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95–515PDF 2015

U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ALLIANCES

IN ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 15, 2015

Serial No. 114–73

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Randall Schriver, president and chief executive officer, Project 2049 Institute ........................................................................................................................ 6

Mr. Walter Lohman, director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation ........................................................................................................................ 12

Balbina Hwang, Ph.D., visiting professor, School of International Service, 

American University ............................................................................................ 21

Mr. James L. Schoff, senior associate, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace ........................................................................................ 35

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Randall Schriver: Prepared statement ........................................................... 8

Mr. Walter Lohman: Prepared statement ............................................................. 14

Balbina Hwang, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 23

Mr. James L. Schoff: Prepared statement ............................................................. 37

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

(1)

U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ALLIANCES IN 

ASIA 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 o’clock p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. The subcommittee will come to order. Let me start 

by recognizing myself and the ranking member to present our 

opening statements. Without objection, the members of the subcommittee can present brief remarks if they choose to, or they can 

submit them for the record. 

Our presence as a Pacific power is amplified and underpinned by 

strong alliances. Each of our alliances contains its own history and 

significance and has promoted security and prosperity for the 

United States and the world for decades. 

In a shifting geopolitical landscape, with China integrating itself 

with other Asian economies and militaries, maintaining these alliances and strengthening the U.S.-led framework has become very 

complicated. Where the United States used to command unfettered 

dedication from its regional partners, the combination of U.S. attention in the Middle East to domestic, economic, and political obligations; historic tensions between our allies such as Korea and 

Japan; and the pull of China’s economic, military, and diplomatic 

overtures has tempered this trend. 

I look forward to hearing from our panel of distinguished witnesses today, which will discuss the status of our alliances in the 

region and evaluate strategies to maximize their mutual benefit in 

the face of a new era of security challenges and great power competition. 

The first ally in the region, Japan, has served as perhaps the 

most vital military relationship in the Asia-Pacific. Prime Minister 

Abe’s recent visit to Washington highlights the dedication between 

the two countries to remain close allies as Asia’s strategic and economic outlook evolves. 

Though concerns persist over opposition to U.S. presence at the 

local level, Japan remains a critical partner for our military with 

54,000 troops, an aircraft carrier, and innumerable other assets 

stationed there. Prime Minister Abe is also seeking to increase Japan’s defense stature outside the confines of the U.S.-Japan alliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:38 Sep 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\071515\95515 SHIRL
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ance by broadening Japan’s military capabilities and forging new 

roles in and missions in Asia. 

On the economic front, with the recent passage of the Trade Promotion Authority and the finalization of the bilateral trade issues, 

Japan is leading the effort alongside the United States to make a 

potential Trans-Pacific Partnership deal a reality. 

Korea. In 1953, the United States and Korea signed a mutual defense treaty and our partnership has grown exponentially ever 

since. Korea is also one of our most valued trading partners in the 

region. With the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement, U.S. goods and 

exports to Korea reached a record level of $44.5 billion in 2014, up 

7 percent from 2013. To this day we continue to make strides in 

our economic and security relations with Korea. And in April we 

also signed the U.S.-ROK 123 civil nuclear agreement which supports U.S. nuclear industries and promotes peaceful uses of nuclear 

energy between our two countries. 

We maintain a very strong military relationship with the Republic of Korea and that relationship is our most important asset in 

countering the rogue North Korean regime. As Korea’s capabilities 

continue to grow and mature, our relationship has evolved toward 

greater equality and burden-sharing. Our two countries still have 

several issues to resolve, however, including the transfers of wartime Operational Control, realignment of U.S. Forces, and whether 

Korea would be interested in deploying a THAAD missile defense 

system. 

We looked forward to welcoming President Park Geun-hye to the 

United States earlier this year and she didn’t let us down. She did 

a great job discussing many of the salient issues in our bilateral 

relationship. Unfortunately, the tragic MERS crisis in the region 

has forced President Park to delay her summit with President 

Obama, but we look forward to welcoming her when she reschedules. 

The Philippines is also another incredibly important ally, and 

has a long history of extensive military cooperation, disaster assistance, and converging economic and security objectives. Our continued cooperation is especially important in light of China’s contested 

legal interpretation and increased military aggression in the South 

China Sea, and I look forward to hearing about how we can work 

with the Philippines to help them modernize their military, improve our economic relationship, and deter coercive Chinese behavior in the disputed territories. 

Thailand continues to serve as a regional operation platform for 

over 50 U.S. Government agencies. Despite some of the concerns 

with democracy, human trafficking, and other human rights issues 

which continue to strain our relationship, we still have, I think, a 

pretty robust relationship with them. 

We have expressed concerns about the Thai Government’s behavior since the coup in 2014, and we have since reduced participation 

in the Cobra Gold military exercises. Right now, the prospects of 

future cooperation are unclear, but the potential for stronger relations in the near future—while they are narrow—are not evaporated, and I welcome any ideas and thoughts from witnesses on 

how we could gain leverage and address major concerns about 

Thailand’s domestic circumstances. 

3

With a rising China that competes for influence with our allies, 

partners, and friends, our alliances serve a very paramount role in 

both providing reassurances against aggressive and unproductive 

behavior, and strengthening interdependence and capacity among 

Asian countries. I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses 

not just about how we work with our allies, but how our allies can 

work with each other to accomplish our mutual foreign policy and 

security goals in Asia. 

Members present will be permitted to submit written statements 

to be included in the official hearing record, and without objection 

the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow 

statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record subject 

to the length limitation in the rules. And I now recognize the ranking member, Brad Sherman, for any statements he might have. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today we will focus on 

our alliances, economic and national security with Japan, South 

Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. As we speak, the Obama administration is negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership which 

will for the first time include Japan as a free trade partner with 

the United States. 

As I have said before in this subcommittee, this is a mistake. The 

TPP will result in our trade deficit ballooning and the loss of American jobs. We need only look at the results of the deal with South 

Korea where the Economic Policy Institute is now able to look 

backward to see the effect of that agreement and has shown that 

it has cost us some 75,000 jobs here in the United States as our 

trade deficit with South Korea has grown. 

Now I believe in massive increases of trade, but we will have free 

access to foreign markets only when we sign result oriented trade 

agreements that require trade balance. Otherwise we are in a circumstance where other countries with very different cultures and 

very different legal systems are able to use every non-tariff barrier 

they wish, and we simply do not respond. 

Now as to national security, our national security policy is influenced tremendously by the Pentagon and every entity looks to meet 

its own institutional needs. Look at the history of America and our 

military during the 120, 130 years that we have spent on the world 

stage outside our own continent. Every time the Pentagon faces a 

uniformed enemy we win with glory, and in the case of the Soviet 

Union without actually having to engage in a major military effort. 

