Filed 8/12/15

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, 

INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B251230

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. SJ003872)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Harvey 

Giss, Judge. Affirmed.

E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant. 

Office of the County Counsel, Brian T. Chu, Principal Deputy County Counsel, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (Surety) appeals the trial court‟s order denying 

its second motion to further extend the appearance period under Penal Code1section 

1304.5 or, in the alternative, to toll the running of time on the extended appearance 

period. Surety argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying its second extension 

motion and maintains that the 180-day extension permitted by the statute is to be 

measured from the date the court granted the first extension, rather than the date the 

exoneration period would have expired in the absence of an extension. Surety failed to 

demonstrate good cause to justify a second extension. We affirm. 

STATUTORY SCHEME

“[T]he „bail bond is a contract between the surety and the government whereby 

the surety acts as a guarantor of the defendant's appearance in court under the risk of 

forfeiture of the bond.‟ (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 13, 22.) Thus, 

when there is a breach of this contract, the bond should be enforced. (See People v. 

North Beach Bonding Co. (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 663, 675.)” (People v. American 

Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 657-658.)

“Section 1305, subdivision (a) requires the trial court to declare a forfeiture of bail 

when a defendant fails to appear in court without a satisfactory excuse. The clerk of the 

court is required to mail notice of the forfeiture to the bail agent within 30 days of the 

forfeiture. (§ 1305, subd. (b).)” (People v. Granite State Ins. Co. (2003) 114 

Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) Once a notice of forfeiture is mailed, the surety has 180 days 

(plus five days for mailing of the notice) to move to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate 

the bond on the ground the defendant has voluntarily appeared or is in custody following 

his or her arrest. (§ 1305, subds. (b), (c)(1).) 

 

1 All further statutory references are to this code. 
3

Within the 185-day period, section 1305.4 allows the surety to file a motion, based 

on good cause, for an order extending the 185-day period, “not exceeding 180 days from 

its order.” Section 1305, subdivision (j) provides “a motion filed in a timely manner 

within the 180-day period may be heard within 30 days of the expiration of the 30 day 

requirement.” (§ 1305, subd. (j).)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court‟s ruling on a motion for extension under section 1305.4 is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. (County of Los Angeles v. Fairmont Specialty Group (2008) 164 

Cal.App.4th 1018, 1028; People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 638, 644.) 

The trial court is said to have abused its discretion when its decision exceeds the bounds 

of reason, all circumstances being considered. (People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2004) 16 

Cal.App.4th 75, 80.) A trial court‟s ruling based on its interpretation of a statute on 

uncontested facts is a question of a law subject to de novo review. (County of Los 

Angeles v. Fairmont Specialty Group (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 146, 151.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 29, 2012, Surety posted a bail bond in the amount of $1,240,000 for 

the release of defendant Oscar Grijalva (Grijalva) in his prosecution for attempted murder 

and related charges. On August 23, 2012, Grijalva failed to appear in court. The court 

declared his bail forfeited and issued a bench warrant. A notice of forfeiture was mailed 

the next day, on August 24, 2012. The 185th day after that mailing was February 25, 

2013.

On February 20, 2013, Surety filed its first motion to extend the exoneration 

period pursuant to section 1305.4. The motion was heard on March 20, 2013. The court 

granted the motion and ordered the period extended 134 days to August 1, 2013. A 

second motion to further extend the exoneration period, or in the alternative to toll the 

running of that period, was filed on August 1, 2013 (23 days before the one-year 
4

anniversary of the forfeiture notice mailing), and was heard on August 26, 2013 (the 

same day the one-year period lapsed). The motion was denied.

Attached to the motion was Surety‟s investigator, Cesar McGuire‟s, declaration of 

the action he had taken to apprehend Grijalva. In sum, the declaration revealed the 

following efforts between February 19 and July 31, 2013: McGuire contacted Grijalva‟s 

relatives on multiple occasions between March and July 2013 to learn of his 

whereabouts; offered to pay a $100,000 reward to Grijalva‟s sister if she persuaded 

Grijalva to turn himself in; raised the reward from $100,000 to $200,000, and posted the 

updated information on websites and publicized the information in California and 

Mexico; conducted surveillance at addresses in Taft, Bakersfield, Sylmar, and Arleta, 

California and interviewed neighbors and local businesses to gather information on 

Grijalva; followed Grijalva‟s mother and sister to Rosarito, Baja California, and inquired 

at the hotel at which they were staying if Grijalva looked familiar; contacted law 

enforcement in Rosarito; and ran want ads on Facebook throughout Tijuana, Rosarito, 

Ensenada and Baja California. Unfortunately, none of this resulted in a confirmed 

sighting of Grijalva, or a verified location.

