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S. HRG. 113–694 

FROM HERE TO MARS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 9, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts 

CORY BOOKER, New Jersey 

JOHN E. WALSH, Montana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

DAN COATS, Indiana 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JOHN WILLIAMS, General Counsel 

DAVID SCHWIETERT, Republican Staff Director 

NICK ROSSI, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

REBECCA SEIDEL, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE 

BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts 

JOHN E. WALSH, Montana 

TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking Member 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

DAN COATS, Indiana 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 9, 2014 ................................................................................ 1 

Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Rubio .................................................................................... 31 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement of Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation .............................................................................................. 31 

WITNESSES

William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and 

Operations, National Aeronautics and Space Administration ......................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Susan Eisenhower, Chairman Emeritus, Eisenhower Institute, President, Eisenhower Group, Inc. ........................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Dr. Leroy Chiao, Former NASA Astronaut; Commander, International Space 

Station Expedition 10; Special Advisor for Human Spaceflight, The Space 

Foundation; and Chairman, National Space Biomedical Research Institute 

User Panel ............................................................................................................ 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18 

Jeffrey Manber, Managing Director, NanoRacks, LLC ........................................ 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to: 

William H. Gerstenmaier ................................................................................. 49 

Dr. Leroy Chiao ................................................................................................ 50 

(1) 

FROM HERE TO MARS 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Good morning. 

Thank you all for coming. We have held, in this committee, a 

number of hearings on space exploration. We’ve highlighted how 

the technologies developed benefit our lives here on Earth. We’ve 

discussed the potential dangers of near-Earth objects. We’ve heard 

about the growing commercial space industry. We’ve explored how 

NASA’s efforts will eventually allow us to put an American on 

Mars. We even heard last year, via downlink, from the ISS about 

some of the amazing work that is going on up there. And all of that 

means that we have plenty of chances to share the excitement 

about the space program. 

But, look. It’s an empty dais. And it’ll just be Senator Rubio and 

me when he arrives. And he’s filling in for Senator Cruz who understandably is in Texas today for the memorial service at the 

Army base there. 

So we need to generate some excitement, again, among the 

American people. And, of course, things give us a problem. Now we 

have the tensions with Russia. Is it going to impact the space program? 

As we’ve seen before, the exploration of space has been the one 

area in times of geopolitical conflict that we can rise above that. 

So NASA’s success is not only a product of tremendous investments 

in technology, but also in international cooperation. And I believe 

that we need to continue that tradition. 

Geopolitics may or may not affect the nation’s exploration mission. It certainly affected it back at the dawn of the Space Race, 

because of the launch of Sputnik. NASA was designed, in part, to 

demonstrate to the world the power of the American way of life. 

NASA’s 1958 Organic Act signed by the grandfather of Susan Eisenhower, President Eisenhower, stated that U.S. space activities 

should contribute to international cooperation. When Secretary of 

Defense McNamara and NASA Administrator Jim Webb proposed 

2 

a lunar mission to the Kennedy administration in 1961, they argued that ‘‘Our attainments (in space) are a major element in the 

international competition between the Soviet system and our own.’’ 

And yet, NASA was a vehicle for working with the Soviets in the 

midst of the Cold War with all of the ICBMs pointed at each other 

with nuclear weapons. In 1975, we had Apollo-Soyuz, the first linkup between a Soviet and U.S. spacecraft, which President Nixon 

viewed as important in pursuing de ́tente. General Tom Stafford, 

the leader of that mission, with General Alexei Leonov, they rendezvoused a Soviet space craft and an American space craft. They 

docked and they lived together in space for 9 days. 

And you talk about a role model for international cooperation. 

Look at the friendship today between Tom Stafford and Alexei 

Leonov. And General Stafford testified here. He called it ‘‘The shining light during the Cold War Era in our relationship with the Soviet Union.’’ That’s what Tom said here. 

And so, today, the ISS, a stunning example of engineering and 

cooperation, combines the contributions of 15 partner nations and 

the famous NASA-Mars Curiosity Rover carries instruments provided by France, Canada, Germany, Russia and Spain. So our leadership in space is a result of decades of strategic investment. If we 

want to maintain that position, then the investments that we’re 

making today have got to be strategic. 

And yet, we’re in an era of limited budgets. The space arena now 

includes new players like China, India, and the private sector. 

So as we look to the future, there are a few questions that I 

would like to propose. What do we get out of our investment in 

being pioneers in space? Number two, how will each mission such 

as the Asteroid Redirect Mission, help meet our space exploration 

goals and benefit American interests? And Bill Gerstenmaier is 

going to speak to that. Number three, when and how will we cooperate with international and commercial partners? And which 

partners will we exclude, and why? 

Following so many decades of advancement in space and given 

the high cost and amazing benefits of exploration, there’s no room 

for rash actions but only for very careful decisionmaking. Those 

leading exploration efforts will realize it is a truth: those that lead 

will realize the economic scientific and political benefits. 

And so, it’s my pleasure to introduce today’s witnesses. Bill 

Gerstenmaier, NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations. Susan Eisenhower, President of the Eisenhower Group, author of Partners in Space, which details U.S.-Soviet cooperation. She will discuss lessons learned. Dr. Leroy Chiao, 

Special Advisor for Human Space Flight to the Space Foundation, 

former Commander of the ISS and a former member of the Augustine Commission. He will discuss the advantages and complications 

associated with international cooperation. Jeffrey Manber, Managing Director of NanoRacks and the author of Selling Peace, a 

book about work with the Russian space program. He will address 

the potential for commercial involvement and expiration Beyond 

Low-Earth Orbit. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier. 

3 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER, ASSOCIATE 

ADMINISTRATOR, HUMAN EXPLORATION AND OPERATIONS, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for 

the opportunity to participate in this hearing entitled ‘‘From Here 

to Mars.’’ 

I’ll briefly describe NASA’s approach to human spaceflight that 

takes humans eventually to Mars. NASA does not see this as a 

monolithic mission or a classic design reference mission approach. 

NASA in this constrained and uncertain budget environment is 

building the infrastructure—that’s operations, techniques, international involvements, spacecraft and hardware—that will allow us 

to make sustained progress toward a human presence on the surface of Mars. 

NASA is developing capabilities and systems that will allow a 

human presence off the Earth and in the solar system. We’re going 

off the Earth while benefiting the inhabitants of the Earth. NASA 

is making significant progress. Each of our activities are judged 

through the lens of being critical and used in future Mars-class 

missions. We are not building a single one-time optimized mission 

to Mars, but an infrastructure that allows humans to pioneer the 

solar system. 

NASA sees three unique regions in space: Earth-reliant, where 

the ISS resides today; two, the proving ground, where the Asteroid 

Redirect Mission will occur in the vicinity of the Moon; and three, 

Earth-independent, or Mars-ready. These regions for human presence require gradually increasing risk acceptance, hardware reliability, and operational complexity. 

NASA believes that its step-wise approach is superior than attempting a Mars-class mission without proper preparation. Just as 

Mercury and Gemini prepared the way for Apollo, we see ISS, in 

the Earth-reliant region, and the Asteroid Redirect Mission, a first 

mission in the proving ground around the Moon, as paving the way 

for Mars-class missions. We also see a significant opportunity to 

work with the Science Mission Directorate and international partners on this approach. 

The International Global Exploration Roadmap, developed by 12 

countries, supports this approach. The roadmap provides a framework to guide countries in their role for human exploration. 

NASA’s current plans are implementing those first key pieces of 

that roadmap. 

The ISS plays a critical role. The ISS not only benefits life on 

Earth but has a critical role in exploration and pioneering of the 

solar system. ISS is not only helping to understand how the human 

body will adapt in the long-duration space flight and allowing us 

to test high reliability hardware such as life support for Mars-class 

missions, but it’s allowing us to build strong international relationships and experiment with commercial private sector capabilities. 

It’s clear that international involvement will be critical to any 

Mars-class mission. Jeff Manber and NanoRacks have shown the 

direct benefit of utilizing the commercial sector and nongovernmental investments to augment government-sponsored activities. 

Mars-class missions will drive technology and will require international and commercial involvement. 

4 

ISS is the first critical step in exploration. Two other critical 

components are the Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle, SLS, and Orion. 

It’s clear from all studies that a Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle is needed. When I see Russia and China beginning to talk about the need 

for a Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle, this reaffirms our analysis. 

Orion is making tremendous progress. The avionics testing in 

Florida completed yesterday for the test mission this fall. Orion is 

making tremendous progress. Eighty percent of the software and 

basic avionics that will be used on the test flight this fall are the 

same that will be planned for future Orion flights. The test this fall 

also verifies heat shield performance. 

SLS tests and manufacturing is well underway in New Orleans. 

Several barrel sections and domes are complete and a vertical weld 

assembly is being installed in New Orleans that will allow these 

sections to be welded into a tank. 

Flight hardware for the Exploration Mission 1, an un-crewed test 

of SLS and Orion, is beginning to be manufactured this year in 

New Orleans. The European service module for the Exploration 

Mission 1 is undergoing preliminary design review in Europe. This 

is tremendous progress and reflects the international involvement 

lessons learned directly from ISS. There is real hardware in manufacture for the path to Mars. 

Last, teams are working on the Asteroid Redirect Mission. Solid 

trades in analysis and requirements are in work. There are concepts being investigated—one that captures an asteroid and returns it into a distant retrograde orbit around the Moon; and another that removes a boulder from a large, potentially hazardous 

asteroid and also moves this boulder to an orbit around the Moon. 

This mission leverages off of activities that were already in work: 

asteroid identification, solar electric propulsion, and uses the basic 

capabilities of SLS and Orion. The solar-electric bus used for this 

mission will be the bus used for Mars cargo-class missions. This 

mission allows for significant operations development in the proving ground of space near the Moon. 

If international partners or commercial companies have interest 

in a lunar surface operation, the techniques, lunar gravity assists, 

et cetera, developed by the Asteroid Redirect Mission, will enable 

NASA to support their efforts. The Asteroid Redirect Mission will 

make significant progress toward furthering the knowledge needed 

for a Mars-class mission. 

NASA has a strong approach that extends human presence into 

the solar system. This approach starts with the International Space 

Station and a firsthand knowledge gained from the ISS and systems, human health, international, and commercial partnerships. 

There’s still a lot of work for ISS. The extension of ISS operations to at least 2024 was critical. There’s also a lot of work needed to establish Commercial Crew capability to the ISS. 

The approach, ISS, SLS, Orion, and the Asteroid Redirect Mission, coupled with commercial and international involvement, is 

well underway today. We have a sound approach that is sustainable, leading to an eventual human presence on Mars. Human exploration and pioneering are more than a single hardware development activity but are an integrated series of activities all of which 

are required to take us from here to Mars. 

5 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, 

HUMAN EXPLORATION AND OPERATIONS, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE

ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity 

to testify before you on NASA’s exploration efforts. Consistent with the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, NASA’s space exploration architecture is based on capabilities that will support multiple missions and destinations, enable private access to— 

and use of—space, and complement and advance other NASA, national, and international objectives and goals. This architecture is intended to be sustainable over 

the long term and affordable. This endeavor is responsive to changing environments, 

including on-ramps for new technologies, new approaches, and other space players. 

We also are tightly coupling the planning of our science and technology portfolios 

with this strategy. 

Our architecture is designed for long-term human exploration of our solar system, 

including the goal of human missions to Mars. NASA’s near-term strategy for exploration has four prongs: using the unique environment of International Space Station 

(ISS) to conduct the research and technology demonstrations necessary to keep our 

crews safe and productive on long-duration spaceflights; partnering with commercial 

entities to develop the capacity to transport cargo and crew affordably to low-Earth 

orbit (LEO); working in cooperation with other NASA Directorates to better understand exploration destinations and improve our ability to work there; and moving 

outward to deep space with Orion and the Space Launch System (SLS) to take us 

there. Orion and the SLS are foundational capabilities for the implementation of our 

integrated human and robotic exploration strategy. We will then travel beyond LEO 

to the proving ground of cis-lunar space, where we will expand and test our capabilities in a rendezvous with a redirected asteroid in lunar orbit. These steps will build 

the foundation for further deep-space exploration. With the technologies and techniques we develop, we will enable expeditions to multiple destinations, ultimately 

allowing us to pioneer Mars and other destinations as we lay the groundwork for 

permanent human settlements in the solar system. Conceived in coordination with 

our international partners, this strategy maintains America’s role as the world’s 

leader and foundational partner in space exploration. 

The International Space Station: Learning the Fundamentals in LEO 

The ISS is an unparalleled asset for the conduct of research and technology development in a unique, microgravity environment. The full focus of ISS is on operations 

and research to: (1) improve our ability to live and work in space, including enabling 

human exploration beyond LEO; (2) enable development of a demand-driven commercial transportation and research market in LEO; (3) enable science, engineering 

research, and technology development in the fields of Earth, space, life (biological 

and human research), and physical sciences; and (4) derive tangible benefits for citizens on Earth. 

NASA’s Human Research Program continues to develop biomedical science, technologies, countermeasures, diagnostics, and design tools to keep crews safe and productive on long-duration space missions. The progress in science and technology 

driven by this research could have broad impacts on Earth as it advances our ability 

to support long-duration human exploration. 

On board the ISS, we are conducting technology demonstrations and development 

efforts to advance human and robotic exploration beyond LEO and the Station also 

serves as the foundation for an international exploration partnership. As an example of both the technology demonstration and exploration partnership aspects of the 

ISS, NASA is preparing for an extended duration, year-long human mission to explore human adaptation to space. The mission, which will involve NASA astronaut 

Scott Kelly and cosmonaut Mikhail Kornienko of the Russian Federal Space Agency, 

is slated to launch in March of 2015. The ISS partnership is strong, and the agencies involved continue to work together in the mutual pursuit of peaceful space exploration. Plans remain on track for upcoming launches to the Station and return 

of astronauts to Earth. Later this year, NASA intends to select from among American companies competing to provide crew transportation to the ISS beginning in 

2017. In the meantime, NASA and its partners will continue to work with each 

other to maintain the Station, where humans have lived continuously for more than 

13 years, and we are confident that the agencies will continue to work as closely 

as they have in the past. 

6 

Two U.S. companies—Space Exploration Technologies and Orbital Sciences Corporation—are supporting the ISS under Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contracts. Purchasing cargo and crew transportation services from U.S. companies allows NASA to focus its efforts on developing the vehicles that will take our astronauts beyond LEO and to multiple deep-space destinations. 

Orion and SLS: Traveling Beyond LEO 

The dedicated NASA-Industry team, working across the Nation utilizing all of the 

NASA Centers and our primary industry partners, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, ATK, 

and Aerojet-Rocketdyne, is making excellent progress toward developing the next 

capabilities for human and robotic space exploration missions beyond LEO. The 

flight test milestones driving the schedule include the uncrewed Exploration Flight 

Test-1 (EFT–1) this December, the first uncrewed launch of Orion and SLS on Exploration Mission-1 (EM–1) in FY 2018, and the first crewed launch of Orion and 

SLS on Exploration Mission-2 (EM–2) in FY 2021–22. Both Orion and SLS are being 

designed to enable multiple missions and destinations rather than being optimized 

for one particular mission or architecture. Early missions will explore cis-lunar 

space and rendezvous with and return samples from a near-Earth asteroid, as well 

as demonstrate capabilities to support deep-space human research and exploration 

in a safe and sustainable manner. SLS will be evolvable to provide progressively 

greater lift capability, and, with Orion, will enable mankind to successfully navigate 

the proving ground of deep space, ultimately sending humans to a variety of destinations in the solar system, including Mars. 

The Orion spacecraft will be capable of taking humans farther into deep space 

than ever before, to multiple destinations as needed, and sustaining them in this 

challenging environment for longer than ever before. The Orion spacecraft includes 

both crew and service modules, and a Launch Abort System that will provide for 

crew safety during ascent. Orion can fly a crew of up to four for 21 days; if used 

in concert with a potential future Habitation Module, Orion will be able to support 

larger crews on extended-duration missions. Orion has a focused and rigorous stepwise test campaign to validate these capabilities in the challenging deep-space environment. 

This year’s EFT–1 flight test will serve as a pathfinder to validate innovative approaches to space systems development. The test will demonstrate spacecraft postlanding recovery procedures and the launch vehicle adapter, which will also be used 

on EM–1 and EM–2. EFT–1 will allow us to test the heat shield at about 85 percent 

of lunar re-entry velocity, protecting the vehicle from temperatures near 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit. The EFT–1 flight test will significantly reduce or eliminate 10 of 

the top 16 risk drivers for the first crewed flight (EM–2). The flight test will also 

demonstrate 47 percent of the design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) 

required for EM–2, and includes 50 percent of the software needed for the first 

crewed mission. Not only is EFT–1 testing hardware and software, but it also is 

testing key processes which will be needed for EM–2. 

The SLS is a heavy-lift launch vehicle that will transport Orion, as well as cargo 

and other systems, with a range of lift capabilities from 70 metric tons, evolving to 

105 metric tons and eventually up to 130 metric tons, based on future mission requirements. The evolution of the SLS lift capability fulfills specific, important roles 

within the exploration architecture, with the 130-metric-ton vehicle supporting full 

capability asteroid missions and ultimately missions to Mars. 

