Filed 1/18/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ADANNA CAR WASH 

CORPORATION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JESUS GOMEZ,

Defendant and Respondent.

B313649

(Los Angeles County Super.

Ct. No. 20LBCP00190)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.

Gulino Law Office and John J. Gulino for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Telleria, Telleria & Levy and M. Anthony Jenkins for

Defendant and Respondent.

__________________________
2

This appeal addresses the relationship between two 

statutory surety bonds required under different sections of the 

Labor Code.1 Adanna Car Wash Corporation (Adanna) appeals 

from the superior court’s dismissal of its trial de novo appeal 

from the Labor Commissioner’s award of back wages and other 

damages in favor of Adanna’s former employee, Jesus Gomez. 

The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction 

because Adanna failed to post with the trial court an appeal bond

required by section 98.2. 

Adanna contends that it, in fact, had complied with section 

98.2, pointing to a surety bond that it had posted earlier under a 

different Labor Code provision, section 2055. The section 2055 

undertaking is required of all car wash owners as a condition of 

operating a car wash business. We agree with the trial court that 

the section 2055 bond was not the appeal bond required under 

section 98.2. Accordingly, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Following a hearing on Gomez’s wage claim against 

Adanna, the Labor Commissioner awarded Gomez $23,915.59 for 

overtime earnings, meal period premium pay, rest period 

premium pay, liquidated damages, interest, and waiting time 

penalties. (The merits of the claim are not material to this 

appeal.) On August 13, 2020, the Labor Commissioner served its

decision on Adanna.

Under section 98.2, subdivision (a), a party to a Labor 

Commissioner proceeding may seek review “of an order, decision, 

or award by filing an appeal to the superior court, where the 

appeal shall be heard de novo.” Under subdivision (b) of the 

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Labor Code 

unless indicated otherwise.
3

statute, if the employer is the appealing party, the employer 

must post a bond.

On August 18, 2020, Adanna filed with the superior court a 

document entitled “Department of Industrial Relations Notice of 

Appeal De Novo” and a “Notice of Posting Bond Re Department of 

Industrial Relations Notice of Appeal De Novo.” The notice of 

posting bond stated: “NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that, 

pursuant to California Labor Code, § 98.2(b), Appellant hereby 

posts an appeal bond in the amount of the Order, Decision, or 

Award from which Appellant appeals. The Original of the appeal 

bond is appended hereto as Exhibit ‘A.’ ”

The first page of exhibit A was a “Hudson Continuation 

Certificate,” which indicated the Hudson Insurance Company

(Hudson) had issued Adanna Car Wash Corporation a California 

“Car Wash Bond” in favor of the Department of Industrial 

Relations. The corporate certificate stated its seal was affixed on 

May 8, 2020. Although the document had a line for the signature 

of Hudson’s “Attorney-in-Fact,” Julliet Adesuyan, the certificate

attached to the notice was unsigned. The next two pages of 

exhibit A indicated that Hudson and ASI American Safety 

Casualty Insurance gave Julliet Adesuyan power of attorney up 

to $150,000.

2

On February 16, 2021, Gomez moved to dismiss the appeal 

because Adanna “failed to deposit/post an undertaking, which is a 

jurisdictional prerequisite for [its] appeal under Labor Code 

section 98.2(b).” Gomez explained Adanna had attached a copy of 

2 As we discuss shortly, the $150,000 reference is to the 

amount of a bond required under section 2055 (not section 98.2), 

a statute applicable only to car wash businesses.
4

its section 2055 car wash bond, not the required section 98.2

bond. We set out in the margin the two statutes, which, we 

observe, are in separate Divisions of the Labor Code.

3

In his motion to dismiss and reply points and authorities, 

Gomez pointed out that the superior court did not have control 

over the section 2055 bond which is filed with the Labor 

Commissioner. Thus, the earlier bond could not necessarily (or at 

least not easily) secure payment to the employee following a 

3 Division 1 of the Labor Code creates, among other things, 

the Department of Industrial Relations and an administrative 

process for an employee to seek relief against an employer. (§ 79 

et seq.) It is not unique to any particular type of business or 

employer. Under section 98.2, “[a]s a condition to filing an appeal 

pursuant to this section, an employer shall first post an 

undertaking with the reviewing court in the amount of the order, 

decision, or award. The undertaking shall consist of an appeal 

bond issued by a licensed surety or a cash deposit with the court 

in the amount of the order, decision, or award.” (§ 98.2, subd. 