In June 2013, McGuire learned through a Facebook message that the Harpy gang 

had a clique close to the Mexican border at Tijuana. Because he had earlier received 

information that Grijalva may have been a member of this gang, McGuire went to 

Tijuana and spoke with local law enforcement regarding the Harpy gang. The Tijuana 

authorities confirmed the presence of the Harpy gang and agreed to contact McGuire if 

they sighted Grijalva. Again this proved fruitless. It produced no sightings, or additional 

information.

On July 22, 2013, McGuire received a call from an informant claiming to have 

information about Grijalva‟s whereabouts. McGuire met with the informant on July 24, 

2013, and was told he knew Grijalva‟s family personally; Grijalva was “in Tijuana” but it 

might take “some time to get actual detailed information” because he didn‟t want it to be 
5

“obvious he was gathering information.” McGuire‟s declaration is devoid of a factual 

foundation for the informant‟s claimed knowledge Grijalva was in Tijuana. 

On July 26, 2013, an unnamed U.S. law enforcement officer who stated that he 

handles all fugitives outside the U.S. advised McGuire that unnamed law enforcement 

officials in Mexico claimed they had an informant who knew Grijalva. Again nothing, no 

sightings or confirmed locations were produced from this 11th hour, third hand 

information. 

During the August 26, 2013, hearing the trial court denied the second motion for 

an extension, finding a lack of good cause as reflected in the following colloquy: 

“[Counsel]: So the court has jurisdiction to grant 180 day extension from 

the [March] 20th date, which is September 16th, which is a Monday; and I know 

the court has been operating under the understanding that it can only grant an 

extension for 365 days total, but that‟s not what the statute and case law states. It 

allows the court to grant an extension from a full 180 [days] from the date of the 

order.” 

“The Court: That‟s discretionary. I‟ll deny that request. There is no good 

cause –

“[Counsel: The good cause is based on the diligence and likelihood of 

success, which the declarations amply show that‟s a very low threshold; and the 

court‟s have held it‟s abuse of discretion to deny an extension with far less details 

and less success than in this case. I would ask the court to grant the extension to 

the time period of 9/16. This defendant is very close to being able to be returned 

to the court.

“The Court: There is no declaration. There is nothing –

“Counsel: There is a declaration.

“The Court: There is no declaration that supports that. They think he‟s 

somewhere in Tijuana.
6

“Counsel: Working with the marshals, who have been identified with 

the defendant.

“The Court: Sir, I‟ll deny your request. Bail remains forfeited.” 

In sum, in denying the motion, although the Surety had made considerable efforts to 

locate Grijalva, the trial court did not find based on the information provided there was a 

reasonable likelihood Grijalva would be apprehended if an extension were granted. 

“They think he‟s somewhere in Tijuana” was not enough.

Surety timely filed a notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

1. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 

CONCLUDING SURETY FAILED TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE TO EXTEND THE 

APPEARANCE PERIOD A SECOND TIME AFTER PREVIOUSLY RECEIVING A 

134-DAY EXTENSION.

At any time within the 185-day period – referred to as the “appearance” or 

“exoneration” period – the surety may seek an order extending the period. “A further 

extension is not automatic. [A surety] has to earn additional time by showing good 

cause.” (People v. Ranger, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 681.) “The court may, if good 

cause is shown for doing so, order the period extended „to a time not exceeding 180 days 

from its order.‟ (§ 1305.4; see § 1305, subd. (i).) Where several shorter extensions are 

granted, the courts have held that section 1305.4 allows „an extension of no more than 

180 days past the 180th day [effectively the 185-day] period set forth in section 1305.”

(People v. Taylor Billingslea Bail Bonds (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1199, 88 

Cal.Rptr.2d 713; (Taylor Billingslea ); see also People v. Granite State Ins. Co. (2003) 

114 Cal.App.4th 758, 768, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 887 (Granite State ) [„[w]e agree . . . that the 

exoneration period can only be extended an additional 180 days once‟].) Once the 

appearance period has elapsed without the forfeiture having been set aside, the court 

„shall enter a summary judgment against each bondsman named in the bond‟ in the 
7

amount of the bond plus costs. (§ 1306, subd. (a).)” (People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2010) 

182 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1380.)

