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KAZAKHSTAN: AS STABLE AS ITS 

GOVERNMENT CLAIMS? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 25, 2012 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE 112–2–2] 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

HOUSE SENATE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Chairman 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, 

Co-Chairman 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

MICHAEL H. POSNER, Department of State 

MICHAEL C. CAMUN ̃ EZ, Department of Commerce 

ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, Department of Defense 

[II] 
KAZAKHSTAN: AS STABLE AS ITS 

GOVERNMENT CLAIMS? 

JANUARY 25, 2012 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 1 

Hon. Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Ambassador William Courtney (Retired), Former U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia .................................... 11 

Susan Corke, Director for Eurasia Programs, Freedom 

House ........................................................................................ 33 

Dr. Sean R. Roberts, Associate Professor and Director of 

the International Development Studies Program, GWU’s 

Elliott School for International Affairs .................................. 4 

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith ................. 28 

Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin .................... 30 

Prepared statement of Amb. William Courtney ....................... 31 

Prepared statement of Susan Corke .......................................... 33 

Prepared statement of Dr. Sean R. Roberts .............................. 38 

Prepared statement of Ambassador Erlan Idrissov ................. 40 

Prepared statement of the Central Council of People’s Front . 45 

[III] 

(1) 

KAZAKHSTAN: AS STABLE AS ITS 

GOVERNMENT CLAIMS? 

January 25, 2012 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC 

The hearing was held at 2 p.m. in room 200, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. 

Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Ambassador William Courtney (Retired), 

Former U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia; Susan 

Corke, Director for Eurasia Programs, Freedom House; and Dr. 

Sean R. Roberts, Associate Professor and Director of the International Development Studies Program, GWU’s Elliott School for 

International Affairs. 

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. SMITH. The Commission will come to order. And I want to 

thank you all for being here this afternoon, and especially to our 

very distinguished panel. 

Today we will discuss the state of human rights and democracy 

in Kazakhstan. 

The Government of Kazakhstan, controlled by the authoritarian 

President-for-Life Nazarbayev, has long sought to obscure its serious human rights and democracy deficiencies by claiming that at 

least it is a haven of stability in Central Asia. Stability has in fact 

become the basis of the Government of Kazakhstan’s claim to legitimacy. Of course, stability can never be an excuse for dictatorship 

or widespread torture and similar abuses. We simply can never accept the hidden premise of the Kazakhstan Government’s talk of 

stability, that human dignity can be bargained away in some exchange for stability. 

Likewise, we cannot accept at face value the claim that 

Kazakhstan is in fact as stable as its Government claims. This 

claim must be carefully examined. That is what this hearing is 

about today. Too often, in Washington and within the OSCE, the 

Government of Kazakhstan’s claim to stability is tacitly accepted. 
2 

And that allows the Government to set itself up as a model for 

other Asian and European countries. 

After last year’s events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, we 

have to look carefully at authoritarian claims to stability—all the 

more since last month, when there were riots in Zhanaozen in 

western Kazakhstan, which the authorities put down with deadly 

force. At least 16 people were killed, and some estimates go as high 

as 70. Many of us have seen terrible videos circulating on YouTube 

that clearly show government forces firing on fleeing protesters and 

beating those who fell to the ground. I doubt many Kazakhs will 

soon forget these images. 

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty reported the harrowing 

testimony of a 21-year-old girl who was detained while out looking 

for her father the night of the riots. She described witnessing the 

torture, the abuse and humiliation of dozens of people who had 

been rounded up and taken to the basement of police headquarters, 

including girls who were stripped naked and dragged into an adjoining room. She herself was beaten. She reported what she saw 

to authorities, who returned with her a week later. The basement 

had been scrubbed clean, and the police claimed that nothing had 

happened. The woman’s father returned home after two days. He 

said he had been badly beaten by police, and he died of his injuries 

on December 24th. 

There are many such stories. AP reports a journalist’s main police department heard screams coming from what appeared to be 

interrogation rooms, while men with bloodied faces were lined up 

in the corridors with their faces against the wall. Sadly, reports of 

police abuse and torture in Kazakhstan are not new. In December 

of 2009, in his report the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture concluded that, quote, ‘‘evidence obtained through torture or ill treatment is commonly used as a basis for conviction.’’ 

Since the violence in December, the Government of Kazakhstan 

has said it is open to an international investigation, and has said 

many other things that we would expect a responsible democratic 

government to say. It has also established a governmental investigative commission. I certainly hope the internal investigation will 

be transparent and serious, and that there will be an international 

investigation soon—but best of all, by the OSCE—and that many 

good things the Government has said since the violence are the 

harbinger of a new openness to reform. 

At the same time, we have reason to be skeptical. Just yesterday, 

the chief editor of an opposition paper was jailed as part of an investigation. So far, charges against police have only been for stealing cellphones and cash from protesters. And the focus of the investigation has been focused instead on the political opposition. Access 

to the town itself and to potential witnesses have been severely restricted. While some journalists were giving access on December 

18th and 19th, they reported that they were under close supervision and not permitted to speak freely with detainees or residents. 

Prison Reform International, which the Kazakhstani Government 

claims met with detainees and found no evidence of torture, told 

my staff that they only assisted in getting access for local human 

rights monitors to a very limited number of detainees, far below 
3 

the official number of those who had been arrested. Contrary to the 

Government’s statement that no evidence of torture was found, in 

fact the monitors cited four suspected cases. 

There are reports that those who have tried to come forward may 

have been threatened. Surprise, surprise. At least one of the local 

monitors who visited detainees will no longer discuss it. The young 

woman I mentioned earlier will no longer speak about her ordeal. 

The persons who filmed the YouTube video from their window reportedly were sought by the authorities and have gone into hiding 

out of fear for their safety. Many people reportedly are still missing, but their families are afraid to come forward. 

Of course, we will also want to talk about the January 15th parliamentary elections, which the OSCE concluded, quote, ‘‘did not 

meet fundamental principles of democratic elections.’’ The OSCE 

details significant problems, including the exclusion of opposition 

parties and candidates, electoral commissions controlled by the ruling party, media bias, restrictions on freedom of assembly and 

problems during the counting process. 

I have spoken to participants in the election observation mission 

who personally observed outright fraud, including falsification of 

the final protocol in favor of the ruling Nur Otan party. Other 

American observers reported falsification of protocols to the party’s 

advantage, as well as ballot stuffing and people being paid to vote. 

I’d like to now introduce our very distinguished panel to the 

Commission. And again, I thank you for being here, because your 

information not only is received by Members of this Commission, 

but we disseminate it very widely among the leadership of the 

House, Senate, Democrat and Republican. And then there’s an even 

wider distribution, obviously, to the executive branch and to others 

in the diplomatic circles. So your testimonies will make a difference. 

Beginning with Ambassador William Courtney, who was a career 

foreign service officer in the U.S. Department of State from 1972 

through 1999. In his past post—last post, I should say—he served 

as senior adviser to this Commission—so we welcome him back— 

and co-chair of the U.S. delegation to the review conference of the 

OSCE, which prepared for its 1999 summit in Istanbul. He was an 

adviser in the 1999 re-organization of foreign affairs agencies; special assistant to the President of Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia; and 

ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia. 

Earlier he headed the U.S. delegation to the implementation 

commission of the U.S.-Soviet Threshold Test Ban Treaty and was 

deputy U.S. negotiator for defense and space in Geneva. He’s a 

member of the Council of Foreign Relations, on the boards of directors of the American Academy of Diplomacy and World Affairs 

Council of Washington, D.C. He graduated from West Virginia University with a B.A. and Brown University with a Ph.D. in economics. 

We will then hear from Susan Corke, who’s director of the Eurasian programs at Freedom House. Ms. Corke is a skilled practitioner in supporting human rights and democratic reforms in Europe and Eurasia. Before joining Freedom House, she spent seven 

years at the State Department, first two as Presidential Management Fellow, and most recently as a deputy director for European 
4 

affairs in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 

where she worked to promote human rights and democratic reform 

in some of the most repressive countries in the region, such as 

Belarus and Russia. 

She oversaw the editing for the State Department human rights 

country reports for Europe and had supervisory oversight of DRL’s 

25-plus civil society meeting and human rights programs in Europe. She also did stints at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, U.S. embassy Prague, in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs and 

the Bureau of Public Affairs. 

Prior to the State Department, Ms. Corke helped found and manage the U.S. foreign policy institute at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. She also worked 

at the German Marshall Fund, and as a media strategist at several 

advertising agencies in New York. Ms. Corke has a master’s degree 

in international affairs from George Washington University—its 

Elliot School of International Affairs—and a bachelor’s degree from 

the College of William and Mary. 

And finally, we’ll hear from Dr. Sean R. Roberts, who is the Director of the International Development Studies Program and Associate Professor of Practice [of International Affairs] at George 

Washington University’s Elliott School for International Affairs. He 

has spent substantial time over the last 18 years living in 

Kazakhstan, both doing academic research and working for the 

United States Agency for International Development. 

While at USAID, Dr. Roberts managed projects in civil society 

development, political party assistance, independent media development, and elections assistance. During this time, he also served 

as a short-term elections monitor for the OSCE missions to the 

1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections, as well as the 2005 presidential elections in the country. He has a forthcoming article coming out in the summer issue of Slavic Review entitled ‘‘Doing the 

Democracy Dance in Kazakhstan: Democracy Development as Cultural Encounter.’’ 

So we have three outstanding witnesses, and we look forward— 

beginning with you, Mr. Ambassador—to your testimonies. 

AMBASSADOR WILLIAM COURTNEY (RETIRED), FORMER U.S. 

AMBASSADOR TO KAZAKHSTAN AND GEORGIA 

Amb. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to appear before you today. 

Kazakhstan has a population of over 16 million. Ethnic Kazakhs 

comprise three-fifths; ethnic Slavs one-quarter; and Uzbeks, 

Uighurs, Tatars and others the remainder. Given this diversity, the 

term ‘‘Kazakhstanis’’ best refers to all the people of the country, 

and Kazakhs to the ethnic group. 

In many ways, Kazakhstan is blessed. It is larger than Western 

Europe and endowed with a minerals bounty. People tend to pragmatism. Ethnic differences are muted—regrettably in part because 

political expression is limited. Rulers encourage inter-ethnic harmony—although some Kazakh advantages, such as political dominance, raise concerns. Selection to chair the OSCE last year was 

a mark of the country’s international respect and weight. 
5 

Kazakhstan has achieved notable economic gains. Modernizing 

reforms, private property, talented people, and booming exports of 

energy and minerals make the country far wealthier than in Soviet 

times. In 2010, according to the World Bank, per capita GDP in 

current U.S. dollars stood at 9,136 [dollars] in Kazakhstan: slightly 

lower than Russia’s 10,440 [dollars], but three times higher than 

Ukraine’s $3,007. 

These data, however, do not tell the full story. Much wealth disappears into corruption. Construction of the extravagant new capital in Astana diminishes state funding for the rest of the economy. 

The economy is unbalanced: for example, the World Bank reports 

that labor productivity in agriculture is just 1 percent of that in 

America. 

Political development in Kazakhstan is stunted by 20 years of 

authoritarian rule. The tragedy last month, to which you referred, 

Mr. Chairman, highlights the risks. On December 16, security 

forces in Zhanaozen in western Kazakhstan fired on unarmed demonstrators, including striking oil workers, killing and wounding 

scores. A chilling video on YouTube shows security forces firing on 

and beating fleeing people, as you pointed out. 

Rather than apologizing, offering amends and opening a credible 

investigation, the authorities did the opposite. They blamed hooligans, shut off communications to the city and imposed martial law. 

The hardline response may not have calmed tensions; martial law 

was extended. A former interior minister became the new regional 

governor—a hint of unease about the loyalty of security forces. 

Today, on the date of this hearing, Kazakhstan’s chief prosecutor 

announced that criminal charges are being brought against several 

regional police executive and state oil company officials. It will be 

important that due process be followed and that judicial proceedings be transparent. Otherwise, many Kazakhstanis will wonder whether these officials are culpable for the Zhanaozen calamity, or whether they are lambs being sacrificed to exculpate the 

guilt of those higher up or better connected. 

The violence was an aberration in the country’s generally peaceful life. The callous response, however, is symptomatic of a wide 

gap between rulers and ruled, between reality and expectations, 

and between those who live honestly and those who do not. 

In history, Kazakhs do not meekly submit to arbitrary power. In 

the 19th century, Russian colonization was slowed by uprisings and 

wars. In World War I, many Kazakhs resisted the czar’s conscription, and then the communist takeover. A decade later, Kazakhs 

opposed brutal Soviet collectivization of agriculture, such as by killing their own livestock rather than turning it over to the State. 

Over a million Kazakhs perished. 

In World War II, Stalin exiled ethnic Germans, Crimean Tatars 

and North Caucasian Muslims to Kazakhstan. A million Poles were 

banished there. Many of these peoples, starving or ill, were taken 

in by Kazakhs and survived. Vast numbers lost their lives to Soviet 

cruelty. Nikita Khrushchev hurled huge numbers of ethnic Slavs 

into northern Kazakhstan for the wasteful Virgin Lands Campaign, 

aimed at turning pasture into a grain belt. Other Slavs built and 

operated raw materials and military facilities. Aleksander Solzhenitsyn labored in Kazakhstan in a prison camp. 
6 

The Soviets used much of Kazakhstan for military purposes. 

They tested nuclear weapons at Semipalatinsk, operated the 

world’s largest anthrax factory at Stepnogorsk, tested biological 

weapons in the open air on an island in the Aral Sea, tested antiballistic missiles and lasers at Sary Shagan, assembled torpedoes 

in Almaty, deployed giant SS–18 intercontinental missiles in two 

locations, and conducted ballistic missile tests and space launches 

from Baikonur. Amid the military activity, most of the country was 

closed. Kazakhstanis had few contacts with the outside world. A 

vital lifeline was shortwave broadcasting by Radio Liberty, VOA, 

BBC, Deutsche Welle and others. 

After the Soviet collapse, Kazakhstan returned nuclear weapons 

to Russia and became a model partner in the Nunn-Lugar program 

to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and their infrastructure. 

Kazakhstan welcomes substantial U.S. and other investment in 

Caspian Energy. It is a critical partner in the Northern Distribution Network, which provides logistical support to U.S. and NATO 

forces in Afghanistan. 

Close cooperation on core interests has yielded a productive U.S.- 

Kazakhstani strategic relationship—one of America’s most valued. 

Yet as Egypt shows, rulers must retain the consent of the governed 

in order to sustain foreign support. The lesson is salient for 

Kazakhstan. 

First, the legitimacy of personalized rule is in decline, and 

Zhanaozen is accelerating it. Transitions beyond President 

Nazarbayev, now 71, are uncertain. No evident successor has broad 

stature or appeal. Few, if any, independent groups combine the experience and acceptance required for effective political intermediation. None is so strong or enduring, for example, as the liberal 

Yabloko party in Russia or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 

On January 15 Kazakhstan held elections for a new parliament, 

but no genuine opposition parties were allowed to participate. 

OSCE election monitors found that the elections, quote, ‘‘did not 

meet fundamental principles of democratic elections,’’ end quote. In 

another anti-democratic step, earlier this week security forces raided the office of the opposition party Alga and the home of its leader. The courageous suffer. Journalist Ramazan Esergepov, labor 

union lawyer Natalia Sokolova, and human rights activists Aidos 

Sadykov and Yevgeny Zhovtis have languished in prison. 

