Editors:

Roy Kamphausen

David Lai

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

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The Chinese 

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Liberation Army 

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Strategic Studies Institute

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THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION 

ARMY IN 2025

Roy Kamphausen

David Lai

Editors

July 2015

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CONTENTS

Foreword .....................................................................vii

Overview .......................................................................1

1. Introduction .....................................................3

Roy Kamphausen and R. Lincoln Hines 

2. Whither China? Alternative Military Futures, 

 2020-30......................................................................31

Lonnie D. Henley 

Domestic, External, and Technological 

Drivers of People’s Liberation Army

Modernization .................................................55 

3. Domestic Drivers of China's Future Military 

 Modernization .....................................................57

Joseph Fewsmith 

4. People’s Liberation Army Trajectories:

 International Drivers ..............................................83

Eric Heginbotham and Jacob Heim

5. Capacity For Innovation: Technological 

 Drivers of China’s Future Military 

 Modernization.......................................................129

Richard A. Bitzinger and Michael Raska
Alternative Futures for the People’s 

Liberation Army ......................................................163

6. The People's Liberation Army in 

 2020-30 Focused on Regional Issues...................165

Bernard D. Cole

7. A Global Expeditionary People’s 

 Liberation Army: 2025-30 .................................207

Oriana Skylar Mastro

8. China’s Military Force Posture Under 

 Conditions of a Weakened People’s Liberation 

 Army: Alternative Military Futures, 

 2020-30 ...............................................................235

Daniel Gearin and Erin Richter

Implications for the Region, World, 

and U.S.-China Relations ....................................267

9. Regional Dynamics in Response to 

 Alternative PLA Development Vectors..............269

Michael McDevitt 

10. Implications: China in the International 

 System ..................................................................301 

Phillip C. Saunders

11. Implications for U.S.-China Strategic 

 Dynamics .............................................................335 

Robert Sutter

About the Contributors.............................................371 

vi
vii

FOREWORD

I’m pleased to introduce The Chinese People’s Liberation Army of 2025 which is the 2014 edition of an 

ongoing series on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

co-published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 

the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), and the 

United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). This 

volume builds on previous volumes and identifies potential trajectories for PLA force modernization and 

mission focus, and how these potential changes could 

impact external actors. 

This volume is of special relevance today in light 

of the profound changes occurring within the PLA. I 

have spent a considerable amount of my professional 

career in the Western Pacific and, during that time, 

I’ve seen first-hand the rapid expansion of the size 

and capability of the PLA as it pursues a long-term, 

comprehensive military modernization program in 

support of China’s more assertive regional strategy. 

China’s desire to develop a military commensurate 

with its diverse interests and economic power is both 

legitimate and understandable. However, China’s 

coercive approach to security is problematic and of 

increasing concern to the region. The challenge for 

USPACOM, and the reason why this volume is timely 

and important, is to understand how China will employ this growing military capability in support of its 

interests. 

The scholarship presented in this edition addresses the uncertainty surrounding the potential direction 

of the PLA by examining three distinct focus areas: 

Domestic, External, and Technological Drivers of PLA 

Modernization; Alternative Futures for the PLA; and 

Implications for the Region, World, and U.S.-China 
Relations. The analysis provides an insightful perspective into the factors shaping and propelling the 

PLA’s modernization, its potential future orientation 

ranging from internally-focused to globally-focused, 

and how the PLA’s choices may impact China’s relations with its neighbors and the world. 

NBR and SSI have, once again, provided an outstanding contribution to the growing body of research 

and analysis on the PLA. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army of 2025 is a timely and important volume that will increase our understanding of the PLA 

at a time in history that requires a well-informed approach to the expanding role of China. 

 

HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.

 Admiral, USN

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

viii
1

OVERVIEW

3

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Roy Kamphausen

R. Lincoln Hines

The 2014 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

conference occurred during a time of flaring regional 

tensions in the East and South China Seas, increasing 

military modernization by China and its neighbors, 

and a potentially changing Chinese approach to its 

regional security environment. In light of these continuing developments, the topic of this conference 

and this volume—The Chinese People’s Liberation Army 

in 2025—is both timely and prescient. China’s increasing military capabilities are creating complex shifts 

in regional security calculations. To understand the 

trends in China’s military modernization and its implications for regional and global security, conference 

participants assessed: 1) the various domestic, international, and technological drivers of China’s military 

modernization; 2) potential trajectories for PLA modernization; 3) and the implications of PLA modernization for the Asia-Pacific, the international order, and 

U.S.-China relations.

The bulk of this volume presents the papers that 

resulted from the 2014 Conference. This chapter discusses key contemporary developments that are pertinent to the topic of this volume. These developments 

include China’s President Xi Jinping’s relationship 

with the PLA, China’s changing approach to regional 

security challenges, and developments in the AsiaPacific and international security environments. After 

reviewing these developments, this chapter discusses 
4

the methodological framework for this volume, and 

provides a chapter-by-chapter summary of each of 

the papers included in this volume. This chapter concludes with a discussion of key themes that emerge 

from this analysis. 

XI JINPING AND THE PLA

China’s President Xi Jinping has quickly consolidated power during his first 2 years in office, despite 

both internal and external challenges to his leadership. 

Economically, Xi has stated that the market should 

play the “decisive” role in China’s economy to support his so-called “China Dream,” but still sees an important role for the state as an economic actor. Xi has 

also moved quickly to make reforms in domestic policy areas, such as banking and social policy (one-child 

policy and the hukou (户口) system). Xi also became 

Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) 

at the same time as he became General Secretary of 

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 

2012, unlike his predecessor, Hu Jintao, whose assumption of the CMC chairmanship was delayed for 

2 years. Likewise, Xi has taken charge of the two new 

structures brought into being by the Fall 2013 Third 

Plenum of the 18th Party Congress: the National Security Commission and the Central Leading Group for 

Comprehensive Deepening of Reforms (CLGCDR).

But it is Xi’s relentless implementation of a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that is perhaps the strongest indicator of his consolidation of power. Staking 

the Chinese Communist Party’s future—as well as his 

own personal survival—on the campaign’s success, Xi 

has provided top-level support for an anti-corruption 

campaign that has ensnared high-ranking civilian and 
5

military officials and potential rivals, such as Bo Xilai 

(薄熙来) and Zhou Yongkang (周永康). This anti-corruption campaign has also targeted top leaders of the 

PLA. Most recently, former CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Caihou (徐才厚) was expelled from the CCP 

and charged by prosecutors with accepting bribes in 

exchange for promotions. Xu is the highest-ranking 

PLA officer to be charged in court, and his retired 

status afforded no protection against prosecution, 

as had previously been the norm in Chinese politics. 

(Although Zhou Yongkang, a more senior but also already-retired Politburo Standing Committee Member, 

has also now been expelled by the Party and charged 

by prosecutors.) Whereas some observers have judged 

that taking on a “big tiger” of the PLA was part of an 

effort to gain control of the PLA, it seems more likely 

that Xi took his anti-corruption campaign to the top 

ranks of the PLA precisely because he had consolidated sufficient power to do so. 

Xi’s record of military service, albeit limited, and 

his status as a “princeling” or offspring of a top leader 

(His father, Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋), was a first generation CCP leader who served in several Party and 

People’s Republic of China (PRC) government roles, 

ultimately ending up as the Party Secretary and Governor of Guangdong Province) are often offered as 

evidence Xi has a special relationship with the PLA. 

But these facts, important as they may be, are not 

sufficient to explain how Xi was able to take charge 

so rapidly. Additional rationales are also required; 

perhaps Xi has taken charge of a PLA that already 

wants to be led in the direction he seems inclined to 

be heading. For instance, it certainly appears that at 

least some sectors of the PLA seem anxious to try out 

the newer enhanced capabilities now resident in the 
6

PLA. Because these new capabilities create new and 

different policy options, they might be of interest to 

the leadership, which might be inclined to see their 

use. A second instance in which Xi’s goals might be in 

consonance with broader PLA desires concerns anticorruption efforts. There are frequent reports of PLA 

officer discontent with rampant corruption, as well as 

a desire to more rapidly professionalize, despite official enjoinders that the PLA will always remain a 

“Party Army.” Xi may be tapping into that impulse to 

some extent. 

There remain some concerns, however, as to exactly how much control over the PLA Xi actually has. 

During his trip to India and visit with India’s Prime 

Minister (PM) Narendra Modi in September 2014, 

there was a simultaneous incursion by PLA troops into 

the Ladakh region along the Line of Control (LOC), 

reportedly resulting in PM Modi taking Xi to task for 

the action. Following the trip, Xi reportedly demanded “absolute loyalty” from top-ranking PLA leadership and stated that PLA forces could “improve their 

combat readiness and sharpen their ability to win a 

regional war in the age of information technology.” A 

potential second example occurred some months later. 

