alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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ORDER - 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

RANDALL VARGA, PhD.

Plaintiff,

v.

STANWOOD-CAMANO SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

Defendant.

No. C06-0178MJP

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. (Dkt. No. 61.) 

Plaintiff requests reconsideration of the Court’s Order of July 27, 2007, which concluded that,

because retroactive application of the recently passed Senate Bill 5340 would violate the separation

of powers doctrine, the applicable law in this case is the definition of “disability” provided by the

Washington Supreme Court in McClarty v. Totem Electric, 157 Wn.2d 214 (2006), and not the

definition in Senate Bill 5340. (Dkt. No. 58.) Plaintiff requests reconsideration for two reasons: (1)

the Court failed to certify the constitutional challenge to the state statute to the state Attorney

General as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(b); and (2) the Court failed to take into account that the

McClarty decision itself violated the separation of powers doctrine. 

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored. Under Local Civil Rule 7(h), the Court will

ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a

showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to the Court’s attention

earlier with reasonable diligence. Plaintiff has failed to make such a showing regarding his second

point: he has not shown that the Court manifestly erred in its retroactivity analysis, nor has he raised

new facts or legal authority which could not have been previously brought with reasonable diligence. 

Case 2:06-cv-00178-MJP Document 62 Filed 08/13/07 Page 1 of 2
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ORDER - 2 

The Court will not reconsider its decision that retroactive application of S.B. 5340 would violate the

separation of powers doctrine.

But the Court will allow for additional briefing on the issue of whether the Court erred by not

certifying to the state Attorney General a notice of the constitutional challenge. Under Local Civil

Rule 7(h)(3), a motion for reconsideration cannot be granted unless the opposing party is given a

chance to respond. The Court requests that Defendant respond to Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration. The response is due no later than August 28, 2007, and may not exceed six (6)

pages in length. The motion for reconsideration will be re-noted on the Court’s motions calendar for

consideration on August 28, 2007. 

The Court will also refrain from ruling on the pending motion for summary judgment until it

has ruled on the motion for reconsideration. If the parties wish, they may request a continuance of

the upcoming trial-related deadlines.

The clerk is directed to send copies of this order to all parties. 

Dated this 13th day of August, 2007.

AMarsha J. Pechman

 United States District Judge

Case 2:06-cv-00178-MJP Document 62 Filed 08/13/07 Page 2 of 2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-7470

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

LARRY DARNELL BELCHER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior

District Judge. (CA-01-39-7)

Submitted: December 16, 2004 Decided: December 28, 2004

Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry Darnell Belcher, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Ray Wolthuis,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Larry Darnell Belcher seeks to appeal the district

court’s order denying relief on his motion for a certificate of

appealability arising out of his action under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue

absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that

his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d

676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the

record and conclude that Belcher has not made the requisite

showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
COLL[EN W. HANABUSA 

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Pul^a:.iL Lntv[rs nN^7 

[-.NVIF1UNMf^:N'f ;1_ HFlitlL^lrIC1N 

June 28, 2013 

Mr. Bob Perciasepe 

Acting Administrator 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Ariel Rios Building 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20460 

Dear Acting Administrator Perciasepe: 

I write today regarding my concern for Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed rule 

amending 40 CFR Parts 280 and 281; Revisions to Existing Requirements and New Requirements for 

Secondary Containment and Operator Training (EPA -HQ-UST-2011-0301), which was published in the 

Federal Register on November 18, 2011. 

I am particularly concerned about this proposal's impact on operators in my home state of Hawaii, as 

compliance could be disproportionately burdensome due to the expense of logistics, the limited number 

of trained personnel in the state and the rural location of many small sites. For example, one of the tests 

required by the proposal generates hazardous waste material and the only way for operators on the 

neighbor islands such as Maui or Kauai to properly dispose of the material is to physically ship it to 

Oahu. 

