CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

The Recruitment, Education, and 

Training of PLA Navy Personnel

www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx

Kenneth Allen and Morgan Clemens
Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

China Maritime Study No. 12

August 2014

President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral P. Gardner Howe III, U.S. Navy

Provost

William Spain

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Thomas Culora

Director of China Maritime Studies Institute

and editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies series

Peter Dutton

Naval War College Press

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ISSN 1943-0817

ISBN 978-1-935352-30-3


List of Tables

TABLE 1 PLA Officer Grades and Ranks..............................................5

TABLE 2 PLA Navy Academic Institutions Providing 

Officer Education ................................................................7

TABLE 3 Universities with PLAN National Defense 

Student Programs ................................................................8

TABLE 4 PLAN Surface Branch Officer Career Track ............................... 13

TABLE 5 PLA Enlisted Grades and Ranks as of 2009................................. 19

TABLE 6 Vocational Colleges Participating in Pilot Programs for the 

Directed Education of PLAN Direct-Recruitment NCOs .......22

TABLE 7 Permanent PLAN Training Units for Conscripts of NCOs......23

The opinions expressed in this publication are the perspectives of the authors and do 

not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its 

components or the views of the government of the People’s Republic of China or 

any of its components. 

Looking back at the parlous state of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 

in the early 1980s, Liu Huaqing, its former commander, wrote, “All areas [of the 

navy] required significant strengthening, but I believed the key was developing capable 

personnel.” Indeed, during Admiral Liu’s tenure (1982–88), the PLAN embarked on a 

major effort to improve the quality of its officers and enlisted personnel—an effort that 

continues to this day.1

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the results of reforms of the way in which 

the PLAN recruits, educates, and trains its officers and enlisted personnel. Although 

these reforms began in the 1980s, they experienced a boost in the 1990s, when procurement of advanced weaponry (made possible by expanding national defense budgets) 

increased, creating an urgent need for a more highly educated force to operate, support, 

and maintain the new systems. To this end, the PLAN has gradually shifted from an officer force consisting primarily of graduates of PLAN academic institutions who were selected from high school graduates and outstanding enlisted personnel with high school 

educations to a combination of PLAN academic-institution graduates; officers who 

have graduated with science, technology, or engineering degrees from the newly created 

National Defense Student (Reserve Officer) Program; and directly recruited graduates of 

civilian colleges who have appropriate technical degrees. The PLAN is currently in the 

process of consolidating and reorganizing its officer academic institutions and professional military education (PME) structure to provide a continuum of education and 

training throughout an officer’s career. 

Reforms in the enlisted force continue to lag behind those of the officer corps. In 1999, 

the PLAN, like the rest of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), went from an enlisted 

force composed of four-year conscripts (who could then remain on active duty for a total 

of sixteen years as volunteers) to a two-year conscription period with the opportunity to 

remain on active duty for a total of thirty years, as members of a newly created noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. The problem then was that the force was still composed 

primarily of personnel with only ninth-grade educations. In the mid-2000s, the PLAN 

began to recruit NCOs directly from among civilian college graduates and civilians with 

The Recruitment, Education, and Training of 

PLA Navy Personnel
2 china maritime studies

certain technical skills. In 2009 the PLA made a dramatic shift from a primarily two-year 

conscription enlisted force to a volunteer force consisting of about one-third civilian college students and graduates. By 2011, however, the program had run into fairly significant problems and was being revised yet again. 

Like the rest of the PLA, the PLAN has begun to recruit, educate, and train female enlisted sailors and officers in multiple career fields, including communications, nursing, 

maritime navigation, radar and sonar operation, and command-and-control functions 

on such platforms as destroyers, landing vessels, and the hospital ship Peace Ark (hull 

number 866).2 During 2010 the training vessel Zhenghe (hull number 81) carried the 

vessel’s first group of nine female officer cadets on a training mission to five countries, 

including Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and Australia.3 Another group of thirteen 

female cadets from the Dalian Naval Ship Academy participated in Zhenghe’s aroundthe-world voyage in 2012.4

The PLAN is now in the process of reforming its entire PME system, which consists of 

multiple levels of education and billet training, to accommodate a more educated officer 

and enlisted force. Some of these reforms will require decades to bear fruit. For example, 

it will be 2029 before anyone who entered service in 1999 will have served a full thirty 

years and 2039 before anyone who joined as a result of the 2009 reforms will have served 

that long. An NCO must now have a secondary technical degree (e.g., high school 

equivalent) to become a junior-grade NCO, a senior technical degree (e.g., associate’s) 

to become an intermediate-grade NCO, or a bachelor’s degree to become a senior-grade 

NCO. However, most NCO schools currently only provide two-year secondary technical 

or two- or three-year senior technical-degree PME for NCOs, making the institutions 

inadequate for educating enlisted personnel who already have bachelor’s degrees. 

To address these issues, after a brief discussion of terminology, this monograph is organized into five sections: officer recruitment, education, and specialty training; officer 

professional military education; two-year enlisted force recruitment, basic training, and 

specialty training; NCO recruitment, training, and education; and conclusions. 

PLA Navy PME Terminology and Concepts

For those familiar with the U.S. Navy, understanding the PLAN personnel system can 

be complicated, because the terminology and concepts are different. For example, the 

PLA translates the term xueyuan (学员) as officer “cadet,” but the term refers to not only 

cadets during their precommissioning undergraduate years at military academic institutions but also “students” who attend military academic institutions or training units 

as officers.5 Meanwhile, students in the National Defense Student Program (discussed 

below) are called “national defense students” (guofang sheng—国防生), not cadets.6 As 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 3

for the enlisted force, the PLA uses the term xuebing (学兵) for all enlisted personnel, 

including NCOs, who receive post–basic training specialty instruction at a training 

organization.7

Importantly, the PLA does not have a term that it translates as “professional military 

education.” For purposes of this monograph, peixun (培训)—a combination of 

peiyang (培养) and xunlian (训练)—will be translated as PME. The PLA translates 

peixun as “development and training.”8 Peiyang is normally translated as to “cultivate,” 

“nurture,” “foster,” “train,” “develop,” or “educate.”9 It is defined in this context as the 

process by which cadets master the system of scientific and cultural knowledge and 

skills, form moral characters, and develop perfect physiques. Xunlian is normally 

translated as “training.”10 “Military training” (junshi xunlian—军事训练), or simply 

“training,” is defined as military personnel receiving education in military theory and 

related specialty knowledge and engaging in combat-skills education and training and 

in military training events.11 Training includes “unit training” (budui xunlian—部队训

练), “military academic institution education” (junshi junxiao xunlian—军事军校训

练), and “reserve training” (yubeiyi xunlian—预备役训练). It is divided into “common 

training” (gongtong xunlian—共同训练), “skills training” (jishu xunlian—技术训练), 

and “strategic, campaign, and tactical training” (zhanlue zhanyi zhanshu xunlian—战略

战役战术训练). 

The Chinese notion of PME embraces cadets, young officers, and NCOs.12 It can include 

“professional science and technology education” (zhiye jishu jiaoyu—职业技术教育), 

“on-the-job training” (zaizhi xunlian —在职训练), “specialty training” (zaiye renyuan 

de zhuanmen xunlian—在业人员的专门训练), “equipment specialty PME” (zhuangbei 

zhuanye peixun—装备专业培训), and “short-term reeducation” (duanqi zaijiaoyu—短

期再教育), such as “cultivation and training for officers at every level” (geji junguan de 

peixun—各级军官的培训), as well as “billet training” (gangwei xunlian—岗位训练). A 

more detailed definition is the systematic cultivation and training of cadets/students at 

an academic institution.13

Officer Recruitment, Education, and Specialty Training

This section briefly discusses officer career tracks and categories, examines how officers 

are recruited, and describes how officers receive their education and specialty training. 

Officer Career Tracks and Categories

The PLA has five officer career tracks for what it calls “active-duty officers” (现役军

官): military (operational), political, logistics, equipment, and special technical.14 All 

officers, regardless of career track, who serve in leadership billets (e.g., as directors or 

deputy directors of offices) are called “commanding officers” (指挥军官), which should 
4 china maritime studies

not be confused with “commanders” (指挥员/司令员). With the exception of political “commanding officers,” officer career tracks are determined on the basis of the new 

cadets’ college entrance scores, and the career tracks in turn determine which academic 

institutions they will attend.15

“Military (or operational) officers” (军事军官) serve as unit commanders or deputy 

commanders down to the platoon level, as well as chiefs of staff (e.g., directors) or staff 

officers in the General Staff Department (GSD) and in the headquarters departments of 

all services and branches down to the regiment level.16

“Political officers” (政治军官) serve as political officers (e.g., political commissars, 

political directors, or political instructors) or deputy political officers in all units down 

to the company level. They also serve as directors or deputy directors, as well as staff 

officers, in the General Political Department (GPD) and in political departments or divisions in all services and branches down to the regiment level, as well as political officers 

and staff officers at the battalion and company levels. There are no political officers at 

the platoon level. 

“Logistics officers” (后勤军官) serve as directors or deputy directors, as well as staff 

officers, in the General Logistics Department and in lower-echelon joint logistics departments or logistics departments or divisions down to the regiment level, as well as logisticsrelated leadership and staff billets at the battalion, company, and platoon levels.17

“Equipment officers” (装备军官) serve as directors or deputy directors, as well as staff 

officers, in the General Armament Department and lower-echelon equipment departments or divisions down to the regiment level, as well as equipment-related leadership 

and staff billets at the battalion, company, and platoon levels.18

“Special technical officers” (专业技术军官) can serve in technical billets in any of the 

four departments but tend to be concentrated in organizations related to research and 

development and equipment. Their specialties are divided into sixteen “sets” (系列), 

with fifty-two categories.19 Depending on their particular jobs, some officers move back 

and forth between billets as special technical officers and equipment or logistics officers. 

Some special technical officers also serve in leadership positions, such as directors of 

research laboratories.20

Unlike the U.S. military, the PLA does not have “military occupational specialties” for 

its officers or enlisted personnel. The PLA often combines its first four career tracks 

together to differentiate them from special technical officers, but there is no official collective term for those four tracks.21

The PLA’s promotion system is a combination of fifteen “grades” (职务等级) and ten 

“ranks” (军衔), as shown in table 1. Because there are fifteen grades but only ten ranks, 

each grade up to military region leader has two ranks, of which one is primary and one 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 5

secondary. As shown in table 1, while the primary rank is often higher than the secondary, in some cases it is lower. The reason for this oddity is that regulations specify that 

naval officers from lieutenant to captain receive rank promotions every four years but 

that those with grades between platoon leader and division leader receive grade promotions every three years.22 Accordingly, grade and rank promotions rarely coincide. At 

the same time, some ranks can comprise up to four grades. For example, a one-star flag 

officer (rear admiral) can have the grade of division leader, corps deputy leader, corps 

leader, or military region deputy leader. Therefore, when discussing PLAN promotions, 

one must clarify whether one is speaking of a promotion in grade or in rank; promotions 

in grade, which are linked to billets, are more important than those in ranks for climbing 

the career ladder. In addition, special technical officers are assigned numbered grades 

from 1 to 14 rather than billet grades; however, they are eligible for the same ribbons and 

ranks as military, political, equipment, and logistics officers in the equivalent grades. 

The PLA further organizes its officers into three categories: “commanding officers” 

(指挥军官), which includes the commanders, political commissars, deputy commanders and deputy political commissars, and directors and deputy directors of all the first-, 

second-, and third-level departments within headquarters; “staff officers” (参谋长), who 

serve in each of the four first-level departments (headquarters, political, logistics, and 

equipment/armament) and their subordinate second- and third-level departments; and 

Table 1. PLA Officer Grades and Ranks

Grade for Military, Political, 

Logistics, and Equipment Offi cers

Grade for Special 

Technical Offi cers

Primary Rank Secondary Rank

CMC chairman (军委主席)

Vice chairmen (军委副主席) N/A N/A

GEN/ADM N/A

CMC member (军委委员) Grade 1 (1级) GEN/ADM N/A

MR leader (正大军区职) Grade 2 (2级) GEN/ADM LTG/VADM

MR deputy leader (副大军区职) Grade 3 (3级) LTG/VADM MG/RADM

Corps leader (正军职) Grade 4 (4级) MG/RADM LTG/VADM

Corps deputy leader (副军职) Grade 5 (5级) MG/RADM SCOL/SCPT

Division leader (正师职) Grade 6 (6级) SCOL/SCPT MG/RADM

Division deputy leader (副师职) Grade 7 (7级) COL/CPT SCOL/SCPT

Regiment leader (正团职) Grade 8 (8级) COL/CPT LTC/CDR

Regiment deputy leader (副团职) Grade 9 (9级) LTC/CDR MAJ/LCDR

Battalion leader (正营职) Grade 10 (10级) MAJ/LCDR LTC/CDR

Battalion deputy leader (副营职) Grade 11 (11级) CPT/LT MAJ/LCDR

Company leader (正连职) Grade 12 (12级) CPT/LT 1LT/LTJG

Company deputy leader (副连职) Grade 13 (13级) 1LT/LTJG CPT/LT

Platoon leader (排职) Grade 14 (14级) 2LT/ENS 1LT/LTJG
6 china maritime studies

special technical officers. Officers in the three categories receive different types of PME 

as they move up the career ladder.23

Officer Recruitment

Today, officers in the PLA are recruited from seven categories of personnel: high school 

graduates (普通高等中学毕业生); National Defense Student (国防生) Program graduates; directly recruited civilian college graduates (接收普通高等院校毕业生) with science, technology, and engineering degrees; specially recruited civilians who have desired 

technical skills (特招地方专业技术人员); outstanding enlisted personnel (优秀士兵) 

who do not already possess postsecondary education; outstanding enlisted personnel 

who already have senior technical (associate’s) or bachelor’s degrees (优秀大学毕业生

士兵); and civilian cadres (文职干部) who become officers.24

High school graduates constitute the largest number of officer recruits. The National 

Defense Student Program is the second-largest source, followed by direct recruitment 

of civilian college graduates. The last four categories encompass only a small percentage 

of officer recruits. Although no statistics are available, the number of enlisted personnel 

with college degrees who become officers appears to be shrinking. The primary reason is 

that the available slots are being filled by national defense students; the PLAN apparently 

prefers to keep enlisted personnel with college degrees in the growing NCO corps.

