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95–423PDF 2015

THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL CAMP DAVID

SUMMIT: ANY RESULTS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 9, 2015

Serial No. 114–68

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, Kahn Fellow, Director, Military and Security Studies 

Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ............................... 6

Mr. J. Matthew McInnis, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute ....... 13

David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies .......................................................................................................... 23

Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D., Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional 

Research Service .................................................................................................. 62

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Michael Eisenstadt: Prepared statement ....................................................... 9

Mr. J. Matthew McInnis: Prepared statement ...................................................... 15

David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................... 25

Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 64

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 92

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 93

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 94

(1)

THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL CAMP 

DAVID SUMMIT: ANY RESULTS? 

THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:19 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. This subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and ranking member, my good friend, Ted 

Deutch, for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then 

recognize any other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We 

will then hear from our witnesses. Thank you for your patience. We 

had unscheduled votes come up, and we were there for 45 minutes, 

so we thank you for that. 

Without objection, your prepared statements will be made a part 

of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert statements 

and questions for the record subject to the length and limitations 

in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

As we continue to analyze the impact of a weak nuclear deal 

with Iran, it is important to examine how the Gulf Cooperation 

Council, the GCC, will be directly impacted by these policy decisions. There is no question that our relationships with the Gulf 

countries have been severely strained in recent years. It should be 

no surprise that our Gulf allies believe that the United States has 

turned its back on them, and that we are not committed to seeking 

stability in the Middle East. 

First, by signaling a preference to focus attention outside of the 

Middle East with the so-called ‘‘Asia pivot’’; second, by initiating 

naive rapprochement with Iran; and third, by not following through 

on the President’s red lines in Syria. So that was the backdrop of 

the Camp David Summit that occurred with the GCC just 2 

months ago. GCC countries see the desire to legitimize Iran as a 

power and counterweight in the region as the motivation for current U.S. policy, a policy that destabilizes the region as we see Iranian influence expand in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, in Yemen, and 

elsewhere. They see the failure to take a strong stance against 

Iran’s ally, Assad, or to enforce the red line against the use of 

chemical weapons as evidence of the desire not to upset Iran. 

2

And let’s not be fooled, any signing bonus or currency injection 

going to Iran from sanctions relief will be spent on Iran fomenting 

hegemonic ambitions in the region, which is another cause for concern for the GCC countries. At a time when we need as many partners as possible in the fight against ISIL and in the fight against 

Iran’s support for terror, now is not the time for the administration 

to be alienating some of the GCC members, especially Saudi Arabia 

and the UAE, who have been part of the coalition against ISIL and 

have helped launch strikes against the terror group in Syria. 

The GCC countries have also led the coalition against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, while we continue to ignore Iran’s 

meddling in regional issues. So how does the administration respond to these countries that we need as partners, that we need 

to trust in the fight against ISIL and other terror groups? By trying continuously to pursue a nuclear deal with Iran that they will 

never accept, only to try to buy the GCC countries off with sales 

of advanced military systems. 

For years, many of us have said that a nuclear Iran would lead 

to a nuclear arms race in the region, and that can still happen. But 

now a nuclear deal with Iran is also leading to a conventional arms 

race in the region. So while on one hand the U.S. was partially responsible for giving legitimacy to Iran and letting it become a larger menace in the region, on the other hand the U.S. is trying to 

sell these military systems to act as a deterrent against Iran. Instead of just trying to prevent the problem in the first place, the 

administration has chosen to treat the symptoms without addressing the underlying disease. 

I also recognize that not all of the GCC countries have been ideal 

partners, and some haven’t taken the necessary steps to stop terror 

financing and the undermining of U.S. national security interests. 

I am concerned that while some GCC countries will use our additional weapons for good and as partners in the fight against ISIL, 

others are only using this as an excuse to get arms for their own 

purposes. 

In addition, human rights and the rule of law concerns continue 

in some GCC countries, but they have figured out our playbook. As 

long as they provide the U.S. with bases and are willing to host our 

troops, they know that the U.S. will look the other way when it 

comes to their many transgressions. 

The other concern I have is with the objective of the most recent 

Camp David Summit and how it relates to Israel’s qualitative military edge. We must be mindful that upholding Israel’s qualitative 

military edge is the law of the land. Yet, many in the public did 

not notice that when the President signed the U.S.-Israel Strategic 

Partnership Act in December 2014, which was sponsored by Congressman Deutch and me, the President issued a signing statement 

saying that his administration would not implement the section 

that pertains to Israel’s qualitative military edge. That is very concerning. What kind of message are we sending to our greatest 

major strategic partner in the Middle East, the democratic Jewish 

state of Israel. We need to take these military sales requests on a 

case-by-case basis. 

Some GCC countries have been at the forefront of leading the 

fight against ISIL, which is a positive step forward. With ongoing 

3

military operations in Yemen, Libya and throughout the region, 

some GCC countries have shown that they have the political will 

and they have the dedication to take this fight head on, and these 

countries should be supported. 

We should be renewing our commitment to the Middle East and 

our GCC allies and combating Iranian aggression, not pulling back 

from this critical region of the world. And with that, I turn to my 

friend, the ranking member, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Thank 

you for calling today’s hearing. 

The announcement that President Obama would be convening 

GCC leaders at Camp David came on the heels of the April nuclear 

framework agreement with Iran. There was, in no uncertain terms, 

meant to reassure our allies that any impending deal would not result in greater Iranian interference or destabilization in the Middle 

East. I know that when this hearing was first noticed, we expected 

to be examining U.S.-Gulf relations in the wake of a final Iran nuclear deal. We are still waiting to hear whether P5+1 negotiators 

will reach a deal, and whether or not that deal would be acceptable, not just to Members of this Congress, but to our allies in the 

region. 

However, Camp David Summit didn’t just focus on Iran, and today’s hearing provides us with an opportunity to assess the ways 

in which we can bolster cooperation with the GCC countries to enhance our mutual security concerns and strategic objectives on a 

range of issues. There has been—there is no doubt that there have 

been growing pains in our relations with the GCC in recent years, 

and there has been frustrations on both sides. The United States 

was deeply troubled by the early financing of extremist elements 

on the fight against Assad by some Gulf actors. The GCC countries, 

in turn, have been frustrated with what they perceive as a lack of 

action by the U.S. against Assad. 

The GCC has been wary of American engagement with Iran. The 

U.S. has struggled to strengthen and reassure our partners, while 

also balancing what are legitimate human rights concerns. But as 

with any relationship, we have got to be able to air these grievances while also looking for ways to move forward together to confront our shared challenges. 

The question is, did Camp David do enough to put us back on 

the right path. Current U.S.-GCC relations have been dominated 

by the Iranian nuclear threat in the fight against ISIS. Gulf states 

are allied in the coalition to fight ISIS, but it appears some countries have not fully lived up to their commitments to coalition. 

Nonetheless, continued GCC support in terms of intelligence sharing, stopping ISIS financing, and preventing foreign fighters from 

joining ISIS are critical to our efforts. 

We continue to cooperate against Iran’s terror proxy, Hezbollah, 

and our efforts to keep it from propping up the Assad regime and 

expanding its regional influence. These concerns are also shared by 

our ally, Israel. The unique alignment of security concerns for the 

Gulf and Israel have presented U.S. with an opportunity to foster 

greater regional cooperation. It was revealed in June that an unprecedented five bilateral meetings had been held between Israelis 

and Saudis to address the Iran threat. 

4

So how do we move forward together to serve our mutual interests? Camp David Summit resulted in agreement to bolster defense 

sales. Some argue that increased sales to the GCC countries are 

beneficial because they not only increase our interoperability, but 

because these are foreign military sales, meaning that they are not 

paid for with U.S.-provided security assistance. So they are a boon 

to the American economy. 

There are those who argue that if American made equipment is 

not for sale, our friends will turn elsewhere. In this increasingly 

volatile region, we do need to ensure our allies can both be active 

participants in combating shared threats, and also maintain their 

own defenses. Of course, any serious increase in these sales must 

carefully be vetted to ensure that Israel retains its qualitative military edge. 