(b).) If the employee succeeds in the appeal and the employer 

fails to pay the judgment in 10 days of entry of judgment, 

settlement, or dismissal or withdrawal of appeal, the bond is 

forfeited to the employee. (Ibid.)

Section 2055 is part of Division 2 of the Labor Code and

deals only with regulation and supervision of car washes. On its 

face, it has nothing to do with Labor Commissioner appeals. 

Section 2055, subdivision (b) conditions a car wash’s registration 

and registration renewal on the car wash obtaining “a surety 

bond issued by a surety company admitted to do business in this 

state. The principal sum of the bond shall not be less than one 

hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000).” The bond is “in favor 

of, and payable to, the people of the State of California, and shall 

be for the benefit of any employee damaged by his or her 

employer’s failure to pay wages, interest on wages, or fringe 

benefits. . . .” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)
5

successful appeal. Gomez argued the bond was a jurisdictional 

requirement and, without an appeal bond, the superior court 

lacked jurisdiction to hear Adanna’s appeal from the Labor 

Commissioner’s award.

In opposition, Adanna argued that the section 2055 bond 

satisfied the section 98.2 undertaking because the former was 

intended to benefit car wash employees and Gomez was a car 

wash employee. Adanna also asserted Gomez’s motion was 

untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 995.920.

The superior court granted Gomez’s motion and dismissed 

the appeal. The court agreed that Adanna failed to file the 

required section 98.2 undertaking and concluded the court lacked

jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Labor Commissioner’s 

decision. Adanna appealed to this court.

DISCUSSION

Adanna argues the superior court erred in dismissing its 

appeal because it satisfied section 98.2’s undertaking 

requirement with its section 2055 car wash bond.4

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

The basic framework of appeals of Labor Commissioner 

decisions to the superior court has been succinctly stated by our 

4 There are no cases, published or unpublished, discussing 

the section 2055 undertaking requirement. However, some 

secondary resources refer to the undertaking as a “car wash 

bond,” and we adopt that nomenclature. (See e.g. Rebekah 

Didlake, Ensuring Wages for California Restaurant Workers: 

Utilizing the Self-Help Prejudgment Wage Lien Tool (2022) 

52 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 187, 204; Labor and Employment Law 

– California (CCH 2018) ¶ 5-46503, § 13682, subd. (b)(2) [2017 

WL 3889857].) 
6

colleagues in the First District: “When an employer does not pay 

wages as required by law, an employee may file either a civil 

action in court or a wage claim with the [Labor] Commissioner. 

(§§ 98-98.8.)” (Cardinal Care Management, LLC v. Afable (2020) 

47 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1018 (Cardinal Care).) If the employee 

seeks administrative relief, a deputy commissioner holds an

informal, expedited hearing on the employee’s wage claims. 

(Ibid.) “Within 10 days after service of notice of the [Labor] 

Commissioner’s order, decision, or award, either party may 

appeal to the superior court, which considers the matter de novo.” 

(Ibid.) 

“An employer’s right to appeal the [Labor] Commissioner’s 

decision is further ‘conditioned on the necessary prerequisite that 

the employer post . . . [an] undertaking for the amount of the 

award.’ [Citation.] ‘The undertaking shall consist of an appeal 

bond issued by a licensed surety or a cash deposit with the court 

in the amount of the order, decision, or award.’ (§ 98.2[, subd.]

(b).) ‘The purpose of this requirement is to discourage employers 

from filing frivolous appeals and from hiding assets in order to 

avoid enforcement of the judgment.’ ” (Burkes v. Robertson (2018)

26 Cal.App.5th 334, 341–342, fn. omitted.) The “undertaking 

requirement of section 98.2[, subdivision] (b) is mandatory and 

jurisdictional, and . . . the court has no authority to extend the 

deadline for posting the undertaking beyond the deadline for 

filing the notice of appeal.”

5 (Palagin v. Paniagua Construction, 

Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 124, 140.)

