-bitten migrants, who jeered and 

cursed at any soldiers or Marines who happened 

to be in sight. Meanwhile, just out of plain sight 

at Camp Quick, the assault force was forming like 

Roman legionnaires, carrying shields and batons, 

wearing shin guards, helmets and face protectors. 

Wth the companies of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, 

in the lead, the final composition of the force 

included two battalions of the 2d Air Defense 

Artillery Brigade (USA), four companies of the 

716th Military Police Battalion (USA) under 

Lieutenant Colonel Garver, two psychological 

warfare teams with loudspeakers, eight teams of 

military working clogs, and elements of other 

groups, including a detachment of elite surveillance and target acquisition Marines armed with 

shotguns.53 

The plan was to establish two parallel linesone along the cliffs to seaward, the other along 

Radio Range Road-and advance the lines toward 

each other like a vice with the Cul~ans and the 

camps in between. If the lead companies tired, 

other companies were to leapfrog forward to 

maintain the impetus. As each camp was uncovered, Marine engineers and MP detachments were 

to peel off to repair breaks in the wire, begin 

searching for contraband and reestablish internal 

secnrity.54 

The men of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, built up 

a full head of steam waiting for the order to 

deploy. Then, just before 1700, they began to tap 

their riot batons and nightsticks in unison against 

the ground and their shin guards, beating out an 

ominous tattoo that echoed down the line of 

camps. All but the most obtuse migrants knew 

that times were about to change. Then, at precisely 1700, the task force threw plywood boards 

over the perimeter of Camp Quick and breached 

the wire to begin the advance. It was, Captain 

Gay1 remembered, an awe-inspiring sight to see 

the long lines of Marines stepping off in perfect 

formation, fully equipped, with company guiclons 

flapping in the hot breeze and waning sunlight. 
Although it was a little unfair to the soldiers who

marched with the Marines, Captain Gayl thought

of the scene in the movie The WincE and the

Lion" when the Marines marched across the desert

behind an enormous eagle, globe and anchor flag

to rescue Candice Bergen.55

Initially, all went very well and the migrants

melted out of the way and back inro their camps,

obeying the commands relayed by the psychological warfare detachments over their mobile

loudspeakers. Hundreds of migrants simply

watched in stunned silence from the perimeters of

their camps. Then rocks started to fly from within

some of the camps. The n:ouhlemakers apparently thought the assault force did not plan to enter

the camps and they could act with impunity. They

quickly found out they were wrong. True to his

plan, LieLitenant Colonel Allen ordered his commanders to go into the camps and retrieve the

rock-throwers, which led to scenes of Marines

and soldiers breaching the wire, chasing their targets through mazes of tents and clotheslines to

finally tackle, cuff and drag them out of the camps

and on to the side of the road subdued and in

shock. There they waited for buses to take them

to administrative segregation. If anything, these

actions deepened the silence among most

CRISIS 63

Cubans. But as time went on, cheers and

applause for the soldiers and Marines broke the

silence. Most Cubans did not care for the troublemakers any more than Allen did,

The assault force encountered particularly

strong hostility at Camp Hunt, an all-male camp.

Hundreds of angry migrants, perched on and

around the portable toilets lining the perimeter of

the camp, jeered at the Marines and soldiers and

threw rocks, first at the forces on the seaside of

the camp and then shifting their focus to the

threat from the lanclward side. For a time, the hail

of rocks was so thick that every member of the

battalion command group was hit at least once. A

platoon of Marines from Company E, 2d Battalion,

6th Marines, stormed and breached the gate to the

camp and formed on line. The 39 Marines routed

the migrants, who fled by the hundreds toward

the rear of the camp.57

A similar drama occurred outside Camp

November, near the end of the mile-long line of

camps. The migrants pulled concertina wire

across the road to create an obstacle. The first

Marines to the ohstacle were from Company F, 2d

Battalion, 6th Marines. They paused, some of

them resting on one knee, tired and thirsty after

more than an hour of tremendous exertion in the

Photo courtesy of Ltcol John R. Allen

cuban migrants who resisted the Marines in Operation clean Sweep found themselves restrained with

fiexicr/fi and loaded on board trucks on their way to administrative segregation.
64 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTI-1

DVTC DM-ST-97-00168

.LtGen Robert B. Johnston, commander, US.

Marine Forces, Atlantic, was one of the main force

providers for Joint Task Force 160. He is shown

here during a vistt to Guantanamo Bay in

December 1994.

heat. The inevitable barrage of rocks began and

tile Marines raised their shields in self-protection.

There was a flurry of activity while the company

commander talked to some of his men. Two

Marines then broke from the ranks and ran

toward the camp where they threw themselves on

their shields and then onto the wire. The company ran over their backs into the camp, chasing the

stunned troublemakers into the arms of the air

defense soldiers who had established blocking

positions from the rear.58

The operation was a complete success and

ended between 1900 and 2000. Order had been

restored without casualties on either side. There

were a few bruises and broken lips, hut no injury

serious enough to require hospitalization. Allen's

troops had not been afraid to use force, but had

done so with discipline and restraint. Between

120 and 200 migrants were detained and removed

to administrative segregation. The Marines and

soldiers were both exhausted and elated after the

days of frustration and some humiliation.9

The next day, 13 September, started much the

same: two impressive columns of Marines and

soldiers ran sorties from Camp Quick in the morning to conduct the second phase of Clean Sweep.

But now the pace was much more deliberate and

there was little resistance. The Marines and soldiers surrounded the camps one by one and faced

outboard, effectively isolating them. Army MPs

then entered the camps and searched them systematically, paying particular attention to tents

and individuals that had aroused suspicion. Using

ground and aerial photography, the JTF had kept

track of individuals who regularly incited the

crowds and of unusually popular and active tents.

The MPs found more than one makeshift armory

where skilled craftsmen had been fashioning a

variety of weapons: knives out of banding wire,

machetes from scrap iron and aluminum and

pikes from tent poles and 16-penny nails.i0

During Operation Clean Sweep, most migrants

abided by Lieutenant Colonel Redlich's amnesty

policy, which was broadcast over loudspeakers. If

they voluntarily surrendered contraband

weapons, they would not go to administrative

d.etention, which they knew was not a pleasant

place to be. Administrative detention already was

home to a variety of sociopaths and criminals. As

a result, MP5 found weapons in many places.

Some migrants had pitched their weapons over

the concertina wire to avoid any association with

their tents. Others had piled the weapons neatly

in common areas. Security forces hauled the

weapons by the truckload to an enormous clump

behind Camp Quick. When it all was over, the MP

commander, Lieutenant Colonel Garver, estimated

his men had contiscated more than seven tons of

weapons.d1 It had been another hot, long and

exhausting day. But it also had been another satisfying day.

The unrest at Guantanamo Bay was more than

a passing interest to Atlantic Conimand and its

Marine component in Norfolk. On 11 September,

the commanding general of Marine Forces,

Atlantic, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston,

called General Williams to offer the assistance of

an air alert battalion from Camp Lejeune along

with the 8th Marines regimental staff, under

Colonel Jennings B. Beavers II, a plain-spoken

Missourian, and an energetic general officer,

Brigadier General Raymond P. Ayres, Jr. The idea

was for General Ayres to form a joint security
group and take over external security for the

entire base, including the barracks and the fence

line. The regimental staff would run a combat

operations center for multiple battalions, a capabilitv the JTF did not possess. Relieved of that burden, General \Villiarns and his troops would he

free to focus on internal security to handle whatever happened inside the camps. Although he

would have preferred not to have yet another

general officer on board Guantanamo—there

already was a Navy admiral under him in the

JTF—General Williams thought the plan was a

"great idea [the] disturbances ... really pointed

up ... [the] need for a single security manager for

the whole place."62

Within hours, the air alert battalion, 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, under the command of the

well-respected Lieutenant Colonel Dennis J.

HejIlk, had mustered and was enroute. The reinforcements landed at Guantanamo Bay over the

following two days. By the time General Ayres

and Colonel Beavers had assembled their staff

and troops, order had been reestablished and the

pace was much slower than it had been a few

days earlier. During a meeting on 14 September,

General Williams reaffirmed the distinction

between external and internal security, which

CRISIS 65

would remain the responsibility of the camp commanders, and devoted his energies to making the

newcomers understand the mission. By now

General Williams knew exactly where the line ran

between persuasion and cooperation on the one

hand and force and compulsion on the other, His

fear was that the newcomers might have arrived

with different ideas about the need to use force.

On 15 September, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines,

came under the operational control of Colonel

Beavers, now officially commanding officer,

External Security Forces, also known as the Joint

Security Group. The new organization conducted

a successful security sweep of the golf course

camps and worked with internal security forces to

build (or rebuild) the infrastructure of the camps.

In the calm after the riots, Lieutenant Colonels

Redlich and Allen were able to make the rounds

to all their camps and tell the Cubans they were

not in a position to make any more demands. But,

the two officers added, they were still free to

work with the JTF to improve living conditions,

which was the planned third stage of the pacification operation.64

For his part, General Williams was guardedly

optimistic. He hoped the large shipment of

Cubans unloaded on 15 September was the last. It

DVIC IJ0-S0-99-03701

Haitian migrants with their meager belongings line up to be processed for return to Haiti during

Operation Uphold Democracy, All those going home went voluntarily.
D\IC DM-ST-97-00101 

While some Cuban migrants attempted to return to Cuba, otbevs waitedpatiently as the American government determined theirfule. In an atlempt to alleviate the boredom, Cpl ~Manttel 7'erg and a group of 

Cuban migrants sot;t out crrrgo tie down straps azuaiting shipment. 

seemed the Cuban-American agreement to curtail 

rafting and improve immigration might take hold. 

As such, he looked forward to devoting his time 

and energy to improving conditions within the 

camps, which for him was still an excellent way 

to prevent unrest.65 

On 19 September, the focus shifted briefly hack 

to the Haitian camps. U.S. forces landed in Haiti 

on 19 and 20 September, which created a stir at 

Camp McCalla.* The JTF arranged for as many 

Haitians as possible to watch the CNN news 

broadcasts on the eve of the invasion. The camps 

were deathly quiet. The next day, there was a 

ceremony of remembrance for the Haitians who 

had died during the military dictatorship. More 

than 100 Haitians, dressed in white, chanted and 

marched through the compounds.66 The Haitian 

camps were not .so peaceful the following day. A 

number of migrants threw roclcs at JTF soldiers 

and airmen out of frustration. While the day of 

liberation had come for their homeland, they 

could not go anywhere and many of them felt 

they were truly in limbo."' Fortunately for those 

who wanted to go home, the JTF was soon able 

' Derailed in Pan I1 

to offer voluntary repatriation back to Haiti, which 

began on 24 September." The question of involuntary repatriation-of Haitians who were ineligible to go to the United States but refused to go 

home-would not be settled for many months. 

During the same period, the Cuban camps 

were largely quiet. It was hard to believe the same 

players had staged the dramatic unrest a few days 

earlier. But the absence of angry crowds did not 

mean the absence of dangerous problems. 

General \Williams wrote in his diary that one of his 

main concerns was the absence of a workable 

policy for the voluntary repatriation of Cuban 

migrants. He noted that one US. policy said 

Cubans who wanted to go to the United States 

needed to go home to apply for a visa, while 

another policy kept them at Guantanamo. The 

Haitians who had tired of the uncertainty and 

boredom of life in the camps were free to go 

home, but what about the Cubans who felt the 

same way?hy 

Many impatient Cubans did not wait for the 

U.S. Government to make up its mind. Since they 

had learned the hard way that it was pointless to 

challenge the American security forces directly, 

they adopted other tactics. Secretive groups of 
troublemakers fornled small units, breached the 

wire at night and disappeared into the darkness 

before anyone could react. Not surprisingly, most 

of these migrants were single males. Their apparent goal was to return to Cuba by either walking 

through the minefields or swimming. The later 

option typically involved jumping from the cliffs 

near the fence line, swimming out to sea and then 

homeward. Both propositions were dangerous, 

and the whole situation was ~~nacceptable to the 

JTF. First, no one on the JTF staff, let alone the 

base or the barracks commander, was ready to 

tolerate something akin to small, hostile paramilitaly units roaming the base.70 Second, the JTF 

could not accept the risk of widespread injury or 

death, either on the fence line or through drowning." Colonel Beavers felt it was his personal 

responsibility to tighten security to make it more 

difficult for the migrants to bring harm upon 

themselves or the security forces. 

One measure instituted by Colonel Beavers 

was to group single males in Camp November 

near the beach and the fence line with Cuba 

where the risks in swimming home were reduced; 

although still real. Then there was a tactical package designed to discourage and defeat outbreaks, 

especially on the landward side. The routine of 

perimeter foot patrols augmented by local quick 

reaction forces changed. The patrols were simply 

too slow or too few and far between to do the 

job. Instead, the joint security group built guard 

towers and put Marines and soldiers in them. 

Although the group retained a heavily armed, 

centrally controlled mobile quick reaction force 

for large-scale clisturbances, the local reaction 

forces now took the form of platoon-sized patrols 

in the backcountry where they established patrol 

I~ases. The camoutlaged and armed patrols operated on a variety of routes covering many of the 

most likely avenues of escape from the camps. 

Every so often, the patrols would hounce off the 

wire, coming close enough to a camp to make 

themselves conspicuous for a few minutes, then 

disappearing back into the darkness. The 

migrants were left to wonder where they had 

gone. The routine, with its combination of psychological effect and presence on the ground and 

in the towers, seemed to work. While it is impossible to know how many Cubans were deterred 

by these measures, the number of incidents 

reflected in situation reports dwindled.72 

By late September, the situation was secure 

enough to allow increments of 2d Battalion, 6th 

Marines, which had done its share of the hard 

work and then some, to return home. This meant 

some of the battalion's Marines had spent more 

than 110 days deployed in the thick of migrant 

operations. On 24 September, 2d Battalion, 6th 

Marines, turned over its riot control gear to 1st 

Rattalion, 2d Marines, which took over as the 

"w-hite sleeves" battalion. To make it clear the 

new troops on the block were every bit as determined and capable as their predecessors, 1st 

Battalion staged a show of force at the Bulkeley 

and Radio Range camps. The Marines marched 

slowly around the camps in a column of two, 

partly to conserve energy and thus be able to look 

fit and ready in the withering heat, and partly to 

give the impression of a larger force. It worked. 

Once again, the jeers and catcalls which greeted 

the first of the grim-faced, heavily-armed Marines 

faded to total silence, broken at times by cheers 

as the procession continued.73 

Before he left Guantanamo, Lieutenant Colonel 

Allen prepared a memorandum entitled "Migrant 

Security Environment and Lessons Learned" for 

the External Security Forces commander. The 

memorandum began with his general observations on migrant operations: that security was a 

state of nuncl and a combined arms effect. It was 

not simply a matter of force, but a result of all of 

the efforts of the JTF, which ranged from housing 

and feeding the migrants to implementing the 

administration's immigration policy, which combined to make the migrant feel secure or insecure. 

The next major point was that, even though the 

Marines had embarked on a humanitarian operation, they needed to think in terms of low intensity conflict, like the Marines who had written the 

classic Small Wan- Manual. Next, he analyzed the 

various threat groups in the Cuban migrant population-from agent provocateurs to criminals to 

members of a religious - cult called "Palo 

Mayombe" to troublemakers or young, bored, 

excitable male malcontents. He stressed the need 

to deploy intelligence resources early to gather 

information about these groups, which was mostly a matter of debriefing them and those who 

worked with them and collating the results.74 

Allen next addressed the concept of "seeing 

the elephant" (a metaphor from the American 

Civil War for the baptism of fire in comhat). For a 

Marine or soldier, the elephant was enormous in 

the first riot. The confusion, the crowds and the 

emotions were overwhelming, making it hard to 

know what to think tactically? how to analyze the 

tactical problem or even how to do the right 

thing. The commanders tended to fall back on 
6s A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTh

DVIC DM-ST-96-00362

Gen John J. Sheehan, Commander in Chief US.

Allan/ic Gomm.and, on one of his official visits to

Guantanamo Bay in 1994. Joint Task Force 160

fell under his operational control.

frontal tactics, which meant lining troops up in

riot formation and facing the crowd, "absorbing

the mass and weight of the migrants against the

line of riot shields." When this happened, the

troops took casualties from rocks, tent stakes, or

homemade weapons.

Allen stressed that as long as the elephant was

large, the frustration level among the troops

would be correspondingly high. It was incumbent

on commanders to take the emotional temperature of their troops and, if necessary, to provide

outlets to prevent outbursts of brutality. The outlets could take the form of training exercises, platoon or company school circles, or intervention

by chaplains or psychologists. The colonel noted

separately that he had been very lucky to have

U.S. Navy Lieutenant Michael A. Colson assigned

to his battalion as chaplain; Lieutenant Colson,

who had worked with refugees for years in Africa

before joining the Navy, was a master at defusing

tensions and even making the troops laugh about

their experiences.75

Once the elephant had shrunk, it was easier for

small unit commanders to think through the problems they faced and develop more effective tactics. The key was the use of controlled violence.

Surprise was paramount. The security forces

would need to spot and mark troublemakers—

those who seemed to he sparking the violence,

whether from the front or from another quarter.

Then the security forces needed to "up the violence ante" quickly and decisively, dispatching

snatch teams to seize the troublemakers, subdue

them and make them disappear. Snatch teams

might come from the front, sides or rear of the

crowd, and more than one snatch team might be

active at the same time. The effect was as much

psychological as physical. Snatch teams macic

every member of the crowd feel vulnerable

because the protective sense of anonymity, being

lost in the crowd, was gone. This was usually

enough to deflate a demonstration. Deprived of

its leaders and its momentum, the crowd would

generally break up.

The memorandum emphasized a collateral

point about the need for active, aggressive intelligence collection during demonstrations, especially with video cameras. Collection served, to target

additional troublemakers, detect new and different weapons and identify hotbeds of unrest within camps. Videotapes also were useful to critique

and improve the performance of the troops following an operation. Another important collateral

point regarded the need for internal security

forces to remain active during demonstrations to

identify and contain potential problems early on.

After reviewing the brief phase of escape and

evasion by determined single males after 13

September, Allen eniphasizecl the key to success

was to think in terms of low intensity conflict and

to continue to analyze the threat, remaining alert

to changes and adapting to meet those changes.

In the version of the memorandum that appeared

in the Marine Corps Gazette in February 1995,

Allen asked the rhetorical question: if he had

established "violence supremacy" earlier on,

would the general breakdown of order have

occurred? He answered his own question, writing

that "increased hut controlled violence" might

have prevented the problem. Some argued later it

was wrong to focus on the need for violence

supremacy because the real issue was the shortages of food, water, and sanitation. Allen countered such arguments stating, you cannot hand
out loaves of bread when people are throwing

rocks at you.76

Quality of Lfe at Guantanamo

The next phase of the operation was anticlimactic. It was not one of crisis upon crisis, but

a time when Joint Task Force 160 made considerable progress on two fronts: improving the quality of life for migrants while tightening security.

The quality of life initiatives aimed first at solving

basic problems: better plumbing, better food and

the like. The work was more difficult because the

JTF was competing with the occupation of 1-laiti

for resources, but after a while the adjutants and

the logisticians came through. Reinforced and resupplied, the JTF was able to start the process of

meeting migrants' higher needs, such as arranging

phone and mail service and building schools and

sports centers. Some 140 chaplains worked to

meet spiritual needs. One interesting retInement

was the establishment of shelters for battered or

threatened women. Regrettably, a number of

migrants expressed their frustrations by abusing

their female companions. As time went on, more

Cubans became involved in these initiatives, especially when it came to helping with building projects. Most Cuban migrants were active, restless,

energetic persons—otherwise they would not

have ventured to sea in the first place—and it was

not difficult to channel their energy.77

There also was some relief for the JTF in that

substantial numbers of Cuban migrants opted for

ovic DM-ST-97-00177

Prominnent visitors to Guantanamo Bay Naval

Base never stopped coming. The Honorable Ted

Stevens, Senatorfrom Alaska and chairman of the

Senate Appropriations Committee, talks with

BGen Raymond P Ayres, who succeeded BGen

Michael j Williams as commanding general of

Joint Task Force 160.

CRISIS 69

safe haven in Panama, thereby relieving the pressure on the facilities at Guantanamo. By midOctober, some 5,000 migrants had gone to

Panama. Ultimately, a total of roughly 8,600 made

the trip.78

With time to focus on security, 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines, quickly settled into the routine and the

Joint Security Group prepared for many possible

contingencies. The group determined the proper

ratio of security forces to migrants was one

infantry battalion to 10,000 migrants, and Colonel

Beavers learned for himself that the best defense

was to contain disturbances before they escalated.

There now were platoon- and company-sized

reaction forces prepared for multiple missions,

which they rehearsed at least once a week. One

mission was, of course, riot control. Another plan

was for a hostage/barricade contingency. Finally,

there was the destructive weather plan: what to

do in case of a hurricane.

The JTF continued to build more watchtowers,

and work started on a very secure holding area

for troublemakers at an isolated part of the base.

Ultimately named Camp X-Ray and run by Air

Force Security Police, it boasted state-of-the-art

security features and was virtually escape-proof.

Although Camp X-Ray was not a prison, many of

its inmates were hard to handle and the regimen

was strict. For example, the policy was to select

only the most mature and stable airmen to work

at the facility because they would face abuse from

the inmates that ranged from insults to assaults.

As such, every member of the security team needed excellent self-control.°

Another security initiative sprung from an idea

originating with General Ayres: that General

'Williams make contact with his Cuban counterpart to discuss the issue of Cuban escapees.

Williams endorsed the idea, and in early October,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to work the issue

of military-to-military transfers through the base's

northeast gate.8' As a result, there was direct contact between the Cuban and American commanders by the spring of 1995. Usually it was the JTF

commander who met his Cuban counterpart, hut

at least once it was the commander in chief from

U.S. Atlantic Command, General John J. Sheehan.

The commanders elaborated a protocol for the

orderly repatriation of small numbers of migrants

(approximately 200 in one representative sixmonth period) through the northeast gate. The

migrants who went home through the gate included both voluntary and involuntary returnees.

Barracks Marines, who were responsible for con-
clucting the operations, took elaborate precautions.82

The Marine commander picked his most physically intimidating Marines to escort the migrants

to what was literally a line in the sand, one that

someone had painted white. If a migrant did not

want to go home, or had been a troublemaker, he

might be shackled hand and foot. On a few occasions, bodies of migrants who had died of natural

causes were repatriated in caskets. An American

military officer, a translator and a State

Department representative officiated at each

transfer. As the American detachment approached

the line, a corresponding detachment of Cubans,

who were typically young and looked undernourished, did the same. The American officer

would read a short statement and the migrant

would then step back into Cuba and his previous

life. If the migrant looked like a troublemaker, the

Cubans might take hold of him physically. Neither

side carried or showed weapons. But watching

the transaction from a camouflaged position in

the brush were Marine spotters and snipers, along

with a small reserve standing ready to intervene at

a moment's notice in case of trouble. The Cubans

almost certainly had a similar standard operating

procedure; the Marines noticed the number of

bushes on the Cuban side of the line changed

according to the operational scenario of the clay.

But for the most part, the two sides treated each

other with respect and die transfers were troublefree. At times, relations were almost amicable.

One day a Cuban soldier tripped a mine while

clearing brush on the Cuban side of the line,

injuring himself and a comrade. Although they

could not cross the line, Marines rushed forward

with battle dressings, which other Cubans

reached over to accept. The Cubans thanked the

Marines for the medical gear and later sent word

the two soldiers had survivedl.83

Over time, the hard work paid off. With only a

few exceptions, the camps stayed quiet. After

September 1994, the situation was so calm that

inbound Marine replacements, who had heard

about the past riots and trained hard to suppress

future riots, were surprised to find the biggest

challenge was often horedlom,81

In early October, General Williants learned an

Army officer would replace him. Within a few

days, the word changed, and the new decision

70 A SKTLLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

uvic DN-ST-98-00744

lstLt Virgilio Gonzalez of 1st Battalion, 2d Marines instructs cuban migrants about American customs.

Since it appeared that many, if not all, would eventually continue on to the United States, the joint task

jbrce held classes to prep are them for 4fe in their new country.
was that General Ayres would replace General

Williams, who would return to Camp Lejeune and

resume his duties as the commander of 2cl Force

Service Support Group. When the formal turnover

occurred on 17 October, Williams reflected on the

recent past, saying he was extremely proud of

the.. men and women, military and civilian, of

Joint Task Force 160." From their initial mission of

processing Haitian migrants in Kingston, Jamaica,

to their "present mission of caring for over 40,000

Cubans and Haitians at Guantanamo Bay, JTF personn.el ... [had] demonstrated professional competence, compassion, and a willingness to work

together. "85

General Ayres agreed. \Vhen he took command. he saluted the JTF's "tremendous improvements" in sheltering and caring for migrants. He

also noted he had inherited "the most interwoven

JTF" he knew 01.86 He soon learned for himself

just how interwoven the command was; he saw

that the 7,000-plus service personnel thought of

themselves first as members of a group with a

common mission rather than as soldiers, sailors,

Marines, or airmen, He noted further that the representatives of the various civilian agencies, both

CRISIS 71

government and non-government, worked handin-hand with their military counterparts in the

same spirit.87

One of the biggest threats in October and

November was that seasonal rains would make

the golf course and some of the beach camps virtually uninhabitable. The JTF moved to consolidate and weatherproof camps. Many of the tents

became "hardbacks" with wooden floors and

walls. But the JTF was unable to carry out its plan

to move Cubans to the hardstand at Camp

Mcflalla, which had obvious advantages in wet

weather.88

The reason was that many Haitian migrants

were not ready to go home. The flow of Haitians

ready to follow the American occupation forces

back to Haiti had slowed to a trickle. Some of the

remainder said they wanted to wait until President

Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned to Port-au-Prince.

