1

Filed 8/13/14 In re Nathan D. CA1/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

In re Nathan D., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law. 

STEPHANIE D., 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LAKE 

COUNTY, 

 Respondent, 

LAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

SOCIAL SERVICES, et al. 

 Real Parties in Interest. 

 A142172 

 (Lake County 

 Super. Ct. No. JV320393) 

 Stephanie D. has been incarcerated in Arizona for most of the life of her son, 

Nathan D. When Nathan was an infant, Stephanie left him temporarily in the care of 

Tracy B., who obtained a court order in Arizona naming her Nathan’s guardian. Tracy 

refused to allow Stephanie contact with Nathan when she was not incarcerated and 

Stephanie did not know where they resided or how to contact them. In 2011, an Arizona 

court revoked Tracy’s appointment as guardian and in 2013, Tracy and Nathan moved to 

California. 

 Nathan was detained by the Child Welfare Service (CWS) of the Lake County 

Department of Social Services when Tracy was arrested. Stephanie was informed and 
2

expressed her interest in reuniting with Nathan when she is released from prison in June, 

2015. The juvenile court sustained jurisdiction allegations and at a disposition hearing 

ruled that providing reunification services to Stephanie would be detrimental to Nathan. 

The court set a date for a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1

 section 

366.26. 

 Stephanie contends that the juvenile court erred by denying her reunification 

services and has filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the Superior Court to 

(1) vacate its order setting a section 366.26 hearing, and (2) order that reunification 

services be provided. We issued an order to show cause. 

 We conclude that the juvenile court’s determination that providing reunification 

services to Stephanie would be detrimental to Nathan was supported by substantial 

evidence and deny the petition. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Nathan’s and Stephanie’s Background2

 Nathan was born to Stephanie in 2004 in Arizona He is now nine years old. 

Stephanie informed CWS that the alleged father, Joshua D., never provided support for 

Nathan. CWS was unable to locate Joshua. 

 Nathan has a number of half-siblings. The oldest is Houston D., now 18 years old 

and residing in Ohio. Emily W. is 15 years old and resides with her father in Arizona. 

Before giving birth to Nathan, Stephanie also had twin girls who were given up for 

adoption at birth. 

 Before Nathan was born, Stephanie had prearranged an adoption with Tamara A., 

who was present at Nathan’s birth and whose last name appears on Nathan’s birth 

certificate. When Nathan was born, Stephanie recanted the adoption agreement. 

 Stephanie has a criminal record dating back to July 14, 1997, with multiple arrests 

for offenses including possession of stolen vehicles, possession/sales of drugs, drug 

 1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 

2

 The personal background is stated from reports provided to the court by CWS. 
3

paraphernalia, alien smuggling, and forgery. In a letter to a CWS social worker, 

Stephanie stated that she was on probation in 2005 and “[her] probation officer told [her] 

that [she] needed to put [her] kids, plus [her] sisters, into a temporary guardianship until 

[she] was back on track with probation.” An acquaintance at her church, Tracy B., 

agreed “to do the temporary guardianship.” On July 18, 2005, Tracy and her husband, 

Andrew E., filed a “[petition for permanent appointment of guardian of a minor]” in 

Maricopa County, Arizona. The petition stated that Nathan “will be continuing in our 

care until mother is able to get [him] back & support [him] in a stable safe environment.” 

 When Stephanie finished a work furlough program, Tracy refused to return Nathan 

to her. Stephanie tried to locate Tracy, “but everytime [she] got close [Tracy] would up 

and move.” 

 On March 17, 2006, the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona appointed 

Tracy as Nathan’s permanent guardian.3

 Stephanie maintains that she was never aware 

that a permanent guardianship of Nathan had been established and that she had no notice 

of the guardianship proceeding. 

 On November 21, 2006, Stephanie was sentenced to three years in prison for drug 

possession and was released in August 2009. According to Stephanie, Tracy sent her 

letters with pictures of Nathan during her incarceration, but the return address was a post 

office box, so she remained ignorant of their specific location. After her release, Tracy 

gave Stephanie her telephone number and they made arrangements to meet at a church so 

Stephanie could see Nathan. Tracy reneged on the meeting and disconnected her phone. 

Stephanie never knew where Tracy and Nathan were until she was contacted by CWS in 

connection with this case. 

