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NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN: BLOCKING OR

PAVING TEHRAN’S PATH TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 19, 2015

Serial No. 114–39

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Antony J. Blinken, Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State ........................................................................................................ 5

Mr. Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury .......................................... 16

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Antony J. Blinken: Prepared statement ...................................... 8

Mr. Adam J. Szubin: Prepared statement ............................................................. 18

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 63

Written responses from the Honorable Antony J. Blinken to questions submitted for the record by: 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs .............. 64

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Florida .......................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey ................................................................................... 68

(1)

NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN: BLOCKING OR 

PAVING TEHRAN’S PATH TO NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS? 

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:30 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order, and the committee here today will continue to evaluate the administration’s nuclear diplomacy with Iran. That is the subject of the hearing today. 

Negotiators face a high-stakes deadline next week. We will hear 

the administration’s case today. But it is critical that the administration hears our bipartisan concerns here. 

Deputy Secretary Blinken, this is your first appearance before 

the committee, and I congratulate you on your position. I wish you 

well. 

And after the hearing, I trust you will be in touch with Secretary 

Kerry, Under Secretary Sherman and others that are involved in 

the negotiating process to report on the committee’s views and I 

think this is very important. 

This committee has been at the forefront of examining the threat 

of a nuclear Iran. Much of the pressure that has been brought on 

the Islamic Republic of Iran and that brought them to the table 

was put in place by Congress, and it was put in place over the objections of the executive branch. 

Now, that is the executive branch whether it was Republican or 

Democratic administrations, but it is the House of Representatives 

that has driven this process, and we would have more pressure on 

Iran today if the administration hadn’t pressured the Senate to sit 

on the Royce-Engel sanctions bill that this committee produced and 

passed in 2013 and passed, by the way, unanimously—and passed 

off the House floor 400 to 20. 

So Congress is proud of this role and we want to see the administration get a lasting and meaningful agreement. But, unfortunately, the administration’s negotiating strategy has been more 

about managing proliferation than preventing it, and a case in 

point that I bring up is Iran’s uranium enrichment program—the 

key technology needed in developing a nuclear bomb. 

Reportedly, the administration would be agreeable to leaving 

much of Iran’s enrichment capability in place for a decade. If ConVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:59 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\031915\93822 SHIRL
2

gress will be asked to roll back its sanctions on Iran, which will 

certainly fund Iran’s terrorist activities when we roll back those 

sanctions, then there must be a substantial rollback of Iran’s nuclear program. 

And consider that international inspectors report that Iran has 

still not revealed its past bomb work despite its commitment to 

those inspectors to the IAEA to do that, and the IAEA is still concerned about signs of Iran’s military-related activities including designing a nuclear payload for a missile. 

Iran has not even begun to address these concerns and last fall 

over 350 members wrote to the Secretary of State expressing deep 

concerns about this lack of cooperation from Iran. How can we expect Iran to uphold an agreement when they are not meeting their 

current commitments? 

Indeed, we were not surprised to see Iran continue to illicitly 

procure nuclear technology during these negotiations or that 

Tehran was caught testing a more advanced centrifuge that would 

help produce bomb material quicker—a new grade of supersonic 

centrifuge right in the middle of this process. 

This was a violation of the spirit and, in my view, the letter of 

the interim agreement. Iran’s deception is all the more reason that 

the administration should obtain zero notice anywhere anytime inspections on Iran’s declared and undeclared facilities. 

You have to have a verification regime in this process that is 

going to work for us. And there is also the fact that limits placed 

on Iran’s nuclear program as part of the final agreement now being 

negotiated are going to expire. 

They will expire, and that means the final agreement is just another interim step. What you call the ‘‘final’’ agreement is an interim step with the real final step being Iran treated as any other 

non-nuclear weapons state under the Nonproliferation Treaty, thus 

licensing it to pursue industrial-scale enrichment. 

With a deep history of deception, covert procurement, and clandestine facilities, Iran is ‘‘not any other country.’’ It is certainly not 

any other country to be conceded in an industrial-scale nuclear program. 

Any meaningful agreement must keep restrictions in place for 

decades, as over 360 Members of Congress, including every member 

of this committee, are demanding in a letter to the President this 

week. 

Meanwhile, Iran is intensifying its destructive role in the region. 

The Islamic Republic of Iran is propping up Assad in Syria while 

its proxy, Hezbollah, threatens Israel. 

Iranian-backed Shi’a militia are killing hopes of a unified, stable 

Iraq and last month an Iranian-backed militia displaced the government in Yemen, formerly a key counterterrorism partner to the 

United States. 

Many of our allies and partners see Iran pocketing an advantageous nuclear agreement and ramping up its aggression in the 

region as a result of the hard currency that they will have at their 

disposal as the sanctions are lifted. 

So this committee is prepared to evaluate any agreement to determine if it is in the long-term national security interests of the 

United States and our allies. 

3

Indeed, as Secretary Kerry testified not long ago, any agreement 

will have to pass muster with Congress. Those were his words. Yet, 

that commitment has been muddied by the administration’s insistence in recent weeks that Congress will not play a role, and that 

is not right. 

Congress built the sanction structure that brought Iran to the 

table, and if the President moves to dismantle it, we will have a 

say. 

So I now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Eliot Engel of New 

York, for his opening remarks. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

calling this very important and timely hearing. 

Mr. Deputy Secretary, Mr. Under Secretary, welcome to our committee. We are grateful for your service and we look forward to 

your testimony and I want to congratulate both of you on your new 

positions. 

The chairman’s remarks are very similar to mine. We have 

worked very hard on this committee to have bipartisanship because 

both the chairman and I agree that if there is one place where we 

need bipartisanship more than any other place, it involves foreign 

policy. 

And so wherever possible we try to talk with one voice, and I 

want to associate myself with the chairman’s remarks. We have 

seen a lot of speculative reporting in the press about might or 

might not be included in the comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. 

Today, we are going to send over a letter to the President signed 

by 360 Members of Congress in both parties, a majority of each 

party, talking about some of the things that we are concerned with 

and we would hope that we could get a prompt response from the 

White House. 

It is truly a very bipartisan letter expressing Congress’ strong 

feelings about things that need to be in the agreement. I want to 

emphasize—re-emphasize what the chairman said. There really 

cannot be any marginalization of Congress. 

Congress really needs to play a very active and vital role in this 

whole process and any attempts to sidestep Congress will be resisted on both sides of the aisle. We have seen a lot of speculative 

reporting in the press about what might or might not be included 

in a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. 

We don’t technically even know right now if there is going to be 

a deal, but if there is I think we would all be wise to review the 

details before passing judgment on whether it is a good deal or bad 

deal or simply a deal we can live with. 

I think it is safe to assume that we are not going to see what 

I would consider a perfect deal. I have said all along that Iran 

should have been required to freeze enrichment during the negotiations but they weren’t and it is clear that a freeze is not on the 

table for a comprehensive agreement. 

At this stage, we need to focus on making the deal as good as 

it can be. I am hoping that our witnesses can shed light on a few 

key areas that, for me, could tip the scales between a bad deal and 

a deal that we might be able to live with. 

4

First, as part of any comprehensive agreement, we need total 

clarity about where Iran stands in terms of its ability to weaponize 

its nuclear material. How far along are they? 

Secondly, will the deal give us sufficient time to respond if Iran 

reneges and presses full throttle toward a nuclear weapon. Is a 1-

year break-out period the time until Iran has sufficient enriched 

uranium to then build a bomb? Is that enough time to catch their 

violation and react? 

Next, how would a comprehensive agreement stop Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon covertly if they make a decision to sneak 

out rather than break out? Iran’s leaders don’t deserve an ounce 

of trust. We need very strong safeguards. 

Lastly, how will we be certain that sanctions relief won’t just 

open the faucet for funding terrorism or fueling the regime’s already abysmal human rights record? 

In my view, these questions lay out clear markers for what we 

need to see. Here is the bottom line. If we say yes to a deal, will 

it be worth unraveling the decades of sanctions and pressure that 

the United States and our partners have built against Iran? 

But if we say no, would we be able to hold the sanctions coalition 

together, and if we maintain or even increase our sanctions, 

wouldn’t Iran just move full speed ahead toward a bomb? 

I know these negotiations have gone on for months and months. 

I know the P5+1 is under intense pressure to produce something. 

But we cannot allow those factors to push us into a bad deal being 

sold as a good deal. 

The administration has argued that reaching a deal is the best 

chance to solve a nuclear crisis diplomatically and avoid another 

war in the Middle East, that dialing up sanctions at this stage 

would undermine the talks. 

And as I have repeatedly said, I am willing to see what is actually in the deal before passing judgment and I strongly urge my 

colleagues to do the same. 

But make no mistake, Congress will play an important role in 

the evaluation of a final deal. Again, I want to say that I will not 

stand by and allow Congress to be marginalized. 

Any permanent repeal of sanctions is by law Congress’ discretion, 

and before we do that we must be completely convinced that this 

deal blocks all of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear bomb. 

So I look forward to your testimony and hope we can have a 

frank discussion of these issues and, again, Mr. Chairman, thank 

you for calling this hearing today. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

This morning we are pleased to be joined by senior representatives from State and from Treasury. Mr. Tony Blinken is the Deputy Secretary of State. Previously, he served as the assistant to the 

President and was principal deputy national security adviser. 

Mr. Blinken also worked as the Democratic staff director for the 

U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and just confirmed last 

December, we welcome him for his first appearance before this 

committee. 

Mr. Adam Szubin is the Acting Under Secretary for the Office of 

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the Department of the 

5

Treasury. He previously served as the director of Treasury’s Office 

of Foreign Assets Control. 

We welcome him back, and without objection, the witnesses’ full 

prepared statements will be made part of the record. 

Members here will have 5 calendar days to submit any statements to you or any questions and any extraneous material for the 

record. We’ll ask you to please summarize your remarks, and Mr. 

Secretary, if you would begin. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANTONY J. BLINKEN, 

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BLINKEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It is pleasure 

to be here. 

I want to thank you, Ranking Member Engel and the members 

of this committee for having us here today and to give us this opportunity to discuss our efforts to reach a comprehensive solution 

to the challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear program. 

As we speak and as you mentioned, Secretary of State Kerry, 

Secretary of Energy Moniz, Under Secretary of State Sherman are 

in Switzerland with our P5+1 partners negotiating with the Government of Iran over the future of its nuclear program. 

Our goal for these negotiations is to verifiably ensure that Iran’s 

program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. To that end, we seek 

to cut off the four pathways that Iran could take to obtain enough 

fissile material for a nuclear weapon. 

There are two uranium pathways through its activities at the 

Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities, a plutonium pathway 

through Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak, and a potential covert 

pathway. 

To cut off all of these pathways, any comprehensive arrangement 

must include exceptional constraints on Iran’s nuclear program and 

extraordinary monitoring and intrusive and transparency measures 

that maximize the international community’s ability to detect any 

attempt by Iran to break out overtly or covertly 

As a practical matter, we are working to ensure that Iran, should 

it renege on its commitments, would take at least 1 year to produce 

enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon. 

That would provide us with more than enough time to detect and 

act on any Iranian transgression. In exchange, the international 

community would provide Iran with phased, proportionate and reversible sanctions relief tied to verifiable actions on its part. If Iran 

were to violate its commitments, sanctions would be quickly reimposed. 

It is Iran’s responsibility to convince the world by building a 

track record of verified compliance that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. That is why we are seeking a time frame for a 

comprehensive deal of sufficient length to firmly establish such a 

track record. 

Only then would Iran be treated like any other non-nuclear 

weapons state party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty with all 

the rights but also all the obligations of an NPT state, including 

continued monitoring and inspections and a verifiably binding commitment to not build a nuclear weapon. 

6

The Bush administration first proposed this concept for Iran. 

Dozens of countries around the world responsibly adhere to the 

NPT. Much has been said recently about the fact that a deal with 

Iran would have an eventual end date. 

In fact, some constraints would be removed after a significant period of time, others would remain in effect even longer and some 

would last indefinitely, including a stringent and intrusive monitoring and inspections regime. 

Iran would have to fully implement the IAEA safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Together, these give inspectors 

access to all declared nuclear facilities and to any suspected 

undeclared facilities. 

So even after some core constraints are completed, far more intrusive inspections will be required of Iran than before this agreement. 

Some have argued that Iran would be free to develop a nuclear 

weapon at the conclusion of the comprehensive joint plan of action 

if we achieve it. That is simply not true. 