5 As is the case with bonds in other settings, where an 

indigent employer is unable to post the security, the employer 

may ask the trial court to waive the undertaking. (Cardinal 
7

Whether Adanna satisfied the required undertaking and 

whether the superior court had jurisdiction are legal issues that 

we review de novo. (Deiro v. Los Angeles County Civil Service 

Com. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 925, 929.)

2. Adanna Failed to Post the Required Undertaking

Without citation to any authority, Adanna asserts the 

documents it attached to the notice of the bond posting satisfied 

section 98.2, subdivision (b). We disagree. 

a. The Certificate on Its Face Was Not a Legally 

Enforceable Bond 

Preliminarily, we observe that although the “The Hudson 

Continuation Certificate” in exhibit A identified a bond number,

the document itself was not executed. The signature of Hudson’s 

attorney in fact, Julliet Adesuyan, is nowhere to be found. 

Execution by the surety is a prerequisite for a valid bond in an 

action or proceeding. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 995.140, subd. (a)(1)

& (2) [“ ‘Bond’ includes both of the following: [¶] (1) A surety, 

indemnity, fiduciary, or like bond executed by both the principal 

and sureties. [¶] (2) A surety, indemnity, fiduciary, or like 

undertaking executed by the sureties alone.”].) The two pages 

that follow the continuation certificate purport to be powers of 

attorney, not a bond. 

b. Adanna’s Car Wash Bond Was Not the Required 

Section 98.2 Appeal Bond

Even if the continuation certificate were an enforceable 

bond for some purposes, it is simply not the undertaking required 

by section 98.2. We begin our analysis with the obvious: there 

Care, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 1019; see Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 995.240.) Adanna makes no argument along this line.
8

are two types of bonds in play here – a section 98.2 appeal bond 

and a section 2055 car wash bond. 

Section 98.2, subdivision (b) states “the undertaking shall 

consist of an appeal bond issued by a licensed surety or a cash 

deposit with the court in the amount of the order, decision, or 

award.” (§ 98.2, subd. (b), italics added.) The appeal bond is 

forfeited to the employee where the employer’s appeal fails or is 

withdrawn, and the employer does not timely pay the award. 

(§ 98.2, subd. (b).)

In contrast, a $150,000 car wash bond is a prerequisite to 

operating a car wash in California. (§ 2055.) On its face, section 

2055 makes clear a car wash bond has nothing to do with

litigation or appellate proceedings. It is condition that must be 

satisfied before the car wash employer may obtain a license or 

permit: “An employer shall not conduct any business until the 

employer obtains a new surety bond and files a copy of it with the 

[Labor Commissioner].” (§ 2055, subd. (b)(3).)

Here, “The Hudson Continuation Certificate” expressly 

states the undertaking is a “CA Car Wash Bond” that benefits 

the Department of Industrial Relations. Adanna admits in its 

appellate briefing that the bond was issued pursuant to section 

2055.

Adanna’s sleight-of-hand attempt to substitute a car wash 

bond for an appeal bond runs afoul of a rule that applies to bonds 

in general. Code of Civil Procedure section 995.140, subdivision 

(b) expressly distinguishes between a licensing bond and one 

furnished in connection with litigation. It provides: “A bond 

provided for or given ‘in an action or proceeding’ does not include 

a bond provided for, or given as, a condition of a license or 

permit.” (§ 995.140, subd. (b); see Walt Rankin & Associates, Inc. 
9

v. City of Murrieta (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 605, 618 [bond for 

public works contract is not a bond on “an action or proceeding”].)

The distinct purposes of the two bonds explain, at least in 

part, why they are found in two different Divisions of the Labor 

Code: the appeal bond (§ 98.2) in Division 1 and the car wash 

bond (§ 2055) in Division 2.

c. Allowing an Employer to Rely on a Car Wash Bond in 

Lieu of an Appeal Bond Would Disadvantage 

Employees like Gomez

Ignoring the internal differences in the statutory language 

of sections 98.2 and 2055, and their placement in the Labor Code, 

Adanna argues the car wash bond’s “purpose and its effect is 

identical to that of the ‘appeal bond’ identified in [section] 98.2.” 