However, while defense sales have been a pillar of our relationship with the GCC countries, it cannot be the only leg on which 

these relationships stand. I was pleased to see the GCC summit include commitments to also increase maritime security, cyber security, and counterterrorism cooperation. These, too, are critical 

pieces of the security puzzle. 

The Iranian navy is well-funded and active. The U.S., in conjunction with our partners, must be able to patrol the Gulf, particularly 

in Strait of Hormuz. Just a few months ago, we saw Iran illegally 

detain and board a commercial vessel passing through the Strait. 

And as Mr. Katzman notes, one-third of the internationally traded 

oil flows through that Strait. In addition, we share with the GCC 

a serious and real concern about Iran’s regional meddling. Bahrain 

and Saudi Arabia, in particular, have accused Iran of stirring dissent among their populations. 

In Yemen, Iran has long backed the Houthi rebels. And as the 

Houthis move to depose the U.S.-backed Hadi Government, Saudi 

Arabia intervened. Many saw this move by Saudi Arabia as a reaction to years of U.S. prodding to take a greater leadership role in 

regional security. 

Outside of the security realm, there are additional steps that can 

be taken to strengthen the GCC. If the price of oil remains low, the 

GCC countries could lose over $200 billion, according to recent reports. Strengthening U.S. Gulf economic ties outside of the oil 

trade could help offset the deepened oil prices. As many GCC countries look to diversify their economies, there are numerous opportunities for cooperation on science and technology. In fact, many U.S. 

universities have built campuses in recent years in cities like Abu 

Dhabi and Doha. 

Finally, we have to have constructive dialogue with our partners. 

While some saw the absence of several heads of state from the 

Camp David Summit as a blow to the administration, the opportunity for the President of the United States to speak directly with 

GCC top leadership was tremendously important. As I said before, 

as important as it is to present a united front with our allies, we 

won’t agree on everything. So for the Gulf states, they must be able 

to share concerns about the implications of a potential Iran deal on 

regional proliferation, or the impact sanctions relief could have on 

Iran’s ability to export terror. 

5

Equally, we must have avenues to address our concerns about 

human rights violations. I believe in the importance of our relationships with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. 

I want to see these relationships stabilize and strengthen both on 

a bilateral and a multilateral basis, and I believe Camp David was 

a good first step. But to sustain this progress, we have to make a 

real commitment on both sides to continue cooperation and consultation. I look forward to discussing with our panel the ways in 

which we can help to encourage that process. And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, for your 

statement. Mr. Weber of Texas is recognized. 

Mr. WEBER. Madam Chair, I am ready to listen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That is very charming of you. Thank you. 

Mr. Boyle, we are ready to listen to you. 

Mr. BOYLE. Well, now that really makes me look bad for wanting 

to say something. 

Mr. WEBER. I am reclaiming my time—no. 

Mr. BOYLE. I will just briefly say, I want to associate myself with 

the very thoughtful comments of Mr. Deutch, and I am very interested in this topic, especially the fact that this was when they were 

at Camp David, and for a fairly significant amount of time, this 

was much in the news and now has largely been forgotten. Certainly, whatever comes about in this part of the world and whatever resolution we may or may not reach with Iran will affect our 

partners and Saudi Arabia, and in the broader Arabian peninsula 

and what actions they may take in response. So making sure that 

we maintain a close relationship with them is of vital U.S. importance, and with that, I will yield 6 seconds back. So I almost didn’t 

speak, but——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, after your critical Oreo speech on the 

floor——

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you. Say no to Oreo. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That was riveting. We all were attuned to 

that. That is an inside joke. We will explain later. 

We are so pleased to introduce our witnesses. First, we would 

like to welcome Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, who is the Kahn fellow 

and director of the Washington Institute, Military and Security 

Studies Program. 

Mr. Eisenstadt is a specialist in Persian Gulf security affairs. 

And, previously, he served as an officer in the U.S. Army Reserves 

and as a military analyst with the U.S. Government. 

Thank you for your service, Mr. Eisenstadt. 

Second, we welcome back Mr. Matthew McInnis, who is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute where he focuses 

on regional security issues of the Persian Gulf. Prior to this, Mr. 

McInnis served as a senior analyst at the U.S. Central Command 

and on leadership and advisory positions for the multi-national 

force in Iraq. 

Thank you. 

Next, we welcome Dr. David Andrew Weinberg, who is a senior 

fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where his primary research is on Saudi Arabia and Gulf affairs. He was a professional staffer for this committee and survived that, and he was 

a visiting fellow at the UCLA Center for Middle East Development. 

6

Welcome back, Dr. Weinberg. 

And last, but certainly not least, we really welcome back Dr. 

Kenneth Katzman, who serves as a senior Middle East analyst for 

the Congressional Research Service. Formally, Mr. Katzman was 

an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency and also worked as 

a consultant for the defense industry for 2 years. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And we would love to hear 

from you. Feel free to summarize. 

Let me just ask 1 second, if Mr. Connolly would like to make an 

opening statement. We would be honored to hear from you, Mr. 

Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I think in order 

to get on with the hearing, I will dispense with an opening statement. Obviously, we are quite interested in the reaction of the 

GCC. We have heard lots of speculation this morning about what 

the reaction might be in the event of a successful negotiated agreement, but would be delighted to hear from this panel in terms of 

their points of view. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

So, Mr. Eisenstadt, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL EISENSTADT, KAHN FELLOW, 

DIRECTOR, MILITARY AND SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, 

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member 

Deutch, distinguished subcommittee members, thank you for inviting me to testify on the state of U.S.-GCC relations. It is an honor 

for me to be here. The high-level summit in Camp David last May 

with leaders of the six GCC states focused on assuring them that 

the U.S. remains committed to their security, while winning their 

support for the nuclear deal being negotiated with Iran. A joint 

statement released at the Summit included U.S. security assurances to the GCC and described the outlines of ‘‘a new U.S.-GCC 

strategic partnership,’’ that committed the United States and the 

GCC to enhance cooperation in a number of areas. 

While many of the announced measures would mark a step forward in U.S.-GCC relations, much will depend on follow-through in 

the months and years to come. Particularly with regard to countering Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. This is a central 

concern of Gulf leaders who are already deeply concerned about 

Iran’s growing regional influence, and who are worried that in the 

event of a long-term nuclear accord between the P5+1 and Iran, the 

latter would use funds obtained through sanctions relief and its 

status as a nuclear threshold state to further advance its regional 

agenda. 

Absent action on this front, many of the announced steps are unlikely to have significant impact on the broader fabric of U.S.-GCC 

relations. The roots of the growing distrust between the two sides 

can be traced to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the perception that 

much of the region that the United States had to either incompetence or design turned over Iraq to the Shiites and Iran. This 

was reinforced by the widespread perception in the GCC and 

among other regional allies that when it entered office, the Obama 

7

administration too eagerly courted traditional enemies, such as the 

Islamic Republic of Iran at the expense of its traditional allies, and 

too quickly abandoned traditional allies, such as Hosni Mubarak 

during the initial phases of what was then called the Arab Spring. 

So to be fair, there was really not all that much, I think, that 

the U.S. could have done differently with regard to Mubarak. This 

destructive dynamic was further strengthened by the Obama administration’s tendency to frame and implement measures to assure the GCC states in ways that tended to exacerbate rather than 

allay their fears. This is best illustrated by the following examples: 

First, in recent years, the United States has sold tens of billions 

of dollars in arms to its Gulf Arab allies. The intent has been to 

assure them by enhancing their ability to deter and counter external aggression. 

Yet Tehran is then likely to engage in the conduct of conventional aggression that would provide its neighbors and the United 

States with reason to respond by conventional means. It is much 

more likely to engage in subversion and proxy warfare as it has 

done in the past and continue to do today. And in light of the administration’s announced rebalance to Asia and the President’s 

statement in an interview with Thomas Friedman in April, that 

‘‘The U.S.’s core interests in the region are not oil,’’ GCC leaders 

may view large U.S. arms sales less as a tangible expression of enduring commitment than a sign that Americais providing its 

friends with the means to fend for themselves as it prepares to 

leave the region. 