Another issue I find troubling is the discrepancy between the EPA's cost estimates for the rule's 

implementation and the industry's cost estimates. Given this discrepancy and the possible impact on 

Hawaii small businesses, I request the EPA pull the proposed rule and form a Small Business Advocacy 

Review (SBAR) panel to further evaluate compliance costs. While my preference would not be to pull the 

proposed rule, I understand that in order to form a SBAR panel, that a rule must be officially pulled and 

then reintroduced at a later date. I believe the SBAR panel's input will allow small operators, like those 

in Hawaii, the opportunity to have a seat at the table in developing the new rule and will ultimately lead 

to a proposal with lower compliance costs while still achieving environmental gains. 

Thank you for your consideration and I look forward to your response. 

Sincer y, 

Colleen^.Hanabusa ^ 

Member of Congress 

NHIIJ1Ef) ON RtS^YCLIiD PAPEH
No. 60534.

#### Trans World Shipping Corp. *v.*United States,

protests 247135-K, 255333-K, and 260766-K (New York).

Opinion by

Donlon, J.

The protests were dismissed.
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26 ORD ON MTN TO CONT - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

HERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

WABASH NATIONAL CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendant(s).

NO. C06-57

 ORDER ON MOTION TO REVISE 

 CASE SCHEDULE

 

The Court, having received and reviewed the Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Joint Motion to

Modify Trial Date, makes the following findings:

1. The motion contains no specific (or insufficient) facts to establish good cause

for a continuance and/or

2. The motion provides no suitable explanation as to why the existing case

schedule deadlines were not met.

The parties have requested an extension of their case schedule deadlines after the deadline for

the identification of experts has passed. In making their request, Plaintiffs and Defendant Wabash

National Corporation (“Wabash”) fail to advise the Court of when the experts were retained, when the

information was forwarded to the retained experts and why the experts were not able to meet the

existing deadlines. 

Defendant Bendix Commercial Vehicle Systems (“Bendix”) opposes the continuance, claiming

that little if any work has been done on the case. Plaintiff and Defendant Wabash claim that they have

not been dilatory, but do not outline what has been accomplished to date, nor do they outline with any

Case 2:06-cv-00057-MJP Document 25 Filed 10/12/06 Page 1 of 2
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26 ORD ON MTN TO CONT - 2

specificity what needs to be done. Neither of the moving parties have made any response to Bendix’s

claim of prejudice.

A discovery cut-off two months before trial is not acceptable, and puts the close of discovery

after the deadline for the filing of dispositive motions.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the request to revise the existing case schedule is

DENIED without prejudice to bring a renewed motion which cures the defects noted above and

outlines a plan for meeting the revised deadlines.

The clerk is directed to send copies of this order to all counsel of record.

Dated: October, 12, 2006

AMarsha J. Pechman

U.S. District Judge

Case 2:06-cv-00057-MJP Document 25 Filed 10/12/06 Page 2 of 2
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y A lton Thomas Davis,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk October 26, 2010

d1018 

# Order

October 26, 2010

141191

BILLIE J. MEADOWS, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 141191 COA: 288893 Wayne CC Family Division: JOAN MEADOWS, 07-705162-DO Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 27, 2010 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
From: halmer1@triad.rr.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 9:43:24 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Harold Cotton

High Point, NC 27260
LAKE
& ASSOCIATES, CPA’s LLC





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We
consent to the use, in the report on Form 10-K of Alchemical Capital Corp.
(A Development Stage Company), of our report dated March 18, 2010 on our audit
of the financial statements of Alchemical Capital Corp. (A Development Stage
Company) as of December 31, 2009 and 2008 and the related statements of
operations, stockholders’ equity/(deficit), and cash flows for the years then
ended, and for the period June 16, 2008 (inception) through December 31, 2009,
and the reference to us under the caption “Experts.”