Adanna continues that posting a car wash bond in lieu of an 

appeal bond, or at least appending the car wash bond to its notice 

of appeal, “places no additional burden on the employee but 

provides the employee with an ally in the form of the Labor 

Commissioner. That is, the Labor Commissioner undertakes to 

enforce the bond obligations in a circumstance where the 

employer fails to pay timely a judgment affirming the Labor 

Commissioner Award or a finding in favor of the employee.”

That is not so. The car wash bond is “in favor of, and 

payable to, the people of the State of California, and shall be for 

the benefit of any employee damaged by his or her employer’s 

failure to pay wages, interest on wages, or fringe benefits. . . .” 

(§ 2055, subd. (b)(1).) Although the employee is the indirect 

beneficiary of the car wash bond, the bond itself is payable to the 

Department of Industrial Relations—not Gomez. (See generally 

Code Civ. Proc., § 995.130, subd. (a) [“ ‘Beneficiary’ means the 

person for whose benefit a bond is given, whether executed to, in 
10

favor of, in the name of, or payable to the person as an obligee.”].) 

Because the employee is not the direct beneficiary of the bond, to 

recover damages from the section 2055 car wash bond, the 

employee must “proceed against the employer’s surety bond by 

taking whatever action he or she deems appropriate to obtain the 

unpaid wages, interest on wages, fringe benefits, or gratuities 

from the bond.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 13693(a).) 

In contrast, the section 98.2 appeal bond is a streamlined

method for the enforcement of any Labor Commissioner award in 

favor of the employee. It guarantees immediate forfeiture of the 

bond to the respondent employee when “the employer fails to pay 

the amount owed within 10 days of entry of the judgment, 

dismissal, or withdrawal of the appeal, or the execution of a 

settlement agreement.” (§ 98.2, subd. (b).)6 

d. The Legislature Amended Section 98.2 in 2000 

Because of Its Concern that Employees Were Often 

Having Difficulty Enforcing Labor Commissioner 

Awards Following an Appeal

The Legislative history also supports our analysis that the 

posting of a section 98.2 bond is essential to protect employees in 

Labor Commissioner appeals filed by employers. Prior to 2000, 

section 98.2 did not require employers seeking appellate review of 

6 Adanna does not address the hypothetical situation in 

which the Labor Commissioner’s award to the employee exceeds 

the $150,000 limit of the car wash bond. Adanna’s position on 

appeal would suggest that the employer could post the car wash 

bond plus an additional appeal bond to make up the difference. 

There is nothing in the statutory scheme that supports such an 

odd procedure.
11

Labor Commissioner awards to post a bond.7 In that year, the

Legislature amended section 98.2 to include the appeal bond 

requirement to ensure that workers are paid if they prevail at the 

de novo appeal in cases where employers “disappear or declare 

bankruptcy” during the appeal. (Assembly member Steinberg, on 

Labor and Employment Com., letter to Gov. Davis, Sept. 8, 2000

7 Prior to the 2000 amendment, section 98.2, subdivisions (a) 

and (b) read: 

“(a) Within 10 days after service of notice of an 

order, decision, or award the parties may seek review 

by filing an appeal to the municipal or superior court, 

in accordance with the appropriate rules of 

jurisdiction, where the appeal shall be heard de novo. 

A copy of the appeal request shall be served upon the 

Labor Commissioner by the appellant. For purposes 

of computing the 10-day period after service, Section 

1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be 

applicable.

“(b) If the party seeking review by filing an 

appeal to the municipal or superior court is 

unsuccessful in the appeal, the court shall determine 

the costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by 

the other parties to the appeal, and assess that 

amount as a cost upon the party filing the appeal.”

The only other part of the pre-2000 version of section 98.2 

that referred to a bond was subdivision (h): “The Labor 

Commissioner shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that 

judgments are satisfied, including taking all appropriate legal 

action and requiring the employer to deposit a bond as provided 

in Section 240.” This provision is found in subdivision (j) in the 

current statute. Section 240 allows the Labor Commissioner to 

require a bond where an appeal has not been taken.
12

regarding Assem. Bill No. 2905 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) pp. 1-2.) 