“Given the underlying policy of avoiding forfeitures in favor of bringing 

defendants before the court, a trial court, faced with a section 1305.4 motion for 

extension, should draw all inferences in favor of the surety. [Citation.] The good cause 

showing under section 1305.4 is a low threshold for the movant. If the surety 

demonstrates good cause by showing due diligence . . . , a reasonable likelihood of 

success of capturing the defendant in a subsequent [extension period], and any other 

relevant circumstances, the court should grant the motion.” (People v. Accredited Surety 

& Casualty Co., Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1358 (Accredited).)

To constitute “good cause” both due diligence and a reasonable likelihood of 

recapture must be shown. (County of Los Angeles v. Fairmont Specialty Group (2008) 

164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1028-1029 (Fairmont); Accredited, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1357.) Both are equally important circumstances in determining “good cause.” 

(Accredited, supra, at p. 1358.)

Surety argues the showing of “diligent, consistent and reasonable efforts to locate 

a fugitive is the measure of good cause.” Surety is wrong; more is required. 

There are only four published cases interpreting the good cause requirement of 

section 1305.4: Fairmont, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1018; People v. Ranger Ins. Co. 

(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 676 (Ranger), People v. Alistar Ins. Co. (2003) 115 Cal.App.4th 

122 (Alistar), and Accredited, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 1349. Each case considered the 

likelihood of recapture as part of the circumstances demonstrating good cause, although 

Accredited (supra, at p. 1349) and Fairmont (supra, at p. 1022) were the only cases to do 

so explicitly.

In Fairmont, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 1018, a case factually similar to ours, our 

colleagues in Division Seven found the facts presented by the surety insufficient to 

establish good cause to grant an extension. There the investigator‟s declaration indicated 

the pre-investigation unit of Bad Boys Bail Bonds had contacted courts, jails, the 
8

defendant's family members, friends, employers and other secondary leads. Those efforts 

had proved fruitless, and the defendant's case was sent to the skip trace department for 

research. The investigator had reviewed the file, obtained the defendant's booking 

photograph and checked the defendant's bench warrant status with the court. He checked 

daily through various law enforcement websites to see whether the defendant was in 

custody. He also explained he had telephoned the indemnitor, Juan Carlos Zurita, and 

left a message. Later, he went to Zurita's home and spoke to him directly. Zurita said he 

believed the defendant was in Mexico, and promised to call the defendant's wife to get 

more information. (Id., at p. 1022.)

One week later, Zurita called and told the investigator that the defendant's wife 

had confirmed the defendant was in Mexico. Zurita told the investigator he would call 

him later with the defendant's telephone number in Mexico, which he failed to do. 

Thereafter, the investigator conducted periodic surveillance at various local addresses: 

the defendant's home address when arrested; an alternative home address for the 

defendant, which had since been torn down; and a residence address for the defendant's 

son, at which other persons were living. No one at any of these locations had sighted the 

defendant or knew his current contact information. Three months later, the investigator 

telephoned Zurita. Zurita advised him the defendant was still living in Mexico. Zurita 

said another friend, Martin Sanchez, had talked to the defendant in Mexico and the 

defendant told Sanchez he was planning to return to the United States to resolve the case. 

The investigator declared that with Sanchez's assistance, Zurita was either going to learn 

the defendant's location in Mexico or find out when the defendant planned to return to 

this country. The investigator concluded his declaration with his “opinion, that if granted 

additional time, in light of the new information obtained, and with the assistance of 

[Zurita] and the informant, the defendant will be apprehended and surrendered to the 

court.” (Fairmont, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1022-1023.)

At the hearing on Fairmont's motion to extend time, the prosecutor did not oppose 

Fairmont's request because he did not consider it “that unreasonable.” (Fairmont, supra, 
9

at p. 1023.) The court nevertheless denied the motion, explaining, based on “what's been 

provided the court, I don‟t really believe an extension of time will necessarily assist bails

[sic] bonds in finding [the defendant]. Even based on the bails [sic] bonds‟ declaration, it 

appears that [the defendant] is in Mexico, avoiding this case, knowing that there's a 

warrant out for his arrest.” The trial court entered summary judgment against Fairmont 

which was affirmed on appeal. (Fairmont, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1023.)

