The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District * Judge for the District of the District of Columbia, sitting by designation withdrew from consideration of this matter. Pursuant to Second Circuit Local Rule 0.14(b), the matter is being decided by the two remaining members of the panel. 1 06-5319-cr USA v. Gomez 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2007 4 (Argued: May 6, 2008 Decided: September 11, 2009) 5 Docket No. 06-5319-cr (L), 06-5690-cr (XAP), 06-5697-cr (CON) 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 8 Appellee-Cross-Appellant, 9 - v. - 10 ARCENY GOMEZ, 11 12 Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, 13 14 DANNY REYES, 15 16 Defendant-Appellee. 17 18 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 19 20 B e f o r e: WINTER and HALL, Circuit Judges.* 21 Appeal from judgments of conviction and sentence entered in 22 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 23 York (Lawrence M. McKenna, Judge). We reverse on the cross24 appeal because there was no plain error in the jury instruction 25 regarding the Hobbs Act requirement of an effect on interstate 26 commerce and the district court erred as to the applicable 27 mandatory minimum sentence. We affirm on Gomez’s appeal.For convenience, we refer to the government’s appeal as to 1Reyes and cross-appeal as to Gomez collectively as a crossappeal.

2 1 LAURIE A. KORENBAUM, Assistant United States 2 Attorney for the Southern District of New 3 York (Michael J. Garcia, United States 4 Attorney, on the brief, Katherine Polk 5 Failla, Assistant United States Attorney, of 6 counsel), United States Attorney’s Office for 7 the Southern District of New York, New York, 8 New York, for Appellee-Cross-Appellant. 9 10 JOHN F. KALEY, Doar Rieck Kaley & Mack, New 11 York, New York, for Defendant-Appellant12 Cross-Appellee. 13 14 PATRICK J. JOYCE, New York, New York, for 15 Defendant-Appellee. 16 17 18 WINTER, Circuit Judge: 19 Arceny Gomez appeals from his conviction by a jury after a 20 trial before Judge McKenna. He, along with Danny Reyes, who did 21 not appeal but whose sentence is a subject of the government’s 22 cross-appeal,was convicted of: (i) conspiring to commit a Hobbs 1 23 Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); (ii) committing 24 a Hobbs Act robbery (or aiding and abetting thereof) in violation 25 of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; (iii) conspiring to 26 possess with intent to distribute one kilogram of cocaine in 27 violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B); and (iv) using 28 and carrying (or the aiding and abetting thereof) a firearm 29 during and in relation to a crime of violence and a drug 30 trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 18 31 U.S.C. § 2.3 1 After the verdict, the district court vacated both Hobbs Act 2 convictions on the ground that the evidence of an effect on 3 interstate commerce was insufficient as a matter of law. Gomez 4 appeals from his conviction and sentence on the Section 924(c) 5 charge. The government cross-appeals from the district court’s 6 vacating of the Hobbs Act convictions and failure to impose a ten 7 year mandatory minimum sentence on the Section 924(c) count. We 8 affirm on Gomez’s appeal and reverse on the government’s cross9 appeal. 10 BACKGROUND 11 a) The Evidence 12 Because the jury convicted Gomez and Reyes on all counts, we 13 view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. 14 See United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2008). 15 Gomez and Reyes, along with two individuals named Ray Solis 16 and Alfredo DeJesus, engaged in a botched robbery of a drug 17 dealer named Rogelio Rivera, during which Rivera was shot and 18 killed. The government’s case consisted principally of testimony 19 from DeJesus, post-arrest statements made by Gomez and Reyes, and 20 telephone records and documents linking the conspirators around 21 the time of the robbery and murder. 22 DeJesus testified that he discussed with Gomez the plan for 23 the robbery, which they intended would net three kilos of 24 cocaine. Solis was to pose as a drug buyer, using Gomez’s black4 1 Acura because they believed that it was the kind of car a drug 2 dealer would use. The plan was to offer Rivera fake money for 3 the drugs, and, while Rivera inspected the money, draw their guns 4 and rob him of the cocaine. 5 Reyes, who lived both in Connecticut and the Bronx, was the 6 defendants’ connection with Rivera. He had sufficient prior 7 contact with Rivera that he could set up the proposed deal to 8 acquire cocaine and that Rivera trusted him to broker the deal 9 with Solis, a person Rivera had not previously met. While the 10 four were on their way to a restaurant in the Bronx where they 11 were to meet with Rivera, they stopped their cars and got out. 12 According to DeJesus, Solis and Reyes adjusted their waistbands 13 in a manner that suggested that each had a gun. Thereafter, 14 Solis and Reyes got into the Acura and continued driving while 15 Gomez and DeJesus followed in a white van. Solis and Reyes 16 picked up Rivera near the restaurant. Those three then traveled 17 together in the Acura to the site of the intended robbery. 