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95–102 PDF 2015

S. HRG. 113–668 

UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO DEFEAT THE 

ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 17, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Connable, Ben, senior international policy analyst, Rand Corporation, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 59 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 61 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee ................................................. 3 

Ford, Hon. Robert S., senior fellow, Middle East Institute, Washington, DC .... 55 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 57 

Kerry, Hon. John F., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions Submitted by Senator 

Marco Rubio .................................................................................................. 79 

Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions Submitted by Senator 

Tom Udall ...................................................................................................... 82 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey .................................... 1 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Udall, U.S. Senator From New Mexico ......... 79 

(III)

(1) 

UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO DEFEAT THE 

ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Boxer, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, 

Durbin, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Corker, Risch, Rubio, 

Johnson, Flake, McCain, Barrasso, and Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

[Disturbance in hearing room.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr. Secretary, 

you have a warm welcome. Having just returned from a coalitionbuilding mission that will determine the breadth of support and 

course of the anti-ISIL strategy in the near and long term, you are 

here at a critical moment for the Iraqi and Syrian people, for the 

region, and for the United States and the world. 

Let me say at the outset, in my view, the coalition you are working hard to build will require fully engaged and fully contributing 

senior partners, a coalition that must be defined not by words, but 

by deeds. The United States can lead this coalition, but our partners, particularly Sunni partners, must be all in. And I fully acknowledge that getting skin in the game will be different for different coalition partners, but Congress cannot be providing a blank 

check for the anti-ISIL campaign. 

I am pleased by the willingness of our partners in the Middle 

East to support, fund, and provide resources for this campaign. 

From Riyadh to Abu Dhabi, from Cairo to Amman to Beirut, our 

partners are sending the signal to ISIL that they are not welcome, 

that they have a bankrupt religious ideology, and that they will be 

aggressively confronted. 

Above all, the problems in Iraq and Syria that created an environment susceptible to ISIL’s advance can only be solved locally. In 

Iraq, this means an inclusive government with a national agenda 

and leaders ready to empower the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish Peshmerga forces to take the fight to ISIL. 

2 

In Syria, it means training and equipping a vetted Syrian opposition force that shares our vision for a pluralistic free Syria, free of 

ISIL and all violent extremist groups, but also free of Assad and 

his regime backers. This fighting force should be prepared to support a post Assad political structure whatever the circumstances 

under which he ultimately leaves Syria, by a negotiated settlement 

or other means. 

The President has laid out a comprehensive, holistic strategy 

that purports to integrate all the tools of U.S. power to defeat ISIL. 

What I expect to hear today are some specifics—the timeline for 

this mission, the scope, the resources in personnel, funds, intelligence, military assets, and assistance, as well as the role our coalition partners will play. We must be clear-eyed about the risks before providing our enduring support for this operation. 

The fact is we are living in 2014, not 2003. We must not repeat 

the mistakes of the past, given the nature of the threat we face. 

This means clearly defining the objectives, the political end state 

that we seek through this anti-ISIL campaign. I want to hear what 

success looks like in Iraq and Syria, across the region, and what 

conditions will indicate when it is time to end military action. 

Now this is what we know about ISIL: It has brutally, mercilessly, barbarically followed through on its threats to kill American 

hostages James Foley and Steven Sotloff. It beheaded British aid 

worker David Haines on Saturday and threatens to execute another British citizen, Alan Henning. 

It promotes genocide against anyone who does not share its 

warped version of Islam—moderate Sunnis, Shias, Christians, 

Yazidis, minorities. It enslaves women and children. It has seized 

United States and Iraqi military equipment, has built a formidable 

fighting force. It is pumping oil and selling it to the tune of $1 million a day to fund its brutal tactics, along with kidnappings, theft 

or extortion, and external support. 

It is recruiting disciples for its unholy war at a frightening pace 

from Europe, the United States, and anywhere they can find disaffected people. These foreign fighters are crossing often from Turkey, which either because of fear or maybe ideology has declined 

to participate to stop that flow of fighters and to counter ISIL. 

It has declared the territory it occupies a caliphate with intent 

to seize more territory from United States partners and allies from 

Jordan to Saudi Arabia to Lebanon. The risk to Jordanian and Lebanese stability is real. It is urgent, and it is grave. We would be 

fools not to take this threat seriously. ISIL is an enemy of the 

United States and the civilized world. 

Now as I have said many times, temporary and targeted airstrikes in Iraq and Syria fall under the President’s powers as Commander in Chief, but if the military campaign lasts for an extended 

period of time, which I gather it will, it is my belief that Congress 

will need to approve an ISIL-specific authorization for the use of 

military force. I am personally not comfortable with reliance on either the 2001 AUMF that relies on a thin theory that ISIL is associated with al-Qaeda and certainly not on the 2002 Iraq AUMF, 

which relied on misinformation. 

I expect the administration, today and in the days ahead, to brief 

this committee on its comprehensive strategy and the operational 

3 

objectives by which we will defeat ISIL so we can draft an appropriate AUMF to address the very grave ISIL threat we face. 

Now let me be clear. I support the President’s strategy and his 

sense of urgency, and I commend you, Mr. Secretary, for your efforts with allies in the region who also face violent and destabilizing threats from ISIL. Let us not, however, make the 9/11 mistake of rushing into an AUMF—an authorization for the use of 

military force—that has become the overriding authorization for 

the last 13 years, has been used for indefinite duration, and has 

been used from South Asia to the Persian Gulf to Africa and Southeast Asia. 

The fact is we need to ensure that whatever authorization for the 

use of military force we consider is comprehensive and appropriate 

in scope and duration to meet the threat and sustain the fight. It 

is our responsibility to answer three fundamental questions. What 

will it ultimately take to degrade and destroy ISIL? How does this 

fight end? And what end state do we seek in the region? 

We need to get it right, in my view, not just get it fast. And in 

doing so, we need a bipartisan approach that puts politics aside 

and the Nation first. This is a long-term effort, and we in Congress 

must be very deliberate in our consideration of any new strategy, 

new authorities, and new funding that it will take to meet the new 

threat we face. 

I believe we need to defeat ISIL before they develop the operational capacity to perform a September 11-like attack. I never 

want to lose as many citizens from my home State of New Jersey 

or from the United States as we did on that day. That is our responsibility, and it is our solemn obligation. 

With that, let me turn to the ranking member, Senator Corker, 

for his comments. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the full and broad opening comments that you made and the 

way you have expressed many of our concerns regarding ISIL and 

their capacity over time to harm Americans. 

I know we are here a few days after the President publicly addressed this, as the Nation and many others around the Western 

world are—around the civilized world are outraged over the conduct of ISIL, and I know that Americans are greatly concerned 

about, over time, the effects they might have on this Nation, as you 

just expressed. 

We are also here exactly 1 year and 2 weeks after, in this very 

room, this committee voted out an authorization for the use of force 

in Syria. It was one of the bright moments, in my opinion, of this 

committee. Not necessarily because of the product, but because we 

all worked together in such a way to come to an end that we 

thought was best for the country, much in the light and in the tone 

that the chairman just laid out. 

So I just want to start by welcoming our Secretary. We have had 

some conversations. I appreciate his hard work. But I do want to 

say, as I have said to him personally, I am very disappointed that 

4 

the administration has chosen to go about what they are doing 

without explicitly seeking the authorization of Congress. 

I think that is a huge mistake. I realize that part of that, unfortunately, has to do with the political season that we are in, which 

is, to me, very unfortunate that that might be a factor to some. I 

also realize that part of the strategy and plan or big parts of it are 

still being created. And therefore, it is being put together as we 

move along, and we are really not in a place right now for Congress 

to fully ascertain what the plan might be. 

And as the chairman just mentioned, he is going to deal with an 

authorization. Our committee will deal with an authorization. But 

I just want to say to our Secretary, I hope that when that is done, 

it is done with the administration explicitly seeking that, not saying if Congress wants to play a constructive role, it can and it 

would be welcomed. But one where you seek it and you lay out in 

detail for us, in both classified and open settings, what it is we are 

seeking to achieve and how we are going to go about it. 

And again, I know much of this is being made up as we go along. 

I do hope that the Secretary today will outline the true nature of 

the threat. I know he was in a meeting prior to coming in here 

where some of that was being discussed. But I hope that clearly 

today you will lay out what you think the true nature of the threat 

is. 

Thirdly, and just one glaring piece, I know that Secretaries of 

State probably do not have the same opportunity that Senators do 

to visit people in refugee camps and to see people that we said we 

would support and do not. We have been pushing, in this committee, for years or for a long time to arm and train the vetted 

moderate opposition. We passed that out of this committee a year 

and a half ago almost on a 15–3 vote. We have been pushing for 

it for longer than that. 

And in spite of the fact that there are some alleged activities that 

are occurring, we have not done the things that we said we would 

do. As a matter of fact, I would say that the position that the administration has taken over this last year and 2 weeks since we 

were here meeting about the authorization and passing one has led 

to many of the problems that we are facing today, many of the 

problems that are causing civilization itself to be fearful. 

And again, though, I appreciate the fact that the Secretary is 

here today, that the administration has stepped forward and has 

the beginnings of a thought process as to how to address it. 

I do want to say that what I have heard about dealing with the 

moderate opposition to me is odd. I know that the administration, 

especially at the White House, has stated how generally feckless— 

to use a word I think that describes it—they believe this moderate 

opposition to be. And yet we look at this, and today, it is our entire 

ground game. 

I have supported the training and arming of these rebels for 

some time. I will say I was shocked yesterday to hear that in the 

Armed Services testimony these rebels are actually going to be 

used against ISIS. All of them that I have met with, and things 

may have changed, but their focus has been taking out Assad. 

I know they have had a two-front battle or war raging as they 

have tried to do that. But I am surprised that the administration 

5 

is basing their entire ground game on a group of people that, candidly, are going to receive very little training under the small authorization that has been put forth, and that that is our entire 

ground game, which brings me back to point two, talking about the 

very nature of the threat. 

It seems to me the administration has placed many, many caveats on what we will not do, and at the same time, the rhetoric describing the threat is far greater than it seems to me than the plan 

that is being put together. 

And I will close with this. I know that typically when you have 

a coalition, you have the coalition put together before you announce 

it. I know in this case, we are announcing a coalition, and we are 

attempting to put it together. 

And I hope that what we are going to end up with is more than 

a group of coat holders. I hope that we are going to have people 

who are really going to be doing things on the ground that matter. 

But I do hope the Secretary, through his hard work, has generated 

commitments that will matter as it relates to this. 

This effort, we all know, is not going to be a 1- or 2-year effort. 

It is going to be a multiyear effort. Some people are saying a decade. Some people are saying a decade. 

And so, I do think it is important, as our chairman laid out, that 

all of us fully understand what we are undertaking, fully understand the nature of the threat, fully understand the commitment 

of this administration to deal with this threat in the appropriate 

way. So I welcome you here today. I look forward to your testimony 

and to our questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. With that, Mr. Secretary, we welcome you back 

to the committee you so ably and distinguishedly chaired. We 

thank you for your service to our country. 

We know that you just recently arrived from building this coalition, and we appreciate you being here today in order to inform 

members of what has been achieved, what is in front of us. And 

with that, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 

Corker, and members of the committee, my friends and former colleagues, I really thank you for holding this hearing on an issue 

that is obviously fraught with all the high stakes that both the 

chairman and the ranking member have just described and all the 

members of the committee understand deeply. 

And I really look forward to this opportunity to both define the 

threat that ISIL does pose, the ways in which it does, and, of 

course, our strategy for defeating it. And all of that could not be 

more critical for the country. 

During the years that I had the privilege of serving here and 

working with different administrations, it always struck me that 

American foreign policy works best and is strongest when there is 

a genuine discussion, a dialogue, a vetting of ideas back and forth, 

really a serious discussion, much more than an articulation of one 

set of ideas and then another, and they just oppose each other and 

6 

they sit out there and there is no real effort to have a meeting of 

the minds. 

So I want to make sure that by the time we are done here today, 

I have heard from you. I know what you are thinking. And you 

have heard from me, and you know what we are thinking, what the 

administration is thinking. And that you have a clearer understanding of what it is that we have done so far, of how we see this, 

and how, hopefully, we can come to see it together, what we are 

doing now, and where we go next. 

And I state unequivocally, and it is not a passing sentence, that 

I welcome the input, need the input of this committee because it 

is together that we are going to be much stronger and much more 

effective in guaranteeing the success of this effort. And it is a big 

effort in a lot of ways. It is about ISIL in the immediacy, but as 

we will, I think, discuss today, it is about a lot more than that. 

So I want to underscore at the start, you know, there are some 

debates of the past 30 years, 29 of which I was privileged to serve 

in the Senate, that undoubtedly will fill up books and documentaries for a long time, and Iraq is certainly one of them. Iraq has 

caused some of the most heated debates and deepest divisions of 

the past decade, a series of difficult issues and difficult choices 

about which people can honestly disagree. 

But I did not come here today and I hope we do not have to rehash those debates. The issue that confronts us today is one on 

which we all ought to be able to agree. ISIL must be defeated, period. End of story. And collectively, we are all going to be measured 

by how we carry out this mission. 

You know, as I came in here, obviously, we had some folks who 

spoke out, and I would start by saying that I understand dissent. 

I have lived it. That is how I first testified in front of this committee in 1971. I spent 2 years protesting a policy. So I respect the 

right of Code Pink to protest and to use that right. 

But you know what? I also know something about Code Pink. 

Code Pink was started by a woman and women who were opposed 

to war, but who also thought that the Government’s job was to take 

care of people and to give them health care and education and good 

jobs. 

And if that is what you believe in, and I believe it is, then you 

ought to care about fighting ISIL. Because ISIL is killing and raping and mutilating women. And they believe women should not 

have an education. They sell off girls to be sex slaves to jihadists. 

There is no negotiation with ISIL. There is nothing to negotiate. 

And they are not offering anyone health care of any kind. They are 

not offering education of any kind for a whole philosophy or idea 

or cult, whatever you want to call it, that, frankly, comes out of the 

Stone Age. 

They are cold-blooded killers marauding across the Middle East, 

making a mockery of a peaceful religion. And that is precisely why 

we are building a coalition to try to stop them from denying the 

women and the girls and the people of Iraq the very future that 

they yearn for. And frankly, Code Pink and a lot of other people 

need to stop and think about how you stop them and deal with 

that. So I—— 

[Disturbance in hearing room.] 

7 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. It is important for people to understand, there is no invasion. The invasion was ISIL into Iraq. 

The invasion is foreign fighters into Syria. That is the invasion, 

and it is destructive to every possibility of building a state in that 

region. 

So even in a region that is virtually defined by division, and 

every member of this committee understands the degree to which 

these divisions are deep in that region. Leaders who have viewed 

the last 11 years very differently have all come together for this 

cause. They may agree on very little in general, but they are more 

unified on this subject than anything that I have seen them unified 

on in my career. 

So as President Obama described last week when he spoke directly to the American people, we do have a clear strategy to degrade, defeat, and destroy ISIL, and it is not in its infancy. It has 

been well thought through and carefully articulated and now is 

being built in these coalition efforts that began with the meeting 

in Jeddah and moved to Paris and will move to the United Nations 

this week when I chair a U.N. Security Council meeting on Friday. 

The United States will not go it alone. That has been a fundamental principle on which President Obama has sought to organize 

this effort, and that is why we are building a coalition, a global coalition. There are more than 50 countries that already have agreed 

or are now doing something. Not every country will decide that 

their role is to have some kind of military engagement, but every 

country can do something. And we will show exactly what that 

means. 

And as I traveled around the region and Europe in the last days, 

the question that foreign leaders were asking me was not whether 

they should join the coalition, but how they can help. We are also— 

and I emphasize this—we are not starting from scratch. This is an 

effort that we have been building over time, both on our own and 

with the help of our international partners. 

Even before President Obama delivered his speech last week, 

nearly 40 countries had joined in contributing to the effort to 

strengthen the capacity of Iraq to be able to strengthen its military, to train, to provide humanitarian assistance. We have been 

focused on ISIL since its inception as the successor to Al Qaeda of 

Iraq in 2013. 

And back in January, realizing that, we ramped up our assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces, increasing our intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, or ISR, the flights that get a better picture of the battlefield. We expedited weapons like the Hellfire missiles for the Iraqis in order to bring their capacity to bear in this 

fight. 

Early this summer, the ISIL threat accelerated when it effectively erased the Iraq-Syria border and the Mosul Dam fell. The 

President acted immediately, deliberately and decisively: We further surged the ISR missions immediately; we set up joint operation centers in Baghdad and Erbil immediately; and our Special 

Forces conducted a very detailed, in-depth assessment of Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish Forces. 

We did that purposefully without jumping, as some people wanted us to, because we wanted to understand what is the capacity of 

8 

the Iraqi Army to fight? How many brigades, having seen what 

happened in Mosul, are still prepared to engage? Are we getting 

into something that, in fact, we do not have the answers to with 

respect to who can do what? 

And to date, we have launched—we have supported those Iraqi 

Security Forces that, by the way, helped in the liberating of Amirli, 

helped in the freedom of Sinjar Mountain, helped in taking back 

the Mosul Dam. And now we have launched more than 150 airstrikes, and it is because of the platforms that we put in place last 

January and even before that those strikes have been among the 

most precise strikes that we have ever taken. 

The percentage, I will not go into it here, but I will tell you, you 

would be astonished if you heard openly now the accuracy of those 

efforts. Those were put in place back in June, and those strikes 

have been extremely effective in breaking the sieges that I described and beginning to move confidence back into the Iraqi military. 

The judgment and assessments of our military that went over 

there to look at the Iraqi military came back with a judgment of 

a sufficient number of brigades capable of and ready to fight. And 

with the reconstitution of the military in a way that can bring the 

country together and not be divided along sectarian lines or viewed 

to be the army of one individual, it is entirely likely that there will 

be much greater and more rapid progress. 

That has given us time to put in place the two pillars of a comprehensive strategy against ISIL: First, an inclusive Iraqi Government, which was essential—there would be no capacity for success 

here if we had not been able to see the Iraqi Government come together—and second, the broad international coalition so the United 

States is not alone. 

We redoubled our efforts, frankly, to help move the Iraqi political 

process forward, and we were very clear-eyed about the fact that 

the strategy of ISIL would only succeed if we had a strong, inclusive government, and frankly, that required transformation in the 

government, which the Iraqis themselves effected. With our support and several weeks of very complex negotiations, President 

Masum nominated Haider al-Abadi to serve as Prime Minister. 

And shortly thereafter, Prime Minister al-Abadi, again with our 

support and others, was able to form his Cabinet and present it to 

the Parliament, and last week, that government was approved. 

I have to tell you, it was quite astonishing to be in Jeddah the 

other day with the Saudis, Emiratis, the Bahrainis, the Jordanians, the Qataris, the Turks, the Lebanese, and Iraqis. Iraqis 

in Saudi Arabia, and everybody here in this committee knows what 

that relationship has been like for the last years. 

And to hear the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, who chaired 

the meeting, Saud al-Faisal, say that they were prepared to open 

an immediate embassy in Baghdad. That is transformative. The result is something also for Iraq that has never seen before in its history, an election deemed credible by the United Nations, followed 

by a peaceful transition of power without any United States troops 

on the ground. 

I must say I was sort of struck. Yesterday, the Wall Street Journal had an article talking about Arab divide, but above the Arab 

9 

divide language is the Shia foreign minister of Iraq, the Kurd 

president of Iraq, and the Sunni foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, 

all in communication and jointly working as never before. So I 

think people need to focus on what has been accomplished here. 

As you know, I went to Iraq last week. I traveled. I met with the 

leaders of Iraq. And throughout the entire process, we have been 

in touch with regional leaders to ensure that the new and inclusive 

government is going to receive support from the region. 

With this inclusive government in place, it is time for a defensive 

strategy that we and our international partners have pursued to 

get things together, get the inclusive government, know exactly 

where we are going, to now transition to an offensive strategy, one 

that harnesses the capabilities of the entire world to eliminate the 

ISIL threat once and for all. 

President Obama outlined this strategy in detail. I am not going 

to go through it in that detail, but I will just quickly say—I will 

be quick in walking through it. At its core, our strategy is centered 

on a global coalition that will collaborate closely across a number 

of specific areas, including direct and indirect military support. 

Military assistance can come in a range of forms, from training 

and equipping to logistics and airlift, and countries from inside and 

outside of our region are already right now providing that support 

in these venues. I have also no doubt whatsoever that we will have 

the capabilities and the resources we need to succeed militarily. 

And President Obama made clear that we would be expanding the 

military campaign to take on ISIL in Iraq, in Syria, wherever it is 

found. But this is not the gulf war in 1991. It is not the Iraq war 

in 2003, and that is true for a number of reasons. 

Number one, U.S. ground troops will not be sent into combat in 

this conflict. From the last decade, we know that a sustainable 

strategy is not U.S. ground forces. It is enabling local forces to do 

what they have to do for themselves and for their country. 

I want to be clear. The United States troops that have been deployed to Iraq, do not and will not, have a combat mission. Instead, 

they will support Iraq Forces on the ground as they fight for their 

country against these terrorists. 

And in Syria, the on-the-ground combat will be done by the moderate opposition, which serves as the current best counterweight in 

Syria to extremists like ISIL. We know that ISIL, as it gets weaker, the moderate opposition will get stronger. And that will be critical in our efforts to bring about the political solution necessary to 

address the crisis in Syria once and for all. 

That is one of the reasons why it is so critical that Congress authorize the opposition train-and-equip mission when it comes to the 

floor, but it is also critical that the opposition makes the most of 

the additional support, the kind of support that they have been requesting now for years. And they need to take this opportunity to 

prove to the world that they can become a viable alternative to the 

current regime. 

Number two, this is more than just a military coalition, and I 

want to emphasize that. In some ways, some of the most important 

aspects of what we will be doing are not military. This mission is 

not just about taking out an enemy on the battlefield. It is about 

taking out a network, decimating and discrediting a militant cult 

10 

masquerading as a religious movement. It is similar to what we 

have been doing to al-Qaeda these last years. 

The bottom line is we will not be successful with a military campaign alone, and we know it. Nor are we asking every country to 

play a military role. We do not need every country to engage in 

that kind of military action, and frankly, we are not asking them 

and we do not want every country to do that. Only a holistic campaign will accomplish our objectives. 

In addition to the military campaign, it will be equally important 

for the global coalition to dry up ISIL’s illicit funding. And by the 

way, the Bahrainis, at the meeting in Jeddah, have offered to host 

a meeting—because they have been already engaged in this—that 

brings people together to focus on precisely the steps we can all 

take to do this, and that can positively have an impact not just on 

ISIL, but on other flows of terrorism support. 

We have to stop the foreign fighters who carry passports from 

countries around the world, including the United States, and we 

also need, obviously, to continue to deliver urgently needed humanitarian assistance. 

And finally, and this is really—you cannot overstate this. We 

must continue to repudiate the gross distortion of Islam that ISIL 

is spreading. Put an end to the sermons by extremists that brainwash young men to join these movements and commit mass atrocities in the name of God. 

I was very encouraged to hear that Saudi Arabia’s top clerics 

came out and declared terrorism a heinous crime under Sharia law 

and that the perpetrators should be made an example of. And I 

think—I might just mention—well, I will wait until we get in the 

Q and A. I will come back to this, but a very important statement 

was made today by the top clerics in the region, and I want to come 

back to that because I think it is critical. 

But let me just emphasize that when we say global coalition, we 

mean it. And this is not—Australia, other countries, the Far East, 

countries in Europe have all taken on already initial responsibilities. So, my colleagues, we are committed to working with countries in every corner of the globe to match the campaign with the 

capabilities that we need to fight. 

And I can tell you today that every single person I spoke to, in 

Wales at the Wales summit, in Jeddah, in Paris, where we had 

more than 30 countries and entities, they all expressed strong support for our mission and a willingness to help in some way. We had 

excellent meetings, and our meetings in Baghdad and in Cairo and 

in Ankara also advanced the process. 

At the conference in Paris, we took another step toward the 

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meetings this week. 

And the UNGA meetings, unlike the meetings we have had thus 

far, which have all been behind closed doors, the UNGA meetings, 

these countries will be speaking out publicly at the United Nations 

Security Council, and the world will begin to see what each of 

these countries are prepared to do. 

So we have a plan. We know the players. Our focus now is in 

determining what each country’s role will be and how to coordinate 

those activities for success. Later this week, we are going to have 

11 

more to say about our partners and the contributions, and we still 

fully expect this coalition to grow through UNGA and beyond. 

One of the things that I am most pleased about is we have asked 

one of our most respected and experienced military leaders, General John Allen, to come to the State Department and oversee this 

effort. He came within 24 hours of being asked, was at his desk at 

7 o’clock in the morning, and is now already laying out the campaign from a diplomatic point of view for how we coordinate what 

will be needed for all of these other aspects beyond the military 

piece. 

And I had a long meeting with him yesterday, again today, and 

I am confident that together with Ambassador Brett McGurk, who 

will serve as his Deputy, and Assistant Secretary Anne Patterson, 

who was so much a part of our effort against al-Qaeda when she 

was our Ambassador to Pakistan, we have a very experienced 

group of people engaged in this effort. The fact is if we do this 

right, then this effort could actually become a model for what we 

can do with respect to the individual terrorist groups in other 

places that continue to wreak havoc on the efforts of governments 

to build their states and provide for their people. 

And I am confident that with our strategy in place and our international partners by our side, we will have all that we need, and 

with the help of the Congress, we will be able to succeed in degrading and ultimately destroying this monstrous organization wherever it exists. 

I know that was a little long, Mr. Chairman, but I wanted to lay 

it out, and I appreciate your patience. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Kerry follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN F. KERRY

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, 

thank you for holding this hearing on an issue where the stakes are so high and 

a full understanding of the ISIL threat and our strategy for defeating it is so important. 

During the years I had the privilege of serving here, working with different 

administrations, it always struck me that American foreign policy works best when 

there’s a genuine discussion, a dialogue, a vetting of ideas back and forth between 

Congress and the executive branch. So I want to make sure that by the time we’re 

done here today, I’ve heard from you, you’ve shared your views and ideas, and that 

you also have a clear understanding of what we’ve done so far, what we’re doing 

now, and where we go next—because your input and your support are absolutely 

critical to the success of this effort. 

I want to underscore at the start—there are some debates of the past 20 years 

that could, and probably will, fill up books and documentaries for a long time. Iraq 

is one. 

Iraq has caused some of the most heated debates and deepest divisions of the past 

decade—a series of difficult issues about which people can honestly disagree. But 

I didn’t come here today to rehash those debates. The issue that confronts us today 

is one on which we should all agree: ISIL must be defeated. Period. End of story. 

And, collectively, we’re all going to be measured by how we carry out this mission. 

I’d also underscore—the same is true on an international level. And even in a 

region that is virtually defined by division, leaders who have viewed the last 11 

years very differently—and who agree on very little in general—are more unified 

on this subject than just about any other. 

So as President Obama described last week when he spoke directly to the American people, we have a clear strategy to degrade, defeat, and destroy ISIL. But the 

United States will not go it alone. That is why we are building a global coalition. 

And as I traveled around the world this week, the question foreign leaders were 

asking me was not whether they should join the coalition, but how they can help. 

12 

We are also not starting from scratch. This is an effort we have been building over 

time, both on our own and with the help of our international partners: Even before 

President Obama delivered his speech last week, nearly 40 countries had joined in 

contributing to the effort to strengthen the capacity of Iraq including military assistance, training, and humanitarian assistance. 

We have been focused on ISIL since its inception as the successor to AQI in 2013. 

Back in January we ramped up our assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces, increasing our intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, or ISR, flights to get a better picture of the battlefield and expediting weapons like Hellfire missiles for the Iraqis 

to bring to bear in this fight. 

Early this summer, the ISIL threat accelerated when it effectively erased the 

Iraq-Syria border and the Mosul Dam fell. The President acted deliberately and 

decisively. We further surged our ISR missions over Iraq. We immediately set up 

joint operation centers in Baghdad and Erbil. And our special forces conducted a 

very detailed field assessment of Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish forces. 

By the time ISIL launched the offensive in the north, President Obama authorized limited air strikes against ISIL and humanitarian missions to protect American 

personnel, prevent major catastrophes and support Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish forces that were fighting bravely to do the same. To date, we’ve launched more 

than 150 airstrikes. And it is because of the platforms we put in place back in June 

that those strikes have been highly precise and incredibly effective, including in the 

operations to break the siege of Sinjar Mountain, retake Mosul Dam, and resupply 

the town of Amerli. 