Multiple factors, some unforeseen today, could shape 

Kazakhstan’s political evolution. One might be the demonstration 

effect of the Arab Awakening. Other factors may include elites empowered by economic liberalization; educated and connected young 

people; restive citizens in western Kazakhstan; Islamic interests; 

disadvantaged groups; and Russia’s policy toward neighbors. 

Kazakhstan’s burden of autocracy could render its politics less resilient against extremist pressures. 

Second, the accumulation of wealth by President Mubarak and 

his family, and popular resentment of it, have a disturbing parallel 

in Kazakhstan. President Nazarbayev is rightly credited for improving the economy, but personal aggrandizement arouses concern 

and cynicism. Moreover, several in his family are multibillionaires. 

Third, Zhanaozen may propel more unrest. 
7 

One risk is western Kazakhstan, which does not benefit commensurate with its contribution to the economy. Another risk is ethnicity. Zhanaozen was largely Kazakh-on-Kazakh violence. If largescale lethal force were ever turned on unarmed ethnic Russians, 

consequences could be far reaching. The Kremlin is vocal about 

protecting the interests of Russians abroad. Kazakhstan’s regions 

with higher proportions of ethnic Russians lie along the border 

with Russia—a key reason why the capital was moved northward. 

In conclusion, political risks in Kazakhstan are rising even as the 

economy expands. The arrogant, official response to Zhanaozen 

suggests dulled leadership awareness of human conditions. Repeated promises of democratic reforms go unfulfilled. Popular expectations may be climbing faster than the brittle political system 

can accommodate. Limits on independent political life weaken safety valves for peaceful change. 

America and Europe are widely respected in Kazakhstan. They 

should bite the bullet and do more to promote political and human 

freedoms. While some may resist, this will be a prudent investment 

in an important country and a friendly people with good long-term 

prospects. I will be pleased to answer any questions you might 

have and hear your further perspectives. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, thank you so very much for your 

testimony and your insights. Ms. Corke. 

SUSAN CORKE, DIRECTOR FOR EURASIA PROGRAMS, 

FREEDOM HOUSE 

Ms. CORKE. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before you and Helsinki 

Commission staff today to discuss whether Kazakhstan is as stable 

as its Government claims at a pivotal moment in its history. I’m 

also pleased to appear in distinguished company with Ambassador 

Courtney and Dr. Sean Roberts. 

While working in the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights and Labor, I worked in common cause both with 

Helsinki Commission staff and Freedom House, before, during and 

after Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE to press together for 

human rights improvements. 

Just over one year ago, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister said at the 

OSCE summit in Astana that that was a sign of the objective recognition by the international community of Kazakhstan’s successes 

in its socioeconomic and democratic development. It continued to 

say that they endeavored to fully live up to their motto—trust, tradition, transparency and tolerance—and be worthy of the confidence placed in them by the OSCE. 

Unfortunately, as we gather today to consider Kazakhstan’s stability and human rights record, it seems that the nation is not deserving of that confidence. While those who supported 

Kazakhstan’s chairmanship argued that it could galvanize human 

rights reform, it has failed to do so. In our recently released Annual Freedom in the World report, Kazakhstan continued to earn 

its ‘‘not free’’ ranking. 

This week, as we take stock of the situation, it’s been a pretty 

bad week. Additional repressive measures have been launched in 

Kazakhstan, including raids of the opposition Alga Party offices 
8 

and detentions of opposition activists and journalists. All of civil society feels under serious pressure and is nervous about what will 

happen next. Our Freedom House office in Almaty, led by Mr. 

Vyacheslav Abramov, and his small but dedicated staff, continuously working on human rights and reporting on developments. 

They are fearful now, and say that the common belief amongst 

NGOs is that NGOs will be the next place raided. 

I’ll focus primarily today on the current human rights situation 

as gathered from their reporting, which demonstrates that 

Kazakhstan is heading down a path of increasing instability. The 

recent riots and violence are not simply a random outburst. A leading Kazakh NGO, The Bureau, documented the growth of civic engagement this past year—interestingly, the emergence of ordinary 

citizens as leading organizers of public assemblies, and 78 percent 

of these were on socioeconomic problems. 

As the Government severely restricts freedom of assembly, however, the fact that more people are willing to challenge the government to have their voices heard is a sign of societal discontent. And 

if theGovernment continues on its repressive path, more peaceful 

protests will turn to violent ones. 

Nazarbayev has ruled Kazakhstan with an iron fist since 1991, 

and remains fixed on retaining power. When stability, however, is 

defined as keeping the lid on, it is only a matter of time before the 

pot starts to boil over. We’ve already talked about Zhanaozen. And 

the international community watched, taken aback, as violence 

erupted there the day of Kazakhstan’s 20-year celebration of independence from the Soviet Union. For those who had been paying 

attention, the pot had been simmering there for a while, and as already discussed, there were some underlying elements of social unrest. The oil strike had been going on since last April, when a large 

group of oil workers in western Kazakhstan began to demand higher wages and better working conditions. While Kazakhstan has 

several billionaires, these strikes signaled that uneven distribution 

of the country’s resources was sparking a backlash. 

Starting in May, many workers began camping in the city square 

in an indefinite protest—a challenge to a government that had 

tried and succeeded in squelching dissent. On December 16, the situation took a deadly turn. We’ve already talked about the videos 

that showed police firing with lethal force at citizen’s backs. Our 

reporting on the ground had 18 deaths, which is higher than some 

of the other reports. And we were horrified, too, to hear of the 

abuse in police headquarters. 

Soon after, President Nazarbayev took decisive steps to try to regain stability, as already discussed, imposing emergency rule. Surprisingly he dismissed his son-in-law, the head of the state oil holding company. He demanded a public inquiry and vowed to severely 

punish perpetrators. At the moment the city remains closed to public defenders and journalists, who may enter the city only if official 

permission is granted. 

The presidential administration, while it was swift in trying to 

usher in stability, shows no real signs of understanding the root 

causes. Nazarbaev’s political adviser called the disorder a provocation against the president and then continued to say that crimi-
9 

nals were responsible. He said: The president dealt with it, and the 

situation is back to normal. If only that were the case. 

We’ve already gone into—Ambassador Courtney went into detail 

on the elections, so I’ll just note that Kazakhstan continued its 20- 

year tradition of failing to observe democratic norms. The election 

was a sham effort to meet its stated goals of increasing the number 

of parties in Parliament. 

Interestingly, two days after the election, Nazarbayev issued a 

fast rebuttal, revealing what he really thinks about political modernization, saying that Kazakhstan would no longer invite international experts who criticize its elections. The Government of 

Kazakhstan seems to only want the OSCE’s input when it is good 

news. 

In looking to place blame for the growing instability, the obvious 

target was the opposition for the Government. In December the 

leaders of the unregistered Alga party in Astana and in the 

Mangistau region were both arrested. After the election, Vladmir 

Kozlov, the leader of Alga in Almaty, predicted Kazakh authorities 

would continue to try to blame the opposition. This has been the 

case. 

On Monday, police and the Committee on National Security organized a search in at the central office of the Alga party and at the 

homes of Kozlov and others. Several were detained, including 

Kozlov, who was then accused of inciting social discord. The Government said the raids were part of the investigation into 

Zhanaozen. By tightening the screws rather than allowing for political competition or dissent, Nazarbayev and his administration are 

on some level admitting their own weakness and vulnerability. A 

confident leader would not need to resort to such tactics. 

Throughout the past year, the country has been shaken by several attacks, mostly in western Kazakhstan, that were blamed on 

religious extremists, and the Government responded by cracking 

down and passing new legislation broadly tightening religious freedoms and public expression. When I visited Kazakhstan last August, there was a palpable sense of fear about what this uptick in 

religious extremism would mean for Kazakhstan. Human rights activists I spoke with warned that speaking publicly about the rise 

in extremism would cross a government red line. 

The restrictive law on religion soon followed, and was rushed 

through Parliament in only three weeks, in spite of protests from 

the OSCE and NGOs. It gives the Government unprecedented authority to regulate the activities and structures of religious communities and forbids prayer or religious expression in government institutions. The specifics of the law are poorly defined and leave 

much room for interpretation to local authorities. 

Shortly on the heels of that, the new National Security Act was 

signed by the President this month. It not only provides for the empowerment of special services, especially for combatting terrorism, 

but it allows for blocking of the Internet and other communication. 

In addition, the law imposes a vague restriction that those who 

harm the image of Kazakhstan in the international arena can be 

considered destructive. This law could be directed against those 

who criticize the country at international fora, such as this one. 
10 

The Government is trying to keep the lid on freedom of expression in other ways too. The new Broadcasting Act was signed by 

the president in January after a year of disregarding recommendations made by the OSCE and NGOs. It contains a number of troubling regulations that give the state additional control over TV and 

radio channels. For example, 50 percent of the broadcasts of foreign 

channels must contain domestic content by 2018. This new restrictive measure occurs in a media environment that is already under 

siege. 

Kazakhstan has preferred to view democracy and freedom as 

public relations slogans to boost prestige. It spared no expense in 

promoting itself with advertisement campaigns and high-level 

consultancies, such as Tony Blair. Admittedly, this has paid some 

policy dividends for Kazakhstan. 

However, in spite of trying to tout its harmony and peace of the 

country, an essential truth has been revealed with the latest violence. When citizens have legitimate grievances without an outlet, 

when freedoms are denied in the name of stability, instability and 

extremism are likely to increase. 

It is time to address the political stagnancy and lack of an apparent heir after Nazarbayev, officially deemed the leader for life. It 

is time for pro-democratic forces within Kazakhstan and the international community to start thinking about how to catalyze a more 

democratic, stable future for the country. Given its strategic importance, how Kazakhstan approaches the immediate future should be 

a cause for concern for policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic. 

I will conclude now with five specific recommendations, which 

were developed in consultation with civil society in Kazakhstan. 

One, it is important to publicly, at high levels, continue to hold 

the Kazakh authorities to their international obligations. 

Kazakhstan must earn positive attention, not buy it. 

Two, it is important to express support for civil society in 

Kazakhstan in cases of direct repression against NGOs and their 

activists. 

Three, the time is now to increase material support for civil society in Kazakhstan through funding and participation in various 

programs. They need our help more than ever. 

Four, it is important to put pressure on the Kazakh authorities, 

demanding that the domestic and international investigation of the 

events in Zhanaozen are allowed to occur openly and transparently. 

And finally, it is important to press the Government of 

Kazakhstan to put words into action and allow political pluralism 

and not paint the opposition as the enemy. The opposition will hold 

a protest rally January 28th in Almaty and will try to contest the 

election results in courts. This is a test for the Government. The 

West should pay attention. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Corke, thank you very much for your testimony 

and your very specific recommendations. Dr. Roberts, please proceed. 
11 

DR. SEAN R. ROBERTS, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES PROGRAM, GWU’S ELLIOTT SCHOOL FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

Dr. ROBERTS. Chairman Smith and members of the Commission, 

I’d like to thank you for inviting me here today to speak on this 

very important and timely topic: Whether Kazakhstan is as stable 

as its Government claims. 

As I recently wrote in a briefing paper commissioned by the Atlantic Council on 20 years of U.S.-Kazakhstani relationship, the 

Republic of Kazakhstan is something of an oasis of stability in the 

desert of uncertainty that represents Central Asia. 

Indeed, this stability is also largely the result of intelligent policies adopted by the Government of Kazakhstan over the last 20 

years. In the 1990s the Government of Kazakhstan, with cooperation from the United States, divested itself of the nuclear weapons 

it inherited from the Soviet Union. Also in the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s 

Government was careful to adopt inclusionary policies for its Russian minority citizens and to establish close relations with the Russian Federation, which helped to substantially reduce ethnic tension in the heavily Russian-populated north of the country. 

During the later 1990s and into the 2000s, Kazakhstan also 

adopted substantial liberal economic reforms that helped the country use its natural resource wealth to stimulate growth and create 

a vibrant middle class. All of these steps have played a role in 

making Kazakhstan the strongest and most stable country in Central Asia, both politically and economically. And the Government of 

Kazakhstan frequently, and justifiably, takes credit for them. 

Unfortunately, stability is not something a state can merely establish once in its history. It is an ongoing duty of governments 

around the world to meet the challenges that they face in keeping 

their citizens secure. This duty requires adapting to changing circumstances and understanding the changing needs of citizens. 

Given the several outbreaks of violence that have occurred in the 

country over the last year, one can justifiably ask whether the Government of Kazakhstan today is adapting to the new realities the 

country faces and whether the state is as stable as itsGovernment 

suggests. 

After all, the Kazakhstan of 2012 is quite different from that of 

1992, or even from that of 2002. But during the past 20 years the 

same President, who continues to be advised by many of the same 

men, has led its Government. This is not a recipe for an adaptive 

government and long-term stability. 

In the interest of time, I want to focus on three critical and relatively recent changes in Kazakhstan’s socioeconomic environment 

that, in my opinion, have contributed to the growing violence and 

tension we have seen in the country over the last year. I will also 

note that the country’s present government has yet to sufficiently 

address these changes and may be ill-equipped to properly engage 

them, bringing into question whether the violence we have seen 

this year is the beginning of a much less stable Kazakhstan into 

the future. 

The first change is the rapid growth of the popularity of Islam 

in the country. In the last several years, the re-engagement of 
12 

Islam by the people of Kazakhstan, which has been ongoing since 

the early 1990s, has suddenly become apparent in public spaces 

throughout the country. As somebody who has been visiting the 

country frequently over the last 20 years, for example, I was struck 

last summer by the number of Kazakh women dressed according to 

Islamic custom in the city of Almaty, which is the most cosmopolitan city in the country. 

This rapid growth of public religiosity is not suggestive of a terrorist threat or even of an immediate move towards political Islam, 

but it does point to a changing public culture that is poorly understood by both the Government and the secular middle class of the 

cities. As such, it is also suggestive of a growing population for 

whom the Soviet past, from which Kazakhstan’s current leadership 

emerged, holds little authority. 

We know very little about this growing Islamic religiosity in 

Kazakhstan, but it is likely quite diverse and represents a variety 

of different understandings of Islam. While we know even less 

about the alleged Muslim extremists who clashed with authorities 

in western Kazakhstan earlier this year, one must assume that 

these people were representative of at least one part of this population that is expressing its belief in Islam more publicly. 

Again, I will stress that I do not consider that these people or 

these events represent a serious terrorist threat to Kazakhstan. 

Rather, I believe they are emblematic of the inability of the present 

government in Kazakhstan to speak to the needs, perspectives, and 

values of an increasingly religious population. 

A second related development in the country is the growth of ethnic Kazakh nationalism. Like the growth of religiosity, this is a 

phenomenon that has been ongoing since the early 1990s, but has 

taken on new characteristics in recent years. In particular, the 

large number of ethnic Kazakh Oralman who have come back to 

the country since the early 90s from exile in China, Mongolia, Iran 

and elsewhere, are now becoming much more integrated into society. They generally have a poor knowledge of Russian language, 

are religious and believe that they should have an advantage over 

non-Kazakhs regarding economic opportunity. 

This situation is increasing ethnic tension in the country, as well 

as creating fear among Russian-speaking Kazakhs in urban areas, 

who see these developments as also promoting the status of 

Kazakh language. While the country’s leadership has tried to balance the promotion of Kazakh patriotism with policies of 

multiculturalism since independence, the growth of Kazakh language use and Kazakh nationalism are developments they are not 

well-placed to engage, given their political education in a Soviet 

system that shunned nationalist politics. 

Furthermore, while the ethnic tension created by these developments has not yet exploded into mass violence, it has already 

manifested itself in numerous violent clashes between Kazakhs and 

Uyghurs in the area of Kazakhstan between Almaty and the Chinese border. 

