J-A15011-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

SCOTT BOWEN 

 Appellant No. 1127 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 22, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013590-2011 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED AUGUST 05, 2014 

 Appellant, Scott Bowen, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered February 22, 2013, by the Honorable Diana Anhalt, Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We affirm. 

 For a detailed recitation of the facts of this case and the conflicting 

testimony adduced at trial, we direct the reader to the trial court’s 1925(a) 

memorandum opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/13 at 2-4. Briefly, 

on September 3, 2011, Bowen and the victim, Aaron Rasmussen, engaged in 

an altercation at Ladder 15, a bar and restaurant located in Philadelphia. 

Although both Bowen and the victim offered different accounts as to who 

started the argument, it is undisputed that at some point after the parties 

were escorted outside, a confrontation again ensued, at which point Bowen 
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stabbed the victim in the upper left abdomen. The victim was transported to 

the hospital for surgery. 

 Bowen was subsequently arrested and charged with Aggravated 

Assault,1

 Possession of an Instrument of Crime,2 Simple Assault,3 and 

Recklessly Endangering another Person.4 Following a non-jury trial on 

January 7, 2013, the trial court convicted Bowen of Aggravated Assault and 

Possession of an Instrument of Crime. On February 22, 2013, Bowen was 

sentenced to four years’ probation. Bowen filed post-sentence motions on 

March 1, 2013, which the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed. 

 On appeal, Bowen raises the following issues for our review: 

1. Was the trial court’s verdict against the weight of the 

evidence insomuch as no reasonable factfinder could find that 

the Commonwealth proved Mr. Bowen guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt? 

2. Was the trial court’s verdict against the weight of the

evidence insomuch as no reasonable factfinder could find that 

the Commonwealth proved Mr. Bowen was not acting in selfdefense beyond a reasonable doubt? 

3. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the 

verdict? 

Appellant’s Brief at 6. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a). 

2

 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). 

3

 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a). 

4

 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. 
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Preliminarily, we note that Bowen has waived his challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. In order to preserve a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 

1925(b) statement must state with specificity the element or elements of 

the crime for which the appellant alleges the evidence was insufficient. See

Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013); 

Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa. Super. 2009). “Such 

specificity is of particular importance in cases where, as here, the appellant 

was convicted of multiple crimes each of which contains numerous elements 

that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gibbs, 

981 A.2d at 281. In Garland, the appellant’s 1925(b) statement stated only 

that “[t]he evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction,” and a 

panel of this court found that the sufficiency challenge was waived on 

appeal. Id. at 344. 

Instantly, Bowen’s Rule 1925(b) statement states in pertinent part, 

“[t]he evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the verdict.” 

1925(b) Statement of matters Complained of on Appeal, 7/23/1 at 2. 

Bowen’s Rule 1925(b) statement not only fails to identify which elements he 

is challenging, but also which conviction he is challenging. That Bowen 

additionally fails to specify in his appellate brief the elements he is 

challenging further inhibits our review of this claim. Accordingly, we are 

constrained to find Bowen’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

waived on that basis. See Garland, supra. 
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We proceed to examine Bowen’s argument that the verdict was 

against the weight of the evidence. A challenge to the weight of the 

evidence “concedes that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, but 

seeks a new trial on the ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so 

weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one's sense of 

justice.” Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1015 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). Our standard when reviewing a weight of the evidence 

claim is well settled. 

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion 

of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a 

mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, “the 

role of the trial judge is to determine that ‘notwithstanding all 

the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to 

ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to 

deny justice.’ ” It has often been stated that “a new trial should 

be awarded when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a 

new trial is imperative so that right may be given another 

opportunity to prevail.”

An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of 

review applied by the trial court: 

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of 

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 

Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear 

and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will

give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons 

advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's 

determination that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting 

or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that 
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the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the 

interest of justice. 

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial 

court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In 

describing the limits of a trial court's discretion, we have 

explained: 

The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion 

within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for 

the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. 

Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, 

as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or

arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused where the course 

pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but 

where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where

the law is not applied or where the record shows that the 

action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. 

Id. at 1015-1016 (citation and emphasis omitted). 

 Bowen primarily argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his selfdefense claim. “The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable 

when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the 

purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the other 

person.” 18 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. § 505(a). “Although the defendant has no 

burden to prove self-defense, ... before the defense is properly in issue, 

‘there must be some evidence, from whatever source, to justify such a 

finding.’” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740 (Pa. 2012) 

(citation omitted). Once a justification defense is properly raised, “the 

Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove such a defense beyond a 
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reasonable doubt.” See Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d 342, 345 

(Pa. 2001). 

The Commonwealth sustains its burden if “it establishes at least one of 

the following: 1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in 

danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or 

continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat and the 

retreat was possible with complete safety.” Commonwealth v. 

McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). “It 

remains the province of the [finder of fact] to determine whether the 

accused's belief was reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and 

whether he had no duty to retreat.” Id. 

With our standard of review in mind, we have examined the certified 

record, the briefs of the parties, Judge Anhalt’s memorandum opinion, and 

the applicable law, and we find that the trial court ably and methodically 

addressed the issues Bowen presented on appeal. We agree with the trial 

court that Bowen’s challenge to the weight of the evidence to support his 

convictions and request for a new trial is without merit. Accordingly, we 

affirm on the basis of the Judge Anhalt’s well-written memorandum opinion. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/13 at 5-7.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/5/2014 
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