These actions blunted ISIL’s momentum and created time and space for us to put 

in place the two pillars of a comprehensive strategy against ISIL: an inclusive Iraq 

Government, and a broad international coalition. 

We redoubled our efforts to help move the Iraqi political process forward. We are 

clear-eyed about the fact that any strategy against ISIL would only succeed with 

a strong, inclusive government in Iraq, with an ambitious national agenda, prepared 

to unite the country against ISIL. 

With our support, after several weeks of complex negotiations, President Masum 

nominated Haider al-Abadi to serve as Prime Minister. Shortly thereafter, Prime 

Minister al-Abadi—again with our support—was able to form his Cabinet and 

present it to the Parliament, and, last week, that government was approved. 

This was a long and difficult process, led by the Iraqis, with our help as needed. 

The result was something Iraq had never before seen in its history: an election 

deemed credible by the United Nations, followed by peaceful transition of power, 

without any U.S. troops on the ground. 

I traveled to Baghdad last week, immediately after the new government was 

approved, to meet with Prime Minister al-Abadi and other leaders throughout the 

Iraqi Government. And I was very encouraged to hear them discuss in detail the 

government’s National Plan to unite the country against ISIL, and empower local 

communities—particularly in Sunni areas—to mobilize, defeat ISIL, and maintain 

security control in their area. 

Throughout the entire process, we were in touch with regional leaders to ensure 

that a new and inclusive government would receive support from the region. Today, 

after years, even decades, of relative isolation from their neighbors, the Iraqis have 

begun to reintegrate with the broader Arab community. For example, last week, 

they were not just invited but warmly welcomed in Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis 

have now said they’ll reopen an embassy in Baghdad. 

With this new, inclusive Iraqi Government in place, it’s time for the defensive 

strategy we and our international partners have pursued thus far to transition to 

an offensive strategy—one that harnesses the capabilities of the entire world to 

eliminate the ISIL threat, once and for all. 

President Obama outlined this strategy in detail, so—while I am happy to answer 

any questions you may have—I will be brief in walking through it again now. 

At its core, our strategy is centered on a global coalition that will collaborate 

closely across a number of specific areas—including, certainly, on direct and indirect 

military support. 

To be clear, military assistance comes in a range of forms, from training and 

equipping, to logistics and airlift. And countries from inside and outside of the region are already providing support in these veins. So I have no doubt whatsoever 

we will have the capabilities and the resources we need to succeed militarily. And 

President Obama made clear we will be expanding the military campaign to take 

on ISIL in Iraq, in Syria—wherever it is found. 

But this is not the gulf war in 1991, and it is not the Iraq war in 2003—for a 

couple of reasons. Number one, U.S. ground troops will not be sent into combat in 

this conflict. From the last decade we know that a sustainable strategy is not U.S. 

13 

ground forces—it is enabling local forces to do what they must for themselves and 

their country. I want to be clear: the U.S. troops that have been deployed to Iraq 

do not and will not have a combat mission. Instead, they will support Iraqi Forces 

on the ground as they fight for their own country against these terrorists. 

And in Syria, the on-the-ground combat will be done by the moderate opposition— 

which serves as the best counterweight in Syria to extremists like ISIL. We know 

that as ISIL gets weaker, this moderate opposition will get stronger, which will be 

critical in our efforts to bring about the political solution necessary to address the 

crisis in Syria once and for all. That’s one of the reasons why it’s so critical that 

Congress authorizes the opposition train-and-equip mission when it comes to the 

floor. But it’s also critical that the opposition makes the most of the additional support—the kind of support they’ve been requesting for years—and take this opportunity to prove to the world that they can be a viable alternative to Assad. 

Number two, this is more than just a military coalition because the objective 

requires more than a military victory. This mission isn’t just about taking out an 

enemy on the battlefield. It’s about taking out an entire network—decimating and 

discrediting a militant cult masquerading as a religious movement. 

It’s similar to what we have been doing to al-Qaeda these last years. 

The bottom line is we will not be successful with a military campaign alone. Nor 

are we asking every country to play a military role—we don’t need every country 

to play a military role and we don’t want every country to play a military role. 

Only a holistic campaign can accomplish our objectives. That is why we are 

focused on multiple lines of effort. 

In addition to the military campaign, it will be equally important for the global 

coalition to dry up ISIL’s illicit funding, to stop the foreign fighters who carry passports from countries around the world including the United States, to continue to 

deliver urgently needed humanitarian assistance, and finally, to repudiate the gross 

distortion of Islam that ISIL is spreading, and put an end to the sermons by extremists that brainwash young men to join these movements and commit mass atrocities 

in the name of God. I was very encouraged to hear that Saudi Arabia’s top clerics 

came out and declared terrorism a ‘‘heinous crime’’ under Sharia law—and that perpetrators should be made an example of. Preventing an individual from joining ISIL 

for example, or from getting to the battle field in the first place, is the most effective 

measure we can take. 

I want to emphasize—when we say ‘‘global coalition,’’ we mean it. This is not a 

threat that a single country or region can take on alone. And there is a critical role 

for nearly every country to play. 

So we are committed to working with countries in every corner of the globe to 

match the campaign’s requirements with the capabilities they are willing to bring 

to bear.I spent the past week in the Middle East and in Europe, meeting with dozens of leaders whose partnership will be essential to our success. 

And I can tell you today: every single person I spoke to over the course of my 

trip expressed strong support for our mission and a willingness to help in some way. 

We had excellent meetings, beginning at the NATO summit in Wales, and then in 

Jeddah. The Jeddah Communique represents a strong, comprehensive and unified 

statement of all the ways in which the region is committed to supporting this fight. 

Our meetings in Baghdad, in Cairo, and in Ankara also advanced the process. And 

at the conference earlier this week in Paris, we took another step along the road 

to the UNGA and the UNSC sessions next week. 

We have a plan and we know the players. Our focus now is determining what 

role each country will play. 

Later this week we will have more to say about our partners and contributions, 

and we fully expect the coalition to grow, evolve, and coalesce well beyond UNGA. 

That’s why we’ve asked one of our most respected and experienced military leaders—Gen. John Allen—to come to the State Department and oversee this effort. And 

he’s already hitting the ground running—he was at work last Friday at 7 am, less 

than 24 hours after we sealed the deal for him to do this job, and he and I had 

a long meeting yesterday, just a few hours after I landed in D.C. General Allen will 

be working with one of our foremost Iraq experts, Ambassador Brett McGurk, as 

well as Assistant Secretary Anne Patterson, who was so much a part of the effort 

against al-Qaeda when she was our Ambassador in Pakistan. 

The fact is that, if we do this right, then this effort could become a global model 

for isolating and undermining other extremist threats around the world. But now 

we must be laser-focused on ISIL. And I’m confident that, with our strategy in place 

and our international partners by our side, we will have all that we need to succeed 

in degrading and ultimately destroying this monstrous organization—wherever it 

exists. 

14 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Let me start off with I think one of the most critical lessons that 

we have learned from past U.S. military interventions abroad is 

that we must have a clear vision for the end state that we are 

seeking and a coherent strategy that is focused about how not only 

do we enter and succeed, but how do we exit a theater of war. 

So I would like to get, as succinctly as you can, a statement from 

you as to what does the end goal look like. I heard you talk about 

taking out a network. I get that. But beyond that, what is the political end state conditions we are seeking so that we will know that 

it is time to end military action? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, the military action ends when we have 

ended the capacity of ISIL to engage in broad-based terrorist activity that threatens the state of Iraq, threatens the United States, 

threatens the region. That is our goal. And that means ending their 

ability to live in ungoverned spaces, have a safe haven, and be able 

to control territory and move at will to try to attack the United 

States or other places. 

The threat, obviously, right now is more immediate to the Middle 

East and to Europe, but we have Americans over there fighting 

with passports. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, obviously, that does not mean we are going 

to look to eliminate every person who is associated with ISIL. 

Secretary KERRY. We have not been able to eliminate every person associated with al-Qaeda. 

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. So then the question—— 

Secretary KERRY. But we have been able to reduce their capacity 

to mount a major attack under the circumstances that we are able 

to obviously guard against, and engage in, preventive actions—— 

The CHAIRMAN. So, in Iraq, we want a sovereign Iraq whose territorial integrity has been restored without the presence of ISIL. 

Secretary KERRY. And an independent, inclusive government that 

is functioning. 

The CHAIRMAN. And in Syria? 

Secretary KERRY. In Syria likewise. We believe that, ultimately, 

there is no solution to Syria without a political settlement. That 

goal has not changed. But Assad has had little incentive to negotiate. 

The incentive that existed when I first went to Moscow last year, 

and President Putin and Russia agreed to support the Geneva process, regrettably got sidetracked by a number of things, one of which 

was the in-fighting that began to take place in the opposition itself. 

Two, the unexpected degree to which Assad became an extraordinary magnet for terrorists, and that is when you began to have 

this amazing flow of foreign fighters who came to get rid of Assad. 

And as Assad gassed people and barrel bombed people and tortured and so forth, it became more evident to those global fighters, 

and particularly to countries in the region, they were focused on 

whatever group could get rid of Assad. And unfortunately, tragically, ISIL is somewhat an outgrowth of that phenomenon. 

And therefore, we are today—you know, I think all the countries 

in the region have recognized that there was a mistake of judgment 

with respect to that process, and I think people are bending over 

backwards to try to rectify it. 

15 

The CHAIRMAN. I think members of this committee who joined together to first vote for the authorization of use of military force as 

President Obama was headed to the G20 summit at the time in 

Russia to deter Assad from using chemical weapons and who subsequently voted in a bipartisan effort to arm the vetted Syrian 

rebels over a year ago fully appreciate that. 

It is my hope that when we refine the definition of the end state 

as it relates to the campaign against ISIL that we understand that 

if I am a moderate vetted rebel and I am being asked to fight 

against ISIL now, I also need to fight against Assad because that 

is my ultimate mission. And so, as we move forward, I would like 

to hear how that is coinciding. 

Let me ask you two other questions. I heard you very clearly 

when you said we are not asking all of our partners to engage in 

direct military actions, but I hope that there will be, and I would 

like to hear from you, can we expect part of the Sunni Arab coalition members to, in fact, be part of military actions in this regard? 

Because this cannot be simply a campaign by the West against the 

East. 

Secretary KERRY. You are absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman. And 

first of all, let me thank you and I thank the committee for the vote 

that you took, the only entity in the Congress that did. And it was 

an affirmative vote, and we are grateful for that and respect it. 

Currently, there are countries outside of Europe and outside of 

the region committed to engage in military action. There are countries in Europe committed to take military action. There are countries in the region, Arab countries, committed to take military action. 

We will have sufficient levels of commitment to take military action. It will be up to CENTCOM and General Allen and others to 

work on the question of who will do what. 

The CHAIRMAN. It is fair to say that this is going to be a 

multiyear effort? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, the President has been very clear about 

that. Certain parts of it will be, absolutely. I cannot tell you—I can 

tell you this. When we took them on at Mosul Dam and the Iraqis 

were on the ground and took them on, we took back Mosul Dam. 

When we took them on at Amirli, they moved out. When we took 

them on at Sinjar Mountain, we freed the people at Sinjar Mountain. 

And we have currently enabled people to be able to hold them 

off at Haditha Dam, and it is clear from the intelligence we pick 

up that what we are doing now, which has fundamentally been 

more defensive than offensive, has already had an impact on them. 

I am convinced that with the proper effort, we can have an impact. 

The CHAIRMAN. I do not dispute that you have had in the short 

term an impact to stem their advances, at least within the region 

that they are in. My question, though, is no one reasonably can 

come from the administration and suggest that the ultimate goal, 

which is taking out this network, is not going to be a multiyear effort? 

Secretary KERRY. It is a multiyear effort. The President has already said that. 

16 

The CHAIRMAN. With that as a reality, then let me turn to the 

AUMF. How is it that the administration believes that—and I support its efforts. But how is it that the administration believes that 

the 9/11 AUMF or the Iraq AUMF provide the authorization to 

move forward whether the Congress decides to or not? 

You know, it was not too long ago that members of the administration appeared before the committee, and when I asked them, I 

was headed toward repealing the Iraq AUMF. And there were administration witnesses who believed that it should be repealed on 

behalf of the administration. How is it that the administration now 

thinks it can rely upon that for legal authority? 

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman, how is it? It is because good 

lawyers within the White House, within the State Department, 

who have examined this extremely closely have come to the conclusion across the board that the 2001 AUMF, which says all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 

or persons responsible for 9/11, those who harbored such organizations or persons, to prevent future acts of international terrorism 

against the United States by such persons or organizations, includes al-Qaeda. It has always been interpreted as including alQaeda. And al-Qaeda and—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Al-Qaeda threw out ISIL—— 

Secretary KERRY. But al-Qaeda and associated forces, that is the 

language. Al-Qaeda and associated forces. Now al-Qaeda, ISIL 

began as al-Qaeda. In 2005 in Iraq, 2004, ISIL was Al Qaeda in 

Iraq. And it only became this thing called ISIL a year ago, and it 

only became that out of convenience to separate themselves in an 

internal fight, but not because their thinking changed, not because 

their targets changed, not because their actions changed. 

They are the same people doing—the same people that we were 

prepared to and were attacking for all of those years. And a mere 

publicity stunt to separate yourself and call yourself something else 

does not get you out from under the force of the United States 

law—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate your ability as a former prosecutor 

and a gifted attorney to try to make the case. I will tell you—— 

Secretary KERRY. Well—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That at least from the chair’s perspective you are going to need a new AUMF, and it will have to 

be more tailored because I do not want to be part of 13 years later 

and multitude of countries that have been used in this regard, for 

that to be the authority. And I think our goals are the same. I 

think we need to get you a different set of authorities, and I look 

forward to working with my colleagues—— 

Secretary KERRY. Not only are our goals the same, Mr. Chairman, but we know you are thinking about retooling the AUMF, and 

we welcome. We would like Congress, please, do this. We want that 

to happen. We are not going to make our actions dependent on it 

happening, but we will work with you as closely as we can and 

should in order to tailor an AUMF going forward, and we look forward to that opportunity. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

17 

I just want to say, as I have said to you personally, we have 

three Senators—the President, Vice President, Secretary of State— 

that are exercising terrible judgment right now. And to say that 

you are going to do this regardless of what we say, you are not 

going to ask for buy-in by the United States Senate or House of 

Representatives on behalf of the American people in a conflict that 

you say is going to be multiyear, some people say a decade, taking 

us into another country with a different enemy is exercising the 

worst judgment possible. 

And so, I have said this to you as strongly as I can personally. 

That is in essence what you are saying to the chairman right now. 

Saying ‘‘if Congress wants to play a constructive role we would welcome that’’ to me is a political game. And I am disappointed that 

you, as Secretary of State, after being chairman of this committee, 

after espousing the views that you have espoused in the past, out 

of convenience and parsing legal words would make the statement 

you just made. 

So let me move on and say I would love—you say much has been 

accomplished. That is a nice photograph on the front of the Wall 

Street Journal. Tell me what has been accomplished. What Arab 

Sunni nation is going to have a ground force in Syria? What Arab 

Sunni country is going to be flying in and bombing and doing missile raids with an Arab insignia on the side of the plane? Tell me 

that. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, you will hear that at the appropriate 

time within the next days, as John Allen and the team work with 

all of these countries for the permissions, for the basing, for all the 

things that will take place. I have told you they have—— 

Senator CORKER. Let me ask you this. 

Secretary KERRY. No, no, no. Let me—— 

Senator CORKER. Are you convinced that that will happen? 

Secretary KERRY. Let me finish. 

Senator CORKER. Are you convinced that that will happen? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I have already said that. I—— 

Senator CORKER. So we will have Arab Sunni countries participating in the ground effort in Syria? 

Secretary KERRY. No, I did not say the ground effort, and you 

know, right now the plan is to work through the—and our judgment is that we can be effective working in the way that we are. 

Let me say a couple of things, first of all, with respect to your—— 

Senator CORKER. Well, you can say the answer to my questions, 

okay? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, no, when I—— 

Senator CORKER. I am not going to be filibustered—— 

Secretary KERRY. No, I am going to answer your question. I am 

going to answer your question. 

Senator CORKER. Okay. 

Secretary KERRY. And I am sure the chair will be, you know, 

happy to have the kind of dialogue I talked about earlier. It is important to talk this through. 

Senator CORKER. I have got 2 minutes and 34 seconds and 4 

more questions. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, you have not let me answer any 

of them yet. So let me try to answer the question. 

18 

Senator CORKER. Well, the question is what Arab Sunni country 

is going to be putting boots on the ground in Syria against this 

now-claimed army by your—— 

Secretary KERRY. At this moment, no country has been asked to 

put boots on the ground or no country is talking of it. And we do 

not think it is a good idea right now. So there is no discussion of 

that at this moment. 

Now with respect to the judgment about asking Congress to do 

it, I am asking. Do it. Pass it. We would love to have you do it. 

But we are not going to get stuck in the situation, when we have 

the authority, of not exercising our authority to do what we believe 

we need to do to protect the country. 

So we are asking you to do it. Pass it tomorrow. 

Senator CORKER. You are asking us to do it, but you are not giving any details because you do not have them. 

Secretary KERRY. That is not true, Senator. 

Senator CORKER. Well, then share them. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, I am not going to share them in public 

here today. Many of these things—— 

Senator CORKER. Share them in a classified setting. 

Secretary KERRY. I am confident there will be so many classified 

briefings that you will be tired of them. But at the moment, we are 

not going to lay this out until John Allen has had a chance to come 

to the U.N. on Friday, until we have had a chance to work closely 

with all of these countries in order to make this as effective as possible. 

Senator CORKER. Do you realize how unserious the things that 

you have laid out and the things that were laid out yesterday 

sound when you are discussing training 5,000, in your all’s own 

words, doctors and dentists and others in Saudi Arabia over a 

year? I do not know whether they are being trained for offensive 

or defensive—I would like you to clarify that—activities. My understanding is that they will be given higher tech equipment after 

they prove themselves on the battlefield. 

Do you understand how unrealistic and how that effort on the 

ground where they are based, where ISIL is based, does not match 

the rhetoric that the administration has laid out? And therefore, 

you are asking us to approve something that we know the way you 

have laid it out makes no sense. 

We have a strong sense that our Army, our military leaders have 

urged you to put special forces on the ground, but, no, we are not 

going to do that. So this does not even seem serious. It seems like 

a political answer to the United States as they cry out about this 

uncivilized activity, but it does not seem real to me. 

And if you are willing to get in a classified setting and lay out 

all these details and tell us which of these countries are going to 

be flying their flag into Syria, they are going to be putting people 

on the ground. Because we know. We know the Free Syrian Army 

cannot take on ISIL. You know that. 

You talk about a multiyear process. We are talking decades if 

that is going to be our salvation. So I will just close with this. I 

am disappointed. I was disappointed in the briefing we had last 

week. 

19 

I do want us to deal with this in an effective way. You have not 

laid it out in a way that meets that test. I hope when we come back 

and before you put people in harm’s way unnecessarily, you have 

a plan that achieves the end that you just laid out. But we know 

right now that is not where you are. 

And again, I hope you will seek it, I hope you will say that you 

are not going to do it without it, and I hope you will lay out a plan 

that will convince us that you are serious about doing the things 

you said you were going to do to the American people and to us 

about ISIL because you have not done it now. And I hope you will 

lay out a way to pay for it, to pay for it, because we know this is 

going to take many, many years, and it has to do with the safety 

of our citizens. 

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman, can I, I hope, answer a little bit 

here? 

Senator, you know, I must say to you I really find it somewhat 

surprising for you to suggest that as the President of the United 

States talks to the Nation and commits to take strikes in order to 

deal with ISIL, as we have come back from a week of very serious 

meetings with nations around the world, all of whom are committed to this, that you sit there and suggest that it is not serious. 

Now, with all due respect to you, Senator, let me just tell you 

something point blank. The moderate opposition in Syria has, in 

fact, been fighting ISIL for the last 2 years. And since last January, the Free Syrian Army has been engaged with ISIL in Idlib, in 

Aleppo, in the Damascus countryside, in Deir al-Zor, and groups 

such as the Syrian Revolutionary Front have fought off ISIL. They 

have expelled them from Idlib province, which borders Turkey and 

includes the border crossing. 

Over the past 2 months, moderate brigades have been deployed 

in northern Aleppo to prevent ISIL from capturing key border 

towns, including Azaz, through which a large quantity of humanitarian assistance is now being sent. But they require our support. 

Senator McCain knows that. He has been screaming about it for 

some time. 

Senator CORKER. We have all been screaming about it, and you 

all have done nothing, or at least not much to talk about. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, let us just understand that the fact is 

that what has propelled ISIS to some degree is a word called success. And as ISIS has had success, they have used social media and 

they have appealed to greater numbers of greater fighters. 

As they have now suddenly been put on their heels and as the 

United States and other countries do seriously commit to this endeavor—and believe me, what we are doing is serious—then if success begins to turn and move toward the Free Syrian Army and the 

moderate opposition, I believe you will see greater numbers of recruits. That is why the President is asking for that open training 

under Title X in order to try to build that up as fast as possible. 

Our estimates are there are now currently tens of thousands still 

of fighting members of the opposition. And if you can get more people better trained, and by the way, every month that I have been 

Secretary of State, we have been adding to the effort of what we 

are doing with respect to the Syrian opposition, and most of that 

needs to be covered in a classified setting, as you know. 

20 

But our assessment is that we can and, given the urgency of the 

situation, begin to move this program to a greater degree. So will 

it take a period of time? We have all said that; yes. But we are confident that we have the ability to be able to change the situation 

on the ground. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Secretary KERRY. By the way, I do have a list here. I am not 

going to go into all of it now. But there are Albania has sent in 

the last—we have had at least 18 flights that we have taken in to 

Erbil. We have been providing additional weapons to Peshmerga. 

Other countries have been doing this. Australia has committed 

a number of different items to this. I am not going to go into them 

publicly. Bulgaria is providing aid. Canada, several—sending various kinds of assistance. Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Germany. 

Look, there are a lot of countries here. And by the way, they are 

all serious, too, or they would not be on this list. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Secretary Kerry, thank you for your tireless 

work. 

I think it is shocking and a sad state of affairs that we heard 

just now such angry comments aimed at you, Mr. Secretary, and 

through you at our President, instead of at ISI, a savage terrorist 

group that decapitated two Americans and has warned—and I 

quote—that they will ‘‘quench’’ their thirst for American blood. 

I think it is shocking. I am actually shaking and trembling. This 

is not the time to show anger at the people who are working night 

and day, whether you agree with them or not, to protect our people. 

Now I want to talk about the AUMF. I voted against the one in 

2002, which started the disastrous war in Iraq. I voted for the one 

in 2001, and I have reread it about six times. 

Mr. Secretary, the lawyers I have consulted with believe that you 

have the authority to go after ISIL. It is very clear. You read the 

parts. If people listened to you, you read the parts that are correct. 

Now that is not to say that I would not welcome working on a 

new AUMF. But I want to say right now, the way things get filibustered around this place and the way politics gets played around 

this place, I am proud that you say you are going to do your work 

to protect the American people. 

This is just a sad opening of a hearing. I have never seen it, and 

I have gone through some tough ones. 

Now I want to say this. The Iraq war inflamed the long-simmering sectarian divisions in that country. I know you do not want 

to get into the past. It is fine. I think it is worth mentioning because from my point of view, that is a war I voted against. I am 

for going after ISIL because there is such a difference. 

And there are two strains of thought as people speak out against 

the policy of the administration. One is they say you are not doing 

enough. Go back with those ground troops, more war, more boots 

on the ground. American boots, they are the only boots that work. 

You have proven just with a few examples that it is just not true, 

and I certainly reject that view. 

And the other, the second school of thought represented by some 

of the folks out there who I like and talk to all the time, they think 

21 

we should not take the fight to ISIL. Forget it. It is too complicated. It is fraught with uncertainty. We should sit on the sidelines. I oppose that view as well. 

You cannot sit on the sidelines, at least I cannot, when you have 

a group that is selling 14-year-olds, as my former colleague said. 

Selling 14-year-old girls as slaves, giving them as gifts to their 

fighters, murdering ethnic and religious minorities, including 

Christians, Yazidis, and Shiite Turkmen. And again, warning that 

their ‘‘knife will continue to strike the necks’’ of Americans. 

They have a very simple goal. They say if you do not take our 

twisted version of Islam, you either flee, you convert, or you die. 

So, no, I am not going to sit idly by. 

Mr. Secretary, I have a question for you. I was being interviewed, 

and I was expressing these views that I was just expressed that 

there were certain areas where it is gray, and there are certain 

areas where it is clear to me. I mean, everyone takes their own 

lens to the question. 

And I was asked this question. How can we make sure that the 

Syrian moderates we help are the right ones? And this particular 

reporter said, well, we have heard reports that the Syrian moderates signed a nonaggression pact with ISIL. 

My answer to that was there are all kinds of Syrian moderate 

groups, and we are certainly not working with those who do not see 

it our way. Could you expand on that answer or—— 

Secretary KERRY. I would be delighted to. Let me just say to you 

that is disinformation fundamentally put out by ISIL. The moderate opposition recently restated its commitment as a national 

movement to fighting extremism generally and including ISIL. And 

a recent statement that they had reached a truce is simply baseless, not accurate, and they have not. And they will not. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

And then just, I mean, I do not have enough time to ask everything. So I will ask one last question. What roles do Iran and Russia play in this conflict, and how do the interests of these two countries factor into the President’s counter-ISIL strategy? I know it is 

very delicate, but how would you respond to that? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, you know, Russia, obviously, is a principal line of support to Assad, and Assad, as we all know, has neither proven the willingness nor the capacity to go after ISIL. And 

Russia was at the meeting in Paris. China was at the meeting in 

Paris. Both spoke out powerfully about the need to stand up to 

ISIL. 

And Iran, as you know, there was the subject of whether or not 

they might have been invited. There were certain problems in trying to make that happen because of country objections with respect 

to their presence, et cetera, and it did not happen. But Iran, obviously, is deeply opposed to ISIL. 

Now we are not coordinating militarily or doing anything, but we 

have had brief conversations on the side of our negotiations that 

are taking place, the P5+1 Iran nuclear negotiations. And we are 

prepared to see whether or not Iran can contribute in a constructive way. But that would require also changing what is happening 

in Syria, where their IRGC is on the ground and supporting Assad 

22 

and been engaged in activities, Hezbollah on their behalf, whom 

they support. 

So there are a lot of areas of twisted conflict in the relationships 

here, and we are looking—you know, it would be negligent not to 

be open to listening to some change in the dynamic or some possibility of constructive activity. But we are not relying on it, waiting 

for it, organizing around it, or in fact coordinating with it at this 

point in time. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I turn to Mr. Risch, Senator Risch, let me 

just say to the Secretary on this subject I heard what you said. But 

to me, Iran is a regional instigator. It is a patron of the murderous 

Assad regime. It is a sponsor of sectarian divisions inside of Iraq. 

It uses Iraq’s airspace to send troops and men into Syria, and 

some of us are really concerned that, first of all, their end purposes 

are not our end purposes. And secondly, that some of us are concerned that negotiations with Iran, you know, are affected by to the 

extent that they express any desire to be helpful, they want to do 

it at the cost of concessions at the negotiating table. 

I know you are shaking your head, and I would not expect anything else. 

Secretary KERRY. Not going to happen. 

The CHAIRMAN. But I have to be honest with you, when we hear 

all these back channel efforts and then they get outed by the Ayatollah, it creates uncertainty in that process. So I do not want to 

take more time from my colleague, but Senator Risch? 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

John, I share some of the anger of Senator Boxer when it comes 

to what has been going on with the beheading of Americans. I 

mean, this is a tough time for America—for Americans to be watching their fellow citizens being beheaded by these savage people, 

and something has got to be done about it. 

And I fully empathize with the problem you have got to where 

it is happening is such a complex situation with complex cultures 

and what have you, and you have got to do something about it. I 

want to throw in with the chairman. He mentioned three points, 

I think, in his opening that he was hoping he would hear, and I 

have not heard yet. 

And that is he talked about hearing the plan that you have, and 

he wanted to hear what success looks like, and he wanted to hear 

some metrics as to how we measure progress. And John, I am just 

not there yet. I am not convinced. 

And this is particularly true where I think everyone is in agreement. The President is in agreement. Congress is in agreement. 

The American people are in agreement. Nobody wants boots, American boots on the ground. I mean, that just is not going to happen. 

There is nobody—nobody going to go there with that. 

In fact, had the President come here and said that, look, I want 

authorization for airstrikes. You and I both know how effective the 

drone program has been and how good it has been as far as accomplishing the goals that we have in Yemen, in Pakistan, and in 

other places. If he would have come here for that, you would have 

had no problem with me. 

