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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

July 26, 2016 

v No. 326588 

Wayne Circuit Court 

ANTONIO RATCLIFF, LC No. 14-002579-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: WILDER, P.J., and MURPHY and O’CONNELL, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 The prosecutor charged defendant with bestiality with a dog, MCL 750.158, and animal 

cruelty, MCL 750.50(2) and (4). After a bench trial, the trial court convicted defendant of both 

counts. The court sentenced defendant to three years’ probation. Defendant appeals as of right, 

and we affirm. 

 Initially, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. 

In People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 618-619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008), this Court addressed a 

sufficiency argument in the context of a bench trial, observing: 

 We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo. When ascertaining 

whether sufficient evidence was presented in a bench trial to support a conviction, 

this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and 

determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of 

the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court will not interfere 

with the trier of fact's role of determining the weight of the evidence or the 

credibility of witnesses. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences that 

arise from such evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the 

crime. All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. 

[Citations omitted.] 

 “[W]hether alleged conduct falls within the scope of criminal law is a question of law 

subject to review de novo.” People v Cassadime, 258 Mich App 395, 398; 671 NW2d 559 

(2003). In People v Haynes, 281 Mich App 27, 29; 760 NW2d 283 (2008), this Court 

summarized the principles governing statutory interpretation: 
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 The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect 

to the Legislature’s intent. We begin this task by examining the plain language of 

the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature 

intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial construction is 

required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written. Unless they are 

otherwise defined in the statute or are terms of art or technical words, we assign 

the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning. If a statute leaves words 

undefined, we may consult a dictionary to aid our goal of construing those terms 

in accordance with their ordinary and generally accepted meanings. . . . . 

Although we must, as far as possible, give effect to every word, phrase, and 

clause in the statute, we may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not 

within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the 

statute itself. [Citations, quotation marks, and alteration bracket omitted.]

 The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant placed his 

penis in a dog’s anus. In relevant part, MCL 750.158 prohibits the common-law crime of 

bestiality.1

 Haynes, 281 Mich App at 30. For purposes of MCL 750.158, Michigan courts have 

recognized bestiality as including “any sexual connection between a human being and an 

animal.” Id.; see also People v Carrier, 74 Mich App 161, 166; 254 NW2d 35 (1977). “To 

sustain a conviction under MCL 750.158, ‘sexual penetration, however slight,’ is required.” 

Haynes, 281 Mich App at 30, quoting MCL 750.159,2

 and citing Carrier, 74 Mich App at 166. 

 Defendant’s roommate, who had lived with defendant for three years, testified that while 

showering on the morning of March 15, 2014, she heard her dog howl, that she then left the 

shower running, and that she proceeded to walk toward the living room to investigate. In the 

living room, the roommate saw defendant with his pants down, on the floor on his hands and 

knees, kneeling over the dog, which was lying on the floor on its back, with its head away from 

defendant. Defendant’s roommate testified to her belief that defendant “was . . . trying to 

penetrate . . . the dog.” An animal control officer, to whom police officers brought the dog on 

the evening of March 15, 2014, testified that the dog had a swollen anus and looked very 

frightened. Police officers testified that they had submitted for DNA analysis defendant’s 

underwear and an oral swab from the dog. Two forensic animal DNA experts testified that from 

 

1

 In MCL 750.158, our Legislature provided as follows: 

 Any person who shall commit the abominable and detestable crime against 

nature either with mankind or with any animal shall be guilty of a felony, 

punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 15 years, or if such 

person was at the time of the said offense a sexually delinquent person, may be 

punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for an indeterminate term, the 

minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of which shall be life. 

2

 MCL 750.159 provides that “[i]n any prosecution for sodomy, it shall not be necessary to prove 

emission, and any sexual penetration, however slight, shall be deemed sufficient to complete the 

crime specified in the next preceding section.” 
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the inside of defendant’s underwear, they developed a DNA profile of a canine, which matched 

the DNA profile of the dog. The roommate indicated that the dog would not generally have 

access to defendant’s clothing, which defendant routinely placed in a basement laundry hamper. 