In 2014, NASA will make significant strides in SLS development. The testing of 

the Booster Qualification Motor-1 (QM–1) will occur this year with a test firing of 

the motor, and fabrication of the QM–2 motor will be completed. Manufacturing will 

begin on key components of the SLS vehicle to be used for the EM–1 mission, including Boosters, interim cryogenic propulsion stage (ICPS), and major components 

of the Core Stage (tanks, engine structure, intertank, and forward skirt), as well as 

the associated Structural Test Articles (STAs). Additionally, the Vertical Assembly 

Center at Michoud Assembly Facility will be completed this spring, as well as modifications to the A–1 Test Stand at the Stennis Space Center for testing of the RS– 

25 Core Stage engines. The SLS Program will conduct the detailed design review 

(Critical Design Review) for the Booster and Core Stage elements. Definitization of 

SLS contracts for Core Stages and the ICPS will be completed this year, as well. 

The Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) team at Kennedy 

Space Center (KSC) continues to make significant progress on the necessary Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) infrastructure design, development, and refurbishment to support SLS and Orion. KSC also is providing valuable operations expertise 

to the SLS and Orion teams to address operational issues in the design in order 

to help reduce eventual production and operations costs. This is a key aspect of assuring long-term sustainability for deep-space human exploration. In 2014, construcVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:59 Aug 17, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\95839.TXT JACKIE
7 

tion of new platforms in the Vehicle Assembly Building at KSC will enable SLS and 

Orion stacking and preflight processing as planned. Refurbishment and upgrades to 

a crawler-transporter, to accommodate up to the 130-metric-ton version of SLS—a 

vehicle more powerful than the Saturn V—are being performed to support the FY 

2018 EM–1 flight of SLS and Orion. 

Orion, SLS, and EGS teams are using the latest in systems and manufacturing 

technology with the intent of developing the safe, affordable, and sustainable systems this country needs to extend human presence to Mars. For example, the Orion 

team is using time-triggered Ethernet and is taking advantage of the standards for 

this technology that are used in the automotive industry. The SLS team has mastered the development of friction-stir welding on large structures to build the SLS 

Core Stage, culminating in the most advanced and largest friction-stir weld machine 

in the world. The EGS team has stripped out the old copper cables from Pad 39B 

and replaced them with the latest in fiber optics. These are three simple examples 

of how NASA’s Exploration Systems are utilizing and advancing the latest in technology. 

In developing the Orion, SLS, and EGS, NASA is seeking to build a sustainable 

National capability for the long-term human exploration of space. By providing more 

volume and mass for payloads, SLS could enable the simplification of the design and 

trajectories of future spacecraft. The evolving capabilities of these systems will provide the Nation with flexibility over the long term to achieve a variety of goals. As 

we move out into the solar system to establish footholds in a variety of locations, 

having such flexibility will be important, as future missions can be built on what 

our astronauts and robotic probes learn during earlier expeditions. 

NASA’s Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Division is pioneering approaches 

for rapidly developing prototype systems, demonstrating key capabilities, and validating operational concepts for future human missions beyond LEO. This work is 

important to enable exploration missions and ensure that they are safe, affordable, 

and sustainable. Activities focus on crewed systems for deep space, and robotic precursor missions that gather critical knowledge about potential destinations in advance of crewed missions. Major products include systems development for reliable 

life support, asteroid capture mechanism risk reduction, deep space habitats, crew 

mobility systems, advanced space suits, and autonomous space operations. As prototype systems are developed, they are tested using NASA ground-based facilities or 

flight experiments on the ISS. The AES Division works with the Space Technology 

Mission Directorate to infuse technologies into exploration missions, and with the 

Science Mission Directorate on robotic precursor activities. The Space Technology 

Mission Directorate supports exploration by investing in capabilities needed for 

deep-space exploration including advanced life support, entry, descent, and landing 

technologies, advanced space robotic systems, advanced thermal management technologies, advanced batteries and fuel cells, lightweight structures, cryogenic storage 

and transfer capabilities, and in-situ resource utilization. 

Asteroid Redirect Mission: Expanding Our Capabilities for Deep Space 

Missions 

NASA will employ SLS and Orion for an early human exploration mission to perform pioneering human operations further from the Earth than ever before, rendezvousing with and returning samples from an asteroid redirected to at stable orbit 

around the Moon by the robotic segment of the Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM). 

The ARM is composed of three separate elements: the detection and characterization 

of candidate near-Earth asteroids; the robotic rendezvous, capture, and redirection 

of a target asteroid to a stable orbit around the Moon; and the crewed mission to 

explore and sample the captured asteroid using the SLS and the Orion crew capsule. Each mission element is heavily leveraging ongoing activities in NASA’s Space 

Technology, Science, and Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorates. 

The mission integrates a variety of technologies and capabilities important to future 

crewed missions to Mars and other deep space destinations. These include: the acceleration of high-power solar electric propulsion development, which will power the 

ARM mission and also has future science, commercial, and human exploration mission applications; and rendezvous with and maneuver of a non-cooperative target in 

deep space, which is enabling for missions to other deep-space destinations. The 

technologies needed for this mission, for example in power, propulsion, guidance and 

navigation, life support, and EVA, will be applicable to future human missions to 

Mars. 

The ARM mission is part of the overall plan for human exploration and pioneering. It allows for operations in the proving ground of cis-lunar space, builds off 

of the skills learned from ISS, prepares the way to support potential lunar activities 

of our commercial or international partners, and builds the skills and hardware 

8 

needed for Mars-class missions. This mission represents a technological challenge— 

raising the bar for human exploration and discovery, while advancing detection of 

near-Earth asteroids and bringing us closer to human missions to Mars. NASA has 

already identified a number of candidate asteroids for this mission; the Agency is 

also continuing to refine estimated costs, and, at this time, we anticipate that the 

incremental cost of the mission will be less than half of what the initial Keck Study 

projected. The ARM would affordably support and leverage multiple efforts across 

the Agency as it paves the way for journeys to other destinations by helping NASA 

prove out its new heavy-lift launch vehicle and exploration spacecraft in a near-term 

mission. 

Exploring Mars and Other Deep Space Destinations 

NASA has been executing an integrated human and robotic exploration strategy 

leading to the human exploration of Mars. The capabilities required for a human 

mission to Mars have been understood for some time. The implementation steps and 

investments, partner approaches, and technical pathways to Mars are varied. NASA 

will ramp up its capabilities to reach—and operate at—a series of increasingly demanding targets, while advancing technological capabilities with each step forward. 

This will include early test and demonstration activities in cis-lunar space as called 

for in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. The Agency is tightly coupling the planning of its science and technology portfolios with this strategy where appropriate. 

As noted earlier, the Agency will conduct a series of test and demonstration 

flights, including EFT–1 with Orion flying uncrewed in 2014, EM–1 with Orion and 

SLS flying uncrewed in FY 2018, and the crewed EM–2 mission with Orion and SLS 

in FY 2021–22. In this vein, ARM will exercise these and other capabilities now in 

development. These missions will help develop the foundation for longer journeys to 

destinations which could include near-Earth Asteroids, the Moon, the moons of 

Mars, and then Mars itself. NASA’s Orion and SLS will enable the Agency to send 

astronauts beyond LEO for the first time since 1972 and will provide the Nation 

a capability and architecture designed to also allow flexibility, partnering, and technological on-ramps. This strategy for human space exploration will ensure that the 

United States fosters a safe, robust, sustainable, and flexible space program by developing a set of core evolving capabilities instead of specialized, destination-specific 

hardware, to achieve human presence in successively farther destinations across the 

solar system. 

NASA’s exploration strategy is consistent with the Global Exploration Roadmap 

(GER), released in August 2013 by NASA with 11 of our international space agency 

partners in the International Space Exploration Coordination Group. The GER 

helps demonstrate how NASA’s ARM and milestones leading up to it are important 

steps toward realizing our goal of future missions to Mars together with our international partners. It also demonstrates that NASA, together with its international 

partners, shares a common interest in advancing a unified strategy of deep-space 

exploration, with robotic and human missions to destinations that include nearEarth asteroids, the Moon and Mars. The roadmap begins with the ISS and includes 

a step-wise expansion of human presence into the solar system, with human missions to the surface of Mars as a driving goal. The roadmap expands on missions 

to send humans to the lunar vicinity, a proving ground that allows nations to advance exploration capabilities and learn to manage risks while using the presence 

of the crew to explore asteroids and the Moon. Our support of the GER helps our 

international partners seek funding support for strong roles in implementing the 

international strategy. 

While there will always be challenges in involving multiple nations with diverse 

national interests in an interdependent human space effort, pioneering the solar 

system cannot effectively be undertaken by any one country. The partners’ participation in the GER demonstrates their interest in an incremental, international approach to expanding human presence into the solar system. Utilizing the key capabilities of SLS and Orion, this roadmap builds on our collective successes to date, 

highlights many exploration preparatory activities underway around the world that 

will drive innovation and new technologies, and encourages collaboration and integration between human and robotic exploration to return great benefit to the global 

community. 

NASA is also discussing with our ISS International Partners exploration uses of 

and transition beyond the Station. These discussions are being held under the auspices of the Multilateral Coordination Board/Heads of Agencies to fully utilize the 

research and technology development capabilities of the ISS and to explore partnership opportunities based on the Station partnership. 

9 

Conclusion 

NASA’s exploration strategy will use an approach of pioneering multiple destinations in the solar system. Over time, we will move beyond conducting limited-duration forays to distant destinations and begin to lay the groundwork to establish outposts, build settlements, and utilize in situ resources as we expand the reach of humanity. The key to realizing this goal will be to channel all of the factors that have 

enabled our space achievements to date in a way that will ensure a sustainable 

foundation on which future generations can continue to build. So we will involve the 

private sector, taking advantage of entrepreneurial drive and business acumen to 

find novel solutions to the challenges we face. We will engage international partners, who will bring to the table their own unique scientific and technological expertise—expanding humanity’s presence into space is too large a task for any one country to go it alone. Finally, we will strive to achieve the optimal balance of human 

and robotic exploration, taking advantage of what humans and machines each do 

best as we search for life in the universe and pursue a variety of objectives and 

goals. This long-term effort will expand the sphere of human life and activity, and 

draw upon the pioneering spirit and ingenuity in the face of the seemingly impossible that have helped make the U.S. the exceptional nation that it is. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to provide you with our progress and status over the past year as we look forward to 

EFT–1 and the award of Commercial Crew Transportation Capability later this 

year, and the first uncrewed SLS/Orion mission in FY 2018. We have a strong strategy that extends human presence into the solar system—beginning with Mars—in 

an affordable and sustainable manner. ISS, Commercial cargo and crew, Orion, SLS 

and the Asteroid Redirect Mission are all first steps in that strategy. I would be 

happy to respond to any questions you or the other Members of the Subcommittee 

may have. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Rubio is going to submit his opening 

statement for the record. And, of course, for each of you in your 

written testimony, it will be inserted as part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Rubio follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having today’s hearing on the human exploration 

of space. It is important that the subcommittee examine NASA’s plans for human 

exploration, including collaboration with international partners and commercial 

space opportunities. Clearly today’s hearing is timely given the impact of national 

security and current geopolitical issues on our space program. 

NASA states that its vision is ‘‘to reach for new heights and reveal the unknown 

so that what we do and learn will benefit all humankind.’’ I certainly agree with 

this vision. But in order to achieve it, the agency must have a clear mission with 

a roadmap and timeline outlining how that mission will be accomplished. 

But a roadmap and timeline will only take the agency so far. NASA’s mission 

must also be accompanied by a strong commitment to achieving it. 

Obviously one of the main factors impacting NASA’s mission and its exploration 

programs is the agency’s funding. The current budget environment is forcing NASA 

to balance priorities, which makes it difficult to achieve large exploration programs 

while sustaining commitments to other scientific efforts that do not always get 

NASA in the news. 

Given this situation, NASA has to spend wisely. This is why I believe that NASA 

must identify common sense savings to help prioritize and fund space operations. 

One area where I believe NASA can reduce costs is by reexamining its many 

underused and outdated facilities and properties, which cost billions of dollars to 

keep and maintain. 

Infrastructure that is duplicative or no longer needed for NASA’s exploration 

roadmap should be reallocated to commercial users and state and local entities. This 

would result in savings for NASA, a reduction in the Federal Government’s footprint 

and burden to fund space operations, and an incentive for commercial space activities. 

The State of Florida and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have already benefitted from reallocated infrastructure. But more needs to be done at KSC and 

around the country. Every facility must examine ways to reduce costs to ensure the 

agency can continue reaching new heights and revealing the unknown. 

10 

One expenditure that continues to get attention and that is relevant to today’s 

discussion is the $70 million NASA pays Russia to transport one astronaut to the 

International Space Station. This underscores the fact that the United States, the 

Nation that has accomplished more in space than any other, currently has no way 

of transporting its citizens into space. The United States should never have to buy 

tickets to space. 

Now, the purpose of today’s hearing is not to prosecute this issue. This committee 

has had numerous hearings investigating why NASA has to pay Russia for access 

to space, and how the agency and its commercial partners are working to end this 

arrangement by achieving commercial crew capabilities. 

But that does not mean this committee should not examine who we are paying 

for access to space, especially when it is a nation and a leader with whom we have 

strong disagreements. Yesterday I highlighted the fact that Russia uses its energy 

resources as leverage over its neighbors, and I called for a long-term strategy to 

break this energy dependence from Russia. 

Well it would certainly seem that Russian leverage applies to today’s discussion. 

Not only is it about leverage, but it is also about prestige. Vladimir Putin believes 

that Russia has lost its influence in the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 

and he views himself as a historic figure that’s going to restore Russia to its rightful 

place, in his mind, as a global power. 

One way he sees to do this is to gain influence and leverage over other countries. 

When it comes to space exploration, the Russians clearly have leverage over the 

United States. The question is whether Russia is using this leverage to influence 

the United States and NASA and serve its own space exploration goals. 

I hope this hearing and today’s witnesses will help shed light on that question 

and provide the Committee with a better understanding of how the geopolitical situation in Ukraine is impacting America’s space program. 

Thanks again to Chairman Nelson, and I want to thank the witnesses for testifying before the Committee. 

Senator NELSON. Ms. Eisenhower. 

STATEMENT OF SUSAN EISENHOWER, CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, 

THE EISENHOWER INSTITUTE; PRESIDENT, 

THE EISENHOWER GROUP, INC. 

Ms. EISENHOWER. Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

this opportunity to testify before you today. It’s an honor to be 

here. 

I hope to address the geopolitical issues surrounding NASA’s exploration efforts. It’s impossible today to think about space exploration strategy without putting it into the context of today’s events 

in Russia and Ukraine. I support well-targeted sanctions on Russia 

which will have a direct impact on President Putin’s thinking. But 

for reasons I will outline, I believe that rolling back space cooperation could be counterproductive and damaging to our national security and our long-term space agenda. 

International cooperation is vital if missions of increasing complexity are on the international agenda such as Mars. During the 

Cold War, scientific and technological communities played a vital 

role in serving as a bridge between the United States and the Soviet Union and then Russia. Especially during times of crisis, many 

multilateral and even bilateral interactions survived the Soviet invasion of Hungary, Sputnik, the U–2 incident, the Cuban missile 

crisis, as well as the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and later 

Afghanistan. But since the Cold War ended, U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear security and in space has been at the heart of enhancing the United States’ national security. 

The restrictive measures on space cooperation announced by 

NASA last week, however, could well threaten our achievements of 

the last 20 years. Here are three reasons why we need to lift last 

11 

week’s ban on all cooperation outside of the operations related to 

the ISS. 

Number one, our national security is greatly enhanced through 

cooperation. Since 1992, U.S.-Russian cooperation in space has had 

a positive impact on the transformation of the Russian aerospace 

industry, which was at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse, a 

bastion of Soviet hardliners. U.S. interaction with the Russians on 

the Shuttle Mir program and then the International Space Station 

brought unprecedented transparency and access to sensitive Russian facilities along with a growing adoption in Russia of Western 

best practices. Since then, the lessons we’ve learned together have 

strengthened our overall performance in space beyond just the ISS. 

And it provided an indispensable window into the workings of the 

Russian military industrial establishment. 

Number two, if the goal of limiting cooperation is designed to 

send a strong signal to President Putin, we need to be careful. It 

could well backfire. The Russian scientific community, as opposed 

to the Soviet aerospace industry, has traditionally been the most 

progressive of all sectors in that country. But today, both sectors 

in Russia, both the scientists and the aerospace industry, see themselves as our friends. Rather than sending a strong message to 

President Putin, suspension of cooperation will strengthen political 

hardliners who would prefer that Russia ‘‘go it alone’’ or work with 

countries more sympathetic to their views. 

Number three, safety depends on trust. Much has been said 

about our mutual dependency in space. Safety of human life requires cooperation. At the moment, operations on the space station 

are proceeding as normal. Trust, however, that invaluable yet fragile commodity, can be easily eroded. NASA’s announcement last 

week that it will suspend ‘‘the majority of its ongoing engagements 

including high-level visits, e-mail exchanges, and video conferencing’’ could leave many of our friends in Russia high and dry and 

potentially change the more general atmosphere. Collective attitudes even in the Russian space sector could change, which might 

negatively impact working relationships on the ISS and potentially 

even safety. 

In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize that we know from 

history that it is always easier to terminate space cooperation than 

it is to get it started again. And we will not be able to meet our 

long-term goals in space without it. We should consider establishing the general principle going forward that space cooperation 

should be exempt from sanctions. Space has the unique capacity to 

serve the global community. It can be a force for preventative diplomacy, transparency, and for sustaining and building bonds among 

those who are willing to put solely national pursuits aside. 

