99–010 

Calendar No. 18 

112TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 1st Session 112–13 

THE USA PATRIOT ACT SUNSET EXTENSION ACT OF 2011 

APRIL 5, 2011.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. LEAHY, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

MINORITY VIEWS 

[To accompany S. 193] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill 

(S. 193), to extend the sunset of certain provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and the authority to issue national security letters, and 

for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably 

thereon, with amendments, and recommends that the bill, as 

amended, do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Background and Purpose of The USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension 

Act of 2011 .................................................................................................. 2 

II. History of the Bill and Committee Consideration ....................................... 20 

III. Section-by-Section Summary of the Bill ...................................................... 22 

IV. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................ 27 

V. Regulatory Impact Evaluation ...................................................................... 31 

VI. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 31 

VII. Minority Views ............................................................................................... 32 

VIII. Changes to Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ........................... 52 


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I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT SUNSET

EXTENSION ACT OF 2011 

A. INTRODUCTION

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, 

Congress drafted legislation to provide law enforcement with new 

or expanded tools to investigate and prosecute terrorists. The Senate passed a bill, the Uniting and Strengthening America Act on 

October 11, 2001. The House passed a bill on October 12, 2001, titled the Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act. The bills were reconciled, producing the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT 

Act) of 2001, which was signed into law on October 26, 2001, as 

P.L. 107–056. 

The USA PATRIOT Act triggered significant debate over the scope and targets of its surveillance authorities and the level of judicial review to be applied to the new law. Then-Majority Leader 

of the House, Richard Armey, and Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Patrick Leahy, insisted that a four-year sunset 

apply to 16 authorities. Modifications to National Security Letter 

(NSL) authorities were enacted without significant controversy in 

2001, but subsequent misuse and abuse of NSLs led to intensive 

public scrutiny and congressional oversight. 

The four-year sunsets in the 2001 law would have resulted in the 

expiration of 16 provisions on December 31, 2005. In enacting a reauthorization law, Congress determined that 14 of the 16 could be 

made permanent. However, a great deal of controversy continued 

to surround two authorities: requests for business records (section 

215 of the 2001 law), and the ‘‘roving’’ intelligence wiretap authority (section 206 of the 2001 law). In addition, NSLs were closely examined as their use expanded exponentially. 

Following intensive debate of the USA PATRIOT Act Improve- ment and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (‘‘2005 USA PATRIOT Act 

Reauthorization’’) conference report, civil liberties concerns led to a 

bipartisan Senate filibuster of the conference report in December 

2005. Congress passed a short extension, finally enacting the conference report and an improvements bill in March 2006 (P.L. 109– 

177 and P.L. 109–178). Sections 206 and 215 of the 2001 law were 

subject to a new sunset of December 31, 2009. A third sunset on 

the same date was imposed on the ‘‘lone wolf’’ surveillance authority, first enacted in 2004 as part of the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108–458). The 2005 USA 

PATRIOT Act Reauthorization required that audits of section 215 

orders and NSLs be conducted by the Inspector General of the Department of Justice. The Inspector General found a small number 

of instances of improper use of section 215 orders that resulted in 

the over-collection of information by the FBI. The NSL audits, published in 2007 and 2008, documented wide misuse and some abuse 

of the NSL authority by the FBI, including improper issuance of socalled ‘‘exigent letters.’’ 

During the 111th Congress, Chairman Leahy introduced the USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009 (S. 1692), which 

extended the sunsets of the three expiring PATRIOT Act provisions 

from December 31, 2009 to December 31, 2013. The bill also inVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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1 Among the Republican members of the Committee, both Senator Kyl and Senator Cornyn 

supported S. 1692 and voted to report the bill favorably to the full Senate. 2During consideration of the bill in the 112th Congress, among the Republican members of 

the Committee, Senator Lee supported S. 193 and voted to report the bill favorably to the full 

Senate. 

cluded a number of improvements and reforms that enhanced judicial and congressional oversight, and strengthened important privacy and civil liberties protections. Although S. 1692 was reported 

out of the Judiciary Committee with bipartisan support,1 the full 

Senate did not take further action on the legislation. Instead, two 

successive short-term extensions of the expiring PATRIOT Act provisions were enacted, ultimately extending the sunset date to February 28, 2011. Another short-term extension enacted in the 112th 

Congress extended that sunset to May 27, 2011. The USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011 (S. 193) is 

virtually identical to the bill reported by Chairman Leahy in the 

111th Congress (S. 1692). As was the case with S. 1692, the USA 

PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011 (S. 193) is the product 

of extensive bipartisan negotiations with the Department of Justice 

and the intelligence community, and received bipartisan support in 

Committee.2

B. PRIOR CONSIDERATION OF USA PATRIOT ACT AUTHORITIES

During the 109th Congress, a number of the expiring provisions 

of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act were considered for reauthorization. 

The majority of the provisions subject to a sunset were made permanent. However, many Senators including a number on the Senate Committee on the Judiciary expressed continuing concerns with 

the broad scope of information-gathering powers afforded the Government. These Senators sought additional protections against possible infringements on the constitutional rights and civil liberties 

of U.S. persons. In particular, concerns were raised about sections 

206 and 215 of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, which authorized 

‘‘roving’’ wiretaps and orders for production of business records 

under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (‘‘FISA’’). 

The ‘‘lone wolf’’ surveillance authority, which had been included in 

FISA through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act 

of 2004, was also viewed as controversial by some. Accordingly, the 

2005 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization included a new sunset of 

December 31, 2009, for these three provisions. The 2005 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization also mandated that the Department of 

Justice, Office of Inspector General complete comprehensive audits 

on the Government’s use of NSLs and requests for production of 

business records and other tangible things under section 215 of the 

2001 USA PATRIOT Act. 

The sunset and auditing measures required by that law proved 

that continuing congressional oversight and procedural protections 

are vital to ensuring that the Government’s powers are exercised 

in a manner that is consistent with the constitutional rights and 

civil liberties of Americans. In 2007 and 2008, the Department of 

Justice, Office of Inspector General issued reports on the use of 

NSLs and requests for section 215 orders for business records by 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and found numerous instances of over-collection of information. In reports on the use of 

NSLs, the Inspector General cited faulty record keeping, poor 


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tracking systems, and both misuse and abuse of the NSL authority. 

For example, a March 2007 report by the Department of Justice Inspector General ‘‘concluded that the FBI engaged in serious misuse 

of NSL authority,’’ including improper authorization of NSLs, improper requests under the pertinent national security letter statutes, and unauthorized collections. (Report of the U.S. Department 

of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, ‘‘A Review of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation’s Use of National Security Letters, March 

2007,’’ found at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0703b/ 

final.pdf.) 

Most troubling, the report also identified more than 700 instances in which the FBI improperly obtained telephone records by 

issuing ‘‘exigent letters.’’ (Id. p. 86–97) The Department of Justice 

Inspector General also found instances in which improper use of 

section 215 orders for business records or other tangible things by 

the FBI resulted in over-collection of information, or where the FBI 

issued NSLs to obtain information for which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (‘‘FISA Court’’) had previously refused to 

authorize a section 215 order, based on First Amendment concerns. 

(Report of the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector 

General, ‘‘A Review of the FBI’s Use of Section 215 Orders for 

Business Records in 2006,’’ March 2008, at pp. 59–74; found at 

http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0803a/final.pdf.) 

Consistent with the 2005 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization, S. 

193, the USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Act of 2011, mandates further 

audits to ensure that these surveillance authorities are implemented properly. It also adds a new set of audits to review the use 

of pen register and trap and trace devices authorized under FISA. 

Early in the 111th Congress, with a December 31, 2009, sunset 

pending, Chairman Leahy wrote to Attorney General Eric Holder 

seeking the administration’s views on reauthorization of the expiring authorities. (Letter from Chairman Leahy to Attorney General 

Eric Holder, dated March 9, 2009.) The Assistant Attorney General 

for Legislative Affairs, Ronald Weich, responded to Chairman 

Leahy on September 14, 2009, stating that the Department of Justice would prefer to have the authorities extended, and that the Department of Justice would be willing to work with the Committee 

to consider additional privacy protections for law abiding Americans. (Letter from Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs, Ronald Weich, to Chairman Leahy, dated September, 14, 

2009.) 

The Committee held a hearing titled, ‘‘Reauthorizing the USA 

PATRIOT Act: Ensuring Liberty and Security,’’ on September 23, 

2009. (See Hearing of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, ‘‘Reauthorizing the USA PATRIOT Act: Ensuring Liberty and Security,’’ September 23, 2009, S. Hrg. 111–333, Serial No. J–111–49, 

available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg55610/ 

pdf/CHRG-111shrg55610.pdf.) During the first panel, testimony 

was heard from David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division of the Department of Justice and Glenn 

Fine, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice. 

Mr. Kris requested that the three expiring provisions of the USA 

PATRIOT Act be reauthorized. The three provisions, which were 

then set to expire on December 31, 2009, are the FISA ‘‘roving’’ 

wiretap authority, the ‘‘lone wolf’’ surveillance authority, and the 


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provision authorizing FISA orders for business records and other 

tangible things. (Id. at 107–112.) 

Mr. Fine summarized the findings of audits conducted by the Office of the Inspector General on the use of NSLs and orders for 

business records. These audits were required by sections 119 and 

106A of the 2005 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization. (Id. at 81– 

96.) As noted above, the audits found significant problems regarding the use of NSLs and exigent letters. 

During the second panel, testimony was received from three experts in national security law. Suzanne Spaulding, principal of the 

Bingham Consulting Group, testified in favor of reforms to the 

three expiring provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. Kenneth 

Wainstein, a partner at O’Melveny & Myers, stated that the expiring provisions contained adequate safeguards and should be reauthorized. Lisa Graves, executive director of the Center for Media & 

Democracy, critiqued the use of orders for business records and 

NSLs and recommended that higher standards for issuance of 

such orders be enacted. The full hearing record is available at 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg55610/pdf/CHRG111shrg55610.pdf.) 

In the 111th Congress, the Committee reported the USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009, S. 1692. That bill, reported on October 13, 2009, received a bipartisan vote in the Committee, with Senators Kyl (R–AZ) and Cornyn (R–TX) voting in 

favor of the bill, along with Chairman Leahy (D–VT) and Senators 

Kohl (D–WI), Feinstein (D–CA), Schumer (D–NY), Cardin (D–MD), 

Whitehouse (D–RI), Klobuchar (D–MN), Kaufman (D–DE), and 

Franken (D–MN). After the bill was reported, Senators Kyl and 

Sessions (R–AL) joined with Chairman Leahy, Senator Feinstein, 

the Department of Justice, and intelligence agencies to continue 

negotiations over the legislative text. In November 2009, the revised bill text was finalized. The bill was endorsed by the Attorney 

General in a letter to Chairman Leahy dated November 9, 2009. 

The bill was again endorsed by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence in a letter to the Leaders of the 

House of Representatives and the Senate dated February 19, 2010. 

Instead of taking further action on S. 1692 in the 111th Congress, two short-term extensions of the expiring provisions of the 

USA PATRIOT Act were enacted, ultimately extending the sunset 

date to February 28, 2011. 

On March 17, 2010, following enactment of the February 28, 

2011 sunset extension, Chairman Leahy wrote to the Attorney 

General, asking him to implement a number of the provisions of 

the negotiated package based on S. 1692, which the administration 

had strongly endorsed. Chairman Leahy noted in his letter that the 

majority of provisions in the package did not require legislative action, but could be implemented as a matter of administrative policy 

and practice. The Attorney General responded to Chairman Leahy’s 

letter on December 9, 2010. The Attorney General agreed to implement a significant number of the provisions, and stated: ‘‘[W]e have 

determined that many of the privacy and civil liberties provisions 

of S. 1692 can be implemented without legislation.’’ He continued: 

‘‘We believe these measures will enhance standards, oversight, and 

accountability, especially with respect to how information about 

U.S. persons is retained and disseminated, without sacrificing the 


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operational effectiveness and flexibility needed to protect our citizens from terrorism and facilitate the collection of vital foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information.’’ (Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to Chairman Leahy dated December 9, 

2010.) 

In his response to Chairman Leahy’s request, the Attorney Gen- eral specifically outlined a number of provisions that the Department of Justice could implement administratively without impacting operational ability to protect Americans from terrorism. For example, regarding section 215 orders for tangible things, the Attorney General agreed to apply new requirements for acquisition of library and bookseller records. Specifically, when library or bookseller records are sought using a section 215 order, the Government 

must provide a statement of facts showing reasonable grounds to 

believe the tangible things are relevant to an authorized investigation and pertain to (a) an agent of a foreign power, (b) the activities 

of a suspected agent, or (c) an individual in contact with or known 

to a suspected agent of a foreign power subject to the investigation. With regard to NSLs, to facilitate better auditing and account- ability, the Department of Justice adopted a policy requiring the 

FBI to retain a written statement of facts showing that the information sought through an NSL is relevant to an authorized investigation. In addition, the Department of Justice adopted procedures 

to provide notification to recipients of NSLs of their opportunity to 

contest any nondisclosure requirement attached to the NSL. The 

Department of Justice further agreed to ensure that NSL recipients 

who challenge nondisclosure orders are notified by the FBI when 

compliance with such nondisclosure orders is no longer required. 

The bill in the 111th Congress (S. 1692) called upon the Department of Justice to adopt procedures for the collection, use, and storage of information derived from NSLs. Those procedures were approved by Attorney General Holder on October 1, 2010. Finally, the 

Attorney General agreed to work with Congress to determine ways 

to make additional information regarding the use of FISA authorities publicly available. 

Chairman Leahy also wrote to Justice Department Inspector 

General Glenn Fine on March 16, 2010, requesting that the Office 

of the Inspector General fulfill several auditing and reporting requirements included in the legislation. On June 15, 2010, Inspector 

General Fine responded, indicating that his office would conduct 

many of the audits called for in the legislation. (Letter from Department of Justice Inspector General Glenn Fine to Chairman 

Leahy dated June 15, 2010.) 

C. CONSIDERATION OF USA PATRIOT ACT AUTHORITIES IN THE 112TH

CONGRESS

Early in the 112th Congress, facing a sunset date of February 28, 

2011, Congress enacted a short-term extension of the three expiring provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act to May 27, 2011. 

The USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011, S. 193 as 

introduced, was virtually identical to the version of S. 1692 that 

was negotiated in the 111th Congress with Senators Kyl (R–AZ), 

Sessions (R–AL), Leahy (D–VT), and Feinstein (D–CA), along with 

the Department of Justice, and intelligence agencies. The only differences between the negotiated package of November 2009 and S. 


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193 as introduced are updates to the dates by which Inspectors 

General must submit audits to Congress. In addition, the new bill 

contains a modification to reflect that procedures for the collection, 

use and storage of information derived from NSLs were established 

by the Department of Justice in October 2010. Rather than calling 

for the establishment of such procedures, the new bill requires the 

Attorney General to periodically review the procedures, taking the 

privacy rights and civil liberties of Americans into consideration. 

With those slight modifications, the text of S. 193 as introduced 

is substantively identical to the package that the Department of 

Justice and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 

have repeatedly endorsed and have stated will pose no operational 

concerns for law enforcement or intelligence collection. Indeed, in 

light of the commitments by the Attorney General and the Inspector General for the Department of Justice to implement administratively a number of the provisions of S. 1692 (111th Congress), 

S. 193 simply codifies much of what the administration is already 

doing. The administration confirmed in a February 28, 2011, briefing for Senators that the prior endorsement letters of November 9, 

2009, and February 19, 2010, remain in force. 

On February 8, 2011, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence wrote to each Member of 

the Senate that the Attorney General and the Director of National 

Intelligence had provided a classified report for review by all Senators in connection with the sunset of FISA authorities. The letter 

invited each Senator to read the classified report at the Senate Intelligence Committee. The letter also advised that the Attorney 

General and the DNI had offered to make Justice Department and 

Intelligence Community personnel available to meet with any 

Member who has questions. 

On February 14, 2011, the Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller; 

the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper; and the Director of the National Security Agency, General Keith Alexander, 

briefed members of the Senate Judiciary and Intelligence Committees. A classified briefing was held on February 28, 2011, for the 

same group of Senators, with the Assistant Attorney General for 

National Security, David Kris; General Counsel of the FBI, Valerie 

Caproni; General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, 

Robert Litt; and General Counsel of the National Security Agency, 

Matthew Olsen. The briefers reiterated that S. 193 poses no operational concerns and is the product of extensive negotiations between the Executive Branch and Congress in 2009. 

On March 1, 2011, in testimony before the House Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and Science, Attorney General Holder stated his support for S. 193, saying that the bill 

strikes ‘‘a good balance,’’ in that it extends authorities subject to 

sunset, ‘‘but also dials in civil liberties protections.’’ In addition, in 

hearing testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, on March 

9, 2011, the Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Todd Hinnen, said: ‘‘The administration had reached the point 

where it was supporting a very similar bill to [S. 193] at the end 

of the last Congress . . . [W]e are prepared to support a bill that’s 

similar to the one that was at the close of the last Congress.’’ Mr. 

Hinnen also confirmed that the FISA ‘‘lone wolf’’ provision has still 


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never been used by the Government. In the same hearing, the General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, Robert Litt, 

said: ‘‘I think the provisions in [S. 193] are examples of the kinds 

of provisions that I described in my statement as provisions that 

would provide enhanced protection for civil liberties without affecting operational utility.’’ 

The USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011, S. 193, as 

amended and reported by the Committee, and as described more 

fully below, recognizes the Government’s need to maintain the tools 

necessary for effective counterterrorism investigations while protecting the civil liberties and constitutional rights so important to 

all Americans. The bill extends to December 31, 2013 the sunset 

on the three expiring provisions: ‘‘roving’’ wiretaps, section 215 orders for business records and tangible things, and the ‘‘lone wolf’’ 

provision. It also imposes a new sunset on the use of NSLs. 

In expressing support for periodic review and oversight, a number of former intelligence officials and national security experts 

wrote to Senate Leadership on February 9, 2011, that: ‘‘A permanent extension . . . risks avoiding the kind of assessment of authorities for national security investigations that we believe is required to ensure that they adequately and appropriately preserve 

civil liberty and privacy and protect national security.’’ (Letter from 

William Banks, Director of the Institute for National Security and 

Counterterrorism at Syracuse University College of Law, et al, to 

Senators Reid and McConnell, dated February 9, 2011.) 

A September 14, 2009, letter to this Committee from the Department of Justice acknowledged that: ‘‘The oversight provided since 

2001 and the specific oversight provisions that were added to the 

statute in 2006 have helped to ensure the authority is being used 

as intended.’’ The bill as reported expands oversight by mandating 

new audits by the Inspector General of the Department of Justice, 

requiring new court-approved minimization procedures on surveillance authorities, and including more detailed public reporting on 

the use of surveillance under FISA. As set forth more fully below, 

the bill strengthens oversight and judicial review, and addresses 

constitutional concerns about NSL nondisclosure orders raised by 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Doe 

v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008). 

The bill has been endorsed by the Fraternal Order of Police, 

which stated that the ‘‘bill will maintain tools used by law enforcement . . . without additional barriers or legal loopholes.’’ (Letter 

from Chuck Canterbury, National President, National Fraternal 

Order of Policy, to Chairman Leahy, Dated March 14, 2011.) In addition, S. 193 was endorsed by the Vermont Library Association, 

the American Library Association, the Association of Research Libraries, the American Association of Law Libraries, the Medical Library Association, and the Special Library Association. 

D. EXPIRING PROVISIONS OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT

1. Section 215 Orders for Tangible Things 

Section 215 of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act (codified at 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1861) amended FISA to enable the Government to apply for an 

order requiring an individual or entity to produce tangible things— 

including books, records, papers, or documents—that are relevant 


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to an authorized investigation involving foreign intelligence, international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities. Since its 

passage in 2001, this provision of the USA PATRIOT Act—sometimes called the ‘‘library provision’’ because of concerns that the 

Government could use it to obtain records and patron lists from libraries and bookstores—has been extremely controversial. It expires on May 27, 2011. 

a. History and Current Law on Section 215 Orders for Business Records and Other Tangible Things 

As originally enacted, FISA did not contain any provision authorizing the Government to require the production of documents or 

tangible things. In 1998, Congress amended FISA to allow the FBI 

to apply for a court order to obtain ‘‘records’’ from a ‘‘common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility.’’ From 1998–2001, any records sought under 

this provision had to be for ‘‘an investigation to gather foreign intelligence information or an investigation concerning international 

terrorism,’’ and the application had to provide ‘‘specific and 

articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom 

the records pertain [was] a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 

power.’’ 

The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act eliminated the restriction on the 

types of entities that were subject to this authority. Current law 

enables the FBI to seek production from any person or entity. The 

2001 USA PATRIOT Act also expanded the scope of this authority 

by allowing the Government to seek ‘‘any tangible things’’—not just 

‘‘records’’. 

Additionally, the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act and the subsequent 

2005 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization lowered the standard for 

obtaining section 215 orders by eliminating the requirement that 

an application specify ‘‘specific and articulable facts’’ giving reason 

to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign 

power or an agent of a foreign power. Under current law, the 

records or tangible things sought need not pertain to a foreign 

power or an agent of a foreign power. Instead, a statement of facts 

demonstrating mere relevance to an authorized investigation is sufficient. 

Under current law, in order to obtain a section 215 order, the 

Government must submit a statement of facts showing that there 

are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought 

are relevant to an authorized investigation to: (1) obtain foreign intelligence information (not concerning a United States person); (2) 

protect against international terrorism; or (3) protect against clandestine intelligence activities. The underlying investigation must be 

conducted in accordance with Attorney General guidelines, and 

may not be conducted on a U.S. person based solely on that person’s First Amendment activity. 

Tangible things are presumptively relevant to an investigation if 

they pertain to any of the following: (1) a foreign power or an agent 

of a foreign power; (2) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of an authorized investigation; or (3) 

an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a 

foreign power who is the subject of an authorized investigation. 

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brary circulation records, library patron lists, book sales records, 

firearms sales records, tax return records, educational records, or 

medical records, the application can be made by only a handful of 

high-ranking FBI officials. In all other instances, the authority to 

apply for section 215 orders can be delegated to the heads of FBI 

field offices. A recipient of a section 215 production order may challenge the legality of that order by filing a petition with the FISA 

Court. 

A recipient of a section 215 order may not disclose that fact, except to those persons to whom disclosure is necessary to comply 

with the order, or to an attorney to obtain legal advice or assistance with respect to the production of things in response to the 

order. The recipient may challenge these nondisclosure requirements—but only after a year has passed since receipt of the section 

215 order. The court must apply a conclusive presumption that 

nondisclosure is justified if the Government certifies that it would 

endanger national security. 

b. Changes to Section 215 Contained in S. 193, as Reported 

The USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011 adjusts the 

requirements for obtaining a court order for tangible things under 

FISA. First, the language modifies the statute slightly to strike the 

requirement for a ‘‘statement of facts,’’ and instead requires ‘‘a 

statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify the belief of the applicant’’ that the items sought are 

relevant to an authorized investigation. The language in the bill 

does not raise the standard, and is not intended to affect or restrict 

any activities approved by the FISA Court under existing statutory 

authorities. In addition, it is not vague or untested language. In 

fact, other sections of FISA use identical language. These are section 104 of FISA, which governs electronic surveillance, and section 

303 of FISA, which covers physical searches. 

Second, the bill removes the presumption of relevance described 

above. The bill requires the Government to provide a statement of 

the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify 

the applicant’s belief that the tangible things sought are relevant. 

The Department of Justice has indicated that it does not rely on 

this presumption, and that its current practice is to provide the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court with a complete statement 

of facts to support issuance of an order. 

Third, to obtain library records that contain personally identifiable information about a library patron, or bookseller records, the 

bill requires the Government to provide a statement of facts showing reasonable grounds to believe the tangible things are relevant 

to an authorized investigation and pertain to (a) an agent of a foreign power, (b) the activities of a suspected agent, or (c) an individual in contact with or known to a suspected agent of a foreign 

power subject to the investigation. ‘‘Bookseller records’’ are defined 

as meaning any transactional records reflecting the purchase or 

rental of books, journals, or magazines, whether in digital or print 

form. In a letter to Chairman Leahy dated December 9, 2010, the 

Attorney General agreed to implement this library and bookseller 

records requirement administratively. (Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to Chairman Leahy dated December 9, 2010.) 


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Fourth, the bill repeals the one-year waiting period for the recipient of a section 215 order to be able to challenge an accompanying 

nondisclosure or ‘‘gag’’ order. It also repeals a provision added to 

the law in 2006 stating that a conclusive presumption in favor of 

the Government shall apply where a high level official certifies that 

disclosure of the order for tangible things would endanger national 

security or interfere with diplomatic relations. The Department of 

Justice has stated that it has no objection to repealing these provisions. 

2. ‘‘Roving’’ Wiretaps 

a. History and Current Law on ‘‘Roving’’ Wiretaps 

Section 206 of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act expanded the wiretap 

provisions of FISA to permit the Government to obtain secret ‘‘roving’’ wiretap orders in intelligence investigations. 

Previously, a wiretap order under FISA had to identify both the 

person who is the target of the surveillance and the phone or computer to be wiretapped. Section 206 authorized the FISA Court to 

issue wiretap orders that identify the target of the surveillance but 

not the specific communications device being used by the target— 

effectively permitting the Government to wiretap new phones or 

computers being used by that target without going back to the 

court for advance approval. 

To obtain a ‘‘roving’’ wiretap order under FISA, the Government 

must demonstrate to the court that the actions of the target may 

have the effect of thwarting surveillance. In addition, changes 

made during the 2005 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization process 

require the Government to report to the FISA Court whenever it 

initiates surveillance on a new phone or computer not listed in the 

original ‘‘roving’’ wiretap order. 

The criminal wiretap law permits ‘‘roving’’ wiretaps, as well, but 

it contains additional safeguards that the FISA ‘‘roving’’ wiretap 

provision does not. First, FISA permits a ‘‘John Doe roving wiretap’’ that does not identify the person or the phone to be wiretapped. The criminal law contains no such provision. Second, the 

criminal wiretap law permits surveillance of a new phone or computer under a ‘‘roving’’ wiretap order only while agents have some 

indication the target is using it. Specifically, under the criminal 

law, surveillance is allowed ‘‘only for such time as it is reasonable 

to presume that the person identified in the application is or was 

reasonably proximate to the instrument through which such communication will be or was transmitted.’’ This is often called the ‘‘ascertainment’’ requirement, and FISA does not contain such a requirement for FISA ‘‘roving’’ wiretaps. 

b. Changes made to the Wiretap Statute Contained in S. 193, 

as Reported 

In addition to placing a new sunset on the FISA ‘‘roving’’ wiretap 

authority of December 31, 2013, the bill modifies the requirement 

for FISA wiretap orders. This section is intended to amend the 

FISA wiretap statute (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(1)(A)) so as to require law 

enforcement to identify ‘‘with particularity’’ the target of a wiretap 

request under FISA. The Department of Justice has testified that, 

in applications to the FISA Court for ‘‘roving’’ wiretaps, it already, 


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3 The suggestion in the Minority Views that the ‘‘lone wolf’’ provision ‘‘ha[s] helped federal 

law enforcement and intelligence agencies stay ahead of terrorists to prevent or thwart planned 

attacks’’ is inaccurate. During testimony before the Committee on March 30, 2011, FBI Director 

Robert Mueller confirmed that the ‘‘lone wolf’’ authority has still never been used. Accordingly, 

it is similarly inaccurate and illogical to suggest that the ‘‘lone wolf’’ authority should be made 

permanent because it has never been abused. To the contrary, significant questions have been 

raised about the constitutionality of wiretapping a person in the U.S. who has committed no 

crime and has no connection to international terrorist organizations, as the ‘‘lone wolf’’ provision 

allows. 

as a matter of practice, provides the court sufficient detail to identify the target with particularity. (Written Testimony of Acting Assistant Attorney General Todd Hinnen, Department of Justice, National Security Division, before the House Judiciary Committee, 

Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, March 

9, 2011, at p. 2). 