23 

As far as the boots on the ground, who do you get to do it? Well, 

we know the Iraqis cannot do it. They dropped their guns and uniforms and went home at the slightest bit of threat. With all due 

respect, I know everybody talks about the moderates, opposition 

and the rebels. We have been through this for over a year, and I 

am just not convinced that there is such a group there. 

So you said let us talk about this, and let us see if we cannot 

come up with some way to do this. You know, the best group 

around to be able to do this for boots on the ground are the Kurds. 

They have been incredibly successful. They have been a reliable— 

they have been reliable to us. They are great fighters. 

I mean, if anybody is going to succeed on the ground in Iraq or, 

for that matter, in Syria, it is going to be the Kurds. Have you guys 

given thought to partnering up with them? What am I missing 

here? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, you are not, Senator. They have been extraordinary, and that was our first line of effort, obviously. That is 

why we put the joint operation center in Erbil right away. And that 

is why we elicited immediate support. We really had to hold that 

line. 

That was critical, and that is why the President was prepared to 

use some strikes, actually, to help guarantee that that happened. 

And there is a huge flow of weaponry. As I said, 18 flights that I 

know of from us have gone in now to Erbil. There are flights coming from other countries, too. Italians, others, lots of countries have 

been supporting the Kurds in this effort. 

And you know, I think this is the work that John Allen needs 

a chance to sort of develop a little bit, see how it is going to go. 

The bottom line is the commitment to destroy ISIL, and that 

means what I described earlier today. And for the moment, growing 

the moderate opposition is one way of coming at it, and we will see, 

you know, what else may be possible as we go forward. 

Senator RISCH. I appreciate that, and it is encouraging for me to 

hear that you have engaged the Kurds. I think that—— 

Secretary KERRY. Oh, very, very much so. 

Senator RISCH. Let me with the little time I have left, I just want 

to make absolutely certain of your testimony. You originally said 

when you were meeting with these other countries, they have said, 

and I am quoting you, ‘‘What can we do to help?’’ But you have also 

said that nobody has agreed to put boots on the ground. And then 

I think you said that you have not asked them to put boots on the 

ground. 

So let me be very clear about airstrikes. Has anybody committed 

that they would fly their flag in and do airstrikes into Syria? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. 

Senator RISCH. And they are committed to do that? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. 

Senator RISCH. Okay. That is good. In a classified setting, we will 

be able to get who those people are? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. 

Senator RISCH. That is much more encouraging. Thank you. And 

with that, my time is up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin. 

24 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Secretary Kerry, first of all, thank you for 

your incredible service. 

And what you have stated expresses my view on the need for 

international action against a barbaric terrorist organization, ISIL. 

It requires an international response. I think President Obama has 

been effective, particularly in the actions in Iraq. The military 

strikes have been very effective in pulling back ISIL’s advancements, and I think the President deserves credit for doing that and 

certainly has my support. 

You have been effective in bringing about an international coalition, and that is extremely important. Whenever we are involved 

in missions like this, it must include an international presence. 

And you have been very clear that we will not have combat ground 

troops as part of this campaign. And I support each of those statements. 

So I want to get back to the point that the chairman mentioned, 

and I guess just about every one of us have mentioned, in regard 

to the authorization of force because I am not clear what we will 

do in Syria, and I am not comfortable yet as to what we will do 

in Syria. And I am looking forward to more information being made 

available to us. 

But my concern, I would really like to get your thoughts on this, 

is that the authorizations that were passed in 2001 and 2002 were 

clearly aimed at a different circumstance. And if your lawyers’ interpretations are correct, they are open-ended indefinitely, well beyond the Obama administration and could be used for long-term 

commitments, including ground force commitments in the future. 

And that certainly was not congressional intent. I did not support the 2002 resolution. As the chairman said, it was based upon 

misinformation. And 2001 was clearly aimed at the circumstances 

in Afghanistan. It was not intended to deal with the current circumstances in Syria. I would hope we would all agree to that. 

So I think it is absolutely essential that we come together and 

revisit the authorization issues. More than that you would welcome 

congressional involvement, I think it is imperative that we attempt 

to clarify the authorizations on the use of force to meet the current 

needs. 

In Iraq, I do not think that is going to be difficult. I think you 

have been invited in by another country. I think we can—— 

Senator BOXER. You mean Iraq. 

Senator CARDIN. I mean Iraq. Excuse me, in Iraq. I do not think 

it is difficult in Iraq. Thank you, Senator Boxer. 

We have been invited in by the host country. It is clear we are 

not going to put combat troops on the ground there. 

Syria is going to be more difficult because there are many of us 

who are not prepared to authorize the use of force in Syria with 

the information we currently have. But that is something I think 

we have to work with. 

You have Article II power, and the President has Article II 

power. So he always has the right for a short period of time to defend the interests of this Nation as he sees fit, and that is his responsibility as Commander in Chief. 

So I do not think there is any immediate urgency for congressional action. But I just think it is vital for the appropriate role of 

25 

Congress and for moving forward beyond just the Obama administration because, as you pointed out, these circumstances are not 

going to end in the next 2 years. And I would just welcome your 

thoughts as to how you think we should proceed with an authorization that can pass Congress and give you the comfort level that you 

need to protect us against any lengthy combat involvements in 

these countries in the future should ultimately be done by their 

own military? 

Secretary KERRY. Sure. Well, Senator, thank you very much. 

Thank you for your comments. 

But, look, I would not sit here comfortably and suggest to you— 

nor would President Obama, by that token, I know—suggest to you 

that this ought to go on indefinitely and that there should not be 

an effort with Congress to define this. Of course, there should be. 

I think the American people want it, deserve it, and it is appropriate role for both branches to play, to work together to articulate 

that going forward. The President has made it crystal clear he is 

ready to do that. We know the chairman has announced that he 

is going to begin work to define that. We look forward to working 

with you to define it. That is how we go about it is to work effectively to do it. 

Now in the immediate moment, we have a Prime Minister—do 

you have the comments of Prime Minister Abadi from the press 

conference the other day? Get those out for me, please. 

[Pause.] 

Secretary KERRY. In my meeting with Prime Minister Abadi, at 

the end we met with the press, and I will just read you what Prime 

Minister Abadi said as an opening comment, not even prompted or 

part of a question. He said, ‘‘ISIL is a terrorist nation. It is mobilizing its international network to recruit people from all over the 

world. They have funds from all across the region. We are fighting 

these people. These people are—’’ and then something inaudible 

about our communities attacking or something, minorities, women, 

children. ‘‘They already—’’ and then it was inaudible about women 

and killing or raping. ‘‘They are a challenge to the whole region, 

to the international community. They are coming to Iraq from 

across the border from neighboring Syria. Of course, our role is to 

defend our country, but the international community is responsible 

to protect Iraq and protect Iraqis and the whole region. 

‘‘What is happening in Syria is coming across to Iraq. We cannot 

cross that border.’’ That is on an international basis. But he says, 

’’It is an international border, but there is a role for the international community, for the United Nations, to do that role and the 

United States to act immediately to stop the spread of this cancer. 

‘‘This cancer is spreading in the whole region, and we have the resolution to fight the cancer in Iraq. We Iraqis will have both an inclusive government now, and we can do this job properly, everybody as whole.’’ 

And he goes on to talk about how they will do it. But he specifically asks for the United States of America to help in this role. 

Now our lawyers also are clear that Iraq has the right of selfdefense, and Iraq is exercising its right of self-defense and asking 

the United States to help it. And we already have a military agreeVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
26 

ment with them with respect to that. And so, Iraq is asking us to 

help them. 

And as a matter of right, if they are being attacked from outside 

their country, you have a right of hot pursuit. You have a right to 

be able to attack those people who are attacking you as a matter 

of self-defense. 

So we believe there is a full justification here, and obviously, that 

will be laid out further. But is it better to have a greater statement 

of that? Is it better to have the Congress of the United States defining this going forward? We agree. But we need to move and to 

move rapidly because of the urgency of this danger. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Secretary Kerry, I was struck by the language in your opening 

statement. ‘‘ISIL must be defeated, period. End of story. And collectively, we are all going to be measured by how we carry out this 

mission.’’ 

Now from a military perspective, the plan of carrying out this 

mission involves a combination of Iraqi Forces in Iraq, from the 

military perspective more capacity; of course, the Kurds; moderate 

rebels in Syria; and American airpower. No combat boots on the 

ground on the part of the United States. 

But over the last few days since the President has made that announcement, there has been real doubts expressed by military experts over whether that strategy will achieve what you have defined as our goal. The Washington Post reported that the top U.S. 

commander in the Middle East advised the President that we needed a modest contingent of American troops, especially Special Operation Forces, to advise and assist Iraqi army units. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs yesterday in the Armed Services Committee said that if local forces do not work, he would recommend U.S. ground troops potentially to the President. So my 

question is if it becomes clear that the only way to achieve the defeat of ISIL, period, end of story, is for the engagement of American 

ground troops, will that be something the President will consider 

at that time? 

Secretary KERRY. The President will not put American ground 

troops into Iraq, and the President made it clear again today in a 

statement that he made at CENTCOM that America can make a 

decisive—I am quoting the President. ‘‘We can make a decisive difference, but I want to be clear. The troops that have been deployed 

to Iraq do not, and will not, have a combat mission.’’ 

Now we believe—and we are not going to deal with hypotheticals 

about what happens if and this and this. We believe there are any 

number of options as to how one can guarantee the effect on ISIL 

long before you were to get to the hypothetical conversation about 

Americans. 

So I understand the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose 

job it is to look at it from his perspective in terms of his military 

and his judgment. But the President has made a judgment as Commander in Chief that that is not in the cards, and that is where 

we are. 

Senator RUBIO. So even if the only way, with the military expert—— 

27 

Secretary KERRY. I am not going to deal with a hypothetical. I 

do not believe it is the only way. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, it is not a hypothetical. It is actually—it 

appears to be, quite frankly, we are relying on a military strategy 

built on rebels who, at this point, are under assault not just by 

ISIS, but by the Assad regime, by local Iraqi Forces, of which some 

testimony say up to half, are incapable of fighting at this stage, 

and Kurds that have been great fighters but are only willing to 

protect their territory. 

This is a very clearly stated goal, and the reason why it is not 

a hypothetical is there may come a point where what you are saying is that if the only thing that can solve this problem is U.S. combat forces, we are not going to do that, and ISIL gets to stay. 

Secretary KERRY. But I think we are so far away from that quote 

being the only way in a hypothetical. I mean, honestly. 

Senator RUBIO. Then let me ask you this. 

Secretary KERRY. No, let me just—let me just finish that. I 

mean, you know, I am not going to get into hypotheticals, but you 

are presuming that Iran and Syria do not have any capacity to 

take on ISIL. I mean, who knows? I am not going to get—I do not 

know what is going to happen here. Let us start down this road 

and see what happens. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, let me ask you about that then. So what 

you are saying now is that there is the opportunity, the potential 

that the United States would be coordinating with Iran? 

Secretary KERRY. No, I never said anything about coordinating. 

If we are failing and failing miserably, who knows what choice they 

might make. You prepositioned this on the notion we are failing. 

I do not believe we are going to fail. 

Senator RUBIO. I did not preposition on—— 

Secretary KERRY. And we are not setting out—— 

Senator RUBIO. I am prepositioning on the state of the military—— 

Secretary KERRY. You did. You said if we fail we cannot do that. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, again, I will go back to the report. I mean, 

a number of people, including former Defense Secretary Gates has 

expressed his belief that it is not possible. A number of highly 

qualified military experts have said they do not believe that the 

goal you have stated in your opening statement is achievable without a U.S. presence. 

Secretary KERRY. There are lots of possibilities. There are lots of 

possibilities between here and there. The President has said he is 

not going to put American troops—— 

Senator RUBIO. Well, you mentioned Iran. And you know, Iran 

yesterday said that not that it was on the sidelines of these negotiations. They claim that the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq reached out 

to the Iranian Ambassador in Iraq and asked to discuss some sort 

of level of coordination. 

And the Iranians already gave us our answer. You said you were 

open to some sort of dialogue with them if it had any sort of promise to be productive. He has already answered the question. He 

says he sees no point in coordinating with a country whose hands 

are dirty. That is what he said about us. 

28 

He says, quite frankly, that—he said this, not me, please. He 

said that you are lying, that we did not exclude them from the 

talks to join the coalition. They excluded themselves, that they refused to participate. And he went on to say that in Iraq, the United 

States goal is to turn it into a playground where we can enter freely and bomb at will. 

I would just say that any hopes of coordinating with Iran, who 

I consider to be just as evil as ISIS, is something that I would discourage for a number of different reasons. But I want to ask you 

just one more question, and it has to do with the rebels in Syria. 

Later today, Ambassador Ford is going to testify that the biggest 

enemy that moderate opposition faces is the Assad regime. In fact, 

there are credible reports today that the Assad regime has stepped 

up its targeting of moderate rebel or non-ISIS rebel forces in the 

hopes of wiping them out so that they, the Assad regime, will be 

the only alternative left in Syria. 

If we are interested in supporting the moderate rebels, will it not 

require us to protect them from Syria as well, from the Assad regime as well, if we hope that they can develop into a credible fighting force? 

Secretary KERRY. ISIL first. That is our policy. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, but Ambassador Ford is going to testify 

later today that the biggest enemy they face is the Assad regime 

bombing them, and there are reports today, credible reports, that 

Assad has stepped up his campaign attacking these moderate 

rebels. They may not be there for us to arm. 

Secretary KERRY. That is not our judgment, but we obviously recognize that there are serious challenges with the Assad regime, 

and our policy has not changed of opposing the Assad regime and 

helping the moderate opposition. And in classified forum, I think 

we have a better opportunity to discuss what we are doing additionally in order to do that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here and 

for all of your tireless efforts to address the ISIS threat. 

That is a threat that I believe was really brought home to the 

American people by the barbarous and heinous murders of James 

Foley and Steven Sotloff. And as you may know, Jim Foley grew 

up in New Hampshire, and Steven Sotloff went to prep school 

there. And so, they both have ties to my State, and I think people 

in New Hampshire and across the country really felt very personally those murders. 

I appreciate and I said this yesterday at the Armed Services 

hearing with General Dempsey and Secretary Hagel that I appreciate the efforts of our men and women in the military to make a 

rescue attempt to free those—James Foley and Steven Sotloff and 

the other Americans—being held hostage. But I have been very 

troubled by the comments from the Foley family that have been reported about their concern that they were not communicated with 

and did not have support from our government as they were trying 

to deal with the hostage situation for their son. 

And I wonder if you could—well, let me rephrase this. I hope 

that post the murders that this administration and future administrations will seriously reassess what can better be done to support 

29 

families who are dealing with this kind of a crisis. Some of the reports have pointed out that there are other countries who have different ways of dealing with the families, and I certainly hope that 

you will help in this effort as we look at how we can better support 

those families. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator Shaheen—excuse me. Senator 

Shaheen, first of all, let me begin by saying that I know how personally deeply involved you were in Jim’s case and in working with 

us to try to keep the focus on it. I know how close you were to the 

family, and I know how much effort when into the prior effort 

when Jim was in Libya. I worked on that personally and on this 

subsequent effort. 

We raised it with country after country to try to get a Foreign 

Minister or some contact in the country. Is there a way to get proof 

of life? Is there a way to find out where he is? Is there a way to 

negotiate the release? 

Most recently, even in the last 2 months before he was barbarously killed, I was talking with people in one of the Middle 

Eastern countries who traveled to Syria on our behalf in order to 

try to find out whether there was a way to secure the release of 

these hostages. And we—I know that you also made an incredible 

effort to reach out to country after country. I know the Czech Republic, others, you were very much active in this and engaged in 

that. 

And when we got him out of Libya, which we worked hard to do, 

I was in touch with people on global posts who I know very closely. 

I mean, they are friends of mine who are part of that effort. So 

they were always in touch with me and talking personally about 

it. 

Now I have read these accounts of things that have happened or 

their judgment. I talked to Diane and John Foley after Jim was 

killed. I think everybody here would just shudder at what they 

have to go through. 

So this is something we feel very deeply, so much so that I remember the hours we sat in the situation room in the White House 

working with our brilliant military, who did a remarkable job of designing a rescue mission, and the President made the difficult decision. Because it is always difficult. You are putting American service people at risk going into another country. They have air defense. You do not know what is going to happen. And you know you 

are going in where there is ISIL. 

And I sat in the White House in the situation room and watched 

that entire mission unfold and was amazed by the capacity of our 

military people to do what they did. A high-risk mission performed 

flawlessly. And the intelligence was correct to every degree that 

they went the right place. They did things correctly. It just was 

empty. 

They had moved them ahead of time, and we do not know exactly 

how soon or when. And you have no idea how just the feeling in 

that room changed when the message came from our people on the 

ground saying nobody is there. So we felt that and feel it to this 

day. 

But you know, if they feel unhappy somehow that it was not 

worked properly, whatever agency it was, we have to make sure in 

30 

the future that we are going to make sure that that is just not a 

feeling—I mean, first of all, we hope no other family has to suffer 

that and go through it. 

But to whatever degree that is a possibility or an eventuality, we 

have got to make sure that people feel better about the process. 

And I can assure you the President on down, everybody feels that 

sensitivity. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. And for the 

hostages who are still being held, I hope there will be an effort to 

look at how those families are being supported. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that my time is up. But I just wanted to 

make one more comment because I know, Mr. Secretary, that you 

have repeated the President’s argument that this military campaign does not require a separate authorization for the use of military force. But I certainly believe that if we are going to commit 

to a long-term effort to address ISIS that having specific congressional action that is bipartisan to support that effort is very important. 

And I believe we should undertake that, and I know the chairman has said that he intends to do that, regardless of whether the 

White House and the administration comes to Congress or not. So 

I certainly support that, and I hope that the administration will 

work with us as we do that. 

Secretary KERRY. Yes. Well, we are coming to Congress. We are 

here, and we welcome it, and we look forward to working with you 

on it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And Senator Shaheen has expressed 

to me on more than one occasion already her desire to work with 

the chair and others on behalf of such an AUMF, and we look forward to working you and other colleagues as well. 

Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, obviously these are pretty complex issues. I do not envy you and the 

President your task at all. You are in my prayers. The President 

is in my prayers. Actually, I ask all Americans to include you in 

their prayers because if you succeed—we all want you to succeed— 

that means America and Americans remain safe. 

I have been listening to you and the President very carefully. I 

am sure the world has been as well, and words have real meaning. 

So I appreciate the fact that you have testified today here that 

ISIL must be defeated period, end of story. 

You know, the President in his speech to the Nation said that 

the goal here is to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS, but here 

is my concern. Here is my problem. In the final—in the final two 

paragraphs of his speech to the Nation, President Obama said, 

‘‘Our own safety, our own security depends on our willingness to 

do what it takes to defend this Nation.’’ But, Mr. Secretary, by taking options off the table, is President Obama not really saying to 

do what it takes up to a point? 

And as Secretary of State, as you are dealing with potential coalition partners who are also listening, if we state a goal and the 

world does not believe we are 100 percent committed to it, is that 

going to be very difficult for you to get the kind of commitment out 

31 

of our potential partners to do what they need to do to actually 

achieve that ultimate goal? 

Secretary KERRY. That is a very fair and a really good question. 

And by the way, thank you for your comments and your prayers. 

The answer is that the President and the military folks currently 

believe we have the capacity, we have the plan, and we have the 

coalition to be able to do the job. Now, you know, there are a lot 

of countries in the region who have capacity going forward who, in 

our judgment, if somebody is necessary to be on the ground, ought 

to be lining up first. So there are a lot of options here before we 

start getting to the talk that the President has taken off the table. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, okay. We have covered—we have covered 

that ground. Let me ask you. In our discussions with, for example, 

Saudi Arabia, do the potential Arab States, do they understand 

how fragile American public opinion will be toward this effort, toward this destruction, if they do not fully commit? 

And when I think of fully commit, I am thinking back to the first 

gulf war when America only had to pay for about 15 percent of 

that, and almost 50 percent of that war effort was paid for by Gulf 

States. The other portion was paid for Germany and Japan. I 

mean, do they understand why it is so important for them to step 

up to the plate and visibly support this effort? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes, and, in fact, King Abdullah said to me, 

personally, ‘‘We will do whatever is needed to be done. We are committed fully to this effort,’’ and they have been. Now, there are bigger complications than just sitting here and talking about having 

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia put its troops on the ground in Syria 

next door to Iran with all of the extraordinary complications of the 

region regarding Shia, Sunni, and other geostrategic challenges. 

So we need to be working at this very carefully with all of the 

nations that are part of the coalition, recognizing we have to win. 

And we are just getting started at that. So I can tell you we are 

not going into this in order to fail, and nor are any of these other 

people who are signing up, so. 

Senator JOHNSON. Well, let me offer, I will be in—up in New 

York next week representing the United States at the U.N. with 

Senator Cardin. I would like to offer, you know, whatever I can do 

to help convince those Arab States that they do need to be fully 

committed to this battle. 

Let me ask you another question. An analogy I have been using, 

and here is another concern of mine. If this is going to literally 

take years, the analogy I have been using is if you identify a hornet’s nest in your backyard, you realize you have got to take care 

of that. But if what we are really doing is just going in the backyard and poking that hornet’s nest with a stick, is that not a concern right now if we are not fully committed to wipe out ISIS 

quickly? 

You mentioned Brett McGurk, who provided powerful testimony 

to this committee back at the end of July about the threat that 

ISIS really does represent, being able to funnel 30 to 50 suicide 

bombers into Iraq per month. Now, we have seen those suicide 

bombers come from Australia and Germany and America with 

passports. And Mr. McGurk’s comment was they could easily funnel those suicide bombers into the West, into America. 

32 

So that is my concern about allowing this—not being fully committed, not getting in there, not cleaning up that hornet’s nest as 

quickly as possible. Do we not just increase the time where we are 

really under threat and danger? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we hope not, Senator. Obviously that is 

not our strategy. I mean, look, ISIL—why do we have to focus first 

on ISIL and focus on it in the way that we are? Because they are 

seizing and holding thousands of square miles of territory; because 

they are claiming to be a state—they are not a state in so many 

ways, and we can go through that. They are confronting and defeating thus far a conventional army with conventional tactics. 

They have—they are avowed genocidists—avowed genocidists—who 

have already practiced genocidal activities at a certain level— 

Yazidis, Shia, people that they have decided to go after along the 

way—Christians. And they have a very large amount of money, unlike lots of other terrorist organizations because they cleaned out 

the banks, and they have sold oil, and done other things in the 

process. 

And so, even al-Qaeda, bold as they were in what they decided 

to do, did not exhibit these characteristics and did not have those 

capacities. And that is why we believe—and we think most of the 

region has come to understand this, including the moderate opposition, who are already fighting ISIL. 

So we believe we have the makings of an ability to be able to 

have a very, very significant impact. And already, by the way, 

France and the United Kingdom are flying with us over Iraq, and 

several other countries are now starting to be willing to join that. 

So we think we have the building of an ability to be able to turn 

that around. 

I guarantee you the President’s goal is to defeat them. And as 

you and we see this unfold and make judgments about how well 

we are doing, we can have further discussions about what else it 

may or may not take to get the job done. But at the moment, these 

are the judgments that are being made. 

Senator JOHNSON. Well, thank you. You have made a strong case 

for defeating ISIS and being fully committed to doing it. The sooner 

the better. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Secretary, as I look at this challenge from ISIL, I think 

there are two distinctly different parts to it relating to Iraq and 

Syria. I do not believe there is any future for Iraq unless Iraq is 

committed to that future. 

The new leadership there has given us some hope, but ultimately 

we have to trust that we can either train or provide the skills and 

support to the Iraq Army that, in fact, they will not be so overrun 

with corruption that they cannot be an effective fighting force. That 

is—it is a big task, but I think it is—at least we are hopeful it is 

within our grasp. 

I look at Syria and see a totally different circumstance there. 

Syria is a dog’s breakfast of violence, and terrorism, and deceit, 

and carnage that has gone on for three years. Here we are talking 

about arming or equipping and training a moderate force within 

Syria. I have read the language that is being considered in the 

33 

House, unless it has been changed in the last day or so. Never 

mentions the word ‘‘Assad’’ once when it talks about what we are 

trying to achieve in Syria. 

It comes down to this basic question. It looks to me that there 

are at least three identifiable forces in Syria: Assad, ISIL, and 

what we hope are moderate opposition forces we can work with. 

But I am also told and have been told there are up 1,500 different 

militia in that country. Some are neighborhood militia. 

How can we chart a course here that defeats ISIL in Syria and 

does not in the end strengthen Assad’s hand? How can we find the 

so-called moderate opposition in Syria and believe that something 

will merge there that results in Syrians deciding that their own 

fate and future is their responsibility? 

Secretary KERRY. A very good question. The calculation is that 

even with the difficulties that they have faced over the last year 

and a half particularly—I remember when I first came in, February 

of last year, the opposition in Syria was actually in a slightly better 

position with respect to Assad and the other groups. And there 

were not as many of the other groups at that moment in time. 

And then regrettably, they started to squabble politically as well 

as to which military group would do what, and they lost some momentum with that, number one. Number two, they did not get 

enough supplies at that point in time. Number three, the country 

began to be flooded with these external fighters from the outside, 

and some countries in the region who wanted to get rid of Assad 

started funding people who seemed to be tougher fighters who 

morphed into either al-Nusra, Ahrar ash-Sham, or ISIL, and then 

they began to fight. And so the concentration on Assad just dissipated, and during that time some of the support that was coming 

from countries in the region was frankly also very badly directed 

and managed. 

All of that has changed now. We have upped our support and our 

engagement, our training, things that we are doing. Other countries have upped it. They have worked out many of the leadership 

issues that existed. There seems to be—even despite these difficulties, they have been able to fight ISIL, and move ISIL out of certain areas, and keep fighting Assad. You have seen this continuing. 

Our belief, therefore, is that as the principal antagonist to their 

presence—more so than Assad in some ways—starts to take hits 

and they gain greater strength, greater training, greater equipment, greater capacity, the success will bring to them, we think, a 

larger structure as well as a greater know-how and ability. And if 

ISIL is defeated, they are going to be taking that experience in the 

same direction that they originally set out to, which is to deal with 

Assad. 

Senator DURBIN. I would like to ask one last question. We know, 

and you have said it in this testimony, that Russia is supplying 

Assad. We have known in the past when there have been sources 

of money, equipment, and other support for our enemies. 

As we look at ISIL today, you told us in testimony that Russia— 

you mentioned Russia—and China, and we know by its nature Iran 

is a Shia nation—oppose ISIL. Who are the countries—which countries are aiding and abetting the ISIL cause either by providing reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
34 

sources, equipment, and arms to them, or allowing their trade to 

create resources and wealth so that they can continue the fight? 

Secretary KERRY. We do not believe at this point that it is state 

supported. What we believe is that because of their success in particularly getting the bank in Mosul and other success along the 

way, as well as in selling oil—— 

Senator DURBIN. Let me stop you there. Who are they selling it 

to? Which countries are transiting—— 

Secretary KERRY. I was just about to get to you. We have raised 

with a number of countries in the region the question of how they 

could possibly be getting oil out of the country. It is being smuggled 

out. And that is part of the approach here is to deal—— 

Senator DURBIN. Through which countries do you believe it is 

being smuggled out? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, it is being smuggled out from the border 

countries of Syria obviously, which means either through Turkey or 

through Lebanon or south. That is how—— 

Senator DURBIN. Now, are they joining us in the effort to stop 

the smuggling? 

Secretary KERRY. They are, but obviously Turkey has difficulties 

right now, has 49 hostages that are being held, and they have 

talked about that publicly. And Turkey is—you know, we have had 

some conversations with them, and those conversations will continue. 

Senator DURBIN. The sooner we can cut them off from their 

sources of funds and—— 

Secretary KERRY. That is exactly what the objective—now, a lot 

of the money—— 

Senator DURBIN [continuing]. Arms. 

Secretary KERRY. There is other money that comes through social 

media, Internet appeals, through individual fundraising. We have 

been able to trace a one-time lump sum, $140,000, that came 

through one country from an individual in the region. And that is 

why we are going to have this immediate focus on the movement 

of money, and begin to really get tough in shutting down that flow 

of funds. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for laying 

out the strategy. I think you know where this committee is and 

where I am in terms of wanting to give the President and the administration the authority and the wherewithal to move ahead and 

succeed in this mission and all our foreign policy missions. 

But I am a little confused at the position that is being taken by 

the administration now that AUMF is not required, would be desired, but not required now. I look back at one of the last hearings 

that you appeared in. It was with regard to Syria and chemical 

weapons. The President, as you know, had drawn a redline and 

said that he would act if they went beyond it. They went beyond 

it, and then the President came to Congress and said what do you 

want me to do. 