 On March 9, 2010, Stephanie was sentenced to a prison term of four years and 

three months on a drug charge in Arizona. She was later convicted for “trafficking 

identity; attempt to commit; repetitive” and sentenced to five years and six months, to be 

 3

 Both Tracy and Andrew E., were appointed as guardians in 2006. However, at a 

guardianship review hearing in 2010, only Tracy was designated as a guardian. 
4

served concurrently with her sentence for the drug conviction. Stephanie is currently 

incarcerated in Arizona and her earliest date of release is June 15, 2015. Release on that 

date will be under supervision, which will end on June 13, 2016. 

II. The Juvenile Court Proceedings

 On January 27, 2014, Tracy, residing with Nathan in Clearlake, California,4

 was 

arrested on various charges not relevant to the petition before us. The police detained 

Nathan “due to having no legal caretaker available and due to questions regarding the 

identities and relationship between [Tracy] and the minor.” On January 29, 2014, CWS 

filed a juvenile dependency petition, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 

300. 

 The juvenile court held a detention hearing on January 30, 2014. Tracy was 

present, in custody, and counsel was appointed to represent her. Separate counsel was 

appointed to represent Nathan. The court ordered Nathan detained. 

 CWS filed a jurisdiction report on February 20, 2014, and the juvenile court held a 

jurisdiction hearing on February 24, 2014. Stephanie was present by telephone. The 

court appointed counsel for Stephanie and continued the hearing. 

 On March 21, 2014, Tracy, in custody, and Stephanie, by telephone, were present. 

Counsel for CWS and for Stephanie objected to Tracy’s presence, challenging her status 

as Nathan’s guardian, based on information in the jurisdiction report. The court 

questioned Tracy, who continued to maintain that she was Nathan’s guardian and was in 

the process of obtaining proof from Arizona. The hearing was continued so that Tracy’s 

status could be resolved. 

 On April 4, 2014, CWS filed a supplemental report, concluding that Tracy’s 

guardianship of Nathan was terminated in Arizona on September 25, 2011 and that Tracy 

had no standing in the dependency proceedings. 

 4

 Tracy later told the juvenile court that she moved to California with Nathan in 

January 2013. 
5

 On April 7, 2014, Stephanie was present by telephone. Tracy was not present and 

the matter of her status was continued to give CWS time to obtain proof that her 

guardianship was terminated in 2011. 

 On April 28, 2014, Tracy, now out of custody, was present. Stephanie was present 

by telephone. Tracy maintained that she could obtain documentation, dated after 

September 25, 2011, showing that she remained Nathan’s guardian. The juvenile court 

again continued the matter, but told Tracy that she had the burden of production and, 

absent additional proof, the court would rule that she had no standing in the proceedings. 

 On May 1, 2014, CWS filed a supplemental report, again concluding that Tracy 

had no standing. 

 On May 7, 2014, Stephanie was present by telephone. She agreed not to contest 

the matter of jurisdiction and to submit on the CWS report. Tracy was not present and 

the court determined that she was not Nathan’s legal guardian and she had no standing to 

appear in the dependency proceedings. By a preponderance of the evidence, the court 

found true jurisdiction allegations pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to 

protect) and (g) (no provision for support).5

 

 On May 23, 2014, CWS filed a disposition report. The report noted that Stephanie 

desires reunification with Nathan and had been cooperative with CWS. During her 

incarceration, Stephanie has received a G.E.D. and has taken classes and courses 

including parenting, cognitive/addiction and behaviors, domestic violence, and graphic 

arts. She attends 12-step meetings once or more per week. She works in the prison print 

shop five days a week and receives excellent work reviews. After discharge, she plans to 

 5

 The section 300, subdivision (b), allegation was: “The biological mother, 

Stephanie D[.], has significant criminal history including, but not necessarily limited to, 

unlawful use of mean of trns [sic], dangerous drug violation; danger/repetit/enhance [sic], 

and trafficking identity; attempt to commit; repetitive, which Ms. D[.] is currently serving 

time for at the Arizona State Prison Complex—Perryville.” 

 The section 300, subdivision (g), allegation was: “The biological mother, 

Stephanie D[.], has not been providing regular care for her child, Nathan D[.]. Ms. D[.] 

is currently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex—Perryville. Ms. D[.]’s 

admission date was 06/25/10 and her current release date is 06/15/15.” 
6

live with a long time friend in Phoenix, Arizona. Alternately, she has also considered 

entering a halfway house in Phoenix. 