From the Spanish War through the Cold War, every time we confront a non-uniformed opponent, an insurrection or something 

asymmetrical it has been an extremely painful, sometimes winning 

sometimes losing but always painful, process for our military. Start 

with the Philippine insurrection right through the Vietnam War 

through Fallujah and Afghanistan. 

So needless to say, it meets the institutional needs of the Pentagon that we face a worthy foe that is uniformed and conventional 

and technological. And so the country that is not the official subject 

of our hearing today, China, is the only country that can fill that 

institutional role. And everything at the Pentagon is designed to 

say how can we ignore or at least downplay the problems we face 

in the Middle East and elsewhere and do our procurement and our 

research to confront China in a glorious war or, better yet, non-war 

4

over islets of incredibly little value to their purported owners and 

of no value, or at least we don’t own them, to the United States? 

Looking at Japan we see a country that spends 1 percent of its 

GDP on their military. We spend supposedly 4 percent on our military, but that is only by ignoring the cost of veterans’ benefits 

which is incredibly bad cost accounting. The cost of our defense includes the compensation package we give our soldiers and that includes their veterans’ benefits. Imagine what would happen to a 

car company that didn’t include in the cost of producing the car, 

the pension benefits it pays to its workers. 

So we are spending much closer to 5 percent of our GDP on our 

military. Japan is on the front lines. They are their islets in their 

own estimation, China would say otherwise, and they stick to 1 

percent. And it is useful that the Lower House in Japan is considering adopting the collective defense principle, but a change in 

principle was nice; I would like to see a change in effort and 

money. And keep in mind these islets are not valuable, they are 

just an excuse for countries to fight and to renew the conflicts they 

have from World War II and the bad blood and who did what to 

whom. And if they are valuable, they are not valuable to the 

United States. If there is any oil, and there isn’t, it is Japanese oil, 

it is Korean oil, it is Chinese oil, it is certainly not our oil. 

Also I pick up on the chairman’s comments that we need to get 

our allies to work together. The Japanese could stop relitigating 

World War II and that would make it a little easier for them to 

coordinate with Korea and our other allies. 

As to Vietnam, they are spending only 2.4 percent of their GDP 

on their military. They are literally on the front lines. We are not 

talking about islets here. We are talking about their continued existential existence. And they are managing to spend—usually the 

supporting actor, the United States, would be spending less and 

they would be spending more. 

As to the Philippines, our military relationship has changed. We 

appreciate the use of eight military bases on a non-permanent 

basis. As to Thailand, we do not have the treaty structure for our 

military cooperation, but for over 60 years Thailand has served as 

an operational platform for our defense efforts. We have seen challenges to Thailand’s democracy and we look forward to Thailand 

hopefully reaching a greater level of social harmony and adherence 

to the rules of law and democracy, and I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. The chair recognizes Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Chairman. I have a markup in Homeland Security and that is why I am going to have to go, but I just 

appreciate the opportunity to make a couple of statements. First 

off, I will align myself with your opening comments. 

And the second thing is, one thing I would love to hear from the 

hearing had I been able to stay is I am very, very concerned about 

the Spratly Islands and China’s incursion there and what it means 

for the Philippines, but what it means for our broader posturing in 

the region by China. And it is the Spratlys today; is it somewhere 

else tomorrow? And I hope the panelists will touch on that because 

I very much value the relationship we have with the Philippines. 

5

And so I would look forward to maybe following up with you at 

another point about that, but anyway, with that, Mr. Chairman, I 

thank you so much and I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Chabot, did you have an opening 

statement? 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I don’t really have a statement. I will 

just be brief. I was listening to my esteemed colleague from California’s statement. I just thought I would comment on the trade portion of it briefly because I happen to disagree with his points on 

that. 

And would just say that I think TPA and ultimately TPP and 

perhaps TTIP down the road are vital to our economy and trade 

and job creation here in this country. I know that some jobs are 

lost, but I think that we create far more jobs than we lose. And the 

United States, if we don’t move forward with these types of agreements are really cutting ourselves out of a whole range of opportunities. We are letting others draw up the rules, principally China, 

who isn’t part of TPA or TPP but ultimately they will be the ones 

writing the rules, we will be following and the rest of the world, 

particularly that portion of the world which is an ever more important part of the world. 

So we need to be involved in this and so I would encourage my 

colleagues. And he is a dear friend. I really enjoy listening to him 

and he is very knowledgeable. I would encourage him to listen to 

the administration on TPA and TPP and——

Mr. SHERMAN. Can we just freeze the record and say encourage 

him to listen to the administration? 

Mr. CHABOT. That is right. Let me just complete my statement. 

I would encourage you to listen to them very closely with respect 

to TPA and TPP and ignore them with respect to the Iran deal. I 

yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I would like to introduce the panel 

members. We are really appreciative that you could take the time. 

Thanks for being so understanding on the flexibility with the votes. 

Those votes get in the way all the time, but that is part of our job. 

Today we are joined by Mr. Randall Schriver. He is the president 

and CEO of Project 2049 Institute. He is also founding partner of 

Armitage International LLC and a senior associate at CSIS. Prior 

to his time in the private sector he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and before that 

as chief of staff and senior policy advisor to then Deputy Secretary 

of State Richard Armitage. Thanks for being here today. 

Do you know Dick Nanto very well over at CSIS? Oh, he actually 

handled Japan there for quite some time. Good guy. Really good 

guy. 

Mr. Walter Lohman is director of the Heritage Foundation’s 

Asian Studies Center and an adjunct professor at Georgetown who 

leads graduate courses on American interests in Southeast Asia. 

Before joining Heritage, Mr. Lohman was senior vice president and 

executive director of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council and was a 

staff member of the Senate. 

Dr. Balbina Hwang is currently visiting professor at American 

University and until recently was visiting professor at Georgetown. 

Earlier in her career she was special advisor to the Assistant SecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:38 Sep 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\071515\95515 SHIRL
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retary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the State Department 

and worked as a policy analyst in the private sector. 

Mr. James Schoff is a senior associate at the Carnegie Asia Program. He previously served as senior advisor for East Asia policy 

at the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense and as director of 

Asia Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. 

Thank you all for joining us. The lighting system is very much 

like a traffic intersection. Green means go, amber means go really 

fast, and red means stop. You have 5 minutes, so thanks a lot. Mr. 

Schriver, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL SCHRIVER, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Sherman and Mr. 

Chabot. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. I also appreciate being seated beside colleagues that I respect and admire so 

much. This is a great opportunity for me. Your staff asked me to 

focus specifically on Japan so my written statement reflects that 

and I will make a few opening comments along those lines. 

Since Prime Minister Abe returned to office in December 2012, 

I think he has provided energy, vision, he has been busy implementing the vision and doing real things, and that energy extends 

to the alliance as well. We have seen a number of very significant 

developments. 2015 alone, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned his successful visit here to the United States. We have completed our 

work on the joint defense guidelines, completed or near complete 

our bilateral discussion with respect to TPP. We are moving into 

another phase where we are talking about roles and missions and 

how we implement the defense guidelines. 