Finally, and perhaps most ominous for the present government, 

Kazakhstan is beginning to face a crisis of rising economic expectations that are unmet. While Kazakhstan is certainly the most economically viable country in Central Asia, the country’s middle class 
13 

and skilled laborers have come to expect their standard of living to 

improve on a regular basis after a decade of rapid economic growth. 

A combination of the global financial crisis, a leveling off of the 

Kazakhstan’s post-transition growth and the burst of a substantial 

housing market bubble have stunted these improvements for many 

citizens in the country over the last several years. 

Given the awareness of the income gulf in the country, these 

unmet expectations for improved standards of living have resulted 

in increased dissatisfaction with the current economic situation in 

the country among the middle class and skilled laborers. This situation undoubtedly contributes to the labor strikes we saw in the 

west of the country. And the Government’s violent reaction to these 

strikes show just how unprepared the present Government of 

Kazakhstan is to deal with such dissatisfaction. 

It should be noted that these changes in Kazakhstan’s socioeconomic environment are not extreme and are unlikely to immediately cause widespread unrest in the country. In fact, in a democratic society such discord and socioeconomic dynamism is expected, and politicians in different political parties compete to provide the best solutions for them. In Kazakhstan, however, the stagnant political system has no mechanism to adapt to such dynamic 

changes. Furthermore, at a time when many authoritarian states 

have sought to implement at least gradual liberalization of their 

political systems in response to the Arab Spring, Kazakhstan has 

shown no such desire, instead holding controlled elections this past 

year that differed little from those held in the country over the last 

20 years. 

In my opinion, the growing dynamism of Kazakhstan’s society 

coupled with its stagnant political system could create a dangerous 

scenario when the country finally decides or is forced to decide on 

a strategy for presidential succession. With a diversification of powerful interests in the country, significant natural resource wealth 

at stake, and no experience with competitive politics, such a succession could become a flash point for substantial conflict and sustained instability. 

In conclusion, I will note that I believe that Kazakhstan has the 

capacity to adapt to these changes, given the country’s rich human 

resources and relatively broad economic prosperity. To do so, however, the country must begin taking measures towards a liberalization of its political system now. The gradual development of a competitive and transparent multiparty political system now can prepare the country to deal with presidential succession. But if 

Kazakhstan waits until a succession crisis ensues to implement 

such reforms, I fear it may be too late. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much for your testimony. You 

know, within the last couple weeks, as you know, President 

Nazarbayev put into effect a couple of new laws—one, putting further controls on broadcast media, but the other that would make 

it a crime to damage the image of Kazakhstan. It occurs to me 

that, as the three of you have been simply telling the truth and 

giving your best insights, all three of you—and I have to put myself 

in that category as well—broke the law. I wonder if you might 

speak to that law. It’s obviously too soon to tell, I think, if anybody 
14 

has been rounded up under its provisions. But what will it do? You 

know, how much time might one get if you hurt the image of 

Kazakhstan? 

Ms. Corke? 

Ms. CORKE. Now, as you mentioned, it provides for the empowerment of special services, especially for combatting terrorism. It also 

allows for the blocking of Internet and fixed and mobile communications. As you noted, it imposes a vague restriction that those 

who harm the image of Kazakhstan in the international arena can 

be considered destructive. So you’re right. This sort of fora is the— 

exactly the sort of thing that may cause our passports to not get 

visas. But it’s interpreted as closing off further dissent, closing 

themselves off to the West, which is—you know, contravenes their 

chairmanship of the OSCE and all of their declarations of being 

committed to political liberalization and modernization. These 

things seem to be mutually exclusive with this law. 

Mr. SMITH. It occurs to me that it is so parallel to what the Chinese Government does, with disharmonious activity on the part of 

dissidents. It’s often used as one big vague way to round up people 

and put them into the laogai for long periods of time. So I think 

it’s a very ominous escalation or further sinking into the abyss of 

dictatorship. 

Let me ask you, if you would—you know, the Kazakhstani’s Government and the embassy right here in Washington has put forward what many must think is a very slick campaign, a PR campaign, portraying the riots in Zhanaozen as instigated by hooligans 

and the recent parliamentary elections as democratic, free and fair. 

And I mean, honestly, do they think governments and do they 

think people, especially a country like the U.S. that does have a 

free press, are so foolish to buy into what is so transparently a 

propaganda—in the worst sense of that word—effort? Or do they 

think they might get away with it? 

Amb. COURTNEY. Earlier last year, President Nazarbayev had an 

op-ed in the Washington Post, which could have been written by 

the propaganda department of the Kazakhstani Government. So 

yes, one would have to assume that Kazakhstani officials believe 

that, in some cases, some official statements can be given currency 

beyond what dispassionate analysis of the facts and conditions 

would suggest. 

Mr. SMITH. And Dr. Roberts? 

Dr. ROBERTS. I’ll just add that—I mean, it’s an interesting phenomenon because so few people in the United States know much 

about Kazakhstan. And I think sometimes, you know, if you look 

at some of these things that come out as communications in the 

U.S. that are obviously public relations attempts, if you know 

something about Kazakhstan, they seem quite silly. But I would 

believe that people who don’t know anything about Kazakhstan 

may take them very seriously. And of course, it’s also well known 

that U.S. consulting firms assist them in these endeavors. 

Mr. SMITH. Do you know who’s assisting them right now? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Actually, I don’t know because I think their former 

company was removed, if I remember correctly. So I’m not sure exactly right now, but maybe some of the other panelists do. 
15 

Mr. SMITH. You know, it is tragic and I would say beyond tragic 

that very often that is the case. I know that Frank Wolf and I have 

been raising the alarm on another country, Sudan, which just got 

the OK from the Obama administration to allow a representative 

group to present talking points that would appear to put a gloss 

over, you know, Bashir’s terrible and despicable crimes against humanity. He ought to be at The Hague, as we all know, being held 

to account for those crimes, and yet he now is being represented 

in a way that puts a good finish on his terrible crimes. 

Let me ask you, if I could, about the new religion law, which 

they, in Kazakhstan, defend as aimed at preventing Islamic radicalism. Your sense of that law—how bad is it? How will it affect 

the various religious groups and individuals? And as you know, 

Kazakhstan is not—you know, has been reviewed and has not been 

designated a country of particular concern under the International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998. Does this new law and recent 

events make a case that the department ought to do that? You 

know, the—[off mic]—your thoughts on that, whether or not they 

should get CPC designation? 

Ms. Corke. 

Ms. CORKE. As far as whether it should receive CPC designation, 

I’d say it’s too soon to tell. 

Mr. SMITH. OK. 

Ms. CORKE. You know, authorities are making the argument that 

the new law on religion will help combat extremism. Critics warn 

that the restrictions under the new law could backfire and fuel extremism rather than combat it. So at this point and one of the urgent things that our office is working on, prior to the swift passage 

of it, they were trying to mitigate and advocate with the Government against some of the worst provisions of the law. But it was 

passed so quickly, with such determination from Nazarbayev and 

his Parliament, that there was no time for us to have our voices 

heard on that. 

But what we’re focused on now is monitoring the implementation 

and raising awareness in the international community when 

there’s any problematic implementation of it. I will note that they 

were in such a rush that before the law was even enacted, authorities started using it as grounds to harass and detain members of 

the New Life Church and Jehovah’s Witnesses and raid these 

groups’ properties. So they were in such a rush, they didn’t even 

wait for the legislation to go through. But international, domestic 

civil society and religious organizations, including Kazakhstan’s top 

Muslim cleric, took issue with several provisions in the law and 

think that it will drastically curtail Kazakh citizen rights to freedom of religious belief. So time will tell. 

Mr. SMITH. I would hope that all of you and—would be looking 

at that and whether or not—I know the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom is watching it very carefully as well, 

because it seems to me that we have been far too slow to designate 

country CPC and far too quick to lift it when there’s even the 

slightest hint of a thaw, when it comes to religious persecutions. 

And I say that—yesterday in this hearing room, I chaired a hearing. It’s about the eighth one I’ve had on human rights abuses in 

Vietnam. Obviously, it’s a whole different country but some of the 
16 

dynamics on how we respond to human rights abuse apply. And 

the situation has so deteriorated in Vietnam against Catholics, 

Christians, the Montagnards, Protestants, the Buddhist Unified 

Church of—Buddhists, that the fact that they’re not CPC is outrageous. And yet, again, this slow response—it was lifted in order 

to get the bilateral agreement and, particularly, most favored nation status effectuated for Vietnam. They made no change. They 

got worse, and, again, no CPC. 

And I know we have concerns about Kazakhstan. We have interests relative to our troops. But if the price is to tolerate significant 

human rights abuse, I would think that that’s too high of a price. 

And I would appreciate your thoughts on how well or poorly you 

think the Obama administration and the State Department, the 

U.S. Congress is dealing with Kazakhstan. Are we speaking forcefully and accurately about what is going on there, with perhaps 

some penalties if they don’t change? 

Mr. Ambassador? 

Amb. COURTNEY. One of the remarkable things about U.S. policy 

toward the former Soviet Union for the last 20 years has been how 

remarkably bipartisan it has been. There was a very smooth continuity from the President George H.W. Bush administration to the 

Clinton administration in terms of the emphasis on supporting territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of the new independent republics; building democracy in the region; providing assistance through USAID and other mechanisms—National Endowment for Democracy, programs carried out by the International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, International 

Foundation for Electoral Systems. Those programs have had strong 

bipartisan support all the way. 

I would argue that, by and large, our policy has continued to be 

generally bipartisan for most of those countries. And in 

Kazakhstan, in particular, we have to consider the enormous interest that the United States has—one I discussed at some length, the 

military activities in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has dismantled an 

enormous amount of infrastructure for weapons of mass destruction. And that came because Kazakhstan saw that America was a 

strategic partner. 

The second consideration is Caspian Energy. At the beginning 

after the Soviet collapse, a lot of oil companies saw that Russia had 

the largest reserves, but it was Kazakhstan, being more moderate, 

which negotiated the first arrangement for a super—the Tengiz Arrangement, initially negotiated by Chevron. 

The third consideration now is that with the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and with the proposed withdrawal or drawdown 

of American troops—which has a fair amount of bipartisan support 

in the United States—if transportation through Pakistan is going 

to be limited, the retrograde—the withdrawal of U.S. forces and 

equipment via surface transportation—is going to depend very 

heavily on cooperation with Kazakhstan, with Russia, other Central Asian countries. So we have quite a few interests at stake, and 

no single interest can be pursued to the exclusion of the others. 

But that said, I would say that the statements by the State Department and our U.S. ambassador to OSCE about the elections 

have been fairly honest and straightforward statements. And the 
17 

work that this Commission does to hold the executive branch to a 

high standard has been particularly important and helped. 

Dr. ROBERTS. I would just add, I think that Kazakhstan is the 

type of country that the U.S. should be engaging on these issues. 

I don’t think that necessarily sanctions and just pure criticism is 

going to really get much accomplished with the Kazak Government. 

And Kazakhstan—and one of the, I think, very positive things 

about Kazakhstan is that it does have a fairly broad base of elites. 

And I think there are people who are close to power in Kazakhstan 

who have very different ideas about what should be done, than 

kind of the old guard that’s been in power for 20 years. 

So I would advocate for engagement. I think it’s important, at 

the same time, that the U.S.—one of the things the U.S. has done 

in the past and, I think to a certain degree, continues to do is 

speak out of both sides of its mouth about issues of democracy and 

human rights in a country like Kazakhstan, where we have an interest in oil reserves and we have security issues that we’re interested in. I think it’s important to be very straightforward about 

how important issues of democracy and human rights are to the 

United States’ interest in the country and not short sell them. But 

on the other hand, I think that we really need a policy of engaging 

Kazakhstan, because I think that that’s going to bear much more 

fruit than just beating them up. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Corke. 

Ms. CORKE. If I may add, so while I was at the State Department 

in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and while 

at Freedom House, my role has been advocating the human rights 

and democracy part of the policy equation. So while in full recognition that it’s a complex policy environment and our bilateral relationship, there’s a range of interests—oil and gas, the Northern 

Distribution network, a restive neighborhood, economic interests— 

at the same time. 

And I was in the State Department in the lead up to deciding 

whether or not Kazakhstan would be chosen as the chairman-inoffice, and making sure that it lived up to its commitments in all 

three dimensions, and it was found to be sorely lacking in the 

human dimension area; and leading up to that, pressing them to 

live up to those commitments. And even during its chairmanship, 

it didn’t. 

So I would say that continuing to make sure that human rights 

and democracy, particularly at this juncture, remains high as far 

as the policy balance is really important. I’ve seen internal battles 

on kind of the relative weight of the various policy interests, and 

it’s important to have consistency of support for human rights and 

democracy concerns, because if we lose the limited space that still 

exists, it will be hard to regain in the future. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. You know, you mentioned the 

chair-in-office and the considerable debate, although there should 

have been more, about whether or not that was a wise decision. I 

strongly oppose that, on the record, believing that we needed deeds 

first, and followed by a modest but a very real reward as being 

chair-in-office. 

And I wonder sometimes that when we put the cart before the 

horse, you know, history has told us in country after country—and 
18 

I believe it’s accurate, I would like to know if there’s an example 

that shows it otherwise—that usually the day they get it or the day 

they get whatever the benefit, is the pivotal day when they start 

turning the other way. And I’ll give you two examples. When we 

delinked most favored nation status from China on May 26, 1994, 

China went into a slide on human rights abuse. It was already 

bad—became much worse. 

Even more telling—and, again, subject of yesterday’s hearing, in 

part, on Vietnam right here in this room—when the bilateral 

agreement was agreed to with Vietnam, they were taken off CPC 

by John Hanford, the ambassador-at-large, with a hope—he called 

them ‘‘deliverables’’—that they promised him and the department 

they would come through on—forced renunciations, all those things 

that were happening. And there was an abatement of repression up 

until bilateral agreement and MFN conference, and that was the 

end of it. It went into Block 8407, patterned after Vaclav Havel’s 

Charter 77, a beautiful manifesto on human rights and democracy. 

All these signers came forward and signed it, and that became the 

hit list for the secret police in Vietnam, soon as they got the bilateral agreement through an MFN from the United States. The 

chair-in-office of—you know, wasn’t as big, certainly. But I think 

in retrospect, we’ve got to get a lessons learned—I would say to all 

of us, that—get some concrete actions on the ground, not even 

vague promises before. 

And I met with the Kazakh parliamentary assembly members— 

some of whom go to these parliamentary assemblies that we have 

frequently. And I can say ‘‘deeds, just do deeds; all we care about 

is your people.’’ You know, this isn’t bashing Kazakhstan because 

it’s some kind of sport. This is all about standing in solidarity with 

your oppressed people, who you could be next if you fall outside the 

parameters that have been circumscribed or established by the 

leadership and by the police. 

So, you know, I sometimes wonder if the OSCE was changing. 

Mr. Ambassador, you might want to talk to this. The same thing 

happened with Belarus. When we invited the Belarusians into the 

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and I kept saying, let’s see deeds 

first before—they were already in the OSCE—the president of the 

PA from the U.K. lamented a year later how disruptive and how— 

what a mistake it was, because there was no movement on the 

ground; if anything, they got worse. So you might want to speak 

to that. 

And sometimes I think they try to change, then, what the human 

dimension provisions are all about, as well as election observations. 

All of a sudden they’re siding with those who want a less robust 

effort, because chair-in-office certainly conveys considerable power. 

