UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-1700

TANYA JACKSON; MICHAEL AGYEMAN; THOMAS GEORGE; ISAAC ASAVE, 

on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

ESTELLE’S PLACE, LLC; JIREH PLACE, LLC; OUR PLACE, LLC; 

DESTINY PLACE, LLC; DEBRA ROUNDTREE; MARY BELL,

Defendants – Appellees.

--------------------------------------

METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; 

WASHINGTON LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN 

AFFAIRS,

Amici Supporting Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:08-cv-00984-LMB-TRJ)

Argued: May 14, 2010 Decided: August 12, 2010

Before GREGORY, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge Gregory wrote

a dissenting opinion.
2

ARGUED: Nicholas Woodfield, EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP, PC, 

Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Edward S. Rosenthal, RICH 

ROSENTHAL BRINCEFIELD MANITTA DZUBIN & KROEGER, LLP, Alexandria, 

Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: R. Scott Oswald, EMPLOYMENT 

LAW GROUP, PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Katelin T. 

Moomau, Jonathan A. Simms, RICH ROSENTHAL BRINCEFIELD MANITTA 

DZUBIN & KROEGER, LLP, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees. 

Susan E. Huhta, Laura E. Varela, WASHINGTON LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE 

FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C., for Amici 

Supporting Appellants.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Tanya Jackson, Michael Agyeman, Thomas George, 

Isaac Asare, Sharon Doss, and Courtney Collins are present and 

former employees of several related entities that operate group 

homes for the developmentally disabled. Appellees, defendants 

below, are those entities and their principals (Estelle’s Place, 

LLC; Jireh’s Place, LLC; Our Place, LLC; Destiny’s Place, LLC; 

Debra Roundtree, and Mary Bell). Appellants’ claims arose under 

the overtime pay provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 

U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”), and state law. Early on, the 

parties settled the action, leaving to the district court, 

however, determination of the amount of attorney’s fees to be 

awarded to Appellants as prevailing parties. See id. at 

§ 216(b). Feeling aggrieved by the amount of the district 

court’s award of attorney’s fees ($36,000), Appellants filed the 

instant appeal.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

Appellants Jackson, George, Asare, Doss, and Collins were 

compensated on an hourly basis; Appellant Agyeman, on the other 

 1 Although Appellants noted their appeal only from the 

denial of their motion to alter or amend the district court’s 

order awarding attorney’s fees, we have jurisdiction to consider 

the merits of the underlying order. See, e.g., Brown v. French, 

147 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 1998).
4

hand, though not paid hourly, was nonetheless misclassified as 

an exempt employee for overtime purposes. Appellees effected the 

underpayments of wages by assigning Appellants to work a total 

of more than 40 hours per week, but at different group homes, 

while treating work at each group home (owned by a separate but 

related corporate entity) as work for a separate employer. 

Consequently, Appellees paid Appellants at the straight time 

rate rather than at the overtime rate of time-and-a-half for 

hours worked beyond 40 per week. 

On September 22, 2008, Appellants Jackson, Agyeman, George, 

and Asare filed suit in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Virginia against Appellees, seeking unpaid 

overtime compensation under the FLSA. Appellants Doss and 

Collins opted into the litigation as plaintiffs. Meanwhile, 

Appellants filed a Motion to Allow Notice to Similarly Situated 

Employees and to Approve Interrogatory to Defendants Seeking the 

Identity of Similarly Situated Employees. On December 19, 2008, 

the district court granted Appellants’ motion. Shortly after the 

district court ordered publication of notice of the pendency of 

the lawsuit to other employees, but before such notice was 

published, the parties negotiated a Confidential Settlement 

Agreement and General Release resolving all of Appellants’

