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*********************************************** 
INDEPENDENT PARTY OF CT—STATE

CENTRAL ET AL. v. DENISE W.

MERRILL, SECRETARY OF

THE STATE, ET AL.

(SC 20165)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Vertefeuille, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 9-372 [6]), ‘‘ ‘[m]inor party’ means a political party or

organization which is not a major party and whose candidate for the

office in question received at the last-preceding regular election for such

office . . . at least one per cent of the whole number of votes cast for

all candidates for such office at such election . . . .’’

Pursuant further to statute (§ 9-374), ‘‘no authority . . . having jurisdiction

over the conduct of any election shall permit the name of a candidate

of [a minor] party for any office to be printed on the official ballot

unless at least one copy of the party rules regulating the manner of

nominating a candidate for such office has been filed in the office of

the Secretary of the State at least sixty days before the nomination of

such candidate,’’ and those ‘‘[p]arty rules shall not be effective until

sixty days after [their] filing . . . .’’

The plaintiffs, a faction of this state’s Independent Party based in Danbury

and its officers, brought the present action seeking, inter alia, a judgment

declaring that the statewide Independent Party is governed by a set of

bylaws drafted in 2006 and not, as claimed by the defendants T and R,

the officers of another faction of this state’s Independent Party based

in Waterbury, a separate set of bylaws drafted in 2010. In 2003, T and

certain other individuals formed the Waterbury faction for the purpose

of endorsing candidates for municipal elections. In 2006, the head of

the Danbury faction of this state’s Independent Party, F, joined with T

in order to petition for statewide offices but failed to obtain a sufficient

number of signatures to gain access to the ballot. Later that year, F and

L, together with one other person, filed a set of bylaws with the named

defendant, the secretary of the state, along with a form designating

themselves as officers of the State Central Committee of the Independent

Party of Connecticut. In 2008, F and T again joined together, this time

with the goal of supporting the candidacy of Ralph Nader for president

of the United States. In order to accomplish this, F and T filed a form

with the secretary of the state designating themselves as the agents of

the Independent Party and agreed to the creation of a new set of statewide bylaws. After Nader received greater than one percent of the votes

cast in the 2008 presidential election, the secretary of the state certified

the Independent Party as a statewide minor party pursuant to § 9-372

(6). T, along with one other person, subsequently drafted a new set of

bylaws, which was later unanimously ratified in a publicly noticed meeting of registered Independent Party members in 2010. F received an

advance copy of the proposed bylaws, attended that meeting, and did

not object to them. The 2010 bylaws were then filed with the secretary

of the state, and no objection was received within the sixty day period

required under § 9-374. After a dispute in 2012, the Waterbury faction

filed a separate action seeking placement of its candidates on the ballot

in the general election but then withdrew its action after the trial court

denied its motion for a temporary order of mandamus. Notwithstanding

that separate action, the 2010 bylaws were used to govern caucuses,

the nomination of candidates, and the election of party officers from

2010 to 2014 without objection by the plaintiffs. In 2016, the Danbury and

Waterbury factions held separate events for the purpose of nominating

Independent Party candidates, and, when competing nominations were

made, the secretary of the state declined to accept either nomination

for placement on the ballot. On the eve of trial in the present case, T

and R filed a motion for permission to amend their answer and assert

a counterclaim seeking a judgment declaring that they were the rightful

officers of the Independent Party, along with certain special defenses

alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had waived their right to contest
the 2010 bylaws. The trial court granted T and R’s motion following the

close of evidence. Shortly before a memorandum of decision was due

pursuant to the statute (§ 51-183b) requiring trial judges to render judgment within 120 days of the date that the trial concluded, the trial court

requested a sixty day extension from the parties. The plaintiffs objected

to that request, and, shortly thereafter, the trial court ordered supplemental briefing and arguments regarding whether the court had subject

matter jurisdiction over the case. The trial court subsequently issued a

written memorandum of decision in which it concluded that it had

jurisdiction and found the facts in favor of T and R on the both the

complaint and the counterclaim. In reaching its conclusion, the trial

court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 2012 decision denying

the request for a temporary order of mandamus was entitled to preclusive

effect. The trial court further found that T and R had proven, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiffs have waived any right

they may have had to challenge the validity of the 2010 bylaws. The trial

court rendered judgment for the defendants and ordered the secretary

of the state to accept only those candidate endorsements made pursuant

to the 2010 bylaws. From that judgment, the plaintiffs appealed. Held:

1. The trial court issued a timely memorandum of decision under § 51-183b,

and, accordingly, that statute did not operate to deprive the trial court

of personal jurisdiction over the parties; notwithstanding the plaintiffs’

objection to the trial court’s request for an extension, the trial court’s

order requiring supplemental briefing and arguments to address a colorable issue pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction, which was issued

before the 120 day decision period lapsed, had the effect of stopping

the decision period and restarting it after supplemental arguments

were heard.

2. The trial court properly determined that, under § 9-374, the 2010 bylaws

were the effective party rules of the statewide Independent Party;

although there was nothing in the language of § 9-374 that would have

expressly precluded the filing of party rules before Nader received 1

percent of the vote as a statewide candidate in 2008, other related

statutory provisions, including the statutory definition of ‘‘minor party’’

set forth in § 9-372 (6), indicated that the Independent Party did not

exist as a minor party for purposes of state election law until 2008, and,

therefore, the 2006 bylaws simply had no effect with respect to the

obligations of the secretary of the state.

3. The trial court properly declined to give preclusive effect to the decision

denying the Waterbury faction’s motion for a temporary order of mandamus in the 2012 action; that decision, which was based on a finding

that the Independent Party did not follow the amendment procedures

provided in the 2006 bylaws in adopting the 2010 bylaws, did not constitute a final judgment under the doctrine of res judicata or collateral

estoppel, as it was issued on an expedited basis and specifically emphasized that it was tentative in nature and not a final judgment on the merits.

4. The trial court’s factual finding, made in connection with the defendants’

special defense of waiver, that the plaintiffs had waived any objection

to the use of the 2010 bylaws to govern Independent Party proceedings

was not clearly erroneous; there was ample evidence in the record to

support the trial court’s factual finding, as the trial court properly credited evidence that T and F actively worked together to form a statewide

party in 2008, filed joint forms on behalf of the Independent Party, and

discussed the proposed 2010 bylaws, which were later unanimously

adopted, filed with the secretary of the state, and used without objection

by the plaintiffs.

5. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their unpreserved constitutional claim

that the trial court’s decision improperly interfered with the Independent

Party’s right to choose its own candidates, as the plaintiffs induced the

claimed error by naming the secretary of the state as a defendant and

seeking an order mirroring the relief ultimately awarded.

6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting T and R’s late

request to amend their answer, as that amendment did not prejudice

the plaintiffs; the plaintiffs did not claim that they would have litigated

the case differently if the court had not permitted the amendment, that

they were deprived of the time necessary to respond to the amendment,

or that the amended answer confused the issues in the case.

Argued October 19, 2018—officially released February 19, 2019

Procedural History
Action for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that certain bylaws are the validly adopted and currently effective party rules of the statewide Independent Party, and

for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of Hartford, where Michael Duff was

substituted as a plaintiff and the defendant Michael

Telesca et al. filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the case

was tried to the court, Hon. A. Susan Peck, judge trial

referee, who, exercising the powers of the Superior

Court, rendered judgment for the defendants on the

complaint and for the defendant Michael Telesca et al.

on the counterclaim, and the plaintiffs appealed.

Affirmed.

Eliot B. Gersten, with whom was Johanna S. Katz,

for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Maura Murphy Osborne, assistant attorney general,

with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, former

attorney general, for the appellee (named defendant).

William M. Bloss, with whom were Alinor C. Sterling

and Emily B. Rock, for the appellees (defendant

Michael Telesca et al.).
Opinion

ROBINSON, C. J. This appeal is the latest battle in

the war for control over the state’s Independent Party

between its Danbury faction, which is led by the plaintiffs, the Independent Party of CT—State Central and

its officers, Michael Duff, Donna L. LaFrance, and Roger

Palanzo,1 and its Waterbury faction, which is led by two

of the defendants, Michael Telesca and Rocco Frank,

Jr. The plaintiffs appeal2

from the judgment of the trial

court, rendered after a bench trial, for Telesca and

Frank on the complaint and the counterclaim in the

present action, which both sought declaratory and

injunctive relief. Specifically, the trial court ordered

the named defendant, Secretary of the State Denise

W. Merrill,3

to accept candidate endorsements made

pursuant to the Independent Party’s 2010 bylaws (2010

bylaws), which, in effect, gave the Waterbury faction

control over the Independent Party’s statewide nominations. There are two principal issues among the plaintiffs’ plethora of claims in the present appeal. First, we

consider whether the trial court’s order of supplemental

briefing and oral argument concerning its subject matter jurisdiction, issued just prior to the 120 day decision

deadline pursuant to General Statutes § 51-183b,4 and

after the plaintiffs’ objection to the trial court’s request

for an extension, preserved its personal jurisdiction

over the parties by stopping and later restarting the

decision period. The second principal issue is whether

the trial court properly determined that General Statutes § 9-374,5 which requires the filing of party rules

before the name of a candidate endorsed by a minor

political party may be printed on an election ballot,

rendered the 2010 bylaws controlling, as opposed to

bylaws that the Danbury faction had filed with the Secretary in 2006 (2006 bylaws) prior to the Independent

Party’s receiving the 1 percent of statewide votes necessary to confer minor party status. Because we conclude

that the order of supplemental briefing and argument

opened the 120 day decision period and later restarted

it, thus rendering the trial court’s decision timely under

§ 51-183b, and also conclude that the trial court properly

construed § 9-374, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.6

The record reveals the following relevant facts, as

found by the trial court, and procedural history. The

genesis of the current Independent Party dates to 2003,

when Telesca and others formed the Waterbury Independent Party (Waterbury party), ‘‘to run candidates

for local office as an alternative to the major parties.’’

The Waterbury party ‘‘endorsed a full slate of candidates

for municipal elections in Waterbury and [saw] eight

people [elected] to office, each of whom received more

than 1 percent of the vote in [his or her] individual

[race]. Because the candidates received at least 1 percent of the vote in each of those races, the Waterbury
[party] was eligible for minor party status for those

offices. Thereafter, Waterbury electors could register

as Independent Party members for local elections. After

the 2003 Waterbury municipal elections, the [Secretary]

sent a letter to the Waterbury [party] requesting that

it submit party rules. In 2004, the Waterbury [party]

drafted bylaws on how to conduct caucuses and created

a nominating process for future races. Telesca’s goal

was to build a new statewide third party to help people

get ballot access around the state. The Waterbury

[party] bylaws were filed with the [Secretary and the]

Waterbury town clerk . . . .’’