So there is a great deal happening and I think real significant 

accomplishments. There are some challenges and we shouldn’t 

overlook those. I think we have to continue this momentum. We do 

have to get TPP across the finish line. We do have to continue this 

process on the defense side going from defense guidelines to roles 

and missions and looking at contingency and getting into more realistic planning. 

We of course have longer term challenges. I think on Japan’s side 

whether they can fire that so-called third arrow with economic reform and put their economy on a better long term footing, because 

if they don’t demographics loom with an aging population and that 

will affect our alliance because more resources would have to go to 

the social programs and perhaps then less available for our security cooperation. 

On the U.S. side, I think it was made mention that we occasionally have diversions to the Middle East and other crises. Those are 

understandable, but I think for our allies that does create some 

anxiety and from time to time we do hear about that. They are interested in whether or not we will have the resources on the defense side if we are continuing to live with sequestration what can 

be done in other forms to ensure that the Asia-Pacific, our best 

forces are forward deployed and we are able to meet our obligations 

and our commitments in the alliance. 

China is certainly a challenge and it cuts multiple ways. Their 

assertive behavior, I think, in one respect has really breathed life 

7

into the alliance. It has really incentivized our Japanese partners 

to take these endeavors seriously. On the other hand, the Chinese 

are very involved in a political warfare and propaganda directed at 

the Japanese to try to drive a wedge in our alliance, and these are 

challenges that we have to be aware of and develop 

counterstrategies to. 

So I think going forward there are some things that we need to 

focus on. Getting TPP across the finish line, your comments notwithstanding, Mr. Sherman, I think is very important for the alliance, the region and really our strategic position in Asia. I think 

that is the minimum. I think that Japan and the U.S. at the conclusion of TPP should look immediately to broaden into a second 

round. Look at countries like South Korea, look at countries like 

Taiwan, and see if they can be brought into this broader trade liberalization effort. 

On the security side, I very much agree Japan could spend more. 

We encourage that. They have had modest increases, which by 

maybe some standards look indeed modest, but for Japanese standards given their history, I think, are significant. But it is really not 

just the spending. We want, as I said, to go from the roles and missions process to get into real contingency planning and have a very 

good discussion in the context of our alliance about the Korean Peninsula, about the Taiwan Strait, about East China Sea and South 

China Sea. 

I think also it was made mention about bringing in other partners and encouraging our allies to do things with other allies so 

that we move away from the traditional hub and spokes and into 

something that is more networked, and I think Japan is poised to 

do that. They have joined some of our multilateral exercises. U.S., 

Japan, Australia have exercised together. There is discussion that 

Japan may once again join the Malabar exercise with the U.S. and 

India. 

So I think these are very positive developments and it needs to 

be continued to encourage, because I think Japan has a very good 

role to play beyond just the defense of Japan. They bring a lot of 

credibility. They bring capacity capability to help other allies improve. They are involved in defense programs with the Philippines, 

possibly Australia. So in short, I think Japan can be a valuable security partner for us, not in just the things we do with one another 

but in strengthening our regional strategy. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Mr. Lohman? 

STATEMENT OF MR. WALTER LOHMAN, DIRECTOR, ASIAN 

STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. LOHMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to 

the members of the subcommittee for having me here today focusing on this very important issue and particularly Southeast Asia. 

I focused on it because too often Southeast Asia gets left off of the 

agenda when we talk about these things. 

I want to start just at the outset by saying that although I do 

serve at Heritage Foundation as the director of the Asian Studies 

Center, what I am saying today does not reflect necessarily the 

views of the Heritage Foundation or anyone else on my resume. 

Let me just get right to it. I thought about what I could do of 

most value here, and I think maybe just give some perspective on 

where Southeast Asian security alliances fit into our vision for the 

region, that is, America’s historic vision. There is a caricature of 

geopolitics often reflected in the media headline that pits the U.S. 

against China in some sort of great game, something more reminiscent of Europe than today’s Asia. It is a convenient mental map, 

I think, and it makes for very good headlines, but it is not really 

the way the world works today. In this day and age, a great game 

in Asia could not be effectuated without targeting the international 

economic sources of China’s power, and no one, not the United 

States, not Thailand, not the Philippines, not even Taiwan, has any 

interest in doing that. If not for any other reason then because targeting China’s economy would hurt all of us as well. 

America’s geopolitical task in Asia-Pacific is pursuit of a liberal 

international order characterized by such things as freedom of 

navigation and overflight, free commerce, political liberty, and 

peace and security. U.S. alliances with the Philippines and Thailand represent two distinct strands in this effort. 

The Philippines is instrumental in managing the downside risk 

that is pushing back on China’s effort to disrupt our vision, and 

Thailand’s values lies in its potential for maximizing the order’s 

upside. That is all of the cooperation that we can do with Thailand. 

They are far from conflict with the Chinese, far from the South 

China Sea. They have much more positive value in their relationship there. 

And I should mention briefly, we are not covering Australia 

today but it is worth mentioning that Australia is another important piece of American’s security network in the Asia-Pacific. The 

Philippines in particular is at the forefront of the contest for freedom of the seas in the Pacific. The case that is presented for arbitration under UNCLOS is the single most important development 

in the South China Sea dispute in 20 years. It will either lead to 

peaceful effective management of the dispute or it will provide critical context and motivation for increased U.S. presence and defense 

cooperation with the Philippines and with others in the region. 

Thailand is the other side of the coin. The cost-benefit calculation 

in the China-Thailand relationship is much more positive. The utility of the U.S.-Thai alliance therefore lies in maximizing its massive capacities for service in the cause of our liberal vision. Its biggest challenge is political, and I think you referenced that in your 

13

opening statement. And the coup last year in Thailand following 

months of political unrest upended U.S.-Thai relations requiring a 

cutoff in U.S. grant assistance to the Thai military. 

The answer in Thailand is not prioritizing security over democracy—the U.S. has to encourage Thailand to return to democracy—

but in properly balancing the two priorities. I have my doubts that 

the current crisis is being handled in a way that will allow us to 

quickly recover once Thailand does return to democracy. 

So based on these quick observations what should the United 

States do with regard to the Philippines? I would suggest that Congress double the FMF budget, the foreign military financing budget, for the Philippines. Among the many other sort of hardware 

things we are talking about, get the Philippines the third coast 

guard cutter that they have requested and has been talked about. 

Those things have a way of derailing in the middle of the process, 

so that is something that we need to keep an eye on. 

I think we should change our position on the application of the 

U.S.-Philippines security treaty to cover features in the South 

China Sea that are currently occupied by the Philippines and 

under its jurisdiction. Currently we are ambiguous in that regard. 