18 DeJesus and Gomez followed in the white van. Reyes and Solis 19 entered a building with Rivera, while DeJesus and Gomez stayed 20 outside to serve as lookouts during the intended robbery. After 21 a short time, a shot rang out. Solis and Reyes ran out of the 22 building and drove away in the Acura, while DeJesus and Gomez 23 followed in the van. When they stopped to switch cars, Reyes 24 indicated that Solis had shot Rivera. Solis said that the5 1 robbery had netted only one kilogram of cocaine. 2 When Reyes and Gomez were interviewed after their arrests, 3 each substantially corroborated DeJesus’s account of the robbery. 4 Reyes’s statement indicated that the plan had been for all the 5 perpetrators to use firearms in the robbery. 6 In order to show Gomez’s intent in anticipation of his 7 testimony outlined below, DeJesus testified as to several other 8 drug robberies committed by Gomez, including one in which he and 9 Gomez had netted 1.5 kilograms of heroin in or around February 10 1998, and another in the spring of 1998 involving one kilogram of 11 cocaine. Finally, DeJesus described a third robbery that was 12 planned to net fifty kilograms of cocaine. DeJesus discussed 13 this robbery with Gomez and the other perpetrators, hoped to be 14 taken along, but ultimately he did not go. DeJesus testified 15 that Gomez told him that the robbery was “triumphant” and that he 16 and Gomez celebrated its success. Gomez then gave DeJesus four 17 kilograms of cocaine that DeJesus sold to a friend of his. 18 Gomez testified in his own defense and stated that while he 19 did participate in the robbery of Rivera, he did so only as a 20 paid informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). 21 Gomez had indeed been acting as an informant for the DEA in some 22 matters but for several days did not inform his handlers about 23 the robbery in question. He sought to explain this delay by 24 stating that his DEA handler did not speak Spanish well and thatThe Hobbs Act provides that: 2 Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). 6 1 an officer he worked with in the New York Police Department 2 (“NYPD”) had given Gomez a disconnected pager number. In 3 response, the government presented testimony from Gomez’s NYPD 4 handler indicating that the officer’s pager number had not 5 changed or been disconnected and that Gomez could have informed 6 him of the robbery at a debriefing session a few days after the 7 robbery. Instead, Gomez did not mention the robbery until he had 8 been arrested for it. 9 b) Jury Instructions, Post-Trial Proceedings, and Sentencing 10 The judge gave several jury instructions pertinent to this 11 appeal. 12 Regarding the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act2 13 conspiracy count, the district court told the jury that: 14 [T]he government must prove . . . that . . . had the 15 robbery been completed interstate commerce would have 16 been or potentially would have been affected in some 17 way[,] even if the effect is slight . . . . Such 18 robbery need only affect interstate commerce in any way 19 or degree, even if the effect is only minimal . . . . 20 The government satisfies its burden of proving an 21 effect . . . if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt anyTitle 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) states in pertinent part: 3 [A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm . . . shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime –- (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and (iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years. 7 1 effect, whether it was harmful or not. 2 3 The court also instructed that: 4 Congress has determined that all narcotics activity, even 5 purely local narcotics activity, has a substantial effect on 6 interstate commerce. Thus, if you find that the object of 7 the robbery was to possess narcotics with the intent to 8 distribute them, you may find this element satisfied. 9 10 With respect to the substantive Hobbs Act count, the judge 11 referred the jury to the above-quoted instructions on the 12 conspiracy count. The judge also noted that substantive Hobbs 13 Act robbery requires a taking of property, “by means of actual or 14 threatened force . . . .” 15 With respect to the Section 924(c)count, the district 3 16 court charged the jury that “[i]n order to convict the defendant 17 you must find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable 18 doubt his involvement in at least one of the underlying crimes of 19 violence or the drug-trafficking crime.” The judge did not8 1 instruct the jury that it had to be unanimous as to which crime 2 was the predicate for a Section 924(c) conviction. 3 The jury reached a guilty verdict on all counts. Gomez and 4 Reyes moved to set aside their convictions under the Hobbs Act on 5 the grounds that there was legally insufficient evidence of the 6 requisite effect on interstate commerce. The district court 7 agreed and vacated the verdict on both Hobbs Act counts. 