‘‘In 2004, the Waterbury [party] decided to run candidates in races for state representative and state [senator] in the Waterbury area. . . . Around this time,

Telesca learned about a separate Independent Party

that had been formed in Danbury headed by [Robert]

Fand that had reserved the name [‘Independent Party

for the 30th Senate District’ (Danbury party)]. Because

the Danbury [party] had already reserved the party designation of Independent Party for the 30th Senate District, the Waterbury [party] was not allowed to nominate

a candidate for that election. In 2004, Telesca and Fand

reached an agreement that the Waterbury [party] would

not operate in Danbury and the Danbury [party] would

not operate in Waterbury. . . .

‘‘In 2006, the Waterbury [party] attempted to reserve

the name ‘Independent Party’ statewide but was not

able to do so because there were local parties using

the name ‘Independent’ in both Danbury and Waterbury.

The [Secretary] would not allow two different parties

with any part of the same name on the ballot at the

same time. In 2006, Telesca and [his colleague, John]

Mertens learned from the [Secretary] that they needed

to get the local independent parties to come together

in order to . . . petition for statewide offices. In 2006,

Telesca and Fand joined together and signed and filed

a form [ED-6017 with the Secretary] as members of

the Independent Party Designation Committee, but they

failed to obtain enough signatures to get ballot access

for any statewide office. As a result, there was no statewide minor party established in that year. . . .

‘‘In September 2006, Fand, [John L.] Dietter, and

LaFrance filed a form ED-48 with the [Secretary] designating themselves as the three members of the party

committee for the ‘Independent Party of CT—State Central.’ . . . At the same time, these individuals filed the

2006 bylaws, which consisted of one page [entitled]

‘Party Rules Amended.’ . . . The introductory paragraph of those rules states that the committee ‘adopts

the following rules for the establishment of local committees and nomination of candidates.’ . . . The final

paragraph of the 2006 bylaws . . . indicates that the

rules were passed unanimously at the meeting of the

‘State Central Committee of the Independent Party of
Connecticut on [September 27, 2006],’ and is signed by

. . . Dietter [as] Chairman . . . LaFrance [as] Treasurer, and . . . Fand [as] Deputy Treasurer . . . .’’

(Citations omitted; footnote added.)

‘‘In 2008, Fand and Telesca [again] joined together

to create a statewide Independent Party. There were

other Independent Party chapters in the state at this

time, including ones in Winsted and Milford. Telesca

assisted those chapters by providing information

regarding the election process. The immediate goal in

2008 was to run Ralph Nader as a candidate for president . . . and achieve 1 percent of the vote, which

would establish the Independent Party as a statewide

minor party. See General Statutes § 9-372 (6).8

In a joint

effort to accomplish this goal, Telesca and Fand both

signed and filed [a] form ED-601 . . . as the designated

agents of the Independent Party. The form designated

the name Independent Party not only for president,

vice president, and electors, but also for state senate

districts 24, 28, and 11, state assembly districts 110 and

96, United States congressmen for the third and fifth

districts, and for several registrar of voters and probate

judge races.’’ (Footnote added.)

The trial court credited Telesca’s testimony that,

‘‘because there were different rules for the various local

parties in the state who controlled the Independent

Party line for their localities, he and Fand agreed that

they would need to create a new set of bylaws to accomplish their joint goal of creating a statewide minor party.

Without a statewide party, a local Independent Party

could oppose a statewide candidate for any office by

reserving the same or a similar party designation for

[its town]. Running . . . Nader for president provided

a clear path toward garnering 1 percent of the vote

and establishing a statewide minor party. Once Nader

achieved over 1 percent of the vote in the 2008 presidential election, the [Secretary] certified the Independent

Party as a minor party and notified all town registrars

of voters of the Independent Party’s new status as a

statewide minor party. . . . Subsequently, anyone in

the state could register to vote as a member of the

Independent Party.

‘‘Following the 2008 election, Telesca and Mertens

drafted bylaws for the new statewide party. Telesca

sent out [between] 700 [and] 800 postcards about a

meeting to be held on March 20, 2010, concerning proposed bylaws to any registered member of the Independent Party who had voted in the last two elections.

Mertens created a website and posted the proposed

bylaws on it months in advance of the meeting. Telesca

put an advertisement in the Hartford Courant announcing the meeting/caucus and gave advance notice to the

[Secretary]. Telesca also sent Fand a postcard and gave

him a copy of the proposed bylaws before the meeting,

which Fand acknowledged. Telesca and [his colleague
Mary] Iorio met with Fand about the bylaws for the

new statewide party before the meeting was held.

‘‘On March 20, 2010, the Independent Party held a

meeting in Waterbury of registered Independent Party

members from around the state to ratify the [2010]

bylaws for the new statewide party. At the meeting,

Fand did not object either to the meeting, the idea of

creating bylaws for the new statewide party, or the

bylaws themselves, [and also did not] request any

changes to the [2010] bylaws as proposed. There was

an agenda for the meeting and a sign-up sheet. Only

registered Independent Party members were allowed

to vote on the [2010] bylaws. The vote to approve the

bylaws was unanimous. The [2010] bylaws were filed

with the [Secretary] on March 22, 2010 . . . . No objections were filed with the [Secretary] within sixty days

of the filing date.’’ (Citation omitted.)

‘‘A caucus was held on August 21, 2010, to nominate

Independent Party candidates for placement on the

November 2, 2010 ballot. The 2010 bylaws were used

to guide the nomination process at the caucus. The

Independent Party got ballot access for statewide

offices in 2010 by going through the petitioning process

for candidates and by filing a form ED-601 . . . . The

purpose of the caucus was to endorse candidates for

certain offices and to ratify endorsements for other

offices that had been made through the petitioning process. At a meeting held on August 21, 2010, immediately

prior to the caucus, Telesca was authorized to preside

over the statewide caucus, file all paperwork regarding

the upcoming state elections, and to act as the agent

and acting chairman of the Independent Party.

‘‘Following the caucus, a document confirming the

nominations and endorsements of the statewide Independent Party candidates for the 2010 election was

filed with the [Secretary]. The document was signed by

Telesca as presiding officer of the caucus, and LaFrance

and Fand as agents of the Independent Party. . . . At

the time, Fand and LaFrance constituted two-thirds of

the [Independent Party of CT—State Central]. The [Secretary] subsequently approved a revised list of nominees on September 8, 2010. . . . All of the candidates

were nominated pursuant to the 2010 bylaws. The new

statewide Independent Party subsequently published a

political advertisement showing its endorsed candidates for the 2010 election. . . .

‘‘[On the basis of] the evidence presented at trial, in

the 2010 election cycle, there was no conflict between

the Waterbury and Danbury factions of the Independent

Party.’’ (Citations omitted.) Indeed, the trial court also

found that there ‘‘was no evidence of conflict between

the Waterbury and Danbury factions in the 2008, 2009,

2010, or 2011 election cycles. The 2006 bylaws were

not used by the Independent Party to nominate anyone

for president in 2008 or for statewide office in 2008,
2010, 2012, or 2014. The Danbury faction did not object

to the caucuses held pursuant to the 2010 bylaws to

nominate candidates for statewide office in either 2010

or 2012. On June 10, 2012, the Independent Party held

a caucus to elect the officers of the statewide party.’’

The conflict between the factions that led to litigation

first developed in early 2012, when ‘‘Fand invited Telesca to a meeting with Danbury mayor Mark Boughton

in an effort to gain Telesca’s support for Boughton as

the endorsed candidate of the Independent Party [for

governor]. Boughton hoped to run for governor as the

next nominee of the Republican Party. Telesca refused

to give Fand his assurance, as chairman of the Independent Party, that he would endorse Boughton for governor and informed Fand that the Independent Party’s

endorsement of candidates was up to the party membership, not him. After that meeting, Telesca and Fand’s

relationship soured.

‘‘Because Nader received more than 1 percent of the

vote in 2008 presidential election, the Independent

Party was able to nominate and endorse a candidate for

the 2012 presidential election without having to go

through the petitioning process. On August 21, 2012, the

Independent Party held a caucus, conducted pursuant to

the 2010 bylaws, to nominate and endorse a presidential

candidate for 2012. The votes were limited to Independent Party members. At the caucus, Rocky Anderson

was selected as the presidential nominee of the Independent Party. Although the 2006 bylaws reserved the right

of the Danbury faction to make the Independent Party’s

nomination for president, the nomination for president

was decided at the August 21, 2012 caucus [pursuant to]

the 2010 bylaws without objection. Because Anderson

failed to garner at least 1 percent of the vote for president, the Independent Party lost its presidential ballot

line for the 2016 presidential election.

‘‘In 2014, the Independent Party held a statewide caucus and nominated candidates pursuant to the 2010

bylaws. No one objected to the use of the 2010 [bylaws]

for Independent Party nominations in the 2014 statewide elections. In 2015, local Independent Party chapters nominated candidates for municipal elections. In

2016, the Danbury faction and the Waterbury faction

nominated different candidates for the Independent

Party’s state senate endorsement for one particular

race. On August 23, 2016, the Danbury faction held an

endorsement event at which nominations for president,

vice president, United States Senate, United States

House of Representatives, state senate and state

[house] were made and thereafter filed with the [Secretary]. Notice of the meeting was given pursuant to General Statutes § 9-452a. . . . Telesca attended that

endorsement meeting and voted no without comment

when the nominees were presented for a vote. Telesca

did not challenge how Duff, the presiding officer, con-
ducted the meeting. Nor did Telesca challenge anyone’s

right to vote at the meeting. Telesca filed a complaint

with the State Elections Enforcement Commission

against the current members of the [Danbury faction],

Duff, LaFrance, Palanzo and others. The [Waterbury

faction] also selected nominees at an event noticed for

that purpose which were also filed with the [Secretary].

Where there were competing nominations, the [Secretary] did not accept either nomination for placement

on the ballot. A major point of contention between the

two factions is that the Waterbury faction believes that

the Danbury faction is merely a proxy for the Republican Party and not truly representative of the Independent Party.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.)

The plaintiffs then brought the present action for

declaratory and injunctive relief, which is the latest in

a line of lawsuits arising from the conflict between the

Waterbury and Danbury factions.9 The case was tried

to the court, Hon. A. Susan Peck, judge trial referee,

on October 11, 17, and 18, 2017, with posttrial oral

argument on March 23, 2018. Following supplemental

briefing and oral argument with respect to whether the

political question doctrine deprived the trial court of

subject matter jurisdiction over this case, on August

21, 2018, the trial court issued a lengthy memorandum

of decision in which it concluded that it had subject

matter jurisdiction over this case10 and rendered judgment for the defendants on the complaint.