To the contrary, Iran would be prohibited from developing a nuclear weapon in perpetuity and we would have a much greater ability to detect any effort by Iran to do so. Iran would be allowed to 

have a peaceful civilian nuclear program, continuously verified by 

the IAEA. 

Our goal is to reach an agreement on the major elements of the 

deal by the end of this month and to complete the technical details 

by the end of June. There has been a lot of reporting in the press 

about where we are. This is what I can tell you as of today. 

In Switzerland, the negotiations have been substantive and intense. We have made some progress on some of the core issues. Significant gaps remain on some of the other issues between what we 

and our partners in the P5+1 believe must be part of the comprehensive deal and what Iran is willing to do. 

While the negotiations are taking place, it is vital, in our judgment, that we avoid any actions that would lead the world to believe that the United States was responsible for their failure. 

Such actions include enacting new sanctions legislation now. 

New sanctions at this time, including through so-called trigger legislation, are unnecessary. Iran knows very well that if it refuses a 

reasonable agreement or reneges on its commitments, new sanctions can and will be passed in a matter of days. 

New sanctions now would be inconsistent with our commitments 

under the interim agreement. They would undermine our sanctions 

coalition. They would give Iran an excuse to walk away from the 

talks or take a hard line that makes an agreement impossible to 

achieve while blaming the failure on us. 

In our judgment, we also must avoid actions that call into question the President’s authority to make commitments that the 

United States will keep. Negotiating with a foreign nation is the 

President’s responsibility. 

If there is confusion on this basic point, no foreign government 

will trust that when a President purports to speak for our country, 

he actually does. 

In this case, such confusion could embolden hardliners in Iran, 

divide us from our allies, poison the prospects for a deal and make 

7

it much more difficult to sustain international support for the existing sanctions, never mind new ones, if negotiations collapse. 

That international support is critical to the success of the sanctions regime that Congress took such an important role in building. 

Up until now, we have kept other countries onboard despite the 

hardship it has caused some of them, in large part because they 

are convinced we are serious about reaching a diplomatic solution. 

If they lose that conviction, the United States, not Iran, could be 

isolated and the sanctions regime could collapse. 

Congress has played and will continue to play a central leading 

role in these efforts. Congressional legislation gave us the tools to 

get Iran to the negotiating table and, as has been noted, only Congress has the authority to lift sanctions as part of any comprehensive solution. 

Since signing the interim deal, we have been on the Hill dozens 

of times to update on the progress of the talks—in all, more than 

200 briefings, meetings, hearings and phone calls. 

If we reach an agreement we will welcome intense robust scrutiny. We also will expect that any critics explain not only why the 

deal is lacking but also what would be a better alternative and how 

it could be achieved. 

Our nuclear discussions with Iran do not alter our commitment 

to the security of our allies in the region who are deeply affected 

by Iran’s efforts to spread instability and support terrorism. That 

commitment will not change with or without a deal. 

We will retain the necessary tools and the determination to continue countering Iran’s troubling behavior. Indeed, the most important thing we can do to keep Iran from feeling further emboldened 

is to deny them a nuclear weapon and we will continue to support 

those in Iran demanding greater respect for the universal human 

rights and rule of law that they deserve and we will continue to 

insist that Iran release Saeed Abedini, Amir Hekmati and Jason 

Rezaian and help us find Robert Levinson. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blinken follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Szubin. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ADAM J. SZUBIN, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF TERRORISM AND FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Mr. SZUBIN. Thank you and good morning, Chairman Royce, 

Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee. 

It is a pleasure to be here today and thank you for the invitation. 

This is my first appearance, as you noted, before a congressional 

committee in my new role as Acting Under Secretary for TFI at the 

Treasury Department. 

In my time at Treasury, including 9 years leading the Office of 

Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, I have devoted the majority of 

my working hours to building, honing and implementing sanctions 

on Iran—both executive sanctions and the strong congressional bipartisan sanctions that you all have enacted. So I am particularly 

appreciative of being able to testify here today on this vital issue. 

The global architecture of our sanctions on Iran is unprecedented 

both in terms of its strength and the international foundations that 

underpin it. Working together with our partners around the world 

and with Congress, we have assembled a coalition that has fundamentally altered Iran’s economic posture. 

As a result, we today have a chance of resolving one of the 

world’s most vexing and persistent security threats. At this critical 

juncture in the talks, it is important to note that Iran remains 

under massive strain and has no viable route to an economic recovery without negotiated relief from international sanctions. 

This strain is visible across every sector in Iran’s economy. First, 

their financial lifeline—oil. In 2012, Iran was exporting about 2.5 

billion—I am sorry, 2.5 million barrels per day of oil to some 20 jurisdictions. 

Today, Iran is exporting 60 percent less oil than just 3 years ago 

to just six jurisdictions. The losses, of course, have been compounded by the steep drop in global oil prices such that Iran’s chief 

revenue source is today bringing in less than one quarter of what 

it brought in for Iran just 3 years ago. 

Just as troubling for Iran is the fact that it can’t freely access 

those revenues. It has a reduced stream of revenues that, thanks 

to Congress, are going into restricted accounts, either frozen or tied 

up in banks around the world. 

Foreign investment in Iran has dropped precipitously. From 2004 

to 2013, as foreign capital was pouring into developing countries, 

Iran saw an 80-percent drop in foreign investment. 

Iran’s oil minister recently estimated that Iran’s oil, gas and 

petro-chem sectors will need approximately $170 billion to recover. 

The Iranian rial has depreciated 52 percent since 2012 and has lost 

12 percent of its value just under the JPOA period alone as we 

have been negotiating. 

The IMF for this coming year projects that Iran’s economy will 

enter stagnation, with GDP growth falling to .6 percent. This is the 

lowest projected rate of any country the IMF looks at in the Middle 

East and North Africa region, including countries like Afghanistan 

that sell no oil. 

17

Finally, Iran’s banking sector remains isolated and holds a high 

proportion of nonperforming loans. As you can hear, their economy 

is under strain, but this sanctions pressure cannot be sustained 

without work. 

Accordingly, over the JPOA period we have worked very intensively to enforce our sanctions. In the past 15 months, we have targeted nearly 100 actors, individuals and companies who were either helping Iran evade sanctions or helping Iran conduct other 

misconduct. 

We have imposed nearly $1⁄2 billion in penalties on companies 

that were conducting illicit transactions under our Iran sanctions 

and we will not soften our enforcement of existing sanctions. 

Now, as we speak, negotiators are hard at work trying to secure 

a joint comprehensive plan of action. Regardless of whether or not 

these negotiations succeed, I want to assure this committee that 

the Treasury Department and the administration as a whole are 

prepared for whatever comes next. 

If we are able to secure a comprehensive understanding, we will 

structure nuclear-related sanctions relief in a way that is phased, 

proportionate and reversible. We will need to see verified steps on 

Iran’s part before sanctions are lifted and we believe that powerful 

U.S. legislative sanctions should not be terminated for years to 

come so that we continue to retain important leverage years into 

a deal. 

Alternatively, if we determine that a comprehensive deal with 

Iran cannot be obtained, the administration, working with Congress, is prepared to ratchet up the pressure. Over the past decade, 

we have developed very subtle insights into Iran’s financial flows, 

its economic stress points and how it attempts to work around 

sanctions. 

We stand ready to raise the costs on Iran substantially should 

it make clear that it is unwilling to address the international community’s concerns. Of course, while we must prepare for every contingency, we remain hopeful that we can achieve a peaceful resolution to this serious and long-standing threat. 

Thank you again for inviting me to appear here today and I look 

forward to taking your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Szubin follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Szubin. 

If I could go to my first question here—it goes to the sunset. Deputy Secretary Blinken, a major concern here is the expiration date. 

In as little as 10 years, all of the restrictions and other measures 

that you are touting here today are going to come off and Iran’s nuclear program is going to be then treated as though it was the 

equivalent of the Netherlands. 

So why 10 years? Does the administration believe or hope that 

the Iranian regime will have moderated within that time frame? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, there is no agreement on the duration of various obligations. All of that is the subject of current negotiations. So whether some aspects are 10 years, more or less, that is all to be negotiated. 

I think looking at this as a sunset is not the accurate way to look 

at what we are trying to achieve. What we are proposing and seeking to achieve is a series of constraints and obligations. 

Some will end after a long period of time, others will continue 

longer than that and still others will be indefinite, in perpetuity. 

The bottom line is that even after certain obligations are completed 

by Iran, it cannot become a nuclear weapon state. 

It will be legally bound under the nonproliferation treaty not to 

make or acquire a nuclear weapon. There will be legally binding 

safeguards on material to verify and deter its diversion. It will 

have to sign and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement 

and the additional protocol. 

Chairman ROYCE. But that is why we are here today. You are 

putting this stock in Iran’s signature to the NPT and its safeguards 

agreement, right? They have had those same commitments. They 

have been violating those commitments for years. 

That is why this process. I would just—I would just point that 

out. And the other point I would make is that 10 years or whatever 

that time frame is, they are then going to be treated as any other 

non-nuclear weapon NPT state, and that means no sanctions, no 

restrictions on procurement, no restrictions on the stockpile or the 

number of centrifuges it can spend at that point, 10 years out, or 

on the purity level to which it may enrich uranium. 

And I will just give you an example of where this would put Iran. 

They would enrich uranium at that point to levels near weapon 

grade, I am presuming, claiming the desire to power a nuclear 

navy because that is what Brazil is doing. So I am going to assume 

that they are going to do the same thing there. 

And that would all be permissible. It would all be blessed under 

this agreement, as I read it, no matter who is in charge of Iran in 

10 years. 

And that’s why Ranking Member Engel and I have a letter going 

to the President, signed by over 350 Members of Congress, demanding that the verifiable constraints on Iran’s program last decades, not, as being discussed, a shorter period of time. So I just 

want to make that point. 

Let me go to my next question, and that goes to the 1-year 

breakout. The administration has set a benchmark—a 1-year 

breakout period. But is a year sufficient to detect and then reverse 

25

potential Iranian violations and why not insist on a period of 2 or 

3 years? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Mr. Chairman, we think that a 1-year breakout 

time not only is sufficient but, indeed, is quite conservative. 

We believe that with the verification and inspections and monitoring that we will insist on in any agreement that would give us 

more than enough time not only to detect any abuse of the agreement but also to act on it. 

If you look at what various experts have said, many have said 

that a far lesser period of time would be sufficient to detect and 

act on any violations. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, let——

Mr. BLINKEN. This is—let me also, just if I can just add to this 

very quickly, Mr. Chairman. 

One year is very conservative. First of all, that is the most—if 

everything went perfectly for Iran. Second, the idea that any country, including Iran, would break out for one bomb’s worth of material is highly unlikely. Like I said, we are——

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. But let me go to this question then. Will 

you insist that the IAEA inspectors have anywhere anytime access 

to all facilities in Iran including Revolutionary Guard bases, from 

what we know about what has gone on there, and will Iran have 

to satisfy all questions that the IAEA has regarding Iran’s covert 

research on a nuclear warhead including access to key scientific 

personnel and paperwork? 

Mr. BLINKEN. So without going into the details because all of this 

is this still subject to negotiation, we will insist that the IAEA have 

the access is must have in order to do its job and to verify. 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes, I understand your perspective of what is 

necessary to do their job. But mine is a specific list of criteria based 

upon my discussions with the IAEA, and I want to make certain 

that those are found and then are followed. 

And then lastly, it seems the administration plans to push the 

Security Council to adopt a new resolution to basically bless this 

agreement and relax sanctions, but at the same time you are pushing off Congress. 

Why push for U.N. action but not Congress? 

Mr. BLINKEN. We are not pushing off either. I think, as you said 

and as Ranking Member Engel said, Congress will have to exercise 

its authority to lift sanctions at the end of an agreement if Iran 

complies and, indeed, keeping that until the end, until we see that 

Iran is complying, is the best way to sustain leverage. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, our concern here is if you push us off for 

10 years, let us say, in theory, and if this is consequential enough 

to go to the U.N. Security Council at the outset under a resolution 

under Chapter 7, which by definition deals with a threat to peace, 

breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, then it would certainly be consequential enough to be submitted to the Senate for 

advise and consent. That is the point I wanted to make. 

Mr. BLINKEN. So the Security Council—this is an international 

agreement. It is an agreement that would be made with the other 

members of the Security Council, with Iran. 

26

Under these circumstances, it would be normal for the Security 

Council to take note of any agreement and then to create a basis 

for lifting the U.N.-related sanctions. 