In Ranger, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 676, the investigator‟s declaration indicated he 

had located a positive address for the defendant in Rosarito, Mexico, and that the 

defendant was a member of a band. The declaration contained no explanation of how the 

investigator learned or verified this information. Because of the paucity of information, 

the appellate court found the surety had not demonstrated good cause to have the time 

extended. The court held a showing of good cause “means an explanation of what efforts 

[the surety] made to locate [the defendant] during the initial 180 days, and why such 

efforts were unsuccessful.” However, in reaching this determination, the court also 

considered the fact that the statement did not indicate how the investigator had located 

defendant, how he knew he had a bona fide address or the significance of defendant‟s 

membership in a band. Without these facts, the court could draw no reasonable inference 

about the likelihood of recapturing defendant. Thus, in considering the lack of these 

facts, the court concluded there was an absence of good cause. (Id. at pp. 678-682.) 

In Alistar, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 122, the investigator had found a new address 

for the defendant and obtained the help of local police. The conduct of the defendant‟s 

family members indicated he was in the area and that they were in contact with him. The 

investigator had a confirmed address for the defendant‟s sister. The defendant‟s brother 

called him and offered to pay the bond. The appellate court considered the fact that the 

agent had cooperation from the family and good reason to believe the defendant was 

currently in a particular geographic area. These facts allowed the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that, with an extension of time, the defendant was likely to be 

recaptured. (Id. at pp. 128-129.)
10

In Accredited, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 1349, the Court of Appeal found an abuse 

of discretion in the denial of the surety‟s section 1305.4 motion because the investigator 

knew where the defendant resided at various times, with whom he associated, and what 

actions he had taken. He learned when the defendant fled to Illinois and was able to 

confirm that information. He learned when the defendant returned to Sacramento. He 

discovered the identities of people who were helping the defendant and where they lived.

He had a long-term relationship with both defendant and his family. The defendant's 

family was actively cooperating with the investigator to bring the defendant to court. The 

appellate court found the surety had demonstrated good cause because the declaration 

provided facts from which a court could reasonably infer that an extension of time would 

serve the purpose of returning the defendant to court. (Id. at pp. 1353-1354, 1359.) 

By contrast, in this case the bail agent had been consistently unable to gather 

verifiable information about Grijalva or his whereabouts. Much of the information he 

obtained was false or proved fruitless. Despite his conversations with some members of 

Grijalva‟s family, it appears none were cooperating or had the slightest idea where 

Grijalva was, where he was likely to be or with whom. Not only had Grijalva‟s trail 

grown cold, it was nonexistent.

In both Alistar, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 122 and Accredited, supra, 137 

Cal.App.4th 1349 the investigator or bail agent was consistently able to gather 

information about the defendant and his whereabouts. Further, they were able to provide 

information that indicated they had a general idea of where the defendant might be and 

had prospects for obtaining additional information which would eventually lead to his 

recapture. The existence of this factual information gave rise to an inference there was a 

reasonable likelihood of capturing the defendant, and is what distinguishes those cases

from the one before us. In Accredited and Alistar, there were verifiable facts from which 

reasonable inferences about the likelihood of capture could be drawn. In this case there 

are no such facts.
11

A showing of a reasonable likelihood of recapture is an important circumstance to 

be considered in determining good cause for an extension. Although the good cause 

showing under section 1305.4 is low, it is not non-existent. (Accredited, supra, 137 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1358.) Simply, it was not met in this case.

We strictly construe the relevant statutory provisions in favor of the surety, but it 

is the surety who bears the burden of establishing that it falls within the statutory 

requirements for relief. (People v. Ranger, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1564.) As 

Surety failed to carry its burden, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 

second motion to extend the appearance period.

Surety‟s central argument in its brief on appeal is that the trial court erred in 

denying the requested relief based on its mistaken belief it lacked discretionary authority 

to further extend the extension period: “The trial court here did not fault the surety for 

the efforts made to locate the defendant. Rather, it was under the erroneous impression 

that the „year has run out.‟” Surety then argues that, at the time the court ordered the 

initial extension of the appearance period on March 20, 2013, it was authorized to extend 

the period until September 16, 2013, that is, 180 days from the date of its prior order. 

Thus, in its second extension request, Surety sought to obtain the additional 46 days 

which it claims the court was authorized to grant on March 20, but did not.

As explained above, we find abundant evidence in the record that the trial court 

denied the second extension motion based on its conclusion that Surety had failed to 

establish a reasonable likelihood an additional 46-day extension would result in the return 

of Grijalva to the court‟s custody. 