After he did return in mid-October, others said

they wanted to wait until he asked for them. Since

American policy included a built-in bias against

forcing anyone to return home, the JTF did what

it could to promote the idea it was safe for the

migrants to go home. One initiative was to find

iavic DF-sT-98-00783

A Cuban migrant in Camp Kilo plays the guitar as a Marine sings along. Members of the foint task force

interacted with m,igants in various settings, but like the members ofJoint Task Force GTMO two years eariie were required to keep relationships on a projèssionalfooting.
72 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTh

out where their homes were, and then collect

information and first-hand testimony about conditions in Haiti to give the migrants an idea of what

they could expect to find at home. But there were

not many takers, and, as of mid-Novemhei; there

were still some 6,000 Haitians in the camps. The

principal exception was a group of 992 Haitian

migrants who were selected and trained for public security functions to help replace the corrupt

police forces in their home country. Once trained,

they were eager to get to work.89

The Cubans' situation was more complicated.

For those who decided to go home rather than

stay in limbo at Guantanamo, getting home

remained a difficult proposition. Apart from the

handful escorted to the northeast gate, migrants

trying to get home found a long wait getting on a

flight to Havana. For the impatient ones—approximately 1,000 between September 1994 and March

1995—there still was the fence line and the

beach.90

On 6 November, for example, 85 migrants

escaped from Camp November. Forty made it

across two strands of concertina wire, down the

nearly vertical cliffs to sea and through the half

mile of surf and strong currents to Cuba. But the

majority of the 25,000 Cubans decided to stay in

the camps. They were certain the American policy would change and they would eventually

make their way to the lJnitecl States. For them it

was heartening to watch the Clinton administration loosen its policy by stages. The adjustment

made in October 1994 allowed very young and

unaccompanied, elderly, or sick migrants to go to

Florida (which meant there was a stream of

migrants who feigned illness).9t Then, on 10

November, the administration redefined young,

which now meant any unaccompanied migrants

under 17, and on 2 December 1994, some families with dependent children became eligible for

parole,92 Most migrants concluded it was only a

matter of time until the policy eroded completely,

and, although there were still some tense

moments to come, they generally settled down to

wait patiently.

Trouble in Panama

By late 1994, a different group of Marines was

facing many of the same migrants—and the same

problems—a few hundred miles away in Panama.

They formed the Marine Corps Security Force

(MCSF) Company, the successor to Marine

Barracks, Panama. Roughly 120-strong, their

home was the large, elegant headquarters of the

barracks at the U.S. Naval Station Panama Canal,

called Rodman Naval Station, which was near the

Pacific entrance to the canal. Their job was to provide security for Rodman, as well as for other

naval installations in the Canal Zone, including

the Naval Security Group Activity on Galeta Island

some 60 miles away on the Atlantic Coast.

The Marine company began to focus on

migrants in July when its commander, Major

Gilbert Desroches, received a call from Southern

Command (SouthCom), the unified command

which flew its flag in Panama and had long heen

a preserve of the U.S. Army. The call was somewhat unusual. Under normal circumstances,

Desroches had no direct contact with SouthCom.

(He reported to the officer-in-charge, Commander

in Chief Atlantic Fleet, Detachment South, Captain

Arthur N. Rowley Ill, USN, the senior naval officer in Panama who was also the base commander at Rodman.) It turned out SouthCom was not

interested in the billet Major Desroches held, hut

rather in his background: Desroches was born in

Haiti and spoke Creole. SouthCom wanted him to

join a group of officers enroute to Guantanamo,

ovic DN-sT-8902617

A narrow road runs alongside the south side of

the Panama C'ana4 near the Gaillard Cut. The

only access to the migrant camps in the Empire

Ranges was along a similar road. Given the terrain, a small number of Marines were able to stop

hundreds of rampaging Cuban migrants from

marching to Panama City in December 1994.
CRISIS 73

Department of Defense Photo (USMO

Nicknamed "The Big House, "this elegant white building was the headquarters for Ma] Gilbert Desroches'

Marine 6'orps Security Force Company at Rodman Naval Station in the Panama Canal Zone.

where they would try to learn how to set up

camps for migrants. It was contingency planning

in case anyone sent Haitian migrants to the Canal

Zone. Desroches' impression was that SouthCom

was trying to avoid creating anything like prison

camps for migrants in Panama. On 7 july 1994,

Desroches flew to Guantanamo and walked

through the Haitian camps with the delegation

from Panama.93

At the same time, other SouthCom officers

were walking the terrain in Panama to evaluate

possible campsites. Eventually, they developed

plans for four camps that would stretch more or

less in a line running northwest from a part of the

Canal Zone known as the Empire Ranges on

many maps. Between the ranges and Rodman, in

an area known as Rousseau, a fifth camp was

planned as an induction and processing center.

Before he left for Cuba, Major Desroches authorized his executive officer, Captain john W.

Capdepon, to send Marines to Rousseau to help

build the camp even though their company, as

such, was unlikely to have a formal relationship

with any joint task force for migrant operations in

Panama that SouthCom might establish.9

The work at Rousseau was, in the short term,

in vain, The Panamanian government recanted

and decided not to allow Haitian migrants into the

country. Many of the new installations were torn

down shortly after they had been put up.95 For a

while, the focus shifted away from migrants.

Then, in late summer, it appeared increasingly

likely that a large group of migrants would come

to Panama after all. Guantanamo was now overflowing, not with Haitians but Cubans.

Fortunately for General Williams and his joint task

force, the new Panamanian administration of

Ernesto Perez Balladares had taken office and was

more receptive to the idea of allowing migrants to

come to Panama for tip to six months provided

they stay in the Canal Zone. On 6 September, the

first of some 8,600 Cubans flew by military air to

Panama, which many of them clearly preferred to

Guantanamo. Although no closer to Miami, at

least it was not Cuha.9

It was one thing to tell a migrant he was going

to Panama, whose name conjures up images of a

cosmopolitan city and an exotic international seaport. It was quite another to deposit him at a

camp in a forbidding, isolated part of the country
and ask him to wait for the U.S. Government to

define its immigration policy. The Cubans soon

discovered the four camps on the western shore

of the canal were in dense, hilly terrain that had

been used for live fire exercises. There were up

to 2,500 migrants under canvas lii each camp,

which was ringed by chain link fences. While the

camps themselves were on open terrain covered

by tents, there was triple canopy jungle between

the sites. It was impossible to see from one camp

to the next. A narrow road connected the camps

and led back in the direction of Rodman, roughly

eight niiles away. The road, which was never

straight for long, twisted up and down the hills

and was barely wide enough for two automobiles

to pass one another. Even the roadside was

uninviting. Where the jungle yielded to the

roadbed, there was deep, dense elephant grass

with razor-sharp blades.9'

Despite their formal independence from joint

Task Force Safe Haven, the command subordinate

to SouthCom that was now responsible for the

new camps, the Panama Marines suspected. they

might one day become involved in migrant operations. Major Desroches had conic away from

Guantanamo with an idea of the kinds of challenges his troops might face. He sat clown with

his officers to brainstorm. They looked, at various

contingencies that might involve Marines and

developed responses.98

The contingencies the Marines foresaw were

variations on the theme of civil disturbance, a

contingency already familiar to them. In the

spring of 1994, they had trained to respond to any

threats to naval facilities that might grow out of

the Panamanian presidential election set for early

May. Although civil disturbance training was normally a quarterly requirement, in the month

before the election the Marines exercised almost

daily, conducting a variety of drills committed to

a kind of playbook.99

At first, the Marine security force's only role in

Operation Safe Haven was in a contingency plan

to serve as the reaction force for Camp 3, which

74 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Photo courtesy of U.S. Army South

Cuban migrants, many with their faces covered, demonstrate at the fence of a Canal Zone camp in

December 1994. These protests quickly turned violent.
was run by a Navy offIcer and happened to be

closer to Rodman than the other camps. On their

own initiative, the Marines stepped up their

preparations for civil disturbances, just in case.

Just as at Guantanamo, there was the traditional

emphasis on developing squad leaders who might

find it necessary to act on their own. Given the

company's dispersion, the largest unit that

rehearsed together was a platoon. But Major

Desroches and Captain Capdepon made preparations to commit the entire company if necessary,

including the platoon of sailors from Rodman

who had volunteered to train with the Marines

and to reinforce them in a crisis. When augmented by the sailors, the Marine Corps Security Force

Company officially became known as the ground

defense force.

All the preparations focused a great deal of

attention to detail. in October and November,

Desroches persuaded a somewhat reluctant JTF

Safe Haven to permit his small-unit leaders to

familiarize themselves with the terrain around

cuists 75

Camp 3. The Marines calculated vehicle loads and

transit times to and from the camps. In accordance with SouthCom rules of engagement, the

Marines would deploy in riot gear, available largely thanks to the unofficial initiatives of a good

supply sergeant. In November, there were indications trouble might be brewing in the camps,

which made the training seem all the more relevant.101

On 7 December 1994, the ground defense

force's hard work paid off. At around 1700, the

Marines received a telephone call from Camp 3,

relaying a report there was a riot in Camp 1. Even

though the Marines were not responsible for that

camp, Major Desroches staged a recall. The

Pacific Marines were told to prepare to deploy,

and the Atlantic Marines were placed on stand-by.

At 1708, JTF Safe Haven officially requested help

from Rodman's reaction force. The Marines were

to deploy to Camp 1 in full riot gear, which

included a flak jacket, riot control helmet with

facemask, body shield and baton. This was a

Photo courtesy of U.S. Army South

As passions became more heated during the demonstrations:, many migrants jumped the fence and

reeked havoc on the areas outside their own camps.
76 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Photo courtesy of U.S. Army South

U.S. Army military police deploy near one of the camps. Rocks thrown at the military police litter the foreground. when order was restorea'ç Jhr more US. servicemen had been injured iPan miran/s.

heavy load at the best of times in a temperate climate, let alone the steaming humidity of

Panama, 102

Desroches ordered the Pacific platoon to

mount its vehicles—some eight humvees—and

follow him to Camp 1. Soon after leaving

Rodman, the Marines found complete chaos on

the road to the camps: a monumental traffic jam

of vehicles crammed with soldiers and airmen in

riot gear. But the Marines persisted, clearing a

path for themselves. After the slow drive, they dismounted some 100 to 150 meters from the gate of

the camp. They did so smartly, quickly getting

into formation and moving folward.103

It was nearly sunset and raining, but the

Marines could see signs of a serious disturbance.

The main gate had been torn down and the landscape was littered with vandalized vehicles and

fence parts. There was an Air Force officer holding a bloody bandage to his head. Some 200

Cubans had commandeered a food truck and

used it to break down the gates of the camp. They

then shattered windshields on nearby vehicles.

Approximately 40 troops were injured in the

ensuing scuftles.101

An Army officer ran forward to meet the

Marines. He cautioned them about aggravating

the situation, saying JTF troops had just succeeded in calming the Cubans. Captain Capdepon

asked the officer to stand aside and the Marines

continued to advance. Some of the Cubans insidc

the camp noticed that Marines had arrived and

they started to heckle the "white sleeves," familiar

to them from Guantanamo. Major Desroches then

heard from the JTF Safe Haven commander,

Brigadier General James L. Wilson, USA, who

ordered the Marines to help establish a perimeter

around the camp.'°5

When the Marines moved forward to establish

the perimeter, the Cubans inside the camp
became extremely agitated and launched a hail of

rocks, At approximately 1845, General Wilson

decided it would be better to use the Marines as

a reserve and ordered their withdrawal,1i6

A few hours later, the Marine security force was

shifted to Camp 3 to respond to reports of unrest

at that camp. But all was quiet when the compafly arrived. Nevertheless, the JTF ordered Major

Desroches to leave a platoon-sized unit at the

camp overnight just in case. After making sure his

troops were fed and sheltered, Desroches

returned to Rodman with his headquarters platoon for the night.107

By 1000 the next day, 8 December, the JTF

radio networks were alive with chatter. Radio traffic from the soldiers at the checkpoints on the

toad to the camps was animated, especially that

from the checkpoint in the vicinity of Gaillard Cut,

the steepest and rockiest portion of the Canal.

Major Desroches and Captain Capdepon ascertained a large group of Cubans was about to

break out of Camps 1 and 2. The Marine Corps

Security Force detachment that had remained

overnight at Camp 3 under the command of First

Lieutenant Jay A. Rutter received orders to deploy

to Camp 1, about one mile to die northwest, away

from Rodman. Lieutenant Rutter's Marines found

some 800 Cubans had left the camp and were

heading southwest toward the Pan-American

Highway and Panama City.

Major Desroches was now in a difficult position. His troops were in separate groups.

Lieutenant RuRer's platoon was detached; the

Atlantic platoon was at its post; and the remaincler was with him at the barracks. He decided the

first order of business was to unite his forces. He

ordered Captain Capclepon to activate a contingency plan to transport the Adantic platoon by

helicopter from the northwest. Word then caine

that Camp 2 was about to erupt. Around 1030,

Captain Arthur Rowley's headquarters at Rodman

authorized Desroches to order a "react."°

Wearing their uncomfortable and cumbersome

riot gear, the headquarters Marines now mounted

their humvees and moved out towards Gaillard

Cut, taking with them an empty bus. Desroches

led the way in a sedan, which he had filled with

tear gas grenades, the company's weapon of last

resort. The major's intent was for Lieutenant

Rutter's Marines and the Atlantic platoon to meet

him along the way. Members of the Auxiliary

Security Force, sailors trained to reinforce the

MCSF in an emergency, were to follow later. A

link was established with the headquarters of the

CRISIS 77

squadron whose helicopter had already picked

up the Atlantic platoon. The squadron promised

to tell the pilot where to land.110

The small convoy soon stopped at a landing

zone along the road to wait for the Atlantic platoon. Flying at about 1,000 feet, a helicopter soon

appeared. Captain Capdepon went into the zone

to guide the bird to a landing, but he was ignored.

The helicopter continued on its way toward

Rodman until, suddenly, it banked hard and landed directly in front of him. Captain Daniel R.

Kaiser, the Atlantic platoon commander, emerged

and greeted Capclepon, whose emotions had

gone from distress to relief in short order. Kaiser

explained they had been on their way to Rodman

until he had recognized Capdepon waving his

arms in the landing zone. It turned out the

squadron headquarters had not relayed the message to the pilotill

Now only Rutter's Marines remained missing.

The problem was Major Desroches could not

communicate with the lieutenant and did not

know where he was. Desroches and Rutter earlier had agreed to meet at Camp 3, hut Rutter was

now outside Camp 1, on his own, out of touch

with his parent command and not under any

other commander on the chaotic scene, Rutter

decided to rejoin the rest of the company at all

costs, and around 1100, he started to move his

humvees toward Rodman.112

It was a nerve-wracking trip. The Marines

found themselves on the road with the crowd of

angry migrants moving in the same direction. The

migrants stoned the humvees throughout most of

the journey. Soon, Desroches and Capdepon

could hear Rutter calling them on the radio, saying the Cubans were "all over" his troops, and

urgently requesting permission to use tear gas.

But, thanks to one of those small mysteries only

communicators understand, Rutter could not

receive transmissions. Lacking permission, he told

his troops not to fire any tear gas.113

At one point during their journey, Rutter's

Marines met a truck coming toward them. It was

filled with a group of Air Force security policemen, who had decided on their own to drive to

Camp 1 to volunteer their services. They were

enthusiastic about joining forces with the Marines,

who were equally enthusiastic about the reinforcements. Turning their truck around, they fell

in behind Rutter's humvees. In the end, the crowd

parted to let the Marines through. Perhaps it was

because the Marines were traveling in the same

direction, or perhaps it was because Rutter
78 A SIULLEUL SHOW OF STRENG'I'H

ordered the drivers not to stop, no matter what.

The small formation moved out ahead of the

crowd. Before long, Rutter's vehicles almost literally bumped into the rest of the company when

he drove around a corner just past the very difficult terrain at Culebra. The time was 1135.114

Within an hour and a half, the Marine Corps

Security Force Company had succeeded in uniting

its widely dispersed forces, no small feat considering the circumstances, which had not favored

the Marines at first. The junior leaders, especially

Lieutenant Rutter, had exercised both initiative

and restraint. Because they had trained together

for such a long time and could almost sense what

their brother officers were thinking, the subordinate commanders literally and figuratively took

the right turns.

Rutter wasted no time informing Major

Desroches and Captain Capdepon there were 800

to 1,000 Cubans only a lew hundred yards behind

him. He guessed they were on their way to

Panama City to continue their demonstration in

front of the American Embassy and recommended the company make a stand on a one-lane

bridge between the Marine force and the Cubans

at the foot of a piece of high ground known as

Contractor's 1-lill. Desroches and his First Sergeant,

Harry B. Vanmatre, quickly reconnoitered the area

and decided to stop the Cubans there. The dcpliant grass along the road and under the structure was nearly impassable, leaving the Cubans

no choice but to try to cross the bridge.

Lieutenant Rutter again urged Desroches to order

the use of tear gas, but the major said it was not

yet time,"5

A few minutes later, as the Marines moved to

the bridge, the 258th Military Police Company,

519th Military Police Battalion, approached the

Marine security force from the rear and offered its

assistance. Major Desroches accepted. At about

the same time, General Wilson, the JTF Safe

Haven commander who was in touch by radio,

designated Desroches the commander of this tiny

joint task force and told him to stop the Cubans,

Photo courtesy of U.S. Army South

A group of US. Army mill/wy police watches as smoke rises from one of the camps during the riots.
either through negotiation or by force. He authorized the use of tear gas.t16 *

Desroches saw the first Cubans were now

almost upon him. He ordered the Marines to

establish a blocking position on the friendly side

of the bridge with one platoon on line forward,

and another on line behind them. Air Force security policemen and Army military police formed a

tactical reserve. A few Cubans then came close

enough to talk to the Marines. Spanish-speakers

in the company told them the Marines did not

intend to harm them and urged them to return to

the camps. This had little effect.117

Around 1140 the fight began. When the

migrants started to arm themselves with sticks and

rocks, the Marines moved forward and seized the

far end of the bridge, pushing members of the

crowd out of the way. Some of the Cubans began

to throw sticks, rocks and at least one Molotov

cocktail at the Marines, all without noticeable

effect. Many, if not most, of the Cubans simply

watched their more aggressive countrymen take

on the Marines.118

At around 1145, the Cubans attacked in

earnest, this time riding an 18-ton dump truck,

which they had found nearby and coaxed to life.

The truck was traveling at approximately 30 miles

per hour. The major had just enough time to order

his troops to open the lines to let it through,

reforming them after it had passed. Though not

rehearsed, this maneuver was perfecdy executed.

Then another unrehearsed maneuver saved the

clay: the airmen rammed the dump truck with

their five-ton truck, bringing it to a halt. They and

the MPs then went to work, energetically subduing the 30 Cubans who had ridden on the truck,

putting them in fiexicuffs and arraying them face

down on the ground.119

Less than 10 minutes later. the Marines faced

another truck. This time it was a water tanker an

enterprising Cuban had hot-wired. There was one

Cuban riding on top of the truck holding on to a

rope like a cowboy on a bucking bronco. The

Marine formation collapsed its lines again and the

truck passed by. Then, to his horror, Captain

Capdepon noticed some of the recently detained

Cubans were still on the roadway along with a

number of airmen who had their hacks to the

oncoming truck. Almost literally in the last second

Maj Desroches used additional troops that appeared, which

later included an Army infantry battalion: as a reserve and told

them to esrablish a detention area 500 yards hehind the

bridge.

CRISIS 79

before disaster struck, an airman leaped onto the

running hoard of the truck and grabbed the steering wheel, sending the tanker skidding away from

its deadly path. It hit the back of the dump truck

and bounced off into the ditch. When the truck

stopped, the Cuban on top flew off into the elephant grass as if he had been launched from a

catapult. The Air Force police in the road turned

around and experienced, in rapid order, surprise,

horror, and relief.120

It was a hot and humid day, with the sun high

in the sky. It was so hot Major Desroches and

Captain Capdepon decided to rotate troops out of

the frontline to prevent heat casualties. Desroches

refused offers from Army truck drivers to block

the bridge because he did not think a vehicle

would stop the crowd. Two events then occurred

almost simultaneously: rock-throwing Cubans

drove the Marines back toward the friendly side

of the bridge and, against the major's orders, a

humvee driven by a soldier approached the

bridge from the friendly side, honked and drove

through the Marines, who instinctively stepped

out of the way when they heard the horn.

Realizing he was now in no man's land between

a crowd of angry migrants and the Marines, the

Army driver stopped the vehicle, jumped out, and

ran hack to the bridge. A Cuban driver took his

place, other Cubans jumped on the vehicle, and

they drove straight at the Marines. Once again, the

formation opened to allow the vehicle to pass.

But this time the driver swerved, injuring three

Marines and two soldiers. One of the Marines,

Sergeant Irvin N. Howard, took the full force of

the fender in his chest.121

Luckily, the Marines were able to divert a passing helicopter and evacuate the casualties. Major

Desroches suspected from the number of helicopters overhead that his bridge was now the

focus of effort, and thought to radio one of the

helicopters to ask if the Cubans were attempting

to outflank his position. The pilot verified that

Desroches only had to worry about the crowd in

front of him. It was roughly at this time the

Auxiliary Security Force from Rodman arrived at

the bridge and reinforced the Marine Corps

Security Force, transforming the command into

the ground defense force, a slight shift in terminologv.122

But there was no respite for the Marines.

Within a matter of minutes, the Cubans were back

at their front, this time behind a road grader that

was advancing on the bridge. The Cubans

stopped some 30 meters away. A few Cubans
80 A SKTIiLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

approached and Desroches told them to return to

their camps. That group walked away from the

bridge, hut a much more belligerent group rushed

by them, throwing rocks antI firebombs at the

Marines. Desroches ordered a counterattack with

tear gas. The initial result was disorder on both

sides. Some of the Marines, who were still pulling

on their gas masks when the canisters plumed,

started gagging and vomiting. The Cubans threw

at least one gas grenade back at the Marines. Now

both sides were engulfed in tear gas and backed

away from the bridge, leaving the major, his executive officer and the first sergeanr standing alone

on the bridge.123

Momentarily angry, the major shouted at his

Marines to get back on the bridge, in good order.

Together with Captain Capdepon and the first sergeant, he reformed the company on the bridge

before the Cubans realized what was happening.

The escapees soon saw a line of Marinas, fully

masked and ready. One of the Marines, Lance

Corporal Jesus G. Palomo, could not get his mask

to work, hut stayed at his post with an undershirt

over his face. For a period of about 10 minutes,

the crowd stayed about 200 meters from the

bridge, leaving the grader between. The major

then asked if there were any farm boys present

who knew how to drive the grader. First Sergeant

Vanmatre volunteered and started forward on his

own. Capdepon quickly moved some troops forward to support him. The first sergeant was able

to start the grader and drove it to the friendly side

of the bridge while the Cubans continued to

retreat in the direction of the camps. It was now

a few minutes past noon.124

The Cubans stopped some 500 meters away.

During the interlude, General Wilson radioed he

was sending a contingent of Panamanian special

police to support the ground defense force at the

bridge. He added that a U.S. Embassy officer was

also on his way to speak to the Cubans. When he

arrived, the defence force advanced to within 100

meters of the Cubans. While Spanish-speaking

Marines announced their intentions, a squad of

Marines escorted Desroches and the embassy officer forward. It was a tense moment. In the words

of the situation report, the defense force

"remained at the ready" to rescue the major and

the diplomat. The noise of the circling helicopters

did not lessen the tension. Nor did the appearance of the Panamanian special police, who were

armed with shotguns. Preferring to avoid bloodshed, the major declined their offer of assistance.'25

The stalemate was broken when nost of the

Cubans decided they had enough of the heat and

the tear gas and, after speaking to the embassy

officer, agreed to return to the camps. A handful

of their compatriots who did not agree with that

decision tried to swim the canal. Desroches called

for transportation, and buses shuttled the migrants

back to their camps between 1400 and 1600.126

General Wilson ordered the ground defense

force to re-deploy to Camp 1, which niade for a

welcome change of pace. The Marines and sailors

from Rodman were elated. They had stopped. the

riot, hut they also were more than a little tired,

hungry, and thirsty. Food and water was the first

order of business. But at 1650 they had to call on

their reserves of energy and discipline when

General Wilson ordered them to return to Camp 2

to assist JTF forces in regaining control of that

camp.127

The ground defense force arrived at the open

ground in front of the camp antI found hundreds

of American servicemen apparently waiting for

orders. The Marines heard someone shout,

"They're here. Let them through!" The crowd. parted for the defense force, which first double-timed,

and then, feeling the effects of the heat and effort,

slowed to quick time. The Marine-Navy unit now

found itself in the center of the frontlines facing

the camp gate along with 258th Military Police

Company, an Air Force quick reaction force and

an Army infantry company.'

Desroches found an Army major who

appeared to be in charge and asked him what the

plan was. He said he did not know but would

find out. When the official response came, it was:

"Push the Cubans back into the camp." A military

police officer called on his troops to charge, and

the mass of American servicemen surged toward

the camp. The migrants began throwing rocks at

them. 129

To Major Desroches, the sky looked "black

with rocks." Captain Capdepon took a rock hard

on his chest and noticed that other rocks were

shattering shields around him. NTevertheless, the

Marines continued to advance. Along with

Lieutenant Rutter, Captains Kaiser and Capclepon

stood behind the first rank, riot batons horizontal,

keeping the Marines and sailors aligned and moving foiward. After Capdepon took another rock,

which literally set him back two feet, he ordered

two of his Marines from the company's softball

team to "return fire" by pitching rocks hack at the

migrants. He then noticed his men were taking

rocks not only from the front, but also from the
side. The reason soon became apparent: the

ground defense force was in an isolated position

ahead of the other American units. But the small

force was lucky. In short order, a handful of Army

MPs came up in a humvee and fired birdshot

(crowd control shotgun rounds packed with

small, non-lethal pellets) at rhe Cuban rockthrowers, who fell back. The Army major then

passed the word for everyone to fall back.