claims. 
5

The Settlement Agreement stipulated that Appellants would 

be paid additional wages equal to unpaid overtime compensation 

(i.e., half-time) for all hours or fractions thereof worked in 

excess of 40 hours during any one work week (from September 22, 

2005, through the date of the settlement), plus an equal amount 

in liquidated damages. The parties then stipulated to the 

following settlement amounts: Asare ($430.00), Collins 

($567.50), Doss ($490.00), George ($4,032.00), Jackson 

($1,963.50), and Agyeman ($12,471.34). Notably, of the 13 forms 

of relief sought in the complaint, nine were not addressed in

the Settlement Agreement and were wholly abandoned by 

Appellants.2

 2 These nine prayers for relief were for (1) an order 

appointing plaintiffs and their counsel to represent similarly 

situated employees as to the FLSA claims, (2) certification of 

the breach of contract and quantum meruit classes and 

designation of plaintiffs as class representatives and their 

counsel as class counsel, (3) a preliminary and permanent 

injunction prohibiting the defendants from engaging in the 

allegedly unlawful practices, (4) an order awarding declaratory 

relief, (5) an order awarding restitution and disgorgement of 

profits, (6) a judgment awarding plaintiffs economic, 

compensatory damages, liquidated damages, and punitive damages, 

(7) pre-judgment interest, (8) equitable relief such as 

employment, reinstatement, promotion, or frontpay, and (9) 

interest due on unpaid wages.

In particular, no injunctive relief was awarded, no 

relief was awarded on any state law claim, and Appellees were 

not required to alter their method of operation. In any event, 

pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the district court entered 
6

an Agreed Order of Dismissal in Part, dated February 23, 2009, 

dismissing all of Appellants’ claims with prejudice, reserving 

for itself the issue of attorney’s fees and costs, as the 

parties had agreed. 

Appellants promptly filed their motion for an award of 

attorney’s fees. Following full briefing and a hearing, the 

district court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 

attorney’s fees and costs. The district court noted that under 

this court’s precedents, a reasonable fee would be calculated by 

determining a lodestar fee, followed by any appropriate 

reductions. See Grissom v. The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313 (4th 

Cir. 2008), where we stated:

The parties also agree that after calculating the 

lodestar figure, the “court then should subtract fees 

for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to 

successful ones.” Johnson v. City of Aiken, 278 F.3d 

333, 337 (4th Cir. 2002). “Once the court has 

subtracted the fees incurred for unsuccessful, 

unrelated claims, it then awards some percentage of 

the remaining amount, depending on the degree of 

success enjoyed by the plaintiff.” Id.

Id. 321 (emphasis added); see also Robinson v. Equifax 

Information Services, LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009).

The district court determined the appropriate hourly rates 

for counsel for Appellants, ranging from $350.00 per hour for 

the most experienced lawyer to $60.00 per hour for the legal 

assistant. The district court then determined the total hours 

reasonably expended by the four people who worked on the case.
7

Thus, the district court arrived at what it described as a 

“lodestar fee” of $47,800. Then, in determining the ultimate 

issue of a reasonable fee, the district court noted that only 

six plaintiffs joined the lawsuit, and their total recovery 

amounted to less than $10,000.00 before it was doubled under 

FLSA’s liquidated damage provision. The court further noted 

that, of the six awards, four were for less than $1,000.00 

before doubling and that Agyeman received the largest recovery,

based only on his misclassification. Thus, the court reasoned 

that the $47,800.00 “lodestar fee” should be reduced because 

“[a]n attorneys’ fee should bear some reasonable relationship to 

the recovery of plaintiffs.” Given the “modest value” of the 

successful claims, the court determined that a reasonable fee, 

which it also described as a “lodestar,” amounted to $36,000.00.

On May 18, 2009, Appellants filed a Motion to Alter or 

Amend the district court’s order granting fees and costs 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). On June 9, 2009, the district 

court denied Appellants’ motion. Appellants have timely 

appealed. 

II.

A.

We review a district court’s award of attorney’s fees for 

abuse of discretion. Johnson v. City of Aiken, 278 F.3d 333, 336
8

(4th Cir. 2002) (citing McDonnell v. Miller Oil Co., 134 F.3d 

638, 640 (4th Cir. 1998); Freeman v. Case Corp., 118 F.3d 1011, 

1014 (4th Cir. 1997)). “Our review of the district court’s award 

is sharply circumscribed; we have recognized that because a 

district court has close and intimate knowledge of the efforts 

expended and the value of the services rendered, the fee award 

must not be overturned unless it is clearly wrong.” Plyler v. 

Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation 

marks, citations, and alteration marks omitted).

B.

A prevailing party is entitled to an award of reasonable 

attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 

216(b). Here, because the parties have agreed that Appellants 

are prevailing parties, Appellants are entitled to an award of 

attorney’s fees and costs that they establish as reasonable. See

Plyler, 902 F.2d at 277. 

Appellants’ challenge to the award in this case is a narrow 

one. Although Appellants sought fees and costs in excess of 

$87,000, they do not assign error to the district court’s

initial determination that the traditional lodestar amount in 

this case (hours worked x appropriate hourly rate) was $47,800. 

Rather, they limit their challenge to the district court’s 

ultimate determination that a reasonable fee was the traditional 

lodestar amount less approximately 25%. Appellants make two 
9

arguments in support of their contention that the district court 

abused its discretion in reducing the traditional lodestar by 

approximately 25% in this case. First, they contend that our 

opinion in Grissom does not allow such a reduction. Second, they 

contend that even if Grissom could be interpreted to allow such 

a reduction, such a reduction is prohibited by City of Riverside 

v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986), and by the Supreme court’s 

recent opinion in Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010). We 

disagree.

1.

We have set forth the Grissom methodology, 549 F.3d at 320, 

above, which the district court cited in its order and which 

provides in part that a court should “award[] some percentage of 

the remaining amount [after reductions for unsuccessful claims], 

depending on the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff.” 

(Emphasis added) Appellants contend that, inasmuch as they 

enjoyed “complete success on all claims,” Appellant’s Br. 11, 

there should not have been any reduction for their pursuit of 

unsuccessful claims and that, therefore, their “degree of 

success” under Grissom was effectively one hundred percent. 

Thus, according to Appellants, under Grissom, the only 

appropriate “percentage” of the traditional lodestar amount that

constituted a “reasonable fee” is one hundred percent.
10

In support of this contention, Appellants seize on the 

district court’s statement that “[i]t is unnecessary to subtract 

fees incurred for unsuccessful, unrelated claims or award only a 

percentage of this amount because plaintiffs settled all of 

their claims for full value.” Having carefully reviewed the 

district court’s orders, it is clear to us that, in context, the 

district court indeed followed Grissom, albeit somewhat 

awkwardly. In other words, we agree with Appellants to the 

extent that they contend that the methodology followed by the 

district court is somewhat less precise than one would hope, but 

we reject the contention that the district court deviated from 

the core mandate of Grissom in calculating a “reasonable fee.”

Like most (if not all) of the courts of appeals, we have 

directed that in deciding what constitutes a reasonable number 

of hours and the appropriate hourly rates (i.e., in calculating 

the lodestar fee), a district court looks to the following

twelve factors:

(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required 

to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the 

attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the instant 

litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the 

attorney’s expectations at the outset of the litigation; 

(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or 

circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the 

results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and 

ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the 

case within the legal community in which the suit arose; 

(11) the nature and length of the professional 
11

relationship between attorney and client; and (12) 

attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.

Barber v. Kimbrell’s Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 

1978) (adopting factors set forth in Johnson v. Ga. Highway 

Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other 

grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). In this 

case, the district court properly assessed the 12 factors and 

focused, most heavily, on factor number eight - “the amount in 

controversy and the results obtained.” In doing so, the district 

court purported to arrive at an “initial” lodestar fee 

($47,800), and then, after consideration of factor number eight, 

it arrived at its “final” lodestar fee of $36,000. Thus, 

although the district court arrived at a reasonable fee as 

mandated by Grissom, it took the somewhat circuitous route of 

calculating a “final” lodestar by relying on factor eight in the 

Kimbrell’s analysis, rather than by expressly taking account of 

Appellants’ unsuccessful claims and then taking a “percentage 

reduction” from the traditional lodestar, as contemplated by 

Grissom.3

 3 The district court described its approach in its order 

denying the motion to alter or amend, stating that: “After 

arriving at the lodestar figure of $36,000.00, the Court 

determined that further reduction [under Grissom] was 

unnecessary because plaintiffs had been fully compensated for 

the hours they worked. Finding that further reduction was 

unnecessary does not support the argument that the earlier 

reduction was in error.”