In November 2014, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) rolled 

out the new J-31 stealth aircraft, reportedly with some 

specifications very similar to the U.S. Air Force’s F-35, 

precisely during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing, which was attended 

by U.S. President Barack Obama. 

In light of these developments, it is important for 

policymakers to focus on the evolving civil-military 

relationship, and especially Xi Jinping’s interaction 

with the PLA. As Chairman of the CMC, Xi will continue the PLA’s refocus from being a ground force 
7

centric military to a more balanced joint force with 

much stronger naval and air force capabilities. He will 

also oversee implementation of the Third Plenum’s 

guidance on institutional and structural reform of the 

PLA, some which have obvious regional security implications. Xi almost certainly wants to have a more 

effective PLA, but not at the cost of raising regional 

security concerns. 

CHANGING CHINESE APPROACHES TO THE 

ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

These reforms within the PLA take place as China 

seems intent to more assertively pursue its interests 

and claims in disputed maritime domains. Despite 

long-standing efforts to mitigate regional perceptions 

of a “China threat,” Chinese actions in the East and 

South China Seas have alarmed both China’s neighbors and the United States, as in the last several years 

China has become increasingly more assertive in staking its territorial claims in its near periphery. Increasingly alarmed by Chinese actions, regional actors have 

protested on the one hand and sought more active intervention by the United States on the other. 

However, the PRC’s pursuit of its aims in its “near 

abroad” have neither broached American “redlines” 

nor have they escalated confrontations to the point 

where military conflict seems likely. This approach—

often referred to as a “salami slicing” approach—to attaining Chinese national security objectives has taken 

place in the gray area between normal peacetime and 

military conflict, albeit with the looming specter of an 

increasingly more capable Chinese military. 

China’s declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which covered the airspace over the 
8

Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, prompted an 

equally assertive American response including a flight 

of B-52 bombers through the ADIZ and a presidential 

statement that the Senkaku Islands were covered under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, since 

they are under the administrative control of Japan. 

China also placed an oil rig near the disputed Paracel 

Islands in May 2014, an oddly timed act considering 

that the PRC and Vietnam had agreed to discussions 

about joint development in mid-2013. The Philippines, 

on the other hand, has attempted to settle its dispute 

with China through international arbitration—a legal 

effort in which China refuses to participate. 

China’s gradual or creeping assertiveness begs 

the question: what is driving China’s new assertiveness? Certainly new capabilities and domestic pressure on the CCP to act like a great power (especially 

since a more restrained approach to conflicting claims 

in maritime dimensions has often been met with active occupation and/or reinforcement efforts by other 

claimants) are part of the story. Furthermore, more 

domestic actors—including state-owned enterprises, 

provincial and city governments, think tanks, netizens, among others—are engaged in the foreign policy process than previously, often arguing for different 

sorts of assertiveness. With these various pressures on 

Chinese foreign policy, it is important to ask: has there 

been a change in PRC strategy? Two key developments in 2013-14 suggest that subtle shift is underway. 

In October 2013, the PRC convened a conference on 

peripheral foreign policy, and Xi Jinping gave a major 

speech emphasizing the importance of regional relations. While great power relations were still judged 

to be important, a relative shift in importance toward 

regional security actors seemed clear. 
9

Then President Xi Jinping gave a keynote speech 

at the 4th Summit of the Conference on Interaction 

and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in 

May 2014 CICA Summit in Shanghai. In the speech, 

Xi argued vigorously for a system in which Asian nations take responsibility for Asia’s issues, emphasizing that regional security challenges should be solved 

by Asian nations themselves. While in later speeches, 

State Councilor Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪) notably stated 

that all countries contributions were welcome in the 

building of a regional security order, the “Asia for 

Asians” theme is likely to be repeated. These rhetorical changes suggest that China is refocusing on Asia 

as a principal objective of PRC security policy.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 

SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS 

China’s broad-based military modernization program and evolving posture toward the Asia-Pacific 

regional security environment take place within the 

context of a changing international security context. 

The stability of the international security system has 

relied, to a great extent, on the security that U.S. power has often provided to not only maintain its security 

commitments to allies and security partners, but to 

also discourage actions that threaten the norms that 

underpin the international system. However, though 

the United States remains an indispensable power, its 

monopoly on power, and thus to some extent the stability of the international system, is being challenged 

at the margins. 

The years 2013-14 were turbulent internationally. 

Prominent challenges to the global order and the U.S. 
10

capacity to sustain it have arisen in Eastern Europe 

and the Middle East. In Eastern Europe, Russian 

President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea represented a flagrant disregard for international norms 

against territorial annexation, and altered regional 

security calculations and energy security dynamics. 

Large parts of the Middle East remain unstable, as 

Syria’s ongoing civil war has reached its third year. 

The extremist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant (ISIL), has expanded its area of controlled territory and influence, and has executed American citizens. In light of these developments, the U.S. military 

has reengaged in Iraq and is now conducting airstrikes 

inside Syria. This is all occurring as the U.S. military 

experiencing severe spending cuts that constrain U.S. 

power projection and military response capabilities.

U.S. budget cuts and emerging crises thus call into 

question the U.S. capacity to sustain its security commitments in the Asia-Pacific, even holding Chinese 

activity constant. When an evolving set of capabilities 

and new apparent focus on the Asia-Pacific region 

by the PRC are added into the mix, dramatic changes 

seem possible. The key to determining the sustainability of this system will be determining, in this context, China’s capacity for challenging the international 

system and regional components of this system. 

The future-orientation of China’s military will 

depend heavily on factors such as the leadership of 

President Xi Jinping, the consequences of China’s actions in its near region, and continuing developments 

affecting the regional and global international order. 

As China continues its rise on world stage, the intentions and the strength of the PLA will become increasingly consequential for the regional and global security. Though it is not possible to predict China’s future 
11

intentions or capabilities, it is possible to begin thinking about which areas are most likely to drive PLA 

modernization, possible vectors for PLA modernization, and how regional and global security might look 

for the PLA in a variety of future scenarios. 

OVERVIEW

This volume and the conference that preceded it 

are deeply indebted to Mr. Lonnie Henley for crafting 

the conference précis that was provided to authors in 

the research and writing stage. The précis is essential 

reading for understanding the background of this effort and for the common frame of reference it provided 

to chapter authors, and has been included in Chapter 

2 in this volume. In the précis, Henley notes the relative lack of clarity from PLA sources as to what PLA 

modernization objectives are through 2020, much less 

further into the future, complicating efforts to understand future trajectories. He makes clear, however, 

that the PLA’s main strategic direction continues to 

be to prepare for a conflict with Taiwan and to deal 

with U.S. intervention in such a scenario. In developing three potential future scenarios, Henley first lists 

important variables that shape the futures, including 

Taiwan’s status, U.S. military capabilities in the AsiaPacific, and internal Chinese stability, among others. 

He further notes two important constants: China’s 

view of its own history and a deep aversion to political fragmentation of the Chinese state. Henley asserts 

that some factors are “non-drivers,” otherwise important factors that nonetheless will not have much 

impact on military modernization. Somewhat controversially, Henley includes that the fate of the CCP is 

a “non-driver” in that it does not rule out, or in, any 

particular future. 
12

After considering these factors, Henley concludes 

that three potential futures for the PLA might be usefully explored. The first future is of a PLA that is regionally focused. The second future sees the PLA as 

having global expeditionary capabilities. The final future is of a PLA that is significantly weakened in reach 

and scope. Henley states the many permutations that 

could exist, but argues that these futures cover sufficient breadth to be useful to chapter authors. It is important to note that Phillip Saunders provided a very 

helpful set of assumptions about the future which 

participants urged be included in the précis, to which 

Henley readily agreed.

The remainder of the volume is dedicated to “looking over the horizon” at these alternative futures for 

the Chinese military in 2025. Chapters 3 to 5 examine 

the various and likely domestic, external, and technological drivers of China’s military modernization. 

Chapters 6 to 8 discuss the potential alternative futures 

that could result from the interaction of the aforementioned drivers—a regionally focused PLA, a global expeditionary PLA, and a weakened PLA. Chapters 9 to 

11 explore the implications of these alternative vectors 

of PLA modernization for East Asian regional dynamics, U.S.-China relations, and the global system.

Domestic, External, and Technological Drivers of 

PLA Modernization.

China’s military modernization is and will continue to be driven by a number of variables. The authors 

in Chapters 3 to 5 assess the most plausible of these 

drivers. These three inputs can broadly be described 

as domestic, international, and technological drivers. It is important to note that none of these drivers 
13

should be viewed as occurring in isolation from one 

another. Instead, these variables should be viewed as 

dynamic and interconnected. 