 According to the report, Stephanie could not identify any of Nathan’s relatives 

who would be capable of caring for him. Nathan’s maternal great grandmother stated 

that she could not care for Nathan due to her age and health issues. Nathan’s halfbrother, Houston, was interested in obtaining guardianship of Nathan in the future, but 

was not financially capable of doing so at present. 

The great grandmother and Houston have been corresponding with Nathan by letters, 

cards and photographs. Nathan has also had one supervised phone call with Houston. 

 Nathan was placed in a foster home on January 27, 2014. His foster mother states 

that “Nathan is a sweet, polite, child with no notable behavioral problems. He follows 

her directions and is not exhibiting resistance to any directions given to him.” 

 The report states that when Nathan was asked what he would like regarding 

placement, he first replied that he wished to return to the care of his “mother,” referring 

to Tracy. Nathan’s next suggestion was his maternal great grandmother, with whom he 

had spoken once on the telephone and from whom he recently received a letter. Nathan’s 

third suggestion was to live with Stephanie. In another interview, Nathan stated that he 

wanted to live with his “brother Chris,” referring to Tracy’s son. It appeared to the social 

worker that Nathan was “interested in finding some family connection and wishes to 

know his maternal family members.” 

 The report stated that Nathan is “developmentally on track for his age.” Nathan’s 

third grade teacher believes that his “skills are below the medium.” The teacher 

“questions how much school history Nathan has, because when she asks him to do a 

simple project, which she would expect a child his age to perform, he often looks 

‘perplexed and/or mystified.’ ” The teacher reported that Nathan has “great manners 

which is above his peers.” Nathan’s test scores show that he is “mid-level in [r]eading 

and fairly low level in [g]eometry.” The teacher reported that Nathan “speaks freely 

about his foster mother and how much he likes her and being in her care.” 
7

 The report states CWS’s belief that ordering reunification services to Stephanie 

would be detrimental to Nathan because it would prevent him “from obtaining his right to 

permanency and to placement in the least restrictive and most family like setting 

possible.” As reasons for this assessment, the report lists the following: (1) at Nathan’s 

birth, Stephanie planned to give him up for adoption; (2) Stephanie had been incarcerated 

for most of Nathan’s life and had not demonstrated an ability to consistently parent any 

of her children; (3) Nathan has no memory of his mother and no bond exists; (4) 

Stephanie’s earliest release date is June 15, 2015, so that “[i]f an extension of 

reunification services were ordered, six-months beyond the 12-month limitation, the 

likelihood of establishing reunification by the 18-month review hearing on 07/30/2015, is 

minimal”; (5) based on Stephanie’s release date, the likelihood of her successfully 

establishing a place of residency and sufficient services to meet her needs and that of a 

child by the 18-month review hearing is minimal; and (6) Stephanie had already 

completed extensive services during her incarceration which had not eliminated the 

current circumstances that led to Nathan’s removal and it is unlikely that these same 

services provided through reunification services would create substantial change in the 

circumstances. 

 The report concludes with a recommendation that reunification services not be 

ordered for Stephanie and that the court set a section 366.26 permanency planning 

hearing. The case plan recommended contact by letter with Stephanie and other family 

members.6

 

 On June 2, 2014, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing. Stephanie was 

present by telephone and her counsel requested that the court grant her reunification 

services. Counsel conceded that Stephanie’s release date “is very near the 18-month 

date” but noted that “there is a new law that allows the court to continue services for up 

to 24 months if certain requirements are met . . . .” Counsel also informed the court that 

 6

 At the disposition hearing on June 2, 2014, upon the request of Stephanie’s 

counsel and without objection by CWS, the court allowed telephone contact between 

Stephanie and Nathan as deemed appropriate by CWS. 
8

the previous Friday Nathan told a schoolmate that he was going to be picked up that 

afternoon by “ ‘his real mom’ ” and did not return to his foster home that day. Tracy 

could not be reached and it was assumed that she had taken Nathan.7

 Counsel argued that 

this “mirrors what [Stephanie] has previously experienced. Her ability to have a 

relationship with Nathan has been thwarted by the former guardian.” 