With respect to Thailand, the U.S. should, first of all, continue 

our full complement of military exercises to the greatest extent possible under current circumstances. Make clear our interest in a 

rapid return to democracy, but in more private settings may be better befitting an ally such longstanding mutual sacrifice. 

Number three, prepare to hit the ground running with resumption of full military to military contact to include a doubling of 

IMET assistance and to send an Ambassador to Thailand. The last 

time we went through this sort of crisis with Bangkok, having an 

Ambassador there, the right one, made all the difference in the 

world and we currently don’t have one and haven’t had one for 

about a year. 

So this concludes my testimony. I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lohman follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Dr. Hwang? 

STATEMENT OF BALBINA HWANG, PH.D., VISITING PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, AMERICAN 

UNIVERSITY 

Ms. HWANG. Good afternoon, Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the kind invitation to testify 

before you today. I am honored for the opportunity to share with 

you my views on the status of our alliance with the Republic of 

Korea and to offer strategies that will serve the national interest 

of both our countries. I have prepared written statement for the 

record but will provide a brief summary now. 

Almost a decade ago, in 2006, I testified before the House Committee on International Relations on this very topic, but under 

quite different circumstances. The question at the time was whether the U.S.-ROK Alliance was at risk as the issues confronting us 

seemed quite dire and challenging. At the time, the alliance was 

endangered primarily by differences on how to address the North 

Korean threat. 

Today, I am happy to appear before you amidst a much more satisfactory environment. Today, the alliance is overall strong and robust due to much dedicated hard work by both governments over 

the last several years. Domestic political changes including changes 

of administration in both countries were certainly also contributing 

factors and must not be overlooked. Today, while both allies remain 

frustrated over the lack of progress in addressing North Korea’s 

nuclear programs, there is nevertheless a renewed and strong 

shared commitment to the alliance itself and its primary function 

to deter and defense against North Korean aggression. 

We should be careful, however, to not be complacent that all remains perfect with the Alliance, nor that the current satisfaction 

will continue indefinitely. Several flashpoints remain as issues in 

the alliance which have the potential to become political issues in 

South Korea, which has a very strong and vociferous civil society 

that is often opposed to the alliance. Therefore it is imperative to 

understand the ROK’s perspective on the alliance which has 

evolved over time due to the changing strategic environment in the 

region. 

Now South Korea’s defense posture since the Korean War has remained largely constant, relying on three reinforcing pillars: Defensive deterrence, forward active defense, and the alliance with the 

United States. But South Korea’s security challenges have grown 

more complex and multifaceted in recent decades and has grown 

far beyond the conventional military threat posed by North Korea. 

These changes have evolved in the context of South Korea’s rapid 

development which, today, has propelled it into a solid middle 

power status. 

South Koreans today are proud of being a global Korea, and this 

is not just a hyperbole. Today South Korea is the 13th largest economy in the world and the 6th largest trading partner of the United 

States. Total bilateral trade with the U.S. totaled almost $114 billion last year. What is more astonishing is how highly dependent 

the ROK is on international trade for its prosperity. Ninety 7 perVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:38 Sep 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\071515\95515 SHIRL
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cent of its GDP is comprised of international trade, and 99.7 percent of the nation’s trade is conducted by ocean transport. 

Now this is important, because for a country entirely dependent 

on oil imports, and by the way Japan is too, but 80 percent of its 

oil imports are transported from the Middle East through two 

major choke points: The Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca. What this means is that any disruption of the open sea lanes 

of communication, or SLOCs, are immediate and would devastate 

the South Korean economy. 

Now the security of critical SLOCs in and around Asia has been 

guaranteed and underwritten by the U.S. Navy for the last six decades as part of the U.S. commitment to its treaty allies in the region. Undoubtedly this has contributed to South Korea’s ability to 

rapidly develop its economy into an industrial powerhouse today. 

While the U.S. remains maritime Asia’s strongest military and 

economic presence today, it is conceivable that China may become 

the dominant regional naval power during this century. It is precisely these challenges posed by China that have created deep anxieties in the region about the future distribution of power. There is 

a profound uncertainty in the region about continued U.S. commitment and presence in the region, and unfortunately the so-called 

Pivot has done little to allay these fears. And complicating this uncertainty is the very complex relationship that Korea has with 

China, perhaps more so than with any other country. 

Today, South Korean public broadly supports the United States. 

A recent Pew survey shows that 84 percent of the public has favorable view of the United States. But by no means does this indicate 

that South Koreans favor the U.S. over China. Indeed, South Koreans are increasingly resentful about a growing perception that 

their country is being pressured to choose the alliance against 

China. 

Now I do not believe this is a correct choice, but this is an increasingly common view. Such a dynamic is played out over the 

growing controversy over the possible South Korean adoption of 

THAAD, and note that the public debates are framed about arguments about negative Chinese reactions more so than about whether THAAD serves to contribute to South Korea’s defense and security. And so these concerns about upsetting China essentially reveal that Korea feels the perennial twin fears of an alliance relationship, the twin fears of entrapment and abandonment. 

And so let me conclude by saying that any close cooperation in 

the future is dependent on continuing the achievements of the past 

few years and that future political leaders should be mindful not 

to sacrifice the achievements and hard work. But we ought to be 

aware there are challenges ahead, and one of the biggest challenges will be on how we frame this argument about China’s interests vis-a`-vis the alliance interests. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hwang follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Schoff. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES L. SCHOFF, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

ASIA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. SCHOFF. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sherman, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 

talk about the U.S. alliance relationships in Asia. I will focus on 

Japan and the Republic of Korea today. 

I have prepared separate testimony for the subcommittee, but 

would now like to highlight two observations about these alliances. 

First, we should take a moment to appreciate how far we have 

come, from a paternalistic relationship helping these countries rise 

from the ashes to more equal and dynamic partnership spanning 

the globe in areas of security, trade, investment, technology, global 

health and many others. This is not to pat ourselves on the back, 

but instead to recognize how diverse and mutually beneficial these 

alliances have become. 

Second, we should consider the fact that the next 60 years of 

these relationships and the environment within which they will operate are unlikely to resemble the past 60. In Asia, I expect a much 

finer line between productive harmony and potentially devastating 

conflict. Greater wealth and capacity in the region together with 

enhanced communication and interaction converging interests in 

the regional commons give me optimism. 

But nationalism, poor governance, competition for resources, rising military investments and other factors provide reason to worry. 

This is a time of transition in Asia, and therefore a delicate balance 

must be struck between U.S. reassurance and in viewing U.S. 

power and presence within a new regional framework built upon 

the foundation of our alliances and emerging partnerships. 

