alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Debra J. GUPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FOOD LION, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-1779.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued June 7, 2001.

Decided July 2, 2001.

*118Constance Alexandra Anastopoulo, Anastopoulo & Anastopoulo, Charleston, SC, for appellant.

Stephen Lynwood Brown, Young, Clement, Rivers & Tisdale, L.L.P., Charleston, SC, for appellee.

ON BRIEF: Stephen P. Groves, Sr., Randell C. Stoney, Jr., Young, Clement, Rivers & Tisdale, L.L.P., Charleston, SC, for appellee.

Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit JJ., and BEEZER, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Debra J. Gupton appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Food Lion, Incorporated, in this slip-and-fall diversity suit based on South Carolina law. *See Bessinger v. Bi-Lo, Inc.,*329 S.C. 617, 496 S.E.2d 33, 34 (S.C.Ct.App.1998). She alleged that she sustained injuries when she slipped and fell on two warm grapes that were on the floor of a Food Lion store in Charleston, South Carolina. On Food Lion’s motion, the district court found that Gupton had failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Food Lion had either actual or constructive notice of the grapes’ presence on the floor but nonetheless failed to remove them. *See id.; Gillespie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,*302 S.C. 90, 394 S.E.2d 24, 24 (S.C.Ct.App.1990).

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, *see Moore Bros. Co. v. Brown & Root, Inc.,*207 F.3d 717, 722 (4th Cir.2000), and conclude that the district court did not err in granting Food Lion’s motion. *See Wintersteen v. Food Lion, Inc.,*344 S.C. 32, 542 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2001) (“To require shopkeepers to anticipate and pre-vent acts of third parties is, in effect, to render them insurers of their customers’ safety. This is simply not the law of this state”); *Hunter v. Dixie Home Stores,*232 S.C. 139, 101 S.E.2d 262, 265 (1957) (granting summary judgment to defendant where “[t]here is an absence of evidence showing how the beans got on the floor or how long they had been there”); *Bessinger,*496 S.E.2d at 34; *H.L. Green Co. v. Bowen,*223 F.2d 523, 524 (4th Cir.1955) (interpreting South Carolina law) (“We cannot attribute constructive notice of the presence of this popcorn on evidence proving merely that the popcorn had been there a very few minutes”). The district court properly considered the evidence in the light most favorable to Gupton in concluding that there were no material facts in dispute. *See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,*477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); *Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co.,*80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir.1996). And the court correctly applied South Carolina’s slip-and-fall jurispru*119dence in determining that Food Lion did not breach its duty to Gupton. *See Brendle v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co.,*505 F.2d 243, 245 (4th Cir.1974) (federal court sitting in diversity applies the law as announced by the highest court of that state).. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

*AFFIRMED.*
### The Honorable George F. Gunn, Jr., United States Distric t 1 

### Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, adopting the rep ort and recomm endationof the Honorable Lawrence O. Davis, United State s Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. ___________ No. 95-3200

___________ Kenneth B. Jones, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. United States of America, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: March 1, 1996 Filed: March 7, 1996

___________ Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Kenneth B. Jones appeals from the district court's order denying his 1 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. After de novo review, we affirm.

In 19 93, Jones pleaded guilty to an information charging him wit h attempting to possess with intent to distribute fifteen kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1) and 846. In accordance with the parties' sti pulations, the district court sentenced Jones to 151 months imprisonment and five years supervised release, and ordered Jones to pay a $5,000

### -2-

fine; Jones did not appeal.

In 1994, Jones filed this section 2255 motion arguing, among othe r things, that the district court erred by assessing a firearm enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); that his prosecution and conviction fo r the drug offense was barred on double jeopardy grounds based on th e uncontested administrative forfeiture of $43,100; and that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise these issues on direct appeal. The district court denied Jones's motion on the merits.