In Chapter 3, Joseph Fewsmith explores the main 

domestic drivers of PLA modernization. Fewsmith 

discusses the various domestic drivers that have led 

China to alter its policy of “avoiding the limelight 

and keeping a low profile” (taoguang yanghui 韬光养

晦) introduced by Deng Xiaoping to an approach of 

“proactively getting some things done” (积极地有所作

为) practiced since 2009, when Hu Jintao was in office. 

Though Fewsmith contends that part of this increasing assertiveness is a natural outgrowth of China’s 

growing economic and military clout, he argues that 

the timing of China’s policy actions suggests that the 

drivers of China’s recent assertive foreign policy are 

largely domestic.

Fewsmith assesses several domestic factors influencing China’s security calculus. These factors include 

domestic social stability, the role of nationalism, concerns over legitimacy issues, a sense of crisis among 

the CCP, and the leadership of Xi Jinping and China’s 

new generation of leaders. China’s local cadres are 

often incentivized to pursue interests contrary to the 

people over whom they govern; consequently, China 

has seen an uptick in the number of “mass incidents.” 

In addition to these challenges, Fewsmith examines 

China’s growing nationalism and the implications 

this could have for elite decisionmaking. A further 

source of domestic pressure discussed by Fewsmith 

is the increasing discontent among Chinese intellectuals regarding the pace of political reform in China, 

which have created a “sense of crisis” among China’s 

political elites. 
14

According to Fewsmith, Chinese President Xi Jinping has been quickly consolidating power and has 

adopted a more assertive foreign policy. This more 

assertive foreign policy serves to facilitate centralization, as opposition to these efforts can be framed as 

unpatriotic. Yet, how durable are these factors driving 

China’s assertive foreign policy? Fewsmith contends 

that, although these trends may reinforce China’s assertive posture in the near future, China will be challenged by several socio-economic problems (e.g., an 

aging population) that may necessitate the Chinese 

policymakers refocus their attention inward. Fewsmith concludes that these domestic inputs might 

drive a more regionally oriented force, however these 

factors would be unlikely to sustain the type of effort 

required to develop a global expeditionary force.

In addition to these internal drivers, PLA modernization will also be driven by a number of interconnected external variables. In Chapter 4, Eric Heginbotham and Jacob Heim analyze how regional actors, 

U.S.-China relations, and China’s growing overseas 

interests are likely to affect China’s perceived national 

security interests and the weapons systems that it 

seeks to procure.

To establish an operational context for parsing the 

impact of different scenarios on Chinese military requirements, the authors begin with a discussion of East 

Asian geography and the types of forces China would 

need to act at three distances from its borders: the immediate periphery (defined as within 1,000 kilometers 

[km] of China); the broader region (roughly 1,000 to 

3,000-km); or areas outside region. Heginbotham and 

Heim also suggest that, although Chinese force development was optimized for operations in the country’s 

immediate periphery through the early-2000s, it has, 
15

for the last decade, placed greater emphasis on adapting its military for broader regional contingencies. 

The authors look at how relations with regional 

and global actors and China’s expanding overseas interests could serve to reinforce current trends toward 

limited power projection and broader regional capabilities. They also discuss current trends that deviate 

from that trajectory—either toward a force optimized 

to operate in China’s immediate periphery, a global 

expeditionary force, or a weakened PLA.

According to Heginbotham and Heim, there are 

a limited range of specific circumstances that could 

lead the PLA to refocus its military to its immediate 

periphery. A strong United States with a more adversarial relationship with China could potentially 

threaten China, spurring Beijing to focus more on 

short-range capabilities designed for defensive purposes in China’s immediate periphery. Similarly, the 

authors contend that if China views a conflict with 

Taiwan as likely or if Taiwan appears to be pursuing de jure independence, the PLA may refocus on 

the periphery.

There are several scenarios that could drive China 

to accelerate the development of capabilities relevant 

to wider regional scenarios. Heginbotham and Heim 

contend this could occur if PRC-Republic of China 

(ROC) relations remain stable, but China’s relationships with other regional neighbors worsen. A military conflict with one or more regional states or attacks 

on Chinese citizens in these states would provide particularly strong motivation. Heginbotham and Heim 

also contend that military-industrial cooperation and 

the formation of meaningful strategic partnerships 

with regional states could also provide incentives for 

China to develop certain types of regional military 

capabilities.
16

Chapter 4 also discusses scenarios that could make 

the PLA a more global expeditionary force. A more 

benign regional environment could provide a more 

permissive environment for diverting PLA resources 

to the development of extra-regional expeditionary capabilities. This could occur if China were able 

to resolve or, more likely, shelve its regional territorial disputes, or if its relations with the United States 

significantly improved. Threats to overseas Chinese 

citizens or investments in distant regions could spark 

domestic political demands for China to develop the 

forces necessary to protect its interests in those areas. 

China could also form deeper military-industrial ties 

with states beyond Asia and might then have added 

incentives for developing the military capacity to 

sustain those ties.

Finally, Heginbotham and Heim discuss the various external factors that could result in a weakened 

PLA. Though the authors note that internal factors 

are more likely to produce this outcome than external ones, they explore various external drivers that 

could weaken the PLA. If the PLA were to engage in 

a protracted and unsuccessful military conflict, public 

support for military modernization could diminish or 

resources could be drained more directly by the conflict itself. Diminished access to technology and components from Russia could affect the Chinese ability to 

produce or maintain certain types of systems. Or support from an outside power for domestic insurgency 

or terrorism could plausibly contribute to weakening the PLA’s ability to fight conventional wars by 

diverting resources and attention toward domestic 

counterinsurgency.
17

In addition to these external drivers, in Chapter 

5, Richard Bitzinger and Michael Raska examine the 

technological drivers of the PLA’s military modernization. Bitzinger and Raska explore the PLA’s approach to and capacity for innovation, and how these 

technological factors would serve a weakened, regionally oriented, or a global expeditionary PLA. Overall, 

this chapter examines China’s approach to military 

modernization, initiatives aimed at reforming China’s 

defense industry, and evaluates these efforts.

Bitzinger and Raska first review literature on the 

role of innovation in military affairs, defining the parameters by which they evaluate the PLA’s innovative 

capacity. From these parameters, the authors assess 

the PLA’s capabilities for making “disruptive” innovations, and the PLA’s capacity for making more incremental innovations. According to the authors, China has been trying to “catch up” with Western powers 

in terms of defense for the past 150 years with varied 

levels of success. In the mid-1990s, China instituted reforms to make its defense industry more efficient and 

responsive to its customer base. As part of its reform 

efforts, China has attempted to unify, standardize, 

and legalize its weapons procurement process. China 

is also making efforts to leverage civil military and 

dual-use technologies better. 

Although China’s military innovation lagged behind that of Western powers, China’s “latecomer 

advantage” has enabled it to skip various phases of 

development. As a latecomer, the PLA has been able 

to identify and absorb key foreign civil and military 

technologies. China’s military has benefitted from 

dramatically expanding defense budgets and increased funding for research and development. China 

has been working on 16 mega projects, with three 
18

classified projects. Bitzinger and Raska discuss the 

likely candidates for these three classified projects: 1) 

the Shenguang (Divine Light) laser program; 2) the 

Second Generation Beidou-2 Satellite System; and, 3) 

a hypersonic vehicle technology project. 

Overall, Bitzinger and Raska contend that China’s 

military has benefitted from investing heavily in military modernization, yet the PLA technological modernization still faces several obstacles in terms of innovation. The PLA’s indigenous innovative capabilities 

remain limited and the PLA’s technological innovation is still being outpaced by foreign competitors. 

Furthermore, few Chinese companies have the knowledge, experience, or capacity required for high-level 

production. 

Bitzinger and Raska conclude that China’s military 

might have the capacity for gaining niche asymmetric advantages that may increase its capability as a 

regionally oriented force, because regionally oriented 

forces, such as so-called anti-access/area-denial (A2/

AD) capabilities may only require incremental innovations. However, Bitzinger and Raska contend that 

China’s current defense industry does not appear set 

to have the capacity for the type of disruptive innovations necessary for developing a robust global expeditionary force. As for a weakened PLA, the authors 

contend that China could continue its process of incremental innovations and would likely focus more on 

developing its defensive capabilities.

Alternative Futures for the PLA.

The aforementioned domestic, external, and technological drivers will produce a wide range of possible alternative futures for the future composition 
19

and orientation of the PLA. Authors in Chapters 6 to 

8 considered three plausible and distinct, though not 

necessarily mutually exclusive, futures for the PLA: 

1) a regionally focused PLA; 2) a global expeditionary 

PLA; and, 3) a weakened PLA.

