F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### UN ITED STA TES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E N IN TH C IR C U IT

J A V I ER C AS TR I J ON -G A R C IA , Petitioner ,

v.
E RI C H. H OL DER , J R ., Attorney Ge ne ra l, Respondent

. No. 09-73756 Ag ency No. A095-733-515

OPI NI ON

On Petition for Review of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Immi g ratio n App e a ls Argued and Submitted Ma y 14 , 2 01 2— San F ra

nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia Filed January

9, 2013

Be fore : Stephen Reinhardt, Richar d R. Cli fton,
and N. Rand y Smith, Cir c uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Reinhar dtC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no par t of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Im m igration The pa nel g rante d J avier

C as trijon-Gar cia’ s petition for revie w from the Boa

rd of Immigration Appe als’ de cision fi nd inghim

statut or ily ine lig ibl e fo r c anc e llatio n of re mov a l, ba se d o n th e B IA’ s h old ing that a c onvic tio n f

or sim ple kid na pp ing , in vio latio n o f Ca lif

or nia Pe na l Co de § 2 07 (a ), is
a categ orica l crime involvingmoral turpitude.

Th e p an e l h e ld th at CP C § 2 0 7 ( a ) d o e s n o t c o n s ti tute a cate g orica l crime involvingmoral turpitude bec au s e it does
no t r e qu ir e an inte nt t o injure , ac tua l injury , or a sp e c ia l c la ss of victims. The panel also found t hat California c ourts have
a pp lied CPC § 20 7( a ) t o c on du c t th at is no t mo ra lly turpitudin o u s , and re manded f or the B IA to apply

the modified categ orica l approa ch.

CO UN SEL

Gar y A. Watt, Su p er vising Counsel; Stephen R. Tollafield, Supe r v is in gCo un s e l; H e id i M

. H an s e nK a ls c h e ur , St u dent C o un s el ; No l an R

. S h aw (a rgu ed ), S tu d en tC o un s el , Ha s t i n gs Appellate Proje ct, San Fr ancisc o, California, for Petitioner.C AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER 3

P e tit io n e r’s la st na m e is sp e ll e d i n c o n siste n tly thr o u g h o u t t h e b rie fs 1

an d re c o r d as “C astri jo n,” “C astrejo n,” a nd “G astrejo n.” W e u se “C a strijo n ,” the las t na m e in the c o u rt d o c k e t. Tony West, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, Civil Division; Mary J ane Ca ndaux, Assis tant Direc tor; L aura M.L . Maroldy (ar gued), Tr ial Attorney , Offic e of Immi g ration L itigation, Civil Division, Department of J ustice, Washington, D.C., for Re sp on de nt.

OP IN ION

REI NHARDT, Circuit Judge:

J av i er C as tri j o n -G ar ci a (“Castrijon”) petitions for revie w 1 of a de cision of the B oard of Immi gration Appeals (“B IA”) , holding that h i s conviction for simple kidnappingunder C a l i f o r n i a P e n a l C o d e ( “ C P C ” ) § 2 0 7 ( a ) i s c at e g o r i c a l l y a c ri me invo lving mor a l tu rp itu de un de r 8 U. S.C. § 1182(a) (2)( A)(i) (I ), making him statutorily ineligible f or c an c e ll ati o no f r e mo v a l un d e r 8 U

. S. C. § 1 2 2 9 b ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C)

. We have jur isd ic tio n p ur su ant t o 8 U. S.C. § 1 25 2(a) (2 )( D) to determ i n e whether a

crime involves mora l turpitude. See N u nez v. H

older , 594 F.3d 1124, 1129 ( 9th Cir. 2010) (“Whether

a cr ime involves moral turpitude is a q u es t i o n of law that w e have jur isd ic tio n to re vie w pur su ant to 8 U. S.C. § 1252(a) (2)( D).” ). We gra nt the petition for re view and
re mand to t he B IA f or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s.
We have he ld that “non-fr audulent cr imes of moral turpit u d e almost alway s involve an intent to harm someone , the ac tual infliction of harm upon someone, or an a ction thatC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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aff ects a protec ted clas s o f vi ctim.” Id. at 11 31 . Si mpl e kid na pp ingun de r C PC § 207 (a ) doe s not inv olv e any of the se e le me nts . M or e ov e r, Ca lif or nia c o u r t s h a v e a p p l i e d th e statut e to conduct that is not morally turpitudinous. See Gonzales v. Duenas-A lvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007). T h ere fore , we hold tha t simple kidnapping unde r CPC § 207(a) is not cate g orica lly

a cr ime involving moral turpitude. We remand to allow the B IA t o conduct a modified categ orica l analy sis of Castrijon’s crime. Se e IN S v . V e ntu ra , 537 U.S. 12 (2002).

F ACT UAL AND P R OC EDU R A L B ACKG ROUND Castrijon is a native and citizen of Mex ico who, ac cording to his application for c ance llation of removal, entere d the Un ite d St ate s w ith out in sp e c tio n in 19 89. He ha s r e sid e d in the United States conti n uously since that time, with the exception of two short trips to Mex ico in 1998 and 2003. He ha s thre e U. S. c iti zen

c hil dr e n a s we ll a s U .S. c iti zen sis te rs , and his mot he r i s a le g a l pe rm ane nt r e sid e nt.

In 2007, the Depa

rtment of Homeland Security ch arge d Cast ri jo n wi th re mov a bil ity un de r 8 U. S.C. § 1182(a) (6)( A)(i) , in that he was a n alien pre s ent i n the United States without beingad m i t t ed or pa roled, or who
arr ived in the United States at a ny time or place other than a s desig nated by

the Attorney

Gene ral. He conc eded
re mov a bil ity , d e signate d M e xico a s h is c ountr y of re moval, and submitted an application for ca ncellation of r emoval under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The conviction re cords submitted
a s p art o f th e a

p p li c ati o n f

o r c an c e ll ati o n o f r e mo v a l refle ct that in 19 92 Ca str ijo n ple d g uil ty to atte mpt e d k idn a pp ingin violation of CPC §§ 664 and 207(a ), and r ece ived a suspended se ntence of 300 day s in jail and 36 months ofC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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probation. Duringa hea

ring befor e the immigration judge, he explained that the incident occ urre d while he wa s with friends and that he did not know the vic tim. The conviction re cords also ref lect that in 2002 and 2005 Castrijon wa s convicted of drivingwith a suspended lice nse. The immigr ation judge issued an or al dec ision finding Castrijon ineligible for

canc ellation of re moval under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)( C) beca us e h is conviction for attempted simple kidnappingis a categ orica l crime of mor al turpitude in that “th e langua g e of the statute requir [ed] the
e le me nt o f i ns til lin gfe ar i n th e vic tim .” Th e B IA a ff ir me d in an unpublished dec ision. I t noted t hat i t had pre viously “listed kidnappingas an e x ample of a [crime of moral turpitude], . . . found that kidnappingfor r ansom under the Fe dera l KidnappingAct involves mo ral turpitude,” and “f ound that the offense of kidnapping, a s defined by the California Pena l Code (CPC), involves moral turpitu d e.” The B IA identified the elements of CPC § 207(a) as: “(1) a perso n was unlawfully

moved by

use of phy sical for ce or fea r, (2) the movement was w it hout the person’ s consent, and ( 3) the
m o v e m e n to f

th e p e r s o nw a s f

o r a s u b s t an t i a l d i s t an c e

. ” It held that, althoug h ransom wa s an ele ment under the Fe dera l Ki dn a ppin g Ac t, the la c k o f a ra ns om e le me nt i n CPC § 207(a) was not re levant bec ause “ there is no require ment that a state of

fense match all the e lemen t s o f an ana logous fede ral off

en se in order

to be classifie d as a [crime of moral tur p i tu d e ]. ” T h e B IAc o n c l u d e d th ats i mp l e k i dn a

p p i n gi s a crime of moral turpitude because it “involves readine ss to do evil and is a

n offe nse that g rievously offe nds the moral code of mankind in its inherent natu re,” citingto People v

. Zataray , 2 1 9 C a l

. R

p tr

. 3 3 , 3 9 ( C a l

. C t

. A p p

. 1 9 8 5 )

. ItC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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6
there fore held t hat C astrijon was inelig ible for c ance llation of
remova l. Castrijon now petitions for review

.