Chairman ROYCE. But let me——

Mr. BLINKEN. Yes, Congress will eventually have to decide 

whether to lift U.S. sanctions. 

Chairman ROYCE. My time has expired, but suggesting that Congress has a role to play by voting on sanctions relief years from 

now once a deal has run its course, that to me is disingenuous. But 

that is my view of it. 

We will go to Mr. Engel for his questions. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me, first, also emphasize that the trepidation that all of us 

have about these negotiations involves, at least for me, what the 

chairman said, that any deal that would sunset in 10 years or however much we were very, obviously, concerned about and I know 

you are well and we, obviously, want to push that back as much 

as we possibly can because we really just don’t trust Iran. 

And I think the chairman is right on the mark in terms of our 

concern with the sunset in 10 years or so. Another thing that has 

bothered us, you know, and again, as the chairman mentioned, he 

and I had legislation which passed the House 2 years ago by 400 

to 20 and unanimously out of this committee, which involved 

strong sanctions, and had the Senate followed suit and been signed 

into law I think we would have been in a much stronger position 

now. 

But one of the things that is really annoying to all of us is that 

we are sitting and negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program 

at a time when Iran continues to be a bad actor all around the 

world. 

You take a look at capitals that Iran essentially controls, now 

Yemen being added to that—Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut. This is 

not a regime that looks like it wants peace. Iran continues to fuel 

terrorism around the globe. 

It is the number one, in my opinion, state supporter of terrorism 

around the globe. So I believe that a nuclear agreement should not 

whitewash the fact that Iran remains a destabilizing actor in the 

region and funds terrorism. 

Now, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps theoretically could 

take advantage of any sanctions relief that results from an agreement between the P5+1 and Iran because money is fungible. So 

how could such relief be structured to minimize any benefits to the 

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Engel. 

First, let me just say we share your deep concerns about Iran’s 

activities in the region—destabilizing activities, support for terrorism and, of course, its own abuse of human rights at home, 

which is why we will and we will continue to vigorously oppose 

those efforts. 

And, indeed, throughout the interim agreement we have pushed 

back very hard on proliferation activities, WMD-related activities, 

terrorism support activities, sanctioning designating individuals, 

intercepting cargoes, et cetera, and working with our partners as 

we have been for more than 6 years to build up their capacity. 

27

With regard to any money that Iran receives as a result of relief 

from sanctions, I would turn to my colleague to discuss this. But 

let me just say I think what we see is that Iran is in a very deep 

economic hole and a large part of the reason that Rouhani was 

elected as President was to respond to the desire of the people to 

try and get out of the hole. 

So in one instance at least we believe that a significant portion 

of any revenues they receive would go to trying to plug their economic holes at home. 

That said, you are exactly right. Money is fungible and presumably that would free up some resources for the IRGC. That said, 

we also believe that denying Iran a nuclear weapon is the single 

most significant thing we could do to prevent further emboldening 

Iran it its actions in the region. 

Mr. ENGEL. And let us me just say, before Mr. Szubin talks, that 

is precisely what we are concerned about because Iran is in a deep 

economic hole. 

By having an agreement and releasing that, helping them, so to 

speak, get out of that hole, we want to, obviously, make sure, and 

you do as well, obviously, to make sure that the safeguards are in 

there as well. 

That is what makes me nervous because once you lose that leverage it is very, very hard to get back. Mr. Szubin? 

Mr. SZUBIN. Yes. Ranking Member Engel, thank you and I will 

say as well that is a concern we have been keenly focused on. 

The truth is the size of the hole that Iran is in, across almost 

any indicator you look at, is far deeper than the relief that is on 

the table, even the substantial relief, should Iran make good on all 

of the commitments that are being set out by the negotiators. 

We are talking about a hole that could be described, in one sense, 

as a $200-billion hole, which are the losses that we assess they 

have suffered since 2012 due to sanctions. 

In just the energy infrastructure, as I mentioned during my 

opening statement, their minister came out recently and said they 

need $170 billion just to regain their footing in that sector alone. 

The average Iranian has seen steady decreases in their standard 

of living, decreases in their purchasing power, even since Rouhani 

came into office, even since the JPOA went into effect. 

And so it is going to be a tremendous effort, a years-long effort, 

for Iran to right itself, and that is not going to happen overnight. 

Finally, I just want to reiterate what Deputy Secretary Blinken 

said. None of our sanctions targeting the nefarious activities that 

you mentioned are going away. None of those are on the table for 

discussion. 

So with respect to the Quds Force interventions in Yemen and 

Syria, we—and Hezbollah, very notably, we will continue to pressure any forms of support that we see. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask you one final quick question because you 

mentioned Hezbollah, and I want to say that we all agree that Iran 

continues to support terrorism and sow instability in the Middle 

East. 

However, the director of national intelligence did not include Iranian terrorism or Hezbollah or any terrorist threat for that matter 

28

in the 2015 worldwide threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence 

communities. 

Can you tell me why? That didn’t make any sense to me. Or you 

can—we can talk and you can send me a letter about it. 

Mr. SZUBIN. Yes, I am happy to get back to you on that. But my 

understanding is, first of all, Hezbollah remains front and center 

in our concerns. I think the director was talking about the immediate front-burner concern that we have with ISIL and that was 

the focus of his remarks. 

But it remains a foreign terrorist organization. It remains very 

much in the spotlight of our efforts to counter it, to push back on 

it, to isolate it around the world. 

Mr. ENGEL. And could not exist if it wasn’t for Iran? 

Mr. SZUBIN. That is correct. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We go now to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Blinken, during your confirmation hearing in the Senate you 

had promised Senator Rubio and the Foreign Relations Committee 

that you and the administration would consult Congress on any 

policy changes the administration was seeking toward Cuba. 

That turned out to be a complete falsehood. I worry that the 

Cuba example was a deliberate attempt by the administration to 

keep Congress in the dark regarding the Castro negotiations. 

And why is this important? Not only because of the Cuba deal 

but of how that implicates the Iranian deal. Keeping us in the dark 

it foreshadows the administration’s approach to Congress and keeping us out of the loop on the Iranian deal. The administration has 

made it clear that it does not want Congress to vote on the Iranian 

deal anytime soon. 

But you just said to Mr. Royce that the U.N. Security Council 

will be having a vote, a binding vote, on the Iranian deal. Just to 

make it clear, you will be going to the U.N. Security Council to ask 

for a vote on the Iranian deal—yes or no? 

Mr. BLINKEN. We will be going to the Security Council presumably, because this is an international agreement, implicating——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes? 

Mr. BLINKEN [continuing]. All the members of the Security Council to take note of the deal and if there are any requirements——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Vote on the deal? 

Mr. BLINKEN. If there are any requirements of the Security 

Council pursuant to the deal——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. To vote? 

Mr. BLINKEN [continuing]. To make clear that it will make 

good——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Congress can wait for the U.N. Security 

Council. 

Mr. BLINKEN [continuing]. On its commitments just as Congress 

will have to vote and decide——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We have 10 years from now. 

Mr. BLINKEN [continuing]. On any lifting sanctions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Sure. No problem. And Palestinian statehood—there have been reports last night that in order for PresiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:59 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\031915\93822 SHIRL
29

dent Obama to continue his temper tantrum toward Prime Minister Netanyahu, what we will be doing in the United Nations is 

push in the shadows for a vote on Palestinian statehood in order 

to pressure Israel to be at the negotiation table with the Palestinians. 

Is that true? Is that press report true? 

Mr. BLINKEN. No. The administration’s support for Israel is absolutely unshakable. We have done more for Israel’s security over the 

last 6 years——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Oh, that support is very clear. Thank you. 

Thank you. No, that support is very clear. 

Mr. BLINKEN [continuing]. Than any administration has. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And I am going to ask you another question on Iran for a minute. 

But I wanted to ask Mr. Szubin, your Cuba sanctions regulatory 

revisions earlier this year took a very broad view of the administration’s licensing authority under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 

and I fear that the administration is using Cuba as a test case, as 

I said, for normalizing relations with Tehran and will utilize its licensing authority to provide broad relief for Iran. 

Under the JPOA, the U.S. is committed to removing nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. However, as the author of the Iran sanctions law, the concept of an exclusively defined nuclear-related 

sanction on Iran does not exist in U.S. law because the sanctions 

are intertwined with Iran’s human rights record, its ballistic missile program and its support for terrorism. 

So I ask you, Mr. Szubin, which sanctions will you seek to suspend and ultimately lift under a final agreement and will you come 

to Congress to ask for authorities before such action is taken? 

Mr. SZUBIN. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

With respect to the actions we took in the Cuba amendments 

amending our regulations, I will note that the licensing authority 

is one that has been drawn on by administrations, Democratic and 

Republican, over the last decade and I have been involved under 

both presidencies, and it is an authority that——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We will leave—it is going to take 

a long time. 

Mr. Blinken, Iran has been cheating, skirting the rules, violating 

international agreements, you have heard, from both Mr. Engel 

and Mr. Royce on that. 

What mechanism do we have to enforce any violation? Will there 

be penalties imbedded in the nuclear deal? If you could be specific. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you. First, I should note that the IAEA has 

said repeatedly that Iran has complied with its obligations under 

the interim agreement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Is that all that the IAEA has said? Has the 

IAEA also not said that Iran is not complying and is not letting 

them in, as the IAEA has asked? 

Mr. BLINKEN. No. It has said that under the agreement Iran has 

complied. It has also said—you are correct—that outside of the 

agreement Iran, of course, is seeking to do whatever——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So you look at their reports and say—you 

cherry pick and you say, okay, the IAEA is happy with this? 

Mr. BLINKEN. No. 

30

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You should give the totality of what they 

have been saying——

Mr. BLINKEN. No, no. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. And how frustrated that agency 

has been with Iran throughout all of these negotiations. 

Mr. BLINKEN. No, no. I want to be clear, to answer your question, 

that the IAEA said that with regard to its obligations under the interim agreement, Iran has complied. 

You are also absolutely correct that outside of the agreement, including the critical question of the possible military dimensions of 

Iran’s program in the past or for that matter now, it has not complied with what the IAEA is seeking and, indeed, that will have to 

be part of any agreement. 

And as to enforcement, it is very straightforward. As the Under 

Secretary said, as I said, in the event Iran were to renege on any 

commitment it made the sanctions would snap back in full force. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I am sure that Iran is just shaking at 

that because that is very——

Mr. BLINKEN. That is why they are at the table. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Oh, yes. Absolutely. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go to Mr. Brad Sherman of California, ranking member of the 

Asia Subcommittee. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We should remember why we are in this situation. 

The executive branch under the Bush administration refused to enforce sanctions and violated American statutes for the benefit of 

Iran for 8 continuous years. 

The Bush administration prevented Congress from passing and 

used all of its power in Congress to prevent us passing new statutory sanctions. Now, that doesn’t fit with the image we have of 

President Bush until you realize that at the time the sanctions all 

focused on international oil companies, which was not President 

Bush’s target of choice. 

Had we continued President Bush’s policies—well, we should 

know that during the Bush administration Iran went from zero to 

5,000 installed centrifuges—had we continued those policies, Iran 

would have $300 billion more available to it in cash right now because we have frozen $100 billion, and $200 billion has been lost 

to Iran in lost oil sales. 

But it is not the executive branch but Congress that has had it 

right for the last 15 years, which is why I take such offense when 

I hear the administration say, Congress, if we have a view, we are 

interfering and undermining. When you read the United States 

Constitution you will see that when it comes to economic sanctions 

and international economics, all the power is vested in Congress 

except to the extent that the President negotiates a treaty that is 

ratified by the Senate. 

Yet, I fear that what the administration is doing is using foreign 

ropes to tie the hands of the United States Congress because the 

foreign minister of Iran was able to cite Article 27 of the Vienna 

Convention on Treaties saying, well, the United States will be in 

violation of international law if Congress doesn’t do whatever the 

President promises Congress will do. 

31

I would—and the administration feeds into that when a high administration official declares foreign policy runs through the executive branch and the President and does not go through other channels. 

I fear that we will have a situation where the executive branch 

comes to us and says, you have to take this action. You are prohibited from taking that action because you are going to hold the 

United States up to ridicule for being in violation of international 

law. 

I would hope that you would look at the memo issued by the 

Carter Department of Justice that stated Congress may enact legislation modifying or abrogating executive agreements, and that if 

that was formally turned over to the Iran delegation, that would 

get us support under Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties. 