 
12

Under the circumstances here, we have no hesitation in 

leaving undisturbed what the district court did, notwithstanding 

that its methodology was not congruent with that contemplated by 

Grissom. Plainly, the court was cognizant of the broad scope of 

the case as Appellants filed it, see supra page 5 and note 2, 

including the presence of state law claims (which were not

“successfully” prosecuted) and the request for broad relief,

compared to the more modest result achieved. We should not and 

do not fault the district court for an arguable analytic 

imprecision where, substantively, no abuse of discretion is 

evident. In so doing, we bear in mind the following reminder 

from the Supreme Court:

[W]e have said repeatedly that “[t]he initial estimate 

of a reasonable attorney’s fee is properly calculated 

by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended 

on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” 

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 

1544, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). The courts may then 

adjust this lodestar calculation by other factors. 

Bergeron, 489 U.S. at 95 (emphasis added); and see Burlington v. 

Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992): 

We have [turned to the lodestar model], it must 

be noted, even though the lodestar model often 

(perhaps, generally) results in a larger fee award 

than the contingent-fee model. See, e.g., Report of 

the Federal Courts Study Committee 104 (Apr. 2, 1990) 

(lodestar method may “give lawyers incentives to run 

up hours unnecessarily, which can lead to 

overcompensation”).
13

Id. at 566 (brackets added). In sum, despite its imprecise 

methodology, the district court plainly acted consonant with our 

Grissom mandate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437

(1983) (noting that a district court may either identify 

particular hours to be eliminated or reduce the fee in light of 

the limited success in calculating fee award).

2.

Appellants’ arguments relying on City of Riverside v. 

Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986), and Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 

1662 (2010), fare no better than their arguments relying on 

Grissom. They contend that City of Riverside prohibits a 

limitation on an award of attorney’s fees to a proportion of the 

damages awarded. As the district court stated, however, City of 

Riverside, did not impose a blanket prohibition on the use of 

the rule of proportionality. In that case, the Supreme Court 

merely “reject[ed] the proposition that fee awards . . . should 

necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil 

rights plaintiff actually recovers.” City of Riverside, 477 U.S. 

at 565 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized the sui generis

nature of civil rights cases, where plaintiffs “seek[] to 

vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot 

be valued solely in monetary terms” and fee awards are used to 

deter future violations. Id. at 575-76. Nevertheless, the Court 

expressly held that “[t]he amount of damages a plaintiff 
14

recovers is certainly relevant to the amount of attorney’s fees 

to be awarded under § 1988.” Id. at 574. There is no indication 

here that the district court relied solely on a proportionality

approach.

Appellants’ reliance on the Supreme Court’s recent decision 

in Perdue is similarly unavailing. They contended in their Rule 

28(j) submission that Perdue involved a rejection of an 

“arbitrary enhancement” of a lodestar fee, and that “if an 

arbitrary enhancement of the lodestar is reversible error, an 

arbitrary reduction of the lodestar would be . . . an abuse of 

discretion and reversible error.” Appellants overstate, if they 

do not misstate, the holding in that case. In Perdue, the Court 

held that an attorney’s fee based on the lodestar may be 

increased due to superior performance, but only in extraordinary 

circumstances. 130 S. Ct. at 1674. But while the Court held that 

an enhancement to the lodestar fee may be permissible, it found 

the justification there inadequate. Indeed, Perdue makes plain 

that the lodestar figure, though supported by a “strong 

presumption” of correctness, is not invariably the end of the 

analysis but, in some classes of cases, only the beginning: 

In light of what we have said in prior cases, we 

reject any contention that a fee determined by the 

lodestar method may not be enhanced in any situation. 

The lodestar method was never intended to be 

conclusive in all circumstances. Instead, there is a 

“strong presumption” that the lodestar figure is 

reasonable, but that presumption may be overcome in 
15

those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does 

not adequately take into account a factor that may 

properly be considered in determining a reasonable 

fee.