A N A L Y SIS
“The deter

mination whether a

conviction under

a criminal statute is categ orica lly

a [crime of moral turpitude] invol ves two steps, to which diffe rent standa rds of re view ap p l y .” Uppal v. Holder , 605 F .3 d 712 , 714 (9 th C ir . 2 01 0) ; se e als o Marmolejo-Campos v . Holder , 5 58 F .3 d 9 03 , 9 07 –1 1 ( 9th Cir . 2 00 9) (e n banc ) (c lari fy ing sta nd ard of re vie w) . T he fi rs t step is to identify

the eleme nts of th e statute of convic tion. See U ppal , 605 F.3d at 714. “B eca use ‘[t] he B IA has no speci al e xpe rt ise by

vir tue of its statut or

y re sp on sib ili tie s in
c on str uin gstate or

fe de ra l c ri min a l st atut e s, ’ w e re vie w i ts conclusion in that reg ard de novo. ” Id. (qu o t i n g MarmolejoCampos , 558 F.3d at 907). The second step is to compar e the elements of the statute of conviction to the g ener ic def inition of a c rime of mora l turpitude and dec ide whethe r the conviction meets that de finition. S e e id. “ B e c a

u s e th e B IA do e s hav e e xpe rt ise in makin g thi s det e rm inatio n, we de fe r t o i t s co n cl u s i o ni f w arra n t ed , fo l l o wi n g the Ch e v ron framework if the dec ision is a publis hed dec ision (or an unpubli shed decision direc tly

controlled by

a p u b l ished dec ision interpre ting the sa

me statute), a

nd followingthe Ski dmore fr ame wo rk

if the de c isi on

is unp ub lis he d ( and

no t directly
c o n tr o l l e d b y an y p u

b l i s h e d d e c i s i o n i n t e r

p r e t i n g th e sa me statute).” Id. ; see a lso Che v ro n U .S .A
., In c . v . Na tural R es. Def. Council, Inc. , 4 67 U. S. 8 37 (1 98 4) ; Sk idm or e v . S

wift & Co. , 323 U.S. 134 (1944).C AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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“ W e have p revi o usl y l o o ked t o u nd erl y i ng cri m es i n de t erm i ni ng 2 whe t h er c on v i ct i on s f

or i n ch oat e of

f en s es c on s t i t u t e cr i mes i n v ol vi ng
mo r al t ur pi t ude. ” B arr ag an
- Lop ez v. M ukasey , 5 0 8 F .3 d 8 9 9 , 9 0 3 (9 th C i r

. 20 07 )

. T her ef

ore, we l oo k t o t he el ement s of s i mp l e k i dnappi ng un der C P C § 2 0 7 (a ) to d e te rm ine w h e the r a c o n v ic tio n fo r a ttem p te d sim p le ki dnappi ng i s a c r i me i nv ol vi ng mo r al t ur pi t ude. I.

We tur n t o t h e first step of our ana ly sis: identify ing the elements of the statute of conviction. Castrijon was convicted of attempted simple kidnapping in violation of CPC § 207(a).

2 Th at st atut e pr ov ide s: Every person who f

orcibly , or b y any

other means of instilling fe ar, stea ls o r take s, or ho lds , d e ta ins , or arr e sts any pe rs on in t his state, and car ri es the pe rson into another countr y , s tate , o r

c o un ty , o r

into an o th e r

p art
o f t h e s am e c o un ty , i s gu i l ty o f k i dn ap p i n g.
C P C § 2 0 7 (a ). “T o p ro v e a d e f en d an tgu i l ty

o f k i dn ap p i n g, the prosec ution mustestablish that (1) t h e def endant took, held, or de tained anothe r person by using force or by instil ling
rea sonable fe ar; (2) using that force or fe ar, t h e defenda nt moved the other

person, or

made the othe r per son move a substantial distance; and (3) the other pe rson did not consent to the movement.” People v . Burney , 212 P.3 d 639 , 666 (C a l. 20 09 ); see also Pe ople v. J ones , 133 Cal

. Rp t r. 2d 358, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The Califor nia Supreme Court ha s explained that “the for ce used ag ainst the victim need not be phy sical. The move ment is forcible where it is accomplished throug h the g iving of order s which the victim f eels c ompelled to obey beca use he or she fe ars ha

rm or injury

from theC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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acc used and suc h appre hension is not unrea sonable under the circumstances.” Pe op lev . M ajo rs , 9 2 P

. 3 d 3 6 0 , 3 6 3 ( Ca l. 2004) ( internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted). For example, “an implicit threat of a rre st satisfies the forc e or f ear element of section 207(a) kidnapping if th e d efe ndant’s
c on du c t or state me nts c a

us e the vic timto b e lie ve that un le ss the v i ctim acc ompanies the de fenda nt the victim will be fo rc e d to do so , a

nd the vic tim ’s be lie f i s o bje c tiv e ly
rea sonable.” Id. at 367.

Whe n th e vic timis a

pe rso n cap a

ble of g ivi ngc on se nt,

“ the purp os e or mot ive of the takin gand

c arr yingawa y is immaterial.” In re M

ichele D

. , 59 P.3d 164, 168 (Cal. 2002) (interna l q u o tation marks, alter ations and citation omitted). “The rule g overningthe forc ible car rying of conscious persons c apable of g iving c onsent

. . . makes a person who fo rc ibl y c arr ie s su c h a pe rs on and tr ans po rt s him a g a ins t his wi ll guil ty

of kid na p[p]i ng , h ow e ver good or inn oc e nt h is motive or i ntent may

otherwise be . . . .” People v . Oliver , 361 P.2 d 5 93 , 5 95 (C a l. 1 96 1) ; see also Pe ople v. She asbey , 255 P. 836, 838–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927) (holdingthat “no state of min d o r be lie f i s a

pa rt of the c ri me of

kid na p[p]i ng ” ). Th is i s beca use “[s] imple kidna

pping traditionally has been a g ener al int e nt c ri me ,” and

do e s no t re qu ir e , fo r e xamp le , th e int e nt t o instil l f ear in the victim. People v . Moya , 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323, 32 5 ( Ca l. C t. A

pp . 1 99 2) . “ A c ri me is c ha ra c te ri zed a s a ‘g e ne ra l int e nt’ c ri me wh e n the re qu ir e d me nta l state e nta ils only an intent to do the ac t that cause s the harm . . . .” Pe op le
v . D av is , 896 P.2d 119, 148 n.15 (Cal. 199 5 ). W hen the vic ti m is an un r e s is ti n g in f an t o r c h il d o r o th e r

person incap ab l e of givingconsent, howe ver, “ the amount of for ce require d to kidnap

. . . is simpl y the amount of phy sical for ce require d to take and c arr y the child awa

y a subst antialC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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distance f or an illeg al purpose or

with an illeg al intent.” In re Miche le D. , 59 P.3d at 171.