3. ‘‘Lone Wolf’’ Surveillance Authority 

a. History of the ‘‘Lone Wolf’’ Surveillance Authority 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 included a provision that created a new category of persons subject 

to surveillance under FISA, titled ‘‘Individual Terrorists as Agents 

of Foreign Powers.’’ (P.L. 108–458, Sec. 6001.) This provision is 

often called the ‘‘lone wolf’’ provision. It expires on May 27, 2011. Under FISA, a ‘‘lone wolf’’ is a person the Government has probable cause to show is engaging or preparing to engage in ‘‘international terrorism,’’ and who is not a U.S. person, meaning not a 

U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resident. This definition may include a person who has no known ties to a foreign organization or 

government. Prior to enactment of this section, FISA required such 

a foreign nexus. ‘‘Lone wolf’’ is often called the ‘‘Moussaoui fix,’’ but that label is 

a misnomer. The misunderstanding stems from claims that the FBI 

was unable to search a computer used by Zacharias Moussaoui, the 

so-called 20th hijacker in the September 11, 2001, attacks, because 

it could not establish probable cause to believe he was acting on 

behalf of a foreign power. Those claims are inaccurate, however, 

and the FBI later admitted in testimony before Congress that the 

agent in charge of the investigation did not understand that probable cause was the standard, what probable cause meant in this 

context, or the legal definition of an agent of a foreign power.3

b. Changes made to the ‘‘Lone Wolf’’ Statute Contained in S. 193, as Reported 

The bill makes no changes to the ‘‘lone wolf’’ statute; it merely ensures continuing congressional oversight by extending the sunset 

from May 27, 2011, to December 31, 2013. 

E. OTHER SURVEILLANCE PROVISIONS OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT

ADDRESSED IN S. 193

1. National Security Letter (NSL) Authority 

a. History of NSL Authority 

A National Security Letter (NSL) is a surveillance tool that allows intelligence and law enforcement officials to obtain certain 

types of communications and financial records sought in connection 

with intelligence and national security investigations. 


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National Security Letters were first authorized by the Right to 

Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) in 1986. By 2001, there were four 

NSL authorities in place under the RFPA, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the National Security Act. The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act added a fifth NSL 

authority under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Before 2001, NSLs 

allowed the FBI limited access to financial, credit agency, telephone, Internet Service Provider, and other communications 

records. 

Under current law, the Government can obtain such records if 

the information sought is relevant to an investigation to protect 

against international terrorism or espionage. The Government does 

not need to show that the records sought pertain to or are otherwise connected to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. 

National Security Letters do not require a court order. They are 

a form of administrative subpoena issued by FBI and other officials. Typically, they are served with nondisclosure orders, or ‘‘gag’’ 

orders, prohibiting the recipient from revealing its issuance. 

b. Expansion of NSL Authority Under the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act 

Prior to 2001, an FBI official had to show a factual basis for believing that the records sought pertained to an agent of a foreign 

power before issuing an NSL. 

Section 505 of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act expanded the NSL 

authorities in ways not contemplated by the original RFPA in 1986. 

The result of these changes is that the FBI may now obtain information on individuals who are not the subjects of national security 

investigations. It eliminated the requirement that the information 

sought pertain to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. 

It also eliminated the requirement to show a factual basis, enabling 

the FBI to rely upon mere relevance to an investigation to protect 

against international terrorism or foreign espionage. 

The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act also expanded the authority to 

issue NSLs beyond FBI headquarters to include the heads of the 

FBI field offices (i.e., Special Agents in Charge). The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act also expanded the list of authorized issuers of certain 

NSLs under the Fair Credit Reporting Act to include intelligence 

agencies. 

c. Further Expansions of NSL Authority Enacted in 2004 

The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004 (P.L. 108–177) 

modified the definition of ‘‘financial institution’’ to allow the FBI to 

issue NSLs under the Right to Financial Privacy Act to a much 

broader range of businesses, including travel and real estate agencies, jewelers, insurance companies, casinos, car dealers, and the 

U.S. Postal Service. Financial records were redefined to include 

‘‘any record held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer’s relationship with the financial institution.’’ 

The FBI issued policy guidance in 2007 stating that FBI officials 

should not rely upon this statute to obtain records from the expanded list above that were not ‘‘financial in nature.’’ 


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d. The 2005 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization Governs 

Challenges to NSLs 

The 2005 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization addressed how the 

Government may compel compliance with both an NSL and a nondisclosure order accompanying an NSL. The law gave the Government explicit power to compel compli- ance with an NSL. Failure to comply may be punished with contempt of court. If the recipient of a nondisclosure order knowingly 

and with intent to obstruct an investigation discloses its existence, 

the recipient faces five years in prison. The law allows the recipient of a nondisclosure order to challenge the nondisclosure in Federal court. If the challenge is filed within 

a year of issuance, however, and the Government certifies that disclosure may harm national security, the judge must treat that certification as conclusive. If the recipient challenges the nondisclosure after one year, the Government must recertify harm to national security or terminate the nondisclosure order. The 2005 USA 

PATRIOT Act Reauthorization also gave the recipient of an NSL 

the ability to challenge it in Federal District Court. In 2008, the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the 

NSL nondisclosure provisions unconstitutional. Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008). The USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011, S. 193, codifies the process suggested by the Second Circuit to correct this constitutional defect (see below). Without 

this legislative correction, the nondisclosure provision remains constitutionally infirm. 

e. Changes to NSL Authority Contained in S. 193, as Re- ported 

The USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011, S. 193, 

does not raise the standard for issuing an NSL but does make some 

targeted changes to ensure NSLs are issued in full compliance with 

law and practice. 

The instances of FBI misuse and abuse of NSLs discussed above 

are well documented. Therefore, to ensure that NSLs are not being 

issued arbitrarily, the bill requires the FBI to retain a written 

statement of specific facts demonstrating the relevance of the NSL 

to an authorized investigation. This allows FBI supervisors to ensure that agents are using NSLs properly, and provides auditors 

with the information necessary to audit NSL records. The Attorney General has stated that retention of a written statement of facts is exactly what current FBI policy requires. The 

new computer system requires the FBI to add the statement of 

facts to the application for an NSL. Therefore, the bill would simply codify current FBI practice. There would be no new recordkeeping requirements imposed on the FBI. 

Second, the bill corrects the constitutional defects in the issuance 

of nondisclosure orders on NSLs as found by the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Doe v. Mukasey, 549 

F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008), and adopts the concepts suggested by that 

court for a constitutionally sound process. Id. at 883–84. The bill 

allows the recipient of an NSL with a nondisclosure order to notify 

the Government at any time that it wishes to challenge the nondisclosure order. The Government then has 30 days to seek a court 

order in Federal district court to compel compliance with the nonVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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disclosure order. The court has authority to set the terms of a nondisclosure order as appropriate to the circumstances, but must afford substantial weight to the Government’s argument in favor of 

nondisclosure. 

Finally, S. 193, as reported, places a sunset on NSL authority. 

If the sunset were reached under the bill, NSL authority would revert to that statute as of September 10, 2001, prior to enactment 

of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act. The sunset was added not as an 

expression of desire for the authority to expire, but to guarantee 

that Congress will carefully review how NSLs are issued. An NSL 

does not need to be presented to a court, a grand jury, or a prosecutor. National Security Letters are typically issued in secret, 

with recipients silenced under penalty of law. After the standard 

for issuing an NSL was lowered in 2001, the use of NSLs spiked. 

Fewer than 10,000 NSLs were issued in 2001, but nearly 50,000 

were issued in 2006. Seeing that growth, Congress included Inspector General audits of NSLs in the 2005 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization bill. The audits showed vast over-collection of information and abuse of the NSL authority. They also revealed that the 

FBI used exigent letters over 700 times without proper authorization, and then compounded that misconduct by trying to issue 

NSLs after the fact to conceal its actions. The bill, therefore, includes the sunset of December 31, 2013, and audits on the use of 

NSLs. 

2. Delayed Notice Search Warrants 

a. History of Delayed Notice Search Warrants 

Prior to the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, courts had authorized delayed notice searches in cases where the suspect might flee or destroy evidence. But two leading court decisions required that notice 

of the search be given within seven days, unless extended by the 

court. Section 213 of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act created legislative authorization for delayed notice searches for the first time, but 

allowed notice to occur within ‘‘a reasonable time.’’ During the 2005 

USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization process, Congress imposed the 

30-day notice requirement, but still allowed courts to set longer notice periods where justified. 

Section 213 of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act authorized the use 

of delayed notice, or ‘‘sneak and peek,’’ search warrants in criminal 

cases. These warrants allow law enforcement agents to enter and 

search an American’s home or business, but not notify the owner 

until weeks or even months later. To obtain such a warrant, the 

Government must demonstrate to the court that notice would endanger someone’s safety, result in flight from prosecution, destruction of evidence, or intimidation of potential witnesses, or otherwise 

seriously jeopardize an investigation. 

Under current law, notice to the owner must be provided within 

30 days, or later if the court authorizes it. In addition, the court 

can extend the time period for additional periods of 90 days, or 

longer if justified. In addition to the delayed notice search authority in criminal cases, the Government also has the authority under 

FISA to conduct secret searches of homes and businesses in intelligence investigations without ever providing notice. 


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Recent reports to Congress from the Administrative Office of the 

U.S. Courts show that the use of delayed notice search warrants 

has nearly tripled in the past few years, but that these warrants 

have been used very rarely in terrorism cases. In fiscal year 2009, 

Federal prosecutors requested 1,150 delayed notice search warrants and 749 extensions (for a total of 1,899)—up from 419 warrants and 271 extensions (for a total of 690) just two years prior. 

In addition, only 14 of those 1,899 warrant and extension requests 

in fiscal year 2009 were made in terrorism cases. In contrast, 1,456 

requests were in drug cases. 

b. Changes to Delayed Notice Search Warrants Contained in 

S. 193, as Reported 

During the 2009 Senate Judiciary Committee markup of the USA 

PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act, S. 1692, an amendment was 

offered to require that subjects of delayed notice searches be notified of the search within 7 days, unless a judge grants an extension. It made no other change to the statute other than changing 

30 days to 7 days. That amendment is retained as section 11 of S. 

193, as reported. 

F. RESPONSE TO THE MINORITY VIEWS AND OTHER CLAIMS RAISED

DURING COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF S. 193

1. Response to Minority Views 

There is nothing to support the claim in the Minority Views that 

the bill somehow creates or rebuilds a ‘‘wall’’ between criminal investigations and intelligence gathering efforts. To the contrary, the 

bill codifies current practice and makes modest improvements to 

increase transparency and accountability. None of those improvements impede the operational abilities of law enforcement or the 

intelligence community to protect against terrorism, or to share information in that effort. 

The Minority Views claim that the bill, S. 193, makes ‘‘significant 

changes to existing national security law,’’ which would ‘‘increase 

burdens on investigators’’ and ‘‘result in delays.’’ The Senators who 

signed the Minority Views claim to ‘‘vigorously oppose the changes’’ 

contained in the bill and vow to ‘‘offer a number of amendments 

to limit the damage’’ they assert the bill would cause. These statements are undermined by two objective facts. First, two of the Senators who signed the Minority Views on S. 193, Senators Kyl and 

Cornyn, voted in favor of reporting a virtually identical bill in the 

111th Congress (S. 1962). Second, none of the Senators who signed 

the Minority Views offered a single amendment during the Committee’s consideration of the bill to address any of the provisions 

of the bill that they now decry as burdensome or otherwise problematic. Rather, they chose to offer amendments that were wholly 

unrelated to the surveillance issues at the heart of the USA PATRIOT Act. Given the opportunity to strike portions of the bill that 

they claim to so strenuously oppose, they instead sought to increase penalties for various crimes, create a new death penalty provision for certain crimes, and modify the immigration statute. 

The Minority Views also take great pains to suggest that the Department of Justice, FBI, and the intelligence community do not 

fully support S. 193. References to the personal preference of the 


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FBI Director and unattributed comments from administration officials do not, however, reflect the collective viewpoint of the administration, including the Department of Justice and the intelligence 

community. Indeed, at a February 28, 2011, briefing attended by 

several members of the Committee, including at least three who 

signed the Minority Views, the Assistant Attorney General for the 

National Security Division stated that the letters sent by the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence in 2009 and 2010 

expressing the administration’s ‘‘strong support’’ for the precursor 

bill (S. 1692, 111th Congress) remain in force as official statements 

of administration policy. In the same briefing, the General Counsel 

to the Director of National Intelligence repeatedly stated that S. 

193 is the product of extensive negotiations between the executive 

branch and Congress and that the bill poses no operational concerns for law enforcement or the intelligence community. 

The Minority Views seek to criticize a number of specific provisions of the bill. Responses to these assertions are set forth below. 

a. Written Statement of Specific Facts in Support of NSLs: The 

Minority Views claim that the bill will somehow confuse the FBI 

by requiring the agency to retain in its files a written statement 

of specific facts that show reasonable grounds to believe the information sought is relevant to an investigation. The FBI already 

records a statement of specific facts when it issues an NSL, a practice it adopted to avoid future misuse and abuse of the NSL authority of the type documented by the Inspector General in his March 

2007 report on NSLs. See FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, Section 11.9.3.C. 

Taking issue with the word ‘‘specific’’, the Minority Views suggest that this requirement will confuse the FBI and cause operational problems, not unlike the failure of the FBI to obtain a 

search warrant of Zacharias Moussaoui’s computer prior to September 11, 2001. The comparison does not make sense. The FBI 

failed to obtain a search warrant for Moussaoui’s computer because, as Senator Grassley co-wrote in a 2003 Committee report, 

‘‘key FBI personnel responsible for protecting our country against 

terrorism did not understand the law.’’ (FBI Oversight in the 107th 

Congress by the Senate Judiciary Committee: FISA Implementation Failures—An Interim Report by Senators Leahy, Grassley, and 

Specter, February 2003, at 20, available at http://grassley.senate. 

gov/releases/2003/p03r02-25c.pdf (‘‘2003 Leahy-Grassley-Specter 

FISA Report’’)). The 2003 Leahy-Grassley-Specter FISA Report, 

which calls throughout for enhanced congressional oversight, attributed this failure to a ‘‘fundamental breakdown in training.’’ Id. 

at 21. The report concluded, ‘‘We simply cannot continue to deny 

or ignore such training flaws only to see them repeated in the future.’’ Id. at 30. 

The language in S. 193 regarding retention of a written statement of specific facts directly responds to the failure of the FBI to 

properly issue NSLs. After the misuse and abuse of NSLs were documented by the Department of Justice Inspector General, the FBI 

engaged in a process to reform its NSL issuance practice. The bill, 

S. 193, simply codifies that practice. In short, S. 193 provides assurance that the FBI will follow the law, rather than become confused by it. Finally, it is worth noting that while the Minority 

Views takes issue with the use of the word ‘‘specific’’, there is apVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:16 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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parently no operational or policy concern with requiring the FBI to 

retain a written statement of facts to support the issuance of NSLs. 

Again, this is not surprising, given that this is already current FBI 

practice. 

b. Presumption of Relevance in Section 215 Orders: The Minority 

Views claim that ‘‘for reasons that have yet to be fully explained, 

S. 193 removes the current presumption.’’ The presumption is removed because it was an unnecessary addition to the 2005 USA 

PATRIOT Act Reauthorization that serves no purpose but to give 

the Government authority it has not requested be retained. Indeed, 

David Kris, former Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division, acknowledged during testimony in September 2009 

before this Committee that the relevance standard for obtaining a 

section 215 order—‘‘with or without the presumption is not a very 

high standard.’’ It is therefore unsurprising that the minority fails 

to cite to any facts or sources to support its assertion that the removal of the presumption would somehow lead to delays in drafting 

applications. 

c. Factual Basis for Section 215 Orders and for Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices (PR/TT): The Minority Views wrongly 

claim that a certain phrase added to section 215 orders and PR/TT 

requirements (‘‘a statement of facts showing reasonable grounds to 

believe that . . .’’) will change the standard required to obtain this 

information by ‘‘injecting vague language into a statute depends 

heavily on its definitions.’’ In fact identical language is used in 

Title I and Title III of FISA. To ensure that the new language is 

not interpreted to raise the standard, the sectional analysis in this 

Committee Report states the clear intent to neither affect nor restrict any activities approved by the FISA Court. This same report 

language was included in the Committee Report for S. 1692 from 

the 111th Congress. The Department of Justice, FBI, and Director 

of National Intelligence have all endorsed this language. 

d. Library and Bookseller Records: The Minority Views assert 

that the standard for obtaining library and bookseller records 

under the reported version of S. 193 will create an ‘‘open invitation 

to terrorists to use unsuspecting third parties to communicate with 

associates.’’ Yet this requirement, which was supported by the 

Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Feinstein, is already being implemented by the Attorney General as indicated in 

his December 9, 2010 letter to Chairman Leahy. Although the Minority Views suggest that the section 215 standard for library and 

bookseller records under S. 193 could have impeded the FBI investigation of Khalid Aldawsari, the individual arrested on terrorismrelated charges in Texas on February 23, 2011, the Attorney General noted in his December 2010 letter to Chairman Leahy that it 

is already current FBI practice to provide the FISA Court with a 

complete statement of facts to support issuance of a section 215 

order. 

e. FISA Court Review of Section 215 Minimization: The Minority 

Views complain that FISA Court review of minimization might lead 

to differing minimization requirements being applied to different 

cases. This claim ignores the practice of the FISA Court, which has 

already approved minimization standards for section 215 orders. 

The language in S. 193 simply codifies current practice, required 

by statute under 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B), a fact confirmed in the 


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December 9, 2010 letter from the Attorney General to Chairman 

Leahy. 

f. Delayed Notice Warrants: The Minority Views claim that S. 

193 will hamper law enforcement by changing the period of time 

after which the Government must inform the target of a delayed 

notice search warrant from 30 days to 7 days. The Government 

can, and often does seek extensions of these orders. The administration endorsed this provision, noting that as long as extensions 

may be sought from a court, it does not oppose modifying the number of days prior to notification. 

2. Response to other claims raised during committee consideration 

of S. 193 

During Committee consideration of S. 193, opponents of the bill 

suggested that no evidence has been provided to the Committee to 

justify changes to current law. In fact, several modifications to current law contained in the bill are the result of problems discovered 

by the Department of Justice Inspector General in reports and audits. As noted above, the Department of Justice Inspector General 

found extensive evidence of misuse of National Security Letters. A 

March 2007 report ‘‘concluded that the FBI engaged in serious misuse of NSL authority,’’ including improper authorization of NSLs, 

improper requests under the pertinent national security letter statutes, and unauthorized collections. The report also identified more 

than 700 instances in which the FBI improperly obtained telephone 

records by issuing ‘‘exigent letters.’’ The Department of Justice Inspector General also found a small number of instances in which 

improper use of section 215 orders by the FBI resulted in over-collection of information. The bill codifies the changes in practice by 

the FBI that will prevent such misuse from occurring in the future, 

and builds in an audit trail so that both the FBI and the Department of Justice Inspector General can monitor future compliance. 

Another assertion raised in the markup is that there has been 

no situation in which prosecutors overstepped their authority and 

were overruled by a court. The United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit found constitutional defects in current law restricting the ability of a recipient of a nondisclosure order on an 

NSL to challenge that nondisclosure order. See Doe v. Mukasey, 

549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008). To correct the constitutional infirmity, 

the bill adopts the concepts suggested by that court for a constitutionally sound process. This provision of the bill should be 

uncontroversial. Similar language was introduced as part of a bill 

sponsored by Senators Sessions, Bond (R–MO), and Lieberman 

(ID–CT) in the 111th Congress. (See section 4 of S. 2336, 111th 

Cong.) 

The majority of legal review of surveillance authorities takes 

place before the FISA Court, away from public scrutiny. Yet in 

April 2009, the Department of Justice confirmed to the press that 

‘‘there had been problems with the NSA surveillance operation.’’ 

The Department of Justice also confirmed that Attorney General 

Holder went to the FISA Court to seek a renewal of the surveillance program only after new safeguards were put in place. Several 

intelligence officials told the press that ‘‘the N.S.A. had been engaged in ‘overcollection’ of domestic communications of Americans.’’ 


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(New York Times, ‘‘Officials Say U.S. Wiretaps Exceeded Law,’’ 

April 16, 2009.) 

Additional reforms and improvements to the USA PATRIOT Act 

are necessary. To say otherwise is to ignore the facts. The FBI has 

made progress in addressing the problems documented by the Department of Justice Inspector General, but the positive steps it has 

taken should be codified in statute to ensure that mistakes are not 

made in the future. By the same token, a lack of evidence of abuse 

does not suggest that surveillance provisions should be made permanent, particularly when one of those provisions—the ‘‘lone wolf’’ 

provision—has never even been used, and therefore is not susceptible to review. The purpose of the sunsets in the bill is to guarantee that Congress will carefully review the use and effect of laws 

that authorize surveillance of Americans. The version of the USA 

PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act that the Committee reported 

in 2009 was virtually identical to the 2011 version and received bipartisan support, with Senators Kyl and Cornyn voting in favor of 

reporting the bill to the full Senate. The 2011 version of the bill, 

S. 193, also received a bipartisan vote, with Senator Lee voting in 

favor of the bill. 

II. HISTORY OF THE BILL AND COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

A. INTRODUCTION OF THE BILL

The USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011 was introduced as S. 193 on January 26, 2011 by Senator Leahy. 

B. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

Executive Business Meetings 

The bill was placed on the Committee’s agenda for consideration 

on February 3, 2011. It was held over on that date. 

On February 17, 2011, the Committee on the Judiciary considered S. 193 during an executive business meeting. Chairman Leahy 

offered an amendment to modify the due dates of the audits contained in section 10 of S. 193. The amendment was accepted by 

consent. 

Senator Feinstein offered an amendment to extend the sunsets 

in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110–261), from 

December 31, 2012, to December 31, 2013. Therefore, if S. 193, as 

amended is enacted, the sunsets in the USA PATRIOT Act and the 

sunsets in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 will be aligned to expire on the same date. The amendment was accepted by consent. 

Senator Leahy offered an amendment regarding the standard for 

obtaining bookseller records under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act to the bill, to match the requirement already contained 

in the bill for library records. The Committee adjourned prior to 

disposing of the amendment. Senator Grassley objected to completing consideration of the amendment and requested that the 

Chairman arrange a classified briefing with officials from the Department of Justice and the intelligence community. A classified 

briefing for members of the Committee was provided on February 

28, 2011, by officials from the Department of Justice, the Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security 

Agency. 


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On March 10, 2011, the Committee on the Judiciary resumed 

consideration of S. 193. 

Senator Leahy offered a technical amendment to modify S. 193 

to reflect the fact that Congress enacted a short term extension of 

the expiring provisions from February 28, 2011, to May 27, 2011. 

The amendment was accepted by consent. 

Senator Leahy then offered a modified version of the bookseller 

amendment he previously offered on February 17, 2011. The new 

version was virtually identical to the earlier bookseller amendment, 

but struck the phrase ‘‘and articulable’’ from the phrase ‘‘specific 

and articulable facts’’ to conform the amendment to the language 

in the underlying bill relating to section 215 orders. The amendment was accepted by a roll call vote. 

The vote record is as follows: 

Tally: 11 Yeas, 7 Nays 

Yeas (11): Kohl (D–WI), Feinstein (D–CA), Schumer (D–NY), 

Durbin (D–IL), Whitehouse (D–RI), Klobuchar (D–MN), Franken 

(D–MN), Coons (D–DE), Blumenthal (D–CT), Lee (R–UT), Leahy 

(D–VT). 

Nays (7): Grassley (R–IA), Hatch (R–UT), Kyl (R–AZ), Sessions (R–AL), Graham (R–SC), Cornyn (R–TX), Coburn (R–OK). 

Senator Grassley offered an amendment to add the death penalty 

as a punishment to certain crimes involving weapons of mass destruction. Senator Leahy offered a motion to table the amendment. 

The motion to table was rejected by a roll call vote. 

The vote record is as follows: 

Tally: 7 Yeas, 10 Nays, 1 Pass 

Yeas (7): Durbin (D–IL), Whitehouse (D–RI), Klobuchar (D–MN), 

Franken (D–MN), Coons (D–DE), Blumenthal (D–CT), Leahy (D–- 

VT). 

Nays (10): Feinstein (D–CA), Schumer (D–NY), Grassley (R–IA), Hatch (R–UT), Kyl (R–AZ), Sessions (R–AL), Graham (R–SC), 

Cornyn (R–TX), Lee (R–UT), Coburn (R–OK). Pass (1): Kohl (D–WI). 

The Grassley amendment was then accepted by voice vote. 

Senator Durbin offered an amendment cosponsored by Senator 

Lee to modify the ‘‘roving’’ wiretap statute to require that the Government describe the target of FISA surveillance with particularity. The amendment was accepted by roll call vote. 

The vote record is as follows: 

Tally: 11 Yeas, 7 Nays 

Yeas (11): Kohl (D–WI), Feinstein (D–CA), Schumer (D–NY), 

Durbin (D–IL), Whitehouse (D–RI), Klobuchar (D–MN), Franken 

(D–MN), Coons (D–DE), Blumenthal (D–CT), Lee (R–UT), Leahy 

(D–VT). 

Nays (7): Grassley (R–IA), Hatch (R–UT), Kyl (R–AZ), Sessions 

(R–AL), Graham (R–SC), Cornyn (R–TX), Coburn (R–OK). 

Senator Cornyn offered an amendment to modify the immigration statute to add terrorism to the list of characteristics that bar 

an alien from applying to naturalize or seek other immigration 

benefits because of a lack of good moral character. Senator Leahy 

offered a motion to table the amendment. The motion to table was 

accepted by a roll call vote. 

The vote record is as follows: 

Tally: 10 Yeas, 8 Nays 


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Yeas (10): Kohl (D–WI), Feinstein (D–CA), Schumer (D–NY), 

Durbin (D–IL), Whitehouse (D–RI), Klobuchar (D–MN), Franken 

(D–MN), Coons (D–DE), Blumenthal (D–CT), Leahy (D–VT). 

Nays (8): Grassley (R–IA), Hatch (R–UT), Kyl (R–AZ), Sessions 

(R–AL), Graham (R–SC), Cornyn (R–TX), Lee (R–UT), Coburn (R– 

OK). 

Senator Whitehouse offered a conforming amendment to strike 

the words ‘‘and articulable’’ from the section of S. 193 regarding judicial review of NSLs. Under the revised language, the bill would 

require the applicant for a nondisclosure order accompanying an 

NSL to include a statement of specific facts indicating that nondisclosure is necessary to prevent a danger to national security or 

other enumerated harms. The amendment was accepted by voice 

vote. 

Senator Kyl offered three amendments that would have increased penalties and added mandatory minimum sentences for 

crimes involving terrorism hoaxes, sexual assault, kidnapping, and 

suicide bombing, among others. Senator Kyl withdrew the amendments. 

The Committee then voted to report the USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act, as amended, favorably to the Senate. The Committee proceeded by roll call vote as follows: 

Tally: 11 Yeas, 7 Nays 

Yeas (10): Kohl (D–WI), Feinstein (D–CA), Schumer (D–NY), 

Durbin (D–IL), Whitehouse (D–RI), Klobuchar (D–MI), Franken 

(D–MI), Coons (D–DE), Blumenthal (D–CT), Lee (R–UT), Leahy 

(D–VT). 

Nays (7): Grassley (R–IA), Hatch (R–UT), Kyl (R–AZ), Sessions 

(R–AL), Graham (R–SC), Cornyn (R–TX), Coburn (R–OK). 

III. SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY OF THE BILL

Section 1. Short title 

This section provides that the legislation may be cited as the 

‘‘USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011.’’ 

Section 2. Sunsets 

This section extends the sunsets on the provisions for ‘‘lone wolf,’’ 

roving wiretaps and orders for tangible things from May 27, 2011 

to December 31, 2013. This section establishes a sunset of December 31, 2013, on the use of NSLs. This section also changes the 

sunset dates for provisions under the FISA Amendments Act of 

2008 (Pub. L. No. 110–261) from December 31, 2012 to December 

31, 2013. This section also makes conforming amendments to FISA 

and other applicable laws consistent with the sunsets. 