Id. at 1673 (emphasis added). In any event, nothing in Perdue

persuades us that the district court’s reduced fee award here 

was in any sense “arbitrary” or was otherwise the product of an 

abuse of discretion. 

III.

For the reasons set forth above, the orders of the district 

court are

AFFIRMED.
16

GREGORY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The fee award in this case is clearly wrong. After 

calculating the initial lodestar fee of $47,800, the district 

court stated that based on “the amount involved and the results 

obtained,” it was reducing the fee award by twenty-five percent. 

J.A. 369.1

 While the majority correctly notes that this is an 

appropriate factor to consider under our precedent, we also have 

precedent that mandates such consideration occurs by comparing 

the relief sought to the relief awarded. Under the latter case 

law, I am left with the inescapable conclusion that the court 

abused its discretion by focusing on the value of the employees’ 

claims and thus respectfully dissent.

I.

This Court has recognized that the factor relied on by the 

district court to reduce the lodestar fee, “the amount in 

controversy and the results obtained,” Barber v. Kimbrell’s 

Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978), is largely 

coextensive with the court’s consideration of the employee’s 

“degree of success.” Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 478 

F.3d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 2007). “When considering the extent of 

 1 Citations herein to “J.A. __” refer to the contents of the 

Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
17

the relief obtained, we must compare the amount of the damages 

sought to the amount awarded.” Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 

199, 204 (4th Cir. 2005). This comparison “rests on the idea 

that a prevailing plaintiff is less worthy of a fee award when 

one or more of his claims lack merit – that is, when he cannot 

demonstrate that he deserves the compensation he demanded in his 

complaint.” Nigh, 478 F.3d at 190.

The above analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 

elucidation of how district courts should account for the 

“degree of success.” In Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Supreme Court 

stated that in considering the “degree of success,” “[t]he 

result is what matters.” 461 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1983) (finding 

that in a case where “a plaintiff has achieved only partial or 

limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the 

litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an 

excessive amount”). The Court found that although district 

courts have discretion in making these judgments, the courts 

must consider this success or result “in comparison to the scope 

of the litigation as a whole.” Id. at 440. For example, in 

Hensley itself, the Court explained that “had respondents 

prevailed on only one of their six general claims, . . . a fee 

award based on the claimed hours clearly would have been 

excessive.” Id. at 436.
18

Following these principles, courts have reduced fee awards 

where FLSA plaintiffs recovered only a portion of the amount 

actually sought. See, e.g., Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods.

Co., Inc., 448 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming the 

district court’s reduction of the lodestar fee due to the 

difference between the amount initially sought in the complaint 

and the ultimate settlement amount); Spegon v. Catholic Bishop 

of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 558 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming the 

district court’s reduction of the lodestar fee because the 

plaintiff failed to obtain the full overtime pay that was 

asserted in the complaint and failed all-together on his claim 

for discrimination and its accompanying request for damages). 

Courts have also reduced fee awards based on degree of success 

when the plaintiffs prevailed on only some of the claims 

brought. See, e.g., Spegon, 175 F.3d at 558; Baird v. Boies, 

Schiller & Flexner LLP, 219 F. Supp. 2d 510, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 

2002).

In light of the above case law, the district court’s focus 

on the damages awarded as compared to the attorneys’ fee is more 

than “analytic imprecision” or “imprecise methodology.” Maj. 

Op. at 12. Rather, it constitutes error. In its initial 

determination of the fee, the court stated that the employees’ 

“total recovery was less than $10,000 before being doubled under 

the liquidated damages provision of the FLSA,” that “of the six 
19

awards, four were less than $1,000 before doubling,” and that 

“[a]n attorneys’ fee should bear some reasonable relationship to 

the recovery of the plaintiffs.” J.A. 369. The court then 

stated that it was reducing the lodestar fee by twenty-five 

percent “[g]iven the modest value of the plaintiff’s claims.” 