So, Mr. Ambassador. 

Amb. COURTNEY. Mr. Chairman, let me offer two perspectives on 

that issue. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir. 

Amb. COURTNEY. One, sir, that you and the Commission and the 

U.S. Government are going to be facing is with Ukraine’s impending chairmanship of the OSCE. 

President Nazarbayev used the chairmanship of the OSCE internally and externally as a very important legitimizing tool for his 
19 

reign. So how do you think Kazakhstanis now interpret President 

Nazarbayev’s recent statement that he will not invite election observers who criticize Kazakhstan? 

Mr. SMITH. Do they get to hear that? 

Mr. SMITH. [Inaudible]—press, yeah. 

Amb. COURTNEY. So what’s happened is that President 

Nazarbayev raised expectations in Kazakhstan about its role and 

the way it might evolve. And now that’s actually made it more difficult for him to be hard-line in a convincing way in his country. 

And I think that’s putting more pressure on him. 

The second consideration—— 

Mr. SMITH. If I could—— 

Amb. COURTNEY. Oh yes. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, is that true even in spite of the 

crackdown on the media and the most recent laws—the Internet 

and all the other—the broadcast new law? I know it’s not soundproof—remember, ‘‘the Iron Curtain isn’t soundproof,’’ that famous 

Radio Free Europe expression? But if you control the media, you 

still control what a lot of people get to hear and say—and think. 

Amb. COURTNEY. Yes, that’s quite true. 

Mr. SMITH. OK. 

Amb. COURTNEY. But still, publicly in Kazakhstan, President 

Nazarbayev raised a lot of expectations with OSCE. And then now 

each one of these new laws that you just cited makes it more complex for him internally to justify doing that, based on the raised expectations. And as Professor Roberts pointed out in his presentation, this clash of reality and expectations is going to be one of 

the major political dynamics that affects his legitimacy and the 

transition beyond President Nazarbayev. 

Second consideration, sir, is Central Asian security in the wake 

of U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. The one area in 

which Russia has made clear that it might be open to cooperation 

with the United States and Central Asia is counternarcotics. It has 

said this over and over. Yet effective cooperation is going to be difficult if Russia keeps the United States out of Central Asia, as 

many in Russia seek to do. There seems to be a schizophrenic approach in Russia about how it should deal with America’s role in 

Central Asia, although the clear predominant view is to remove 

U.S. participation in the Manas air base and to have the U.S. take 

a lesser role. 

The Russian Government, though—as we’ve seen in the North 

Caucasus, does not have a good strategy for how to deal with Islamic extremism. And security threats from Afghanistan as U.S. 

and NATO forces withdraw could increase. Now I’m not saying that 

they will, but they could increase. And it certainly would be prudent on the part of Russia, the United States, Kazakhstan and 

other countries in Central Asia to take advantage of the intermediation of the OSCE, which has legitimacy, and the OSCE has field 

presence in those countries—to start thinking harder about security arrangements and security cooperative mechanisms with that 

impending change. 

So I think the shift in the center of gravity of the focus of OSCE 

toward Central Asia, caused by Kazakhstan’s chairmanship, has 

not been a bad thing. Frankly, I believe too many OSCE resources 
20 

have been lingering too long in countries that are hoping to get into 

the European Union, and not enough out where some of the danger 

zones are. 

So there was that benefit as well, but that benefit will be vitiated 

if political openness in Kazakhstan does not improve, and especially if it gets worse. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Just to be clear in terms of my position, it wasn’t 

that Kazakhstan could never be chair-in-office—— 

Amb. COURTNEY. Right. 

Mr. SMITH.—it was only when certain benchmarks were 

achieved. Would any of our other witnesses like to—— 

Dr. ROBERTS. I think one other thing that I do perceive as kind 

of a chronic problem in the United States’ approach to Kazakhstan 

is, there’s a general belief that Kazakhstan doesn’t need the United 

States. There’s a sense that they have these other partners. They 

have Russia; increasingly China is a major trading partner and a 

major ally. 

But I think it’s important to realize that Kazakhstan’s always 

been very interested in having a very good relationship with the 

United States, because precisely their other partners are countries 

they don’t necessarily trust exclusively. I think there’s a lot of suspicion of China’s interest in Kazakhstan among Kazakhstanis, including within the Government. And there always has been a certain reticence to be dependent on Russia. 

So I think it’s important that the U.S. recognizes where it does 

have leverage, that there is an interest. It is important to 

Kazakhstan that they have a strong relationship with the U.S. And 

we have to at least express what that relationship means to us beyond just the oil and gas and security issues. 

Mr. SMITH. One final question, and I’d like to yield to Janice 

Helwig for a question or two, our expert on the Commission. And 

back to Zhanaozen very briefly: The Government has suggested 

that they would allow an international investigation. Do we take 

that at face value? And in your view, how quickly must that be 

done so that evidence, information, victims’ testimonies, can be appropriately received without retaliation to those who might come 

forward? I mean, the fear has always been, you get somebody’s 

equivalent of a deposition, the next thing you know, they’re in prison. Can it be done? Should the OSCE do it? U.N.? Some other, you 

know, cobbled-together investigative team? How do you think it 

should be done, and can it be done? 

Amb. COURTNEY. That offer was suggested at the very beginning. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Amb. COURTNEY. We’ve had a month of experience now and seen 

no sign that the Kazakhstani suggestion of an international investigation was a serious offer. There have been circumstances in a 

variety of countries in which incidents that are murky in nature 

have raised questions, and the United States has offered the support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigators to help 

look into circumstances. I’m not in government, but I’m not aware 

that Kazakhstan immediately invited that kind of participation, or 

that FBI or international law enforcement or investigatory authorities have been involved in any of the arrangements. 
21 

Now as I mentioned in my statement today, the prosecutor general in Kazakhstan announced that a number—a small number— 

of regional police executive authorities and a mayor and a former 

mayor and some officials of the state oil company there—are going 

to be held criminally liable. But that came out of the blue with no 

transparency, although sometimes that happens. 

But from the point at which you announce that people may be 

held criminally liable, that they’re being charged, there should be 

transparency in the proceedings, in the trials and other things, to 

build confidence among Kazakhstanis that indeed these people are 

culpable. And so right now is the most important time, I think, to 

hold Kazakhstan to account for having a judicial process that is 

worthy of an independent judiciary. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Ms. CORKE. I agree that it’s vitally important that there be a full 

international and domestic investigation. The state of emergency is 

on until January 31st, so up until now there’s been—it’s been virtually a closed environment for information, which is dangerous. 

And they have not shown—while saying that they intended to fully 

investigate and find the perpetrators—they haven’t shown a real 

interest in doing so. Their only interest, I think, is in portraying 

that as criminal elements as opposed to really wanting the answers 

to that. 

So yes, I think it’s important that the U.N. be allowed in to do 

an expert investigation. And I think if the OSCE could field a team 

to go in as well—which would also remind Kazakhstan of its commitments within the OSCE—so I would encourage the OSCE to 

continue—— 

Mr. SMITH. Are there U.N. agencies—any treaty bodies, panel of 

experts, investigative teams, actively looking to go in—Arbitrary 

Detention, for example, the working group? 

Ms. CORKE. They have announced that they—I think it was the 

prosecutor general that announced that a U.N. expert working 

group would be allowed into the country. But to my knowledge, it 

has not—— 

Mr. SMITH. OK. 

Ms. CORKE.——been given a mandate yet to go in. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Dr. ROBERTS. I would just add that, if there was any interest 

from the Kazakh side of the FBI going in, I think that would be 

a very bad idea, because there is experience with that—I think it 

was in 2005, there was a suspicious killing of a prominent opposition figure, Altynbek Sarsenbayev. And when that happened, the 

U.S. Government did bring in some FBI assistance. 

And the problem was that they probably did good work, but none 

of the information ever got out to the public, what their findings 

actually were. And subsequently there were trials that were—did 

not have due process and so on. And so it just became that the FBI 

investigation was somehow linked to a bad process overall, and it 

was a—I think a mistake. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Ms. Helwig. 

Ms. HELWIG. Thank you. I would like to just add a couple of 

questions. First I’d like to talk a little bit more about the recent 

parliamentary elections. As we’ve talked about, the Kazakhstani 
22 

Government has worked hard to create an alternate narrative 

about the parliamentary elections and their conduct—and has even 

gotten Western experts, parliamentarians, other organizations like 

the CIS to provide public positive assessments of the elections. You 

can find a list on the embassy’s website if you go to that here. 

At the same time, we’ve also talked about the authority’s moves 

against the Alga party in the wake of Zhanaozen, and also that 

Alga’s never been allowed to register and wasn’t allowed to participate in the elections. And what I wondered is, why do you all think 

that the Government has felt it so necessary to control the electoral 

process so much by preventing the opposition parties and the candidates from running; controlling almost all of the levels of the 

electoral commissions; and manipulating the count, certainly in 

some polling stations, including the one where I observed? And 

why do you think they find Alga in particular such a threat? Or 

do they find it a really serious threat? 

Amb. COURTNEY. If I may, you know, in Russian history and the 

Bolshavik period, the word ‘‘spark’’ played an unusual role. And 

when you asked the question, I was thinking you were going to ask 

about Yabloko in Russia. But in fact we’re seeing a very similar circumstance there. 

My sense is that leaders in former Soviet countries that have authoritarian regimes—which in some cases have been popular, 

whether it’s Vladimir Putin or Nursultan Nazarbayev—and in 

which there are no credible people of national stature who’ve had 

an opportunity to express their views politically, or had access to 

free media—these figures can be for awhile sort of generally popular, or ‘‘acquiesced in’’ may be a better word in some circumstances, but leaders may still be scared. 

They are scared even of a small party, of Grigory Yavlinsky in 

Russia or the Alga party in Kazakhstan. There could be a leader 

who could start off with maybe not much knowledge by the electorate, but after voicing opinions in an open political debate, could 

catalyze greater support. So I think it’s the fear of a potential 

spark, even from a small source. 

Dr. ROBERTS. I think—I mean, the short answer is, why they 

control the process is because they can, and it’s worked so far, so 

why change it? I think that that, you know, may really be the perspective of the powers that be. 

In terms of—I mean, I’ve found that Kazakh—one of the interesting things about Kazakhstan is the politics are much more complex than they look like—than they look on the surface. And there’s 

a history behind every relationship. 

I would think that one of the reasons that they’re concerned 

about Alga is they feel that there are certain former government 

officials who are injecting money into it and support it, and that 

these kind of personal vendettas, in my experience, are extremely 

important in Kazakh politics. So I think that that’s part of the reason. 

Ms. CORKE. To add to that, the Russia comparison is an apt one. 

I remember some media reporting saying that the problem with 

Russia having the huge demonstrations after the election was that 

it allowed a little bit of openness. And Kazakhstan was not going 

to make the same mistake, it was making sure to clamp down. 
23 

I was in Russia after the elections and attended the protests of 

100,000 people. And I couldn’t believe I was seeing this in Russia 

that, you know, we’ve seen even a protest of 200 people be cracked 

down on so harshly. And I think Kazakhstan is very much afraid 

of that same thing. 

I’ll just mention one other thing, that in addition to being scared 

that the Alga party could gain some popular support, they’re also 

scared of, if they had access to the media, what sort of information 

they might reveal, such as corruption, murders, other abuses. So 

keeping them sidelined and portraying them as enemy number one 

of the Government and, you know, now trying to blame the 

Zhanaozen events on them is trying to find somebody to blame for 

what’s going on in the country other than the Government. 

Ms. HELWIG. Thank you. And just to follow up on that, a bit 

more on media and Internet issues. We’ve talked about the new 

broadcast media law and also the Internet law, which went into effect a few years ago. The Government seems to know exactly how 

to use all these new media; they certainly were using Facebook and 

Twitter and Internet updates after Zhanaozen. They brought a 

team of bloggers into Zhanaozen right after the events and actually 

posted their blogs on the, I believe, prime minister’s website, if I’m 

not mistaken. 

At the same time, independent bloggers seem to have been gone 

after after Zhanaozen. One even reported having a gun held to his 

head while his film was taken—his video was taken. We’ve seen an 

editor of a major newspaper arrested, Stan TV and other broadcasters gone after after Zhanaozen. 

I wondered if you could talk a little bit about how you think the 

new broadcast law might restrict TV, what the state of Internet 

control is, and in particular the role of social media in Kazakhstan, 

particularly among the younger generation. I know when I visited 

there it seems to be that even though there are controls on it, 

everybody’s seen the video of Zhanaozen, even though it’s certainly 

not been shown on national television. 

So if you could just discuss a little bit about that. 

Ms. CORKE. To start out with the social media question, it—there 

was a big discussion in social media after Zhanaozen on the reason 

and the role of the Government and the opposition in those events. 

One thing to mention, that most of the citizens of Kazakh are using 

Russian social media, which is more apolitical. So there isn’t the 

same full openness of views exchanged. Only about 350,000 people 

are on Facebook and less than 100,000 are using Twitter. So those 

tools have not been fully realized in the country. 

So young people are using social media. What our office is reporting, though, is that it’s more for entertainment than searching for 

information purposes, and that the Zhanaozen events were sort of 

a—them following that so closely was a relatively new development. 

Amb. COURTNEY. Let me talk about our media. We made a mistake in ending the Kazakh service on the Voice of America. That 

mistake needs to be corrected. Kazakhstan is too important a country to have been excluded. 
24 

Secondly, Russian is still the language throughout Central Asia. 

VOA should establish a Central Asian Russian service run by Central Asian broadcasters to expand information. 

And again, if we’re in a circumstance of withdrawal or drawdown 

in Afghanistan, which is going to lead to greater insecurity in Central Asia, it’s time now to start making these kinds of prudent, 

very cost-effective investments. The Kazakh service that Radio Liberty has had has been very important. But, even Radio Liberty 

broadcasts in Kazakh and Russian, oriented toward Kazakhstan 

and Central Asia, should be strengthened. 

Dr. ROBERTS. I’ll just add that I think that the Kazakhstan Government has always seen the control of the media as probably its 

most important mechanism for preventing political dissent. And 

they’ve been very, I would say, smart about how they’ve gone about 

it. They have not done the type of things you see in Uzbekistan, 

where you completely cannot access opposition media. They just 

limit it so—they understand that there’s a certain number of people who are going to be with the opposition. And if they can limit 

access to that information, allow those people to share it amongst 

themselves, then they feel that they’re fine—that’s it’s safe. 

So it’s always been to limit the ability of the opposition—the opposition has no access to television. You know, they’ve really only 

had the print media to date, and they’ve always tried to limit the 

ability to get those newspapers out. 

Now, that said, the Internet is an interesting dilemma for 

Kazakhstan, I think, because it’s much less predictable. And I 

haven’t really looked at this new law, but my guess is that that 

would be a major part of it, is trying to decide how they’re going 

to be able to limit access to the Internet. 

Ms. CORKE. Just to add to that, the new law will essentially 

allow them to intensify a trend that we saw already in the past 

year, that the Government, under the guise of extremism and countering terrorism, expanded their attempts to identify websites that 

had supposedly, quote, ‘‘destructive content,’’ blocking the blogging 

sites LiveJournal and LiveInternet.ru and 20 other sites. So I think 

they’re adding—they already have a lot of tools to crack down on 

media freedom and the Internet, but they’re just stacking their arsenal, I think, with the new law. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask one final question on sex trafficking and 

trafficking in general. As you might know, Kazakhstan was designated a tier two country in the last round, and obviously the data 

calls are out or are going out and we’ll know soon whether or not 

progress continued. And perhaps based on what you’ve heard, is 

that trend continuing? Kazakhstan is a destination and, to a lesser 

extent, source and transit country for women and girls subjected to 

sex trafficking and for men, women and children subjected to conditions of forced labor. 