Officer Recruit Education and Specialty Training

New officer recruits receive basic naval education and training at different locations, 

the choice of which is determined by their career tracks and college entrance examination (高考) scores.

Cadet Education at PLAN Academic Institutions. High school graduates and outstanding 

enlisted personnel without prior degrees receive basic education and specialty training at 

one of seven PLAN academic institutions (table 2).25

Not all cadets who attend military academic institutions receive bachelor’s degrees; some 

receive only three-year senior technical (associate’s) degrees. Also, time as a cadet in any 

military academic institution is included in total time in service.26

In addition to the PLAN’s academic institutions, some PLAN cadets attend the General 

Armament Department’s Academy of Equipment Command Technology (AECT, 装备

指挥技术学院), where they wear navy uniforms, and the National University of Defense Technology (国防科学技术大学), where they wear army uniforms.27 Basic cadet 

education consists of about two years of military common training (军事共同科目训

练) and basic theory (基础理论). Once this work is completed, cadets receive specialty 

education and training (专业课). Upon graduation they either attend about ten months 

of professional education (任职教育) at a PLAN academic institution or are assigned 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 7

directly to their permanent units, where they receive billet training.28 In recent years 

the PLAN has attempted to address a major complaint about its education system, that 

the students spend too much time studying theory and not enough time on practical 

application.29 Part of this problem is that much of the teaching material at the academies 

has not been updated for years and the equipment the students train on is not the same 

as they will find in the PLAN’s operational units. 

To solve these problems the institutions have attempted to acquire advanced equipment for training purposes and to update their written training materials. They are also 

acquiring and making more use of simulators. Moreover, students in their final years 

spend a few weeks before graduation with operational units to gain practical experience. 

For example, a group of 110 cadets, including thirteen female cadets from the Dalian 

Naval Ship Academy, participated in Zhenghe’s around-the-world voyage from April to 

September 2012.30

National Defense Student Program. As mentioned above, the National Defense Student 

Program is the second-largest educator of PLAN officer recruits. The PLA initiated the 

program, also called the Reserve Officer (后备军官) Program, in a few civilian universities in 1998.31 All students must be in degree programs for science and technology 

or engineering.32 To date, the PLA has created such programs, thirteen of them for the 

PLAN, in 118 civilian universities (see table 3).33

Table 2. PLA Navy Academic Institutions Providing Officer Education

Notes:

a. This institution has changed names and missions several times since it was created in 1977 as the Naval Second Surface Vessel 

School (海军第二水面舰艇学校). In 1983, it changed its name to the Naval Surface Vessel School (海军水面舰艇学校). In 1986, it 

became the Naval Guangzhou Vessel Academy/College (海军广州舰艇学院). In 2004, it became the Naval Arms Command Academy/College (海军兵种指挥学院). Finally, in 2011, the name was changed to the Naval Marine Academy/College (海军陆战学院). 

See “中国人民解放军海军陆战学院” [People’s Liberation Army Naval Marine Academy/College], available at zh.wikipedia.org/.

b. In 2001, the Naval Flight Academy/College (海军飞行学院) in Huludao, Liaoning Province, and two naval training bases (海军

的两个训练基地) merged to become the Naval Aviation Academy/College (海军航空兵学院). “中国军校改革背后的战略指向” 

[The Strategic Direction behind Chinese Military Academic Institution Reforms], available at chn.chinamil.com.cn/ll/2012-01/09/

content_4763254.htm.

Chinese Name English Names City,

Province

Grade

海军指挥学院 Naval Command College Nanjing, Jiangsu corps leader

海军工程大学 Naval Engineering University Wuhan, Hubei corps leader

海军航空工程学院 Naval Aeronautical and Astronautical College / 

Naval Aviation Engineering Academy

Yantai, 

Shandong

corps deputy 

leader

海军大连舰艇学院 Dalian Naval Ship Academy/College Dalian, 

Liaoning

corps deputy 

leader

海军陆战学院 Naval Marine (Corps) Academy/Collegea Guangzhou, 

Guangdong

corps deputy 

leader

海军潜艇学院 Naval Submarine College/Academy Qingdao, 

Shandong

corps deputy 

leader

海军航空兵学院 Naval Aviation Academy/Collegeb Huludao, 

Liaoning

div. leader
8 china maritime studies

In April 2007, the GPD’s Cadre Department stated that the PLA’s goal was to have 60 

percent of all new officers come from the National Defense Student Program by 2010.34

It does not appear, however, that the PLA met this goal. For example, a December 2009 

Jiefangjun Bao article stated that the PLA’s officer corps at that point received about a 

hundred thousand graduates per year, of which 70 percent came from military academic 

institutions and 30 percent from the National Defense Student Program.35 No more 

recent statistics have been found. The PLA also has capped the maximum number of 

female national defense students at 15 percent.36

Every university with a National Defense Student Program branch has a recruiting office, subordinate to the relevant service’s political Cadre Department, responsible for 

recruiting and selecting students for the program on the basis of scores on the National 

Unified College Entrance Examination (高考).37 Although most students join during 

their first year, some begin during their second year, or even the third. Until 2009, participating students received scholarships of five thousand renminbi (RMB) per year, of 

Table 3. Universities with PLAN National Defense Student Programs

Notes:

Information accessed at “国防生(后备军(警)官)” [National Defense Students (Reserve [People’s Armed Police] Officers)], baike

.baidu.com/view/3196.htm, and “海军国防生” [Naval National Defense Students], baike.baidu.com/view/5047801.htm. 

a. University website: www.ecit.edu.cn/. 

b. University website: www.hrbeu.edu.cn/. 

c. University website: www.haust.edu.cn/. 

d. University website: www.hhu.edu.cn/. 

e. University website: www.hust.edu.cn/. 

f. University website: www.ecsi.edu.cn/. 

g. University website: www.nchu.edu.cn/. 

h. University website: www.ncu.edu.cn/. 

i. University website: www.nbu.edu.cn/. 

j. University website: www.ouc.edu.cn/. 

k. University website: usc.edu.cn/. 

l. University website: job.xaut.edu.cn/index.aspx. 

m. University website: www.ysu.edu.cn/.

Chinese Name English Name City, Province

东华理工大学a East China Institute of Technology Nanchang, Jiangxi

哈尔滨工程大学b Harbin Engineering University Harbin, Heilongjiang

河南科技大学c Henan University of Science and Technology Luoyang, Henan

河海大学d Hohai University Nanjing, Jiangsu

华中科技大学e Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan, Hubei

江苏科技大学f Jiangsu University of Science and Technology Zhenjiang, Jiangsu

南昌航空大学g Nanchang Hangkong University Nanchang, Jiangxi

南昌大学h Nanchang University Nanchang, Jiangxi

宁波大学i Ningbo University Ningbo, Zhejiang

中国海洋大学j Ocean University of China Qingdao, Shandong

南华大学k University of South China Hengyang, Hunan

西安理工大学l Xi’an University of Technology Xi’an, Shaanxi

燕山大学m Yanshan University Qinhuangdao, Hebei
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 9

which three thousand RMB were for tuition and two thousand were for living expenses. 

The total was raised to ten thousand RMB in 2009, but it is not clear how it is divided. 

Other types of scholarships are available as well. The military provides the tuition 

directly to the university. Each university’s selection and PME office pays the funds for 

living expenses directly to students. The amounts are adjusted according to the university’s tuition fees and to market fluctuations. To become officers, students must complete 

military-political training and required studies and receive appropriate degrees. Upon 

graduation, they enter the military and are assigned to organizations. National defense 

student participants take the same courses as their civilian classmates with the same 

majors.

The students live in military dormitories and wear their uniforms to all military-related 

classes. All new students receive fifteen days of “military-political training” (军政训

练), conducted at the university or a PLA facility. Altogether, students in the four-year 

program must complete 488 hours of classroom study plus fifty-nine days of military 

skills, physical, and integrated training. Integrated training occurs at the university’s or 

a nearby PLA unit’s training site; it includes physical training, boxing, skills, and tactics. 

In the summer, second- and third-year students receive group training off campus or at 

military units, including physical training, marching, field training, small arms training, 

and observing technical skills. Graduating students must complete rigorous physical 

training exams.38

Upon graduation, students have several options, including attending graduate school. 

For example, in 2010 about 40 percent of the students in Hunan University’s National 

Defense Student Program chose to attend graduate school.39 In 2011, the South Sea Fleet 

(SSF) had three hundred officers from the National Defense Student Program, of whom 

29 percent (eighty-six officers) had received master’s degrees.40 Another ninety-four had 

taken additional courses in various locations. 

If they do not attend graduate school, graduates are assigned either to training organizations for a few months to learn basic specialty skills before they report to their operational units, or they are assigned directly to the units. Once they arrive at their ultimate 

duty stations, they receive on-the-job training for their specialties. With the exception of 

those who serve in remote areas or attend graduate school, the first year for new graduates is considered a probationary (见习) period.41 Almost all National Defense Student 

Program graduates serve in technical support, rather than in command, billets.42

According to a 2008 assessment, the program had five major shortcomings: (1) a lack of 

overall coordination, both within the PLA and between the PLA and the civilian universities; (2) incomplete policies and regulations governing the program; (3) generally lowquality recruits; (4) a lack of commitment by the students, resulting in a high dropout 
10 china maritime studies

rate; and (5) poor coordination between the military training schedules and academic 

schedules.43 Two additional, more specific problems have also been identified.44 First, the 

GPD’s Cadre Department manages the overall National Defense Student Program and 

the PLAN’s counterpart organization manages the PLAN’s program, whereas the GSD’s 

Military Training Department manages the PLA’s academic institutions and the PLAN’s 

counterpart manages the PLAN’s institutions. Second, unlike the case for cadets who 

attend military academic institutions, time in service for the students in the National 

Defense Student Program does not start until they graduate and become active-duty 

officers. 

Other Commissioning Programs. Almost no information is available about the PLAN’s 

program to recruit civilian college graduates directly as officers (直接招收).45 The 

program is governed by GPD regulations issued in 2003. As a basic rule, individuals are 

directly recruited by specific PLAN organizations to fill particular billets. For example, 

in May 2010 an East Sea Fleet (ESF) unit directly recruited seven males to serve as medical personnel in an operational unit and another ESF unit recruited additional medical 

personnel in May 2012.46 Each applicant was required to have a bachelor’s degree and to 

be age twenty-four or younger. Each new recruit must complete a one-year probationary 

period. 

At the time of this writing, no public information was available concerning the recruitment, education, and training program for outstanding enlisted personnel with a postsecondary degree or on civilian cadres who become officers.47

Officer Professional Military Education

As noted above, PLAN officer PME covers cadet education and specialty training 

(outlined above), billet training, and additional education and training for officers moving up the career ladder, based on their grades. There appears to be a clear distinction 

between “commanding officers” and support officers. Specifically, commanding officers 

receive bachelor’s degrees, followed by basic-, intermediate-, and senior-level certificates 

for their PME, while special technical and other support officers receive opportunities 

to complete postgraduate degrees.48 Although at the time of this writing no information 

is available to shed light on this difference, the apparent reason is that the PLAN does 

not want to have commanding officers away from their posts for the two or three years 

required for a graduate degree. 

As PLAN officers move up their career ladders, they receive various types of professional military education—much like U.S. Navy officers, who pursue a five-tiered PME 

structure. One of the biggest differences between Chinese and U.S. practice, however, is 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 11

that PLAN officers receive their intermediate PME at different locations depending on 

their career tracks. 