With respect to its specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court first concluded as a matter

of statutory interpretation that the 2010 bylaws were

controlling under the statutory scheme governing minor

parties, in particular §§ 9-374 and 9-372 (6), the ‘‘plain

language of [which] indicates that a minor party does

not exist in Connecticut until it designates a candidate

for office who achieves 1 percent of the vote.’’ The trial

court further observed that, in contrast to the 2010

bylaws, which were created in a statewide process after

Nader’s nomination in 2008, the 2006 bylaws were filed

with the Secretary at a time when ‘‘the party so-named

had not achieved minor party status for any statewide

office.’’ Thus, the trial court determined that the ‘‘2006

bylaws are valid only to the extent they are recognized

as such within the local committee. Although the plaintiffs filed the 2006 bylaws with the [Secretary], the filing

of these rules merely allowed the [Danbury faction] to

nominate local candidates and get them on an official

ballot once they had attained 1 percent of the vote for a

particular office. The 2006 bylaws did not automatically

allow the [Danbury faction] to gain control of the statewide Independent Party after the 2008 presidential election.’’11 (Footnote omitted.) Accordingly, the trial court

concluded that ‘‘the only statewide Independent Party

was created post-2008, and the 2010 bylaws are the only

valid governing rules of that party.’’12
The trial court also rejected the plaintiffs’ additional

arguments about why the 2006 bylaws should be considered controlling. With respect to those relevant to this

appeal, the trial court first considered the plaintiffs’

conduct subsequent to the adoption of the 2010 bylaws

and concluded that ‘‘the defendants have established

by a preponderance of the evidence submitted in this

case [their special defense alleging] that the plaintiffs have waived any right they may have had to challenge the validity of the 2010 bylaws.’’ The trial court

also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that a 2012 decision issued by Judge Mark H. Taylor in Independent

Party of Connecticut v. Dietter, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-12-5016387-S

(September 28, 2012) (2012 Waterbury action), which

had concluded ‘‘that the 2006 bylaws were the validly

adopted Independent Party rules,’’ was entitled to

preclusive effect in the present case. The trial court

reasoned that the 2012 Waterbury action was distinguishable because it did not concern statewide office,

addressed only ‘‘a motion for a temporary order of mandamus, and . . . was [subsequently] withdrawn.’’

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs ‘‘failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that they are entitled to the declaratory and

injunctive relief requested in their second amended

complaint,’’ which would have given them control over

the Independent Party. Instead, the trial court concluded that ‘‘the defendants . . . have established by

a preponderance of the evidence that the 2010 bylaws

are the validly adopted and operative bylaws of the

Independent Party/Independent Party of Connecticut,

filed pursuant to the requirements of § 9-374, and that

[Telesca and Frank] are the duly elected officers of the

Independent Party/Independent Party of Connecticut,

and the individual plaintiffs are not. In addition, the

court hereby declares that the 2006 bylaws apply only

to the Danbury faction’s local committee of the Independent Party. Finally, the court hereby declares and orders

that the [Secretary] must accept only the nominations

and endorsements of the Independent Party/Independent Party of Connecticut, made pursuant to the 2010

bylaws filed with the [Secretary] on March 22, [2010],

or as may be amended, pursuant to . . . § 9-374.’’

According to the plaintiffs, this order effectively ‘‘gives

the Waterbury faction, under the leadership of Telesca

and Frank, control of the statewide ballot line.’’ This

expedited appeal followed.13 See footnote 2 of this

opinion.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court (1)

lost personal jurisdiction over this case when it failed

to render judgment within 120 days as required by § 51-

183b, (2) improperly construed § 9-374 in concluding

that the 2010 bylaws are controlling, (3) improperly

declined to give preclusive effect to Judge Taylor’s deci-
sion in the 2012 Waterbury action, (4) committed clear

error in finding that they had waived their objections

to the 2010 bylaws, (5) crafted an order that violated

their constitutional rights, and (6) abused its discretion

in permitting the defendants to amend their answer to

assert special defenses and counterclaims. Additional

relevant facts and procedural history will be set forth

in the context of each of these claims as necessary.

I

WHETHER § 51-183B DEPRIVED THE TRIAL

COURT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Relying primarily on Foote v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 296, 8 A.3d 524 (2010), and

Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc., 215 Conn. 688,

577 A.2d 1047 (1990), the plaintiffs first claim that the

trial court lost personal jurisdiction over this case

because it failed to issue its decision within 120 days

after oral argument and posttrial briefing as required

by § 51-183b. The plaintiffs argue that their refusal to

consent to the extension of time requested by the trial

court deprived it of authority to issue the decision after

120 days had passed, and that countenancing the trial

court’s attempt to extend the deadline by raising subject

matter jurisdictional questions at the last minute would

remove the ‘‘teeth’’ from § 51-183b. The plaintiffs further

argue that it was improper for the trial court to raise

subject matter jurisdictional questions so late in the

process because the parties had mentioned these issues

repeatedly earlier in the proceedings. In response, the

defendants contend that the trial court’s decision was

timely under § 51-183b because its order of supplemental briefing and argument concerning its subject matter

jurisdiction, which was filed prior to the expiration of

the original 120 day decision period, had the effect of

stopping and then restarting the 120 day decision period

after the court heard supplemental arguments on

August 3, 2018. We agree with the defendants and conclude that the trial court’s order requiring supplemental

briefing to address a colorable jurisdictional issue had

the effect of stopping the 120 day decision period, which

then started anew after supplemental arguments, thus

rendering its decision timely under § 51-183b.

The record reveals the following additional relevant

facts and procedural history. On July 17, 2018, four days

before the trial court’s decision was due pursuant to

§ 51-183b, the trial court left voice mail messages for

the parties, requesting a sixty day extension to issue

the decision and asking them to file certain additional

proposed orders. On July 18, 2018, the defendants filed

proposed orders and did not comment as to timeliness.

That same day, the plaintiffs filed a response declining

to submit additional filings and refusing to waive the

120 day decision deadline, stating that a decision was

needed to facilitate plans for the 2018 elections in light

of the upcoming September 5, 2018 nomination filing
deadline pursuant to General Statutes § 9-452. On July

19, 2018, the trial court issued an order directing the

parties to brief the question of whether the court had

subject matter jurisdiction over the case under, inter

alia, the political question doctrine, and to appear for

oral argument on that issue on August 3, 2018. Following

oral argument, on August 21, 2018, the trial court issued

a comprehensive memorandum of decision addressing

both the jurisdictional issue and the merits of the various claims made by the parties.

At the outset, we note that the plaintiffs’ claim concerns the application of the case law interpreting § 51-

183b to the undisputed facts, which raises a question

of law over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 305 Conn. 539, 546, 46 A.3d 112

(2012); see also Gilmore v. Pawn King, Inc., 313 Conn.

535, 542, 98 A.3d 808 (2014) (‘‘we do not write on a

clean slate when this court previously has interpreted

a statute’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

‘‘[I]n past cases interpreting § 51-183b and its predecessors, we have held that the defect in a late judgment

is that it implicates the trial court’s power to continue

to exercise jurisdiction over the parties before it. . . .

We have characterized a late judgment as voidable

rather than as void . . . and have permitted the lateness of a judgment to be waived by the conduct or the

consent of the parties. . . . [A]n unwarranted delay

in the issuance of a judgment does not automatically

deprive a court of personal jurisdiction. Even after the

expiration of the time period within which a judge has

the power to render a valid, binding judgment, a court

continues to have jurisdiction over the parties until

and unless they object. It is for this reason that a late

judgment is merely voidable, and not void.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Foote v.

Commissioner of Correction, supra, 125 Conn. App.

300–301, quoting Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc.,

supra, 215 Conn. 692; see also Commission on Human

Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Arnold v. Forvil, 302

Conn. 263, 269–70, 25 A.3d 632 (2011) (noting that § 51-

183b concerns personal rather than subject matter jurisdiction).

The ‘‘completion date’’ of trial, for purposes of starting the 120 day period, includes the filing of briefs and

completion of oral argument because ‘‘briefing of the

legal issues [is] a component of the judicial gathering

of the materials necessary to a well reasoned decision.

In related contexts, ‘completion’ has been held to

encompass the availability of all the elements directly

or indirectly to be considered in the rendering of a

decision.’’ Frank v. Streeter, 192 Conn. 601, 604, 472

A.2d 1281 (1984); see also Fibre Optic Plus, Inc. v. XL

Specialty Ins. Co., 125 Conn. App. 399, 406, 8 A.3d 539

(2010) (‘‘completion date’’ includes any oral argument

heard subsequent to filing of briefs), cert. granted, 300
Conn. 907, 12 A.3d 1003 (2011) (appeal withdrawn February 14, 2012), and cert. granted, 300 Conn. 907, 12

A.3d 1003 (2011) (appeal withdrawn February 28, 2012).

Our decision in Commission on Human Rights &

Opportunities ex rel. Arnold v. Forvil, supra, 302 Conn.

263, controls the plaintiffs’ claim in the present appeal.

In that case, we followed the Appellate Court’s decision

in Statewide Grievance Committee v. Ankerman, 74

Conn. App. 464, 470, 812 A.2d 169, cert. denied, 263

Conn. 911, 821 A.2d 767 (2003), and concluded that,

‘‘when a trial court properly reopens a case during

the pendency of the 120 day statutory time period, the

completion of proceedings scheduled on the date the

proceedings were reopened constitutes the relevant

completion date for purposes of commencing the 120

day limitation period for rendering judgment.’’ (Emphasis added.) Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Arnold v. Forvil, supra, 271; see also

Statewide Grievance Committee v. Ankerman, supra,

470 (trial court’s order that attorney appear at hearing

on disposition of grievance proceedings opened 120

day period). Thus, under Forvil, the trial court’s order

requiring supplemental briefing and argument within

120 days had the effect of stopping the decision period

and then restarting it after supplemental arguments

were heard.

The plaintiffs’ reply brief relies, however, on Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc., supra, 215 Conn. 688,

for the proposition that their July 18, 2018 refusal to

consent to a late decision deprived the trial court of

authority to render a late judgment. See id., 694 (concluding that parties could not withdraw their prejudgment refusal to consent upon subsequently learning of

favorable judgment). We understand the plaintiffs to

argue that, under Waterman, their refusal to extend the

deadline acted, as a matter of law, to block the court

from subsequently reopening the decision period in any

way, even to address a jurisdictional issue. We disagree

with this reading of Waterman. First, that case is factually distinguishable from the present case because the

trial court in Waterman took no steps to open the 120

day period prior to its expiration and had not asked

for consent until after the lapse of the 120 day period.

See id., 690 (‘‘[b]y a letter dated October 5, 1988, which

acknowledged that a judgment had not been rendered

within the 120 day period . . . the trial court asked

the parties to consent to an extension of time until

December 15, 1988’’ [emphasis added]). In contrast to

Waterman, the trial court in the present case acted to

reopen the jurisdictional period by requesting supplemental briefing and argument while it still had personal

jurisdiction because the 120 day period had not yet

elapsed.