I should point out for the record that in 2007, Senator Clinton 

introduced, with the co-sponsorships of Senator Obama and Senator Kerry, the Oversight of Iraq Agreements Act, which stated 

that any status of forces agreement between the United States and 

Iraq that was not a treaty approved by two-thirds of the Senate or 

authorized by legislation would not have the force of law and prohibited funding to implement that. 

For the record, because I just don’t have time to give you at this 

moment, I would like you to explain whether under the standards 

of the Obama administration the introduction of that act by those 

three senators constituted an interference with policy undermining 

President Bush’s policy, et cetera. 

But I want to focus on a particular question. There is a question 

here. I fear that you have misled this committee in telling us that 

once Iran has the rights of a non-nuclear state, subject to the additional protocol, that you will be able to stop sneak out because you 

have said first that, well, they can’t develop a nuclear weapon because that would be illegal. That is a preposterous argument. Obviously, they are willing to break the law. 

And the next point is that you have conjured up this idea there 

will be inspections. The question is, inspections of suspected sites. 

There is nothing in the additional protocol that adds to the NPT. 

The NPT was in force and it took 2 years after it was widely suspected that Fordow was a secret site for the IAEA to get there. 

So why do you tell us that oh, this IAEA, it has worked fine for 

Japan and the Netherlands—it will work great for Iran—when it 

won’t allow us to get in quickly to suspected sites? Mr. Deputy Secretary. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you very much. 

First, if Iran makes an agreement it will make it with the full 

knowledge that if it violates the agreement there will be severe 

consequences. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I was talking about sneaking, not being detected. 

Secret sites. 

Mr. BLINKEN. The inspections regime that we will insist on, first 

of all, for any initial duration—let me finish, if I may, please—will 

be beyond that, that any country has had anytime, anywhere in the 

world. 

32

That will—from cradle to grave of the production progress—

mines, mills, factories, centrifuge facilities. That will create a basis 

of knowledge of the people, the places, the documents, that will last 

far beyond the duration of any of those provisions. 

Then beyond that, its obligations under a safeguards agreement, 

under the additional protocol, under Modified Code 3.1. All of those 

taken together will, with any other measures that we might 

achieve on top of that and those remain to be negotiated, give us 

the confidence that the inspectors will have the ability to detect in 

a timely fashion any efforts by Iran to break out of the agreement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So you need an intrusive inspection regime, you 

will have it for a few years and then, for reasons you can’t explain, 

the blindfolds will go on and we will hope that we can prevent 

sneak-out thereafter. 

I yield back. 

Mr. BLINKEN. The blindfolds won’t be on. They will be off. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. 

So Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California, chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It does 

get a little tiring to keep being reminded that President Bush is 

responsible for all of our problems. After all of these years they are 

still blaming President Bush. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If the gentleman will yield. I blame the executive 

branch and I spent four of it blaming the current executive branch. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

I am—are we actually more concerned about the mullah regime 

in Iran having possession of a nuclear weapon versus what we 

seem to be just talking about—is their ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon? 

Don’t we see this—do you see that in this debate, Mr. Secretary, 

and shouldn’t we be—I think, frankly, with Mr. Netanyahu’s 

speech as well as what we have been hearing here, I think the 

American people are being lulled into a false sense of security—

that if we just prevent them from being able to manufacture the 

weapon that these crazy mullahs aren’t going to have their hands 

on the ability to have possession a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. BLINKEN. The issue is——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You have to push a button on it. 

Mr. BLINKEN. I apologize. Thank you. 

Like it or not, Iran has mastered the fuel cycle and we can’t 

bomb that away, we can’t sanction that away and, unfortunately, 

we probably can’t negotiate that away. 

So they have the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Negotiate what away? 

Mr. BLINKEN. The fuel—their mastery of the fuel cycle. They 

have the knowledge of how to put together a weapon. 

So the issue is whether the program that they have is so limited, 

so constrained, so inspected, so transparent, that as a practical 

matter they cannot develop material for a bomb, or if they did we 

would detect it and have time to do something about it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is not my question. Whether they can 

manufacture it or not, couldn’t they get one from Pakistan or from 

33

China or from Korea or perhaps somebody stole a couple nuclear 

weapons as the Soviet Union was collapsing? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Yes. No, your point is very well taken, which is exactly why, as a my colleague said, even if there is an agreement, 

the various sanctions and stringent efforts we are making around 

the world to prevent Iran from proliferating or from receiving the 

benefits of proliferation will continue. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, the only—the only way we are going to 

prevent these bad guys from having the nuclear weapon—we keep 

saying Iran. We don’t really mean Iran. The people of Iran are really nice people. 

In fact, I understand they like Americans more than just about 

any other country in the world. It is the mullah regime. It is these 

the bloody mullahs that are supporting terrorism around the world, 

that are repressing their own people. 

Isn’t the real answer trying to make ourselves partners with 

those people in Iran who want a more democratic country, a more 

democratic country, and has not this administration passed up 

time and time again the opportunity to work with the people of 

Iran to free themselves from these mullahs? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Congressman, I think you are exactly right that 

the actions of the regime are the problem, whether it is destabilizing activities in the region, whether it is support for terrorist 

groups including Hezbollah and whether it is, indeed, their abusive 

human rights at home, which is exactly why across the board, 

whether it is standing up and supporting those who are trying get 

greater rights in Iran, whether it is working with our partners in 

the region to increase their defensive capacities, whether it is pushing back on proliferation and on support for terrorism through the 

actions we have taken, that is exactly why we are doing that and 

that is exactly why those actions will continue. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I would suggest—I would suggest that 

I give you an A+ in terms of being able to focus people’s attention 

on these negotiations dealing with the ability for them to manufacture a weapon. 

I would give you an F– when it comes to whether or not we can 

try to get rid of the threat by helping the people of Iran institute 

a democratic government there. 

This administration from day one in order to—frankly, the irony 

of this is, I believe this administration is bending over backwards 

not to try to threaten the mullah regime in Iran in order to get a 

nuclear deal which will make no difference at all because it still 

leaves the mullahs with the right to own and possess a nuclear 

weapon that they didn’t manufacture themselves, which leaves us 

vulnerable to these very same——

Mr. BLINKEN. I want to assure you they won’t have the that 

right, period. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Albio Sires of New Jersey. 

He is the ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Western 

Hemisphere. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here. 

I think you can take back to the department how concerned this 

body is that we don’t seem to be part of any of this negotiation and 

we don’t seem—that we seem to be bypassed. 

34

I remember when the Secretary was here. We talked about Cuba, 

and I asked him point blank about negotiations. They said that 

nothing was going on in exchange for Alan Gross. 

Now we have a situation similar to what we had in those hearings. One of the questions that I have is, can you speak to how the 

U.N. Security Council resolutions are being handled in the negotiations? 

Because once these sanctions are lifted, I think it is going to be 

virtually impossible to reimpose them because I don’t think Russia 

and China are going to go along with it. They have veto powers. 

So how are we handling this? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you. First, on your first point, Congressman, I have to say having been part of this, you know, there have 

been by our count, since the interim agreement was signed, more 

than 200 briefings, hearings meetings, phone calls with Members 

of Congress on the ramifications. 

Mr. SIRES. With all due respect, we don’t get—you know, we 

don’t get much on those briefings. That is like, you know, these 

classified briefings that we get—I can get more information on anything in my district than what I get here. 

Mr. BLINKEN. You will understand that in—while negotiations 

are going on it is difficult sometimes to provide all of the details. 

It is something that is going back and forth on a virtually continuous basis. That said, I would be happy to talk to you further 

about this. 

Mr. SIRES. But the problem is some of this stuff leaks out and 

then we look like—the press comes to us and we look like well, we 

don’t know what is going on with the administration. You know, I 

mean——

Mr. BLINKEN. Don’t always believe what you read. 

Mr. SIRES. Yes, I know. I don’t believe what I listen to when people come in front of me either, you know. Can you talk a little bit 

about the sanctions, about the——

Mr. BLINKEN. Yes, absolutely. So, again, and I will also invite my 

colleague to do the same thing, just as with our own sanctions, 

with regard to U.N. sanctions, first of all, we would preserve sanctions related to the non-nuclear aspects of Iran’s behavior. 

Second, any U.N.-related sanctions also would be—have to be 

lifted in a way that shows, first, Iranian compliance with various 

obligations under the agreement. 

So they too in some fashion would have to be sequenced depending on Iran’s fulfilling its obligations. We want to see a demonstration that Iran is serious. But all of that, including the sequencing, 

is under negotiation. 

But Adam, do you want to add to that? 

Mr. SZUBIN. Only to add that you are absolutely right to focus 

on the ability to restore sanctions in the event of a breach. That 

is something that, obviously, is very much at the forefront of our 

mind when we look at any possible sanctions relief is, is it reversible. 

And it is a trickier question when you talk about U.N. Security 

Council resolutions where we are obviously not the only member of 

that council. But we are very focused on that in the negotiations 

35

to make sure that if there is a violation there isn’t the ability for 

one country to stand in the way of snapping back those sanctions. 

Mr. SIRES. Have you had these conversations with China and 

Russia, you know, on this issue? 

Mr. SZUBIN. Yes, absolutely. That is very much part of the conversations that we have among the negotiating partners as well as, 

obviously, the conversations we have with the Iranians, yes. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Mr. Steve Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Iran has repeatedly violated its obligations under the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty. It has built secret nuclear facilities. It has 

illicitly procured nuclear materials. It has denied IAEA inspectors 

access to the suspected facilities. 

So isn’t it foolish to trust them now? Wouldn’t a bad deal be 

throwing Israel under the proverbial bus? And, because of Iran’s 

intercontinental ballistic missile goals, placing the U.S. at great 

risk as well? Now, I know you are going to say something to the 

effect that we are not trusting or this is trusting and verifying, but 

there are a whole lot of us on both sides of the aisle who, clearly, 

aren’t buying it. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you, Congressman. 

You are exactly right. Iran has repeatedly violated various obligations, which is exactly why it is in the position that it is in 

now—that is, facing the isolation and the sanction of the entire 

world and exactly why it is at the table now trying to negotiate an 

agreement. 

Those violations are what led to our ability to impose the most 

severe sanctions on Iran of any country in history and convinced 

other countries to come along. 

Mr. CHABOT. We are, clearly, concerned that we are going to end 

up in a bad deal. Let me go to the second question I have for you. 

President Obama, clearly, has disdain for the winner of the 

Israeli elections held this week. Maybe the only group I can think 

of that he might have more disdain for is the elected representatives of the American people—this Congress. 

Since Israel will be the most directly affected by a bad deal with 

Iran, how is the administration going to repair relations with our 

key ally in the region? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Congressman, in my judgment, no administration 

has done more for Israel’s security than this administration. If you 

look at the measures we have taken, the steps we have taken to 

provide for Israel’s security over the past 6 years, they are exceptionally extraordinary and, indeed, Prime Minister Netanyahu has 

called them such, and that will—that will endure. 

Mr. CHABOT. That is the least credible answer I have heard all 

morning, that this—no President has done more for the AmericanIsraeli relationship than this President. 

Mr. BLINKEN. No, that is not what I said. 

Mr. CHABOT. That is——

Mr. BLINKEN. I said for Israel’s security. 

36

Mr. CHABOT. Security, relations, whatever. This President—there 

has been no President that has damaged relations between the 

United States and Israel more than this President. 

Let me go to my third question. One of the concerns about a bad 

deal with Iran has always been proliferation in the region—that 

there is a nuclear arms race with the Saudis, the Gulf States, Turkey and perhaps others developing enrichment programs and eventually nuclear weapons. 

There are indications that the Saudis in particular are so 

alarmed that a bad deal is in the cards that they are already moving in that direction. What is your response? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you, Congressman. 

Well, of course, if there is no deal Iran could rush to a nuclear 

capacity and a nuclear weapon tomorrow, which I imagine is exactly what would spark an arms race. 

So, indeed, the best way to prevent countries from feeling the necessity to do that is to prevent Iran from getting a weapon. The 

model that is being set by this agreement, if there is an agreement, 

is hardly one that other countries would want to follow if they decided that they needed to acquire the capacity to build a nuclear 

weapon because the Iranian model is a decade or more of isolation 

and sanctions and, indeed, anything that emerges from this agreement will require such intrusive inspections, access and monitoring 

I doubt any country would want to follow that model. 

The answer is exactly what we have been doing, which is to do 

everything we can to prevent Iran from getting a weapon so other 

countries don’t feel the need to do it and to build up their capacity 

to defend themselves. 