PLAN officers receive their precommissioning, basic, and intermediate PME at one of 

three types of academic institutions: “command academic institutions” (海军指挥院

校), “specialty academic institutions” (海军专业院校), and “comprehensive academic 

institutions” (海军综合性院校).49 They also receive specialty training at academic institutions, as well as billet training at their operational units.50

The Naval Command College is apparently the PLAN’s only remaining command academic institution. Prior to 2011 the Naval Arms Command College was also considered 

a command academic institution, but it is not clear whether its successor, the Naval 

Marine (Corps) College, is a command or specialty institution. Most likely, it is the 

latter. As a command academic institution, the Naval Command College is organized 

into three levels: basic (初级), intermediate (中级), and senior (高级). Basic-level command academic institutions provide three types of degrees: four-year bachelor’s (本科), 

two-to-three-year “senior technical” (大专), and two-year “secondary technical” (中专). 

The students are recruited from among high school graduates and outstanding enlisted 

members who have already graduated from high school. Intermediate-level command 

academic institutions use PME and “rotational training” (轮训) to educate combinedarms personnel; service and branch regiment-grade military, political, logistics, and 

equipment commanding officers; and staff officers in division, brigade, and regiment 

headquarters departments. The primary senior-level command academic institution is 

the National Defense University (国防大学). It cultivates corps-and-above army, navy, 

and air force military, political, logistics, and equipment commanding officers, as well as 

military senior-level theory graduate students, with a focus on joint operations.

The PLAN currently has at least four specialty academic institutions: the Dalian Naval 

Ship Academy, Naval Submarine Academy, Naval Aviation Engineering Academy, and 

Naval Aviation Academy. As noted above, the new Naval Marine (Corps) Academy was 

probably converted to a specialty academic institution. The PLAN’s specialty academic 

institutions are organized into two levels, intermediate (中等) and senior (高等). 

Together, they provide five tiers of PME: secondary technical degrees (e.g., high school 

equivalent), senior technical (associate’s) degrees, bachelor’s degrees, master’s degrees, 

and doctorate degrees. Intermediate-level academic institutions primarily recruit middle 

school and high school graduates and outstanding enlisted personnel to cultivate them 

as basic-level technical and medical officers. Senior-level academic institutions primarily recruit outstanding enlisted personnel who possess high school diplomas and high 

school seniors, to cultivate them as senior engineers. They also recruit technical and 

medical personnel. These individuals receive two-to-three-year senior technical degrees 

or four-to-six-year bachelor’s degrees. In addition, master’s students are recruited from 
12 china maritime studies

the military and civilian personnel who already have bachelor’s degrees. Their degree 

program lasts for two to three years. Doctoral students are selected from personnel who 

already have master’s degrees, and their degree program lasts three years. 

The Naval Engineering University is currently the PLAN’s only comprehensive academic 

institution. No good definition of what it means to be a comprehensive university was 

found, but it apparently blends academic education and professional education.51 The 

university offers cadet and postgraduate education and training. Students pursuing 

bachelor’s degrees are selected from the pool of graduating high school students and 

outstanding enlisted personnel. The cadets all receive the same two years of foundational 

training, after which they enter one of the specialty academic institutions within the 

comprehensive academy for technical education and training. Candidates for graduate education at a comprehensive academy are recruited from military personnel who 

already have bachelor’s or master’s degrees, as well as from civilians with specialized 

knowledge. The comprehensive academy offers master’s and doctorate degrees to senior 

special technical personnel, scientific researchers, and academic institution instructors.

Case Study: PME in the Surface Branch Officer Career Track

The Handbook for Officers and Enlisted of the Chinese PLA Navy provides diagrams 

showing the career path and required PME for commanding officers in each of the 

following nine branches: surface, submarine, aviation, marine corps, coastal defense, 

communications, political, logistics, and equipment. It shows the same information 

for staff officers in each of the four departments in PLAN headquarters at the division 

level and above. It appears that “commanding officers” in each career track are selected 

while they are still cadets. Upon graduation, they begin assuming leadership positions, 

first as deputies, then as directors/leaders of platoon-level subunits, such as operational 

units or maintenance organizations. As they advance they become deputies or leaders of 

operational units or first- or second-level administrative or functional departments—for 

example, a logistics department. Other officers upon graduation begin as staff officers 

in subunit or regiment-level headquarters. Some of them eventually fill second-level 

leadership billets—as, for example, directors of a propaganda branch under the political division in a regiment headquarters. But they will not become deputies or directors 

of political divisions or political officers at the brigade or division level. Table 4 shows 

the sequence for a ten-step career progression, which alternates between education and 

grade promotions from cadet to corps-leader grade for surface branch officers.52 (No 

information was located that shows how support officers, who receive graduate degrees 

at the various PLAN and civilian academic institutions, move up their career ladders.)

It is clear from table 4 and from the career paths of the other branches and specialties 

that the PLAN places great emphasis on continuing PME for officers as they move up in 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 13

grade (not rank). However, it is unclear to what extent this system has been implemented. No biographies found for PLAN officers indicate that senior officers have actually 

received the PME noted in table 4. That is, the program still appears to be aspirational. 

It will most likely take another ten years to put the system into full practice. Officers are 

promoted in grade up to regiment-deputy-leader grade every three years. According to 

PLA regulations, those officers must receive passing grades (合格) in their intermediatelevel PME course to receive promotion to the grades of regiment deputy leader, division 

deputy leader, and corps leader.53 It is unclear whether officers must first complete correspondence courses and what proportion of officers has an opportunity to attend PME 

in residence. With very few exceptions, PLAN officers do not participate in joint PME 

until they are corps-level (one star / rear admiral) flag officers, at which time they attend 

a course at the National Defense University. 

Continuing Education

The PLAN invests considerably in continuing education for officers assigned to operational units. For example, some units have formalized agreements with local civilian 

universities to provide night classes focused on technical specialties. Certain civilian 

schools, such as the Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, have offered training classes for PLAN officers for decades. In addition, the PLAN has spent millions of 

RMB on reading rooms, online systems, computers, and libraries. Some units designate 

certain nights as periods for individual or group study.54

Several PLAN units have also created officer training centers, which provide simulation training and offer instruction on naval strategy.55 In addition, the PLAN has a Navy 

Cadre Training Center (海军干部训练中心), associated with the Central Party School 

Table 4. PLAN Surface Branch Officer Career Track

Step 1 New officers who have graduated from a PLAN or civilian academic institution or were selected from outstanding enlisted personnel who already have college degrees receive ten months of professional education at a 

PLAN academic institution.

Step 2 The new officers are assigned to vessels and assume their initial billets at the platoon, company, and battalion 

levels.

Step 3 They attend a ten-month tactics command course at the Dalian Naval Ship Academy/College.

Step 4 They are assigned as executive officers on various vessels or as dadui (squadron) deputy commanders at the 

regiment level.

Step 5 They attend a ten-month combined-arms command course at the Naval Command College.

Step 6 They are assigned as commanding officers at the division deputy leader–grade level.

Step 7 They attend a five-month campaign command course at the Naval Command College.

Step 8 They are assigned as commanding officers at the division leader–grade level.

Step 9 They attend a ten-month joint campaign command course at NDU.

Step 10 They are assigned as commanding officers at the corps level and above.
14 china maritime studies

in the Western Hills near Beijing, for the study of advanced naval and intermediate-level 

cadre theory.56

Unlike the PLA Air Force, which created the distance-learning, online Air Force Military 

Professional University (空军军事职业大学) in 2008 and subordinate branch campuses throughout the PLA Air Force, the PLAN has apparently not created a centralized 

system to provide online PME.57 Rather, it has focused on the development of individual 

training courses and the formalization of its technical skills–evaluation system, as will be 

discussed in greater detail below in reference to the enlisted force.

Unit-Level Individual Training

Almost no information is publicly available about how and when officers receive unitlevel individual training. The basic presumption, however, is that although these officers 

possess the necessary senior technical or bachelor’s degrees and have learned the pertinent theory, their only practical experience is that received at operational units shortly 

before they graduate. For the most part thereafter, they receive on-the-job training from 

responsible personnel in the units during their probationary periods. At the end of that 

year, they assume their commanding officer, staff officer, or technical support officer 

billets. Under the current reforms, however, the PLAN is trying to provide more professional education for new officers before they are assigned to their permanent billets. 

They will continue, however, to receive on-the-job training upon their arrival until they 

are fully qualified to assume their posts. On-the-job training is also a key element of billet training for national defense students and directly recruited officers, who receive only 

limited specialty training before they are assigned to permanent billets.

Once they assume their billets, officers occasionally participate in “group training” 

(集训) for a particular subject.58 For example, in April 2013, the South Sea Fleet held 

group training sessions to instruct officers and enlisted personnel in political work and 

new regulations.59 Units also often hold specialty competitions, internally and against 

other units.60 Competitions usually include events such as firing weapons under various 

conditions or taking weapons apart and putting them back together, blindfolded, within 

a time limit.

According to Science of Naval Training, once PLAN officers and enlisted personnel 

assume their operational billets, they receive “common subject” and “specialty” training.61 Common subject training refers to the body of material that all PLAN officers and 

enlisted personnel must know, such as general naval knowledge, common regulations, 

service and branch knowledge, and maritime geography.

Specialty training is organized by branch and refers to training for PLAN units in the 

operation, use, and maintenance of weapons and other equipment. Almost all specialty 

training includes an introduction to what the PLAN calls “theory” (理论), which relates 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 15

to the science behind how certain categories of equipment work—for example, electronics or aircraft.

Two-Year Enlisted Recruitment, Basic Training, and Specialty Training

Over the past decade, the PLA has gradually moved from a primarily conscription (征

兵) force to one that has both conscripts and volunteers (参加 or 志愿).62 The proportion of personnel voluntarily joining the PLA is increasing, but the military still has a 

conscription system, to fill the holes and to maintain links with the people. All new twoyear soldiers are called “new soldiers” (新兵) while in basic training but are then called 

“conscripts” (义务兵), regardless of whether they enlisted voluntarily or were drafted.63

(In the PLAN, as in the U.S. Navy, only enlisted personnel are referred to as “sailors” [水

兵].) 

Two-Year Conscript/Enlistee Recruitment 

Since 2011, the PLA’s recruitment methods have undergone a number of reforms.64

These include most prominently the modification of the former system of populationbased quotas, by which as much as two-thirds of the armed forces’ recruits came from 

the more populous rural areas, where well-educated and technically skilled individuals 

are comparatively scarce. Service-specific quotas continue to be assigned to individual 

localities, but they are no longer directly tied to population, which allows for a greater 

proportion of recruits from urban areas.65 Historically, these quotas apparently served 

to connect People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs, 人民武装部, discussed below) 

with operational units or commands, making specific localities responsible for providing fixed numbers of men to particular units each year. The extent to which this practice 

continued after 2011 is unclear.66

Additionally, the PLA sought to make enlistment more attractive to students and graduates of vocational colleges and universities by increasing the recruitment-age limit to 

twenty-three for graduates of vocational colleges and twenty-four for university graduates (allowing them either to graduate or at least to progress farther in their studies prior 

to enlisting). The National People’s Congress has also amended its active-duty military 

personnel laws, enabling students to resume their studies easily after two years’ service 

as conscripts, with no loss of credit or time served as students.67

The actual recruitment process begins with a determination by each ship or unit of its 

need for new recruits in the coming year. The information is then passed up the chain of 

command until it is eventually compiled by the GSD’s Military Affairs Department 

(军务部), which exercises overall responsibility for the PLA’s table of organization and 

equipment and for managing enlisted personnel. The GSD then assigns each locality 

in China a quota (apparently, as noted, no longer based strictly on population size). 
16 china maritime studies

Historically, this process culminated in the entry of all new conscripts, of all services and 

all units, into basic training on or about 10 December. Beginning in 2013, however, the 

registration, evaluation, and recruitment process was moved forward several months. 

New conscripts now enter basic training at their respective units and training bases beginning on 1 September, with individual units staggered over the course of the month.68

The reasons for this change are not clear. However, the change was likely motivated by 

at least two desires. First, the change brings forward the larger PLA-wide schedule of 

training to allow complex and large-scale exercises to be held earlier in the year instead 

of in the summer. Second, it allows for greater differences in the length of basic training 

for various units, specialties, and billets, especially as the latter two proliferate in number 

and deepen in complexity.

Where previously the PAFDs attached to each local government were charged with 

contacting for registration each eligible male within their respective areas of responsibility turning eighteen during the current calendar year, those interested in military service 

now voluntarily register online. However, there are no apparent penalties for those who 

fail to register.69 The registration period, previously confined to October, now includes 

the summer and early spring. This facilitates recruitment of college and vocational 

students, either at graduation or on completion of an academic year. The local PAFDs 

prune the mass of registrants during August (previously this was done in October and 

November), removing individuals with criminal records or who are otherwise barred 

from service and subjecting the remaining candidates to physical, political, and psychological examinations and to personal interviews. Upon the basis of these results, by 

the month of September conscripts and volunteers are selected for service and allocated 

to specific units. Unit allocation is based on a combination of personal preference and 

educational level.70

Although there are no explicit educational requirements for male conscripts and enlistees, recruits from rural areas are generally required to have at least a middle school 

education, and in the cities the standards are higher. The navy, the air force, and the 

independent Second Artillery, as the more technically oriented services, dispatch special 

conscription teams to support the local PAFDs and to represent their interests during 

the evaluation, selection, and distribution of candidates for conscription. In effect, these 

services handpick their conscripts from among available candidates in given areas.