Desroches countered that the Marines were at the

front gate of the camp and the Cubans would give

up the fight, especially if the MPs fired more birdshot. But his suggestion fell on deaf ears and

eveiyone had to fall back to the positions on die

perimeter of the camp. Seven Marines had injuries

worth noting, ranging from a broken finger to

chemical burns from tear gas and numerous knee

injuries from rocks. The Cubans had learned to

aim the rocks below the riot shields. Four of these

Marines were hospitalized.130

During the hiatus that followed, the ground

defense force needed to address command relationships. The Marines had deployed on orders

relayed through their parent command at

Rodman, and were now feeling the effects of

"mission creep." Should they stay with JTF Safe

Haven or return home to the Navy base? An Army

officer then announce they had been placed

under the operational control of the 92d Military

Police Battalion. Major Desroches asked for confirmation from higher authority, and proceeded to

the nearby headquarters for Safe Haven. There he

learned SouthCom's commander in chief, General

Barry R. McCaffrey, had used his authority to

attach Desroches' ground defense force to the .JTF

for the duration of the crisis. On the afternoon of

9 December, the reinforced company of Marines

and sailors hecame part of Task Force 92, formed

around the 92d Military Police Battalion, itself

reinforced with U.S. Army Rangers and infantry.

The new task force was ordered to regain control

of Camp 2)3'

The men of the ground defense force were

able to focus on their own needs for a few hours.

They had come to the field literally without a

change of socks. When it was clear they could not

return to Rodman for supplies, Desroches ordered

the company gunnery sergeant, Claude G.

Lashley, to procure 1.00 pairs of socks. Apart from

requisitiornng them from the Army, a traditional

CRISIS 81

Photo coutlesy ot U.S. Army South

Debris left over from the riot at one of the camps in Panama. compared with all the migrant disturbances

that occurred in 199'i, the events in Panama ranked highest for violence.
82 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Marine Corps method of obtaining supplies, the

only other alternative that sprang to mind was the

Marine Corps Exchange at Rodman, whose manager, Mr. Herman Rijfkogel, was a former Marine.

lie understood the situation and did not hesitate

to send the socks along with a variety of health

and comfort items. [32

In the meantime, the planning for the operation at Camp 2 continued. Desroches tasked his

commanders with analyzing possible courses of

action. After a thorough chalk talk, the Marines

came up with a number of suggestions, which the

major presented to the MP battalion commander

who, in turn, presented them to General Wilson.

Some of the ideas became pail of the plan, which

was finally approved a few hours before H-Hour,

set for 0400 on 11 December. It was a 'hurry up

and wait" kind of day. The timing and last minute

changes meant the Marines and sailors needed to

rehearse in the middle of the night. For a while

there had been little to do; now there was a sudden need to rehearse. But the ground defense

force did what was necessary.133

The concept of the operation was simple. The

Army Rangers and infantry would breach the wire

around the camp and cordon off the blocks of

tents most likely to the migrants who had fueled

the unrest—the single males. The defense force

would clear the migrants from one block of

roughly 18 tents, each of which housed some 13

migrants. One group of Marines and sailors would

enter the front of the tent while another group

waited at the hack to snare any evaders.34

During the rehearsal, it occurred to the Marines

there was no lighting in the tents and it would be

impossible for them to see what they were doing,

let alone tell the difference between hostile and

compliant Cubans. Since there were not enough

flashlights for everyone, around midnight the call

went out to Mr. Rijflcogel, who once again did not

hesitate to help. This rime he sent a load of small

yellow flashlights, enough for each member of the

defense force to tape one to his helmet. The new

gear was not regulation, but it worked. '35

Major Desroches told his men to prepare for

two contingencies, In the first, the Marines and

Photo courtesy of U.S. Army South

Homemade weapons seized from the Cuban migrants in Panama. Some migrants were ready to escalate the intensity and violence oftheirprotests.
sailors would have to overcome resistance. In the

second, and equally likely contingency, they

woud have to guard against using too much force

against sleepy, dazed migrants with no interest in

resisting the inevitable. This was good guidance.'6

When the time came for the operation, the

entry teams encountered little resistance. Armed

only with batons and flashlights, the ground

defense force went through the breach at 0402,

and by 0415 had secured all of the tents in its sector. Only a few overeager Marines needed to be

reminded not to use their batons on the legs of

migrants who were too slow to leave their tents.

Overall, some 250 Cuban males were flexicuffed

and removed from the camp.'37

When the tents were empty, the MP5 and the

defense force searched them thoroughly for contraband while Spanish-speaking soldiers from a

psychological warfare detachment explained the

situation to the Cubans still in the camp. By 1600

on 11 December, Task Force 92 left Camp 2, its

mission accomplished. A similar, and unremarkable, evolution occurred the next day between

0500 and 0700 at Camp 3. Not only were the

Marines, soldiers, and sailors practiced, but the

migrants at Camp 3 were as compliant as they had

always heen.'3

A few hours later, at around 1000, the

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E.

Mundy, Jr., appeared at the JTF Safe Haven base

camp. Although the visit had been scheduled well

before the crisis, the timing could not have been

better. The Commandant came from visiting

wounded Marines. When he addressed the formation, he praised the defense force for its part in

the crisis. General McCaffrey then presented the

Joint Service Commendation Medal to Major

Desroches for his actions at the bridge on 8

December. The citation credited the major and, by

extension, his Marines and sailors with playing a

pivotal role in containing a potentially explosive

situation. It was a proud moment for the small

force. '39

By 15 December, Major Desroches was anxious

to return to his normal duties, which he felt had

been somewhat neglected. Finally, around noon

that day, the JTF agreed to release the defense

CRISIS 83

DvIc DA-SC-97-O 1366

After the protests; no one was taking any chances with the Cuban migrants in Panama. Soldiers of the

160th Militwy Police COmpany from Fort Lewis, Washington, preparedfor Operation Safe Passage, which

tranfered the migrants from Panama to Guantanamo Bay.
84 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTh

DWC DF-ST-98-02240

US. Army military police escort a cuban troublemaker out of the aircraft that carried him from Panama

to Guantanamo Bay. Those known to have rioted in Panama were put in handctWc and leg restraints

for the trip and then placed in administrative segregation upon their arrival to limit their potential to

incite additional unrest.

force, and the reinforced company returned to

Rodman. The staff noted with relief and pride

that, of the final total of 11 Marines injured during

the disturbances, nine had already returned to lull

duty.140 According to SouthCom news releases,

the total number of injured migrants and servicemen was in the neighborhood of 250, of whom

220 were American servicemen. Most of the

injuries were minor. It appears the only deaths

occurred when migrants tried to swim the

canal.'4'

Life more or less returned to normal. But the

accomplishments of individual Marines and

sailors were not forgotten. In mid-January 1995,

Desroches organized an awards ceremony at

Galeta Island. Lance Corporal Palomo, the Marine

who had used an undershirt for a gasmask, was

recognized for his steadfastness at rhe bridge with

a Navy Achievement Medal. Sergeant Roderick L.

Davis, who had conducted much of the training

in November, received the same award. Six other

members of the company received certificates of

According o Pius, Migrant Resettlement Operations, p. 23,

there were two confirnsecl cuban tatatities.

commendation, and 17 received meritorious

masts. Like virtually all Marines who participated

in Operation GTMO and Operation Sea Signal,

the members of the company later received the

Humanitarian Service Medal in addition to a joint

Meritorious Unit Award.142

JTF Safe Haven's reaction to the disturbances

was to dramatically increase the security of the

camps. Reinforcements from the 82d and 101st

Airborne Divisions flew to Panama, and the chain

link cyclone fences around the camps were

topped with barbed wire. '['he JTF then added a

second harrier of concertina wire and guard towers. Troops outside the fence wore full riot control gear and carried shotguns.'43

The Cubans still had to leave Panama within

six months under the agreement with the

Panamanian government, hut there was nowhere

for them to go apart from Guantarianio, where

they did not want to go. When it came time to

move them in February 1995, the preparations

were elaborate. The operation was planned to the

last detail, right down to restroom stops and the

confiscation of razors and cigarette lighters just

before departure. "If they want to smoke ... our
soldiers will have to light up for them," said one

Army officer

Despite the size of the force already available,

General McCaffrey insisted the Marines participate

in the operation. So Major Desroches and his staff

prepared a contingency plan to block any runaway migrants—especially anyone who might

commandeer a vehicle in the vicinity of Rodman,

an important intersection along the route.'45

When the time came, soldiers carrying riot

batons lined the walkways at Howard Air Force

Base, and for every 100 migrants on each aircraft,

there were 50 soldiers guarding them. Those proportions were reversed for the approximately 280

Cubans suspected of being troublemakers. They

boarded the aircraft wearing handcuffs and leg

irons.46 One group of Cubans went by sea on a

tank landing ship, closely guarded by

Guantanamo Marines 147

A few months later, on 5 June 1996, the Marine

Corps Security Force Company was disbanded as

pair of the Panama Canal Treaty to return the

Canal Zone to Panama by 2000. At the ceremony,

Captain Arthur Rowley, the Navy base commander, credited the ground defense force with playing

a major role in restoring order and preventing

bloodshed during the disturhances, especially

during the confrontation at the hridge. If anything,

Captain Rowley understated the company's

CRISIS 85

achievement. The Marines had been both prepared and flexible. They succeeded because of

good small unit leadership and because they had

conducted so many rehearsals. They were intimately familiar with the mission, the terrain, and

the equipment. That familiarity allowed them to

go beyond their scripted roles. As Captain

Capdepon put it, they had rehearsed so much

they had developed an instinctive sense for what

needed to be done. If the Cubans had faced a less

disciplined and resourceful formation, the result

could have been bloodshed and a major embarrassment for the U.S. Government.'48 *

Endgaine at Guantanamo

The most significant event hetween January

and March 1995 was the reintegration of the

migrants from Panama into the camps at

Guantanamo. Their reception at Guantanamo was

almost as unfriendly as their farewell from

Panama had been; no one at either end was taking any chances. Some 120 of the worst trouble-

* The absence of Marines in Panama was soon felt, and

southCom asked for some Marine infantry to replace rhe

Marine Corps 5ecurity Force Company. In response, 2d Marine

Division rotated companies through Panama to perform security operations, at least through the first half of 1996. (See 2d

MarDiv ConidC, lJan-3OJunl 96 [MCHC]).

OVIC nF-ST-98-02246

All Cuban migrants were closely watched upon their arrival at Gun ntanamo Bay from Panama, as well

as when boarding transportation from one side of the naval base to the other
86 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

DVIC DN-ST-98-0061 1

Rows of hardback tents jbr d'uban migrants quickly sprang up at Camp Bulkeley. In the oreground, a

new galley is under construction. US. Navy Seabees and Cuban migrant caipenters worked together to

improve the quality of life at the migrant camps in the spring of 1995.

makei-s from Panama went straight into tIse ultrasecure facility at Camp X-Ray.'49

But the Cubans returning from Panama had

lost their fire, and like the rest of the migrants, settled clown to wait quietly for the U.S. Government

to decide theit fate. One Marine commander

noted the group that had caused the most trouble

in Panama, that from Camp 1, were the most disciplined and orderly at Guantanamo.150

As time wore on, both for the migrants and the

leaders of Joint Task Force i60, the troubles in

Panama and Guantanamo receded into the past.

Lieutenant Colonel Redlich, the Marine commander who had personally waded into the angry

crowd in September, had left for home in October

and was replaced by Colonel Douglas 0.

Hendricks. General Ayres and Colonel Beavers,

who had come to Guantanamo specifically to deal

with the riots, had rotated home in December

1994 and February 1995, respectively. No one

replaced Colonel Beavers as the concept of the

security group had lost its urgency. Colonel

Hendricks simply took on the additional duty of

joint security group commander.151

In March, Colonel Kevin F. Leffler, a Marine

aviator, took Colonel Hendricks' place at Camp

Bulkeley. He presided over a period characterized

by expenditures to improve the quality of life—

some $35 million spent between March and

May—and by what he called "deinstitutionalization." Although the administration of the camps

was not trouble-free, it was far more tranquil than

at any time in the past. The camps were now

evolving into small, self-governing towns. When

Colonel Leffler arrived, he was told the Cubans

wanted to keep the concertina wire strung

between camp compounds because they were

territorial. After he had been there a while, he

asked the camp representatives what they thought

of the wire. It was clear they did not like it, and

Leffler authorized them to. remove it, hut not the

outer cyclone fences. To his surprise, the Cubans

did the job themselves within 24 hours without

any of the equipment military engineers use. They

even rolled it neatly for future use.152

With the concertina wire gone and the gates

open during the day, the migrants could visit

other camps, swim, fish, or just walk around the

area as long as they remained orderly and

returned to their own camps to eat and sleep.

Many of the Cubans held jobs of one sort or

another——working in the mess hall, distributing

supplies, or performing maintenance. As the last

Marine commander at Camp Bulkeley, Colonel
Michael R. Lehnert, later commented: "We encouraged work. I never used a soldier [or Marine] for

a job if I could employ a migrant. This kept the

migrants busy, left them with a sense of control

over their own destiny, and improved relations

with rhe military."53

There was both a U.S. military and a migrant

infrastructure. The camp commander, who was

typically a company commander, interacted with

a migrant jeJèe. or headman, but the commander

always had the last word. He was the de facto

mayor and justice of the peace of a small town of

a few thousand. He had what amounted to a

police force of infantrymen and the authority to

impose a certain modicum of discipline, to

include extra duties or brief periods of restriction

and administrative segregation for infractions of

the rules such as fighting, hoarding, or smoking

indoors. To preclude discrepancies in punishnients from one camp to the next, there was a

handbook of sorts on discipline that applied to all

camps.t54

CRISIS 87

It was a heady experience for many young

Marines. Although some of their conventional

infantry skills may have atrophied, they learned

much about a different kind of leadership and

civil affairs. At least a few remembered this was as

much a part of Marine tradition as making

amphibious landings or guarding Navy bases, and

with a little bit of creativity, they could almost

always find ways to train for their primary mission

wherever they were.155 *

The Cubans came to agree, grudgingly at first,

the Marines were doing a good job. Many Cuhans

who were being transferred from the golf course

camps to the Radio Range did not want to go.

They said they did not want to work with the

white sleeves. Even before leaving Cuba, they had

known of the Marine Corps and believed it existThere were some conventional infantry training opportl.tnities on base and resourceful battalion commanders rotated

their troops our of the camps to take advantage of them and

maintain most of their skills.

Photo cuurtcsy of the author

By the fall of 1995, an "era of good feelings" had set in af Guantanamo Bay. Most of the cubans knew

they would eventually go to the US. Some were moved to express their gratitide, as in this monument

depicting a migrant and incorporating an Amen can flag.
ed only to kill and destroy. Colonel Leffler met

with the jefes to allay their fears and take them to

the new camp sites to show them how much better life was at the Radio Range. Eventually, everyone moved willingly. 56

By May the end was predictable. On 2 May,

Attorney General Janet Reno announced another

policy change so broad that virtually all of the

migrants who were then at Guantanamo would

go to the United States. They would count against

the annual Cuban immigration quota as though

they had applied for visas in 1-lavana, but any

future migrants trying to make their way to the

United States would he returned to Cuba. The few

remaining tensions subsided immediately and the

operation entered a kind of golden phase of good

feeling. The issue now became one of deciding

who would go when. Joint lask Force 160 used a

lottery system to assign immigration dates to individual Cuban migrants. On the assigned day, the

migrants in a given camp would assemble in a

large tent, and the incumbent JTF commander,

Rear Admiral Michael D. Haskins, would draw lots

for the happy migrants. Although some migrants

still had many months to wait—the last Cuban

migrant arrived at Homestead Air Force Base in

Florida on 31 January 1996—most migrants

viewed the process as fair and quietly waited their

turn. When the day came for the last 127 Cul).an

migrants to go to Florida, there was a small celebration on the apron. While a group of somc 50

soldiers, civilians, and migrants watched, they

waved plastic American flags and hugged and

kissed each other happily. The very last migrant

to leave, an attractive young woman with a toothy

grin named Margarita Uria Sanchez, carried a

poster that read 'End of the 94-96 Exoclus."ln

In the intervening months, die Haitian migrants

had continued to leave Guantanamo in trickles.

Some were paroled into the United States, a few

hundred were involuntarily repatriated, but most

were ferried home voluntarily. The last Itaitian

migrants left in October 1995, a few weeks after

the closure of Camp McCalla and a few clays

88 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Photo courtesy of the author

Many cuban migrants used their time at the camps to learn English. Some even, used the walls qf their

tentsas blackboards to practice grammar and compose up4fting slogans.
before the disestablishment of Joint Task Group

Bulkeley, which had been under the command of

Colonel Lehnert, who had succeeded Colonel

Leffler as the commander of MarFor i60. Since the

parent command, JTF 160, was shrinking, it made

sense to downgrade the billet of its commander,

and on 3 November 1995, Colonel John C. McKay

became the last commander of the humanitarian

task force.158

This was the quietest period, as the migrants

departed and troops began rotating home. But

there was a great deal of equipment that had been

loaned to the JTE The challenge became one of

finding the original owners or disposing of the

equipment, no easy task since the organization

had been a joint task force and because the staff

had turned over so many times. While major

CRISIS 89

items went hack to the mainland, no one in the

U.S. military wanted the lesser items, such as the

large quantities of wood used to build the camps.

It was eventually loaded onto barges for shipment

to Haiti, a deforested country with a dire shortage

of wood. By 11 April 1996, the process had ended

and the last remaining members of JTF i60

marked the end with a short ceremony at the

command post overlooking Camp McCalla.159

When the Marines looked hack on their experiences on the joint task force in Operation Sea

Signal, three themes emerged. One was the benefit of synergy. It was even clearer than it had

Another ceremony formally deactivating the JTF occurred on

2 February 1996. However, the rear party continued to work

atter that date. WSACom, 'Migrant Camp Operations, p. iv)

ovic DN-sT-98-oo6o3

The USCG Boutwell (WI-lEG 719) leaves Guantanamo Bay for Port-au-Prince to repatriate I-Ia i/ian

migrants from the camps run by Joint Task Force 160. The ocean ftent rooft at Camp McC'alia can be

seen here in the foreground and one of the guard towers overlooking the camp is visible on the right.
90 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

been in Operation GTMO that no one Service

could have accomplished the task on its own, in

part because of the drain on personnel and equipment (especially on the Marine Corps' 2d Force

Service Support Group, which gave up many of

its key personnel to JTF 160), but also because

each Service brought a particular set of skills

and/or equipment to the operation. These were

capabilities that reside almost exclusively in the

military. It is difficult to imagine a predominantly

civilian response to the challenges that General

Williams faced, especially the initial challenges.

The carefully trained and disciplined Marine

infantrymen made a significant contribution.

Although establishing and running migrant camps

was not their primary mission, their core skills

were compatible with this secondary mission,

especially after they received some additional

training in riot control and rules of engagement.

The Army contributed MPs, who were ideally suited to the operation, as well as civil affairs units.

This was perhaps the most notable Marine shortcoming, the only Marine civil affairs teams being

in Marine Corps Reserve units. Those members,

while capable and well respected, were simply

too few and their deployments too short. Virtually

every Marine admitted to benefiting from the

cross-fertilization. At the end of the day, their uniforms were still Marine green even though their

orientation and mission had been purple."

A second theme was that, even though it had

worked well, the joint task force had been a "pick

up" team whose members had to learn how to

work together. Would it not be better to stand up

a contingency JTF whose staff officers would

establish working relations and procedures before

they deployed? In 1996, at Camp Lejeune, the

o For a thorough discussion of this topic, see Maj Gilbert

Desroches, USMc, "Rf Operations: Incapacitating the

U.S. Military" (Quantico, vA: Marine Corps Command and Staff

College thesis, 1995). Maj Desroches discusses the erosion of

primary skills when combat units are committed for long periods ot time to humanitarian operations, and calls for added

funding prior to employing forces in such operations to sateguard that funding, which is required to maintain combat

skills training. His argument dues not, of course, apply to units

whose primary skills are directly relevant to humanitarian

operations, such as MPs. civil affairs, nr engineering units.

Addressing a similar subject, an Army after action report made

the excellent point that "training for war antI training to a

wartime ME1'L IMission Essential Task UstI allow units to be

prepared to conduct operations other than war. The Opposite

is not true." (0. 5. Atlantic Cummand, "Operation Uphold

Democracy: U.S. Forces in tiaiti" Norfolk, vA u.s. Atlantic

command, 19971, p. 10)

OVIC nF-sT-98-o11862

Haitian migrants, with the help ofJoint Task Force

160 personnel, load their belongings on board the

aircraft that will take them from Guantanamo

Bay to the United States.

Marine Corps embarked on just such an experiment.

The last theme was that of personal and professional satisfaction. Some Marines went to Sea

Signal with reluctance. They had not joined the

Marine Corps to work in the arena of civil affairs,

or to run what looked from the outside to be a

World War II prison camp. Some commented the

operational tempo in August and September 1994

had been too high. The short-handed force had

been overloaded with too many tasks, and it was

not an experience they wanted to repeat. But, like

the Marines in Operation GTMO, many, if not
most Marines in Sea Signal remembered the operation as one of the highpoint.s of their careers.

Sonic simply enjoyed the daily challenges, while

many liked contributing to a humanitarian cause.

They had helped to save the migrants, keep them

safe, and get them back on their feet. As Major

CRISIS 91

John L. Shissler III of the JTF staff commented, if

it had not been for Sea Signal, many migrants

would have ended up on the bottom of the

ocean. Others simply took satisfaction in a job

well done—whether it was riot control or civil

engineering or camp administration. i6i
Part II

Op eration

andUph6'

-ap iiI

I

a

4

4. e

S

S
Chapter 4

Preparing to Invade Haiti

Throughout the crisis caused by the flood of

migrants, the United States, the TJnited Nations

and the Organization of American States debated

what action, if any, to take against the Haitian military, which had precipitated the crisis by overthrowing President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The

aim for most was to restore A.ristide to power,

although enthusiasm for that gqal waxed and

waned. Imposing an economic embargo had been

an easy, though not very effective, first step that

committed no one to further action. In late June

1993, the U.N. had bolstered the long-standing

U.S. embargo with an embargo of its own, which

included a ban on all petroleum and arms sales to

Haiti. It was only a few days later that representatives of the Aristide government and the Haitian

military met separately with U.N. officials and

hammered out the Governor's Island Accord. to

restore Aristide to power by 30 October 1993.

But that agreement collapsed when one of its

major elements, the U.N. mission to rebuild and

reorient the infrastructure of the Haitian army and

police, failed. To pave the way for that mission,

an advance team of American and Canadian

troops, which included military engineers from

Company B, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, 2d

Force Service Support Group from Camp Lejeune,

set sail in early October on the USS Harlan

County (LST 1.196). Arriving in Port-au-Prince on

11 October, the Harlan County was met by what

appeared to he an angry crowd chanting antiAmerican and anti-U.N. slogans. The U.S. and

U.N. commanders decided not to force their way

ashore, but to stand off from the harbor and, ulti-
94 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

DVrC D?-5C-96-OOO6O

The destroyer USS Spruance (DD 963) patrols off the coast of Haiti in the summer of 1994. A rigid-hull

inflatable boat from the destroyer's boarding party is on its way to inspect a merchant ship. Under the

United Nations embargo of the caribbean nation, all shipping was subject to inspection for contraband.

mately, to order the ship home. The U.N. fell back

to a policy of economic sanctions.1

The remainder of 1993 and the first half of 1994

was a time of indecision and diplomatic maneuvering. In the spring of 1994, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff directed the Norfolk-based U.S. Atlantic

Command (USACom) to develop plans to land

U.S. forces in Haiti. For that purpose, USACom

activated Joint Task Force 180 (JTF 180), built

around the Army's :xviti Airborne Corps and

commanded by Lieutenant General Henry H.

Shelton, USA. By mid-summei; tough talk was

added to the mix. In early July, the tough talk

included a show of force by the 24th Marine

Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable

(MEU ISOC]) under Colonel Martin K. Berndt, who

would become known to the public for his role in

rescuing downed U.S. Air Force Captain Scott

O'Grady in the former Republic of Yugoslavia in

1995. A composite of 3d Battalion, 6th Marine,

Medium Helicopter Squadron 266, and MEU

Service Support Group 24, this unit had just

returned from a 180-day deployment to the

Mediterranean and the Indian Oceans, which had

included seven weeks ashore in Somalia helping

to safeguard the withdrawal of American troops

from that desolate and war-torn country. With less

than three weeks home to get reacquainted with

their friends and families, the orders came for

them to pack their bags and return to their ships,

the USS Inchon (LPH 12), Portland (LSD 37),

Trenton (LPD 14), and Spartan burg County (LST

1192). Pentagon spokesmen explained, somewhat

sheepishly, there was simply no one else ready to

go on short notice. This was cold comfort for

many young Marines, sailors and. their families,

but they did their duty. One Marine, Sergeant

Jeffrey Glenn, put it simply and directly: "1 was

disappointed. But you know, I gotta go." in typical Marine fashion, though some were more

enthusiastic than others, all remembered there

was a reason the Marine Corps laid claim to the

"First to Fight" slogan. This was, in the words of

one MEU officer, First Lieutenant Douglas M.