Mr. CHABOT. Well, our concern, obviously, is that we are going 

to end up with a bad deal—they are going to get nuclear weapons 

and the other countries in the region are going to feel threatened. 

Then all the other countries are going to end up with them and 

Israel is right in the middle of that, and God help us if that is 

where we end up. 

My final question: What is the difference between the road that 

we traveled down with North Korea and we are now traveling 

down with Iran, other than Iran is a far more dangerous country 

than North Korea? 

There are a lot of us who believe that we have seen this movie 

before and we know how it is going to end. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you. They are very different cases. 

The North Korean program was far more advanced. First of all, 

when the Clinton administration was in office, Iran, we believe, 

had the material for nuclear weapons and there is some analysis 

that suggests that it already had nuclear weapons before the 

agreed framework was signed. By the time President Obama came 

in, of course, North Korea had nuclear weapons. 

Iran has neither. It is not—doesn’t have the weapons, doesn’t 

have the material for the weapons. It hasn’t tested and, of course, 

North Korea, as you know, has also tested. So they are in far different situations. 

The inspections regime that existed at various points for North 

Korea was far, far less than what Iran faces right now under the 

37

interim agreement and certainly far less than it would face under 

any comprehensive agreement. 

Mr. CHABOT. Well, my time has expired. But, again——

Mr. BLINKEN. And we have also taken lessons. I want to assure 

you we have taken lessons from that——

Mr. CHABOT [continuing]. There is great skepticism on both sides 

of the aisle here and, I believe, for good reason. I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida, ranking member on 

the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to you and 

Ranking Member Engel. Thanks to our witnesses, Deputy Secretary Blinken and Acting Under Secretary Szubin. It is great to 

have you both here in your new roles. 

Let me start with this. I understand that we are now approaching a deadline and I want to express my thanks, as I have every 

single time I have had the opportunity, for the focus on working 

to bring my constituent, Bob Levinson, home. 

But as we approach these last days, let me just say that raising 

the issue at this point can no longer suffice, and that with respect 

to Pastor Abedini and Amir Hekmati and Jason Rezaian and Bob 

Levinson, if anyone is to take Iran seriously, that there is any commitment that they can make that can be adhered to, then the best 

show of good faith that they can make would be to return those 

Americans. I urge you to make that a priority. That is number one. 

Next, I have been clear. I know we are not supposed to prejudge 

any deal but there are certainly things that would concern us in 

any deal that I think it is okay for us to address and I want to just 

go through a few of those. 

First, a couple of straightforward questions. Deputy Secretary 

Blinken, will a final agreement and the technical annexes and side 

agreements be made public? Will they be readily available to Congress and to the public? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you. 

Can I just start by saying, first of all, we strongly, strongly agree 

with your statement about the American citizens who are unjustly 

imprisoned in Iran. 

I want to assure you this is something that we are working on 

virtually every day. The only issue that comes up regularly within 

the context of the nuclear discussions, apart from those discussions, 

is the—is our American citizens. We are working on it very, very 

vigorously. We want to bring them home and we very much share 

your commitment to do that. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Mr. BLINKEN. With regard to whether the agreement will be 

made public, certainly, the core elements will. I don’t know at this 

stage because we don’t know exactly what form any agreement 

would take, whether certain pieces would be—would remain made 

classified and be subject to classified review, what parts would be 

public. I can’t tell you at this stage because we don’t know the 

exact——

Mr. DEUTCH. The greater the transparency the easier it will be 

for people to——

38

Mr. BLINKEN. I think we saw with the interim agreement that 

we reached that it was made public and Congress had full access 

to it. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Congress had full access to it. The American people 

didn’t. Let me just go on. 

Next, again, just a couple of straightforward questions. Does 

Iran—Secretary Blinken, does Iran remained the world’s most active state sponsor of terror? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Whether it is the most active, it certainly for sure 

in the very top percentile. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And is the administration in any way considering 

removing them from the state sponsor of terrorism list? 

Mr. BLINKEN. No. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Now, when it comes to the issues that we are dealing with that 

concern me in any deal, one, we have talked about the number of 

centrifuges and the infrastructure. A question I have is whether 

the ultimate number of centrifuges is reduced from the close to 

20,000 to 6,000 or 7,000 or 3,000, whatever the number is, what 

will happen to the rest? 

Will any of them be dismantled? Will they go into a closet? Will 

they go into an attic? Will they be readily available for Iran at the 

expiration of the deal? 

Mr. BLINKEN. All of that is subject to the negotiations. That remains to be determined. I think you are right to point in general 

to the centrifuges. Obviously, that is a key component. But it also 

important to understand it is not the only component. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I understand. I understand, and I only have a little 

time. But I would encourage—I would suggest that if the ultimate 

deal doesn’t require that a single one of those centrifuges is dismantled, it is going to make it awfully difficult for a lot of us to 

be comfortable that this is a serious enough step to prevent them 

from breaking out. 

Next, I just—I think you can understand, and I am not going to 

have time to get to my other—so I will just focus on this. I think 

you can understand the frustration that we have when both you, 

Secretary Blinken and Mr. Szubin, both talked about phased, proportionate and reversible sanctions relief but then went on to acknowledge the plan to go to the United Nations Security Council 

and to make clear that at the U.N., Venezuela, Malaysia, Nigeria 

may get a chance to vote on this deal now but Congress, ultimately, 

will have a chance to vote on this perhaps 5, perhaps 10, perhaps 

15 years in the future. 

That is what we are being told. I hope you can understand the 

frustration and how can—and the real question I have is how can 

the sanctions relief be reversible if the plan is to go to the United 

Nations to reverse all of the multilateral sanctions, leaving only the 

American sanctions in place? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Again, I just want to try to make it clear that this 

is, if it happens, an international agreement that has other parties 

to the agreement. That is done through the Security Council. 

The Security Council would take note of any agreement and it 

would make clear that it is prepared, once Iran demonstrates that 

it is meeting its commitments, which would be at some point in the 

39

future because there would be a series of commitments under the 

deal, at that point to suspend or lift any international sanctions. 

Our own sanctions, again, would be under our own discretion 

and ultimately Congress has to pass judgment on that. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask to have Mr. 

Szubin provide to us, because I am out of time, provide to us after 

this hearing a breakdown to the extent that you have done it of the 

$700 million that has been released every—the money that has 

been released every few months under the interim deal, and if you 

have done analysis on a deal of what a final deal might look like 

of sanctions relief, to the extent that $10 billion, $20 billion, $50 

billion of the frozen money was released all at one time where any 

that money in the case of the interim deal has gone in Iran, where 

it would go under the—under the permanent deal and whether it 

would simply wind up going to benefit the Revolutionary Guard, 

the military and their terrorist activities. 

I thank you and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection, so ordered. And we go to 

Mr. Mike McCaul of Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Section 1, 2 and 3 of the Atomic Energy Act, as 

you know, requires that all significant U.S. nuclear cooperation 

agreements must be approved by both houses of Congress. 

Last year, Congress approved two such agreements, one with 

South Korea and the other one with Great Britain, who are our allies. However, in this case, when we are dealing with the world’s 

leading state sponsor of terrorism, the position of this administration is that that should not be subject to approval by the United 

States Congress. 

I don’t quite understand that distinction. Can you explain that 

to me? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you, Congressman. 

I think the issue is what is the best form of an agreement in 

order for us to have the flexibility that we need to make sure that 

Iran is living up to its obligations and to be able to reimpose sanctions quickly if it is not. We—what we are seeking is—and the 

issue here is really whether this is a legally binding agreement or 

not. 

If it is a legally binding agreement, it would be subject to the 

rules of international law on how you get into an agreement and 

how you get out of it, which can be quite burdensome. 

So having a nonbinding agreement allows us to have the flexibility we need if necessary to snap back sanctions immediately, not 

wait for international partners to agree or not agree. 

With regard to whether it is a treaty or not and so subject to the 

advice and consent of the United States Senate, as you know, the 

vast bulk of international agreements that we have made under 

Democratic administrations and Republican administrations in the 

nonproliferation area and the foreign policy area more generally in 

fact are not treaties and are not subject to the advice and consent 

of the Senate. 

And I can go through the list under the nonproliferation area. 

We have everything from the missile technology control regime, 

40

which has been very successful in creating voluntary export licensing around the world, the nuclear security guidelines——

Mr. MCCAUL. And my time is limited, and I appreciate what you 

are saying. I just think we are treating our allies different from a 

state sponsor of terror and I think that the American people, 

through its representatives, should be weighing in this deal. But I 

know we disagree on that point. 

ICBMs—this concerns me greatly. There has been no—this has 

been off the table, not part of the discussions at all, and the intelligence community and the Pentagon in its annual report on military power of Iran have noted that by—as early as 2015 of this 

year they may have ICBM technology—missile ranges that could 

potentially reach as far as the United States of America. 

And then the Ayatollah, the Supreme Leader, says that to limit 

this program would be a stupid idiotic expectation and that the 

Revolutionary Guard should definitely carry out their program and 

should mass produce. 

Why in the world isn’t this on the table and does that not concern you about their intent here? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Yes. The missile program is absolutely a concern 

which is, again, why we have been working very vigorously around 

the world to deny, where we can, Iran the technology for that program and to push back against proliferation. 

In that effort, whether there is an agreement or not, we will persist in those sanctions and the various measures we are taking will 

continue regardless of whether there is an agreement. 

The scope of this agreement, if there is one, is the nuclear program. That is what our partners have agreed to. That is what is 

being negotiated. It is not a missile agreement. 

Now, there are aspects of it that come into this that are critical 

in terms of Iran’s capacity to make, potentially, a nuclear weapon 

to a missile and, indeed, we are focused on that because that does 

fall within the confines of what we are——

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, because that is the delivery device for a nuclear warhead. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Exactly. Exactly. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And so they are not backing down on that, which 

kind of makes me question, you know, their whole good faith analysis here. You know, if I could just say, when I read their own 

words, President Rouhani, who you say is taking a different tack 

and trying to be a peacemaker here, says that in Geneva agreement world powers surrendered to the Iranian nation’s will, and 

that is in his words. 

And then, you know, they said that the centrifuges were spinning 

and will never stop. When Prime Minister Netanyahu gave his 

speech at the joint session of Congress, Iran was they were blowing 

up a mock of the USS Nimitz in the Red Sea, simultaneously. 

I question the good faith here. You have an extraordinary challenge, sir, and I wish you all the best. But I cannot—I just have 

to question the good faith on the part of Iran. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Sir, you are exactly right. It is not a question of 

good faith. 

41

It is a question—and by the way, whether it is President 

Rouhani or the foreign minister or any others, it is not that we 

think these are good guys who like the United States. 

It is that there are some people who are somewhat more pragmatic about what Iran needs to do for its own interest in the future 

and they believe that negotiating an agreement and getting some 

relief from the pressure that they have been under is what makes 

the most sense for their country, again, not because they like us 

or have good intentions. 

The other thing I would say that I think is important is that 

there are abhorrent statements made on a regular basis by Iran’s 

leaders on all sorts of issues. In some instances, though, some of 

these statements are made for domestic political purposes. 

We sometimes have a tendency to see Iran as the only country 

on Earth that doesn’t have politics. In fact, it has very intense politics and there is a lot of politics going on right now between those 

in Iran who would want an agreement, again, because they believe 

it is in the interest of the country, and those who don’t want one, 

and some of the statements you are seeing, as objectionable and as 

abhorrent as they may be, some of those designed for political consumption at home to push back against those who do not want an 

agreement. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. I hear ‘‘Death to America’’ on an ongoing basis 

regardless of the politics and that is concerning for us. 

We go now to David Cicilline of Rhode Island. Mr. Cicilline? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much 

for being here and for giving us your insight on this very important 

issue. 

I am hopeful that the ongoing negotiations will ultimately result 

in an agreement that we can get behind and I think, as our chairman and our ranking member said, many of us have a lot of questions about the details of a final agreement and in a letter I think 

we will express to you what some of those concerns are. 

As I listen to the—my colleagues today, you know, guaranteeing 

that actors to a negotiated agreement are going to behave in a certain way is always difficult and we have no guarantee of that. 

And so it seems to me what the goal of this agreement should 

be is to be sure that we set it out so that it is difficult for them 

to violate the agreement, that we make it certain that we can detect it if they do and that we have an opportunity to respond to 

it. 

I mean, that is really the best we can do other than imagining 

that we can control the decisions of lots of other people. 