8 Gomez alone argued that his Section 924(c) conviction should 9 also be vacated because the jury was not instructed that it had 10 to be unanimous on the selection of a specific predicate crime 11 and because the vacating of the Hobbs Act counts had eliminated 12 two of the three possible predicates, rendering it impossible to 13 know which alleged predicate(s) the jury had found. Although the 14 district court agreed that the jury should have been instructed 15 that they had to be unanimous on a particular predicate, it found 16 that there was no need to vacate the Section 924(c) conviction. 17 It reasoned that had the jury been properly instructed, it would 18 have selected the remaining drug distribution count as a 19 predicate. 20 In sentencing Reyes, the district court calculated his base 21 offense level using the three kilograms of cocaine that the 22 robbers had planned to steal rather than the one kilogram 23 actually obtained. This resulted in a base offense level of 28 24 for Reyes.9 1 On Reyes’s Section 924(c) convictions, the district court 2 imposed the five year minimum sentence for use of a gun rather 3 than the ten year mandatory minimum sentence for discharging it. 4 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); supra note 3. The district court 5 noted that the jury had not been asked to specify which gun(s) 6 was the basis for the Section 924(c) convictions. The court then 7 reasoned that because there was some evidence that two guns were 8 involved but only one was discharged, it was impossible to say 9 whether the jury had convicted Reyes under Section 924(c) for the 10 gun that was discharged. Accordingly, the five year sentence for 11 mere use applied. The district court ultimately imposed a total 12 sentence of 132 months -- 72 months was based on the drug 13 conspiracy count and a consecutive 60 months was based on the 14 Section 924(c) count. 15 With respect to Gomez, the district court began by factoring 16 in the three kilograms of cocaine contemplated in planning the 17 robbery. The court, however, rejected the government’s argument 18 that all of the drugs from Gomez’s alleged prior drug robberies 19 should be used in calculating Gomez’s guidelines sentence. The 20 district court specifically rejected DeJesus’s testimony 21 regarding the robbery involving one kilogram of cocaine and the 22 robbery involving fifty kilograms of cocaine, finding that these 23 events were “not described with adequate specificity.” The 24 district court, however, did factor in the February 1998 robbery10 1 involving 1.5 kilograms of heroin. The district court also 2 followed the logic it applied to Reyes to hold that only the five 3 year minimum sentence under Section 924(c) should apply to Gomez. 4 The district court ultimately sentenced Gomez to 162 months -- 5 102 months was based on the drug conspiracy count and a 6 consecutive 60 months was on the Section 924(c) count. 7 DISCUSSION 8 a) The Hobbs Act Counts 9 The government’s cross-appeal seeks to reinstate Reyes’s and 10 Gomez’s convictions on the conspiracy and substantive Hobbs Act 11 counts. To sustain a Hobbs Act conviction, there must be 12 evidence that the underlying act affected interstate commerce. 13 See United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 227 (2d Cir. 2007). 14 The government argues that any error in the jury instructions was 15 harmless and that the evidence regarding the interstate commerce 16 element of the Hobbs Act offenses was sufficient. We agree. 17 Because no objection was made at trial to the interstate 18 commerce instructions, plain error analysis applies. See United 19 States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2007). A finding of 20 plain error requires “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that 21 affects the defendant's substantial rights. If all three 22 conditions are met, we may exercise our discretion to notice the 23 error, provided that the error seriously affects the fairness, 24 integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United11 1 States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 537 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations 2 omitted). No error in the present case affected substantial 3 rights. 4 We first identify any error in the jury instructions. The 5 pertinent portion reads, “Congress has determined that all 6 narcotics activity, even purely local narcotics activity, has a 7 substantial effect on interstate commerce. Thus, if you find 8 that the object of the robbery was to possess narcotics with the 9 intent to distribute them, you may find this element satisfied.” 10 (emphasis added). The district court’s reference to a 11 Congressional determination was to Section 801(3)-(6) of the 12 Controlled Substances Act, which contains legislative findings 13 that both intrastate and interstate drug trafficking affect 14 interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(3)-(6). In fashioning 15 these instructions, the district court may have reasoned that, 16 given the Congressional findings, robberies involving drugs or 17 their proceeds are per se within the affecting-commerce 18 requirement of the Hobbs Act, a conclusion we later adopted in 19 United States v. Fabian, 312 F.3d 550, 555-56 (2d Cir. 2002). 