Our TIP Report for the most recent report—and that would be 

for the year 2010—said that while Kazakhstan does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, 

it is making, however, significant efforts to do so, and noted in pertinent point that there was a significant decrease in the use of 

forced child labor in the cotton harvest, increased law enforcement 

efforts against human trafficking, and they passed a law that hiked 
25 

penalties. And I’m wondering if any of you have any knowledge or 

information or insight as to whether or not that trend continued 

into 2011. That would have been for 2010 calendar year. 

Ms. CORKE. That’s something I can get back to you with more information. 

Mr. SMITH. OK, thank you. 

Ms. CORKE. My understanding of the situation has not been that 

there’s been a huge change in the situation, but I can talk to our 

staff in Almaty and see if they could get us some more updated information. But I haven’t witnessed a huge change. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I want to thank our very distinguished 

witnesses for your testimony. If there’s anything you’d like to say 

before we close? Mr. Ambassador? 

Amb. COURTNEY. Sir, you made reference to the Arab awakening 

earlier. In the former Soviet Union, many people believe that Western Europe is more politically mature, as well as more prosperous. 

Many people believe that those are the kinds of conditions to which 

people should aspire in the former Soviet Union, even as many disagree about what should be the tradeoffs today between democratic 

change and economic advancement in Russia or Kazakhstan or 

other countries. 

The Arab awakening has had an interesting impact on the 

former Soviet Union. Without overgeneralizing, many people in the 

former Soviet Union have tended to believe that political culture in 

the Arab world has been less advanced than in the former Soviet 

space. For people in the former Soviet Union to see young people 

have the courage go out into the streets in Tunisia, Egypt, and now 

especially in Syria, where young people are going out in the streets 

every day risking death, fighting for some measure of greater political equity or more competitive, more open political arrangements—and those goals may vary widely in Syria, in part because 

of the ethnic makeup of the country—but for people in the former 

Soviet Union to see these young people going out and risking injury 

and death every day for some more responsive political system, 

that, I think to some extent, is embarrassing for many people in 

the former Soviet Union, because we haven’t seen people in the 

former Soviet Union go out and take those same risks day after 

day. So I think this has, if you will, concentrated the mind a bit 

in the former Soviet Union, among a number of people whom we 

today can’t predict how they will react. And the impact may be 

very different in Ukraine or Russia or Kazakhstan or other places. 

But I think what’s happening in the Arab Awakening is concentrating the mind, and probably is going to have a helpful effect in 

the former Soviet Union and cause people to think harder about 

the choices they should be making for greater political openness 

and greater political and human freedoms. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Dr. Roberts. 

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Dr. ROBERTS. To add on that, I think one of the interesting— 

going back to a media issue, the people of Kazakhstan consume 

Russian media on a steady diet. 

And so I think that the changes that happened in Ukraine in 

2005 and in Georgia—that didn’t really have much influence on 

people in Kazakhstan. But if we do see that these protests in Rus-
26 

sia continue and we see that there’s even any kind of—any kind 

of change coming out of the next presidential election in Russia, 

that would have massive impact, I think, in Kazakhstan, because 

I think most people in Kazakhstan kind of see Russia as their reference point. And that’s partially just because that’s what they 

watch on TV every day. And you know, I think if they saw changes 

in Russia, that would very quickly translate to changes in 

Kazakhstan. 

Ms. CORKE. I’d just like to say thank you for holding this panel 

today. It’s very important. And I’d like to end just on a final note. 

Civil society—and our office as well has noted this—that they’ve 

noticed a waning interest from the international community in civil 

society, following Kazakhstan’s chairmanship. And right now, they 

need the attention of Europe and the U.S. more than ever. So I 

would urge the U.S. to give support vocally and materially to civil 

society and urge European counterparts to do the same. Thank 

you. 

Mr. SMITH. Excellent point. And this Commission will certainly 

try to do that as well. And I thank you for all of your very valuable 

insights, your—this is of extraordinary benefit to the commission 

and, I hope, to the rest of the Congress by extension. Without any 

further ado, the hearing is adjourned, and I thank you again. 

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.] 
(27) 

A P P E N D I X 
28 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

Good afternoon and welcome to our witnesses and everyone joining us. Today we 

will discuss the state of human rights and democracy in Kazakhstan. 

The Government of Kazakhstan, controlled by the authoritarian ‘‘president for 

life’’ Nursultan Nazarbayev, has long sought to obscure its serious human rights 

and democracy deficiencies by claiming that at least it is a haven of ‘‘stability’’ in 

central Asia. ‘‘Stability’’ has in fact become the basis of the government of 

Kazakhstan’s claim to legitimacy. 

Of course ‘‘stability’’ can never be an excuse for dictatorship or widespread torture 

and similar abuses. We simply can never accept the hidden premise of the 

Kazakhstan government’s talk of ‘‘stability’’—that human dignity can be bargained 

away in some exchange for ‘‘stability.’’ 

Likewise we cannot accept at face value the claim that Kazakhstan is in fact as 

stable as its government claims—this claim must be examined carefully. 

That is what this hearing is about. Too often in Washington, and within the 

OSCE, the Government of Kazakhstan’s claim to stability is tacitly accepted. And 

that allows the Government to set itself up as a model for other Asian and European countries. 

After last year’s events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, we have to look carefully at authoritarian claims to ‘‘stability.’’ 

All the more so since last month there were riots in Zhanaozen in western 

Kazakhstan, which the authorities put down with deadly force—at least 16 people 

were killed, some estimates go as high as 70. Many of us have seen the terrible videos circulating on YouTube that clearly show government forces firing on fleeing 

protesters, and beating those who fell to the ground. I doubt many Kazakhs will 

soon forget these images. 

RFE/RL reported the harrowing testimony of a 21-year old girl who was detained 

while out looking for her father the night of the riots. She described witnessing the 

torture, abuse, and humiliation of dozens of people who had been rounded up and 

taken to the basement of police headquarters, including girls who were stripped 

naked and dragged into an adjoining room. She herself was beaten. She reported 

what she saw to authorities, who returned with her a week later. The basement had 

been scrubbed clean, and the police claimed that nothing had happened. The woman’s father returned home after two days. He said he had been badly beaten by police; he died of his injuries on December 24. 

There are many such stories. Associated Press reported that journalists at 

Zhanaozen’s Main Police Department heard screams coming from what appeared to 

be interrogation rooms, while men with bloodied faces were lined up in the corridors 

with their faces against the wall. Sadly, reports of police abuse and torture in 

Kazakhstan are not new. In a December 2009 report, the UN special rapporteur on 

torture concluded that ‘‘evidence obtained through torture or ill-treatment is commonly used as a basis for conviction.’’ 

Since the violence in December, the Government of Kazakhstan has said it is open 

to an international investigation, and has said many other things that we would expect a responsible democratic government to say. It has also established a governmental investigative commission. 

I certainly hope the internal investigation will be transparent and serious, and 

that there will be an international investigation soon—best of all by the OSCE— 

and that the many good things the Government has said since the violence are a 

harbinger of a new openness to reform. 

At the same time we have reason to be skeptical. Just yesterday the chief editor 

of an opposition paper was jailed as part of the investigation. So far charges against 

police have only been for stealing cell phones and cash from protesters, and the 

focus of the investigation has been focused instead on the political opposition. Access 

to Zhanaozen itself and to potential witnesses has been severely restricted. While 

some journalists were given access to Zhanaozen on December 18 and 19, they reported that they were under close supervision and not permitted to speak freely 

with detainees or residents. Prison Reform International, which the Kazakhstani 

Government claims met with detainees and found no evidence of torture, told my 

staff that they only assisted in getting access for local human rights monitors to a 

very limited number of detainees, far below the official number of those arrested. 
29 

Contrary to the government statement that no evidence of torture was found, in fact 

the monitors cited four suspected cases. 

There are reports that those who have tried to come forward may have been 

threatened. At least one of the local monitors who visited the detainees will no 

longer discuss it. The young woman I mentioned earlier also will no longer speak 

about her ordeal. The persons who filmed the YouTube video from their window reportedly were sought by the authorities and have gone into hiding out of fear for 

their safety. Many people reportedly are still missing, but their families are afraid 

to come forward. 

Of course we will also want to talk about the January 15 parliamentary elections, 

which the OSCE concluded ‘‘did not meet fundamental principles of democratic elections.’’ The OSCE detailed significant problems, including the exclusion of opposition 

parties and candidates, electoral commissions controlled by the ruling party, media 

bias, restrictions on freedom of assembly, and problems during the counting process. 

I have spoken to participants in the Election Observation Mission who personally 

observed outright fraud, including falsification of the final protocol in favor of the 

ruling Nur Otan party. Other American observers reported falsification of protocols 

in Nur Otan’s advantage, as well as ballot stuffing and people being paid to vote 

for Nur Otan. 
30 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this hearing on Kazakhstan. The Helsinki Commission 

has closely examined that country’s record on democratization and human rights, 

especially in connection with Astana’s ultimately successful bid to chair the OSCE. 

Today, for the first time since Kazakhstan’s chairmanship ended, we will consider 

the implications for the country’s stability of very interesting events that have been 

unfolding the last few months. 

Until recently, Zhanaozen, in western Kazakhstan, had gotten few headlines. But 

a strike by oil workers led to violence in December, triggering a crackdown and the 

imposition of martial law. According to official reports, at least 16 people have been 

killed; unofficial videos have surfaced of police firing at fleeing demonstrators. 

The willingness expressed by Kazakhstan’s Government to participate in an international investigation was welcome. I hope the OSCE, which Kazakhstan chaired 

in 2010, will have a leading role in efforts to uncover what really happened. In any 

case, it is clear that Kazakhstan’s Government will have to seriously address social 

concerns in order to prevent any more outbreaks of discontent. 

The other major news story is Kazakhstan’s January 15 parliamentary election, 

which has been touted as the beginning of multi-party democracy in Central Asia’s 

economic powerhouse. Surely, it is a positive development that all the seats in Parliament are no longer occupied by the ruling party, Nur Otan, as two other parties 

will now be represented. 

But I would have been more pleased if genuinely opposition political parties that 

sought to participate had been able to do so. As many observers have pointed out, 

the two parties which won seats are reputedly ‘‘safe’’ from the Government’s point 

of view. And, I would have been delighted if the OSCE had been able to certify the 

election as having met OSCE standards. Unfortunately, the OSCE said the election 

did not meet fundamental principles of democratic elections. 

In that connection, I would like to note Kazakhstan’s efforts to create an alternate 

narrative of the election. A stream of positive, even glowing, reviews of the election 

has come out of Astana. We are accustomed to such assessments from CIS observers 

but it is frankly surprising that Western analysts have come to conclusions so at 

variance with those of the OSCE. 

Mr. Chairman, I very much look forward to the day when the most positive views 

of an election in Kazakhstan legitimately accord with the OSCE’s judgment. I look 

forward to hearing from our witnesses. 
31 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM COURTNEY

Chairman Smith, it is an honor to appear before you. I am William Courtney, a 

retired career diplomat. I served as the first U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan, 1992 

to 1995. Later I was Ambassador to Georgia, special assistant to the President for 

Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, and senior advisor to this distinguished Commission. 

Kazakhstan has a population of over 16 million. Ethnic Kazakhs comprise threefifths, ethnic Slavs one-quarter, and Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Tatars, and others the remainder. Given this diversity, the term ‘‘Kazakhstanis’’ best refers to all the people 

of the country, and ‘‘Kazakhs’’ to the ethnic group. 

In many ways Kazakhstan is blessed. It is larger than Western Europe and endowed with a minerals bounty. People tend to pragmatism. Ethnic differences are 

muted, regrettably in part because political expression is limited. Rulers encourage 

inter-ethnic harmony, although some Kazakh advantages, such as political dominance, raise concerns. Selection to chair the OSCE last year was a mark of the 

country’s international respect and weight. 

Kazakhstan has achieved notable economic gains. Modernizing reforms, private 

property, talented people, and booming exports of energy and minerals make the 

country far wealthier than in Soviet times. In 2010 according to the World Bank, 

per capita gross domestic product in current U.S. dollars stood at $9,136, slightly 

lower than Russia’s $10,440 but three times higher than Ukraine’s $3,007. 

These data, however, do not tell the full story. Much wealth disappears into corruption. Construction of the extravagant new capital in Astana diminishes state 

funding for the rest of the country. The economy is unbalanced. For example, the 

World Bank reports that labor productivity in agriculture is just one percent of that 

in America. 

Political development in Kazakhstan is stunted by twenty years of authoritarian 

rule. A tragedy last month highlights the risks. 

On December 16, security forces in Zhanaozen, in western Kazakhstan, fired on 

unarmed demonstrators, including striking oil workers, killing and wounding scores. 

A chilling video on YouTube shows security forces firing on and beating fleeing people. 

Rather than apologizing, offering amends, and opening a credible investigation, 

the authorities did the opposite. They blamed ‘‘hooligans,’’ shut off communications 

to the city, and imposed martial law. The hard-line response may not have calmed 

tensions; martial law was extended. A former interior minister became the new regional governor, a hint of unease about the loyalty of security forces. 

Today—on the date of this hearing—Kazakhstan’s chief prosecutor announced 

that criminal charges are being brought against several regional police, executive, 

and state oil company officials. It will be important that due process be followed and 

that judicial proceedings be transparent. Otherwise, many Kazakhstanis will wonder whether these officials are culpable for the Zhanaozen calamity, or whether they 

are lambs being sacrificed to exculpate the guilt of those higher up or better connected. 

The violence was an aberration in the country’s generally peaceful life. The callous response, however, is symptomatic of a wide gap between rulers and ruled, between reality and expectations, and between those who live honestly and those who 

do not. 

In history, Kazakhs do not meekly submit to arbitrary power. In the 19th century, 

Russian colonization was slowed by uprisings and wars. In World War I many 

Kazakhs resisted the Tsar’s conscription, and then the communist takeover. A decade later Kazakhs opposed brutal Soviet collectivization of agriculture, such as by 

killing their own livestock rather than turning it over to the state. Over a million 

Kazakhs perished. 

In World War II, Stalin exiled ethnic Germans, Crimean Tatars, and North Caucasian Muslims to Kazakhstan. A million Poles were banished there. Many of these 

peoples, starving or ill, were taken in by Kazakhs and survived. Vast numbers lost 

their lives to Soviet cruelty. 

Nikita Khrushchev hurled huge numbers of ethnic Slavs into northern 

Kazakhstan for the wasteful Virgin Lands campaign, aimed at turning pasture into 

a grain belt. Other Slavs built and operated raw materials and military facilities. 

Alexander Solzhenitsyn labored there in a prison camp. 

The Soviets used much of Kazakhstan for military purposes. They tested nuclear 

weapons at Semipalatinsk; operated the world’s largest anthrax factory at 

Stepnogorsk; tested biological weapons in the open air on an island in the Aral Sea; 

tested anti-ballistic missiles and lasers at Sary Shagan; assembled torpedoes in 

Alma Ata; deployed giant SS-18 intercontinental missiles in two locations; and conducted ballistic missile tests and space launches from Baykonur. 
32 

Amid the military activity, most of the country was closed. Kazakhstanis had few 

contacts with the outside world. A vital lifeline was short-wave broadcasting by 

Radio Liberty, VOA, BBC, Deutsche Velle, and others. VOA broadcasts in Kazakh 

language ought to be resumed. VOA should also create a Russian language service 

focused on Central Asia. Radio Liberty ought to strengthen its valuable Kazakh 

broadcasts, and increase its Russian language broadcasting oriented toward Central 

Asia. Kazakhstan is an important a country and its people need better access to 

trustworthy information. 

