United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 23-2123

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Gilberto Aguilar-Beltran 

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

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Submitted: March 15, 2024 

Filed: May 17, 2024

[Unpublished] 

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Before GRUENDER, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

A jury found Gilberto Aguilar-Beltran guilty of conspiracy to distribute and 

to possess with intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of methamphetamine 

mixture, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1), as well as possession with intent to 

distribute five hundred grams or more of methamphetamine mixture, see id. 
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§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1). The district court1 sentenced Aguilar-Beltran to 293 months’ 

imprisonment. Aguilar-Beltran appeals, raising four arguments that we address in 

turn. 

First, Aguilar-Beltran argues that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s 

findings of guilt on both counts. “We review the sufficiency of the evidence de 

novo, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving 

conflicts in the government’s favor, and accepting all reasonable inferences that 

support the verdict.” United States v. Sherman, 81 F.4th 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2023). 

“We will reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found all the elements of the 

offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

To sustain the conspiracy conviction, the evidence must be sufficient for a 

reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) that there was a 

conspiracy, i.e., an agreement to distribute the drugs; (2) that the defendant knew of 

the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the conspiracy.” Id.

at 807. “In this context, an express agreement is unnecessary—a conspiracy may 

consist of simply a tacit understanding.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

“conspiracy may be proven through circumstantial evidence and by inferences based 

on the actions of the parties.” Id. at 807 n.3. And to “prove possession with intent 

to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), the government must show knowing 

possession of methamphetamine and the intent to distribute it.” United States v. 

Thompson, 881 F.3d 629, 632 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Drug possession may be actual or constructive, sole or joint. United States v. Blair, 

93 F.4th 1080, 1085 (8th Cir. 2024).

Aguilar-Beltran does not dispute that a conspiracy to distribute drugs existed. 

He instead claims that he did not know of the conspiracy and that, even if he was 

aware of the conspiracy, he did not intentionally join it. But the jury heard that 

1

The Honorable Brian C. Buescher, United States District Judge for the 

District of Nebraska.
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Aguilar-Beltran allowed his home to be used as a drug-distribution warehouse. And 

one witness identified Aguilar-Beltran as a person “in charge of sending the money 

back to Mexico,” explaining that he was given instructions by a co-conspirator in 

Mexico to give drug proceeds to Aguilar-Beltran. Police also searched AguilarBeltran’s house and determined that the northeast bedroom was his because it 

contained his driver’s license, clothing, and mail. In the bedroom, police found 599 

grams (more than a pound) of methamphetamine, a digital scale, cling film, a heat 

sealer, and $6,640. 

From this evidence, a jury could have found that Aguilar-Beltran knew of the 

drug-distribution conspiracy and intentionally joined it. See Sherman, 81 F.4th at 

807 n.3. And given the evidence of Aguilar-Beltran’s dominion over his bedroom, 

a reasonable jury could have found that he maintained constructive possession over 

the drugs and other items. See Blair, 93 F.4th at 1085. From Aguilar-Beltran’s 

possession of those items, a jury likewise could have found the requisite intent to 

distribute. See United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 980-81 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding 

that a jury may infer intent to distribute from circumstantial evidence like drug 

quantity and the presence of cash, packaging material, or other distribution 

paraphernalia). Thus, we reject Aguilar-Beltran’s contention that the evidence was 

insufficient on either count. 

Second, Aguilar-Beltran challenges the district court’s findings supporting the 

imposition of a two-offense-level increase under the sentencing guidelines because

“the offense involved the importation of . . . methamphetamine.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(5). We review the district court’s findings for clear error. See United 

States v. Werkmeister, 62 F.4th 465, 468 (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. RazoGuerra, 534 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The Government must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence each of the facts necessary to establish a sentencing 

enhancement.”).

The district court imposed the two-level increase after finding that AguilarBeltran’s offenses involved the importation of methamphetamine from Mexico, 
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relying on the following facts to support its application of the enhancement. One of 

Aguilar-Beltran’s co-conspirators sold methamphetamine to an undercover law 

enforcement agent after the agent had ordered methamphetamine from a source in 

Mexico. Over the course of the conspiracy, Aguilar-Beltran wired drug proceeds to 

Mexico on several occasions. On one occasion, Aguilar-Beltran was in contact with 

an individual in Mexico while distributing methamphetamine. An expert witness 

also testified that the vast majority of methamphetamine is produced in labs in 

Mexico and smuggled into the United States. In light of the above, we conclude that 

the district court did not clearly err in finding that the offenses involved the 

importation of methamphetamine from Mexico.

Third, Aguilar-Beltran argues that he was entitled to an offense-level 

reduction under the guidelines because he played only a minimal or minor role in 

the conspiracy. We review the district court’s refusal to grant a mitigating-role 

adjustment for clear error. United States v. Garcia, 946 F.3d 413, 418 (8th Cir. 

2019). The guidelines provide for a decrease of two to four offense levels if a 

defendant’s “role in the offense” was “minimal” or “minor.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. 

When considering whether a mitigating-role reduction is appropriate, “the district 

court should consider the defendant’s knowledge, planning, authority, 

responsibility, and benefit from the illegal scheme.” United States v. Jones, 25 F.4th 

1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 2022). It is the defendant’s burden to prove that he had a 

mitigating role in the offense. United States v. Young, 689 F.3d 941, 946 (8th Cir. 

2012). 

The district court found that Aguilar-Beltran “played a role in every step of 

the drug distribution conspiracy.” The record reflects that Aguilar-Beltran helped to 

transport methamphetamine to Omaha by hosting his co-conspirators at his home 

while they unloaded drugs from their car in his garage. Aguilar-Beltran himself sold 

one pound of methamphetamine to two other individuals. Trash pulls and a search 

of Aguilar-Beltran’s residence further suggested that drugs were being stored and 

packaged in his home. The search also revealed that Aguilar-Beltran had 

methamphetamine in the nightstand beside his bed. We conclude that the district 
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court’s decision to deny a mitigating-role adjustment was not clearly erroneous. See 

United States v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1177, 1182 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[O]ur cases make it 

clear that merely showing the defendant was less culpable than other participants is 

not enough to entitle the defendant to the adjustment if the defendant was deeply 

involved in the offense.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Fourth, Aguilar-Beltran contends that the district court clearly erred when it 

determined at sentencing the quantity of methamphetamine attributable to him. “We 

review a district court’s drug-quantity finding for clear error and reverse only when 

the entire record definitely and firmly illustrates that the lower court made a 

mistake.” United States v. Buford, 42 F.4th 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2022) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see id. (noting that drug quantity must be proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence). It is “well established that in sentencing matters a 

district court’s assessment of witness credibility is quintessentially a judgment call 

and virtually unassailable on appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court found that Aguilar-Beltran was responsible for fifty pounds

of methamphetamine mixture. A witness testified at trial that on at least two 

occasions twenty-five to thirty “burrito size” packages of methamphetamine were 

unloaded in Aguilar-Beltran’s garage. Other evidence showed that such bulk 

packaging normally contains one pound of drugs. Thus, we conclude that the district 

court did not clearly err in its drug-weight determination. See United States v. 

Padilla-Pena, 129 F.3d 457, 467-68 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the district court 

may rely on other evidence “to approximate total drug quantities beyond the amount 

of drugs actually seized”); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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