I questioned whether or not that was a wise move. And you said 

to me—these are your words—‘‘It is somewhat surprising to me 

that a member of Congress, particularly one on the Foreign Relations Committee, is going to question the President for fulfilling the 

35 

vision of the Founding Fathers when they wrote the Constitution, 

divided power in foreign policy, to have the President come over 

here and honor the original intent of the Founding Fathers in ways 

that do not do anything to distract from the mission itself.’’ 

Now, I would argue, and I think others would as well, that that 

did distract from the mission itself. In fact, it torpedoed it, coming 

to Congress when we said we were going to strike and what was 

described as a 10-day or 2-week mission to degrade the ability to 

use chemical weapons. But then in this case, in what you, yourself, 

today describe as what will be a multiyear effort, say that you do 

not need—you desire, but do not need congressional buy-in. 

It is best when we speak with one voice. Our allies know that. 

And in order to build the kind of coalition that is going to be required to, one, defeat ISIL, and, two, sustain that defeat over time, 

our coalition partners and our adversaries have to believe our 

threats and our promises. And I would submit that it helps for us 

to be together. So I question the unwillingness to come and ask for 

a renewed AUMF. Can you enlighten me as to why the change of 

heart from the last hearing? 

Secretary KERRY. There is no change of heart, Senator, honestly. 

There is a big difference between the authorities that are available. 

We did not have authority in any form sufficient without Congress 

passing it, except for Article 2—excuse me. We had Article 2 authority for the President of the United States, which is always 

there, and nobody has ever gotten to the question of whether or not 

he would have exercised it had Congress not passed it. 

But the fact is the President did make a decision to strike. He 

made a decision and publicly announced it. He said, I have made 

a decision to strike. Then, as you know, there were a lot of requests 

in our briefings with Congress to come to Congress. And since we 

did not have authority beyond Article 2, and that is the distinction 

between then and now. 

Then the 2001 AUMF did not cover chemical weapons with 

Assad. It covered terrorism and al-Qaeda. And so, if it were not 

ISIL that was this direct component of al-Qaeda, and we were talking about, for instance, one of the other entities there, we might 

not have the same capacity here. But we are looking at an entity 

that was al-Qaeda from 2004 or 2005 all the way through until 

2013, and then tried to disassociate itself by name, but continued 

to do the very same things it was doing with al-Qaeda the entire 

time. That is not true of what happened with Assad. 

Now, it also happened, and I remember this distinctly, obviously, 

that during the walk-up to the process of the request for the 

AUMF, President Putin and President Obama had a conversation 

in St. Petersburg regarding the removal of weapons. Prime Minister Netanyahu had called me, and we had talked about the possibility of removal of weapons. 

Senator FLAKE. I have just got a few seconds here, but I appreciate that history. But I hope we have a better explanation than 

that when we go to our allies and say that we are going to be in 

it for the long haul, and that we are united in this mission. 

Secretary KERRY. And that is why we want Congress to pass 

AUMF. And I think five times in the course of this hearing I have 

said we welcome the effort work with you to refine the AUMF 

36 

going forward, and, yes, we will be stronger and better with the 

passage of an AUMF and with Congress involved in it. But we are 

not going to put ourselves in the position of not being able to do 

what we believe we need to do with legitimacy at this moment in 

time. But we welcome it. 

Senator FLAKE. With respect, I would argue that is what we did 

to ourselves before. We put ourselves in a position where we drew 

a redline, and then were not willing to do what it takes to go and 

enforce that redline. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, but—— 

Senator FLAKE. And that is going to affect our ability to move 

forward and build the kind of coalitions that we need to do this 

mission. And that is why I am saying I think there is an inconsistency here. I hope that the administration will change its mind and 

ask firmly for an AUMF, and I hope Congress gives it. With that, 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary 

Kerry, thank you for your tireless, committed, caring approach to 

these international issues, all of the ones which are so pressing 

today. And I think you are probably one of the most traveled Secretaries we have ever had. And I think all of us wish you the very 

best in your endeavors. 

Chairman Menendez, I would like to thank you for this hearing. 

I think it is very important that we carefully weigh the President’s 

request. We must address the very real threat presented by ISIS. 

A little over a year ago, we were in this same room talking about 

air strikes on the Assad regime and arming rebels to fight it, and 

due to Assad’s use of chemical weapons. Today Assad’s weapons 

are gone, and thank you, Secretary Kerry, I think, for your diplomatic efforts there. 

And we are debating now, air strikes on ISIS and arming rebels 

to fight that. That is really, in a way, quite a turnaround. The 

American people deserve a full debate and explanation about this 

new plan that you have presented. And we have heard today a 

number of Senators—ISIS—talk about this. ISIS is a brutal terrorist organization. It must be stopped. And that is a subject I 

think we can all agree on. And I would associate myself with all 

of the comments—the previous comments about their brutality and 

their murderous ways. I do think there is any doubt about that. 

We have a clear responsibility to continue to work with local 

groups, with our allies in the region, and for as long as it takes. 

We must use strategic force, I believe, to stop ISIS and end its 

murderous path, but let me be clear here. I do not want us to lose 

sight of the forest from the trees. There are calls for more and more 

direct U.S. military intervention in the Middle East, putting us 

back on a very risky course. 

ISIS has thrived on the chaos, on the instability, the unintended 

consequences of America’s failed policy in Iraq for the past 13 

years, and this is the crucial point. Military power is one tool, one 

among many tools, that will be needed to bring stability to the region. ISIS emerged from disorder, from dysfunction, and alienation, 

and the divide between Sunni and Shia followers of Islam. Those 

37 

conditions will remain without a comprehensive strategy of diplomacy, development, and commitment to long-term stability. 

We must destroy ISIS, but we cannot put ourselves in the situation of creating a void, one that could then be filled by other extremists or by an Iranian-controlled regime. We should support the 

Iraqi Government, as well as the Kurdish and other moderate 

forces. However, I remain skeptical about the so-called moderate 

forces. And, Secretary Kerry, you have heard several times here 

this issue about moderate forces and are there moderate forces. 

And I think one of the key issues for us is the effectiveness of 

the moderate forces that are there on the ground now. And my 

question to you has to do with—and this all public information, and 

everybody is well aware there has been a covert operation operating in the region to train forces, moderate forces, to go into Syria 

and to be out there. We have been doing this the last 2 years. 

And probably the most true measure of the effectiveness of moderate forces would be what has been the effectiveness over that last 

2 years of this covert operation of training two to 3,000 of these 

moderates. Are they a growing force? Have they gained ground? 

How effective are they? What can you tell us about this effort that 

has gone on, and has it been a part of the success that you see that 

you are presenting this new plan on? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, I hate to do this, but I know it has 

been written about in the public domain that there is ‘‘a covert operation,’’ but I cannot confirm or deny whatever that has been written about it, and I cannot really go into any kind of possible program. 

Senator UDALL. Okay. Well, I want to say to Chairman Menendez, I mean, to me, the key here on effectiveness is what has happened these past 2 years. And so, I think we should have a briefing 

by our committee specifically on what has gone on in that area 

from our intelligence people. 

And just one final thing. ISIS is already in possession of U.S. 

weapons paid for by U.S. taxpayers that extremists seized from 

United States-trained Iraqi Forces and Syrian rebels. How will you 

guarantee or assure that the weapons and resources you are requesting now will now end up in the hands of radical Sunni insurgents? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we have been following that very, very 

closely, and our folks who have been involved in this at all levels. 

And, again, this probably ought to be in the classified session for 

various reasons. But what we have been doing is providing various 

kinds of support to them, nonlethal, as I think you know. And we 

are vetting people very, very carefully. 

And our folks who do that, because this is something we have 

really watched very carefully. The President has been very concerned about this question of downstream and impact. There are a 

couple of instances of an overrun of a warehouse up in the north 

and Aleppo and one instance a couple of things. But by and large, 

we have found the vetting to be pretty effective. Our guys have 

been doing it for about 20 years now, you know, for better or worse, 

and they have gotten pretty good at it. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. And I would also agree with, and I 

appreciate your offer to work with us on an authorization of force. 

38 

I think we have to have one with what you are describing, and I 

hope that we can get to that as soon as possible. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Udall, let me take your request and say, 

first of all, we will have as robust intelligence briefings as we can. 

However, to the core question that you raise, this is a problem that 

both the administration as well as the Senate leadership must be 

willing to deal with because when it comes to questions of being 

briefed on covert operations, this committee does not have access 

to that information. Yet it is charged with the responsibility of determining whether or not the people of the United States should, 

through their representatives, support an authorization for the use 

of military force. 

It is unfathomable to me to understand how this committee is 

going to get to those conclusions without understanding all of the 

elements of military engagement both overtly and covertly. And so, 

I am four square with you, but this is a challenge—I will call it 

for lack of a better term—a procedural hurdle that we are going 

to have to overcome if we want the information to make an informed judgment and to get members on board. 

Before I turn to Senator McCain, let me just recognize some distinguished members of the Kurdish delegation and the Iraqi Ambassador, Lukman Faily. I appreciate your being here. And in the 

Kurdish delegation, the chief of staff to President Barzani, Fuad 

Hussein, as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the 

Kurdistan regional government, Falah Bakir. So thank you both for 

being here. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to recognize our Kurdish friends who have been such steadfast and good 

allies for so long. 

Mr. Secretary, today, September 17, Secretary Gates said the following—former Secretary of Defense Gates. ‘‘The reality is they are 

not going to be able to be successful against ISIS strictly from the 

air or strictly depending on the Iraqi Forces or the Peshmerga or 

the Sunni tribes acting on their own.’’ Gates said, ‘‘So there will be 

boots on the ground if there is to be any hope of success in the 

strategy. And I think that by containing—by continuing to repeat 

that that the U.S. will not put boots on the ground, the President, 

in effect, traps himself.’’ 

Now, Mr. Secretary, I have talked to so many people who are 

military experienced, who have been on both sides on this issue. 

They all agree with Secretary Gates’ assessment, and that is just 

the reality. And there are some of us that place a great deal of confidence in the opinion of people like Secretary Gates, General 

Keane, the architects of the surge, so many others. Now, is it your 

view that the Syrian opposition is viable? Hello? 

Secretary KERRY. Hello, Senator. I am taking you so seriously I 

am writing notes. 

Senator MCCAIN. Is it your view the Syrian opposition is viable? 

Secretary KERRY. The Syrian opposition has been viable enough 

to be able to survive under difficult circumstances—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Are you—— 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. But not yet—but they still have 

some distance to go, and we need to help them go that distance. 

39 

Senator MCCAIN. Right. And they obviously need our assistance 

in weapons and training, which you are going to embark on. Are 

you surprised sometimes at the degree of disinformation that Members of Congress will swallow whole, like there has been a ceasefire agreement between the Free Syrian Army and ISIS put out by 

ISIS? Does that surprise you sometimes? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, sometimes. 

Senator MCCAIN. No, it does not surprise you. It does not surprise you. I got it. 

Secretary KERRY. No, no, no. 

Senator MCCAIN. The hero of this piece so far in my view is a 

guy who is going to testify here after you, Robert Ford—Ambassador Ford. He did a magnificent job at the risk of his own life 

riding around Damascus in support of the Free Syrian Army. Now, 

here is what he is going to say in his testimony. ‘‘The moderate 

armed opposition’s biggest enemy is not the Islamic State. It is the 

Assad regime, which has killed far more Syrians than has the detestable Islamic State. And they will not stop fighting the Assad regime even as they advance against the Islamic State.’’ 

But you are saying ISIL first. So we are going to train and equip 

the Free Syrian Army, and they are going to be fighting against 

Assad, who they view as their number one enemy. I agree with 

Ambassador Ford’s assessment, but you are saying ISIL first. 

So if this—so we are telling a young Syrian today, I want you 

to join the Free Syrian Army. You go to fight ISIL first. And, by 

the way, those barrel bombs that are being dropped on you and 

these attacks from the air that have massacred so many Syrians, 

we are not going to do anything about that. I think at least we owe 

the Free Syrian Army to negate the air attacks that they will be 

subjected to when they finish their training and equipping, and go 

into the fight. 

So why is it that we will not at least neutralize Bashir Assad’s 

air activity, which has slaughtered thousands and thousands and 

thousands—192,000 dead, 3 million refugees? And we are not going 

to do anything about Assad’s air capabilities? 

And finally, ISIL first, that is what you are telling these young 

men who really view Assad as the one who has slaughtered their 

family members, not ISIL, as bad as ISIL is. So how do you square 

that circle, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, you square it this way, Senator. And, 

first of all, let me just say a word. I think everybody knows I had 

the pleasure of working with Robert Ford in the Department from 

the day I arrived there. 

Senator MCCAIN. We share admiration for him, yes. 

Secretary KERRY. And we worked very closely together. I have 

huge respect and admiration for him. And he and I worked many 

long hours with the Syrian opposition, and I respect his opinion, et 

cetera. He is correct that they will not stop fighting the Assad regime. I understand that. We understand. 

Senator MCCAIN. They not only will not stop fighting, it is their 

primary goal. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, it is except that—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I know too many of them, John. Go ahead. 

40 

Secretary KERRY. I understand. It is. I am not denying that. But 

they also are fighting ISIL. They are up in Aleppo right now fighting ISIL. They are fighting ISIL in other places. They threw them 

out of Idlib province. They are engaged in fighting ISIL. And our 

belief is, I think—I bet you—I hope Robert Ford believes that they 

will actually get stronger as a result of ISIL being removed from 

the field. 

Senator MCCAIN. Are you not going to protect them from air 

strikes? 

Secretary KERRY. I think what we need—yes. And I think what 

we need—that is a legitimate concern, and it is a concern that I 

would need to address with you in a classified session for reasons 

I think you well understand, and I think Robert Ford well understands that. 

Senator MCCAIN. I think the Free Syrian Army would like to understand, too. 

Secretary KERRY. And if we have a good classified session and 

other good things happen, who knows. The important thing is for 

us to recognize that if ISIL continues doing what it is doing, and 

I think you know this, without being stopped, and if we had not 

stood up when we did stand up and work with the Peshmerga and 

help them to push back and retake Mosul Dam and so forth—they 

were threatening Baghdad, and they were threatening more. And 

if they did that sufficiently—— 

Senator MCCAIN. John, we are talking about Syria and—— 

Secretary KERRY. No, I know, but I am about to come back. 

Senator MCCAIN [continuing]. The Free Syrian Army. 

Secretary KERRY. I am about to come because that—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Thank you. I am running out of 

time. 

Secretary KERRY. That pertains to their capacity then to focus on 

Assad, and it might be not the Free Syrian Army, but ISIL that 

you see in Damascus, and ISIL bringing al-Nusra and other people 

to them because of the level of their success. Clearly many people 

have told us in the region success breeds success, and many of the 

people who have come to ISIL have come because it seems as if 

they were not being opposed. Well, we believe that transition works 

to the benefit of the moderate opposition, works ultimately to all 

of our benefit by removing ISIL from the field. 

Senator MCCAIN. You cannot ask people to go and fight and die 

unless you promise them that we will defeat their enemy and defeat them right away. You cannot say wait until we defeat ISIL. 

People will not volunteer for such things. 

Secretary KERRY. I do not believe that is going to be ultimately 

a wait and see because I do not believe, number one, that the people supporting the opposition in various parts of the region are ever 

going to stop until the Assad problem is resolved. And number two, 

I do not believe ISIL is going to—I do not believe that the moderate 

opposition will obviously stop in that effort. So, therefore, there will 

be these two prongs. There is no way to avoid that. 

Senator MCCAIN. I hope there are two prongs and not ISIL first, 

that that message is not given to these brave young people who we 

are asking to sacrifice—— 

41 

Secretary KERRY. Well, if we do not stop ISIL first, there may 

not be much left of the other prong. 

Senator MCCAIN. John—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MCCAIN. That means we cannot take on two adversaries 

at once. 

Secretary KERRY. It is not us. 

Senator MCCAIN. That is bogus and false. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know you two colleagues would like to go at it 

for the rest of the session, but—— 

Secretary KERRY. No, no, no. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We have other—I am sorry. 

Secretary KERRY. We have a great tradition. I believe in John’s 

adage that a fight not joined is a fight not enjoyed. So we always 

have a great time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons. I am sorry. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, and thank you, 

Secretary Kerry, for appearing, and for outlining, and for discussing with us in detail the strategy to degrade and destroy ISIL. 

And, I, too, want to thank Ambassador Ford for his commendable 

service and his ongoing commitment to the people of Syria. 

I share your grave concern about ISIL, the threat it poses to our 

regional allies and to the United States, and the actions that they 

took in the massacring of Christians, Yazidis, Turkoman. And I am 

proud that we have stood up to them, and I am eager to hear and 

learn more about the strategy and exactly how it will play out. 

First, Mr. Secretary, if I might, in your visit to Baghdad last 

week, the Prime Minister announced a proposal to establish a national guard style force of Sunnis that would reclaim and protect 

predominantly Sunni areas. And I think reconciliation between 

Shia and Sunni in the formal government and in the underground 

conditions in Iraq is absolutely essential to our having a prospect 

of success. 

Can you explain how long it will take to establish this national 

guard style Sunni force on the ground in Iraq, how this model will 

work, and if there would be any role for our National Guard in 

training or equipping or supporting this Iraqi national guard? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator Coons, that is a really good question, 

and I do not have all those answers at this point in time. I mean, 

there are military decisions with respect to who is going to be involved in training them and whether there is room for some National Guard input, et cetera. I am confident that the military folks 

would not dream of advising and assisting with respect to the National Guard structure without using their experience within our 

military as to how it has worked here and how it has been effective. 

Senator COONS. Then let me ask a related question. 

Secretary KERRY. That said—but that said, let me just say very 

quickly. The theory of it is to try to localize capacity in a way, as 

I think you know, that deals with this sectarian divide. One of the 

reason that the ‘‘Iraq army,’’ as it has been called, folded in Mosul 

and before the wave of ISIL was frankly that the—some of the officers abandoned the men who were left behind. And there was a 

real sense of sectarian divide there. 

42 

Senator COONS. Right. 

Secretary KERRY. They left because they were perceived by many 

people, and this was part of the problem with Iraq at that time, 

that there was a Sunni—there was a Sunni-Shia divide, sectarian 

divide within the construct of the military itself. And people to 

some degree felt even that it went so far as to be the prime minister’s personal military entity, and there was not a stake in it. 

So it was the absence of that commitment that motivated people 

to take off, and that has to be done away with, and there has be 

a unity. So whatever this national guard is, it is going to have to 

still be unified and connected to the state to ensure a sense of national enterprise, but made up of people who are—have a greater 

stake in their local community in their region, which was absent 

previously. 

Senator COONS. I strongly agree and support your hard work on 

the diplomacy side of trying to address the challenges in Iraq, because if we have a Shia-only government and military, it is not sustainable, and that is in some ways what created the vacuum. 

Let me move on to two regional questions, if I could. Has the 

campaign against ISIL affected our ongoing negotiations to end 

Iran’s illicit nuclear program? And how has a potentially expanded 

military campaign against ISIL made it more difficult to find a 

final deal between Iran and the P5+1, the deadline coming in November, or have the mutual interests of Iraq and some of the P5+1 

members provided a common point of interest for ongoing dialogue? 

How has it affected our—— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we hope it is going to be the latter. We 

hope obviously very much it will be the latter part of your question 

that it has not affected it, that it can continue. Our P5+1 folks left 

for New York this afternoon. We will be engaging in that activity 

over the course of the next days, and we will get a better sense of 

it. 

My belief is that the nuclear issue is so huge in its consequences, 

not just to Iran, but to the region, to the world, to all of us, the 

interest in getting rid of the sanctions, which is the end goal here 

with respect to Iran and our end goal of being able to reach an 

agreement is significant enough. And to the credit of people in the 

P5+1, thus far there has been a compartmentalization. Russia and 

China are both very constructively continuing to be active and involved in the negotiations and constructive with them. And our 

hope is that that will prevail going forward, but the answer is not 

yet defined fully. 

Senator COONS. Let me make sure you are not misunderstood because I do not think you meant exactly what you just said. The end 

goal is not to end the sanctions. The end goal is not to reach—— 

Secretary KERRY. The end goal is to end the nuclear possibility, 

but what I said is their end—I think I said their end goal. 

Senator COONS. I thought that might be a helpful clarification. 

Secretary KERRY. No, no, no. I said there—I thought I said their 

desire is to obviously get the sanctions. You cannot do that—you 

cannot lift the sanctions without absolutely guaranteeing that the 

four pathways to a nuclear weapon have been closed off. And that 

is what we are working at. 

43 

Senator COONS. Last question. I am very concerned about the 

stability, security, safety of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, our 

vital ally in the region, which has borne so much of the challenge 

and the burden of the refugees from Syria. And I am concerned 

that ISIL has had efforts to infiltrate Jordan, and there have been 

some isolated outbreaks of violence in Jordan related to ISIL. What 

are we doing and what more can we do to strengthen King 

Abdullah and to partner with him and work with him as we expand the mission we are talking about here as it has some impact, 

not just in Syria and Iraq, but also in Jordan? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we are working very, very closely with 

our friends in Jordan. And I was in Jordan, and I met with King 

Abdullah a few days ago—last week, I think Wednesday night after 

I had been to Iraq. We spent the evening talking about the various 

things we need to do together. They are determined to be helpful 

to us, and we are determined to be helpful to them, and we will 

be. 

We are committing additional funds. We are committing additional equipment and capacity. And, you know, everybody shares 

concerns with all the neighbors in the region. I mean, ISIL—that 

is one of the reasons why this is so critical. And I can assure that 

you that an already extremely robust mil-to-mil, intel-to-intel and, 

you know, supply assistance program and economic program will 

be even more robust going forward. And you all have the budget, 

and you know what we are trying to do. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, 

thank you very much for coming. Yesterday’s New York Times 

headline, ‘‘Kerry Says U.S. is Open to Talking to Iran.’’ And you 

just—and I agree with your comments about the nuclear issue is 

so huge. You do talk about compartmentalization and also that 

Iran’s goal is to eliminate the sanctions. 

We have already seen the administration roll back sanctions— 

January, $7 billion in sanction relief. The administration recently 

introduced and announced another $2.8 billion in Iran sanction release. There are serious concerns that the administration could further relieve and remove sanctions in terms of trying to get concessions relating to Iran and the fight in Syria or Iraq. Clearly Iran 

and the United States do not have the same goals that we have in 

Syria, so I am curious, what are you hoping to achieve by reaching 

out to Iran regarding ISIL? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, let me clarify something because 

it is very important to understand it. Every aspect of the interim 

agreement that we arrived at with Iran, which required Iran to do 

certain things, they have done, every aspect. And the5 thing that 

is outstanding still is the IAEA compliance where a recent meeting 

was not as forthcoming as people would have liked. But with respect to the agreement they entered into with the United States, 

they have done all the things they said they would do. 

We have people daily inspecting in Fordow. Before that agreement, we had none. We have people daily inspecting Natanz. Before the agreement, we had none. We have people in Iraq on a periodic basis with the plans being delivered to us with the commisVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
44 

sioning completely halted, and before that that was not true. I 

mean, I can run down a list. 

We have had access to centrifuges, centrifuge production, centrifuge storage. We have mining and milling and, you know, a clarity here as to their activities that simply did not exist. That is what 

we have gotten out of this. Their program has been halted where 

it was when we began. And they have reduced their stockpile of 20 

percent going down to zero. That is an extraordinary thing. For all 

the people who frankly said to us it is never going to work, the 

sanctions will come apart, that is not what has happened. The 

sanctions regime has not only held, there have been additional 

sanctions. 

Now, yes, was there an agreement to release a portion of an initial round of some of the money that had been escrowed and held? 

Yes, $4.6 billion. Was there an agreement for the extension of a 

plan that continued this cooperation of $2.8? Yes. That is a total 

of about, what, $7 billion over, what, 9 months or something. The 

fact is that during that same amount of time, tens of billions of dollars have been withheld. There is more than a hundred—I forget 

the exact figures—more than a hundred and some billion that Iran 

believes it has a right to and wants that is being held in a freeze 

account until this gets resolved. 

So I would have to say to you, Senator, this has been an enormous success thus far. Our hope is that in exchange for whatever 

schedule might be worked out, all of which will have to be subject 

to public scrutiny and a final agreement, any pathway to a bomb 

will be eliminated with a sufficient breakout time that we have the 

ability to come to you and say the world is safer, our allies in the 

region are safer, and this is a deal that people believe can be 

upheld. That is the goal. 

We are not there yet. I do not know if we can get there. I hope 

we can get there because the alternatives are, you know, more complicated. 

Senator BARRASSO. I do not want to get to a point where the 

sanctions have been removed and they are still on a path to producing a bomb. 

Secretary KERRY. That will not happen. 

Senator BARRASSO. Switching a little bit to follow up with Senator McCain, do we have any intelligence on how the Assad regime 

is going to react should the coalition launch airstrikes on ISIS targets in Syria in terms of commitments that Assad will not intervene specifically? We know ISIS does not have the capability to 

shoot down our jet bombers, but Syria does. And are there precautions in place to prevent that? 

Secretary KERRY. The answer is, Senator, we are going to take 

precautions, but what I need to do is take it up with you in a classified session. 

Senator BARRASSO. A couple of final questions on hostages. Do 

you know how many American hostages we believe are being held 

by ISIS or militant groups right now? 

Secretary KERRY. Somewhere about three or four. I do not want 

to get—I think we have got to be careful on the numbers. 

Senator BARRASSO. The concern is that, you know, after the barbaric murder of James Foley, the operational details of rescue atVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
45 

tempts were leaked to the press, including the special operations 

unit. And I just wanted to make sure that the administration is 

committed to working to stop leaking classified information that 

undermines our military operations. 

Secretary KERRY. I honestly do not know where it came from. I 

cannot tell you that. We have a problem in this city with leaks in 

every department of government. And we try, believe me, to stop 

that. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The 

world today is more complicated, more dangerous than at any time 

during our lifetimes. And I wake up every day thankful that we 

have leaders like you and President Obama, thoughtful, strategic, 

guiding our way through it. So thank you for all the work that you 

are doing and for enduring this process for as long as you have. 

It strikes me that we are dealing with a fundamentally new 

problem in a frustratingly familiar context. The new problem is 

ISIL. They are on the verge of becoming the world’s first autonomous terrorist state if they are successful. I have no doubt that 

they will turn their focus on the United States and our allies. But 

the familiar new problem is the Middle East, and if we have 

learned anything over the last 12 years of war it is that the Middle 

East seems largely immune from U.S. efforts to bend it to our will. 

And so, that is not an excuse to idly by. It is just a reason why 

we have to be very careful about crafting a strategy that is not just 

well intentioned, but realistic. And so, I think that you and the 

President have got it largely right. I think I am broadly supportive 

of the strategy that you have laid with one exception, and so I want 

to just bring us back to the question about arming and trading 

with Syrian rebels. 

When we talked about this in open session a year ago, we raised 

concerns about the potential for the Free Syrian Army to coordinate with the al-Nusra wing of al-Qaeda, and there was confidence 

that that would not end up being the case. But we have a variety 

of reports that that indeed has been the practice, most recently in 

a joint effort between the Free Syrian Army and al-Nusra fronts 

to take a border post between Syria and Israel. 

So let me ask you that question. You answered Senator Udall’s 

question about the ways in which we can keep arms from flowing 

to Islamic extremist groups. But why are you confident—how can 

you give us confidence that we are not going to train a fighting 

force that is then going to enter a battle with a known affiliate of 

al-Qaeda? And how confident are we that ultimately when they get 

on the field of battle that they are not going to look to ISIS, who 

is fighting the same enemy that they originally entered into battle 

against, Assad, in common cause? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, there is no fail-safe obviously. 

As I said earlier in answer to an earlier question, our guys have 

gotten much, much better at the vetting. And now that we are 

doing the training to some degree and hopefully do it openly, we 

are going to be in a much better position to do command and control, to do, you know, much greater in-depth accountability, if you 

will. 

46 

In the end, there probably will be some strange bedfellow moments in the course of this kind of battle. I would be crazy if I sat 

here and just said to you, oh, it will never happen, there is nobody—you know. There are exigencies and circumstances that we 

do not always control. But by and large, we are beginning to get 

a much better handle with other players in the region on the funding streams, for instance, to al-Nusra. 

Different countries that have played the angles with certain 

groups are now coalescing together. And we see a shift, and I think 

that is going to be to our benefit to be able to exercise at least a 

greater amount of control. Fail-safe, I cannot sit here and promise 

you that, but we are going to do the best we can. 