Powell, for real. "It gets your blood pumping. This

is what you sign up for."2

Exactly what was the mission? What did putting

pressure on the Haitian government mean in

practical terms? Colonel Berndt said his primary

mission was to be ready to evacuate American citizens from Haiti, known in the jargon as a noncombatant evacuation operation. But he was

quick to addS: "We have a list of capabilities as

long as your arm. My job is to lie ready for anything. "3

To exercise and demonstrate their capabilities,

the 24th MEU conducted a two-day landing and

evacuation exercise on the Bahamian Island of

Great Inagua in mid-July. As The Wash ington Post

put it dryly, "administration officials called. attention to the action, apparently as part of

Washington's effort to unnerve the H aiti's military
PREPARING TO INVADE 1-IAITI 95

leaders and pressure them into 1eaving." A few

weeks later, iii early August, there was another

exercise at the Naval Air Station at Roosevelt

Roads in Puerto Rico, where 1,000 Marines

stormed ashore to secure the airfield and prepare

to evacuate civilians.5 imaginative platoon commanders found ways to augment the training with

exercises on board ship, such as when Marines on

the Spartanburg County worked their way

through live fire shooting drills on the flight

deck.6

But being the force in readiness in this show of

force primarily meant, "doing gator squares" in

the stifling heat off the coast of Haiti. The slang

referred to amphibious, or "gator," ships steaming

in fixed patterns. The average Marine was more

than willing to invade Haiti. But after nearly eight

months overseas, the Marines wanted very much

to go home if the alternative was waiting on station day in and day out.7

The Joint Chiefs of Staff received the message

and acted on it. Replacements having set sail, the

24th MEU returned to Morehead City, North

Carolina, on 16 August, where Secretary of

Defense William J. Perry met them. He told the

Marines he had come "to get some first-hand flavor for the stresses and strains that come from

extra long deployments" and wanted "to assure

lthe returning Marines and sailors] that the decision to send them out again after two weeks was

not made lightly." The press photos show Marines

listening politely to the secretary's message. But

no doubt their minds were elsewhere.8

Replacing the 24th MEU was Special Purpose

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean

(SPMAGTF Carib), built around the headquarters

of the 2d Marines under Colonel Thomas S. Jones,

a Vietnam veteran who had commanded 1st

Battalion, 6th Marines, during the Gulf War. For

more than a year, 2d Marines had figured in contingency planning for Haiti and the Caribbean.

The regiment had even sent troops to stand by at

Guantanamo for operations in Haiti. In the second

half of July, Haiti became more than a plan on the

shelf for the regiment. Colonel Jones received

word his staff would form the nucleus of a

SPMAGTF to replace the 24th MEU, and on 20

July, SPMAGTF Carib, destined to play a role in

the overlapping Operations Support Democracy

and Uphold Democracy to restore the legitimate

government of Haiti, officially came into being at

Camp Lejeune.9

The 1,900 Marines and sailors of the SPMAGTF

included 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, formed into a

battalion landing team (BLT) under Lieutenant

Colonel George S. "Steve" Hartley; Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron 264 (HMM-264)

under Lieutenant Colonel Anthony J. Zell; and

Combat Service Support Detachment 29 (CSSD29) under Major Lance R. McBride. Included in

the battalion landing team was a provisional rifle

company, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,

which left its howitzers at Camp Lejeune—no one

thought conventional artillery would be of much

use in Haiti—and Company B (-), 2d Light

Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, along with its

vehicles, which might be needed for at least two

reasons. In a noncombatant evacuation, the

objectives might he a few miles apart, and the

Marines might need the added transportation.

Another point in some planners' minds was a

recent and painful lesson from Somalia when

members of the U.S. Army's elite Delta Force and

Rangers had been unable to fight their way out of

the back streets of Mogadishu without suffering

heavy casualties. Light armored vehicles might

have saved lives, but there had been none in

country.1° Yet another important decision about

Dvlc DD-SD-03666

SPMAGTF Ca rib commander Col Thomas S. Jones

stands in front of the flag of 2d Marines, which

was flown in 1-la itt some 60 years earlier.

* White the distinction between "Support Democracy' anti

Uphold Democracy' is often blurred in literature, Support

Democncy refers tn the pre-invasinn/pre-occuparinn phase,

especially maritime interdiction, while uphold Democracy

refers to the planning for and implementation of the invasion

and occupation nf Haiti.
the composition of the SPMAGTF came when

Colonel Jones argued to add air-cushioned landing craft (LCACs) to the table of equipment

because they were faster and more flexihie than

the more traditional and sturdier utility landing

craft. In the end, the task force had both types of

landing craft at its disposal.11

The principal difference between the 24th MEU

and SPMAGTF Carib was not so much in its

organization but in its capabilities. Colonel Jones

held the reasonable belief he would not need to

conduct special operations in Haiti. It was far

more likely his task force would conduct some

sort of conventional landing. Jones also wanted

an organization robust enough to conduct sustained operations ashore, as opposed to quick

incursions, the forte of the MEIJ(SOC). As the regimental operations officer, Major Thomas C.

Greenwood, pointed out, the traditional purposes

of a regimental headquarters had always been to

plan and conduct landings and, if necessary, fight

on shore for the duration. The staff of 2d Marines

also had worked together for more than a year, an

advantage many MEU staffs did not posess.'2

Initially, Colonel Jones and his planners

thought primarily in terms of conducting a noncombatant evacuation, either in Port-au-Prince or

in the country's second city, Cap-Haltien, on the

north coast. Like Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haitien

boasted a seaport and an airfield, infrastructure

with obvious military significance. Jones later

commented that some planners thought there

might he as many as 5,000 to 10,000 American citizens needing evacuation.'3 But a peacetime evacuation of civilians was still not the only contingency. The plans for hostilities continued to

evolve, and Colonel Jones and Major Greenwood

traveled to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to talk with

officers from the XVIII Airborne Corps, which

would form the nucleus of JTF 180 and assume

overall control of an invasion of Haiti.'' The possibility of 'forcible entry," the euphemism for

invasion, was very much on Jones' mind when his

command set sail on 13 August in the USS Wasp

(LHD 1) and Nashville (LPD 13), forming a small

amphibious ready group.

The incoming SPMAGTF and the outgoing

MEU passed each other close enough for Colonel

Jones and his staff to fly over to the Inchon for a

briefing by Colonel Bernclt. The MEU turned over

its operation plans to the newcomers, who proceeded to emulate their predecessors by conducting a series of no less than four major and two

partial landing exercises, mostly on the Puerto

Rican island of Vieques, but also at Guantanamo

and Great Inagua. Jones used a building block

approach, doing the first landings in daylight

without troops, then with troops and then at

96 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

DVIC DN-SC-96-0005S

An air cushioned landing craft (L6'AC 46) speeds along the beach at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, as

Marines conducted a two-day landing exercise in preparation for the landings in Haiti.
PREPARING TO INVADE HAITI 97

night. When the exercises had ended, the

SPMAGTF had rehearsed a variety of contingencies through D + 1 (the day following the landing), including a simultaneous landing from landing cntft over a beach and from helicopters onto

an airfield, and a landing at 0300 with no moon at

low tide. Jones believed in night operations,

when the darkness would leverage his combat

power and denigrate that of the opposition. In

each of the exercises, the staff learned something

useful and refined its procedures. 15

SPMAGTF Carib received mixed signals from

higher headquarters through mid-September.

Colonel Jones still reported to Norfolk, but he

stayed attuned to developments at Port Bragg. At

one point, the word was "he prepared to conduct

all three missions," the three being two noncombatant evacuations, one in Port-au-Prince and one

in Cap-Haitien, followed by a forcible entry at a

"to be determined" location. Part of the problem

was each staff had its own focus. USACom, which

had been rescuing migrants, literally for years, still

tended to think in terms of helping civilians,

while JTF 180 planners from XVIII Airborne Corps

were more focused on preparing for an invasion

and had less interest in an evacuation.16

As time went on, it seemed likely the Marines

would form part of an invasion by JTF 180 rather

than conducting an evacuation of noncombatants.

Colonel Jones adopted an approach that made

cacti plan a variant of the other, which gave him

a great deal of flexibility. The two plans began

with simultaneous air and sea landings to secure

both a seaport and an airport while neutralizing

any threats. In both cases, it was a matter of gettidg as much combat power ashore as quickly as

possible. This became easier to do when the

amphibious task force gained the temporary use

of the USS Ashland (LSD 48), which had been

engaged in migrant operations in Cuban waters.

With the Ashland, more Marines could go ashore

at the same time. The difference between the two

plans lay in what would happen after the initial

landing and, of course, in the rules of engagement. Whatever happened, it was generally

accepted the Marines would withdraw soon after

the situation ashore had stabilized.17

By mid-September, the Marines were focusing

their efforts on preparing to seize Cap-HaItien, as

Port-au-Prince had definitively become the

province of the Army, which had ostentatiously

loaded troops and helicopters onto an attack aircraft carrier. With his reconnaissance assets,

including the sophisticated capabilities of the

Army's Bell OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters

temporarily based on the fast frigate USS Oliver

Hazard Perry (PEG 7), Colonel Jones had an

excellent idea of the lay of the land and the challenges that awaited him. Cap-Haltien was a congested town of some 65,000 persons, laid out in a

grid along a crescent-shaped waterfront roughly

three kilometers long. There were hills directly

behind the town, hemming it between the high

ground (the highest was 718 meters) and the

beach. The airport was a short distance from the

harbor, inland and to the south, Jones thought the

area bore some resemblance to Beirut and some

resemblance to Vietnam, The once graceful

DvIc DN-sc-96-00065

Marine amphibious assault vehicles storm the beach at Vie ques Island with smoke masking the landing

force behind them. A tank landing ship is partially visible in the background.
98 A SKRLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

DVC DN-SC-96-00066

Secretaiy of Defense Williamf Perry addresses members of SPMA4GTF ('a rib and the crewmen of the USS

Wasp (LI-ID 1) on. 1 7 September 1994, a little more than 24 hours before the scheduled invasion of Haiti.

The G'ommandant of the Marine ('ops, General Carl E.Mundy, Jr, stands to his leji.

French and Spanish colonial-style buildings, now

mostly rundown, and the narrow cobblestone

streets in the old town must have reinforced that

impression. Not far from the city center were

overcrowded neighborhoods of half-finished cinder block dwellings.18

Jones decided to split his ground forces from

Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 2d Marines,

into three elements. One, which became Task

Force Irish, would land by surface and seize the

town itself The second, Task Force Hawg (a reference to Harley-Davidson motorcycles), would

conduct a helicopter-borne assault to seize the

small airport, which could accommodate the

Marines' cargo planes, the Lockheed Martin C-130

Hercules. The third element, Company F, 2d

Marines, was the reserve, to be held on hoard the

Wasp until needed. Bell AH-IW Super Cobra gunships and an Air Force Lockheed Martin AC-130

Spectre, which could fill every square foot of a

football field with lead in a few seconds, would

stand by if anyone needed close air support.'9

Colonel Jones also decided he would he the

mission commander. It would be difficult for

Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, the BLT commander,

to oversee the disparate parts of the ground operation with the assets at his disposal. Jones, on the

other hand, had a regimental staff at his disposal.

Hartley, therefore, became the commander of

Task Force Irish, while his executive officer, Major

Herman C. Broadstone, became commander of

Task Force Hawg.

What was the threat picture? The ragtag 7,000-

man Armed Forces of Haiti, formally known as

the Forces Armees d'Haiti, included the army and

the police, along with a tiny navy, and had a miserable reputation. The ['few York Times described

it as "poorly armed and seasoned only in terror."20

But no one knew for sure what threats awaited

Marines ashore. The memory of the U.S. Army's

bad experiences in Somalia against irregular

forces was still very fresh; there, whole neighborhoods seemed to rise up against the "invaders,"

launching disorganized but sometimes deadly
PREPARING TO INVADE HAITI 99

attacks with everything from rocks to crew-served

weapons in a maze of crowded streets and alleys

not too different from those of CapHaItien.21

Would elements of the 1-laitian Army actually fight

on the beaches? Would some brave soul aim the

machine guns at the airport at the Marine helicopters and open fire? Or, perhaps more likely,

would a few hardcore Haitian soldiers or their

paramilitary auxiliaries, the infamous attaclads,

use hit-and-nun tactics against the Marines, trying

to snipe and ambush? It did not help that the

Haitian forces in the north, those around CapHaitien, were reputed to he more disciplined and

prepared than their counterparts in the south

around the capital.22 Their commander, Lieutenant

Colonel Claudel Josephat, had a reputation for

being both relatively effective and ruthless.

According to one account, he led an operation in

April 1994 against a reputed insurgent leader,

"burning entire villages to the ground [and] razing

schools and crops."23

lIt was hard to know what to tell young Marines

who had trained for combat, in some cases for

years. Colonel Jones had purposefully waited to

publish the U.S. Atlantic Command rules of

engagement for the operation because they

seemed to change hourly. On 15 September, he

decided the time had come, and he carefully prepared his Marines for an ambiguous situation. He

repeatedly told his subordinate commanders they

could and should use force decisively if necessary, adding that he would not second-guess their

battlefield judgment. But he also urged them to

weigh the consequences of their actions and

remember the Marines really wanted to capture

the "hearts and minds" of the 1-laitian people.

Securing that objective was the best guarantee of

the Marines' own security.24

Jones reminded his Marines the last time the

Marine Corps had occupied Haiti and run the

paramilitary gendarmerie, it had not been a uniformly positive experience. He wanted this intervention to he for the good. While some Marines

had covered themselves with glow fighting banclits in the 1920s when the Marine Corps certainly

helped to modernize the infrastructure of the

country, there had also been allegations of brutality by Marines and a famous incident in 1929 near

the town of Les Cayes where a Marine contingent

opened lire on an unruly and threatening mob,

killing and wounding 34.

For 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, the landing

would he a homecoming of sorts. It was at CapHaitien during the Marine occupation of Haiti the

battalion had flown its colors for the first time.25

While the word on what was about to happen

was hazy at best, preparations continued on 16

and 1.7 September. Perhaps the wildest rumor on

16 September was that the Secretary of Defense

and the Commandant of the Marine Corps were

going to fly to the Wasp on a McDonnellDouglas/British Aerospace AV-8B Harrier jump jet

and address the troops. The rumor was partly

true. On the motning of 17 September, there still

was no confirmation of D-Day or H-Hour, hut it

was confirmed that Secretary of Defense William

J. Perry and General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., were on

their way, although not in a Harrier. By the time

they arrived in the afternoon, it had been confirmed the landings would occur on 19

September, although there also was news a last

minute mission by former President Jimmy Carter,

accompanied by the former Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, General Cohn L. Powell, and

The smallest Marine presence in Haiti in recent memory was

the 1959 to 1963 U.S. Naval Mission to Haiti, under the com- mann of colonel Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. About 70 strong anti

mostly Marines, the mission grew out of contacts between

General Lemuel c. Shepherd, Jr., and Haitian dictator Francois

Duvalier. who had known each other during the first Marine

occupation of Haiti when Duvalier appeared to stand for

progress. The mission worked barn to rio its job, trying to

modernize the armed forces of Haiti. Colonel Heinl laeheved

the Haitian military could literally huild the nation if it were

professionalized. But it was a thankless task. The Haitian government wanted the appearance of collaboration with the

Unitenl States and little else. When Heinl left 1-taiti, his outgoing brief to the chief of staff of the I-iaitian armed forces was

brutally frank, with none of rhe window dressing so common

in diplomatic exchanges or end-of-tour reports. Apart from the

frustrations of working with unwilling counterparts, there were charges the mission was helping to prop op the Duvalier

regime, as when political colunmist Drew Pearson wrote

ahnitr Haiti in The Miami Herald nn 30 August 1959. ''iisting

no time, Heini replied to the column in a letter to Pearson on

2 September 1959 in his take-no-prisoners style. Heinl wrote

that he saw his mission as one of helping Haiti, "not...any

incumbent regime." From Heinl's point of view, the Marines

involved in thc mission had always taken pains to uphold

Marine tranlitions in general and the traditions of the gendormer/c in panicular. This emerges clearly from documents

such as Heinl's 24 August 1959 request to \vashington to allow

his Marines to wear the field hat still worn by Marine rlrill

instructors. As he explained: "the primary reason for this

request is the long-standing association in the mind of the

average Haitian of the field hat with the U.S. Marine officers

who trained its armed forces from 1915 to 1934. It is the policy of this Mission to foster in every way a sense of continui between the highly successful past efforts of the Marine

Corps in Haiti and the present objectives and operations of

this Mission. (Heinl Papers, MCI-IC; see also Charles T. Williamson, The U.S. Naval Mission to Haiti: 1959-1963

lAnnapolis, MD: Naval Instiwte Press, 1.9991)
100 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Sketch by Capt Charles G. Grow

A few hours before the landing, Marines were

required to put down their combat gear and pick

up their sewing kits to stitch American flags on

their uniforms. The Marine sewing is Capt

Thomas C. Smith, the commander of Company G,

2d Battalion, 2d Marines.

Senator Sam Nunn were on their way to Port-auPrince to find an alternative to invasion.26

Secretary Perry and General Mundy addressed

the troops briefly and conferred with Colonel

Jones. Paying particular attention to the rules of

engagement, Jones outlined his concept of operations for Secretary Perry, who appeared to like

what he heard, In the evening, a media pool

arrived on hoard, and the various Navy and

Marine Corps staffs briefed reporters and

answered questions while their troops continued

to prepare for combat.27

The tension continued to build on 18

September. In the morning, mission commanders

held briefings, and in the afternoons there were

concrete preparations for the landings. In the kind

of last minute "brown side out, green side out"

change familiar to all infantrymen, someone high

in the chain-of-command decided all U.S. ground

personnel should wear U.S. flags on their right

shoulders and one-inch reflective patches on top

of their helmets and on their left shoulders to

make it easier to identify them, especially from

the air. As a result, the warrior elite spent part of

the day sewing.28

During the afternoon, the skipper of the Wa.cp,

Captain Robert C. Chaplin, USN, spoke to the

ship's company over the ship's public address system. I-fe announced that "we will be putting the

Marines ashore tonight in Cap-Haitien. This will

not be practice. This will he the real thing."

"Anchors Aweigh" and the "The Marine's Hymn"

were then played. After the evening meal, Captain

Chaplin followed up with another announcement,

confirming that "we have just received the execute order. ... May God he with us all." Colonel

Jones announced that H-Hour would occur at

0001 local time on 19 September29

The tension was now palpable. There was no

horseplay and little bravado. In the time-honored

tradition of the Corps, small unit leaders gathered

their men to pass the word in straightforward

terms, telling them exactly what they needed to

do and when they needed to do it. Quiet and

focused, Marines checked and rechecked their

gear, and after drawing ammunition, staged it

neatly where they would wait to be called to

board landing cnift or helicopters. Some Marines

pulled out camouflage sticks and began covering

exposed skin, creating elaborate patterns that,

with their camouflage utilities, would make them

nearly invisible in the right terrain, When there

was nothing more to do, many Marines wrote letters home, just as Marines have done for decades

before amphibious landings against the chance,

however slight in this case, they might die in combat. Around 1900, Marines in the initial serials

started to migrate to the staging areas, ready for

last minute instructions and perhaps a few minutes of sleep on top of their gear. Around sunset,

Navy SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) teams attached to the

amphibious ready group slipped into the water

ready to spend the night reconnoitering the

beaches and marking the landing lanes.30

At 2000, an hour before Jones planned to call

the first Marines to fall in on the hangar and well

decks, there was a stutming turn of events.

Captain Chaplin announced over the add.ress system there was an indefinite delay. The troops

were now on a "12- to 24-hour tether," meaning

they might go ashore later than planned. More

information trickled in shortly after. The CarterPowell-Nunn mission had, at the last minute, succeeded in averting an invasion by convincing the

Haitian military regime to step down and allow

President Aristicle to return to power. The landings would still occur, albeit on a revised schedule and without opposition. There was now to be

some sort of vaguely defined cooperation with

the Haitian army. It did not exactly sound like

peace, but it would not be war.31
Chapter 5

Landing at Cap-HaItien

The letdown on 18 September was tremendous. The Marines had trained hard and were

emotionally and physically ready to fight. For

many, this was to be their baptism of fire, and

now they were told there would be no fighting.

There were some very vocal expressions of disappointment and dismay. Speaking for many, one

Marine said he felt "sold out." Another railed

behind the nation's political leadership. Then they

began the process of undoing many of their

preparations for the invasion of northern 1-laiti,

securing their gear for the night and taking off

their camouflage paint, a lengthy and unpleasant

process akin to scrubbing your face with a dishrag

20 or 30 times. When they were clone, the troops

watched Eddie Murphy's "Beverly Hills Cop" over

the ship's internal television system.'

The following day, 19 September, was another

full of frustration. The Marines learned they

would not land at Cap-Haltien until the Army

component of Joint Task Force 180 had landed at

Port-au-Prince; the operations in the north

became contingent on the results of the operations in the south. On the IJSS Wasp (LHD 1),

Marine commanders were able to watch the

progress of those landings on the Cable News

Network. They saw U.S. Army helicopters taking

off from the deck of an aircraft carrier to ferry

troops ashore, a sight that made some Marines

grind their teeth. After all, amphibious landings

Photo courtesy of Maj John T. Quinn II

Downtown Cap-Haitien as viewed from the sea. Although appearing small and quaint it was Haiti s second most important city. Behind the old town, and on its flanks, there were newer buildings.
102 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

were the Marines' forte, not the Army's.

Neverlheless, the official word from Headquarters

Marine Corps was the operation in Haiti was not

setting a precedent. As a spokesman noted: "this

operation does not require a robust forcible entry

or the unique capabilities only available in Ethel

Marine Corps."2

Adding to the sense of fmstration, the Marines

had to wait nearly the entire day for any definite

word about their role in the operation. Would

they land at all, or simply go borne? Most Marines

and sailors in the amphibious ready group

seemed to think Special Purpose Marine AirGround Task Force Caribbean (SPMAGTF Carib)

had been on station, ready to invade, far too long

to steam away without going ashore in Flaiti and

playing a role in the operation. After all, the task

force had prepared for both "hard." (opposed) and

"soft" (unopposed) entries. Colonel Thomas S.

Jones' operations officer, Major Thomas C.

Greenwood, observed that, according to the clictates of operational doctrine, it would have made

good sense to land simultaneously at Port-auPrince and. Cap-Haitien.3

Being a seasoned commander, Colonel Jones

knew the situation was one of those proverbial

leadership challenges, especially for the young

officers and noncommissioned officers who were
LANDING AT CAP-HAITIEN 103

DVIC DD-SD-99-03594

Members of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, offload from a Navy air cushioned landing craft (LCAC 9)

at Cap-Ha flien. It is little wonder the citizens were impressed by these unusual Jbrins of transportation.

platoon and squad leaders. He spent much of the

day making the rounds to his subordinate commands, talking to his men and conthating what he

recognized as the "play me or trade me" syndrome. While he shared their disappointment, he

did not want them to be demoralized, He said

later he was glad the Marines had the luxury of a

"buffer day" to adjust their attitudes and reorient

their thinking while they waited for a decision

from die commander of JTF 180, Lieutenant

General Henry H. Shelton. It was a measure of

good small-unit leadership and the overall discipline of the force that the Marines successfully

made the adjustment when the word came

around 1800 that they would indeed make a soft

landing at Cap-Haltien on 20 September as part of

JTF 180 in Operation Uphold Democracy.4

The adjustment was to a more ambiguous situation, which was reflected in the new rules of

engagement that were quickly printed on orange

cards and issued to each member of the landing

force. Under the original rules of engagement, a

Haitian carrying a weapon was a legitimate target

if he was not putting it down or in the process of

surrendering. The emphasis now was on selfdefense. The Marines could expect to encounter

armed Haitians, but they could fire only to protect

themselves. As Major Greenwood put it when he

briefed the commanders: 'We are not supposed to

be out there killing people. We are ... taking all

steps to create a strong, positive impression.

These folks are not the enemy. Everyone we meet

is an ally until they prove otherwise." He noted

that no one had fired any shots on 19 September

during the landings in and around Port-auPrince.5

At the same briefing, Greenwood declared that,

apart from the rules of engagement, the landing

plan had not changed dramatically, though the

Marines would not be painting their faces or

assaulting the same objectives. The Haitian army

barracks, for example, was no longer on the list.

The pace of the openuion would slow as it was

no longer necessary to push combat power

ashore as fast as possible. The watchwords

changed from "shock action" to "steady flow"

Nevertheless, the basic outlines of the operation

were still the same. The Marines would land "but-
104 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

toned down" (ready for action with weapons

loaded). The two task forces would simultaneously seize the port and the airfield and establish

blocking positions at key intersections and

bridges throughout the area, ready to stop traffic

if necessary. There would also be outposts on the

high ground in and around the city. Colonel Jones

made a point of emphasizing he did not want the

Marines to be isolated in their enclaves, as they

had been in Beirut. Although the AC-130 Spectre

would not support the operation—its capabilities

were now clearly overkill—there still would he

heavily armed Bell AT-I-i Cobra helicopter gun

ships on station, But no one expected any lethal

opposition. The biggest threat was likely to he

curious crowds that might get in the Marines' way,

and they needed to be ready to control them

through peaceful means. After securing the area,

the Marines would conduct a civil-military operations evaluation of Cap-Haitien's infrastructure

and prepare to cede control to Army occupation

troops in 10-14 d.ays. The final issue was timing.

Colonel Jones still would have preferred to land

at night, but higher powers decided the landing

would occur precisely at 0800 on 20 September.6

The Wcisp sounded reveille at 0500, hut many

Marines had been up long before that hour. At

0530, the first serials were called away and

Marines mustered on the hangar deck. Flight

quarters were sounded and the troops loaded on

to helicopters. In the bright, clear morning, the

large Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters

turned up at 0700, then lifted off and hovered.