And so with respect to that, last year the Pentagon’s Defense 

Science Board released a report that found the U.S. Government 

mechanisms for detection and monitoring of small nuclear enterprises or covert facilities are ‘‘either inadequate or, more often, do 

not exist.’’

So in that context, how will we know and what are we doing to 

ensure that we would learn if Iran was pursuing a covert program, 

particularly after the sunset of a comprehensive agreement, and 

will the additional protocols in the NPT address this? 

42

But isn’t that a fair question to know? We are not particularly 

good at that from the sounds of it in general, and with respect to 

Iran in particular what are the protections? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you very much, Congressman. 

Yes, I think you make a very important point and, indeed, I am 

well aware of the report by the Defense Science Board. We are factoring in the report’s recommendations as we work on and think 

about any agreement with Iran. 

I think it underscores the absolute necessity of having the most 

intrusive significant monitoring access transparency regime anywhere, anytime, anyplace in the world, and in terms of what happens in perpetuity it underscores the absolute necessity of having 

at the very least the combination of the additional protocol, Modified Code 3.1, and a safeguards agreement. 

Those things taken together, the storehouse of knowledge that 

will be built up by the exceptional transparency measures, we believe that all of those things taken together will give us the ability 

to detect any efforts by Iran to break out or to sneak out. 

But I think the report underscores the absolute essential nature 

of those components of any agreement. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. And would you speak for a moment 

about kind of what you see as the kind of scenario if no agreement 

is reached? 

There has been a lot of discussion about the urgency of enacting 

additional sanctions, which I think Congress would do immediately 

and the President would support. But to the extent that happens, 

do you foresee that that actually would prevent the development of 

a nuclear weapon? 

I mean, the goal here we shouldn’t lose sight of is not just to impose pain on Iran but impose conditions such that they don’t develop a nuclear weapon. That is the ultimate goal. 

And I am wondering if you would speak to what is the alternative of a good comprehensive agreement here. What do you likely 

see even if additional sanctions were imposed if these talks fall 

apart? Do we prevent a nuclear Iran in that scenario? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Well, I think it depends very much on how an 

agreement is not reached. That is to say, if it is clear at the end 

of this process that Iran is simply not able and will not make a reasonable agreement, then, clearly, that calls not only for sustaining 

the existing pressure but adding to it in an effort to get them to 

rethink that very unfortunate position and, indeed, to bear down 

on all fronts in its efforts to acquire technology for a nuclear program and the resources for a nuclear program. So that is where we 

would want to go. 

Now, if on the other hand, we are at the end of March very close, 

having gotten agreement on many of the key elements but not all 

of them, and because nothing is agreed until everything is agreed 

we can’t put the whole thing together, then I can see a circumstance where it might be useful to take the time that we still 

have until June under the nature of the interim agreement that we 

signed. So we have to see exactly where we are. 

The third possibility, of course, is that for whatever reason we 

are perceived as having been responsible for the failure to reach an 

agreement or at least there is enough mud in the waters to create 

43

that impression, that—were that to happen, which absolutely cannot and must not happen, that would make it more challenging, 

not only to add new sanctions and add more pressure but just to 

sustain the pressure that we have because it is very important to 

keep remembering that this is not just about us. 

The power, the efficacy of the sanctions that Congress has produced and that we have been implementing is exponentially magnified by the participation of other countries around the world. If 

that goes away a lot of the power of the sanctions will. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady. 

I have a lot of questions and I think you can answer many of 

them with just a yes or no. They are not gotcha questions. But unless I ask you to explain the answer, don’t explain the answer, if 

you would. 

The 10-year agreement or however many years it is going to be. 

Is the deal that the sanctions will be lifted—all of the penalties, I 

should say—after the agreement is over with whenever that is? 

With Iran, are the penalties coming to an end? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Congressman, it would be—it would be phased. 

That is, we would insist on Iran demonstrating compliance and 

then certain sanctions might be at that point suspended, not ended. 

And after still more compliance, at some point sanctions would actually be ended, assuming Congress agreed to end them. 

Similarly, on the international front with the U.N., we would be 

looking at demonstrated compliance by Iran and then suspension 

and then ending. And then if Iran didn’t do what it was supposed 

to do or if it cheated or reneged, we would have snap back provisions both here and internationally. 

Mr. POE. Okay. The purpose of this agreement is to prevent Iran 

from getting nuclear weapons. Would you agree that Israel is probably concerned, being a neighbor, about Iran getting nuclear weapons? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Yes. 

Mr. POE. And the United States are both concerned about—the 

United States as well? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Yes. 

Mr. POE. The ICBM issue—that is not even being discussed as 

a part of this agreement, is it? 

Mr. BLINKEN. That is correct. 

Mr. POE. And the Supreme Leader has said they want to get rid 

of Israel first and then take on us—calls us the Great Satan. And 

one way to get to us is the ICBMs, correct? 

Mr. BLINKEN. That is correct. 

Mr. POE. ICBMs aren’t needed to eliminate Israel. They have got 

other missiles that can already go and reach Israel. Is that correct? 

Mr. BLINKEN. That is correct. 

Mr. POE. We are not talking about trying to prevent the ICBMs. 

All we are trying to do, if I understand the State Department’s position, is to keep them from getting technology. 

Mr. BLINKEN. What we are trying to do apart from this agreement——

44

Mr. POE. Is that correct? We are trying to get them——

Mr. BLINKEN. The contours of this agreement go to the nuclear 

program and to the United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding that program. That is what needs to be satisfied. Those are 

the terms of the negotiations that our partners sign on to. 

Mr. POE. Okay. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Separate and apart from that, though, we are 

working very hard to prevent Iran from getting the technology. 

Mr. POE. That is what I just asked you. It is a yes or no. We are 

trying to prevent them from getting technology. But isn’t it true 

that Iran is pursuing the development of ICBMs in their country? 

Mr. BLINKEN. I am sure that is true, yes. 

Mr. POE. So it is true. So they are building the missiles. We are 

not trying to stop them, except we just don’t want them to get the 

technology from the North Koreans or the Chinese or Russians. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Well, that is why they need—that is why they need 

to develop it and they need to get technology from other countries 

with knowledge——

Mr. POE. Reclaiming my time. They are developing intercontinental ballistic missiles. Is that correct? 

Mr. BLINKEN. They are trying to do so, yes. That is correct. 

Mr. POE. And we are not dealing with that issue, I don’t think, 

at all. 

Mr. BLINKEN. We are, but just not part of this——

Mr. POE. Excuse me, sir. Excuse me. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Sorry, Congressman. 

Mr. POE. We are trying to prevent them from getting nuclear 

weapons, which I think at the end of the day if this agreement is 

signed and delivered they will get them eventually and then they 

may have the capability to send them to us. 

I think this is a long-term threat to the world and especially the 

United States and Israel and peace-loving countries. Iran gets nuclear capability. Assume this. Would you agree that Saudi Arabia 

will get it next? Turkey will get it? Egypt will get it? And who else 

knows in the Middle East to balance the power over the Middle 

East? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Yes, it sigificantly increases the likelihood, which 

is why we are trying to prevent them from getting one. 

Mr. POE. Just a couple of more questions. 

The 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment put out by the Director 

of National Intelligence, you said that this report focused on ISIS. 

If it is a worldwide assessment—worldwide—wouldn’t you think 

that it would mention Hezbollah? You think it might? Should? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Hezbollah is a foreign terrorist organization. It remains designated. It remains a focus of our activities. 

Mr. POE. But it is not mentioned as a worldwide threat in this 

report. That confuses me. If the Federal Government comes out 

with a report and it reports on everything, and it is a worldwide 

threat assessment of terrorism, we leave off of the state sponsor of 

terrorism—Iran—and we leave off their puppet, who is causing 

mischief all over the world—Hezbollah—that seems a little bit confusing to me. 

45

So would you recommend that maybe the intelligence agency go 

back and have an addendum to this worldwide report and add 

these other two organizations? 

Mr. BLINKEN. What I can tell you is, led by the intelligence agencies, we are pushing back every single day on Hezbollah’s activities——

Mr. POE. So you think they ought to add to the report that 

Hezbollah and Iran are terrorism threats to the world? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Let me go back and look at the report. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, Judge Poe. 

Ms. Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for being here today. 

Well, it does sound like the one thing that we all agree on is that 

Iran should not be able to get a nuclear weapon. I have a couple 

of questions. I want to—if I could just state them first and then 

you can answer. 

First—my first question is if there is no deal, how long would it 

take Iran to—at this point, do you think, to break out to have a 

nuclear weapon? 

It is interesting because I hear the frustration of so many of my 

colleagues about, you know, not trusting Iran. I think we—no one 

trusts Iran. But if we do not get a deal, we do not get a deal, is 

the alternative—the realistic alternative a military operation? 

What would that look like? And if there was a military operation, 

how long do you think that could delay Iran from getting a nuclear 

weapon and what do you think would be the interim collateral 

damage? I mean, what would you—I am sure you have discussed 

this. 

You know, what is the scenario of not having a deal? Now, and 

just to add to that, you have said, well, if there is no deal, then 

we are going to increase the sanctions. But I am assuming that you 

have made the calculation that we have taken them—that this is 

a time to get a deal. So you can respond to those thoughts. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you very much, and I think that you raise 

very important questions. 

First, with regard to the break-out time, this is something we 

can, I think, best deal with in a classified setting. But what I can 

tell you broadly is this, that currently the break-out time is a matter of a few months, if everything went just right. 

But, of course, we would—even under the interim agreement, we 

would see that immediately. But that is—that is where we are. So 

if there was no deal, that is where they would be. 

But, presumably, under various scenarios they would then seek 

to speed to increase the number of centrifuges, and increase the 

other capacity, move forward on Fordow, move forward on Iraq. 

And as a result of all of that over some period of period of time 

the break-out time would drop, presumably, even further. 

What are the alternatives? Well, I think that is a critical question because at the end of the day any agreement that is reached 

has to be evaluated, first of all, under the terms of the agreement. 

That is the most important thing. People will have to decide whether the agreement holds up, makes sense and advances our security. 

46

But I think it is also going to be very important for those who 

would oppose the agreement, if there is one, to say what the alternative would be and how it would be achievable. Those are critical 

questions because we are not operating in a vacuum and in an abstraction. 

So a lot, again, as I suggested earlier, depends on why there 

would be no deal. That is, if it was clear that Iran simply was not 

going to make an agreement and the international community recognized that, I think we would be in a position not only to sustain 

the sanctions that we have now but to increase the pressure and 

increase the sanctions. 

Now, however, if for whatever reason that didn’t happen, if Iran 

started speeding to a weapons capacity and to a bomb, then a military option has always been on the table. It would remain on the 

table. If military action were taken, it could certainly set back 

Iran’s program for some period of time. 

But, again, it is important to understand that because Iran has 

the knowledge and that we can’t bomb that away, we can’t sanction 

it away, that at some point they would resume their activities. 

They would probably go underground. We would lose the benefit 

probably of the international sanctions regime and pressure and 

Iran would be in a better position than it is today and, certainly, 

than it would be under an agreement. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And, if you could, because I am sure you have 

talked about this, what would be the ramifications especially in the 

region if all of a sudden there was a war with Iran? What would 

be the consequences, for example, to Israel? What would you expect? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Well, I think, first of all, if Iran were in a position 

where it was rushing to a nuclear weapon, many of the concerns 

that have been raised by other members of the committee in terms 

of what other countries in the region would do would be front and 

center. 

That is, it would be, I think, very tempting for other countries 

to feel that they needed to pursue a nuclear weapon to protect 

themselves. That is exactly one of the reasons we are trying to prevent Iran from getting a weapon. We do not want to see an arms 

race in the region. 

In terms of Israel, it faces an existential threat from Iran and, 

indeed, one of the reasons we are trying to prevent Iran from getting a weapon is in defense of our close ally and partner, Israel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. But would you—would you expect further acts of 

terrorism? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Oh, I would—I would expect that Iran unshackled 

with a weapon or speeding toward one, would feel further 

emboldened to take actions in the region, including against Israel. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Frankel. 

Subcommittee chair, Mr. Duncan, is recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. And this has been a 

very informative hearing. Yesterday, we had a hearing on Iran as 

well. Mr. Deputy Secretary, do you believe Iran is present and active in the Western Hemisphere? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Yes. 

47

Mr. DUNCAN. Do you believe their influence is steady? Do you 

think it is increasing, as General Kelly may say, or do you believe 

it is not? 