We have serious doubt Surety was entitled to an additional 46 days based on 

relevant case law. In Taylor Billingslea, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th 1193 the trial court had 

previously granted several extensions of the appearance period. On the day before the 

one-year anniversary of the mailing of the notice of bond forfeiture, the trial court denied 

the surety‟s request for an additional seven-day extension, stating there was “no authority 

in either case law or the statute that would permit me to extend the tolling period for 
12

more th[a]n 180 days.” (Id. at p. 1197.) Division Four of this Court affirmed that ruling. 

After granting that “[t]he language in section 1305.4 is somewhat ambiguous,” the 

appellate court reviewed the legislative history of the statute. It concluded, “Guided by 

the language of the statute and the explanation of its provisions provided by the 

legislative counsel, we are of the opinion that the Legislature intended section 1305.4 to 

allow an extension of no more than 180 days past the 180-day [now 185-day] period set 

forth in section 1305.” (Id. at p. 1199.) Subsequent cases have cited Taylor Billingslea 

in support of the proposition that the maximum period during which a surety may vacate 

the forfeiture is 365 days from the date of mailing of the notice of forfeiture. (See, for 

example, People v. Granite State Ins. Co., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 768 [“We agree . 

. . that the exoneration period can only be extended an additional 180 days once.”]; 

People v. Bankers Ins. Co., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1382 [“[T]he statute allows an 

extension of the appearance period „of no more than 180 days‟ past the 185-day period 

provided by section 1305”]; People v. Accredited Surety and Casualty Co., Inc. (2013) 

220 Cal.App.4th 1137.)

In the last cited case, People v. Accredited Surety and Casualty Co., Inc., supra, 

220 Cal.App.4th 1137, a notice of bail forfeiture was mailed to the surety on January 18, 

2011. On July 22, 2011, 185 days later, the surety filed a motion to extend the 

appearance period pursuant to section 1305.4, which motion was set for hearing on 

August 5, 2011. The People conceded that the extension request was supported by good 

cause, and “„suggested that the statutory deadline should be extended in this matter for 

180 days from the date of the order purporting to extend the deadline to January 31, 

2012.‟” (Id. at p. 1141.)

On April 26, 2012, summary judgment was entered on the forfeiture. Contending 

that the extended exoneration period authorized by statute expired no later than 

January 18, 2012 (365 days after service the notice of forfeiture), the surety challenged 

the validity of the summary judgment, claiming that it was entered beyond the 90-day 
13

period authorized by section 1306, subdivision (c)2and was therefore void. In response, 

the People maintained that the trial court‟s extension of the appearance period to January 

31, 2012 was proper as that date was within 180 days of the court‟s August 5, 2011 

extension order. Citing Taylor Billingslea, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th 1193, People v. 

Granite, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 758 and People v. Bankers Inc. Co., supra, 182 

Cal.App.4th 1377, the Court of Appeal rejected this analysis: “All of the cases that have 

addressed the ambiguity in section 1305.4 have concluded that this is not a correct 

reading of the statute.” (Id. at p. 1147.) Consequently, the court concluded that, “[u]nder 

the construction of section 1305.4 adopted by every court that has thus far considered the 

question, the summary judgment in the present case was entered after the expiration of 

the 90-day time period permitted by section 1305, subdivision (c).” (People v. 

Accredited Surety and Casualty Co., Inc., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1149.) Thus, this

case holds that the 180-day extension authorized by section 1305.4 is to be measured 

from the date the exoneration period would have expired in the absence of an extension, 

rather than from the date the court granted the extension; or in other words, 365 days 

from the mailing of the notice of forfeiture.

Without explicitly repudiating this holding, our colleagues in Division Four 

recently came to the opposite conclusion in County of Los Angeles v. Williamsburg

(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 944 (“Williamsburg”). In that case, a notice of bail forfeiture 

was mailed to the surety on July 23, 2012, giving the surety until January 24, 2013 to 

produce the defendant. On January 22, 2013, the surety moved to extend the appearance 

period pursuant to section 1305.4; the motion was heard on February 1, 2013, and the 

appearance period was extended to July 20, 2013. The surety filed a second motion to 

extend the appearance period on July 22, 2013 (the first court day after July 20, 2013), 

 

2

Section 1306, subdivision (a) provides that when the exoneration period has lapsed 

without the forfeiture being set aside, the trial court shall enter summary judgment in the 

amount of the bond, plus costs. Subdivision (c) of that section provides that in the event 