20 However, to the extent that Fabian held that proof that a robbery 21 involved drugs or proceeds thereof automatically satisfied the 22 interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act as a matter of law, 23 thereby taking the issue from the jury, it was overruled by 24 United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2007), in light of12 1 intervening Supreme Court and other circuit decisions. Id. at 2 229-30. Parkes held that “[p]roving an effect on interstate 3 commerce is . . . an element of a Hobbs Act offense, which must 4 be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.” Id. at 227. 5 The district court’s instructions quoted above were 6 consistent with Parkes in that they used the permissive “may” and 7 therefore described only what the jury might find rather than 8 taking the issue from it entirely. The error in the instruction 9 lay in referencing Congressional findings. This reference may 10 have misled the jury into believing that those findings were 11 binding upon it as a trier of fact. This view is not consistent 12 with Parkes. See id. Whether this error was “plain” is a close 13 question, but one that we need not reach because it was harmless 14 and for that reason did not impair the defendants’ substantial 15 rights. 16 The error in the jury instruction was in its potential to 17 mislead the jury into believing that it need not make an 18 independent finding regarding the element of an effect on 19 interstate commerce. Such omitted element errors are subject to 20 harmless error analysis. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 10 (1999). In such a case, we “consider the weight of trial 22 evidence bearing on the omitted element; and if such evidence is 23 overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted, there is no basis 24 for concluding that the error seriously affects the fairness,If the evidence regarding an omitted element is 4 overwhelming but controverted, we have “conduct[ed] a two-part inquiry, searching the record in order to determine (a) whether there was sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find in favor of the defendant on the omitted element, and, if there was, (b) whether the jury would nonetheless have returned the same verdict of guilty.” United States v. Guevara, 298 F.3d 124, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

13 1 integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United 2 States v. Guevara, 298 F.3d 124, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations 3 and quotation marks omitted) (considering an Apprendi error, 4 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), where the jury did 5 not make a finding on an element).To sustain the conviction, 4 6 we must find that the jury would have returned the same verdict 7 beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Jackson, 196 8 F.3d 383, 386 (2d Cir. 1999). 9 The government’s evidence regarding interstate commerce was 10 that the object of the robbery was three kilos of cocaine and 11 that one kilo was seized. This evidence was not controverted; 12 that is, no defendant challenged the object, fact, or result of 13 the robbery. Also uncontroverted was the fact that Reyes, who 14 occupied residences in both Connecticut and the Bronx, was known 15 to Rivera and trusted to the point that Rivera was willing to 16 deal with him and Solis -- a person Rivera did not know –- to 17 sell three kilograms of cocaine. The defendants’ claim here is 18 that the robbery’s object (the theft of multiple kilograms of 19 cocaine from a drug dealer) and/or result are insufficient as a14 1 matter of law to constitute the requisite effect on interstate 2 commerce. We disagree. 3 It hardly needs repeating that the reach of the Hobbs Act is 4 coextensive with the full reach of Congressional power over 5 commerce, see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960), 6 and that only “a very slight effect on interstate commerce” need 7 be shown. See United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 726 (2d 8 Cir. 2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Indeed, “[e]ven a 9 potential or subtle effect on commerce will suffice.” United 10 States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 35 (2d Cir. 1981). In drug 11 trafficking cases, the requisite effect on interstate commerce 12 can be found either in the importation or interstate 13 transportation of drugs or even in the trafficking of particular 14 drugs in a “small but going enterprise” that handles product 15 almost exclusively transported into the United States from 16 outside the country and very little of which is produced in New 17 York. See Parkes, 497 F.3d at 231; see also United States v. 18 Vasquez, 267 F.3d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2001). While making it 19 clear that it was not deciding the issue, the Court in Parkes 20 said in a footnote: “It may well be that a rational jury could 21 conclude that the interstate commerce element is satisfied by 22 proof that a robbery targeting drugs or proceeds of a drug 23 business that is purely intrastate.” Parkes, 497 F.3d at 231 24 n.10. Parkes also reminds us that “[t]he required evidence of anParkes involved marijuana, 497 F.3d at 225, which can be 5 grown in the United States. Cocaine is exclusively foreign in origin. 