In Chapter 6, Bernard Cole discusses the potential 

makeup of a PLA focused on regional issues. According to Cole, in such a scenario, Taiwan would still remain a top contingency, but that the PLA’s most immediate maritime concern would be establishing sea 

control in “near seas” or “three seas.”

Cole discusses the various changes that might occur in the PLA’s orientation and structure to become 

a regionally oriented force. To meet regional challenges, the PLA’s personnel and budget prioritization 

would likely shift away from the PLA and move toward the PLA Navy (PLAN) and the PLAAF. As the 

ballistic missile capabilities of these forces continue 

to increase, the responsibility for controlling China’s 

nuclear forces will likely be divided among the Second Artillery Force (SAF), the PLAN, and PLAAF, 

with the SAF playing the leading role. Furthermore, 

Cole contends that the PLA will also likely continue 

efforts at reforming its personnel management and 

Professional Military Education (PME). Much of the 

PLA’s reforms will hinge upon the PLA’s ability to rid 

the PLA of corrupt promotion practices and develop a 

professional, career non-commissioned officer corps.

According to Cole, a regionally oriented China 

would likely have greater power projection capabilities, such as improved amphibious assault capabilities. 

With these growing capabilities, the PLA will likely 

increase the frequency of interregional port calls, and 

increase its involvement in nontraditional missions, 

such as counterpiracy and Humanitarian and Disaster 

Relief (HADR) operations. 
20

The PLA could also become a force with a more 

global reach. In Chapter 7, Oriana Skylar Mastro explores the potential makeup of a global expeditionary 

PLA. According to Mastro, the PLA will have to overcome significant hurdles and make several changes to 

its doctrinal, strategic, and force posture to become a 

global expeditionary force.

Specifically, Mastro posits a series of changes China would need to make to its doctrine, strategic guidelines, and operational concepts to be able to conduct 

global expeditionary operations on a limited scale. 

The PLA would likely move beyond its current doctrinal formulation of “local war under informationized conditions,” and seek to develop greater power 

projection capabilities to carry out “win-win operations.” The PLA would also reprioritize certain operational concepts, emphasizing joint island landing 

campaigns and strategic air raids, thus leveraging the 

PLA’s asymmetric advantages. Furthermore, Mastro 

contends that the PLA would likely seek to form more 

institutionalized strategic partnerships necessary for 

expeditionary concepts.

According to Mastro, the PLA would need to develop the relevant air, naval, and ground forces required to ensure that the PLA could not be denied air 

and sea space access in areas far from Chinese territory. Additionally, China will need to make significant 

technological progress in terms of space, cyber, and 

electronic warfare capabilities. Throughout Chapter 

6, Mastro discusses the types of developments in air, 

sea, and ground power, as well as changes to organization, training, and logistics that the PLA will need to 

support global expeditionary forces.

From these observations, Mastro discusses what 

a global expeditionary PLA could mean for China’s 
21

propensity to use force, as well as regional and global 

stability. If China gains global capabilities it may alter its grand strategy and move beyond its current 

regional aims. This could be a positive development 

if a global PLA becomes enmeshed in the global order and contributes more to global public goods. On 

the other hand, a global PLA could also interfere in 

areas around the world where the United States may 

prefer China to adopt a more “hands-off” approach. 

Even if China’s focus remains regional as it becomes 

more active globally, newfound capabilities could 

create a backlash among regional powers and the 

United States, resulting in regional instability or even 

armed conflict. 

After examining the potential makeup of a regionally focused, as well as a global expeditionary PLA, 

in Chapter 8, Erin Richter and Daniel Gearin discuss 

the potential makeup of a weakened PLA. Richter and 

Gearin explore some of the variables that could lead 

to a weakened PLA, and how these could reorient 

China’s security concerns, and the new challenges this 

would present for China. 

According to Richter and Gearin, there are several 

factors that could potentially result in a weakened 

PLA, but the most probable cause would be domestic—either from social instability or an economic 

downturn. In the case of social instability or a sharp 

economic decline, the PLA would likely have to divert resources away from PLA modernization and reallocate these resources toward internal security and 

self-defense.

A weakened PLA will have to be more selective 

in how it invests its resources. Richter and Gearin 

contend that though the PLA would like to have a reformed organizational structure and a more modern 
22

order of battle, a weakened PLA would have to refocus its training and make unplanned force reductions. 

The PLA would also have to slow the development 

and production of new combat systems and extend 

maintenance cycles. As a result, the PLA would have 

declined troop proficiency and combat readiness. The 

PLA would likely be able to carry out limited defensive military operations in its immediate periphery, 

but would be unable to meet challenges outside its 

immediate periphery. Richter and Gearin assess how 

these changes would affect various branches of the 

PLA, such as the PLA, PLAN, PLAAF, and the Second Artillery Force. Overall, a weakened PLA could 

have broader implications for regional security. A 

weak PLA could potentially encourage China’s neighbors to exploit China’s weakness. On the other hand, 

the PLA could also potentially seek to resolve territorial disputes before its military capabilities further 

deteriorate.

Implications for the Region, World, 

and U.S.-China Relations.

There are various potential trajectories for the 

PLA’s modernization. Whether the PLA is significantly weakened, anchored regionally, or is a robust 

global expeditionary force, these futures will have 

profound implications for East Asian regional security dynamics, U.S.-China relations, and the global 

system. Authors in Chapters 9 to 11 examine how the 

aforementioned alternative futures will affect relationships with, and factor into the security calculations of, 

regional actors and the United States, and ultimately 

the implications of this for the global system. 
23

In Chapter 9, Michael McDevitt examines the implications of PLA modernization for countries in the 

Asia-Pacific region. According to McDevitt, China’s 

military modernization is not a new phenomenon, 

and that China can already “reach out and touch” 

many countries in its near region. Therefore, for 

some countries in China’s immediate neighborhood, 

China’s military modernization will be threatening 

regardless of whether it increases, or if the pace begins to slow. For other countries, however, China can 

use various elements of its “smile diplomacy” to reassure them of China’s benign intentions, and allay 

regional anxieties.

According to McDevitt, China’s military modernization, regardless of which vector it takes, will have 

the same impact on certain countries in China’s near 

periphery. For example, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam will likely continue their military 

modernization programs regardless of the vector of 

China’s military modernization. South Korea’s primary security threat will likely continue to come from 

North Korea, and South Korea has ambitious naval 

modernization plans underway. Japan, Taiwan, and 

Vietnam are close enough in China’s periphery to be 

highly concerned about China’s military modernization program, even if its pace begins to slow.

Further outside the region, countries in Southeast Asia can be divided as follows: countries that 

are likely to be threatened immediately by China’s 

military modernization efforts; countries that are affected by how China handles its maritime disputes; 

and countries that are more likely to accommodate 

China. Countries such as Australia and India are most 

likely to be concerned about China’s naval modernization efforts, particularly its efforts at obtaining global 
24

expeditionary capabilities. Nevertheless, McDevitt believes that China can allay regional anxiety through its 

political, economic, and diplomatic efforts. As for the 

future composition of the PLA, McDevitt envisions a 

PLA that is primarily a regional force, with some global expeditionary elements, as these capabilities are not 

mutually exclusive.

Beyond its implications for regional dynamics, 

the PLA’s modernization will have significant implications for the international system. In Chapter 

10, Phillip Saunders explores the implications of the 

PLA’s modernization for the international system. 

After examining Chinese debates regarding international norms, Saunders argues that China appears to 

be a “moderate revisionist power.” The factors likely 

to determine China’s approach to international norms 

include China’s aversion to a military conflict with the 

United States, China’s global economic ties, its domestic stability, regional stability, and China’s power relative to the United States. Overall, Chapter 10 explores 

how a regionally focused PLA, a global expeditionary 

PLA, and a weakened PLA could impact the international system.

The first scenario considered by Saunders is that 

of a China and a PLA that remain focused on regional 

challenges. This implies a more competitive U.S.-China relationship within Asia. Saunders suggests Beijing 

would likely seek to moderate competitive tensions 

with bilateral cooperation on issues of mutual concern and adopt an incrementalist approach to altering the international system. Globally, China would 

likely pursue strategic partnerships to promote trade 

and finance rules more amenable to Chinese interests, 

and to promote the yuan as a global reserve currency. 

China would remain opposed to any U.S. interven-
25

tion. Saunders also contends that China could become 

more active internationally in combating transnational concerns such as terrorism. However, one concern for U.S. policymakers would be that China could 

develop closer relations with countries hostile to the 

West when it has concrete interests at stake.