II.

A.

We n owtur

n to the se c on d ste p o f o ur ana ly sis : compar ing the eleme nts of the statute of c onviction to the g ener ic def

inition of a crime involvingmoral turpitude. The parties d i s agre e about whe ther we must defer to the BIA’s unpublishe d d ecision. The gove rnment ar gues that bec ause, in i ts d e c isi on , th e B IA c ite d to seve ra l pu bli sh e d d e c isi on s, i n c l u d i n g Ma tte r o

f Lo pe z- Me za , Ma tte r o

f P , Matter of Nakoi , and Matter o

f C-M- , it s d e c isi on

that si mpl e kidnappingin violation of CP C § 207(a) is a crime involving moral turpitude is ent i t l ed to Chevron defe renc e. Alternatively , the g overnme nt argues t hat the B IA dec ision was pe rsuasive a

nd is thus entitl ed to Skidmore defe renc e. Ca str ijo n c onte nd s th at th e B IA d e c isi on is no t e nti tle d to Chevron defe renc e bec ause the decision wa s unpublished and the “c ited decisions do not construe the identical s tatute . . . and i n s te a d

c o n s is t o f

b o il e r p late g e n e r a li ti e s an d

o ther
c o n c l u s o r y s t at e m e n t s

. ” C a s tr i

j o na l s o c o n t e n d s th at th e B IA decision does not wa

rra nt defe renc e under Skidmore be c a us e its de c isi on

“ lacks any

re a l ana ly sis and

c on sis ts o f a

sin g le conclusory

para g raph.”

We h old fi rs t th at th e B IA d e c isi on he re is n ot e nti tle d to C hevron defe renc e. Chevron d e f e r e n c e is a f

f o r d e d to an unpublished decision only when it is “direc tly

controlled by
a published decision interpre ting the sam e s t atute.” Uppal , 605 F.3d at 7 1 4

. Although the BIA’s unpublished dec isionC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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10

In fac t, is n o t c le a r th a t Ma t t e r o f C

- M- i nvo l ved C P C § 2 0 7 (a), as t he 3 B IA f ai l ed t o s p eci f

y unde r whi ch C a lif

o rni a ki d nap p i ng s t at ut e t he pet i t i on er h ad bee n c on v i ct ed.

In i t s answeri ng bri ef , t he go vernm ent argues t h a t a lt ho ugh t he 4 p ub l i shed d eci si o ns ci t ed b y t he B IA d i d no t i nt erpret C P C § 2 0 7 (a), t he ag en cy de ci s i on i s n on et h el es s e n t i t l ed t o Chev r on def er en ce

. I t r el i es on cites to published decisions, none interprets CPC § 207(a) and thus n o n e d ir e c tl y c o n tr o ls

. T h e f ir s t c a s e c it e d b y th e BI A, Matte r o f Lo pe z- Me za , involved the offe nse of a g g ravated dr i v i n gun d e r

th e i n f l u e n c e i n v i o l at i o no f

A r i z o n a l aw
. 2 2 I. & N . Dec . 1188 (B IA 1999). The second and third case s cited b y th e BI A, Ma t ter of P and Matter of Nakoi , involved convictions under the Fe dera l KidnappingAct, which contains diffe rent e lements th an si mple kidnappingunder CPC § 2 0 7 ( a ) , mo s t im

p o rta n t b e in g th at th e k id

n a p p in gbe committed for “ransom or rew ard or otherwise.” Ma tte r o

f P , 5 I . & N. De c . 4 44 (B IA 1 95 3) ; Matter of Nakoi , 14 I . & N

. Dec . 208 (B IA 1972). F in al l y , althoug h Matter of C-M- , the fourth case cited by the BIA, invol v ed a kidnapping conviction under

the California Pena l Code, the BI A di d not interpre t CP C § 207(a), or eve n decide that kidnappingwas 3
a categ orica l crime of mor al turp itude. 9 I . & N . Dec . 487 (B IA 1961). Rather , the petitioner t o o k “no issue with the finding[by

the spec ial inquiry

office r] that t h e o ffense of kidnapping , as def

ined by the C alifornia Penal Code, involves moral turpitude,” instea d arguing that he had be en convic ted as a juve nile and that the pr ocee dings w ere th er ef ore not criminal. Id. at 48 8. In s um, the c a se s c ite d b y the B IA i n it s unpublished decision did not “interpre t[ ] the same statute” and thus do not “ direc tly control[] ” the outcome h er e. See Uppal , 605 F.3d at 714. There fore , the B IA dec isio n is not entitled to Chevron defe renc e. 4C AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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o ur en b anc d eci si o n i n M ar m ol ej o- Cam pos , 5 5 8 F .3 d 9 0 3 , t o su p p o rt its argu men t

. I n t h at c as e, h owe v er , w e af f or ded Chev r on de f

e r e n c e t o an
u n pu bl i s h ed B I A dec i s i on becau s e i t r el i ed on “ a pr ec ede n t i al de ci s i on
a d d re ssin g the d isp o sitive q u e stio n o f statu to ry in te rp re ta tio n a t i ssu e in t hi s case” b y i nt erpret i ng t he same st at ut e, t he A ri zo na aggravat ed dri vi ng
u n d e r th e influe n c e sta tute

. I d. a t 905–06, 911. We tur n to the Sk

idm or e framework to de termine whe ther we should neve rtheless de fer to the BI A decision to t he extent it ha s persua sive eff

ect. Unde r Sk

idm or e , the weight af

forde d to t he a g e nc y

de c isi on “ wi ll d e pe nd up on the tho ro ughn e ss e vid e nt i n it s c on sid e ratio n, th e vali dit y of its re a so nin g , it s c on sis te nc y wi th e arl ie r a nd late r p ro no un c e me nts , a nd a ll those fac tors which g ive it power to pe rsuade , if lacking power to control.” Sk

idm or e , 323 U. S. at 14 0; see also Uppal , 6 0 5 F

. 3 d at7 1 5

. H e r e , th e B IAd e c i s i o n i s u n p e r s u a s i v e

. It had l i ttle rea soning a

nd its analy sis of why

CPC § 207(a) constitutes a cr ime of moral turpitude co nsists onl y of two
c on c lus or y state me nts . In th e se state me nts , th e B IA s imp ly repe ated phr ases use d in a decision by the California Court of Appea l, Zataray , 2 1 9 Cal. Rptr. at 39, which dec ided that under Califor

nia eviden ce law, a simple kidnapping
c onvic tio n w a s a dmi ssi ble fo r i mpea c hme nt p ur po se s. Bor rowingthe languag e from that decision, the B IA said that sim ple kid na pp ing un de r CPC § 2 07 (a ) “ inv olv e s r e a din e ss t o do evil and is an off

ense that gr ievously

offe nds the moral code of mankind in its inhere nt nature .” This i s no analy sis at all; the BIA does not explain whysimple kidna pping unde r CPC § 207(a) involves a re adiness to do evil (or even what
rea diness to do evil means), or why i t s o deeply offe nds our moral code — espec ially as it is a general intent crime, see Moya , 6 C al

. Rptr. 2d at 325. More over, w e have held that whether a crime has bee n found to be one of moral turpitude under Califor

nia law is “not of gre at weight give n theC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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12

W e d i scu ss Zat ar ay i n mor e det ai l i n pa r t I I

. B

. bel ow, a n d c on cl u de 5 t ha t i t s ho l d i ng d o es no t aff ec t o ur m o ral turp i t ud e an alysi s in p art b ec au se the fac to rs re lied up o n b y the C a lif o rn ia C o u r t o f A p p e a l — tha t sim p le ki d nap p i ng unde r CP C § 2 0 7 (a) i nvo l ves i nst i l l i ng fear i n t he vi ct i m and is a n inh e re n tly d a n g e ro u s felo n y — fail to c o n sid e r th e a b se n c e o f a cul pabl e ment al s t at e.