15 1 effect need not take any particular form or be offered in any 2 particular quantum -- direct, indirect, or circumstantial 3 evidence could suffice. It is a case-by-case inquiry.” Id. at 4 231 n.11. Similarly, in Vasquez, a plain error case, we 5 expressly held that heroin trafficking “affects interstate 6 commerce, at the very least, regardless of where the raw 7 materials originate” and that any error in relevant jury 8 instructions regarding the commerce element could not have 9 affected the fairness, integrity, or public perception of the 10 proceeding, much less have amounted to a miscarriage of justice. 11 Vasquez, 267 F.3d at 90 (emphasis in original). Indeed, Parkes 12 itself held that a robbery of marijuana and $4000 in drug 13 proceeds, along with direct expert testimony, was sufficient to 14 establish the requisite nexus to interstate commerce. Parkes, 15 497 F.3d at 231. 16 The only evidence even arguably lacking was direct testimony 17 of an expert nature that cocaine is imported into the United 18 Statesand/or that any robbery of cocaine, wherever the source, 5 19 affects interstate commerce. Such expert testimony is 20 unnecessary because a reasonable juror is surely capable of 21 drawing the conclusion that a robbery undertaken with the object 22 of stealing from a drug dealer three kilos of cocaine -- and16 1 which successfully yielded one kilo (i.e., a thousand grams or 2 multiple thousands of doses of cocaine) -- would have had at 3 least the required de minimus effect on interstate commerce. See 4 Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 46 (2d Cir. 2004) 5 (expert testimony unnecessary in cases where jurors “are as 6 capable of comprehending the primary facts and of drawing correct 7 conclusions from them as are witnesses possessed of special or 8 peculiar training” (quoting Salem v. U.S. Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 9 35 (1962)). The importation and interstate transportation of 10 cocaine, as well as the financial size of the cocaine trade, have 11 been routinely and copiously discussed by public officials, 12 candidates for office, and the news media for decades. In 13 addition, even the commercial effect of home-grown drugs, which 14 by reason of that origin distinguish them from cocaine, has been 15 described by the Supreme Court as “visible to the naked eye,” 16 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28-29 (2005), such that we would 17 infer an effect on interstate commerce from purely domestic 18 production. Certainly, as Vaquez held, the absence of such 19 expert testimony would not constitute plain error. See 267 F.3d 20 at 87-90. 21 The analysis of proof of effect on interstate commerce is a 22 case-by-case inquiry, Parkes, 497 F.3d at 231 n.11, and such 23 proof need only demonstrate “a potential or subtle effect” on 24 interstate commerce. Angelilli, 660 F.2d at 35. Based on the17 1 facts presented to the jury in this case, we find beyond a 2 reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned the guilty 3 verdict even absent the instruction that was given. See Jackson, 4 196 F.3d at 386. For that reason, we hold that the error in the 5 jury instruction was harmless. 6 Finally, although for the reasons stated we find no plain 7 error in the charge given, even if we were to determine that such 8 error existed, we would be hard pressed to find that the error 9 created an injustice. The lack of injustice is underlined by the 10 fact that the instructions were not challenged and the issue of 11 the sufficiency was preserved only by a general motion at the 12 close of the government’s case in which the words “interstate 13 commerce” were conspicuous by their absence. The timing and 14 general non-specific nature of the challenge is understandable. 15 Before verdict, any issue could have been quickly and 16 indisputably resolved, see Parkes, 497 F.3d at 231, destroying 17 any value on appeal. 18 We therefore overturn the vacating of the Hobbs Act counts. 19 b) Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Section 924(c) Count 20 There was no evidence that Gomez carried a weapon during the 21 robbery. However, he was charged with, and convicted of, aiding 22 and abetting a violation of Section 924(c), and, under 18 U.S.C. 23 § 2, he is punishable as a principal. Relying on United States 24 v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 1994), Gomez challenges his18 1 Section 924(c) conviction. Medina held that “a defendant who is 2 not present [at the crime] . . . cannot be said to aid and abet 3 the use or carrying of a firearm simply by aiding and abetting 4 the overall enterprise in which the firearm is employed.” Id. at 5 47. Gomez argues in the present matter that the evidence tying 6 him specifically to the use of firearms, as opposed to showing 7 merely his general involvement in the robbery, was legally 8 insufficient. We disagree. 