 Stephanie’s counsel argued further that Stephanie and Nathan “have just started 

forming a relationship, and . . . within these next 18 months possibly 24 months, there’s a 

chance to continue to nurture that and for him to be able to stay in contact and know his 

family. There is a possibility to be able to reunite this mother with her son . . . .” 

Counsel also asked the court not to consider the fact, cited in the disposition report, that 

before his birth, Stephanie had agreed to give Nathan up for adoption. He argued that the 

fact was not relevant because Stephanie did not follow through with adoption “and if we 

held every parent to that standard then we would likely be not . . . offering services to a 

lot of people.” 

 The juvenile court stated that “the one thing that’s most troubling” was that “for 

eight years of [Nathan’s] life, [Stephanie has] not been in on it while she’s been 

incarcerated for things she did. That weighs heavy in the court’s mind in looking at this.” 

 Nathan’s appointed counsel also urged the court to order reunification services for 

Stephanie because Nathan has, “through the actions of [Tracy], found himself here in 

Lake County away from Arizona, away from family, away from grandparents or great 

grandparents that care about him. It seems odd to me that we would be moving towards 

basically, without even trying, to take him away from his family.” 

 In addition to the disposition report, the court also considered a letter from 

Stephanie, commenting that “it shows a lot of good progress made by the mother. And if 

you accept it at face value, she is determined to change her life. Part of the difficulty here 

though is she’s going to have a very tough time of it just to take care of herself upon her 

 7

 On June 6, 2014, CWS updated the court that Nathan and Tracy had been 

located in Utah. Nathan was again in CWS custody and Tracy had been arrested. 
9

initial release, let alone properly parent a child who at that time would be in the 

neighborhood of 10 or 11 years old or be ready even six months after release.” 

 The juvenile court found that providing reunification services to Stephanie would 

be detrimental to Nathan. The matter was set for selection and implementation of a 

permanent plan, pursuant to section 366.26, on August 25, 2014. 

 On June 10, 2014, Stephanie timely filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition. 

The petition for extraordinary writ and a request for a stay of all proceedings was filed on 

July 11, 2014. On July 15, 2014, we issued an order to show cause why the petition 

should not be granted and we stayed the section 366.26 hearing pending further order. 

DISCUSSION 

 Stephanie contends that the juvenile court erred by denying her reunification 

services. She seeks a writ of mandate compelling the Superior Court to vacate its order 

setting a section 366.26 hearing and to order that reunification services be provided. 

 “We review the court’s decision to deny reunification services under the 

substantial evidence test to determine whether it is supported by evidence that is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value. [Citation.] ‘We do not reweigh the evidence, 

nor do we consider matters of credibility.’ ” (L.Z. v. Superior Court (2010) 188 

Cal.App.4th 1285, 1292.) “[W]e presume ‘in favor of the order, considering the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit 

of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.’ ” (In re 

G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164.) 

 When a child has been removed from the custody of a parent or guardian, the 

juvenile court is generally required to order family reunification services to the child’s 

mother. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) When the child is, like Nathan, over the age of three years, 

“court-ordered services shall be provided beginning with the dispositional hearing and 

ending 12 months after the date the child entered foster care . . ., unless the child is 

returned to the home of the parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Services may 

be extended “up to a maximum time period not to exceed 18 months after the date the 

child was originally removed from physical custody of his or her parent or guardian if it 
10

can be shown, at the hearing held pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 366.21, that the 

permanent plan for the child is that he or she will be returned and safely maintained in the 

home within the extended time period. The court shall extend the time period only if it 

finds that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical 

custody of his or her parent or guardian within the extended time period or that 

reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. 

(a)(3).) 

 If the reunification services have been extended to 18 months and the child is not 

reunified with the parent within that time period, then reunification services may again be 

extended to 24 months if “the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the 

best interests of the child would be met by the provision of additional reunification 

services to a parent or legal guardian who is making significant and consistent progress in 

a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program, or a parent recently 

discharged from incarceration . . . and making significant and consistent progress in 

establishing a safe home for the child’s return.” (§ 366.22, subd. (b).) “If the court 

extends the time period [to 24 months], the court shall specify the factual basis for its 

conclusion that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the 

physical custody of his or her parent or guardian within the extended time period.” 

(§ 361.5, subd. (a)(4).) 