We have repeatedly stated that "[a] defendant who explicitly an d voluntarily exposes h imself to a specific sentence may not challenge that punishment on appeal." United States v. Nguyen , 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir
. 1995) (citing United States v. Durham , 963 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 1023 (1992), and United States v. Fritsch , 891 F.2d 667, 668 (8th Cir. 1989)). Here, the record shows that at sentencing Jame s explicitly and voluntarily stipulated to a 151-month sentence. Because th e fi rearmenhancement claim Jones now asserts directly challenges tha t sentence, we conclude he is foreclosed from raising it. We also conclude that Jones's double jeopardy claim is foreclosed by this court's opinion in United States v. Clementi , 70 F.3d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 1995)
. Accord ingly, we need not consider whether Jones was denied effectiv e assistance. See Dyer v. United States , 23 F.3d 1424, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994) (no ineffective assis tance if claim defendant alleges counsel should have pursued is meritless).
Fi nally, we will address neither the claims Jones raises for th e first time on appeal, see Thomas v. United States , 27 F.3d 321, 325 (8th Cir. 1994), nor the issue raised for the first time in his reply brief, se e Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co. , 29 F.3d 362 , 367 n.6 (8th Cir. 1994).
The judgment is affirmed.

### -3- A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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H. Res. 429 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

May 23, 2007. 

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 

XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 

Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 

the bill (H.R. 1100) to revise the boundary of the Carl Sandburg Home National Historic Site in the State of North 

Carolina, and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill 

shall be dispensed with. All points of order against consideration of the bill are waived except those arising under clause 

9 or 10 of rule XXI. General debate shall be confined to the 

bill and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the 

Committee on Natural Resources. After general debate the 

bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute 

rule. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for 

the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the 

amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the 

Committee on Natural Resources now printed in the bill. The 
2 

•HRES 429 EH 

committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be 

considered as read. All points of order against the committee 

amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived except 

those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. Notwithstanding clause 11 of rule XVIII, no amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in 

order except those printed in the report of the Committee on 

Rules accompanying this resolution. Each such amendment 

may be offered only in the order printed in the report, may 

be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall 

be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, 

and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All 

points of order against such amendments are waived except 

those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such 

amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may 

demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment 

adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the 

committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and 

amendments thereto to final passage without intervening mo-
3 

•HRES 429 EH 

tion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions. 

SEC. 2. During consideration in the House of H.R. 1100 

pursuant to this resolution, notwithstanding the operation of 

the previous question, the Chair may postpone further consideration of the bill to such time as may be designated by the 

Speaker. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 189 (Monday, October 2, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Page 67783]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-21612]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Library of Medicine; Notice of Closed Meetings

    Pursuant to section 1009 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of a meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable materials, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Library of Medicine Special Emphasis 
Panel; E-Curation for Biomedical Research.
    Date: November 30, 2023.
    Time: 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Library of Medicine, 6705 Rockledge Drive, 
Bethesda, MD 20892, (Video Assisted Meeting).
    Contact Person: Ali Sharma, Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, 
National Library of Medicine, NIH, 6705 Rockledge Drive, Suite 500, 
Bethesda, MD 20892-7968, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#85e4e9ecabf6ede4f7e8e4c5ebecedabe2eaf3"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="9ffef3f6b1ecf7feedf2fedff1f6f7b1f8f0e9">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program No. 93.879, 
Medical Library Assistance, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: September 26, 2023.
Miguelina Perez,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2023-21612 Filed 9-29-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


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EXHIBIT 13.1





GREEN
CHINA RESOURCES, INC.