Second, beyond the trial court’s inherent discretion

to seek supplemental briefing and argument on factual
or legal issues in the case, the plaintiffs’ Waterman

argument, insofar as it concerns the trial court’s decision to raise a colorable question of subject matter

jurisdiction, squarely conflicts with the axiom that questions about subject matter jurisdiction issues may be

raised at any time, including by the court, sua sponte,

and on appeal. See, e.g., Angersola v. Radiologic Associates of Middletown, P.C., 330 Conn. 251, 265, 193 A.3d

520 (2018). Indeed, in Machado v. Taylor, 326 Conn.

396, 404, 163 A.3d 558 (2017), we recently concluded

that it ‘‘would contravene well settled law’’ to allow

‘‘delay or laches [to preclude] a jurisdictional challenge.’’ In so concluding, we emphasized that ‘‘[t]he

objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any

time,’’ including by the court sua sponte, and that ‘‘[t]he

requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be

waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in

the proceedings.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also id. (concluding that

trial court improperly denied motion to dismiss ‘‘and

render[ed] judgment in favor of the plaintiff without

first resolving whether the defendant’s motion raised

a colorable jurisdictional issue, and, if so, whether it

had jurisdiction over the cause of action’’).

In the present case, we conclude that the trial court’s

order requiring supplemental briefing stopped the 120

day decision period, which then restarted after supplemental arguments were heard, thus rendering the trial

court’s decision in this case timely under § 51-183b,

notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ earlier refusal to consent

to the requested extension.14 Accordingly, § 51-183b did

not operate to deprive the trial court of the personal

jurisdiction over the parties required to decide this case.

II

WHETHER § 9-374 RENDERS THE 2010

BYLAWS CONTROLLING

We next address the second principal issue in this

appeal, namely, whether the trial court improperly construed § 9-374 in concluding that the 2010 bylaws, filed

after Nader’s tally of 1 percent of the vote in the 2008

election afforded the Independent Party statewide status for the first time, were controlling over the 2006

bylaws previously filed by the Danbury faction. The

plaintiffs argue that the trial court’s construction of § 9-

374 has the effect of improperly supplying nonexistent

statutory language because, as enacted by the legislature, the statute ‘‘contains no requirement’’ that a party

refile its bylaws with the Secretary ‘‘upon achieving

minor party status.’’ The plaintiffs rely on ‘‘[p]ublic policy and common sense,’’ arguing that the trial court’s

construction of the statute ‘‘would create a burdensome

and tedious exercise for minor parties that the statutory

scheme does not anticipate [or] facilitate,’’ insofar as

it would require that ‘‘new bylaws . . . be filed every

time the Independent Party wins new minor party status
for a given office . . . .’’ In response, the defendants

contend that, under General Statutes § 1-2z, the court’s

construction of § 9-374 must consider the definition of

minor party in a related statute, § 9-372 (6), and that,

because the Independent Party did not receive 1 percent

of the vote until 2008, ‘‘[n]o matter how the plaintiffs

styled it, the 2006 filing was not the filing of a statewide

minor party.’’ We agree with the defendants and conclude that, under § 9-374, the 2010 bylaws govern the

statewide Independent Party.

Whether § 9-374 renders the 2010 bylaws controlling

‘‘presents a question of statutory construction over

which we exercise plenary review. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain

and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.

. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language

as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . .

In seeking to determine that meaning . . . § 1-2z

directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself

and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining

such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does

not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual

evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be

considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the

legislative history and circumstances surrounding its

enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to

implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation

and common law principles governing the same general

subject matter . . . . The test to determine ambiguity

is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchesi v. Board of

Selectmen, 328 Conn. 615, 627–28, 181 A.3d 531 (2018).

Beginning with the statutory text, § 9-374 provides in

relevant part: ‘‘In the case of a minor party, no authority

of the state or any subdivision thereof having jurisdiction over the conduct of any election shall permit the

name of a candidate of such party for any office to be

printed on the official ballot unless at least one copy

of the party rules regulating the manner of nominating

a candidate for such office has been filed in the office

of the Secretary of the State at least sixty days before

the nomination of such candidate. In the case of a minor

party, the selection of town committee members and

delegates to conventions shall not be valid unless at

least one copy of the party rules regulating the manner

of making such selection has been filed in the office of

the Secretary of the State at least sixty days before

such selection is made. A copy of local party rules

shall forthwith be also filed with the town clerk of the

municipality to which they relate. Party rules shall not

be effective until sixty days after the filing of the same
with the Secretary of the State. . . . The term ‘party

rules’ as used in this section includes any amendment

to such party rules. When any amendment is to be

filed as required by this section, complete party rules

incorporating such amendment shall be filed, together

with a separate copy of such amendment.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Section 9-374 sets forth two operative time periods

with respect to the filing of the party rules. First, the

statute requires minor parties to file their party rules

with the Secretary ‘‘at least sixty days’’ before nominating a candidate or selecting town committee members and delegates to conventions, and precludes state

or municipal officials from putting such candidates on

the ballot unless such a filing has been made. Second,

§ 9-374 provides that such party rules ‘‘shall not be

effective until sixty days after the filing of the same

with the Secretary of the State.’’ Given this time frame,

we agree that the plaintiffs’ reading of § 9-374 is plausible, insofar as there is no statutory language precluding

a minor party from filing its party rules before a given

point in time, or rendering those rules ineffective if filed

early, and reading § 9-374—standing by itself—in such

a manner might conceivably run afoul of the maxim

that, in construing statutes, ‘‘[w]e are not permitted to

supply statutory language that the legislature may have

chosen to omit.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Josephs, 328 Conn. 21, 27, 176 A.3d 542 (2018).

We do not, however, read § 9-374 by itself. Section

1-2z counsels us to construe statutes in light of related

provisions, as we are ‘‘guided by the principle that the

legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . . [T]his tenet of

statutory construction . . . requires us to read statutes

together when they relate to the same subject matter

. . . . Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a

statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue,

but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure

the coherency of our construction.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 21,

981 A.2d 427 (2009); see also, e.g., Gilmore v. Pawn

King, Inc., supra, 313 Conn. 555–56 (‘‘in interpreting a

statute, [r]elated statutory provisions, or statutes in pari

materia, often provide guidance in determining the

meaning of a particular word’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]). Thus, we read § 9-374 in conjunction with

§ 9-372 (6), which defines ‘‘ ‘[m]inor party’ ’’ as ‘‘a political party or organization which is not a major party

and whose candidate for the office in question received

at the last-preceding regular election for such office,

under the designation of that political party or organization, at least one per cent of the whole number of votes

cast for all candidates for such office at such election

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) This definitional statute suggests that a minor party simply does not exist—for

purposes of the ballot—unless and until its candidate
receives 1 percent of the vote for a particular office at

the last preceding regular election. Put differently, this

definition suggests that there is nothing—at least under

the contemplation of the statutory scheme—for those

bylaws to govern until a putative party’s candidate

receives 1 percent of the vote for an office.

Another related statute, namely, General Statutes § 9-

453u,15 which governs applications to reserve party designations for candidates on the ballot by petition,

further supports this reading. The designation of a candidate under § 9-453u is a precursor to minor party

status, and that provision makes clear that a minor

party is conceptually distinct under the statutory

scheme from an organization seeking a party designation. See General Statutes § 9-453u (c) (3) and (4) (precluding designation of party name that ‘‘incorporate[s]

the name of any minor party which is entitled to nominate candidates for any office which will appear on the

same ballot with any office included in the statement’’

or is ‘‘the same as any party designation for which a

reservation with the secretary is currently in effect for

any office included in the statement’’). These provisions

indicate that a minor party simply does not exist for

purposes of our election laws until its candidate

receives 1 percent of the vote, thus triggering an obligation to file party rules and creating a party line on the

ballot for the next election. Because a minor party does

not exist prior to that point, ipso facto, party rules filed

prior thereto simply have no effect with respect to the

obligations of the Secretary.

Although there is no legislative history to illuminate

the meaning of the statutes further, we observe that

limiting the effective party rules to those filed after the

putative minor party’s candidate receives 1 percent of

the vote, along with the sixty day period before those

rules take effect, has the salutary effect of allowing

the party to take shape and potentially eliminate the

confusion sown by factional disputes, such as that in

this case. The statutory framework also reflects the

organic nature of the development of statewide parties

like the Independent Party that have their genesis in a

conglomeration of smaller or local groups, each with

their own history and political interests. Accordingly,

we conclude that the trial court properly determined

that the 2010 bylaws are the effective party rules of the

Independent Party, because they were filed after Nader

received 1 percent of the vote as a statewide candidate.16

III

ADDITIONAL CLAIMS

Beyond the principal issues in this appeal, the plaintiffs also raise numerous other claims. Specifically, the

plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly (1)

failed to afford preclusive effect to Judge Taylor’s decision in the 2012 Waterbury action, (2) determined that
they had waived their rights to challenge the adoption

of the 2010 bylaws, (3) adopted a construction of § 9-

374 that violated the parties’ constitutional rights, and

(4) permitted the defendants to amend their answer to

add special defenses and counterclaims after the close

of evidence. See footnote 6 of this opinion. Because we

conclude that all of these claims lack merit, we briefly

address each in turn.

A

Preclusive Effect of 2012 Waterbury Action

The plaintiffs contend that the trial court’s decision

improperly conflicts with Judge Taylor’s decision in

the 2012 Waterbury action; see Independent Party of

Connecticut v. Dietter, supra, Superior Court, Docket

No. CV-12-5016387-S; an action brought and withdrawn

by the Waterbury faction after Judge Taylor denied its

motion for a temporary order of mandamus based on

his finding that the ‘‘Independent Party did not follow

the amendment procedures provided in the 2006

[bylaws] for the adoption of amendments to those rules

in 2010.’’ The plaintiffs argue that Judge Taylor’s decision was well reasoned and considered ‘‘essentially the

same issues between essentially the same parties,’’ and

that the trial court in this case should have accorded it

preclusive effect given the defendants’ ‘‘gamesmanship’’

in withdrawing that action upon receipt of an adverse

ruling. In response, the defendants contend that Judge

Taylor’s decision in the 2012 Waterbury action lacks

preclusive effect in the present case because it was

specifically intended to be a preliminary decision rendered on an expedited basis and not a final judgment

on the merits. We agree with the defendants and conclude that Judge Taylor’s decision in the 2012 Waterbury

action has no preclusive effect with respect to the pressent case.