Section 3. Factual basis for and issuance of orders for access to tangible things 

This section modifies the standard for obtaining a court order for 

tangible things under FISA. Current law requires the Government 

to submit a statement of facts showing reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized 

investigation. However, current law states that the tangible things 

sought are presumptively relevant if the Government shows that 

they pertain to (a) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, 


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(b) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the 

subject of such an authorized investigation, or (c) an individual in 

contact with, or known to, an agent of a foreign power who is the 

subject of such authorized investigation. This section removes the 

presumption of relevance described above. It requires the Government to provide a statement of the facts and circumstances relied 

upon by the applicant to justify the applicant’s belief that the tangible things sought are relevant. This ensures that the Government 

is presenting a thorough statement of facts to the court and 

strengthens judicial oversight. The Department of Justice has indicated that it does not rely on this presumption, and that its current 

practice is to provide the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 

with a complete statement of facts to support issuance of an order. 

Section 3(a)(2)(A) alters certain requirements with respect to applications made pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861. These changes are 

not intended to affect or restrict any activities approved by the 

FISA Court under existing statutory authorities. Rather, this provision is intended to ensure that in applications made pursuant to 

50 U.S.C. § 1861, the Government must submit a statement of the 

facts it relies on to support its belief that the items or information 

sought are relevant to an authorized investigation and that such 

relevance is not to be presumed based on the presence of certain 

factors. 

To obtain library records that contain personally identifiable information about a patron, or bookseller records, the Government 

must provide a statement of facts showing reasonable grounds to 

believe the tangible things are relevant to an authorized investigation and pertain to (a) an agent of a foreign power, (b) the activities 

of a suspected agent, or (c) an individual in contact with or known 

to a suspected agent of foreign power subject to the investigation. 

‘‘Bookseller records’’ are defined as meaning any transactional 

records reflecting the purchase or rental of books, journals, or magazines, whether in digital or print form. The Department of Justice 

has already agreed to implement this requirement administratively. 

This section also requires court review of minimization procedures. Finally, this section includes transition procedures to ensure 

that any order in effect at the time of enactment remains in effect 

until the expiration of the order. 

Section 4. Factual basis for and issuance of orders for pen registers 

and trap and trace devices for foreign intelligence purposes 

Under current law, in order to obtain a FISA pen/trap, the Government must certify that the information sought is merely foreign 

intelligence information or is relevant to an investigation to protect 

against terrorism. The bill modifies the standard for obtaining a 

pen/trap to require the Government to provide a statement of the 

facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify the 

applicant’s belief that the information likely to be obtained is relevant. This ensures that the Government is presenting a thorough 

statement of facts to the court and strengthens judicial oversight. 

Section 4(a)(2)(A) alters certain requirements with respect to applications made pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1842. These changes are 

not intended to affect or restrict any activities approved by the 

FISA Court under existing statutory authorities. Rather, this proviVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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sion is intended to ensure that in applications made pursuant to 

50 U.S.C. § 1842, the Government must submit a statement of the 

facts it relies on to support its belief that the items or information 

sought are relevant to an authorized investigation. 

This section also requires minimization procedures, which are 

not required under current law, and makes those procedures subject to court review. Section 4(b) governs procedures for minimization of the retention and dissemination of information obtained 

pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1842 where appropriate in exceptional circumstances. This provision is intended to provide a statutory footing for the existing practice whereby specialized minimization procedures are implemented in certain limited circumstances under 

FISA Court authorization and oversight. 

Finally, this section includes transition procedures to ensure that 

any order in effect at the time of enactment remains in effect until 

the expiration of the order. 

Section 5. Limitations on disclosure of national security letters 

This section authorizes the Government to prohibit disclosure of 

the receipt of an NSL (there are four different statutes that authorize NSLs) where a high level official certifies that disclosure may 

result in danger to the national security, interference with an investigation, or danger to the life or safety of a person. The FBI has 

stated that its current practice is to require such a certification to 

include an appropriately thorough statement of facts setting forth 

the need for nondisclosure. 

The recipient of an NSL nondisclosure order may challenge the 

nondisclosure at any time by notifying the Government of a desire 

to not comply. Section 6 (below) details the process for doing so. 

Section 6. Judicial review of FISA orders and NSL nondisclosure 

orders 

This section allows the recipient of a section 215 order for tangible things to challenge the order itself and any nondisclosure 

order associated with it. Current law requires a recipient to wait 

a year before challenging a nondisclosure order. This section repeals that one-year mandated delay before a recipient of an order 

for tangible things can challenge such a nondisclosure order in 

court. It also repeals a provision added to the law in 2006 stating 

that a conclusive presumption in favor of the Government shall 

apply where a high level official certifies that disclosure of the 

order for tangible things would endanger national security or interfere with diplomatic relations. 

This section also corrects the constitutional defects in the 

issuance of nondisclosure orders on NSLs as found by the Second 

Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 

2008), and adopts the concepts suggested by that court for a constitutionally sound process. Id. at 883–84. The bill allows the recipient of an NSL with a nondisclosure order to notify the Government at any time that it wishes to challenge the nondisclosure 

order. The Government then has 30 days to seek a court order in 

Federal district court to compel compliance with the nondisclosure 

order. The court has authority to set the terms of a nondisclosure 

order as appropriate to the circumstances, but must afford substantial weight to the Government’s argument in favor of nondisclosure. 


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According to current Department of Justice policy, all NSLs must 

include a notice that informs recipients of the opportunity to contest the nondisclosure requirement through the Government-initiated judicial review. This section states that the government’s application for an NSL nondisclosure order may be filed either in the 

district within which the authorized investigation is conducted or 

in the jurisdiction where the recipient’s business is located. This 

option will ease the burden on the recipient in challenging the nondisclosure order. 

This section requires the Government to notify any entity that 

challenges a nondisclosure order when the need for nondisclosure 

is terminated. The Department of Justice agreed to implement this 

measure administratively in December 2010; therefore, this section 

will codify current practice. 

The bill also requires FISA Court approval of minimization procedures in relation to the issuance of a section 215 order for production of tangible things, similar to the court approval required 

for other FISA authorities such as wiretaps, physical searches, and 

pen register and trap and trace devices. 

Section 7. Certification for access to telephone toll and transactional 

records 

This section codifies current FBI practice in issuing an NSL, and 

augments oversight and transparency. Current law requires only 

that an official certify that the information requested in the NSL 

is relevant to, or sought for, an authorized investigation to protect 

against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, or for a law enforcement investigation, counterintelligence inquiry, or security determination. This section adds a requirement 

that the FBI retain a written statement of specific facts showing 

that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information 

sought is relevant to such an authorized investigation. This statement of specific facts will not be included in the NSL itself, but will 

be available for internal review and Office of Inspector General audits. The Department of Justice has stated that it is current policy 

for the FBI to retain a statement of specific facts showing the information sought through NSLs is relevant to an authorized investigation. 

Section 8. Public reporting on national security letters 

This section requires reporting of aggregate numbers based upon 

the total number of all NSLs issued each year, as opposed to by 

individual NSL. This section ensures that the FBI can keep an accurate record of the information it must disclose by allowing it to 

report both on persons who are the subject of an authorized national security investigation, and on individuals who have been in 

contact with or otherwise directly linked to the subject of an authorized national security investigation. 

Section 9. Public reporting on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act 

This section requires that the Government produce an annual 

unclassified report on how the authorities under FISA are used, including their impact on the privacy of United States persons. This 

report shall be easily accessible on the Internet. 


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Section 10. Audits 

This section requires the DOJ Office of Inspector General to conduct audits of the use of three surveillance tools: (1) orders for tangible things under section 215 of the 2001 Patriot Act, or section 

501 of FISA; (2) pen registers and trap and trace devices under section 402 of FISA; and (3) the use of NSLs. The audits will cover 

the years 2007 through 2011. The scope of such audits includes a 

comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness and use of the investigative authorities provided to the Government, including any improper or illegal use of such authorities. This section also requires 

the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community to submit 

separate reports that also review these three provisions. The audits 

covering the years 2007–2009 must be completed by March 31, 

2012. The audits for the years 2010–2011 must be completed by 

March, 31, 2013. These due dates ensure that Congress will have 

time to fully consider the findings of the audits prior to the December 31, 2013 sunsets in the bill. 

Section 11. Delayed notice search warrants 

Current law requires notification of a delayed notice search warrant within 30 days. This section requires notification of a delayed 

notice search warrant within seven days, or a longer period if justified. 

Section 12. NSL procedures 

Current law does not require minimization procedures be established, but on October 1, 2010, the Attorney General adopted procedures concerning the collection, use, and storage of information obtained in response to NSLs. This section requires that the Attorney 

General periodically review, and revise as necessary, those procedures, and to give due consideration to the privacy interests of individuals and the need to protect national security. If the Attorney 

General makes any significant changes to these NSL procedures, 

the Attorney General is required under this section to notify Congress, and to submit a copy of the changes. 

Section 13. Severability 

This section includes a severability clause that will ensure that 

in the event any part of the bill or any amendment to the bill is 

found to be unconstitutional the remainder of the bill will not be 

affected. 

Section 14. Offset 

This section includes a $5,000,000 offset from the Department of 

Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund for any direct spending that could 

be incurred by the provisions of the bill. 

Section 15. Electronic surveillance 

This section is intended to amend the FISA wiretap statute (50 

U.S.C. § 1805(c)(1)(A)) so as to require law enforcement to identify 

‘‘with particularity’’ the target of a wiretap request under FISA. 

The Department of Justice has testified that, in applications to the 

FISA Court for ‘‘roving’’ wiretaps, it must provide the court sufficient detail to identify the target with particularity. 


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Section 16. Death penalty for certain terror related crimes 

This section provides for the possibility of the death penalty as 

punishment for certain crimes involving the use of weapons of 

mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, missile systems, radiological devices, and the variola virus. 

Section 16. Effective date 

This section includes an effective date of 120 days from the date 

of enactment for the statutory revisions made by this legislation to 

take effect. This period of time will provide the Government an appropriate amount of time to implement the new procedures required by the legislation. 

IV. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

The Committee sets forth, with respect to the bill, S. 193, the following estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the 

Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the Congressional 

Budget Act of 1974: 

MARCH 31, 2011. 

Hon. PATRICK J. LEAHY, 

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 193, the USA PATRIOT Act 

Sunset Extension Act of 2011. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark Grabowicz. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF. 

Enclosure. 

S. 193—USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011 

Summary: The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 

(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107–56), the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108– 

458), and the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization 

Act of 2005 (Public Law 109–177) expanded the powers of federal 

law enforcement and intelligence agencies to investigate and prosecute terrorist acts. S. 193 would extend, until December 31, 2013, 

certain provisions of those acts that will otherwise expire in 2011. 

In addition, the bill would require the Department of Justice (DOJ) 

and certain offices within the intelligence community to prepare 

additional reports and audits relating to those investigations. Finally, S. 193 would permanently rescind $5 million from the unobligated balances of DOJ’s Assets Forfeiture Fund. 

Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO estimates that implementing S. 193 would have discretionary costs of 

$9 million over the 2011–2016 period. We also estimate that enacting the legislation would decrease direct spending by $5 million 

over the 2011–2013 period (with no impact after 2013). In addition, 

we estimate that enacting the bill would affect revenues, but such 

effects would not be significant. Pay-as-you-go procedures apply beVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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cause enacting the legislation would affect direct spending and revenues. 

CBO has determined that the provisions of S. 193 are either excluded from review for mandates under the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act (UMRA) because they are necessary for national security or they contain no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates. 

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of S. 193 is shown in the following table. The costs 

of this legislation fall within budget functions 050 (national defense) and 750 (administration of justice). 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2011– 

2016 

CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING 

Budget Authority ............................................ ·5 0 0 0 0 0 ·5 

Estimated Outlays ......................................... ·1 ·2 ·2 0 0 0 ·5 

CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION 

Estimated Authorization Level ....................... 1 4 3 * * * 9 

Estimated Outlays ......................................... 1 4 3 * * * 9 

Note: * = less than $500,000. 

Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill 

will be enacted by July 1, 2011, and that the amounts necessary 

to implement the bill will be appropriated for each year. 

Direct spending and revenues 

S. 193 would permanently rescind $5 million from the unobligated balances of the DOJ Assets Forfeiture Fund. CBO estimates 

that this rescission would reduce direct spending by $1 million in 

2011 and by $2 million in each of fiscal years 2012 and 2013. 

Because those prosecuted and convicted under S. 193 could be 

subject to civil and criminal fines, the federal government might 

collect additional fines if the legislation is enacted. Collections of 

civil fines are recorded in the budget as revenues. Criminal fines 

are recorded as revenues, deposited in the Crime Victims Fund, 

and later spent. CBO expects that any additional revenues and direct spending would not be significant because of the small number 

of cases likely to be affected. 

Spending subject to appropriation 

We estimate that implementing the bill would cost about $9 million over the 2011–2016 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. S. 193 would require the inspectors general of 

DOJ and certain offices within the intelligence community, by 

March 31, 2013, to conduct audits of their agencies’ use of selected 

investigative powers during the 2007–2011 period. The bill also 

would require DOJ to prepare new reports each year, in both classified and unclassified form, on its use of certain investigative powers. 

Based on information from DOJ and the intelligence community, 

we expect that about two dozen people would be hired to carry out 

the audits and prepare the reports. CBO estimates that it would 

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lion in 2013, and less than $500,000 annually thereafter to complete the audits and reports required by the bill. 

Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act 

of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement procedures 

for legislation affecting direct spending or revenues. By rescinding 

$5 million from the unobligated balances of the Assets Forfeiture 

Fund, S. 193 would reduce direct spending. The bill also could affect direct spending and revenues through the collection and spending of civil and criminal fines. The net changes in outlays and revenues that are subject to those pay-as-you-go procedures are shown 

in the following table. 


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CBO ESTIMATE OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO EFFECTS FOR S. 193 AS REPORTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON MARCH 17, 2011 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2011– 2016 2011– 2021 

NET INCREASE OR DECREASE (·) IN THE DEFICIT 

Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Impact ..................................................................................................... ·1 ·2 ·2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ·5 ·5 

Memorandum: 

Changes in Outlays ................................................................................................................ ·1 ·2 ·2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ·5 ·5 

Changes in Revenues ............................................................................................................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 


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Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: CBO has determined that the provisions of S. 193 are either excluded from review 

for mandates under UMRA because they are necessary for national 

security or they contain no intergovernmental or private-sector 

mandates. 

Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Mark Grabowicz (DOJ) and Jason Wheelock (Intelligence Community); Impact on State, Local, 

and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell; Impact on the Private 

Sector: Paige Piper/Bach. 

Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant Director 

for Budget Analysis. 

V. REGULATORY IMPACT EVALUATION

In compliance with rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that under S. 193, as reported, the Department of Justice would be required to issue minimization procedures on section 215 orders, and pen register and trap and trace 

devices. 

VI. CONCLUSION

The USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011, S. 193, 

was reported favorably to the Senate with a bipartisan vote from 

the Committee on the Judiciary. The bill provides the Government 

with important tools to prevent terrorist attacks, while increasing 

protections of civil liberties, and affording greater respect for constitutional rights than under current law. The bill contains vigorous oversight and public reporting requirements, new Inspector 

General audits, and sunsets on four controversial provisions. Because three provisions of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 are due to expire on May 27, 2011, the 

Committee recommends swift action on S. 193 as reported. 


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4 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 

and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 

(Oct. 26, 2001). 5These provisions were set to expire at the February 28, 2011, but Congress passed Pub. L. 

No. 112–3, 125 Stat. 5 (Feb. 25, 2011), a short term extension which extends the provisions until 

May 27, 2011. 6 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., A Review of the FBI’s Use of Section 215 

Orders for Business Records in 2006, at 5 March 2008 noting, ‘‘We did not identify any illegal 

use of Section 215 authority.’’ 

VII. MINORITY VIEWS

MINORITY VIEWS FROM SENATORS GRASSLEY, HATCH, 

KYL, SESSIONS, GRAHAM, CORNYN, AND COBURN 

Prior to September 11, 2001, government surveillance authorities 

fell, broadly, into two categories: ordinary domestic crime and foreign intelligence information collection. A rigid divide between the 

two undermined the government’s ability to ‘‘connect the dots’’ in 

terrorism investigations because it prevented domestic law enforcement officers from collaborating with national security personnel. 

To protect against future threats to our security, government investigators needed more appropriate counterterrorism and foreign intelligence tools. As a result, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT 

Act 4 among other legislative responses. 

If Congress does not act in the coming weeks, three vital national 

security tools to fight terrorism and prevent attacks will expire.5

These provisions, section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorizing 

roving wiretaps, section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act regarding 

access to tangible things such as business records, and section 6001 

of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, otherwise 

known as the ‘‘lone wolf’’ provision, have previously been reauthorized and there have been no reported abuses of these authorities.6

These tools, established in the wake of the September 11th attacks, 

have helped federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies stay 

ahead of terrorists to prevent or thwart planned attacks. 

A key theme of these post-9/11 provisions was the purposeful dismantling of the distinctions between criminal and national security 

investigative tools. Congress believed then, as we believe now, that 

an FBI agent investigating a potential act of terrorism should have 

the same tools and authorities available to an FBI agent investigating a drug offense. While there are some distinctions that remain in place between criminal and national security tools, the effort to have greater parity among them has been largely successful. 

For example, section 206 of the PATRIOT Act gives intelligence 

agencies a capability that has been available to law enforcement 

for decades. Unfortunately, S. 193 puts us back on a path to a pre9/11 mindset, in which arbitrary distinctions between criminal and 


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7The USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009, S. 1692, 111th Cong. (2009). 

8 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, 

and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (March 9, 2011) (statement of Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office of the Dir. Of Nat’l Intelligence). 9Good Morning America, Interview of Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. (ABC television 

broadcast Dec. 21, 2010). 10Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert S. Mueller, III, Address at the 10th Annual 

Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police Conference Orlando, FL (Oct. 25, 2010). 

national security techniques were the norm. This we cannot sanction. 

On January 26, 2011, Senator Leahy introduced S. 193, the USA 

PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011. This legislation is 

similar to previous legislation he introduced that was reported out 

of the Judiciary Committee (Committee) in the 111th Congress,7

but not considered on the Senate floor. S. 193 reauthorizes expiring 

provisions of the PATRIOT Act, but with significant changes to existing national security law. These changes would increase burdens 

on investigators, result in delays—seldom experienced in domestic 

criminal matters—in obtaining critical national security authorities, and drain federal resources that should be focused on keeping 

the nation safe. If S. 193 becomes law, national security investigators will face greater procedural hurdles to using critical surveillance tools—many of which have long been readily available to law 

enforcement in run-of-the-mill criminal cases. 

S. 193 makes significant changes to the three expiring provisions 

and other critical national security tools, despite the fact that we 

currently face an ongoing and evolving terrorist threat. For example, the General Counsel for the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence recently testified before the House Judiciary Committee: ‘‘The threat to the Homeland from violent extremists is 

growing . . . the nature of the terrorism threat that we face is 

evolving. Our adversaries are constantly adapting their strategies 

and communication techniques.’’ 8 The Attorney General also recently stated, ‘‘The threat has changed from simply worrying about 

foreigners coming here, to worrying about people in the United 

States, American citizens—raised here, born here, and who for 

whatever reason, have decided that they are going to become 

radicalized and take up arms against the nation in which they 

were born.’’ 9 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director 

Mueller stated, ‘‘Threats from homegrown terrorists are also of 

great concern. These individuals are harder to detect, easily able 

to connect with other extremists on the Internet, and—in some instances—highly capable operationally.’’ 10

We raise our concerns with S. 193 against this backdrop of evolving terrorist threats, including the deadly shooting at Fort Hood by 

Major Nidal Hassan, and recent attempted terrorist attacks that 

fortunately were thwarted before any lives were lost. Among the 

thwarted attacks: the February 2011 plot by Khalid Ali-M 

Aldawsari in Lubbock, Texas, to utilize weapons of mass destruction; the 2009 plot by Najibullah Zazi to bomb the New York City 

subway; the failed bombing in Times Square by Faisal Shahzad; 

the planned bombing of the Washington D.C. Metro system by 

Farooque Ahmed; and the failed bombing of Northwest Airlines 

Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 by Umar Farouk 

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emies have not rested since 9/11, but remain intent upon causing 

us harm—including here at home. Because now is not the time to 

be dialing back or raising the bar on any of our national security 

tools, we agree with FBI Director Robert Mueller’s statement to the 

House Judiciary Committee on March 16, 2011 that we favor reauthorization of the three expiring provisions as is. 

The Three Expiring Provisions 

The PATRIOT Act has provided our national security investigators and analysts with critical legal authorities they need to protect 

the nation against terrorist threats. These legal tools were authorized in 2001, then renewed as part of the PATRIOT Act reauthorization in 2005 and 2006, and then again in December 2009. Three 

provisions are currently set to expire on May 28, 2011. These three 

provisions are: 

• The ‘‘roving wiretap’’ provision, Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This tool allows investigators to collect evidence 

against terrorists in the same way that evidence is collected 

against drug dealers in the criminal context, and requires an initial 

finding of probable cause by the court. Retaining the ability to 

maintain surveillance on terrorists who are trained to evade detection is crucial, particularly in the age of disposable cell phones, 

which terrorists are known to use and frequently replace. The current authority already sets forth a process for notification to the 

court when a terrorist is tracked using roving authority. This process enables agents to continue their investigation, without having 

to file repetitious court applications every time a terrorist changes 

phones. Like regular wiretaps, roving wiretaps have been routinely 

used in domestic law enforcement for decades. 

• The ‘‘business records’’ authority, Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This authority allows officials to ask a court for an 

order to obtain tangible things, including business records, in national security terrorism cases. Examining business records often 

provides key information that assists investigators in solving a 

wide range of crimes. In criminal matters, similar records may be 

obtained using a grand jury subpoena, without any need for court 

approval. 

• The ‘‘lone wolf’’ authority, Section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This authority allows intelligence investigations of terrorists who cannot initially be connected to a foreign power or terrorist organization. Before 2004, national security officials had to show a court that a target was an 

agent of a foreign power, or acting on behalf of a foreign power, in 

order to get permission to monitor him. This was a problem in the 

case of Zacharias Moussaoui (the so-called ‘‘20th hijacker’’ in the 

9/11 attacks), when agents did not get a search warrant for his 

computer because they believed that they could not show that he 

was an agent of a foreign power. 

All three of these authorities were previously reauthorized by 89 

Senators—including President Obama and Vice President Biden 

when they were senators in 2006. Despite the fact that these provisions have not been abused, S. 193 would continue to include sunsets on these authorities and would make a host of changes to 


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11 U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 12See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(2)(B) (2006). 13 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(3) (2006). 

other counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence authorities that 

increase the burdens associated with utilizing them. 

S. 193 Unduly Expands Burdens on Expiring Provisions 

Chief among our concerns are the increased requirements that S. 193 would place on existing surveillance authorities. The Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is a precisely worded statute 

where certain words have longstanding and carefully crafted definitions that impact how those in the intelligence community do their 

jobs. Adding words or phrases to portions of FISA that are undefined or vague can have serious and unintended consequences on 

those operating in the field. Further, the FISA court already has 

the authority to require additional documentation or data to support orders in specific cases sought by the intelligence community. 

Changing the statutory requirements, regardless of whether the 

Court is already exercising its discretion by requiring such information, will certainly impact how the Department of Justice prepares applications before they are submitted to the court. Generally stated, we have serious concerns with how S. 193 would increase the burdens on law enforcement and intelligence 

community personnel and create new divisions between criminal 

and intelligence authorities—potentially rebuilding the ‘‘wall’’ between criminal and intelligence collection. We are concerned that 

additional requirements will inherently slow down the process for 

obtaining critical intelligence in early stages of counter-intelligence 

and counter-terrorism investigations. We offer the following details 

to support our concerns. 

1. Increases the Burden to Obtain Business Records from 

Third Parties 

Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act concerns the government’s abil- ity to obtain business records from third parties, such as banking 

information and car rental agreements. Under Supreme Court 

precedent, business records, such as banking deposit slips or car 

rental records are not subject to Fourth Amendment protections because the customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in documents that are in the possession of third parties.11 Because obtaining such records is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, 

prosecutors in standard criminal investigations can seek these 

types of records through the use of a simple grand jury subpoena. 

Under current law, however, investigators pursuing terrorists 

and spies face the additional burden of seeking court permission to 

obtain similar records. Other distinctions also exist. A 215 order 

cannot be based solely on First Amendment protected activities.12

Further, only three specified, high-ranking federal officials have 

the authority to request these orders in certain sensitive areas— 

such as library records.13 Thus, under current law, this section 

puts greater burdens on law enforcement in terrorism cases than 

otherwise apply to standard criminal law enforcement. 

Despite the already more difficult process in the terrorism context, S. 193 further increases the elements of proof needed to obVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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14 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2006). 15 Id. 

tain business records under Section 215. Current law requires the 

government to submit a statement of facts showing reasonable 

grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to 

an authorized investigation.14 Current law also states that tangible 

things sought are presumptively relevant if the government shows 

they pertain to (a) a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, (b) 

the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the 

subject of such an authorized investigation, or (c) an individual in 

contact with, or known to, an agent of a foreign power who is the 

subject of such authorized investigation.15 For reasons that have 

yet to be fully explained, S. 193 removes the current presumption 

of relevance. 

The presumption of relevance was included in Section 215 originally in order to prevent applications from turning into full-blown 

FISA surveillance applications, which require sufficient facts to 

support a finding of probable cause. Why is this important? By removing the presumption, the court may require officials to do additional investigation or provide more facts before obtaining the business records order from the court. This is problematic because section 215 authorities are most often used at the beginning of an investigation—thus, the simple relevance standard. At the beginning 

stages, it may be impossible or unduly burdensome to get the extra 

required information. As a result, this increased burden may inadvertently cause a potential lead in a national security investigation 

to be abandoned or critical terrorism links to be ignored. 

Similarly, the new proof language will also cause delays in drafting applications as the government will no longer be able to rely 

on the presumption of relevance. As noted below, the 215 application process already suffers from inexcusable delays. Losing the 

presumption means the application itself will also be longer, as 

more and more information must be included. As we continue this 

fight against terrorism, we must ask ourselves a fundamental question: do we want our intelligence agents to spend more time doing 

paperwork or be out tracking terrorists? 

Even more troubling than the potential administrative delays, 

the new proof language is amorphous and brand new in the national security context. By establishing a FISA court in the first 

place, Congress sought to create an environment in which national 

security matters would be handled by a specific pool of judges, 

thereby leading to greater certainty in how national security matters would be resolved by the courts. By injecting vague language 

into a statute that depends heavily on its definitions, it is likely 

that judges will have very different ideas about what constitutes 

‘‘justif[ication]’’ of the applicant’s belief of relevance. Our national 

security should not depend on an individual judge’s interpretation 

of a term that has no analogous use in the entire FISA statute. 

Lengthier applications employing vague and new legal standards 

will do nothing to improve the unreasonable delays in obtaining 

section 215 orders that were identified by the Department of Justice Inspector General in his March 2008 report. Remember, delays 

in acquiring basic information in a terrorism investigation can reVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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16See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(3) (2006). 

sult in the loss of intelligence, connections, and criminals, as well 

as a failure to ‘‘connect the dots’’ and prevent a terrorist attack. 

The 2008 Inspector General audit of section 215 usage identified 

considerable delays, up to several months, for processing routine 

business records applications in the Department of Justice. Given 

that it takes only hours to ordinarily obtain a grand jury subpoena, 

delays of this length are already unacceptable and must be addressed by the Department of Justice. It is likely, however, that 

this new amorphous language—rather than the clear, and well-understood, relevance standard—will simply worsen the problem. 

2. Increases the Burden to Obtain Library Records from 

Third Parties 

Despite the special exceptions and standards that already exist 

for obtaining library records under a section 215 court order,16 S. 

193 increases the standard to obtain library records that contain 

personally identifiable information about a library patron. Under S. 