Now, let me just say to you—all of you here a couple of things. 

One, the House just passed the Syria Train and Assist and Equip 

bill, and obviously we hope the House having done that, that the 

Senate will follow suit in short order. I also want to just correct 

one thing I said earlier. I was talking about the JPOA, the agreement, and John is gone. But I just want to emphasize, I did not 

mean to say we did not have any inspection before. We did not 

have daily inspection. We had some inspection through our process, 

but now we have the daily, and we did not have a sufficient level 

to have guarantees in a place like Fordow that we have a comfort 

level. 

One other thing can I just say because you raised this, Senator 

Murphy? 

Senator MURPHY. It is fine. 

Secretary KERRY. Okay. 

Senator MURPHY. Go ahead. 

Secretary KERRY. No, go ahead. I will answer it following your 

question. 

Senator MURPHY. Well, here is my—I guess my only followup is 

this. I understand that there are going to be strange bedfellows, 

but to the extent that the strange bedfellows are the Free Syrian 

Army fighting alongside al-Nusra, which is a wing and affiliate of 

al Qaeda, I hope that is not a reality that we are prepared to accept. We have had all sorts of talk about ISIL, but it is important 

to remember that the only major terrorist organization that has 

plans and stated intentions to carry them out against the United 

States today is al Qaeda. So I just want to make sure that we have 

a specific focus on that particular set of strange bedfellows. 

Secretary KERRY. I am with you 100 percent, and we will to the 

greatest degree possible, absolutely. But what I wanted to say to 

everybody here is you mentioned something very important a moment ago, which was about ISIL being a terrorist state and so 

forth. This is one of the things that I ran into very strongly with 

all the meetings I had in the region. And I want to just share with 

you this, that one of the key parts of this strategy is to not ever 

give them the legitimacy that they are trying to seek as to being 

a state. They have no legitimacy. They are not an Islamic state, 

and they are not in the vein of any other state in that region that 

tries to give meaning to the concept of Islamism as they celebrate 

it with their citizens and their countries. 

And this is important for us because, you know, Islam does not 

produce—no legitimacy in Islam produces the butchers who killed 

47 

Steven Sotoloff or David Haines or, you know, Jim Foley. That is 

not Islam, and Islam is not ISIL. And increasingly all of the voices 

in the region are really starting to feel that they have a need to 

speak out and to reclaim Islam, and that is one of the most important things that could come out of this. And we are working on 

ways to do that. 

So ISIL is not a state obviously. It is not remotely like a state, 

and what we need to do is make that more clear. So let me just 

share with you two important things. The Grand Mufti of Saudi 

Arabia, the home of Mecca and Medina, which, by the way, are in 

the target scale of ISIS, these are Islam’s most holy cities, they 

said of these murderers they are enemy number one of Islam. That 

comes from the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia. 

And today, Saudi Arabia’s top clerical council, all 21 members, 

the only institution in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that is authorized to issue fatwahs, invoking Muhammad, using the words of the 

Koran itself, today they said that ISIL are killers. They are thugs. 

They should be singled out and punished as apostates under 

Sharia, and made an example of. And they said they were not following the Prophet, but that these—and these are their words, not 

mine. They are following the order of Satan. 

Now, that is what you are beginning to hear from the region, and 

that is a key part of this strategy. And obviously we do not have 

the legitimacy to do what people in the region can do to de-legitimize, but we are certainly going to do everything in our power to 

help encourage that and make sure that people are aware of it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Paul. 

Senator PAUL. Thank you, and thank you for your testimony. I 

agree with you and with the President that we must confront and 

destroy ISIL. I think that, you know, I am well on record as being 

very skeptical about our interventions in the Middle East. I think 

that the original war in Iraq has led to more chaos and less stability. I think the President’s war in Libya as well as your intervention in Syria have led to less stability and more radical Islam 

throughout the country, and have actually enabled ISIL. 

I do also and have been a frequent critic of Secretary Clinton for 

not providing adequate security, though, for Benghazi and for the 

consulate. So I do think that there is an American interest in defending our Embassy in Baghdad as well as our consulate in Erbil. 

And I want there to be some message going forward from this hearing today that there is obviously bipartisan support for defending 

American interests in Iraq. 

However, I am very disappointed, though, in the President for 

not obeying the Constitution. The Constitution is very clear. It gave 

the power to declare war to Congress. And you can say, hey, we 

are going to come back when it is convenient, but we are going to 

be committing war for the next 3 or 4 months, and we will do as 

we please. That is not what the Constitution intended. 

The interesting thing about the creative logic that used to say 

that a vote in 2001 has anything to do with today is that it seems 

to be acknowledged that, well, that allows you to do anything with 

forces that may be associated with terrorism or al-Qaeda. One of 

the interesting things is if you look at Ambassador Ford’s testimony, he will say that ‘‘Moderate forces have and will tactically coVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
48 

ordinate with al-Qaeda, with al-Qaeda linked to al-Nusra.’’ So the 

interesting thing, if we use your logic and say the 2001 AUMF can 

be used to justify this, well, the 2001 AUMF could be used to justify going after the moderate Syrian rebels who are associated with 

al-Qaeda. 

So I think really anybody who is intellectually honest would say 

that the people who voted in 2001 to go to war with the people who 

attacked us on 9/11, the people who congregated in Afghanistan, 

has absolutely nothing to do with this. And really this committee, 

Congress, Senate, and the President are all abdicating the responsibility to vote for a new use of authorization of force, and that 

what you are doing now is illegal and unconstitutional. 

I think also from a practical point of view, it would be better to 

bring the country together. I think we would galvanize more support. It would be a bipartisan war. And had the President been a 

great leader, he should have come before a joint Congress instead 

of going on TV. He should have come before a joint Congress and 

immediately asked for a resolution, and there should have been a 

vote. That would have been true leadership. There would have 

been true bipartisan support, and then really there would be less 

carping on both sides. 

The President also used to believe this. The President ran, and 

it was one of the large reasons the public went for the President 

initially, is he said no President should unilaterally go to war without the authority of Congress. So I liked the President as a candidate on this issue, but not so much as the President. 

The other problem with this is that, you know, who are these 

moderate people? Are there really moderate, you know, Islamic 

rebels in Syria? Here is a quote, and I would like your comment 

on this. Ryan Crocker, the distinguished former United States Ambassador to both Iraq and Syria, said, that ‘‘The administration’s 

knowledge about the non-ISIS opposition in Syria is that we need 

to do everything we can to figure out’’—this is Crocker. ‘‘We need 

to do everything we can to figure out who the non-ISIS opposition 

is because, frankly, we do not have a clue.’’ 

You know, most of the weapons we have been giving to the moderate rebels, they are sort of at a stopping place. That is where 

they stopped briefly before ISIS takes the weapons. Some of these, 

the Syrian National Revolutionary Front have signed—have signed 

a cease-fire. Maybe not all of the vetted rebels are, but the Syrian 

Revolutionary Front has signed a cease-fire. 

So really, I argue, and I would believe, and I would like to hear 

your comment. I think we have allowed there to be more of a safe 

haven for ISIL in giving weapons to the so-called moderate rebels 

because really that has taken pressure off them. It has kept Assad 

at bay. And I think, contrary to what others have said here, had 

we bombed Assad last year, ISIL would be in Damascus. 

So I think we are lucky we did not bomb Assad last year, and 

that we should be very careful about arming any Islamic rebels in 

Syria because the weapons may not stay where they are intended, 

and they may have the unintended consequence of actually enabling ISIL. Your comments? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we are not planning to, nor do we want 

to, nor have we armed Islamic folks in Syria. The United States 

49 

does not do that, and we have opposed it, and Robert Ford will tell 

you. And Robert Ford worked very hard to make sure that we were 

not doing that. 

I also think it is good that you are going to hear from Robert 

Ford because he will give you about as good an analysis of who the 

non-ISIS opposition is, and he will break it down point for point because he did that for me on many occasions and articulated who 

they were and so forth. But he was also a passionate supporter of 

making certain that the moderate opposition got support. And he 

fought hard to get it more support than they did get, absolutely. 

So I think he should do that for you. 

But let me just make it clear that the—I mean, I am glad that 

you can guarantee that there would be a vote if the President sent 

up here. I have got 60 nominees, some of whom have been waiting 

more than a year to get a vote up here. And the chair and the 

ranking member have been terrific in helping to try to break them 

out, but they cannot get a vote. So if you can tell the President you 

can absolutely guarantee a vote, I would be really amazed. 

Senator PAUL. I find it unbelievable that if the President came 

before a joint session of Congress and asked for use of force, that 

he would not get a vote. I find it unthinkable. There is absolutely 

no way that you can imagine that he would not get a vote if he 

asked for it, so really, let us be honest. Politics are engaged here. 

People do not want to have a vote before the election. They are 

afraid of this vote. People are petrified, not of the enemy, but petrified of the electorate. That is why we are not having a vote. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let me answer the first part of your question so that we make it crystal clear why the President is doing 

what he is doing, because you are not insinuating. You are stating 

quite declaratively that the President has violated the Constitution. The President absolutely, clearly, by almost any legal standard that I can imagine is not violating the Constitution. He is upholding it. Article 2 gives the President the power to do what he 

is doing. He has lived by the War Powers Act. He has sent countless notices up to the Congress. And I think every legal analysis 

suggests that while you may not like it—— 

Senator PAUL. If Article 2 gives unlimited power, why come at 

all? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, let me just finish. Because he believes 

that the Congress ought to do this, and no one has—— 

Senator PAUL. But he does not believe he is bound. 

Secretary KERRY. The President has the right as the President 

under Article 2 to defend this Nation and to take the steps necessary to do so. The War Powers Act declares the terms under 

which you do that, Senator. You know that. And he has lived absolutely within that constitutional prerogative. 

Secondly, like it or not, and I can agree. I think you can find reasons to be uncomfortable. That does not mean it is not legal. And 

the chairman of this committee is appropriately going to try to recalibrate the AUMF, which we support entirely. We welcome the 

opportunity to have it recalibrated. It should be. But for the moment, the President believes we need to move now, and that is a 

full and appropriate exercise of constitutional power. 

Senator PAUL. And for the record, that will be after the election. 

50 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary for 

your testimony. It has been an illuminating back and forth. I also 

want to thank Ambassador Ford and Mr. Connable, the written 

testimony that you each prepared. Very instructive. I often walk 

away from hearings older, but not smarter. I am walking away 

from this one older and smarter, so thank you for that. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your comments at the beginning with respect to the authorization. A number of us feel like 

additional congressional authorization for the mission as described 

by the President is mandatory. Some of us do not feel that. But all 

of us, I think, on both sides of the dais believe it is advisable. And 

your commitment to crafting that in an appropriate way is notable 

and important. 

I have introduced a draft, and others have as well, that we know 

will be forwarded to this committee as we look to try to put something together that is, in fact, bipartisan, and it should be. Based 

on the statements around the table, it should be. 

An observation. Tomorrow in Portsmouth, VA, a container ship, 

the MV Cape Ray, is returning to the Commonwealth of Virginia. 

It is a merchant marine ship with merchant marines and DOD personnel, and it is the ship that has been in the Mediterranean involved in the complete destruction of the declared Syrian chemical 

weapons stockpile. That is a good news day tomorrow. And I think 

it is something that we ought to just contemplate as we are thinking about U.S. power, that there was a diplomatic breakthrough 

that led to the destruction of one of the largest chemical weapons 

stockpiles in the world. The United States played a critical role and 

this committee played a critical role. 

The diplomatic breakthrough, a factor in that was the willingness to use military force. Diplomacy is important. Often you get 

a much better result if you are really willing to use military force. 

Some interpret what happened last year as the President stepped 

away from a redline. No, there was a redline. We will take action 

against you if you use chemical weapons. We were prepared to take 

military action. Had we taken military action, the best we were 

going to get from the mission as described was convincing the 

Assad regime not to use chemical weapons again. But we were not 

going to get their complete destruction. 

Those chemical weapons still would have been out there, possibly 

to have been seized by ISIL or other elements. What we now have, 

because of a willingness to use military force as a factor, is the 

complete destruction of a stockpile that is widely viewed as a real 

positive, especially by neighbors in the region. So as we move forward, diplomacy is important. Credible military threat is important. Those things can work together. 

Mr. Secretary, you talked a lot about this. We are very deeply 

concerned about the extent of the coalition, and we understand as 

it is still coming together, the purpose for the hearing today is not 

to describe every Nation and what their role is. But just to sort of 

put it on the table for you and others, it is incredibly important 

that this coalition not just be vast, but that it also be public at the 

appropriate point, and that the participation of Arab nations, nations in the region, be public. They have often been willing to supVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
51 

port the United States playing the lead in a financial way where 

they have not wanted to be public in condemning atrocities within 

their own region. 

I do not think the American public, and I do not think Congress, 

will support the United States policing a region that will not police 

itself. And so, it is critically important for the success of the mission and for the success of both of getting bipartisan support and 

supporting the American public that the coalition be vast, but especially with the nations that their participation not be, you know, 

we will help finance it, but we do not want to be public about it. 

They have to be full public partners for this mission to be successful. 

In addition, the importance of their public participation is critical 

to the success of the mission on the ground because if this is a campaign of the West against ISIL or the United States against ISIL, 

in a bizarre way, we will potentially legitimize ISIL even more. But 

if it is, and you read the quotes earlier that are helpful, if it is a 

public campaign by leaders in the region, whether they be religious 

leaders or clerics and certainly nations against ISIL. 

This is not about Islam. You are a profanation of Islam in what 

you are doing. So the more public that is, the more ISIL is de-legitimized, and the ultimate success of this mission is not just a 

military success, it is a de-legitimization strategy that will strip 

away the pretense that this is an organization that has anything 

to do with Islam and demonstrating to the public that they need 

to back away from it and condemn it. And so, that is why the coalition thing is so critical, and the public nature of the coalition is important. And if you just want to comment on that briefly, please. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, no, Senator, look, you have said it, and 

I think I have said it in the course of the hearing. We completely 

understand that. We do not want this just to be—this is not just 

an American effort. That is one of the reasons why the President 

took the time to make sure that the Iraqi Government was in 

place, that we were going to build a coalition, that we took the time 

to do what was necessary because we all understand that no one 

is advantaged by this being perceived of as just an American effort, 

and it is not. There are many other countries. I mean, France 

helped, stepped up, and bringing people to Paris the other day for 

a larger conference, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia hosted that meeting. 

And countries that had not sat at the table together for some period of time were at that table. 

One of the things that people really have not, I think, sufficiently 

focused on in this story is the Iraqi story. I mean, Iraq was on the 

brink 2 months ago, and many people were talking about, oh, my 

god, is it going to break up? Can it hold together? What is going 

to happen? We worked very, very closely with Iraqis, and Iraqis led 

that effort, all of them, you know. The Sunni folks who had bitter 

feelings about what happened in the last years came together, 

picked a new speaker. 

The Kurds, who had plenty of reasons to be mistrustful and not, 

you know, be certain of the future, came together and elected a 

new president. And that new president had the courage to choose 

somebody other than the current Prime Minister to say you try to 

form a government. That could have faltered. It did not. They came 

52 

together, put together that new government, actually ratified the 

new Prime Minister. The new Prime Minister has been continuing 

to put the government together. His Foreign Minister was in 

Jeddah, was in Paris. 

So, you know, this photograph I pointed out of a, you know, of 

a Kurd President, of a, you know, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister 

of a Shia-Iraqi Foreign Minister, all together conferring about how 

they are going to deal with ISIL tells you the story of an amazing 

transformation that has taken place. And I think people need to 

recognize that that is a big step forward. Now, we have to build 

on it. 

The second thing I would just say about the Cape Ray coming 

back, I want to thank your people. I wish you would extend the 

huge gratitude of the administration and of the world for this incredible job well done. And you are absolutely correct. The President announced he was going to strike. We had already been talking with the Russians and others about how to get the weapons 

out, and then the deal came together and took away the necessity 

for the President to make a judgment he still would have made, 

whether or not to strike under his constitutional power based on 

the announcement he made. 

But clearly getting 100 percent of the declared weapons out—we 

still have some questions about a few other things. But 100 percent, 1,300 tons of weapons out completely and destroyed is the 

first time that has ever happened in a time of conflict in any part 

of the world. 

And I will tell you, ask Prime Minister Netanyahu, ask people 

in the region, they will tell you they are safer. You have an X factor that has now been eliminated from this whole equation of what 

we may or may not do in Syria as a consequence of that action. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, and thank you for the excellent job 

which you are doing, Mr. Secretary. Turkey—Turkey does not want 

to become part of our combat operations because ISIL has hostages 

from Turkey. But at the same time, Turkey has become the destination for the oil which has been captured by the ISIL army in 

both Iraq and in Syria. And it is upward of a million to $3 million 

a day, $300 million to a billion dollars in the course of a year. In 

fact, the smuggled oil has now become the lifeblood of the ISIL 

army. 

So talk a little bit about Turkey and what our efforts are going 

to be to just shut this down, because without that money, they do 

not have the money to produce Hollywood-style videos. They do not 

have the money to pay their soldiers. They do not have the money 

to take care of these cities and towns that they are taking over. 

Talk about what we have to do with Turkey to just get them to 

shut this down. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, it is a very, very relevant question and one that we are working on very hard obviously. We really 

do understand the sensitivities that Turkey has. I do not want to 

talk about it too much publicly, to be honest with you, because of 

that. I think we are better off having a classified conversation 

about this. But I have hopes that as we move forward here over 

53 

time, that the current dynamic may be able to shift in a way that 

will help us deal with that a lot more. 

Turkey understands the challenges, believe me, and we have had 

some very candid conversations about it. But Turkey will have to 

make its decisions in the days ahead, and we will see what happens. 

Senator MARKEY. It is unconscionable that Turkey has become 

the principal source of funding for ISIL, and if we can shut that 

down, we do almost immeasurable damage to their ability to finance this war. And I just think we have to put Turkey right front 

and center and have the world say to them, they must stop it. 

Let me move on. The language which is in the resolution says 

that one of the goals is to promote the conditions for a negotiated 

settlement to end the conflict in Syria. We will be voting on that. 

So experts are saying that it will take upwards of 3 years to resecure the border between Iraq and Syria. And experts are also 

saying that it will take up to 10 years to create the conditions on 

the ground in Syria to bring Assad to the table in order to, in fact, 

have a negotiated settlement. 

So I would ask you talk about those two timelines that experts 

are talking realistically given the weakness of the Free Syrian 

Army, how long it will take to build them up, how long it will take 

for us to push the ISIL army out of Iraq. The American people, I 

think, want to know how long we are going to be engaged in this 

effort toward the end game. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let me talk macro in a sense here, Senator, if I can. First of all, I have read various accounts of summaries of various experts, some of whom are experts and some of 

whom are called experts. And there is only one expert right now 

that I am looking to, and that is Gen. John Allen. He has the responsibility here. He is putting together his team very rapidly. He 

is having meetings, and I will listen to him very carefully before 

I start pushing out timelines. 

Now, that said, President Obama has already said it is going to 

take a number of years to do the broad-based effort that we are at. 

And when I say that, you know, I think you can do a lot to ISIL 

fairly quickly, and then you have a longer fight as you begin to 

really go into the, you know, full destruction and defeat mode, so 

to speak. 

But I got to tell you, and this is something that I expect to be 

talking about more with this committee and with Congress over the 

course of the next months. The fight of our generation is a combined fight against the immediate challenge of radical, religious extremism and its exploitation in various parts of the world, and 

large, unemployed populations of young people without good governance surrounding them and without opportunity, without dignity, respect. And this is a challenge we face, all of us, and all 

countries that consider themselves, you know, developed, and neardeveloped, and civilized. 

It is our challenge, and we need to figure out how we are going 

to do all the things we need to do. And this is part of what President Obama talked about when he went to West Point, and about 

the focus on counterterrorism, and the need to talk more as we go 

54 

forward in the days ahead about exactly how we are going to fill 

out the full agenda of our country to be safe in the long term. 

It is a big, long-term operation, and that part of it is going to 

take years. And the United States, I think it is clear, is going to 

have to help lead that effort, and that is going to require a different attitude about foreign policy and engagement than a lot of 

people have been willing to embrace. I look forward to that discussion very much, and we are doing our homework to be able to come 

to you with thoughtful ideas about how we can deal with it. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We are very fortunate to have you as the person sitting in that seat. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, you are because you are now in my seat. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The most fortunate of them all. Well, Mr. Secretary, thank you for your engagement here today. You became the 

Secretary of State at a time in which I have never seen in 22 years 

in the Congress such a confluence of challenges globally as they 

exist right now, the topic we have been discussing here for the last 

3 hours: the challenge of ISIL, the Russian invasion in Ukraine, 

the challenges of Ebola in Africa, the reality of our continuing challenge with Iran and its search for nuclear weapons, and the list 

goes on and on. And your service comes at an extraordinarily important time, so we want to salute you. 

I do want to make one or two final comments. Number one is 

this is going to be an issue in which more information and a steady 

flow of information and briefings will be critical to having the congressional understanding and the ultimate support for what I believe is our mutual mission to defeat ISIL. And I just want to say 

that on various occasions, you have legitimately said that we need 

to have some of these conversations in classified settings. I will say 

that I look forward and intend to hold those classified hearings, but 

I hope it is going to be as robust so that when we get into a classified hearing, we do not have to hear, well, I cannot talk about that 

in that context. That will be problematic. 

Secondly, there have been many—I do not question anybody’s intentions here. I believe that there are many legitimate questions, 

and there are certainly legitimate questions when we think about 

putting America’s sons and daughters into harm’s way. We are 

strongest in the national challenge that we face when we speak 

with one voice, as Democrats, Republicans, and Independents together as Americans. And it is that unity of purpose I think that 

will be critical—a critical element of our success against ISIL. This 

is a moment in which politics must stop at the water’s edge. 

This committee for the last 2 years has taken on a whole host 

of major foreign policy and national security challenges in a bipartisan way, and I look forward to working with my colleagues to 

come together again to do that in this most critical case. I think 

we can. 

And finally, I remind those who are concerned about the use of 

U.S. military might in a foreign country, that we face the world as 

it is, not as we wish it to be. I do not know how you negotiate with 

an entity that beheads Americans. 

So thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony and engagement 

for what I expect will be a continuing engagement. And before you 

55 

have a parting word, I do want to urge colleagues, we have an important panel coming up with a lot of information, and I hope 

members will be able to stay or come back. 

Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary KERRY. I will be very, very brief. Just thank you very 

much. I look forward to having those discussions. And one coda, I 

think you know this. I long believed as chairman that the chairman and ranking member should have the same input as the chair 

and ranking member of the other committees—Armed Services, et 

cetera, Intel—because of the policy considerations. And I have advocated for that within this administration, and it is something 

that I think ought to happen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your testimony. Let me call up 

our second panel today as the Secretary leaves. And I—— 

[Disturbance in hearing room.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. I will ask the 

Capital Police to remove individuals who will not come to order. 

Our second panel today is Robert Ford, senior fellow of the Middle East Institute. And Ambassador Ford, of course, has a long and 

distinguished history in the Foreign Service of the United States, 

which he did so exceptionally well in Syria. And Ben Connable, the 

senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation here 

in Washington. I appreciate both of you. Both of your written statements will be included in the record in its entirety without objection. 

And I appreciate your willingness to hang in there for the last 

several hours and to still be here to provide what I think is some 

critical testimony and insights. So with the thanks of the committee to both of you, I will recommend—I mean, I will recognize 

Senator—I mean, I will recognize Ambassador Ford first, and then 

we will turn to Mr. Connable. 

Ambassador Ford. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. FORD, SENIOR FELLOW, 

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador FORD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Johnson, and other 

distinguished guests and members of the committee. It is a very 

big honor to be with you today, and I thank you for the invitation. 

And as you noted, I submitted a written statement. And so, let me 

just make a few opening remarks, and then I will turn it over to 

my copanelist, Ben. 

Many have spoken about the dangers of the Islamic State against 

us and against our allies in the region. And I would simply note 

that I have been looking on Arabic social media sites in Arabic language, and some of the language is blood-curdling, the threats 

against us. And I take these people at their word, and they do 

present a serious danger to us. 

The administration’s proposal to increase assistance to moderate 

elements of the armed opposition in Syria will be useful as one part 

of addressing the Islamic State threat, and the administration’s 

proposal deserves congressional support. I understand from you— 

56 

well, Secretary Kerry that the House has voted, and I hope the 

Senate does as well as soon as possible. 

Let me just make three points. First, and I heard it again today 

here. People question whether there is a moderate armed opposition, but there is, and it is already fighting the Islamic State. I put 

some details about some of the groups in my written testimony, 

Mr. Chairman. When I say ‘‘moderate,’’ what I mean by that word 

is that its leaders—the leaders of these groups do not seek to impose a religious state on Syrian society by force. Many of them are 

Islamists, Mr. Chairman, but they do not seek to impose a religious 

state by force. 

That said, there are no angels in the Syrian war now. However, 

the moderate groups emanate from what were peaceful protest 

movements around Syria in 2011. These were the protest movements that I myself saw. And their leaders accept the idea that 

there has to be an eventual political deal in Syria. That also makes 

them moderate. Some of these groups, in fact, including groups in 

my written testimony, had representatives at the talks in Geneva 

where Secretary Kerry was present. 

My second point is these moderates now are fighting the Islamic 

State. They lost badly in eastern Syria. They lost very badly. That 

is how the Islamic State took control of oil fields. They are holding 

their own right now in northern Syria not far from the Turkish 

border, but it is a hard fight. It is a desperate fight, and they 

would definitely benefit from greater and more reliable material 

aid in those battles against the Islamic State in northern Syria. 

We just had a delegation here from the Iraqi Kurdish Government. Like the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga who are fighting the Islamic State on the Iraq side of the border, the moderate armed opposition in Syria would benefit as well from American airstrikes 

against Islamic state targets. And they would benefit more than 

Assad because those airstrikes up in northern Syria would help the 

moderates we are trying to help secure the moderates’ vital supply 

lines. Assad does not even have forces that far north in Syria anyway. 

My last point is that we have to go into this with our eyes open. 

The moderates in the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian armed opposition, their primary enemy is indeed still the Assad regime, 

which has killed far more Syrians than has the Islamic State, as 

awful and terrible as the Islamic State is. And so, as we try to 

work with them, they will always be thinking about how to manage 

their two-front war—the Islamic State on one side, the Assad regime on the other. 

But as their resources from the entire coalition of countries that 

Secretary Kerry and the administration is assembling, as their 

total resources increase, they will have more resources to devote 

against the Islamic State, but I doubt that all of their new resources from all of the countries are going to be used only against 

the Islamic State. I think we have to understand that going in. 

Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to take questions later, and thank 

you again for your invitation. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ford follows:] 

57 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. FORD

Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, members of the committee, it is an honor to be 

invited to speak with you today about what we should do in the face of a growing 

threat from the Islamic State. 

I spent almost 5 years working within Baghdad as the senior political advisor and 

later deputy to Ambassadors John Negroponte, Zalmay Khalilzad, Ryan Crocker, 

and finally Chris Hill. I left Iraq in 2010. 

And I then served on the ground in Damascus for a year before we had to close 

the Embassy in February 2012 and I returned home to head, for 2 years, the State 

Department team working on the Syria crisis. 

It’s been a grim 3 years, but I see some positive signs in Iraq that suggest guideposts as we think about next steps in Syria. 

These signs result from policy approaches to contain and reduce extremist groups 

that also worked when I was in Iraq years ago. 

Over the past several months in Iraq we identified groups on the ground in Iraq 

that rejected the Islamic State and that were sturdy enough to build upon. 

The Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga were not extremely well organized in June 2014— 

they had multiple command chains and there was confusion at the time of the fall 

of Mosul. And to be clear, the political goal of an independent Kurdistan shared by 

many Kurds is not one that the U.S. Government has endorsed. 

Still, the Peshmerga represented a reliable core group that could use our help to 

confront the Islamic State’s fighters on the ground. 

And despite the collapse of many Iraqi army units, there were reliable special 

operations army units that again could usefully utilize our help to fight the Islamic 

State. 

These Peshmerga and Iraqi Special Operations Forces together with a limited, 

judicious use of airstrikes pushed Islamic State fighters away from the Mosul Dam, 

from Erbil and Kirku parts of Diyala province. 

The fight is not at all over, but the Islamic State’s advance in Iraq has been 

blunted. 

It’s going to be a long fight. 

The President, very wisely in my opinion, insisted that we could not fight the 

Iraqi battle against the Islamic State for them, however. He conditioned big American help on the Iraqis finding a political deal to set up a new government—a sort 

of unity government—that could rally all Iraqis to fight the Islamic State. 