U.S. priorities will remain the maintenance of stability, openness 

and access in the region, but we will not be able to do this on our 

own. And so we must accomplish this in concert with other nations, 

and China should be a part of this process. Overall, the U.S. response to changing dynamics in Asia should include concrete steps 

to reassure allies and deter Chinese coercion combined with active 

diplomacy and networking in the region to foster a more collective 

approach to rulemaking and enforcement as Asia grows. This can 

ultimately help spread the burden for maintaining peace and territorial integrity beyond the traditional hub and spoke alliance system, although for the time being these alliances are the primary 

means to preserve stability and prosperity. 

The United States must be a leader in Asia in a comprehensive 

way not just in military terms, and we should support closer cooperation among our allies and partners particularly encouraging 

our stronger security partnerships between Japan and Australia 

and Japan and the Philippines. For example, progress toward an 

ASEAN economic community, and even the fragile Japan-KoreaChina framework that can reinforce U.S. policy goals vis-a`-vis 

China via the words of trusted allies. 

For the sake of time I would like to highlight three points on 

Japan. First, Japan’s reaction on the defense front remains modest 

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tions on how its forces can cooperate with others. Japan is going 

beyond mere presence in its EEZ and actually considering how to 

fight and contain a low level conflict. This is a more credible form 

of deterrence, and positive, I think, for the alliance as long as the 

alliance can become more integrated and Japan can plug into multilateral security cooperation activities more effectively. 

Second, Prime Minister Abe is trying to do this and this alliance 

integration opportunity is embodied in our new defense cooperation 

guidelines. The new alliance coordination mechanism mentioned in 

the defense guidelines should become a more valuable tool to coordinate decisions with a higher degree of political and operational 

accountability. 

Third, Japan is also reaching out actively to Southeast Asia in 

order to diversify economic interests beyond China and attempt to 

balance along its periphery. This is an opportunity for the United 

States to coordinate with Japan and reinforce our own Asian strategy. 

Two points on Korea. First, North Korea remains the number 

one security concern, and allied solidarity is vital to managing any 

dangerous scenario. A conditions based approach to transfer wartime operational control, or OPCON, to South Korea is appropriate 

given the security challenges, but I think we should stay focused 

on this objective. I believe OPCON transfer is the correct policy because South Korea is capable, it can enhance our leverage vis-a`-vis 

North Korea and China, and it is the right thing to do. Implementing OPCON transition, however, must not diminish our ability 

to operate in a joint fashion when necessary or undermine mutualized confidence. 

Second, although South Korea has become an increasingly important partner in multilateral institutions and responding to crises 

overseas or problem solving be it health, security, development, 

and despite Seoul’s understandable focus on the Peninsula, the 

U.S. should keep looking for opportunities to involve South Korea 

in multilateral partnerships to support regional governance. They 

are too important and capable a player to have on the sidelines and 

it will serve their interests too. 

Finally, with regard to the poor state between Japan and Korea 

over historical perspectives, this is a situation that Washington can 

neither solve nor ignore. I applaud recent efforts by Seoul and 

Tokyo to improve ties, and long term, I think, a deep politicized 

process of grassroots truth-seeking will help solidify relations, but 

that will take time and is beyond U.S. control. Meanwhile, trilateral cooperation with the United States on not only North Korea 

but also in other shared security concerns is an opportunity to create a safe haven for Japan-Korea collaboration. We should strive 

to get the public in both countries to see such cooperation as a matter of course independent of bilateral grievances. And so conducting 

some of our trilateral activities at a higher public profile, I believe, 

might be useful. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schoff follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Lohman, I am going to direct my 

first question to you. Thailand’s ongoing military rule and the significant human rights issues that have come with it has made justifying military cooperation with Thailand more difficult for us. But 

despite this, Thailand is still a critical partner and U.S.-Thai cooperation is important for U.S. security efforts in the region. What 

kind of leverage do we have to encourage the military government 

to move toward elections? 

Mr. LOHMAN. Well, I think in the case of Thailand, our leverage 

really comes from our long term friendship with the country. We 

do have a security alliance with Thailand, in fact we do also have 

a treaty basis for that alliance dating back to 1954. So in this case 

I don’t really think of it so much as leverage because you don’t 

really use leverage over a friend, you try to work it through the difficult times. 

I think ultimately Thailand will return to democracy, but they 

have a couple underlying, very deep political challenges, one involving the health of the king, and the other very deep social divisions 

within the country that they have to work their way through. In 

the meantime, I think we need Thailand to help us address a lot 

of the security challenges in the region, and so I don’t think we 

want to throw that away in the process of pushing for a return to 

democracy. 

Mr. SALMON. So in response to—this will be for Dr. Hwang and 

Mr. Schoff—the evolving threat posed by North Korea over the past 

several years, the United States and South Korea have developed 

a new counter-provocation plan and a tailored deterrent strategy. 

What should Congress know about these plans, and have the various agreements between the U.S. and South Korean militaries on 

responding to North Korean provocations made the alliance function more smoothly? 

Mr. SCHOFF. Sir, I happened to be serving in the Defense Department at the time of the Yeonpyeongdo shelling and that was a perfect example of the alliance dealing with a low level provocation 

that in many ways in conjunction with the Cheonan bombing had 

prompted this idea of developing a counter-provocation strategy. 

And I think as tight as our alliance is and as well as I think we 

manage that process, those situations are inherently difficult, because the main responsibility of the low end of escalation is our 

ally partner but they want to bring the United States in kind of 

relatively quickly or early or show us up to help force the other to 

stand down. At the same time we don’t necessarily want to get too 

deeply enmeshed and yet we want to be supportive of our ally. 

So I think that process was a very useful way to help deepen mutual understanding about what to expect from each other, and I 

think what Congress should know about this process is that it is 

a continual process. As people change in and out of these positions 

in the Secretary of Defense and in the White House and over time, 

continued communication at the very high levels so that mutual expectations are shared about what to expect from each other, this 

reassurance deterrence balance, I think, is a very tenuous one. 

We have done okay with Korea on this front, and in the tailored 

deterrent strategy it is even more important because the stakes are 

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tion and the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, I think, is extremely valuable. I have been in those meetings and we share, we 

learn things about each other in that process. And continued engagement in that process, I think, is the main thing I would recommend. 

Ms. HWANG. Well, this is where history is important, because, 

and you talk to any military commanders that have served in 

Korea and they will tell you that it is one of the closest alliances, 

and this is because the U.S. has fought side by side with South Korean soldiers. I mean you often hear about the blood, sweat and 

tears, but not only obviously during the Korean War but also during the Vietnam War when South Korea sent so many troops to reinforce U.S. troops. And this makes the U.S.-ROK lines quite different from the U.S.-Japan which, in essence, is theory in terms of 

how they work together. 