Second, while the United States has drawn down its presence in 

Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years, it has increased other aspects of its presence around the Gulf as part of its efforts to assure 

allies and deter Iran. Yet, there is no sign that the large post-1991 

U.S. military presence in the Gulf deterred Iran from using proxies 

to target U.S. interests in the region and elsewhere. Furthermore, 

our GCC allies are frequently reminded by U.S. officials that America continues to maintain some 35,000 servicemembers in the region, but this has led them to question the purpose of such a large 

show of presence at a time when Iran and Hezbollah’s intervention 

has contributed to the death of more than 200,000 Syrians, mostly 

Sunni civilians, amid U.S. inaction. 

And even when Washington finally did act against ISIL, it did 

so at least initially on behalf of beleaguered Iraqi minorities, the 

Yazidis in Sinjar, Turkmens at Amerli, and Kurds in Erbil, rather 

than Sunni Arabs. 

Third, while President Obama declared in January 2012 that if 

Tehran tried to build a nuclear weapon, the U.S. would use all its 

means at its disposal to prevent it from doing so. Since then, he 

has tended to couch his threats in passive language that conveys 

more ambivalence than resolve. Thus, in a March 2012 interview 

with Jeffrey Goldberg he stated, when the U.S. says it is unacceptable for Iran to have nuclear weapons, we mean what we say. 

In sum, the U.S. has a credibility deficit with its GCC partners 

that threatens its interests and endangers its allies in the region. 

The steps it has taken in the past to assure its GCC allies, arms 

transfers, forward presence, and red lines, often fail to allay their 

doubts and frequently compounded their fears. In this light, the 

8

steps promised at a Camp David Summit do not constitute a game 

changer in U.S.-GCC relations, because the joint statement is so 

vague regarding specific steps to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities. Only by pushing back against Iran’s efforts to expand its regional influence can Washington hope to restore its credibility. 

There is no reason that such a policy cannot go hand and in with 

engaging Iran, just as the U.S. pushed back against Soviet aggression while engaging Moscow during the Cold War. For as much it 

may be in the American interest to conclude a long-term nuclear 

accord with Tehran, it is also U.S. interest to curb Iranian activities that fuel sectarian violence, contribute to the appeal of groups 

such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS and ultimately threaten the stability and security and of the U.S. allies in the region. Such a policy would also go a long way toward repairing ties with traditional 

allies in the part of the world that still very much matters to U.S. 

security. I apologize for going over. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It was fine. Thank you so much. 

Mr. McInnis. 

STATEMENT OF MR. J. MATTHEW MCINNIS, RESIDENT 

FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. MCINNIS. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify here today on the impact of the potential nuclear deal on our allies from the Gulf Cooperation Council. And let 

me begin with how Iran perceives this changing strategic environment and their contest with the Gulf states. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has sought to spread its concepts of Islamic governance 

and to assert its regional hegemony by displacing the United States 

as the dominant power. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, 

countering the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states has 

dominated Iran’s regional calculations. Saudi Arabia poses a 

unique ideological challenge to Tehran’s attempts to assert its leadership in the Muslim world. The GCC states are increasingly 

alarmed about expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East, but 

seem unable to develop an effective means to push back against 

Tehran’s growing influence and power. 

For the past 36 years, Tehran has pursued its objectives against 

the GCC primarily through clandestine operations. In particular, 

Iran has utilized its resistance network of partners, proxies, and 

terrorist groups, including Lebanese’s Hezbollah and others, while 

employing a suite of deterrence capabilities, including ballistic missiles and asymmetric naval platforms. With the new Saudi leadership under King Salman, Tehran is recalculating its threat perceptions and response. Iranian leaders worry that the GCC’s expanded 

interventions in Yemen and Syria come as a result of U.S. encouragement perhaps at the Camp David Summit for the Gulf states 

to take a more leading role in countering Iran’s destabilizing activities. A more active Saudi Arabia poses a risk to Iran’s long-term 

objectives. Tehran may even be worried that Saudi Arabia, underwritten by its own financial holdings and U.S. military support, 

will begin using the IRGC’s own playbook of regional proxy warfare 

against Iran. Considering these fears, it is important for us to look 

at how a nuclear deal will impact Iran’s strategy toward the GCC 

and the rest of the region. 

Supreme Leader Khamenei has not shown any indication that a 

nuclear deal will fundamentally alter Iran’s regional policies toward the United States, our allies in the Gulf, and even Israel. The 

IRGC may initially become even more assertive against the GCC, 

the United States or Israel, as the Iranian leadership tries to establish its anti-Western and an anti-Zionist credentials following a 

nuclear deal. Tehran, however, will likely try to limit any resulting 

conflict escalation that could credibly endanger the world power’s 

support for the agreement, especially with a new U.S. President entering office in 2017. 

The bulk of Iran’s estimated $150 billion windfall from a nuclear 

deal will likely go to internal economic investment as the U.S. administration argues. This does not mean that the Iranian leadership will not have access to billions more to allocate to the IRGC’s 

efforts in Iraq, Syria, and around the region. We should not underVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:21 Aug 18, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\070915\95423 SHIRL
14

estimate how far Iran will go to defend its interests in Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad, as well as to attempt to expand its activities 

in Yemen, Bahrain, the Palestinian territories, and elsewhere. 

More critically, if the IRGC decides to send actual combat forces 

into Syria to fight the GCC or Turkish-backed opposition groups, 

or into Iraq to fight ISIL, we risk potential serious miscalculations 

by Turkey, the GCC, or Israel. The United States must be prepared 

for and try to prevent, if possible, escalation by these regional powers in response to a direct Iranian intervention. With this in mind, 

here are four recommendations that the United States should consider to best support our allies in the region: First, prevent the conventional forces’ balance of power in the Gulf from eroding in Iran’s 

favor, which a removal of the conventional arms embargo would do, 

which is being discussed potentially in Vienna. Congress should 

carefully scrutinize the Iranian nuclear deal to mitigate any weakening of the arms embargo or missile technology import restrictions 

that are currently in place. Second, reinforce the U.S. commitment 

to the region’s security through enhanced defense agreements with 

the GCC, mindful to maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge. 

We may want to consider elevating the relationship by signing security treaties, but should avoid pursuing concepts such as a nuclear umbrella. Third, help the GCC develop better asymmetric 

warfare capabilities for both defensive and potentially offensive capabilities. 

President Obama’s comments at the Camp David Summit implied that the Gulf states already have sufficient resources to push 

back against Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. We need 

to go further. The United States and the GCC have a shared interest in contesting the IRGC, and formation of an Arab rapid reaction force would be a step forward in that directs. 

Finally, we should focus diplomatic, legislative, intelligence, and 

military strategies for shaping the post-2025 environment, once 

Iranian uranium enrichment and nuclear research and development restrictions expire under a potential deal, to ensure Iran remains deterred from achieving a nuclear weapon. This should include ensuring that the United States maintains a robust military 

option to degrade or destroy Iranian infrastructure. 

Taking these steps will help assure our Gulf partners at a time 

of increasing doubt about U.S. commitment to their security as well 

as mitigate the impact the Iran nuclear deal will have on our position in the region. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McInnis follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. McInnis. 

Dr. Weinberg. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID ANDREW WEINBERG, PH.D., SENIOR 

FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. WEINBERG. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for this opportunity to testify before you today. 

America’s relations with the GCC states are on the wrong track. 

Each side offers the others some benefits, yet our main interests 

continue to go unfulfilled. Today I will cover four main topics on 

this regard: Threats from Iran, negligence on terror finance, religious incitement, and abuses of basic rights. 

On Iran, our Sunni-ruled Gulf allies see the pursuit of a nuclear 

bargain with their main enemy and Washington’s disengaged approach to the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and they wonder 

if they are on the fast track to abandonment. These states perceive 

an imminent threat from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps, which, as Mr. McInnis indicated, will inevitably share in 

any windfall from sanctions relief. 