 Even if the parent is incarcerated or institutionalized, the juvenile court must still 

order reasonable reunification services “unless the court determines by clear and 

convincing evidence, those services would be detrimental to the child. In determining 

detriment, the court shall consider the age of the child, the degree of parent-child 

bonding, the length of the sentence, the length and nature of the treatment, the nature of 

the crime or illness, the degree of detriment to the child if services are not offered and, 

for children 10 years of age or older, the child’s attitude toward the implementation of 

family reunification services, the likelihood of the parent’s discharge from 

incarceration . . . within the reunification time limitations described in subdivision (a), 

and any other appropriate factors.” (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1).) 
11

 The juvenile court determined that ordering reunification services for Stephanie 

would be detrimental to Nathan. Accordingly, we examine the relevant8

 section 361.5, 

subdivision (e)(1), factors to determine if substantial evidence supports the court’s ruling. 

The age of the child. Nathan is nine years old and will be eleven years old within 

six months of Stephanie’s release from prison. It is in Nathan’s interest now to form a 

bond of trust with a person exercising the role of parental authority and who has the 

resources to respond to his needs before he enters his teen years. The trial court reflected 

this interest when it stated: “Part of the difficulty here though is [Stephanie’s] going to 

have a very tough time of it just to take care of herself upon her initial release, let alone 

properly parent a child who at that time would be in the neighborhood of 10 or 11 years 

old or be ready even six months after release.” This factor weighs against ordering 

services, based on Stephanie’s time of release, which is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

The degree of parent-child bonding. Nathan has no memory of Stephanie and, 

before this case commenced, there had been no contact between them for seven or eight 

years. Even though some bond might have been formed but for the wrongful acts of 

Tracy, substantial evidence supports a finding that this factor weighs against ordering 

services for Stephanie. 

The length of the sentence. Stephanie is currently serving a sentence of five 

years and six months. Stephanie had previously served a three-year sentence and was out 

of custody for only about seven months between the two sentences. Even if she had been 

able to maintain some contact with Nathan, she has been absent as a caretaker and 

parental authority for most of Nathan’s life. Substantial evidence supports a finding that 

this factor weighs against ordering services for Stephanie. 

 8

 The irrelevant factors here are the child’s attitude toward the implementation of 

reunification services (because that factor applies only for children 10 years of age or 

older) and the length and nature of the treatment (because we read this factor as applying 

to “institutionalized” parents, who are also covered by section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1), 

and not to incarcerated parents.) 
12

The nature of the crime or illness. Stephanie is currently incarcerated for a drug 

violation and for identity trafficking. Stephanie’s criminal history relating to drug use 

dates back to 1999. While Stephanie had made admirable efforts while incarcerated to 

attain the personal insight and vocational skills necessary to maintain herself in society 

without committing further offenses, she has yet to demonstrate an actual ability to do so. 

In order to reunify with Nathan, Stephanie would have to demonstrate her ability to 

maintain a home environment, free from drug use, that would be safe for Nathan and, as 

we discuss below, this does not appear to be reasonably possible within the statutory time 

limits. Accordingly, this factor weighs against ordering reunification services and is 

supported by substantial evidence. 

The degree of detriment to the child if services are not offered. In her petition, 

Stephanie argues that “[n]ot allowing [her] a chance to reunify will result in permanently 

cutting off [Nathan’s] connection with his family, a family he has wrongfully been 

deprived of.” She further contends: “Reunifying [Nathan] with his mother is the only 

means for [Nathan] to have a meaningful connection with the family he lost when he was 

only two years old.” Stephanie overstates the detriment to Nathan if services are not 

offered because contact with Stephanie and Nathan’s other relatives is not “permanently 

cut[] off” in that case. The court’s order permits contact by letter between Nathan and 

Stephanie, Houston, and his maternal great grandmother. Telephone contact between 

Nathan and Stephanie is permitted if CWS deems such contact appropriate. 

 Whatever permanent plan is adopted at a section 366.26 hearing and whatever the 

consequent impact that might have on Stephanie’s parental rights, communication 

between Nathan and his relatives need not necessarily be terminated. Considering that 

there is no current parental bond between Nathan and Stephanie and considering the 

interest in providing permanence to Nathan as he enters his second decade, there is no 

evidence of significant detriment to Nathan if reunification services are not offered. This 

factor weighs against ordering reunification services. 