/s/Lake
& Associates, CPA’s
LLC


Lake
& Associates, CPA’s LLC


Boca
Raton, Florida




March 28,
2010
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED JULY 31, 1999 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             NOV-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1999
<CASH>                                         123,729
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               138,167
<PP&E>                                          44,341
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,165,069
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          986,051
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     3,824,907
<OTHER-SE>                                 (3,673,082)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,165,069
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               301,494
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,129,329
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (827,835)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (827,835)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (827,835)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.04)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1
                                  ------------

                      CEO AND CFO CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of ITEC Attractions, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Paul M. Bluto, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/  Paul M. Bluto
------------------
Paul M. Bluto
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
November 14, 2003
Exhibit 32.2

                           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.A. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Annual Report of Sync2 Networks Corp., a Nevada
corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30 2011 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commision (the "Report"), John Moore as
Chief Executive Officier and Chief Financial Officier of the Company does hereby
certify, pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.A. ss.
1350), that to his knowledge:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the reguirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

     2.   The information contained in thee Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.

January 17, 2013
                                            By /s/John Moore
                                               --------------------------------
                                               CEO/CFO/DIRECTOR
No. P67/322.

#### Charles Sadek Import Co., Inc. *v.*United States, protest 65/18099 (New York).

Landis, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise covered by the foregoing protest consists of statuary, sculptures, and/or copies, replicas, or reproductions thereof, valued at not less than $2.50 each, similar in all material respects to those the subject of *Wm. S. Pitcairn Corp.*v. *United States*(39 CCPA 15, C.A.D. 458), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
#### DIMMICK v. UNITED STATES.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

October 27, 1903.)

No. 887.

George D. Collins, for plaintiff in error.

¡Marshall B. Woodworth, for the United States. No opinion. Motion for reversal of judgment denied.
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MINUTE ORDER – 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

PAULA MOOREHEAD,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF,

Defendant.

CASE NO. C05-1767JLR

MINUTE ORDER

The following minute order is made by the direction of the court, the Honorable

James L. Robart:

The court is in receipt of the parties’ agreed motion to extend the deadline for

dispositive motions in this matter (Dkt. # 12). The court DENIES the stipulation. If the

parties wish to enter a new stipulation, they must do so in compliance with this order. 

The court issues scheduling orders setting trial dates and related dates to provide a

reasonable schedule for the resolution of disputes. First, the court generally sets the

discovery cut-off 30 days prior to the deadline for filing dispositive motions in order to

ensure that the court has before it a complete record when it considers a motion that could

potentially dispose of the case. Second, the schedule generally provides 90 days between

the deadline for filing dispositive motions and the trial date. This 90-day period takes

Case 2:05-cv-01767-TSZ Document 13 Filed 12/04/06 Page 1 of 2
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MINUTE ORDER – 2

into account: (a) an approximate 30-day lag between the date a party files a motion and

the date that motion becomes ripe for the court’s consideration, see Local Rules W.D.

Wash. CR 7(d)(3); and (b) an additional 30 days during which the court endeavors to rule

on the motion, id. at CR 7(b)(5). Anything short of a 90-day period leaves inadequate

time for the parties to consider the court’s ruling and plan for trial or an alternate

resolution. 

Here, the parties propose to shorten the deadline between dispositive motions and

trial by thirty days. Without a compelling reason to do so, the court declines to abandon

its case management principles outlined above. If the parties are unable to comply with

the existing schedule, the court will consider a stipulated one-month continuance of the

trial date and pre-trial deadlines, include the dispositive motions cut-off. 

Filed and entered this 4th day of December, 2006.

BRUCE RIFKIN, Clerk

s/Mary Duett

By

Deputy Clerk

Case 2:05-cv-01767-TSZ Document 13 Filed 12/04/06 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 32.1  Certification of the Principal Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 In connection with the periodic report of IBI Acquisitions, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended May 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Patsy Sessions, the Principal Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  /s/ Patsy SessionsPrincipal Executive Officer Date: August 28, 2009