The President rightly understands that it is vital to undercut extremist recruiting 

among the disaffected Sunni Arab population by means of Iraqi political leaders figuring out a political deal. 

I am very encouraged that various tribal figures in Anbar and Hawija, elected 

provincial councils in Mosul and Salah ad-Din all have come forward to offer to 

mobilize Sunni Arab fighters against the Islamic State if the new government in 

Baghdad will join with them. The initial statements I have seen from the new Prime 

Minister are also encouraging. 

The regional states pledging to act with us in Iraq is also encouraging—and something we didn’t really have when I was in Iraq years ago. Just the symbolism of 

the Iraqi Foreign Minister—a senior Shia politician—appearing in Riyadh at Saudi 

invitation with other Sunni states’ representatives was very positive. We’re in a better spot in this regard than we were in 2003 or 2007. 

But as I said, if there are encouraging signs, we also need to understand that just 

as it took years to contain and reduce Al Qaeda in Iraq, so it will take years again 

in Iraq. Patience and firm insistence on our political conditions are vital. 

Turning to Syria, it’s a much harder problem than Iraq and we are long past the 

chance to find easy answers or sure bets. Still, the same elements used in Iraq offer 

the best path forward: 

• We need to identify friendly forces on the ground and boost their ability to fight 

the Islamic State; 

• We may need to use, judiciously, our own airpower; 

• As in Iraq the real fighting will be on the ground, so equipment, ammunition, 

logistics, and even cash matter just as much if not more; 

• A sustainable solution requires a new Syrian government via negotiations 

between Syrians with outside encouragement. 

Many Americans question whether there are any moderates left in the Syrian 

armed opposition. There are. They are fighting the Islamic State and the Assad 

regime both, they are, not surprisingly, hard pressed, and they could very much use 

our help. 

I find it odd that the media don’t talk about them much. Units like the Hazem 

Brigade fighting in northwestern Syria that actually helped expel the Islamic State 

58 

out of that part of Syria last spring. The Hazem Brigade issued a manifesto last 

March saying it was fighting for a pluralistic Syria where minorities’ rights would 

be protected. Or units like the 101st and 13th divisions, fighting in both northern 

and southern Syria, led by former Syrian military officers. Or units like the Omari 

and Yarmouk brigades which are fighting regime forces in southern Syria. There are 

others too, of course. 

Right now, some of these units, and others are locked in battle with the Islamic 

State near Aleppo in northern Syria.It’s a hard fight—U.S. equipment the Islamic 

State captured from the Iraqi Army is being used against those Free Syrian Army 

fighters. However, these units also have received help from outside and they have 

fought the Islamic State to a standstill in that part of Syria. It’s a desperate fight— 

the Islamic State is trying to capture vital supply lines for the moderate armed 

opposition coming down from Turkey. 

Helping those units, right now, around Aleppo could secure supply routes and 

boost the morale of the moderate fighters. Assad’s forces are some distance away 

and far too stretched already to hold ground northeast of Aleppo. Thus, we and our 

friends ramping up help there would not benefit Assad nearly as much as the moderate opposition. 

We do need multiple changes in approach. Larger, more reliable logistics help, 

including provision of ammunition and cash, are a must if we hope to make any 

headway against the Islamic State. And just as important, regional allies must stop 

competing with each other for influence by provisioning different groups in an uncoordinated fashion and instead blend their efforts in a broader strategic plan with 

the Syrian fighters’ commanders. 

And we must understand two vital points going in: 

—The moderate armed opposition’s biggest enemy is not the Islamic State. It is the 

Assad regime which has killed far more Syrians than has the detestable Islamic 

State. And they won’t stop fighting the Assad regime even as they advance 

against the Islamic State. 

—Moreover, in the desperately hard-fought battle against the Assad regime, moderate forces have, and will, tactically coordinate with the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra 

Front on the ground. This is due to operational necessity, made more urgent by 

the shortage of supplies. 

This coordination has nothing to do with ideological sympathy—indeed, groups 

such as the ones I mentioned have criticized the Nusra Front’s politics and even 

refused to work with its leaders in towns recaptured from the regime. 

Until the moderate elements are so strong that they don’t need Nusra to pressure 

the regime successfully, the moderate elements will accept working militarily with 

Nusra. 

As we think medium- and longer-term, a large moderate opposition force will be 

vital to holding ground seized back from the Islamic State. It will also be necessary 

to contain the Nusra Front one day. I do not see any other force that could do this 

short of a U.S.-led foreign force and even that would be extremely hard to sell politically in the region and in the broader international arena. I therefore welcome the 

administration’s proposal to move to a Title 10 program. 

However, just as in Iraq, the sustainable solution is to find a way to rally more 

Syrians against the Islamic State. The Assad regime’s brutality has helped the 

Islamic State’s rapid growth in Syria. Working with the Assad regime would be a 

golden gift to help the Islamic State’s recruiting in Syria and beyond. And there 

aren’t Assad forces to spare for central and eastern Syria anyway. 

Instead, as in Iraq, the endgame in Syria has to be a new government able to 

rally the armed opposition and the remaining regime forces together to fight the 

Islamic State. 

And we should know from the Libya experience, and our Iraq experience, that 

negotiating the creation of that new government in Syria, not trying to topple it, 

is the only way to preserve what remains of the Syrian state. 

Getting to negotiations will be very, very hard. Our Geneva efforts failed quickly. 

But 7 months later, the regime’s forces have taken heavy casualties at the hands 

of the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic State. Assad’s remaining forces are more 

stretched and tired. There are new signs of dissent among Assad’s ranks. 

Asad’s supporters may be tired but they don’t see a place to jump. They fear 

extermination at the hands of the Islamic State and the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra 

Front. I don’t blame them. 

The best way to give them a sense that there is a third way for a new government—one that is neither the current regime nor an Islamic extremist state—is for 

the moderate opposition to reach out to Assad’s supporters and to put forward ideas 

about how together they could assemble a new government. 

59 

Asad won’t like this, but that’s not the point. The point is that others inside the 

regime’s ranks should and could drag the top Syrian leadership back to negotiations. 

Thus, as we ramp up help to the Syrian moderate armed opposition, we also 

should insist that the opposition redouble efforts to reach out to regime elements 

and pursue discussions about a deal for a new government. There are steps the 

moderate opposition could take right now to send the right signal—treating prisoners well and offering to exchange them would be an excellent start. 

I do not think any of this will be fast or easy. I do think that both sides are tiring, 

and that could help get to the negotiations for a new government. The conclusion 

of a few local cease-fire deals here and there indicates that local commanders at 

least are willing to talk. 

Lastly, I welcome the administration’s decision which, when implemented with 

real resources and actions, will gain support of regional allies. In Iraq when I was 

there we worked without regional support with the exception of Kuwait. The administration is making a strong pitch for regional political and material backing. If we 

show determination, the regional states who have long wanted to see the Syrian crisis resolved will back us, even if some necessarily do it quietly. 

Going forward, we have be determined and committed.The first step is for the 

Congress to approve the President’s proposal to help Syrian moderate armed groups. 

And as we begin our efforts under Title X and back moderate fighters on the 

ground, we will need to be strategically patient and very tough with our allies and 

the moderate opposition when they stray outside the agreed lines of scrimmage. The 

Islamic State problem has grown over the course of 3 years. Putting it down again 

in Iraq and Syria likely will last years more. But based on what I saw in Iraq years 

ago, it is achievable. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Connable. 

STATEMENT OF BEN CONNABLE, SENIOR INTERNATIONAL 

POLICY ANALYST, RAND CORPORATION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. CONNABLE. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, 

and distinguished committee members, thank you for allowing me 

testify before you today on this critical topic. Ambassador Ford, it 

is an honor. 

I have been engaging with Sunni Iraqis since 2003 first as a Marine intelligence officer in Iraq, then as an attache ́ in Amman, Jordan, and most recently in support of my research on Sunni-Iraqi 

perceptions at RAND. My remarks are based on those relationships 

and on my research. 

This afternoon, I will outline options the United States and its 

allies can take in order to help free northern and western Iraq from 

Islamic State dominance. The thrust of my proposition here is that 

the success or failure of any coalition effort to defeat Islamic State 

and ultimately to stabilize Iraq hinges not on tactical consideration 

or tribal engagement efforts, but on the more critical issue of 

Sunni-Iraqi reconciliation. 

IS has been able to dominate millions of Sunni with only a few 

thousand fighters because they generate considerable fear, but also 

because the ongoing Sunni revolt against the Government of Iraq 

has given IS a perfect opportunity to latch onto the Sunni host in 

a part parasitic, part symbiotic relationship. IS serves the purposes 

of the Sunni polity by fighting against the government, and the 

Sunni provide IS with at least a temporary accommodation. 

In late 2014, we now have a situation in Iraq that closely resembles that in late 2004. Sunni Iraqis are disenfranchised from their 

government. They fear Iranian influence, and they do not yet trust 

the coalition. But underlying all of this is the desire to turn out the 

extremists. Tolerance of IS in Iraq is temporary. The ways in which 

they may be ejected, however, matter a great deal. 

60 

The coalition counterterrorism approach, which we use together 

with coalition airstrikes, Iraqi operations, and Sunni militia support, will certainly reduce IS influence and power in Iraq. Yet the 

coalition plan to defeat and destroy IS faces a range of challenges. 

I will enumerate three of those for you now. 

First, the recent tactical victories in northern Iraq came only 

with the help of local sectarian and ethnic militias. It is possible, 

but unlikely, that these groups will directly support Iraqi army advances further west into the almost wholly-Sunni province of Al 

Anbar. There are limits to Iraqi collaboration. 

Second, the offensive capability of the Iraqi army is questionable 

at best. They may well be able to mount a successful campaign into 

Mosul and Al Anbar, but it is more likely that they will move slowly, haltingly, and that they will have an insufficient force to overcome many of the hardened urban objectives they will face. 

And third, the Iraqi army is not structured, trained, or inclined 

to conduct the kind of thoughtful counterinsurgency campaign that 

appears necessary in the Sunni provinces. Instead, they are likely 

to conduct the kind of tactical campaign they executed in Al Anbar 

in the first half of 2014. This military-centric approach is unlikely 

to generate grassroots Sunni support for the government. 

Sunni popular and militia support, though, are critical to the 

success of the coalition campaign. This kind of uprising or revolt 

against IS is central to the possible solution I am laying before you 

this afternoon. To achieve this, some hope to force a reprise of the 

2006 to 2008 awakening movement by aggressively incentivizing 

Sunni with financing and military aid. Yet simply paying or otherwise incentivizing Sunni to fight at the local level absent national 

reconciliation is likely to perpetuate rather than reduce instability 

in Iraq. If not addressed, the ongoing Sunni revolt will continue 

even if IS is ejected, in this event the second awakening is likely 

to end in the same was as the first, with Sunni fighters turning 

against the government in a recurring cycle of violence. 

President Obama and senior administration officials have correctly stressed that success against IS is dependent on Iraqi reconciliation and positive Iraqi leadership. I recommend two mutually supporting approaches, one solely Iraqi and one for the broader 

coalition to capitalize on this strategic assumption. Prime Minister 

al-Abadi has a window of opportunity now in the early stages of 

the campaign to make unequivocal moves towards genuine reconciliation. The coalition should encourage him to enact all grievance resolution measures within his authority in one fell swoop. 

Following this top-level Iraqi action, all coalition activities should 

be predicated on reconciliation. This may mean taking some tactical risk, but these risks will be taken in the hope of achieving 

long-term stability rather than short-term tactical success. Stopping IS now is wise. Current anti-IS action should be applied aggressively to keep the organization on its heels. In the case of IS, 

military force is necessary. 

Yet addressing root causes of any insurgency has also historically 

proven to be the best and most lasting way to defeat insurgent 

groups. Leveraging reconciliation and using military force to support reconciliation rather than using reconciliation to support miliVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
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1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This 

product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony 

presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; governmentappointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions 

that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 

tary force seems to be the least costly and possibly the only way 

to defeat Islamic State in Iraq and to stabilize that country. 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Connable follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BEN CONNABLE

Chairman 1 Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished committee 

members, thank you for allowing me to testify before you today on this critical topic. 

This afternoon I will first discuss how the self-described Islamic State, or IS, was 

able to sweep through northwestern Iraq with such rapidity, and then I will outline 

options the U.S. and its coalition allies might take in order to attempt to free northern and western Iraq from IS dominance. The thrust of my proposition here is that 

the success or failure of any coalition effort to defeat IS—and ultimately to stabilize 

Iraq—hinges not on tactical considerations or tribal engagement efforts, but on the 

more critical issue of Sunni Iraqi reconciliation. I believe the new anti-IS coalition 

can succeed if it predicates all of its actions in Iraq on national reconciliation 

between Sunni and Shia Iraqis. If political reconciliation is not the core aspect of 

an anti-IS strategy then coalition efforts are likely to fail in the long run. 

ISLAMIC STATE SWEEPS INTO NORTHERN IRAQ

There are many tactical, or perhaps localized reasons why IS and its temporary 

nationalist insurgent allies were able to achieve so much success in June and July. 

These include a patient yet aggressive infiltration of IS assets into northern Iraq 

through the spring, major gaps in Iraqi Security Force (ISF) capabilities in Nineweh 

province, and also a series of IS victories in Syria and western Iraq that generated 

operational momentum. The Iraqi Army units in the Mosul area had alienated local 

Iraqis and lost nearly all vestiges of popular support. These units may have also 

been stripped of some of their equipment and personnel to shore up units fighting 

in Anbar province. Morale in the northern Iraqi Army Forces was low, leadership 

was weak, and IS capitalized brilliantly on their own operational surprise. Other 

Iraqi Army units that might have responded to the IS invasion of Mosul were tied 

down in the west or were simply incapable of the kind of rapid planning and movement required for operational-level quick reaction. IS succeeded in part because of 

Iraqi Army weakness, but also in great part due to their own military competence 

and elan. 

All of these military factors were important to the IS sweep into northern Iraq. 

However, they do not fully explain why IS has been so successful in dominating millions of Sunni with only a few thousand fighters. The mostly Sunni Iraqi provinces 

of Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Nineweh are known for rejecting outside influence and 

repelling invaders. But while most Sunni Iraqis reject IS methods and philosophy, 

only a few have turned against IS and tried to push them out of the Sunni provinces. The ongoing Sunni revolt against the Government of Iraq (GoI) has given IS 

a perfect opportunity to latch on to the Sunni host in a part parasitic, part symbiotic 

relationship. IS serves the purposes of the Sunni polity by fighting against the government, and the Sunni provide IS with at least a temporary accommodation. 

UNDERLYING SUNNI ISSUES PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES TO EXTREMISTS

AND TO THE COALITION

A similar phenomenon took place between 2003 and 2006, the period after the 

U.S.-led coalition invasion of Iraq. Millions of Sunni Iraqis suffered the growth and 

ultimately the dominance of AQI while quietly and fearfully rejecting the al-Qaeda 

methods and philosophy. They underwent years of murder and intimidation, 

beheadings, robbery, and rape because at least in part they viewed AQI as the lesser of three evils: the extremist group did not present as great an existential threat 

as either a Shia-led government or the foreign coalition. During this period many 

nationalist, or Ba’athist fighters reached temporary deals with AQI and even supported some of its military activities. AQI’s power culminated in early 2006 after 

62 

the destruction of the Golden Mosque in Samaara; they exploited the fear of Shia 

oppression and took on the role of ‘‘defenders of the faithful’’ to fight for the Sunni. 

Yet in late 2006 the Sunni Iraqis turned against AQI. Despite their best efforts 

to play on Sunni fears and sectarian animosities, AQI had worn out its welcome. 

Most Sunni Iraqi did not want to be part of an AQI caliphate and were only willing 

to accept AQI presence as long as the balance of fear kept them in check. The Awakening movement was the outward expression of the Sunni’s turn against AQI. They 

accepted the promises of support and protection made by both the coalition and the 

government of Prime Minister al-Maliki. Many members of AQI turned against the 

group itself, other insurgents rose up to fight AQI emirs, and in very short order 

AQI was defeated. While coalition and Iraqi Army military power helped turn the 

tide, the key to success in 2006 and 2007 was the shift in popular Sunni sentiment 

against extremism and against outsider domination. 

Unfortunately, Prime Minister al-Maliki abused the trust of the Sunni and undertook an active campaign to disenfranchise them. Between 2006 and 2013, the Sunni 

again lost faith in what they saw as an Iranian-influenced government. They again 

grudgingly allowed a foreign-led Sunni extremist group to enter and dominate their 

provinces, partly out of fear of IS and greatly out of fear of the Iraqi Security Forces 

(ISF). In late 2014 we now have a situation that closely resembles late 2004: Sunni 

Iraqis are disenfranchised from their government, they fear Iranian influence, and 

they do not yet trust the coalition. But underlying all of this is a desire to turn out 

the extremists. For now the members of IS float on the surface of the Sunni Iraqi 

polity; but they will never be integral nor will the Sunni Iraqis accept the IS caliphate. Tolerance of IS in Iraq is temporary. The ways in which they might be ejected, 

however, matter a great deal. 

A MILITARY CENTRIC ANTI-IS EFFORT FACES FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES

In his 10 September speech, President Obama described a primarily militaryfocused effort designed to eject IS from Iraq and ultimately destroy them across the 

globe. This counterterrorism approach, which weaves together coalition airstrikes, 

Iraqi Army operations, and Sunni militia support, will certainly reduce IS influence 

and power in Iraq. Within months we can expect that IS armor, large artillery 

pieces, technical gun trucks, and overt fixed military positions will be reduced or 

eliminated inside of Iraq; they will no longer have the ability to conduct large-scale 

offensives of the kind we saw in Mosul and Tikrit. It does not necessarily follow, 

however, that IS will be weakened to the point of defeat. While many pundits and 

analysts have focused on IS technical and financial assets, their fighting power 

derives primarily from their overall morale and their aggressive, motivated small 

infantry units. Some of these can be destroyed from the air, but most can and probably will position themselves close to the civilian population in an effort to survive 

and increase chances of civilian casualties from airstrikes. As a result, airstrikes are 

insufficient to defeat or destroy IS. 

The coalition plan also calls for increased support to the Iraqi Army, which will 

then help to drive IS out of Iraq. Equipment and trainers are already being prepared and deployed, and intelligence and air control support have already played 

critical roles in places like the Mosul Dam. All of these technical efforts will help 

Army units get back on their feet, and they will stiffen the resolve of some units 

that may be faltering. Consistent, overt U.S. military support can strengthen an 

allied partner in ways that cannot be measured and should not be underestimated. 

However, there are several reasons why the Iraqi Army will be challenged to 

achieve immediate or even long-term success against IS. I propose three of what I 

think are the most important reasons for doubt. 

First, the recent tactical victories in northern Iraq came only with the help of 

combined Kurdish and Shia militia support. Iraqi Army units fought alongside 

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) units, Peshmerga units, and some sectarian Shia 

fighters. It is possible but unlikely that Kurdish forces will directly support Iraqi 

Army advances into the mostly Sunni city of Mosul. It is even less likely they will 

support offensive thrusts further west into the almost wholly Sunni province of 

Anbar. They are most interested in protecting the Kurdish north. Similarly, Shia 

fighters are most interested in protecting their sectarian cantonments in Diyala and 

other mixed provinces. While some Shia militia may accompany Iraqi Army units 

west, their presence will only serve to reinforce the increasingly widespread—if perhaps exaggerated—belief amongst Sunni that the Iraqi Army is a Shia-dominated, 

Iranian-directed force bent on eliminating Sunni Arabs. There are limits to Iraqi 

collaboration. 

Second, the offensive capability of the Iraqi Army is questionable at best. They 

may well be able to mount a successful campaign into Mosul and Anbar, but it is 

63 

more likely that they will move slowly, haltingly, and that they will have insufficient force to overcome hardened urban objectives. They remain, as some experts 

have noted, logistically challenged; this problem will require years of remediation. 

Iraqi special operations forces that have carried out the most aggressive and successful actions against Sunni insurgents are exhausted from nearly a year of constant combat, and they are too few in number to generate the kind of combat power 

necessary to seize a large urban area like Mosul, Fallujah, or Ramadi. 

And third, the Iraqi Army is not structured, trained, or inclined to conduct the 

kind of thoughtful counterinsurgency campaign that appears necessary in the Sunni 

provinces. Instead they are likely to conduct the kind of counterguerrilla campaign 

they executed in Anbar in the first half of 2014. Counterinsurgency campaigns are 

designed to win support of the population by building government legitimacy and 

applying force in careful measure. Counterguerrilla campaigns are designed to kill 

guerrillas, or in this case IS. In early 2014 Iraqi Army units conducted Vietnam 

War era ‘‘sweep and clear’’ missions across Anbar province with very little success. 

When they moved against the insurgent stronghold in Fallujah they used excessive 

force and still failed to retake the city. Surely they will be more successful at killing 

IS fighters with coalition air support and intelligence, but they will probably be no 

more successful at winning popular support than they were earlier this year. 

There are also aspects of IS that will affect the likelihood of military success. I 

stated previously that they are militarily competent and resilient. They may collapse in the face of airstrikes and ground offensives, but it seems more likely that 

they will adapt their tactics and dig into dense urban areas. They will also probably 

accelerate their use of terror attacks against both military and civilian targets in 

order to weaken political support for the coalition and to degrade Iraqi Army 

morale. 

But while IS has many strengths it also has weaknesses. As pressure mounts 

against the group, and as young and unbalanced IS fighters are forced to manage 

hundreds of thousands of Sunni civilians, the likelihood that IS will alienate the 

Sunni Iraqis increases. And while IS may have a robust force of tens of thousands 

of fighters across Iraq and Syria, some IS fighters were either forcibly conscripted 

or have stronger loyalties to Iraqi nationalist insurgent groups like the Jaysh 

al-Rijal al-Tariqeh al-Naqshibandieh, or JRTN. These conscripts and nationalist 

fighters can be peeled away from IS with the right pressure and incentives. This 

will make the job of the Iraqi Army somewhat easier. 

WHAT ABOUT THE TRIBES? CONSIDERING A SECOND AWAKENING MOVEMENT

There are challenges to an Iraqi Army offensive, even if it is supported by coalition airstrikes and intelligence. But there are three proposed legs to the anti-IS 

military plan: airstrikes, Iraqi Army operations, and Sunni popular support. Ostensibly the Iraqi Government and the coalition will try to rally Sunni support to turn 

against IS and, at the very least, defend their local areas to create space for the 

Iraqi Army to maneuver. Some hope to see a reprise of the 2006–08 Awakening 

Movement. A mass Sunni uprising against IS would probably shift the balance of 

power in favor of the government and might rapidly push IS back across the international border to Syria. Indeed, this uprising, or revolt against IS is central to the 

possible solution I am laying before you this afternoon. However, it is important to 

eliminate misconceptions about the first Awakening movement before trying to 

encourage a second. 

Conditions in 2006 and early 2007 were perfect for an Awakening. AQI had alienated the population, the U.S. had demonstrated its commitment to the Iraqis by announcing a surge of troops, and the Iraqi Government pledged millions of dollars 

in reconstruction support to Sunni areas stricken by years of heavy combat. Finely 

tuned special operations targeting raids kept the insurgents on their heels while 

U.S. infantry and armored forces created safe zones for civilians and for burgeoning 

yet vulnerable Sons of Iraq militias. Prime Minister al-Maliki offered reconciliation 

to the Sunni and seemed to prove his nonsectarian bona fides by moving against 

Shia militias. And probably millions of dollars changed hands through local reconstruction deals and direct payments to fund and motivate Sunni militia leadership. 

What did not happen is just as important as what did happen. While Sattar Albu 

Risha did lead the Awakening council and was a charismatic figure, he was not a 

unifying figure for all Sunni nor did he generate the Awakening. At no point did 

U.S. interlocutors find ‘‘the right person’’ to talk with, thereby energizing a Sunni 

revolt against AQI. Instead, Albu Risha was a convenient public face for a broad 

grassroots shift in popular sentiment. And while the U.S. troop surge played an important moral and physical role in defeating AQI, the troop surge was not the critical component in the Awakening. While it would have been far more difficult, and 

64 

would have taken longer, it is possible that the Awakening might have succeeded 

against AQI even with less U.S. or coalition support. Iraqi Sunni are competent and 

sometimes aggressive fighters. They nearly ejected the coalition from Iraq, and perhaps ultimately they could have ejected AQI from Sunni-dominated areas. 

Conditions today are different in several critical ways. IS has alienated many 

Sunni, but it still has some support in various Sunni areas. There are some strong 

local Sunni leaders and even potential national leaders, but the Sunni political class 

is badly fragmented. Even tribal leaders have very limited influential power over 

their own tribal members, and many tribes are if anything more divided than they 

were in 2006. There are no U.S. ground troops to create ‘‘oil spots’’ of stability for 

fledgling militia forces, and ostensibly none of the supremely capable U.S. special 

operations direct action forces will help pick apart IS leadership in the dense urban 

or maze-like rural swathes of Anbar. Most importantly, though, is the absence of 

proof—so far—that the new Prime Minister of Iraq, Haider al-Abadi, is serious 

about reconciliation. 

Finding ‘‘the right person’’ to talk to amongst Iraq’s Sunnis and handing over bags 

of cash to stand up militias or encourage Sunni to join a new national guard may 

lead to real short-term tactical success in some Sunni areas of Iraq. There may be 

visible signs of Sunni resistance against IS as tribal leaders come to the fore and, 

cash in hand, pledge to work alongside the Iraqi Army. It is possible that over time, 

with coalition airpower, the Iraqi Army and Sunni militiamen may be able to push 

IS out of Iraq without national reconciliation of any kind. 

Ultimately, though, this quick tactical approach is likely to perpetuate rather 

than reduce instability in Iraq. While the world focuses on IS, it is important to remember that IS floats above the Sunni population and does not represent enduring 

Sunni grievances or narratives. There is an ongoing Sunni revolt against the Iraqi 

Government that, if not addressed, will continue even if IS is ejected. 

In this event the second Awakening is likely to end in the same way as the first: 

with armed, angry Sunni fighters turning against the government in a recurring 

cycle of violence. 

I propose there is a way to encourage the Sunni to turn against IS in a way that 

will be more tactically effective, more cost effective, and ultimately more enduring 

than inducing quick and temporary allegiances with cash and military aid. I also 

propose that this approach will obviate the weaknesses inherent in a primarily military or counterterror approach to the IS problem. 

RECONCILIATION IS THE BEST AND LEAST COSTLY OPTION FOR SUCCESS

The Iraqi state that existed in early 2014 now exists only in the Iraqi Constitution. There is a de facto split of Iraq along ethnosectarian lines: Sunni, Shia, and 

Kurd. It may or may not be possible to bring the Kurds fully back into the Iraqi 

state. Chances for successful Sunni-Shia reconciliation are probably quite low. However, my interactions with Sunni Iraqis since 2003, and my targeted research on 

Sunni Iraqi perceptions over the past year indicate that all strata of the Sunni Iraqi 

population wish to remain within the state. 

They tend to view their revolt against the government as an anti-Iranian rather 

than an anti-Shia movement. Most are nationalists who believe they should play a 

prominent role in the central state. Further, the natural resources in the Sunni 

provinces are inconsequential in comparison to Kurdish and Shia resources, and 

Sunni do not believe decentralization will result in equitable sharing. While they 

want more local power, they do not want to be permanently marginalized and 

disenfranchised from the state. It is therefore possible to leverage Sunni nationalism 

to foster lasting reconciliation. 

One approach to Sunni reconciliation would be through negotiation. This might 

require finding a charismatic Sunni leader who represents a large majority, or at 

least large plurality, of the Sunni population. His influence would have to be sufficient to encourage tens of thousands of Sunni to turn against IS. As of late-2014, 

though, this leader has not emerged and the Sunni do not seem disposed to follow 

a single political figure. Another approach would be dispersed engagement, with 

coalition and Iraqi leaders fanning out across Iraq to drum up local support. I argue 

this approach will lead to tactical success but strategic failure. Instead, I propose 

that only intensive, one-sided national reconciliation efforts aimed at the broad 

Sunni population will lead to lasting success. 

Earlier this month Prime Minister al-Abadi enumerated a list of grievance resolution measures he intended to take in order to win Sunni support. These include general amnesty for innocent Sunni caught up in the counterguerrilla campaign, a 

depoliticized justice system, amendments to antiterror laws, reconstruction of damaged Sunni areas, the formation of a National Guard, and increased regional 

65 

authorities. Sunni leaders have listed other grievances and want the immediate 

release of all female prisoners and Sunni politicians, restoration of full retirement 

pay for former regime officers, and other measures to reduce the impact of deBa’athification laws that have been used to target Sunni leadership. Some of these 

actions will require political ratification, but others will not. 