N ot abl y , t hi s i s n o t t he f i r s t t i me we h ave he l d a cr i me nott o be a 6 cat ego ri cal cri m e o f m o ral t urpit ud e und er 8 U

. S.C

. § 1 1 8 2 (a)( 2 )( A )( i )( I)
e v e n tho u g h C a lif

o rn ia c o u rts h a v e he ld the c o n tra ry u n d e r th e ir
e v id e n tiar y sta n d a rd fo r p u rp o se s o f i m p e a c h m e n t o f a d e fen d a n t. C o m p a re P e o

p le v . E lw e ll , 253 Cal

. Rpt r

. 480, 482 ( Cal

. Ct

. App. 1988) ( as s aul t wi t h a deadl y wea po n i s a c r i me o f m o r al t ur pi t ude u nder C a lif o rn ia e v id e n tiar y sta n d a rd ), wi t h Ca r r v

. I NS , 8 6 F .3 d 9 4 9 , 9 5 1 (9 th C i r

. 199 6) ( as sau l t w i t h dea dl y wea po n i s not a c r i me i nv ol vi ng mo r al t urpit ud e und er t he Imm i grat i o n and N at i o nal i t y A ct ). differ ent roles of

the [crime involving moral turpitude] desig nation under the [I mmigration and Nationality Act] and California law .” Latter-Singh v. Holder , 668 F.3d 1156, 1163 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012). Th e B IA’ s unr e a so ne d r e lia nc e on a state 5 court de cision that is of a ty pe that we have h el d “i s not of g reat weight” bec ause it re lates to the very differ ent issue of whether a cr ime is moral ly

turpitudinous for purposes of California e vidence law, lacks “powe r t o persua de” a nd thus i s not entitled to defer ence

. S e e S a a v e d ra
-F ig u e r o a v. 6 Holder , 6 2 5 F

. 3 d 6 2 1 , 6 2 7 ( 9 th C i r

. 2 0 1 0 ) ( h o l d i n gth atB IA decision “has no pe rsuasive a uthority ” and de clining Skidmore defe renc e whe re immig ration judg e spec ulated that the c ri me wa s c on sid e re d h e ino us by the pe op le of

Ca lif or nia without ex planation and f ail ed to addr ess intent element) ; Uppal , 605 F.3d a t 715 (dec lining to af ford B IA dec ision Sk idm or e defe renc e be ca use its “ana ly sis [ was] neither tho ro ughly

re a so ne d n or

c on sis te nt wi th pr ior B IA a nd Ni nth Cir c uit c a se law” ). We t

he re fo re de c lin e to gra

nt d e fe re nc e toC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER 13

the unpublished BIA dec ision a nd deter mine de novo whether the elements of si mple kidnapping under CPC § 207(a) me et the g ener ic def

inition of moral turpitud e under immig ration law.

B.

To de te rm ine wh e the r a g ive n off e ns e c on sti tut e s a

c ri me involving mora l turp i t ude, we apply the categ orica l and modified cate g orica l approa ches se t forth in Taylor v. United States , 4 9 5 U

. S. 5 7 5 (1990). See Nunez , 594 F.3d at 1129. Under the categ orica l approa ch, we “compa re the elements of the cr ime to the g ener ic de fi n i t ion of moral turpitude a nd de c ide wh e the r t

he c on du c t pr os c ri be d in the statut e is br oa der th an, and

so do e s n ot c ate g or ic a lly fa ll w ith in, thi s g ener ic def

inition.” Id. at 1129 (interna l quotation marks omi tte d) . In o rd e r t o h old tha t th e statut e of

con vict ion

is
ov e rb ro a d, we mus t de te rm ine that the re is a “ re a lis tic probability ” of its application to conduc t that falls beyond the scope of the g ener ic fe dera l offense

. Id. ; see also Duenas -Alvare

z , 549 U.S. at 193. “I f the c rime does not qualify under the categ orica l approa ch, we apply the modified cate g orica l a

pproac h and look to the documents within t he
re cord of conviction to see whether the conviction in the particula r case invol ved moral turpitude.” Nunez , 594 F.3d at 1129–30.

The I mmigration and Nationality Act does not define the term “c rime involving mora l turpitude,” b ut “cour ts and the BIA have g ener ally define d [i t] as comprising cr imes that are inhere ntly base, vile, or

depra v ed, and c ontrary to the
acc epted r

ules of m orality

and the duties owe d betwee n persons or to society

in ge nera l.” Robles-Urre a v. Holder ,C AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER

14

“ W e h ave he l d t hat , at t hi s s t age of our an al y s i s , we ‘ r el [ y ] on our own 7 g e n e ra lize d d e finiti o n ’ o f m o ra l t u r p it u d e b e c a u se the B IA ha s faile d to p ro v id e a n y ge n e ric d e finiti o n to w h ic h w e c o u ld m e a n in g fu ll y d e fer .” Nun ez , 5 9 4 F

. 3 d a t 1 1 3 0

– 3 1 n.3 (quo t i ng M ar m ol ej o- Cam pos , 558 F. 3d at 91 0 ) ( al t erat i o n i n ori gi nal ). 678 F.3d 702, 708 ( 9th Cir. 2012) (intern al quotation marks and citation omitted). “ Suc h c ri mes are of tw o ty pe s: tho se 7 involving fr aud and those involving g rave acts of base ness or depra vity .” Id. Fr aud is not an element of simple kidnapping under CPC § 207(a), nor is it i nhere nt i n the nature of the crime. I n fac t , the California Supre me Court has held that when the c onsent of the v i ct im is obt ained through fra ud alone, t h e defenda

nt is not guilty

of simple kidnapping

. See Ma jor s , 92 P.3d at 364 (“In contra st to the use of for ce or fea r to compel asportatio n, asportation by fra ud alone doe s not constitute g ener al kidnappingin California.”) (i nterna l quotation marks and citation omitted). We theref ore f ocus on wh e the r s imp le kid

na pp inginv olv e s “ g ra

ve a c ts o f b a se ne ss or depr avity .”