J.A. 369. No other explanation was given for the fee reduction 

at the time of the determination. No comparison of the relief 

sought to the relief awarded was conducted by the court, as 

mandated by case law when considering “results” or the “degree 

of success.” Nor did the court decide that any claims put 

forward by the employees lacked merit. Subsequently responding 

to the employees’ objection to the fee reduction, the court’s 

main justification for reducing the fee remained its belief that 

“the amount of plaintiffs’ claims and their eventual recovery 

was quite modest.” J.A. 418.

“A presumptively correct ‘lodestar’ figure should not be 

reduced simply because a plaintiff recovered a low damage 

award.” Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 935 F.2d 522, 

526 (2d Cir. 1991). The size of the damage award carries even 

less weight here given that the case arose under the feeshifting provision of the FLSA. See Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 

166 F.3d 422, 426 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Congress enacted fee-shifting 

in civil rights litigation precisely because the expected 

monetary recovery in many cases was too small to attract 
20

effective legal representation.”); Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 

1126, 1134-35 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The purpose of the FLSA attorney 

fees provision is to insure effective access to the judicial 

process by providing attorney fees for prevailing plaintiffs 

with wage and hour grievances. Courts should not place an undue 

emphasis on the amount of the plaintiff’s recovery because an 

award of attorney fees here encourage[s] the vindication of 

congressionally identified policies and rights.” (alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Thus, by subjectively labeling the employees’ success “modest” 

and failing to look at the success of the employees’ claims “in 

comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole,” Hensley, 

461 U.S. at 440, the court abused its discretion.

While the court did have discretion to consider the size of 

the damages award, that amount was relevant only when compared 

to the damages sought. Mercer, 401 F.3d at 204. The district 

court itself found that no reduction for “degree of success” was 

necessary because the employees “settled all of their claims for 

full value.” J.A. 370 (emphasis added). I assume that the 

district court meant what it said. Indeed, full success is 

supported by the record. The employees negotiated a settlement 

that provided them with the maximum monetary relief due under 

the FLSA – the full amount of overtime pay owed plus an equal 

amount of liquidated damages. When compared to the scope of 
21

litigation as whole, which evolved solely around the FLSA 

claims, this relief cannot be classified as limited. There was 

no other claim that the employees failed to succeed on the 

merits, and the majority even agrees that the settlement 

agreement “resolv[ed] all of Appellants’ claims.” Maj. Op. at 

4. Thus, the full lodestar fee should have been awarded.2

The majority closes its eyes to the district court’s focus 

on the value of the employees’ claims. Beyond repeating the 

same mistake made by the district court – judging the result 

obtained as “modest” in and of itself, see maj. op. at 12 

(describing the employees’ full recovery as a “modest result”) –

the majority seems to assert that the district court correctly 

compared the result obtained to the result sought in justifying 

the fee reduction. This cannot be the case. The district court 

did, only after the employees objected, state that it compared 

the relief sought to the relief obtained, and that the employees 

“did not receive any of the other forms of relief they sought in 

the complaint.” J.A. 418.3

 2 This is especially so given the “strong presumption” that 

the full lodestar fee is reasonable and owed to prevailing 

attorneys. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 

(1992).

 The court is referring to the prayer 

3 The court also claims that the employees obtained limited 

success because only six employees joined the lawsuit. It is 

unclear how this fact means that the six employees that did opt 

in were not successful. The fact that they settled their claims 

(Continued)
22

for relief contained in the complaint, which sought punitive 

damages, a request for declaratory judgment, and various forms 

of injunctive relief. The majority likewise cites to the prayer 

for relief, maj. op. at 5, as proof that a fee reduction is 

appropriate because the employees failed to obtain every form of 

relief requested. In this case, placing such a burden on the 

employees in order for them to obtain the full lodestar fee, 

which is presumptively reasonable, is unfounded. First, as the 

employees and amicus point out, punitive damages and 

reinstatement or other injunctive relief are not available for 

claims under the FLSA. EEOC v. Gilbarco, Inc., 615 F.2d 985, 

987 n.1 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that only the Secretary of 

Labor may bring an action for injunctive relief); Lanza v. 