Saunders also examines the implications of a global expeditionary PLA for the international system. According to Saunders, a PLA focused on global power 

projection implies that China has peacefully resolved 

its regional disputes and that the United States is comparatively weaker. In such a circumstance, the United 

States may encourage China to take on greater global 

responsibilities, and the two could achieve peaceful 

coexistence. Yet, if China’s new position of power is 

a result of failed U.S. policy, U.S. policymakers may 

approach Beijing with more suspicion. A global expeditionary PLA may also be motivated to meet security 

challenges in alternative security institutions outside 

the purview of the United Nations. It is likely, however, that the PLA would be selective in its use of force, 

considering that Chinese elites view U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as eroding U.S. power.

Lastly, Saunders discusses the implications of 

a weakened PLA for the international system. This 

would likely be the result of domestic problems that 

cause Chinese leaders to redirect resources away from 

PLA modernization to address internal security, requiring the PLA to assume a more defensive posture. 

A weakened PLA would likely allay U.S. and global 

concerns about China, but would not preclude China 

from conducting demonstrations or limited use of 

force when major interests are at stake. In international institutions, China would likely continue to oppose interventionist policies, and Beijing would likely 
26

seek closer bilateral relationships with other countries 

dealing with separatist issues such as Turkey, Russia, 

and Central Asian states.

In Chapter 11, Robert Sutter examines how the alternative futures discussed in previous chapters will 

affect U.S.-China strategic dynamics. Sutter discusses 

various aspects of U.S.-China strategic dynamics, such 

as the state of strategic equilibrium, China’s tougher 

approach in the Asia-Pacific, China’s domestic occupations, the high degree of economic interdependence 

between the United States and China, and U.S. leadership in the region.

Sutter contends that if the PLA becomes a regional 

force, although it would challenge U.S.-China relations, relations between the two would likely remain 

manageable. If China is a regionally oriented force and 

the United States maintains its leadership role in the 

region, China would likely be very cautious to enter 

into a military conflict with the United States. There 

are, however, “wild card” factors that could provoke 

conflict. For example, belligerent regional neighbors 

in Taiwan or Southeast could adopt policies that bring 

the United States and China into greater tension.

As for a global expeditionary PLA, Sutter contends 

that the implications of such a development would 

depend significantly on the reasons why China became a global expeditionary force. If China becomes 

a globally oriented force because it has resolved its 

territorial disputes peacefully and has reassured 

its neighbors, Chinese expeditionary forces may be 

welcomed and may be coordinated with the United 

States. If, however, China attains its position of power 

through coercive measures or by forcing the United 

States out of the region, the United States may check 

Chinese expansion outside of Asia. On the other hand, 
27

the two powers could possibly form a more pragmatic 

and cooperative relationship. 

Lastly, Sutter examines the implications of a weak 

CCP for U.S.-China relations. According to Sutter, 

U.S.-China relations in this scenario would depend 

largely upon whether or not China was still ruled by 

the CCP. If the CCP still ruled over China, it would be 

reasonable to expect greater U.S. interference. However, it is not in U.S. interests for the CCP to experience a sudden collapse. Thus, one of the key themes 

in future U.S.-China relations will be how the United 

States approaches its relations with the CCP.

THE PLA IN 2025

This volume is an effort to assess some of the most 

plausible drivers and trajectories for the PLA’s modernization and the potential ramifications this could 

have for regional, international, and U.S.-China relations. From these chapters several themes emerge. 

First, the futures are not mutually exclusive. While 

there will be differences in terms of magnitude, none 

of these futures rule out all elements of the other futures. For example, though a robust regional PLA 

may not possess or require forces to project power 

globally, this does not preclude the PLA from having an increased presence in international operations. 

Similarly, a weakened PLA, with fewer resources and 

thus more limited capabilities, could still maintain 

forces with considerable potential impact on regional 

neighbors. 

Second, this volume somewhat considers the domestic political context in which PLA modernization 

will occur over the next decade, but it inevitably makes 

judgments about the future based on what has already 
28

occurred. It does not, and indeed cannot, anticipate all 

future possibilities. Consider for example, the case of 

General Xu Caihou, discussed at the beginning of this 

chapter. Setting aside the relative merits of the charges 

against him, or even what the charges say about how 

endemic corruption might be within the PLA, it is the 

case that the PLA has not prosecuted a retired CMC 

Vice Chairman in the past; it was a wholly new development. Going forward, there may well be future 

scenarios that lack historical precedent, and which 

will clearly have uncertain and unanticipated effects 

on the PLA.

Third, as is concluded in several of the chapters 

in this volume, and was evident during the broader 

conference discussion at Carlisle, The Chinese PLA in 

2025 is anticipated still to have a regional orientation. 

In one scenario, these capabilities will be limited, in 

another much more robust, and in a third scenario, 

a regionally-capable PLA would be part of a larger 

global expeditionary force. Indeed, many of the technologies procured by a future PLA will have dual 

functions, making them useful for regional contingencies or limited power projection. That participants 

foresaw a PLA largely maintaining a regional orientation for a decade hence is certainly consistent with the 

shift in prominence to regional foreign affairs that has 

emerged in 2013-14.

Fourth, a PLA that it is largely regionally oriented would have important policy implications for the 

United States. Would such a PLA be less likely to strive 

for global competitor status with the United States, 

thereby avoiding the fundamental system struggle 

experienced by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the Cold War? If so, a 

certain level of security tension might be avoided. But 
29

it becomes also necessary to assess whether a regionally focused PLA will be less welcoming of U.S. posture and presence, especially if an “Asia for Asians” 

motif gains strength. If this proves true, we can expect 

higher levels of security contestation since the United 

States would likely continue pursuing its freedom of 

navigation aims and support for regional allies. 

Fifth, even though the PLA must overcome many 

obstacles in its modernization efforts, if the PRC continues to invest heavily in PLA modernization, the 

PLA could very well develop the types of capabilities 

that could supplant a regional focus with a more global orientation. Yet, as the PLA continues to modernize 

policymakers must accord these developments their 

proper weight, and assess whether technological developments address important tactical goals or more 

strategic aims. Moreover, the degree to which the PLA 

is a technological innovator will shape how much the 

PLA is able to fundamentally reshape the regional 

security landscape and potentially challenge U.S. interests and sustained focus on the Asia-Pacific region, 

thus on the part raising important policy implications 

for the United States. 

Sixth, the process of transition to alternative futures—how they come to pass—will likewise have 

important ramifications for regional security. For instance, a strong and regionally focused PLA does not 

necessarily harm U.S. interests if disputes are resolved 

peacefully and if China is able to successfully reassure 

the United States and its regional neighbors. Likewise, 

a PLA that is weakened is not necessarily a future 

that should be welcomed if it invites aggression from 

China’s neighbors or if it leads China to behave more 

belligerently in an effort to resolve territorial disputes 

before its capabilities go into further decline. 
30

Last, any future-oriented assessments must be 

approached with caution. There are numerous, unexpected “wild card” events that could potentially 

undermine the trajectories discussed in this volume. 

These wild cards include both domestic and external 

developments. Similarly, though PLA capabilities will 

be a significant component of China’s comprehensive 

national power, future-oriented projections of China’s 

role in the world must take into account other factors 

such as economic interdependence and diplomacy. 

Additionally, the future of China’s political leadership 

likely matters as well. While conference participants 

were not predisposed to imagine a China without the 

CCP in charge, such a huge change would almost necessarily have an impact on PLA futures as well. 

Overall, the trajectory China’s military follows 

will be of significant consequence for security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region and for global security 

and international norms. This volume represents an 

effort to examine the drivers, potential vectors, and 

implications of China’s military modernization for the 

near-to-medium future. The authors in this volume 

are among the foremost experts on China’s military. 

Their unique insights and perspectives illuminate 

some of the most pressing concerns for policymakers 

in the near future. We hope readers find this book to 

be informative and that it illuminates their own work 

regarding China.
31

CHAPTER 2

WHITHER CHINA?

ALTERNATIVE MILITARY FUTURES, 2020-30

Lonnie D. Henley

The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s 

alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Department of Defense or any other element of the 

U.S. Government.