Certification





Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the
undersigned, Jean Chalopin, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
of Green China Resources, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certifies, to his
knowledge, that the Company's annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended
December 31, 2008  (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Date:
February 2, 2010





/s/ Jean
Chalopin


Name:
Jean Chalopin


Title:
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer








A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The
foregoing certification is being furnished with the Company’s Report pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and it is not to be incorporated by
reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date
hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such
filing.
EXHIBIT C

Case 2:06-cv-00204-JCC Document 41-4 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 1 of 3

Gordon v. Virtumundo Inc et al Doc. 41 Att. 3

Dockets.Justia.com
Delivered-To: virtual-gordonworks_com-jim@gordonworks.com 

Delivered-To: virtual-gordonworks_com-jay@gordonworks.com 

X-ClientHost: 106097121064103111114100111110119111114107115046099111109

X-MailingID: 308880

From: First Premier Bank <FirstPremierBank@vmadmin.com>

To: Jay <jay@gordonworks.com>

Reply-To: First Premier Bank <FirstPremierBank308880@replies.virtumundo.com> 

Subject: Your First PREMIER Bank Visa/MasterCard Application

Dear Jay,

First Premier Bank, 04:17 PM 6/8/2004, Your First PREMIER Bank Visa/MasterCard Application Page 1 of 2

Printed for 10/27/2006 CONFIDENTIAL VM 039046

Case 2:06-cv-00204-JCC Document 41-4 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 2 of 3
First Premier Bank 900 W. Delaware St., Sioux Falls, SD 57104

First Premier Bank, 04:17 PM 6/8/2004, Your First PREMIER Bank Visa/MasterCard Application Page 2 of 2

Printed for 10/27/2006 CONFIDENTIAL VM 039047

Case 2:06-cv-00204-JCC Document 41-4 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 3 of 3
From: esmit2@comcast.net

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Conscience cause

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 6:32:07 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Eric P Smith

Zion, IL 60099
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Garza MENDEZ, also known as Jose Garza, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-51150.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided July 27, 2005.

*310Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Donna F. Coltharp, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, JONES, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Following his conditional guilty plea, Jose Garza Mendez was convicted of one charge of illegal reentry into the United States and sentenced to serve 27 months in prison. Garza Mendez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Garza Mendez further argues that his sentence was improper under *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

Garza Mendez argues that his indictment was invalid because the underlying deportation order, which was based on his prior conviction for driving while intoxicated, is invalid under *United States v. Chapa-Garza,*243 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir. 2001). The denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment is reviewed de novo. *United States v. Wilson,*249 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir.2001). To prevail on a challenge to the validity of an underlying deportation order, an alien must establish that: (1) the prior deportation hearing was fundamentally unfair, (2) the hearing effectively eliminated his right to seek judicial review of the removal order, and (3) the procedural deficiencies caused actual prejudice. *United States v. Lopez-Vasquez,*227 F.3d 476, 483 (5th Cir.2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).

Garza Mendez has not shown that his deportation hearing violated his due process rights. *See United States v. Lopez-Ortiz,*313 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir.2002). He concomitantly has not shown that this hearing was fundamentally unfair. *See id.*Consequently, Garza Mendez has not shown that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, and we need not consider his remaining arguments in relation to this claim.

Garza Mendez also argues that his sentence is invalid under *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This claim is, as Garza Mendez concedes, foreclosed. *See Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 247, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); *United States v. Dabeit,*231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir.2000).

Garza Mendez has shown no error in the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment or in the judgment of conviction. Consequently, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Emery Joseph BEAULIEU, also known as Joe Beaulieu, Appellant.

No. 00-2339.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 18, 2001.

Filed June 22, 2001.

Before McMILLIAN, LAY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

After a bench trial, the district court convicted Emery Joseph Beaulieu of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and sentenced Beaulieu to 108 months imprisonment and five years supervised release. On appeal, Beaulieu’s counsel has filed a brief and moved to withdraw under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Beaulieu has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. Because we conclude Beaulieu knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, *see United States v. Michelsen,*141 F.3d 867, 871-72 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied,*525 U.S. 942, 119 S.Ct. 363, 142 L.Ed.2d 299 (1998), we enforce the waiver and dismiss this appeal, *see United States v. Estrada-Bahena,*201 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam). Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.