193, the government would have to present a statement of facts 

showing reasonable grounds to believe that tangible things are relevant to an authorized investigation and pertain to (a) an agent of 

a foreign power, (b) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign 

power, or (c) an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power subject to an authorized investigation. So, if the government could convince a court that there were 

reasonable grounds to believe that the business records sought 

were relevant to an authorized investigation, and if the government 

failed to show the involvement of a specific agent of a foreign 

power, then it would not be able to get the records. Such a requirement could disable the government from using a section 215 order 

at the early stages of an investigation, when such an order is most 

useful, simply because the government could not establish that the 

individual in question was an agent of a foreign power. Imposing 

this new requirement is an open invitation to terrorists to use 

unsuspecting third parties to communicate with associates on their 

behalf. 

No special ‘‘library record’’ exception exists in the criminal law 

context. In fact, criminal investigators can obtain these records, 

without a court order, by obtaining a grand jury subpoena through 

a federal prosecutor. In the national security context, there is a 

special exception plus court authorization, both designed to protect 

civil liberties. In an interesting side note, the Department of Justice has pointed out that many libraries already take measures to 

inform their patrons that all records are erased every night to limit 

the disclosure of this information. 

Enacting a separate and noticeably more stringent standard for 

library records will simply encourage terrorists to use library networks—either on their own or through unwitting third parties—to 

communicate with each other. It should come as no surprise that 

because of the heightened standards contained in the Leahy bill, it 

may be difficult for the national security investigators to quickly 

track such terrorists’ usage of library computers. 


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3. For the First Time—Court Review of Business Records 

Minimization 

S. 193 also requires FISA Court review of minimization procedures. Currently, section 215 requires that an application by the 

government include ‘‘an enumeration of the minimization procedures adopted’’ for business record orders. S. 193 would take this 

a step further and authorize the FISA Court to review and direct 

the government to follow the minimization procedures. 

This additional requirement could lead to differing minimization 

requirements on each 215 order issued. It raises questions about 

how the FISA Court will view this new authority to direct the government to comply with minimization. Will the FISA Court require 

additional documentation, reporting, or other compliance measures 

under this new provision? How in depth will each federal judge require the minimization? This could lead to potential confusion 

among operational entities as they are ordered to impose different 

minimization procedures on essentially the same information within the same office because different judges proposed different minimization procedures. This could lead to operational uncertainty 

within offices hindering the ability to utilize leads obtained as a result of section 215 orders. Further, it poses potential compliance 

problems for offices that confuse minimization procedures among 

different collections of section 215 derived information resulting in 

potential sanctions on the government investigators by a federal 

judge or inspector general. 

4. Immediate and Unlimited Judicial Review of Nondisclosure Orders 

S. 193 allows recipients of section 215 orders and National Security Letters (NSLs) to challenge a nondisclosure requirement immediately and without end. This will require tasking investigative 

agencies and Department lawyers with defending nondisclosure orders much more often, possibly from the earliest moments of the 

investigation. In addition, since there is no limit, the recipient can 

challenge a non-disclosure order repeatedly until he succeeds. In 

most national security investigations, the ability to rule-in or ruleout certain information as being relevant to an investigation increases with time, as more facts are learned. Early in an investigation, it is not always readily apparent that a particular number 

that is the subject of a particular NSL is no longer relevant or that 

its disclosure will not cause any harm. This provision raises the 

risk that the FBI will be compelled to disclose the existence of an 

NSL or section 215 order, simply because the necessity for secrecy 

is often not provable until some time has elapsed, and the true 

value of the material becomes clear. 

S. 193 Expands Burdens on Other Tools 

On top of the additional restrictions S. 193 places on the expiring 

provisions, S. 193 alters three other criminal and intelligence tools 

that are not subject to sunset: FISA pen registers and trap and 

trace devices, NSLs, and delayed notice search warrants. 


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17Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 18 Id. 19 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2006), with 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (2006). 20 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2006), with 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (2006). 21 USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011, S. 193, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011). 

1. FISA Pen Registers/Trap and Trace Devices 

A. Raises the Standard for FISA Pen Registers/Trap and 

Trace Devices 

Pen registers (which retain a list of phone numbers called) and 

trap and trace devices (which catalogue a list of received calls) 

have long been used by law enforcement to obtain telephone transaction records. These devices do not capture the content of communications, just the source or destination of calls.17 The Supreme 

Court has held that pen registers do not constitute a search under 

the Fourth Amendment and do not require a warrant because the 

individual ‘‘voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company.’’ 18 Current law allows law enforcement to obtain 

pen registers and trap and trace devices from a judge under both 

criminal law and foreign intelligence surveillance law.19 The standard to obtain pen registers and trap and trace devices is currently 

the same in these areas: that the information likely to be obtained 

is relevant.20

S. 193 would impose, for the first time ever, a higher requirement in the national security area, requiring the government’s application to include ‘‘a statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify the belief of the applicant.’’ 21

This new requirement replaces the current certification of relevance which has guided the use of FISA pen registers since their 

inception, and which mirrors the standard practice used in criminal 

investigations. As with many of the other tools impacted by the 

Leahy bill, pen registers are building blocks of an investigation. 

The simple requirement to certify the relevance of the information 

reflects the fact that early in an investigation, there may not be 

large amounts of information known or available to intelligence 

agents. For this reason, content may not be obtained through a pen 

register. This change in S. 193 destroys the parity between criminal and national security pen registers. Interestingly, it also creates the dynamic in which a spy, terrorist, or non-U.S. person could 

actually be given more protections than a U.S. person being investigated for an ordinary crime. This is a seismic shift in current law 

and sends the wrong signal to our agents in the field, by conveying 

that they must jump through more hoops in order to catch terrorists than ordinary criminals. Further, by making it more difficult 

for investigators to obtain pen registers in the counter-intelligence 

and counter-terrorism field than compared to traditional criminal 

law, it is a step further toward reconstituting the ‘‘wall’’ between 

criminal and national security investigations that the 9/11 Commission criticized, and the Committee followed through in knocking 

down. 

B. Pen Register/Trap and Trace Minimization Required 

S. 193 imposes a new requirement for minimization procedures 

to be applied to information obtained from FISA pen registers. 


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22 Id. at § 7 (2011). 

Minimization is a concept ordinarily applied to the content of communications. This requirement raises questions about how minimization of non-content information is to be accomplished; what 

privacy interests are involved that may require minimization; and 

why this provision is even necessary. While proponents of S. 193 

have claimed that they do not expect many substantive changes to 

current practice, it is highly likely that the FISA Court will interpret any change in law to mean that more procedures are necessary. This interpretation will lead to considerable operational 

confusion as both the court and agents/analysts struggle to apply 

minimization procedures, designed to protect U.S. person information, to data that is not readily identifiable as being U.S. person 

information. The irony is that imposing these procedures on dialing 

data, for example, will require that the FBI actually take a closer 

look at each number dialed to determine whether or not that number belongs to a U.S. person, effectively requiring agents to make 

an inquiry more invasive than current practice. 

2. National Security Letters 

A. Raises the Standard for Issuing a National Security Letter 

S. 193 imposes a new requirement on investigators who wish to utilize NSLs, in effect making it even more difficult for federal authorities to investigate national security threats than to pursue 

common crimes like health care fraud, mail fraud, and tax evasion. 

Under S. 193, in addition to certifying relevance to a terrorist or 

intelligence investigation, investigators would also have to show 

‘‘specific facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 

that the information sought is relevant.’’ 22 Such a standard is both 

vague and possibly difficult to meet in the early stages of investigation when NSLs are most useful. 

This statement of ‘‘specific facts’’ is a holdover from negotiations following the Committee mark-up of S. 1692 in the last Congress. 

That bill originally included a provision requiring a ‘‘statement of 

specific and articulable facts.’’ There was a debate surrounding this 

requirement and ultimately the term ‘‘articulable’’ was dropped. 

However, there was no further debate about what is, and is not, 

a ‘‘specific’’ fact. 

Absent a definition of what makes a fact ‘‘specific’’, this new requirement has the potential to create confusion and compliance 

issues within the FBI. The cannons of statutory construction instruct judges that words in a statute have meanings, and that adding or removing words will have consequences in how those judges 

interpret the statute. Director Mueller agreed with this principle 

when he stated on March 16, 2011 that adding a new word to a 

statute can cause confusion and can put it ‘‘into a different ballpark.’’ 

This new standard could cause operational problems as well. For 

example, prior to 9/11 there was significant confusion about what 

was necessary to establish probable cause to obtain a FISA warrant to search the belongings of Zacharias Moussaoui, the ‘‘20th hijacker’’ on 9/11. FBI Special Agent Colleen Rowley testified before 


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23See 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2006). 24 Hearing on: The Inspector General’s Independent Report on the F.B.I.’s Use of National Security Letters: Hearing Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (March 20, 2007) (statement of FBI General Counsel Valerie E. Caproni). 

this Committee in 2002 about the threshold necessary to establish 

probable cause. That testimony highlighted problems within the 

FBI in determining what standard applied to find probable cause. 

If the FBI had such a hard time determining what ‘‘probable cause’’ 

was, a basic standard in criminal investigations, how is the FBI 

going to interpret an undefined term like ‘‘specific’’, or will they experience the same paralyzing confusion with NSLs? 

Further, this undefined requirement could lead to compliance 

problems with the Inspector General. Under current law, NSLs 

may be approved by a Special Agent in Charge of a FBI field office.23 What if the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Chicago 

Field Office has a different opinion of what constitutes a ‘‘specific’’ 

fact than the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Miami Field Office? When the Inspector General for the Department of Justice 

starts auditing the issuance of National Security Letters, how do 

we know the Inspector General will not have a different idea of 

what ‘‘specific’’ means? It is entirely possible that the Inspector 

General and the FBI could have different definitions of what demonstrates a ‘‘specific’’ fact. FBI Director Mueller stated as much on 

March 16, 2011, when he said that there is a possibility that the 

Inspector General may have a different interpretation of whether 

specific facts were specific enough. This term, absent a definition, 

could unnecessarily cause confusion for the FBI in trying to figure 

out the difference between what constitutes a ‘‘specific’’ fact and 

what is just a fact. 

B. Adds a new Sunset of National Security Letters 

NSLs are a valuable tool and have provided investigators and analysts with critical information. Although details on NSL use are 

classified, the Justice Department has reported that ‘‘information 

obtained through NSLs has significantly advanced numerous sensitive terrorism and espionage investigations and has assisted the 

FBI in discovering links to previously unknown terrorist 

operatives.’’ In its March 2007 report on NSLs, the Department of 

Justice Inspector General noted that ‘‘[m]any FBI personnel used 

terms to describe NSLs such as ‘indispensable’ or ‘our bread and 

butter.’ ’’ As Valerie Caproni, General Counsel of the FBI, explained 

in 2007, ‘‘NSLs have been instrumental in breaking up cells like 

the ‘Lackawanna Six’ and the ‘Northern Virginia Jihad.’ Through 

the use of NSLs, the FBI has traced sources of terrorist funding, 

established telephone linkages that resulted in further investigation and arrests, and arrested suspicious associates with deadly 

weapons and explosives. NSLs allow the FBI to link terrorists together financially, and pinpoint cells and operatives by following 

the money.’’ 24

S. 193 rescinds these valuable tools by, starting in 2013, requiring the government to follow the cumbersome pre-PATRIOT Act 

NSL standard. Prior to the PATRIOT Act, not only did the requested records have to be relevant to an investigation, but the 

FBI also had to have specific and articulable facts giving reason to 


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25Oversight Hearing on the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (response to Member questions by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, 

III). 26See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a (2006). 

believe that the information requested pertained to a foreign power 

or an agent of a foreign power, such as a terrorist or spy. This prePATRIOT Act requirement kept the FBI from using NSLs to develop evidence at the early stages of an investigation, which is precisely when they are the most useful, and often prevented investigators from acquiring records that were relevant to an ongoing 

international terrorism or espionage investigation. 

It makes little sense to roll back the sensible NSL reforms that 

were made as part of the USA PATRIOT Act. Criminal investigators have long been able to use administrative or grand jury subpoenas to obtain records, so long as they are relevant to their investigation. Under Section 505 of the PATRIOT Act, the FBI can 

use NSLs to obtain specified records so long as they are ‘‘relevant 

to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities provided that such an 

investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely on 

the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the 

Constitution of the United States.’’ 

This protection ensures that NSLs may not be used for improper 

purposes. Although some deficiencies were found by the Department of Justice Inspector General concerning the FBI’s handling of 

NSLs, the FBI and Department of Justice have responded to these 

findings and taken action to ensure that they are not repeated. In 

its March 2008 report on NSLs, the Inspector General stated that 

‘‘the FBI and the Department have made significant progress in 

implementing the recommendations from [a prior Inspector General] report and in adopting other corrective actions to address serious problems we identified in the use of national security letters.’’ 

What is puzzling is that the supposed remedy in S. 193—sunsetting the NSL standard to pre-September 11, 2001—generally has 

no relationship whatsoever to the deficiencies related to NSLs 

found by the Inspector General. In support, FBI Director Mueller 

affirmatively stated on March 16, 2011, that he is against a sunset 

for NSLs and does not support reverting to pre-9/11 standards.25

3. Shorter Time for Use of Delayed Notice Search Warrants 

Delayed notice search warrants, well-accepted criminal investigative tools, allow investigators who have a court order to search a 

property without immediately informing the suspect.26 S. 193 

would dramatically and arbitrarily cut the time by which investigators must inform the suspect from 30 days to 7 days—less than a 

quarter of the time allowed under current law. In this instance, it 

would place this new burden on both national security and criminal 

investigations. 

While it is true that applicants for a delayed notice search warrant may apply for an extension, up to 90 days or less, unless the 

facts of the case justify a longer delay, this requirement effectively 

takes law enforcement agents off the street in order to complete the 

required paperwork seeking the extension. The new disclosure requirements, if adopted, will force investigators to return to the 


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27Oversight Hearing on the Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 22. 

issuing judge less than a week after they first received the warrant, and in some cases, before they have even had an opportunity 

to examine the material obtained. Investigators should be spending 

their time bringing offenders to justice, not at the courthouse deluging courts with unnecessary paperwork. It is also likely that 

courts will interpret this reduction by Congress as indicating that 

Congress frowns on delays of 30 days or more. This interpretation 

will make it harder for the government to obtain extensions beyond 

30 days, much less up to 90. FBI Director Mueller stated that the 

30-day delayed notice limitation works well and that there is no 

advantage to going back to 7 days.27

Additional Problems Created by Amendments Adopted 

As part of the Committee’s considerations of S. 193, Senators 

Leahy and Durbin offered amendments that further decrease the 

value and usefulness of critical national security tools. The Committee first adopted an amendment offered by Senator Leahy that 

would expand the list of business records that required additional 

scrutiny by the FISA court to include ‘‘bookseller records’’. 

1. Leahy Amendment Regarding ‘‘Bookseller Records’’ 

Currently, section 215 of the PATRIOT Act authorizes a national 

security investigator to make an application to the FISA Court for 

an order to require the production of ‘‘tangible things’’ including 

books, records, papers, documents, and other items. There are certain requirements that this application must satisfy and current 

applications can be quite lengthy. There is often a considerable 

delay, between three to six months, in obtaining a 215 order because of the multiple layers of review and approval a request goes 

through. 

For the first time, the 2005 reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act 

created additional requirements for obtaining library circulation 

records, library patrol lists, book sales records, book customer lists, 

and certain other records (medical, firearm, and tax records). The 

2005 amendment requires the FBI Director, or a high level designee, to approve the request before a court order is sought, as well 

as mandating specific congressional reporting. In contrast, library 

records can be obtained in criminal investigations with a grand 

jury subpoena, which does not require FBI Director approval or a 

court order. 

In addition to the current carve-out for library and other records 

in the 2005 reauthorization, and the additional burdens to obtain 

library records contained in S. 193, this amendment further restricts national security investigators by expanding the exception to 

include ‘‘bookseller records.’’ This amendment increases the burden 

on the government when obtaining business records from booksellers by putting commercial booksellers on the same level as public libraries. 

The amendment defines bookseller records to include records reflecting the purchase or rental of ‘‘books, journals, or magazines, 

whether in digital form or in print.’’ Exempting these records is 

problematic and creates an easily exploitable loophole for terrorists. 


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28 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization, supra note 5. 29Federal Bureau of Investigation Aff. in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant 

for Khalid Aldawsari (February 23, 2011). 

Specifically, the amendment states that if the records sought contain bookseller records, the entire request rises to the new additional requirements. This special exception advertises to terrorists 

that they can increase the work of law enforcement simply by buying a book, or even better, obstruct investigators from even finding 

out about their activities by buying a magazine. The recent arrest in Texas of Khalid Aldawsari highlights the se- vere limitations this amendment would put on law enforcement to 

prevent a terrorist attack. Aldawsari is a Saudi national who was 

attending college in Texas on a student visa. He was recently arrested and indicted for attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. Fortunately, federal agents were able to prevent the terrorist attack, instead of cleaning up after it. To prevent this massive attack, an order was obtained under the section 215 business 

record authority, as confirmed by Robert S. Litt, General Counsel 

for the Director of National Intelligence.28

If the ‘‘bookseller records’’ amendment were the law this month 

when Aldawsari was investigated and arrested, it is possible that 

evidence of his bomb-making would not be obtainable with a section 215 order. According to the affidavit supporting the arrest of 

Aldawsari, he obtained many of the materials needed to build his 

weapon of mass destruction through online retailer Amazon.com— 

a bookseller. Through the use of a section 215 order, the FBI 

learned that this bookseller had records that include items 

Aldawsari purchased to build his bomb, including: • three gallons of concentrated sulfuric acid; • soldering iron; • Christmas lights (wire for explosives and electronic circuits for improvised explosive devices); • 3.2 million volt Stun Gun with built in flashlight; • battery tester; • alarm clock; • precision screw driver set; • chemistry flask; • chemistry laboratory equipment set; and • narrow mouth flask and 12′′ glass stirring rod.29

These tangible things purchased are not books, journals, or magazines. They are components for making bombs. This amendment 

would essentially make online booksellers a refuge for terrorists, 

allowing them to acquire all their bomb-making supplies, while investigators are further handcuffed by the increased standards to 

obtain records from a third party. If this amendment had been the 

law, records about all of these purchases may have been held to the 

heightened standard as it is unclear how the FISA Court would 

treat an application for these records, merely because they came 

from a bookseller. Taken a step further, if Aldawsari had simply 

purchased a book with these items, it would have automatically 

triggered the heightened standard because the request would now 

include ‘‘bookseller records’’ as defined by the Leahy amendment. 

As a practical matter, how would the investigators know if the 

records they were seeking included a book? It is likely that early 


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30 Id. 31 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., supra note 3. 

in an investigation, government agents would not know exactly 

what type of products were purchased and what records a 215 

order will produce. For example, what if investigators knew 

Aldawsari was purchasing items from Amazon.com, but did not 

know what he was purchasing? Would the FISA Court automatically apply the heightened standard simply because Amazon.com is 

an online bookseller and FBI agents were unclear if the request 

would return ‘‘bookseller records’’? 

It is inconsistent for Congress to applaud the good work of investigators in preventing Aldawsari’s terrorist attack while simultaneously creating laws that preclude investigators from utilizing 

those same tools when attempting to prevent the next attempted 

terrorist attack. By increasing the burdens required to obtain a section 215 order for both library and bookseller records, the application of this valuable tool could be rendered less effective in future 

investigations. 

Aldawsari made other purchases from retailers that could be considered booksellers. For example, he made purchases from online 

retailer eBay, including a ‘‘Hazmat Suit Tychem BR Chemical Protective Clothing’’ and he failed to win an online auction for a ‘‘US 

M42 Gas Mask’’.30 The tangible things Aldawsari purchased are 

not books, journals, or magazines. They are components for making 

bombs and protective gear from those hazardous materials. This 

amendment would essentially make online booksellers a refuge for 

terrorists, allowing them to acquire all of their bomb-making supplies, while investigators are further handcuffed by the increased 

standards to obtain records from a third party. 

The Inspector General for the Department of Justice has already 

reported that FBI agents encountered processing delays for section 

215 applications—averaging 147 days.31 147 days is an eternity in 

fast-moving operational situations. Adding new requirements, as 

the Leahy bill and amendment would do for libraries and booksellers, will only extend that delay. Ironically, these same records, 

potentially protected by the ‘‘bookseller records’’ amendment, are 

available in a matter of hours under a criminal grand jury subpoena. But in national security investigations, a grand jury subpoena is infrequently an option due to the need to keep national 

security concerns and interests classified. 

2. Durbin Amendment Regarding John Doe Roving Wiretaps 

Senator Durbin offered an amendment that was adopted by the 

Committee. His amendment inserted a particularity requirement 

into one of the specifications that must be made in a FISA electronic surveillance court order whenever the identity of the target 

of surveillance is not known. The stated purpose of the Durbin 

amendment was to require particularity for ‘‘John Doe’’ roving 

wiretaps. Unfortunately, this purpose was little more than a solution in search of a nonexistent problem. 

Under current law, FISA allows the issuance of a wiretap against 

an individual in situations where the identity of the individual may 

not be known, but the government can describe the surveillance 


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32 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2006). 33 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(3) (2006). 34 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2006). 35 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(1)(A) (2006). 

target sufficiently to establish probable cause that he is an agent 

of a foreign power; this is a form of surveillance that has been labeled as a ‘‘John Doe’’ wiretap or search in the criminal context. 

A challenge separate and distinct from the ‘‘John Doe’’ issue is 

presented when a surveillance target is taking measures to evade 

electronic surveillance. In such cases, section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act allows the government to seek a ‘‘roving’’ court order 

when it can show that an individual is taking actions to ‘‘thwart’’ 

surveillance.32 This roving order allows the government to continue 

its surveillance of the target as he switches from communication 

device to communication device without having to go back to the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for a new court order. Unlike the ‘‘John Doe’’ situation where the identity of the target is not 

known, the problem in the roving context is that the government 

is initially unable to identify the communications facilities that the 

target is using now or in the future. Under section 105(c)(1)(B), the 

government may still obtain a FISA warrant when the facilities 

cannot be identified initially; however, in these situations, the government is required to provide notice to the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court within ten days after the date on which surveillance is initiated against any new facility or place.33 This notice requirement is applicable in all ‘‘roving’’ situations. 

Given these requirements for a roving wiretap court order, it is 

difficult to envision a real-life situation in which the government 

could successfully demonstrate that the target of the surveillance 

is attempting to evade surveillance without knowing the actual 

identity of the target—hence, the nonexistent problem of the ‘‘John 

Doe’’ roving wiretap ‘‘solution.’’ Regardless, if the Durbin amendment was truly intended to amend FISA roving authority, then it 

should have amended the text in section 105(c)(2)(B) 34 where the 

roving authority is actually found. Instead, the Durbin amendment 

modified section 105(c)(1)(A) 35 which applies to all FISA electronic 

surveillance orders. If the Durbin amendment were to become law, 

the government would be required to describe the target with particularity in situations in which the identity of the target is unknown. This injects a new level of uncertainty into the FISA application and court order process as the Department of Justice and 

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court attempt to interpret 

the effect and meaning of this new requirement. It is reasonable 

to assume that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court will interpret this ‘‘particularity’’ standard to require a greater factual 

showing than is required under the present ‘‘description’’ standard. 

This could result in a delay or interruption of real-world intelligence operations and a corresponding loss of potential foreign intelligence information. Unlike the underlying Leahy bill, which the 

administration has at least grudgingly stated it ‘‘could live with,’’ 

this Durbin amendment was not vetted with the Intelligence Community or the Department of Justice. 

There has never been any allegation of abuse with respect to the use of the FISA ‘‘if known’’ standard in section 105(c)(1)(A). The 


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36The USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009, supra note 4. 

provision has been working well since FISA’s original enactment in 

1978. In these limited situations in which the target’s identity is 

unknown, the government is still required to provide, and the court 

must specify, a description of the target that satisfies the agent of 

a foreign power probable cause standard. The Constitutional ‘‘particularity’’ requirement is designed to prevent the use of a ‘‘general’’ warrant and to limit the scope of an actual physical search, 

e.g., if the warrant authorizes law enforcement to search for stolen 

televisions, then they are not permitted to search in desk drawers. 

The requirement for a ‘‘description’’ of the surveillance target prevents the FISA court order from becoming a general warrant and 

provides enough information to ensure that surveillance is conducted against the intended target. 

It is important to remember that all FISA wiretaps, even John 

Doe and roving wiretaps, are ordered by a judge after the Attorney 

General has approved the request and the court has found probable 

cause that the surveillance target in question is a foreign power or 

an agent of a foreign power. The concept of a ‘‘John Doe roving 

wiretap’’ appears to be little more than a theoretical joining of two 

distinct statutory requirements in a combination not reflected by 

the reality of actual intelligence operations. This amendment, either as intended or drafted, is simply a solution in search of a problem. 

3. Whitehouse Amendment Striking ‘‘and articulable’’ 

Under current law, the government is only required to certify 

that records sought from a National Security Letter are relevant to 

an ongoing investigation. S. 193 would raise the standard for obtaining a National Security Letter by requiring the government to 

retain a written statement of ‘‘specific facts showing that there are 

reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is relevant to the authorized investigation.’’ 

One section of S. 193 retained a version of this language that 

was a holdover from last Congress, requiring a ‘‘statement of specific and articulable facts’’ for an application for a nondisclosure 

order accompanying a NSL. The ‘‘specific and articulable’’ standards was included in S. 1692 during the previous Congress.36 Subsequent negotiations modified this language to ‘‘specific facts’’ as 

incorporated into S. 193. As such, Senator Whitehouse’s amendment was adopted by a voice vote. While we agree with the inclusion of this amendment for consistency in the bill, we disagree with 

the final language that now requires a statement of ‘‘specific facts’’. 

Conclusion 

Following September 11, 2001, Congress took steps to ensure 

that national security investigators had access to tools analogous to 

those long available to criminal investigators. The FBI has stated 

repeatedly that these tools have been critical in keeping the nation 

safe in the years since. Those who seek to weaken the tools currently available to our law enforcement and intelligence agencies 

must make the case that the existing law is unnecessary, counterproductive, or has been abused. No such case has been made. The 


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37Letter from Jon Adler, National President, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, 

to Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator Charles Grassley, Senate Committee on the Judiciary 

(March 2, 2011) (on file with minority staff). 

Senate should act to make sure our law enforcement and intelligence professionals have the tools they need to stop those threats 

to our national security at every turn. Despite the Majority’s view that the classified member briefing revealed that S. 193 ‘‘poses no operational concerns,’’ the Administration’s stance has been only that they can ‘‘live with’’ the changes 

contained in S. 193. Being able to ‘‘live with’’ something is far different than having no concerns or supporting it. Interestingly, we 

have yet to hear anyone in the Administration say that S. 193 will 

actually help them keep this country safe. Moreover, the non-partisan members of the Federal Law Enforcement Agents Association, who operate independently of political considerations, oppose 

changes to the PATRIOT Act and said: ‘‘We would caution the Congress to be careful when trying to re-work any provisions that have 

already been in effect and have been effective.’’ 37 While the Administration may be able to ‘‘live with’’ the changes contained in S. 

193, we are concerned that in legislating distinct differences between national security and criminal laws this Committee is headed down a path that would rebuild the wall between national security and criminal cases. We all remember the tragic events of 9/11 

and the serious work in Congress to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations and tear down the wall between national security and criminal cases. We continue to face threats from terrorists that originate abroad and at home. We have heard of no abuses of the existing authorities set to expire, but yet this legislation imposes a new set of burdens on law enforcement and national security investigators. Limiting the important investigative tools that have helped to thwart 

numerous terrorist attacks, by unnecessarily adding conditions to 

their already highly-regulated use, is a short-sighted strategy. As 

recent arrests and indictments demonstrate, these vital tools are 

being used responsibly and wisely by law enforcement and intelligence professionals to protect our nation from another terrorist 

attack. Now is definitely not the time for Congress to add new legal 

standards and bureaucratic requirements to the legal authorities 

our counterterrorism officials rely upon to identify and stop those 

responsible for planning these terror attacks. 