The U.S. should offer the GCC states explicit commitments about 

how we will respond to cheating on a nuclear deal, and how we will 

prevent Iran from obtaining the bomb after the deal begins to sunset. That said, we should also press Riyadh to take its own confidence-building steps to prove their own nuclear program will also 

stay peaceful. 

With regard to regional conflicts and Iran’s destabilizing activities, we should strive to get Iran-backed militias in Iraq off of the 

front lines in Sunni majority areas of the country, such as in the 

effort to retake Ramadi. In Yemen, we should help make the Saudibacked arms embargo more sustainable, specifically by finding 

ways to mitigate its significant humanitarian impact. 

In Syria we should boost support for the moderate opposition, including providing air cover where appropriate, but impose sanctions on groups like Ahrar al-Sham, Jund al-Aqsa, and the Army 

of Conquest, urging Gulf states to similarly choke off support. Unfortunately, in the fight against ISIL and al-Qaeda, our GCC allies 

have broken their word in two critical regards that they pledged on 

the last anniversary of 9/11: To end the impunity of terror financiers and to halt the religious incitement that feeds extremist recruitment. 

They agreed to take these steps when they joined the anti-ISIL 

coalition, yet still today, little has changed. Last year America’s 

czar for combating terror finance revealed that the majority of private support reaching al-Qaeda’s core leadership in Pakistan came 

from the Gulf. The worst offenders were Qatar and Kuwait. Yet 

neither country has taken noteworthy legal action against individuals on U.S. or U.N. terror lists. 

For example, it appears that Muthanna al-Dhari, whom the U.S. 

and U.N. charged with providing over $1 million to the group we 

now know as ISIL, was let into Qatar yet again last month since 

the Camp David Summit, in violation of his U.N. travel ban, and 

earlier this year he was hugged and kissed by the Qatari Emir’s 

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Qaeda financiers several hours after detaining them. For the fourth 

time last week, Israel accused another Hamas operative in Doha of 

directing a West Bank terror cell, and I believe Congress can take 

some constructive steps to address this challenge. We should not 

let the Gulf states’ lucrative arms purchases or desire to invest in 

U.S. assets crowd terror finance off the agenda, and we should not 

wait to insulate our economy from Gulf energy disruptions via a 

national strategy for transportation fuel choice. 

As for incitement, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have recklessly supported religious leaders who propagate hatred. To highlight one example, Representative Deutch, you mentioned U.S. campuses in 

Doha, for instance. Yet, we found that the mosque that serves the 

U.S. universities in Doha’s Education City, campuses like Northwestern University and Texas A&M, when the mosque was inaugurated earlier this year, the ceremony was sponsored by the Emir 

of Qatar’s mother. The preacher who was invited to give the sermon has memorably called on Qatar TV saying that Osama bin 

Laden died with more dignity and honor than any infidel, such as 

any Christian, any Jew, any apostate, any atheist, any 

Zoroastrians. This is very discouraging rhetoric, and unfortunately 

these sorts of clerics have continued to receive state perks especially from the Saudi and Qatari Governments, but also from the 

Governments of Dubai, Kuwait, and Bahrain as well. 

Finally, while President Obama claims that it is important to 

have tough conversations with our allies in the Gulf, and said this 

in advance of the Camp David Summit, there wasn’t really clear 

indication in the public view that this sort of conversation has actually been had. Unfortunately, this is all too typical for U.S. administrations, both Democrat and Republican, when it comes to the 

Gulf. All six GCC states are systematically demolishing the constituencies needed to move their countries in a more moderate direction. Washington needs to get tougher with Gulf security chiefs, 

whom we treat as partners against al-Qaeda, yet also preside over 

the sorts of egregious rights abuses that we know feeds extremism 

long term. 

Thank you. And with that, I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinberg follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Weinberg. 

Dr. Katzman. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH KATZMAN, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN 

MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 

SERVICE 

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking 

Member Deutch, distinguished subcommittee members for asking 

me to appear on behalf of CRS (Congressional Research Service) on 

this important topic. I will summarize my remarks and ask that 

my remarks be submitted for the record. 

The United States has been a major actor and basically the guarantor of Gulf security for over 30 years. The United States still imports more than 15 percent of its oil from the GCC states. Containing a potential threat for Iran requires substantial cooperation 

with the GCC states. The GCC states express concern about how 

a final nuclear agreement with Iran might affect the region. They 

assert that broad sanctions relief will enable Iran to increase its assistance to regional factions in governments, such as President 

Assad of Syria, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, Shiite militia forces in 

Iraq, Lebanese Hezbollah, and hard line opposition factions in Bahrain. Sanctions relief could enable Iran to potentially enable Iran 

to modernize its armed forces, possibly to the point where Iran 

could deploy a large ground force across the Strait of Hormuz. Iran, 

too, now has been hampered by the lack of sea lift and ability to 

move across waterways. 

The GCC leaders are concerned that a nuclear deal could lead to 

a broader improvement in U.S.-Iran relations, but gives Iran’s 

views in the region increase weight on the U.S. decision-making 

apparatus. There is a perception in the Gulf that the United 

States, as a consequence of a nuclear deal, could come to view the 

Gulf region as secure and walk away and or reduce—substantially 

reduce its military presence in the Gulf. That is a huge concern 

that the Gulf leaders have. 

There are, however, some possible benefits of a nuclear deal to 

the GCC. The GCC states conduct extensive trade with Iran, particularly the UAE. And economic growth in Iran would enhance, 

obviously, the economic—this trade and help the GCC economies. 

A nuclear agreement could, depending on what direction Iran goes 

after a deal, provide some movement, perhaps, on a political solution in Yemen and some regional energy projects that have been 

long discussed but have not moved forward because of sanctions, 

such as energy pipeline linkages between Iran and Kuwait, Iran 

and Oman, and Iran and Bahrain. 

Iran and the UAE could potentially resolve their territorial dispute over the three Gulf islands, Abu Musa and the Tunb islands, 

which the Shah seized, and the Islamic Republic completed that 

seizure by taking Abu Musa in 1992, putting its forces, IRGC 

forces, on Abu Musa. The administration has sought to reassure 

the GCC leaders. We have talked about the GCC summit, which 

came out with the strategic partnerships stipulating five areas facilitating arms sales to the Gulf, increasing U.S.-GCC cooperation 

on maritime security, cyber security, counterterrorism, military exercises, U.S. training, and a renewed commitment to building a 

63

Gulf-wide holistic missile defense against Iran’s missile capabilities. 

Gulf diplomats indicate to me and others that working groups on 

these stipulated areas have now been established in the foreign 

and defense ministries of the GCC states, and that U.S.-GCC discussions on these areas are becoming more systematic and structured. Previously, the U.S.-GCC strategic dialogue was only at the 

level of U.S. Defense—Defense Secretary and Secretary of State, 

and now it has moved into down the bureaucracy, more institutionalized. 

Again, armed sales are a key to this relationship. Two of the 

countries, Kuwait and Bahrain are major non NATO allies. There 

have been substantial weapon sales to the Gulf states, obviously. 

And these armed sales have not only made the GCC states able 

partners, but in some way, they have emboldened the Gulf states. 

The Gulf states are flexing their muscles, so to speak, on regional 

issues. We have seen it in Libya, where the UAE conducted an air 

strike last year on a terrorist training camp without necessarily 

consulting the United States; Saudi Arabia has taken the lead in 

putting together this coalition that is intervening in Yemen with 

very minimal support from the United States, and perhaps the U.S. 

didn’t think maybe this type of intervention was going to succeed. 

So we have that against the Houthis. Obviously, the GCC states 

were helping the military Government of CC and Egypt at the 

same time the U.S. was, you know, denying some weaponry to 

Egypt. So the Gulf states are emboldened and are acting, perhaps, 

because they feel the U.S. is not acting on some of these key interests that they have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Katzman follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Excellent testimony. 

And I will begin the question-and-answer period. 