The lynchpin of this goal must be engagement. We must be wary 

of any space policy that provides only short-term symbolic satisfaction just as we should be cautious of those in both countries who 

might want to exploit this crisis for short-term commercial or political gain. They could ultimately undermine our long-term strategy 

in space and possibly jeopardize the enormous human and financial 

investment we have already made. 

Thank you very much. I look forward to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Eisenhower follows:] 

12 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN EISENHOWER, CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, 

THE EISENHOWER INSTITUTE; PRESIDENT, THE EISENHOWER GROUP, INC. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity 

to testify before you today. It is an honor to be here. 

I hope today to address the geopolitical issues surrounding NASA’s exploration efforts. I served on the NASA Advisory Council for eight years and was also a member 

of the International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force. 

However, it was not until I wrote Partners in Space: U.S.-Russian Cooperation after 

the Cold War that I fully understood the operational and geostrategic benefits of 

U.S.-Russian cooperation in space. It is this point that I would like to examine with 

you today. 

I would like to make it clear before I begin that it is essential, I think, for the 

United States and its allies to respond to the ongoing situation in Ukraine with appropriate and well-targeted sanctions on Russia, which will have a direct impact on 

President Putin’s thinking. For reasons that I will outline, I do not believe, however, 

that disengaging in space cooperation is in our national interest. 

Near and long-term goals 

It has long been NASA’s strategy to engage our international partners, who have 

diverse and valuable scientific and technological expertise. This is vital if missions 

of increasing complexity are on the international agenda. 

This strategy has not only proven to be successful through cooperation on the 

International Space Station, I believe it will be the only way we can meet our longterm objectives of expanding mankind’s presence in space. The issue then is not 

about long-term strategy, but about appropriate short-term measures—given the 

current geopolitical environment. 

As you well know, strategy has to be informed by a simple calculus. Do the shortterm and the long-term goals mesh? Or do short-term actions jeopardize or pose insurmountable road blocks to meeting one’s overarching goal? 

With those simple questions in mind, I was concerned to read NASA’s announcement last week that, in light of the Crimean crisis, NASA will suspend ‘‘the majority 

of its ongoing engagements’’ with Russia, with the exception of continued U.S.-Russian cooperation on the International Space Station. I believe that sweeping limitations of this kind are a mistake. A brief review of the past is instructive for understanding the vital role the scientific and technical communities have played and can 

continue to play in serving as a bridge between our two countries, especially during 

times of crisis. 

With the dawn of the nuclear age and later the space age, the administration of 

President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to avert the possibility of fostering an atmosphere of ‘‘paranoid uncertainty’’ between the United States and the Soviet 

Union. In 1953, in his Atoms for Peace speech, the president opened the way for 

the peaceful uses of the atom. As part of that proposal he initiated, with the scientific community, the Atoms for Peace conferences that brought countries together 

from across the globe to exchange papers on power generation, nuclear medicine and 

agriculture. These conferences, initiated first in 1955, survived the Soviet invasion 

of Hungary, Sputnik, the U–2 incident, the Cuban missile crisis—as well as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. As a result of that engagement, the Soviet 

Union declassified a whole field of nuclear science: fusion. 

In 1955, the International Council of Scientific Unions spearheaded an international effort to study the Earth. Scientists from the United States, the Soviet 

Union, and sixty-four other countries agreed that the International Geophysical 

Year would be marked in 1957–1958. Among its activities, it called for the Soviet 

Union and the United States to launch artificial satellites and it created a forum 

for international dialogue on science and the future of the Antarctic. This cooperation also survived those above mentioned crises. Despite this, the work of IGY continued and was augmented by U.S.-Soviet negotiations that led the way for the Antarctic Treaty, signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and ten other countries 

in 1959. This assured in perpetuity the demilitarized status of an entire continent, 

preserving the Antarctic for international scientific research—a benefit for all of 

mankind. Had this U.S.-Soviet cooperation been suddenly cut off, who knows what 

the impact would have been on Antarctica, then a contested continent. 

Even though the 1950s/60s are considered to be, perhaps, the most perilous times 

of the Cold War, U.S.-Russian ‘‘engagement’’ was seen as a way to gauge the thinking of our adversaries, to understand how the other side approaches issues, and to 

build bonds among those who were not their country’s chief decision makers. In 

short: a way to mitigate the potential for ‘‘paranoid uncertainty’’ by achieving some 

level of transparency. At one point concern was such that there was not enough enVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:59 Aug 17, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\95839.TXT JACKIE
13 

gagement, prompting the successful effort to sign a bilateral General Exchanges 

Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1958. Its role was 

to foster and, in some cases, mandate science, academic and cultural exchanges. 

This agreement remained in force until the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Space cooperation was a promising new avenue of engagement with the ApolloSoyuz dock up in July 1975. But things began to change with the U.S. boycott of 

the 1980 Olympics and the suspension of other cooperative activities in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Until the Shuttle Mir programs (1992) 

very few people from the space community were schooled in the arts of East-West 

cooperation. If not for the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet/Russian programs might have been doomed to continue operating as rival entities. 

With this history in mind, let me explain at least three reasons why U.S.-Russian 

space cooperation should be continued without restriction. 

First, decoupling could endanger safety. 

Much has been said about our mutual dependency in space. It is not just our reliance on Russian crew transport that is at issue, Russia also relies on the United 

States for communications after launch and for ISS operations. The Russians also 

have scientific instruments integrated into our Martian and Lunar programs. 

Even in day-to-day operations, it is logical and important to note that safety of 

human life requires international cooperation. Last week, NASA Associate Administrator Michael O’Brien wrote a memo to employees explaining the termination of 

many important relationships: 

‘‘This suspension includes NASA travel to Russia and visits by Russian government representatives to NASA facilities, bilateral meetings, e-mail, and teleconferences or video conferences. At the present time, only operational International Space Station activities have been excepted.’’ 

But where does work on the ISS begin and where does it end? Continuous improvement and enhanced work on human safety and hardware investment is often 

made through tangential contacts and interaction. How easy will it be to draw the 

line between these baskets of activity if there cannot be visits between our two 

country’s facilities or even e-mail exchanges? This could be of major significance if 

there is an emergency in space that impacts the community beyond the operational 

side of the ISS. 

Second, if the goal of suspending cooperation is designed to send a strong message 

to President Putin, we need be careful. It could backfire. 

While it is true that NASA and its Russian counterpart, Roscosmos, have maintained a professional, beneficial, and collegial working relationship through the various ups and downs of the broader U.S.-Russia relationship, we are assuming that 

the ISS program will be unaffected by the current policy. In other words, we are 

presuming that Russian forbearance in this case is ‘‘a given.’’ In recent days, however, there have been cries in the Russian Duma to respond to the cancellation of 

contacts with the U.S. 

Of greatest concern to me, however, is the long-term impact. The Russian scientific community has traditionally been the most progressive of all political sectors 

in that country. People who are involved in international scientific cooperation are 

less likely to be nationalists. Rather than sending a strong message to President 

Putin, suspension of cooperation will strengthen hardliners who would prefer that 

Russia ‘‘go it alone’’ or work with countries more sympathetic to their views, such 

as China. 

From a U.S. perspective, we cannot afford to lose another generation of people 

who know how to cooperate with Russia on science and technology, especially with 

baby boomers retiring. 

Finally, those who are aggressively pushing for using space as a way to ‘‘punish Russia’’ should be reminded that contact with countries that have such technical capabilities have, in the past, been a way to enhance transparency. 

In my book, Partners in Space: U.S.-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War 

(2004), our research revealed: 

Cooperation has had a dramatically positive impact on the transformation of 

the Soviet hardliner aerospace industry, bringing unprecedented transparency 

and a move toward western best practices. Increased transparency has reinforced both expanded commercial cooperation and the political goals of civil 

space cooperation (e.g., nonproliferation). 

Today, ‘‘Curiosity,’’ NASA’s Mars Science Laboratory, has a Russian instrument 

on it that uses adapted technology from the heart of the Russian nuclear weapons 

14 

program. This is a perfect example of how space cooperation has aided in providing 

greater transparency on the Russian program. 

Partners in Space also found that cooperation with Russia brought significant benefits, not only to our national security, but also to our technical knowledge—as Russians were at that time the leaders in long-duration space flight. Since then the lessons we have learned together have strengthened our overall performance in space 

and have provided an indispensable window into the workings of the Russian military-industrial establishment. 

Conclusion 

As we know from history, it is always easier to terminate scientific and technical 

cooperation than it is to get it started again. Before we codify this potential mistake, 

we must recall that there are ample historical precedents to support the value of 

science and technology cooperation, even in times of crisis. Space cooperation should 

be exempt from sanctions, just as Atoms of Peace and IGY survived the tumultuous 

ups and downs of the Cold War. 

Space cooperation is the ultimate global bridge, and international space has 

unique capacities to serve the global community. It can be a force for preventive diplomacy, transparency and for sustaining and building bonds among those who are 

willing to put aside solely national pursuits. Like terrestrial cooperation, exemplified by the International Geophysical Year, space cooperation can serve as a stabilizing factor in space. 

The lynchpin of this goal must be engagement. Through consistent interaction, 

larger goals can also be realized. This can only enhance America’s national security. 

We must be wary of any space policy that provides only short-term symbolic satisfaction, just as we should be cautious of those who might want to exploit this crisis 

for short-term commercial or political gain. They could, ultimately, undermine our 

long-term strategy in space and possibly jeopardize the enormous human and financial investment we have already made. 

On March 27, 2014, former Senator Sam Nunn and former Secretary George 

Shultz wrote in a Washington Post op-ed, ‘‘A key to ending the Cold War was the 

Reagan administration’s rejection of the concept of linkage, which said that bad behavior by Moscow in one sphere had to lead to a freeze of cooperation in all 

spheres.’’ 

I would add that linkages between geopolitical crises and space should be avoided 

in favor of more direct ways to impose sanctions. Space can serve as at least one 

example of what it really means for the global community to set goals and see them 

through for the betterment of mankind. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Gerstenmaier, which policy is NASA operating under? You heard what Mrs. Eisenhower just said about the 

statements and there were conflicting statements. Which is NASA 

operating under? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. NASA, as you’ve seen in the press exchanges, we’ve exempted ISS operations from many of the sanctions or any of the issues associated with activities. And then we’re 

reviewing, kind of on a case-by-case basis, the need to go ahead 

and continue other activities. So there is an activity, a scientific 

event, this summer in August called COSPAR. That particular item 

has recently been accepted and that event will occur. 

So NASA’s methodically going through each one of the events 

and activities that are scheduled and we’re determining which ones 

are accepted and which ones we need to curtail. 

Senator NELSON. What about the acquisition of the engine RD– 

180? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. That’s really not a NASA issue. That’s between United Launch Alliance and their activities. 

I’m not aware of any discussion, but that’s really not a NASA 

issue per se. 

Senator NELSON. OK. Well we will get into that in the Armed 

Services Committee. 

All right. Dr. Chiao. 

15 

STATEMENT OF DR. LEROY CHIAO, 

FORMER NASA ASTRONAUT; COMMANDER, 

INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION EXPEDITION 10; 

SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT, 

THE SPACE FOUNDATION; AND CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL 

SPACE BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE USER PANEL 

Dr. CHIAO. Chairman Nelson, Senator Rubio, thank you both for 

your service to our Nation and thank you for the opportunity to 

present my views on the future of U.S. human spaceflight. 

U.S. human spaceflight program drives technology development 

by employing our citizens to advance the state-of-the-art of several 

fields. Many of these technologies are adapted to purposes which 

improve the quality of life for people here on the Earth. These are 

both very good reasons to continue a robust human spaceflight program. But I believe that the biggest return on our investment is 

prestige and inspiration of the next generation, best put together 

by the mission statement of the Space Foundation, ‘‘To advance 

space-related endeavors to inspire, enable and propel humanity.’’ 

Human spaceflight has become woven into the very fabric of our 

identity as a nation of explorers, innovators and entrepreneurs. It 

was exactly the endeavors of Apollo and the programs prior that 

inspired me and my generation. We must do the same and more 

for our children and grandchildren and help maintain our position 

as the world leader. 

As you pointed out, I was a member of the 2009 Review of U.S. 

Human Spaceflight Plans Committee and the current space policy 

is based on the major elements of one of the options that was put 

together. However, the main and most important message of the 

Committee and the report was that, in any case, the program support needed to be robustly supported both politically and financially. Strong bipartisan leadership is needed to sustain the program across administrations otherwise election-cycle changes could 

cause confusion and waste. 

The Committee estimated back then that the 2010 NASA budget 

would have been needed to increase by $3 billion and the buying 

power of that sustained in following years, if we were going to have 

a credible Beyond-Low Earth Orbit exploration program. The implied message was that if we were unable to go ahead and increase 

the budget by that much, then the proper thing to do would have 

been to continue to fly space station and robustly support ISS. 

Unfortunately, that was not realized and NASA has been directed to attempt to put together a credible Beyond-Low Earth 

Orbit program within the framework of essentially a flat budget in 

terms of buying power. The challenge of this cannot be overstated. 

This is why you’ve seen a lot of conflicting proposals and different 

changes over the last several years settling now on the Asteroid 

Redirect Mission. But the first crewed flight to that asteroid is currently being planned for 2021, which is still some years away. And 

that assumes that the SLS is developed on-time with no hiccups 

and no reduction and further reduction in budget. 

Thus, the first step, I believe, to go from here to Mars is to ensure that the budget is sufficient to support the program. The realistic sustainable funding level for Beyond-Low Earth Orbit maybe 

it should be determined a priori and then the program scoped acVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:59 Aug 17, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\95839.TXT JACKIE
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cordingly. If we cannot adequately support both politically and financially the Beyond-Low Earth program, then we should not attempt it. 

The ISS is the current Low Earth Orbit human spaceflight program. It serves not only as a common point for the international 

partner community but as a critical part of development of the Beyond-Low Earth Orbit program itself. The most challenging aspect 

about flying Beyond-Low Earth Orbit is not a technical challenge, 

it’s not a matter of computers or navigation or propulsion, but rather how do we keep astronauts healthy that far away from the 

Earth for that long of a duration of flights. The ISS is critical for 

the development operational medical countermeasures to ensure 

that we can keep our astronauts healthy as we contemplate these 

more demanding flights. 

The National Space Biomedical Research Institute, or NSBRI, 

was formed about 17 years ago by NASA at the recommendation 

of the National Academies. The NSBRI has built a consortium of 

the finest Biomedical Research Universities and Institutes across 

the country. And it’s targeting applied research to develop countermeasures to enable these Beyond-Low Earth Orbit flights. This 

work maps to and adds unique value to NASA’s Human Research 

Program. 

The ISS is currently scheduled for decommissioning in 2024, although studies have shown that it can be safely operated though 

at least 2028 and perhaps beyond. I believe that ISS’s life should 

be extended to as long as practical so that we can go ahead and 

make sure that we are able to develop these countermeasures. 

Similarly, the NSBRI will reach its 20-year life contract in 2017 

and I believe it also should be renewed to ensure no loss of continuity in these countermeasure developments. 

Commercial flights to Low Earth Orbit is a logical evolution. It 

was perhaps the most exciting yet the most controversial part of 

the new space policy but I think the commercial companies have 

made impressive strides. Already, we have companies delivering 

cargo commercially to the ISS and we have companies working, 

with NASA support, on developing the capability to launch astronauts to the International Space Station. 

In contrast to what some people think, these commercial efforts 

are not in competition with the NASA’s Beyond-Low Earth program. They’re complementary in that these commercial flights support the ISS which supports the Beyond-Low Earth Orbit program. 

A sustainable Beyond-Low Earth program requires a heavy-lift 

launcher. So the SLS is something that’ll be essential, either the 

SLS or something like it, for our long-term goals in Beyond-Low 

Earth Orbit Space. 

However, the current budget does not support a reasonable plan, 

timeline, or complement of missions. As I mentioned before, the 

first flight with a crew onboard is only planned for 2021. That, 

again, assumes that everything goes perfectly. 

It is important during the buildup of a flight test program, or to 

have a buildup of a flight test program for a new development, 

with meaningful and consistent flight rate during the development 

of something like the Beyond-LEO program. This is so you can develop the ground and flight operations and maintain team proVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:59 Aug 17, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\95839.TXT JACKIE
17 

ficiency. If the national budget cannot be increased to support such 

a plan for SLS/Orion, perhaps we need to start thinking about 

some other possibilities. If we think of SLS/Orion as Apollo/Saturn 

flights, maybe we need to take a look at possibly having something 

analogous to the Gemini program. 

The Orion is being currently built and the first flight, as you 

heard, is scheduled for later this year using an existing launch vehicle and upper stage. A similar configuration possibly could be 

human-rated and be used in a series of meaningful tests and development missions. Such a buildup flight test program using this 

configuration could be planned to thoroughly test Orion’s systems, 

develop rendezvous and docking operations, and include first destinations Beyond-Low Earth Orbit. The latter flights will be used 

to characterize the flight environment beyond Earth’s magnetosphere, to develop operations, and to characterize other issues as 

well; and test biomedical countermeasures. 

These flights would pave the way for the more ambitious SLS/ 

Orion missions. SLS will enable robust Beyond-LEO missions 

which should include the development of a crew-tended base on the 

Moon. This base would be used as a test bed for hardware and operations to develop for eventual human spaceflights to the surface 

of Mars. 

While it would be technically possible to bypass the Moon on the 

way to Mars, I believe it would be imprudent and would add risk. 

The importance of thorough ground and buildup flight test to ensure program success is clear has been demonstrated many times 

and cannot be overstated. 