Projections of China’s future are hardy perennials in the garden of punditry, so this chapter does not 

pretend to any earth-shaking new insights.1 Its purpose is to frame the discussion for other authors in 

this volume. The focus is on alternative visions of Chinese military posture in the decade between 2020 and 

2030, dates chosen because of the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army’s (PLA) continued reliance on 5- and 

10-year planning cycles. Although Chinese public 

statements are not very transparent about the goals 

set for the PLA between now and 2020, it is reasonably clear that there are such goals and that barring a 

major change in strategic objectives, the PLA’s course 

through 2020 is already determined. We will examine 

what those goals might be, and what kind of developments might lead them to change between now and 

then. The main focus of this chapter, however, is on 

what might happen afterwards if the PLA achieves its 

2020 goals and what direction PLA force development 

might take in the following decade through 2030. 
32

ASSUMPTIONS

To assess potential PLA development toward 

2020-30, we must first establish a baseline understanding about the future of the global order. Dr. Phillip 

Saunders wrote the chapter in this volume entitled 

“Implications: China in the International System,” in 

which he explores the impacts on China’s participation in the global order under the three future scenarios detailed later in this discussion. In his original 

conference draft, Saunders listed a range of assumptions about the international system and global technology in 2025 that should be taken into consideration 

when considering the future. As Saunders’ list was the 

most comprehensive and captured all of the various 

inputs discussed in the conference, participants urged 

that the assumptions be incorporated into an enlarged 

conference précis, which served as the starting point 

for each individual chapter as authors undertook their 

assigned tasks. Assumptions about the international 

system and global technology and assumptions about 

China in 2025 will be discussed.

Assumptions about the International System and 

Global Technology in 2025.

• Today’s global governance (United Nations 

[UN] General Assembly; UN Security Council; 

nonproliferation regime) and economic (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and 

World Trade Organization) institutions still exist and perform their basic functions. Their effectiveness is a function of the degree of major 

power consensus on particular issues, with less 

U.S. ability to shape consensus and determine 

outcomes.
33

• Globalization and a liberal global trade regime 

continue, but major economies and major regional powers are more willing to carve out 

exceptions to global rules when it suits their 

particular economic interests. Regional trade 

mechanisms have become more widespread 

and cover a significant percentage of global 

trade. Enforcement of global trade, finance, 

and intellectual property rules and norms has 

become more difficult.

• Continued growth in major regional powers 

means that the U.S. share of the global economy 

has declined somewhat relative to others. The 

United States is still the most powerful country, 

and one of only a handful of states able to wield 

all the elements of national power (diplomatic, 

information technology, military, and economic) on a global level.

• The United States still plays an active global 

role and is involved in most other regions of the 

world. The United States depends even less on 

Middle East oil, but its economy is still affected 

by fluctuations in global oil and natural gas 

prices.2 The Asia-Pacific is the region of most 

importance to the U.S. economy.

• The United States has significant military power 

projection capabilities, but is less willing to intervene militarily in other regions. The United 

States will provide military training; advisors; 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) support; and logistics and airlift to help 

allies and partners deal with regional instability on a case-by-case basis.

• Other major powers have only limited extra-regional power projection capabilities (less than 
34

today in case of European Union members; 

somewhat more than today in case of Russia 

and major regional powers such as India and 

Brazil).

• The world includes a diverse range of democratic, semi-democratic, and authoritarian 

regimes.

• Most countries remain dependent on fossil fuels for most of their energy; renewable forms 

of energy and nuclear power have a somewhat 

expanded share.3

• No fundamental improvements in the speed 

and cost of land, water, and air transportation, 

although the Northern passage will provide 

a shorter route from Asia to Europe during 

summer months.

• The speed and distribution of telecommunications and internet access continue to increase 

in both developed and developing countries; 

satellites play a more important role in global 

communications.

• Only a few countries and companies produce 

state-of-the-art weapons (e.g., fifth generation 

fighters), which are sold to select customers at 

high cost and in limited quantities.

• Weapons that incorporate 1980s-1990s technology are widespread in medium-sized developed countries and major regional powers; 

some countries have militaries equipped with 

somewhat more advanced technologies, including some anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) 

capabilities.

• Major regional powers and some medium-sized 

developed countries have deployed better sensors (radars, drones, and satellites) and Com-
35

mand, Control, Communications, Computers, 

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

(C4ISR) capabilities to improve their situational 

awareness and military effectiveness.

Dr. Saunders’ assumptions provide critical context 

for the individual chapter authors’ analysis in this 

volume. Beyond the context these assumptions have 

provided authors, they also serve to demonstrate the 

expected developments, in a global context, to which 

the PLA will need to adapt its goals and capabilities in 

the coming decades. 

2020 DEVELOPMENT GOALS

It is clear that the PLA relies heavily on 5- and 10-

year plans to guide long-term force development. It is 

much less clear what those plans contain. The 2020 goal 

is frequently stated in terms of “basically accomplishing mechanization” and “making substantial progress 

in informationization” to “lay a solid foundation for 

the building of fully informatized military forces.”4

Even more vaguely, the 2006 defense white paper

articulated PLA modernization goals as “lay[ing] a 

solid foundation by 2010,” “mak[ing] major progress 

around 2020,” and “basically reach[ing] the strategic goal of building informatized armed forces and 

being capable of winning informatized wars by the 

mid-21st century.”5 The 2020 part of that formula appeared again in the 2010 defense white paper, with no 

more definition.6

Public statements about 5-year plan objectives are 

equally opaque. Press articles about the General Staff 

Department’s “Plan for Reform of Military Training 

during the 12th Five-Year Plan”7 (“十二五”时期军事
36

训练改革总体方案) are full of PLA-speak platitudes 

about advancing from training under conditions of 

mechanization to training under conditions of informationization, accelerating the change in PLA modes 

of training to respond to the rapidly changing requirements for generating combat power, etc.8

The Hong Kong journal Wen Wei Po asserted in 

2011 that the PLA will enjoy a major upgrade in military hardware during the 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP).9

The article quoted then Chief of General Staff Chen 

Bingde speaking at the end of the 2011 National 

People’s Congress, saying the PLA will: 

make accelerating the transformation of the modes 

for generating combat power the main battle lines of 

national defense and armed forces development, and 

carry out the entire process of armed forces development and reform and military combat preparations in 

every realm.10

After decades of studying the PLA, I still cannot 

decide whether the reams of boilerplate issued on 

such occasions convey any useful information to PLA 

insiders. I certainly get little out of them. 

Since the PLA will not tell us what its development 

goals for 2020 consist of, we are left to infer them from 

logic and our basic understanding of Chinese security 

objectives. The goals seem to fall into two major categories. The first, and most challenging, is completing preparations for potential conflict around China’s 

periphery. These “strategic directions,” the Chinese 

equivalent of U.S. Defense Planning Scenarios, were 

articulated in the 2004 iteration of the Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Era (新时期军事战略方针), 

issued by the Central Military Commission on behalf 

of the collective political leadership.11 Authoritative 
37

PLA documents make clear that the “primary strategic direction” (主要战略方向) serves as the driver of 

military force development, or “army building” (军队

建设) in the PLA lexicon:

Planning for the national defense and modernization 

of army building, and planning for military combat 

preparations requires a prominent primary strategic 

direction. While paying attention to other strategic directions, the primary strategic direction is the impetus 

for army building in other strategic directions.12

A 2013 text for masters’ degree candidates at the 

Academy of Military Science says that there should be 

only one primary strategic direction at any given time, 

providing the foundation for strategic decisionmaking, combat preparations, strategic disposition, and 

the employment of forces.13

Although the PLA tries not to discuss openly what 

scenario constitutes the primary strategic direction, 

many sources make clear that it is the “southeast coast” 

(东南沿海); that is, a conflict with Taiwan and the 

United States over Taiwan’s status.14 The secondary 

strategic directions are harder to identify. One source 

specifies the South China Sea and the Indian border;15

other obvious candidates include the East China Sea 

(that is, conflict with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 

Islands), the Korean border, and possibly the Central 

Asian frontier. 

It is also clear that the PLA does not yet have all 

the capabilities it requires for those missions. I will not 

rehash the arguments developed very well in many 

other sources—the U.S. Department of Defense annual report to Congress,16 previous volumes from this 

conference series,17 monographs and edited volumes 

by my many esteemed colleagues.18 It therefore seems 
38

likely that one major focus of PLA force development 

through 2020 is on the hardware, doctrine, organizational structure, tactics, techniques, and procedures, 

and support structures required for the Taiwan mission, including counterintervention operations against 

U.S. forces and any third party that joins in defending 

Taiwan, and training the force to execute such operations. With only a few exceptions, the capabilities 

required for the other strategic directions are a lesser 

included set of those required for Taiwan. 