After the Soviet collapse Kazakhstan returned nuclear weapons to Russia and became a model partner in the Nunn-Lugar program to eliminate weapons of mass 

destruction and their infrastructure. Kazakhstan welcomes substantial U.S. and 

other investment in Caspian energy. It is a critical partner in the northern distribution network, which provides logistical support to US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. 

Close cooperation on core interests has yielded a productive U.S.-Kazakhstani 

strategic relationship, one of America’s most valued. Yet, as Egypt shows, rulers 

must retain the consent of the governed in order to sustain foreign support. The lesson is salient for Kazakhstan. 

First, the legitimacy of personalized rule is in decline and Zhanaozen is accelerating it. Transitions beyond President Nazarbayev, now 71, are uncertain. No evident successor has broad stature and appeal. Few if any independent groups combine the experience and acceptance required for effective political intermediation. 

None is so strong or enduring as, for example, the liberal Yabloko party in Russia, 

or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 

On January 15 Kazakhstan held elections for a new parliament, but no genuine 

opposition parties were allowed to participate. OSCE election monitors found that 

the elections ‘‘did not meet fundamental principles of democratic elections.’’ In another anti-democratic step, earlier this week security forces raided the office of the 

opposition party, Algha, and the home of its leader. The courageous suffer. Labor 

union lawyer Nataliya Sokolova, and human rights activists Aidos Sadykov and 

Yevgenniy Zhovtis languish in prison. Fortunately journalist Ramazan Yesergepov 

has been released. 

Multiple factors, some unforeseen today, could shape Kazakhstan’s political evolution. One might be the demonstration effect of the Arab awakening. Other factors 

may include: elites empowered by economic liberalization, educated and connected 

young people, restive citizens in western Kazakhstan, Islamic interests, disadvantaged groups, and Russia’s policies toward neighbors. Kazakhstan’s burden of autocracy could render its politics less resilient against extremist pressures. 

Second, the accumulation of wealth by President Mubarak and his family, and 

popular resentment of it, have a disturbing parallel in Kazakhstan. President 

Nazarbayev is rightly credited for improving the economy, but personal aggrandizement arouses concern and cynicism. Moreover, several in his family are multibillionaires. 

Third, Zhanaozen may propel more unrest. One risk is western Kazakhstan, 

which does not benefit commensurate with its contribution to the economy. Another 

risk is ethnicity. Zhanaozen was largely Kazakh-on-Kazakh violence. If large-scale 

lethal force were ever turned on unarmed ethnic Russians, consequences could be 

far-reaching. The Kremlin is vocal about protecting the interests of Russians abroad. 

Kazakhstan’s regions with higher proportions of ethnic Russians lie along the border with Russia, a key reason why the capital was moved northward. 

In conclusion, political risks in Kazakhstan are rising even as the economy expands. The arrogant official response to Zhanaozen suggests dulled leadership 

awareness of human conditions. Repeated promises of democratic reforms go 

unfulfilled. Popular expectations may be climbing faster than the brittle political 

system can accommodate. Limits on independent political life weaken safety valves 

for peaceful change. 

America and Europe are widely respected in Kazakhstan. They should bite the 

bullet and do more to promote political and human freedoms. While some may resist, this will be a prudent investment in an important country and a friendly people 

with good long-term prospects. 

I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have and hear your further 

perspectives. Thank you. 
33 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN CORKE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, it is an honor to appear before you 

today to discuss whether Kazakhstan is ‘‘As Stable as Its Government Claims?’’ at 

a pivotal moment in that nation’s history. I am also pleased to appear today in distinguished company with Ambassador William Courtney and Dr. Sean Roberts. 

During my years in the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights 

and Labor, I worked in common cause with Helsinki Commission staff and Freedom 

House before, during, and after Kazakhstan assumed the Chairmanship of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In particular, we worked together to press for human rights improvements before Kazakhstan assumed the 

Chairmanship and continued to hold the spotlight up throughout the year highlighting where the government continued to fall short of its human dimension commitments. On the civil society side, Freedom House helped establish a coalition of 

leading Kazakhstani NGOs, the OSCE 2010 coalition that produced numerous reports on Kazakhstan’s flawed human rights peformance as chairman. 

Just over one year ago, Kazakhstan, in concluding its OSCE Chairmanship, 

hosted an OSCE summit in Astana, where Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev proclaimed that ‘‘this is a sign of the objective recognition by the international community of Kazakhstan’s impressive successes in its socio-economic and democratic development during the years of independence and convincing evidence of the leadership of Nursulatan Nazarbayev and his contribution to ensuring regional and global 

security. We have endeavoured to fully live up to our motto—trust, tradition, transparency and tolerance {4 T’s}—and be worthy of the confidence placed in us by the 

participating States and meet the expectations of the OSCE community.’’ 

Unfortunately, as we gather today to consider the questions of Kazakhstan’s stability and its adhesion to human rights commitments and its own 4Ts’ motto, it 

seems that the nation is not deserving of the OSCE community’s confidence. While 

those who supported Kazakhstan’s chairmanship argued that it could galvanize 

human rights reform, more than a year after its chairmanship, it has failed to do 

so. In our recently released annual Freedom in the World report Kazakhstan continued to earn its ‘‘Not Free’’ ranking. 

This week, as we take stock of the situation, additional harsh and repressive 

measures have been launched in Kazakhstan, including raids of the opposition Alga 

party offices and detentions of opposition activists and journalists. This follows the 

OSCE’s critical assessment the recent parliamentary elections lacked plurality, 

transparency, safeguards against fraud, and respect for electoral procedures. 

Our Freedom House office in Almaty, led by Mr. Vyacheslav Abramov, is a small 

but dedicated staff continuously reporting on and working to improve respect for 

human rights. I will focus today primarily on the current human rights situation 

as gathered from their reports and recent events. From what we have heard from 

our office and our partners, Kazakhstan is heading down a path of increasing instability. But the recent riots and violence are not simply a random outburst. The 

Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, a leading 

NGO, documented the growth of civic engagement in Kazakhstan in 2011, and the 

emergence of ordinary citizens as the leading organizers of public assemblies; 78 

percent of these were demonstrations on socio-economic problems of citizens, many 

of whom had avoided political activity in the past. The government severely restricts 

freedom of assembly; 91 percent of assemblies were not authorized by the government. This signals that there is growing societal discontent and that more people 

are willing to challenge the government to have their voices heard. And if the government continues on its repressive path, more peaceful protests will turn to violent 

ones. 

When a government is dedicated to systematically thwarting democratic reforms 

and failing to observe citizens’ fundamental rights, it is sowing the seeds for instability. President Nazarbayev has ruled Kazakhstan with an iron fist since independence in 1991, and as demonstrated again in the recent parliamentary elections, his 

administration remains fixed on retaining power and on withholding it from other 

parties, even as Nazarbayev reaches the ripe age of 72. When stability is defined 

as keeping the lid on, and silencing its citizens, it is only a matter of time before 

the pot starts to boil over. By denying moderate voices, the regime is opening the 

door to extremism and violence. 

Zhanaozen: Social Unrest 

The international community watched, taken aback, as violence erupted December 

16 in the city of Zhanaozen (Zhe-na-oh-ZEN), the day of Kazakhstan’s 20th year of 

independence from the Soviet Union. For those who have been paying attention to 

Zhanaozen, however, the pot had been simmering for a while, and there had been 
34 

long-standing underlying elements of social unrest. An oil strike has been going on 

since April 2011, when a large group of oil workers in the western Mangistau region 

of Kazakhstan began to demand higher wages and better working conditions. While 

Kazakhstan has several billionaires, there is not much of a middle class, and these 

strikes signaled that uneven distribution of the country’s resources was sparking a 

backlash. Starting in May, many workers began camping in the city square in an 

indefinite protest, a challenge to a government that had tried and succeeded in 

squelching dissent. A court found the workers’ strike illegal, and hundreds were 

subsequently fired from their posts. In August, Natalia Sokolova, a labor lawyer and 

activist, was accused of inciting social discord and sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment for doing nothing more than providing counsel to several of the striking workers. Freedom House issued a statement and expressed concern that Kazakhstan was 

using the judiciary as a means to silence oppositional voices. Despite the strikers’ 

increased coverage in the international media, as organizations like Freedom House 

and celebrities like Sting condemned the government’s actions, officials began to 

harass journalists trying to cover the strike, and in October, two journalists were 

brutally attacked by unknown assailants. 

On December 16, the situation in Zhanaozen took a deadly turn. While local officials claimed police fired at the ground to disperse troublemakers interfering with 

Independence Day celebrations, videos on the Internet showed police firing with lethal force at fleeing crowds. 18 people were reportedly killed. It is not clear where 

the riots began or who initiated them, but a correspondent from Russia’s Novaya 

Gazeta newspaper reported that 3,000 oil workers, families, and onlookers were in 

the square when authorities brought additional residents there for the celebration. 

Then, from noon until late into the night, over a thousand people reportedly attacked the square and burned down the city hall, the offices of oil companies, and 

shops. On December 17 similar events spread to the village of Shetpe, where police 

also opened fire and killed one person. 

The next day, President Nazarbayev took decisive steps to try to regain ‘‘stability.’’ In Zhanaozen he imposed emergency rule, which he extended until January 

31 (and essentially cut off communications to the outside world). The government 

promised to find jobs for the oil workers. Nazarbayev also dismissed his son-in-law, 

the head of the holding company to which state-owned oil company KazMunaiGaz 

belongs. He demanded a public inquiry into the events in Zhanaozen, and vowed 

to severely punish the perpetrators. The Prosecutor General later said that 

Kazakhstan is ready to allow a United Nations expert group to investigate, but at 

the moment the city remains closed to public defenders and journalists, who may 

enter the city only if official permission is granted. Human rights organizations 

have only now been able to begin fully monitoring events and conducting a public 

investigation of law enforcement’s firing onto crowds. 

The presidential administration, while it was swift in trying to usher in stability, 

shows no real signs of understanding or addressing the root causes of the instability. Nazarbaev’s political advisor called the disorder in Zhanaozen a provocation 

against the president and then continued to say that criminals caused the trouble 

December 16. ‘‘The president dealt with it, and the situation is back to normal,’’ he 

said. ‘‘There will be a detailed criminal investigation.’’ These labor strikes originated 

in social and economic grievances, but as they gathered steam became a political 

challenge. If Nazarbayev wants to prevent a repeat of this violence, he would be 

wise to pay heed to the calls of his people. 

January 15th Elections and the Aftermath 

Besides failing to address the root issues of instability in Zhanaozen, following a 

20 year tradition of holding elections that Western observers have continually 

deemed unfair, Kazakhstan failed again to observe democratic norms in the January 

15 parliamentary elections. The OSCE’s election observation mission issued a statement that the ‘‘early parliamentary vote did not meet fundamental principles of 

democratic elections’’ and expressed disappointment that the election was a sham 

effort to meet stated goals of increasing the number of parties in parliament. In the 

style of authoritarian elections, there was a high voter turnout (75%), and observers 

reported standard abuses such as ballot stuffing and misuse of absentee ballots. 

Two days after the election, Nazarbayev issued a fast rebuttal, revealing what he 

really thinks about political modernization and dialogue with the West, saying that 

Kazakhstan would no longer invite international experts who criticize its elections. 

This was interpreted as unambiguous criticism of the OSCE. The government of 

Kazakhstan’s rhetoric touting transparency and fulfillment of OSCE commitments 

thus seem to be only applicable when there is good news to share and not on the 

day-to-day level. 
35 

In looking to place blame for the growing instability, the opposition was the obvious target for the government. In December the leaders of the unregistered Alga 

party in Astana and in the Mangistau region were both arrested. After the election, 

Vladmir Kozlov, the leader of Alga in Almaty, predicted that Kazakh authorities 

would continue to try to blame the opposition for the Zhanaozen events. The website 

‘‘Republika’’ posted an anonymous message stating that the authorities have chosen 

the path of repression, that many opposition politicians and civil society activists 

will be arrested. 

On Monday, police and the Committee on National Security (KNB) organized a 

search in at the central office of the Alga party and at the homes of Kozlov, his deputy, several party activists, and a youth leader. Several were detained, including 

Kozlov, who was then accused of inciting social discord. The National Security Committee said the raids against the Alga party were part of an investigation into last 

month’s fatal clashes between police and striking oil workers in the town of 

Zhanaozen. But this latest clampdown on the opposition figures contravenes the 

government’s promises of political reform and liberalization. 

By tightening the screws rather than allowing for political competition or dissent, 

Nazarbayev and his administration on some level are admitting their own weakness 

and vulnerability. A confident leader would not need to resort to such tactics. 

Religious Extremism and the Government Response 

Throughout 2011, the country was shaken by several attacks, mostly in Western 

Kazakhstan, that were blamed on religious extremists, and the government responded by abruptly passing new legislation broadly tightening religious freedoms 

and public expression. 

When I visited Kazakhstan last August, there was a palpable sense of unease and 

fear about what this uptick in religious extremism would mean for Kazakhstan. 

Citizens and the government had been proud of its stability and peace in a restive 

neighborhood and had often touted the nation as a model for religious harmony. 

Human rights activists I spoke with warned that speaking publicly about the rise 

in extremism would cross a redline that they feared would provoke the government. 

There was already a sense that the government planned to clamp down tightly on 

religious freedom in response to the attacks and that restrictive legislation was underway. The resultant legislation, rushed through parliament in only 3 weeks in 

spite of protests from the OSCE and human rights organizations, gives the government unprecedented authority to regulate the activities and structures of religious 

communities and forbids prayer or religious expression in government institutions. 

Some additional provisions of the law on religion include: 

• Religious literature, as well as groups’ registration documents, now have to be 

examined in a specially created Agency for Religious Affairs; 

• religious associations must agree on the appointment of leaders of organizations 

with a state agency; and 

• all religious groups should be re-registered within one year of the law’s adoption. 

Similar to analogous legislation in neighboring countries, the specifics of the laws 

are poorly defined, leave much room for interpretation to local authorities, and empower special ‘‘anti-terror’’ task forces to police mainstream religious groups. Authorities say the new law on religion will help combat extremism, but critics warn 

that restrictions under the new law could backfire and fuel extremism rather than 

combat it. How the law is implemented needs to be carefully monitored. Authorities 

express confidence that the new law does not violate the rights of believers and religious groups and is directed against the Muslim extremist groups. 

Law on national security 

Shortly on the heels of the new religion law, with little fanfare or room for analysis, the new National Security Act was signed by the president this month. The 

law not only provides for the empowerment of special services, especially for operations to combat terrorism, but it allows for blocking of the Internet, as well as disabling fixed and mobile communications. In addition, the law imposes a vague restriction on allowing people ‘‘recognized to be destructive’’ to enter Kazakhstan; according to a clause, those who ‘‘harm the image of Kazakhstan in the international 

arena’’ can be considered ‘‘destructive.’’ There is an obvious concern that this law 

will thus be directed against the human rights organizations and politicians who 

criticize the country at international fora. 
36 

Trying to Keep the Lid on Freedom of Expression 

Unlike the government’s previously-mentioned hasty steps to crack down on dissent and unrest, the new Broadcasting Act was signed by the president in January 

after a year of disregarding recommendations made by the OSCE and Kazakhstani 

civil society organizations. 