Next came the aging rwin-rotor Boeing CH-46E

Sea Knights. By 0740, the air armada, escorted by

Cobra gun ships, had formed and was ready to

cross the beach. The same was true of the oldfashioned, blunt-nosed utility landing craft

launched from the USS Ashland (LSD 48), and of

the amphibious assault vehicles (AAV5), which

launched from the USS Nashville (LPD 13). The

landing craft and AAVs circled in the water until

they received the signal to proceed ashore on line

with the LCAC hovercraft. At precisely 0800, the

forces hit the beach while Colonel Jones watched

from his command and control vantage on hoard

a Bell UH-1 Huey helicopter. Another I-lucy flew

low over the ciw broadcasting the message the

Marines had come in peace. That message

reached literally thousands of Haitians who left

DVTC DI) sD-99-03779

A Marine walks the pertmeter of the ('ap-Haitien aiiport while another stands in his foxhole tented with

a camouflaged poncho. Securing the airstrip was a vital link for incoming logistical support.
LANDING AT CAP-HAITIEN 105

Marines guard one of the headquarters buildings

Haltien.

their homes to watch the spectacle.

The landing went virtually without a hitch. The

only problem was the LGACs landed before the

small helicopter-borne advance party had been

able to land and secure Blue Beach at the northern end of the port area to protect the thinskinned inflatable hovercraft from any hostile

Haitian soldiers, as well as the crowd of

bystanders. But in the end it did not matter.

Mounted in their amphihious assault and light

armored vehicles, Company G, 2d Marines and

Company B, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance

Battalion, the main components of Task Force

Irish, rolled ashore in good order to a peaceful,

friendly reception. The crowd burst into applause

as the Marines emerged from their strange conveyances.8

The scene at the small airport south of town

was not much different. In textbook fashion, the

Marines of Task Force Hawg, in particular Captain

Gregg L. Lyon's Company F and Captain Alvin W.

Peterson, Jr.'s artillerymen of Battery B, 10th

Marines, dashed off the helicopters and quickly

established a tactical perimeter, facing outboard,

ready for any threats. The Marines looked so professional that Major Greenwood, who was able to

watch their deployment over a soundless closed

circuit television feed from a circling aircraft, initially thought they were under fire. it was, he

remembered, like watching a very realistic silent

war movie. But he soon learned the only threat

Photo courtesy of Maj John 1. Quinn II

of the Haitian army and police in downtown Capwas from Haitian children waving American flags,

and then from a crowd of Haitians from nearby

slums who gathered at the end of the runway,

clapping and cheering.9

While the helicopters and landing craft

returned to the ships to ferry the second. and third

waves ashore, Colonel Jones' staff prepared to

phase control of the operation ashore, the landing

having been controlled from the landing force

operations center on the Wasp in accordance with

Marine Corps doctrine. Major Greenwood made

his way to the beach on an LCAC and was

stunned by the level of poverty; garbage piled

high throughout the town, crowds of curious

onlookers, and the general air of chaos and confusion. Even so, within a little more than an hour,

he and his Marines had set up a working command post and operations center in the port area

(which was fenced off from. the rest of the city

and relatively secure), and took control from the

landing force center on the Wasp.1°

For its part, the Haitian Armed Forces in Cap1-laitien reacted as much to the crowds as to the

invaders. A number of Haitian soldiers ind police

tried to restrain the onlookers, and almost certainly threatened their countrymen for being too

friendly to the Marines. "They pushed us and

shouted at us to go home and leave the

Americans alone," said one Haitian.1' Dozens of

armed Haitian soldiers milled around in the port

area while the Marines tried to do their work, nei-
i06 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

ther side sure exactly how to treat the other. One

beaming Haitian soldier with the improbable

name of Voltaire, who declared that it was 'a fine

day" because the Americans had returned and

now "everything will be better," was curtly

silenced by one of his officers 12

The situation being well h hand, the next

order of business was to find the local commander of the 1-Jaitian Armed Forces and establish an

understanding with him. Mounted in a handful of

tactical vehicles and accompanied by a small

security detachment, Colonel Jones, Lieutenant

Colonel George S. Hartley, and Major Greenwood

n2acle their way in mid—afternoon through the

congested streets to the Haitian military compound, a two-story colonial building bleached by

the tropical sun on a pleasant tree-lined square in

the old town near the waterfront. There they

found the rough equivalent of a company of

1-laitian soldiers, armed with pistols and Mi. rifles,

milling around slowly and aimlessly. Jones and

Hartley, along with a few Marines, dismounted

and went inside the compound while Greenwood

waited outside in the heat, keeping a careful eye

on the Haitians and worrying about the security

of his commander. Ii was, he remembered, an

Photo courtesy of Maj Joho 1,. Quino II

SPML4GTF 6arth commander CbI Thomas S. Jones

(right) takes time out to talk with one of the many

journalists who covered the operation.

eerie sensation as the minutes ticked by and there

was no word on the talks between the two leadcr5.13

Inside the compound, the atmosphere was far

less tense. One spokesman later said it was actually cordial. Colonel Jones thought Lieutenant

Colonel Claudel Josephat, the 1-laitian in comO\IC 00-50-99-03546

Cpls Gregory Camp Oef&) andJoseph Cooper of the Scout SniperPlatoon, 2dBatialion, 2dMarines. watch

the outskirts of Cap-Haltien. During the operation, lookouts were posted on high ground 24 hours a day

keeping an eye on the situation in the town below; the tools of their trade at hand.
mand of the Military District of the North, had a

good command presence and the insight to

understand his position. Ticking off the items on

his agenda, Jones told Josephat just how much

combat power he had ashore, which had a visible

effect on the Haitian officer. He declared his principle concerns were the security of his force and

the security of the local populace. For him, the

two were inextricably linked. Jones said he knew

the Haitian army and police had "violated the

security" of the citizens of Cap-Haitien in the past.

(He was almost certainly thinking of the incidents

that had occurred earlier in the clay.) Jones would

not tolerate any further acts of intimidation and it

would be up to Josephat to control his forces to

prevent excesses. If that did not happen, the

Marines would begin active patrols of the town.

Jones made it clear the Marines did not intend to

cooperate with the Haitian army in running joint

patrols, but he did want the two sides to

exchange liaison officers.14

Both Colonel Jones and Major Greenwood

were satisfied with the outcome of the

encounter—Jones because josephat had been

agreeable and Greenwood because his commander had emerged from the compound in one

piece. Nevertheless, the Marines did not let down

their guard on their first night ashore. As Major

Herman C. Broadstone, commander of Task Force

Hawg, put it: "The concern now is the night. Even

though everything ran smoothly today ... we still

have to be concerned about renegade forces that

might be hostile to Ethel American presence.

There's always the possibility of someone who

doesn't listen to the Haitian commander and starts

taking potshots at us." On the airport perimeter,

the Marines dug foxholes and positioned their

machine guns. Two-man sniper teams—one man

with a sniper rifle and the other with a pair of

high-power binoculars—carefully chose positions

where they could look out over their surroundings and become so familiar with them they could

react instantly to any changes that might mean

danger. For most Marines, there was a 75 percent

alert (three-quarters of the men awake) during the

hours of darkness."

LANDING AT CAF-FIAlTIEN 107

Photo courtesy of Maj John T. Quinn II

Marines from Company B, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, provide a checkpoint in GapHautien. The light armored vehicles had a psychological as well as physical presence.
108 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STREI'qGTH

The night was quiet, apart from the sounds of

drumming and singing Marines throughout the

area heard at odd intervals during the night.

These were almost certainly happy sounds,

although some Marines wondered if they were listening to sonic kind of sinister voodoo ritual.16

Tensions between the Marines and the Haitian

army increased during the blisteringly hot days

from 21 to 24 September. On the morning of 21

September, there was a small but typical drama at

one of the main traffic circles guarded by a few

Marines in two light armored vehicles, which did

not look light with their eight sturdy wheels and

protruding guns. There was a ring of portable

concertina wire around the Marine outpost. When

two armed Haitian soldiers waded through the

inevitable crowd, two Marines armed with M16

rifles jumped down from their vehicles and

walked to the edge of the wire to confront their

Haitians counterparts. The crowd fell silent as the

two sides eyed each other in silence. In the end,

the 1-laitian soldiers simply turned around and

walked away, which was a real crowd pleaser—

the bystanders burst into cheers and applause.

Simply by their presence, the Marines had protectecl them from the soldiers.17

In a similar incident, a Haitian policeman

threatened one of his countrywomen with his

weapon and nearby Marines had to train their

weapons on him before he backed down.

Throughout the day, Haitian civilians approached

Marines with reports that Haitian police and soldiers were harassing, beating, and detaining ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide supporters.

The Marine task force took concrete action when

the reports were confirmed after another instance

of Haitian crowd control.18

In the late afternoon, a U.S. Army psychological operations group attached to the SPMAGTF

drove slowly through the northern part of the

town broadcasting through loudspeakers an

appeal for law and order in Creole to calm the situation. Hundreds of Haitians fell in behind the

detachment's two hunivees, which became sort of

an electronic pied piper. It was a happy crowd

until Haitian policemen with "batons the size of

ax handles" waded in and started beating anyone

they could reach. The Army detachment was too

small to take any action apart from driving quickly from the area and to the SPMAGTF command

post, which was still in the port area hut now at

a slightly better location. The Army noncommissioned officers reported to Major Greenwood,

who in rum took them to Colonel jnnes.19

Jones was incensed and dispatched troops to

find Josephat and bring him to the comniancl

DYIC no-sD-99-03595

in addition to static checbpoints, there were roving patrols. Here, Marines from Batteq' B 1st Battalion,

10th Marines, patrol the road between the port of cap-Ha.Itien and the Haitian militaty headquarters in

the old town.
LANDING AT CAP-HAITIEN 109

Photo courtesy of Maj John T. Quinn II

Marines stand outside the command post of Company 2dBattalion, 2dMarines, on 22 September. The

company's mission that day and during the following days was to patrol crowded parts of/he city and

monitor Haitian police stations.

post. But he was nowhere to he found—it turned

out later he had left the city to confer with his

superiors in the capital—and Jones had to make

do with two of Josephafs subordinates. He made

it clear the Marines would not tolerate any further

excesses by Haitian police or soldiers. If Haitian

officers could not control their men, the Marines

would do it for them. According to one account,

when he finally spoke with Josephat himself, he

added if he and his officers did not get it right,"

the Marines could wind up shooting at Haitian

soldiers.20

To reinforce his words with actions, and to

restrain his Haitian counterparts, Jones decided to

increase the Marine presence around Haitian militaly and police installations. Marines would

establish patrol bases in the city and patrol up to

and around those installations. This was a departure from the initial policy of keeping Marines

mostly at their positions at the airport, the port,

and at various key points throughout the city.

The bulk of the patrolling fell to Company E,

2d Marines, commanded by Captain Richard L.

Diddams, Jr., which had been moved to the port

area. At midday on 22 September, the company

set out on a patrol of the city, which began

around 1100 and took most of the afternoon.

Heavily laden in the 100-degree heat, the Marines

stepped off in a tactical formation. But crowds of

Haitians soon engulfed the troops and changed

the formation such that the Marines were almost

touching one another as they moved slowly

through the shouting, waving, and dancing

Haitians.2'

Captain Diddams made a round of the local

police stations with his company. At the first stop,

the crowd instinctively backed 50 feet away when

the Marines halted in front of the building.

Diddams went in and told the police through a

translator the Marines had come in peace as part

of the negotiated settlement, but added they

would not tolerate further acts of violence by the

police. The Marines then inventoried the 1-laitians'

weapons and emerged from the building to even

louder and more ecstatic cheers from the crowd.22

Diddams repeated much the same routine at

the next two police stations, where he encountered a more hostile reception. At one location, a

policeman emerged when the captain approached

and blocked the entrance. Diddams asked, "How

are you doing?" The policeman just shook his

head in reply. Someone in the crowd yelled a

warning and one of Diddams' lieutenants moved

his platoon closer to the captain. Diddams
110 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

remembered later that, expecting violence, the

crowd went wild." But the policeman backed

down, and with hand gestures, invited the

Marines inside to inventory their weapons.23

In the late afternoon, Diddams moved his company to a Catholic school a few blocks west of the

center of town, which was to be the company's

base for the next few days. Around sunset, the

company was treated to an unusual kind of sunset parade. Singing and dancing Haitians carrying

live chickens along with placards to welcome the

The last signicant event of the day was

the dissemination of a report, based on

human intelligence collected by a counterintelligence team, that a clash with the

Haitian army was "inevitable."

Marines and proclaim their support for Aristide

filled the bleachers at the nearby soccer field. At

one point in the celebration, they simultaneously

raised the American flag and sacrificed the chickens. The Marines were puzzled by the ceremony

until their translator explained it was to symbolize

the rebirth of their country.'4 The last significant

event of the day was the dissemination of a

report, based on human intelligence collected by

a counterintelligence team, that a clash with the

Haitian army was "inevitable."Zs *

The following is an excerpt from 2d Battalion, 2d Marines'

Intelligence Log: 22 Sept. 1994: There was an increase in proAristide and pro-U.5. demonstration. There was also an equal

increase in police brutality to ch'ilians Two Haitians were

received by the BAS [Battalion Aid station] claiming to have

been beaten hy local police. One man had injuries that indicated he was bludgeoned and the other had a bullet wound

entering and exiting his right thigh Occasional reports were

receiverl from civilians that the police were telling the crowds

that the U.S. troops were in Haiti to dominate the country.

civilians paid no attention to the police claims, By this time it

had also become clear that Marine positions were being

actively surveilled. Marine STA ISurveillance and larget

Acquisition] teams in the port facility observed individuals in

buildings adjacent to the Marine position studying U.S. activity with binoculars. On the evening of the 21st Ithe previous

day] a vehicle approached Golf company's perimeter, turned

off its lights and stopped. The two passengers got out and

stood in place. watching the Marines within the perimeter. At

1415 a Marine from Golf company approached an individual

videotaping the Marine activities. Upon approach the Haitian

fled. civihans in the area claimed he was a member of the

cap-Haltien police (he was not in uniform), civilians claimed

to be no longer afraid of the local military and police due to

the Marine presence. At 1945, a Division Reconnaissance team

reported three shots fired from a semiautomatic weapon.

The next day was relatively uneventful. The

port and airport were quiet, the biggest threats to

the Marines at those locations being heat and

boredom. Company E continued to patrol the

town and encountered visibly hostile reactions

from their Haitian counterparts. They heard from

Haitian civilians that a nunther of attachEs, the

semi-official Haitian paramilitary auxiliaries, were

in nearby buildings discussing what action they

could take against the Marines, who later broke

up a small rock-throwing incident between

attachEs and civilians.26 The battalion intelligence

officer collected additional reports of police misconduct, along with rumors that some Haitians

planned to recruit and train a "patriotic resistance"

group. Overall, relations between the Marines and.

the local authorities remainedl tense.27

On the morning of the 24th, the men of 2d

Battalion, 2d Marines' 81mm mortar platoon were

ordered to conduct an unusual mission: take their

humvee to the flight line at the airport to meet a

U.S. Army helicopter and pick up Lieutenant

Colonel Josephat and. two other senior Haitian

officers. .Josephat had returned from Port-auPrince with his superiors and they wanted to talk

to Colonel Jones. Even the Marines driving the

huinvee, who knew nothing about previous

exchanges between Jones and Josephat, could tell

the Haitian officers were uncomfortable during

the drive from the airport to the command post.

One of the senior officers was Brigadier

General Henri Maynard, the inspector general of

the Haitian army. The other was Colonel Martial

Romulus, its operations officer. Romulus spoke

English reasonably well and delivered the inessage, which had apparently been coordinated

with his commander in chief, Brigadier General

Raoul Cedras: the Haitian army acknowledged the

friction between its forces and Marines in CapHaitien, but now wanted to "reestablish" cooperation and conduct joint operations. Jones stopped

the conversation and told them the Marines did

not intend to conduct joint operations with the

Haitian army. He repeated the same message he

had delivered to Josephat and his subordinates:

he would. not tolerate any further acts of violence

against the citizens of Cap-Haitien by Haitian

authorities. If Haitian officers could not control

their own troops, Jones would. At one point,

Colonel Romulus intimated the Haitian army was

responsible for the security of Jones' Marines.

Jones replied, "No," it was the other way around.

The meeting did not last long and the Marines

from the mortar platoon soon drove the visitors
LANDING AT CAP-!-tAITIEN 111

from Port-au-Prince back to the airport. When he

left Colonel Jones, Josephat looked even more

uncomfortable than when he had arrived.29

Josephat returned by himself later that day to

talk to Jones again and told him he would try his

best to control his troops. Jones was left with the

impression his Haitian counterpart was really saying he was losing control of his troops and the situation.30

Meanwhile, Company E was running platoonsized patrols from its base at the Catholic school.

The routes included the prison and other army

and police installations. The 70 or so Haitians at

the prison and the main army barracks were

caught off guard by Marine patrols early in the

day, which seemed to upset them. Later patrols

found the prison and the barracks virtually deserted.3' There was a certain irony in deserting the

prison because of the proximity of Marines. With

exceptionally thick plaster walls, it had been built

during the 1920s as the Marine Barracks in CapHaitien, and though it was now a virtual ruin, the

building still bore signs of its former occupants.

Late in the afternoon, Company Es Marines heard

gunshots and received a report that a Haitian

army major had fired five rounds over the heads

of a crowd.3

Captain Diddams decided to establish a presence at two potential trouble spots during the

night—the two police stations, designated

Objectives 1 and 2, where he had faced a hostile

reception from Haitian policemen on 22

September. He wanted a squad-size presence at

each position by 1.700 with a lieutenant or staff

sergeant on the scene. He planned to rotate the

squads every four hours. The initial result was a

standoff at Objective 1, the block-long central

police headquarters.33

On one side of the narrow street outside the

headquarters, Haitian policemen played cards on

the sidewalk or went about their business inside

the building, where doors and windows were

open. 'On the other side of the street, their backs

against a building wall, 14 Marines stood in full

battle dress," weapons locked and loaded. They

stood in the open, without any cover, where the

two sides could face each other without involving

any of the bystanders off to the sides. Several

hundred 1-laitians stood at either end of the block,

hurling insults at the Haitian policemen and

cheering the Marines from behind cordons, which

held them back.3 The officer in charge was First

Lieutenant Virgil A. Falumbo, a 24-year-old NTaval

Academy graduate who had completed the

demanding Infantry Officer Course at the Basic

School and was Company Es most experienced

platoon commander.

Diddams had a premonition about Objective 1,

and around 1830 went to see for himself what

was happening there, His translator told him the

crowd of some 250 civilians was urging the

Marines to shoot the police and conveying the

rumor there were attaches in the neighborhood

that were planning to attack the Marines.

Diddams noticed the squad automatic weapon

gunners were lying down next to their weapons,

which were at Condition 3 (with the ammunition

belts out of the guns). The Marines armed with

M16 rifles were at Condition 1, with a round in

the chamber and the weapon on safe, In accordance with the dictates of good tactical sense, the

squad leader had already assigned fields of fire.

Diddams decided the lieutenant, whose mission

The lieutenant reacted immediately by

firing two rounds from his M16, one into

the chest of each of the Haitians. As f on

cue, the lieutenant's Ma rines followed suit

and opened fire on the Haitians in front

of them, who were scrambling—perhaps

for cover, perhaps for their weapons.

was to control the police and the crowd, had the

situation well in hand and went on to the battalion command post.35

Around 1900, there was a flurry of phone conversations in the station, followed by a heated

argument among several of the Haitian policemen

standing in or near the doorway directly across

the street from the lieutenant, who was not more

than 30 feet away. One of the Haitian policemen

then reached for his pistol while another raised

his Uzi sub-machine gun. Unfortunately for them,

they were both looking directly at Lieutenant

Palumbo while they were raising their weapons.

The lieutenant reacted immediately by firing

two rounds from his M16, one into the chest of

each of the Haitians. As if on cue, the lieutenant's

Marines followed suit and opened fire on the

Haitians in front of them, who were scrambling—

perhaps for cover, perhaps for their weapons.

Some Haitians may have fired at the Marines. In

any case, the small space was filled with flying

lead that killed eight Haitian policemen outright

and wounded three others, two of whom died of
their wounds before they could he evacuated.

One American, a Navy boiler technician named

Jose Joseph who was there to translate for the

lieutenant, was wounded in the leg. Although it

seemed like an eternity to the Marines, the firefight probably lasted less than a minute, and perhaps even less than 30 seconds. When it was

over, the Marines were in a state of stunned

amazement. "It was," said Lance Corporal Jerry

Acton, 'like [the shootout at] the OK Corral."3G

Along with a motorized reaction force that

sealed off the area, Captain Diddams and the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hartley,

hurried to the scene. Colonel Jones quickly

decided his best course of action was to find

Josephat and take him to Objective 1 to control

his troops. He drove through the dark, narrow

streets to the Haitian commander's house, a modest hut attractive home near his headquarters, hut

could not find him, The colonel then joined

Diddams and Hartley at the police station, where

he could make out the pockmarked walls and the

eight dead Haitians lying in the street.7

Virtually everyone in Cap-Haltien heard the firing. Some Marines even reported seeing tracer

rounds; nothing was very far in the small city.

Company Es 60mm mortars immediately started

firing illumination rounds, followed by the battalion's 81mm mortars, lighting up the very dark

Photo courtesy of Maj John T. Quinn II

Senior Haitian officers; anxious to reduce the

conflicts, arrive at SPML4GTF headquarters on 25

September to discuss and defuse the situation.

112 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Photo courtesy of capt charles 0. Grow

Marines examine the bullet holes around the entrance to the police station where the shooting occurred

between Gompany E, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, and Haitian police.
LANDING AT CAP-HAITIEN 113

tropical night. There was still little, if any, electricity for lighting in Cap-Haitien, a lingering result

of the embargo. When Palumbo's Marines

stopped firing, they looked for cover. In the flickering half-light of the illumination rounds,

Lieutenant Palumbo saw what appeared to he an

injured Marine. He ran to the form and discos'-

ered, to his immense relief, it was a bit of lowlying shrubbery.3

Meanwhile, Marines at Objective 2 reacted to

the sounds of the gunfight by disarming the

Haitian policemen they were watching. The

Haitians were quick to surrender. A few•- minutes

later, Company E's Marines at the school reported

two or three incoming pistol or rifle shots, and

one Marine at that compound fired his pistol at a

Haitian who had pointed a shotgun in his direction. He missed and the Haitian disappeared into

the night.39

Back at the police headquarters, the adrenalin

started to ebb and the question became, what

next? Should the Marines storm the objective or

wait for daylight? There were still a number of

Haitians inside the building; would they fire on

the Marines? The decision was made to coax them

out, and a translator set to work on a loudspeaker broadcasting appeals for surrender into the

night. At first, the wrong Haitians surrendered.

Civilians who lived in the close quarters around

the police station thought the message was for

them and came out into the streets with their

hands up.4°

After about an hour of hard work, six Haitians

emerged from Objective 1, one of them severely

wounded. The other five were taken prisoner, but

released a few hours later on Colonel Jones'

orders. The wounded Haitian was medically evacuated to the tISS Wasp and soon recovered

enough from his wounds to tell reporters the

Haitians at the police station had no intention of

starting a firefight with the Marines, and that most

of the Haitians there that night had not even been

armed.' But when the Marines entered the building the next day they found more than 100

weapons, some loaded and ready to fire.42 *

The 25th was the kind of day most Marines

detest: niggling inquiries from higher headquar-

• John R. Ballard mentions the initial uncertainty about the

Haitian response to the incident. U.S. commanders wondered

if other members of the Haitian army would seek to avenge

the shooting. Ballard also concluded the shooting was justified

under the rules of engagement and describes how the incident

fir into the overall context of the operation. (Ballard,

Upholding Democracy, p. 115)

ovic DD-sD-99-03548

The day after the incident at the police station was one of conferences with senior American officials.