The other candidate for 2020 force development 

objectives is the out-of-area power projection capabilities required for the “Historic Mission of Our Armed 

Forces in the New Century and New Era” (新世纪新

阶段我军历史使命) articulated by Hu Jintao in 2004.19

Again, my colleagues have examined in depth the associated missions, the capabilities required, and where 

the PLA stands in pursuit of those objectives, and 

there is no need to repeat that excellent work here.20

That leaves the question of the relative balance 

between those two objectives, between getting ready 

for potential fights around China’s periphery versus 

developing capabilities to defend China’s interest outside the immediate East Asia region and to conduct 

other “military operations other than war” (非战争军

事行动, MOOTW). It seems to me that the former must 

take priority until such a time as the PLA can assure 

political leaders that it is fully capable of defending 

China’s territory and sovereignty, including compelling Taiwan’s unification with mainland China by 

military force if called upon to do so. This is not to the 

exclusion of building other capabilities, as highlighted 

by the focus of China’s 2012 defense white paper on 

“diversified missions” for the PLA.21 But the Taiwan 

mission will take priority, in my view.
39

If nothing changes, the most likely course of events 

for the PLA is to stay focused through 2020 on developing whatever capabilities the PLA and Chinese 

leaders have decided are necessary to fight and win a 

war with Taiwan and to thwart U.S. military intervention in that conflict. But something will change sooner 

or later, if only that the PLA achieves its Taiwan-related force development goals and is able to give more 

attention to other issues. The heart of this chapter, 

therefore, addresses the range of possible outcomes 

for Chinese military force posture, starting with a set 

of assumptions by Dr. Saunders about China through 

2025, leading to an examination of the factors likely 

to have the greatest impact on the outcome. The concluding section aggregates these drivers into several 

representative cases illustrating the range of alternative futures of interest for this conference. 

Assumptions about China in 2025.

• China will remain dependent on imports (food, 

energy, and raw materials) and foreign markets and thus must be engaged internationally. 

Higher economic growth rates will likely increase Chinese demand for imports (and likely 

increase exports as well). China will continue 

to be the world’s largest oil importer and its 

demand for imported oil, natural gas, and coal 

will increase significantly through 2025.22

• The pattern of Chinese trade will determine 

the relative economic priority Chinese leaders 

place on different regions.

• Chinese interests outside Asia will likely follow 

this pattern, with highest priority countries and 

regions listed first:
40

— Internal Security: Beijing will focus on countries that might support terrorist or separatist groups operating in China and seek to 

obtain cooperation in suppressing the activities of those groups. Priorities: South Asia 

(Pakistan, Afghanistan, India), Central Asia 

(bordering countries), and the Middle East 

(Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Yemen).

— Energy: Beijing will focus on countries able 

to export oil and natural gas to meet China’s 

energy needs. Priorities: Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and North 

America.23

— Raw Materials: Beijing will focus on countries able to export minerals, metals, and 

food to meet China’s economic needs. Priorities: Africa, Latin America, and Central 

Asia.

— Markets: Beijing will focus on markets for 

Chinese exports, with developing countries 

gradually playing a more important role. 

Priorities: Europe, North America, Middle 

East, Latin America, and Africa.

• China’s military posture will have only a limited direct impact in shaping the international 

security environment outside Asia. That impact 

will depend primarily on China’s ability and 

willingness to project power outside Asia or to 

sell significant quantities or types of advanced 

weapons that change local military balances. 

However, Chinese actions in Asia (e.g., using 

coercion to assert control over disputed territory, ignoring rulings by international courts, 

or enforcing restrictive rules on military operations in exclusive economic zones) may set 

precedents that affect other regions.
41

• The approach Chinese leaders adopt toward 

regions outside Asia will remain focused on 

obtaining concrete benefits (or forestalling specific harms) for China and Chinese citizens.

• China will have neither an ideology with global 

appeal nor an attractive vision of a new world 

order; as a result China’s “soft power” will remain limited.24 The partial exception is potential 

support for Chinese calls for an international 

economic order more favorable to developing 

countries, although concerns about competition from Chinese companies will complicate 

Chinese efforts to build coalitions on this issue.

Drivers Part 1: Variables.

Most of the factors likely to drive the course of Chinese military development are variables, in that there 

are a number of possible paths to consider in each category. The variables that seem most likely to have an 

impact include:

• Status of Taiwan. If Chinese leaders are able to 

achieve a reconciliation with Taiwan that satisfies their political and nationalist objectives, and 

that they can be confident will endure, this may 

eventually lead them to relieve the PLA of the 

requirement to be able to intimidate and coerce 

Taiwan or compel its unification with China 

with military force. It probably would not have 

that effect immediately, as it would take some 

time to gain confidence that whatever compromise they had achieved would not be reversed 

by future leaders in Taipei or Washington. So a 

reconciliation in the next year or two probably 

would not change China’s military posture 
42

until 2020 or so, while a much later reconciliation might not have military effect until closer 

to 2030. Conversely, if Chinese leaders lose 

confidence in the long-term viability of political 

and economic approaches to Taiwan, becoming 

convinced that time is not on China’s side and 

that developments on Taiwan are foreclosing 

the possibility of peaceful unification, then it 

is likely they would accelerate military modernization beyond the pace currently intended, 

and that out-of-area missions would drop to a 

much lower priority. Finally, if neither of those 

extremes comes to pass, but the Taiwan issue 

remains unresolved, then achieving and maintaining the capabilities required for a Taiwan 

conflict will remain the central focus of Chinese 

military modernization, at roughly the same 

development pace as today.

• U.S. Military Capabilities. The PLA’s modernization trajectory is shaped in large part 

by Chinese perceptions of current and future 

U.S. military capabilities relevant to a potential 

conflict in China’s “near seas.”25 If they reach 

their 2020 force development objectives only to 

find that U.S. capabilities are progressing faster 

than they anticipated in an environment where 

the Taiwan mission remains their primary focus—if U.S. military modernization has moved 

the goalposts, so to speak—then the subsequent decade of PLA modernization through 

2030 probably also will center on countering 

U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan conflict. 

Conversely, if they achieve their goals and consider themselves ready for whatever the United 

States might bring to the fight, then their 2020-
43

30 force development may exhibit more balance 

between staying ready for a conflict near China 

and projecting power elsewhere in the world.

• Military Conflict. If China is involved in a military conflict with any of its neighbors or with 

the United States (probably in support of a 

neighbor), that will radically change Chinese 

perceptions of the international security environment, and not for the better. Even if China 

is successful militarily, the conflict is likely to 

so inflame patriotic sentiment among elites and 

the general public that Chinese leaders perceive 

the need for more rapid military development 

to prepare for the next fight.

• Status of Territorial Disputes. Closely related 

to possible conflict is how well China and its 

neighbors deal with festering disputes in the 

East China Sea, South China Sea, and along 

the Indian border. If Beijing were able to reach 

some kind of accommodation with rival claimants, either a final settlement or a durable modus vivendi, then depending on the status of 

the Taiwan issue discussed earlier, it might 

not perceive any near-term issue that would 

be likely to spark a conflict with the United 

States. It is likely Chinese leaders still would 

perceive a long-term U.S. intention to contain 

China’s rise to world power, and perceive that 

military pressure would always form a central 

part of that containment scheme. So preparing 

for a potential conflict with the United States 

would still shape Chinese military modernization, but the perceived arena for that contest 

might be broader than China’s maritime periphery. At the other extreme, a potential war 
44

with the United States in the Senkaku/Diaoyus 

or Spratlys could replace Taiwan as the focus of 

PLA modernization.

• Internal Stability. How Beijing views the outside world depends heavily on how well they 

are coping with their many internal challenges. “Internal strife and external calamity” (内

乱外患) will always be linked in the Chinese 

mind, but as Chiang Kai-shek famously said, 

the external threat is a disease of the limbs, but 

the internal threat is a disease of the heart. A 

Chinese regime that was overwhelmed with 

internal crises might welcome a relatively benign external environment, to the extent that 

it cut spending on warfighting capabilities in 

order to concentrate resources on internal political, economic, environmental, and security 

concerns (to include, of course, the military’s 

ability to crush opponents inside China). A severe and prolonged economic downturn would 

probably accompany such strife, if it did not 

cause it in the first place, further reducing the 

resources available for military modernization. 

Alternatively, beleaguered officials could stir 

up external trouble to divert their internal opponents. Such events are rarer in actual world 

affairs than in political prognostications, but 

they do occur.

• Progress toward China’s Strategic Goals. By 

the mid-2020s, China could have made enough 

progress toward being a respected great power to begin defusing the deep-seated sense of 

historical victimization and national grievance 

against the outside world. A more satisfied 

China could take a more relaxed and nuanced 
45

approach to relations with its neighbors, to 

Taiwan affairs, and to the United States and 

other great powers. Alternatively, the growth 

of Chinese power could fuel greater national 

arrogance, a determination to impose China’s 

will on others using all the components of comprehensive national power, including military 

might. Similarly, at the other extreme, a China 

that was visibly failing to achieve its goals of 

economic prosperity, military strength, and 

international influence could seethe with resentment at those deemed responsible for frustrating its rightful ambitions. Least likely, but 

still possible, is a national acceptance that such 

ambitions were overly grandiose to begin with, 

and that China needs to be less confrontational 

abroad in order to focus on its own internal 

problems.