While human rights groups were urging the president to veto the law, the new 

law was eventually passed, at least officially, in connection with the transition of 

television and radio broadcasting to digital format, but it contains a number of troubling regulations that give the state additional control over television and radio 

channels, thereby violating citizens’ rights to freely receive and impart information. 

All foreign television and radio stations will be required to be registered with an 

official Kazakh entity, and 50 percent of the broadcasts of foreign channels must 

contain domestic content by 2018. One of the more bizarre restrictions is that the 

government will now license all satellite devices, and local authorities may prohibit 

placement of satellite dishes on rooftops if they are not attractive to the eye. Human 

rights groups believe that the law is directed primarily against the opposition K+ 

TV channel, which is broadcast via satellite in Kazakhstan, funded by Mukhtar 

Ablyazov and extremely popular in the regions. 

The new restrictive measure occurs in a media environment that is already under 

siege. The government has repeatedly harassed or shut down independent media 

outlets. Libel is a criminal offense, the criminal code prohibits insulting the president, and self-censorship is widespread. Most media outlets, including publishing 

houses, are controlled or influenced by members of the president’s family and other 

powerful groups. In 2011, the government expanded attempts to identify websites 

with supposedly ‘‘destructive’’ content, blocking the popular blogging sites 

livejournal.com and liveinternet.ru along with some 20 other sites in August on 

charges that they contribute to ‘‘terrorism.’’ 

The human rights situation in Kazakhstan has eroded in many areas over the 

past year, but following the parliamentary election, the situation has become more 

urgent. Our office in Almaty said that the common belief is that NGOs will be raided next by the government. Civil society in Kazakhstan had already operated under 

tightly controlled and repressive conditions, with government harassment, including 

police visits and surveillance, of NGO offices and personnel. Real civil society efforts 

have been squeezed out by the GONGOs, which the government mobilized to create 

the impression of a thriving Kazakhstani civil society in the West. Kazakhstan’s 

most-prominent human rights defender, Evgeniy Zhovtis, remains in prison. The expectation now is that things are only going to get worse. 

While in 2010 Kazakhstan’s human rights record was under the spotlight during 

its OSCE chairmanship, in 2012 the international community moved its focus elsewhere, which has proved to be a dangerous miscalculation and which has let the 

situation unravel all the more. 

Kazakhstan has preferred to view democracy and freedom as public relations slogans to boost prestige. It spared no expense in promoting itself with advertisement 

campaigns and high-level consultancies with Tony Blair and lobbyists. Admittedly, 

this has paid some dividends for Kazakhstan on policy fronts. The international 

community hoped that giving Kazakhstan the carrot of a prestigious OSCE leadership role as well as the accompanying glare of the international spotlight, would 

lead to significant improvements in the country’s human rights implementation. 

This has not been the case. 

Despite trying to tout a multi-ethnic population which lives in relative harmony 

(especially in comparison with its neighbors in the Ferghana Valley), an essential 

truth was revealed in yet another authoritarian government: governments that cannot meet the political and material aspirations of their citizens lose legitimacy. 

When citizens have legitimate grievances without an outlet, when freedoms are denied in the name of stability, instability and extremism are likely to increase. 

Kazakhstan’s ‘‘stability’’ was based on the precarious assumptions that dissent 

could be stifled and there was no need to enable a peaceful rotation of power among 

alternative political forces. The lesson of the past year is that stability will not be 

enhanced through further repression. It is time to address the political stagnancy 

and lack of an apparent heir after Nazarbayev, officially deemed ‘‘Leader for Life.’’ 

It is time for pro-democratic forces within Kazakhstan and the international community to start thinking about how to catalyze a more democratic and more stable 

future for the country. Given its strategic importance, how Kazakhstan approaches 

the immediate future should be a cause for concern for American, Russian, Central 

Asian, and European policy-makers. 

I would now like to offer five specific recommendations, which have been developed in consultation with civil society in Kazakhstan: 
37 

• It is important to publicly, at high levels, continue to hold the Kazakh authorities to their international obligations—particularly the fundamental freedoms of 

expressions and assembly—and to require their implementation. Kazakhstan 

must earn positive attention not buy it. 

• It is important to express support for civil society in Kazakhstan in cases of direct repression against NGOs and their activists. 

• The time is now to increase material support for civil society in Kazakhstan— 

through funding and participation in various programs. Freedom House’s office 

in coalition with other domestic and international NGOs has worked hard to try 

to build space in a repressive environment. They need our help more than ever. 

• It is important to put pressure on the Kazakh authorities, demanding an investigation of the events Zhanaozen openly and transparently, including any 

searches, detentions and arrests. 

• It is important to press the government of Kazakhstan to put words into action 

and allow political pluralism and not paint the opposition as the enemy. The 

opposition has announced on January 28 it will hold a massive protest rally in 

Almaty and will try to contest the election results in courts. The West should 

pay attention. 
38 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. SEAN R. ROBERTS

Chairman Smith and members of the Commission, I would like to thank you for 

inviting me here today to speak on this very important and timely topic. As I recently wrote in a briefing paper commissioned by the Atlantic Council on twenty 

years of U.S.-Kazkahstani relations, the Republic of Kazakhstan is something of an 

oasis of stability in the desert of uncertainty that represents Central Asia. Indeed, 

this stability is also largely the result of smart policies adopted by the Government 

of Kazakhstan over the last twenty years. 

In the early 1990s, the Government of Kazakhstan, with cooperation from the 

United States, divested itself of the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet 

Union. Also in the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s government was careful to adopt 

inclusionary policies for its Russian minority citizens and to establish close relations 

with the Russian federation, which helped to substantially reduce ethnic tension in 

the heavily Russian-populated north of the country. During the later 1990s and into 

the 2000s, Kazakhstan also adopted substantial liberal economic reforms that 

helped the country use its natural resource wealth to stimulate growth and create 

a vibrant middle-class. All of these steps have played a role in making Kazakhstan 

the strongest and most stable country in Central Asia both politically and economically, and the Government of Kazakhstan frequently and justifiably takes the credit 

for them. 

Unfortunately, stability is not something a state can merely establish once; it is 

an ongoing duty of governments around the world to meet the challenges that they 

face in keeping their citizens secure. This duty requires adapting to changing circumstances and understanding the changing needs of citizens. Given the several 

outbreaks of violence that have occurred in the country over the last year, one can 

justifiably ask whether the Government of Kazakhstan today is adapting to the new 

realities the country faces and whether the state is as stable as its government suggests. After all, the Kazakhstan of 2012 is quite different from that of 1992 or even 

from that of 2002, but during the past twenty years the same President, who continues to be advised by many of the same men, has led its government. This is not 

a recipe for an adaptive government and long-term stability. 

In the interest of time, I want to focus on three critical and relatively recent 

changes in Kazakhstan’s socio-economic environment that, in my opinion, have contributed to the growing violence and tension we have seen in the country over the 

last year. I will also note that the country’s present government has yet to sufficiently address these changes and may be ill-equipped to properly engage them, 

bringing into question whether the violence we have seen this year is the beginning 

of a much less stable Kazakhstan into the future. 

The first change is the rapid growth in the popularity of Islam in the country. 

In the last several years, the re-engagement of Islam by the people of Kazakhstan, 

which has been ongoing since the early 1990s, has suddenly become apparent in 

public spaces throughout the country. As somebody who has been visiting the country frequently over the last twenty years, for example, I was struck last summer 

by the number of Kazakh women dressed according to Islamic custom in the city 

of Almaty, the most cosmopolitan city in the country. This rapid growth of public 

religiosity is not suggestive of a terrorist threat or even of an immediate move towards political Islam, but it does point to a changing public culture that is poorly 

understood by both the government and the secular middle-class of the cities. As 

such, it is also suggestive of a growing population for whom the Soviet past, from 

which Kazakhstan’s current leadership emerged, holds little authority. 

We know very little about this growing Islamic religiosity in Kazakhstan, but it 

is likely quite diverse and represents a variety of different understandings of Islam. 

While we know even less about the alleged Muslim extremists who clashed with authorities in western Kazakhstan earlier this year, one must assume that these people were representative of at least one part of the population that is expressing its 

belief in Islam more publicly. Again, I will stress that I do not consider that these 

people, and others like them, represent a serious terrorist threat to Kazakhstan. 

Rather, I believe they are emblematic of the inability of the present government in 

Kazakhstan to speak to the needs, perspectives, and values of an increasingly religious population. 

A second related development in the country is the growth of ethnic Kazakh nationalism. Like the growth of religiosity, this is a phenomenon that has been ongoing since the early 1990s, but it has taken on new characteristics in recent years. 

In particular, the large number of ethnic Kazakh Oralman who have come back to 

the country since the early 1990s from exile in China, Mongolia, Iran, and elsewhere 

are now becoming much more integrated into society. They generally have a poor 

knowledge of Russian, are religious, and believe that they should have an advantage 
39 

over non-Kazakhs regarding economic opportunity. This situation is increasing ethnic tension in the country as well as creating fear amongst Russian-speaking 

Kazakhs in urban areas who see these developments as also promoting the status 

of Kazakh language. 

While the country’s leadership has tried to balance the promotion of Kazakh patriotism with policies of multiculturalism since independence, the growth of Kazakh 

language use and Kazakh nationalism are developments they are not well placed 

to engage given their political education in a Soviet system that shunned nationalist 

politics. Furthermore, while the ethnic tension created by these developments has 

not yet exploded into mass violence, it has already manifested itself in violent clashes between Kazakhs and Uyghurs in the area of Kazakhstan between Almaty and 

the Chinese border. 

Finally, and perhaps most ominous for the present government, Kazakhstan is beginning to face a crisis of rising economic expectations that are unmet. While 

Kazakhstan is certainly the most economically viable country in Central Asia, the 

country’s middle-class and skilled laborers have come to expect their standard of living to improve on a regular basis after a decade of rapid economic growth. A combination of the global financial crisis, a leveling off of Kazakhstan’s post-transition 

growth, and the bust of a substantial housing market bubble have stunted these improvements for many citizens in the country over the last several years. Given the 

awareness of the income gulf in the country, these unmet expectations for improved 

standards of living have resulted in increased dissatisfaction with the current economic situation in the country among the middle-class and skilled laborers. This situation undoubtedly contributed to the labor strikes we saw in the west of the country this year, and the government’s violent reaction to these strikes shows just how 

unprepared the present Government of Kazakhstan is to deal with such dissatisfaction. 

It should be noted that these changes in Kazakhstan’s socio-economic environment are not extreme and are unlikely to immediately cause widespread unrest in 

the country. In fact, in a democratic society, such discord and socio-economic dynamism is expected, and politicians and different political parties compete to provide 

the best solutions to them. In Kazakhstan, however, the stagnant political system 

has no mechanism to adapt to such dynamic changes. Furthermore, at a time when 

many authoritarian states have sought to implement at least gradual liberalization 

of their political systems in response to the ‘‘Arab Spring,’’ Kazakhstan has shown 

no such desire, instead holding controlled elections this past year that differed little 

from those held in the country over the last twenty years. 

In my opinion, the growing dynamism of Kazakhstan’s society coupled with its 

stagnant political system could create a dangerous scenario when the country finally 

decides, or is forced to decide, on a strategy for presidential succession. With a diversification of powerful interests in the country, significant natural resource wealth 

at stake, and no experience with competitive politics, such a succession could become a flashpoint for substantial conflict and sustained instability. 

In conclusion, I will note that I believe that Kazakhstan has the capacity to adapt 

to these changes given the country’s rich human resources and relatively broad economic prosperity. To do so, however, the country must begin taking measures towards a liberalization of its political system now. The gradual development of a 

competitive and transparent multi-party political system now can prepare the country to deal with presidential succession, but if Kazakhstan waits until a succession 

crisis ensues to implement such reforms, I fear it may be too late. 
40 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ERLAN IDRISSOV

Thank you Chairman Smith, Senator Cardin and other Members of the Helsinki 

Commission, for holding this important hearing on the state of Human Rights in 

Kazakhstan. We appreciate that our close friend and ally, the United States, is concerned about the recent events in Zhanaozen and the overall stability of 

Kazakhstan. On behalf of my government, I want to address those concerns and outline for you the steps Kazakhstan is taking to ensure continued stability in our 

country and the events that took place on December 16. 

The support of the United States for our young democracy over the past twenty 

years has been essential to our development. We look forward to another 20 years 

of close engagement and partnership on these issues as Kazakhstan grows in its 

independence. 

As you are well aware, the United States was the first country to recognize 

Kazakhstan’s sovereign independence from the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991. 

As Kazakhstan has just celebrated its 20th anniversary of independence, we look 

back with pride over the progress we have made over such a short period of time. 

Democracy is about more than laws and institutions; it is fundamentally about custom, habit, and culture, supported by property rights, and backed by the rule of law. 

When given the opportunity 20 years ago to choose how we wanted to govern ourselves, we chose democracy because we believe it is the best way to run our society, 

ensure the prosperity of our people and guarantee the long-term security and success of our state. While Kazakhstan’s record in all of these areas is not perfect, we 

are proud of the progress we have made. 

Kazakhstan’s ties with the United States are close, multi-faceted and enduring. 

We have shared objectives of enhanced political, economic, infrastructure, and security linkages and cooperation that can mutually benefit our nations. We have 

achieved much towards building institutional capacity and making our continued 

progress in areas such as education, civil society, media freedom and local governance. 

Kazakhstan is committed to being a responsible member of the international community. After suffering through almost 500 Soviet nuclear tests that destroyed the 

lives of 1.5 million people, Kazakhstan made the unprecedented move, upon independence, to voluntarily shut down its nuclear test site and renounce the world’s 

fourth largest nuclear arsenal. At this time, our nuclear arsenal was larger than the 

nuclear weapons stockpiles of Great Britain, France, and China combined. President 

Nazarbayev stood up to intense pressure from outside forces pushing for 

Kazakhstan to keep our nuclear weapons and become the first Muslim nation with 

nuclear capabilities. He made this decision because he knew that responsible engagement in the international community was far more important than having a 

large nuclear stockpile. 

Today, Kazakhstan is actively collaborating with the United States in bringing 

peace and stability to Afghanistan. When operations at the U.S. Air Force Base at 

Manas were threatened by the political instability in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the 

Kazakh government offered our airspace for expedited U.S. military flights to Afghanistan. 

We are an essential part of and proud partners in the Northern Distribution Networks, which provides supply lines to coalition troops in northern Afghanistan. 

The Eurasian region has seen instability over the past year. In Kyrgyzstan political unrest in April 2010 led to the ouster of President Bakiyev. The Kazakh government worked with the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United 

Nations to address the turmoil as it was taking place. Working with the transition 

government we encouraged them to work together to return normalcy to the country 

by restoring political institutions and basic economic activity. We were pleased with 

the outcome of the Presidential elections last year and are committed to working 

with President Atambayev to promote stability in the region. 

As we have shown our commitment to promoting stability throughout the region 

we are equally committed to promoting stability within our borders. For this reason, 

my government was deeply concerned about the events in Western Kazakhstan last 

December. The government is still conducting its investigation, but as far as we can 

tell a small group of people violently interrupted a national celebration. While hundreds of other citizens happily commemorated Kazakhstan’s 20th year of independence from the Soviet Union, agitators burned police cars and government buildings 

for reasons that remain unclear. This disturbance, which I am sad to say resulted 

in at least 16 deaths and many injuries, is an example of the growing pains that 

our young nation is going through. Oil workers in Zhanaozen have been pressing 

for higher wages and better conditions and the government has been working to ad-
41 

dress their concerns. Nevertheless, the rioters, possibly instigated by outsiders, 

chose destruction rather than negotiation. 