Here ('ol Thomas S. Jones (back to the camera) confers with LtGen Heniy I-I. Shelton (left), commander

of Joint Task Force 18O and the United States Amba.csador to Haiti William L. Swing.
n4 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

ters and a large group of senior visitors who

appeared to have come to second-guess the commander on the spot. The delegation, which flew

to Cap-Haltien from the capital in the morning,

had a unique composition: the Haitian leader,

General Cedras; the American Ambassador to

Haiti, Mr. William Lacy Swing; and General

Shelton. They descended on the SPMAGTF command post with their respective entourages wanting to discuss the events at Objective 1. During

the talks they discovered the hodies of the Haitian

policemen were at the nearby Combat Service

Support Detachment 29 storage facility in body

bags—the local hospital had refused to accept the

bodies. General Cedras wanted to see the

corpses. The bags were produced and unzipped

for the general and his aides, who conducted a

short, impromptu memorial ceremony.43

When he returned to the discussion at the

group, General Cedras demanded the immediate

relief and court martial of Colonel Jones 'for

atrocities." General Shelton dismissed that possibility out of hand, and instead gave Genenil

Cedras a lecture on the United Nations resolution,

which legitimized the occupation and use of

force. General Cedras had to content himself with

venting his spleen on the Haitian soldiers present

for, among other things, not being able to produce Lieutenant Colonel Josephat, who had simply disappeared and would not reappear for the

duration of the operation.44

Before he left, General Shelton reassured

Colonel Jones, saying the Marines' actions had

shown General Cedras the U.S. forces in Haiti

were prepared to back up their words with

actions. Perhaps the Haitians had learned their

lesson. Nevertheless, Jones had to answer questions for the rest of the day, and to repeat over

and over to reporters and callers from Norfolk

and Washington that he was 100 percent behind

Lieutenant Palumljo. He said he did not know

who fired first, but he hoped it had been the lieutenant, who had been in a threatening situation

and was paid to make difficult on-the-spot decisions. His life and those of his Marines had been

threatened, and he had to act.45

Jones' command post did not have the time to

convert itself into an oversized public affairs

Photo courtesy of Maj John T. Quinn II

While senior officers ia/keel, the Marines continued to seize weapons from the Haitian army and police.
LANDiNG AT CAP-HAiTIEN 115

DVIC DD-SD-99-0375

crowds of Haitian civilians follow Marines through the dusty streets of Grand Riviere du Nord. The mission was to secure Haitian army and police armories.

office. All around were signs the Haitian armed

forces were collapsing and the Marines needed to

fill the void. Like Josephat, Haitian soldiers were

shedding their uniforms and disappearing. The

prison in the old Marine barracks was now completely abandoned, prisoners and all. jubilant

crowds started to ransack police stations and

army barracks. When the Marines withdrew their

cordon around Objective I at midday, Haitian

civilians dashed in to stare at rhe bloodstains on

the fading yellow walls and to remove everything

of value. Next to the bloodstains, someone painted in Creole: "This is just the beginning of things

to come."46 A similar incident occurred at Haitian

army headquarters—the crowds rushed in as the

soldiers literally went over the hill. This was initially more worrisome because the Marines had

not yet secured the armory. Colonel Jones led a

detachment of his troops over to the compound

to reestablish order, confiscate approximately 25

weapons from the crowd and remove hundreds

of other weapons for safekeeping.4

Given the collapse of authority in his area of

operations, Jones expedited a long-planned series

of raids to outlying jurisdictions to secure Haitian

army and police armories. The colonel himself led

the first helicopter-borne raid, which departed a

few hours behind schedule at 1430 on 25

September. When the reinforced platoon from

Company F in its CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters,

escorted by Cobra gunships, reached its destination at Lembe some 20 kilometers southwest of

Cap-Haltien, the Marines received an incredible

reception from the local citizenry. The Marines

made their way through the jubilation to the local

garrison, only to find its commander, who had a

bad reputation, was nowhere to he found. To

make matters worse, the armory was locked.

Somewhat angry, Colonel Jones ordered his

troops to break down the door. They found the

armory nearly empty, with signs the bulk of the

weapons had been moved. This ratified the decision to expedite the raids. Now even more displeased, Jones told the unfortunate Haitian corporal who had not fled that he had a choice: find

the weapons or conic with the Marines. Jones left

it to the corporal's imagination as to what "come

with the Marines" meant and his eyes widened.

Within 15 minutes he produced his commander,

who in turn agreed to produce the weapons. He

came back 30 minutes later, empty-handed, saying he was afraid the Cobras would fire on him if

they saw him load the weapons onto trucks. This

was irritating, but it made sense. After being reassured about the Cobras, the Haitian departed

again, and this time returned 45 minutes later with
i16 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

DVIC DD-SD-99-03581

Cot Thomas S. Jones speaks with Haitian security forces during a weapons seizure at Grand Riutere dii

Nord.

a large truckload of weapons, which were then

loaded onto the helicopters. Jones left a few rifles

and pistols for the Haitian authorities and flew

hack to Cap-I-laItien.45 *

There were similar raids on succeeding days.

On 26 September, the operation went to the town

of Grand Riviere du Nord (where, some

SPMAGTF Marines remembered, the legendary

Marine Herman H. Hanneken had been the captain of the Gendarmeri&; on 28 September to Le

Borgne and Petit Bord du Borgne; and on 1

October to the town of Ouaniminthe near the border with the Dominican Republic.49 The Marines

found the situation at Grand Riviere du Nord to

• JTF 180 considered it important to reduce the number of

weapons in general circi.ilation in Haiti ant! worked aggressively to this end. (See Ballard, Upholding Democracy, p. 113,

and Maj Forrest L. Marrion, IJSAFR, "Captured Weapnns and

the Weapons Boyhack Program in Haiti, September 1994-

March 1995, USACOM Special Historical Study," Norfolk, VA:

Office of the Command Historian, n.d.)

I-tanneken received rhe Medal of Honor in 1919 for leading

a daring raid to find and kill the Haitian bandit leader

charlemagne Peralte.

be like that in Lernhe, while Le Borgne and Petit

Bord du Borgne were small outposts of five or six

soldiers with 10 weapons. The crowds already

had overrun the outposts, and by the time the

Marines arrived on scene, everyone was subdued,

perhaps because they already had used up all

their energy. On the other hand, the last raid, at

Ouaniminthe, was certainly not the least. The

weapons cache there was die largest the Marines

found at any location.°

As eonthat artist capt Charles G. Grow recorded: "On 26

September, the SPMAGTF commander, Col Thomas S. Jones,

and a plaroon from Company F of BLT 2/2 flew to Grand

Riviere do Nord to seize weapons at a military police company barracks. The low-level helicopter ride over the countryside was exhilarating. Huge crowds of cheering Haitians deal

ened the Marine platoon as it made its way [rum the soccer

fielrl to the yellow barracks in the center of town. Thousands

of spectators watched and waved banners as the Marines

emptied the huilrling of weapons. A Toyota picktip truck was

piled high with rifles and ammunition and escorted haclt to

the LZ handing zonel. The cache included many Ml Garands

and '03 Springfields: the latter were likely left over from the

1915-1934 Marine intervention, judging by their age and condition. The day was a grand success." (Capt Charles G. Grow,

"Combat Artist Preserves Haiti Service Scenes on Paper,"

Fortiiudine, Winter 1994-1995, p. 13)
LANDING AT CAP-HAITIEN 117

Sketch by Capt Charles C. Grow

On 28 September; Marines from Company C, 2d

Battalion. 2d Marines, are applauded by local citizens as they move through the streets of Petit

Bord du Borgne.

In the wake of the raids, the Marine task force

inserted U.S. Army Special Forces A Teams into

the larger towns of Lembe and Grand Riviere du

Nord to begin the lonely and difficult task of serving as outposts and trying to restore a semblance

of order. Now the SPMAGTF was free to devote

more energy to resurrecting the infrastructure of

Cap-Haltien. The Combat Service Support detachment already had cleared some of the mounds of

garbage and sewage from city streets and canals,

removed derelict fishing vessels and small merchanrmen which were blocking access to the port,

and delivered supplies to the local hospital,

where treatment and care was very basic. Jones

wanted to turn on the lights in town. As he put it,

the local population had given the Marines a great

reception and he wanted to give them something

tangible in return. And so, after a lot of hard work

by Marine engineers under the direction of the

SPMAGTF Carib's executive officer, Lieutenant

Colonel John D. McGuire, the lights came on

again in Cap-Haltien on the evening of 29

September. It was, in the restrained words of Captain John T Quinn, II 'a very popular measure."52

Even before turning on the lights, Lieutenant

Colonel McGuire, the de facto civil-military operations coordinator on scene, had been looking for

a charity or nongovernmental organization that

could distrihute food to the still very hungry population. He faced the same problem that

SPMAGTF Marines and sailors had encountered

when delivering supplies to the local hospital:

DVIC DD-D5-99-03613

Marines in Cap-Haitien stand ready to maintain order during a pro-A ristide demonstration scheduled

for 30 September I-Iowever as the picture suggests, the streets were largely empty because many townspeople were more interested in going to the SPMAGTF's food distribution centers.
118 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTh

Photo courtesy of Capt Charles G. Grow

The crowds at the jbod distribution points grew to where the SPMAGTF felt it necessary to position

amphibious assault vehicles to maintain order.

finding someone who was responsible and efficient but not associated with the abuses of the

previous regime and not disposed to divert the

supplies to their own needs. In the end, the

Marines decided to establish and run their own

distribution points.53

On 30 September and again on 1 October, two

distribution points opened for business. The reaction to the giveaway was enthusiastic—so enthusiastic that, on 30 September, a large pro-Aristide

demonstration in the heart of town fizzled as

would-be demonstrators migrated to the distribution points. The relief operation went well and

Haitians who wanted food lined up in an orderly

fashion and waited their turn. But, there was one

day at one of the distribution points when

Marines could not control the crowds despite the

use of pepper spray, and had to close early. First

Lieutenant Daniel Q. Greenwood, 2d Battalion's

81mm Mortar Platoon commander, remembered

that, after the site opened around 0900, the crowd

of hundreds grew and extended in single file for

four or five city blocks. The Marines of Battery B,

10th Marines, conducted crowd control in the

streets around the compound and the 81mm platoon provided perimeter security. The situation

deteriorated as the food ran out. Two-thirds of the

crowd received nothing. Several scuffles between

Haitians broke out hut were easily controlled by

the Marines. Interpreters helped to disperse the

crowd, and by 1400 the situation had returned to

normal.5 The result was the somewhat incongruous picture of grim and businesslike Marines with

fixed bayonets guarding their relief effort from

then on.

The next phase was turning the area of operations over to the Army and loading back onto the

amphibious ships in accordance with the longstanding plan for the Marines to land, secure the

area and depart, the classical equation for Marine

operations. The process had begun as early as 25

September when advance elements of the U.S.

Army's 2c1 Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, began

to arrive in Cap-Haltien. When the 2d Battalion,

14th Infantry, arrived on the afternoon of 1 October, loading began in earnest. tt was complete by 1600 on 2 October. A few hours later, the

special task force sailed for Roosevelt Roads for a

thorough equipment wash clown, another traclitional Marine evolution after a landing on foreign

shores and mandated by Department of

Agriculture regulations to limit the spread of disease through parasites. After the better part of a

week in port, the Marines reloaded their equip-
LANDING AT CAP-HA1TIEN 119

merit and boarded their ships again to return to

Haitian waters, where they served as a floating

reserve until 17 October. After a few more days of

steaming, the amphibious ready group docked at

Moreheacl City, North Carolina. Most of the

Marines returned to Camp Lejeune and SPMAGTF

Carib was deactivated"

Reflecting on the operation in the months that

followed, Colonel Jones and Major Greenwood,

his operations officer, felt a justifiable sense of satisfaction with their accomplishments. First among

Jones' reflections was that Marines had not had to

land with guns blazing. While no one was able to

muster much sympathy for the 1-laitian army,

there would have been many civilian casualties in

the small, congested city.

Both officers were satisfied with how the special task force had performed. Greenwood again

emphasized his conclusion the operation had

showcased the capabilities of a conventional

Marine Corps regimental staff and of a SPMAGTF,

with their ahility to deploy and adapt to a variety

of ambiguous situations in short order. This

adaptability would be given form three years later

when the Commandant of the Marine Corps,

General Charles C. Krulak, described future urban

operations as the three block war," where

Marines can expect to be providing humanitarian

assistance in one part of the city, cond.ucting

peacekeeping operations in another and be fighting a lethal mid-intensity battle in yet a third part

of the city.'56

Since the SPMAGTF came with its own floating

airfield and supply dump, air operations and

logistics were almost completely trouble-free.

Colonel Jones commented that, if there were any

unsung heroes, they were Major Lance R. McBride

of the Combat Service Support detachment and

Major Mark C. Dobbs, the task force's logistics

officer. Jones went on to say the successful landing at Cap-Haitien had demonstrated the value of

rehearsals and aerial reconnaissance, especially

reconnaissance from the Kiowa Warrior helicopter. Once ashore, the various attachments—such

as the psychological operations detachment, the

linguists and the Special Forces, which kept their

finger on the pulse of the outlying towns—had

also proven their worth.5

Colonel Jones emphasized two intangible lessons. One was that "cooperation ... with the forPhoto courtesy of Capt Charles G. Grow

Marines from Companies E and F; 2d Battalion) 2d Marines, augmented the vehicle-mounted Marines,

With fixed bayonets they stood behind billows of concertina wire. One Marine, forward of the line, and

in an almost gentle gesture, tries to guide and restrain the crowd at the food distribution point.
mer perpetrators of abuse and violence never

work[sI." His point was that to "win the hearts and

minds of the populace—essential in a Haiti-type

scenario—U.S. forces cannot support the symbol

of past repression." And that was one of the most

satisfying aspects of the operation. Tt was, Colonel

Jones said, profoundly moving to see "literally

thousands of men, women and children, tears

streaming down their faces, chant and celebrate

in sheer jubilation." While they may not have

understood the concept of democracy, they felt

the "yoke of oppression" being lifted from their

shoulders 58

But what impressed Jones the most about the

operation was the performance of the small unit

leaders, the lieutenants, sergeants and corporals.

They had successfully confronted "uncertainty,

disorder and ambiguity ... in emotionally charged

and potentially deadly street[s] when decisions

Ihad to] ... be made instantaneously," when there

was no time to find out what the captain or the

colonel wanted to do. Guided by clear rules of

engagement, they had acted with common sense,

discipline, restraint, and clecisiveness.59

Looking at Uphold Democracy from his vantage point as Commander in Chief. U.S. Atlantic

Command, General John J. Sheehan, USMC, came

to the same conclusion. The operation had

demonstrated the value of detailed yet flexible

joint force planning. But more than anything, it

had been a platoon commander's war, its success

was tied more to the actions of lieutenants and

sergeants than to the plans of generals or admirals. Like the refugee operations that started in

1991 in the Caribbean, it was the selection, education, and training of small unit leaders that

determined the outcome of the operation long

before any Marines embarked for l-Iaiti.6°

Epilogue

After the Marines left Haiti, General Shelton's

Joint Task Force 180 continued to consolidate the

gains of the occupation. In mid-October 1.994, the

military dictator, General Cedras, stepped down

and left the country forever. His departure paved

the way for the triumphant return of President

Aristid.e, who remained as popular as the Haitian

military had been unpopular. Five weeks after the

initial landing, General Shelton and the XVIII

120 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

DvIC DD-SD-99-03600

Their mission with Operation Uphold Democracy accomplished, members of Company F 2d Battalion,

2d Marines, hoard a US. Navy air cushioned landing craft for the ride hack to the USS Wasp.
LANDING AT CAP-l-IAITIEN 121

Airborne Corps redeployed to the United States,

leaving Joint Task Force 190 in charge. Its coinmander, Major General David C. Meade, USA, was

also commanding general of the 10th Mountain

Division. That division formed the initial core of

the remaining occupation forces which operated

in Haiti for some five months before ceding control in March 1995 to a smaller multinational force

subordinate to the United Nations Mission in

Haiti. This multinational force also was Americanled and included a U.S. contingent, which served

in country until March 1996, when all but a handful of U.S. troops returned home. By then there

was a new Haitian national police force on the

streets and the now-defunct Haitian armed forces

were fast becoming an unhappy memory.

The after-action analyses written in 1997 and

1998 were guardedly optimistic about the future

of Haiti. The United States-United Nations forces

had created a "safe and secure" environment for

Haiti to recover from years of oppression, nothing

more and nothing less.61 The analysts concluded

that Operation Uphold Democracy and its successors had given Haiti "critical breathing space,"

a chance to recover from the embargo and create

a working democracy. What happened next was

up to the government of Haiti, not the U.S. inilitary/2

NOTES

Chapter 1

Operation GTMO

1. Capt Robert R Salasko intvw, 11Nov95, hereafter Salasko intvw. Unless otherwise noted all

original source material is located in the

GTMO/Haiti Collection, Marine Corps Historical

Center. There are a number of general sources

on Guantanamo Bay and on Matines in the

Caribbean, See, for example, Jack Shulimson,

Wanda J. Renfrow, David E. Kelly, and Evelyn A.

Englander, eds., Marines in the SpanishAmerican War 1895-1 899, Anthology and

Annotated Bibliograhy (Washington, D.C.:

Marine Corps Historical Center, 1998). For

Marines in Haiti, an excellent source is Robert

Debs Heinl, Jr. and Nancy Gordon Heinl,

Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People,

1492-19 71 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978).

2. Anon., "Marines Prepare for Possible Haiti

Evacuation," Marine Co'ps Gazette, Nov 91, p. 7.

3. MB Guantanamo Bay ComdC for 1991

(Marine Corps Historical Center, hereafter

MCHC).

4. Ibid., Capt William R. McClintock, SC, USNR

and Capt Alexander G. Monroe, USNR,

Operation GTMO, I I October-1991-1 July 1993

(Norfolk, VA: Office of the Command Historian,

U.S. Atlantic Command. 1997). Hereafter it is

cited as "McClintock and Monroe Study."

5. Ibid, p. 18; BGen George H. Walls, Jr.,

13Nov92 intvw (Oral History Collection, MCHC),

hereafter Walls intvw.

6, EJSCinCLant msg 221621ZNov91 (Operation

GTMO Collection, Marine Corps Research

Center, Quantico, VA, hereafter MCRC).

7. Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Base Is To Assist Haitians,"

The New York Times, 28Nov91, p. A 6.

8. Col Gary A. Blair intvw, 25Feb94, hereafter

Blair intvw.

9. MB Guantanamo Bay ComdC fot 1991

(MCHC).

10. Col Peter R. Stenner intvw, 20Mar92 (GTMO

Collection, Naval Historical Center, hereafter

NHC).

11. SgtMaj Douglas E. Berry intvw, 13Apr96,

hereafter Berry intvw.

12. BSSG 6 ComdC for 1991 (MCHC).

13. Walls intvw.

14. Ibid.

15. liSCinCtant msg 221621ZNov91 (MCRC).

16. Walls intv'w.

17. USCinCLant msg 250313ZNov91.

18. CJTF GTMO msg 291200ZNov91.

19. JTF GTMO msgs 292900ZNov91 and

271650ZNov91; USCinCLant msg 300358Z Nov

91.

20. CJTF GTMO msg 111957ZDec91 (MCRC).

21. MB Guantanamo Bay ComdC for 1991

(MCHC).

22. Ibid.

23. USCinCLant msg 300358ZNov91.

24. Walls intvw.

25. Tab A to Appendix 8 to Annex C to CJTF

OpOrd Clean Sweep, l6l800ZDec9l (MCRC).

26. CJTF GTMO msg 111957ZDec91.

27. Anon, "Tent City Living Up to Its Name,"

Jacksonville Daily News, 14Dec91, p. 1A.

28. Ibid.; JTF, Operation GTMO, briefing book

dtd Jan92.

29. Ibid.

30. JTF J-2, Operation Take Charge, video tape

dtd Dec91.

31. Ibid.; Walls intvw; Berry intvw; MB

Guantanamo Bay Comd for 1991 (MCHC); CO

MB Guantanamo Bay, Humanitarian Service

Medal Input, 24Feb92 (MCRC); CJTF GTMO msg

l6O4OlZDec9l (MCRC). The 16 December message contains an incomplete dare/time group

when referring to the first day of rioting, which

all other sources put as 15 December.

32. Ibid. See also Maj Theodore R. McKeldin III,

Notes on Operation GTMO, Dec00. Lt McKeldin

watched the original breakout from the camp.

33. CJTF GTMO msg l6O4OlZDec9l (MCRC). See
124 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

IA

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. FASTCo., MCSFBnLant ComdC for 1992

(MCHC).

50. MB Guantanamo Bay ComdC for 1992

(MCHC).

51. Amlimb PaP msg to SecState, 301832ZApr92;

USCG Tampa msg 291850ZApr92 (GTMO

Collection, NHC).

52. Walls intvw.

53. Ibid.

54. Capt William R. McClintock, USNR, and Capt

Alexander G. Monroe, USNR, "Clio Goes to

GTMO," Full Together, Spring/Summer 1993, p.

8.

55. Al Kamen, "U.S. Phasing Out Tent City for

Refugees at Guantanamo Bay," The Washington

Fort, 29May92, p. A 24.

56. McClintock and Monroe Study, Executive

Summary and Working Chronology, pp. 31-32.

57. Ibid., esp. p. 34

58. See BGen Richard I. Neal intvw, 26Mar93

(NHC); hereafter Neil intvw; Col Lawrence R.

Zinser intvw, 7May93 (NRC), hereafter Zinser

intvw.

59. McClintock and Monroe Study, p. 203; MB A 1.

Guantanamo Bay, ComclC for 1991 (MCI-IC).

60. Ibid.

also: MB CorndC for 1991 (MCHC).

34. TF GTMO msg l6O4OlZDec9l (MCRC)

refers to another message, GJFT GTMO

152300ZDec91, The Deployment of Additional

Forces, which was most likely Gen Walls' formal

request for reinforcements.

35. CJTF GTMO msg i6O4OlZDec9l (MCRC).

36. Berry intvw.

37. Maj William L. Poggi intvw, 25Feb94, hereafter Poggi intvw; Walls intvw.

38. Blair intvw,

39. Ibid.

40. Walls intvw; 2d Bn, 8th Mar ComdC, 1 Jul to

31Dec91 (MCHC); CG II MEF rnsg

162059ZDec91 (MCRC).

41. JTF FragOrd Take Charge, 16Dec91

(MCRC).

42. Poggi intvw; QJTF GTMO tnsg

i7O900ZDec9l.

43. ibid.

44. CJTF GTMO rnsg l7l600ZDec9l (MCRC).

45. CJTF GTMO msg 2Ol900ZDec9l (GTMO

Collection, NHC).

46. Sam Fullwood III, "Fear, Resignation at

Guantanamo," Los Angeles Times, 3Feb92, p. A

61. McClintock and Monroe Study, p. xii.

62. Ibid., p. 206.

63. Ibid., p. 212.

64. Ibid., p. 217.

65. Garry Pierre-Pierre, "Haitians Bear H.I.V.

Alone, Waiting for Word on Asylum," The New

York Times, 25May98, p. A 1.

66. Ibid.; Zinser i.ntvw. McClintock and Monroe

Study, p. 219.

67. Ibid, at Appendix I is a breakdown of costs.

68. BGen George H. Walls, J,. 22Mar92 intvw

(NHC Oral Interview, Accession Number

937032).

69. See Neal intvw.

70. Marine Corps lessons Learned System,

Numbers 31737-33346 and 31240-10665, both

dated 29Mar92. See also Poggi intvw.

71. See Poggi intvw, Walls intvw, and Tom

Bartlett, "Operation Guantanamo," Leatherneck,

Apr92, pp. 36.

Chapter 2

Operation Sea Signal

1.. Maj John L. Shissler III intvw, 10Nov95, hereafter Schissler intvw.

2. Ibid., and MGen Michael j. Williams intvw,

14Dec95, hereafter Williams intvw.

3. MarForLant Fax to II MEF G-5 17May94.

4. Shissler intvw

5. Richard Jerome and Meg Grant, "Cool in the

Hot Seat," Feople, 26Aug94, pp. 85-86.

6. LtCol John R. Allen intvw, 24Aug96, hereafter

Allen intvw; Shissler intvw.

7. Ibid.

8. MajGen Michael .J. Williams diary, entry for

22Jun94, hereafter Williams diary.

9. Allen intvw.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid. and Shissler intvw.

12. Allen intvw and SJA Memorandum,

Investigtion into Possible Criminal Charges

Against Three Migrants Accused of Throwing

Overboard Seven Other Migrants, 28Jun94.

13. 2d MarDiv ComdC, Jul-Dec94 (MCHIC). Able

Vigil and Able Manner were not JTF 160 operations.

14. Williams diary entry for 5-6Jul94; Michael R.

Gordon, "In Shift, U.S. Will No Longer Admit

1-laitians at Sea," The New York Times, 6Jul94, p.

15. Williants diary entry for 6Jul94; CJTF 160 Det

Jamaica msg 061800ZJul94.
16. Allen intvw.

17. Ibid.

18. tbid.

19. Copy in GTMO/Haiti Collection, MCHC. See

also 2d Bn, 6th Mar ComdC, Jul-Dec 94 (MCHC).

20. Allen intvw.

21. LtCol John M. McAd.ams, Jr., intvw 6Dec96,

hereafter McAdams intvw.

22. Col Douglas C. Redlich intvw. 12Apr96, hereafter Redlich intvw; and Captain Franz J. Gay]

intvw, 11Dec96, hereafter Gayl inrvw.

23. Williams intvw.

24. Steven Greenhouse, "Islands to Let U.S.

Process Haitian Refugees," The New York Times,

4Jun94, p. A 4.

25. Gay] and Redlich inrvws.

26. FT 160 ni.sg 200253ZJun94.

27. MarFor 160 ComdC. pp. 9-10. This was an

unofficial command chronology since MarFor

160, being an ad hoc group, was nor required to

submit an official chronology to HQMC.

28. McAdams inrvw.

29. Ibid., Redlich inrvw, MarFor 160 ComdC, p.

1.7.

30. MarFor 160 ComdC, pp. 19-20.

31. Williams diary entry for 22Jun94.

32. Ibid.

33. Williams diary entry for 24Jun94.

34. Williams diary entry for 27Jun94.

35. Williams diary entry for 4Jul94.

36. Williams diary entry for 10Jul94.

37. MarFor 160 CoindC, p. 18.

38. Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Shelves Plan to Transfer

Haitians to Third Countries," The New York

Times, 3Aug94, p. A 8.

39. MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 19.

40. Ibid., p. 29 and TF Grand Turk msg

151830zJul94. 41. MarFor i6o ComdC, p. 29.

42. Ibid., p. 31 and Williams diary entres for 13

and 14Jul94.

43. Ibid. 44. Williams diary entry for 18Jul94.

45. CJTF 160 msg 201200ZJul94.

46. MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 34.

47 Ibid., pp. 26-28.

48. Ibid., and Gayl intvw.

49. Gayl and Redlich intvws.

50. Williams diary entry for 30Jul94.

51. MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 42.

52. JTF Grand Turk msg 252215ZJul94; Williams

diary entry for 17Aug94.

53. Williams diary entry for 8/30; see also entry

for 8/25.