We have e x plained that some “off enses . . . a

re so ba se, vile, and depr aved that they qualify as cr imes of moral tur pit ud e e ve n th ou g h th e y

have no eleme nt o f f

ra ud . T he se o f f e n s e s i n v o l v e ‘ r ath e r

g r av e a c t s o f b a s e n e s s o r d e p r av i ty’ such as murde r, ra

pe, and inc est.” Navarro-Lo p ez v. Gonzales , 503 F.3d 1063, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhar dt, J ., concur ringfor the majority) (c itation omit ted), overruled on other grounds by Unit ed States v. Aguila–Montes de O ca , 65 5 F .3 d 9 15 (9 th C ir . 2 01 1) (e n b anc ). Th e ma jor ity in Navarro-Lopez

explained:C AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER 15

O n ly the F ift h C irc u it h a s d e c id e d w h e the r k id n a p p ing is ca te g o ric a lly 8

a c rim e in v o lvin g m o ra l tu rp itud e , h o ld ing th a t it is n o t. H amdan v

. I NS , 98 F. 3d 183 ( 5t h Ci r

. 1996)

. T h at c as e wi l l be di s cu s s ed i n f ra
. N o ca se f rom our ci rcui t has ad d res sed whether ki d nap p i ng i s a c rim e i nvo l vi ng
m o ral t urpit ud e. O ne case f rom t he Fir st C i rcui t i nvo l ved a remo val on t he gr ound t hat ki dnappi ng was a cr i me of m oral t ur pi t ude, b ut t he pet i t i oner Not al l serious crimes me et this standard, how e v e r

. In d e e d , w e h av e d e te r mi n e d , for example, that burg lary , Cuevas-G aspa r v. Gon z a les , 430 F.3d 1013, 1020 ( 9th Cir. 2005), and a ssault with a

deadly wea pon, Car r v . I NS , 86 F.3d 949, 951 ( 9th Cir. 1996), do not involve mor al turpitude. To be conside red
a cr ime of moral turpitude, a crime othe r than fr a ud mus t be mor e tha

n s eri ou s; i t mu st offe nd the m ost fundame ntal moral value s of society , or as some would say , ‘shock[ ] t he public conscie nce.’ Medina v . United States , 259 F.3d 220, 227 ( 4th Cir. 2001) (quot ing Ma tte r o f D an esh , 19 I . & N . Dec. 669, 670 (B IA 1988)).

Id. at 10 74 –7 5 ( a lte ratio n in or ig ina l) . U lti matel y , “ [o]nl y truly uncons ci o n ab l e c o n d

u cts urp as s es th e t h re s h o l d of moral turpitude.” Robles-Urre a , 678 F.3d at 708.

Cr ime s o f m or a l t ur

pit ud e g e ne ra lly

inv olv e so me “ e vil intent.” Mendoza v . Holder , 623 F.3d 1299, 1302 ( 9 t h Cir. 2010). “The BIA has emphasized that evil or m alicious intent is the e sse nc e of mor a l tur pit ud e ,” and we have “ up he ld t

his emphasis on evil int en t .” Latter-Singh , 668 F.3d at 1161 (interna l quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitt ed). A re view of our

past ca ses analy

zing whethe r par

ticular 8C AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER

16

i n t hat cas e conceded r emo vabi l i t y , and t he i s s ue whe t her he r cr i me was
ca t eg or i ca l l y on e of

mor al t u r pi t u de wa s n ot c on s i der ed or de ci ded. Cho e um v

. I

NS , 12 9 F.3d 29 (1st C i r. 19 9 7 ). offe nses ar e cr imes of moral turpitude r eveal s t hat nonfra udulent crimes of

moral t u rp i tude g ener ally involve an int e nt t o in

jur e , a c tua l injury , or a

pr ote c te d c la ss o f v ic tim s. Nunez , 594 F.3d at 1131. In Uppal , for e x ample, we held that a convic tion for ag g ravated assault under § 268 of the Cana da Criminal Code was not cate g orica lly a cr ime involving mora l turpitude beca

use “an assault statute no t inv olv ing a sp e c if ic intent to injure or a spe cial trust re lationship and no t requiring that the assault cau s e d eath or even se rious bodily

injury
can not qualify

as a c ateg orica l [ crime of moral turpitude].” 60 5 F .3 d at 71 9 (emph a se s in or ig ina l) . Si mil arl y , in Saavedra-Figueroa , w e ana lyzed a c onvic tio n f

or fa lse imp riso nme nt u

nd e r C PC § 2 36 , a

nd he ld t hat it wa s n ot a cate g orica l crime of moral turpitude be cause the statute “doe s not proscribe conduct that c ateg orica lly cause s serious har

m or is direc ted ag ainst a protected class of persons” and “does not require the def

endant to have ha d the intent to harm
nece ssary for the c rime to be ba se, v i l e, o r depr aved.” 625 F.3d at 626 & n.4 ( internal quotation marks omitted). Simpl e kidnappingunder CPC § 207(a) does not requir e an inte nt t o in

jur e , a c tua l in

jur y , o r a sp e c ia l c la ss o f v ic tim s. The thre e ele ments of simple kidna p ping unde r the statute a

re: “(1) the def

endant took, held, or d et ai n ed another per son by using f orce or by

instil ling r eas o nable f

ear ; (2) usingthat forc e or f ear , the def

endant moved the other pe rson, or made the other pe rson move a substantial distanc e; and (3) the other person did not con s ent t o the movement.” Burney , 212 P.3d at 666. I t is a “g ener al intent crime,” and does not require , forC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER 17

For t h i s r ea s on , ou r dec i s i on h er e i s con s i s t en t wi t h ou r r ec en t de ci s i on 9 i n Uni t ed St at es v

. M ar quez
- Lobos , 69 7 F

. 3 d 75 9 (9t h C i r. 20 1 2 ). In M a r q u e z
- Lobos w e he ld tha t A ri zon a ’s k i dn appi n g s t at u t e, ARS §13- 1 3 0 4 , i s c a t e g o r i c a l l y a “ c r i m e o f v i o l e n c e ” u n de r U. S

. S

. G. § 2 L 1 .2(b )(1 )(A ), b ut o nly b ec au se t he A rizo na kid na p p i ng st atute i s a
s pec i f i c i nt ent c rim e tha t “in c lud e s the e le m e n t o f t h e ‘co n c e p t o f a nef ar i ous pur po s e. ’ ” Id

. a t 7 6 4 ; s ee al s o A R S § 1 3 -1 3 0 4 ( listin g six mot i v es , a t l ea s t one o f w h i ch t h e ac cu s ed mu s t h av e t o be g u i l t y of ki d nap p i ng). example, the intent to insti ll fear in the victim. Moya , 6 Ca l. Rptr. 2d at 325. The California Supreme Court has held that

“ the purp os e or

mot ive of

the tak in g an d c arr

yingawa y is imm ate ri a l” wh e n th e vic timis c a pa ble of g ivi ngc on se nt; illega l intent or motive is required only when a child or other person inca

p able of consentingis kidnapped. In reMi c he le D. , 59 P.3d at 168, 171 (internal quotation mar ks, alterations and citation omitted). Ther efor e, a pe rso n can be guilty of kidnapping“howe ver g ood or innoce nt his mot ive or intent may otherwise be .” Oliver , 3 61 P.2 d at 59 5; se e als o P e op le v. Bruno , 193 P. 511, 512–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920) (kidnapping

co n v i ct i o nu

p h el d ev en wh er e def

endant be lieved that he wa s eng ag ed to the v i ct i m and the victim would not object). In fac t, “no stat e o f mind or belief is a part of

the
c r im e o f k id n a p [p ]i n g ,” S

heasbey , 255 P. at 838–39, and a person c an be c onvicted of kidnapping if he actua lly , but
unrea sonably , believed that t h e victim consente d to the movement, se e May berr y , 5 42 P.2 d at 13 45 ; W illiams , 841 P.2d at 965. Accor dingly , the intent to cause injury is not
an el em en to f s i mp l e k i dn ap p i n g. 9

Nor doe s simple kidnapping involve “ the ac tual infliction of har m upon someone, or a

n action that affec ts a protec ted class of vic tim.” Nunez , 594 F.3d at 1131. Ther e i s noC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER

18 require ment that the kidnappingresult in a ctual injury to the vic tim , a nd si mpl e kid

na pp ingc onvic tio ns un de r C PC § 207(a) have been upheld even when the victims have been found to be uninjured. See, e .g. , Pe op le v. Fe lix , 1 12 Ca l. Rptr. 2d 311, 314–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (kidnapping
c onvic tio n u

ph e ld whe re de fe nd ant k idn a pp e d v ic timto reque st a rene wal of their relationship and eventually returne d he r h ome sa fe ly