One of the principal findings of our 2009 committee was that the 

U.S. can lead a bold, new, international effort in the human exploration of space. Having common, very visible, civil space projects 

leads to generally better relationships between partner countries 

and provides the potential for overall cost savings. The ISS is a 

great example of such a program and future human spaceflight 

programs should expand on this model. 

Currently, for the last 3 years, the only entities able to launch 

humans into space are Russia and China. Thus, China is an obvious addition to the international human spaceflight partnership, 

both for the ISS program and beyond. 

China has successfully demonstrated rendezvous and docking capabilities, extravehicular activity, and operation of a crew-tended 

LEO space module. The Chinese have a long-term plan that includes construction of a space station in 2018 with full operational 

capability by 2022. China is in a unique position to be a unique 

partner and, to the people who are concerned about security and 

technology transfer concerns, I would say that we can handle those 

things the same way we have with the Russians. To my knowledge, 

there have been no improper transfers in either direction. 

America can and should be the clear world leader of international space exploration both in LEO and beyond. What is needed is consistent and sustained strong, political, and financial commitments from the White House and the Congress. NASA requires 

the resources to create a robust, integrated, international exploration plan that will lead us into the next exciting phase of human 

spaceflight. 

18 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Chiao follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEROY CHIAO, PH.D., FORMER NASA ASTRONAUT; 

COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION EXPEDITION 10; SPECIAL ADVISOR

FOR HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT, THE SPACE FOUNDATION; CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SPACE

BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE USER PANEL

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Cruz, and Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for your service to our nation, and thank you for the opportunity to 

present my views on the future of U.S. human spaceflight (HSF). 

The U.S. HSF program drives technology development by employing our citizens 

to advance the state of the art in several fields. Many of these technologies are 

adapted to purposes, which improve the quality of life for people on the Earth. 

These are very good reasons for our Nation to maintain a robust HSF program. But 

I believe the biggest return on our investment is national prestige, and inspiration 

of the next generation, as called out in the mission statement of the Space Foundation: ‘‘To advance space-related endeavors to inspire, enable and propel humanity.’’ 

HSF has become woven into the very fabric of our identity, as a nation of explorers, 

innovators and entrepreneurs. It was exactly the endeavors of the Apollo and prior 

HSF programs that inspired me, and my generation. We must do the same and 

more for our children and grandchildren, and to help maintain our position as the 

world leader. 

I served as a member of the 2009 Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee. The Committee addressed both Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Beyond-LEO (B– 

LEO) exploration, and presented options to the administration. The current space 

policy is based upon major elements of one of the options presented in the Committee report. 

However, the main and most important message of the Committee and report was 

that in any case, the chosen HSF program must be robustly supported, both politically and financially. Strong, bipartisan leadership is needed to sustain programs 

across administrations. Otherwise, election-cycle changes cause confusion and 

waste. If credible B–LEO exploration was to be a part of the HSF program, the 

Committee estimated that the 2010 NASA budget would have needed to be increased by three billion dollars, and that the buying power of this budget would 

need to be sustained in follow-on years. The implied message was that if the budget 

could not be increased to this level, then the United States should continue to operate the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) and delay significant 

work towards a B–LEO program. 

Unfortunately, this has not been realized, and NASA has been directed to attempt 

to plan a credible B–LEO program within the framework of what has essentially 

been a flat budget, in terms of buying power. The challenge of this cannot be overstated. This is why we have seen changing proposals of the first destination and 

mission over the last several years, settling recently on an asteroid-redirect mission, 

with the first B–LEO astronaut flight planned for 2021. During that mission, the 

crew is to fly in formation with the redirected asteroid in Earth-Lunar orbit. But 

the plans for even these modest goals within the schedule allow for practically no 

cost overruns. This calls the credibility of the plan into question. 

Thus, the first step to plan ‘‘from here to Mars’’ is to ensure that the budget is 

sufficient to support the program. The realistic, sustainable funding level for B–LEO 

should be determined, and then the program scoped accordingly. If we cannot adequately support a credible B–LEO program politically and financially, then we 

should not attempt it. 

The ISS defines the current LEO HSF program. It serves not only as a common 

point for the international partner community, but also is a critical part of the development of the B–LEO HSF program. The most challenging technical aspect of the 

B–LEO program is biomedical: How to maintain the health of astronauts during 

long-duration flight, both inside and beyond the Earth’s magnetosphere. Research 

aboard ISS is critical to the development of operational medical countermeasures to 

ensure astronaut health during these demanding missions. Created and enabled by 

NASA at the recommendation of the National Academies, the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) has formed a consortium of the finest biomedical research universities and institutes in the United States, and funds targeted, applied research to develop countermeasures to enable B–LEO flights. This 

work maps to, and adds unique value to NASA’s Human Research Program (HRP). 

NSBRI also led to the creation of the Center for Space Medicine (CSM) at the 

Baylor College of Medicine. CSM complements government-funded research, both in 

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space and Earth applications. ISS is currently scheduled for decommissioning in 

2024, although studies indicate that it can be safely operated through at least 2028. 

ISS life should be extended to at least 2028, and beyond if practical, in order to adequately support the development of necessary technologies and countermeasures for 

the B–LEO HSF program. Similarly, NSBRI will reach its twenty-year contract life 

in 2017. It should be renewed, to ensure no loss of continuity in countermeasure 

development. 

Commercial flight to LEO is a logical evolution. NASA developed the technologies 

for flights to and from LEO, and should now focus on B–LEO goals, rather than 

LEO transportation. The commercial companies currently receiving NASA support 

have shown impressive progress with multiple cargo deliveries to the ISS, and 

progress towards crew transportation capabilities to ISS. These efforts should continue to receive full support, so that the U.S. can regain the capability to launch 

astronauts to ISS in the next few years. This commercial effort does not conflict 

with NASA’s B–LEO exploration program. In fact, it helps to enable B–LEO missions, by supporting important, critical-path research and hardware test bed 

projects aboard ISS. 

A sustainable B–LEO program requires a heavy-lift launcher. The Space Launch 

System (SLS) is an essential part of the long-term program. However, the current 

budget does not support a reasonable plan, timeline or complement of missions. The 

optimistic schedule calls for a flight rate of only 0.75 times per year once operational, possibly in 2021, and only if development proceeds as planned with no 

schedule slip or decrease in budget. If the budget cannot be increased to accelerate 

this development and support a higher flight rate, then the U.S. should consider 

slowing, or delaying SLS development. 

It is important to have a build-up flight test plan with a meaningful and consistent flight rate during development of a B–LEO program. This is to develop both 

ground and flight operations, and to maintain team proficiency. If the national 

budget cannot be increased to support such a plan and flight rate for SLS/Orion 

missions in the next few years, alternatives should be considered. If one thinks of 

SLS/Orion as analogous to Apollo/Saturn flights, an appealing alternative is an 

analogy to the Gemini program. 

The Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV, Orion) is currently being built, with the 

first flight test (without crew) scheduled for late 2014. The configuration for this 

first Exploration Flight Test (EFT–1) includes the use of an existing launch vehicle 

and upper stage. A similar configuration could be human rated, and be used in a 

series of meaningful test and development missions. 

Such a build-up flight test program using this configuration could be planned to 

thoroughly test Orion systems, develop rendezvous and docking operations, and include first destinations B–LEO. These latter flights would build up flight experience 

beyond the Earth’s magnetosphere to develop operations, to characterize the environment, and to test biomedical countermeasures. These flights would pave the way 

for the more-ambitious SLS/Orion missions. 

SLS will enable robust B–LEO missions, which should include the development 

of a crew-tended base on the Moon. This base would be used as a test bed for hardware and operations development for eventual HSF flights to the Martian surface. 

While it would be technically possible to bypass the Moon on the way to Mars, I 

believe it would be imprudent and add risk. The importance of thorough ground and 

build-up flight tests to ensure program success is clear, has been demonstrated 

many times, and cannot be overstated. 

One of the principal findings of the 2009 committee was that ‘‘The U.S. can lead 

a bold new international effort in the human exploration of space.’’ Having common, 

very visible international civil projects generally lead to better relationships between the partner countries, and provides the potential for overall cost savings. The 

ISS program is an example of such a project, and future HSF programs should expand on this international model. 

Currently, and for nearly three years, the only entities able to launch humans 

into space are Russia and China. Thus, China is an obvious addition to the international HSF partnership, both for the ISS program and beyond. China has successfully demonstrated rendezvous and docking capabilities, extravehicular activity 

(EVA) and operation of a crew-tended LEO space module. The Chinese have a longterm plan that includes construction of a space station in 2018, with full operational 

capability by 2022. China is in a position to provide hardware and capability inkind. Security and technology transfer concerns would be handled exactly as the 

U.S. does today with Russia. To my knowledge, there have been no improper technology transfers, in either direction. 

America can and should be the clear world leader of international space exploration programs, both in LEO and beyond. What is needed is consistent and susVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:59 Aug 17, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\95839.TXT JACKIE
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tained, strong political and financial commitments from the White House and Congress. NASA requires the resources to create a robust, integrated, international exploration plan that will lead us into the next exciting phase of HSF. It does not have 

it today. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Chiao, you’re not suggesting that the Asteroid Redirect would preclude the lunar mission? 

Dr. CHIAO. No, sir. Not at all. 

In fact, if there is much to be learned from an Asteroid Redirect 

Mission and as I—to avoid any confusion—I just want to make 

clear that my statements about another program or subprogram 

would be complementary to the SLS and the Orion. 

Senator NELSON. And that was the program that you testified 

where there would be a program on the surface of the Moon. 

Dr. CHIAO. Well, the Moon would be part of the SLS/Orion. It 

would be follow-on to the Asteroid Redirect Mission. 

Senator NELSON. Right. Thank you for clarifying that. 

Mr. MANBER. 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY MANBER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

NANORACKS, LLC 

Mr. MANBER. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Senator Rubio. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on behalf of 

NanoRacks; a private firm which has developed a strong customer 

base onboard the International Space Station. 

Let me start by saying that NanoRacks’ business model would be 

commonplace in any industry other than human spaceflight. We 

build our own research facilities with our own money. We market 

these facilities and our services to customers at set prices. We 

began the company 4 years ago without a NASA contract. Instead, 

we negotiated access to the real estate onboard the station and access to the NASA launch manifest. Critical has been NASA’s willingness to let us attempt a new way of adding services and facilities to the ISS. 

I applaud Mr. Gerstenmaier and the Space Station Program Office, led by Mike Suffredini, for allowing a private company to attempt this new role. 

At NanoRacks, we are very much aware that we may lose our 

money. We may fail in the marketplace to continue attracting customers. Our equipment may not always work. But these risks are 

not borne by the taxpayer; they’re borne by our investors. That is 

how business works in the real world and it’s how it should also 

work in outer space. 

How are we doing? NanoRacks has flown 150 payloads to date. 

We have 100 more in the pipeline and we are averaging just 9 

months through the NASA safety process, a tiny fraction of the 

usual timeline. Today, I can tell you that every single day, 

NanoRacks is showing that more and more consumers, teachers, 

researchers, companies around the world, see a value in paying for 

station utilization and including station in their plans. 

For us, for our customers, for the space station, and for the intent of you in Congress, the payoff has been dramatic. We estimate 

that today there is close to $150 million in private capital from 

venture capital firms and personal investors now supporting 

NanoRacks and our customers. 

21 

The resulting economic valuation is estimated to be much higher, 

with significant job creation in California, Florida, Texas, and elsewhere. The global recognition of the power of American-style open 

markets is perhaps the single most enduring result of the end of 

the Cold War, whether in former communist nations, now in Low 

Earth Orbit and yes, I am sure, one day on the Moon and Mars. 

Because of the success of companies like NanoRacks contributing 

to the International Space Station, I believe the viability of market 

economics in outer space is finally coming of age. NanoRacks’ experience is showing there is little difference between a government 

organization here or abroad and a non-government institution in 

terms of customers. To us, they are all customers. Our transactions 

are fundamentally commercial in nature. 

Our customer list today includes the German Space Agency DLR, 

Romanian Space Agency, parts of ESA, and companies and organizations from Israel, Japan, UK, Lithuania, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia. In short, commercial space has become a new form of international cooperation. And I’m really grateful for everyone in the 

NASA International Office who’s allowed NanoRacks to begin to 

play this commercial role. 

NanoRacks has already shown that the divisions and tensions 

that have sometimes characterized the government versus commercial debate in our industry are becoming, in our view, outdated. For 

too long, we have considered space exploration as an either/or proposition. Either the program is government-driven, government-operated, and government-funded, or it must be commercial. 

NanoRacks is showing, on space station, that such distinctions are 

unreasonable and even unproductive. 

The government can, therefore, play many different roles in 

human exploration. It can be a facilitator, a landlord, and almost 

always a customer. Depending on where we’re going, the private 

role could be smaller or greater. Whether we’re reaching for Mars 

or returning humans to the Moon, or exploring asteroids, a flexible 

partnership is where and how we should be heading. Turning to 

near-term Beyond Earth Orbit exploration, we are committed to 

using ISS as a launchpad for this new chapter in human 

spaceflight. We understand NASA’s focused on Mars. 

At NanoRacks, we too may have Mars in our hearts but we have 

lunar in our business plans. We can see well, replicating ISS’s new 

commercial environment with a lunar program, off-the-shelf hardware, commercial economic efficiencies, low-cost enough for student 

participation, market leadership in both technology and market 

savvy. Sure we can do Mars, but that’s going to take a little more 

doing and understanding in the commercial relationships. 

Congress has stayed the course on the International Space Station. Thank you for that. Your reward, our reward, is a stable 

beachhead in space, both technically and now commercially. I mentioned about our new relationship with NASA. Yes, NASA is our 

landlord and safety official. But the space agency is, every day, less 

and less of a competitor, leaving to the private sector those services 

that we do best. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Manber follows:] 

22 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY MANBER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, NANORACKS LLC 

Chairman Nelson and Senator Cruz, thank you for the opportunity to speak 

today. I’m pleased to lead NanoRacks, which is developing a robust customer base 

for the U.S. National Laboratory onboard the International Space Station. We regard our growing private business on the station as a stepping stone for commercially undertaking projects Beyond Low-Earth Orbit in partnership with NASA and 

other allied space exploration programs. 

Personally, I’ve spent the last three decades working to bring about a more commercial space marketplace, whether by helping set up the first investment fund on 

Wall Street for commercial space ventures, working with PanAmSat to break open 

the Intelsat monopoly on international communications, as well as helping open the 

door in American-Russian relations on space and later assisting in the marketing 

of the Russian space station Mir. The common thread has been to help realize a 

human space enterprise that is driven by American-style commercial principles and 

practices. 

NanoRacks has for the past four years worked to realize a truly commercial business onboard the International Space Station, using our own capital and developing 

our own customer base. Today I’d like to share with you some lessons we’ve learned 

about how human spaceflight can be integrated into a commercial environment. In 

this way, everyone, including NASA, our international space agency partners, private customers and the American taxpayer can all benefit from a new approach to 

space exploration that harnesses government and commercial resources to achieve 

our goals in space. 

Attempting Traditional Business in Human Spaceflight 

Let me start by saying that NanoRacks’ business model would be commonplace 

in any industry other than human spaceflight. We build our own research hardware 

with our own money. We market these facilities and our services to customers at 

set prices. To date, we have purchased and modified for use or built microscopes, 

centrifuges, biopharma hardware and basic research platforms. All normal business. 

Except our facilities are all located in Low Earth Orbit onboard the space station. 

We began the company without a NASA contract (and still don’t have a traditional one). Instead, we did negotiate access to real-estate onboard the space station 

and access to the NASA launch manifest, literally first to the empty nooks and crannies on cargo vehicles headed to ISS. We flew our first equipment with no guarantee 

that anyone, let alone NASA, would make use of our facilities. And there had never 

been a proven commercial market for space station facilities, so we couldn’t forecast 

a market based on real world data. Given these realities, we didn’t even bother with 

traditional investors. We say at NanoRacks that our first two investors were 

MasterCard and Visa. 

But we believed passionately that given a permanent presence in Low Earth 

Orbit, the robust transportation to and from the space station, and NASA’s willingness to let us attempt a new way of adding services and facilities to ISS, that we 

would be successful. Rare, if ever, does a market fail to develop when commercial 

practices are allowed to thrive. 

Placing our own hardware aboard a government facility is a critical part of our 

success, as it allows us to use commercial practices to design, manufacture and sell 

the facilities in what is still an immature market. I applaud Mr. Gerstenmaier and 

professionals in the Space Station Program office, from Mike Suffredini down to the 

working level, for allowing a private company to attempt this new role. I think their 

view when we offered to build and market our own equipment with no NASA funding was ‘‘let’s take a shot and see if these guys can produce.’’ 

At NanoRacks, we are very much aware that we may lose our money. We may 

fail in the marketplace to continue attracting customers. Our equipment may not 

always work. But these risks are not borne by the taxpayer but by our investors. 

That is how business works in the real world and should also work in outer space. 

A Pioneering and Growing Success 

So how are we doing? NanoRacks has flown 150 payloads to date, we have a hundred more in the pipeline, and are averaging just nine months through the NASA 

safety and payload integration process, a tiny fraction of the usual wait. Our prices 

are transparent and start low enough to allow parents in school districts to pool 

their money to fund a genuine space station project, and our facilities robust enough 

to attract serous academic and industrial researchers. All without NASA funding. 

When we do receive Federal dollars its because NASA or another agency is buying 

our services just like any other customer. 

23 

And today, I can tell you that every single day NanoRacks is showing that more 

and more consumers, teachers, researchers, companies and organizations around the 

world see a value in paying for station utilization. 