This morning our full committee held a hearing on Iran, and 

some of the witnesses pointed out that the U.S. is no longer seen 

in the region as upholding our commitments to protect our partners 

from foreign aggression. So my first question to you, gentlemen, is 

even if the U.S. signs some sort of security cooperation agreement 

with the GCC countries, do they believe that we will uphold that 

commitment or have we lost trust with the GCC? You can keep the 

answers short, because I have several. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. I think the important point is I think they don’t 

know. And I think the fact of the matter is that in light of U.S. 

behavior in recent years, the red line with regard to the Syrian CW 

and the initial U.S. red lines with regard to Iran’s nuclear program 

and how those red lines have kind of moved in the course of negotiations, I think they probably have questions about the validity of 

any commitments that the United States provides. 

Plus I would just point, in terms of the joint statement that was 

made at the Camp David Summit, it was—as these kind of commitments go, it was a very kind of bland and—kind of statement that 

I think from the point—you know, that kind of reference U.N. 

Charter as kind of the grounds for U.S. support for its allies. And 

you know, it wasn’t the treaty that was passed by Congress, although I am not sure that would—that is the way to go either. So 

I think they probably have a lot of questions. But the problem is, 

from their point of view, they don’t really have anywhere else to 

go at this point. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I know that some of you might 

want to participate in this. Let me ask you some other questions, 

and you can still answer it that way. 

At Camp David, the GCC needed to hear that the United States 

is committed to the Middle East region and committed to stopping 

Iranian expansionism. But instead, they received assurances about 

arms deals and general defense cooperation, as important as they 

may be. But we must ensure that sales of advanced weapon systems to the GCC are consistent with our larger goals, objectives 

and policies, including human rights concerns, maintaining Israel’s 

qualitative military edge and also addressing the underlying problems that the GCC has beyond the surface level. 

And should a deal be finalized, we all know that Iran is not going 

to stop its destabilizing activities against the U.S. and against the 

GCC interests in the region. So what credible actions are the GCC 

countries asking from us in order to ease their anxieties about developments in the region, and what alternatives do you suggest in 

order to combat Iranian aggression and repair this difficult and already harmed GCC relationship? 

Mr. MCINNIS. Thank you. What I would add, and following up in 

the context of your previous question, Chairwoman, is that the 

GCC countries in conversations I have had with leaders there, indicate that it is more the issue that the United States is not one to 

understand the personal relationship issue. I think that we tend to 

underestimate how much they value personal commitments. When 

they see the President breaking red lines or, you know, even if 

there are rational policy reasons for it, with personal relationships, 

78

it is really hard for the Gulf leaders to rebuild those. And I think 

we tend to be too callous about that. 

The second thing is I think that the GCC leadership does not 

think that we understand the Iranian threat adequately, and that 

we do not understand the existential problems that the GCC feels 

it faces. It thinks that the United States underestimates the destabilizing internal threat that Iran poses to them. I think this is a 

real key problem. I think the President was very dismissive of that 

issue at Camp David. And I think because of that, bearing in mind 

the human rights concerns, we do need to increase our capacity to 

work on counterterrorism issues with the GCC countries, because 

their fears of internal instability, frankly, trump all decision-making. We have to be sensitive to that in making them feel reassured 

that we are there to strengthen overall security in the region, while 

at the same time, we do want them to change certain policies. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. And let me continue, 

and you can answer whichever ones you like. 

I am concerned, as you have heard me say, that the sale of advanced weapon systems to GCC countries is contributing to a conventional arms race in the region, and that we are running into the 

risk of diminishing Israel’s qualitative military edge, which is still 

a U.S. law whether the administration wants to enforce it or not. 

What kind of weapons can we expect to see the U.S. offer GCC 

countries in the months ahead beyond those deals that are already 

pending, and how would this impact Israel’s qualitative military 

edge, and will GCC countries look toward Russia or China to fulfill 

their military needs? And if so, what kind of threat does this pose 

to our security interests in the region? 

Mr. WEINBERG. So I think at the Camp David Summit, one of the 

measures that was a constructive U.S. proposal for addressing 

some of these concerns, both QME—rather, that doesn’t undercut 

QME, but is still a constructive thing we can do for our Gulf allies, 

is the creation of a Foreign Military Sales office specifically devoted 

to GCC-wide sales. 

So this is something that could decrease bureaucratic hurdles 

while not necessarily providing new weapon systems that would be 

problematic. The U.S. did not provide promises to give the Gulf 

states the F–35 joint strike fighter. It did not provide, as far as I 

am aware, commitments for improved bunker busters. These are 

two things that the Israelis would be very uncomfortable about. 

I think it is important to recognize that, indeed, the Gulf states 

are not going to be reassured by forward U.S. deployments or arms 

sales alone. They need to know that the U.S. has their back when 

it comes to Iran’s destabilizing regional activities or else otherwise 

they are basically on their own when it comes to using those American weapons. 

One area where the Russians have been turning to—the Saudis 

have been turning to the Russians, have been reports that they are 

seeking the S–400 missile system. They also likely are seeking 

from the United States countermeasures against the S–300 that 

the Iranians recently acquired. And that is going to be a real challenge going forward without that undermining QME. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I agree. And, Dr. Katzman, I am going to ask 

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ready posed. While we contemplate additional GCC arms sales, we 

must ensure that we aren’t losing sight of our commitment to 

human rights in the region. How can the U.S. continue to promote 

human rights in the Gulf, where the political, social, and religious 

repression is some of the worst in the world, while maintaining our 

strategic partnership? This a difficult dance for us, isn’t it? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, actually, I would say a lot of the human 

rights groups were somewhat upset a few weeks ago when the U.S. 

announced it was going to proceed with an armed sale to Bahrain 

that had been held up on human rights grounds in 2011. This was 

a September 2011 sale of basically Humvees, tow missiles, anti 

tank weaponry. And the administration stated that Bahrain had 

been improving its human rights record. 

I think what I have heard, many in the region saw it, really, as 

a way of implementing the Camp David commitments to release 

certain armed sales that the GCC states wanted and to show that 

the U.S. is implementing Camp David. So the human rights question in the Gulf is a very difficult question. You know, the Summit, 

human rights were barely mentioned at the Camp David Summit. 

And this almost didn’t come up at all. We have had several leaders 

visit in the past 2 years. The Emir of Kuwait has been here. 

Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed, who is the defacto leader of UAE 

has been here, Sheikh Emir Tamim of Qatar has been here, and 

the communiques based on the meetings that have gone on, barely 

have mentioned human rights at all. So these are some issues that 

some of the human rights groups are raising. 

Now, I just—I wanted to just comment on the QME issue. You 

know, again, Israel and the GCC states have the very same position on a lot of regional issues right now. So I think—and the 

Israelis and the GCC states are talking about a broad range of security issues that they never even talked with each other about at 

all previously. So, you know, to some extent that, perhaps, puts 

context to the QME discussion. 

I would also say in terms of the Iran deal, let’s—for 35 years the 

United States has not talked to Iran at all. So the only message 

the U.S. was getting about Gulf security, the region, was from the 

Gulf states. Now, the United States is getting Iran’s point of view. 

The U.S. does not always necessarily put much weight on it, but 

at least the U.S. is hearing Iran’s point of view. And what I am 

understanding from Gulf officials, is that has caused a problem because now they know that the U.S. is at least hearing Iran’s point 

of view, which is mainly to complain about them, the GCC states. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you for excellent answers to my rambling questions. 

And Mr. Deutch is recognized for his question and answers. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We discussed earlier 

today in an Iran hearing an issue that I would like to get this panel’s thoughts on. We have—as these talks in Vienna move on, and 

as we move forward to see whether there is a deal that can be 

made, one of the big—the biggest issues is what sanctions relief 

would mean to Iran, what they would do with the $150 billion that 

they would then have access to. And the argument has been made 

that it would more likely be used for domestic purposes, that it 

would not be, despite our concerns, that it wouldn’t be used, that 

80

sanctions wouldn’t be used to fuel regional mischief to fund terror, 

to do all the things that we worry so much about the Iranian regime for. What—how do the Gulf states view this? What is their—

how do they view this? What evidence do they use to draw their 

conclusions? Any of our panelists. 