“summary judgment is not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it may first 

be entered, the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated.”
14

with hearing set for August 11, 2013. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing 

on July 22, 2013. While the issue on appeal was simply whether the surety had a 

statutory right to a hearing on its extension motion, the court explained in a footnote in 

dicta that the “plain text” of section 1305.4 “clearly states that any extension runs from 

the date the court issues an order granting an extension.” In reaching this conclusion the 

court cited a nine-word paraphrase contained in People v. American Contractors 

Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th 653, 658 (American Contractors), “„[T]he trial court 

may . . . extend the period by no more than 180 days from the date the trial court orders 

the extension, provided that the surety files its motion before the original 185-day 

appearance period expires and demonstrates good cause for the extension. [Citations.]‟ 

Emphasis added.)” (Williamsburg, supra, at p. 951, fn. 7, underscore added.) As our 

discussion makes clear, we disagree with the dicta of the Williamsburg court.

American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 662-663, held the premature entry 

of summary judgment following a bail forfeiture renders the judgment voidable, not void. 

In dicta, in the introduction to the opinion, the Supreme Court described in general terms

the process by which a surety may extend the appearance period: “[T]he trial court may 

. . . extend the period by no more than 180 days from the date the trial court orders the

extension . . . .” (Id., at p. 658, emphasis added.) Section 1305.4 actually states the court 

may order the appearance period “extended to a time not exceeding 180 days from its

order” (emphasis added.) The gravamen of the Supreme Court holding, premature entry 

of summary judgment renders the judgment voidable, not void, did not require an 

analysis of the meaning of the phrase “from its order” in section 1305.4. Therefore the 

opinion is devoid of any analysis of whether “from its order” means 180 days from the 

last day of the appearance period, or 180 days from the date of a subsequent order 

extending the appearance period.

2. THE TOLLING PROVISION OF SECTION 1305, SUBDIVISION (H) DOES

NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
15

Surety also contends that it was entitled to a tolling of the appearance period under 

section 1305, subdivision (h). We do not agree.

Subdivision (g) of section 1305 states: “In all cases of forfeiture where a 

defendant is not in custody and is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, is temporarily 

detained, by the bail agent, in the presence of a local law enforcement officer of the 

jurisdiction in which the defendant is located, and is positively identified by that law 

enforcement officer as the wanted defendant in an affidavit signed under penalty of 

perjury, and the prosecuting agency elects not to seek extradition after being informed of 

the location of the defendant, the court shall vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond 

on terms that are just and do not exceed the terms imposed in similar situations with 

respect to other forms of pretrial release.” (§ 1305, subd. (g).) Subdivision (h) of the 

statute provides: “In cases arising under subdivision (g), if the bail agent and the 

prosecuting agency agree that additional time is needed to return the defendant to the 

jurisdiction of the court, and the prosecuting agency agrees to the tolling of the 180-day 

period, the court may, on the basis of the agreement, toll the 180-day period within which 

to vacate the forfeiture. The court may order tolling for up to the length of time agreed 

upon by the parties.” (§ 1305, subd. (h).) 

“The geographic scope of section 1305, subdivision (g) is set forth in simple 

language: It applies when a defendant is detained by bail agents „beyond the jurisdiction 

of the state.‟ Plainly, this includes situations in which the defendant is located in another 

country.” (County of Orange v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 795, 800.) Thus, 

in order to benefit from the tolling provision of the statute, Grijalva must have been 

temporarily detained by the bail agent and have been identified by a law enforcement 

officer in the foreign jurisdiction. Neither of these predicates were present at the hearing 

on Surety‟s extension request: The investigator‟s declaration made clear that Grijalva 

had never been located, much less detained and identified by a local law enforcement 

officer. Relief under subdivision (g), and consequently under subdivision (h), is simply 

not available when the accused was never temporarily detained by the bail agent in the 
16

presence of a local law enforcement officer, or positively identified by that law 

enforcement officer. (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co. (2004) 132 

Cal.App.4th 1134, 1146.)

Moreover, tolling can be granted only with the agreement of the prosecutor. 

While Surety represents that “the prosecuting agency was very interested in having the 

defendant returned to court, and the extradition deputy was inclined to agree to a tolling,” 

at the extension hearing, it conceded, “I agree that at this moment [the prosecutors] 

haven‟t made an agreement to do that.” Consequently, as the trial court ruled, the tolling 

provision of section 1305, subdivision (h) was unavailable in this case.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Surety has failed to establish that the 

trial court erred in denying its motion to extend the appearance period. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The County of Los Angeles is awarded costs of appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

KIRSCHNER, J.

We concur:

MOSK, Acting P. J.

KRIEGLER, J.

 



Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.