A final thought on the LEO market today. Just as NanoRacks has customers that 

are commercial organizations as well as space agencies, it also has space agencies 

that are competitors. One prime example is the Chinese Space Agency, which is 

today marketing its space station services to the international community, including 

my customers. One international client was just about ready to ‘‘jump ship’’ to work 

with China on a multi-year program. What stopped this client was the U.S. commitment to operate the ISS until at least 2024. 

But the Chinese space station program is already today a formidable competitor 

for NanoRacks, and we are committed to assuring prices low-enough, and services 

good enough, to thwart their efforts, not because they are Chinese but because that 

is the nature of commercial competition. 

NanoRacks’ progress in attracting customers and helping build up the capabilities 

of space station is being noticed. For example, Aviation Week recently described the 

growing commercial utilization of the ISS as transforming the station from a marvel 

of engineering construction into a thriving entrepreneurial marketplace. Music to 

my ears. 

I would not argue that a purely commercial approach should be the only path to 

ISS utilization. There is always the more traditional, public sector approach, using 

taxpayer funds, via NASA or CASIS. Typically this involves peer review, with the 

highest priority given to projects of agreed-on national priority. Our way allows a 

researcher or entrepreneur who believes in their idea to avoid waiting and try an 

experiment as quickly as they can develop their hardware. 

For us, for our customers, for the space station and for the intent of Congress, 

the payoff has been dramatic: we estimate that today there is close to $150 million 

in private capital, from venture capital firms and personal investors, now supporting 

NanoRacks and our customers. The resulting economic valuation is estimated to be 

much higher, with significant job creation in California, Florida, Texas and elsewhere. If you add to this the private investment in commercial cargo vehicles from 

SpaceX and Orbital, and resulting value of their future launch markets, and the 

economic value of the International Space Station ecosystem already totals several 

billion dollars. 

By creating and realizing commercial value in human spaceflight I believe we are 

dramatically increasing spaceflight’s economic return to our Nation and the world 

overall. And I am sure that our success in using private capital to leverage government space efforts is transferable not only to other human space stations in Earth 

orbit but beyond Earth orbit as well. 

The global recognition of the power of American-style open markets is perhaps the 

single most enduring result of the end of the Cold War, whether in former ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:59 Aug 17, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\95839.TXT JACKIE

409MANB1.eps
24 

munist nations, now in Low Earth Orbit and yes, I am sure, one day on the Moon 

and Mars. Because of the success of companies like NanoRacks working on the 

International Space Station, I believe the viability of market economics in outer 

space is finally coming of age. 

The Synergy of Commercial and International Cooperation 

NanoRacks’ experience is showing that there is little difference between a government organization here or abroad and a non-governmental institution. To us they 

are all customers, and our transactions are fundamentally commercial in nature: a 

voluntary exchange of reciprocal value. Whether it’s a U.S. Government R&D agency like DARPA or a privately funded research foundation or a startup company in 

Silicon Valley or a school in Colorado, our relationship is based on the commercial 

contract. Just like in any business on the ground that books a government customer 

for a plane ticket or purchasing software. 

NanoRacks has already shown that the divisions and tensions that have sometimes characterized the government vs commercial debate in our industry are becoming outdated. Working together, we can assure human spaceflight operations are 

undertaken in a commercially efficient manner and reach out to the widest customer base possible, both domestically and internationally, while accepting that 

much of the space utilization market still requires some public support, especially 

the first time we seek to go to Mars, or undertake an asteroid mission or permanently colonize the Moon. 

Our low costs, state of the art facilities, and speedy commercial practices are just 

as appreciated by our international government customers as by our private domestic ones. The internationals appreciate our ‘‘business as usual’’ approach, or as we 

say: ‘‘no flags, just results.’’ 

I have no doubt that the next chapter in space exploration must involve a wide 

range of contributions from international partners, just as any large commercial enterprise already does, from the automobile to telecommunications sectors. On the 

space station, we have learned without a doubt that other nations have no hesitation to work with a U.S. company like NanoRacks for access to the International 

Space Station. Our current customer list includes the German Space Agency DLR, 

the Romanian Space Agency, parts of ESA, and companies and institutions from 

Israel, Japan, UK, Ireland, Peru, Lithuania, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia. In short, 

commercial space is another powerful form of international cooperation, and we appreciate NASA’s flexibility to allow this new form of space diplomacy to flourish. 

Allow me to add another valuable lesson we are learning from ISS operations. 

And this is the value of the InterGovernmental Agreement (IGA) which is the legal 

and regulatory framework for managing space station operations among the ISS 

partners. This document, in my view, provides a solid legal foundation for future 

international exploration programs. There are certainly improvements to be made 

as we proceed outward from Earth orbit, but the basic framework and principles of 

the IGA have withstood many challenges over the past three decades and are extremely sound. 

Our commercial utilization of ISS is changing not just the perception of commercial markets in Low-Earth Orbit, but the very behavior of NASA and the other ISS 

agencies. Skepticism and confrontation towards working side by side with a commercial company’s self funded hardware and services has given way to commercial 

cooperation and shared resources. 

To cite just one example, earlier this year we sought permission from NASA to 

replace the Japanese Space Agency (JAXA) small satellite deployers with our own, 

which are larger. We didn’t ask NASA for funding. We were willing to take the risk 

that we could find customers if the deployers could hold bigger and more satellites. 

And we offered slots for NASA use at no cost. 

The result? In just seven months we designed the hardware, had it manufactured, 

passed the NASA and JAXA safety gauntlet, launched it on an Orbital Sciences 

Cygnus vehicle. With our space agency colleagues we just deployed 33 CubeSats, 

providing market leadership for three American companies and also introducing two 

nations, Peru and Lithuania, to the space station. All with no taxpayer funding in 

that project. 

25 

We saw an opportunity for using space station as a small satellite deployer and 

have invested in the necessary hardware and are finding the customers. Not only 

is there strong commercial demand for this service but government agencies are 

now taking advantage of the no-cost slots. That is a win-win for everyone. 

A Model for Beyond Earth Exploration 

For too long we have considered space exploration as an ‘‘either-or’’ proposition. 

Either the program is government driven, government operated and government 

funded, or the program is commercial. NanoRacks has shown on space station that 

such distinctions are unreasonable and even unproductive. One can well envision a 

Mars mission which is driven by the space agencies, with basic infrastructure provided by agency funding. The private sector would be invited to risk capital and develop supporting facilities and capabilities which we would then market to space 

agencies, scientific organizations, and consumers. 

The Government can therefore play many different roles in human exploration. 

It would usually be a facilitator, frequently a landlord, and almost always a customer. Depending on where we are going, the private role could be smaller or greater. 

Whether we’re reaching for Mars, returning humans to the Moon, exploring Asteroids, or conducting science or business on commercial platforms of the future, a 

flexible partnership is where and how we should be heading. 

Turning to near-term beyond-earth-orbit (BEO) exploration, NanoRacks is committed to using ISS as launch pad for this new chapter in human spaceflight. 

We understand NASA is ultimately focused on Mars. At NanoRacks, we too may 

have Mars in our hearts but our business plan already includes cis-lunar and lunar. 

We see a commercial market possible with the U.S. Government as customer, modeled on the relationship we have developed aboard space station. Other governments 


409MANB2.eps
26 

could also be commercial customers—or if they want to be political partners, that 

is fine. But commerce must be allowed to flow among the partners. 

We can well see replicating ISS’ new commercial environment with a lunar program. Off the shelf hardware. Commercial economic efficiencies. Low cost enough 

for student participation. American leadership in both technology and market savvy. 

For me, the key message here is that ISS is not just a science and technology laboratory, but a powerful management and policy testbed for how the government and 

private sectors can undertake space exploration together. 

And the Moon is not the only possible example. NASA could reach an overarching 

agreement with ESA on a Congressionally funded, administration approved, asteroid rendezvous program, for example, but DLR and other individual national space 

agencies in Europe might be pleased to go even further, working commercially with 

a company like NanoRacks for use of privately-funded exploration hardware for research and utilization aboard the visiting spacecraft. At NanoRacks, we would be 

willing to self-fund a range of research hardware and services in conjunction with 

such a mission if we were allowed to market commercially to the user community. 

As on the space station today, everyone gains. Less government funding and more 

commercial practices that meet customer expectations, whether the customer is a 

research organization or a space agency. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, Congress has stayed the course on the International Space Station. 

Your reward, our reward, is a stable beachhead in space, both technically and now 

commercially. The space station is showing us that incorporating commercial utilization into exploration programs will indeed have huge benefits. 

And, as on the space station today, U.S. Government strategy should include a 

way to foster an ecosystem of commercial capabilities that government needs—or 

very often, the government doesn’t know it needs. But given the freedom to operate, 

commercial will help lower the costs and increase the benefits to government and 

industry alike of an exploration program. 

Finally, I mentioned about our new relationship with NASA. Yes, NASA is our 

landlord and safety official. But the space agency is every day less and less of a competitor, leaving to the private sector those services we do best. 

Taken together, the ISS has emerged as a true laboratory for assuring that our 

future exploration efforts, like those now on space station, reflect the best values 

of American leadership and market ingenuity. 

Thank you. 

BIO OF JEFFREY MANBER, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NANORACKS, LLC 

Jeff Manber brings together three decades of experience in realizing a more robust 

commercial space marketplace. 

Currently, as Managing Director of NanoRacks from 2009 onwards, Manber has 

steered the growth of the first company to own and market its own hardware and 

services onboard the International Space Station. NanoRacks enjoys a customer 

pipeline of over 100 payloads from both domestic organizations and foreign governments, has flown over 150 payloads in the last two years and is a recognized leader 

in commercial space services from sub-orbital to low-earth orbit and beyond. 

Previous to NanoRacks, Jeff’s accomplishments include: 

• adviser to the chairman of PanAmSat, the first privately owned international 

satellite venture that ended the Intelsat monopoly on international satellite 

communications and enjoyed a billion dollar IPO; 

• co-developer of the first Wall Street fund dedicated solely to commercial space 

(Shearson Lehman); 

• helping create the Office of Space Commerce at U.S. Department of Commerce 

in the Reagan administration; 

• Managing Director of the American office for the Russian space company RKK 

Energia. Jeff facilitated the current cooperation between the Russian and American space programs. Participant in formation of Energia-Lockheed (ILS), 

Energia-Boeing (Sea Launch) and other key U.S.-Russian space ventures; 

• CEO of MirCorp. While leading MirCorp, Manber signed media and entertainment deals with space tourist Dennis Tito, Survivor television producer Mark 

Burnett and movie producer James Cameron; 

The author of numerous articles and several books, including ‘‘Selling Peace,’’ 

which chronicles Jeff’s time working with the Russian space program. Jeff was also 

27 

the recipient of the American Astronautical Society’s 2011 Lloyd V. Berkner Award 

and NASA’s Exceptional Achievement Medal in 2012. 


409COMMEN1.eps
28 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Manber, you remember, it was not too long 

ago, that the space station was supposed to cease to exist in 2015. 

Mr. MANBER. Yes, indeed. 

Senator NELSON. And that was extended to 2020. Now, fortunately, the President’s budget has recommended that it be extended to 2024. From this Senator’s standpoint, that’s the least we 

could do. It seems to me, it ought to go to the end of the decade. 

A $100 billion investment, with all the things that you have just 

testified, clearly is worth continuing. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier, sequester is part of the budget for the next 8 

years unless we can change it. And there are some of us in bipartisan discussions right now that are trying to change that. But limited funding is a reality over the course of the next several years. 

So would you make the case for the record of why the Asteroid Redirect Mission is doable, number one? Number two, does not preclude a lunar mission. And number three, develops the technologies 

and procedures that ultimately get us to the goal of Mars in the 

decade of the 2030s? 

Senator Rubio, my question was for Mr. Gerstenmaier to make 

the case: with limited funding, which is a reality over the course 

of the next several years, for Mr. Gerstenmaier—who is the best 

of the best at NASA—to make the case of why the Asteroid Redirect Mission, number one, develops the procedures and the technologies ultimately going out to the goal in the 2030s of Mars. And, 

number two, does not preclude a lunar mission as many people 

have spoken, it’s like it’s either/or. And doing that within the context of limited budgets. 

Go ahead, Mr. Gerstenmaier. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, if I try to go back to a little of what’s 

in my testimony, the way I would describe it is, if we look at any 

other real activity, it’s going to require a significant amount of new 

investment on NASA’s part. So if we try to go to an asteroid in 

some distant location away from the Moon, we need to build some 

kind of habitation module to augment Orion; we need to do significant medical research to keep our crews healthy during that period 

of timeframe; we have to do significant life support development. 

So that’s a lot of new development to go do an activity there. 

It has been talked about, you know, Mars fly by missions. The 

same kind of thing. If you look at the amount of investment that 

needs to occur to make that a reasonable mission to keep the risk 

down to appropriate levels, a tremendous amount of investment. 

So the Asteroid Redirect Mission, it moves essentially a piece of 

the solar system to a location around the Moon, which we can get 

to with Orion and SLS the way they’re being designed today. So 

the first test flight of Orion, EM2, scheduled in Fiscal Year 2021 

to 22, that mission with crew can go to the Moon and that vicinity 

with really no changes. The Asteroid Redirect Mission doesn’t require any changes to the Orion capsule. Basically, we can do the 

spacewalk from the Orion capsule the way it’s designed. So there’s 

no unique hardware needed in that aspect. 

It also puts us in the vicinity of the Moon, which we think is a 

great proving ground to go understand how to operate in space. 

You know, we’ll now be 5 days away from an immediate return 

back to the Earth. On station, we can get back in a couple hours. 

29 

But in the Moon environment, we’re going to be roughly 5 days 

away. We’ll use lunar gravity assist, which will be an important 

technique to learn how to operate for missions to Mars and other 

locations. 

Also, being in the vicinity of the Moon and lunar orbit, it enables, 

if our partners want to do something on the surface of the Moon 

or commercial activities want to do things on the Moon, we can assist them in those activities with Orion. So it effectively uses exactly what’s there for SLS and Orion. 

It also took advantage of what the Science Mission Directorate 

was already doing. They already had an asteroid observation campaign. So we did not have to build a unique asteroid observation 

campaign. We leveraged off of what they were doing already. 

The Space Technology Mission Directorate, it was building a 

solar electric bus to be demonstrated to look at electric propulsion 

which will be needed for Mars-class missions. We’ll leverage off of 

their work that they are doing and it uses SLS and Orion. 

So it essentially uses all the pieces we had put together and allows us to make signification and real progress toward gaining the 

capabilities to go to Mars and it also enables the Moon. So when 

you put all of those together for the modest investment, I think it 

makes sense moving forward. 

And last, the bus that we used to actually go capture this asteroid and redirect it around the Moon, that same electric bus would 

be used for cargo missions to Mars. So that is extensible going forward. 

So when I look at the options in front of us, I look at the budget 

environment that you’ve described; the uncertainty. This is the way 

we can make significant progress moving forward that keeps us focused toward Mars but doesn’t preclude the Moon but yet it keeps 

us moving in a positive direction and helps us work with our international partners and stay a leader in space. 

Senator NELSON. Just to close this out and it is affordable within 

that time-frame over the course of the next five to 10 years of 

which, if we went directly on a mission to go back to the Moon’s 

surface, you’re talking about a lot more money. Is that correct? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes. The difference would be to go back to 

the surface of the Moon with a human-class mission. We would 

have to build a human lander to go to the Moon. We don’t see that 

as necessary for Mars. 

You know, to enter into the Martian atmosphere with its atmosphere is much more difficult. To do entry, decent, and landing into 

Mars requires new technology development. We think that’s where 

our focus ought to be for the next big lander. We ought to be looking at how we land a crew-size capability on Mars and not go back 

and replicate to some extent what we’ve already done on the Moon 

for Moon landing. 

But now, if a commercial company would like to do that or an 

international partner would like to do that, we will be capable with 

Orion to be in cis-lunar space and we can assist them with those 

activities. 

So we don’t preclude that activity but, in this limited environment, we want to invest in the technologies that have not been 

30 

done and the things that will help us and keep us a leader and 

keep us moving forward toward ultimately Mars-class missions. 

Senator NELSON. But you said, ‘‘But we don’t preclude that activity.’’ 

So if the geopolitics suddenly changed, that it was important to 

the United States to get back to the surface of the Moon before, 

say, the Chinese would with humans, if that were the case, we’d 

already have a lot of the technologies developed and we’d be sitting 

out there close to the Moon already. Is that correct? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes. That’s correct. 

And I would say that, if you look today, countries talk about 

building an Orion-class capsule that could go to the vicinity of the 

Moon. There’s no country doing that today other than us. And this 

vehicle, you can go down to Florida and you can see today it’s getting ready for the test flight this fall, that is the basic capsule 

shape that is mostly the avionics it will fly, it’s mostly the software 

that’s there. So we are again, being a leader and we are building 

a capsule that allows us to take humans Beyond-Low Earth Orbit 

to the vicinity of the Moon. 

The SLS is also another rocket that other countries talk about. 

They’ve conceptualized that. They’re not putting hardware together. You can go to New Orleans and you can actually see barrel 

sections of the oxygen and hydrogen tanks, actually manufactured 

as test articles. You can see this large welding equipment; the largest in the world. It will use state-of-the-art reaction friction stir 

weld to assemble tanks. We’re moving forward. We’re at the Marshal Space Flight Center today doing acoustic tests of scale model 

rockets firing solid rocket motors next to the model to go look at 

launch activities down in Florida. We’re modifying Pad 39B to accommodate the new launcher capability. 