Many of the most recent reforms in the PLA’s conscription system raise the question 

whether the process should still be deemed “conscription.” Registration for service is 

essentially voluntary in most or all cases, even though every man is legally liable for 

immediate military service. That all recruits continue to be referred to as conscripts 

demonstrates the oxymoronic nature of the system and suggests a reluctance to abandon it, for political or practical reasons. Further, though local quotas are no longer tied 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 17

directly to population, they nonetheless still exist. Perhaps it is also significant that the 

Chinese terms used to describe the system have never changed—only their officially 

prescribed English translations were altered. Nonetheless, it is incontrovertible that the 

PLA recruits very actively and that entrance into military service is often a competitive 

process, one not uncommonly helped along by bribes. Ultimately, there is insufficient 

publicly available information on the actual workings of the conscription system at the 

grassroots level to support a definitive judgment whether an active element of conscription remains in certain localities or under specific conditions. 

New-Soldier Training

By 1 September (previously 10 December), new soldiers begin reporting to their basic 

training (入伍训练) locations. In the PLAN, many new enlisted personnel are sent 

directly to the shore-based operational units and support bases to which they will be 

permanently assigned. There they are segregated into ad hoc “training units” (教导

队), attached to divisional-, brigade-, and regimental-level units. Others are sent to 

“specialized training bases” (训练基地) for submarine and logistics personnel, where 

they receive their basic training and technical training before being sent on to their 

permanent units.71 New enlisted personnel assigned to aviation units are sent either to 

the Naval Aviation Training Base (海军航空兵训练基地) near Qingdao or to one of 

the training units associated with the naval aviation component of each fleet, the latter 

bearing primary responsibility for training new soldiers.72 Finally, each of the three fleets 

has a training base (舰队训练基地) that primarily conducts basic training and some 

technical training for new soldiers. After completion of their training, the new soldiers 

are assigned to vessels (舰艇部队).73 It appears that these fleet training bases account for 

nine to ten thousand new enlisted personnel per year, since the ESF and SSF bases each 

trained approximately three thousand new soldiers during the 2012–13 training cycle. In 

addition, basic training at these bases increasingly involves actual shipboard experience 

with frontline units.74 The instructors are primarily junior officers and NCOs who are 

temporarily assigned from operational units and return to their regular duties when the 

training is complete. During the rest of the year, the bases used for basic training provide 

NCO and officer training courses, employing a combination of permanent and ad hoc 

instructors.75

Depending on the branch (e.g., surface, subsurface, aviation, coastal defense, or marines), 

basic training lasts from two to three months, formerly often ending around the beginning of the Spring Festival in late January or early February, though the length of basic 

training under the new schedule remains unclear. Its program encompasses political/

patriotic indoctrination and basic military knowledge and discipline.76 Once their basic 

training is complete, sailors receive the rank of private second class (列兵) and are 

formally assigned to specific billets within their operational units. While it is likely that 
18 china maritime studies

this decision is largely made for the majority of new enlisted personnel without regard 

for their preferences, in some cases personal input is allowed, primarily from individuals who have distinguished themselves in some way or who already possess technical 

qualifications (sometimes referred to as techangbing—特长兵).77

According to official sources, the majority of new personnel are then sent as “students” 

(学员) to appropriate “training organizations” (训练机构) or “schools” (院校) for 

three to six months of “specialty skills training” (专业技能训练) to prepare them for 

service in such areas as submarines, aircraft maintenance, communications, logistics, 

health care, and vehicle maintenance.78 It is unclear, however, how much this process 

is actually followed, especially as six to nine months of combined basic and specialty 

training would leave comparatively little service time for the new personnel in twentyfour-month enlistments. It is more likely that most new conscripts initially receive only 

on-the-job training at their assigned units and that more formalized specialty training 

is reserved for second-year conscripts, especially those being selected for NCO service 

(discussed below). Indeed, the shortening of service periods and ever-increasing emphasis on NCO training and education indicate that two-year enlisted service in the PLAN 

may be increasingly viewed as an apprenticeship of sorts. Such apprenticeships could 

serve to determine the suitability and capacity of individuals for further NCO service, 

during which time greater resources and effort would be expended on their professional 

and technical development.

NCO Recruitment, Training, and Education

The PLA recognizes that a technically proficient NCO corps capable of exercising effective leadership and oversight is critical to sustaining the combat capability of any 

modern military force.79 Thus, the PLA is developing an increasingly complex and 

intricate system for the recruitment, training, education, and professional development 

of its NCOs. 

NCO Roles and Positions 

The PLA generally requires that its NCOs be competent in multiple technical specialties 

in addition to their one or two primary specialties, thereby creating redundancy in personnel capability critical to unit effectiveness in wartime. Table 5 shows the PLA’s thirtyyear enlisted-force grade structure, following reforms in 2009. (Note that the PLAN uses 

army terminology for its enlisted personnel.)

The higher an NCO’s grade, the more specialties he must master or in which he must 

at least achieve competence.80 Further, since 2005 promotion to higher grades has been 

explicitly tied to the successful completion of educational or training programs, the 

general requirements (or at least overall goals) being that a junior NCO should attain a 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 19

secondary technical degree, an intermediate NCO a senior technical degree, and a senior 

NCO an undergraduate degree, or equivalent.81 This pairing basically corresponds with 

the prescribed roles for the different NCO grades, whereby junior NCOs assume an 

“expertise role” (能手型), intermediate NCOs a “teaching and training role” (教练型), 

and senior NCOs a “specialist role” (专家型).82 Essentially, junior NCOs are to develop 

expertise in their particular billets, intermediate NCOs to teach and coach their subordinates, and senior NCOs to be masters of whole specialties, providing critical oversight 

and management. This, of course, is an ideal end state, far from reflecting present reality. 

But it is nonetheless the objective toward which the PLA is striving and which guides the 

structure and reform of its NCO recruitment, training, and education systems.

NCO Recruitment and Selection

At present, the large majority of noncommissioned officers come from the two-yearconscript pool. Second-year conscripts apply to become NCOs, achieving that status 

either by selection by their units or through admission to an NCO course run by one of 

the PLAN’s academic institutions. 

Recruitment from Second-Year Conscripts. “Unit selection” (部队选取) is the primary 

method of selecting junior NCOs (初级士官), and its primary targets are suitable 

conscripts finishing their service periods. Selection takes place simultaneously with the 

demobilization of conscripts who will be leaving the service. The basic requirements 

for unit selection are two years of active service and completion of associated training.83 This preparation includes “command management NCO training” (指挥管理

士官训练), which is a three-month program for second-year conscripts administered 

within the unit.84 Preference is given to individuals with experience as squad leaders or 

deputy squad leaders (班长, 副班长), those already possessing “vocational qualifications 

certificates” (职业资格证书), and those already possessing senior technical educations. 

Following application, conscripts are subjected to three levels of evaluation: “360-degree 

Table 5. PLA Enlisted Grades and Ranks as of 2009

Grade Service Period Rank Time in Rank

Conscript (义务兵) 1st year private second class (列兵) ~9 months

2nd year private first class (上等兵) 1 year

Junior-grade NCO (初级士官)

(6 years)

3rd–8th years corporal (下士) 3 years

sergeant (中士) 3 years

Intermediate-grade NCO (中级士官)

(8 years)

9th–16th years sergeant first class (上士) 4 years

master sergeant grade four (四级军士长) 4 years

Senior-grade NCO (高级士官)

(14 years)

17th–30th years master sergeant grade three (三级军士长) 4 years

master sergeant grade two (二级军士长) 4 years

master sergeant grade one (一级军士长) 6 years
20 china maritime studies

evaluations” (群众评议) by their superiors, peers, and subordinates; an evaluation by 

the party branch responsible for them; and “relevant testing” (机关考核). Final approval 

of applications takes place at the regimental level.85

“Academic institution training” (院校培训) is the second means of obtaining personnel 

for NCO service. It is conducted at the PLAN Bengbu NCO School (海军蚌埠士官学

院) or one of the PLAN’s officer academic institutions that offer NCO training programs.86 In June of each year, second-year conscripts and junior NCOs seeking promotion take navy-wide NCO student-recruitment examinations (士官学员招生考试). The 

minimum service requirements for conscripts is one year and for NCOs at least one year 

at the junior (初级) level.87 Aside from satisfying various standard political and moral 

requirements, those taking examinations for courses awarding secondary technical degrees must already possess middle school–level educations (初中), while those seeking 

to enter senior technical degree programs must already possess high school–level educations (高中) or equivalents. 

Additionally, as part of the broader effort to align classroom instruction more closely 

with actual experience and unit requirements, NCO students seeking graduation from 

their programs must pass regular subject tests, intensive training programs, and comprehensive exercises in their specialties (专业综合演练), all designed to ensure that they 

will be able to satisfy their units’ requirements.88 If a student is unable to pass these final 

tests and assessments, his graduation (or the granting of a completion certificate) is deferred and he is not promoted.89 All students successfully graduating from NCO student 

programs return to their original units, except a small number directly overseen by the 

Navy NCO Student Recruitment Office.90

Direct Recruitment from the Civilian Population. A minority of NCOs are directly 

recruited from the civilian population by individual units to fill specific billets to which 

they are suited by prior tertiary education at civilian schools or work experience. The 

primary targets of direct recruitment are university students in their year of graduation, 

graduates of vocational technical schools, and others possessing advanced technical 

“vocational qualifications certificates” (高级职业资格证书). Such persons must satisfy 

the same physical, psychological, and political requirements as conscripts and can be no 

older than twenty-four.91 Their initial ranks and grades upon entry depend on the extent 

of their previous education and experience but can theoretically run the gamut from 

corporal (下士) to master sergeant grade one (一级军士长).92

Though this is a potentially useful means of quickly obtaining technically qualified 

NCOs, the total numbers involved appear to be comparatively small; only 260 university graduates entered service as NCOs during 2012.93 Additionally, directly recruited 

NCOs may well be diverted from their original technical billets to heavier management 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 21

and administrative responsibilities for which a university education would make them 

better suited than NCOs risen from among conscripts.94 It is reasonable to question the 

sheer practicability, in social and command-authority terms, of directly promoting men 

in their early twenties into intermediate or senior NCO billets while at the same time 

attempting to create a sizable NCO corps whose members would have an initial educational (and attendant social) status equivalent to that of many commissioned officers.

Recently, however (and perhaps in response to such concerns), the PLAN has introduced a new variation on direct NCO recruitment. Beginning in the summer of 2012 

the PLAN entered into bilateral agreements with a number of vocational schools to run 

pilot programs for the “directed education of directly recruited NCOs” (定向培养直

招士官). Under this system, graduating high school seniors who are less than twenty 

years of age as of 31 August of each year may apply to one of the schools in the program 

through a common online application system. The top 150 applicants (determined by 

college entrance exam scores) are interviewed for fifty slots in a single specialty or area 

of study (see table 6).95 The course of study runs for three years and students receive a 

senior technical degree at the end. The first two and a half years of education are the 

responsibility of the schools, with each entering into a formal agreement with the PLAN 

concerning curriculum and standards. The final half-year is spent in service, undergoing basic training alongside conscripts and then serving in an operational unit for final 

evaluation. Only at the end of this period of service do graduation and promotion to 

NCO grade take place.96

Primary oversight of the program seems to rest with the PLAN Headquarters Department’s Military Affairs Department (海军军务部), with subsidiary responsibility for 

curriculum guidance and support belonging to the fleet training bases.97 This is in 

contrast to the National Defense Student Program for officers, which is overseen by the 

General Political Department (all officers being considered cadres first and foremost). 

The size of this pilot program is uncertain. Chinese sources give conflicting information. For instance, a July 2012 description of the program in Renmin Haijun indicates 

that it encompasses 390 students studying seven specialties at eight schools.98 However, 

a news article describing the program at a school in Shandong indicates that it involves 

830 students nationally, studying at an unspecified number of schools in seven provinces 

(including fifty from Shandong, selected from approximately a thousand applicants).99

The latter source also indicates that despite its present overall size, the program clearly 

represents a potentially rich source of technically proficient NCOs and one that could be 

readily expanded in size. It is unclear the degree to which this new means of direct recruitment is meant to serve as either a supplement to or replacement for the traditional 

approach.
22 china maritime studies

Continuing NCO Training and Education

Until very recently, the large majority of NCOs in the PLA achieved certification 

and promotion through on-the-job billet training and ad hoc local testing. The PLA 

recognizes that such unsystematic training is problematic for personnel with complex 

specialties, and it now views the development of a fully systematized NCO training and 

education structure as imperative.100 NCO training in the PLA as a whole now comprises 

two primary categories. The first category involves vocational standards education 

(including secondary technical, senior technical, and bachelor’s degrees) and pre-billet 

training (岗前任职训练), both provided by officer academic institutions and NCO 

schools. The second involves all types of short-term (短期) specialty training provided 

by NCO training dadui (大队), or unit training organizations.101 For its part, the PLAN 

operates NCO training programs at the PLAN Bengbu NCO School, the PLAN’s seven 

officer academic institutions, the three fleet training bases, and the various submarine, 

aviation, and logistics training bases discussed above. Table 7 lists the schools and bases 

involved in NCO and conscript training. 