Sugarland Run Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 737, 741 

(E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that punitive damages are not allowed 

under the FLSA). Therefore, the employees argue that the 

request for such relief was merely boilerplate language and 

should not provide a basis for finding limited success. There 

 

within seven days of the district court’s granting their Motion 

to Allow Notice to Similarly Situation Employees would seem to 

indicate that the employers settled quickly to avoid a larger 

damages award, meaning the employees were successful. If the 

court did rely on the number of employees that opted in, this 

was legal error. See Estrella v. P.R. Painting Corp., 596 F. 

Supp. 2d 723, 727-28 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
23

is support for this assertion. See Smith v. District of 

Columbia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 151, 160 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The District 

of Columbia argues that Plaintiff’s degree of success – the 

award of $72,000 – should be measured against the ad damnum

clause in her Complaint. That is just plain foolish. Ad damnum

requests, as all judges and litigants know, rarely bear any 

relationship to reality or expectations.”). Second, 

“[l]itigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds 

for a desired outcome, and the court’s rejection of or failure 

to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing 

a fee. The result is what matters.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. 

Here, the result was significant and the best possible under the 

FLSA, which was the employees’ only stated source of relief. In 

“the scope of the ligation as a whole,” id. at 440, the relief 

was not limited.

Finally, because the other relief referred to by the 

district court and the majority is available only through the 

breach of contract or quantum meruit claims, the court must have 

necessarily meant that the failure of the employees to prevail 

on those claims, in addition to the FLSA claim, merited a 

reduction in the lodestar fee. The majority specifically cites 

“the presence of state law claims.” Maj. Op. at 12. Yet, it 

was impossible for the employees to prevail on both the FLSA 

claim and the breach of contract/quantum meruit claims. Quantum 
24

meruit was an alternative to the breach of contract claim. 

Additionally, the breach of contract claim nowhere relies on 

Virginia law and asserts no contractual basis for the claim 

other than the FLSA. Thus, the breach of contract duplicates 

the FLSA claim and is preempted under this Circuit’s precedent. 

See Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 194 (4th Cir. 

2007). The court, therefore, relied on an alternative claim on 

which the employees had no chance of success.

It is telling that the majority omits discussion of the 

district court’s final rationale for reducing the lodestar fee –

that the employees “did not achieve the sort of public benefits 

discussed in City of Riverside.” J.A. 418. This assertion is 

patently incorrect. As the court itself recited in the same 

order, “damages in civil rights cases also serve[] the public 

interest, for example, by deterring future civil rights 

violations.” J.A. 417 (citing City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 

U.S. 561, 575 (1986)). In City of Riverside, the Supreme Court 

stated, “[r]egardless of the form of relief he actually obtains, 

a successful civil rights plaintiff often secures important 

social benefits that are not reflected in nominal or relatively 

small damages awards.” 477 U.S. at 574. Thus, the public 

interest promoted by civil rights statutes, such as the FLSA, 

“is perhaps most meaningfully served by the day-to-day private 

enforcement of these rights, which secures compliance and deters 
25

future violations.” Quarantino, 166 F.3d at 426. Therefore, 

counsel’s efforts to secure a full recovery in this case is 

exactly the type of private enforcement of wage and hour rights 

that achieves a public benefit. See Wales v. Jack M. Berry, 

Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“It is 

recognized that the FLSA is an important piece of social 

legislation. Accordingly, the public derived a benefit from the 

plaintiffs’ recovery on their FLSA claims.”). Sadly today’s 

opinion discounts the public benefit that unquestionably 

accompanied counsel’s efforts.4

II.