I think it is important to understand that for the last 60-plus 

years we have actually had a very effective deterrent that has 

evolved against North Korea’s conventional threat. So when you 

ask about North Korea’s threat it is important that currently and 

in the future North Korea now really poses threats on several different fronts. One is the conventional one, which I believe our alliance has worked very successfully to deter and that is essentially 

manageable. 

What is more challenging are the asymmetric threats increasingly from North Korea, and these include not only missile threats, 

certainly potential use of WMD and now things like cyber threats. 

And the 2015 Strategic Digest published by the U.S. forces in 

Korea essentially identifies North Korea’s missile threat and comes 

up with four specific ways in order to address them including detect, defend, disrupt and destroy, the so-called 4D lines. 

And I believe that South Korea is complementing this. They just announced an increase in $8 billion to the 2016–2020 Fiscal Year 

budget specifically to address the missile threats. So this is an ongoing process, but again the North Korean threat is evolving over 

time. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. How is Prime Minister Abe’s government—I am going to direct this to Mr. Schriver—planning to implement the reinterpretation of the right to engage in collective selfdefense? What is the legislative process ahead and what is the expected time frame, and how will the new policy affect bilateral security cooperation, and how do the revised mutual defense guidelines reflect this change? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Thank you. That process is unfolding right now. 

They have pursued implementing legislation as a follow-on effort to 

the decision to reinterpret the constitution. It is a fight that Prime 

Minister Abe is willing to take on even though in many cases it is 

not very popular. 

I think right now the legislation that has gone forward and actually was approved in the last couple days, that polls under 50 percent. So he is taking some risks here, but it is a follow-on to the 

previous decision. It is something he is committed to. And the 

timeline will depend on the politics and whether or not he wants 

to go quickly with the separate pieces of legislation. At one point 

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fine that. But it is a significant number of pieces of legislation in 

order to fully implement this decision. 

For us, I think it gives us greater flexibility. Again we have to 

further define that alongside the Japanese and have that discussion about roles and missions, but breaking out of this self-imposed 

limitation on collective self defense opens up a wide range of possibilities for our alliance in potential conflict talking about known 

contingencies such as the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, but 

also peacetime activities, humanitarian affairs, disaster relief, freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. I think, in 

short, it just gives us a lot more flexibility to act as an alliance 

where our shared interests are concerned and this is something 

that I think is a good thing. 

Mr. SALMON. So a segue onto that would be the disputed islets 

of, well, Japan would probably contend they are not disputed. It is 

a settled issue. But the Senkaku Islands, the Diaoyu Islands in the 

East Sea: It has been our policy since 1972 that the 1960 U.S.-

Japan Security Treaty covers the islets, because Article V of the 

treaty stipulates that the United States is bound to protect the territories under the administration of Japan, and Japan administers 

the islets. 

So what are Japan’s expectations regarding U.S. involvement in 

a hypothetical contingency between China and Japan over these islets, and under what conditions do you think that the United 

States would be required by that statute to use force to defend the 

islets or defend Japan? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, I think Japan’s expectations should rightfully be that we would honor our word. And as you say, the treaty 

has been interpreted that way. President Obama when he visited 

Japan last year articulated that specifically that the treaty applies 

to the Senkaku Islands. So I think they should have an expectation 

that we would honor that word and help them defend the 

Senkakus should there be a crisis there. 

They are fully prepared to do things on their own before bringing 

in the United States, and I think the response that they have had 

to Chinese incursions has been quite robust. And if you look at how 

they are doing their own defense planning, they are shifting more 

resources and attention to the south specifically for this purpose to 

deal with this potential contingency. 

So I think Japan’s first notion would be to see about their own 

defense, but of course given that we have provided our reassurance 

and our word at the highest level, I think they would rightfully expect us to be involved should there be a conflict of that nature. 

Hopefully it is one that we can avoid, and I think so far the Japanese response has been pretty effective in terms of deterring more 

Chinese aggression. 

Mr. SALMON. At least for now it is on hold. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I will pick up on that. On 9/11, forces under the 

protection of the de facto Government of Afghanistan killed over 

3,000 Americans. NATO recognized this as an attack on the United 

States and NATO countries put their own soldiers in harm’s way 

in order to respond. Japan did not put any of its forces in harm’s 

way. 

52

Is this security agreement we have with Japan explicitly created 

as a one-way street? That is to say an attack on Japan is an attack 

on America, but an attack on America is something for Japan to 

sympathize about? Is this a two-way agreement like NATO or a gift 

from the American people to Japan? Mr. Schriver? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, I think as a reminder, of course we essentially wrote Japan’s——

Mr. SHERMAN. I am not saying that this agreement was written 

in Tokyo, it may have been written in Washington. But it has got 

to be evaluated today. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Right. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Is it a mutual defense agreement or a one-way defense agreement? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, it is moving in the direction of a mutual defense agreement because——

Mr. SHERMAN. Moving in the direction. But we lost 3,000 people 

and they exposed no soldiers to harm. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. They did commit peacekeeping troops under their 

constitution and what was allowed at the time, and we have 

long——

Mr. SHERMAN. So is there anything in our treaty with Japan that 

says they have to come to our aid if we are attacked? Is there a 

line you can point to? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. It is not the same nature——

Mr. SHERMAN. So it is a one-way deal, the wisdom of which may 

have existed in prior centuries. I visited Japan not too long ago, 

was shocked by the jingoistic views of some of the very top leaders 

that I met with, with regard to World War II. A major leader who 

played even a more critical role before I met him put forth the idea 

that nanshoku benefited from Japanese occupation. What do we do 

to get the Japanese to build bridges like the Germans and to not 

relitigate World War II? Mr. Schoff. 

Mr. SCHOFF. Sure. Thank you, sir. Well, I think one quick point 

to make is that the Japanese opinion is diverse. That there is not 

one Japanese view, but what you described is certainly a worrying 

or an uncomfortable portion of the Japanese population that I 

think does not fully appreciate how severe and subjugating their 

actions were during that time, and therefore does not really understand why the feedback from parts of South Korea and parts of 

China are the way they are. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And part of it is a matter of when the events took 

place. Their conquest of much of China wasn’t any more brutal 

than European expansion in Africa or even in Indonesia. It is just 

that it took place in the 1940s not the 1840s and it is very hard 

to make an argument that conquering China was a fair thing to do 

in the 1940s. 

Mr. SCHOFF. I think that is a valid point and certainly one that 

some in Japan would say we were kind of following the lead of 

many of the other imperial powers. I think the point, or what I try 

to encourage Japanese friends who may feel this way—plenty do 

not feel that way; plenty learn very sufficiently about the history—

is to say the focus should not be on kind of what was right or 

wrong in the context of what was going on at that point, but here 

53

we are now and you have neighbors that feel the way they do and 

we have an education process that I think needs to be continued. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And trivialize the concerns of those who are concerned about the so-called comfort women, which I think is perhaps 

not a good euphemism, then you are going to have a great difficulty 

doing business in East Asia. 