President Obama and senior administration officials have correctly stressed that 

success against IS is dependent on Iraqi reconciliation and on positive Iraqi leadership. Prime Minister al-Abadi has a window of opportunity now, in the early stages 

of the campaign, to make unequivocal moves toward genuine reconciliation. The coalition should encourage him to enact all grievance resolution measures within his 

authority in one fell swoop. This action, which should include prisoner releases and 

the real-time transfer of money for reconstruction and retirement pay, would demonstrate that he is taking a different path than his predecessor. At this point in the 

year-long Sunni revolt, only real and dramatic action on the above-named fronts will 

be sufficient to convince the Sunni that the more tangible things—cash payments, 

equipment—are part of a broader strategy to reunite the state. 

Following this top-level Iraqi action, all coalition activities should be predicated 

on reconciliation. Every engagement should hinge on some kind of local or regional 

reconciliation measure, and every tactical military action should be planned to preserve and improve relationships between the Sunni and the state. This may mean 

taking some tactical risk, including strictly limiting damage to Sunni urban areas 

and curtailing aerial targeting. Advisors will find themselves in difficult positions 

as they attempt to rein in Iraqi Army air and artillery support. This approach will 

certainly preclude the use of Shia and Kurdish militias in support of Iraqi Army 

combat actions in Sunni areas. Reconciliation first and foremost, in conjunction with 

coalition support, and Iraqi military and government efforts must be woven together 

into a holistic strategy with a definitive envisioned end-state. 

There are many hurdles to successful reconciliation. Divisions in the Sunni polity 

will continue to undermine Sunni cohesion and may hinder efforts to develop militia 

support. Prime Minister al-Abadi may not be willing or able to make the kind of 

dramatic measures necessary to gain Sunni trust. And IS and some of its allies will 

probably make every effort to foster discord between Sunni and Shia in order to 

maintain Sunni support. They already conduct terror attacks that seem designed to 

deepen the divide between Sunni and Shia Iraqis. However, there are also some 

positive underlying factors. While there are divisions between Sunni and Shia 

Iraqis, there are also strong inter- and intra-tribal bonds between the two sectarian 

groups. Sunni leaders I have spoken with in the last year repeatedly emphasized 

their belief that Sunni and Shia Iraqis are first and foremost Iraqis. 

CONCLUSION

As I stated earlier, chances of genuine and lasting reconciliation in Iraq are 

admittedly low. However, reconciliation also offers the best and perhaps only chance 

to reconstitute the admittedly limited successes of Operation Iraqi Freedom and 

Operation New Dawn. Absent reconciliation we can expect lasting instability in 

Iraq. We may physically defeat IS, but the ideas that cause young Iraqi men to support groups like IS and al-Qaeda will live on. The group name will change—there 

were over 100 identified insurgent groups in Iraq during the 2003–11 war—but the 

violence will continue to destabilize the region, give space for international terror 

groups, and deprive millions of Iraqis of even a modicum of normal life. 

Stopping IS now is wise; current anti-IS actions should be applied aggressively 

to keep the group on its heels. In the case of IS, military force is necessary. Yet 

addressing root causes of any insurgency is also historically proven to be the best 

and most lasting way to defeat insurgent groups. Leveraging reconciliation—and 

using military force to support reconciliation rather than using reconciliation to support military force—seems to be the least costly and possibly the only way to defeat 

IS in Iraq and stabilize that country. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both for your testimony. Ambassador Ford, let me start with you. One of the main arguments that 

the administration has presented in addressing members of Congress’ concerns about the vetting for the fighters that we seek to 

train and equip—the so-called moderate vetted Syrian rebels—is 

we know them. We know them. And I can tell you that as this 

issue has come forward that I am constantly called by colleagues 

for which this is one of their central questions—not their only quesVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
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tion, but it is one of their central questions, particularly as this 

vote comes up. 

So my questions to you are: do we really know these fighters 

would receive U.S. training and equipping if Congress provides the 

authority? And are there enough willing, capable fighters that 

would pass U.S. vetting standards, do you believe? 

Ambassador FORD. The answer to the second question is a simple, yes, there will be enough. Actually the problem has always 

been, Senator Menendez, that there have been more willing fighters in the Free Syrian Army than they have material guns, ammunition, et cetera. 

So a different question is, do we know them? Two things I would 

say. First, we do not know all 1,500 groups because some of the 

groups are just two or three guys and, you know, they have a video 

camera, and, wow, you are, you know, a group of freedom fighters. 

There is actually a pretty small number of serious groups, and 

when I say ‘‘serious,’’ I mean that have a thousand, two, five, 7,000. 

That number of groups is actually pretty small. It would not pass 

more than about 15 to 20. Funny how that is never mentioned in 

the press. 

Those groups, we do not work with all of them. Some of them are 

beyond the pale politically in terms of not being moderate the way 

I mentioned, like Ahrar ash-Sham, which has sectarian tendencies 

and might well try to impose a state. And that is a big group. So 

I have met Ahrar ash-Sham, but we do not in any way provide assistance to them. 

But the other groups and the ones that, for example, the State 

Department was providing nonlethal assistance to, yes, we know 

them. Not a secret that I have met them on occasion in places like 

Turkey, and I went over the border and met them in Syria about 

14 months ago. We know them, and we have talked politics with 

them. We have talked about the Nusra Front with them. Those, I 

think, we know, and we have had more experience just in the last 

7, 8, 9, 10 months with them as well. So I think the groups that 

we need to help that will have an impact on the ground, we know 

them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. So we know them, and you believe that a 

sufficient number of capable fighters would pass U.S. vetting 

standards. 

Ambassador FORD. Yes, I feel very strongly about that. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Well, that is very important to know. 

Now, in an article in Sunday’s New York Times, there was a report 

that said, ‘‘Mr. Assad and his closest advisors have looked at the 

American decision to undertake anti-ISIL military strikes in Syria 

as representing a victory for their longstanding strategy, which is 

obliterating any moderate opposition to its rule, and persuading 

the world that it faces a stark choice between him and the Islamist 

militants who threaten the West.’’ 

How do we respond to those who raise that concern? How do we 

prevent Assad and his Iranian- and Russian-backed forces from 

seizing back territory from ISIL after military strikes, further 

squeezing the moderate vetted Syrian rebels? 

Ambassador FORD. Two comments on that very quickly, Senator. 

First, Assad does not have enough forces. He has been seriously deVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
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pleted. That is why he could not hold the air base in Tabqa, for example, where they actually flew some of their senior officers out 

and then left hundreds of their soldiers to be murdered by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant. And they could not hold other parts 

of eastern Syria, for example. 

He does not have the troops to put back in. His forces are very 

stretched. He was depending a lot on Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militia. The Iraqi Shia militiaq has flown home to deal with ISIL inside Iraq. 

So I would not worry so much, especially in north and eastern 

Syria about Assad benefiting very much. The moderate armed opposition will benefit greatly more, especially as they try to secure 

their supply lines. It is interesting to me that ISIL is trying to cut 

their supply lines coming down from Turkey. So they need to—they 

need help to secure those lines. 

One other comment about Bashir al-Assad. I think his strategy 

all along has been to sort of destroy the political opposition—the 

moderate political opposition and the armed fighters attached to it. 

If we do not go forward on this proposal to help the moderate 

armed opposition, I think he will say indeed my strategy is working, the Americans will come around and eventually deal with me. 

And that will actually make it even harder to get a resolution to 

the Syrian crisis. 

The CHAIRMAN. Which is, in part, why we had an authorization 

in the committee a year ago, which supported your view. Part of 

what I want to do here is try to get some of the concerns of my 

colleagues responded to by virtue of your expertise. 

Secondly—thirdly, the authorization language submitted by the 

administration in order to stand up, train, and equip the effort for 

the Syrian moderate opposition articulates three purposes: one, defending the Syrian people from attacks by ISIL and the Syrian regime, facilitating the provisions of essential services and stabilizing 

territory controlled by the opposition; two, protecting the United 

States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the 

threats posed by terrorists in Syria; and, three, promoting the conditions of a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria. Do 

you agree that those should be the stated purposes? Would you 

change or add anything to them? 

Ambassador FORD. Sorry. I had not seen the language. Yes. 

These seem reasonable to me, but I would just caution that getting 

to negotiations is going to be a very long and hard process. I would 

not want to pretend that we could get there quickly. Geneva was 

a bad failure, and until the regime feels more pressure—it is already under pressure. What is interesting is in Assad’s own community now, there are demonstrations against him. There is a 

whole campaign called Sarkhet al-Watan—‘‘Scream of the nation’’—just criticizing Assad for keeping his throne, they call it, and 

sending young Alawis to their graves. So there is—there are cracks 

which we did not see before. But I do not think this is going to be 

fast, Senator. 

So the first goal of containing and starting to roll back ISIL and 

defending the Syrian people, and also as well protecting us, those 

are in the short term things we have to work on right way. Negotiations are going to come later. 

68 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. And do you think—I think—oh, Senator 

McCain is back, so he is probably going to ask this question on his 

own, but I think it is an important one. Do you envision the moderate vetted Syrian rebels understanding that if we are training 

and equipping them with our focus being ISIL that they will look 

toward that fight even as their main goal is to displace Assad? 

Ambassador FORD. Absolutely they will for two reasons. One, the 

Islamists, or ISIL, is actually threatening their supply lines right 

now, and has butchered hundreds of members of the moderate Syrian opposition, and I mean butchered. Cut their throats, video, the 

whole nine yards. So there is no—there is a lot of bad blood between them. That is the first reason. 

The second reason is, in places where ISIL was in authority, especially in northwestern Syria in the Idlib province, there was a 

popular reaction against them. And that public popular support 

helped the moderate armed opposition actually eject ISIL fighters 

out of that province. And also the same thing happened in Aleppo 

to the west of the city. 

There was also an uprising, Senator, a very big uprising against 

ISIL. In Deir ez-Zor province, an entire tribe, called Shaitat tribe, 

rose up against them, but they did not—they did not get any help. 

And that is not a criticism of us per se, but they just—they lost 

a military battle, and ISIL killed—I have seen estimates of as 

many as a thousand of the tribesmen afterwards in retaliation. So 

there will be constant problems and fighting between the moderate 

armed opposition and ISIL. I do not see any way that that is going 

to end. 

Syrians just in general are Mediterranean people, and they do 

not go for this kind of very heavy duty, conservative Salafi type 

state. They are just not that kind of fundamentalist religiously. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, these insights are very important. Mr. 

Connable, I do have questions for you, but my time has run out. 

In deference to my colleagues, I will come back to you at the end. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again, thank 

you for this hearing today. Thank you both for your testimony. Ambassador Ford, I think we have all experienced being in—or most 

of us—refugee camps looking into the eyes of Syrians who had 

counted on us to do a lot of things that we said we were going to 

do and did not do. And their brothers, and cousins, and uncles were 

butchered, and we never supported them like we said we would. 

You actually encouraged them out doing your patriotic duty. We 

encouraged them out. And, in fact, we did not follow up with much 

that they thought was coming, and when we did, it was delayed. 

And I want to thank you for your service also and your leadership 

in Syria. And I think all of us on this panel probably wish to do 

so. 

My question to you is, what is the mentality now of the Syrian 

opposition having seen, you know, promised support, it not being 

what was envisioned? What is their mentality, their attitude, toward the United States right now relative to helping them, if you 

will, against Assad? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator Corker, thank you. First, just a comment to be clear on the record, we did not encourage, and I cerVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
69 

tainly as Ambassador did not encourage Syrians to protest. But I 

did defend their right to protest peacefully. And, in fact, when I 

was in the country I said, do not resort to violence because it will 

cause problems even for us if you do that. That is ancient history. 

But just to be clear what we did, we did not encourage them out, 

but we absolutely stood for their right to protest peacefully in accord with rights under the U.N. Charter for Human Rights. 

What is the mentality of the Syrian opposition now toward us? 

I think you and I both know that there is a lot of bitterness. Two 

hundred, maybe more—200,000 maybe more have died. I think 

there is very great anger that the United States did not intervene 

militarily to stop that. There is a belief that we could have stopped 

it. I am not sure that belief is accurate, but in any case it is widely 

held. And so, we have a credibility problem, and we have a credibility problem, Senator Corker, with some of these groups even. 

You do not regain credibility overnight. It is based on new shared 

experiences. And so, were we to go forward with the administration’s proposal, and I certainly hope we do, I think with the passage of time, credibility and confidence can be restored. But I think 

it will be bumpy at the start. 

Senator CORKER. One of the things that people—thank you for 

that. One of the things—one of the things that people have said, 

and by the way, I strongly supported, as most people did here, arming, especially back in May, but even before, a year and a half ago. 

And I think we might be in a different situation, and I would say 

we would be in a different situation today if we had taken action 

at a more—at a better time. I still support what is getting ready 

to happen, although I have a lot of questions relative to the moderate opposition being trained and armed. 

Some people have said who have been close to this issue that 

there are not enough—I know you answered a question specifically 

to Menendez, but there are not enough, and it is very difficult and 

expensive to train these people, that 5,000 troops over the next 

year, short-term training in Saudi Arabia, getting more sophisticated weapons after they have proven themselves on the ground is 

something that is not going to be particularly effective. Could you 

respond to that? 

Ambassador FORD. Syria is a big country, Senator, and 5,000 is 

not a lot for a country that size. The Syrian armed opposition, however, is a lot bigger than 5,000. I think the latest numbers I have 

seen for the non-Nusra, non-ISIL groups is still in the range of 80 

to 100,000. I think most people now are saying it is more on the 

lower end of that, so say 80,000. Some say higher. The Islamic 

State—you probably saw the same things in the press I did. They 

have somewhere 20 to 30,000, of which some are in Iraq and some 

are in Syria. 

So it is not as if the 5,000 would be the only ones on the field. 

I think there will be a lot of others on the field. And although we 

are not helping some of the harder line Islamist groups, like Ahrar 

ash-Sham, Ahrar ash-Sham is also fighting ISIL right now, and 

ISIL killed a number of Ahrar ash-Sham prisoners. And so we are 

not in that exact fight, and the groups that we have helped are not 

in that fight. But there are other people also fighting the Islamic 

State. So I do not look at it as only 5,000. 

70 

Senator CORKER. Knowing what you know about the way things 

are on the ground, is what is being laid out something that will 

evolve into an effective ground strategy, or are there additional 

components that you knowing the country the way you do are necessary—if we really want to destroy and defeat ISIL are necessary 

to make that happen? 

Ambassador FORD. I would think we are going to get into a 

longer-term relationship with some of these groups that I mentioned. It needs to be really carefully coordinated with other countries in the region that have been funneling in help. And it has got 

to be centralized in a way, Senator. There is too much stuff going 

to too many disparate groups, and it actually has made the job of 

the armed opposition much more difficult. So we are going to have 

to be pretty tough with some of our regional allies. That is on the 

diplomatic political side. 

On the ground, Senator, as ISIL is pushed out of places, it will 

be really important to try to get help into the civil administrations. 

The Syrian Government will not go into those places. And, again, 

these are in a sense the political side of the opposition linked to 

the moderate armed opposition. And so, the State Department has 

worked in some places with these people, and I think there is going 

to have to be a dedication of resources and program money to backfill as ISIL is pushed out of places so that the lights stay on some 

hours a day, so that there is clean water some hours of the day, 

maybe so schools can reopen in some places, that kind of thing. 

Senator CORKER. Just one more question. I know time is short. 

We put a lot of stock in Idris, and many of us got to know him, 

and yet we did not support him. We left him hanging. Trucks that 

were supposed to be delivered to him were delivered months late. 

The things—I mean, it was almost like a—I do not even want to 

use the word because it is just a negative connotation toward the 

activities that we undertook. Has there been a command and control established for the moderate opposition that is workable after 

we, in essence, again, undermined by not really doing the things 

we said we would do, not that Idris was General Patton. But do 

we have someone there, an organization there, that has the ability 

to deal with command and control? 

Ambassador FORD. I think this is a question that you will want 

to be asking as you go forward. You are right, Idris was never empowered not only by us, Senator, but by other regional states that 

were funneling assistance in. And so, he was always in a very difficult position. And I think going forward, if we want the moderate 

armed opposition to be successful, we are going to have to figure 

out a way to get a more centralized command structure. And aid 

goes through that structure, and all countries must support that 

structure and not help friendly group over here or friendly group 

over there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. Thank you both for being here, and 

thank you, Ambassador. A couple of points that I wanted to—first, 

I do not want to go back in time simply for purposes of pointing 

fingers or saying who was wrong and who was right, but I think 

it is important to learn lessons from this. 

71 

It was my impression early in this conflict that when this arose, 

and by the way, it is important to remind everyone that this was 

not a U.S.-instigated thing. These were Syrians who wanted to get 

rid of Assad. And in the initial stages, the rebellion were Syrians, 

but the lack of—the decision not to go in and empower them early 

created a vacuum that attracted foreign fighters from all over the 

world to kind of pour in and take advantage of that situation. 

In your opinion, had we been more forceful early on—if we could 

go back two and half years in time knowing what we know especially and had empowered those groups early on to be more capable, do you think that it is possible that you would—that that space 

that was left there for ISIL may never have existed? In essence, 

having a more forceful group on the ground, you know, the Syrian 

military defectors early on would have closed off the opening for 

some of these more radical foreign fighters to be able to come in 

and take advantage of the chaos on the ground? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, I do think that. I have said that publicly before. And in particular, three things: cash, ammunition, and 

food. And had more of the moderate groups I am talking about that 

are not seeking to impose an Islamic state by force, had they had 

these things—cash, ammo, food—in greater supplies in, say, second 

half of 2012, it would have been very hard for Nusra to gain recruits. I heard that repeatedly from members of the Syrian opposition, including from the Free Syrian Army, that they could not pay 

salaries. The other guys could. 

I would say, well, I mean, you are a liberation movement; why 

do you need salaries? And they would say, you have got to understand, the fighters have families. They have got kids. They have 

got parents they have to take care of. So, yes, if there had been 

more back then, I think the problem today would be smaller, but 

I am encouraged at least that now I think there is an understanding of that. And if this program goes forward, I think that 

will actually help reduce the recruiting of ISIL and Nusra. 

Senator RUBIO. Now, the second question I wanted to ask, and 

it touches upon a theme that Senator McCain has also explored is, 

so these groups that are on the ground that we want to work with 

now, as you said in your testimony, the biggest threat that they 

face, the people who are targeting them right now the most, although they will fight ISIL. But the group that is doing the most 

damage to them militarily is Assad. 

It seems from here to appear to be that Assad is undertaking a 

very deliberate strategy of trying to wipe out what we could call 

moderate forces so that the world is left with a very simple choice: 

if you want to defeat ISIL in Syria, you have to align yourself with 

Assad. He is the only alternative to them, if he can wipe these 

more moderate groups out. 

And then, in fact, it seems like over the last few hours, days, and 

weeks, he has ramped up the effort to wipe them out in pursuance 

of that strategy. Do you agree that is the calculation he has made? 

And, if so, how could any effort to equip and empower and capacitate these groups, how could any effort to do that be successful if 

we do not protect them from the assault that is being undertaken 

against them? 

72 

As I asked the Secretary when he was here, I guess, 2 hours ago 

now, when I asked him questions, there may not be anyone left for 

us to arm or train if Assad is continued to be given free rein to target them and try to eviscerate them. 

Ambassador FORD. I do think that is Assad’s strategy, and I 

think it is very evident. Just kind of looking at what he is doing 

day by day, it is clear. I do think the moderate armed opposition 

has some staying power, and if the administration’s proposals are 

adopted and go forward, I think that will help bolster them, and 

they will be in the field for the long term. 

But absolutely they are going to fight Bashir al-Assad. I think 

the idea that they would somehow turn away from that fight, the 

original fight, and focus solely on ISIL is simply not realistic. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, they cannot ignore the fact they are being 

attacked. 

Ambassador FORD. Right, precisely. And in the end, I talked 

about the bad blood between ISIL and the armed moderate opposition, but there is plenty of bad blood between them and the Assad 

regime, too, not to mention the airstrikes you are talking about. 

I do take heart, Senator Rubio, that the armed moderate opposition, I think they have gotten more supplies, though. I am not sure 

where from. But they have been making some gains on the ground, 

and, in particular, against the Syrian regime, and in particular, up 

in the area between Damascus and Aleppo, Hama and Homs up 

there. There is a lot of heavy fighting, and also along the Lebanese 

border in a place called Qalamoun where the moderate armed opposition suffered a big defeat in May and June 2013. They have actually retaken a lot of those places. And I think part of it is 

Hezbollah had to re-deploy to other places, and this just goes back 

to the manpower shortage of the regime itself. 

So as we go to the American people and we make the argument 

we need to do this, and I am in favor of doing this. I have actually 

called for this for quite a while, and I was part of those on this 

committee that voted to do that a while back. The American people 

best understand when they—either a face or a name that they 

know. Right now it is just kind of a generic term, ‘‘moderate 

rebels,’’ but we do not know who they are. And in the absence of 

being able to point to who they are, it leaves it open to all sorts 

of misinformation that I have seen in the press, including from 

members of Congress who have made claims that, quite frankly, 

are not only inaccurate, but outrageous with regards to who some 

of these groups are and who we would be working with. 

Could you help navigate a couple of the organizations? I mean, 

I know there are some groups out there that we have heard. The 

Steadfastness Movement is one. I do not know if you are familiar 

with them. Harakat Hazm, but other groups like this. I mean, I do 

not know if that is the right example, but who exactly are some of 

these groups that you think fit the bill of what we would look to 

work with? 

Ambassador FORD. Yes. So let me—I will just very quickly name 

a few, and they are in my written testimony, and I am happy to 

provide members of your staffs more information later. Harakat 

Hazm, the Hazzm Movement, which operate mainly in northern 

Syria, but also has fighters in the south. They are one of the 

73 

groups. They actually are kind of more or less fighting the Nusra 

front right now, as well as the Islamic State and the regime. And 

so, they are in it up to their eyeballs. 

There are two units of the moderate opposition that are mainly 

officered by recently defected Syrian army officers. One is called 

the 101st Division, although I do not think it has anywhere near 

a division’s worth of men. I think it is in the range of 3,000 to 

4,000. The 101st—it is kind of ironic—too bad Dave is not here. 

And then the 13th Division as well, again, led primarily by recently 

defected army officers. 

You might remember, Senator Rubio, there was a Syrian air 

force pilot who flew his plane to Jordan a couple of years ago. That 

pilot is the commander of the 13th Division now. But it is not a 

division in terms of, like, 14, 15,000. There are a couple of thousand. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Ford, 

you mentioned a word that really—I really want to be the crux of 

my questioning, is ‘‘credibility.’’ I want to explore the credibility of 

our commitment and the credibility of our strategy. 

So, first of all, in my questioning of Secretary Kerry, I quoted the 

President when he said that ‘‘Our safety, our security depends on 

our willingness to do whatever it takes to defend this Nation.’’ And, 

of course, by taking off—a number of options off the table, I certainly am concerned about that, the credibility of our commitment. 

What is your view in terms of our potential coalition partners? 

I mean, they are listening to this as well. Do they feel there is any 

credibility to our commitment to the defeat of ISIS? 

Ambassador FORD. I think the meeting in Riyadh was really interesting—I am sorry—in Jeddah. I was really struck that the 

Saudis brought the Iraqi Foreign Minister there, and that was 

something when I was working in Iraq for 5 years under—during 

the war with all of our ambassadors there, we could never get the 

Saudis to do that. Never could get the Saudis to do that. So I think 

that is a change, and it is significant. It is symbolic, but it is a 

start. 

I think ultimately, Senator Johnson, our credibility by countries 

in that region—Saudi, Emirates, Qatar, Turkey—will be judged by 

what we do ourselves in the next few weeks and months. If the proposal to help the Syrian armed opposition does not move forward 

out of Washington this week and then gets bogged down, I think 

our credibility will suffer not only with the Syrian opposition, but 

it will suffer with countries in the region. 

Senator JOHNSON. So let me quickly ask, is it true that the 

Saudis are willing to base as well as pay for that training effort? 

Ambassador FORD. I have not received any classified briefings 

since I left government, Senator Johnson, but it seems everything 

I am seeing in both Arabic language media as well as English language media says it is the case. 

Senator JOHNSON. I mean, if that is the case, then let us face it, 

the moderate-vetted Syrian rebels will be armed and trained. So 

would it make sense—that being the case, would it not be better 

for the United States to be involved in that training, especially if 

we do not have to pay for it? 

74 

Ambassador FORD. Completely. Totally. 

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. Again, I think that is the political argument for voting for that authorization. 

Ambassador FORD. I am assuming—again, I have not received 

any classified briefings. You all will know more than I do, but I am 

assuming that there will be U.S. personnel working on this with 

Saudis and other coalition partners in Saudi Arabia. 

Senator JOHNSON. Yes, I would just make that point because— 

I make that point. I understand our colleagues’ concern about who 

are we really training, but they are going to be trained anyway. I 

would rather be involved in that process, probably reduce the 

chance that the wrong individuals will be trained by whoever. 

Ambassador FORD. We will be much safer from ISIL in the future if we lead this effort rather than hand it off to someone else. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Connable, you have been sitting here. 

There you go. I do want to actually utilize you in the testimony 

here. I want to really talk about the credibility of the strategy. 

From my standpoint, there is really two major steps to the offense. 

I mean, first of all, it is to drive ISIS out of Iraq and secure Iraq 

again, and then, of course, we have got the whole mess in terms 

of Syria. 

Let us go back in history. I think both you gentlemen were there 

in Iraq during the surge. We had Brett McGurk before us, and I 

was just trying to kind of put this thing in context using some 

numbers. We had about 68,000 Al Qaeda in Iraq at that point in 

time were the estimates, and we had 130,000—surged over 160,000 

U.S. troops to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. Now we have got 31,000 

ISIS. We have 1,500 noncombat troops on the ground. We have got 

an Iraqi Security Force. We have the Kurdish Peshmerga. How 

credible is it that we are going to be able to, first of all, just get 

ISIS out of Iraq with that force? 

Mr. CONNABLE. I would start by saying I do not put a lot of credence in the numbers that we had either in the first Iraq war that 

we have now. I do not believe we have any degree of accuracy 

there, so assuming we are within some kind of order of magnitude 

there. 

I do not think the key to this in 2006, 2007, and 2008 was necessarily the surge. The announcement of the surge helped strengthen our allies on the ground. Really I believe it was the Sunni population turning against Al Qaeda in Iraq that was the key to victory 

there. And I think that is going to be the key to victory now. 

So whether there are 10,000 IS in Iraq or 30,000, I think over 

time that becomes less relevant when you look at how much territory they have to control. If that is hostile territory, they are going 

to have a real hard time doing that. Just bombing them and trying 

to drive them out with Iraqi army units, I think our chances are 

much lower. 

Senator JOHNSON. So which gets you basically to your point that 

the key here is reconciliation between the Sunni and the Shia in 

Iraq. And I guess the question I wanted to ask either one of you 

or both of you—I am trying to think of the exact term you used— 

the grievance resolution measures. Is the Shia government threat 

enough to actually do what you think is necessary to pass those 

75 

grievance resolution measures to bring the Sunnis back into the 

government? 

Mr. CONNABLE. Frankly, I think the chances of reconciliation are 

low. I think it is the best strategy, and it is probably the one that 

is going to lead to long-term success. But Haider al-Abadi is in a 

very difficult position. He has got the Iranians there providing direct support. They have no enthusiasm for reconciliation with 

Iraqi-Sunni. He has got other fragmented elements of the Shia polity that he has to deal with. They just voted down a couple of his 

nominations for key posts in his cabinet. So I do not hold out a 

great deal of hope, but I do think that that is where we need to 

put all our emphasis. 

Senator JOHNSON. So in other words—go ahead, Ambassador 

Ford. 

Ambassador FORD. I totally agree with what Ben said, that the 

key to the success in Iraq back in the period 2007, 2008, 2009 was 

getting Sunni Arab support. The presence of our troops was vital, 

but the most important part, the key part, was to get the buy-in 

from the local populations. 

Just one little thing on your question about are the Shia today, 

2014, are they sobered. Ben is absolutely right. The nominees for 

Defense and Interior Minister are such sensitive positions in the 

cabinet that were just disapproved by the Iraqi Parliament yesterday. Not a good sign. However, I have also seen Prime Minister alAbadi say they will not send the Iraqi Army deep into Sunni regions again, and that they are going to try to build a national 

guard. I have seen him say that. 