 The evidence gave rise to a reasonable inference that defendant’s penis penetrated the 

dog’s anus. Defendant’s roommate did not see defendant’s penis. But moments after hearing 

the dog howl, she saw the dog lying on its back with its head away from defendant, who had his 

pants partially down, and defendant was on his hands and knees above the dog. Later that night, 

the dog still had a swollen anus. And two forensic animal DNA experts matched the canine 

profile from the interior of defendant’s underwear to the profile from the dog. Viewing the 

circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, deferring to the trial court’s credibility and evidentiary-weight 

assessments, and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prosecution, we hold that 

the trial court did not err in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed the 

offense of bestiality under MCL 750.158. 

 With respect to the animal cruelty conviction, the prosecutor charged defendant with 

“negligently allow[ing] an animal to suffer unnecessary neglect, torture, or pain.” The 

prohibition of this conduct appears in MCL 750.50(2)(f), which criminalizes “[n]egligently 

allow[ing] any animal . . . to suffer unnecessary neglect, torture, or pain.”3

 In MCL 750.50, our 

Legislature penalized to varying degrees a broad range of conduct toward animals. In MCL 

750.50(1)(h), the Legislature defined “neglect” as failing “to sufficiently and properly care for an 

animal to the extent that the animal’s health is jeopardized.” Because MCL 750.50 does not 

specifically define “torture” or “pain,” we would generally be permitted to consider dictionary 

definitions of these terms to aid in our construction. However, the term “pain” is selfexplanatory, and we see no need to contemplate or reach the “torture” provision. 

 We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the record proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt that defendant inflicted pain on the dog. Shortly before the roommate observed defendant 

partially naked on the floor above the dog, she heard the dog howl. The animal control officer 

testified that later that evening, she noticed swelling around the dog’s anus. We detect no error 

in the trial court’s finding that the howling by the dog and the anal swelling suffered by the dog 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant inflicted pain on the dog. 

 Finally, defendant contests the validity of his sentence, arguing that because animal 

cruelty constitutes a misdemeanor, the trial court could impose only a probationary term of two 

 

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 In his appellate brief, defendant fails to address that the prosecutor charged him with violating 

MCL 750.50(2)(f), or the trial court’s analysis finding that he violated subsection (2)(f). 

Defendant’s brief instead addresses a different subsection, MCL 750.50(2)(b), which prohibits a 

person from “[c]ruelly driv[ing], work[ing], or beat[ing] an animal.” When an appellant fails to 

dispute the basis of the trial court’s ruling, we need not even consider granting the relief being 

requested. Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 381; 689 NW2d 145 

(2004). Regardless, sufficient evidence supports defendant’s conviction under subsection (2)(f). 
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years. Therefore, defendant argues, if this Court sets aside his felony bestiality conviction, 

remand for resentencing on the animal cruelty count is warranted. We have affirmed the 

bestiality conviction. Accordingly, defendant’s argument fails, but we shall briefly examine the 

sentence. Bestiality is a felony, MCL 750.158, and pursuant to the plain language of MCL 

771.2(1), “if the defendant is convicted of a felony, the probation period shall not exceed 5 

years.” The trial court also convicted defendant of misdemeanor animal cruelty, MCL 

750.50(4)(a), and under the plain language of MCL 771.2(1), “if the defendant is convicted for 

an offense that is not a felony, the probation period shall not exceed 2 years.” 

 The order of conviction and sentence and the order of probation identify the two statutes 

underlying defendant’s convictions, but refer to a single, three-year term of probation, which is a 

lawful term of probation given defendant’s felony bestiality conviction. The record does not 

establish that the trial court imposed a separate three-year term of probation for defendant’s 

misdemeanor conviction. Resentencing is thus unwarranted. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Peter D. O'Connell