What do we do to get the Japanese to spend more on their military? We are told we have to defend the oil of the Middle East. 

Why? Well, because the world economy is dependent upon it. Why? 

Because Japan burns Middle East oil. So how do we get Japan to 

spend more than 1 percent, and how is it they have stuck us with 

the responsibility of defending their oil tankers, which by the way 

don’t even have American flags or American troops? 

Mr. SCHOFF. Well, sir, just quickly responding, I believe Japan 

does contribute in a variety of ways. Certainly when they are helping the Syrian refugees in the Middle East that is helping the overall situation. When they are contributing to counterpiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden that helps. I understand that it is not 

an additional percent or two of GDP necessarily, but they do have 

legal and political limitations. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, it is all wrapped up in 1 percent of GDP. 

Mr. SCHOFF. Well, those other expenditures are beyond that on 

different line items. But I think we need to continue to encourage. 

To me it is less about the money right now. They don’t necessarily 

get the best value for money in the way that they procure and the 

way they maintain their forces, so I think they are moving in a direction to be able to have a more competitive defense industry that 

may reduce procurement costs; they may get more value for the 

dollar. But it is also about loosening legal restrictions on being able 

to be a more equal partner in multilateral security cooperation. 

Mr. SHERMAN. When you save hundreds of billions of dollars by 

keeping legal restrictions it is hard to loosen legal restrictions. 

Dr. Hwang, South Korea is developing its own missile defense 

system. They could be buying the American system. They run a 

huge trade surplus with the United States. We are supposed to be 

partners in their defense. Why are they creating their own instead 

of buying ours? 

Ms. HWANG. Well, I certainly can’t speak for the South Korean 

Government. Clearly though there are obviously economic reasons 

they want to develop their own system domestically. There are 

some political ones though too. There is this impression among 

South Koreans, and again this is the civil society that is opposed 

to the alliance. They view the alliance as an outdated form essentially of dependence on the United States. They don’t necessarily 

trust the United States. And so by relying on a U.S. system this 

perpetuates this notion that somehow South Koreans are dependent on the United States. Personally I think that obviously South 

Korean adoption of the THAAD does make the system much more 

interoperable and makes much more sense for the South Korean 

defense. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Lowenthal? 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to kind of 

follow up. I found the discussion of Japan very interesting. And I 

54

want to talk, and I know this is a little bit off the topic, but I want 

to talk, this past weekend I was honored to host the United States 

Ambassador to Vietnam, Mr. Ted Osius, in my district. I represent 

a very large section of Little Saigon. Well, the largest part of Little 

Saigon, and I was pleased that the Ambassador came. And much 

of the discussion was about the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and he 

heard many of the concerns of my constituents who have deep misgivings about efforts to strengthen ties, economic ties especially between the United States and a Southeast Asian country such as 

Vietnam because of human rights issues in Vietnam. 

And so I want to ask you if you have any thoughts about that. 

How do we balance our strategic interests with human rights interests if you have, I mean we are really talking about, it kept coming 

up in the polls that 92 percent of the people in Vietnam want closer 

economic ties with the United States and not China. And I am 

going to talk a little bit about that also, about China. 

And so we see this on both countries, but I am also very concerned about human rights issues and what we can do about it and 

what your thoughts are, how we strengthen this alliance when we 

know that there are countries that we are talking about that have 

terrible records on human rights, like Vietnam. So I am wondering, 

any thoughts about that? 

Mr. LOHMAN. Well, I think of the TPP and some of these trade 

connections that we are making less in strategic terms than I do 

in economic terms. I don’t really see inclusion of Vietnam in the 

TPP as a way of building strategic connections to Vietnam. It is 

really a way of helping them liberalize their economy. And so the 

connections from the econ side and the liberalization side to the 

human rights side, I think——

Mr. LOWENTHAL. But people also see it there as a way of breaking the dependence of Vietnam from China too. That is critically 

a part of the equation. And it may not be directly as you are talking about, but in that equation. And whether it is in, I am going 

to ask you also to tell me whether it is because of the issues in the 

South China Sea or whatever, but they see this as that relationship 

with China is also part of that equation. 

Mr. LOHMAN. They may see it as a way to diversify their ties. 

I mean, I think they still do have significant economic interests in 

China and with China, trade connections and investment connections and that sort of thing. So maybe they want is fully diversify, 

and in that sense the TPP does that for them as well. But I just 

don’t see it as a tie-up. I think——

Mr. LOWENTHAL. But what about in terms of economic issues 

though? 

Mr. LOHMAN. What is that? 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. What about us lifting the lethal weapons ban 

with——

Mr. LOHMAN. Well, no, I mean on those things——

Mr. LOWENTHAL. It is beginning this, well, I am just wondering 

how do we deal especially around when we know there is strong 

human rights violations. 

Mr. LOHMAN. Yes. I think the restrictions that we have on lethal 

shipment of arms to Vietnam is a prudent thing and something 

that we have to take on a case by case basis. We just sent them 

55

these P–8 aircraft or just sold them P–8 aircraft in a way to help 

them address a problem we have in a nonlethal way, but help them 

contribute to something that we both have. But it is not the same 

as giving them tanks or guns and that sort of thing. So I think that 

is something that we can manage with them. It is a very different 

relationship than we have with Thailand. 

So right now Thailand is going through a hard time but we have 

this long history with Thailand. So you have different venues of 

working through these issues with a country like that where you 

have a treaty alliance than you do with Vietnam. We are still 

emerging from a long period of enmity. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Anybody else about the human rights? Dr. 

Hwang? 

Ms. HWANG. I really appreciate this question, and I think the example of South Korea can actually be quite instructive. We have 

to remember that all during the years of the alliance, I mean South 

Korea for the ’60s and ’70s during rapid industrialization also had 

a really bad human rights problem. It was a brutal authoritarian 

regime. And the United States privately, the government had serious problems with South Korea’s, the government’s behavior. 

But the point here, I think, is that what history has shown us 

on the northern half of the Peninsula, basically North Korean 

human rights record and the world’s response, correctly, I believe, 

has been to try to isolate them, place economic sanctions, and 

human rights violations is a tremendous part of it. But it has not 

improved the situation. So in other words, threatening to cut off 

economic engagement, threatening to cut off economic opportunities 

has not worked in North Korea. 

Now I think the key point here is that through economic vitalization that TPP brings with increased U.S.-Vietnam trade, it is precisely as you said, sir, that it is an alternative to China. And the 

reality is, if U.S. has vigorous economic contact and trade with 

Vietnam we can be a much more positive influence than China can 

be in Vietnam. 