These organizations are engaged in a variety of training and education activities focused 

on shaping various facets of the NCO corps. The training structure is likely more 

complex and convoluted than the official description would have it, with multiple types 

of education and training taking place at each institution and each type of training and 

education spread across various types of institutions. 

Table 6. Vocational Colleges Participating in Pilot Programs for the Directed Education of PLAN 

Direct-Recruitment NCOs

Chinese Name English Name Program Focus City, Province

湖北交通职业技术学院a Hubei Communications Technology 

College

turbine engineering

(轮机工程技术)

Wuhan, Hubei

江苏海事职业技术学院b Jiangsu Maritime Institute vessel engineering 

(船舶工程技术)

Nanjing, Jiangsu

南昌航空大学c Nanchang Hangkong University aircraft manufacturing

(飞机制造技术专业)

Nanchang, Jiangxi

山东交通职业学院d Shandong Transport Vocational College navigation technology 

(航海技术专业)

Weifang, Shandong

武汉航海职业技术学院e Wuhan Marine College turbine engineering 

(轮机工程技术),

vessel engineering 

(船舶工程技术)

Wuhan, Hubei

Notes:

This table includes only those schools positively identified as participating; several others remain unidentified.

a. School website: www.hbctc.edu.cn/.

b. School website: www1.jmi.edu.cn/.

c. School website: www.nchu.edu.cn/.

d. School website: www.sdjtzyxy.com/.

e. School website: whhhxy.sinotrans-csc.com/.
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 23

PLAN regulations require that conscripts promoted to junior NCO and junior NCOs 

taking up new duties (任职) undergo five to six months of “specialty technical NCO 

training” (专业技术士官训练). The source of training depends on the complexity of 

the specialty; personnel with more complex specialties attend schools or training bases, 

while those with less complex specialties remain in their units, training under their 

superiors and visiting instructors from the academic institutions and training organizations.102 Personnel in designated “complex specialty technology billets” (复杂专业技

术岗位) receive formal vocational technical education. The primary targets of such 

training are second-year conscripts or third-year junior NCOs already in possession 

of secondary technical or higher degrees, though the service-length restrictions can 

be relaxed according to the needs of units. Intermediate-level training entails a year of 

study at a naval academic institution and a year of practical work or apprenticeship (实

习) back in the unit; advanced training entails two years in a school and one in the unit. 

Those successfully fulfilling requirements receive a “vocational technology education 

graduate certificate” (职业技术教育毕业证书).103

In addition, PLAN academic institutions have joined with civilian academic institutions in collaborative relationships focused on the joint educational development of 

NCOs (联合士官培养). The Bengbu NCO School, for instance, in 2012 entered into a 

partnership of an unspecified extent with Qingdao Agricultural University (青岛农业

大学).104 The Naval Aviation Engineering Academy (海军航空工程学院) and Nanchang 

Hangkong University (南昌航空大学) established a partnership in 2013 to educate several 

dozen directly recruited NCOs in aircraft manufacturing technologies and processes.105

Those seeking promotion to either intermediate or senior NCO must undergo “promotion training” (升级培训) according to the requirements of their specific billets, 

allowing them to obtain and demonstrate the skills necessary to serve at the next rank 

or grade within their billets. The primary targets of promotion training are men with at 

least two to three years of service as NCOs. Training lasts one to three months. Again, 

training for more technically complex specialties takes place at schools or training 

Table 7. Permanent PLAN Training Units for Conscripts and NCOs

Chinese Name English Name City, Province

北海舰队训练基地 North Sea Fleet Training Base Liugong Island, Shandong

东海舰队训练基地 East Sea Fleet Training Base Shanghai

南海舰队训练舰队 South Sea Fleet Training Base Dongguan, Guangdong

海军航空兵训练基地 Naval Aviation Training Base Qingdao, Shandong

海军航空工程学院某训练基地 Naval Aviation Engineering Academy Training Base near Qingdao, Shandong

海军潜艇兵训练基地 Naval Submarine Training Base near Qingdao, Shandong

海军后勤训练基地 Naval Logistics Training Base Handan, Hebei
24 china maritime studies

facilities attached to military region–level units, while training for less technical specialties takes place at the units. For technically simpler specialties or those held by very few 

people, promotion training can be combined with annual specialty training organized by 

units.106

In addition, the increasing complexity and rapid development of the PLA’s weapons and 

equipment have caused a renewed focus on “refresher training” (复训) and “new billet 

training” (上岗训练), which in the PLAN is conducted in short (one or two months) 

programs at both academic institutions and training bases.107 Ultimately, the proliferation of various types of training affords (or even dictates) more frequent opportunities 

for formal training and education over the course of a sailor’s career—a critical factor in 

building up and maintaining a technically proficient force.

The PLAN also seeks to enhance the quality and effectiveness of NCO training and 

education by means of a number of other, smaller-scale efforts. To improve the verisimilitude of training received in the schools, the PLAN is requiring students to train 

with frontline units at “student practice bases” (学员实习基地). This allows units to 

take joint responsibility for training and creates a mechanism to guarantee that students 

receive practical experience relevant to their actual duties.108 In addition, schools have 

begun to track former students at their units to ensure that units are properly employing 

them in the billets for which the students were trained.109 Of course, distance education 

and self-study also constitute useful means of education for NCOs; moreover, they do 

not excessively disrupt unit manning. In each fleet several hundred NCOs each year 

engage in long-term self-study programs that often provide senior technical or bachelor’s 

degrees.110 The PLAN is also concerned with improving the NCO corps’s leadership 

capacity, especially in operational contexts, and seeks to provide NCOs with opportunities to exercise such leadership during their training and education.111 All in all, these 

represent potentially critical supplements to the main efforts in expanding and systematizing NCO training and education, as described above.

NCO Skills Evaluation

In the interest of systematizing training and education, the PLA is developing a more 

structured and formalized system for evaluating the skills of individual personnel, 

to identify candidates for both promotion and further training and education. Until 

recently, it did so primarily through “military skills competitions” (比武竞赛), which, 

in the PLAN at least, were not organized on a regular basis and produced only servicerecord entries that would reflect credit on personnel in consideration for promotion. 

Moreover, PLAN skills competitions are increasingly associated with anniversaries and 

other celebrations, as are such nontechnical skills as camping, indicating that the importance of these competitions in assessing technical skills and suitability for promotion 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 25

has declined. It appears that the PLAN is now conducting more of its technical-skills 

evaluation within a system of formal centers and stations (技能鉴定中心 and 技能鉴定

站), dedicated to skills evaluation in specific specialties and awarding formal “vocational 

skills evaluation certificates” (职业技能鉴定证书). This system has apparently been in 

development since approximately 2009, though implementation for many specialties 

began only in 2011–12; the intervening years were devoted to developing standards, 

publishing texts, and building organizations.112

A January 2013 article in Renmin Haijun gives a basic description of the evaluation 

infrastructure for the “ordnance equipment safeguard specialty” (军械装备保障专

业), which includes missiles, torpedoes, and other ordnance types.113 Top-level oversight is provided by the Navy Equipment Department, which established an “evaluation 

guidance office” (鉴定指导办公室) dedicated to the specialty within the Bengbu NCO 

School’s Weapons Department (武器系). This office is charged with developing qualified instructors, publishing necessary instructional texts and standards, and establishing evaluation centers with the equipment departments of the three fleets, the NCO 

School’s Weapons Department, the Naval Engineering University’s Weapons Department, and Naval Aviation Engineering Academy’s conversion training dadui.

114 The 

centers depend, in turn, on approximately eighteen evaluation stations established by the 

PLAN’s eight “equipment technology quality monitoring stations” (装备技术质量监测

站), on the two “submarine base missile technology central stations” (潜艇基地导弹技

术总站), and on the three academic institutions mentioned above. Though the precise 

roles of each component in this system are not explicitly stated, it seems reasonable to 

infer the existence of a three-tiered structure (one that might be extended, in its general 

structure, to other specialties). Evaluation stations are at the bottom, conducting initial, 

basic, and junior NCO evaluations in support of local units and feeding evaluations for 

more advanced qualifications and senior NCOs to evaluation centers, and then on to the 

specialty’s central evaluation office, likely located at an academic institution. This model 

gains credence from the fact that the source article describes a senior NCO successfully 

passing an evaluation at the Bengbu central office and thereby ensuring his smooth 

promotion to master sergeant grade two.115

The Central Military Commission and the four general departments view this formalized skills-evaluation system for enlisted personnel as a critical element of the overall 

drive to improve the NCO corps.116 It is also bound up with an effort to integrate more 

closely military with civilian education opportunities, by means of the skills certificates 

that the evaluation system awards, which are considered legally equivalent to those 

issued by the civil government for satisfying “national advanced vocational evaluation 

standards” (国家高级职业鉴定标准) in various fields and trades.117 Thus, in addition 

to providing more discrete criteria for qualifications based on merit, the examination 
26 china maritime studies

system affords individual enlisted men a set of formal qualifications that will aid them 

in finding civilian employment upon demobilization, thereby making the long-term 

prospects of NCO service more attractive and (ideally) attracting higher-quality personnel.118 The PLAN’s skills-evaluation and certification system may also represent a unique 

service response to a PLA-wide organizational challenge, distinct from the PLA Air 

Force’s apparent response represented by the Air Force Military Professional University, 

which had its origins in the same 2008–2009 period. 

Conclusions

The recruitment, training, and education of the PLA Navy’s officer corps and enlisted 

force are components of and basically mirror the overall PLA personnel system. However, there are some differences. 

Concerning the officer corps, the PLAN has historically recruited officers among high 

school graduates and outstanding enlisted personnel, who then attend a three- or fouryear PLAN academic institution. Although the PLA’s overall goal, and apparently that of 

the PLAN as well, was to take in by 2010 40 percent of all new officers from the National 

Defense Student Program, along with a small percentage of directly recruited civilian 

college graduates, it appears the PLA/PLAN fell short. The primary reason for expansion 

of the National Defense Student Program and direct recruitment of graduates was that 

the PLA and PLAN were not providing adequate education for new officers. At the same 

time, the PLAN has reformed some of its academic institutions to focus more on undergraduate education, which is followed by postgraduation specialty training, rather than 

mixing them together during the undergraduate years. Although the initiative appears to 

be largely aspirational at this point, the PLAN has laid out a fairly detailed PME system 

for officers as they move up the grade-promotion ladder. It will take several more years, 

however, for the PLAN to implement the reforms fully and have all its officers at each 

level participate. Further adjustments are expected over the next decade as the PLAN 

experiences positive and negative results of the PME reforms, including the lack of joint 

professional military education below the corps level at the National Defense University.

Whereas the army and air force have reduced their post–basic training specialty training, 

the PLAN still continues to emphasize it for a significant portion of two-year conscripts, 

primarily those in their second years of service and likely to continue as NCOs. On the 

basis of the information available, it appears that the PLAN will most likely continue 

to emphasize skills training for its entire enlisted force, with greater emphasis on its 

NCOs, over the next several years. Perhaps the most critical aspects are the twin efforts 

to formalize skills training and education and to increase the frequency and regularity 

with which that training occurs over the course of an enlisted individual’s career. Both 

initiatives are critical to developing an enlisted force capable of manning and fighting 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 27

increasingly sophisticated ships, aircraft, and systems. Finally, the PLAN, along with 

the rest of the PLA, will continue to seek new and effective means of harnessing China’s 

extensive and well-developed civilian education system in an effort to improve rapidly 

the quality, education, and technical training of officers and enlisted personnel. Though 

the quality of education in both China’s military and civilian schools can and should be 

questioned in individual instances, it must nonetheless be recognized that the civilian 

education system has been critical to the country’s rapid economic and technological 

development and may prove equally critical to the development of the armed forces’ 

organizational and personnel strength. 