Mr. BLINKEN. I think they are trying in various parts of the 

world including in our own hemisphere to position themselves and 

to take advantage of any openings that they have. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The State Department report that came out in 

2013 says that the Iranian threat in the Western Hemisphere is 

waning. Are you aware of that? 

Mr. BLINKEN. I am yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. If Iran is—is Iran still on the state sponsor 

of terrorists list? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. So they are still aiding and abetting terrorist 

organizations like Hezbollah all over the world, correct? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. What is going to—what is going to change 

with this agreement with regard to their being on the state sponsor 

of terrorists list, as of the administration? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Nothing. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So we are negotiating with a country that is not 

willing to quit exporting terrorist items to terrorist organizations 

that could threaten the United States and its friends and allies, 

right? 

Mr. BLINKEN. So we are negotiating in order to deny them a nuclear weapon which would further embolden those activities. And 

at the same time, we are making it very clear that whether or not 

there is an agreement we will continue to be taking action against 

its efforts to do all of the things you just cited. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Iran has continually violated past obligations with 

regards to sanctions and sanctions relief and all of that. What is 

to make us think that they are not going to violate this? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Because of the penalties that they would have to 

pay. The reason that they are at the table now is because they violated——

Mr. DUNCAN. But it is not legally binding on us. Do you—will 

you all of a sudden think it is going to be legally binding on them? 

Mr. BLINKEN. I don’t think——

Mr. DUNCAN. How do you think they—how do you think they 

view that statement? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Oh, I think the issue is not whether it is legally 

binding. The issue is whether it is very clear, and it will be, that 

if they violate the agreement there will be serious consequences. 

It doesn’t matter if that is legally binding or not. The sanctions 

will come back into full force and there will be more sanctions. 

Mr. DUNCAN. North Korea has the same sanctions and they violated those and they have the bomb now. 

Mr. BLINKEN. But, again, with regard to Iran the very reason 

they are at the table is because they spent years and years and 

years violating their obligations. Thanks to Congress, thanks to the 

administration, thanks to our international partners, we exerted 

significant pressure on them and now, faced with that pressure, 

they are seeking to make an agreement. 

48

Mr. DUNCAN. I think pressure works. I think the sanctions 

worked. I think Mr. Szubin talked about some of the repercussions 

of that. 

Now, let me move on. In April 2014, Secretary of State John 

Kerry said that the Obama administration will consult with Congress about sanctions relief contained in a final agreement and he 

said, well—and this is his quote: ‘‘Well, of course, we would be obligated under the law,’’ he said, adding ‘‘What we do will have to 

pass muster with Congress. We well understand that.’’

Yet, the Secretary’s testimony in the Senate last week, excuse 

me—Deputy Secretary Blinken said and Under Secretary Cohen indicated that the Obama administration would not submit a potential agreement to Congress for a vote. Instead, the administration 

will sign what is termed a political agreement. 

So What is the difference between what Secretary Kerry said in 

2014 and what is being said by the administration now? 

Mr. BLINKEN. No, I don’t there is a difference, sir. I think the 

Secretary is exactly right. First of all, in our judgment, at least, we 

have consulted extensively throughout the duration of these negotiations—as I cited earlier, more than 200 hearings, meetings, 

calls, briefings. 

If there is an agreement, obviously, we will go through that in 

great detail in Congress in open sessions and closed sessions, in 

meetings, in calls. And as we have been clear all along, the agreement at some point will call—will require the lifting of sanctions 

and only Congress can decide whether to do that or not. 

So Congress will have a vote and, indeed, keeping that Sword of 

Damocles hanging over the heads of the Iranians—that is, the 

knowledge that the sanctions have been suspended but not ended 

and that Congress has the authority to end them—we think will 

be leverage to make sure that they make good on their commitments. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. 

Madam chair, I don’t have a whole lot of other questions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. DUNCAN. A lot them I asked. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Because although there is a vote on and we 

have two votes, the subcommittee—I mean, the full committee will 

come back. But we would never break without the opportunity of 

recognizing Mr. Connolly for his 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend. 

Unfortunately, I have to begin by chastising my friend. You 

know, my friend, the chair, who is truly my friend, referred to the 

President having a temper tantrum about Prime Minister 

Netanyahu, and Mr. Chabot, my friend from Ohio, and he is also 

my friend, said there is no President who has done more to damage 

the U.S.-Israeli relationship. 

I cannot let that go by. A foreign leader has insulted the head 

of state of the United States Government. It is not a temper tantrum and it didn’t start with President Obama. It started with Bibi 

Netanyahu. 

You can decide for yourself whether it was appropriate for him 

to speak to a joint session. But the process is beyond dispute. 

49

It was an insult to this government. Friends don’t act that way, 

and I would say to my friend, Mr. Chabot from Ohio, it would come 

as news to Shimon Peres, the outgoing President of Israel who gave 

President Obama the highest award that the Israeli Government 

can give, for his support of Israel. 

At some point, does the partisan rhetoric ever stop? Where are 

your loyalties with respect to the prerogatives of this government 

and our country? And the shameless way Mr. Netanyahu has conducted himself deserves reproach and I think the President has actually shown restraint. 

And I say this as somebody who has a 35-year record of unwavering support for Israel. I am not a critic of the Israeli Government. 

But I am a critic of how this Prime Minister has treated my President—everyone’s President—and I cannot sit here and listen to the 

waving away of bad behavior that is an insult to my country. 

We have one President, whether you like him or not, whether 

you want to take political issue with him or not. Fair enough. That 

is fair game. 

But when a foreign leader insults him, that should not be fair 

game and that should never be apologized away because it damages relationships long-term. It puts a divide where there was 

never a divide in public opinion in my country and I worry about 

that long term. I hope you do too. 

Let me say, Mr. Deputy Secretary, it seems to me there are five 

issues that Congress has to be concerned about. There is the broad 

extensional question, are we better with a deal or without. 

I would argue that same Prime Minister of Israel has never supported any agreement with Iran even though we are where we are, 

and he would like zero centrifuges. He would like zero enrichment 

capability. 

He would like a complete roll back so that there is no nuclear 

capability, and so would I. But I don’t know anybody who can 

achieve that, realistically, and if you feel that, if those are your 

goals, the only option is what has euphemistically been called the 

kinetic option if you are not willing to accept any nuclear capability 

and I am not sure the American people support that. I am not even 

sure the Israeli people support that. Would you agree with that 

analysis, Mr. Deputy Secretary? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you. I would agree. As we discussed earlier, 

that Iran has knowledge of the fuel cycle. They know how to make 

a bomb if they choose to do it and we can’t bomb that away. We 

can delay it. We can’t eliminate it. It is knowledge. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me—let me say I think there are five issues. 

If we move on—okay. Let us accept that and so we need an agreement. We are going to get the best agreement or we need to seek 

the best agreement we can. 

I think with respect to my colleagues in Congress including myself there are five issues that have to be addressed and that the 

administration is going to have to convince us you have addressed 

efficaciously to the best of your ability to our satisfaction. 

One is what capability is left in place? Number of centrifuges, 

percentage of enrichment—something we can live with? Something 

we got to worry about? Two, cheating, and that—the inspection regime to me is all important. If there are holes in the inspection reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:59 Jun 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\031915\93822 SHIRL
50

gime I don’t see how you are going to get any confidence in the 

agreement. 

Thirdly, sanctions—how do we phase in the lifting of sanctions 

assuming an efficacious agreement and how expeditiously can we 

reimpose them? Our worry up here is that we might be okay but 

our allies may not. 

Fourth, the threshold time frame—there are a lot of—there is a 

lot of legitimate concern up here that it is too fast, that Iran can 

quickly rush to nuclear capability under the reported terms of the 

agreement. 

And, finally, the expiration of an agreement—the time frame for 

expiration. A lot of people are very concerned about the that, that 

it is almost an open invitation to a future Iranian Government to 

proceed. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly, and it is not my 

temper tantrum to cut you off. We really are out of time. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I know. I know. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And to all the committee members and witnesses, we have two votes on the floor. We will recess briefly and 

then come back to get to the most amount of members that we can 

get to before our witnesses have to depart. 

And so with that, the committee stands in recess. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman ROYCE. We will re-adjourn and go to Mr. Tom Emmer 

of Minnesota. 

Mr. EMMER. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both the 

witnesses for being here today. 

Just a couple of questions because you pretty much have been 

running the range today in front of the committee. But first, Mr. 

Blinken, thank you for being here, again, and thank you for your 

service. 

Your opening remarks were assuring to somebody like me who 

wants to see the branches as they were constructed work the way 

they are supposed to and I just want to confirm, if you will bear 

with me. 

I believe it is Article 1 Section 8 says that it is the sole responsibility of Congress to enter into agreements with foreign nations, 

which would include treaties or agreements such as the one that 

we have been discussing, and I believe that you confirmed that 

again this morning that it will be Congress’s obligation to finalize, 

ratify any negotiated agreement. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Because Congress imposed and legislated the sanctions on Iran, if those sanctions are ever to be lifted Congress must 

be the one to do it. Congress has the—only Congress has the authority to do that. 

Mr. EMMER. But that is what is already in place. That part aside, 

any agreement with the details that the administration is participating in the negotiations in right now it is Congress that not 

only—I think your words this morning will play a very important 

role—that was number one, which indicates to me there will be 

much communication once this framework, if it is reached by the 

end of this month—once that is reached there will be some significant communication. 

51

Mr. BLINKEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. EMMER. And after that, assuming that can you can arrive at 

the final details by the end of June, then I just want to make sure 

that I understand your position on behalf of the State Department 

is that Congress will have to approve or will not any final agreement. 

Mr. BLINKEN. No, Congressman, that is not our position. This 

would not be a treaty that would be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. 

This would be an agreement that, obviously, as I said before, for 

its terms to be implemented, assuming that sanctions are to be lifted, Congress would have to play that role and it could decide 

whether or not to do that. 

And you are absolutely right that just as we have sought to consult fully throughout this process in hearings and briefings and 

meetings and phone calls, you are absolutely right that if there is 

an agreement in the coming weeks that we would consult intensely 

with Congress on that agreement. Every aspect of that agreement 

would be——

Mr. EMMER. But all you—but all you are going to ask for, based 

on what you are testifying to this morning, is that Congress lift the 

sanctions. You are not going to ask for Congressional approval of 

the final agreement. 

Mr. BLINKEN. That is correct. 

Mr. EMMER. So if it is not legally binding then, as Secretary of 

State Kerry has discussed, what do you actually believe that you 

are getting out of it then? And let me just add to it because I am 

trying to be very measured. 

It disturbs me greatly to have people talk about giving an organization that is not interested in peace around the globe, that is actually and being an aggressor and trying to roil up problems—we are 

going to give them all kinds of hard currency. Explain to me how 

this is a good idea. 

Mr. BLINKEN. So two things. Thank you, Congressman. First, 

with regard to whether it is legally binding or not, if this is really 

a question of international law, first and foremost, if you make a 

legally binding agreement then it is subject to various provisions 

of international law which actually make it more difficult to do 

things we may have to do if Iran violates the agreement. 

There are all sorts of treaty law formalities that we would have 

to go through if we said Iran is violating the agreement. 

We would have to present a legally defensible reason to cease our 

implementation of our commitments under the agreement. We 

might get into a debate with our international partners if they did 

not agree. I am making——

Mr. EMMER. Well, I am going to run out of time, with all due respect. I am going to run out of time. So I just—I think that this 

is the problem that the administration has had and now the administration and Congress are having is this breakdown in an understanding of respective positions in the process, and the idea that 

this administration is going to get approval from the U.N. Security 

Council as opposed to coming to Congress is not only disturbing, 

it is wrong, from my perspective. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you, Congressman. 

52

Could I just mention—you know, again, I just want to be clear. 

We will have to go, if there is an agreement, to both. That is, there 

are sanctions that are pursuant to the United Nations Security 

Council that have been implemented by the Council so the Council 

will have the authority and will have to decide whether to lift them 

or not, suspend them or not. 

Similarly, our own sanctions have been imposed and legislated 

by Congress. Only Congress can decide whether to end them. And, 

as you know, the vast majority of the international agreements 

that we strike around the world, a key tool of our foreign policy 

and national security policy, are nonbinding. 

Mr. EMMER. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I am going to yield back. 

But I just want to make the comment that it is amazing to me 

that this administration apparently puts Congress and the U.N. on 

the same level in terms of who they are going to deal with. 

Chairman ROYCE. If the gentleman will yield. I am not sure it 

is on the same level because I think the U.N. vote will come immediately. 