As later legislative analysis explains, when the appeal bond was 

being considered there was evidence that “unscrupulous 

employers, particularly those in the underground economy, were 

filing ‘frivolous’ appeals of [Labor Commissioner] decisions with 

the superior court in an effort to drag out litigation and hide 

assets so that workers would not be able to collect on judgments, 

even if ultimately successful on appeal.” (Sen. Com. on Labor 

and Industrial Relations, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. AB 2772

(2009–2010 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 8, 2010, p. 1.) Via the

bond requirement, the Legislature sought to eliminate frivolous 

appeals and protect the employee who was successful in 

proceedings before the Labor Commissioner. 

The Court of Appeal’s 2006 decision in Progressive 

Concrete, Inc. v. Parker (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 540 (Progressive 

Concrete) instigated further amendment to section 98.2, 

subdivision (b). The Progressive Concrete court concluded that 

the appeal bond was directory, not mandatory or jurisdictional.

(Id. at p. 552.) After Progressive Concrete, the Legislature found 

that some employers continued to disregard the bond 

requirement and trial courts could not dismiss on that basis. 

Instead, courts had to first issue an order directing the employer 

to post the bond before dismissing the appeal. This meant “that 

an employee must generally retain counsel to file a motion for 

such an order. If the employer disobeys the court order by failing 

to post the bond, then the court may dismiss the appeal.” (Sen. 

Com. on Labor and Industrial Relations, Analysis of Assem. Bill 

No. 2772, supra, at p. 2.) Employers who failed to post bonds 

either (1) delayed proceedings to shift assets and judgment proof 

themselves, or (2) hoped that “workers would be unable to secure 
13

counsel to handle the trial de novo and would walk away from a 

legitimate claim for wages (which they had won at the Labor 

Commissioner level).” (Assemblymember Swanson, Labor and 

Employment letter to Gov. Schwarzenegger, July 8, 2010, Assem. 

Bill No. 2772 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) p. 1.)

In 2010, Assembly Bill No. 2772 made explicit that the 

appeal bond was a condition of filing and the failure to post an 

appeal bond a basis for dismissal. (Sen. Com. on Labor and 

Industrial Relations, Analysis Assem. Bill No. 2772, supra, at 

p. 4.) Assembly Bill No. 2772 evidenced the Legislature’s 

intention to prevent employers from gaming the system and to 

make it easier for employees to actually receive their 

compensation following a successful Labor Commissioner award 

or trial de novo judgment. (See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. 

Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1129 [“The purpose of this 

requirement is to discourage employers from filing frivolous 

appeals and from hiding assets in order to avoid enforcement of 

the judgment. (Sen. Com. on Labor and Industrial Relations, 

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2772[, supra,] p. 4.)”].)

We hold that a section 2055 car wash bond is not an appeal 

bond under section 98.2 subdivision (b). Because exhibit A to 

Adanna’s notice was not an appeal bond, Adanna failed to file the 

requisite undertaking per section 98.2, subdivision (b). The

superior court lacked jurisdiction over the Adanna’s de novo 

appeal, and respondent’s motion to dismiss was properly 

granted.8

8 Adanna also argues that Gomez’s motion was untimely 

because it was filed more than 10 days after service of Adanna’s 

notice. Code of Civil Procedure section 995.930, subdivision (c) 

allows a court to permit late filing of a motion challenging a bond 
14

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Defendant and respondent Jesus 

Gomez is awarded costs on appeal.

RUBIN, P. J.

I CONCUR:

MOOR, J.

“upon a showing of good cause for failure to make the objection 

within the time required by statute or of changed circumstances.” 

By its order dismissing the appeal, the superior court impliedly 

found there was good cause for not filing the motion within the 

statutory period. Adanna does not claim that the court abused 

its discretion in doing so. (See Laraway v. Sutro & Co. (2002) 

96 Cal.App.4th 266, 273 [“Determinations of good cause are 

generally matters within the trial court’s discretion, and are 

reversed only for an abuse of that discretion.”].) 
Adanna Car Wash Corporation v. Jesus Gomez

B313649

BAKER, J., Concurring

Although I do not subscribe to all the particulars of the 

majority’s published opinion—which in several respects goes 

beyond what was presented to us in the briefs filed by the parties, 

I agree the result reached by the trial court should be affirmed.

BAKER, J.