The record reveals the following additional relevant

facts and procedural history. In one chapter of this

dispute between the parties; see footnote 9 of this opinion; the officers of the Waterbury faction and its nominees for the 16th senate district and the 106th assembly

district brought the 2012 Waterbury action against the

Secretary, the officers of the Danbury faction, and their

corresponding house and senate candidates, seeking a

declaration and an order directing the Secretary to place

the Waterbury faction’s candidates on the ballot for

the 2012 election. Independent Party of Connecticut

v. Dietter, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-12-

5016387-S. In that case, Judge Taylor observed that the

‘‘essential dispute between the parties revolve[d]

around the validity and proper adoption of political

party rules following the Independent Party of Connecticut’s qualification as a minor political party for presidential elections, inter alia, which occurred after the

2008 election.’’ Id. Along with their complaint, the

Waterbury faction filed a motion seeking a temporary
order of mandamus. Id. After conducting an evidentiary

hearing and receiving memoranda of law on an expedited basis, the court issued a decision denying that

motion. Id.

Although Judge Taylor agreed with the Waterbury

faction’s claim that ‘‘the 2006 [bylaws] concerning the

party nomination process are extremely general and

do not so much as state the vote required for a local

committee or caucus endorsement,’’ he nevertheless

rejected its argument that the 2006 bylaws did not comply with § 9-374, concluding that ‘‘there are no specific

requirements listed in the statute to guide a political

party in adopting party rules ‘regulating the manner of

nominating a candidate . . . .’ ’’ Id. Judge Taylor then

observed that the ‘‘question presented is whether the

[Waterbury faction] properly convened a caucus of the

Independent Party of Connecticut in 2010 to amend the

2006 [bylaws] and [to] elect new officers pursuant to

the newly adopted 2010 [bylaws]. The court finds that

the [Waterbury faction] did not follow the amendment

procedures provided in the 2006 [bylaws] for the adoption of amendments to those rules in 2010. The court

further finds that the 2010 amendments made to the

2006 [bylaws] occurred at a caucus of the [Waterbury

faction] pursuant to a statute that is inapplicable to the

amendment of state party rules. These findings lead to

the court’s conclusion that the [Waterbury faction] has

failed to establish a clear legal right to the performance

of a duty by the [Secretary] necessary for the issuance

of an order of mandamus in this case.’’17 Id.

Judge Taylor emphasized, however, that, ‘‘[t]hus far

in this case . . . the court has held only an expedited

hearing on a preliminary [m]otion for a [t]emporary

[order of] [m]andamus. The court notes that there has

not yet been a full opportunity for an exploration into

the questions raised at the preliminary hearing as to

whether the 2006 [bylaws] are fatally inconsistent with

state elections statutes, other than § 9-374 standing

alone. The 2006 [bylaws] appear to be vintage party

rules, allowing for strong party leadership through a

self-perpetuating central committee, holding a veto over

party endorsements that appear inconsistent with more

modern and open party rules and procedures. These

issues would be more thoroughly considered in a

motion to dismiss, which the [Danbury faction] has not

yet filed. Accordingly, in light of the inextricable link

between the issue of standing and the merits of the

[Waterbury faction’s] underlying claims, the court will

postpone a determination of the jurisdictional issue.’’

(Emphasis added.) Id. After Judge Taylor’s ruling on

the motion for a temporary order of mandamus, the

Waterbury faction subsequently withdrew the 2012

Waterbury action.

Whether the preclusion doctrine of collateral estoppel or res judicata applies is a question of law subject
to plenary review. See, e.g., MacDermid, Inc. v.

Leonetti, 328 Conn. 726, 738–39, 183 A.3d 611 (2018).

‘‘Although res judicata and collateral estoppel often

appear to merge into one another in practice, analytically they are regarded as distinct.’’ Weiss v. Weiss, 297

Conn. 446, 458–59, 998 A.2d 766 (2010). ‘‘The doctrine

of res judicata provides that [a] valid, final judgment

rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between

the same parties . . . upon the same claim or demand.

. . . Res judicata prevents a litigant from reasserting

a claim that has already been decided on the merits.

. . . Under claim preclusion analysis, a claim—that is,

a cause of action—includes all rights of the plaintiff to

remedies against the defendant with respect to all or

any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. . . . Moreover,

claim preclusion prevents the pursuit of any claims

relating to the cause of action which were actually made

or might have been made. . . . [T]he essential concept

of the modern rule of claim preclusion is that a judgment

against [the] plaintiff is preclusive not simply when it

is on the merits but when the procedure in the first

action afforded [the] plaintiff a fair opportunity to get

to the merits. . . . Stated another way, res judicata is

based on the public policy that a party should not be

able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an

opportunity to litigate. . . . [W]here a party has fully

and fairly litigated his claims, he may be barred from

future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 459–60.

‘‘[I]t is significant that the doctrine of res judicata

provides that [a] judgment is final not only as to every

matter which was offered to sustain the claim, but also

as to any other admissible matter which might have

been offered for that purpose. . . . The rule of claim

preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim

regardless of what additional or different evidence or

legal theories might be advanced in support of it.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 463.

Similarly, the ‘‘fundamental principles underlying the

doctrine of collateral estoppel are well established. The

common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue

preclusion, embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy, the stability of former judgments and

finality. . . . Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,

is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated

and necessarily determined in a prior action between

the same parties upon a different claim. . . . For an

issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have

been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also

must have been actually decided and the decision must

have been necessary to the judgment. . . .
‘‘An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised

in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined. . . . An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of

the issue, the judgment could not have been validly

rendered. . . . If an issue has been determined, but the

judgment is not dependent [on] the determination of the

issue, the parties may relitigate the issue in a subsequent

action. . . . Before collateral estoppel applies [however] there must be an identity of issues between the

prior and subsequent proceedings. To invoke collateral

estoppel the issues sought to be litigated in the new

proceeding must be identical to those considered in the

prior proceeding. . . . In other words, collateral estoppel has no application in the absence of an identical

issue. . . . Further, an overlap in issues does not

necessitate a finding of identity of issues for the purposes of collateral estoppel.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.)

MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 328 Conn. 739–40.

Finality of judgment is critical because ‘‘the preclusive effects of res judicata and collateral estoppel

depend upon the existence of a valid, final judgment

on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.’’18

Slattery v. Maykut, 176 Conn. 147, 157, 405 A.2d 76

(1978); see also id. (‘‘a judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter operates

as res judicata in the absence of fraud or collusion

even if obtained by default, and is just as conclusive

an adjudication between the parties of whatever is

essential to support the judgment as when rendered

after answer and complete trial’’); Corey v. AvcoLycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 317–18, 307 A.2d

155 (1972) (decisions of administrative board acting in

judicial capacity are entitled to res judicata effect), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S. Ct. 903, 34 L. Ed. 2d 699

(1973). This need for finality reflects the fact that the

application of preclusion doctrines can have ‘‘dramatic

consequences for the party against whom the doctrine

is applied.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 59, 808

A.2d 1107 (2002).

Accordingly, courts have held that preliminary decisions, such as on preliminary injunctions or other temporary orders, are not entitled to preclusive effect,

particularly when the court makes clear that it is a

‘‘tentative ruling . . . not intended as a final decision

on the merits. Ordinarily, findings of fact and conclusions of law made in a preliminary injunction proceeding do not preclude reexamination of the merits at a

subsequent trial.’’ Irish Lesbian & Gay Organization

v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 1998); see also

id., 644–46 (treating District Court’s earlier decision as

on merits and subject to res judicata effect, rather than

about whether to grant preliminary injunction, because
it dismissed plaintiff’s claims after hearing and ‘‘gave

no indication that this ruling was tentative or done

without prejudice, and [the plaintiff] did not dispute

the dismissal at the time’’); Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1204 (Fla. App. 2014) (‘‘we are not

convinced that a ruling at such a provisional stage in

the proceedings should have preclusive effect,’’ and

preliminary injunction rulings may be given preclusive

effect only if ‘‘the prior decision is based on a decisive

determination and not on the mere likelihood of success’’); Malahoff v. Saito, 111 Haw. 168, 182 n.16, 140

P.3d 401 (2006) (grant of preliminary injunction is ‘‘not

a final judgment sufficient for collateral estoppel purposes’’ unless intended as final resolution [internal quotation marks omitted]). Declining to accord the effect of

finality to preliminary decisions, such as on preliminary

injunctions or other temporary orders, is consistent

with the observation of the United States Supreme

Court that such orders are often issued with ‘‘haste’’

and are ‘‘customarily granted on the basis of procedures

that are less formal and evidence that is less complete

than in a trial on the merits.’’ University of Texas v.

Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S. Ct. 1830, 68 L. Ed.

2d 175 (1981).

Having reviewed Judge Taylor’s decision in the 2012

Waterbury action, it is clear that he rendered it on an

expedited basis as, in essence, a preliminary injunction

ruling, without benefit of full exploration of the questions raised. Judge Taylor specifically emphasized that

his denial of the Waterbury faction’s motion for a temporary order of mandamus was tentative and not a final

judgment on the merits. Accordingly, we conclude that

the trial court properly declined to give preclusive effect

to Judge Taylor’s decision in the 2012 Waterbury

action.19

B

Special Defense of Waiver

The plaintiffs next claim that the trial court ‘‘improperly intervened in the party’s internal affairs’’ because

the 2010 bylaws are ‘‘invalid’’ given that the defendants

did not follow the amendment procedure contained in

the 2006 bylaws. In this vein, the plaintiffs also contend

that the trial court improperly held for the defendants

with respect to the special defense of waiver; the plaintiffs contend specifically that the trial court improperly

found that they had waived any right to challenge the

validity of the 2010 bylaws, because, since 2012, they

have operated in accordance with Judge Taylor’s decision in the 2012 Waterbury action, which held that the

2010 bylaws were not a properly executed amendment

of the 2006 bylaws. In addition to renewing their statutory argument that the 2006 bylaws were not binding

on the statewide Independent Party, which was a new

entity that did not exist until after the 2008 election,

the defendants also contend that the trial court properly
found that the plaintiffs waived objection to the 2010

bylaws by ‘‘their acquiescence in the process of their

adoption and in the use of those bylaws, with their

express consent, to govern subsequent nominations and

endorsements.’’ We agree with the defendants and conclude that the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs had

waived any objection to the use of the 2010 bylaws to

govern Independent Party proceedings was not

clearly erroneous.

‘‘Waiver is a question of fact. . . . [W]here the factual basis of the court’s decision is challenged we must

determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum

of decision are supported by the evidence or whether,

in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole

record, those facts are clearly erroneous. . . . Therefore, the trial court’s conclusions must stand unless

they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts

found or unless they involve the application of some

erroneous rule of law material to the case. . . .

‘‘Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. . . . Waiver is

based upon a species of the principle of estoppel and

where applicable it will be enforced as the estoppel

would be enforced. . . . Estoppel has its roots in

equity and stems from the voluntary conduct of a party

whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in

equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have

otherwise existed . . . .