Dr. Weinberg, you seem anxious to answer. 

Mr. WEINBERG. So I think there is an interesting comparison 

with how our Israeli allies view the Iranian threat that they face 

and how our Gulf allies view it. I think for our Israeli allies, the 

existential question is the nuclear one, and the IRGC issue is another major concern. I think for the Gulf states, the nuclear issue 

is a very major concern, and the nuclear component is the existential question for them. They basically see it as a core threat to their 

rule. And so when they see that Iran, in the last calendar year, increased its public budget allotment for the IRGC by 48 percent 

when Iran is under crippling sanctions——

Mr. DEUTCH. I am sorry, Dr. Weinberg, to what amount? 

Mr. WEINBERG. I don’t have the numbers offhand, but you we 

can submit that for the record. 

Understandably, when they see that the IRGC is undoubtedly 

going to share in some portion of the windfall, I mean, even supporters of the Iran nuclear deal acknowledge that. It would be folly 

to say that they are not going to get any of the money. The question is how aggressive will they be with that money, and nobody 

in the Gulf is putting money on more moderate. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. So let me be more specific. 

Mr. WEINBERG. Sure. 

Mr. DEUTCH. There are those who have argued that, in response 

to what I believe are valid concerns in line with your response to 

my question, that we don’t really believe that more of their—that 

they would use much of this money to fund the IRGC to engage in 

the nefarious activities that they do around the world, because they 

have been able to do it already with a small amount of money, 

which I have a hard time really wrapping my head around. Because if they have been successful with a small amount of money, 

then why wouldn’t they—Dr. Katzman, why wouldn’t we expect 

that some part of that $150 billion, whether 1 billion or 5 or 20, 

would be used? And if so, what could all of that additional money 

be used for? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Congressman, I agree with that question and the 

way you framed it. The issue—I would take some, perhaps, difference on the—Iran is having trouble. Iran is not having success 

universally. Yes, they have had some success in places. They are 

having tremendous trouble in Syria right now. I am not convinced 

in my analysis that more money would necessarily bring them to 

success in Syria where they seem to be having grave difficulty in 

Syria. Hezbollah is taking very large casualties in Syria. I am not 

convinced that there was—I was at a discussion the other day 

about Iran might give Hezbollah $1 billion, theoretically, of this 

money they are going to get. What would Hezbollah do with the billion—that is the thing. They are losing a lot of men; very tough to 

recruit; Hezbollah doesn’t necessarily believe in fighting all over 

Syria, just on the border. 

81

So, yes, they would have more resources, but I think Iran is having a lot of problems in the region. They are having success in 

places, but they are also having problems. 

Mr. DEUTCH. My question isn’t whether—I am not asking you to 

anticipate whether they would be successful in how they spent the 

money. My question is, is it realistic to believe that if they have 

access to $150 billion, that given this regime, some significant 

amount of money would go to fund terrorists, and that some significant amount of money would go to wreak havoc in the region? Mr. 

Eisenstadt. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. If I could just piggy back on Ken’s comments. 

I agree with what he is saying, that Iran’s allies in Syria are overstretched. We have seen them. They have been using recently 

Afghani Shiites and Pakistani Shiites. I think that is the answer. 

In the past, their preference has always been to fight to the last 

Arab proxy. Having money enables them to hire on additional people. They are now expanding their recruitment base to Afghan and 

Pakistanis. And more money means greater ability to recruit people. Now, whether they will be effective or not is another question. 

But I think, given the fact that they have committed their own people to combat for the first time in Iraq and Syria, and they prefer 

not to do that, they prefer to fight the proxies, money gives them 

additional resources to gain additional proxies. 

Again, I don’t know if it will translate into greater effectiveness, 

but I think you can say that given the situation they are in, that 

that provides them potentially a new lease on life, at least in the 

short run. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. McInnis, do you agree? 

Mr. MCINNIS. I would agree with that. And what I would add is 

that the strain that we are discussing on the Iranians’ expeditionary activities right now is very significant. And when you think 

about what they are having to give to Assad to kind of keep him 

afloat, the amount of money that is coming in that can help offset 

some of those negative things on their budget right now allows 

them to kind of do what they want to do. Frankly, especially what 

I consider to be the more expansionist activities in Yemen, for example, that is something that makes me worried. If they can kind 

of hold the fort better in Syria and Iraq, the additional money coming in allows them to expand what they are trying to do in very, 

sometimes, odd ways inside Yemen to really pressure the Saudis. 

And I think what the Iranians have been looking for just as the 

Iranians always fear that we are surrounding them or trying to 

surround them—the Iranians are trying to surround Saudi Arabia 

and the Gulf states. That is the reason why you saw the recent exposure of the plot in Jordan that just came to light recently. When 

you look at their activity in Iraq, Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain, and potentially other places, the Iranians have kind of a latent capacity 

surrounding Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. And I think that is 

the concern. If they can hold the fort better in Iraq and Syria with 

additional money, it allows them to put greater pressure on the 

Saudis. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. 

Madam Chairman, I just—I appreciate the input from our panelists. And as we move forward in these talks, this is very helpful, 

82

because a sober analysis of the potential outcome of this negotiation, I think, requires us to acknowledge that in all likelihood, 

sanctions relief, if and when it comes, is going to result in more 

money. However it is spent, it is going to result in more money creating more problems in the region. I just think that, perhaps, has 

not been part of the discussion as much as it should have, and I 

hope that with this from our panelist, we will have an opportunity 

to inject into it today. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. We turn to 

Mr. Boyle of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you. I wanted to, just a quick follow-up on the 

last point that Ranking Member Deutch was making. Unfortunately, we have a terrible history in this part of the world of funding and of sending armaments for one purpose, and then suddenly 

seeing those armaments used by a different group in a completely 

different purpose and reminded of that each and every day by the 

activities of ISIS. But the two questions I wanted to ask, though, 

weren’t really on this point. 

The first, though, I think it was Dr. Katzman, you raised it in 

your opening statement. One of the unintended consequences, positive unintended consequences of this protracted negotiation that 

P5+1 has had with Iran is that we finally found something that 

would bring the Gulf—the GCC states and Israel a little closer together and cooperating. I am just wondering if you see this—this 

is—you know, it is not completely possible to accurately predict 

this, but I am interested in your sense of whether or not this is a 

temporary phenomenon, or this actually could be the beginning of 

a permanent improving of relations and actually working together? 

Mr. KATZMAN. I will address it further. Thank you. 

The way I would frame it is the GCC and Israel still have a huge 

difference of opinion on certain regional issues, mainly the Palestinians, Arab-Israeli dispute. But I think they see that as sort of 

an emotional and political dispute. On Iran, they have a strategic 

agreement. Israel and the GCC have an exact same strategic analysis, and they have a strategic alignment that Iran is the key 

threat to the region; Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon; Iran must 

be contained and deterred, and so that has brought a level of strategic dialogue, as quiet as it is, between Israel and the GCC, as has 

ever been witnessed really, since Israel was formed. 

Mr. BOYLE. Right. So the follow-up, I am more on—if we can 

project, and once, let’s say, whether an agreement is reached or 

not, the Iranian nuclear negotiations are now, one way or the 

other, no more, we are into the fall, we are into next year, I am 

interested in your view to project forward, whether or not you 

think this could be the beginning of a longer shift, or this is simply 

a one-time, all about Iran, and then go back to business as usual? 

Mr. KATZMAN. It depends. I think if Iran goes back in the direction that I think most of us think, which is they will use the resources to continue to try to expand their influence in the region, 

then I think that basis of strategic cooperation would continue. 

Mr. WEINBERG. If I may offer a different perspective on this. I 

am much more pessimistic in this regard. I went on to the Saudi 

state news channel’s Web site recently, and there was an article in 

which they talk about alleged Israeli overflights in Lebanon. But 

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the way in which they talk about these are the ‘‘enemy’’ Israeli Air 

Force. When you look at these sorts of preachers whom the Saudi 

king has surrounded himself with, on the official state Ulema council, some of the other preachers whom he hugs and kisses, these 

people have a long record of inciting against Christians and also inciting against Jews. 