NOTES 125

54. MarFor 160 ComdC, pp. 6-7.

55. Allen intvw; 2d Bn, 4th Mar ComdC lJan30Jun94 (MCHC).

56. Williams diary entries for 28Jun94 and 1Jul94.

57. Williams diary entry for 6Jul94.

58. QTF 160 Det Jamaica 0618000ZJu194.

59. Bradley Graham, "Tent City With No Exit

Lands on a Runway," The Washington Post,

21Jul94, hereafter Graham, "Tent City."

60. Ibid. 61. Williams diary entry for 19Jul94.

62. Williams diary entries for 7Jul94, 8Jul94, and

13-14Jul94. 63. Williams diary entries 16Jul94 and 1Aug94.

64. Williams diary entries for 15Jul94, 21Jul94,

and 22Jul94; Graham, "Tent City."

65. Ibid. 66. Williams diary entry for 28-29Jul94.

67. Williams diary entry for 30-31Ju194.

68. Willliarns diary entry for 1Aug94; see also

Shissler intvw,

69. Williams diary entry for 13Aug94; Col John

M. Himes intvw, 12Apr96, hereafter Himes

intvw.

70. Williams diary entry for 14Aug94.

71. Williams diary entry for 18Aug94; Eric

Schmitt, "U.S. to Charter Boats and Jets if

Hurricane Nears Guantanamo," The New York

Times, 4Sep94. 72. Ann Devoy, "U.S. to Double Refugee

Capacity at Guantanamo," The Washington Post,

25Aug94, p. A 1.

73. Robert Suro, "Rafters are Driven by

Misperception," The Washington Post, 25Aug94,

p. A 21.

74. Williams diary entries for 26Aug94 and

3Sep94.

75. Salasko intvw; Maj Michael B. O'l-Iara intvw

97, hereafter O'Hara intvw; Himes inrvw. All of

these officers were stationed at the Marine

Barracks.

76. Salasko intvw and MB Ground

Defense/Security Force, Guantanamo Bay

ComdC, IJan-31.Dec94 (MCHC).

77. Williams intvw.

78. Williams diary entry for 27Aug94.

79. Maj John E. Stone intvw 19Mar97, hereafter

Stone inw; Col John R. Allen memo to author,

5MarOO. 80. Allen intvw.

81. Allen intvw; Stone intvw.

82. Williams diary entries for 29Aug94 and

1Sep94.

83. Allen intvw; Stone intvw; Redlich intvw.
126 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

84. See, for example, Williams diary entry for

6Sep94.

85. Stone inrvw.

86. Ibid.

87. Williams duart entry for 6Sep94.

Chapter 3

Crisis

1. Shissler intvw; CWO2 David Ii. Marquis

intvw, 21Nov95.

2. Williams diary entry for 7Sep94.

3. Williams diary entry for 6Sep94.

4. Williams diary entry for 9Sep94.

5. AlIen intvw; MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 46.

6. Ibid.

7. 2d Bn, 6th Mar S-i document, Significant

Events Timeline, 6Oct94, hereafter Significant

Events Timeline.

8. Ibid. See also MarFor 160 ConidC, pp. 46-47.

9. Ibid., pp. 47-48; Gayl intvw.

10. Redlich intvw.

H.. Himes intvw.

12. Ibid.

13. AlIen intvw.

14. Salasko intvw; Allen intvw.

15. Salasko intvw; Hime intvw; Shissler intvw.

16. MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 48.

17. Ibid.; Salasko intvw.

18. Ibid.; I-limes intvw.

19. MarFor ComdC, p. 48.

20. Ibid., p. 49; Gayl inrtw; Redlich intvw.

21. Redlich intvw.

22. MarFor 160 ConidC, pp. 49-50.

23. Ibid.; Gayl inrvw.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.; MarFor 160 ComdC, pp. 50-51.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.; Gayl intvw.

28. Williams diary entry for 10Sep94; MarFor 160

ComdC, p. 51.

29. Ibid., p. 52.

30. Stone intvw.

31. Ibid.

32. MarFor 1.60 GomdC, p. 52.

33. Stone intvw; Significant Events Timeline.

34. MB Guantanamo Bay, COG Log for 11Sep94.

35. Ibid.; MarFor 160 GomdC, p. 52; Significant

Events Timeline. The MarFor 160 GomdG contains an apparent typographical error, placing

some of these events on 12 September.

36. Salasko intvw.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.; Allen intvw.

39. Williams intvw.

40. Himes intvw.

41. Allen intvw.

42. Ibid.; see also Significant Events Timeline.

43. Williams diary entry for 11Sep94.

44. Allen itnvw.

45. Ibid.; MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 53.

46. Stone intvw; Allen intvw.

47. Gayl intvw; MarFor 160 GomdG, p. 54. Once

again, the date in the latter source is incorrect.

The Williams diary and the Significant Events

Timeline contain the correct date for the security sweep.

48. Gayl intvw; MarFor 160 GomdC, p. 56.

49. Ibid., p. 57; Gayl inrvw.

50. MarFor ComdC, p. 57.

51. Significant Events Timeline; Allen intvw;

MarFor 160 ComdC, pp. 57-58.

52. Ibid., p. 58.

53. Ibid., p. 6o; Mien intvw.

54. MarFor 160 GomdC, p. 60.

55. Gayl intvw.

56. Allen intvw; Stone intvw.

57. Ibid.; MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 62.

58. Allen intvw; Stone intvw.

59. AlIen intvw.

60. Ibid.; Significant Events Timeline.

61. MarFor 160 ComdG, p. 63.

62. Williams diary entry for 11Sep94.

63. Williams diary entry for 26Sep94.

64. Significant Events Timeline in Gol John R.

Allen papers; Redlich, Allen intvws.

65. Williams diary entry for 15Sep94.

66. Shissler intvw.

67. Williams diary entry for 20Sep94.

68. Williams diary entry for 24-255ep94.

69. Ibid.; see also Williams diary entry for

28Sep94.

70. LtCol John R. Allen, "Humanity in

Humanitarian Operations: How Much Violence

is Enough?" Marine Corps Gazette, Feb95, pp.

14-21, hereafter Allen, "Humanitarian

Operations."

71. Col Jennings B. Beavers II intvw, 12Apr96,

hereafter Beavers intvw.

72. Allen, "Humanitarian Operations."

73. Beavers intvw.

74. Allen, "Humanitarian Operations" is the version of the memorandum that appeared in print.

A copy of the original version, dated 29Sep94, is

in the GTMO/Haiti Collection, MCHC.

75. Allen intvw.

76. Ibid.; LtGol Norman E. Hitchcock, "Update
on Guantanamo Bay, 1994-1995," Marine Corps

Gazette, Jun95, PP. 37-38.

77. iJSACom, Migrant Camp Operations: The

Guantanamo Experience, 1996, hereafter

USAC0m Migrant Camp Operations, JTF 160,

Operation Sea Signal After Action Report,

Coordinating Draft, 1Nov95, hereafter .AAR.

78. \Villiams diary entry for 8-90ct99; MarFor 160

ComdC, P. 248.

79. Beavers intvw; Salasko intvw; Capt Kevin P.

McLernon intvw, 11Nov95, hereafter McLernon

intvw.

80. Unit Summary for JTG Bulkeley, AAR, P. 32.

81. Williams diary entry for 28Sep94.

82. 1-listory of JTF 160, AAR, P. 12; Salasko intvw.

83. Salasko intvw.

84. McClernon intvw.

85. HQMC News Summary 42-94, transmitted as

CMC WashDC msg 141530ZOct94.

s6. Ibid.; BGen Raymond P. Ayres, Jr. intvw,

14Nov94 (GTMO Collection, Naval Historical

Center, Washington, D.C.)

87. Ibid.

88. ibid.

89. Ibid. See also: Maj Forrest L. Marion, USAFR,

Development of a Haitian Public Security Force

September 1994-March 1995 (Norfolk, VA: Office

of the Command Historian, n.d.)

90. History of JTF 160, AAR, P 12.

91. Col John M. Kendall, USA intvw. 11Nov95.

92. MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 248.

93. Maj Gilbert Desroches intvw, 2Jan96, hereafter Desroches inrvw. See also: Anon., "Officials

in Panama Say They'll Accept 10,000 from Haiti,"

The New York Times, 5Jul94, p. A 7; John A. Pitts,

Migrant Resettlement Operations, Supplement

Number 2 to U.S. SouthCom Command History

(Miami: U.S. SouthCom, 1998)

94. Desroches intvw; Capt John W. Capdepon

intvw, 24Feb96, hereafter Capdepon intvw.

95. Ibid.; and Michael R. Gordon, "Panama

Refuses Haitians," The New York Times, 8Jul94, p.

Al.

96. williams diary entry for 6Sep94; Desroches

intvw.

97. Capdepnn and Desroches inrvws.

98. Ibid.

99. Capclepon intvw.

100. Maj Gilbert Desroches Itr, 28Jan97, hereafter

Desroches ltr, 28Jan97.

101. Ibid.; Desroches intvw; Col Paul R. Ottinger

intvw, 27Jul00.

102. MCSFCo Rodman Pm msg to MCSFBn

Norfolk, VA 101450ZDec94, hereafter MCSFCo

NOTES 127

msg 101450ZDec94.

103. Capdepon intvw.

104. Desroches intvw and Eric Schmitt, "Cuban

Refugees Riot in Panama," The New York 7iines,

9Dec94, p. A 1.

1.05. N'lCSFCo rnsg 101450Z94; Capdepon intvw.

106. Desroches ltr, 28Jan97; Capdepon intvw;

MCSFCo Msg 101450ZDec94.

107. Ibid.; Desroches intvw.

108. MCSFCo msg l0i450ZDec94; Desroches

intvw.

109. Ibid.

110. Desroches lIt, 28Jan97; Capdepon intvw.

ill. Capdepon intvw.

112. Desroches inrvw.

113. Maj Jay A. Rutter note to author, 7Mar03,

hereafter Rutter note; Capdepon intvw.

114. Ibid.; MCSFCo msg 101450ZDec94.

115. Rutter note; Capdepon intvw.

116. MCSFCo msg 101450ZDec94; Desroches

intvw.

117. MCSFCo msg lOl45OZDec94.

118. Ibid.; Desroches ltr, 28Jan97.

119. Capdepon and Desroches intvws.

120. Capdepon intvw.

121. Capdepon and Desroches intvws; Desroches

ltr. 28Jan97; MCSFCo msg 101450ZDec94.

122. Ibid.

123. Capdepon intvw.

124. Ibid.; MCSFCo msg lOl45OZDec94.

125. M.CSFCo msg 10l450ZDec94; Desroches

intvw.

126. MCSFCo msg 101450ZDec94.

127. Ibid.; Capdepon intvw.

128. MCSFCo msg lOl45OZDec94.

129. Ibid.; Desroches intvw.

130. Capdepon and Desroches intvws; MCSFCo

msg i01450ZDec94.

131. MCSFCo msg to MCSFBn Norfolk

l22l55ZDec94, hereafter MCSFCo msg

l22155ZDec94.

132. Desroches intvw.

133. Capdepon intvw.

134. Ibid.

1.35. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.; MCSFCo msg 122155ZDec94.

138. Desroches intvw.

139. Ibid.; MCSFCo msg 122155ZDec94.

140. MCSFCo Rodman Pm msg 2Ol600ZDec94,

hereafter MCSFCo msg 201600ZDec94.

141. Anon, "Panama Camps Are Calm," The New

York Times, 10Dec94, p. A 6.

142. MCSFCo Rodman Pm ComdC lJan95-30Jun95
128 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

(MCHC), hereafter MCSFCo ComdC. See also

Desroches and Capdepon intvws.

143. Douglas Farah, "U.S. Prepared to Move

Cubans out of Panama," The Washington Post,

30Jan95, p. A 1.

144. Ibid.

145. Desroches note, 16Dec96.

146. Douglas Farah, "U.S. Begins Flying Cubans

Refugees in Panama to Guantanamo Naval

Base," The Washington Post, 2Feb95, p. A 18.

147. Himes intvw.

148. MCSFCO ComdC; Capdepon intvw.

149. Himes intvw,

150. Leffler intvw.

151. Ayres, Beavers, and Redlich intvws; MarFor

160 ComdC, pp. 90 and 249.

152. Leffler inrvw.

153. USACom, "Migrant Camp Operations," p. 22.

154. Executive Summary, AAR, p. 26.

155. Capt Joel S. Sauer inrvw, 11Nov95.

156. Leffler intvw.

157. Anon, "Last Cuban Refugees at Guantanamo

Base Leave for U.S.," The Washington Post,

1Feb96, p. A 22.

158. Anon, "RADM Haskins turns over command

to Col McKay," [Guantanamo Bay] Gazette.

3Nov95, p. 1.

159. Col Grant M. Sparks intvw, 12Apr96, hereafter Sparks inrvw.

160. 1-limes and Sparks intvws.

161. See, for example, Redlich and Shissler

intvws.

Chapter 4

Preparing to Invade Haiti

1. William Matthews and Mark Faram, "Setting

Sail for Haiti," Navy Times, 1Oct93.

2. Chris Lawson, "On a float ... again," Navy

Times, 18Jul94, p. 12.

3. Ibid.; see also John R. Ballard, Upholding

Democracy, The United States Military

campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997 (Westport, Ct:

Praeger, 1998), hereafter Ballard, Upholding

Democracy.

4. Bradley Graham, "U.S. Holds Evacuation

Exercise," The Washington Post, 14Jul94.

5. Bob Deans, "U.S. Replacing '911 crew' off

Haiti as threats fail," The Washington Times, p. 6.

6. Ibid.

7. See, for example, Richard F Smith, "Lejeune

Marines off Haiti," Jacksonville Daily News,

25Jul94, p. 1 A.

8. Lance M. Bacon, "SecDef Welcomes Home

24th MEU," Leatherneck, Oct92, p. 32; Chlnfo

WashDC msg 172300ZAug94.

9. Col Thomas S. Jones inrvw, 6Oct94, hereafter

Jones intvw. Other basic sources for the invasion

of Haiti are Capt John T. Quinn II, "Marine

Expedition to Haiti: September-October 1994,"

Marine Corps Gazette, Jul95, pp. 50-54, hereafter

Quinn, "Expedition," and Col Thomas S. Jones,

"Review the Ingredients: Commander's Insights

from Cap Haitien," Marine Corps Gazette, Jul95,

pp. 55-59, hereafter Jones, "Commander's

Insights," See also Ballard, Upholding

Democracy, for the USACom perspective, which

is also reflected in U.S. Atlantic Command,

Operation Uphold Democracy Joint After Action

Report (Norfolk, VA: USACom, 1995), hereafter

Uphold Democracy Joint After Action Report.

USACom also issued a multimedia package

including a pamphlet, VHS video and a CD-ROM

on the operation: USACom, Operation Uphold

Democracy' US. Forces in Haiti (Norfolk, VA:

USACom, 1997).

10. Gidget Fuentes and Sean Naylor, "Mission

Impossible: What's Next in Haiti," Navy Times,

3Oct94, p. 12.

11. Jones intvw.

12. Maj Thomas C. Greenwood intvw, 6Oct94,

hereafter Greenwood intvw.

13. Jones intvw; Anon, "Americans living in Haiti

oppose Marine 'rescue'," The Baltimore Sun,

10Jul94, p. 3.

14. Jones intvw.

15. Greenwood intvw; Jones intvw; Maj Herman

C. Broadstone intvw 18Sep94, hereafter

Broadstone intvw.

16. Greenwood intvw.

17. Greenwood intvw; Jones intvw.

18. Jones inrvw.

19. Quinn, "Expedition."

20. Rick Bragg, "Haiti's Forces: Poorly Armed

and Seasoned Only in Terror," The New York

Times, 14Sep94, p. 1

21. See for example Bob Shacochis, The

Immaculate Invasion (New York: Viking, 1999),

p. 88, hereafter Shacochis, The Immaculate

Invasion.

22. Jones, "Commander's Insights."

23. Shacochis, The Immaculate Invasion, p. 201.

24. Quinn, "Expedition;" Maj John T. Quinn II,

SPMAGTF Carib Chronology of Events, Aug-Oct

94, hereafter Quinn, Chronology; Maj John T.

Quinn II, SPMAGTF Carib Historical Diary, hereafter Quinn, Historical Diary. it is hard to over-
state the importance of the rules of engagement,

which are the subject of a useful article by

Stephen A. Rose, 'Crafting the Rules of

Engagement for Haiti," International Law

Studies, 1998 (Vol 72), pp. 225-237. See also

Ballard, Upholding Democracy.

25. Quinn, "Expedition."

26. Quinn, Historical Diary,

27. Quinn, Chronology.

28. Quinn, Historical Diary.

29. Ibid.; Thomas E. Ricks, Making the corps

(New York: Scribner, 1997), pp. 268-269, hereafter Ricks, Making the corps.

30. Quinn, Chronology; Quinn, "Expedition;"

Quinn, Historical Diary.

31. Quinn, Chronology; Jones intvw; Quinn,

Historical Diary.

Chapter 5

Landing at Cap-Haitien

1. Ricks, Making the corps, pp. 269-270.

2. Quinn, "Expedition;" Hartman Slate, "Army's

lead role on Haiti leaves Marine Corps miffed,"

Wilmington Morning Star, 16Sep94, p. 1 A.

3, Greenwood intvw.

4. Jones intvw; Quinn, Historical Diary.

5. Maj Thomas C. Greenwood, S-3 Briefing,

19Sep94, hereafter Greenwood, briefing; Capt

Richard L. Diddams, Jr. intvw, 2Oct94, hereafter

Diddams intvw. For information on the rules of

engagement, see the sources cited in Chapter 4,

footnote 24.

6. Jones intvw; Greenwood, briefing.

7. Quinn, Historical Diary; William Booth,

"Marines, Amid Hugs, Secure Cap-Haltien," The

Washington Post, 21Sep94, p. A29, hereafter

Booth, "Marines Secure Cap-Haitien."

8. Quinn, "Expedition;" Greenwood intvw.

9. Ibid.; Cpl Mark D. Oliva, "Uphold

Democracy," Marines, Oct94, p. 4.

10. Greenwood intvw.

11. Booth, "Marines Secure Cap-HaItien."

12. Ibid. 13. Greenwood intvw.

14. Booth, "Marines Secure Cap-Haltien"; Jones

intvw.

15. Greenwood intvw; Ricks, Making the corps,

pp. 270-273; Cpl Mark D. Oliva, "Leathernecks

Come Ashore in 'Soft Landing'," Leatherneck,

Nov94, p. 17.

16. See WpnsCo, 2d Bn, 2d Mar, Historical

Narrative for the 81mm Mortar Platoon During

NOTES 129

Operation Uphold Democracy, 9Oct94, hereafter

81mm Mortar Platoon During Operation Uphold

Democracy.

17. Eric Schmitt, "From the Shores of Haiti Into

the Hearts of People," The New York Times,

22Sep94, p. A 13.

18. Jones intvw; S-2, 2d Bn, 2d Mar, Summary of

Action During Operation Uphold Democracy,

ilOct 94, hereafter 3-2, 2/2 log.

19. Greenwood intvw.

20. ibid.

21. Diddams intvw.

22. ibid. 23. Ibid.; CoE, 2d Bn, 2d Mar, After Action report:

Support Democracy, Uphold Democracy, 10

Oct94, hereafter CoE AAR.

24. Diddams intvw.

25. Quinn, Chronology.

26. Diddams intvw; CoE AAR.

27. S-2, 2/2 log.

28. 81mm Mortar Platoon During Operation;

Quinn, Chronology.

29. Jones intvw; Simm Mortar Platoon During

Operation.

30. Jonas intvw.

31. C0EAAR

32. Diddams intvw.

33. Ibid.; CoP AAR.

34. Eric Schmitt, "How a 15-second Shootout Left

10 Haitians Dead," The New York Times,

27Sep94, p. A 15, hereafter Schmitt, "15-second

Shootout."

35. Diddams intvw.

36. Schmitt, "15-second Shootout"; Diddams

interview; CoE AAR.

37. Jones intvw.

38. Diddams intvw.

39. CoE AAR.

40. Diddams intvw.

41. Richard A. Serrano, "Wounded Haitian

Policeman Disputes Marines 'Ambush' Story,"

Los Angeles Times, 30Sep94, p. A 12.

42. Diddams intvw.

43. Jones intvw.

44. Ibid. 45. Ibid.; Greenwood intvw

46. Schmitt, "15-second Shootout."

47. Jones intvw; Greenwood intvw; Quinn,

Chronology.

48. Jones intvw.

49. Quinn, "Expedition."

50. Ibid.; Jones intvw.

51. Quinn, "Expedition;" Jones intvw; See also Shacochis, The Immaculate invasion, which
130 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTI-I

describes tile life of an Special Forces A" Team 57. Jones intvw; Greenwood intvw; Ballard,

in a Haitian town. Upholding Democracy, p. 114.

52. Quinn, "Expedition." 58. Jones, Commander's Insights."

53. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 54. Simm Platoon During Operation Uphold 60. Uphold Democracy Joint After Action Report,

Democracy. p. i. 55. Quinn, "Expedition." 61. USAC0m, Operation uphold (Norfolk, VA:

56. Gen Charles C. Krulak, 'The Three Block USACom, 1997), p. iv.

War: Fighting in Urban Areas," National Press 62. Ballard, Upholding Democracy, p. 211.

club, 15Dec97.
Appendix A

Marine Units

Operation GTMO

2d Force Service Support Group

Detachments, Headquarters and Service Battalion

Detachments, Battalion Service Support Group 6

Detachments, 8th Engineer Support Battalion

Marine Barracks Ground Defense/Security Force, Guantanamo Bay

Battery H, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines (Nov-Dec9l)

Detachments, Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team Company

2d Battalion, 8th Marines (Dec91)

Detachments, Command Element, II Marine Expeditionary Force

Operation Sea Signal (Jamaica and Guantanamo Bay)

2d Force Service Support Group

Detachments, Headquarters and Service Battalion

Detachments, 2d Landing Support Battalion

Detachments, 8th Engineer Support Battalion

Detachments, 2d Maintenance Battalion

Detachments, 2d Supply Battalion

Combat Service Support Detachment 61

2d Battalion, 4th Marines/2d Battalion, 6th Marines (Jun-Sep94Y

Marine Barracks Ground Defense/Security Force, Guantanamo Bay

Detachments, 2d Tank Battalion (Reinforcing Marine Barracks Ground Defense/Security Force)

Command Element, 8th Marines (Sep-Dec95)

Detachments, Command Element, II Marine Expeditionary Force

Detachments, 2d Marine Air Wing

Detachments, 2d Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group

Detachments, Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune

1st Battalion, 2d Marines (Sep-Dec94)

Detachments, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines

Detachments, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines

Detachments, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines

Detachments, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

Detachments, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division

Composite Company, 23d Marines (Nov-Dec94)

• The designation tar 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, was changed to 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, in July 1994.
132 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Company E, 2d Battalion, 25th Marines (Sep-0ct94)

Company F, 2c1 Battalion, 24th Marines (Oct-Nov94)

3d Battalion, 2d Marines (Jul-0ct95)

Detachments, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion (Jul-0ct95)

3d Battalion, 6th Marines (Jan-Feb95)

1st Battalion, 6th Marines (Sep-Dec95)

Operations Able Vigil and Able Manner (Seaborne Interdiction of Migrants)

Detachments, 2d Tank Battalion

Detachments, 10th Marines

Detachments, Heaclquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division

Detachments, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

Detachments, 8th Marines

Operation Safe Haven (Panama)

Marine Corps Security Force Company, Panama

Operations Support Democracy and Uphold Democracy (Haiti)

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit

3d Battalion, 6th Marines

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266

MEU Service Support Group 24

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean

Detachments, Headquarters, 2d Marines

2d Battalion, 2d Marines

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264

Combat Service Support Detachment 29

Battery B, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines

Company B, 2d light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
Appendix B

Marine Commanders

Operation GTMO

Commanding General/Commanding Officer, Joint Task Force GTMO

BGen George H. Walls, Jr. (Nov9l-Mar92)

BGen Richard I. Neal un-Aug92)

Col Lawrence R. Zinser (Dec92-Mar93)

Marine Forces/Marine Barracks Ground Defense/Security Force, Guantanamo Bay

Col Gary A. Blair (91-92)

Col John T. Murray (92-94)

2d Battalion, 8th Marines

LtCol James C. Hardee

Operation Sea Signal

Commanding General/Commanding Officer, Joint Task Force 160

BGen Michael J. Williams (May-Oct94)

BGen Raymond P. Ayres, Jr. (0ct94-Feb95)

Col John C. McKay (Nov95-Apr96)

Marine Forces (MarFor) 160*

Col Douglas C. Redlich (May-0ct94)

Col Douglas 0. Hendricks (0ct94-Mar95)

Col Kevin E. Leffler (Mar-Aug95)

Col Michael R. Lehnert (Aug-Nov95)

Joint Security Group JTF 160

BGen Raymond P. Ayres, Jr. (Sep-0ct94)

Col Jennings B. Beavers II (Oct-Dec94)

2d Battalion, 4th Marines/2c1 Battalion 6th Marines

LtCol John R. Allen**

1st Battalion, 2d Marines

LtCol Dennis J. Hejlik

3d Battalion, 2d Marines

LtCol Joseph V. Medina

1st Battalion, 6th Marines

LtCol Jack K. Sparks

Marine Barracks Ground Defense/Security Force, Guantanamo Bay

Col John M. Himes

• The commanding officer, MarFor 160 was also commander, JIG Bulkeley from August 1994 to November 1995.