We deeply regret that this incident resulted in the loss of life. In response to this 

violence, President Nazarbayev called for a full investigation into the matter within 

24 hours. Establishing government commission, headed by First Vice-Prime Minister Shukeyev, and collaborating with the investigation group led by Interior Minister Kasimov, the Kazakh government is looking forward to receiving a full report 

of what exactly took place. These groups are not only investigating the rioters’ actions, but are also conducting a thorough investigation into the police forces actions 

throughout this event. Moreover, international experts have been invited by us to 

participate in the investigation process, including from FBI and UN. 

The Kazakh government is committed to accountability. Those found responsible 

for this violence will be brought to trial and must be held accountable for their actions. We will pursue the full weight of the law against anyone found guilty, including those in the security forces and government. 

In order to address the unrest and ongoing disputes with oil workers, the unemployed oil workers in the region have been offered new jobs. In addition, the Government and company officials who had failed to address these grievances have been 

removed from their positions and replaced. The newly appointed Minister of Economic Development and Trade, Bakhytzhan Sagintayev, is overseeing a seven-point 

action plan to rehabilitate the region. This plan is working to address problems of 

rebuilding damaged property, improving food security, and improving residents living conditions. 

These actions taken to restore stability have already seen some results. The region had regained sufficient stability to participate fully in Parliamentary elections 

held last week, and citizens of the region were given the opportunity to participate 

fully in those elections. 

Zhanaozen violence came out of the blue and shocked the entire nation. But observers noted that despite this the Government displayed quite a mature behavior 

and reaction to the events, making special emphasis that the crisis is addressed and 

reported in the most transparent, open and fair manner. 

I have personally held press briefings here in Washington to discuss these events 

and the government’s response to them. To ensure transparency, beginning on the 

day after the riots, I have published on the Embassy website 

(www.kazakhembus.com) a timeline of events on that day, and updates regarding 

the investigation, as they are available. 

The Parliamentary elections that took place January 15 are further proof that 

Kazakhstan is making incremental progress in developing its democracy. For the 

first time in history Kazakhstan has elected a multi-party Parliament. This shows 

great movement in the right direction for Kazakhstan, in terms of building political 

pluralism, strengthening the rule of law and developing democratic institutions. 

Over 75 percent of the eligible population voted in the election, and more than half 

of the Kazakh population living abroad participated by voting at polling stations in 

diplomatic and consular representation offices. In addition, the people of Western 

Kazakhstan turned out in large numbers to vote. Various international observers 

commented on the high organizational level of the elections and generally praised 

them. The elections were monitored by 819 international observers. Those include 

309 representatives of the OSCE/ODIHR, 262 from the CIS Observer Mission, 46 

from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 15 from the PACE, eleven from the SCO 

Observer Mission, nine from the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, 

seven from the OIC, ten from the TURKPA, and 150 others from 29 countries. In 

addition, 156 foreign media representatives covered the elections. These figures 

show that the elections were open and transparent. All international organizations 

have made independent assessments and conclusions based on their own observation of the electoral process. 

OSCE issued a critical Statement on Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. But 

even OSCE’s assessment could not ignore improvements. In particular, OSCE said: 

‘‘The elections were well administered at the technical level and the observers noted 

legal changes aimed at ensuring representation of at least a second party in parliament, but the authorities did not provide the necessary conditions for the conduct 

of genuinely pluralistic elections.’’ Despite these assessments from OSCE ODIHR, 

the outcome is clear: Kazakhstan has made a major step forward to strengthen its 

multiparty and more robust democracy. 

Kazakhstan is uniquely positioned in a region of the world that is fraught with 

instability and poor governance. Amidst the uncertainty however, Kazakhstan is establishing a stable democracy. We are not perfect, but we are a mature government. 

It takes a long time to develop the institutions and cultural habits that make up 

democracy as westerners know it. We make progress towards that goal every year. 
42 

Kazakhstan has benefited from significant progress in a short period of time in part 

because we have focused on strengthening our economy. A strong economy is the 

necessary first step toward democracy. We started out, twenty years ago, with 

hyperinflation, poverty and high unemployment. Today we are the fastest growing 

and most reliable economy in our region. 

Developing a fully functioning democracy is not easy work, and it will not happen 

overnight. However, Kazakhstan is committed to pursuing the ideals of freedom, 

rule of law, and economic growth. Our government will take full responsibility and 

demand accountability when it is found to have been wrong. However, we are also 

committed to protecting our citizens from overzealous activists who choose violence 

over dialogue. We are thankful for the support and partnership of the United States 

and hope to strengthen our bilateral relationship as we work to address challenges 

together. 

I appreciate the opportunity to share the perspective of my Government with you. 

In addition, in our continuing effort to be open and transparent about 

the violence last December in western Kazakhstan, below please find the 

complete report by the Prosecutor General. It [is] noteworthy reading because of its balance and fairness. 

25 January 2012 

Statement by the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the events 

that took place in the town of Zhanaozen on Dec. 16, 2011 

On the 16th of December 2011 in the town of Zhanaozen in Mangystau province 

during the celebration of the Independence Day of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a 

group of former workers of the ‘‘OzenMunaiGaz’’ oil producing enterprise—with the 

support of youngsters—started to loot and set fires in the Central Square. 

As a result, 125 facilities were set on fire, damaged or looted, including offices of 

the mayors of Zhanaozen and Tenge. Also damaged were a Pension distribution center, police stations, an office of ‘‘OzenMunaiGaz,’’ the ‘‘Aruana’’ hotel, the ‘‘Sulpak,’’ 

‘‘Atlant’’ and ‘‘Sholpan’’ shopping centers, five bank offices, nine ATM machines, 21 

vehicles, apartment buildings and numerous facilities that belong to small and medium sized businesses. 

The damage caused to the state, companies and individuals ran in the billions of 

tenges. 

In order to end mass disorder and to protect civilians, the command of the Department of Internal Affairs of the province sent a police squad that was attacked by 

the crowd with firearms and knives, stones, sticks and Molotov cocktails. 

The police, after several warning shots, used weapons against the rioters. 

As a result of the clashes, 64 persons received gunshot wounds, 14 persons died. 

The death of two persons mentioned in media reporters was not related to the disturbances. 

35 police officers received various injuries. 

* * * 

By the instruction of the Head of the State, in order to investigate the facts of 

the disturbances as well as the reasons and conditions of their development, an 

inter-agency investigation team under the special prosecutor was established and is 

operating now. 

Six organizers of the disturbances have been identified—Saktaganov, 

Dzharylgasinov, Irmuhanov, Dosmagambetov, Utkilov and Tuletaeva—and all have 

been charged with Part 1 Chapter 241 of the Criminal code and all are under arrest. 

Twenty three active participants of the disturbances and 11 individuals who set 

fires and looted have also been identified and arrested. Most of them confirmed the 

fact that they helped organize and participated in the disturbances. 

They said that they were preparing for the insurgencies in advance and worked 

with a group of young people who prepared bottles of Molotov cocktails and armed 

themselves with improvised weapons. 

In the course of the investigation—and following an appeal—softer treatment was 

given to 11 individuals, short of arrest. The work to identify other organizers and 

participants of the disturbances continues. 

* * * 

Simultaneously, by the order of the Head of the State, the legitimacy of the actions of the police officers who took part in restoring public order is being examined. 

Special attention is being given to the use of weapons. 
43 

The investigation has shown that in most cases police officers acted in accordance 

with law under a real threat to the lives and health both of civilians and the police 

officers themselves. 

Nevertheless, in some cases, use of weapons and special devices by the police was 

of disproportional character, reaction to the acts of the attackers was unequal to the 

threat thus leading to death and injures of citizens. 

For the improper performance of his duties, the deputy head of the Department 

of Internal Affairs (DIA) of Mangystau province Utegaliev, who was in charge of the 

police squad, is being brought to criminal account. 

For the use of a weapon with excess of authority that lead to the death of people, 

the following are being brought to criminal account: 

• head of the anti-extremist division of the DIA of Mangystau province 

Bagdabaev; 

• first deputy head of the Office of the Internal Affairs of the town of Zhanaozen 

Bakytkaliuly; 

• police inspector of DIA of Mangystau province Zholdybaev. 

The death of Kenzhebaev Bazarbai, who according to the statement of his relatives died because of the bodily injures that he suffered in the Temporary Detention Facility of the Office of the Internal Affairs of the town of Zhanaozen, was evaluated. 

As a result, the Head of the Temporary Detention Facility of the Office of the Internal Affairs of the town of Zhanaozen Temirov, who allowed illegal detention of 

Kenzhebaev and did not arrange timely hospitalization for the latter, is being 

brought to criminal account. 

Also, measures are being taken to identify those who beat the deceased. 

* * * 

Illegal actions of the local executive officials and the heads of oil enterprises contributed to the tension that resulted in the disturbances. 

Financial police discovered that the abovementioned officials, contrary to the interests of the people of the town, for several years had been stealing money allocated for social and economic support of the local population and workers of the oil 

industry. 

The investigation reveals that both the former and the current mayors of the town 

of Zhanaozen Babahanov and Sarbopeev had been stealing money through the 

‘‘Zhanashyr’’ and ‘‘Zharylkau’’ public endowments. 

The mentioned officials and heads of endowments are being brought to criminal 

account. 

A criminal case on clause ‘‘b’’ of part 3 of chapter 176 of the Criminal code has 

been started against heads of JSC ‘‘EP’’Kazmunaigaz’’ and ‘‘Kompaniya Munai 

Ecologiya’’ LTD Mirishnikov and Baimuhambetov on the evidence of the theft of 335 

million tenges that belongs to JSC ‘‘EP′′Kazmunaigaz’’. 

A criminal case on clause ‘‘b’’ of part 3 of chapter 176 of the Criminal code is 

under investigation against former director of ‘‘OzenMunaiGaz’’ Eshmanov, his deputy Markabaev, who are accused of stealing 127 million tenges that belongs to JSC 

‘‘EP’’Kazmunaigaz’’—in collusion with director of ‘‘Burgylau’’ LTD Seitmagambetov. 

* * * 

One of the reasons of the disturbances was active efforts of some individuals who 

persuaded fired workers to continue protests and to violently oppose the authorities. 

A Committee of national security has started to investigate a criminal case in accordance with part 3 of chapter 164 of the Criminal Code. 

During the investigation a number of leaders and active members of the unregistered public unions ‘‘Alga’’ and ‘‘Halyk Maidany’’ Kozlov, Amirova and Sapargali, 

who are suspected in inciting social hatred, have been detained. 

* * * 

Events that took place in the village of Shetpe need a separate comment. 

On the 17th of December 2011 a group of people blocked a railroad connection, 

disassembled the railroad sections and damaged facilities of transport infrastructure 

at a railroad station of Shetpe in Mangystau province. 

These actions infringed the normal operation of the transport for several hours. 

When police tried to prevent the illegal actions, they were attacked by individuals 

who used weapons, Molotov cocktails and stones; 5 police officers received various 

injures and burns. 

After several warning shots police were forced to use weapons. 11 of the attackers 

were wounded, 1 died. 
44 

The investigation had come to the decision that in this case the use of weapons 

was legal. 

Three individuals—Bakytzhan, Sabirbaev and Zhilkishiev—are being brought to 

criminal account for organizing disturbances and for the use of violence against authorities. 

Another 12 individuals were charged with participation in mass disorder, use of 

violence against the representatives of authority and damaging means of transportation and railroads. 

* * * 

Investigations on all the mentioned cases continue. The results of the investigations will be reported regularly. 
45 

STATEMENT FROM THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF PEOPLE’S FRONT

January 24, 2012 

Statement regarding arrests of Alga People’s Party and People’s Front activists 

On January 23, 2012, the Committee of National Security (KNB) raided the office 

of Alga People’s party and homes of Vladimir Kozlov, Mikhail Sizov, Gulzhan 

Lepisova, Askar Tokmurzin, as well as People’s Front activists Igor Vinyavskiy and 

Zhanbolat Mamay. 

After that Vladimir Kozlov and Igor Vinyavskiy were arrested on charges of inciting social unrest and calling for the violent overthrow and change of the constitutional order by force and violation of the unity in the Republic of Kazakhstan. We 

view these actions as political provocations by KNB to intimidate our activists, to 

undermine activity of the Alga People’s Party and People’s Front and to stop supporting people who participated in peaceful social protest in Zhanaozen and who 

were shot by the police on December 16, 2011. 

With these actions, KNB confirms a fact that Nazarbayev and his law enforcement agencies were not planning and will not conduct an objective investigation of 

the Mangistau tragedy. But on the other hand they try to shift a responsibility for 

what happened out there on strikers themselves and those who helped them effectively protect their political and human rights. 

This means that our fellow party members will face a politically-motivated and 

legalized tyranny because the investigation is managed by those who gave the order 

to open gunfire on December 16–18 and it conducted by those who detained, tortured and beaten our fellow citizens, beating testimonies out of them forcibly required by the Akorda. 

To save our party members from the Nazarbayev’s repression, as well as to rescue 

victims of the December 16-18 tragedy from police reprisal is possible by breaking 

out the informational blockade and make public all facts about what happened in 

in Zhanaozen and Shetpe,and solidarity support by the Kazakhstani and international societies. 

Therefore we call upon all citizens of Kazakhstan, NGOs and political forces: 

• To support our party members. 

• To disseminate information about the outbreak of police brutality and 

Nazarbayev’s lawlessness. 

• To send us and independent media outlets information about events in 

Zhanaozen and Shetpe, eye-witness and documented evidences that the death 

toll there is higher than official one, and that the Akorda is trying to hide it 

to weaken and undermine the resentment of the bloody action as well as facts 

that prove the innocence of our fellow party members to the bloody events. 

• To support victims of the Mangistau tragedy to help them break the information blockade, ease the pressure on them from the police state apparatus, to 

help them survive the incident and find the strength to live. 

We also call upon the diplomatic offices of democratic countries: 

• To inform their countries’ political leadership on transformation of 

Kazakhstan’s ‘‘managed democracy′′’’ into a totalitarian state. 

• To protest against recurrent violation of citizens’ human and political rights by 

the Kazakhstani authorities. 

We urge the European Parliament and European Commission: 

• To form an International Commission to investigate the December 16–18, 2011 

events in Zhanaozen and Shetpe, and in case of refusal by Nazarbayev to allow 

conduct a full and fair investigation in Kazakhstan they should initiate a case 

at the International Criminal Court in the Hague. 

• To adopt a resolution in support of the Mangistau tragedy victims and in defense of the democratic forces of Kazakhstan, defending the right to freedom of 

speech, assembly, procession and other fundamental human rights. 

We also urge the OSCE and international human rights organizations: 

• To express their negative position to a recent outbreak of police lawlessness in 

Kazakhstan. 

• To dispatch their representatives to the Mangistau region after the state of 

emergency is lifted to study the situation there and to participate in the trials 

of activists of the democratic forces whom Nazarbayev and his law enforcement 

agencies are trying to make responsible for what happened there on December 

16–18, 2011. 
46 

We ask foreign non-governmental organizations and media outlets: 

• To pay attention to the transformation of Kazakhstan into a police state, and 

Nazarbayev to a dictator of the Arab type, who stays in power only because of 

police brutality and widespreading the fear. 

• To provide information and moral support to the democratic forces of 

Kazakhstan and Kazakhstani civil society in their efforts to turn the country 

to democracy path, rule of law, justice and harmony. 

The Central Council of People’s Front 

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