So this country again is leading and we are making real investments and real hardware that you can go out, see, visit, touch, and 

they all fit in this ability to get humans Beyond-Low Earth Orbit, 

which other countries talk about but we are still the leader in 

doing that and our activities will enable and we’ll be able to cooperate with them and their activities as they move forward. 

And the global exploration roadmap shows their desires, what 

they would like to go do. It also shows where we fit and then this 

allows each country to kind of decide for themselves what their role 

is in in human spaceflight and how they want to fit and build hardware. But we are the leader with the SLS and Orion that we’re 

building today. 

Senator NELSON. As I turn to Senator Rubio, would you describe 

one of the activities of a rover on the surface that could be controlled from Orion with Orion being in cislunar space? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We see the ability of getting into the vicinity 

around the Moon, either a Lagrangian point, which is a gravity location around the Moon, or in a distant retrograde orbit. We can 

use crew members in Orion to actually command a robotic space 

craft or robotic rover on the surface of the Moon and do activities. 

There’s a lot of interest on the far side of the Moon. There’s some 

discussion that’s occurred about putting a radio telescope on the far 

side of the Moon where it’s shielded from the radio interference 

from the Earth. You could actually deploy that antenna on the far 

31 

side of the Moon from an orbiting space craft from Orion orbiting 

the Moon and actually do those kinds of operations on the surface 

of the Moon. 

And we did a demonstration of that from space station. We actually used space station to drive a rover in California that deployed 

essentially a plastic antenna on a simulated lunar field in California to go actually see if we could go do that. So, when we get 

to this vicinity of the Moon, we can do robotic activities on the surface of the Moon from Orion as a temporary space craft in a roughly five to six day orbit around the Moon. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you very much. 

Senator Rubio. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman, for holding 

this hearing and all of you for being here. 

Let me just start by segueing from that last question that was 

asked. To be clear, as we talk about this long-term goal of landing 

on Mars in 2030, I think what you’re describing is that all the 

things that we are doing now in the interim all build upon each 

other. In essence we’re creating capability along the way. These are 

not separate programs though they have separate aims and segues. 

The general path, as it is with all space exploration, is that previous missions create technological platforms upon which we can 

build in the future. That they’re all moving, ultimately, in the same 

direction. So we’re not really duplicating efforts here, we’re kind of 

constructing one on top of the other. Is that an accurate assessment? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think that’s accurate. And I think the other 

thing we need to take advantage of with this group here is that 

there’s also significant advantage we can get from international 

partners in this activity and also from the commercial sector. So we 

need to change our thinking a little bit where it used to be an only 

government program and look at creative ways we can use the 

commercial sector and use the international community to augment 

what we’re doing. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, that’s what I wanted to segue to. Before— 

and I’ve already cleared this with the Chairman. I want to submit 

a statement for the record by Mr. Dean Cheng, who’s a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. He is an expert in our 

relations with China regarding space matters. He’s unable to participate in today’s hearing but he has submitted his testimony and 

he brings forward some interesting perspectives on the issues we’ll 

discuss today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEAN CHENG, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, 

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

PROSPECTS FOR U.S.-CHINA SPACE COOPERATION

My name is Dean Cheng. I am the Senior Research Fellow for Chinese political 

and security affairs at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position 

of The Heritage Foundation. 

32 

My comments today pertain to prospects for cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in outer space. While the United States should not avoid cooperation with any country out of fear, at the same time, it is vital that cooperation occur 

with full understanding and awareness of whom we are cooperating with, and that 

such cooperation serve American interests. 

In the case of the PRC, the combination of an opaque Chinese space management 

structure, a heavy military role in what has been observed, and an asymmetric set 

of capabilities and interests raise fundamental questions about the potential benefits from cooperation between the two countries in this vital arena. 

To this end, it is essential to recognize a few key characteristics of China’s space 

program. 

First, that China possesses a significant space capability in its own right, and 

therefore is not necessarily in need of cooperation with the United States. Too often, 

there is an assumption that the PRC is still in the early stages of space development, and that we are doing them a favor by cooperating with them. 

Second, that the Chinese space program is closely tied to the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA), their military. Therefore, any cooperation with the PRC in 

terms of space must mean interacting, at some level, with the PLA. 

Third, that the Chinese space program has enjoyed high-level political support, 

is a source of national pride, and is therefore not likely to be easily swayed or influenced by the United States, or any other foreign actor. 

These three issues, in combination, suggest that any effort at cooperation between 

the United States and the PRC will confront serious obstacles, and entail significant 

risks. 

A Brief Overview of China’s Space Program 

The PRC is a major space power, by which we mean that the PRC has the range 

of space-related capabilities to be able to access and exploit space for its own purposes, at times and places of its own choosing. Indeed, the PRC has a range of space 

capabilities that arguably equal or exceed those of Europe, and places it ahead of 

every other Asian country. 

China possesses three space launch facilities (Jiuquan, Taiyuan, and Xichang), 

and is building a fourth on Hainan Island, in the southernmost province of China. 

From their current launch facilities, they can place satellites into low, middle, and 

geosynchronous orbit, relying entirely on the Chinese-manufactured Long March 

family of launch vehicles. It is expected that China will be launching the new Long 

March 5 heavy lift vehicle from the new Hainan facility. 

Satellites. China fields a significant array of satellites. 

• It has a communications satellite array that includes both domestically produced and foreign satellites, including at least two military communications satellite constellations: the Shentong and Fenghuo systems. 

• It is only the third country to field a satellite navigation and positioning system, 

the Beidou/Compass system. The Beidou system was first orbited in 2000, with 

several satellites in geostationary orbit. This was an active system which required the user to transmit a signal to help determine the user’s location. This 

active signal also provided a communications channel, which could handle messages of up to 140 characters. The Compass portion (sometimes referred to as 

Beidou-2) is comprised of 35 mid-earth orbit satellites. The Compass portion is 

currently being deployed and is in regional service. 

• It has a weather satellite constellation that includes both sun-synchronous and 

geosynchronous meteorological satellites (the Fengyun series). There has been 

discussion in the United States of relying on China for weather satellite data, 

due to repeated delays in replacing American meteorological satellites. The Chinese 2007 ASAT test involved a defunct FY–1C weather satellite in Low Earth 

Orbit. 

• It fields a number of earth observation and reconnaissance satellites. The Ziyuan 

series was the first Chinese observation satellite to be able to beam their data 

to Earth. It is the product of a joint development effort between the PRC and 

Brazil (in the form of the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite, or CBERS). 

• China has also fielded a large array of small satellites, including the ‘‘Practice,’’ 

‘‘Experiment,’’ ‘‘Gaofen,’’ and ‘‘Innovation’’ series. These have carried a variety 

of payloads, including synthetic aperture radars (SAR), electro-optical imaging 

equipment, and monitoring equipment believed to support military intelligence 

requirements. A Chinese small satellite, believed to be from the ‘‘Experiment’’ 

series, was recently launched with a robotic arm. Previously in 2010, two ‘‘Practice’’ satellites deliberately ‘‘bumped’’ each other in orbit. 

33 

1Sean O’Connor, ‘‘PLA Ballistic Missiles,’’ Air Power Australia, APA–TR–2010–0802, April 

2012, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA–PLA-Ballistic-Missiles.html#mozTocId274945 (accessed 

April 7, 2014). 2 ‘‘2007 Researcher Application Form,’’ Academy of Equipment Command and Technology, 

China, http://yz.chsi.com.cn/adv/zbxuyjs.htm (accessed April 7, 2014). 

Manned Space Program. China has an active manned mission program that involves the Shenzhou manned spacecraft, which has now had ten successful flights 

(five manned, five unmanned), and the Tiangong space lab. With the completion of 

the 2013 Shenzhou-X mission, China has also successfully demonstrated docking capabilities between the Shenzhou and Tiangong spacecraft, as well as relatively extended duration missions. (Shenzhou-X lasted 15 days.) 

To support the manned program, China established its first overseas bases with 

mission support facilities in Swakopmund, Namibia, and Kiribati in the South Pacific. Chinese documents have indicated that a space station, perhaps in the 60–80 

ton range (smaller than the U.S. Skylab) is expected to be deployed by 2020. 

Lunar Exploration Program. The Chinese lunar exploration program has launched 

two lunar orbiters (Chang’e-1 and -2), as well as a lunar rover (the Jade Rabbit on 

Chang’e-3) since 2007. The lunar rover has exhibited erratic performance, but is still 

considered fairly successful. The final part of the Chang’e program is expected to 

be a lunar sample retrieval mission in the 2017–2018 time frame. 

At this point in time, there is no official indication of plans for a manned mission 

to the moon. In the 2011 Chinese white paper on space, it was indicated that initial 

studies were now underway to explore the requirements for such a mission. 

Supporting these various space efforts is a major space industrial complex mainly 

comprising two state-owned enterprises (SOEs): the China Aerospace Science and 

Technology Corporation (CASC) and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). Each of these SOEs is believed to employ over 100,000 people and 

is dedicated to producing aerospace and missile-related systems. Thus, unlike their 

American counterparts (e.g., Boeing and Lockheed-Martin), these companies do not 

manufacture aircraft or helicopters. On the other hand, not only do they produce 

rockets and satellites, but also ground test equipment and specialized vehicles associated with space launch, etc. In this regard, they somewhat resemble large, 

vertically integrated corporations. 

The two SOEs are also responsible for manufacturing missiles for China’s Second 

Artillery, the equivalent of the Soviet Union’s Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as 

tactical missile systems for the PLA as a whole. Thus, subordinate research academies within the CASC manufacture not only the Long March space launch vehicle, 

but also the DF–21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which comes in an 

anti-carrier variant (the DF–21D) and serves as the launch vehicle for the Chinese 

anti-satellite system (the SC–19).1

The PLA and China’s Space Program 

The close links between the Chinese military and space are not restricted to the 

Chinese military and space industrial complexes. The PLA has consistently played 

a key role in the Chinese space effort, and China’s space program is closely identified with the military. Indeed, the Chinese space program dates its creation to October 8, 1956, with the establishment of the Fifth Academy of the Ministry of Defense 

by Dr. Qian Xuesen. 

Since then, the Chinese military has played an essential role in the management 

of various Chinese space programs. This is reflected today in the continuing role of 

the General Armaments Department (GAD) in Chinese space affairs. The GAD is 

one of the four General Departments of the PLA (along with the General Staff Department, General Political Department, and General Armaments Department) that 

form the core of the Central Military Commission (CMC). It is the CMC that actually manages the military. The Ministry of Defense, by contrast, has little authority, 

compared with the two uniformed vice chairmen of the CMC. 

All of China’s space launch facilities, mission control facilities, and tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) facilities, including its fleet of space tracking ships, are 

all subsumed within the GAD. Indeed, the facilities are typically referred to by their 

base number in Chinese literature: Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center is Base 25, 

while the Xichang Satellite Launch Center is Base 27. Not surprisingly, the various 

facilities and ships are all staffed by units of the GAD. The personnel are trained 

at the Academy of Command Equipment and Technology, which is a subsidiary organization of the GAD.2

In addition, China’s manned space program is managed through the GAD. The 

website of the China Manned Space Engineering Office (CMSEO) lists the chief 

commander of the program as Zhang Youxia. General Zhang Youxia was appointed 

34 

3 ‘‘Management,’’ China Manned Space Engineering, http://en.cmse.gov.cn/list.php?catid=40 

(accessed April 7, 2014). 4Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, The Cox Report (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1999), pp. 220 

and 221–222. 5 ‘‘A Record of the General Staff Department Satellite Navigation Station’s Commitment to the 

Beidou Navigation System,’’ Xinhua, November 9, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013–11/09/ 

contentl2524730.htm (accessed April 7, 2014). 6 ‘‘The Stars in the Sky Join Beidou,’’ http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/71065/370766/ 

(accessed April 7, 2014). 7Deng Liqun, ed., China Today: Defense Science and Technology, Vol. I (Beijing: National 

Defence Industry Press, 1993), p. 356. 

director of the GAD in October 2012.3 Another deputy chief commander (apparently 

the senior deputy) of the program is Major General Niu Hongguang, one of the deputy directors of the PLA General Armaments Department. Other deputy chief commanders are drawn from the military and space industrial complex, reflecting the 

integrated nature of this key industrial sector. 

Indeed, it is useful to recall that the U.S. prohibitions currently limiting the ability of the PRC to launch any satellites containing American parts, under the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR), were put in place due to the transfer of aerospace-related information to Chinese companies in the 1990s. As the Cox 

Commission report noted, information that was given to China regarding items such 

as the fairing on the Long March-2E space launch vehicle led to improvements for 

Chinese ballistic missile programs. In particular, it led to changes in both rocket 

design and Chinese operations that improved the reliability of all Chinese rocket 

launches.4

Meanwhile, China’s satellite programs are often linked to military, as well as civilian, users. Like the United States, for example, China’s satellite navigation system (Beidou) is linked to the military—specifically, the General Staff Department 

Satellite Navigation Station.5 There is even a website celebrating this organization’s 

achievements.6 Military officers from key GSD departments apparently were part of 

the design effort for the Chinese weather satellite system. Military participation in 

space efforts is hardly unique to the PRC, but should serve as a reminder that any 

interaction with the Chinese space program will almost certainly mean a PLA role 

and presence. 

More to the point, there is no obvious civilian counterpart to the PLA in terms 

of China’s space efforts. The most regularly mentioned equivalent to NASA is the 

Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA). But the head of CNSA is typically 

described in Chinese writings and press coverage first as a vice minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), then as a deputy director of 

the State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense 

(SASTIND), before being mentioned as the head of the CNSA. This suggests that 

the position of the CNSA is a third-tier bureaucracy, standing below the key superministry for advanced technologies, and the managing authority for China’s military 

industries (SASTIND). 

By contrast, the PLA is a key part of the Chinese power structure. One of the 

key positions for the top Chinese leader (Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin) is the 

chairmanship of the Central Military Commission. That role, along with being General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is what vests Xi, Hu, and 

Jiang with their power—head of the Party and head of the military. In short, bureaucratically the CNSA is dwarfed by the Chinese military (which may explain the 

CNSA’s absence from the top echelon of Chinese manned space management). 

The Importance of Space to the Chinese Leadership 

As early as 1958, months after Sputnik was placed into orbit, Chinese leaders saw 

the development of space capabilities as reflecting on China’s place in the international order. In May 1958, Chairman Mao Zedong advocated the creation of a Chinese space program, declaring at the Second Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress, 

‘‘We should also manufacture satellites.’’ 7 This high-level support has varied at 

times, but space has generally been seen as contributing to ‘‘comprehensive national 

power’’ by facilitating national economic development, strengthening military modernization, and supporting the legitimacy of the CCP. It is therefore not surprising 

that senior Chinese leaders have made sure that they are present for key events 

such as the inauguration of satellite communications in the 1970s, or the launch of 

China’s first manned spacecraft, the Shenzhou-V. 

For China, its space program is emblematic of its steady advancement since 1949, 

especially since most of it has been accomplished through its own efforts. When the 

Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1960, Chinese access to foreign technology was abruptVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:59 Aug 17, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\95839.TXT JACKIE
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8For a more extensive discussion of this topic, please see Dean Cheng, ‘‘China’s Military Role 

in Space,’’ Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2012), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/ 

spring/cheng.pdf (accessed April 7, 2014). 9Mark Stokes, ‘‘China’s Commercial Aviation Sector Looks to the Future,’’ Futuregram 09– 

002, Project 2049, http://project2049.net/documents/chinaslcommerciallaviationlsectorl 

looksltolthelfuture.pdf (accessed April 7, 2014). 10 It is worth noting here that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a part of the 

CCP Politburo, a key power center in China. Thus, the voice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

is muted, at best, in any internal debate on policy. 

ly ended. As a result, China had to rely on its own efforts, in what became known 

as the ‘‘two bomb, one satellite’’ program. This effort saw the Chinese focus their 

national energies to develop an atomic bomb, a hydrogen bomb, and a satellite. This 

reflected the long-standing dual-use nature of China’s space efforts—if China was 

to have a full-fledged nuclear deterrent, it would have to develop a delivery system, 

which in turn could also serve as a space launch vehicle. 

‘‘Two bombs, one satellite’’ went beyond a programmatic objective, however. The 

term also referred to the idea of homegrown development of advanced capabilities. 

Because of the Sino–Soviet split, as well as the ongoing Cold War with the United 

States and broader isolationist policies pursued by Beijing, Chinese development of 

these capabilities would have to wholly rely on their own resources. The phrase ‘‘two 

bombs, one satellite,’’ therefore, came to also be associated with the idea of indigenous development and self-reliance. These characteristics remain hallmarks of today’s Chinese space program. For the same reason, Chinese ‘‘firsts’’ (e.g., the first 

satellite and first manned mission) tend to be of longer duration and incorporate 

more extensive tasks than other nations’ firsts. 

Moreover, in keeping with the Chinese memory of the ‘‘Century of Humiliation,’’ 

Beijing will want any cooperative venture to be, at a minimum, on a co-equal basis. 

For the PRC to be treated as anything other than a full member in any program 

or effort would smack of the ‘‘unequal treaties’’ that marked China’s interactions 

with the rest of the world between 1839 and 1949. For the same reason, China has 

generally been reluctant to join any organization or regime in which it was not 

party to negotiating. For the CCP, whose political legitimacy rests, in part, on the 

idea that it has restored Chinese pride and greatness, this is likely to be a significant part of any calculation. 