Of course, it must be recognized also that while the recruitment, training, and education systems described here are, in principle, well suited to the task of developing the 

sort of highly proficient officer corps and enlisted force the PLAN desires, their effective 

implementation at the middle and lower bureaucratic levels remains the chief stumbling 

block to success. In particular, it remains to be seen whether corruption and favoritism 

in the NCO selection and promotion process can be effectively controlled at the regimental and divisional levels, thereby allowing the extensive enlisted training, education, 

and certification system described herein to have its full intended effect. In addition, 

the PLAN, along with the rest of the PLA, has yet to make clear the place of directly 

recruited NCOs (who often possess associate’s or bachelor’s degrees upon entry). What 

is the role of a directly recruited NCO in a professional education military system geared 

to conscripts and junior NCOs with middle or high school educations and bringing the 

conscripts up to the bachelor’s degree level over the course of twenty or so years? The 

PLAN has yet to design educational programs or tracks specifically for those already 

possessing higher qualifications, a shortfall that could prove a serious detriment to 

retaining such personnel in the long run. 

Ultimately, though the recruitment, training, and education structures of the People’s 

Liberation Army have been steadily reformed over the past decade, the efficacy of these 

centrally mandated reforms, as in so many of China’s civil and military reform efforts, 

will be decided by numerous individual bureaucratic struggles at the grassroots level. 

The schools, the bases, the evaluation centers, and the units all have roles to play. This 

is especially true for the PLA Navy. Many of the basic structural and functional reforms 

have been made. It now remains to make them stick and to bring reality into line with 

the ideal that has been laid out. 

Notes 

1. 刘华清 [Liu Huaqing], 刘华清回忆录 [Memoirs of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004), 

p. 440. Liu also writes, “A strong modern navy 

not only needs modern weapons and equipment; 

it also needs a cadre of personnel well versed in 

naval theory, strategy and tactics; and capable of 

skillfully commanding and deploying modern 

weapons and equipment. An organic fusion of 
28 china maritime studies

capable people and modern equipment is the 

only means to create a powerful fighting force.” 

2. 凌竹 [Ling Zhu], “女兵上舰” [Women at Sea], 

中国舰队 [China Armed Forces] 5, no. 17 

(2012), pp. 74–77; 查春明 [Zha Chunming], 

“女舰员” [Women Sailors on the International 

Stage], China Armed Forces 1, no. 9 (2011), pp. 

88–91; 冯凯旅 [Feng Kailu], “我是浪花一朵” [I 

Am a Spray], PLA Pictorial, issue A (June 2013), 

pp. 14–25, special report on new female enlisted 

sailors on the destroyer Lanzhou. 

3. “中国海军有意培养女舰长 女学员登上战斗

舰艇实习” [China’s Navy Is Interested in Female 

Vessel Commanding Officers: Female Students 

Are Obtaining Experience aboard Combatant 

Ships], 中国青年报 [China Youth Daily], 31 October 2010, available at news.ifeng.com/mil/2/

detail_2010_10/31/2954950_0.shtml.

4. The English version of the 2013 PRC defense 

white paper, “The Diversified Employment of 

China’s Armed Forces,” available at news

.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c

_132312681.htm; Li Qinwei and Cao Jinping, 

“‘Zheng He’ Training Ship’s Round-the-World 

Navigation Boasts Four Features,” PLA Daily

(in English), 19 April 2012, english.peopledaily

.com.cn/90786/7792075.html.

5. 董会瑜 [Dong Huiyu] and 牟显明 [Mou 

Xianming], eds., 现代军校教育辞典 [Dictionary of Contemporary Military Academic Institution Education] (Beijing: National Defense Univ. 

Press, July 2009), p. 108. The book does not have 

an official English title; this is the best translation. See also “不达标不达辨不合格不毕业海

军指挥学院严把研究生培养‘出口关’” [Naval 

Command Academy Graduate Students Who 

Do Not Meet the Requirements Are “Shown the 

Exit”], Jiefangjun Bao, 23 May 2011, p. 5. The 

PLAN also uses the term shengzhang ganbu (生

长干部) for “cadet.”

6. 李玉平 [Li Yuping], ed., 中国国防生 [China 

National Defense Students] (Beijing: PLA Press, 

January 2008).

7. 菜吕良 [Cai Luliang] and 李纬 [Li Wei], “海

军某训练基地建立全程考核淘汰机制” [A 

Particular Navy Training Base Establishes a 

Full Assessment and Elimination Mechanism], 

Jiefangjun Bao, 17 June 2013, p. 5. 

8. The definition for peixun was found in 中国

人民解放军军语 [PLA Military Terminology] 

(Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 

September 2011), p. 323. Note that the characters for “education” (教育) are not included in 

the Chinese term peixun. Although the PLAN 

normally uses peixun, it also uses the term jixu 

jiaoyou (继续教育), which is best translated as 

“continuing education” and includes peixun. 

杜景臣 [Du Jingchen], ed., 中国海军军人手

册 [Handbook for Officers and Enlisted of the 

Chinese PLA Navy] (Beijing: Haichao, 2012) 

[hereafter Naval Handbook], p. 143. The PLA 

has published two versions of 中国人民解放

军军语 (PLA Military Terminology). The September 1997 version did not have any English 

translations; however, in December 2011 the 

PLA published an updated version with English 

translations for each term. Neither version has 

an official English title or an editor; Englishlanguage publications often refer to them as the 

PLA Military Terminology, or simply as the 

Junyu (军语). Both publications are “For Internal Distribution Only” (内部发行). Hereafter 

cited as Junyu, with year.

9. Wu Guanghua, ed., 汉英辞典 [Chinese–English 

Dictionary] (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ. 

Press, September 1998), p. 1218; Dong Huiyu 

and Mou Xianming, eds., Dictionary of Contemporary Military Academic Institution Education,

pp. 192–93.

10. Dong Huiyu and Mou Xianming, eds., Dictionary of Contemporary Military Academic Institution Education, p. 193.

11. Junyu, 2011, p. 299. 

12. Dong Huiyu and Mou Xianming, eds., Dictionary of Contemporary Military Academic Institution Education, p. 563; Naval Handbook, pp. 

134–35. For peixun, see Junyu, 2011, p. 323. 

13. “培训” [Cultivation and Training] and “军队院

校培训体制” [Training System in Military Colleges and Schools], in China Military Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China, 

June 2008), 军事训练 [Military Training] series, 

vol. 32, pp. 562–63; “军队院校学历教育” 

[Academic Credential Education] and “军队

院校任职教育” [Professional Education in Military Colleges and Schools], in ibid., pp. 538–40; 

屠恒章 [Tu Hengzhang], ed., 军事认知教育

论 [Military Professional Education Training 

Theory] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science 

Press, March 2007). Note that renzhi (任职) can 

be translated as “professional” or “vocational.”

14. Information on these career tracks and terminology was accessed at “中国人民解放军军官

军衔条例 (修正)” [China People’s Liberation 

Army Officer Rank Regulations (Revision)], 

Baidu Online Encyclopedia, 20 December 2002, 

baike.baidu.com/link?url=hNqfYIQw-yLt9D

JHw5Cqxcs-ZvQz1kl3q9R9Lu0XMYo6GH6q

cmdKsUo8-a7Ywgej. See also “干部等级制度” 

[System of Cadre Grades], in China Military 

Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. (Beijing: Encyclopedia of 

China, December 2006), 军队干部工作 [Military Cadre Work] series, vol. 39, pp. 48–50. This 

encyclopedia does not have an official English 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 29

name but is referred to in English publications 

as the China Military Encyclopedia and is the 

successor to a 1997 version that had eleven 

volumes. From 2006 to 2008, the PLA published 

a revised set of encyclopedias consisting of 

about a hundred volumes. Of these, the three in 

the PLA’s Military History series (中国人民解

放军军史) have profiles on each of the PLAN’s 

academic institutions at that time. This series 

was published in December 2007.

15. Kenneth Allen, Brian Chao, and Ryan Kinsella, 

“China’s Military Political Commissar System in 

Comparative Perspective,” and Kenneth Allen et 

al., “Assessing PLA Navy and Air Force Political 

Commissar Career Paths,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13, no. 5 (4 March 2013). 

Whereas political staff officers attend a military 

political academic institution, political “commanding officers” are selected primarily from 

officers in the military (command) track at the 

company (lieutenant) level; however, political 

officers can also be selected from the logistics 

and equipment career tracks and remain as 

political officers in those systems for the rest of 

their careers.

16. Reference to an individual as a “military officer” 

indicates that he or she is specifically in the 

military (operational) career track. 

17. Junyu, 2011, p. 340. 

18. Ibid.

19. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century,

2nd rev. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 64. 

Information about the sixteen sets and fifty-two 

categories is scarce. The authors have identified 

ten of the sets: education, scientific research, 

engineering technology, health technology, 

economics and accounting, the arts, sports education, interpreting, agricultural technology, and 

that of news, publishing, and broadcast. Presumably most sets comprise multiple categories. 

20. The PLA also has a civilian cadre (文职干部), 

found in a wide variety of jobs in research, 

engineering, medicine, education, publishing, 

archives, culture, and sports. The group can be 

categorized as “special technical civilian cadre” 

(专业技术文职干部) and “nonspecial technical 

civilian cadre” (非专业技术文职干部).

21. Some PLA dictionaries and encyclopedias combine military, political, logistics, and equipment 

officers as “non–special technical officers” (非专

业技术军官).

22. See Kenneth Allen, “Assessing the PLA’s Promotion Ladder to CMC [Central Military Commission] Member Based on Grades vs. Ranks: Part 

1,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 10, no. 

15 (22 July 2010); 中国人民解放军空军军官手

册 [People’s Liberation Army Air Force Officer’s 

Handbook] (Beijing: Blue Sky, November 2006), 

p. 162.

23. 于大清 [Yu Daqing], ed., 中国人民解放军军

官手册 [PLA Officer Handbook] (Beijing: PLA 

General Political Department Cadre Department, December 2011), p. 21. This book has 

no official English title; hereafter PLA Officer 

Handbook, the best translation. 

24. Ibid., pp. 22–39.

25. Xueyuan (学院) can also be translated as “college” or “academy.” The PLAN has seven officer 

academic institutions and one NCO school. 

Some have no official English names and are 

identified differently in various publications. 

None of the PLAN’s academic institutions seem 

to have official websites, and only a handful 

of them apparently have English acronyms. 

Besides providing cadet education and specialty 

training, some of the PLAN’s academic institutions offer postgraduate education, including 

master’s, doctorate, and postdoctorate degrees. 

For example, cadets at the Dalian Naval Ship 

Academy/College can receive either senior 

technical or bachelor’s degrees and then return 

for postgraduate education.

26. “中国人民解放军海军大连舰艇学院” [Dalian 

Naval Ship Academy of the CPLA], in China 

Military Encyclopedia, PLA’s Military History 

series, vol. 3, pp. 742–43.

27. 毕业留念 [Video: Graduation Pictures], 

v.youku.com/v_show/id_XODg1NjQyMTI=

.html, a 2006 video yearbook for AECT graduates showing cadets in army, navy, and air force 

uniforms. 

28. PLA Officer Handbook, pp. 22–39; Junyu, 2011, 

pp. 305–306.

29. U.S. Navy Dept., China’s Navy 2007 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2007), 

chap. 11.

30. “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed 

Forces”; Li Qinwei and Cao Jinping, “‘Zheng He’ 

Training Ship’s Round-the-World Navigation 

Boasts Four Features.”

31. 军队院校及普通高校国防生班报考指南 [A 

Guide for Applicants to Military Academic Institutions and Civilian College National Defense 

Student Program] (Beijing: PLA Press for the 总

政治部干部部培训局 [Department’s Professional Military Education Bureau] and 石家庄

陆军指挥学院军事教育研究所 [Shijiazhuang 

Army Command Academy’s Military Education 

Research Institute], January 2005). 
30 china maritime studies

32. In May 2000, the State Council and Central 

Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party issued the “Decision Concerning 

Establishing a System for Civilian Colleges to 

Educate and Train Military Officers” (关于建

立依托普通高等教育培养军队干部制度的决

定). The document noted that the National Defense Student Program had been created because 

the PLA had been unable to educate or train 

personnel to operate or support new high-tech 

weapons and equipment. See CNR, www.cnr.cn/

wcm/military/junlv/t20040325_146439.html. 

33. “海军国防生” [Naval National Defense Students], Baidu Online Encyclopedia, baike.baidu

.com/view/5047801.htm, and “国防生” [National Defense Students], Baidu Online Encyclopedia,

baike.baidu.com/view/3196.htm. Each university has its own national defense student website. 

See, for instance, Nanchang University’s, at chgf 

.ncu.edu.cn/. 

34. 李选清 [Li Xuanqing] and 胡春华 [Hu Chunhua], 

“全军依托普通高校培养国防生呈现良好发

展势头” [Whole Military Sees Good Trend of 

Development in Relying on Ordinary Colleges, 

Universities to Cultivate National Defense 

Students], Jiefangjun Bao, 14 December 2007. 

35. 孙志 [Sun Zhi], “培育国防生当代革命军人核

心价值观综述” [Summary of Nurturing National Defense Students as the Core of Today’s 

Military Personnel], Jiefangjun Bao, 1 December 

2009. 

36. 福建省教育厅阳光高考信息平台 [Fujian 

Province Education Department Yangguang 

Entrance Examination Information Platform], 

available at gaokao.fjedu.gov.cn/htm/

teshuzhaosheng/guofangsheng/20110629/

41984.shtml, and 新东方 [New East], gaokao

.xdf.cn/201109/869579.html. 