Additionally, the majority fails to recognize that although 

the court did not run afoul of the Supreme Court’s rejection of 

a rule of strict proportionality, see City of Riverside, 477 

U.S. at 578, the district court’s emphasis on the size of the 

attorneys’ fee and its pro rata reduction of the fee comes 

dangerously close to such violation and has been soundly 

rejected by other courts. See Simpson v. Merchants & Planters 

Bank, 441 F.3d 572, 581 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding in the context 

 4 The opinion goes further and, in an attempt to affirm the 

“imprecise” reasoning of the district court, throws in a quote 

suggesting counsel ran up hours in this case, maj. op. at 12, an 

allegation of which there is no evidence whatsoever.
26

of an Equal Pay Act case that “a pro rata reduction [in 

attorneys’ fees] would not normally be appropriate . . . [and 

that the court had] explicitly rejected a ‘rule of 

proportionality’ in civil rights cases because tying the 

attorney’s fees to the amount awarded would discourage litigants 

with small amounts of damages from pursuing a civil rights claim 

in court”); Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246, 252 (2d 

Cir. 2005) (“Reasoning that a rule calling for proportionality 

between the fee and the monetary amount involved in the 

litigation would effectively prevent plaintiffs from obtaining 

counsel in cases where deprivation of a constitutional right 

caused injury of low monetary value, we have repeatedly rejected 

the notion that a fee may be reduced merely because the fee 

would be disproportionate to the financial interest at stake in 

the litigation.”).

Even if the majority is correct that some reduction in the 

fee award was appropriate, which I do not believe to be the 

case, the district court’s method of reducing the award by the 

arbitrary figure of twenty-five percent without any explanation 

as to how the percentage was arrived at is an abuse of 

discretion. It is precisely this subjectivity on the part of 

the district court that the lodestar analysis guards against, 

making the Supreme Court’s decision in Perdue v. Kenny A. ex 

rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010), particularly relevant. In 
27

Perdue, the Court considered whether a district court abused its 

discretion in increasing the lodestar fee by seventy-five 

percent based on what the court believed to be extraordinary 

results. Id. at 1669. The Court first noted “the lodestar 

method is readily administrable” because “the lodestar 

calculation is ‘objective,’ and thus cabins the discretion of 

trial judges, permits meaningful judicial review, and produces 

reasonably predictable results.” Id. at 1672 (citations 

omitted). The Court then noted that while “[t]he lodestar 

method was never intended to be conclusive in all 

circumstances,” “there is a ‘strong presumption’ that the 

lodestar figure is reasonable, but that presumption may be 

overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does 

not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be 

considered in determining a reasonable fee.” Id. at 1673. The 

court found only a few exceptional circumstances in which 

superior attorney performance would lead to an increased 

lodestar fee. Id. at 1674. One such instance was when “an 

attorney’s performance includes an extraordinary outlay of 

expenses and the litigation is exceptionally protracted.” Id. 

However, in such a rare case, the Court held that “the amount of 

the enhancement must be calculated using a method that is 

reasonable, objective, and capable of being reviewed on appeal, 
28

such as by applying a standard rate of interest to the 

qualifying outlays of expenses.” Id. at 1674-75.

As for the seventy-five percent increase in the lodestar 

fee in Perdue, the Court found that “this figure appears to have 

been essentially arbitrary. Why, for example, did the court 

grant a 75% enhancement instead of the 100% increase that 

respondents sought? And why 75% rather than 50% or 25% or 10%?” 

Id. at 1675. Thus, although the Court found that an enhanced 

fee was possible in some circumstances, it reversed the fee 

award because “when a trial judge awards an enhancement on an 

impressionistic basis, a major purpose of the lodestar methodproviding an objective and reviewable basis for fees is 

undermined.” Id. at 1676 (citation omitted).

Here, the same prohibition of subjectivity should apply 

when a judge asks whether a plaintiff’s “results obtained” are 

limited. The lodestar fee is presumptively reasonable and while 

the district court did have discretion to reduce the fee based 

on limited success, the court arbitrarily decreased the lodestar 

fee by twenty-five percent even if we assume success was 

limited. The court provided no rationale for why the decrease 

was not above or below the number it chose, offering no 

“objective and reviewable basis,” id. at 1676, for the 

percentage decrease. I therefore believe today’s decision 

undermines the very purpose of the lodestar approach.
29

III.

Because the district court abused its discretion in 

reducing the presumptively reasonable lodestar fee based on its 

determination that the value of the employees’ award was 

“modest” and in arbitrarily choosing a twenty-five percent 

reduction, I would reverse the order of the district court and 

remand with instructions to award the full fee of $47,800.