). Mo re ov e r, wh ile a

kid na pp ingun de r C PC § 207(a) could involve a minor victim or other person with a specia l trust relationshi p t o t h e def endant, see, e .g. , In re Miche le D. , 59 P.3d at 166 (victim was minor child), it can al s o involve complete stra ng ers, see, e .g. , Ma

jor s , 3 6 0 P.3d
at 36 1 ( vic timwa s 1 8- y e ar- old g ir l w ithou t rel atio ns hip to defe ndant). Thus, simple kidnapping und er CP C § 207(a) “ does not
c ate g or ic a lly

have any thi ng in c omm on wi th the ty pe of c ri me we have norma lly

held to involve moral tu rp i t u d e. It can be committed without any

intention of harminganyone, it need not result in actua l harm, a nd it does not nece ssarily involve a protected class of victim.” See Nune z , 5 9 4 F

. 3 d

at1 1 3 5

. It is true that the B IA’s and our case s note th at s ome cr imes involve moral turpitude beca use they are “intrinsically

wrong (malum in se).” Me nd

oz a , 623 F.3d at 1302. We ha ve noted, ho we ve r, that “ no t a ll m a lum in s e c ri me s c ate g or ic a lly involve mo ral turpitude.” Nicanor-Romero v . Mukase y , 5 23 F.3d 992, 998 ( 9th Cir. 2008), o v e rr u le d o n other grounds by Marmolejo- Campos , 558 F. 3 d903. Instead, we h av e emphasiz ed that “both the a ctus reus a nd the mens re a must b e c o n s id e r e d

in c o n c e rt t o d e te r

mi n e w h e th e r

the behavior they

descr ibe is sufficiently

culpable to be labeled morally turpitudinous.” Id. at 999. In fac t, in concludingthat kidnappingfor r ansom under the Fe dera l K idnapping Act wa sC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER 19

a cr ime of m o ral turpitude, the BIA emphasized that the
rec ord of c onviction established that the kidnappin g had involved ransom. Ma tte r o f P , 5 I . & N . Dec . at 446–47. Even in the specific context of a kidnapping c onviction, theref ore, the B IA has a cknowledg ed the importanc e of c onsideringthe prese nce of a culpable me ntal state in deter mining whe ther the cr ime is one of mora l turpitude.

In sum, simpl e kidnapping under CPC § 207(a) does not fall within the ty

pes of ca ses we ha

ve pre viously

held ar e c ate g or ic a l c ri me s o f m oral tu rp itu de . M or e ov e r, c ourt s in California have applied CPC § 207(a) to c o n duct that is not morally turpitudinous. For example, in one ca s e, black stud en t s at a colleg e complaine d about the ac tions of a f o o tb a ll c o a c h in b e ati n g a b la c k f o o tb a ll p la

y e r d uring the
course of a g ame. Peopl e v. Apo , 102 Cal. Rptr. 242, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). Members of the Bla ck Students Union demande d to meet with sever al administrato rs, who responde d that only

the pre sident of the colleg e could take action on personne l issues. See id. The students then surrounde d the administrators and “ marc hed fr om the phy sical education building to the a dminist ration building, a distance of

700 y ards (

just sli g htly l es s than four- tenths of a mile),” so that the a dminist ra t o rs could speak with the pr e sid e nt o f the c oll e g e re g ard ingthe inc ide nt. Id. at 244–45. Duri ngthe marc h, so me stu de nts pu sh e d th e a dmi nis tr ator s, and made threats to ma k e t hem continue moving

. See id. Sev e r a l o f

th e s tu d e n ts w h o p arti c ip ate d in th e ma r c hw ere convicted of

kidnapping

. See id. at 24 5. Th e ir c onvic tio ns , wh ic h w e re up held on

a pp e a l, d e mon str ate that si mpl e k i d n ap ping unde r CPC § 207(a) will be applied to c onduct that, althoug h criminal, is not “truly unconsciona

ble” suc h that it meets the moral turpitude standa rd. The stude nts in ApoC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER

20

a c te d f oo lis hly , n o d ou

bt, but th e ir

c on du c t cann ot be sa id t o “involve rather g rave acts of ba sene ss or depra vity .” NavarroLopez , 5 0 3 F. 3d at 1074 (Reinhar dt, J ., concur ringfor the majority) (inter

nal quotation marks and c itation omit ted).

In a more re ce nt case , the def endant wa s convicted of kidnappingafter he inter cepte d his 18-y ear -old niece , who had run a way to go live w ith her boy friend, a nd drov e her back to his home. People v . Garibay , 20 10 WL21 12 94 7 ( Ca l. Ct. App. May

27, 2010) (unpublished). T he conviction was upheld on appe al. The nie ce h ad made abuse a lleg ations ag ainst her father , and left home t o g o live with her boy friend and his pare nts. Id. at *1– * 2. One nig ht, when she a nd her boy friend w ere returning from dinner with some friends, the defe ndant, his brother ( the father of the g irl), and two other men interc epted their

vehicle. Id. at *1. The fathe r gr abbed the g irl by the ar m, threate ned her

friends, got her i nto the ca r th e d e f e n d an tw a s dr i v i n g , an d

th e d e f e n d an tdr o v e aw ay, t akinghis brother a

nd niece to his house. Id. at * 2

. T h at the de fe nd ant, the un c le of

the vic tim , w a s co nvic te d o f s imp le kidnappingag ain demonstrate s that CPC § 207(a) is applied to conduct that is not morally turpitudi n o u s

. The de fenda nt
a c te d in an unla wf ul m ann e r, but a ssi sting on e ’s br oth e r i n br ing ingba c k a

fa mil y me mbe r wh o ha s ru

n awa y fr om h ome is not conduct we w ould classify as “truly unconsci o nable” such that it meets the mora l turpitude standard.

Th e se tw o c a se s d e mon str ate that th e re i s a “ a re a lis tic probability , n o t [j ust] a theor etical possibility , that [Ca lif or nia ] wo uld

a pp ly [the sim ple kidnappi ng ] statut e to condu ct that falls outside the g ener ic def inition of [ the] crime.” Duenas-A lvarez , 549 U.S. at 193. We have held that “[t] his realistic proba

bility can be established by

showingC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER 21

that, i n at le a st o ne oth e r c a se , th e state cou rt s in fa c t di d apply the statute in the spec ial (nong ener ic) manne r.” Nunez , 594 F.3d at 1129 (internal quotation marks and c itation omi tte d) . H e re , Cal if

or nia c ourt s “in fa c t did ap ply the statut e in the specia l (nong ener ic) manne r” to c onduct that is not
mor a lly tur pit ud inous . T hu s, sim

ple kid na pp ingun de r C PC § 207(a) , when compar ed to the definition of moral turpitude, is o ve rb ro a d a

nd no t lim ite d to c on du c t th at c on sti tut e s a crime of moral turpitude. The g overnme nt relies on a dif fer ent California c ase, Zataray , 219 Cal. Rptr. at 39, to suppor t i t s p osition t hat simple kidnapping is a c ateg orica l crime of mor al turpitude. As explained in part I I .A., the dec ision in Zatarayis “not of g reat weight.” Latter-Singh , 668 F.3d at 1163 n.4. The issue in Zataray was whe th er s i m ple kidnappingwas a crime of moral turpitude for

purposes of Ca liforni a evide ntiary law. 219 Cal. Rptr. at 38–39. In California, a prior convic tion of an offe nse involving moral turpitude may be introduced for the purp os e of

imp e a c hme nt —

to s ho w that th e de fe nd ant i s likely to lie under oath. Zatarayconclud ed t h at a de fenda nt convicted of

simple kidnapping ha d a bad c hara cter , a rea diness to do evil, and there fore had committed a crime of moral turpitude, which c ould be used to i mpeac h him. Id. at 39 . T he c ourt

fa ile d, ho we ve r, to c on sid e r whe the r C PC § 207(a) involved the most elementary require ment for a

n offe nse to categ orica lly constitute a crime of m oral turpitude as applied in c ases r el atingto removal a nd simil ar immigration provisions. To constitute moral turpitude in such
cas es , the offe nse must ge nera lly include a r equire ment of intent to injur e, t h e infli ction of ac tual injury , or a pr otected class of vic tims. See Nune z , 594 F.3d at 1131.C AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER

22 Zataraylabeled all k i d nappingas a c rime of mora l turpitude in part b ec ause it grievously offe nds the inhere nt “m o ral c ode of ma

nkind.” 219 Cal. Rptr. at 39. We cannot
a c c e pt t his sw e e pin g hy

pe rb oli c state me nt, a s th e State its e lf has cr eate d a lesser

cate g ory of kidnapp i n g t h at does not require specific intent, the i nfliction of any injury , bad fa ith,
un lawf ul m oti ve , o r a

ny oth e r e le me nt e st abl ishin gthat a ll such off enses would cate g orica lly be base, vile or depra ved. Compare CPC § 207 with CPC § 209

. S i milarly , Zataray states that CPC § 207(a) is a felony dang erous to human life and that the gr avame n of the off ense is the victim’s appre hension or fe ar; it does not , howeve r, state, a s require d for pur poses of mora l turpitude under imm i gration law, that the defend ant m

us t be awa

re of the ri sk and c on sc iou sly disreg ard it. Uppal , 605 F.3d at 718.

Our d e te rm inatio n th at CPC § 20 7( a ) i s n ot c ate g or ic a lly
a cr ime involving mora l tur pitude is a lso consistent with our
rec ent dec ision in Delgado-H ernandez v. Holder , 697 F.3d 11 25 (9 th C ir . 2 01 2) , in

wh ic h we he ld t

hat CPC § 20 7( a ) i s cate g orica lly

a cr ime of violence under 18 U .S .C. § 16(b) beca use kidnapping prese nts a “substantial risk that phy sical forc e . . . may be used.” Id. at 1127–28 (qu ot ing 18 U. S.C. § 16(b))

. De lga do -H

e rn an de z d i dnot answer

the question here , i.e., whethe r th e p otential use of phy sical for ce in the
c omm iss ion

of a CPC § 20 7(a) ki dn a

pp ingis c ate g or ic a lly tur pi tudin ou s. I t is no t th e c a se tha t e ve ry c ate g or ic a l c ri me of violence is al so cate g orica lly a cr ime involving mora l turpitude. See Cue vas -G aspar v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005) (residential burglar y is not a cate g orica l
c r i m e o f m o r a l tur

p i tu d e e v e nth o u g hi ti s c at e g o r i c a l l y a crime of violence) , abrogated on other grounds by Holder v

. MartinezGu t i errez , 1 32 S. Ct . 2 01 1 ( 20 12 ); se e als o I n r eC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER 23

Brieva-Perez , 23 I & N De c . 766 , 772 –7 3 (B IA 200 5) (“ Som e of the most common crimes f alling w ithin the definition of a ‘crime of violence ’ do not nec essar ily involve moral turpitude.”), overruled on othe r grounds by Judulang v. Holder , 132 S. Ct. 476 (2 01 1)

. He re , the vio le nc e inh e re nt i n a CPC § 2 0 7 (a ) k idnappingdoes not rende r the c rime a cate g orica l crime involvingmoral turpitude bec ause the forc e involved or threa

tened is not nec essar ily

acc ompanied by

an evil intent. For e x am p l e, in t wo of the c ases we descr ibe above, which constituted kidnapping s under C P C § 207(a), the def endants (or

their co- conspirator s ) used a modicum of forc e ag ainst the victims; in Apo , the defe ndants pushed and sh ov e d univ e rs ity

a dmi nis tr ator s to f

or c e the m to marc h w ith the pr ote sti ngstu de nts , 1 02 Ca l. R ptr . at 24 4–45 , whil e in Garibaythe def

endant’ s brother grabbe d his daug hter, who
was a runaw ay , by the arm and forced her into the def endant’ s c ar, 20 10 WL21 12 94 7 at *1 ; se e als o Fe lix , 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 314–15 (upholdinga def endant’ s conviction f

o r k id n a p p ing his e x -g irlfriend wher e he took the ir four- y ear ol dd aughter , wh o wa s in a c ar s e at in

the e x-g ir lf

ri e nd ’s c ar, and

put he r i n his own car

in order to c onvince the g irlfriend t o t ak e a ride in h is c ar t o d isc us s r e un if ic atio n, and th en r e tur

ne d b oth safe ly afte r a 30–45 minute drive ). Ye t despit e the use of phy sical for ce in these case s, t h e actions givingrise to the kid na pp ingc ha

rg e s a g a in st the de fe nd ants un de r C PC § 207(a) wer e not “base , vile, and depr aved,” Navarro-Lopez , 503 F.3d at 1074 ( Reinhardt, J ., concur ring for the majority

), or “truly unconscionable,” Robles-Urre a , 678 F.3d at 708, and did not “involv[e] a spec ific intent to injure,” Uppal , 605 F.3d at 719, or any other for m of “e vil intent,” Me nd

oz a , 62 3 F .3 d at 13 02 , a s wo uld be re qu ir e d f or the se of fe ns e s to constitute crimes of mor al turpitude. Ac cordingly , our holding in De lga do -H

e rn an de z th at C P C § 2 0 7 ( a ) isC AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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24

T h e Lou i s i an a s i mpl e k i dn appi n g s t at u t e pr ov i ded: 10

A

. S i m p l e k i d na p p i ng i s: ( 1) T h e i n t en t i on al a n d f or ci bl e s ei zi n g an d ca r r y i n g of

a n y p e rs o n f

r o m o n e p la c e to a n o the r w itho u t his
con s en t ; or (2 ) T h e inte n tio n a l t a k in g , e n ticin g o r d e c o ying a w a y, f o r an unlawf

ul purp o se, of any chi l d not hi s o wn and

u n der t h e ag e of

f ou r t ee n y ea r s , w i t h ou t t h e con s en t of i t s pa r en t or t h e per s on c h ar g ed wi t h i t s c u s t ody ; or (3 ) T h e inte n tio n a l t a k ing , e n tic ing o r d e c o ying a w a y, wi t ho ut t he co nsent of the pro p er aut ho ri t y , of any p ers o n w ho ha s b een l awf ul l y c o m m i t t ed to any o rphan, i nsane, f eeb l e- m i nd ed or o t her s i m i l ar i nst i t ut i o n. ( 4) T he i nt ent i onal t aki ng , en t i ci ng or decoy i ng awa y and r emo vi ng f

r om t he s t at e, b y any p ar ent o f hi s or her ch i l d, f r om t h e cu s t ody of an y per s on t o w h om c u s t ody has been aw arde d by a n y co urt of co m p et ent j ur i s di ct i on of

an y s t at e, wi t hout t he cons ent of t he l ega l cust o d i an, wi t h i nt ent t o de f eat t he jur i sdi ct io n of t he
s ai d c ou r t ov er t h e cu s t ody of t h e ch i l d. c ate g or ic a lly

a c ri me of viole nc e un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 16 (b ) i s f u l l y c o n s i s t e n tw i tho ur

d e c i s i o nt o d ay. Finally , we n ote that our holdinghere is in li ne with the holding of

the Fif th Circuit, the only

other c ircuit to have de c ide d whe the r k idn a

pp ingqu a lif

ie s a s a cat e g or ic a l c ri me of moral turpitude. Hamdan , 98 F.3d 183

. T h e L ouisiana statut e in t

hat c a se , li ke the statut e he re , w a s a sim ple kidnappingstatute. The F ifth Circuit held that the 10C AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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(5) T he t aki ng, ent i ci ng or d eco y i ng away and rem o vi ng f r om t h e s t at e, by a n y pe r s on , ot h er t h an t h e par en t , of a chi l d t em p o rari l y placed i n his c u st o d y by any co urt
o f co m p e te n t ju risd ic ti o n i n the sta te , w ith inte n t t o def ea t t h e j u r i s di ct i on of s ai d c ou r t ov er t h e cu s t ody of t h e ch i l d.