‘‘Waiver does not have to be express, but may consist

of acts or conduct from which waiver may be implied.

. . . In other words, waiver may be inferred from the

circumstances if it is reasonable to do so.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) AFSCME,

Council 4, Local 704 v. Dept. of Public Health, 272

Conn. 617, 622–23, 866 A.2d 582 (2005); accord RBC

Nice Bearings, Inc. v. SKF USA, Inc., 318 Conn. 737,

747, 123 A.3d 417 (2015); see also DeLeo v. Equale &

Cirone, LLP, 180 Conn. App. 744, 758–60, 184 A.3d 1264

(2018) (finding that defendant did not waive noncompete clause in partnership agreement was not

clearly erroneous, despite defendant’s statement

encouraging plaintiff to take clients and that he did not

want to hurt plaintiff, because defendant never denied

existence or enforceability of noncompete clause and

reiterated accounting firm’s intention to adhere to partnership agreement, which required compensation when

departing partner took clients); Santos v. Zoning Board

of Appeals, 144 Conn. App. 62, 66–67, 71 A.3d 1263

(concluding that trial court’s finding that plaintiff had

waived 120 day decision deadline under § 51-183b ‘‘by

executing multiple agreements to extend the period for

the court to render judgment’’ was clearly erroneous

because plaintiff ‘‘seasonably objected’’ to late decision

and agreements ‘‘set forth a specific date beyond which

their consent to a late judgment would not extend’’),
cert. denied, 310 Conn. 914, 76 A.3d 630 (2013); Grey

v. Connecticut Indemnity Services, Inc., 112 Conn.

App. 811, 815–16, 964 A.2d 591 (2009) (trial court’s finding that defendant waived right to arbitration was not

clearly erroneous because she ‘‘acted inconsistently

with her contractual right to arbitration’’ by litigating

case in court for three years before moving to compel

arbitration on eve of trial).

We conclude that the trial court’s factual finding of

waiver with respect to the 2010 bylaws was not clearly

erroneous and was, moreover, consistent with the

court’s legal conclusion under § 9-374 and its underlying

findings—namely, that the Independent Party, as constituted in contemplation of the 2008 election, was a newly

formed political party that had roots in various local

independent parties around the state, including those

from Danbury and Waterbury. Thus, the record amply

supports the trial court’s findings of ‘‘numerous indicators that the plaintiffs have waived their right to contest

the validity of the 2010 bylaws.’’ For example, the trial

court properly credited testimony by Telesca and Mertens in finding that that Telesca and Fand ‘‘actively

worked together starting in 2008 to create a statewide

Independent Party in 2008 by petitioning to get Nader

ballot access for the office of [the] president of the

United States. Both Fand and Telesca filed a joint ED601 party designation form on behalf of the Independent

Party on May 5, 2008.’’20 (Footnote omitted.) After Nader

received the requisite 1 percent of the vote, ‘‘Telesca

and Mertens then began drafting bylaws for the new

statewide party in an effort to comply with § 9-374.

They sent the bylaws they drafted to local Independent

Party town committee chairs, 21 and arranged for a statewide party meeting/caucus to vote on the proposed

bylaws.’’ (Footnote added.) As the trial court found,

Telesca and Iorio ‘‘met personally with Fand to discuss

the proposed bylaws; Fand did not object to the planned

meeting, nor did he object to the idea of creating new

bylaws for the statewide party or to the bylaws themselves. After the bylaws were unanimously adopted at

the March 20, 2010 party meeting and later filed with

the [Secretary], neither Fand nor any other member of

the Danbury faction objected to them,’’22 either at the

meeting or after they were filed with the Secretary.

‘‘Moreover, when the Independent Party held a caucus on August 21, 2010, to endorse candidates for various offices pursuant to the 2010 bylaws, Fand and other

members of the Danbury faction attended the meeting

and did not question or object to their use. In addition,

both Fand and LaFrance, two-thirds of the [Danbury

faction], signed the endorsement form filed with the

Waterbury town clerk and the [Secretary] along with

Telesca, which specified the candidates that the Independent Party had endorsed for the 2010 elections at

the August 21 meeting.’’ The 2010 bylaws also governed

the 2011 municipal election cycle, with no objection by
Fand or the Danbury faction. ‘‘Fand and others in the

Danbury faction also used the 2010 bylaws to govern

[statewide] nominations/endorsements for the 2010,

2012 and 2014 election cycles without any objection,’’

including the presidential election in 2012.

As the trial court found, Fand and the Danbury faction

‘‘did not call the legitimacy of the 2010 bylaws into

question until sometime in 2012 when [Fand and Telesca] first disagreed about the nomination of Mark

Boughton, the Republican mayor of Danbury, who was

hoping for the endorsement of the Independent Party

in connection with his gubernatorial ambitions in 2012.’’

Accordingly, the trial court found that ‘‘there is nothing

in the law that prevented Telesca from filing the 2010

bylaws with the [Secretary], and that the plaintiffs’

knowledge about the drafting and adoption of such

bylaws and their failure to object demonstrate their de

facto acceptance of them.’’ We conclude that the trial

court did not commit clear error in finding, with respect

to the special defense of waiver, that ‘‘the defendants

have established by a preponderance of the evidence

submitted in this case that the plaintiffs have waived

any right they may have had to challenge the validity

of the 2010 bylaws.’’

C

Constitutional Claims

The plaintiffs next argue that the trial court’s decision

violated the parties’ rights under the first amendment

to the United States constitution and article first, § 14,

of the Connecticut constitution by directing the Secretary to accept only those Independent Party nominations ‘‘made pursuant to the 2010 bylaws . . . .’’ They

contend that this order is an improper interference with

the Independent Party’s right to choose its candidates

in accordance with its own desires and hurts the party

by depriving the Danbury faction of the right to make

an endorsement even when the Waterbury faction has

not made a competing endorsement, thus adversely

affecting the entire party’s chance to maintain the ballot

line for future elections. In response, the defendants

contend, inter alia, that this claim is unreviewable

because the plaintiffs did not raise it before the trial

court. The defendants also argue that the trial court’s

‘‘disposition of the parties’ dispute [with an order to

the Secretary] was a necessary and appropriate judicial

action’’ to which the plaintiffs had agreed at trial,

because they named her as a defendant and explained

to the trial court the necessity of an order directed to

the Secretary given her office’s long established policy

of not accepting a minor party’s nomination for an office

when there is a conflicting nomination under the same

party designation. We agree with the defendants and

conclude that the plaintiffs waived their constitutional

claim by inducing any claimed error.
The plaintiffs’ failure to raise their constitutional

claim before the trial court ordinarily would not be fatal

to appellate review, insofar as we could consider it

under the bypass doctrine of State v. Golding, 213 Conn.

233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).23 See, e.g., Gleason v.

Smolinski, 319 Conn. 394, 402 n.10, 125 A.3d 920 (2015)

(Golding doctrine applies in civil cases); see also State

v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 750–51, 91 A.3d 862 (2014)

(Golding review is available when record is adequate

and claim fully briefed, even without specific invocation

of doctrine or acknowledgment of unpreserved nature

of claim).

It is well settled, however, that Golding review is not

available when the claimed constitutional error has

been induced by the party claiming it. See, e.g., State v.

Coward, 292 Conn. 296, 305, 972 A.2d 691 (2009); State

v. Cruz, 269 Conn. 97, 106–107, 848 A.2d 445 (2004). ‘‘[A]

party cannot take a path at trial and change tactics on

appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Martone, 160 Conn. App. 315, 327, 125 A.3d 590, cert.

denied, 320 Conn. 904, 127 A.3d 187 (2015). ‘‘[T]he term

induced error, or invited error, has been defined as [a]n

error that a party cannot complain of on appeal because

the party, through conduct, encouraged or prompted

the trial court to make the [allegedly] erroneous ruling.

. . . It is well established that a party who induces an

error cannot be heard to later complain about that error.

. . . This principle bars appellate review of induced

nonconstitutional error and induced constitutional

error. . . . The invited error doctrine rests [on principles] of fairness, both to the trial court and to the opposing party. . . . [W]hether we call it induced error,

encouraged error, waiver, or abandonment, the result—

that the . . . claim is unreviewable—is the same.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 328.

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that

the plaintiffs induced the claimed constitutional error

in this case by naming the Secretary as a defendant

and seeking an order directed to her. In their posttrial

memorandum of law, the plaintiffs explained that the

Secretary ‘‘remains as the first named [d]efendant for

two reasons. First, the [Secretary] practices a longstanding policy of not accepting a candidate’s nomination to office by a minor party when the [Secretary’s]

office receives a conflicting nomination with the same

minor party designation for a given office. Therefore,

the [trial court’s] granting [of the plaintiffs’] third prayer

for relief will compel the [Secretary] to recognize nominations from the plaintiffs as the valid nominations from

the Independent Party, invalidating conflicting ones by

[the defendants] or otherwise. Second, without the third

prayer for relief, the [Secretary]—by enforcing its longstanding policy—stands positioned to cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm. This harm has been caused in at
least the last three . . . state election cycles.’’ (Footnote omitted.) The relief granted to the defendants,

namely, a declaration that they, rather than the plaintiffs, are the ‘‘rightful’’ officers of the Independent Party,

with the 2010 bylaws controlling, and an order that the

Secretary ‘‘recognize the above and to treat nominations

and endorsements made pursuant to [the] 2010 bylaws

as nominations and endorsements of the Independent

Party of Connecticut,’’ is simply a mirror image of that

requested by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, because we

consider the alleged constitutional errors to have be

induced by the plaintiffs’ own litigation tactics, we

decline to review those claims.

D

Amendment of Pleadings

The plaintiffs’ final claim is that the trial court abused

its discretion by granting the defendants’ request to

amend their answer to add special defenses and counterclaims after the close of evidence. In response, the

defendants contend that the plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the amendment, insofar as they have not identified anything that they would have done differently

had the amendment either not been permitted or made

earlier, and observe that the plaintiffs did not seek a

continuance to address any new factual issues. The

defendants rely on Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Brookfield

Development Corp., 266 Conn. 572, 833 A.2d 908 (2003),

and emphasize that the amended pleading did not

change any of the factual issues in the case, and that any

changes were purely questions of law that the plaintiffs

could address in posttrial briefing. We agree with the

defendants and conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by allowing them to amend their

answer.