So I think now what they are arguing about in Iraq, if I understand it is, who do they trust enough from among the Shia and the 

Sunni to do that mission. So the proof will be in the pudding. Having spent 5 years in Iraq, I have learned to trust nothing at first 

look. But I at least was encouraged that Abadi said we will not 

send the Iraqi Army deep into the Sunni province. Again, we will 

get a national guard. 

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. I have got a lot more questions, but I 

am out of time. So thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank the witnesses, and I thank you, Mr. 

Connable, for being here. And, Ambassador Ford, thank you for 

your outstanding service. Mr. Connable, if I have got you right, the 

Iranians are in a position of significant influence in Baghdad right 

now, is that correct? 

Mr. CONNABLE. I believe that to be true. 

Senator MCCAIN. That cannot be good for our interests over time. 

Mr. CONNABLE. I agree with you. 

Senator MCCAIN. And another legacy of total withdrawal. 

Mr. CONNABLE. I think that would have happened anyway. I 

think it was exacerbated by the fact that the western and northern 

parts of Iraq collapsed. I cannot attribute it directly to our withdrawal. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ambassador Ford, is there any doubt about the 

viability if given the proper training and equipment, and you mentioned—my understanding is that ISIS has given them as much as 

$2,000 a month because they have got plenty of money; that there 

76 

is no doubt in your mind about if we do it right, that the FSA is 

viable. 

Ambassador FORD. With much less support than what we have 

been giving, they have actually held ground and advanced in a few 

places. 

Senator MCCAIN. And I share that view, and the thing that is 

frustrating to me sometimes is all of this stuff that people accept— 

they have made a deal with ISIS, they cannot fight. And having 

known them, as you have known them a lot better than I do, they 

will fight, and they need our support in order to do that successfully. But they are not about to become part of ISIS or even alNusra if from time to time they have to cooperation because of 

their straightened circumstances. 

Ambassador FORD. That is absolutely true that they are in a 

tough situation. A two-front war is never fun. But I am very impressed that they have held up as well as they have despite the 

difficult circumstances. 

Senator MCCAIN. So in my view, I conclude that it is an excuse 

that people use, frankly, to not have us involved. And I do not expect you to comment on that, but here we are. Again, I want to sort 

of pursue what I was pursuing—a line that I was—with Secretary 

Kerry. We are going to train them. We are going to equip them. 

But we are not going to protect them from these airstrikes that are 

so devastating to their capability—the barrel bombs, the helicopters, the fixed wing, which, by the way, as you know, is the 

main way for Bashir al-Assad to move his people and material 

around Iraq. 

So is it not—we are asking them to fight. We are asking them 

to risk their lives, and yet we will not give them the protection 

from the air attacks, which would be the major source of casualties 

for them. Make sense of that for me. 

Ambassador FORD. Well, I think we both know that there are 

concerns that if we provide surface-to-air missiles, that they will be 

somehow transferred to the Nusra front or to ISIL or something 

like that. One encouraging sign I take from the recent fighting, 

Senator McCain, up in Hama, which is a city between Damascus 

and Aleppo, the regime has a very important air base. And using 

stand-off weapons, mortars and such things, the Free Syrian Army 

was actually able to bring most of the air traffic at the Hama military airport to a stop. 

Senator MCCAIN. I am impressed with what they do, but if I am 

a Syrian and I am being armed and trained and asked to go into 

battle, and I see that we are not giving us the capability even, 

much less the United States taking out that air power, it is not 

great for my morale. 

Ambassador FORD. Our refusal to provide surface-to-air missiles 

has been a gigantic irritant not only to the armed opposition fighters, but to the population in generation that is getting barrel 

bombed. There is no doubt of that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Did you see—I am sure you saw the quote I 

gave from Secretary Gates, his comment today that we really cannot succeed without boots on the ground is basically what he was 

saying. 

Ambassador FORD. I did not see Secretary Gates’ remarks. 

77 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I guess I could read it to you again, but 

do you think that in your estimate that the 5,000 being trained and 

not taking out Bashir al-Assad’s air assets, telling everybody that 

it is ISIL as if we cannot address two adversaries at the same time, 

that the chances of success without much more significant involvement on the ground, and it does not mean combat units, but forward air controllers, special forces, et cetera, that we are going to 

have to—basically Secretary Gates was saying we are going to have 

to do that over time. 

Ambassador FORD. I think several things on this, Senator 

McCain. First, 5,000 is obviously not enough. Syria is a really big 

country. But I think there is going to be more than 5,000. And I 

think already elements of the armed opposition, excluding Nusra 

and ISIL, 80,000 plus. The 5,000 might be one of the better parts, 

and it might be the part that we would have more influence with. 

But frankly, we will have more influence if we provide more weapons and cash anyway. 

Second point, with respect to ISIL first or not, I just think realistically, of course, the armed opposition is going to fight Assad 

even as they fight the Islamic State. We would be foolish to think 

otherwise. So—— 

Senator MCCAIN. The question is, Do we help them to do that? 

Ambassador FORD. Well, I think we—— 

Senator MCCAIN. The way we help them to do that is you neutralize the air assets. 

Ambassador FORD. Yes. But we have not neutralized the air assets obviously, and there have been horrific barrel bombs attacks 

almost daily. We have been providing other help. We suffer credibility problems, Senator McCain. I am not going to argue with you 

on that. 

We have been providing other help, which they use against the 

regime. I would actually argue that help that we have provided has 

actually enabled them to make advances in places like southern 

Syria and northern Syria. And the aid has actually been effective 

that way. 

Senator MCCAIN. And there is no doubt in your mind they are 

not going to join forces with any extremist organization. 

Ambassador FORD. As I mentioned—I am glad you asked that 

question. I actually have raised with them when I was working at 

the State Department the problem that Nusra poses for us, and I 

get a very consistent answer. I got a very consistent answer, which 

is we do not like them either. We do not like al-Qaeda. Now, these 

are defected army officers or, you know, people who were civilians, 

but were high up in the Syrian military before they went into civilian life, and then they became leaders in the Free Syrian Army. 

They say, we do not like them either, but you cannot ask us to 

not deal with them when they are over in the next neighborhood, 

and we are pushing against the regime, and they are pushing, and 

not coordinate with them. They said, that is not reasonable because 

we do not have enough stuff to do this by ourselves. And they were 

very blunt with it. They said, you give us more stuff, we will not 

have to deal with them. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Connable, do you have a comment on that 

aspect of it? 

78 

Mr. CONNABLE. In regards to Syrian air power, I think it would 

be very interesting to see if we eventually do put Title 10 advisors 

on the ground on Syria, what effect that will have on the Assad regime’s decision on whether or not to attack the Syrian opposition. 

So if our special forces teams are providing higher level advice 

there, I think the Syrian Government will be very reluctant to attack those forces. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. One last question, Mr. 

Connable. You made a very pointed effort to make the case that it 

was the Sunni awakening that was the critical element in the success. Yes, the surge. Yes, the other elements. But that without the 

Sunni awakening, we might not have had the success that we ultimately achieve there. 

So what steps must, in your view, the Iraqi Government take to 

facilitate reconciliation with the alienated Sunni tribes in Anbar 

province and other Sunni majority areas in order to reduce political 

support for ISIL and to get them to have a second awakening? 

Mr. CONNABLE. Yes. As I have stated, Mr. Chairman, that is the 

fundamental question. There is one major problem and, I think, 

one major opportunity. The major problem is the Sunni polity and 

the political leadership are so badly fragmented, that there is really no hope for some kind of negotiated settlement at the top level 

or even with regional leaders. There simply is not enough credibility there in the Sunni leadership to allow that to happen. 

However, the real opportunity is that the Sunni, in a very kind 

of dispersed way, have very clearly enumerated a lot of the grievances that they think are most critical to them, and it is almost 

like a laundry list. I listed a few of them in my—in my written testimony. 

But I think the good news here is that Prime Minister al-Abadi 

also listed another laundry list of these when he assumed office 

and put his government together, and that was a very positive 

step. So he has already announced the things that need to be done. 

The trick is executing. And I think about 50 percent of the things 

that he identified, and you could probably add in another small 

group of things that would be really critical, he could probably do 

with the stroke of a pen. The others would require deliberation of 

the government. 

I think he should do whatever he can under his own authority 

immediately and together. If he is able to do that, then Sunni that 

I have spoken to, I think, would react quite favorably to that. It 

is a first step, but it is an important one. 

The CHAIRMAN. So even though the Sunni leadership, as you described it, is fragmented, there are some universal issues that they 

have raised that if addressed as part of reconciliation would be 

cross-cutting. 

Mr. CONNABLE. I think Prime Minister al-Abadi is speaking to 

the Sunni people, not to Sunni leaders. I think they are cross-cutting, yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this has been very helpful. You have the 

thanks of the committee for your insights. 

This record will remain open until the close of business on Friday. 

79 

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY JOHN F. KERRY TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. On Iran.—Secretary Kerry, several days ago, you indicated that the 

United States might be open to including Iran in the coalition being organized to 

challenge ISIL. 

♦ Have there been any conversations with Iranian officials regarding potential cooperation against ISIL? 

Answer. If we believe that it would be useful to discuss counter-ISIL efforts with 

Iran, we may do that on the margins of the P5+1 talks, as we have done in the 

past. We are open to engagement with Iranian officials in specific circumstances 

when doing so could help to advance U.S. interests. But let me be clear that the 

nuclear negotiation is a separate issue from actions regarding ISIL. 

♦ Would you describe Iran as a state that furthers or undermines regional stability? 

Answer. While Iran has, in common with the emerging international consensus, 

a strong interest in seeing ISIL defeated, we remain deeply concerned about many 

aspects of Iran’s foreign policy in the region. In particular, we continue to express 

our concerns about Iran’s destabilizing activities in Syria where it, along with Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), continues to support the Assad regime by providing weapons, 

training, and material assistance to Assad’s forces. 

♦ Under what scenarios would the Obama administration cooperate with Iran 

against ISIL? 

Answer. As previously mentioned, if and when there are specific circumstances in 

which engagement with Iran would advance our interests in countering ISIL, we are 

open to such engagement. However, let me be clear that the United States will not 

coordinate military action with Iran. 

♦ As military actions against ISIL expand, what actions will the United States 

take to avoid implicitly supporting Iranian or Syrian forces currently combating 

ISIL? 

Answer. We are not coordinating with the Assad regime or Iran regarding any 

planning that the U.S. military is developing. The President has emphasized repeatedly that Bashar al-Assad has lost legitimacy in Syria and should go. Supporting 

the moderate opposition will support our goal of degrading and destroying ISIL and 

our goal of pressuring Assad to accept a negotiated political settlement. As we’ve 

made very clear, the United States will take lawful action when our people are 

threatened, regardless of geographic boundaries. 

Question. On the Strategy.—The President compared his strategy to confront ISIL 

to very limited counterterror operations carried out in Yemen and Somalia. 

♦ Are Yemen and Somalia today the model of stability the President seeks to 

achieve in Iraq? 

♦ Is the threat posed by ISIL in the territories it controls in Iraq and Syria comparable to that of al-Shabab in Somalia or AQ in the Arabian Peninsula in 

Yemen? 

Answer. The U.S. strategy to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL) involves five interdependent lines of effort: (1) providing military support to 

the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and to the moderate Syrian opposition; (2) cutting 

off the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to ISIL; (3) countering ISIL’s financing and 

funding; (4) addressing humanitarian crises; and (5) de-legitimizing ISIL’s ideology. 

Simultaneously, we will support the efforts of the Government of Iraq to govern 

inclusively. This is a broad strategy, which builds on the model the President 

announced at the National Defense University and at West Point, with many elements that will require a long-term commitment to achieve success. We are not indicating that the threats emanating from Somalia and Yemen are entirely parallel to 

those of Iraq and Syria, nor are we holding up Yemen and Somalia as our end-state 

goal for Iraq and Syria in years to come. Rather, the administration has pointed to 

80 

these lines of effort as examples of where the United States has used a comprehensive strategy and had seen some successes. 

In Yemen and Somalia, the United States has taken steps to build up the capacity 

of forces on the ground to take the fight to terrorists in their own country, and we 

have used our military and intelligence capabilities to support the efforts of those 

indigenous forces. With our support, al-Shabaab has been pushed out of nearly all 

major urban areas in Somalia by local Somali forces and the African Union Mission 

in Somalia (AMISOM). Across the country, Somalis have chosen peace, local governance, and a national identity instead of al-Shabaab. In April and May, the Yemeni 

military conducted an offensive that drove Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP) from its safe havens in Abyan and Shabwah governorates. While AQAP 

remains a lethal threat, it no longer openly controls large swaths of territory. 

Beyond our military and intelligence activities, the administration has also 

worked with partners inside and outside these regions and even in the United 

States to prevent the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Yemen and Somalia. The 

U.S. Government has used its financial tools and mobilized international efforts to 

cut off external contributions to AQAP and al-Shabaab. We have provided alternative messages to their hateful propaganda. Our counterterrorism efforts in both 

countries have been underpinned by a comprehensive strategy to support the government and the people as they pursue challenging but important reforms through 

their political transition processes, recognizing that stability and security also 

depend on continued political, economic, and humanitarian progress. While severe 

challenges remain in both countries, we strongly believe that our counterterrorism 

efforts will only succeed in the context of broader political and economic advancement. 

Using this model in Yemen and Somalia, we have been able to contain the threat 

to the U.S. homeland, degrade those terrorist-affiliated organizations, and in some 

instances, eliminated their top leadership. Like these efforts, the fight against ISIL 

will be waged through a steady, relentless effort to take out ISIL wherever it exists, 

using our air power, support from a growing coalition of foreign partners, and our 

support for partner forces on the ground, complemented by a broader campaign that 

brings all elements of national power to bear in countering this threat. 

Question. Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, said in June: ‘‘We need, 

and we have long needed, to help moderates in the Syrian opposition with both 

weapons and other nonlethal assistance. Had we done that a couple of years ago, 

had we ramped it up, frankly, the al-Qaeda groups that have been winning adherents would have been unable to comply with the moderates.’’ 

♦ Do you agree with Ambassador Ford that the failure to provide lethal and nonlethal assistance to the mainstream Syrian opposition helped give rise to ISIS 

and other jihadist groups? 

♦ Wouldn’t we have better options before us now if he had taken that route early 

on? 

Answer. We have been providing nonlethal assistance to the moderate opposition 

since 2013; with the rise of ISIL, we are increasing nonlethal assistance as well as 

moving forward with the train and equip program, along with our regional partners. 

The moderate opposition is being squeezed from both sides, forced to confront ISIL, 

other extremists, and the Assad regime. In order to degrade and ultimately defeat 

ISIL, as well as to counter the Assad regime, we need to strengthen the moderate 

opposition, and will do so with a joint State Department and DOD train and equip 

program as authorized by Congress. With this new effort, we’ll provide training and 

equipment to help the moderate opposition grow stronger and take on ISIL terrorists inside Syria. This program will be hosted outside of Syria, in partnership with 

allies, and it will be matched by our increasing support for Iraqi Government and 

Kurdish Forces in Iraq. 

Question. A month ago, the President referred to the moderate Syrian opposition 

as ‘‘former doctors, farmers, pharmacists, and so forth.’’ He went on to say ‘‘There’s 

not as much capacity as you would hope.’’ 

♦ Can you describe what changed the President’s assessment of the opposition 

since then to such an extent that he now hopes to provide them lethal assistance? 

♦ What percentage of the opposition in Syria is made up of extremist or terrorist 

elements and what percentage would you deem moderates that we can work 

with? 

♦ Is it still possible for the non-jihadist rebels to topple Assad and gain control 

of the entire country? In essence, will they be able to not just take over DamasVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
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cus, but also drive the jihadists out of northern Syria? If it is, what will it take 

for that to happen? 

Answer. As the President said in his ‘‘60 Minutes’’ interview that was broadcast 

on September 28: ‘‘Keep in mind my statement referred to the outlook 2 years ago. 

The point that I made then, which is absolutely true, is that for us to just start 

arming inexperienced fighters who we hadn’t vetted would leave us in a situation 

where we didn’t know and couldn’t sort out who was a potential ISIL or al-Nusra 

member and who was somebody that we could work with. For us to just go blind 

on that would have been counterproductive and would not have helped the situation.’’ 

The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is a term to describe various armed groups that 

share the goal of overthrowing the Assad regime, and includes secularists as well 

as moderate Islamist fighting groups. The FSA has proven its will and ability to 

stand up against ISIL, at the same time Assad’s air force was attacking them with 

ground forces and barrel bombs. 

Estimates of the total number of violent extremist fighters or the moderate opposition are complex, and the most detailed estimates are based on sensitive information. The most recent relevant analysis of ISIL is that it has between 20,000 and 

31,000 fighters. By way of comparison, estimates of the moderate opposition are 

larger: tens of thousands of nationalist Syrian fighters committed to facing ISIL are 

present today in Aleppo, Idlib, Deir al-Zor, and Daraa. 

The United States is already supporting some of these fighters with nonlethal assistance, but the train and equip program will enable us to increase our support. 

It could also help deter ISIL recruitment efforts as the moderate opposition demonstrates greater support from abroad. Together with our partners, the United 

States is supporting the Syrian opposition to be a counterweight to the terrorists 

of ISIL and the brutality of the Assad regime. 

Question. What role is Qatar playing in our coalition against ISIL? How do you 

respond to concerns that Qatar is playing a double game, trying to work with the 

United States, while simultaneously retaining ties to terrorist groups inside of 

Syria? 

Answer. Qatar is an important partner in the coalition to degrade and defeat the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As a signatory to the Jeddah Communique, Qatar joined a host of countries in the region and the United States in pledging to support a comprehensive strategy to fight ISIL. Qatar has been outspoken 

in its condemnations of ISIL, with Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Khalid bin 

Mohammed Al Attiyah stating that he is ‘‘repelled by their [ISIL’s] views, their violent methods, and their ambitions.’’ The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also 

issued statements congratulating the new Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi on 

his appointment and welcoming the formation of a new Iraqi Government, helping 

to establish the regional legitimacy of the fledgling government. 

Qatar joined the United States in initiating airstrikes in Syria, and hosts the 

al-Udeid Air Base, a critical military facility for the coalition’s air campaign against 

ISIL. We continue to work closely with Qatar on other issues related to terrorism, 

including efforts to combat contributions from private citizens in the region to violent extremist groups. On September 16, Qatar announced a new law regulating 

charities that, if fully implemented and deployed, will be an important step in its 

progress in cracking down on terror financing. 

Question. Press reports indicate that ISIL receives significant funding from crossborder smuggling of oil into Turkey. Many foreign jihadists that have joined ISIL’s 

ranks also have transited through Turkey on their way to Syria. 

♦ How would you characterize your discussions with Turkey about both of these 

challenges? Is the Turkish Government doing enough to address both of these 

issues? 

Answer. We have raised with Turkish officials at the highest level our serious 

concerns regarding ISIL financing via black market oil sales and smuggling in the 

region. While Turkish officials have already taken some action to curb oil smuggling, they realize more needs to be done and have promised to take additional 

steps, including bolstering the Customs Ministry’s role in antismuggling efforts. 

U.S. and Turkish agencies have also stepped up the exchange of analysis and intelligence on oil smuggling and other ISIL financial activity to assist Turkey in taking 

more effective action. 

Similarly, we are working closely with Turkey and other European partners to 

stem the flow of foreign fighters into Syria. Turkish Government leaders acknowledge that the extremist presence in Syria poses a threat to Turkey, the region, and 

the home countries of foreign fighters. Turkey faces particular challenges given its 

82 

geographical location and the high volume of legitimate travelers. As the conflict in 

Syria has continued, the threat posed by violent extremist elements has prompted 

stronger action by the Turkish Government to counter foreign fighter travel across 

its borders. For example, the Turkish Government is working to tighten entry and 

exit controls. 

We have an ongoing, robust dialogue with Turkey on ways to improve our 

counterterrorism cooperation, including better information-sharing, curbing of terrorism finance more effectively, and stronger border security. Special Presidential 

Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL John Allen traveled to Turkey October 8–10 to discuss coalition efforts to degrade and defeat ISIL through a variety 

of means, including efforts to stop terrorist financing and countering the flow of foreign fighters. 

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY JOHN KERRY TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM UDALL

Question. How much has food insecurity contributed to ISIS’ rise, and what is the 

international community and USAID doing to help ensure that access to food is protected among refugees, displaced populations, and even the Iraqi military? 

Answer. ISIL has preyed upon grievances and vulnerabilities within Syrian communities. We have not been tracking food insecurity specifically, but needs continue 

to expand. The international humanitarian community, with the U.S. Government 

as the largest donor, continues to feed millions of Syrians every month, both inside 

the country and in neighboring countries. In August, the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP), USAID’s primary partner in the region, delivered food assistance 

to more than 4.1 million people inside Syria in August—the largest number of people reached in 1 month since the conflict began. Distributions by WFP were taking 

place in areas that ISIS has since conquered, and WFP can now no longer access 

these areas. Gathering the necessary public health data to assess acute malnutrition rates in a war zone is difficult. Comprehensive food security and nutrition surveys have not been possible since 2010 due to the conflict, but there have not been 

reports of the emergency-level acute malnutrition rates that would indicate severe 

food insecurity inside Syria during the conflict. While food prices in Syria have risen 

dramatically, Syria had better-than-expected harvests in 2012 and 2013 despite the 

conflict; those harvests, along with international food assistance, helped offset what 

would otherwise have been a more severe decline in food security due to the war. 

USAID-funded food assistance to internally displaced and conflict-affected Syrians 

inside the country and to Syrian refugees in neighboring countries is very carefully 

targeted and distributed to ensure that it reaches only intended beneficiaries and 

is not used for nonhumanitarian purposes. Inside Syria, USAID-funded WFP food 

parcels reach specific, vulnerable communities, and our NGO partners deliver food 

parcels directly to beneficiary households and provide flour to bakeries that benefit 

affected communities. In neighboring countries, WFP provides USAID-funded food 

assistance to Syrian refugees in strict accordance with refugee registration lists; assistance is provided either via voucher, for which refugees must prove their identity, 

or via food distribution to specific households. 

In Iraq, the Public Distribution Systems (PDS), managed by the Iraqi Government, used to provide basic food rations to nearly all food-insecure Iraqi families on 

a regular basis, including in areas that ISIS now controls. In those areas PDS has 

now been suspended. We have not heard any reports of the excessively high food 

prices in Iraq, or of the emergency-level acute malnutrition rates. Malnutrition rates 

are generally very low in Iraq and there are no indications that this has changed 

recently or that food insecurity has led to increased support for ISIS. The food security situation has been stable in recent years and USAID had not needed to contribute food assistance since 2008. 

Due to a generous contribution from Saudi Arabia, WFP’s emergency food operations in Iraq are covered through December. Ensuring food assistance reaches 

those in need remains a priority, and WFP has consistently increased the geographic and numeric reach of its operations since conflict intensified in June. 

USAID will consider support for WFP in coming months as necessary based on 

review of WFP’s pipeline and assessment of need. 

USAID does not provide food assistance to the Iraqi military or indeed to any 

military. 

Question. The conflict in Syria has continued for over 3 years and taken nearly 

200,000 lives. If ISIS is beaten back in Syria but the underlying conditions of the 

Syrian civil war remain, should we expect another radical Islamic group to emerge? 

83 

Answer. We have long been working to lay the basis for effective peace negotiations and a post-Asasd Syrian government. Our ongoing support to local communities, together with the political leadership of the opposition help opposition-held 

areas effectively govern, rebuild, and establish law and order. This is why we continue to support the local councils, civil defense brigades, and teachers in oppositionheld areas. The moderate opposition is already benefiting from this help as it 

administers areas in Aleppo, Hama, Northern Lattakia, Idlib, Daraa, and some 

areas around Damascus, while building credibility with citizens of their communities. While no plan is risk-proof, our goal is to empower civilian institutions, together with vetted brigades on the ground, in partnership with local communities 

we support, to fill in any space that is vacated by ISIL. 

Supporting the moderate opposition is essential to our political strategy. There is 

no military solution to the conflict. Increasing support to the moderate opposition 

can put pressure on the regime and promote more conducive conditions for a negotiated political settlement. The regime has created the present instability and the 

conditions for the growth of violent extremism among an otherwise nonextremist 

population. 

The administration has built an international coalition against ISIL working 

across multiple lines of effort. In coordination with our international partners, we 

will also redouble efforts to cut off funding flows to ISIL; enhance intelligence collection on ISIL; counter the group’s violent, extremist ideology; and stem the flow of 

foreign fighters into the area. Additionally, the President committed to working with 

our international partners to continue providing humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians who have been displaced, to stabilize a potentially vulnerable population. The United States will also continue to work to help prevent mass atrocities, 

particularly against vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities, since these can also 

be destabilizing and lead to a cycle of violence. 

Question. One year ago many of us were concerned about plans to arm these socalled Syrian moderates because weapons could get in the hands of al-Nusra, which 

is a powerful rebel group allied with al-Qaeda. Who is backing al-Nusra in the 

region and what is the administration’s strategy for dealing with them should ISIS 

be degraded and destroyed? 

Answer. The support structure of violent extremist organizations is complex and 

diverse. Al-Nusra Front, which is a mix of foreign fighters and Syrian nationals, like 

ISIL, has received its financial support from criminal activities, abuse of nonprofit 

organizations, looting of cultural heritage sites, and some external support. The 

recent legislation authorizing the train-and-equip program requires us to vet out, at 

a minimum, those associated with terrorist groups, including, but not limited to, 

ISIL, al-Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham and other al-Qaeda related groups, and 

Hezbollah. 

Question a,b,c. If we look around the Middle East, there are radical Islamic elements in many nations that have lost central government control. We have been 

fighting the Taliban for over a decade, long after driving them from power and 

eliminating the senior al-Qaeda leaders responsible for 9/11. Libya is in a civil war. 

Iraq is in a civil and sectarian war. Similar situations persist in Yemen and Somalia 

and Sudan. Syria is perhaps the worst example. We seem to be engaging in many 

of these conflicts in one way or another. 

♦ With our engagement in each of these areas, are we focusing on individuals and 

groups that are seeking to attack American interests and our homeland? 

Answer (a). The Taliban (Afghanistan).—The President has been clear that while 

our combat mission will be over by the end of the year, we will continue to pursue 

our objective in Afghanistan of disrupting threats posed by al-Qaeda. We will 

advance that objective with a twofold mission of supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda as well as a broader effort to train and 

equip Afghan Forces to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven 

for al-Qaeda and other extremist groups. 

Answer (b). Somalia.—The United States has designated the Somalia-based group 

al-Shabaab a terrorist organization. Al-Shabaab’s leaders have publicly pledged allegiance with al-Qaeda and have called for attacks against the United States and U.S. 

citizens abroad. The group leverages its regional network to conduct terrorist operations. 

U.S. counterterrorism programs are aligned with strategic regional priorities to 

assist Somalia’s efforts in monitoring and securing its own borders, detecting and 

disrupting terrorist plots, and investigating terrorist incidents. We have funded proVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:04 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
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grams to build capacity in law enforcement, crisis response, border security, and 

strengthening the rule of law. 

The Federal Government of Somalia works in partnership with the United States 

and other regional partners to deny and disrupt al-Shabaab operations within 

Somalia. We have also conducted unilateral strikes against targets, including 

against former al-Shabaab emir Ahmed Abdi ‘‘Godane.’’ A key focus of our engagement is to strengthen the Somali Government’s capacity to provide sustainable security that will eliminate al-Shabaab’s ability to regroup and regain footholds in 

Somalia. 

Answer (c). Syria.—Yes, that is always the primary concern. For example, that 

is why in Syria we have been tracking for several years the al-Nusra Front and the 

‘‘Khorasan Group,’’ a term sometimes used to refer to a network of al-Nusra Front 

and al-Qaeda core terrorists who share a history of training operatives, facilitating 

fighters and money, and planning attacks against U.S. and Western targets. These 

operatives are seasoned and very dangerous individuals who have fought and lived 

together in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and North Africa. 

They have many years, if not decades, of experience conducting and planning 

attacks against innocents, and they have brought advanced skill sets to Syria. 

ISIL also poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and the broader Middle 

East—including American citizens, personnel and facilities. If left unchecked, these 

terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United 

States. While we have not yet detected specific plotting against our homeland, ISIL 

leaders have threatened America and our allies. Our Intelligence Community 

believes that thousands of foreigners—including Europeans and some Americans— 

have joined them in Syria and Iraq. Trained and battle-hardened, these fighters 

could try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks. 

Success for us is working to methodically target such organizations, their external 

plotters, and operatives to prevent attacks as best we can, particularly any plotting 

against U.S. interests or the homeland, and to set the conditions in place so that 

these groups are defeated in the long run. This will have to be done in concert with 

partners on the ground. 

Æ