And there was recently much talk about an unofficial dialogue 

between a former Israeli official and a former Saudi official. So 

what? I mean, this was, as I understand it, a very unofficial level, 

and it was covered in a much lesser level in Saudi press as it was 

than it was in the Israeli press. I don’t think the Saudi Government is really in a position to do anything beyond the security—

the quiet security and strategic intelligence coordination which was 

already going on a decade ago. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you. I would just add, Dr. Weinberg, your 

opening remarks, I was very much listening. And I think it is 

worth repeating the reminder that a number of these states that 

we can cooperate with on a number of strategic areas still are pretty large funders of anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric and 

hate. And that is something that we had better always keep in 

both the back and the front of our minds. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Boyle. And Mr. 

Clawson is going to take over for me. Meanwhile, I will recognize 

Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. You are so kind. 

Thank you, Mr. Clawson. Mr. Clawson, if you wish to go, I, of 

course, would defer to you. Okay. Thank you very much. Welcome 

to our panel. Fascinating discussion. If I understood what Dr. 

Weinberg just said to Mr. Boyle, Mr. Katzman, he was saying, let’s 

not overstate this, you know, level of cooperation, that the enemy 

of my enemy is my friend kind of status that has descended on the 

GCC and its relations with Israel. Did I get that right, Mr. 

Weinberg? I did? 

Mr. WEINBERG. You did. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So, Dr. Katzman, you disagree, you think actually it is of a different elevation than in the past and worthy of 

some note? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Yes. I mean, I am not disputing what Dr. 

Weinberg is observing. But I think a lot of it is the basic culture 

and approach of the population and people way below the leadership level in the GCC. And I tend, perhaps, because of my background or whatever, to give more weight to what is going on at the 

government-to-government level and to not necessarily look at each 

cleric. These clerics have been around, Youssef al-Qaradawi is in 

Qatar. He is one of the most inflammatory clerics in the Islamic 

world. He is in Qatar. There were 9/11, there were al-Qaeda activists who transited through Qatar before 9/11. These things go on. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. But, I mean, take Qatar, for one example. 

I mean, there is all kinds of behavior we could decry and call out 

and not like. On the other hand, they have actually been useful 

interlocutors in some other situations, including on behalf, well, de 

facto on behalf of Israel. Is that not correct? 

84

Mr. KATZMAN. Qatar has also been very helpful in Afghanistan. 

Without Qatar, we probably would not have gotten Mr. Bergdahl 

back. They are interlocutors on any number of issues absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. So we have a mixed record of behavior. We 

would like everyone to be perfect and do what we think is in 

everybody’s best interest. But it is a problematic area at best, the 

Gulf. I want to go back to sort of the origins of this hearing. So, 

Dr. Katzman, the GCC reps were invited to Camp David to meet 

with the President and his team, is that correct? And what was 

your understanding of the purpose of that summit or that meeting, 

set of meetings? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, the summit was announced simultaneously 

when President Obama briefed the Nation on the April 2 tentative 

nuclear accord with Iran, the framework accord. So it was in connection to that certainly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. As a longtime analyst and observer of the region, 

were those productive meetings from your point of view? 

Mr. KATZMAN. From everything I have heard, the Camp David 

summit was more productive than was anticipated. There were 

very low expectations. Only two of the heads of state attended. 

King Salman and then King Hamad of Bahrain pulled out, you 

know, about a day before. So there were very low expectations. And 

my understanding is the summit far exceeded the expectations. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. In far exceeding the expectations, is an element 

of that a sense of reassurance by the GCC that the United States 

was actually quite serious about what it was trying to achieve in 

the Iran nuclear negotiations? Because I assume that was the big 

elephant in the room. 

Mr. KATZMAN. Yes. I mean, I think the GCC statements on the 

nuclear deal have evolved. And I think it has been somewhat more 

positive, not outright positive, but more positive than they were before the Camp David summit on the nuclear deal. Yes, they have 

become more positive on it, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do you feel that the United States was successful 

in providing reassurances, both in terms of their collective security 

and in terms of where we are headed in this relationship with 

Iran? 

Mr. KATZMAN. That is my understanding, yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You know what? My first trip to the Gulf was in 

the early 1980s to mid 1980s. I was there right after the revolution 

in Iran and when we reflagged the Kuwaiti oil tankers. And what 

struck me and surprised us when we went, we were expecting all 

the Gulf, the GCC nations, I keep on wanting to say G7, forgive 

me, GCC nations to be really as preoccupied as we were with the 

Ayatollah Khomeini and the revolution in Iran and the threat that 

posed to the region and so forth. They weren’t particularly focused 

on that. In the 1980s, they were focused on Iraq and Saddam Hussein. I might just observe that the preoccupation with Iran today 

is logical. They are the big menace now that Iraq has been 

defenestrate, and Saddam Hussein is no more. And it is perfectly 

understandable, and it has to be dealt with, but it is not a 

unique—I mean, depending on who is strong at any given moment 

in the region, that is who GCC members are going to be concerned 

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about, given size and proximity and the nature of the military 

threat. 

So it has to be dealt with. It can’t be minimized. But I think 

some of the rhetoric we have heard about broken relationship and 

lacking credibility and fractured this and fractured that, I don’t 

think so. And I would agree with your characterization, Dr. 

Katzman. Actually, the meeting at Camp David turned out, press 

expectations notwithstanding, more successfully than one might 

have expected. And I think reassurances apparently were made 

that were well received. I don’t want to overstate it, but I would 

hardly call that a fractured relationship in the Gulf between them 

and the United States. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CLAWSON [presiding]. Thank you. Sorry for coming late, gentlemen. We appreciate you coming in today. I was in a subcommittee on Africa. So we get double booked here. So it certainly 

wasn’t meant to be any kind of disrespect. So if any of my questions or comments are repetitive, I ask your forgiveness for my absence. When we voted last year and again this year on our country’s, my country’s, your country’s involvement in the Syrian conflict, I voted no, because it felt like, to me, another bad war with 

very limited chances of any meaningful success, with the possibility 

of acceleration of our involvement, and one more kind of no-win situation in that part of the world. 

And I don’t like sending my own sons and daughters of my constituents to die in faraway places without a meaningful payback. 

And as the son of my oldest sister prepares for his second tour in 

Afghanistan, in a face-to-face war with the enemy, I just have a 

hard time getting there unless I see victory in the cards, which I 

would love to see. Then when I think about the backdrop of this 

Iranian deal, I say to myself sanctions go away, these guys get 

more money to fight us in places like Afghanistan and Syria and 

other places. The Gulf states, by and large, are going to sit it out. 

And a big mess just got messier. 

Am I being overly pessimistic here? I look now at the money we 

have spent in Syria and where we are, what, a year, almost a year 

later, $1 billion, 60 people trained or whatever, and this feels like 

a sinkhole of money, lives, and confidence that will only be made 

worse if this deal goes through. 

So I know you are going to tell me why I am mistaken. So I turn 

it over to you all to give the counterpoint here. Remember, we are 

going to come back in 6 months and we are going to do a business 

review and see if it really has gotten any better here. With that, 

I yield to whoever would like to answer first. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Mr. Chairman, actually I share a lot of your 

concerns. I think one of the challenges we face in dealing with the 

challenge posed by ISIL in Iraq and Syria is basically our strategy 

is contingent on our allies’ policies, and what I am talking about 

with regard to the Iraqi Government and their willingness to engage in Sunni outreach and create an inclusive political system, 

which flies in the face of the zero-sum politics which tend to dominate Iraqi politics and the politics not all the countries in the region, but many of the countries in the region. 

86

But the challenge we face is that we have seen what happened 

in Syria as a result of 3 or 4 years of non-engagement, and that 

it creates a vacuum that is then filled by extremists. And, in fact, 

the failure of the United States to engage earlier in Syria created, 

and tried to create, tried to create, we have to acknowledge there 

is no guarantee that our efforts to create a moderate opposition will 

succeed. But our efforts to try to create a third way could then perhaps suck away resources and manpower that are now going to alQaeda affiliates and ISIL. So the challenge is to find the right balance. 