9 It is clear from the facts in Medina that the words “not 10 present [at a robbery]” described a participant who was 11 geographically distant from the crime and played no supportive 12 role as the robbery took place. Here, by contrast, Gomez was 13 “present” as a lookout at the scene and played a critical 14 supportive role in the armed robbery. Accordingly, there was 15 easily sufficient evidence to convict Gomez for aiding and 16 abetting on the Section 924(c) count. 17 c) Jury Instructions on the Section 924(c) Count 18 A Section 924(c) conviction requires the trier of fact to 19 find that the use of a gun was “during and in relation to any 20 crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” See 18 U.S.C. § 21 924(c)(1)(A); supra note 3. The predicate crimes alleged here 22 are those alleged in the two Hobbs Act counts and the single 23 cocaine trafficking count. Gomez argues that his Section 924(c) 24 conviction must be vacated because the jury was not instructed to 25 reach a unanimous agreement about which specific predicate crimeIn Santana-Madera, this Court concluded that a Richardson 6 error was not a “structural error,” i.e., a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” 260 F.3d at 139 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)). As a result, we concluded that Richardson errors are subject to harmless error review. See 260 F.3d at 139. 19 1 or crimes were the basis for that conviction. This argument 2 gained force when the convictions on two of the three predicate 3 crimes were vacated. 4 The failure to instruct the jury that it had to agree on a 5 specific predicate was likely error. See Richardson v. United 6 States, 526 U.S. 813, 818 (1999) (concluding that jury must 7 unanimously agree that defendant is guilty of each of the 8 predicate violations that together constitute a continuing 9 criminal enterprise under 21 U.S.C. § 848); compare 18 U.S.C. § 10 924(c) (referring to predicate “crime[s]”). Again, however, 11 there was no objection at trial, and plain error review applies. 12 See Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 13 2001).Indeed, a Richardson error is essentially an omitted 6 14 element -- in this case the requirement that each juror agree on 15 the predicate crime. See id.; see also United States v. Brown, 16 202 F.3d 691, 699 (4th Cir. 2000). The analysis we undertake 17 here is similar to that which we have already undertaken with 18 respect to the defendant’s claim regarding the interstate 19 commerce element. When an alleged error relates to an omitted 20 element of a jury charge, it is reviewed for harmlessness. And20 1 if an error is harmless, then none of the defendant’s 2 “substantial rights” will have been affected and the error is 3 therefore not “plain.” Following Neder, therefore, we ask, “Is 4 it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would 5 have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” Neder v. 6 United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999). 7 The answer is obviously yes. Whatever force Gomez’s 8 argument may have had when the Hobbs Act convictions were vacated 9 vanishes now that they have been reinstated. Because the jury 10 validly reached a unanimous guilty verdict on every predicate 11 crime alleged, the erroneous jury instruction was necessarily 12 harmless. Accordingly, the Section 924(c) conviction stands. 13 d) Element vs. Sentencing Factor for the Section 924(c) Count 14 Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides a scale of differing 15 mandatory minimum sentences depending on whether the gun in the 16 crime was merely used, was brandished, or was actually 17 discharged. See supra note 3. Gomez is exposed to this scale 18 because of his conviction as an aider and abettor punishable as a 19 principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2. 20 Gomez argues that the application of a particular mandatory 21 minimum based on the facts of the crime is an element of the 22 crime that should therefore have been determined by the jury. 23 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). Gomez 24 acknowledges that a Supreme Court decision is directly to the21 1 contrary. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567-70 2 (2002). In Harris, a plurality of the court, and Justice Breyer 3 in concurrence, agreed that facts that trigger a mandatory 4 minimum sentence are not elements of the crime but are rather 5 sentencing factors of the sort that a judge may properly find. 6 Id. Indeed, Harris explicitly considered Section 924(c). Id. 7 Gomez contends that Harris has been undermined by subsequent 8 Supreme Court decisions such as Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (holding 9 that any fact necessary to support a sentence exceeding the 10 maximum authorized by the facts established by a jury verdict 11 must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt). However, we 12 must still follow Harris. The Supreme Court has held that “if a 13 precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet 14 appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 15 decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which 16 directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of 17 overruling its own decisions.