37. Guide for Applicants to Military Academic Institutions and Civilian College National Defense 

Student Program. The PLA has two terms for 

reserve officers. Students are referred to as 

houbei junguan (后备军官); once graduated and 

assigned to their permanent duty stations, they 

lose this designation. Reserve officers who are 

serving on active duty are called yubeiyi junguan

(预备役军官).

38. Multiple sources, including 兰州交通大学

[Lanzhou Jiaotong University], xpb.lzjtu.edu.cn/

html/gfsgl/2008/18392884.htm. 

39. “湖南大学2007-2008学年度总结表彰大会” 

[Hunan University 2007–2008 Academic Year 

Awards Ceremony], 湖南大学 [Hunan University], kjxpb.hnu.cn/index.php?option=com

_content&task=view&id=822. 

40. 张海文 [Zhang Haiwen] and 李立德 [Li Lide], 

“昔日, 他们是大学校园里的优秀学子; 今朝, 

他们是祖国蓝色方阵中的‘蛟龙’. 他们究竟是

如何实现从国防生向‘一线带兵人’的精彩转

身? 请看来自南海舰队的报道— 把国防生

干部送上成才‘快车道,’” [Olden Days, They 

Are Outstanding Students from the University; Today, They Are “Flood Dragons” in the 

Fatherland’s Blue Front Line. So How Did They 

Go from Being National Defense Students to 

“Firstline Soldiers”? Please See the Report from 

the South Sea Fleet Entitled National Defense 

Students on the “Fast Track.”], Jiefangjun Bao, 15 

February 2011, p. 10.

41. “2010年西安电子科技大学国防生招生计划” 

[Xidian University 2010 Year National Defense 

Student Plan], 25 May 2010, available at 西安电

子科技大学 [Xidian University], xpb.xidian

.edu.cn/trans.aspx?id=944.

42. “2010年军队院校和普通高校国防生招生政策

解读” [Deciphering the 2010 Recruitment Policies for Military Schools and Civilian Schools’ 

National Defense Students], 解放军报 [PLA 

Daily], 11 June 2010, available at www.csust.edu

.cn/pub/kjxpb/notice/t20100611_126804.htm. 

43. Bo Zhiyue, “The PLA’s Young Cadet Development: Defense Student Program” (paper 

presented at the Chinese Council of Advanced 

Policy Studies and the Institute of Chinese 

Communist Studies’ “PLA in the Next Decade” 

Conference in Taipei, 31 October–1 November 

2011). The original source for the five problems 

is He Zongfa, Dong Jinhai, and Wang Zhanhe, 

“对进一步提高国防生选拔培养质量的几点思

考” [Some Reflections on Further Improvement 

on Selection and Cultivation of Students for 

National Defense], Jiaoxue Yanjiu [Research in 

Teaching] 31, no. 3 (May 2008), pp. 211–14.

44. Author interviews with PLA officers. 

45. Naval Handbook, p. 143.

46. “海军东海舰队92118部队接收大学毕业生

简章” [Brochure about Navy East Sea Fleet 

92118 Unit Recruits College Graduates], 12 

May 2010, available at www.career.zju.edu.cn/

news/127362354967235680.html; “浙江温州海

军部队接收地方高校毕业生入伍” [Zhejiang 

Wenzhou Navy Unit Directly Recruits Civilian 

College Graduates to Enter the Military], 湖南

中医药大学 [Hunan University of Traditional 

Chinese Medicine], 11 May 2012, www

.hnctcm-zsjy.com/News_View.asp?NewsID=786. 

47. The PLAN uses the term tigan (提干) for the 

process wherein enlisted personnel and civilian 

cadres become officers (ganbu). 

48. For comparison purposes, PLAN officers attend 

the Naval Command College course for ten 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 31

months, but unlike graduates of the U.S. Naval 

War College, they receive only certificates 

instead of master’s degrees.

49. Unless otherwise noted, the information in this 

section comes from 张永义 [Zhang Yongyi], ed., 

海军军事训练学 [Science of Naval Training] 

(Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 

April 2006) pp. 200–219.

50. “Training System in Military Colleges and 

Schools,” pp. 562–63.

51. In 1999, the Central Military Commission 

designated five PLA universities as “comprehensive universities” (综合大学), with programs 

in science, engineering, military science, social 

science, management, economics, philosophy, 

literature, education, law, and history. The 

PLAN refers to as “comprehensive universities” 

those that provide senior technical, bachelor’s, 

master’s, and doctorate degrees in a wide variety 

of technology and engineering areas. One goal 

is to provide a high proportion of the students 

opportunities to receive two science and technology bachelor’s degrees and then move on to 

master’s and doctorate degrees; 苗宝今 [Miao 

Baojin], “双学位学员展英姿” [Exhibit Heroic 

Double Bachelor’s Degree Cadets], Jiefangjun 

Bao, 11 June 2001. The five universities, each 

of which has several subordinate xueyuan (i.e., 

colleges), are Air Force Engineering University 

(AFEU, 空军工程大学), the National University 

of Defense Technology, the Naval Engineering 

University (NAE, 海军工程大学), the PLA 

Information Engineering University (PLAIEU, 

解放军信息工程大学), and PLA Science and 

Engineering University (PLAUST, 解放军理工

学院). 西陆网 [Xilu Network], club.xilu

.com/emas/msgview-821955-4656460.html; 

Contemporary Military Academic Institution 

Education Dictionary (现代军校教育辞典), s.v. 

“Comprehensive University (综合大学)” (Beijing: National Defense Univ. Press, July 2009).

52. Naval Handbook, p. 144.

53. 苏树波 [Su Shubo], 俞志勇 [Yu Zhiyong], 汤

奇 [Tang Qi], and 蔺承 [Lin Cheng], 军队干

部工作手册 [Military Cadre Work Handbook] 

(Beijing: National Defense Univ. Press, May 

2011), chap. 4, pp. 115–38. 

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. 人民海军 [Renmin Haijun], 2 April 2002, p. 1. 

The PLA Navy’s Political Department publishes 

the newspaper Renmin Haijun (hereafter RMHJ)

for a public readership four times per week. It 

has no official English title but is often referred 

to in English-language publications as People’s 

Navy.

57. Wei Yinhai and Zhang Jinyu, “Air Force Military 

Professional University Established,” 4 July 

2008, english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/news

-channels/2008-07/04/content_1348728.htm. 

“The PLA’s First Military Professional University 

Is Established in the Air Force” [全军第一家

军事职业大学在空军挂牌成立], 3 July 2008, 

www.go81.net/news/shownews_12454.html. 

58. Junyu, 2011 (p. 308), translates jixun (集训) as 

“intensive training,” specifically as short-term 

training for personnel within a given specialty.

59. “南海舰队引导官兵献身强军实践” [The 

South Sea Fleet Guides Officers and Enlisted 

Members toward a Stronger Path], Jiefangjun 

Bao, 19 April 2013, p. 1.

60. “‘雄狮文化’砥砺三栖劲旅” [“Lion Culture” 

Powers an Amphibious Brigade], Jiefangjun Bao,

2 February 2013, p. 8.

61. Science of Naval Training, pp. 236–52.

62. However, the PLA continues to use zhengbing

(征兵) for conscription and recruitment.

63. Naval Handbook, pp. 123–24. For example, 

the 2004 defense white paper used zhengbing

for “conscription” and yiwubing (义务兵) for 

“conscripts,” in reference to the PLA’s then-new 

program of two-year enlisted personnel. The 

2006 and 2008 white papers did not use either 

term; the 2010 white paper translated zhengbing

as “recruitment” and did not use yiwubing at all. 

This usage reflects the PLA’s overall attempt to 

move away from a draft/conscript to a volunteer 

system for enlisted personnel.

64. This section is based in part on Naval Handbook, pp. 121–23.

65. “东莞市寮步镇403人争22空军征兵名额” 

[403 Men Vie for Twenty-Two Slots in the Air 

Force’s Conscription Quota in Liaobu Village, 

Dongguan], 东莞日报 [Dongguan Daily], 8 

November 2010. 

66. 陆家嘴 [Lujiazui], lujiazui.pudong.gov.cn

/2006_nj_info/2007-12-19/Detail_168898.htm, 

describes a local district in Shanghai as providing ninety-one recruits per year to units in the 

Nanjing Military Region.

67. 陈四林 [Chen Silin], “当前 ‘征兵难,’ ‘征集高素

质兵员难’的主要原因及对策” [The Principal 

Causes of and Remedies for Present “Difficulties 

with Conscription” and “Difficulties in the Recruitment of High-Quality Military Personnel”], 

国防 [National Defense] (August 2011), pp. 

60–65. Apparently height and weight requirements have also been relaxed; 玛沁县人民政府

征兵办公室 [Maqin County People’s Government Recruitment Office], “2013年度夏季征

兵公告” [2013 Annual Summer Recruitment 
32 china maritime studies

Announcement], 6 June 2013, available at 玛沁

县人民政府 [Maqin County People’s Government], www.maqin.gov.cn/html/155/189353 

.html. For men with a middle school education, 

the upper age limit is twenty years, for high 

school graduates twenty-one years, for students 

at colleges and universities twenty-two, for 

graduates of vocational schools twenty-three, 

and for graduates of universities twenty-four. 

For women with middle school educations, 

the upper age limit is nineteen years, female 

students at colleges and universities twenty, and 

female graduates of colleges and universities 

twenty-two.

68. 哈密市国防教育办公室 [Hami National Defense Education Office] and 中共哈密市委宣传

部 [Hami Party Committee Propaganda Office], 

“关于扎实开展‘征兵宣传月’活动的通知” [Notice on Practical Development of “Recruitment 

Propaganda Month” Activities], 26 April 2013, 

available at 哈密政府网 [Hami Government 

Website], www.hami.gov.cn/10038/10038/10553/

12617/2013/274115.htm.

69. “安排部署2012年冬季征兵工作” [Arrangements for the 2012 Winter Recruitment Work], 

解放军报 [PLA Daily], 14 September 2012. 

Registration must be completed by 31 October.

70. Details of the actual allocation process and rules 

are unclear.

71. “新兵连, 好一个温暖的家” [New Soldier 

Companies: What a Warm Home], RMHJ, 18 

December 2012, p. 4.

72. 第三媒体 [Third Media], 1 April 2013, ido.3mt

.com.cn/Article/200707/show789263c30p1

.html. Prior to 2010–12, each fleet had its own 

aviation training base, but it appears likely that 

their functions have since been consolidated 

into that of the ESF, near Qingdao.

73. Men assigned to shore-based units stationed 

in the South Sea Fleet are also sent to the SSF 

training base. In terms of basic training, the 

fleet bases appear to be primarily intended for 

men assigned to units that cannot undertake 

their own basic training (e.g., ships and units 

on small islands). Training bases are located 

at Liugong Island (刘公岛), Shandong, for the 

North Sea Fleet (NSF), Shanghai for the ESF, 

and Dongguan (东莞), Guangdong, for the SSF.

74. “水兵初长成: 海军某训练基地举行新兵授衔

仪式” [Sailors’ Initial Progress: Naval Training 

Base Holds Rank-Conferral Ceremony], 中国

军网 [China Military Online], 8 February 2013, 

military.people.com.cn/n/2013/0208/c1011

-20468336.html. During the 2011–12 training 

cycle, the SSF base trained three thousand “new 

soldiers,” of whom some 92 percent underwent 

“tempering” (锻炼) on board vessels at sea or 

with marine units; RMHJ, 6 March 2012, p. 2.

75. U.S. Navy Dept., China’s Navy 2007, pp. 77–79. 

The PLAN is seeking to increase the prevalence 

of NCO instructors in basic and other forms of 

training, seeing such duty as a critical means of 

developing their staff, management, and leadership skills; “士官参谋显威组训一线” [NCO 

Staff Work Group Training], RMHJ, 29 June 

2012, p. 1.

76. Naval Handbook, pp. 121–23.

77. “出发! 我们一起守西沙” [Setting Off! Together 

We’re Defending the Paracels], RMHJ, 20 February 2012, p. 1. In this particular case, three 

hundred outstanding conscripts from the SSF 

training base were allowed to visit vessels at sea 

and shore-based units in the South China Sea to 

observe real-life conditions of various billets so 

as to make informed choices. At training units, 

techangbing (roughly, “specially skilled soldiers”) 

engage in competitive testing to determine 

which are to be assigned to highly desired 

billets; “定岗, 特长兵人尽其才” [Assigning 

Billets, Using Specially Skilled Troops to the 

Fullest], RMHJ, 20 February 2012, p. 1. It should 

be noted that techangbing can refer not only to 

technically trained but to entertainment and 

cultural personnel as well.

78. Naval Handbook, pp. 125–26. According to the 

same source, prior to the completion of either 

basic or specialty training, conscripts undergo 

further educational, physical, and psychological 

tests to determine their billets on board their 

eventual units or vessels. Apparently, each billet 

has specific educational, physical, and psychological standards.