We vigorously oppose the changes contained in S. 193 and, 

should it come before the full Senate, we will offer a number of 

amendments to limit the damage it would cause to critical national 

security and criminal law tools. Absent significant amendments to 

correct the problems we have highlighted, the Senate should reject 

S. 193 and extend the PATRIOT ACT without changes to current 

law. 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY. 

ORRIN G. HATCH. 

JON KYL. 

JEFF SESSIONS. 

LINDSEY GRAHAM. 

JOHN CORNYN. 

TOM COBURN. 


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1Letter from Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper and Attorney General Eric Holder to House Speaker John Boehner, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Minority 

Leader Nancy Pelosi, and Senate Minority Leader McConnell (Jan. 28, 2011) (on file with minority staff). 2 Id. (emphasis in original). 3 Id. 

4FISA Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–3, 125 Stat. 5 (2011). 

ADDITIONAL MINORITY VIEWS FROM SENATORS 

GRASSLEY, HATCH, KYL, SESSIONS, GRAHAM, AND CORNYN 

EXPIRING PROVISIONS SHOULD BE MADE PERMANENT

On January 28, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper wrote to Speaker of the 

House Boehner, Majority Leader Reid, Minority Leader Pelosi, and 

Minority Leader McConnell. In that letter, Attorney General Holder and Director Clapper wrote, ‘‘In the current threat environment, 

it is imperative that our intelligence and law enforcement agencies 

have the tools they need to protect our national security.’’ 1 The letter goes on to describe the importance of the three expiring provisions, including section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act providing authority for roving surveillance, section 215 providing authority to 

compel production of business records and other tangible things, 

and section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, otherwise known as the ‘‘lone wolf’’ provision, authorizing 

use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to target 

non-U.S. persons engaging in terrorism who are not associated 

with an identified terrorist group. The authors add, ‘‘It is essential 

that these intelligence tools be reauthorized before they expire, and 

we are committed to working with Congress to ensure the speedy enactment of legislation to achieve this result.’’ 2

In addition to this statement, where the emphasis was noted by the authors, they continued, ‘‘We also urge Congress to grant a reauthorization of sufficient duration to provide those charged with 

protecting our nation with the reasonable certainty and predictability. When Congress originally enacted the PATRIOT Act, it included a three-year sunset on these authorities. While we welcome 

Congressional oversight into the use of these tools, Congress did 

not contemplate that this sunset would devolve into a series of 

short-term extensions that increase the uncertainties borne by our 

intelligence and law enforcement agencies in carrying out their 

missions.’’ 3 Despite this clear statement in support of reauthorizing the expiring authorities, we are now, two months later, addressing yet another short term extension extending the PATRIOT 

Act provisions set to expire now on May 27, 2011.4

Notwithstanding the calls from the Attorney General and Direc- tor Clapper, S. 193 would simply extend the expiring provisions 

until December 2013, just 33 months from now. By extending the 

three provisions for a short term, albeit nearly three years, Congress fails to provide needed certainty to law enforcement and 

counterterrorism officials. In fact, Director of the Federal Bureau 


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5 Chris Strohm, PATRIOT Act Extension Enters Home Stretch, NAT’L JOURNAL, Feb. 16, 

2011, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/patriot-act-extensionenters-home-stretch–20110216?mrefid=sitelsearch. 6Letter from Jon Adler, National President, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, 

to Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, United States Senate (Feb. 7, 2011) (on file with minority 

staff). 7 Id. 

8Letter from Jon Adler, National President, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, 

to Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator Charles Grassley, Senate Committee on the Judiciary 

(March 2, 2011) (on file with minority staff). 9Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Use of Section 215 Orders for Business Records in 2006 at 5 (March 2008) (emphasis added). 

of Investigation (FBI) Robert Mueller III testified before the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence on February 16, 2011, that the 

expiring provisions were critical to ongoing investigations and 

should be permanently reauthorized.5 Similarly, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA), a non-profit law enforcement association representing over 26,000 federal law enforcement officers, wrote to Senate Minority Leader McConnell on February 7, 2011, supporting ‘‘legislation that seeks to incorporate a 

long-term solution to the USA PATRIOT Act’s problematic recurring expiration date.’’ 6 The letter added, ‘‘Crime and terrorism will 

not ‘‘sunset’’ and terrorists don’t need any ‘‘extension’’ to continue 

their heinous activities. Just like handcuffs, this tool should be a 

permanent part of the law enforcement arsenal. Arguments to the 

contrary are flawed and don’t recognize the reality that the Act has 

been judiciously used and has kept Americans safe . . . Terrorists 

don’t ‘‘sunset’’ and the tools needed to stop them shouldn’t either.’’ 7

A subsequent letter from FLEOA to members of the Judiciary Committee dated March 2, 2011, added, ‘‘We would caution the Congress to be careful when trying to re-work any provisions that have 

already been in effect and have been effective. Additionally, the 

short-term authorization is at odds with a Congress that in the 

aftermath of September 11th, 2001 attacks asked ‘‘Why didn’t we 

know and connect the dots? The USA PATRIOT Act removed some 

of the barriers in place that prevented us from ‘‘connecting the 

dots’’ and any retraction of those provisions is in effect, ‘‘re-building 

the wall.’’ 8

We wholeheartedly agree with FLEOA and the federal agents on the ground that the organization represents. The terrorist threat is 

not going away anytime soon and efforts to continually renew these 

provisions on an ad hoc basis provide little, if any, operational certainty to agents in the field. Continuing to temporarily postpone sunsets of these critical na- tional security tools runs the risk that eventually the sunsets will 

be allowed to lapse, causing operational problems. Further, in continually reauthorizing these expiring sunsets, we in Congress continue to amend the provisions making them more difficult to use 

with so many requirements that they become unduly burdensome 

and functionally useless. Despite erroneous statements to the contrary, the three expiring provisions have not been the subject of 

abuse. In the case of section 215 orders, the Inspector General of 

the Department of Justice has twice reviewed the use of the authority and ‘‘did not identify any illegal use of Section 215 authority.’’ 9 In fact, Section 215 orders are crucial to the early stages of a terrorism investigation, allowing the government to obtain information at an early investigative stage, helping to connect dots. 


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10Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Ju- diciary, 111th Cong. 24 (statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir. Fed. Bureau of Investigation). 11 Id. 12Letter from Assistant Attorney Gen. Ron Weich, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Senator Patrick 

Leahy, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 14, 2009) (on file with minority staff). 13 USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, 

and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (March 9, 2011) (statement of Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office of the Dir. Of Nat’l Intelligence). 

This vital tool has become a staple of counterterrorism efforts, with 

investigators utilizing this authority 223 times between 2004 and 

2007.10 FBI Director Mueller has called this tool ‘‘exceptionally 

helpful and useful in our national security investigations.’’ 11

Similarly, section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Protection Act, known as the ‘‘lone wolf’’ provision, has not ever 

been used, much less abused. However, the absence of utilization 

does not provide support as some have argued to call for its expiration. For example, FBI Director Mueller, Secretary of Homeland 

Security Napolitano, and Attorney General Holder have all raised 

concerns that the current threat environment has evolved with the 

development and proliferation of self-radicalized, home grown terrorists. This is precisely the scenario the lone wolf provision was 

designed to help thwart. In fact, a September 14, 2009, letter from 

Assistant Attorney General Ron Weich stated, ‘‘the prospect of a 

terrorist who ‘self-radicalizes’ by means of information and training 

provided by a variety of international terrorist groups via the internet’’ 12 is one possible scenario the lone wolf provision would help 

protect against. 

Finally, section 206 authorizing the roving surveillance authority 

is also without reported abuses. In fact, in recent testimony before 

the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, the General Counsel for the Office 

of Director of National Intelligence provided a specific example of 

how the provision is being utilized to track a foreign agent who 

‘‘changes cellular phones frequently.’’ 13

These three provisions have provided law enforcement and national security investigators the vital tools necessary to investigate 

a host of terrorism cases. If we simply kick the can down the road 

and delay the sunset of these provisions we risk losing the operational edge against an enemy that have proven to be methodical 

and resilient. Failing to recognize that our enemy continues to 

watch our every move and adjust their operational readiness to 

match the changes we make to our counterterrorism tools would be 

a significant miscalculation. We must show those who seek to harm 

our citizens and our way of life that we are willing to do what it 

takes to prevent them from waging attacks on our soil. Permanently extending the three expiring provisions would send such a 

signal and ensure the operational continuity that agents on the 

ground, at home and abroad, deserve. 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY. 

ORRIN G. HATCH. 

JON KYL. 

JEFF SESSIONS. 

LINDSEY GRAHAM. 

JOHN CORNYN. 


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VIII. CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by S. 193, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted 

is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

UNITED STATES CODE 

TITLE 12—BANKS AND BANKING 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 35—RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 3414. SPECIAL PROCEDURES. 

(a)(1) Nothing in this chapter (except sections 3415, 3417, 3418, and 3421 of this title) shall apply to the production and disclosure 

of financial records pursuant to requests from— 

(A) a Government authority authorized to conduct foreign 

counter- or foreign positive-intelligence activities for purposes 

of conducting such activities; (B) the Secret Service for the purpose of conducting its pro- tective functions (18 U.S.C. 3056; 18 U.S.C. 3056A, Public Law 

90–331, as amended); or 

(C) a Government authority authorized to conduct investigations of, or intelligence or counterintelligence analyses related 

to, international terrorism for the purpose of conducting such 

investigations or analyses. (2) In the instances specified in paragraph (1), the Government 

authority shall submit to the financial institution the certificate required in section 3403(b) of this title signed by a supervisory official of a rank designated by the head of the Government authority. 

(3)(A) If the Government authority described in paragraph (1) or 

the Secret Service, as the case may be, certifies that otherwise 

there may result a danger to the national security of the United 

States, interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or 

danger to the life or physical safety of any person, no financial institution, or officer, employee, or agent of such institution, shall 

disclose to any person (other than those to whom such disclosure 

is necessary to comply with the request or an attorney to obtain 

legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request) that the 

Government authority or the Secret Service has sought or obtained 

access to a customer’s financial records. 

(B) The request shall notify the person or entity to whom the request is directed of the nondisclosure requirement under subparagraph (A). 

(C) Any recipient disclosing to those persons necessary to comply 

with the request or to an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal 

assistance with respect to the request shall inform such persons of 

any applicable nondisclosure requirement. Any person who receives 


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a disclosure under this subsection shall be subject to the same prohibitions on disclosure under subparagraph (A). (D) At the request of the authorized Government authority or the 

Secret Service, any person making or intending to make a disclosure under this section shall identify to the requesting official of 

the authorized Government authority or the Secret Service the person to whom such disclosure will be made or to whom such disclosure was made prior to the request, except that nothing in this section shall require a person to inform the requesting official of the 

authorized Government authority or the Secret Service of the identity of an attorney to whom disclosure was made or will be made 

to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request 

for financial records under this subsection. 

(4) The Government authority specified in paragraph (1) shall 

compile an annual tabulation of the occasions in which this section 

was used. 

(5)(A) Financial institutions, and officers, employees, and agents 

thereof, shall comply with a request for a customer’s or entity’s financial records made pursuant to this subsection by the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation when the Director of the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (or the Director’s designee in a position not lower 

than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director) certifies in writing to the financial institution that such 

records are sought for foreign counter intelligence purposes to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by 

the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 

(B) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field 

office designated by the Director, may make a certification under 

subparagraph (A) only upon a written statement, which shall be retained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, of specific facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is relevant to the authorized investigation described in 

subparagraph (A). 

(C)¿(B) The Federal Bureau of Investigation may disseminate 

information obtained pursuant to this paragraph only as provided 

in guidelines approved by the Attorney General for foreign intelligence collection and foreign counterintelligence investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and, with respect to 

dissemination to an agency of the United States, only if such information is clearly relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such 

agency. 

(D)¿(C) On the dates provided in section 415b of Title 50, the 

Attorney General shall fully inform the congressional intelligence 

committees (as defined in section 401a of Title 50) concerning all 

requests made pursuant to this paragraph. 

¿(D) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURE.— 

¿(i) If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or 

his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in 


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a Bureau field office designated by the Director, certifies that 

otherwise there may result a danger to the national security 

of the United States, interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with 

diplomatic relations, or danger to the life or physical safety of 

any person, no financial institution, or officer, employee, or 

agent of such institution, shall disclose to any person (other 

than those to whom such disclosure is necessary to comply 

with the request or an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal 

assistance with respect to the request) that the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation has sought or obtained access to a customer’s 

or entity’s financial records under subparagraph (A). 

¿(ii) The request shall notify the person or entity to whom 

the request is directed of the nondisclosure requirement under 

clause (i). 

¿(iii) Any recipient disclosing to those persons necessary to 

comply with the request or to an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request shall inform 

such persons of any applicable nondisclosure requirement. Any 

person who receives a disclosure under this subsection shall be 

subject to the same prohibitions on disclosure under clause (i). 

¿(iv) At the request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation or the designee of the Director, any person making or intending to make a disclosure under this section shall 

identify to the Director or such designee the person to whom 

such disclosure will be made or to whom such disclosure was 

made prior to the request, except that nothing in this section 

shall require a person to inform the Director or such designee 

of the identity of an attorney to whom disclosure was made or 

will be made to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request for financial records under subparagraph 

(A).

(E) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURE.— 

(i) PROHIBITION.— 

(I) IN GENERAL.—If a certification is issued under subclause(II) and notice of the right to judicial review under 

clause (iii) is provided, no financial institution, or officer, 

employee, or agent thereof, that receives a request under 

subparagraph (A), shall disclose to any person that the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or records under subparagraph (A). 

(II) CERTIFICATION.—The requirements of subclause (I) 

shall apply if the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a designee of the Director whose rank shall be 

no lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge of a Bureau field office, certifies that, absent a prohibition of disclosure under 

this subparagraph, there may result— 

(aa) a danger to the national security of the United 

States; 

(bb) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, 

or counterintelligence investigation; 

(cc) interference with diplomatic relations; or 


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(dd) danger to the life or physical safety of any person. 

(ii) EXCEPTION.— (I) IN GENERAL.—A financial institution, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, that receives a request under subparagraph (A) may disclose information otherwise subject 

to any applicable nondisclosure requirement to— (aa) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in 

order to comply with the request; (bb) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or assistance regarding the request; or (cc) other persons as permitted by the Director of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the 

Director. 

(II) PERSONS NECESSARY FOR COMPLIANCE.—Upon a request by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

or the designee of the Director, those persons to whom disclosure will be made under subclause (I)(aa) or to whom 

such disclosure was made before the request shall be identified to the Director or the designee. (III) NONDISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT.—A person to whom 

disclosure is made under subclause (I) shall be subject to 

the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to 

whom a request is issued under subparagraph (A) in the 

same manner as the person to whom the request is issued. 

(IV) NOTICE.—Any recipient that discloses to a person de- scribed in subclause (I) information otherwise subject to a 

nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of the 

applicable nondisclosure requirement. 

(iii) RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.— (I) IN GENERAL.—A financial institution that receives a 

request under subparagraph (A) shall have the right to judicial review of any applicable nondisclosure requirement. (II) NOTIFICATION.—A request under subparagraph (A) 

shall state that if the recipient wishes to have a court review a nondisclosure requirement, the recipient shall notify 

the Government. 

(III) INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS.—If a recipient of a request under subparagraph (A) makes a notification under 

subclause (II), the Government shall initiate judicial review 

under the procedures established in section 3511 of title 18, 

United States Code, unless an appropriate official of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation makes a notification under 

clause (iv). 

(iv) TERMINATION.—In the case of any request for which a financial institution has submitted a notification under clause 

(iii)(II), if the facts supporting a nondisclosure requirement 

cease to exist, an appropriate official of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation shall promptly notify the financial institution, or 

officer, employee, or agent thereof, subject to the nondisclosure 

requirement that the nondisclosure requirement is no longer in 

effect. 

(b)(1) Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a Government authority from obtaining financial records from a financial institution 


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if the Government authority determines that delay in obtaining access to such records would create imminent danger of— (A) physical injury to any person; 

(B) serious property damage; or 

(C) flight to avoid prosecution. (2) In the instances specified in paragraph (1), the Government shall submit to the financial institution the certificate required in 

section 3403(b) of this title signed by a supervisory official of a 

rank designated by the head of the Government authority. (3) Within five days of obtaining access to financial records under this subsection, the Government authority shall file with the appropriate court a signed, sworn statement of a supervisory official of 

a rank designated by the head of the Government authority setting 

forth the grounds for the emergency access. The Government authority shall thereafter comply with the notice provisions of section 

3409(c) of this title. 

(4) The Government authority specified in paragraph (1) shall 

compile an annual tabulation of the occasions in which this section 

was used. 

(d) For purposes of this section, and sections 3415 and 3417 of 

this title insofar as they relate to the operation of this section, the 

term ‘‘financial institution’’ has the same meaning as in subsections 

(a)(2) and (c)(1) of section 5312 of Title 31, except that, for purposes 

of this section, such term shall include only such a financial institution any part of which is located inside any State or territory of 

the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, 

American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or the United States Virgin Islands. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE 15—COMMERCE AND TRADE 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 41—CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION 

Subchapter III—Credit Reporting Agencies 

SEC. 1681u. DISCLOSURES TO FBI FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. 

* * * * * * * 

¿(d) CONFIDENTIALITY.— 

¿(1) If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

or his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant 

Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge 

in a Bureau field office designated by the Director, certifies 

that otherwise there may result a danger to the national security of the United States, interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference 

with diplomatic relations, or danger to the life or physical safety of any person, no consumer reporting agency or officer, employee, or agent of a consumer reporting agency shall disclose 

to any person (other than those to whom such disclosure is 

necessary to comply with the request or an attorney to obtain 


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legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request) 

that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained the identity of financial institutions or a consumer report respecting any consumer under subsection (a), (b), or (c) 

of this section, and no consumer reporting agency or officer, 

employee, or agent of a consumer reporting agency shall include in any consumer report any information that would indicate that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained such information on a consumer report. 

¿(2) The request shall notify the person or entity to whom 

the request is directed of the nondisclosure requirement under 

paragraph (1). 

¿(3) Any recipient disclosing to those persons necessary to 

comply with the request or to an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request shall inform 

such persons of any applicable nondisclosure requirement. Any 

person who receives a disclosure under this subsection shall be 

subject to the same prohibitions on disclosure under paragraph 

(1). 

¿(4) At the request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation or the designee of the Director, any person making or intending to make a disclosure under this section shall 

identify to the Director or such designee the person to whom 

such disclosure will be made or to whom such disclosure was 

made prior to the request, except that nothing in this section 

shall require a person to inform the Director or such designee 

of the identity of an attorney to whom disclosure was made or 

will be made to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request for the identity of financial institutions or 

a consumer report respecting any consumer under this section.

(d) WRITTEN STATEMENT.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, or a designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in 

Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director, may 

make a certification under subsection (a) or (b) only upon a written 

statement, which shall be retained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, of specific facts showing that there are reasonable grounds 

to believe that the information sought is relevant to the authorized 

investigation described in subsection (a) or (b), as the case may be. (e) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURE.— 

(1) PROHIBITION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—If a certification is issued under subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review 

under paragraph (3) is provided, no consumer reporting 

agency, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, that receives 

a request or order under subsection (a), (b), or (c), shall disclose or specify in any consumer report, that the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or records under subsection (a), (b), or (c). 

(B) CERTIFICATION.—The requirements of subparagraph 

(A) shall apply if the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a designee of the Director whose rank shall 

be no lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau 


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headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge of a Bureau 

field office, certifies that, absent a prohibition of disclosure 

under this subsection, there may result)— 

(i) a danger to the national security of the United 

States; 

(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 

counterintelligence investigation; 

(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or 

(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person. 

(2) EXCEPTION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—A consumer reporting agency, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, that receives a request or 

order under subsection (a), (b), or (c) may disclose information otherwise subject to any applicable nondisclosure requirement to— 

(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in 

order to comply with the request or order; 

(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or assistance regarding the request or order; or 

(iii) other persons as permitted by the Director of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the 

Director. 

(B) PERSONS NECESSARY FOR COMPLIANCE.—Upon a request by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

or the designee of the Director, those persons to whom disclosure will be made under subparagraph (A)(i) or to whom 

such disclosure was made before the request shall be identified to the Director or the designee. 

(C) NONDISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT.—A person to whom 

disclosure is made under subparagraph (A) shall be subject 

to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to 

whom a request or order is issued under subsection (a), (b), 

or (c) in the same manner as the person to whom the request or order is issued. 

(D) NOTICE.—Any recipient that discloses to a person described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject 

to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of 

the applicable nondisclosure requirement. 

(3) RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—A consumer reporting agency that receives a request or order under subsection (a), (b), or (c) 

shall have the right to judicial review of any applicable 

nondisclosure requirement. 

(B) NOTIFICATION.—A request or order under subsection 

(a), (b), or (c) shall state that if the recipient wishes to have 

a court review a nondisclosure requirement, the recipient 

shall notify the Government. 

(C) INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS.—If a recipient of a request or order under subsection (a), (b), or (c) makes a notification under subparagraph (B), the Government shall initiate judicial review under the procedures established in 

section 3511 of title 18, United States Code, unless an apVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6603 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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propriate official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

makes a notification under paragraph (4). 

(4) TERMINATION.—In the case of any request or order for 

which a consumer reporting agency has submitted a notification 

under paragraph (3)(B), if the facts supporting a nondisclosure 

requirement cease to exist, an appropriate official of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation shall promptly notify the consumer reporting agency, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, subject to 

the nondisclosure requirement that the nondisclosure requirement is no longer in effect. 

(f)¿(e) PAYMENT OF FEES.—The Federal Bureau of Investigation 

shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, pay to the consumer reporting agency assembling or providing report or information in accordance with procedures established under this section 

a fee for reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably necessary 

and which have been directly incurred in searching, reproducing, or 

transporting books, papers, records, or other data required or requested to be produced under this section. 

(g)¿(f) LIMIT ON DISSEMINATION.—The Federal Bureau of Investigation may not disseminate information obtained pursuant to this 

section outside of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, except to 

other Federal agencies as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counterintelligence investigation, or, where the information concerns a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to appropriate investigative authorities within the 

military department concerned as may be necessary for the conduct 

of a joint foreign counterintelligence investigation. 

(h)¿(g) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall 

be construed to prohibit information from being furnished by the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to a subpoena or court 

order, in connection with a judicial or administrative proceeding to 

enforce the provisions of this subchapter. Nothing in this section 

shall be construed to authorize or permit the withholding of information from the Congress. 

(i)¿(h) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.— 

(1) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall fully 

inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and 

the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of the 

House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 

Affairs of the Senate concerning all requests made pursuant to 

subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section. 

(2) In the case of the semiannual reports required to be submitted under paragraph (1) to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the submittal 

dates for such reports shall be as provided in section 415b of 

Title 50. 

(j)¿(i) DAMAGES.—Any agency or department of the United 

States obtaining or disclosing any consumer reports, records, or information contained therein in violation of this section is liable to 

the consumer to whom such consumer reports, records, or information relate in an amount equal to the sum of— 


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(1) $100, without regard to the volume of consumer reports, records, or information involved; 

(2) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a re- sult of the disclosure; 

(3) if the violation is found to have been willful or intentional, such punitive damages as a court may allow; and (4) in the case of any successful action to enforce liability under this subsection, the costs of the action, together with 

reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the court. (k)¿(j) DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS.—If a court determines that any agency or department of the United States has violated any provision of this section and the court finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise questions of whether or 

not an officer or employee of the agency or department acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the violation, the agency or department shall promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether or not disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or employee who was responsible for the violation. (l)¿(k) GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, any consumer reporting agency or 

agent or employee thereof making disclosure of consumer reports 

or identifying information pursuant to this subsection in good-faith 

reliance upon a certification of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

pursuant to provisions of this section shall not be liable to any person for such disclosure under this subchapter, the constitution of 

any State, or any law or regulation of any State or any political 

subdivision of any State. 

(m)¿(l) LIMITATION OF REMEDIES.—Notwithstanding any other 

provision of this subchapter, the remedies and sanctions set forth 

in this section shall be the only judicial remedies and sanctions for 

violation of this section. 

(n)¿(m) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.—In addition to any other remedy 

contained in this section, injunctive relief shall be available to require compliance with the procedures of this section. In the event 

of any successful action under this subsection, costs together with 

reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the court, may be recovered. 

SEC. 1681v. DISCLOSURES TO GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES FOR 

COUNTERTERRORISM PURPOSES 

(a) DISCLOSURE.—Notwithstanding section 1681b of this title or 

any other provision of this subchapter, a consumer reporting agency shall furnish a consumer report of a consumer and all other information in a consumer’s file to a government agency authorized 

to conduct investigations of, or intelligence or counterintelligence 

activities or analysis related to, international terrorism when presented with a written certification by such government agency that 

such information is necessary for the agency’s conduct or such investigation, activity or analysis. 

(b) CERTIFICATION.—¿FORM OF CERTIFICATION.—The certification

(1) FORM OF CERTIFICATION.—The certification described in 

subsection (a) of this section shall be signed by a supervisory 

official designated by the head of a Federal agency or an officer 

of a Federal agency whose appointment to office is required to 


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61 

be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent 

of the Senate. 

(2) WRITTEN STATEMENT.—A supervisory official or officer described in paragraph (1) may make a certification under subsection (a) only upon a written statement, which shall be retained by the government agency, of specific facts showing that 

there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information 

sought is relevant to the authorized investigation described in 

subsection (a). 

¿(c) CONFIDENTIALITY.— 

¿(1) If the head of a government agency authorized to conduct investigations of intelligence or counterintelligence activities or analysis related to international terrorism, or his designee, certifies that otherwise there may result a danger to the 

national security of the United States, interference with a 

criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, 

interference with diplomatic relations, or danger to the life or 

physical safety of any person, no consumer reporting agency or 

officer, employee, or agent of such consumer reporting agency, 

shall disclose to any person (other than those to whom such 

disclosure is necessary to comply with the request or an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to 

the request), or specify in any consumer report, that a government agency has sought or obtained access to information 

under subsection (a) of this section. 

¿(2) The request shall notify the person or entity to whom 

the request is directed of the nondisclosure requirement under 

paragraph (1). 

¿(3) Any recipient disclosing to those persons necessary to 

comply with the request or to any attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request shall inform 

such persons of any applicable nondisclosure requirement. Any 

person who receives a disclosure under this subsection shall be 

subject to the same prohibitions on disclosure under paragraph 

(1). 

¿(4) At the request of the authorized government agency, 

any person making or intending to make a disclosure under 

this section shall identify to the requesting official of the authorized government agency the person to whom such disclosure will be made or to whom such disclosure was made prior 

to the request, except that nothing in this section shall require 

a person to inform the requesting official of the identity of an 

attorney to whom disclosure was made or will be made to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request 

for information under subsection (a) of this section.

(c) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURE.— 

(1) PROHIBITION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—If a certification is issued under subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review 

under paragraph (3) is provided, no consumer reporting 

agency, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, that receives 

a request under subsection (a), shall disclose to any person 

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cy has sought or obtained access to information under subsection (a). 

(B) CERTIFICATION.—The requirements of subparagraph 

(A) shall apply if the head of a government agency authorized to conduct investigations of, or intelligence or counterintelligence activities or analysis related to, international 

terrorism, or a designee, certifies that, absent a prohibition 

of disclosure under this subsection, there may result— 

(i) a danger to the national security of the United 

States; 

(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 

counterintelligence investigation; 

(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or 

(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person. 

(2) EXCEPTION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—A consumer reporting agency, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, that receives a request 

under subsection (a) may disclose information otherwise 

subject to any applicable nondisclosure requirement to— 

(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in 

order to comply with the request; 

(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or assistance regarding the request; or 

(iii) other persons as permitted by the head of the 

government agency authorized to conduct investigations of, or intelligence or counterintelligence activities 

or analysis related to, international terrorism, or a designee. 

(B) PERSONS NECESSARY FOR COMPLIANCE.—Upon a request by the head of a government agency authorized to 

conduct investigations of, or intelligence or counterintelligence activities or analysis related to, international terrorism, or a designee, those persons to whom disclosure will 

be made under subparagraph (A)(i) or to whom such disclosure was made before the request shall be identified to the 

head of the government agency or the designee. 