The likelihood of the parent’s discharge from incarceration within the 

reunification time limitations. As we have noted, when a child is, like Nathan, older 
13

than three years, a parent is generally permitted 12 months of reunification services, and 

that may be extended to 18 months if, at 12 months, it can be shown “that the permanent 

plan for the child is that he or she will be returned and safely maintained in the home 

within the extended time period.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).) 

 The 18-month period commences with the date the minor entered foster care. In 

this case, the initial detention order was filed on January 30, 2014, and the 18-month 

period expires on July 30, 2015. Stephanie’s earliest release date from incarceration is 

June 15, 2015, only six weeks before the 18-month period expires. Stephanie’s postrelease plans are to live with a friend in Phoenix or to enter a halfway house. Like the 

trial court, we fail to see how, within six weeks of release, Stephanie could demonstrate 

her ability to provide the care Nathan needs in a safe place of residence so that 

reunification could actually take place at that point. 

 At the disposition hearing and in her petition, Stephanie argues that we should take 

into account the possibility, under sections 361.5, subdivision (a)(4) and 366.22, 

subdivision (b), that the time period might be extended to 24 months. However, in order 

to be granted the additional six months of reunification services, Stephanie would have to 

demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence at the 18-month point, six weeks after her 

release, that she had made “significant and consistent progress in establishing a safe 

home for [Nathan’s] return.” (§ 366.22, subd. (b).) There is no evidence, and no 

reasonable likelihood, that Stephanie would be able to demonstrate significant and 

consistent progress within six weeks of her release. 

 As noted in Fabian L. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1030-1031 

(quoting Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Court Practice and Procedure (2012) 

§ 2.129[2][b], pp. 2-390 to 2-391, italics added): “ ‘[T]here are many cases in which the 

provision of . . . services has little or no likelihood of success and thus only serves to 

delay stability for the child, particularly if the incarcerated parent is the only parent 

receiving services. This is especially true when the parent will be incarcerated longer 

than the maximum time periods for reunification efforts. . . . Indeed, to attempt services 

in such circumstances may be setting everyone up for failure, including the parent, 
14

agency, and child. Thus, in cases such as these, it may be possible to show that providing 

services to the incarcerated parent would be detrimental to the child since it would delay 

permanency with no likelihood of success.’ ” 

 Given that Stephanie’s release date is so close to the 18-month point, substantial 

evidence supports a conclusion that this factor weighs against providing reunification 

services. 

Any other appropriate factors. On this factor, Stephanie argues as follows: 

“What has happened to [Nathan] is a travesty. He has been taken away from not only his 

mother, but other biological family members as well. The most important factor is that 

[Nathan] was essentially kidnapped from his family, and later kidnapped from his foster 

placement by the same individual. Because [Tracy] cut-off all contact with [Stephanie] 

and ran off with [Nathan], [Stephanie] was not able to place [Nathan] in suitable care 

during her current incarceration, which at least under California law would not have risen 

to the level to detain [Nathan] in the first place. [Tracy] has committed a great wrong 

that needs to be righted. The only way to do so is to allow [Nathan] to have the 

opportunity to reunify with his mother.” 

 We agree that Tracy committed a great wrong against both Stephanie and Nathan 

and that consideration of that wrongdoing weighs in favor of ordering reunification 

services. Nevertheless, even though Tracy contributed to the current state of affairs, so 

did Stephanie with the criminal acts that resulted in her lengthy incarceration. It was the 

duty of the court to consider the best interests of Nathan in the current state of affairs, 

whatever its cause—not to right the wrongs that created that state of affairs. 

 Stephanie concludes her examination of the factors by, in essence, asking us to 

ignore the proper standard of review: “In looking at the balance of the factors, there is 

not clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to [Nathan] to offer 

services to [Stephanie].” On review, we do not reweigh the factors. We simply ask if 

substantial evidence supports the determination of the juvenile court. Here, substantial 

evidence supports a determination that most of the relevant factors weigh against the 

provision of reunification services to Stephanie. 
15

DISPOSITION 

The petition for extraordinary writ relief is denied on the merits. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.452(h)(1).) The stay of the section 366.26 hearing is lifted. This decision is 

final as to this court immediately. (Id., rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) 

 _________________________ 

 Brick, J.* 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

Kline, P.J. 

_________________________ 

Richman, J. 

 * Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.