I agree, I don’t want Americans on the ground engaged in combat 

again. But, on the other hand, walking away or disengaging, we 

have seen what has happened. We still have vital interests there. 

What happens in this part of the world has implications for, first, 

our allies, but it is already we are seeing that ISIL is influencing 

people here to act as lone wolves and engage in attacks. So the 

challenge is finding the right balance. And I actually share the administration’s concerns and I support a light-footprint approach, 

though I would say that it would have to be, doing a light-footprint 

approach that entails more than the administration is doing. But, 

again, the challenge is finding the right balance because we have 

seen what happens when we don’t engage. But then our allies also 

do things, act on their impulses which are not always the healthiest ones and sometimes they have supported groups that are either al-Qaeda affiliates, or very close to being, you know, they are 

kind of extremist in their orientation. And that is not good either. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Do you think that lifting sanctions will put more 

guns into the wrong hands in the region? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. That is one of the dangers of that course of action. And the problem is, we will never be able to square the circle 

with all the, you know, there are so many moving parts with regard to our policies in this part of the world, that you are never 

going to be able to iron out all the contradictions in U.S. policy. 

You can manage them. 

So I am supportive of a deal with Iran that advances our interests. It will remain to be seen if the deal we get actually does that. 

But while doing that, and if that entails sanctions relief, as it necessarily would have to, we have to find ways to mitigate that by 

doing other things, like I said, while extending a hand to Iran, we 

still also have to push back against Iranian efforts to expand their 

influence and to engage in proxy warfare in the region. That is also 

a driver of ISIS. 

Iran’s involvement in Syria and Iraq also empowers ISIS. So I 

know it is like, you know, sometimes it makes my head explode too 

when I try to think of all this stuff because it really is almost impossible to iron out all the contradictions. But you need to try to 

manage it. And walking away, we have seen what happens when 

we are not engaged. 

Mr. MCINNIS. I would just add on that point that, and we have 

been talking about this in general, but there needs to be recognition that what is happening in the region is, yes, their role. The 

mistakes of U.S. strategy and policy have helped create the problems we have there right now. But the real issues are what the 

other regional states have done. And you look at what Iran’s strateVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:21 Aug 18, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\070915\95423 SHIRL
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gies have been in the region. They have been, aside from our own 

concern about what they are trying to achieve, even for their own 

purposes what they are trying to do has created enormous amounts 

of failure, at least right now. And that what they are facing is the 

fact of what they have done in Syria and what they are doing in 

Iraq is not necessarily succeeding. 

At the same time, our allies within the GCC, they are not nearly 

as sophisticated on these types of asymmetric proxy warfare efforts 

that Iran is able to do, which it is kind of failing at right now. But 

they are also in a position where the Saudis traditionally and the 

Emiratis and others, they throw money at groups and they fund 

these types of efforts, but they don’t actually know how to build 

governance or build effective fighting forces. We have to recognize 

the limits of the players there. If we are going to leave, kind of 

withdraw and just kind of let this play out, we have to recognize 

the limits of the players there. 

And the fact that if we are going to make this work, if this is 

going to keep ISIL from becoming a worldwide problem for us, we 

are going to have to find ways to work with our allies in particular 

to learn how to fight these wars better. And that is one of the reasons why the encouragement that we saw, perhaps, from Camp 

David, that we need to start creating these types of Arab rapid reaction forces or help them train better how to build and work with 

fighting forces in other countries. People talk about: Should Saudi 

Arabia create its own version of the Quds force? I don’t know. That 

is a really tough question. 

But this is something where we have to recognize the limits of 

what we have there. The other issue when it comes to the sanctions relief, and I hit this on my earlier points but wanted to hit 

it again, on the conventional side is a huge problem, especially if 

we start seeing a relaxation of the conventional arms embargo or 

the missile technology control regimes. Those are things that could 

happen in a deal. And if that happens, we could see a real shifting 

of the conventional balance of power in the Gulf in a direction that 

is dangerous for the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, in addition to the 

pressure it is going to put on our Gulf allies and accelerate the conventional arms race that the chairwoman was mentioning earlier. 

So I think on both the asymmetric fight, the proxy fight, and the 

conventional fight, the potential nuclear deal is a real disaster for 

us. 

Mr. WEINBERG. You had mentioned the fight in Afghanistan. And 

I just want to note a terror finance case that relates. There was 

an organization known as Revival of Islamic Heritage Society in 

Kuwait which has branches all over the world, including in Pakistan. The United States first sanctioned the Pakistan branch and 

another regional branch, and several years later, sanctioned the 

headquarters in Kuwait as well. And, yet, indications suggest that 

the Kuwaitis have never taken significant action against RIHS 

within their own territory, even though we believe that it was functioning, including in Pakistan, as a channel for funds to al-Qaeda 

in South and Central Asia. The reported office director of the Pakistan office, both before and immediately after it was under U.S. 

sanctions at the time, was a Jordanian national named Khalil alZeer, who then, for many years, went on to be the executive direcVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:21 Aug 18, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\070915\95423 SHIRL
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tor of a prominent charity in Qatar named the Eid Bin Muhammad 

Al Thani Charitable Society. One of the founding board members 

of the Eid Bin Muhammad Al Thani Charitable Society, was recently sanctioned by the United States and the United Nation on 

charges of providing up to $2 million a month to the organization 

we now know as ISIS. Alzeer left the country in 2014. And the organization threw him a going-away party. 

The most recent State Department counterterrorism country report said that one of the positive steps that Qatar took against terror finance was to deport an individual who was a terror financier 

of Jordanian nationality who worked at a Qatari charity. Could it 

be Khalil al-Zeer? It could. Could it be somebody else? It could. Regardless of who that individual is, the fact is that Qatar’s supposedly positive step that the administration is citing for fighting 

terror finance is to deport somebody rather than arrest them and 

try them. That they did the same with Hamas financiers according 

to the Christian Science Monitor quite recently. And that Kuwait 

is doing the same with alleged Nusra Front financiers as well. 

Arresting them and releasing them is very worrisome. And until 

we get at this problem of seed funding going to terror groups 

throughout the world from primarily Gulf private financiers in 

these early stages when we get these start-up terror groups, it is 

going to be extremely hard to keep these conflicts from getting to 

the point where we need to go in, or our allies need to go in militarily and take on the problem when they have conquered territory. 

Mr. CLAWSON. You are making the point to me that, the way I 

would put it, we are undermanaging our foes, in this case, Iran, 

and we are undermanaging our so-called friends. 

Mr. WEINBERG. Yes. 

Mr. CLAWSON. And my second conclusion on that is we are not 

helping Israel enough because they are right over there. And, you 

know, words like what you just said lead me to believe that if I 

were them, I would want a few extra weapons if everybody around 

me was arming like this. Dr. Katzman? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you. I mean, again, I wouldn’t dispute everything Dr. Weinberg is saying. But I would also note Kuwait is 

hosting the headquarters for our anti-ISIS mission right now. I 

would point out also that Qatar is hosting forward headquarters for 

U.S. Central Command. Yes, there are these actors in the Gulf 

states. We are not disputing that. There was an minister in Kuwait 

for the Awazem tribe, Al Ajmi, who was allegedly posting, making 

posts on Twitter and raising money for al-Nusra I believe. And the 

Kuwaitis fired him. Now, they didn’t necessarily arrest him, they 

didn’t punish him. But they did take him away from his ministry. 

So the issue is to get at some of this, what Dr. Weinberg is talking about, would probably require a level of U.S. intrusiveness into 

the internal dynamics, tribal dynamics, political dynamics. It would 

require a level of intrusiveness that might interfere with our broader strategic plan in the Gulf. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Okay. I really have to cut it off because we have 

got to go. I thank all of you for your participation and your patience as the committee comes and goes. But these are obviously 

life-and-death kind of stuff. So I appreciate your contributions 

today. 

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[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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