(C) NONDISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT.—A person to whom 

disclosure is made under subparagraph (A) shall be subject 

to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to 

whom a request is issued under subsection (a) in the same 

manner as the person to whom the request is issued. 

(D) NOTICE.—Any recipient that discloses to a person described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject 

to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of 

the applicable nondisclosure requirement. 

(3) RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—A consumer reporting agency that receives a request under subsection (a) shall have the right to 

judicial review of any applicable nondisclosure requirement. 

(B) NOTIFICATION.—A request under subsection (a) shall 

state that if the recipient wishes to have a court review a 


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nondisclosure requirement, the recipient shall notify the 

government. (C) INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS.—If a recipient of a request under subsection (a) makes a notification under subparagraph (B), the government shall initiate judicial review 

under the procedures established in section 3511 of title 18, 

United States Code, unless an appropriate official of the 

government agency authorized to conduct investigations of, 

or intelligence or counterintelligence activities or analysis 

related to, international terrorism makes a notification 

under paragraph (4). (4) TERMINATION.—In the case of any request for which a consumer reporting agency has submitted a notification under 

paragraph (3)(B), if the facts supporting a nondisclosure requirement cease to exist, an appropriate official of the government agency authorized to conduct investigations of, or intelligence or counterintelligence activities or analysis related to, 

international terrorism shall promptly notify the consumer reporting agency, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, subject to 

the nondisclosure requirement that the nondisclosure requirement is no longer in effect. (d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in section 1681u of this 

title shall be construed to limit the authority of the Director of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation under this section. (e) SAFE HARBOR.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this 

subchapter, any consumer reporting agency or agent or employee 

thereof making disclosure of consumer reports or other information 

pursuant to this section in good-faith reliance upon a certification 

of a government agency pursuant to the provisions of this section 

shall not be liable to any person for such disclosure under this subchapter [FN1], the constitution of any State, or any law or regulation of any State or any political subdivision of any State. (f) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.— (1) On a semi-annual basis, the Attorney General shall fully 

inform the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee 

on the Judiciary, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

Senate concerning all requests made pursuant to subsection (a) 

of this section. 

(2) In the case of the semiannual reports required to be submitted under paragraph (1) to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the submittal 

dates for such reports shall be as provided in section 415b of 

Title 50. 

‘‘(f) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—(1) On a semi-annual basis, the Attorney General shall fully inform the Committee on the Judiciary, 

the Committee on Financial Services, and the Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

Senate concerning all requests made pursuant to subsection (a). 


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‘‘(2) In the case of the semiannual reports required to be submitted under paragraph (1) to the Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the submittal dates for such 

reports shall be as provided in section 507 of the National Security 

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b).’’. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE 18—CRIMES AND CRIMINAL 

PROCEDURE 

PART I—CRIMES 

CHAPTER 10—BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 

SEC. 175c. VARIOLA VIRUS. 

(a) UNLAWFUL CONDUCT.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), it 

shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, engineer, synthesize, acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or possess and threaten 

to use, variola virus. 

(2) EXCEPTION.—This subsection does not apply to conduct 

by, or under the authority of, the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services. 

(b) JURISDICTION.—Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) is within 

the jurisdiction of the United States if— 

(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; 

(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and is 

committed by a national of the United States; 

(3) the offense is committed against a national of the United 

States while the national is outside the United States; 

(4) the offense is committed against any property that is 

owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any department or agency of the United States, whether the property is 

within or outside the United States; or 

(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an offense 

under this section or conspires with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an offense 

under this section. 

(c) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Any person who violates, or attempts or 

conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more than 

$2,000,000 and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 

not less than 25 years or to imprisonment for life. 

(2) OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.—Any person who, in the course 

of a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to 

use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than 

$2,000,000 and imprisoned for not less than 30 years or imprisoned for life. 


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(3) SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.—If the death of another results 

from a person’s violation of subsection (a), the person shall be 

fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or imprisonment for life. 

(d) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the term ‘‘variola virus’’ 

means a virus that can cause human smallpox or any derivative of 

the variola major virus that contains more than 85 percent of the 

gene sequence of the variola major virus or the variola minor virus. 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 39—EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER DANGEROUS 

ARTICLES 

SEC. 832. PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES. 

(a) Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, willfully participates in or knowingly provides material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A) 

to a nuclear weapons program or other weapons of mass destruction program of a foreign terrorist power, or attempts or conspires 

to do so, shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years. 

(b) There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense 

under this section. 

(c) Whoever without lawful authority develops, possesses, or attempts or conspires to develop or possess a radiological weapon, or 

threatens to use or uses a radiological weapon against any person 

within the United States, or a national of the United States while 

such national is outside of the United States or against any property that is owned, leased, funded, or used by the United States, 

whether that property is within or outside of the United States, 

shall be punished by death if death results to any person from the 

offense, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 

(d) As used in this section— 

(1) ‘‘nuclear weapons program’’ means a program or plan for 

the development, acquisition, or production of any nuclear 

weapon or weapons; 

(2) ‘‘weapons of mass destruction program’’ means a program 

or plan for the development, acquisition, or production of any 

weapon or weapons of mass destruction (as defined in section 

2332a(c)); 

(3) ‘‘foreign terrorist power’’ means a terrorist organization 

designated under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or a state sponsor of terrorism designated under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 or section 

620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; and 

(4) ‘‘nuclear weapon’’ means any weapon that contains or 

uses nuclear material as defined in section 831(f)(1). 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 113B—TERRORISM 

SEC. 2332g. MISSILE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO DESTROY AIRCRAFT. 

(a) UNLAWFUL CONDUCT.— 


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(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (3), it 

shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, construct, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or possess and threaten 

to use— 

(A) an explosive or incendiary rocket or missile that is 

guided by any system designed to enable the rocket or missile to— 

(i) seek or proceed toward energy radiated or reflected from an aircraft or toward an image locating 

an aircraft; or 

(ii) otherwise direct or guide the rocket or missile to 

an aircraft; 

(B) any device designed or intended to launch or guide a rocket or missile described in subparagraph (A); or (C) any part or combination of parts designed or redesigned for use in assembling or fabricating a rocket, missile, or device described in subparagraph (A) or (B). (2) NONWEAPON.—Paragraph (1)(A) does not apply to any device that is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon. 

(3) EXCLUDED CONDUCT.—This subsection does not apply 

with respect to— 

(A) conduct by or under the authority of the United 

States or any department or agency thereof or of a State 

or any department or agency thereof; or (B) conduct pursuant to the terms of a contract with the 

United States or any department or agency thereof or with 

a State or any department or agency thereof. (b) JURISDICTION.—Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) is within 

the jurisdiction of the United States if— (1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; 

(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and is 

committed by a national of the United States; 

(3) the offense is committed against a national of the United 

States while the national is outside the United States; 

(4) the offense is committed against any property that is 

owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any department or agency of the United States, whether the property is 

within or outside the United States; or 

(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an offense 

under this section or conspires with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an offense 

under this section. 

(c) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Any person who violates, or attempts or 

conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more than 

$2,000,000 and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 

not less than 25 years or to imprisonment for life. 

(2) OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.—Any person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to 

use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items deVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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scribed in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than 

$2,000,000 and imprisoned for not less than 30 years or imprisoned for life. 

(3) SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.—If the death of another results 

from a person’s violation of subsection (a), the person shall be 

punished by death or fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by imprisonment for life. 

(d) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the term ‘‘aircraft’’ has 

the definition set forth in section 40102(a)(6) of title 49, United 

States Code. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 2332h. RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES. 

(a) UNLAWFUL CONDUCT.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), it 

shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, construct, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or possess and threaten 

to use— 

(A) any weapon that is designed or intended to release 

radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human 

life; or 

(B) any device or other object that is capable of and designed or intended to endanger human life through the release of radiation or radioactivity. 

(2) EXCEPTION.—This subsection does not apply with respect 

to— 

(A) conduct by or under the authority of the United 

States or any department or agency thereof; or 

(B) conduct pursuant to the terms of a contract with the 

United States or any department or agency thereof. 

(b) JURISDICTION.—Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) is within 

the jurisdiction of the United States if— 

(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; 

(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and is 

committed by a national of the United States; 

(3) the offense is committed against a national of the United 

States while the national is outside the United States; 

(4) the offense is committed against any property that is 

owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any department or agency of the United States, whether the property is 

within or outside the United States; or 

(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an offense 

under this section or conspires with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an offense 

under this section. 

(c) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Any person who violates, or attempts or 

conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more than 

$2,000,000 and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 

not less than 25 years or to imprisonment for life. 


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(2) OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.—Any person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to 

use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than 

$2,000,000 and imprisoned for not less than 30 years or imprisoned for life. 

(3) SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.—If the death of another results 

from a person’s violation of subsection (a), the person shall be 

fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or imprisonment for life. 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 121—STORED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS 

SEC. 2709. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACCESS TO TELEPHONE TOLL 

AND TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS. 

(a) DUTY TO PROVIDE.—A wire or electronic communication service provider shall comply with a request for subscriber information 

and toll billing records information, or electronic communication 

transactional records in its custody or possession made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under subsection (b) 

of this section. 

(b) REQUIRED CERTIFICATION.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or his designee in a position not lower than 

Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special 

Agent in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director, 

may— (1) request the name, address, length of service, and local 

and long distance toll billing records of a person or entity if the 

Director (or his designee) certifies in writing to the wire or 

electronic communication service provider to which the request 

is made that the name, address, length of service, and toll billing records sought are relevant to an authorized investigation 

to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a 

United States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of 

the United States; and 

(2) request the name, address, and length of service of a person or entity if the Director (or his designee) certifies in writing to the wire or electronic communication service provider to 

which the request is made that the information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is 

not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by 

the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 

¿(c) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURE.— 

¿(1) If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

or his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant 

Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge 

in a Bureau field office designated by the Director, certifies 

that otherwise there may result a danger to the national security of the United States, interference with a criminal, counterVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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terrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference 

with diplomatic relations, or danger to the life or physical safety of any person, no wire or electronic communications service 

provider, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to 

any person (other than those to whom such disclosure is necessary to comply with the request or an attorney to obtain 

legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request) 

that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or records under this section. 

¿(2) The request shall notify the person or entity to whom 

the request is directed of the nondisclosure requirement under 

paragraph (1). 

¿(3) Any recipient disclosing to those persons necessary to 

comply with the request or to an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request shall inform 

such person of any applicable nondisclosure requirement. Any 

person who receives a disclosure under this subsection shall be 

subject to the same prohibitions on disclosure under paragraph 

(1). 

¿(4) At the request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation or the designee of the Director, any person making or intending to make a disclosure under this section shall 

identify to the Director or such designee the person to whom 

such disclosure will be made or to whom such disclosure was 

made prior to the request, except that nothing in this section 

shall require a person to inform the Director or such designee 

of the identity of an attorney to whom disclosure was made or 

will be made to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request under subsection (a).

(c) WRITTEN STATEMENT.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, or a designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in 

Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director, may 

make a certification under subsection (b) only upon a written statement, which shall be retained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, of specific facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to 

believe that the information sought is relevant to the authorized investigation described in subsection (b). 

(d) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURE.— 

(1) PROHIBITION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—If a certification is issued under subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review 

under paragraph (3) is provided, no wire or electronic communication service provider, or officer, employee, or agent 

thereof, that receives a request under subsection (a), shall 

disclose to any person that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or records under this section. 

(B) CERTIFICATION.—The requirements of subparagraph 

(A) shall apply if the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a designee of the Director whose rank shall 

be no lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau 

headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge of a Bureau 


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field office, certifies that, absent a prohibition of disclosure 

under this subsection, there may result— 

(i) a danger to the national security of the United 

States; 

(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 

counterintelligence investigation; 

(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or 

(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person. 

(2) EXCEPTION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—A wire or electronic communication 

service provider, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, that 

receives a request under subsection (a) may disclose information otherwise subject to any applicable nondisclosure 

requirement to— 

(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in 

order to comply with the request; 

(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or assistance regarding the request; or 

(iii) other persons as permitted by the Director of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the 

Director. 

(B) PERSONS NECESSARY FOR COMPLIANCE.—Upon a request by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

or the designee of the Director, those persons to whom disclosure will be made under subparagraph (A)(i) or to whom 

such disclosure was made before the request shall be identified to the Director or the designee. 

(C) NONDISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT.—A person to whom 

disclosure is made under subparagraph (A) shall be subject 

to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to 

whom a request is issued under subsection (a) in the same 

manner as the person to whom the request is issued. 

(D) NOTICE.—Any recipient that discloses to a person described in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject 

to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of 

the applicable nondisclosure requirement. 

(3) RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—A wire or electronic communications 

service provider that receives a request under subsection (a) 

shall have the right to judicial review of any applicable 

nondisclosure requirement. 

(B) NOTIFICATION.—A request under subsection (a) shall 

state that if the recipient wishes to have a court review a 

nondisclosure requirement, the recipient shall notify the 

Government. 

(C) INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS.—If a recipient of a request under subsection (a) makes a notification under subparagraph (B), the Government shall initiate judicial review under the procedures established in section 3511 of 

this title, unless an appropriate official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation makes a notification under paragraph 

(4). 


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(4) TERMINATION.—In the case of any request for which a re- cipient has submitted a notification under paragraph (3)(B), if 

the facts supporting a nondisclosure requirement cease to exist, 

an appropriate official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

shall promptly notify the wire or electronic service provider, or 

officer, employee, or agent thereof, subject to the nondisclosure 

requirement that the nondisclosure requirement is no longer in 

effect. 

(e)¿(d) DISSEMINATION BY BUREAU.—The Federal Bureau of Investigation may disseminate information and records obtained 

under this section only as provided in guidelines approved by the 

Attorney General for foreign intelligence collection and foreign 

counterintelligence investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, and, with respect to dissemination to an agency of 

the United States, only if such information is clearly relevant to 

the authorized responsibilities of such agency. (f)¿(e) REQUIREMENT THAT CERTAIN CONGRESSIONAL BODIES BE

INFORMED.—On a semiannual basis the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Committee 

on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, concerning all requests made 

under subsection (b) of this section. 

(g)¿(f) LIBRARIES.—A library (as that term is defined in section 213(1) of the Library Services and Technology Act (20 U.S.C. 

9122(1)), the services of which include access to the Internet, books, 

journals, magazines, newspapers, or other similar forms of communication in print or digitally by patrons for their use, review, examination, or circulation, is not a wire or electronic communication 

service provider for purposes of this section, unless the library is 

providing the services defined in section 2510(15) (‘‘electronic communication service’’) of this title. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 3103a. ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR ISSUING WARRANT. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—In addition to the grounds for issuing a warrant in section 3103 of this title, a warrant may be issued to search 

for and seize any property that constitutes evidence of a criminal 

offense in violation of the laws of the United States. 

(b) DELAY.—With respect to the issuance of any warrant or court 

order under this section, or any other rule of law, to search for and 

seize any property or material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States, any notice 

required, or that may be required, to be given may be delayed if— 

(1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing 

immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may 

have an adverse result (as defined in section 2705, except if the 

adverse results consist only of unduly delaying a trial); (2) the warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible prop- erty, any wire or electronic communication (as defined in section 2510), or, except as expressly provided in chapter 121, any 

stored wire or electronic information, except where the court 

finds reasonable necessity for the seizure; and 


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(3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice within 

a reasonable period not to exceed 7 ¿30 days after the date 

of its execution, or on a later date certain if the facts of the 

case justify a longer period of delay. 

(c) EXTENSIONS OF DELAY.—Any period of delay authorized by 

this section may be extended by the court for good cause shown, 

subject to the condition that extensions should only be granted 

upon an updated showing of the need for further delay and that 

each additional delay should be limited to periods of 90 days or 

less, unless the facts of the case justify a longer period of delay. 

(d) REPORTS.— 

(1) REPORT BY JUDGE.—Not later than 30 days after the expiration of a warrant authorizing delayed notice (including any 

extension thereof) entered under this section, or the denial of 

such warrant (or request for extension), the issuing or denying 

judge shall report to the Administrative Office of the United 

States Courts— 

(A) the fact that a warrant was applied for; 

(B) the fact that the warrant or any extension thereof 

was granted as applied for, was modified, or was denied; 

(C) the period of delay in the giving of notice authorized 

by the warrant, and the number and duration of any extensions; and 

(D) the offense specified in the warrant or application. 

(2) REPORT BY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

COURTS.—Beginning with the fiscal year ending September 30, 

2007, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United 

States Courts shall transmit to Congress annually a full and 

complete report summarizing the data required to be filed with 

the Administrative Office by paragraph (1), including the number of applications for warrants and extensions of warrants authorizing delayed notice, and the number of such warrants and 

extensions granted or denied during the preceding fiscal year. 

(3) REGULATIONS.—The Director of the Administrative Office 

of the United States Courts, in consultation with the Attorney 

General, is authorized to issue binding regulations dealing 

with the content and form of the reports required to be filed 

under paragraph (1). 

SEC. 3511. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION. 

(a) The recipient of a request for records, a report, or other information under section 2709(b) of this title, section 626(a) or (b) or 

627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the 

Right to Financial Privacy Act, or section 802(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 may, in the United States district court for the 

district in which that person or entity does business or resides, petition for an order modifying or setting aside the request. The court 

may modify or set aside the request if compliance would be unreasonable, oppressive, or otherwise unlawful. 

¿(b)(1) The recipient of a request for records, a report, or other 

information under section 2709(b) of this title, section 626(a) or (b) 

or 627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, section 1114(a)(5)(A) of 

the Right to Financial Privacy Act, or section 802(a) of the National 

Security Act of 1947, may petition any court described in subVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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section (a) for an order modifying or setting aside a nondisclosure 

requirement imposed in connection with such a request. 

¿(2) If the petition is filed within one year of the request for records, a report, or other information under section 2709(b) of this 

title, section 626(a) or (b) or 627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting 

Act, section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act, or 

section 802(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, the court may 

modify or set aside such a nondisclosure requirement if it finds 

that there is no reason to believe that disclosure may endanger the 

national security of the United States, interfere with a criminal, 

counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere 

with diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical safety of 

any person. If, at the time of the petition, the Attorney General, 

Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or the 

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or in the case of 

a request by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government other than the Department of Justice, the head 

or deputy head of such department, agency, or instrumentality, certifies that disclosure may endanger the national security of the 

United States or interfere with diplomatic relations, such certification shall be treated as conclusive unless the court finds that the 

certification was made in bad faith. 

¿(3) If the petition is filed one year or more after the request for records, a report, or other information under section 2709(b) of this 

title, section 626(a) or (b) or 627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting 

Act, section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act, or 

section 802(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Attorney 

General, Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, 

or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field 

office designated by the Director, or in the case of a request by a 

department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government 

other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the head or deputy 

head of such department, agency, or instrumentality, within ninety 

days of the filing of the petition, shall either terminate the nondisclosure requirement or re-certify that disclosure may result in a 

danger to the national security of the United States, interference 

with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or danger to the life or 

physical safety of any person. In the event of re-certification, the 

court may modify or set aside such a nondisclosure requirement if 

it finds that there is no reason to believe that disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States, interfere with a 

criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, 

interfere with diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical 

safety of any person. If the recertification that disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States or interfere with 

diplomatic relations is made by the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or the Director of 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, such certification shall be 

treated as conclusive unless the court finds that the recertification 

was made in bad faith. If the court denies a petition for an order 

modifying or setting aside a nondisclosure requirement under this 


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paragraph, the recipient shall be precluded for a period of one year 

from filing another petition to modify or set aside such nondisclosure requirement.

(b) NONDISCLOSURE.— (1) IN GENERAL.— (A) NOTICE.—If a recipient of a request or order for a report, records, or other information under section 2709 of 

this title, section 626 or 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting 

Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u and 1681v), section 1114 of the Right 

to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414), or section 802 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 

436), wishes to have a court review a nondisclosure requirement imposed in connection with the request or order, the 

recipient shall notify the Government. (B) APPLICATION.—Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a notification under subparagraph (A), the 

Government shall apply for an order prohibiting the disclosure of the existence or contents of the relevant request or 

order. An application under this subparagraph may be 

filed in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the recipient of the order is doing 

business or in the district court of the United States for any 

district within which the authorized investigation that is 

the basis for the request or order is being conducted. The 

applicable nondisclosure requirement shall remain in effect 

during the pendency of proceedings relating to the requirement. 

(C) CONSIDERATION.—A district court of the United 

States that receives an application under subparagraph (B) 

should rule expeditiously, and shall, subject to paragraph 

(3), issue a nondisclosure order that includes conditions appropriate to the circumstances. 

(2) APPLICATION CONTENTS.—An application for a nondisclosure order or extension thereof under this subsection shall include a certification from the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney 

General, an Assistant Attorney General, or the Director of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, or in the case of a request by 

a department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government other than the Department of Justice, the head or deputy 

head of the department, agency, or instrumentality, containing 

a statement of specific facts indicating that, absent a prohibition of disclosure under this subsection, there may result— 

(A) a danger to the national security of the United States; 

(B) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 

counterintelligence investigation; 

(C) interference with diplomatic relations; or 

(D) danger to the life or physical safety of any person. 

(3) STANDARD.—A district court of the United States shall 

issue a nondisclosure requirement order or extension thereof 

under this subsection if the court determines, giving substantial 

weight to the certification under paragraph (2) that there is reason to believe that disclosure of the information subject to the 

nondisclosure requirement during the applicable time period 

will result in— 


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(A) a danger to the national security of the United States; 

(B) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 

counterintelligence investigation; (C) interference with diplomatic relations; or 

(D) danger to the life or physical safety of any person. (c) In the case of a failure to comply with a request for records, a report, or other information made to any person or entity under 

section 2709(b) of this title, section 626(a) or (b) or 627(a) of the 

Fair Credit Reporting Act, section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act, or section 802(a) of the National Security Act 

of 1947, the Attorney General may invoke the aid of any district 

court of the United States within the jurisdiction in which the investigation is carried on or the person or entity resides, carries on 

business, or may be found, to compel compliance with the request. 

The court may issue an order requiring the person or entity to comply with the request. Any failure to obey the order of the court may 

be punished by the court as contempt thereof. Any process under 

this section may be served in any judicial district in which the person or entity may be found. (d) In all proceedings under this section, subject to any right to an open hearing in a contempt proceeding, the court must close any 

hearing to the extent necessary to prevent an unauthorized disclosure of a request for records, a report, or other information made 

to any person or entity under section 2709(b) of this title, section 

626(a) or (b) or 627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, section 

1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act, or section 

802(a) of the National Security Act of 1947. Petitions, filings, 

records, orders, and subpoenas must also be kept under seal to the 

extent and as long as necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a request for records, a report, or other information made 

to any person or entity under section 2709(b) of this title, section 

626(a) or (b) or 627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, section 

1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act, or section 

802(a) of the National Security Act of 1947. (e) In all proceedings under this section, the court shall, upon request of the government, review ex parte and in camera any government submission or portions thereof, which may include classified information. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE 42—THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 

CHAPTER 23—Development and Control of Atomic Energy 

Division a. Atomic Energy 

Subchapter XVII. Enforcement of Chapter 

SEC. 2272. VIOLATION OF SPECIFIC SECTIONS. 

(a) Whoever willfully violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to 

violate, any provision of sections 2077 or 2131 of this title, or whoever unlawfully interferes, attempts to interfere, or conspires to 

interfere with any recapture or entry under section 2138 of this 

title, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not 

more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than ten 


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years, or both, except that whoever commits such an offense with 

intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation shall, upon conviction thereof, be 

punished by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for any 

term of years or a fine of not more than $20,000 or both. 

(b) Any person who violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, 

section 2122 of this title shall be fined not more than $2,000,000 

and sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than 25 years or 

to imprisonment for life. Any person who, in the course of a violation of section 2122 of this title, uses, attempts or conspires to use, 

or possesses and threatens to use, any atomic weapon shall be 

fined not more than $2,000,000 and imprisoned for not less than 

30 years or imprisoned for life. If the death of another results from 

a person’s violation of section 2122 of this title, the person shall be 

fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or imprisonment for life. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 15—NATIONAL SECURITY 

Subchapter VI—Access to Classified Information 

SEC. 436. REQUESTS BY AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES. 

(a) GENERALLY.— (1) Any authorized investigative agency may request from 

any financial agency, financial institution, or holding company, 

or from any consumer reporting agency, such financial records, 

other financial information, and consumer reports as may be 

necessary in order to conduct any authorized law enforcement 

investigation, counterintelligence inquiry, or security determination. Any authorized investigative agency may also request records maintained by any commercial entity within the 

United States pertaining to travel by an employee in the executive branch of Government outside the United States. 

(2) Requests may be made under this section where— 

(A) the records sought pertain to a person who is or was 

an employee in the executive branch of Government required by the President in an Executive order or regulation, as a condition of access to classified information, to 

provide consent, during a background investigation and for 

such time as access to the information is maintained, and 

for a period of not more than three years thereafter, permitting access to financial records, other financial information, consumer reports, and travel records; and 

(B)(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe, based on 

credible information, that the person is, or may be, disclosing classified information in an unauthorized manner 

to a foreign power or agent of a foreign power; 

(ii) information the employing agency deems credible indicates the person has incurred excessive indebtedness or 


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has acquired a level of affluence which cannot be explained 

by other information known to the agency; or (iii) circumstances indicate the person had the capability 

and opportunity to disclose classified information which is 

known to have been lost or compromised to a foreign 

power or an agent of a foreign power. (3) Each such request— 

(A) shall be accompanied by a written certification 

signed by the department or agency head or deputy department or agency head concerned, or by a senior official 

designated for this purpose by the department or agency 

head concerned (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Secretary or Assistant Director), and shall certify 

that— 

(i) the person concerned is or was an employee with- in the meaning of paragraph (2)(A); (ii) the request is being made pursuant to an authorized inquiry or investigation and is authorized under 

this section; and 

(iii) the records or information to be reviewed are 

records or information which the employee has previously agreed to make available to the authorized investigative agency for review; (B) shall contain a copy of the agreement referred to in subparagraph (A)(iii); (C) shall identify specifically or by category the records 

or information to be reviewed; and 

(D) shall inform the recipient of the request of the prohibition described in subsection (b) of this section. 

(4) A department or agency head, deputy department or agen- cy head, or senior official described in paragraph (3)(A) may 

make a certification under paragraph (3)(A) only upon a written statement, which shall be retained by the authorized investigative agency, of specific facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is relevant 

to the authorized inquiry or investigation described in paragraph (3)(A)(ii). 

¿(b) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURE.— ¿(1) If an authorized investigative agency described in sub- section (a) of this section certifies that otherwise there may result a danger to the national security of the United States, interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or 

danger to the life or physical safety of any person, no governmental or private entity, or officer, employee, or agent of such 

entity, may disclose to any person (other than those to whom 

such disclosure is necessary to comply with the request or an 

attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect 

to the request) that such entity has received or satisfied a request made by an authorized investigative agency under this 

section. 

¿(2) The request shall notify the person or entity to whom 

the request is directed of the nondisclosure requirement under 

paragraph (1). 


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¿(3) Any recipient disclosing to those persons necessary to 

comply with the request or to an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request shall inform 

such persons of any applicable nondisclosure requirement. Any 

person who receives a disclosure under this subsection shall be 

subject to the same prohibitions on disclosure under paragraph 

(1). 

¿(4) At the request of the authorized investigative agency, 

any person making or intending to make a disclosure under 

this section shall identify to the requesting official of the authorized investigative agency the person to whom such disclosure will be made or to whom such disclosure was made prior 

to the request, except that nothing in this section shall require 

a person to inform the requesting official of the identity of an 

attorney to whom disclosure was made or will be made to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request 

under subsection (a) of this section.