The record reveals the following additional relevant

facts and procedural history. On October 10, 2017, on

the eve of trial, the defendants sought permission to

file an amended answer, including four special defenses

and a counterclaim. The original answer did not include

any special defenses or counterclaims. The proposed

amended answer asserted the following special

defenses: (1) the plaintiffs ‘‘lack standing to file and

prosecute this action’’; (2) the plaintiffs ‘‘have ratified

the actions of the defendants in filing bylaws for the

Independent Party of Connecticut in 2010 or have

waived any right they might have had to challenge it’’;

(3) the ‘‘purported bylaws [of 1987 and 2006] violate

rights of free of association [under] the first amendment

[and] the Connecticut Constitution’’; and (4) the 2006

bylaws were adopted without authority and therefore

invalid. The defendants also filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment ‘‘that they are [the] rightful

officers of the Independent Party of Connecticut [and]

that the individual plaintiffs . . . are not . . . .’’ The

plaintiffs objected to the request, and the trial court
considered argument on the proposed amendment on

October 11, 2017, which was the first day of trial.24 The

trial court held the defendants’ motion in abeyance

and, after the close of evidence, indicated that it would

overrule the plaintiffs’ objection and permit the amendment.

‘‘While our courts have been liberal in permitting

amendments . . . this liberality has limitations.

Amendments should be made seasonably. Factors to

be considered in passing on a motion to amend are the

length of the delay, fairness to the opposing parties

and the negligence, if any, of the party offering the

amendment. . . . The motion to amend is addressed

to the trial court’s discretion which may be exercised

to restrain the amendment of pleadings so far as necessary to prevent unreasonable delay of the trial. . . .

Whether to allow an amendment is a matter left to the

sound discretion of the trial court. This court will not

disturb a trial court’s ruling on a proposed amendment

unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.

. . . It is the [appellant’s] burden to demonstrate that

the trial court clearly abused its discretion. . . . If an

amendment is allowed at trial and the opponent wants

to raise an abuse of discretion issue on appeal, he

should immediately move for a continuance in the trial

in order to defend against the new issue. . . . Under

certain circumstances, the trial court may allow an

amendment to plead an additional special defense even

after judgment has entered.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dow & Condon, Inc. v.

Brookfield Development Corp., supra, 266 Conn. 583–84.

In considering whether a trial court has abused its

discretion ‘‘in granting or denying a request to amend

a [pleading] during or after trial,’’ we recognize that

‘‘the trial court has its unique vantage point in part

because it is interpreting the . . . allegations not in a

vacuum, but in the context of the development of the

proceedings and the parties’ understanding of the meaning of those allegations. Similarly, prior to trial, in light

of discovery, pretrial motions or conferences, a trial

court may have a different context for the allegations

than what is evident to an appellate court.’’ Dimmock

v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., 286 Conn. 789,

799 n.4, 945 A.2d 955 (2008).

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in allowing the late amendment to the defendants’ answer because it did not prejudice the plaintiffs.

In their reply brief, the plaintiffs posit only that they

were injured by the late amendment because the trial

court ‘‘ultimately found in favor of the defendants on

one special defense [of waiver] and on their counterclaim. The injury is that the trial court could not have

found waiver or found in favor of the defendants on

their counterclaim if the court had not permitted the

amendment.’’ Beyond the obviously adverse result of
losing, however, the plaintiffs do not indicate that the

trial court’s decision to permit the amendment

adversely affected the process. Specifically, they do not

argue that they would have litigated the case differently

had the trial court not permitted the amendment, or that

they were deprived of any additional time necessary

to respond to the amendment. Indeed, the trial court

specifically afforded the plaintiffs fourteen days to file

any necessary responsive pleading, in addition to posttrial briefing. See Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Brookfield

Development Corp., supra, 266 Conn. 584 (The court

noted that no prejudice resulted from allowing the inclusion of a special defense claiming a violation of state

regulations because the plaintiff did not seek a continuance, and ‘‘the new affirmative defense did not inject

any new factual issues into the case, but instead raised

a purely legal issue. The plaintiff had the opportunity

to address that issue fully in its posttrial brief to the

court, which was filed nearly one month after trial.

Finally . . . the trial court would have been obligated

to consider the effect of the regulation on the enforceability of the cobrokerage agreement even if it had not

been raised as a special defense.’’); Burton v. Stamford,

115 Conn. App. 47, 61–62, 971 A.2d 739 (declining to

find that trial court abused its discretion by permitting

late amendment of complaint when key factual issues

remained same despite new theory of liability that

would have required changes to jury instructions), cert.

denied, 293 Conn. 912, 978 A.2d 1108 (2009).

Nor do the plaintiffs indicate that the late ‘‘amendment . . . confuse[d] the issues in the case . . . .’’

Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 312 Conn. 714, 759, 95 A.3d 1031 (2014);

cf. LaFrance v. Lodmell, 322 Conn. 828, 847–48, 144

A.3d 373 (2016) (it was not abuse of discretion to deny

defendant permission to amend cross complaint and

related defenses at ‘‘late stage’’ when amendment

‘‘would have raised many complex issues, which would

have required motions and discovery’’ that ‘‘would have

significantly delayed the trial and prejudiced the plaintiff’’). This suggests, then, that the late amendment to

the answer did not prejudice the plaintiffs. Accordingly,

we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the late amendment to the defendants’ answer.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 Duff is the chairman of the Independent Party of CT—State Central,

LaFrance is its treasurer, and Palanzo is its secretary and deputy treasurer.

Although the previous chairman, John L. Dietter, was originally a plaintiff

in the present action, he died in November, 2016. LaFrance and Palanzo

later appointed Duff to the position of chairman, and, shortly thereafter,

the trial court granted a motion substituting Duff as a plaintiff. We note

that, notwithstanding this substitution, the plaintiffs’ appeal form in the

present case continues to identify Dietter as chairman. The record reflects

that this is nothing more than a scrivener’s error. Cf. State v. Zillo, 124

Conn. App. 690, 691 n.1, 5 A.3d 996 (2010).

2 The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. See also footnote 1 of this

opinion. We then ordered, sua sponte, that this appeal ‘‘be considered on

an expedited basis,’’ and set a briefing and argument schedule accordingly.

3 For the sake of simplicity, we hereinafter refer to Merrill as the Secretary

and to Telesca and Frank, collectively, as the defendants.

4 General Statutes § 51-183b provides: ‘‘Any judge of the Superior Court

and any judge trial referee who has the power to render judgment, who has

commenced the trial of any civil cause, shall have power to continue such

trial and shall render judgment not later than one hundred and twenty days

from the completion date of the trial of such civil cause. The parties may

waive the provisions of this section.’’

5 General Statutes § 9-374 provides in relevant part: ‘‘In the case of a minor

party, no authority of the state or any subdivision thereof having jurisdiction

over the conduct of any election shall permit the name of a candidate of

such party for any office to be printed on the official ballot unless at least

one copy of the party rules regulating the manner of nominating a candidate

for such office has been filed in the office of the Secretary of the State at

least sixty days before the nomination of such candidate. In the case of a

minor party, the selection of town committee members and delegates to

conventions shall not be valid unless at least one copy of the party rules

regulating the manner of making such selection has been filed in the office

of the Secretary of the State at least sixty days before such selection is

made. A copy of local party rules shall forthwith be also filed with the town

clerk of the municipality to which they relate. Party rules shall not be

effective until sixty days after the filing of the same with the Secretary of

the State. . . . The term ‘party rules’ as used in this section includes any

amendment to such party rules. When any amendment is to be filed as

required by this section, complete party rules incorporating such amendment

shall be filed, together with a separate copy of such amendment.’’

6

In addition to the principal issues, the plaintiffs also claim that the trial

court improperly (1) determined that it was not bound by an earlier decision

of the Superior Court in Independent Party of Connecticut v. Dietter, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-12-5016387-S (September 28, 2012), (2) found that they had waived their right to challenge

the 2010 bylaws, (3) issued an order that violated the parties’ constitutional

rights, and (4) allowed the defendants to amend their answer to assert a

counterclaim and special defenses. We conclude that these additional claims

lack merit. See part III of this opinion.

7 As the trial court noted, a form ED-601 ‘‘is required to be filed with the

[Secretary] to reserve a party designation in any race where a candidate

must petition to get on the ballot. See General Statutes §§ 9-353b and 9-

453u. A reservation of party designation may only be filed for a race in

which another similarly named party has not already filed such a form.’’

8 General Statutes § 9-372 (6) provides: ‘‘ ‘Minor party’ means a political

party or organization which is not a major party and whose candidate for

the office in question received at the last-preceding regular election for such

office, under the designation of that political party or organization, at least

one per cent of the whole number of votes cast for all candidates for such

office at such election . . . .’’

9 See Price v. Independent Party of CT—State Central, 323 Conn. 529,

543, 147 A.3d 1032 (2016) (single justice proceeding before Palmer, J.,

dismissing Waterbury faction’s motion for permeant injunction, in connection with Independent Party nomination for United States Senate, for lack

of jurisdiction because ‘‘officials administering minor party caucuses are not

‘election official[s]’ for purposes of [General Statutes] § 9-323’’);Independent

Party of CT—State Central v. Telesca, Superior Court, judicial district of

Danbury, Docket No. CV-14-6015650-S (August 4, 2014) (stipulation between

parties regarding conflicting candidate endorsements for 2014 election);

Independent Party of Connecticut v. Dietter, Superior Court, judicial district

of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-12-5016387-S (September 28, 2012) (withdrawn

by Waterbury faction after denial of motion for temporary order of

mandamus).

10 We note that none of the parties challenges the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction over this case under the political question doctrine, and, having

considered the issue sua sponte; see, e.g., Soracco v. Williams Scotsman,

Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 91, 971 A.2d 1 (2009); we agree with the trial court’s

conclusion that, although this case is an intraparty dispute, its resolution

‘‘required [the court] to interpret § 9-374 and related provisions to determine

which bylaws govern the Independent Party’s nomination procedures for

candidates for public office, which is the central dispute between the parties.

. . . [S]uch issues of statutory interpretation are regularly entertained by

the [court] and are well within its jurisdiction.’’ See Nielsen v. Kezer, 232
Conn. 65, 76, 652 A.2d 1013 (1995) (The court concluded that the political

question doctrine did not preclude judicial resolution of an intraparty dispute

because ‘‘the plaintiffs’ claims present no special obstacles to judicial ascertainment and application of appropriate standards for resolving them, and

adjudication of the claims does not require judicial policy-making properly

left to another branch of government. On the contrary, the controversy raises

issues of constitutional and statutory interpretation of the kind regularly

entertained by courts.’’); see also id., 77 n.19 (‘‘We recognize, of course, that

the issues raised by the plaintiffs’ action relate to activities that are at the

heart of our political process. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the suit seeks

protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question.

. . . The doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions, not one

of political cases.’’ [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).