At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant political support 

within the Chinese political system. Based on their writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to establish ‘‘space dominance,’’ in order to fight 

and win ‘‘local wars under informationized conditions.’’ 8 The two SOEs are seen as 

key parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the opportunities to 

expose a large workforce to such areas as systems engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China’s commercial airliner development effort tapped 

the top leadership of China’s aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent.9 From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on preserving 

its interests. 

China’s space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as much as military or 

economic, statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as 

the PRC has scored major achievements in space, these reflect positively on both 

China’s growing power and respect (internationally) and the CCP’s legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to be 

viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the world’s second-largest economy (in gross domestic 

product terms), it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms. 

Prospects for Cooperation 

Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation with the PRC 

in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited. China’s past experience 

of major high-technology cooperative ventures (Sino-Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, 

U.S.-China cooperation in the 1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino-European space cooperation on the Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure 

of the joint Russian-Chinese Phobos-Grunt mission is likely seen in Beijing as further evidence that a ‘‘go-it-alone’’ approach is preferable. 

Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant interest from key players 

such as the PLA or the military industrial complex in expanding cooperation.10

Moreover, as long as China’s economy continues to expand, and the top political 

leadership values space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space exVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:59 Aug 17, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\95839.TXT JACKIE
36 

penditures—making international cooperation far less urgent for the PRC than most 

other space-faring states. 

If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation in Chinese circles, there 

should also be skepticism in American ones. China’s space program is arguably one 

of the most opaque in the world. Even such basic data as China’s annual space expenditures is lacking—with little prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important, China’s decision-making processes are little understood, especially in the context of space. Seven years after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, exactly which 

organizations were party to that decision, and why it was undertaken, remains unclear. Consequently, any effort at cooperation would raise questions about the identity of the partners and ultimate beneficiaries—with a real likelihood that the PLA 

would be one of them. 

It is possible that the Chinese could be induced to be more transparent when it 

comes to space, although the unwillingness of Beijing to engage in substantive discussions on space during the last several Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S&ED) 

would cast doubt on this. But this would argue for a ‘‘go-slow’’ approach, at best. 

There is room for greater interaction, especially in the sharing of already collected 

data, such as geodesy information. As both sides set their sights on the moon, exchanges of data about lunar conditions and the lunar surface and composition all 

might help create a pattern of interaction that might lower some of the barriers to 

information exchange. Even there, however, concerns on both sides about information security and electronic espionage, etc., is likely to raise serious doubts about 

how freely one should incorporate data provided by the other side. 

The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United 

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Senator RUBIO. Let me begin with Mr. Chiao. 

You mentioned at the close of your statement about cooperation 

with China. Let me step back for a second and make this statement. We Americans have always viewed the space program, certainly over the last 30 years, as the sort of cooperative effort that 

certainly helps our country but benefits all mankind. We have 

viewed it as a peaceful endeavor, as one that can unite people. And 

we’ve seen the fruits of it. 

But I think we have to be cautious that not every other nation 

has the same view. And I think China, in particular, potentially 

poses a pretty interesting dilemma for us. Certainly, their space 

program has military components but our space program is largely 

driven by civilians and has civilian methodology and civilian purposes behind it. Everything in China, but certainly the space program, is deeply linked with the PLA and we’ve seen evidence of 

that. 

I would like to further expand on your statement. I don’t necessarily disagree. I think in an ideal world we’d want cooperation 

with China because I think three major powers: Russia, China, the 

United States, and others working in conjunction if in fact we all 

have the same goals could certainly get some of these things accomplished quicker than any nation on its own. 

But I also think we have to be careful and realistic that we not 

somehow ascribe our motivations and our way of thinking to that 

of another nation that perhaps has different aims and goals for 

their space program. And one of the things highlighted in Mr. 

37 

Cheng’s written testimony is warnings about that. About the threat 

of potentially seeing China use sensitive information to improve its 

ballistic missile capability and so forth but also its desire to quite 

frankly achieve what they have termed in their own documents 

and what they’ve called ‘‘publicly spaced dominance’’ which is not 

our view. The U.S. may not necessarily want to be the most predominant space power in the world but we don’t view it as a dominance thing, we view it as something that great nations do great 

things. 

So here’s my question. In your experience, and certainly because 

you’ve mentioned it in your statement, do you see any potential pitfalls in terms of the Chinese attitude toward the space program 

that, in essence, places them in an incompatible position to our 

own view to what space would be about? 

Dr. CHIAO. Well, as you mentioned, and it’s certainly true that 

the Chinese space program is part of the PLA. Now operationallywise and that’s kind of the way I think, you know, I understand 

the distinction but functionally it shouldn’t make that big of a difference because we’re going to be working on civil space together. 

And they have a clearly delineated civil space part of their organization. So I don’t see any roadblocks if you were or stumbling 

blocks. 

And as far as sensitive information is concerned, we have the 

safeguards that we can put in place to make sure that there are 

no technology transfers. And, you know, frankly from a, you know, 

guidance system, ballistic missile, those aren’t things that we work 

on at NASA. We don’t develop the guidance systems. We certainly 

don’t transfer it to our partners, information like that. So it can be 

controlled and, as far as I know, it has been very successfully controlled with our relationship with the Russians. 

Senator RUBIO. And again, the ideal scenario is that we will be 

able to work with them cooperatively. I’m just always concerned 

that somehow we ascribe to other countries the same motivations 

as we have for the space program and sometimes that those things 

don’t add up. And I just want to make sure we’re cautious about 

it. 

But I think we all share your goal that it’s achievable which I 

pivot now to Ms. Eisenhower. Your testimony was about Russia. 

And I think you’ve raised some interesting points in your testimony 

about things like, for example, Russian scientists associated with 

the space program are among the most progressive elements in 

their society. We’ve enjoyed a depoliticized relationship with them. 

There are safety concerns about cutting off interaction with them. 

And then, there is also the geopolitical realities of what’s in the 

headlines today. 

Maybe you can expand a little more about how we balance those 

two things. Because, on the one hand, there are geopolitical realities. I think when Americans see what’s happening in Ukraine, 

we’re uncomfortable about the fact that we’re paying the Russians, 

what is it, $70 million to go to the International Space Station. 

Does that sound right? 

Ms. EISENHOWER. $70 million, sorry? 

Senator RUBIO. To get a seat on those flights to the Russians. 

And we depend on them now, for being able to launch our astroVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:59 Aug 17, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\95839.TXT JACKIE
38 

nauts into space. So you can understand the political implications 

of that domestically. And on the other hand, you’ve raised some interesting points—that we don’t want to cut off the scientific community in Russia that quite frankly has been either apolitical or 

in many instances progressive in their thought process in terms of 

our ongoing relationship. And it seems to be a relationship that has 

some significant degree of cooperation. It has been able to overcome 

whatever is happening politically elsewhere in the world. 

So perhaps you can describe that a little bit better for us, in 

terms of what that actually looks like and maybe a roadmap moving forward. How do we navigate this, for a lack of better term, 

minefield that we find ourselves in? 

Ms. EISENHOWER. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio. And it’s 

an honor to be able to be here and to share my thoughts on this. 

I think this requires, this particular situation, requires a really 

very nuanced strategy, which of course is extremely difficult in today’s world where everything is given a bumper sticker. 

But, nevertheless, I think a nuanced approach is important for 

the simple reason that we want to make sure that we express our 

displeasure with Russian behavior and we do so in a way that’s 

going to count with the regime and not punish our friends. Everybody here would back me up by saying that the Russian space program is much more important, or space in general, is much more 

important in Russia than it is in this country. If this were a Duma 

committee you would have a full room. And so, yes, it has a very 

big symbolic impact but we have made extraordinary strides in the 

last 20 years in bringing what was a very, very hardline aerospace 

community into a fully cooperative relationship as we’ve seen over 

the last years. 

If I were in charge, I would be organizing sanctions to hit exactly 

at the heart of the regime itself: the people that interact most directly with Vladimir Putin and others. If the scientific community 

had that kind of influence with Vladimir Putin, they would not 

have lost their recent political struggle over the future of the Russian Academy of Sciences. So I do think that that is the political 

reality on the ground. 

And then, the other point I would make is that none of this interaction—maybe this’ll actually have some reference to Dr. Chiao’s 

comments too, about China. I think we engaged the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, not to do them a 

favor, but to do us a favor. We gained unprecedented access to 

some of their most sensitive facilities. And I think, if you look at 

the China situation, we could well gain every bit as much as they 

might in terms of understanding how our two societies view this 

area; this important area. And also, to give us that kind of access 

in China. Bill Gerstenmaier played a leadership role in negotiating 

the agreements with the Russians at that time. 

By the way, I have supplied a copy of Partners in Space for both 

of your committees. But, in any case, I think this is really about 

enhancing our national security and we want to make sure that we 

don’t jeopardize our national security and lose access to those important communities while we’re legitimately trying to express our 

displeasure to the Russian government. 

39 

Senator RUBIO. And for my last question, I’m going to go back 

to you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. Because I think in your written testimony—but this is open to any of you that want to answer this because I think this is a more, big picture, broader question. In your 

statement you talked about, ‘‘To channel all of the factors that have 

enabled our space achievements to date in a way that will ensure 

a sustainable foundation under which future generations can continue to build.’’ 

I think the key part for me of that statement is ‘‘future generations,’’ and the notion that we, the scientists, and engineers, many 

of the people who will work on a 2030 mission, for example, to 

Mars are probably in college right now or thinking about what 

they’re going to major in in college. And maybe I’m wrong, but my 

sense is that on a broader public level, we have lost some of the 

public awareness and/or enthusiasm of what the space program 

means for the country and I would like some ideas from you, I 

guess—from all of you, is on how we can reinvigorate that. 

I think if you go back to 1960 when President Kennedy made 

that promise that we would land a man on the Moon and return 

him safely to Earth by the end of the decade. That invigorated the 

American scientific community to pursue with a singularity of 

mind that in addition to getting a man on the Moon and back safely—also, by the way, held all sorts of commercial and technological 

advances that were made that benefited our economy and society 

as a whole. 

How can we reinvigorate a new generation of people to pursue 

or go into these fields that are so critical? And, more importantly, 

this comes at a time when we have so many young people looking 

for what fields they can go into that will provide stable middle and 

higher income jobs that have opportunities in the twenty-first century. 

So my question is, from a public relations standpoint, what can 

we do more of to excite people about what space can mean for the 

future and get more people interested in the fields that are the 

backbone of any successful endeavor? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. That’s a really difficult question. You know, 

my experience has been, when I expose folks to what we’re doing, 

and by folks I think of high school kids and maybe even grade 

school kids, they really get excited about what we’re doing. And 

sometimes, when I’m kind of down in the mouth and I’m worried 

about sequester and budgets and I look at all the wonderful things 

we could do if we just had more budget, I forget what we’re really 

doing with what budget we have. And when I go expose some of 

the younger students and some of the other folks to what we’re 

doing, that excitement comes back and then I get reenergized again 

and then I’m ready to go back. 

So one thing is I think we need to talk to them unashamedly 

about what we’re doing and capture some of the excitement. If you 

think about what we’re doing with the Asteroid Redirect Mission, 

we’re going to grab a piece of the solar system. We’re going to deflect it around the Earth to deflect it around the Moon and insert 

it into a distant retrograde orbit around the Moon where our crews 

can go visit with the Orion capsule. 

40 

You know, that seems kind of boring to some folks when I say 

all that, but if you talk to some kids that are still excited and they 

think about what we’re really doing. That has a really big deal. I 

mean, to think we are moving a piece of the solar system for our 

use that will allow us to learn skills and techniques that we need 

to push human presence into the solar system, that’s a pretty aweinspiring statement. 

But I think we get so jaded because we talk about, well, why 

don’t we go to the Moon or let’s go to Mars or let’s do some other 

activity. We have kind of, you know, buyer’s neglect, right? It’s 

when you order your food in the cafeteria and you look over and 

you see what somebody else ordered and immediately what’s in 

front of you isn’t appetizing enough. You wish you would have ordered what that person next to you did. I think we have to ignore 

that a little bit and look at what we’ve got in front of us with what 

this country can do and not be ashamed about what we’re doing 

moving forward. 

Senator RUBIO. And by the way, I agree. I don’t have a public 

polling on this, but I would venture to guess that an extraordinary 

majority of Americans are unaware of the existence of that program. Certainly, a majority of our young students and even in college are. And I think we can rally people around a goal like that. 

But I think it’s incumbent upon us in public office who hold these 

positions and have these forums to make people aware of what we 

are actually working on; what’s there and what’s tangible. 

I think people would be very excited about thinking that they 

can be a part of an effort like that or the subsequent efforts that 

will lead off from that. But, I just think a lot of people don’t even 

know we’re doing that. 

Dr. CHIAO. Yes. 

If I could just add a few comments. I think the key to stoking 

public interest is flying more and flying sooner. And that’s why, in 

part of my remarks, I talked about the need for possibly a new subprogram of earlier flights that’ll get us Beyond-Low Earth Orbit 

more quickly. 

Now, as I mentioned also, for a sustainable program we do need 

a heavy-lift like SLS and Orion. And as Mr. Gerstenmaier has said 

in his remarks, I think it’s absolutely possible that we can do these 

kinds of missions in partnership with commercial and with international and just do it maybe without a lot of big increases in the 

NASA budget. 

So I’m hopeful that somewhere in the near to mid-term we could 

be flying more often and doing missions that will develop the capabilities to go back to the Moon one day and then on to Mars. And 

this could be done in partnership context that might be very creative and synergistic, and I think that’s the way we get the public 

interested in space flight. 

Senator NELSON. That is correct. Once you start putting Americans on American rockets, the interest in this country is going to 

accelerate. How many people have come up to me and said, ‘‘Did 

you see the movie ‘Gravity’?’’ 

They were really gripped by it. Well, they’ll be gripped when you 

see an American climbing in and strapping into an American rocket. And that’s the good news. The bad news is that it’s going to be 

41 

2017, in a commercial rocket getting to the space station (unless 

you believe some of the commercial companies that it can be 2016) 

and then Orion, it’s not going to be until 2021. But these things 

are complicated. And so, that excitement will return, but we’ve got 

to keep pressing on. 

We have a vote that is called right now. I’m going to recess and 

quickly run over and vote and come right back. It’s not a series of 

votes. It should be just one vote. And then we’ll continue with the 

questions. 

Thank you so much. 

The Committee will stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Senator NELSON. The Committee will resume. 

I want to ask a quick question to a couple of you about the Commercial Crew Program. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier, would additional funding allow us to speed up 

the start of domestic flights to the ISS? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, I think probably the most critical 

thing, right now, is to get the funding that we’ve requested in the 

President’s budget in 2015. We have a pretty solid plan. Our goal 

is to select a commercial provider in the August–September timeframe of this year. But to make that happen and to be there by 

the end of 2017, as we’ve talked about, I really think we absolutely 

need the funding level that the President has requested. 2015 is 

probably one of the more critical years in terms of where we are 

in development and activities. This is really the paramount year of 

when we need funding for Commercial Crew. 

So any support we can get to the President’s budget for that activity is absolutely what we need. 

Senator NELSON. So the answer to that question is yes, because 

the President had requested about $850 million for Commercial 

Crew and over the years, it had gone from $300 million to $500 

million to develop Commercial Crew, start the competition, et 

cetera. Then, to about $700 million and now, for Fiscal Year 2015, 

which starts October the first, to about $850 million. I agree with 

you. And so, the answer is yes. 

All right. Dr. Chiao, how does commercial access to Low Earth 

Orbit support further exploration? 

Dr. CHIAO. Well, thank you for the question, Senator. 

Commercial Crew will ensure access for Americans to the International Space Station. And, as you know, the ISS is designed to 

be operated internationally. That is we need the crews on the 

ground and in the station working together in conjunction in order 

to effectively operate the space station. 

The space station is critical for developing the medical, biomedical countermeasures that we need to develop and test before 

we can send crews Beyond-Low Earth Orbit for any significant period of time. The station also, of course, serves as a test bed for 

technology, although, new things that we’re going to be developing 

and proving out before we can start sending crewed missions farther from the Earth for longer durations. And so, in that way Commercial Crew very directly supports the station which directly supports the Beyond-Low Earth Orbit program. 

42 

Senator NELSON. Ms. Eisenhower, what lessons might we take 

away from the lapse of, what you mentioned in your testimony, of 

the need for engagement even during diplomatic uncertainty? The 

space cooperation agreement between the U.S. and the then-Soviet 

Union lapsed in the years following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. So, given from that lapse, what was the key to managing the 

relationship through the many crises of the Cold War? 

Ms. EISENHOWER. Yes. Well, that lapse between Apollo-Soyuz 

and 1992, when the Shuttle Mir program began, I think the biggest 

impact is that a generation of people were lost who actually knew 

how to engage in this kind of cooperation. Even though ApolloSoyuz was not a huge program, there just wasn’t the interactive 

culture that we see today. And one reason I’m concerned about 

space being involved in some of the measures we may take in response to the current crisis, is that it would be very sad to see anyone disengaged in this process because long-term space cooperation 

is going to require the Russians, long-term. So I think that gap 

does have workforce implications. 

As I said in my testimony too, the Eisenhower Administration, 

which was the administration in power during the dawn of the 

space age, was also at a crucial stage at the early part of the dawn 

of the nuclear age. The administration’s greatest concern was the 

development of what might be called ‘‘paranoid uncertainty.’’ And 

so, these kinds of programs, that would be the Atoms for Peace 

conferences and later work around the International Geophysical 

Year, as being stabilizing. Precisely because of those crises. 