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 18 237 (1997) (citation and alteration omitted) (quoting Rodriguez 19 de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 20 (1989)). Moreover, our Court has applied Harris even after 21 Booker. See e.g., United States v. Estrada, 428 F.3d 387, 389 22 (2d Cir. 2005) (relying on Harris to conclude that prior 23 narcotics convictions that triggered a mandatory life sentence 24 were not required to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable22 1 doubt). Accordingly, Harris still governs, and the Section 2 924(c) enhancement can properly be found by the sentencing court. 3 e) Section 924(c): Use or Discharge 4 The government cross-appeals from the district court’s 5 holding that Gomez and Reyes are subject only to the five-year 6 minimum sentence for use of a firearm rather than the ten-year 7 enhancement for discharge. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); supra 8 note 3. The district court concluded that because there was 9 evidence that only one gun was discharged but two guns may have 10 been used in the crime, it was unclear which gun or guns the jury 11 relied upon in convicting under Section 924(c). We disagree. 12 Although the jury was not asked to make a specific finding 13 regarding which gun or guns it was relying upon, Solis’s 14 discharge of a gun is undisputed. Apart from that murderous 15 discharge –- the effect of which proved the use of a gun beyond 16 any doubt -– the evidence of the use of guns consisted of 17 DeJesus’s testimony as to Solis and Reyes adjusting their 18 waistbands, Reyes’s post-arrest statement, and the necessity of 19 weapons in such a robbery. We believe it obvious that the 20 undisputed evidence that Solis killed Rivera with a gun was a 21 foundation for the jury’s Section 924(c) conviction. We see no 22 possibility that the jury would have disregarded this undisputed 23 fact to consider in its deliberations over the gun-use element 24 whether Reyes had a gun. We therefore order resentencing of23 1 Gomez and Reyes. 2 f) Uncharged Robbery as Sentencing Enhancement 3 Gomez argues that the district court improperly enhanced his 4 sentencing range by four levels based on his alleged robbery of 5 1.5 kilograms of heroin. Gomez makes several attacks against the 6 procedure used by the district court, but each is meritless. In 7 particular, Gomez argues that the district court should not have 8 relied on DeJesus’s trial testimony. However, we have said, “The 9 sentencing court’s discretion is largely unlimited either as to 10 the kind of information it may consider, or the source from which 11 it may come . . . . A sentencing court is free to consider 12 hearsay evidence, evidence of uncharged crimes, dropped counts of 13 an indictment and criminal activity resulting in acquittal in 14 determining sentence.” United States v. Sisti, 91 F.3d 305, 312 15 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 16 Gomez argues that he should have been given an opportunity 17 to cross-examine DeJesus at sentencing. The district court did 18 not abuse its discretion, however, given that Gomez’s trial 19 counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine DeJesus at trial. 20 See United States v. Williams, 247 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2001) 21 (sentencing court under no duty to conduct “full-blown 22 evidentiary hearing”) (quoting United States v. Prescott, 920 23 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1990)); United States v. Harris, 38 F.3d 24 95, 98 (2d Cir. 1994) (court found without merit defendant’s 25 objection to lack of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses24 1 testifying at sentencing hearing where defendant “conced[ed] that 2 defendants have no right to confrontation at sentencing” and 3 “cite[d] no authority to support his claim that the defendant has 4 a right to cross-examine witnesses called to testify”). 5 Gomez also argues that it was unfair to rely on DeJesus’s 6 trial testimony as evidence at sentencing because the trial 7 testimony had been admitted only for a limited purpose: namely 8 proof of intent under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The 9 evidence admitted at trial for the purpose of demonstrating 10 Gomez’s intent with respect to the robberies was relevant at 11 trial only if the jury also found that the robberies had actually 12 occurred. Likewise, the testimony regarding Gomez’s intent was 13 relevant at sentencing only if the robberies had occurred. 14 Therefore, the testimony was admitted at trial for the same 15 purpose for which it was used at sentencing. 16 Gomez further argues that it is simply improper for a 17 district court to find facts at sentencing. This argument is 18 squarely contradicted by Crosby. See United States v. Crosby, 19 397 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2005)(concluding that the sentencing 20 judge is entitled to find all facts relevant to the sentencing). 21 CONCLUSION 22 We reverse on the government’s cross-appeal, reinstate the 23 Hobbs Act convictions, and remand for resentencing in accord with 24 this opinion. We affirm on Gomez’s appeal. 25 26