(b) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURE.— (1) PROHIBITION.— (A) IN GENERAL.—If a certification is issued under subparagraph (B) and notice of the right to judicial review 

under paragraph (4) is provided, no governmental or private entity, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, that receives a request under subsection (a), shall disclose to any 

person the particular information specified in the certification during the time period to which the certification applies, which may be not longer than 1 year. (B) CERTIFICATION.—The requirements of subparagraph (A) shall apply if the head of an authorized investigative 

agency described in subsection (a), or a designee, certifies 

that, absent a prohibition of disclosure under this subsection, there may result— (i) a danger to the national security of the United 

States; 

(ii) interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 

counterintelligence investigation; 

(iii) interference with diplomatic relations; or 

(iv) danger to the life or physical safety of any person. 

(2) EXCEPTION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—A governmental or private entity, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, that receives a request 

under subsection (a) may disclose information otherwise 

subject to any applicable nondisclosure requirement to— 

(i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in 

order to comply with the request; 

(ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or assistance regarding the request; or 

(iii) other persons as permitted by the head of the authorized investigative agency described in subsection 

(a). 

(B) NONDISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT.—A person to whom 

disclosure is made under subparagraph (A) shall be subject 

to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to 


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whom a request is issued under subsection (a) in the same 

manner as the person to whom the request is issued. 

(C) NOTICE.—Any recipient that discloses to a person de- scribed in subparagraph (A) information otherwise subject 

to a nondisclosure requirement shall inform the person of 

the applicable nondisclosure requirement. 

(3) EXTENSION.—The head of an authorized investigative agency described in subsection (a), or a designee, may extend a 

nondisclosure requirement for additional periods of not longer 

than 1 year if, at the time of each extension, a new certification 

is made under paragraph (1)(B) and notice is provided to the 

recipient of the applicable request that the nondisclosure requirement has been extended and the recipient has the right to 

judicial review of the nondisclosure requirement. (4) RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.— (A) IN GENERAL.—A governmental or private entity that receives a request under subsection (a) shall have the right 

to judicial review of any applicable nondisclosure requirement and any extension thereof. (B) TIMING.— (i) IN GENERAL.—A request under subsection (a) shall 

state that if the recipient wishes to have a court review 

a nondisclosure requirement, the recipient shall notify 

the Government not later than 21 days after the date 

of receipt of the request. 

(ii) EXTENSION.—A notice that the applicable nondisclosure requirement has been extended under paragraph (3) shall state that if the recipient wishes to have 

a court review the nondisclosure requirement, the recipient shall notify the Government not later than 21 

days after the date of receipt of the notice. (C) INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS.—If a recipient of a request under subsection (a) makes a notification under subparagraph (B), the Government shall initiate judicial review under the procedures established in section 3511 of 

title 18, United States Code. 

(5) TERMINATION.—If the facts supporting a nondisclosure requirement cease to exist prior to the applicable time period of 

the nondisclosure requirement, an appropriate official of the authorized investigative agency described in subsection (a) shall 

promptly notify the governmental or private entity, or officer, 

employee, or agent thereof, subject to the nondisclosure requirement that the nondisclosure requirement is no longer in effect. (c) RECORDS OR INFORMATION; INSPECTION OR COPYING.— 

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law (other than 

section 6103 of Title 26), an entity receiving a request for 

records or information under subsection (a) of this section 

shall, if the request satisfies the requirements of this section, 

make available such records or information within 30 days for 

inspection or copying, as may be appropriate, by the agency requesting such records or information. (2) Any entity (including any officer, employee, or agent thereof) that discloses records or information for inspection or 

copying pursuant to this section in good faith reliance upon the 


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certifications made by an agency pursuant to this section shall 

not be liable for any such disclosure to any person under this 

subchapter, the constitution of any State, or any law or regulation of any State or any political subdivision of any State. 

(d) REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS.—Any agency requesting records 

or information under this section may, subject to the availability of 

appropriations, reimburse a private entity for any cost reasonably 

incurred by such entity in responding to such request, including 

the cost of identifying, reproducing, or transporting records or other 

data. 

(e) DISSEMINATION OF RECORDS OR INFORMATION RECEIVED.—An 

agency receiving records or information pursuant to a request 

under this section may disseminate the records or information obtained pursuant to such request outside the agency only— 

(1) to the agency employing the employee who is the subject 

of the records or information; 

(2) to the Department of Justice for law enforcement or counterintelligence purposes; or 

(3) with respect to dissemination to an agency of the United 

States, if such information is clearly relevant to the authorized 

responsibilities of such agency. 

(f) CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION.—Nothing in this section may be 

construed to affect the authority of an investigative agency to obtain information pursuant to the Right to Financial Privacy Act (12 

U.S.C. 3401 et seq.) or the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 

1681 et seq.). 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 36—FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 

Subchapter I—Electronic Surveillance 

SEC. 1805. ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER. 

(a) NECESSARY FINDINGS.—Upon an application made pursuant 

to section 1804 of this title, the judge shall enter an ex parte order 

as requested or as modified approving the electronic surveillance if 

he finds that— 

(1) the application has been made by a Federal officer and 

approved by the Attorney General; 

(2) on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant there 

is probable cause to believe that— 

(A) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign 

power or an agent of a foreign power: Provided, That no 

United States person may be considered a foreign power or 

an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution 

of the United States; and 

(B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic 

surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be 

used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; 

(3) the proposed minimization procedures meet the definition 

of minimization procedures under section 1801(h) of this title; 

and 


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(4) the application which has been filed contains all statements and certifications required by section 1804 of this title 

and, if the target is a United States person, the certification 

or certifications are not clearly erroneous on the basis of the 

statement made under section 1804(a)(7)(E) of this title and 

any other information furnished under section 1804(d) of this 

title. 

(b) DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.—In determining wheth- er or not probable cause exists for purposes of an order under subsection (a)(2) of this section, a judge may consider past activities 

of the target, as well as facts and circumstances relating to current 

or future activities of the target. (c) SPECIFICATIONS AND DIRECTIONS OF ORDERS.— (1) SPECIFICATIONS.—An order approving an electronic sur- veillance under this section shall specify— (A) the identity, if known, or a description with particularity of the specific target of the electronic surveillance identified or described in the application pursuant to section 1804(a)(3) of this title; 

(B) the nature and location of each of the facilities or 

places at which the electronic surveillance will be directed, 

if known; 

(C) the type of information sought to be acquired and the type of communications or activities to be subjected to the 

surveillance; 

(D) the means by which the electronic surveillance will be effected and whether physical entry will be used to effect the surveillance; and 

(E) the period of time during which the electronic sur- veillance is approved. 

Subchapter III—Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices for Foreign Intelligence Purposes 

SEC. 1841. DEFINITION. 

As used in this subchapter: (1) The terms ‘‘foreign power’’, ‘‘agent of a foreign power’’, ‘‘international terrorism’’, ‘‘foreign intelligence information’’, 

‘‘Attorney General’’, ‘‘United States person’’, ‘‘United States’’, 

‘‘person’’, and ‘‘State’’ shall have the same meanings as in section 1801 of this title. 

(2) The terms ‘‘pen register’’ and ‘‘trap and trace device’’ have the meanings given such terms in section 3127 of Title 18. (3) The term ‘‘aggrieved person’’ means any person— (A) whose telephone line was subject to the installation or use of a pen register or trap and trace device authorized 

by this subchapter; or (B) whose communication instrument or device was subject to the use of a pen register or trap and trace device 

authorized by this subchapter to capture incoming electronic or other communications impulses. (4) THE TERM ‘‘MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES’’ MEANS.— (A) specific procedures, that are reasonably designed in 

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vice, to minimize the retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information known to concern 

unconsenting United States persons consistent with the 

need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information; 

(B) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information, which is not foreign intelligence information 

shall not be disseminated in a manner that identifies any 

United States person, without such person’s consent, unless 

such person’s identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance; and 

(C) notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), procedures that allow for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which has been, is 

being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes. 

SEC. 1842. PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 

INVESTIGATIONS. 

(a) APPLICATION FOR AUTHORIZATION OR APPROVAL.— 

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney 

General or a designated attorney for the Government may 

make an application for an order or an extension of an order 

authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device for any investigation to obtain 

foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States 

person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of 

a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis 

of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution which is being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under such guidelines as the Attorney General approves pursuant to Executive Order No. 12333, or a successor 

order. 

(2) The authority under paragraph (1) is in addition to the 

authority under subchapter I of this chapter to conduct the 

electronic surveillance referred to in that paragraph. 

(b) FORM OF APPLICATION; RECIPIENT.—Each application under 

this section shall be in writing under oath or affirmation to— 

(1) a judge of the court established by section 1803(a) of this 

title; or 

(2) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of 

Title 28, who is publicly designated by the Chief Justice of the 

United States to have the power to hear applications for and 

grant orders approving the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device on behalf of a judge of that court. 

(c) EXECUTIVE APPROVAL; CONTENTS OF APPLICATION.—Each application under this section shall require the approval of the Attorney General, or a designated attorney for the Government, and 

shall include— 

(1) the identity of the Federal officer seeking to use the pen 

register or trap and trace device covered by the application; 

¿and


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(2) ¿a certification by the applicant a statement of the facts 

and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify the belief of the applicant that the information likely to be obtained 

is foreign intelligence information not concerning a United 

States person or is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 

activities, provided that such investigation of a United States 

person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution¿. ; and 

(3) a statement of whether minimization procedures are being 

proposed and, if so, a statement of the proposed minimization 

procedures. 

(d) EX PARTE JUDICIAL ORDER OF APPROVAL.— (1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, the 

judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as modified, approving the installation and use of a pen register or 

trap and trace device if ¿the judge finds that the application 

satisfies the requirements of this section. the judge finds— (A) that the application satisfies the requirements of this 

section; and 

(B) that, if there are exceptional circumstances justifying 

the use of minimization procedures in a particular case, the 

proposed minimization procedures meet the definition of 

minimization procedures under this title. 

(2) An order issued under this section— 

(A) shall specify— (i) the identity, if known, of the person who is the 

subject of the investigation; (ii) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is 

leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line or 

other facility to which the pen register or trap and 

trace device is to be attached or applied; and 

(iii) the attributes of the communications to which 

the order applies, such as the number or other identifier, and, if known, the location of the telephone line 

or other facility to which the pen register or trap and 

trace device is to be attached or applied and, in the 

case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits 

of the trap and trace order; 

(B) shall direct that— 

(i) upon request of the applicant, the provider of a 

wire or electronic communication service, landlord, 

custodian, or other person shall furnish any information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation and operation of the pen register or trap and trace device in such a manner as will 

protect its secrecy and produce a minimum amount of 

interference with the services that such provider, landlord, custodian, or other person is providing the person 

concerned; 

(ii) such provider, landlord, custodian, or other person— 

(I) shall not disclose the existence of the investigation or of the pen register or trap and trace 


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device to any person unless or until ordered by the 

court; and 

(II) shall maintain, under security procedures 

approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 

1805(b)(2)(C) of this title, any records concerning 

the pen register or trap and trace device or the 

aid furnished; ¿and

(iii) the applicant shall compensate such provider, 

landlord, custodian, or other person for reasonable expenses incurred by such provider, landlord, custodian, 

or other person in providing such information, facilities, or technical assistance; and 

(iv) if applicable, the minimization procedures be followed; and 

(C) shall direct that, upon the request of the applicant, 

the provider of a wire or electronic communication service 

shall disclose to the Federal officer using the pen register 

or trap and trace device covered by the order— 

(i) in the case of the customer or subscriber using 

the service covered by the order (for the period specified by the order)— 

(I) the name of the customer or subscriber; 

(II) the address of the customer or subscriber; 

(III) the telephone or instrument number, or 

other subscriber number or identifier, of the customer or subscriber, including any temporarily assigned network address or associated routing or 

transmission information; 

(IV) the length of the provision of service by 

such provider to the customer or subscriber and 

the types of services utilized by the customer or 

subscriber; 

(V) in the case of a provider of local or long distance telephone service, any local or long distance 

telephone records of the customer or subscriber; 

(VI) if applicable, any records reflecting period 

of usage (or sessions) by the customer or subscriber; and 

(VII) any mechanisms and sources of payment 

for such service, including the number of any credit card or bank account utilized for payment for 

such service; and 

(ii) if available, with respect to any customer or subscriber of incoming or outgoing communications to or 

from the service covered by the order— 

(I) the name of such customer or subscriber; 

(II) the address of such customer or subscriber; 

(III) the telephone or instrument number, or 

other subscriber number or identifier, of such customer or subscriber, including any temporarily assigned network address or associated routing or 

transmission information; and 


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(IV) the length of the provision of service by such provider to such customer or subscriber and 

the types of services utilized by such customer or 

subscriber. 

(e) TIME LIMITATION.— (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), an order issued under this section shall authorize the installation and use of 

a pen register or trap and trace device for a period not to exceed 90 days. Extensions of such an order may be granted, but 

only upon an application for an order under this section and 

upon the judicial finding required by subsection (d) of this section. The period of extension shall be for a period not to exceed 

90 days. (2) In the case of an application under subsection (c) of this 

section where the applicant has certified that the information 

likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person, an order, or an extension of an 

order, under this section may be for a period not to exceed one 

year. (f) CAUSE OF ACTION BARRED.—No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of a wire or electronic communication 

service, landlord, custodian, or other person (including any officer, 

employee, agent, or other specified person thereof) that furnishes 

any information, facilities, or technical assistance under subsection 

(d) of this section in accordance with the terms of an order issued 

under this section. 

(g) FURNISHING OF RESULTS.—Unless otherwise ordered by the judge, the results of a pen register or trap and trace device shall 

be furnished at reasonable intervals during regular business hours 

for the duration of the order to the authorized Government official 

or officials. 

(h) At or before the end of the period of time for which the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device is approved 

under an order or an extension under this section, the judge may 

assess compliance with any applicable minimization procedures by 

reviewing the circumstances under which information concerning 

United States persons was retained or disseminated. 

SEC. 1843. AUTHORIZATION DURING EMERGENCIES. 

(a) REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTHORIZATION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the Attorney General 

makes a determination described in subsection (b) of this section, 

the Attorney General may authorize the installation and use of a 

pen register or trap and trace device on an emergency basis to 

gather foreign intelligence information not concerning a United 

States person or information to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon 

the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution if— 

(1) a judge referred to in section 1842(b) of this title is informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time of 

such authorization that the decision has been made to install 

and use the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case 

may be, on an emergency basis; and 


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(2) an application in accordance with section 1842 of this 

title is made to such judge as soon as practicable, but not more 

than 7 days, after the Attorney General authorizes the installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as 

the case may be, under this section. (b) DETERMINATION OF EMERGENCY AND FACTUAL BASIS.—A determination under this subsection is a reasonable determination by 

the Attorney General that— (1) an emergency requires the installation and use of a pen 

register or trap and trace device to obtain foreign intelligence 

information not concerning a United States person or information to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 

intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a 

United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of 

activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution 

before an order authorizing the installation and use of the pen 

register or trap and trace device, as the case may be, can with 

due diligence be obtained under section 1842 of this title; and (2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under such section 1842 of this title to approve the installation and use of the 

pen register or trap and trace device, as the case may be, exists. 

(c) If the Attorney General authorizes the emergency installation 

and use of a pen register or trap and trace device under this section, 

the Attorney General shall require that minimization procedures be 

followed, if appropriate. 

(d)¿(c) EFFECT OF ABSENCE OF ORDER.— (1) In the absence of an order applied for under subsection 

(a)(2) of this section approving the installation and use of a pen 

register or trap and trace device authorized under this section, 

the installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace 

device, as the case may be, shall terminate at the earlier of— (A) when the information sought is obtained; 

(B) when the application for the order is denied under 

section 1842 of this title; or 

(C) 7 days after the time of the authorization by the Attorney General. 

(2) In the event that an application for an order applied for 

under subsection (a)(2) of this section is denied, or in any other 

case where the installation and use of a pen register or trap 

and trace device under this section is terminated and no order 

under section 1842 of this title is issued approving the installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as 

the case may be, no information obtained or evidence derived 

from the use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as 

the case may be, shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before 

any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory 

body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United 

States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United States person acquired from the 

use of the pen register or trap and trace device, as the case 

may be, shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any other 

manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent 


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of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious 

bodily harm to any person. 

SEC. 1845. USE OF INFORMATION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.— 

(1) Information acquired from the use of a pen register or 

trap and trace device installed pursuant to this subchapter 

concerning any United States person may be used and disclosed by Federal officers and employees without the consent 

of the United States person only in accordance with the ¿provisions of this section minimization procedures required under 

this title. 

(2) No information acquired from a pen register or trap and 

trace device installed and used pursuant to this subchapter 

may be used or disclosed by Federal officers or employees except for lawful purposes. 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 36—FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 

Subchapter IV—Access to Certain Business Records and 

Other Tangible Things for Foreign Intelligence Purposes 

SEC. 501. ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS AND OTHER TANGIBLE THINGS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS. 

(a)(1) Subject to paragraph (3), the Director of the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose rank 

shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may 

make an application for an order requiring the production of any 

tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and 

other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against 

international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first 

amendment to the Constitution. 

(2) An investigation conducted under this section shall— 

(A) be conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney 

General under Executive Order 12333 (or a successor order); 

and 

(B) not be conducted of a United States person solely upon 

the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the 

Constitution of the United States. 

(3) In the case of an application for an order requiring the production of library circulation records, library patron lists, book 

sales records, book customer lists, firearms sales records, tax return records, educational records, or medical records containing information that would identify a person, the Director of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation may delegate the authority to make such 

application to either the Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation or the Executive Assistant Director for National Security (or any successor position). The Deputy Director or the Executive Assistant Director may not further delegate such authority. 


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(b) Each application under this section— 

(1) shall be made to— 

(A) a judge of the court established by section 1803(a) of 

this title; or 

(B) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 

of Title 28, who is publicly designated by the Chief Justice 

of the United States to have the power to hear applications 

and grant orders for the production of tangible things 

under this section on behalf of a judge of that court; and 

(2) shall include— 

(A) ¿a statement of facts showing a statement of the 

facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify the belief of the applicant that there are reasonable 

grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat 

assessment) conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) 

of this section to obtain foreign intelligence information 

not concerning a United States person or to protect against 

international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities; ¿clandestine intelligence activities, such things being 

presumptively relevant to an authorized investigation if 

the applicant shows in the statement of the facts that they 

pertain to— 

¿(i) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; 

¿(ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign 

power who is the subject of such authorized investigation; or 

¿(iii) an individual in contact with, or known to, a 

suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject 

of such authorized investigation; and

¿(B) an enumeration of the minimization procedures 

adopted by the Attorney General under subsection (g) of 

this section that are applicable to the retention and dissemination by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of any 

tangible things to be made available to the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation based on the order requested in such application.

(B) if the records sought contain bookseller records, or 

are from a library and contain personally identifiable information about a patron of the library, a statement of facts 

showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 

the records sought— 

(i) are relevant to an authorized investigation (other 

than a threat assessment) conducted in accordance 

with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to 

protect against international terrorism or clandestine 

intelligence activities; and 

(ii)(I) pertain to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; 

(II) are relevant to the activities of a suspected agent 

of a foreign power who is the subject of such authorized 

investigation; or 


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(III) pertain to an individual in contact with, or 

known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power; and (C) a statement of proposed minimization procedures. 

(c)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, if the 

judge finds that the application meets the requirements of subsections (a) and (b) and that the proposed minimization procedures 

meet the definition of minimization procedures under subsection (g) 

of this section, the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, 

or as modified, approving the release of tangible things, and directing that the minimization procedures be followed. ¿Such order shall 

direct that minimization procedures adopted pursuant to subsection (g) of this section be followed. (2) An order under this subsection— 

(A) shall describe the tangible things that are ordered to be 

produced with sufficient particularity to permit them to be fairly identified; (B) shall include the date on which the tangible things must 

be provided, which shall allow a reasonable period of time 

within which the tangible things can be assembled and made 

available; 

(C) shall provide clear and conspicuous notice of the principles and procedures described in subsection (d) of this section; 

(D) may only require the production of a tangible thing if 

such thing can be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum 

issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury 

investigation or with any other order issued by a court of the 

United States directing the production of records or tangible 

things; ¿and

(E) shall not disclose that such order is issued for purposes 

of an investigation described in subsection (a) of this 

section¿. ; and 

(F) shall direct that the minimization procedures be followed. 

(d)(1) No person shall disclose to any other person that the Federal bureau of investigation has sought or obtained tangible things 

pursuant to an order under this section, other than to— 

(A) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary to comply 

with such order; 

(B) an attorney to obtain legal advice or assistance with respect to the production of things in response to the order; or 

(C) other persons as permitted by the Director of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the Director. 

(2)(A) A person to whom disclosure is made pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be subject to the nondisclosure requirements applicable to a person to whom an order is directed under this section 

in the same manner as such person. 

(B) Any person who discloses to a person described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of paragraph (1) that the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things pursuant to an 

order under this section shall notify such person of the nondisclosure requirements of this subsection. 

(C) At the request of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the Director, any person making or intending to make a disclosure under subparagraph (A) or (C) of 


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paragraph (1) shall identify to the Director or such designee the 

person to whom such disclosure will be made or to whom such disclosure was made prior to the request. 

(e) A person who, in good faith, produces tangible things under 

an order pursuant to this section shall not be liable to any other 

person for such production. Such production shall not be deemed to 

constitute a waiver of any privilege in any other proceeding or context. 

(f)(1) In this subsection— 

(A) the term ‘‘production order’’ means an order to produce 

any tangible thing under this section; and (B) the term ‘‘nondisclosure order’’ means an order imposed 

under subsection (d) of this section. 

(2)(A)(i) A person receiving ¿a production order a production 

order or nondisclosure order may challenge the legality of that 

order by filing a petition with the pool established by section 

1803(e)(1) of this title. ¿Not less than 1 year after the date of the 

issuance of the production order, the recipient of a production order 

may challenge the nondisclosure order imposed in connection with 

such production order by filing a petition to modify or set aside 

such nondisclosure order, consistent with the requirements of subparagraph (C), with the pool established by section 1803(e)(1) of 

this title.

(ii) The presiding judge shall immediately assign a petition under clause (i) to 1 of the judges serving in the pool established by section 1803(e)(1) of this title. Not later than 72 hours after the assignment of such petition, the assigned judge shall conduct an initial review of the petition. If the assigned judge determines that 

the petition is frivolous, the assigned judge shall immediately deny 

the petition and affirm the ¿production order or nondisclosure

order. If the assigned judge determines the petition is not frivolous, 

the assigned judge shall promptly consider the petition in accordance with the procedures established under section 1803(e)(2) of 

this title. 

(iii) The assigned judge shall promptly provide a written statement for the record of the reasons for any determination under this 

subsection. Upon the request of the Government, any order setting 

aside a nondisclosure order shall be stayed pending review pursuant to paragraph (3). 

(B) A judge considering a petition to modify or set aside a production order may grant such petition only if the judge finds that 

such order does not meet the requirements of this section or is otherwise unlawful. If the judge does not modify or set aside the production order, the judge shall immediately affirm such order, and 

order the recipient to comply therewith. 

(C)(i) A judge considering a petition to modify or set aside a nondisclosure order may grant such petition only if the judge finds 

that there is no reason to believe that disclosure may endanger the 

national security of the United States, interfere with a criminal, 

counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere 

with diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical safety of 

any person. 

¿(ii) If, upon filing of such a petition, the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or the DirecVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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tor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation certifies that disclosure 

may endanger the national security of the United States or interfere with diplomatic relations, such certification shall be treated as 

conclusive, unless the judge finds that the certification was made 

in bad faith.

(ii)¿(iii) If the judge denies a petition to modify or set aside a 

nondisclosure order, the recipient of such order shall be precluded 

for a period of 1 year from filing another such petition with respect 

to such nondisclosure order. 

(D) Any production or nondisclosure order not explicitly modified 

or set aside consistent with this subsection shall remain in full effect. 

(3) A petition for review of a decision under paragraph (2) to affirm, modify, or set aside an order by the Government or any person receiving such order shall be made to the court of review established under section 1803(b) of this title, which shall have jurisdiction to consider such petitions. The court of review shall provide for 

the record a written statement of the reasons for its decision and, 

on petition by the Government or any person receiving such order 

for writ of certiorari, the record shall be transmitted under seal to 

the Supreme Court of the United States, which shall have jurisdiction to review such decision. 

(4) Judicial proceedings under this subsection shall be concluded 

as expeditiously as possible. The record of proceedings, including 

petitions filed, orders granted, and statements of reasons for decision, shall be maintained under security measures established by 

the Chief Justice of the United States, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. (5) All petitions under this subsection shall be filed under seal. 

In any proceedings under this subsection, the court shall, upon request of the Government, review ex parte and in camera any Government submission, or portions thereof, which may include classified information. 

(g) MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—¿Not later than 180 days after March 9, 

2006, the Attorney General shall adopt specific minimization 

procedures governing the retention and dissemination by the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation of any tangible things, or information therein, received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to an order under this subchapter. At or before the end of the period of time for the production of tangible 

things under an order approved under this section or at any 

time after the production of tangible things under an order approved under this section, a judge may assess compliance with 

the minimization procedures by reviewing the circumstances 

under which information concerning United States persons was 

retained or disseminated. 

(2) DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘minimization procedures’’ means— 

(A) specific procedures that are reasonably designed in 

light of the purpose and technique of an order for the production of tangible things, to minimize the retention, and 

prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons 


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consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, 

produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information; (B) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information, which is not foreign intelligence information, 

as defined in section 1801(e)(1) of this title, shall not be 

disseminated in a manner that identifies any United 

States person, without such person’s consent, unless such 

person’s identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance; and (C) notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), proce- dures that allow for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which has been, is 

being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes. (h) USE OF INFORMATION.—Information acquired from tangible things received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response 

to an order under this subchapter concerning any United States 

person may be used and disclosed by Federal officers and employees without the consent of the United States person only in accordance with the minimization procedures adopted pursuant to subsection (g) of this section. No otherwise privileged information acquired from tangible things received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter 

shall lose its privileged character. No information acquired from 

tangible things received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 

response to an order under this subchapter may be used or disclosed by Federal officers or employees except for lawful purposes. (i) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

(1) the term ‘‘bookseller records’’ means transactional records 

reflecting the purchase (including subscription purchase) or 

rental of books, journals, or magazines, whether in digital form 

or in print, of an individuals or entity engaged in the sale or 

rental of books, journals, or magazines; (2) the term ‘‘library’’ has the meaning given that term in sec- tion 213(1) of the Library Services and Technology Act (20 

U.S.C. 9122(1)); 

(3) the term ‘‘patron’’ means a purchaser, renter, borrower, 

user, or subscriber of goods or services from a library; and (4) the term ‘‘personally identifiable information’’ includes in- formation that identifies a person as having used, requested, or 

obtained specific reading materials or services from a library. 

SEC. 503. DEFINITIONS. 

In this title, the terms ‘‘Attorney General’’, ‘‘foreign intelligence information’’, ‘‘international terrorism’’, ‘‘person’’, ‘‘United States’’, and 

‘‘United States person’’ have the meanings given such terms in section 101. 

* * * * * * * 

Subchapter V—Reporting Requirement 

SEC. 601. SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. 

(a) REPORT.—On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall 

submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of 


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the Senate, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 

Representatives and the Senate, in a manner consistent with the 

protection of the national security, a report setting forth with respect to the preceding 6-month period— (1) the aggregate number of persons targeted for orders 

issued under this chapter, including a breakdown of those targeted for— (A) electronic surveillance under section 1805 of this 

title; 

(B) physical searches under section 1824 of this title; 

(C) pen registers under section 1842 of this title; 

(D) access to records under section 1861 of this title; 

(E) acquisitions under section 1881b of this title; and 

(F) acquisitions under section 1881c of this title; 

(2) the number of individuals covered by an order issued pur- suant to section 1801(b)(1)(C) of this title; 

(3) the number of times that the Attorney General has authorized that information obtained under this chapter may be 

used in a criminal proceeding or any information derived 

therefrom may be used in a criminal proceeding; (4) a summary of significant legal interpretations of this 

chapter involving matters before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 

of Review, including interpretations presented in applications 

or pleadings filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 

by the Department of Justice; and (5) copies of all decisions, orders, or opinions of the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Court or Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that include significant construction or 

interpretation of the provisions of this chapter. 