79. The PLA uses identical terminology for enlisted 

ranks across all services, including the PLAN. 

Occasionally official articles published in English by the PLA and Xinhua use Western naval 

ranks, such as “petty officer,” to relate to foreign 

audiences; however, even those translations are 

not consistent. A search of all available PLA 

sources failed to identify an official English list 

of PLAN enlisted ranks that equate to Western 

naval ranks. Ultimately, there being no single 

authoritative set of translations for enlisted 

ranks, the authors have chosen to refer to naval 

noncommissioned officers as simply “NCOs.”

80. Yu Daqing, ed., PLA Officer Handbook, p. 30. 

See also Baidu Online Encyclopedia, baike.baidu

.com/view/2090591.htm.

81. Naval Handbook, p. 133.

82. PLA Officer Handbook, pp. 65–67.

83. This training is discussed further in the section 

on NCO training.
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 33

84. Naval Handbook, pp. 133–34. Whether this 

training takes place prior to or after application 

for NCO service is not explicitly stated.

85. Ibid., pp. 131–32.

86. The Bengbu NCO School, which China Military 

Encyclopedia identifies in English as the Bengbu 

Naval Petty Officers Academy of the PLA, offers 

senior technical degrees in up to forty specialties. Its yearly intake of secondary and senior 

technical-degree students is approximately nine 

hundred men, who enter the school each October, a date used to fall immediately before the 

yearly demobilization/conscription process began. The entry date for the school will likely be 

modified to reflect that of the conscripted force 

in the near future. 吕海华 [Lv Haihua], “海军

士官培养整体步入高等职业技术教育” [Naval 

NCO Development’s Integral Steps toward 

Advanced Vocational Technical Education], 解

放军报 [PLA Daily], 7 October 2012, available 

at news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2012-10/07/

content_4403740.htm. The school has five 

academic departments: maritime navigation, 

electromechanical, information technology, 

weapons, and machinery; China Military 

Encyclopedia, PLA’s Military History series, vol. 

3, pp. 746–47. 

87. Although sources are not explicit, there are presumably various forms of the test for personnel in 

different grades. Additionally, an applicant who 

has previously been awarded second- or thirdclass service honors, has received regimental-level 

approval, has passed a divisional-level investigation, and has received approval from the Navy 

NCO Student Recruitment Office (海军士官

学员赵审办公室) can be admitted to a school 

or program relevant to his specialty or billet 

without sitting for the examination.

88. NCO students are subjected to individual, 

overall quality assessments prior to graduation, 

measuring once again their physical and leadership qualities as well as their capacity to translate 

theory and instruction into actual practice.

89. Presumably if an NCO student fails and is 

nearing the end of his present period of service, 

he would be demobilized, along with all other 

NCOs in his grade not being promoted.

90. Naval Handbook, p. 132. It remains unclear what 

distinguishes students under the direct responsibility of this office.

91. They have also been eligible, since 2009, for up 

to twenty-four thousand RMB in tuition reimbursement or other compensation for the cost 

of a civilian education. 大学生士官网 [Civilian 

College Student NCO Network], www.shiguan8

.com/Article/bm/557.html.

92. Direct recruitment of junior NCOs requires 

regimental-level approval, of intermediate NCOs 

divisional-level approval, of master sergeants 

grade three the approval of the group army, 

and of master sergeants grades one and two 

the approval of the military region. Directrecruitment NCOs undergo basic training 

alongside conscripts at the training bases, though 

are segregated into separate units; “模型给力排

故教学” [Model of Troubleshooting Teaching], 

RMHJ, 24 February 2012, p. 1. They apparently 

often stay on at technical training bases until 

the fall to receive further billet training before 

proceeding to units; “海军航空训练基地岗位

练兵掠影” [A Glimpse of Billet Training at the 

Naval Aviation Training Base], Xinhua, 9 September 2011, available at pic.cnr.cn/jskt/201109/

t20110909_508483673.shtml. 

93. “2012年大学生士兵提干,优秀士兵报送入

学和专业体育单位优秀学员提干对象名

单” [Lists for 2012 of Civilian College Student 

Enlisted Personnel Who Became Officers, 

Outstanding Enlisted Personnel Who Enrolled 

as Cadets in Officer Academic Institutions, and 

Outstanding Cadets in Specialty Sports Units 

Who Became Officers], RMHJ, 4 November 

2012, p. 2.

94. “潘士兵的‘士兵之路’” [Soldier Pan’s “Road of 

the Soldier”], RMHJ, 31 August 2012, p. 2. In the 

case described here, a direct-commission NCO 

and university graduate serving in a geographically detached element of the maintenance 

section of an ESF communications station essentially became its logistics coordinator because 

no one else physically present had the requisite 

education. His position was later formalized, 

which effectively transformed him into an 

administrative cadre.

95. It remains unclear whether students are individually selected by specific units, as are standard directly recruited NCOs, or are allocated to 

units only after their entry into military service. 

96. 湖北省征兵办公室 [Hubei Provincial Conscription Office] and 湖北省高等学校招生委

员会 [Hubei Provincial University and College 

Recruitment Committee], “关于做好定向培养

直招士官试点工作的通知” [Notice Concerning Successfully Carrying Out the Directed 

Education of Directly Recruited NCOs Pilot 

Program Work], 洪山高中 [Hong Shan High 

School], www.hsgz.cn/uploads/zsg.doc.

97. 王福霞 [Wang Fuxia], “海军军务部领导来院

访问就联合培养海军士官生工作进行洽谈” 

[Navy Military Affairs Department Leadership 

Paid a Visit to Discuss Carrying Forward Direct 

Education of Direct-Recruitment NCOs], 3 July 

2012, 山东交通职业学院 [Shandong Transport 
34 china maritime studies

Vocational College], www.sdjtzyxy.com/html/

redianxinwen/20120703/1072.html. The source 

describes a visit to a school involved in the program in order to finalize the curriculum agreement and inspect the program facilities. The 

leaders of the navy delegation were the director 

of an unspecified office in the Navy Military 

Affairs Department and the deputy commander 

of the NSF training base, the junior officer (i.e., 

director) from the department apparently taking 

the lead in both discussions and the inspection. 

Additionally, and according to the official circular from Hubei, only the NSF and ESF training 

bases are participating in the pilot program.

98. “海军定向培养直招士官试点工作展开” [Pilot 

Program Initiates for Directed Education of 

Directly Recruited Navy NCOs], RMHJ, 9 July 

2012, p. 1. 

99. 张蓓 [Zhang Bei], “50名直招士官 千余考生

来抢” [Thousands of Candidates Compete for 

50 Direct-Recruitment NCO Slots], 潍坊晚报

[Weifang Evening News], 17 July 2012, 

available at zs.sdjtzyxy.com/html/meitijujiao/

20120718/223.html.

100. PLA Officer Handbook, p. 73.

101. Dong Huiyu and Mou Xianming, eds., Dictionary of Contemporary Military Academic 

Institution Education, p. 128. The 2011 Junyu

(p. 331) translates dadui (大队) as “group”; 

however, depending on the context, a dadui

can be either a regiment leader– or battalion 

leader–grade organization. Each service has 

several regiment leader–grade training groups 

(xunlian dadui, or 训练大队). The PLAN also 

has regiment leader–grade vessel dadui, (舰艇

大队), which the 2011 Junyu (p. 886) translates 

as “ship group.” For comparison purposes, 

Western publications often translate “ship 

group” as “squadron.” The air force and naval 

aviation have battalion leader–grade flight 

groups (feixing dadui—飞行大队) and a single 

maintenance group (jiwu dadui—机务大队).

102. Naval Handbook, pp. 133–34; PLA Officer Handbook, pp. 73–74. Some sense of the size of this 

yearly training effort is given by the fact that in 

2012 the ESF alone gave specialty training to two 

thousand new junior NCOs; captioned photo by 

陈鹏鹏 [Chen Pengpeng], RMHJ, 7 September 

2012, p. 2. The training begins immediately after 

the end of the basic training cycle in February 

and runs through August, using the same bases 

and facilities.

103. Naval Handbook, p. 135. It is not clear how the 

intermediate and advanced programs relate to 

zhongzhuan and dazhuan degrees, especially 

whether the certificates of completion can serve 

as equivalents to those degrees.

104. 刘晓华 [Liu Xiaohua], “青岛农大拟与海军

蚌埠士官学校联合培养士官” [QAU Agrees 

to Jointly Develop NCOs with Bengbu NCO 

School], 13 April 2012, 校园在线 [Campus 

Online], news.qau.edu.cn/n13600c1.aspx.

105. “海军航空工程学院与我校联合培养士官生

签约仪式举行” [Opening Ceremony Held for 

Joint NCO Development between Naval Aviation 

Engineering Academy and Our School], 11 April 

2013, 南昌航空大学 [Nanchang Hangkong 

University], news.nchu.edu.cn/NewsDetail.aspx

?className= percentb2 percentfd percentba 

percentbd percentd2 percentaa percentce 

percentc5&id=11386. This would appear to be 

separate from the direct-education program described elsewhere, as the NCOs in this instance 

appear to be simply attending classes, rather 

than being enrolled as full students.

106. Naval Handbook, pp. 133–34.

107. PLA Officer Handbook, p. 33.

108. “军中脊梁 ‘淬火成型”’ [The Backbone of the 

Armed Forces “Formed by Tempering”], RMHJ,

20 June 2012, p. 2. In the particular case described, the Bengbu NCO School established ten 

such bases during the course of 2012. The article 

also describes the NCO School’s organizing field 

exercises for fifty radar students, allowing them 

to apply their learning in a “complex electronics 

environment.” The overall intent is to bring the 

students’ training and education more closely in 

line with the requirements of operational units 

and bases.

109. “让个人成才对接部队需要” [Getting Individual Capacity to Align with Unit Requirements], 

RMHJ, 24 October 2012, p. 1. Training elements 

are also described as giving guidance directly 

to units to ensure that students are properly 

utilized.

110. “东海舰队依托自学考试提升官兵素质” [The 

ESF Depends on the Quality of Officers and 

Men Engaged in Self-Study and Testing], RMHJ,

12 January 2012, p. 1. In the ESF, some 1,300 

officers and NCOs per year engage in distance 

learning and formal self-study courses. Of 

course, the objective quality of these courses is 

unclear and certainly open to question.

111. Approximately twenty NCOs acted as team and 

squad leaders in an ESF electronic-warfare exercise led by and solely consisting of enlisted men. 

“20名士官当上代理排长” [Twenty NCOs Take 

Up Duty as Acting Platoon Leaders], RMHJ, 29 

June 2012, p. 1.

112. “83名士兵喜获执业资格证” [Eighty-Three 

Enlisted Men Are Awarded Vocational Qualifications Certificates], RMHJ, 17 October 2012, p. 

2; “首批29名士兵获国家职业资格证书” [The 
the recruitment, education, and training of pla navy personnel 35

First Batch of Twenty-Nine Enlisted Men Obtain 

National Vocational Qualification Certificates], 

RMHJ, 27 September 2012, p. 1.

113. “校园淬火砺精兵” [Campus Tempers Elite 

Troops], RMHJ, 4 January 2013, p. 3.

114. Specifically, this entailed the office’s also formulating six major specialties and vocational standards for twenty-seven trades, and, in cooperation with the three schools, publishing sixty-two 

instructional texts, as well as various “test banks” 

for online or remote testing. The office has also 

organized three consecutive training courses for 

evaluators, producing 235 evaluators by January 

2013.

115. Also, other specialties are establishing a dozen 

or more evaluation stations of their own, a figure 

that gives some idea of their intended extent. 

“Eighty-Three Enlisted Men Are Awarded Vocational Qualifications Certificates,” p. 2.

116. “First Batch of Twenty-Nine Enlisted Men 

Obtain National Vocational Qualification Certificates,” p. 1.

117. “42名士兵获国家高级职业技能证书” [FortyTwo Enlisted Men Obtain National Advanced 

Vocational Skills Certificates], RMHJ, 29 September 2012, p. 1.

118. “多项联合缩短课堂与战场距离” [Bringing 

Classroom Instruction Closer to the Battlefield], 

RMHJ, 24 August 2012, p. 2.
About the Contributors

Ken Allen is a Senior China Analyst at Defense Group Inc. (DGI). He is a retired U.S. 

Air Force officer whose service abroad includes assignments in Taiwan, Berlin, and 

Japan, as well as a tour in China as an assistant air attaché. He has written numerous 

articles on China’s military, with particular emphasis on organizational structure, 

personnel, education, and foreign affairs. He holds bachelor’s degrees from the University of California at Davis and from the University of Maryland, as well as an MA in 

international relations from Boston University.

Morgan Clemens is a research associate at DGI, where his work focuses on the Chinese 

armed forces and defense industry. He has studied in China and holds an MA in Asian 

studies from George Washington University and a BA in history and government from 

the College of William and Mary.