11 The court also observed that ‘‘there is no evidence that any other local

party adhered to the 2006 bylaws or that the [Danbury faction] actually

sought to impose the will of its three member state central committee

beyond [Danbury]. Although the [Danbury faction] may have won the race

to the [Secretary’s] office and referred to themselves by a name which

included the designation ‘State Central,’ that is not enough to anoint them

as the governing body of the Independent Party post-2008.’’ The court

observed that the ‘‘designation ‘State Central’ has no real significance in

the organization or operation of a minor party. It is simply a name chosen

by the [Danbury faction] and carries with it no special status. For reasons

previously stated in the findings of fact, there is no indication that [the

Danbury faction] has statewide reach although they continue to claim that

they are the true governing entity of the statewide Independent Party.’’

12 The trial court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 2010 bylaws

afford the Independent Party statewide status only for particular offices,

emphasizing that ‘‘nothing in § 9-374 or any other statute concerning minor

parties states that bylaws must be repeatedly filed every time a minor party

candidate achieves 1 percent of the vote for any office, unless those bylaws

are amended.’’

13 We note that significant motions practice continued before the trial court

subsequent to the commencement of appellate proceedings, as numerous

candidates for the state House of Representatives sought to intervene in

the present case and otherwise protect their rights with respect to the

judgment of the trial court as it affected the Independent Party’s endorsements for the 2018 election, ultimately leading them to file a writ of error

under Docket Number SC 20160. A detailed discussion of those additional

facts and procedural history is set forth in a separate opinion of this court

pertaining to that writ of error, which is also released today. See Independent

Party of CT—State Central v. Merrill, 330 Conn. 729, A.3d (2019).

14 We recognize that the legislature ‘‘clear[ly]’’ intended § 51-183b ‘‘to place

the onus on judges to decide cases in a timely fashion. . . . [A]s a practical

matter, there is nothing that counsel can do to require the trial judge to

comply with [§ 51-183b]. . . . Thus, the statute . . . attempts to balance

judicial expediency with fairness to the parties and to reduce delays over

which counsel have little, if any, control. . . . The salutary effect of [§ 51-

183b] is to compel diligence and a prompt decision on the part of the judge

who tried the case, and to avoid manifest disadvantages attendant on long

delay in rendering judgment.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Foote v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 125

Conn. App. 304–305; see also Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179

Conn. 415, 420, 426 A.2d 1324 (1980); Gordon v. Feldman, 164 Conn. 554,

556–57, 325 A.2d 247 (1973).

We also acknowledge that compliance with the 120 day mandate of § 51-

183b while rendering a comprehensive decision is sometimes difficult, especially in relatively complex cases, given the scheduling demands placed on

our trial judges, who are often left to their own devices without the aid of

legal research assistance. Given the lack of a clearly articulated claim in

the present appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering

supplemental briefing and argument on the jurisdictional question subsequent to the plaintiffs’ refusal to extend the deadline, we leave to another

day the question of whether a trial court could ever abuse its discretion by

requesting supplemental briefs or argument on any relevant question shortly

before the expiration of the 120 day period.

15 General Statutes § 9-453u provides: ‘‘(a) An application to reserve a party

designation with the Secretary of the State and to form a party designation

committee may be made at any time after November 3, 1981, by filing in

the office of the secretary a written statement signed by at least twentyfive electors who desire to be members of such committee.

‘‘(b) The statement shall include the offices for which candidates may
petition for nomination under the party designation to be reserved but shall

not include an office if no elector who has signed the application is entitled

to vote at an election for such office.

‘‘(c) The statement shall include the party designation to be reserved

which (1) shall consist of not more than three words and not more than

twenty-five letters; (2) shall not incorporate the name of any major party;

(3) shall not incorporate the name of any minor party which is entitled to

nominate candidates for any office which will appear on the same ballot

with any office included in the statement; (4) shall not be the same as any

party designation for which a reservation with the secretary is currently in

effect for any office included in the statement; and (5) shall not be the word

‘none’, or incorporate the words ‘unaffiliated’ or ‘unenrolled’ or any similarly

antonymous form of the words ‘affiliated’ or ‘enrolled’.

‘‘(d) The statement shall include the names of two persons who are

authorized by the party designation committee to execute and file with

the secretary statements of endorsement required by section 9-453o and

certificates of nomination as required by section 9-460.

‘‘(e) The secretary shall examine the statement, and if it complies with

the requirements of this section, the secretary shall reserve the party designation for the offices included in the statement and record such reservation

in the office of the secretary. The reservation shall continue in effect from

the date it is recorded until the day following any regular election at which

no candidate appears on the appropriate ballot for that office under that

party designation.’’

16 The plaintiffs argue that this reading of the statutory scheme is unworkable because it means that a minor party must refile its rules with the

Secretary each time that party’s candidate receives 1 percent of the vote

for a particular office, thereby affording it party status for that office for

the next election. The defendants appear to disagree, insofar as they argue

that the 1 percent of the vote received by Nader in 2008 rendered the

Independent Party a statewide party, meaning that the 2010 bylaws filed

with the Secretary are effective for other statewide offices, such as governor

and United States senator. Although the trial court determined that such

refiling was not necessary, we agree with the plaintiffs that their reading

requiring refiling better accords with the plain language of the statute, insofar

as it links minor party status to specific ‘‘office[s].’’ General Statutes § 9-

374. We disagree, however, with the plaintiffs’ conclusory claim in their

reply brief that this reading would create ‘‘bedlam’’ in the Secretary’s office.

We have every confidence that the Secretary will be able to implement this

reading on an administrative level, such as by the promulgation of new

forms indicating the continued acceptance and utilization of previously filed

party rules, each time a political party receives minor party status for a

particular office.

17 Judge Taylor further stated that, in ‘‘reviewing the language of . . . § 9-

374 regarding the nomination of candidates by minor parties, the court sees

no inconsistency between the plain meaning of the statute and the 2006

[bylaws], currently followed by the [Danbury faction]. Further, the [Waterbury faction] neither followed the amendment procedure of the 2006

[bylaws] nor an applicable statute in the adoption of the 2010 [bylaws].

Therefore, the [Waterbury faction] has not shown that it has a clear legal

right to the placement by the [Secretary] of its nominees on the ballot line

reserved for the Independent Party of Connecticut, in the face of different

nominees from the [Danbury faction].’’ Independent Party of Connecticut

v. Dietter, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-12-5016387-S.

18 This emphasis on finality is consistent with the public policies underlying

the preclusion doctrines, which are ‘‘the interests of the defendant and of

the courts in bringing litigation to a close . . . and the competing interest

of the plaintiff in the vindication of a just claim. . . . These [underlying]

purposes are generally identified as being (1) to promote judicial economy

by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments

which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide

repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.

. . . The judicial doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are based

on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter

which it already has had an opportunity to litigate. . . . Stability in judgments grants to parties and others the certainty in the management of their

affairs which results when a controversy is finally laid to rest.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn.

45, 59, 808 A.2d 1107 (2002).

19 Given the lengthy history of the litigation between the parties, the plaintiffs also rely by analogy upon the law of the case doctrine, and contend

that these proceedings should be treated, in essence, as a unitary litigation

such that Judge Taylor’s decision was the law of the case with respect to

the force and validity of the 2010 and 2006 bylaws. ‘‘The law of the case
doctrine expresses the practice of judges generally to refuse to reopen what

[already] has been decided . . . . New pleadings intended to raise again a

question of law which has been already presented on the record and determined adversely to the pleader are not to be favored. . . . [When] a matter

has previously been ruled [on] interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent

proceeding in the case may treat that decision as the law of the case, if it

is of the opinion that the issue was correctly decided, in the absence of some

new or overriding circumstance. . . . A judge should hesitate to change

his own rulings in a case and should be even more reluctant to overrule

those of another judge. . . . Nevertheless, if . . . [a judge] becomes convinced that the view of the law previously applied by his coordinate predecessor was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice if followed,

he may apply his own judgment.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc. v. Connecticut

Oil Recycling Services, LLC, 308 Conn. 312, 322, 63 A.3d 896 (2013). Here

again, the preliminary nature of the proceedings before Judge Taylor in 2012

defeats the plaintiffs’ reliance on the law of the case doctrine. We agree

with the United States Supreme Court that preliminary injunctions, which

are akin to the temporary order of mandamus at issue here, are often issued

with ‘‘haste’’ and are ‘‘customarily granted on the basis of procedures that

are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the

merits. A party thus is not required to prove his case in full at a [preliminary

injunction] hearing . . . and the findings of fact and conclusions of law

made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial

on the merits . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) University of Texas v. Camenisch,

supra, 451 U.S. 395. Accordingly, we decline to treat the preliminary decision

by Judge Taylor—which was expressly preliminary and expedited—as the

law of this case.

20 Telesca testified that cooperation between him and Fand actually began

in 2006, when they jointly signed a form ED-601 seeking a party designation

for every single statewide race but did not receive enough votes to afford

them minor party status for those offices in subsequent years.

21 Telesca testified that his goal was ‘‘to unify the party, not just Danbury,

but Waterbury, Watertown, Winsted, Milford, all the other regional parties

that were around. And [he] tried to get everybody to come together to

create a statewide party.’’ Similarly, Mertens testified that they modeled

their collaborative approach after that taken by the Green Party to combine

local organizations into a statewide party under a single set of bylaws.

22 Telesca testified that, with respect to the 2008 election, he believed that

‘‘[d]ifferent rules’’ governed ‘‘different areas of the state,’’ and emphasized

his belief that the 2006 bylaws ‘‘didn’t apply to us’’ because they ‘‘were not

my bylaws,’’ and that he did not look to them as a ‘‘guide’’ for drafting the

2010 bylaws. Telesca also testified that he had voiced his objection to the

2006 bylaws, particularly the portion allowing nonmembers to vote in party

proceedings, to Fand, Dietter, and LaFrance, and that he told ‘‘Fand in 2008

that we would never live under those bylaws. And if we got a party together,

we had to create a new set of bylaws, and he agreed.’’ On redirect examination, Telesca emphasized his belief that ‘‘there [weren’t] any rules in 2010

until we created them’’ and that they were not in any way bound by the

2006 bylaws, even though they had previously been filed with the Secretary.

23 We review unpreserved constitutional claims pursuant to Golding, under

which ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is

adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional

magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged

constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a

fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed

to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond

a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the

defendant’s claim will fail.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Holley, 327 Conn. 576, 590 n.8, 175 A.3d 514 (2018); see

also In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015) (modifying

Golding’s third prong).

24 Counsel for the defendants explained to the trial court that he filed the

amended answer and counterclaim late because he was not ‘‘involved in

the case at the time when the complaint was filed,’’ and became involved

in the case shortly before trial because the defendants’ previous attorney

had been suspended from the practice of law. He argued that the proposed

amended answer and counterclaim would not affect the development of the

record at trial and emphasized that he did not intend for the ‘‘allegations

of the complaint and the allegations of the answer to be materially different’’

or change the issues in the case, and that the new pleading was intended

‘‘to clean things up . . . .’’