(b) FREQUENCY.—The first report under this section shall be submitted not later than 6 months after December 17, 2004. Subsequent reports under this section shall be submitted semi-annually 

thereafter. 

(c) SUBMISSIONS TO CONGRESS.—The Attorney General shall sub- mit to the committees of Congress referred to in subsection (a)— (1) a copy of any decision, order, or opinion issued by the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that includes significant 

construction or interpretation of any provision of this chapter, 

and any pleadings, applications, or memoranda of law associated with such decision, order, or opinion, not later than 45 

days after such decision, order, or opinion is issued; and (2) a copy of each such decision, order, or opinion, and any 

pleadings, applications, or memoranda of law associated with 

such decision, order, or opinion, that was issued during the 5- 

year period ending on July 10, 2008 and not previously submitted in a report under subsection (a). 

(d) PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY.—The Attorney General, 

in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, may authorize redactions of materials described in subsection (c) that are 

provided to the committees of Congress referred to in subsection 

(a), if such redactions are necessary to protect the national security 


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of the United States and are limited to sensitive sources and methods information or the identities of targets. (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

(1) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT.—The term 

‘‘Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’’ means the court established under section 1803(a) of this title. 

(2) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF RE- VIEW.—The term ‘‘Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review’’ means the court established under section 1803(b) of 

this title. 

SEC. 602. ANNUAL UNCLASSIFIED REPORT. 

Not later than June 30, 2012, and every year thereafter, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and with due regard for the protection of classified information from unauthorized disclosure, shall submit to the Committee on 

the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 

and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives an unclassified report summarizing how the authorities under this Act are 

used, including the impact of the use of the authorities under this 

Act on the privacy of United States persons (as defined in section 

101). 

* * * * * * * 

USA PATRIOT IMPROVEMENT AND 

REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005 

P.L. 109–177 (H.R. 3199) 

SEC. 102. USA PATRIOT ACT SUNSET PROVISIONS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act is repealed. 

(b) SECTIONS 206 AND 215 SUNSET.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Effective ¿May 27, 2011 December 31, 

2013, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is 

amended so that sections 501, 502, and 105(c)(2) read as they 

read on October 25, 2001. 

(2) EXCEPTION.—With respect to any particular foreign intelligence investigation that began before the date on which the 

provisions referred to in paragraph (1) cease to have effect, or 

with respect to any particular offense or potential offense that 

began or occurred before the date on which such provisions 

cease to have effect, such provisions shall continue in effect. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 106A. AUDIT ON ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR 

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. 

(a) AUDIT.—The Inspector General of the Department of Justice 

shall perform a comprehensive audit of the effectiveness and use, 

including any improper or illegal use, of the investigative authority 

provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation under title V of the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et 

seq.). 


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(b) REQUIREMENTS.—The audit required under subsection (a) 

shall include— 

(1) an examination of each instance in which the Attorney 

General, any other officer, employee, or agent of the Department of Justice, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a designee of the Director, submitted an application 

to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (as such term is 

defined in section 301(3) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1821(3))) for an order under section 501 of such Act during the calendar years of 2002 through 

2011 ¿2006 , including— 

(A) whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation requested that the Department of Justice submit an application and the request was not submitted to the court (including an examination of the basis for not submitting the 

application); 

(B) whether the court granted, modified, or denied the 

application (including an examination of the basis for any 

modification or denial); 

¿(2) the justification for the failure of the Attorney General 

to issue implementing procedures governing requests for the 

production of tangible things under such section in a timely 

fashion, including whether such delay harmed national security; 

¿(3) whether bureaucratic or procedural impediments to the 

use of such requests for production prevent the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation from taking full advantage of the authorities 

provided under section 501 of such Act;

(2)¿(4) any noteworthy facts or circumstances relating to orders under such section, including any improper or illegal use 

of the authority provided under such section; and 

(3)¿(5) an examination of the effectiveness of such section 

as an investigative tool, including— 

(A) the categories of records obtained and the importance of the information acquired to the intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other 

Department or agency of the Federal Government; 

(B) the manner in which such information is collected, 

retained, analyzed, and disseminated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including any direct access to such 

information (such as access to ‘‘raw data’’) provided to any 

other Department, agency, or instrumentality of Federal, 

State, local, or tribal governments or any private sector entity; 

¿(C) with respect to calendar year 2006, an examination 

of the minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney 

General under section 501(g) of such Act and whether such 

minimization procedures protect the constitutional rights 

of United States persons;

(C) with respect to calendar years 2007 through 2011, an 

examination of the minimization procedures used in relation to orders under section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861) and whether the 


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minimization procedures protect the constitutional rights of 

United States persons; 

(D) whether, and how often, the Federal Bureau of Investigation utilized information acquired pursuant to an 

order under section 501 of such Act to produce an analytical intelligence product for distribution within the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, to the intelligence community 

¿(as such term is defined in section 3(4) of the National 

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) , or to other Federal, State, local, or tribal government Departments, agencies, or instrumentalities; and 

(E) whether, and how often, the Federal Bureau of Investigation provided such information to law enforcement 

authorities for use in criminal proceedings. (c) SUBMISSION DATES.— (1) PRIOR YEARS.—Not later than one year after the date of 

the enactment of this Act, or upon completion of the audit 

under this section for calendar years 2002, 2003, and 2004, 

whichever is earlier, the Inspector General of the Department 

of Justice shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and 

the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 

of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary and the 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report containing the results of the audit conducted under this section for 

calendar years 2002, 2003, and 2004. (2) CALENDAR YEARS 2005 AND 2006.—Not later than December 31, 2007, or upon completion of the audit under this section for calendar years 2005 and 2006, whichever is earlier, the 

Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall submit to 

the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 

the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on 

Intelligence of the Senate a report containing the results of the 

audit conducted under this section for calendar years 2005 and 

2006. 

(3) CALENDAR YEARS 2007, 2008, AND 2009.—Not later than 

March 31, 2012, the Inspector General of the Department of 

Justice shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and the 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 

Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary and the 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report containing the results of the audit conducted under subsection (a) 

for calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009. (4) CALENDAR YEARS 2010 AND 2011.—Not later than March 

31, 2013, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice 

shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report containing the results of the audit conducted under subsection (a) for calendar 

years 2010 and 2011. (d) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.— (1) IN GENERAL.—For the period beginning on January 1, 

2007 and ending on December 31, 2011, the Inspector General 


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of each element of the intelligence community outside of the Department of Justice that used information acquired under title 

V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 

U.S.C. 1861 et seq.) in the intelligence activities of the element 

of the intelligence community shall— (A) assess the importance of the information to the intelligence activities of the element of the intelligence community; (B) examine the manner in which that information was 

collected, retained, analyzed, and disseminated by the element of the intelligence community; (C) describe any noteworthy facts or circumstances relating to orders under title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 as the orders relate to the element of 

the intelligence community; and (D) examine any minimization procedures used by the 

element of the intelligence community under title V of the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and whether 

the minimization procedures protect the constitutional 

rights of United States persons. (2) SUBMISSION DATES FOR ASSESSMENT.— (A) CALENDAR YEARS 2007 THROUGH 2009.—Not later than 

March 31, 2012, the Inspector General of each element of 

the intelligence community that conducts an assessment 

under this subsection shall submit to the Committee on the 

Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representative a report containing the results of the assessment 

for calendar years 2007 through 2009. (B) CALENDAR YEARS 2010 AND 2011.—Not later than 

March 31, 2013, the Inspector General of each element of 

the intelligence community that conducts an assessment 

under this subsection shall submit to the Committee on the 

Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report containing the results of the assessment for calendar years 2010 and 2011. 

(e)¿(d) PRIOR NOTICE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL AND DIRECTOR OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; COMMENTS.— 

(1) NOTICE.—Not less than 30 days before the submission of 

¿a report under subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2) any report under 

subsection (c) or (d), the Inspector General of the Department 

of Justice and any Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community that submits a report under this section 

shall provide such report to the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. 

(2) COMMENTS.—The Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence may provide comments to be included in 

¿the reports submitted under subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) any report submitted under subsection (c) or (d) as the Attorney 

General or the Director of National Intelligence may consider 

necessary. 


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(f)¿(e) UNCLASSIFIED FORM.—¿The reports submitted under sub- sections (c)(1) and (c)(2) Each report submitted under subsection (c) and any comments included under ¿subsection (d)(2) subsection 

(e)(2) shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified 

annex. 

(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

(1) the term ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 

U.S.C. 401a); and 

(2) the term ‘‘United States person’’ has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). 

* * * * * * * 

SECTION 118. REPORTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS. 

* * * * * * * 

¿(c) REPORT ON REQUESTS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS.— ¿(1) IN GENERAL.—In April of each year, the Attorney Gen- eral shall submit to Congress an aggregate report setting forth 

with respect to the preceding year the total number of requests 

made by the Department of Justice for information concerning 

different United States persons under— 

¿(A) section 2709 of title 18, United States Code (to access certain communication service provider records), excluding the number of requests for subscriber information; 

¿(B) section 1114 of the Right to Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. 3414) (to obtain financial institution customer 

records); 

¿(C) section 802 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 436) (to obtain financial information, records, and 

consumer reports); 

¿(D) section 626 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u) (to obtain certain financial information and 

consumer reports); and 

¿(E) section 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681v) (to obtain credit agency consumer records 

for counterterrorism investigations). 

¿(2) UNCLASSIFIED FORM.—The report under this section 

shall be submitted in unclassified form.

(c) REPORTS ON REQUESTS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS.— 

(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection— 

(A) the term ‘‘applicable period’’ means— 

(i) with respect to the first report submitted under 

paragraph (2) or (3), the period beginning 180 days 

after the date of enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act 

Sunset Extension Act of 2011 and ending on December 

31, 2011; and 

(ii) with respect to the second report submitted under 

paragraph (2) or (3), and each report thereafter, the 6- 

month period ending on the last day of the second 

month before the date for submission of the report; and 

(B) the term ‘‘United States person’’ has the meaning 

given that term in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). 


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(2) CLASSIFIED FORM.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than February 1, 2012, and 

every 6 months thereafter, the Attorney General shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee 

on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, 

and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of 

Representatives a report fully informing the committees 

concerning the requests made under section 2709(a) of title 

18, United States Code, section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right 

to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(A)), 

section 626 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 

1681u), section 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 

U.S.C. 1681v), or section 802 of the National Security Act 

of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 436) during the applicable period. 

(B) CONTENTS.—Each report under subparagraph (A) 

shall include, for each provision of law described in subparagraph (A)— 

(i) the number of authorized requests under the provision, including requests for subscriber information; 

and 

(ii) the number of authorized requests under the provision— 

(I) that relate to a United States person; 

(II) that relate to a person that is not a United 

States person; 

(III) that relate to a person that is— 

(aa) the subject of an authorized national security investigation; or 

(bb) an individual who has been in contact 

with or otherwise directly linked to the subject 

of an authorized national security investigation; and 

(IV) that relate to a person that is not known to 

be the subject of an authorized national security 

investigation or to have been in contact with or 

otherwise directly linked to the subject of an authorized national security investigation. 

(3) UNCLASSIFIED FORM.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than February 1, 2012, and 

every 6 months thereafter, the Attorney General shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee 

on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, 

and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of 

Representatives a report fully informing the committees 

concerning the aggregate total of all requests identified 

under paragraph (2) during the applicable period ending 

on the last day of the second month before the date for submission of the report. Each report under this subparagraph 

shall be in unclassified form. 


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(B) CONTENTS.—Each report under subparagraph (A) 

shall include the aggregate total of requests— (i) that relate to a United States person; 

(ii) that relate to a person that is not a United States 

person; 

(iii) that relate to a person that is— 

(I) the subject of an authorized national security 

investigation; or (II) an individual who has been in contact with 

or otherwise directly linked to the subject of an authorized national security investigation; and (iv) that relate to a person that is not known to be 

the subject of an authorized national security investigation or to have been in contact with or otherwise directly linked to the subject of an authorized national 

security investigation. 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 119. AUDIT OF USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS. 

(a) AUDIT.—The Inspector General of the Department of Justice 

shall perform an audit of the effectiveness and use, including any 

improper or illegal use, of national security letters issued by the 

Department of Justice. 

(b) REQUIREMENTS.—The audit required under subsection (a) 

shall include— 

(1) an examination of the use of national security letters by 

the Department of Justice during calendar years 2003 through 

2011 ¿2006 ; 

(2) a description of any noteworthy facts or circumstances relating to such use, including any improper or illegal use of 

such authority; and (3) an examination of the effectiveness of national security 

letters as an investigative tool, including— (A) the importance of the information acquired by the 

Department of Justice to the intelligence activities of the 

Department of Justice or to any other department or agency of the Federal Government; 

(B) the manner in which such information is collected, 

retained, analyzed, and disseminated by the Department 

of Justice, including any direct access to such information 

(such as access to ‘‘raw data’’) provided to any other department, agency, or instrumentality of Federal, State, 

local, or tribal governments or any private sector entity; 

(C) whether, and how often, the Department of Justice 

utilized such information to produce an analytical intelligence product for distribution within the Department of 

Justice, to the intelligence community¿ (as such term is 

defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 

(50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) , or to other Federal, State, local, or 

tribal government departments, agencies, or instrumentalities; 

(D) whether, and how often, the Department of Justice 

provided such information to law enforcement authorities 

for use in criminal proceedings; 


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(E) with respect to national security letters issued following the date of the enactment of this Act, an examination of the number of occasions in which the Department 

of Justice, or an officer or employee of the Department of 

Justice, issued a national security letter without the certification necessary to require the recipient of such letter 

to comply with the nondisclosure and confidentiality requirements potentially applicable under law; and 

(F) the types of electronic communications and transactional information obtained through requests for information under section 2709 of title 18, United States Code, 

including the types of dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information obtained, and the procedures the Department of Justice uses if content information is obtained 

through the use of such authority. 

(c) SUBMISSION DATES.— 

(1) PRIOR YEARS.—Not later than one year after the date of 

the enactment of this Act, or upon completion of the audit 

under this section for calendar years 2003 and 2004, whichever 

is earlier, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice 

shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report containing the results of the audit conducted under this subsection 

for calendar years 2003 and 2004. 

(2) CALENDAR YEARS 2005 AND 2006.—Not later than December 31, 2007, or upon completion of the audit under this subsection for calendar years 2005 and 2006, whichever is earlier, 

the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives 

and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee 

on Intelligence of the Senate a report containing the results of 

the audit conducted under this subsection for calendar years 

2005 and 2006. 

(3) CALENDAR YEARS 2007, 2008, AND 2009.—Not later than 

March 31, 2012, the Inspector General of the Department of 

Justice shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and the 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 

Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary and the 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report containing the results of the audit conducted under this section for 

calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009. 

(4) CALENDAR YEARS 2010 AND 2011.—Not later than March 

31, 2013, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice 

shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report containing the results of the audit conducted under this section for calendar 

years 2010 and 2011. 

(d) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.— 


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(1) IN GENERAL.—For the period beginning on January 1, 

2007 and ending on December 31, 2011, the Inspector General 

of each element of the intelligence community outside of the Department of Justice that issued national security letters in the 

intelligence activities of the element of the intelligence community shall— (A) examine the use of national security letters by the element of the intelligence community during the period; (B) describe any noteworthy facts or circumstances relating to the use of national security letters by the element of 

the intelligence community, including any improper or illegal use of such authority; (C) assess the importance of information received under 

the national security letters to the intelligence activities of 

the element of the intelligence community; and (D) examine the manner in which information received 

under the national security letters was collected, retained, 

analyzed, and disseminated. (2) SUBMISSION DATES FOR ASSESSMENT.— (A) CALENDAR YEARS 2007 THROUGH 2009.—Not later than 

March 31, 2012, the Inspector General of each element of 

the intelligence community that conducts an assessment 

under this subsection shall submit to the Committee on the 

Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report containing the results of the assessment for calendar years 2007 through 2009. (B) CALENDAR YEARS 2010 AND 2011.—Not later than 

March 31, 2013, the Inspector General of any element of the 

intelligence community that conducts an assessment under 

this subsection shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report containing the results of the assessment for 

calendar years 2010 and 2011. 

(e)¿(d) PRIOR NOTICE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL AND DIRECTOR OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; COMMENTS.— (1) NOTICE.—Not less than 30 days before the submission of 

any report under subsection (c) or (d)¿ a report under subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2) , the Inspector General of the Department of Justice and any Inspector General of an element of the 

intelligence community that submits a report under this section 

shall provide such report to the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. 

(2) COMMENTS.—The Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence may provide comments to be included in 

¿the reports submitted under subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2) any re- port submitted under subsection (c) or (d) as the Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence may consider necessary. (f)¿(e) UNCLASSIFIED FORM.—¿The reports submitted under subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2) Each report submitted under subsection (c) 


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and any comments included under subsection (e)(2) ¿subsection 

(d)(2) shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified 

annex. 

(g)¿(f) MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES FEASIBILITY.—Not later than 

February 1, 2007, or upon completion of review of the report submitted under subsection (c)(1), whichever is earlier, the Attorney 

General and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on the feasibility of applying minimization procedures in the context of national security letters to 

ensure the protection of the constitutional rights of United States 

persons. 

¿(g) NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER DEFINED.—In this section, the 

term ‘‘national security letter’’ means a request for information 

under one of the following provisions of law: 

¿(1) Section 2709(a) of title 18, United States Code (to access 

certain communication service provider records). 

¿(2) Section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial Privacy 

Act (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(A)) (to obtain financial institution 

customer records). 

¿(3) Section 802 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 

U.S.C. 436) (to obtain financial information, records, and consumer reports). 

¿(4) Section 626 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 

1681u) (to obtain certain financial information and consumer 

reports). 

¿(5) Section 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 

1681v) (to obtain credit agency consumer records for counterterrorism investigations).

(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

(1) the term ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given 

that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 

U.S.C. 401a); 

(2) the term ‘‘national security letter’’ means a request for information under— 

(A) section 2709(a) of title 18, United States Code (to access certain communication service provider records); 

(B) section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(A)) (to obtain financial institution customer records); 

(C) section 802 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 

U.S.C. 436) (to obtain financial information, records, and 

consumer reports); 

(D) section 626 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 

U.S.C. 1681u) (to obtain certain financial information and 

consumer reports); or 

(E) section 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 

U.S.C. 1681v) (to obtain credit agency consumer records for 

counterterrorism investigations); and 


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(3) the term ‘‘United States person’’ has the meaning given 

that term in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). 

* * * * * * * 

INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM 

PREVENTION ACT OF 2004 

PL 108–458 (118 Stat. 3742) 

TITLE VI—TERRORISM PREVENTION 

Subtitle A—Individual Terrorists as Agents of Foreign 

Powers 

SEC. 6001. INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS AS AGENTS OF FOREIGN POWERS. 

* * * * * * * 

¿(b) SUNSET.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be 

subject to the sunset provision in section 224 of Public Law 107– 

56 (115 Stat. 295), including the exception provided in subsection 

(b) of such section 224.

(b) SUNSET.— 

(1) REPEAL.—Subparagraph (C) of section 101(b)(1) of the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 

1801(b)(1)), as added by subsection (a), is repealed effective December 31, 2013. 

(2) TRANSITION PROVISION.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), 

subparagraph (C) of section 101(b)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(b)(1)) shall continue 

to apply on and after December 31, 2013, with respect to any 

particular foreign intelligence investigation or with respect to 

any particular offense or particular offense that began or occurred before December 31, 2013. 

* * * * * * * 

FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 

Public Law No. 110–261 

50 U.S.C. 1881 note 

SEC. 403. REPEALS. 

* * * * * * * 

(b) FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in section 404, effective 

December 31, 2013 ¿December 31, 2012 , title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 101(a), is repealed. 

(2) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Effective 

December 31, 2013 ¿December 31, 2012 — 


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(A) the table of contents in the first section of such Act 

(50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items 

related to title VII; 

(B) except as provided in section 404, section 601(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1871(a)(1)) is amended to read as such 

section read on the day before the date of the enactment 

of this Act; and 

(C) except as provided in section 404, section 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘or a court order pursuant to section 704 of 

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978’’. 

SEC. 404. TRANSITION PROCEDURES. 

* * * * * * * 

(b) TRANSITION PROCEDURES FOR FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF

2008 PROVISIONS.— (1) ORDERS IN EFFECT ON DECEMBER 31, 2013 ¿DECEMBER 31, 2012 .—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, any amendment made by this Act, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), any order, authorization, or directive issued or made under title VII of the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by 

section 101(a), shall continue in effect until the date of the expiration of such order, authorization, or directive. 

* * * * * * * 

New Provisions Under USA PATRIOT Act 

Sunset Extension Act of 2011 (S. 193) 

SEC. 2.—SUNSETS. 

* * * * * * * 

(c) NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS.— (1) REPEAL.—Effective on December 31, 2013— 

(A) section 2709 of title 18, United States Code, is 

amended to read as such provision read on October 25, 

2001; 

(B) section 1114(a)(5) of the Right to Financial Privacy 

Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)) is amended to read as 

such provision read on October 25, 2001; 

(C) subsections (a) and (b) of section 626 of the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u) are amended to 

read as subsections (a) and (b), respectively, of the second 

of the 2 sections designated as section 624 of such Act (15 

U.S.C. 1681u) (relating to disclosure to the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation for counter-intelligence purposes), as added 

by Section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal year 1996 (Public Law 104–93; 109 Stat. 974), read on 

October 25, 2001; and 

(D) section 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 

U.S.C. 1681v) is repealed; and (E) section 802 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 436) is amended to 

read as such provision read on October 25, 2001. 


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(2) TRANSITION PROVISION.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the provisions of law referred to in paragraph (1), as in effect 

on December 30, 2013, shall continue to apply on and after December 31, 2013, with respect to any particular foreign intelligence investigation or with respect to any particular offense or 

potential offense that began or occurred before December 31, 

2013. 

(3) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Effective 

December 31, 2013— 

(A) section 3511 of title 18, United States Code, is 

amended— 

(i) in subsections (a), (c), and (d), by striking ‘‘or 627(a)’’ each place it appears; and 

(ii) in subsection (b)(1)(A), as amended by section 6(b) of this Act, by striking ‘‘section 626 or 627 of the 

Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u and 

1681v)’’ and inserting ‘‘section 626 of the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u)’’; (B) section 118(c) of the USA PATRIOT Improvement 

and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (18 U.S.C. 3511 note) is 

amended— 

(i) in subparagraph (C), by adding ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(ii) in subparagraph (D), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and inserting a period; and (iii) by striking subparagraph (E); and (C) the table of sections for the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) is amended by striking the item relating to section 627. 

SEC. 10.—AUDITS. 

* * * * * * * 

(c) PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES.— 

(1) AUDITS.—The Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall perform comprehensive audits of the effectiveness and 

use, including any improper or illegal use, of pen registers and 

trap and trace devices under title IV of the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1841 et seq.) during the period beginning on January 1, 2007 and ending on December 31, 

2011. 

(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The audits required under paragraph 

(1) shall include— 

(A) an examination of the use of pen registers and trap 

and trace devices under title IV of the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act of 1978 for calendar years 2007 through 

2011; 

(B) an examination of the installation and use of a pen 

register or trap and trace device on emergency bases under 

section 403 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 

1978 (50 U.S.C. 1843); 

(C) any noteworthy facts or circumstances relating to the 

use of a pen register or trap and trace device under title IV 

of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, including any improper or illegal use of the authority provided 

under that title; and 


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(D) an examination of the effectiveness of the authority 

under title IV of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

of 1978 as an investigative tool, including— (i) the importance of the information acquired to the 

intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (ii) the manner in which the information is collected, 

retained, analyzed, and disseminated by the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, including any direct access to 

the information provided to any other department, 

agency, or instrumentality of Federal, State, local, or 

tribal governments or any private sector entity; (iii) with respect to calendar years 2010 and 2011, 

an examination of the minimization procedures used in 

relation to pen registers and trap and trace devices 

under title IV of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act of 1978 and whether the minimization procedures 

protect the constitutional rights of United States persons; 

(iv) whether, and how often, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation used information acquired under a pen 

register or trap and trace device under title IV of the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to 

produce an analytical intelligence product for distribution within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the 

intelligence community, or to another department, 

agency, or instrumentality of Federal, State, local, or 

tribal governments; and (v) whether, and how often, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation provided information acquired under a 

pen register or trap and trace device under title IV of 

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to law 

enforcement authorities for use in criminal proceedings. 

(3) SUBMISSION DATES.— (A) PRIOR YEARS.—Not later than March 31, 2012, the 

Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall submit 

to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on 

the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report containing the results of the audit conducted under this section 

for calendar years 2007 through 2009. (B) CALENDAR YEARS 2010 AND 2011.—Not later than 

March 31, 2013, the Inspector General of the Department 

of Justice shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary 

and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and 

the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives 

a report containing the results of the audit conducted under 

this section for calendar years 2010 and 2011. (4) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.— (A) IN GENERAL.—For the period beginning January 1, 

2007 and ending on December 31, 2011, the Inspector GenVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:43 Apr 08, 2011 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6603 E:\HR\OC\SR013.XXX SR013

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eral of any element of the intelligence community outside of 

the Department of Justice that used information acquired 

under a pen register or trap and trace device under title IV 

of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 in the 

intelligence activities of the element of the intelligence community shall— (i) assess the importance of the information to the intelligence activities of the element of the intelligence 

community; (ii) examine the manner in which the information 

was collected, retained, analyzed, and disseminated; (iii) describe any noteworthy facts or circumstances 

relating to orders under title IV of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 as the orders relate to 

the element of the intelligence community; and (iv) examine any minimization procedures used by 

the element of the intelligence community in relation to 

pen registers and trap and trace devices under title IV 

of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 

and whether the minimization procedures protect the 

constitutional rights of United States persons. (B) SUBMISSION DATES FOR ASSESSMENT.— (i) CALENDAR YEARS 2007 THROUGH 2009.—Not later 

than March 31, 2012, the Inspector General of each element of the intelligence community that conducts an 

assessment under this paragraph shall submit to the 

Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee 

on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the 

Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report containing the results of the assessment for calendar years 

2007 through 2009. (ii) CALENDAR YEARS 2010 AND 2011.—Not later than 

March 31, 2013, the Inspector General of each element 

of the intelligence community that conducts an assessment under this paragraph shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on 

Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representative a report containing the results of the assessment for calendar years 

2010 and 2011. 

(5) PRIOR NOTICE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL AND DIRECTOR OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; COMMENTS.— 

(A) NOTICE.—Not less than 30 days before the submission 

of any report under paragraph (3) or (4), the Inspector General of the Department of Justice and any Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community that submits a report under this susbsection shall provide the report to the Attorney General and the Director of National 

Intelligence. (B) COMMENTS.—The Attorney General or the Director of 

National Intelligence may provide such comments to be included in any report submitted under paragraph (3) or (4) 


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as the Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence may consider necessary. (6) UNCLASSIFIED FORM.—Each report submitted under paragraph (3) and any comments included in that report under 

paragraph (5)(B) shall be in unclassified form, but may include 

a classified annex. 

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

(1) the terms ‘foreign intelligence information’ and ‘United 

States person’ have the meanings given those terms in section 

101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 

U.S.C. 1801); and 

(2) the term ‘intelligence community’ has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 

U.S.C. 401a). 

SEC. 12.—PROCEDURES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General shall periodically review, 

and revise as necessary, the procedures adopted by the Attorney 

General on October 1, 2010 for the collection, use, and storage of information obtained in response to a national security letter issued 

under section 2709 of title 18, United States Code, section 1114(a)(5) 

of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(5)), 

section 626 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u), or 

section 627 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681v). 

(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In reviewing and revising the procedures 

described in subsection (a), the Attorney General shall give due consideration to the privacy interests of individuals and the need to 

protect national security. 

(c) REVISIONS TO PROCEDURES AND OVERSIGHT.—If the Attorney 

General makes any significant changes to the procedures described 

in subsection (a), the Attorney General shall notify and submit a 

copy of the changes to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on 

the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

of the House of Representatives. 


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