I d. at 18 6

– 8 7 (quo t i ng 14 L.A. R ev. Stat

. § 4 5 A ). kidnapping“statute cover s conduct that cannot be conside red inh e re ntl y mor a lly tu rpit

ud ino us , a

nd that th e ana ly sis mus t
e xten d b e y on d th e statut e to t he re c or d o f c onvic tio n” to deter mine whether

the petitioner ha d been c onvicted of a crime involvingmoral turpitude. Hamdan , 9 8 F

. 3 d at 1 8 9

. In other wor ds, t h e Fifth Circuit held that simple kidnapping
un de r L ou isi ana

law i s not

cate g orica lly

a cr im e of moral turpitude, thus requiringapplica t i on of the modified
ca t eg orica l approa ch. Id. T h e L o u is ia n a s im p le k id n a p p ing statute contains diff

erent elements than CPC § 207(a), but the re are s uf

fi c ie nt s imi lari tie s th at th e ho ldi ngof the F if th Circuit provides a c lear path t o the result here. The L ouisiana statute requir es “intentional a nd forc ible seizing and ca rry ing of any p e r s o n

. ” Si mp le k id

n a p p in gun d e r

CP C § 2 0 7 (a) simil arly requires that the kidnappingbe ac complished “f o rc i bly , or by

any other mea

ns of instill ing f

ear .” Ne ither statute, howeve r, re quires the intent to ca use ha rm , o r that actua l harm re sult. Moreover, a lth o u gh both the L ouisiana statute and CPC § 207(a) relax the force and lack of consent
re qu ir e me nts wh e n the vic tim is a c hil d o r u na ble to c on se nt,
n eit her requires th at t

h e v ic ti m b e f

r o m t h e s e p r o te cted g roups. Given these simil arities, Ha mdan p r o v id e s p e r suasive auth o r it y f o r h o ld in gth at k id

n a p p in gun d e r

CP C § 2 0 7 (a) , like kidnappi ngunder the L ouisiana simple kidnapping statute, is not a cate g orica l crime of mor al turpitude.C AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

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26

W e a lso no te tha t alth o u g h sim p le kid n a p p ing u n d e r C P C § 2 0 7 (a ) is 11

a s er i ous cr i me, a de f

endan t conv i ct ed un der t hat s t at ut e c an r ece i ve a
s en t en ce of

a s l i t t l e as t h r ee y ea r s , or i f proba t i on i s gr an t ed, one y ea r ( or l ess i f a l ess er se n te n c e is i n t he i nt erest of jus t i ce). C P C § 2 0 8

. M o re
s eve r e s ent enc es ar e r es er ved f or more s er i ous f

orms of ki dnappi ng , s uch

a s kid n a p p ing fo r ra n so m , ro b b e ry, o r ra p e , w h ic h c a rr y a p o ssib le
s ent enc e of

l i f e. C P C § 20 9. H er e, Cast r i j on r ece i ved onl y a s us pended
se n te n c e o f l e ss th a n a ye a r p lus p ro b a tio n fo r h is c rim e o f atte m p t. C.

Th is und ou

bte dly a pp e ars to b e a

dif fi c ult qu e sti on

at f ir st g lance . Kidnappingis a serious crime, and our insti ncts may be that it wo uld me e t the mor a l tur pit ud e de fi nit ion

. “ No t a ll serious cr imes meet [the moral turpitude] s ta n d a rd, howe ver.” Navarro-Lopez , 503 F.3d at 1074 (Reinhardt, J., concurring fo r t he ma jor ity ). Ev e n f or se ri ou s o ff

e ns e s, we mus t lo ok

to the spec ific elements of the statute of conviction and c ompare them to the definition of cr imes involvi n g moral turpitude. Her e, the e lements of simple kidnapping under CPC § 207(a) “do[] n o t c ate g o r ic a ll y

h av e an y th in gin c o mm o nw it

hthe ty pe of c rime we have nor mally held t o i n v o lve moral turp itude. I t can be committed without any intention of harming anyone, it ne ed not r esult in a ctual har m, and it does not nece ssarily

involve a prote cted c lass of victim.” Nunez , 594 F.3d at 1135. “Only truly unconsciona b le conduc t surpasses the threshold of mora l turp i t u de,” Robles-Urre a , 678 F.3d at 708, and simple kidnapping, as interpr eted by Ca lif or nia c ourt s, do e s not s ur

pa ss t hat thre sh old . Ca lif

or nia
c ourt s h ave in f

a c t a pp lie d th e sim

ple kid na pp ingstatut e to
c on du c t that is c le arl y

no t mo ra lly

tur pit ud ino us

. There fore ,

11
we ho ld t hat si mpl e kid

na pp ingun de r C PC § 2 07 (a ) i s no t a cate g orica l crime of mor al turpitude.C AS TR I J ON -G AR C I A V

. H OL DER 27

D.

“ In th e a bs e nc e of a c ate g or ic a l matc h, we g e ne ra lly a pp ly a modified c ateg orica l analy sis, in which we cons ide r whe ther
rec ord docume nts or j udicially noticeable fac ts establish that the alien’s p rior convic tion satisfies the g ener ic offe nse.” Saavedra-Figueroa , 625 F.3d at 628. The B IA did not rea ch the mod if

ie d c ate g or ic a l a

pp ro a c h a

na ly sis be c a

us e it
err oneously

held that simple kidnappingunder CPC § 207(a) is a c ate g or ic a l c ri me of

mor a l turp itu de . A lth ou g h it se e ms un lik e ly that on the bas is of thi s r e c or d th e a g e nc y c ou ld conclude t h at Castrijon was convicte d of a c rime of mora l tu r p it u d e , “ w e r e c o g n iz e th at t h e B IAis e n ti tl e d

to c o nduct the ana ly sis in the first instance.” Robles-Urre a , 678 F.3d at 712. We the ref

ore rema nd to the BIA to c onduct the modified cate g orica l approa ch.

C ONCL US I ON
Be cause simple kidnapping unde r CPC § 207(a) i s not cate g orica lly

a cr ime involving mora l turpitude, the BIA er red in determiningthat Castrijon was statu t o ri ly ineligible f

or c an c e l l at i o no f

r e m o v a l o nth atb a s i s

. W e r e m an d t o th e B IA to determine whether , under the mo d i fi ed ca teg orica l approa ch, Castrijon was c o n v i cted of a cr ime of moral turpitude.

P ETIT ION G RA NT ED and REM AN DE D

.