And in terms of what can we do about human rights, I think the 

very fact that you even brought up this issue and to constantly 

state this as not necessarily as a condition but as a parallel to increase economic engagement, I think, is very helpful. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you. And I also wanted to know, what 

I heard also, and I went on a CODEL led by Chairman Salmon to 

Vietnam, much about the fear of what is going on in the South 

China Sea and what role the United States can play or should play, 

and the great fear of Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea 

and which may be part of the driving force of Vietnam which we 

picked up of wanting to, at least part of the reason of wanting to 

be closer to the United States, although that love-hate relationship 

between China and Vietnam goes on long before what has taken 

place. 

Any comments about what our role should be and what you perceive how this will affect our alliances, the actual activities of 

China in the South China Sea? 

Mr. LOHMAN. Well, I think Randy referenced one impact it is 

having, and it is pushing the alliances closer to us and that has 

definitely happened with the Philippines. I think a couple of things 

56

we could do in the case of the Philippines, because it is on the front 

lines, is continuing to help them build their military, build their 

maritime awareness, build their presence in the seas in a way that 

they can at least monitor their claims full time, if not defend them, 

and maybe one day be able to defend them. I think we could also 

be more vocal about the application of our treaty with the Philippines to certain areas of the dispute. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I will just add that I think what Secretary Carter 

said in his speech in Singapore about fly, sail, operate is very important. The areas that we regard as international waters we need 

to exercise in a way that demonstrates that, freedom of navigation 

exercises. Clearly we can’t deter the Chinese from the land reclamation. They are building the air strips and militarizing the islands. But challenging the broader sovereignty claim of the socalled 9-dash line is very important, and I think Japan and Korea 

have important roles to play here. Because they are also nonclaimant countries and their participation then underscores that for us 

it is about freedom of navigation. It is about free flow of commerce. 

It is about international law. It is about how you address these disputes. And so having other nonclaimant countries such as Korea 

and Japan who count on those sea lines of communication alongside us in these efforts, I think, is very important. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Mr. Schoff? 

Mr. SCHOFF. Sir, could I just add briefly on that? For example, 

when Japan began to engage Vietnam in terms of trying to transfer 

build capacity for maritime domain awareness, maritime surveillance that helped prompt Vietnam to actually develop a coast 

guard authority and a separate entity non-military that would 

begin to operate these, because that was the only actor that then 

this aid could be given, and there are now coast guard exchanges 

between Japan and Vietnam. So I think whether it is Japan or getting other countries involved in this capacity building process physically improves their capacity, but then in terms of human capital 

and exchange, I think, is also very important. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you. And I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Ms. Meng. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. I 

wanted to go back a little bit to the issue of specifically comfort 

women, but just in general historical tensions which have long colored Japan’s relationships with its neighbors, specifically China 

and South Korea. China and South Korea and many Americans as 

well argue that the Japanese Government has never sufficiently 

atoned nor adequately compensated them for Japan’s occupation 

and belligerence in the early twentieth century. 

How should Japan approach the question of history going forward? How serious is Japan’s historical past to building new relationships? And just out of curiosity, recently Prime Minister Abe 

visited the United States and spoke in front of Congress, and would 

love to hear your thoughts and analysis on what you thought about 

the words and his tomes specifically in relation to a comfort women 

issue. Thank you. 

Ms. HWANG. Well, I actually think that focusing on the specific 

historical disagreement is actually distracting. And I have to be 

careful here because I think we as the United States should be 

57

very careful to not be dismissive. That these are very, very highly 

emotional and deeply and profoundly important issues for Asians. 

And I don’t think it helps for us to lecture our allies and say this 

is trivial, get over it and move on, there are more important things. 

However, having said that, I don’t think it is actually the specific, all the disagreements about the actual wording and so on. I 

don’t think that is really what is at heart here. What it really is 

is what it represents. And I think there are deep uncertainties and 

anxieties felt by Japan as well as by, certainly by China, but South 

Korea and others in the region, and it is uncertainties about the 

future. And I think especially for South Korea, Japan’s inability to 

express what Koreans believe is adequate apology, which by the 

way I don’t think Japan will ever be able to meet South Korean 

bar for what is adequate, that represents uncertainties, deep uncertainties about the future. 

So it is really not so much about the past, but the fact that if 

Japan can’t account enough about the past what will its behavior 

be in the future? And so I think as the United States with these 

allies and this complex relationship with China, what we should do 

is focus on those strategic objectives that Japan and South Korea 

share in the future. And I think on that they can find common 

ground. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Maybe I could add. I think particularly on the socalled comfort women, I agree it is a terrible euphemism. Japan 

can and should do more and they should do it quickly, because this 

is a population that is literally dying off and they have an opportunity to address it directly in meaningful ways now. Prime Minister Abe will have an opportunity in August, the 70th anniversary 

of the end of the War to make a statement. There is a lot of attention and focus on that statement. And I do expect he will say something to correctly take responsibility and address that. Whether or 

not it meets a threshold that the South Koreans will approve of 

that is more difficult to say. 

Yes, ma’am. In fact the other part of your question was about his 

address. I thought his address was excellent for a U.S. audience, 

for the U.S. Congress. You were probably there. And he, I think, 

chose to focus on our difficult past and was able to turn it into a 

positive by having veterans there talk about how we rebuilt this relationship into one of the closest alliances we have. 

I personally don’t think that that was the forum where he is 

going to talk about Korea and China. And by the way I am very 

skeptical on China. They are not exactly the guardians of historical 

accuracy here. If you go through their museum, no mention of the 

Cultural Revolution, no mention of the Great Leap Forward, no 

portrait of Zhao Ziyang, and he was General Secretary of the Communist Party. 

But I do think with Korea he has got this opportunity on August 

15th. He has the possibility of meeting with Park Geun-hye at various international fora. They haven’t had a bilateral meeting yet. 

And I think we should push him not in a disrespectful way but 

among allies that there is some urgency on this Korea problem, because this is a community that is not going to be around forever 

and he can do things to positively address it. 

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Mr. SCHOFF. I was just going to add that there was a time during 

the 1990s, I think, when Japan and Korea were able to, in many 

ways, paper over a significant difference in historical perspective 

about what exactly happened during the colonial era, but they 

managed to paper over that. Subsequently in more recent years 

enough holes have been poked in that paper and that hole that now 

what used to look like an okay, a seamless part of the wall is now 

a bit of a gaping hole there right now. 

And these efforts in August and other anniversaries are opportunities to begin to move in the right direction, but I still think fundamentally if you are going to fix that problem it is a long term 

process of education and engagement between the two so that sons 

and daughters of those today have a deeper appreciation for what 

actually happened and they have gone through a process of discovering that together. That is ambitious and time consuming, but 

there is not a real substitute for that over the long term. 

Mr. SALMON. Well, the buzzers have rung and it looks like we 

have got some votes. This has been a very wonderful panel. I appreciate you taking the time to answer all of our questions and I 

am sure we have a million more, but thank you very much. And 

this committee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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