It’s remarkable that, after Sputnik actually, the United States 

and the Soviet Union engaged in private negotiations over the future of Antarctica. And it was as a result of the International Geophysical Year and the fact that that cooperation had not suspended 

that we managed to demilitarize an entire world continent, which 

is the Antarctic, which is, today a real test bed and laboratory for 

the scientific community. 

So I think I know that, as NASA understandably goes through 

reviewing all of its programs, that it should not underestimate the 

importance of these conferences because the conferences, in fact, at 

least in the past, played a very significant role. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. Would you think that that kind of collaboration 

that you’re talking about, would that ultimately apply to our relationship with other up-and-coming space-faring nations, such as 

China and India? 

Ms. EISENHOWER. Well, I must say that since cooperation with 

Russia since 1992 has been so successful, I really do think that it 

makes a lot of sense to be able to look at engaging other countries 

more deeply. As I said earlier, we didn’t do it for them, we did it 

for us. 

We not only had an opportunity to create more transparency, but 

actually, in the book Partners in Space, which I’ve left a copy for 

you, we learned a lot from the Russians too. They had some very, 

very elegant ways of handling complex situations on a very tight 

budget; which actually could be quite a useful discipline these days. 

I’m sure the Chinese have very interesting and creative ways of 

looking at solving exactly the same kind of problems in space. 

43 

And that’s why I alluded to the fact that we in fact have a much 

more robust effort in space today because we did share ideas about 

how to solve some of these common problems. What came together, 

actually, at the end was something that was really not like the way 

it was for anybody before, because we put different scientific and 

technological perspectives together to create something very robust 

and strong. 

Senator NELSON. I must admit that I am shaped in part by my 

past experiences, for example, in the 1980s. Out of an administration policy in the 80s, they started allowing American satellites to 

be launched on Chinese Long March rockets. And basically, there 

was supposed to be a firewall there so that they couldn’t get our 

technology and, of course, they got it. 

It’s many years later and we’re confronted with a different situation but I personally think that the United States was taken advantage of by the Chinese, because of some well-meaning folks in 

the administration at the time. They were so well-meaning, in my 

judgment, they were naive. But it is what it is. And here we are 

in the year 2014. What do you think, Dr. Chiao, about the international collaboration? And do you think we can best engage now 

with these up-and-coming space-faring nations? 

Dr. CHIAO. Well, Senator, I have to admit, in the early 90s, you 

know, I grew up during the Cold War. And so, during the early 90s 

I was one of the skeptics of working with the Russians and I was 

wondering why we were doing this. But after I went over there and 

started working with these folks and started seeing the advantages 

and the big picture of international relations and bettering things 

not only between, you know, cooperating in space but just between 

our two countries, I became a big believer in international collaboration. 

And so, I think there will always be risks. I mean, first of all, 

you know, it’s clear to everyone, I think, that the Russians are trying to spy on us, you know, the Chinese are trying to spy on us. 

We’re spying on everyone. Everyone is spying on everyone else. So 

there are going to be attempts to get technology from all sides. And 

I think the safeguards that we have in place, that we put in place 

with the Russians, as I mentioned earlier, I’m not aware of a single 

instance where there has been an inappropriate transfer of technology. 

Now, to your point about the Chinese missile technology being 

benefited from some American advice, unfortunately, that was due 

to naı ̈vete ́ at the time I think. It was not anything directly to do 

with launching satellites on their vehicles except that in the postaccident investigation some American experts naively gave them 

some advice which probably helped improve their rockets. That’s 

something we’ve learned from I think. And as I mentioned, the 

safeguards that can be part of the safeguards that I think will 

make the benefits of cooperating more outweigh the risks of possibly losing some technology. 

As Ms. Eisenhower mentioned, you know, we can gain great insights into the Chinese program. I’ve been over and seen their 

technology. I’ve seen their rocket factories and their space center, 

their control center, and it’s impressive. They’re doing some really 

44 

impressive things. And I think we would gain a lot of insight into 

what they’re doing in this relationship if it were to happen. 

Senator NELSON. Ms. Eisenhower, do you have an additional 

comment on how did the United States still manage to benefit from 

the Russian technologies even though we beat them to the Moon? 

As a matter of fact, they had a big rocket and it blew up on the 

pad. And it was their Moon rocket. 

Ms. EISENHOWER. Are you talking about the period after—— 

Senator NELSON. Back then. 

Ms. EISENHOWER.—started cooperation? Yes. 

Senator NELSON. Right. 

Ms. EISENHOWER. Well—— 

Senator NELSON. With the Soviet Union. 

Ms. EISENHOWER.—first of all, some of this is outlined in my 

book. But I think we learned, for instance, a number of things that 

the Russians, for instance—and actually probably Bill ought to be 

answering this question in large measure. But we learned a lot 

about how a completely different group of people would launch 

rockets. They were organizing their rocket launches—having their 

rockets horizontally maintained and then hoisting them up and 

launching them. I think we learned a lot about redundancy. Help 

me here, Bill. It’s been a long time since I wrote that book, but we 

used numerical redundancy. They used functional redundancy. 

Would you like to maybe—could I cede my—— 

Senator NELSON. Absolutely. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I’d just say, again, we’ve learned an awful 

lot and both Jeff and Leroy can also add their own experience. 

When you solve the same physical problems and you see another 

country, another group of engineers, solve that same physical problem, and because you’ve been isolated, you see their solution to 

that problem in a very different light. And that gives you tremendous exposure. And that’s one of the true advantages of cooperation. 

Space station is amazing. If you look at the heat shield, the debris shields on the outside of a space station, there’s a Russian design for—and we’re all protecting ourselves from micrometeorites; 

small penetrations of the pressure shell. 

You can see how the Russians solved the problem; you can see 

how the Italians solved the problem; you can see how the Europeans solved the problem; how the Japanese solved the problems; 

and how the U.S. solves the problems. And every one of them does 

exactly the same job but they do it in a very different manner, fundamentally. So you gain a tremendous experience and a new way 

of thinking that really helps you become innovative and creative as 

you try to build your next program. 

Dr. CHIAO. Yes. I would totally agree with all of those comments. 

You know, during my experience with the Russians, as I mentioned 

earlier, my going in position was why are we doing this, our stuff 

is so much better. What do we have to learn from them? But the 

fact is, as Mr. Gerstenmaier just said, the fact is that when you 

see perspectives, you know, different cultures, different entities, 

solve the same technical problems from a different approach, it 

really broadens your own perspective. And personally, having done 

spacewalk using both American spacesuits and Russian spacesuits, 

45 

I really came to admire certain elements of their design, the approach and it’s really been eye-opening. And that’s just one example. 

Senator NELSON. So did Sandra Bullock in ‘‘Gravity.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Senator NELSON. Another example, I think, is the Russian engine, RD–180. It creates temperatures and pressures because of 

some alloys that they are very, very good at. That it’s an extraordinary engine. And we have the license to it, but we don’t know 

all the techniques of how they blend all those metals to be able to 

have that kind of thrust in an engine. 

Mr. Manber, tell me about—why do you, or do you think that we 

are nearing a point where commercial exploration could become 

viable? 

Mr. MANBER. I know we are, because I have a lot of customers. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator NELSON. And why is that, that we’re nearing that point? 

Mr. MANBER. Well, apologies, Mr. Senator. 

I think the primary reason is the stability we enjoy and policy 

in Low Earth Orbit. We have actually reached a moment in the 

midst of all the politics we have in Washington where this Congress has given us, in the space community, at least the 10-year 

horizon. And that is extraordinary. 

And we were about to lose a significant foreign customer, in fact, 

to the Chinese. And the reason was, they were looking at a longterm project onboard space station and we were planning to bring 

down the station in 2020 and the Chinese are out there commercially marketing this space station now. And when the announcement was made that we’re extending it to at least 2024, they came 

back. 

And so, I think the answer to the question, and I think it’s a lesson for us as we look at Beyond-Low Earth Orbit, is we have a stable policy now. We have robust transportation to and from the station. We have bipartisan agreement that the station should be continued. We have NASA not competing with the private sector. And 

we have a very good regulatory framework; the IGA, the Intergovernmental Agreement which lays out the rules of the road. In that 

environment, I’m willing, my investors are willing, to make investments, and customers are willing to make plans. 

So the answer to the question is we have a stable policy and existing hardware in space. 

Senator NELSON. And do you have any suggestions what NASA 

could learn from the commercial partners? 

Mr. MANBER. Oh, do I. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MANBER. Yes. 

What government does best, as Mr. Gerstenmaier has said in 

these hearings so many times—what government does best, what 

NASA does best, is plan and develop. The government does not do 

operations that well in any industry. They don’t run our airlines, 

they don’t, you know, they don’t operate our car industry. You don’t 

rent a car from a government agency. 

And so, I think what NASA can learn from the experience we are 

having together on the space station, is to relax a little bit. If they 

46 

can provide, with congressional funding, the infrastructure, let the 

commercial sector in on it. 

We have a small satellite program now on space station. We just 

deployed 33 small satellites on the station with no additional taxpayer funding. We took the risk, we invested the money, we built 

the hardware, we got it through the NASA safety process and the 

Japanese Space Agency safety process, and it’s all working fine. 

And I think what we’re learning is: NASA should not be trying to 

do the bells and whistles. Provide the opportunity, provide the infrastructure if that’s, you know, the basic facilities, and then let 

the commercial sector invest its own funds. We still don’t have a 

NASA contract, unfortunately. 

But no, we still don’t have a NASA contract. And we’re very 

happy with that because they don’t design our hardware and we 

take the risk. And so, I think the lesson for both sides to learn is 

let the commercial sector do what we do best in any market including space. 

Senator NELSON. What can the commercial efforts do to generate 

more excitement among young people until we can actually get 

American bodies in American rockets flying back? 

Mr. MANBER. When we started NanoRacks, we did not start to 

do education. I’m not a teacher. I didn’t think of education. Today, 

we have an unbelievable program at NanoRacks where, through 

our educational partners, we’ve flown over 45 or 50 school districts 

in America. We’re flying Florida high schools, universities—there’s 

a program in California at Valley Christian which is now 14 Christian high schools. 

It’s even gone international. We fly Israeli high schools. All with 

no NASA funding. It’s not a NASA program. NASA is the landlord. 

NASA is the safety. NASA and the taxpayers have given us this 

opportunity. And I will say that, you know, NanoRacks is a small 

company. We’re not in ‘‘Space News’’ and the industry publications 

that often. But we’re in the, you know, ‘‘Albany This’’ and all these 

small-town newspapers where we’re giving these kids the opportunities. We have parents doing bake sales to fly on the space station. And we have some students, now, that have gone from high 

school to Stanford and other national universities. 

And both at the high school level and in university, they’re doing 

projects on space station through us. And so, I guess the answer 

to your question is we move so quickly, we’re able to do these student projects in one school-year. And it takes NASA, unfortunately, 

far longer to get through the process and the payload integration 

for whatever reason. 

And so, I think the answer is just with us willing to invest our 

own hardware, education, partner with educational schools, we’re 

partnering with CASIS now, the nongovernmental organization, to 

do even more schools. And I think at times people get bothered 

when you put the word ‘‘commercial’’ and ‘‘education’’ in the same 

sentence. 

But I think what we’re seeing is we move so quickly, we invest 

our facilities, the teachers say that kids never forget that opportunity. So the more that we—we’re not an educational company— 

the more folks who come to us to do it, the more schools, high 

47 

schools, homeschooling (we’re even reaching out to now), the better 

it is. And I think there’s a lot of excitement under the surface. 

What Senator Rubio was talking about, I think, under the surface there’s a lot of excitement on station. We shouldn’t forget 

about space station. 

Senator NELSON. You dealt in commercialization with the Russian station, Mir. Is that correct? 

Mr. MANBER. Yes, it is. I admit it. 

Senator NELSON. From that experience and your ISS experience, 

what would you anticipate would be your challenges on a Chinese 

station? 

Mr. MANBER. You mean, commercially or—— 

Senator NELSON. Commercially. 

Mr. MANBER. Well, the Chinese are now competing against us 

now, and I’m trying to match, already, what I know what their 

prices to be. 

First, what I’ve learned from the experience with Mir is you can 

market a space station. That was where we learned you can. 

And second, you can work with a government’s agency even if, 

and in this case it was Russian, a different government. I think 

what we’ll learn is that, from all indications we’re seeing at 

NanoRacks, is that the Chinese will pursue a commercial pathway. 

They’re offering, already, opportunities with other sovereign nations in exchange for minerals or exchange for other opportunities. 

And so, I think what I’m taking away from the experience on Mir 

and ISS is that the Chinese will be a formidable commercial competitor. I want to win in the marketplace not because they’re Chinese but because they’re a competitor to us. We can work with 

them but I think the lesson we have got to be clear on in this country is that space stations are commercial platforms. They have political purposes as well. They’re important. They’re going to be 

more important. And we need one. 

And I did fight in the 1990s to ensure that the Mir did not come 

down. And I lost that battle. But now, I’m fighting to make sure 

the ISS doesn’t come down. And for many of the same reasons. It’s 

extraordinarily critical that we keep the ISS going as long as it’s 

technically feasible because it has political implications and it has 

commercial implications, as well, for us. 

Senator NELSON. We’re going to try to do that in a NASA authorization bill if we can ever get over the problems of sequester. 

Mr. MANBER. Yes. I appreciate that. 

Senator NELSON. Any final comments from anybody on the 

panel? 

Thank you. It’s been most illuminating. Thank you for your expertise and your testimony. And thank you for your devotion to our 

space program. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(49) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BILL NELSON TO

WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER

Question 1. Due to budgetary constraints, NASA has previously had to withdraw 

from international collaborations, with notable examples including the ExoMars 

mission and, recently, the proposed suspension of the SOFIA airborne telescope. 

What steps can the government take to better protect its relationships with international partners during long-term mission planning? 

Answer. NASA has a long history of very successful cooperation with nations 

around the world, and part of that history has from time to time included actions 

taken by NASA and some by our international partners to re-phase, redesign, or 

even terminate planned cooperative activities. Even the most robust space partnerships, such as those among the International Space Station partners, have weathered such developments. Our partners are very aware that in all instances our cooperation is based on the availability of appropriated funds, just as we are aware 

that their participation has similar funding constraints. 

Currently, NASA has over 600 active agreements with over 120 countries and anticipates that international cooperation will remain a cornerstone of all of its future 

activities. As international collaboration in space exploration continues to increase 

(as resources remain constrained world-wide), maintaining an open, frank dialogue 

with partners and potential partners will be a key component of sound international 

partnership practice. 

Question 2. Based on your substantial experience with and knowledge of international space exploration efforts, how might NASA’s international partners collaborate with the United States on the asteroid redirect mission? 

Answer. NASA has identified a number of areas where international collaboration 

on the asteroid redirect mission could provide mutual benefit. Examples could include: 

• Data sharing and lessons learned analysis involving other asteroid/small body 

missions; 

• Asteroid identification and characterization, both near term as NASA works to 

down-select candidate asteroid targets, and longer term to support preparation 

for the selected asteroid; 

• Asteroid capture system contributions including both deployable structures and 

autonomous robotic manipulators; 

• Rendezvous sensor contributions that could be used for a wide range of mission 

applications including automated rendezvous and docking and asteroid characterization and proximity operations; and 

• Secondary payload contributions to either the Asteroid Retrieval Vehicle or the 

SLS that could advance either science or future exploration capabilities. 

Question 2a. How might that collaboration benefit both partner space programs 

and our own? 

Answer. There is global consensus of the value of human and robotic exploration—with Mars as the ultimate destination—as reflected in the Global Exploration Roadmap released by the space agencies in the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG) in August 2013. The ISECG member agencies 

further recognize that collaborative efforts toward this goal are necessary to maximize success in this multi-decadal endeavor while also strategically managing investments across national economies. Coupled with the need for space agencies to 

demonstrate near term, specific and collaborative steps toward that long-term goal, 

NASA feels that significant mutual benefit can be realized in each of the areas outlined above. 

50 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BILL NELSON TO

DR. LEROY CHIAO

Question 1. Based on your substantial experience with and knowledge of international space exploration efforts, how might NASA’s international partners collaborate with the United States on the asteroid redirect mission? 

Answer. International partners will collaborate with NASA on all Beyond-LowEarth-Orbit (B–LEO) exploration missions, as an extension to the current collaboration on the International Space Station (ISS). Their astronauts will have future opportunities to fly on these missions. They will also contribute to hardware for the 

exploration programs. As an example, the European Space Agency (ESA) is currently developing the Service Module (SM) for the Orion spacecraft, which will enable it to maneuver in LEO. In addition, there will be opportunities to collaborate 

on an Earth Departure Stage and other hardware in support of the redirect mission. 

Question 2. How might that collaboration benefit both partner space programs 

and our own? 

Answer. International collaboration benefits all partners in many ways. First, it 

allows partners to have a stake in, and develop different components of the exploration program. This serves as technology drivers in their own countries, while providing employment in the aerospace and other high-technology sectors. Second, similar capabilities provide redundancies that have proven to be critical in the past. For 

example, the U.S. Space Shuttle supported the Russian MIR space station during 

the late 1990s. Similarly, the Russia Soyuz supported the ISS after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Third, working together on a very visible civil space program 

helps to improve overall relations between the partners, as they are all focused on 

a common goal. Furthermore, the partners are highly motivated to be successful, for 

the overall benefit of all partners. The ISS is a shining example of this. 

Æ 

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