The designation for 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, was changed to 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, in July 1994.
134 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Operation Safe Haven

Marine Corps Security Force Company

Maj Gilbert Desroches

Operations Support Democracy and Uphold Democracy

Commanding Officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit

Col Martin R. l3erndt

Commanding Officer, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean

Col Thomas S. Jones

2d Battalion, 2d Marines, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean

LtCol George S. Hartley

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force

Caribbean

LtCol Anthony 3. Zell

Combat Support Service Detachment 29, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean

Maj Lance R. McBride
Appendix C

Chronology of Caribbean Operations

Sep 1.991 Haitian Armed Forces overthrow President Aristide.

Oct 1991 1-laitian migrants set sail for Florida to escape political and economic oppression.

22-25 Nov 1991 Under command of BGen George H. Walls, Jr., JTF GTMO deploys to

Guantanamo Bay to care for rescued migrants.

5-17 Dec 1991 Disturbances in migrant camps at Guantanamo Bay.

Feb 1992 JTF GTMO begins to repatriate migrants to Haiti.

24 May 1992 Administration announces that rescued migrants will be returned to Haiti while

JTF GTMO continues to downsize.

Aug 1992-Jun 1993 JTF GTMO runs camp for HIV-positive Haitian migrants.

Jul 1993 U.S./U.N. initiative to restore President Aristide culminates in Governor's Island

Accord.

Oct 1993 The USS Harlan County unable to disembark U.S./U.N. peacekeepers at Portau-Prince.

Oct 1993 Governor's Island Accord considered as a dead letter in wake of the Harlan

County incident.

Jan 1994 JTF isO established under LtGen 1-lenry H. Shelton to plan for invasion of Haiti.

18 May 1994 JTF 160 established under BGen Michael J. Williams to care for new seahorne

migrants.

Mid-Jun 1994 Operation Sea Signal begins: Haitian migrants processed on IJSNS (Thmfort off

Jamaica.

Jun 1994 MarFor 160 begins to construct camp on Grand Turk.

6 Jul 1994 General Williams shifts his flag from Jamaica to Guantanamo.

Jul-Aug 1994 Haitian migrants processed by ArFor 16o at Camp McCalla in Guantanamo.

Aug 1994 MarFor 160 returns from Grand Turk to process Cubans at Camp Bulkeley and

other overflow camps in Guantanamo.

9 Sep 1.994 First Cuban migrants break out of camps, disorder begins.

10-11 Sep 1994 Disorders continue and escalate.

12-13 Sep 1994 Order restored during Operation Clean Sweep.

Mid-Sep 1994 'Quality of life" and security upgrades begin at Guantanamo.

19 Sep 1994 Main effort of JTF 180 lands at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in Operation Uphold

Democracy.

20 Sep 1994 As part of JTF 1.. 80, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean

lands at Cap-Haltien, Haiti.

Sep-Oct 1994 8,600 Cuban migrants relocated to camps in Panama.

1-2 Oct 1994 SPMAGTF Carib withdraws from Cap-Haltien, Haiti.

7 Dec 1994 Cuban migrants in Panama begin series of outbreaks.

8-15 Dec 1994 Marine Corps Security Force Company (Panama) plays pivotal role in restoring

order.

Feb 1995 Cuban migrants return from Panama to Guantanamo.

Feb-Apr 1995 "Quality of life" phase continues in Cuban camps at Guantanamo.

2 May 1995 Announcement of new parole policy for Cuban migrants.

Aug-Oct 1995 Lotteries for parole into United States in Cuban camps.

Oct 1995 Last Haitian migrants at Guantanamo go to U.S. or return to Haiti.

31 Jan 1996 Last Cuban migrant departs Guantanamo for United States.

Feb-Mar 1996 Repatriation of JTF 160 equipment and personnel.

2 Feb 1996 Formal ceremony to disestablish JTF 160.
136 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Mar 1996 Remaining U.S. troops return home from occupation duty in Haiti.

11 Apr 1996 Last members of JTF 160 cease work at Guantanamo.
Appendix D

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

Able Manner The Coast Guard/Navy operation to interdict and rescue Haitian migrants in the

summer of 1994, augmented by shipboard security teams from 2d Marine

Division.

Able Vigil The extension of Able Manner in late summer 1994 when thousands of Cuban

migrants set sail for Florida; also augmented by shipboard security teams from 2d

Marine Division.

ArFor Army Forces, here the abbreviation for the Army component of a JTF.

ARG Amphibious Ready Group, a group of amphibious ships, with Marines embarked,

CinCLant Commander in Chief, Atlantic, the parent command in Norfolk, Virginia, of Navy

and Marine forces deployed to the Caribbean in 1991.

CSSD Combat Service Support Detachment, the logistics component of a MAGTF.

CP Command Post.

EPW Enemy Prisoner of War.

flexicuffs Lightweight plastic strips for use as temporary handcuffs.

FMFLant Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, 1991 title for the Marine organization subordinate to

CinCLant.

FSSG Force Service Support Group, the designation for the major Marine Corps commands that provide logistical support to operating components.

GDF Ground Defense Force, the MCSFCo when augmented by the platoon of sailors

from Rodman Naval Station, Panama; the term was also part of the official title of

Marine Barracks, Guantanamo Bay.

GTJ Grand Turk Island, one of the Turks and Caico.s Islands.

GTMO Operation GTMO, the operation to care for Haitian migrants at Guantanamo Bay

from 1991 to 1993. Although an abbreviation, GTMO (pronounced "git'mo") was

the official codename of the operation.

Humvee High mobility medium wheeled vehicle, the official designation of the mediumsized tactical vehicle that replaced the jeep to carry personnel and light cargo.

Humvee is the nickname for the official HMMWV abbreviation.

J-2 The intelligence component of a JTF staff.

J-3 The operations component of a JTF staff.

J-4 The logistics component of a JTF staff.

JTF Joint Task Force, a task force with components from more than one Service.

JTG Joint Task Group, a subordinate component of a JTE

LantCom Atlantic Command, until 1993 the title for the headquarters of the unified command in Norfolk, Virginia, commanded by CinCLant.

LCAC Landing Craft, Air-Cushioned, the military version of the hovercraft.

LCU Landing Craft, Utility, conventional landing craft for ship-to-shore movement.

MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force, a composite Marine unit task-organized for expeditionary operations, includes air, ground and support components.

MarFor Marine Forces, the abbreviation for the Marine component of the JTF.s.

MarForLant Marine Forces, Atlantic, after 1993 the title used for the Marine component of the

forces under Commander in Chief, USACom.

MCHC Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
138 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

MCSFCo Marine Corps Security Force Company, rhe formal tide for the Marines at Marine

Barracks, Panama.

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force, here II MEF, the umbrella command subordinate to

FMFLant and, later, MarForLant; 2d Force Service Support Group, 2d Marine

Aircraft Wing, and 2d Marine Division were subordinate to II MEE

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit, a Marine amphibious force package built around a

battalion landing team, composite helicopter squadron and support detachment.

NavFor Navy Forces, abbreviation for the Navy component of a JTF.

NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operation, usually a term for rescuing civilians.

ROE Rules of Engagement, typically regulating the use of deadly force.

S-2 Intelligence component of a battalion or regimental staff.

S-3 Operations component of a battalion or regimental staff.

S-4 Logistics component of a battalion or regimental staff.

Safe Harbor Interim codename for Operation GTMO.

Safe 1-laven Cndename for the operation to care for Cuban migrants in Panama in 1994 and

1995.

Safe Passage Codename for the operation to return Cuban migrants from Panama to

Guantanamo Bay in early 1995.

Sea Signal Operation Sea Signal, the codename for JTF 160's operations to care for Cuban

and Haitian migrants from 1994 to 1996.

SouthCom Southern Command, the unified command based in Panama that covers operations in Latin America.

SPMAGTF Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, a type of MAGTF.

STA Surveillance and Target Acquisition, Marines performing reconnaissance functions.

Support

Democracy Codename officially in use from Sep 1993 to Sep 1994 for operations to restore

the legitimate government of Haiti; focus was on maritime interdiction.

TCI Turks and Caicos Islands, a British dependency north of Cuba.

Uphold

Democracy Codename officially in use from May 1994 to Mar 1995 for operations to restore

the legitimate government of Haiti; covers invasion and occupation of Haiti.

IJSAC0m U.S. Atlantic Command, a designation for CinCLant in use after October 1.993, subsequently changed to Joint Forces Command. Headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia,

it was die parent command of JTF 16o.
Appendix E

Citations

JOINT TASK FORCE GTMO

CITATION:

The Joint Task Force Guantanarno distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service from 22

November 1991 through 2 July 1993. During this period, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and

coastguardmen of Joint Task Force Guantanamo provided emergency temporary humanitarian assistance

to Haitian migrants under extraordinary circumstances that involved international interest. The Joint Task

Force off-loaded over 35,000 migrants from Coast Guard and Navy vessels and provided them shelter,

security, nourishment, and medical attention. It also coordinated multi-agency operations to identify,

process, and transport Haitians to the United States, back to Haiti and to other countries. With empathy

and dedication to duty, the Joint Task Force professionally aided large numbers of migrants during a

period of extreme tension, simultaneously serving United States immigration interests and furthering

United States international policy. These difficult tasks were accomplished in a superior fashion over

many months despite political and legal controversy, limited logistical support, overwhelming numbers

of migrants, and the extraordinary nature of this non-doctrinal mission. By their exemplary performance

of duty, the members of Joint Task Force Guantanamo have brought great credit to themselves and to

the Department of Defense.

Given under my hand this 31st day of March 1994

John M. Shalikashvili

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
140 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

JOINT TASK FORCE 160

CITATION:

The Joint Task Force 160, Guantanamo distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious achievement

from 20 May 1994 to 19 May 1995, During this period, the soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen, and coastguardsmen of Joint Task Force 160 provided emergency temporary humanitarian assistance to both

Cuban and Haitian migrants under extraordinary circumstances that involved international interest. The

Joint Task Force inrerdictect on the high seas, transported and off-loaded over 50,000 Caribbean migrants

from Coast Guard and Navy vessels, and provided shelter, security, nourishment, and medical attention.

It also coordinated multi-agency operations at various centers throughout the Caribbean to identify,

process, and transport Cuban and Haitian migrants to the United States, safe haven locations, and back

to Haiti or Cuba. With empathy and dedication to duty, the Joint Task Force professionally aided large

numbers of migrants during periods of extreme tension, while simultaneously serving U.S. immigration

interests and furthering U.S. immigration interests and U.S. national policy. These difficult and complex

tasks were accomplished in a superior fashion over many months despite political and legal controversy, limited logistical support, overwhelming numbers of migrants, and the extraordinary nature of this

non-doctrinal mission. By their exemplary performance of duty, the members of Joint Task Force 160

have brought great credit upon themselves and the Department of Defense.

Given under my hand this 23rd day of June 1995.

John M. Shalikashvii

Chainman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
APPENDIX 141

MAJOR GILBERT DESROCHES, USMC

CITATION:

Major Gilbert Desroches, United States Marine Corps, distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious achievement while serving as Commander, Marine Security Force Company, Rodman Naval Station,

Panama, on 8 December 1994. Major Desroches deployed his company to Empire Range, Panama, as

part of a quick reaction force in support of Joint Task Force Safe Haven to help repel an uprising by a

large group of detained personnel. Major Desroches and his Marines moved to the vicinity of

Contractor's Hill where they were confronted by the advancement of approximately 500 riotous Cubans.

Greatly outnumbered, Major Desroches quickly and expertly analyzed the situation and placed his company in a blocking position. Although Cubans in three commandeered vehicles attempted to breach the

company's position, he exhibited exceptional leadership, discipline, and courage, enabling the Marines

to effectively halt the Cuban advance. Major Desroches, with effective dialogue, calmed the outraged

mob and convinced them to return to their camp. His exceptional initiative helped defuse a potentially

volatile situation. The distinctive accomplishments of Major Desroches reflect great credit upon himself,

the United States Marine Corps, and the Department of Defense.
Index

Acton, LCpI Jerry, 112

Ainsworth, Capt Suzanne, USAR, 38

Air Force Commands and Units

56th Air Transportable 1-lospital, 33

Alien Migrants Interdiction Agreement, 5

Allen, LtCol John R., 24, 26-28, 30-31, 49, 54, 57,

59-61, 63, 65, 67, 68

American Embassy Haiti. 17

Aristide, President Jean-Bertrand, 3, 22-23, 71,

93, 100, 108

Army Commands and Units

101st Airborne Division, 84

10th Mountain Division, 121

258th Military Police Company, 78, 80

2d Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 62

2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 118

2cl Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, 118

401st Military Police Company, 33

504th Military Police Battalion, 14

519th Military Police Battalion, 78

716th Military Police Battalion, 62

82d Airborne Division, 84

92d Military Police Battalion, 81

96th Civil Affairs Detachment, 96th Civil

Affairs Battalion, 10

Army Special Forces A Ttèams, 117

Civil Affairs Direct Support Team 53, 38

XVIII Airborne Corps, 94, 96-97, 120-121

Ashland (LSD 48), 97, 104

Atlantic Command, 23, 44, 47, 64, 94, 99

Ayres, BGen Raymond P., Jr., 64-65, 69, 71, 86

Balladares, Ernesro Perez, 73

Beavers, Col Jennings B. II, 64-65, 67, 69, 86

Berndt, Col Martin R., 94, 96

Berry, SgtMaj Douglas E., 6, 13, 56

Blair, Col Gary A., 8-9, 14

Broadstone, Maj Herman C., 98, 107

Bulkeley, Lt John, 6

Bush, President George H.W., 16

ButleE Maj Smediley D., 2

Caicos Islands, 31-34

See Turks and Caicos Islands

Camp 1, 75-77, 80, 86

Camp 2, 77, 81-83

Camp 3, 74-75, 77, 83

Camp Bulkeley, 6-12, 19-22, 35, 40, 48-49, 53-54,

57-61, 67, 86

Camp Hunt, 63

Camp Lejeune, NC, 3, 7, 14-15, 19, 20, 22-23, 31,

49, 56, 64, 71, 90, 93, 95, 119

Camp McCalla, 8-9, 13, 17, 19, 35, 40, 43-44, 46,

48, 56, 59, 61, 66, 88-89

Camp McCalla I, 11

Camp McCalla II, 11-15

Camp McCalla III, 11-12, 13

Camp McCalla IV, 15

Camp Mike, 49

Camp November, 63, 67, 72

Camp Quick, 57-60, 62, 64

Camp WI, 15, 21

Camp X-Ray, 69, 86

Canal Zone, 72-73

Cap-Haitien, 96, 97, 99-105, 107, 110, 112-119

Capdepon, Capt John W., 73, 75-80, 85

Caperton, Adm William B., 1

Carter, President James E., Jr., 49, 99

Castro, President Fidel, 2, 23, 44

Cedras, BGen Raoul, 3, 110, 114, 120

Chamberlain, Col Joshua L., 59

Chapel Hill, 55-57

Chaplin, Capt Robert C., USN, 100

Clinton, President \X'illiam 5., 24, 32, 41, 44, 52,

72

Coast Guard, 4-5, 7, 16-18, 25, 29, 36, 41

Cockhurn Town, 31

Colson, Lt Michael A., USN, 68

Corn/on (T-AH 20), 25-31, 35, 49

Contractor's Hill, 78

Costantini, Capt William R., 59

Crane, Stephen, 1

Cuba, 2, 13, 44-45, 52-53, 56, 67, 70, 72-73

Cuban missile crisis, 2

Culebra, 78

Davis, Sgt Roderick L., 84

Desroches, Maj Gilbert, 72-85

Diddams, Capt Richard L., Jr., 109-112

Dobbs, Maj Mark C., 119
Dolphin, 1

Dominican Republic, 2, 11.6

Edney, Adm Leon A., USN, 3, 5

Empire Ranges, 73

External Security Forces, 65

Fort Bragg, NC, 96-97

Gaillard Cut, 77

Galeta Island, 72, 84

Garver, LtCol Randy, 59, 62, 64

Gay!, Capt Franz J., 39, 54, 56-57. 60, 62-63

Glenn, Sgt Jeffrey, 94

Governor's Island Accord, 23, 93

Grand Riviere du Nord, 116-117

Grand Turk Island, 24, 31-36, 38-39, 46, 53

See Turks and Caicos Islands

Great Inagua, 94, 96

Greenwood, lstLt Daniel Q., 118

Greenwood, Maj Thomas C., 96, 102-103, 105-

108, 119

Gru.ziya, 26

Haiti, 1-5, 9, 16-17, 19, 22-23, 25, 41-43, 52, 66,

69, 72, 93-95

Hanneken, Herman H., 116

Hardee, LtCol James C., 14

Harlan Cbunty ST 1196), 23, 93

Hartley, LtCol George S., 95, 98, 106, 112

Hashimoto, LtCol Ted W., 14

Haskins, RAdm Michael D., USN, 88

Hejlik, LtCol Dennis J., 65

Hendricks, Col Douglas 0.,

I-limes, Col John M., 47-48,

Homestead A.ir Force Base,

Howard Air Force Base, 85

Howard, Sgt Inn N., 79

Huck, Col Richard A., 31

Inchon (LPH 12), 94, 96

Ivan Franko, 26, 28

Jackson, Reverend Jesse L., 21

Jamaica, 29, 36, 40, 49

John Paul Jones Hill, 54

Johnston, 1.tGen Robert B., 38, 64

Joint Security Group, 65, 69

Joint Task Force 129, 3

Joint Task Force 140, 4

joint Task Force 160, 24, 29, 31-32, 37, 40, 48,

51, 56, 69, 71, 86, 88-90

Joint Task Force 180, 94, 96-97, 101, 103, 120

Joint Task Force 190, 121

Joint Task Force Grand Turk Island, 33, 39

Joint Task Force GTMO, 4, 24

Joint Task Force Safe Haven, 74-76, 78, 81, 83-84

Joint Task Group Bulkeley, 46, 49, 54, 89

Jones, Col Thomas S., 95-100, 102, 104-117, 119-

120

.Joseph, Jose, USN, 112

Josephat, LtCol Claudel, 99, 106-107, 109-111,

114-115

Kaiser, Capt Daniel R., 77, 80

Kappel, Maj Donald J., 12

Keys, LtGen William M., 7

Krulak, Gen Charles C., 119

Lamonde, Cdm Joseph R., USN, 39

Lashley, GySgt Claude G., 81

ft Borgne, 1.16

Leffler, Col Kevin E., s6, 88

Lehnert, Col Michael R., 87, 89

Lembe, 117

I,es Cayes, 99

Lyon, Capt Gregg L., 105

MacArthur, Gen Douglas, 6

Magazine Number 121, 53, 60

Magazine Road, 58-59

Mainside, 54

Mariel Boatlift, 7, 49

Marine Corps Commands and Units

1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 65, 67, 69

1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 95

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special

Operations Capable, 94-96

2d Battalion, 2d Marines, 95, 98, 110, 118

2d Battalion, 4th Marines, 24, 26, 31, 33, 38,

40

2d Battalion, 6th

61-62, 65, 67

2d Battalion, 8th

2d Force Service

71, 90

2d Marine Division, 29

2d Marines, 95, 96

3d Battalion, 6th Marine, 94

81mm mortar platoon, 110, 118

8th Engineer Support Battalion, 13

8th Marines, 64

Battery B, 10th Marines,

Battery B, 1st Battalion,

Battery H, 3d Battalion,

Brigade Service Support

Combat Service Support

Combat Service Support

114

Company B (-), 2d Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion, 95

Company B, 2d Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion, 105

Company B, 8th Engineer Support Battalion,

2d Force Service Support Group, 93

Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, 40

Company C, 8th Marines, 33

143 INDEX

86

54-55, 58-59

88

Marines, 31, 49, 53-54, 57,

Marines, 14

Support Group, 6-7, 23, 56,

105, 118

10th Marines, 95

10th Marines, 8, 9

Group 6, 7

Detachment 160, 40

Detachment 29, 95,
144 A SKILLFUL SHOW OF STRENGTH

Company

Company

Company

Company

Company

59-60

E, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, 59, 63

F, 2d Marines, 98, 109-113

F, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, 63

F, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, 14

C, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, 56,

Company G, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, 14

Company G, 2d Marines, 105

Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team (FAST)

Company, Atlantic, 17

II Marine Expeditionary Force, 4, 24

Marine Barracks, Panama, 72

Marine Corps Security Force Company, 72,

75, 77-79, 85

Marine Force 160, 24, 33, 89

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264, 95

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266, 94

MEU Service Support Group 24, 94

Rifle Security Company Windward, 54

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task

Force Caribbean, 95-97, 102, 108, 114, 116-

117, 119

Marine Cotps Gazette, 68

Maslow, Abraham H., 41

Maynard, BGen Henri, 110

McAdams, LtCol John M., Jr., 33

McBride, Maj Lance R., 95, 119

McCaffrey, Gen Barry R., 81, 83, 85

McCalla, Cdr Bowman H., 8

McCamy, Capt William C., USN, 5

McGuire, LtCol John D., 117

McKay, Col John C., 89

McMurtry, Larry, 35

Meade, MajGen David C., USA, 121

Military District of the North, 107

Miller, Adm Paul D., USN, 6

Mirande, lsiit Thomas M., 49

Mitchell, Lt Peter J., 37

Morehead City, NC, 95, 119

Mundy, Gen Carl E., Jr., 15-16, 37, 42, 83, 99-100

Murray, Col John T., 20

Nashville (LPD 13), 96, 104

Navy Commands and Units

Auxiliary Security Force, 79

Naval Air Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto

Rico, 95

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74, 33-

34, 36

Naval Security Group Activity, 72

Naval Station Panama Canal, 72

Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, 1-121 passim

Navy SEAL Teams, 100

Sealjees. See Naval Mobile Construction

Battalion 74

Underwater Construction Team 1, 36

Neal, BGen Richard I., 20

Nunn, Senator Sam, 100

O'Grady, Capt Scott, USAF, 94

Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG 7), 97

Operation Able Manner, 29

Operation Able Vigil, 29

Operation Clean Sweep, 60-61, 64

Operation GTMO, 7, 10, 16, 18, 22-23, 35-36, 84,

90

Operation Provide Comfort, 9

Operation Safe Harbor, 7

Operation Safe Haven, 74

Operation Sea Signal, 84, 89-91

Operation Support Democracy, 95

Operation Take Charge, 14, 20

Operation Uphold Democracy, 95, 103, 120-121

Organization of American States, 93

Ouaniminthe, 116

Overstreet, SgtMaj Harold G., 38

Palomo, LCp1 Jesus C., 80, 84

Palumbo, lstLt Virgil A., 111, 113

Pan-American Highway, 77

Panama, 52, 69, 72-73, 84, 86

Panama City, 77-78

Pearson, Col Michael, USA, 40

Fell, Senator Calihorne, 21

People, 24

Perry, Secretary of Defense William J., 95, 99-100

Peterson, Capt Alvin W., Jr., 105

Petit Bord du Borgne, 116

Petit, Jean-Claude, 43

Philips Park, 40

Port-au-Prince, 16-1.7, 71, 93, 96-97, 100-103,

110-111

Portland (LSD 37), 94

Powell, lstLt Douglas M., 94

Powell, Gen Cohn L., USA, 99

Puglies, Capt Neal Fl, 54-55, 58

Quick, Sgt John H., 1, 8, 31

Quinn, Capt John T. II, 117

Radio Marti, 52, 56

Radio Range, 49, 53, 57, 59-60, 67, 87-88

Radio Range Road, 62

Red Cross, 16, 31

Redlich, LtCol Douglas C., 24, 33-39, 46, 54, 56-

57, 59-62, 64-65, 86

Reno, Attorney General Janet, 44, 88

Restivo. SgtMaj Royce 5., 33, 60

Rijflcogel, Herman , 82

Romulus, Col Martial, 110

Roosevelt Roads, 118

Rousseau, 73

Rowley, Capt Arthur N. III, USN, 72, 77, 85

Rutter, lstLt Jay A,, 77-78, 80
Salasko, lstLt Robert P., 54

Sanchez, Margarita Uria, 88

Schwarzkopf, Gen H. Norman, USA, 38

Shalikashvii, Gen John M., USA, 42

Sheehan, Gen John J., 69, 120

Shelton, LtGen Henry H., USA, 94, 103, U4. 120

Shissler, Maj John L. III, 91

Skippings, Oswald 0., 38

Smith, Howard, 37

SouthCom, 73-74, 81, 84

Spartanburg County (LST 1192), 94-95

Stenner, Col Peter R., 7

Stone, Maj John E., 49, 57, 59

Sutton, BGen Russell H., 4

Swing, American Ambassador William Lacy, 114

Tampa (WMEC 902), 17

Task Force 92, 81, 83

Task Force Hawg, 98, 105, 107

Task Force Irish, 98, 105

The Evening Standard, 37, 38

The New York Times, 36, 98

The Washington Post, 94

Trenton (LPD 14), 94

Turks and Caicos Islands, 31-34

145 INDEX

United Nations, 16, 23, 93, 114, 121

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

13

USACom, 97

Vanmatre, lstSgt Harry B., 78, 80

Vieques, 96

Vincent, Maj Brian J., 32, 61

Walls, BGen George H., Jr., 6-7, 10, 12-16, 18,

22, 24, 42, 48, 56

Wasp (LHD 1), 96, 98-101, 104-105, 113

Wbidbey island (LSD 41), 39, 53

Williams, BGen Michael j., 24-25, 27, 29, 33, 35-

36, 38-49, 51-52, 54, 56-57, 59, 61, 64-66, 69-71,

73, 90

Wilson, BGen James L., USA, 76-78, 80, 82

Zell, LtCol AnthonyJ., 95

Zinser, Col Lawrence R., 20
ISBN 0-16-051501-7

90000

U 9 780160 515019
The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest

military insignia in continuous use in the United States.

It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stats changed to five

points this device has been used continuously on

Marine Corps buttons to the present day.