Mr. EMMER. Again, I was trying to be measured. 

Chairman ROYCE. You were being measured and I appreciate 

that, Tom. 

I do think that it is going to be a considerable amount of time 

under the calculus that the administration is working under when 

they intend to come to Congress for that vote and that is very, very 

concern concerning. But I appreciate the gentleman raising this 

issue. 

We go now to Brian Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, is this the most complicated negotiation that the administration has been involved with 

internationally? 

Mr. BLINKEN. It is—I think the answer is yes. I am searching my 

mind to think of anything that could rise to a higher level of complexity. You know, arguably, the new START agreement was complicated. But I would I have to say this probably tops the list. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. Now, the interesting thing is, you know, it is 

still an agreement. You hear varying reports saying that, you 

know, 90 percent is done and 60 percent is done. But, you know, 

the bottom line is that it is still very fluid. 

Mr. BLINKEN. That is correct. 

Mr. HIGGINS. And those issues that remain will always be the 

most critical issues because they are the most difficult to find mutuality on. 

Mr. BLINKEN. That is correct. 

Mr. HIGGINS. But, clearly, the issue of fuel and enrichment capacity are central to this and inspections and verification. How 

many pounds of enriched uranium is Iran though to have currently? 

Mr. BLINKEN. So they have a stockpile of low enriched uranium 

at about 3.5 percent that is, I recall, is about 7,000 kilos. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. HIGGINS. And under the current draft framework, what 

would become of that 3.5 percent enriched uranium? 

Mr. BLINKEN. So you will understand I can’t get into the details. 

This is all subject to negotiations. But one of the elements, and you 

53

are right to point to it, that would be important in figuring out 

their break-out time is the available stockpile of material that they 

have to work with. 

So centrifuges—the number of the centrifuges is one component. 

The configuration of the centrifuges is another. The stockpile is a 

third. And depending on how you put those elements together you 

limit their break-out time. 

But I can’t tell you what the limitation might be under an agreement because that is all subject to the negotiation. 

Mr. HIGGINS. The proliferation of centrifuges 10 years ago, really, 

under Rouhani, there were probably, you know, less than 200 centrifuges. 

Now there is over 19,000. Now we are talking about advanced 

centrifuges. We are talking about next generation centrifuges. We 

are talking about, as you mentioned in your response, a knowledge 

that you can’t destroy. 

Is it—is it plausible, is it—is it realistic to accept the uranium—

Iranian argument that they need so many centrifuges in order to 

sustain a civil peaceful nuclear program? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Well, look, obviously, we are highly skeptical of 

that argument. The fact of the matter is that they, clearly, had the 

military aspirations for their program at least through 2003. 

That is, certainly, the assessment that our intelligence community made at the time. And, of course, so many aspects of this program strongly suggest that they are seeking or have been seeking 

a nuclear weapons capacity. 

That said, their argument, for what it is worth, is that they do 

want to build a nuclear power program for the country. They, obviously, have vast oil resources so why they would need it is a very 

good question. 

They say that they want to devote oil to exports. They want to 

have the nuclear program for domestic energy production. They 

talk about a post-carbon future, which other countries talk about. 

But all of that said, their activities, of course, suggest the opposite and if that is really what they were focused on, they could presumably, you know, buy nuclear fuel abroad instead of produce it. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Well, let me ask you this. What percentage of Iranian’s domestic nuclear power is nuclear? 

Mr. BLINKEN. It is very de minimis but I will get you the exact 

number. But what they—what they purport to be looking at is a 

much more significant piece of their domestic energy program 

being provided by nuclear. 

That is the argument they make for why they would need a significant enrichment capacity in the future and, again, we are certainly skeptical of that, especially given their oil resources. 

Mr. HIGGINS. The—you know, it is just, you know, again, very, 

very difficult within the context of what Iran is engaged in today. 

Qasem Soleimani, head of the Quds Forces, is on the ground in 

Iraq today, probably, you know, directly leading the Shi’a militias 

in Iraq today to defeat ISIS. 

He saved Bashir al-Assad in the 11th hour to preserve Syria as 

a land bridge into Lebanon, to Hezbollah, which acts as a proxy for 

Iran. 

54

And yet here we sit with them face to face in negotiations. I do 

understand the complexity of diplomacy and the fact that you use 

diplomacy with your enemies more than your—but this is a very, 

very, very hard thing not only technically from the standpoint of 

a negotiator—and we do appreciate your efforts—but politically as 

well. You know trust is a hard thing and America is an extraordinary superpower. 

But I do believe that even if, you know, in the end we have to 

exercise a military option because negotiations fail, I do think we 

have to demonstrate to the international community that every 

diplomatic avenue was exhausted before that can happen and that 

is, unfortunately, the responsibility of America as the indispensable 

world power. 

I yield back. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

We are going to Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and I am not really 

sure where to start, I have so many questions, and just looking for 

clarification. 

I think the best way to start is that there was a quote from 

President Dwight Eisenhower 60 years ago when he announced the 

Atoms for Peace program: ‘‘One lesson is clear. Civilian nuclear 

programs flourish only through cooperation and openness. Secrecy 

and isolation are typically signs of a nuclear weapons program.’’

I don’t think that has differed and, you know, we look at Iran 

over the last 30 years and if you have you read, and I am sure you 

have, Ambassador John Bolton’s book, ‘‘Surrender is Not an Option,’’ Iran has been moving steadily in this direction ever since 

then. They have played the cat and mouse game. They have lied 

and deceived. 

It is a pure game of sophistry, and sophistry, as we all know, is 

a well orchestrated deception, misdirection and we call that a lie, 

in the country. And I see that going on with our nuclear negotiations and I mean that in the sense that I think it is great that we 

are negotiating to prevent them from getting nuclear arms but I 

think we are all in agreement they are going to get nuclear arms. 

I have sat here for 2 years. I am going into the third year. We 

have had expert after expert after expert sitting where you are that 

said Iran within 6 months—that is when I first got here in January 

2013—within 6 months to a year has enough fissile material for 

five to six bombs. 

And so that has been over a year so I can only assume, because 

the experts like you have told us, they are going to have that. And 

for us to say no, they are not, and then you look at Iran has prevented the IAEA to go in to inspect, we have got evidence that they 

have detonated a nuclear trigger in the region of Parchin but they 

won’t let the IAEA go in. 

And going back to what President Eisenhower said is if they are 

not going to be forthright and honest and open, is it prudent for 

the United States of America to go forward with this versus backing up from the negotiation table and say, when you are serious, 

Iran, let us know and we will take the sanctions off. 

55

Mr. Szubin, you brought up that Iran is in a crisis mode. They are in a hole. It will take over a $160 billion to get out of it. Yet, 

yesterday on the Western Hemisphere meeting we had the experts 

again and the report from the State Department said that Iran and 

Hezbollah has got the most activity they have ever had in the 

Western Hemisphere since 2009. 

Iran is working with Iraq to beat ISIS so they are funding a war 

in Iraq. They have funded the takeover of Yemen, and I ask you 

is that the nation—is that the status of a nation that is in crisis 

and they are starving and they are on their last dollar? 

Would they be investing money into that or would they investing 

it into their own country? What are your thoughts on that? 

Mr. SZUBIN. Thank you, Congressman. If I could take the last 

part of your question and then——

Mr. YOHO. Sure. 

Mr. SZUBIN [continuing]. Actually defer to my colleague. 

Mr. YOHO. And I have got another one I want to ask you real 

quick so go ahead. 

Mr. SZUBIN. Sure. So I did not say that they were on their last 

dollar and, obviously, we are talking about a sophisticated large industrialized country. What I talked about the were indicators of the 

economic strain on their society and the economic strain is massive. 

That doesn’t mean that they don’t have the thousands of dollars 

or even hundreds of thousands of dollars to provide to nefarious actors in their region or even in Latin America and, unfortunately, 

some of this activity, as dangerous as it is, comes cheap. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. And their goal is—again, we hear over and 

over again Fidel Castro met with the Ayatollah roughly 10 years 

ago, said we have a common enemy—that enemy is America and 

our goal is to bring them jointly together to its knees. 

I don’t see that any different, and with the narrative coming out 

of there, the rhetoric you hear, it is like Chairman Royce says, you 

know, ‘‘Death to America.’’

You can pick up a paper pretty much every week and you will 

find that in there. To move forward, thinking that we are stopping 

them—and Henry Kissinger said the move that we are—we are 

moving to prevent proliferation to managing it. 

So I think we should come clean with the American people, say 

they going to have a nuclear weapon. I think that we should put 

emphasis on what are we going to do the day that they do have 

that and have our foreign policy because you are already seeing 

Saudi Arabia and Egypt wanting to run a nuclear program. 

Are we going to monitor them? Are we going to say, no, you 

can’t? And then at what point do you intervene? And so I think all 

of this we are going through, I appreciate you going through it. But 

I think we are putting emphasis on something to say we are trying 

to prevent it and we know they are not going to prevent it. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you very much, Congressman. 

I would say, first of all, as in many things and most things President Eisenhower was very wise——

Mr. YOHO. Yes, he was. 

Mr. BLINKEN [continuing]. And so I think apply very appropriately to what we are looking at now, and it is precisely because 

of Iran’s efforts to cheat and to dodge its responsibilities and dodge 

56

its commitments and proceed with a program that the world has 

called them out and the world has exerted extraordinary pressure 

on them and that is why they are at the table. 

And the only reason that they are there is in order to relieve 

some of that pressure and the fact that that pressure could be reimposed is the strong incentive they would have to make good on 

the agreement. 

And I would note again that under the interim agreement—

under the terms of the agreement they have made good on those 

commitments for its duration. Going forward, we have to have, and 

we will have for there to be any agreement, the most exceptional 

intrusive monitoring, access and inspection regime than any country has ever seen. 

That is the only thing that can give us confidence that we are 

not trusting Iran’s word. We are looking at its actions and we will 

find out if it is violating its commitments. 

That is what this is about. At the end of the day, again, we have 

to deal with—and by the way, I should say we don’t accept the 

proposition that they would get a nuclear weapon. The entire effort 

that we are making is to make sure that they don’t. 

If there is no agreement, then there is a good chance that they 

will rush to a weapon or, certainly, rush to have the capacity to 

make one. 

Mr. YOHO. Does that make all those experts previously that said 

that they were going to have it wrong? 

Mr. BLINKEN. I think what they were—I would have to go back, 

Congressman, and see what—exactly what they said. I think what 

they were talking about was what is their capacity, where are they 

in terms of the capacity of producing a weapon should they choose 

to do it. 

I believe that is what they are talking about and what would the 

time line be. We are pushing that back. We are making sure that 

if they did decide to do that we would see it and we would be able 

to do something about it. That is what this is about. 

Mr. YOHO. My time has expired and I appreciate it. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentleman and I thank Secretary 

Blinken and Mr. Szubin. Thank you very much for your testimony 

here today. 

I also want to remind you about the points that we made here, 

the points that we made in the opening statements. I implore you 

to convey those views immediately, if you would, to Secretary 

Kerry and the negotiating team. 

You heard deep concerns over the sunset provision here, the fact 

it is only 10 years, over the question of verification of the agreement itself and whether at the—as part of this process whether 

Iran is going to be required to reveal its clandestine work that it 

has took on trying to develop a nuclear weapon in the past as part 

of any final agreement. 

You can’t have real verification going forward unless you have 

that revealed to the IAEA. You heard our concerns about previous 

military activities on the part of the regime, previous testing, what 

actually went on at the sites that they won’t give us access to, as 

57

well as Iran’s vast ballistic missile program that is underway as we 

speak and about Congress’ role in this. 

So, there is a number of the other issues raised as well so I hope 

you can convey that there are some profound bipartisan concerns 

that need to be heard, as a deal may be announced any day. 

And while our hearing was taking place there is news breaking 

from Switzerland that a draft is circulating there among the parties and in that draft Iran would have 6,000 spinning centrifuges 

for the next decade. 

So I know the committee is frustrated to read the press about 

drafts circulating. It does says something about the administration’s commitment to transparency when the press has the information and we are reading it off the news wire. So——

Mr. BLINKEN. Mr. Chairman, just on that point——

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. BLINKEN [continuing]. My understanding is that there is no 

draft—that that report is erroneous and, indeed, our spokesperson 

clarified that. 

Chairman ROYCE. That is good news. So we appreciate that. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. So when there is a draft, please share it with 

the members of this committee and of the Congress. 

We thank you again for your testimony, and for now, we will 

stand adjourned. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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