Drivers Part 2: Constants.

There are several factors likely to influence the 

course of Chinese military modernization that do not 

seem likely to vary over the coming 15 years, at least 

in the opinion of this observer. 

• Chinese Views of China’s History. The narrative that dominates Chinese views of their own 

modern history pivots around China’s unjust 

treatment at the hands of rapacious foreign 

powers, China’s “century of humiliation” from 

the Opium War to the reunification in 1949, 

and of the “sacred mission” to complete China’s return to national power and international 

respect. The Communist Party-dominated 

regime has assiduously fanned the flames of 
46

wounded nationalism, but they did not invent 

this narrative, and it will not fade soon from 

public consciousness, regardless of any other 

developments. As a result, any future China, 

however consumed with internal problems or 

however satisfied with progress toward its strategic goals, will remain distrustful of foreign 

intentions and feel the need for a significant capability to defend against the world’s leading 

military powers for considerably longer than 

the 2030 time frame of this projection.

• Aversion to Political Fragmentation. Closely 

related to the historical narrative is the perception that China must, at all costs, remain politically unified and remain committed in the 

long term to regaining lost territories such as 

Taiwan. Political fragmentation was one of 

the main tools China’s enemies used to drag 

it down from the world’s richest nation in the 

high Qing dynasty to one of its poorest in the 

mid-20th century, according to the narrative, 

and no patriotic Chinese of any political persuasion could countenance dividing the country. Of course, some ethnic minority groups 

disagree on whether Tibet and Xinjiang should 

rightly be part of China, but the majority Han 

Chinese opinion on such issues is not likely to 

evolve very far in the next decade or two. As 

a result, if there is no acceptable political resolution of the Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu, or 

South China Sea issues, those will continue to 

shape Chinese military modernization for the 

foreseeable future.
47

Drivers Part 3: Non-Drivers.

Finally, a few issues that will not have much effect 

on the course of military modernization, in this author’s opinion, even though others might vigorously 

disagree.

• Fate of the Chinese Communist Party. It matters a great deal whether the Chinese government is able to maintain stability, address the 

legitimate demands of the people, and sustain 

economic development while ameliorating its 

adverse effects. For the purposes of projecting 

military modernization trends, however, I am 

convinced that it does not much matter whether that government is the Chinese Communist 

Party or a post-Communist regime of some 

sort. Of course, it matters how traumatic the 

transition was, whether the successor regime 

was hostile to the United States, whether they 

blamed us or praised us for whatever sequence 

of events led to the end of the former regime. 

But with regards to the effect on China’s military posture, whether the Party retains power 

is a dependent variable driven by the independent variables outlined earlier. Any of the alternative futures assembled below could come 

to pass under Communist leadership or under 

any of various possible post-Communist governments. Or so it seems to me.

• Party-Army Relations. Similarly, for the purposes of this analysis, it does not matter much 

whether the PLA remains the army of the 

Communist Party or becomes a nonpolitical national army. The issue at hand is what 

kind of missions the Chinese armed forces are 
48

prepared to undertake, what national aspirations and economic resources underpin military modernization, and what kinds of issues 

might lead to military conflict between China 

and other states. Whether the Chinese armed 

forces develop such capabilities in the name of 

the Party or the state has little effect on those 

questions. So in the remainder of this chapter, 

we will continue referring to “the PLA” for 

convenience sake, but the reader should interpret that to mean “China’s military forces” in 

general, whatever their future name or political 

orientation.

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

This list of drivers is far from exhaustive, although 

a motivated pundit probably could stuff whatever 

other factors one wanted to raise into one of the broad 

categories listed previously. Nonetheless, there are far 

more permutations of those variables and constants 

than we can examine here, and each construct is a perfectly plausible alternative for how China might develop over the coming decade and a half. Our purpose 

here is not to predict the single most likely outcome, 

but we also should not get lost in an endless thicket 

of possible futures. In order to set the stage for useful 

analysis by the other contributors to this volume, we 

will group the hundreds of possible futures into three 

major bins.
49

Alternative Future 1: A PLA Focused 

on Regional Issues.

In this future, the PLA’s primary mission remains 

to prepare for conflict on China’s periphery, particularly its maritime frontier along the southeast coast, 

and in particular to fight a high-intensity war against 

U.S. military forces intervening on behalf of Taiwan, 

Japan, Vietnam, or whoever else China is fighting. 

The Taiwan issue has not been resolved to China’s 

satisfaction, or some other issue has loomed as large 

as Taiwan was before. The Chinese government has 

its internal issues well enough in hand to continue 

prioritizing and funding military modernization. The 

PLA is not confident that its modernization through 

2020 was sufficient to meet the U.S. threat, and outof-region missions continue to take a back seat as 

the PLA responds to the previously-unexpected increase in U.S. military capabilities. Regional conflict 

remains the central focus of PLA military modernization through 2030, and its ability to project power to 

other regions of the world increases only as an adjunct 

to developing combat capabilities out to the second 

island chain.

Alternative Future 2: A Global Expeditionary PLA.

The PLA’s primary focus has shifted to military 

power projection beyond China’s maritime periphery, whether because regional tensions have faded, 

because the PLA has satisfied Chinese leaders that 

it has achieved what needs to win regional conflicts, 

or because unexpected events elsewhere in the world 

have raised Beijing’s sense of urgency about protecting Chinese interests farther afield. The government 
50

has internal issues under control and can afford the 

required new military capabilities. For most of the decade between 2020 and 2030, the PLA focuses on power projection, the details of which we leave to other 

contributors to explore.

Alternative Future 3: A Weakened PLA. 

Chinese leaders are overwhelmed with China’s internal problems, and the resources available for military modernization have dropped sharply. The PLA 

failed to achieve the development it intended, and the 

decade through 2030 is consumed in a protracted effort to achieve capabilities relative to the United States 

that it intended to achieve by 2020. Internal missions 

including disaster relief, internal security, and assistance to civil authorities consume a great deal of the 

PLA’s time. The external situation remains tense, the 

possibility of conflict has not diminished, and Chinese 

interests remain threatened in other parts of the world, 

but the PLA does not have the time or resources to 

address those challenges as well as it would wish. 

POSTSCRIPT

The arbitrary choice of three alternatives is not intended to constrain further analysis, but just to provide 

a framework for discussion. The other contributors to 

this volume will do the heavy lifting, examining their 

assigned topics in light of these three alternatives, 

then pointing out any other important possibilities 

which this overly-simplistic schema omits. I hope this 

exercise has at least provided a good starting point for 

their analysis.
51

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. See, for example, Michael D. Swaine et al., China’s Military 

& The U.S.-Japan Alliance In 2030, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.

2. Daniel Yergin, “The global impact of US shale,” China Daily, February 12, 2014.

3. See World Energy Outlook 2013, Paris, France: International 

Energy Agency, 2013.

4. Liu Yazhou (刘亚洲), “Implement the Strategic Arrangements Made by the 18th CPC National Congress, Promote the 

In-depth Development of the Revolution in Military Affairs With 

Chinese Characteristics” (“贯彻落实党的十八大战略部署; 推动

中国特色军事变革深入发展”), Qiushi, Seeking Truth (求是) online, July 2013, available from available from www.qstheory.cn/

zxdk/2013/201313/201306/t20130628_244172.htm. 

5. People’s Republic of China, State Council Information Office, “China’s National Defense in 2006,” December 2006, available from www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm. 

6. People’s Republic of China, State Council Information Office, “China’s National Defense in 2010,” March 2011, available 

from english.gov.cn/official/2011-03/31/content_1835499.htm.

7. The 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP) runs 2011-15, the 13th FYP 

will run 2016-20.

8. Liu Feng’an (刘逢安) and Hu Junhua, (胡君华), “High-level 

Interview: How Will Military Training be Reformed during the 

PLA 12th Five-Year Plan?” (高端访谈:解放军 十二五 时期军事

训练如何改革?”), PLA Daily online, September 23, 2011, available 

from news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2011-09/23/content_4300202.htm. 

See also Hu Junhua (胡君华) and Liu Feng’an (刘逢安), “GSD Issues ‘Plan for Reform of Military Training during the 12th FiveYear Plan’,” PLA Daily online, September 23, 2011, available from 

www.mod.gov.cn/auth/2011-09/23/content_4300347.htm.
52

9. “Armed Forces Development will Greatly Raise the Level 

of Weapons and Equipment in the Armed Forces in the 12th FiveYear Plan” (“十二五」军队建设武器装备大提升”), Wen Wei Po (文

汇报 online, Hong Kong), March 10, 2011, available from trans.

wenweipo.com/gb/paper.wenweipo.com/2011/03/10/YO1103100004.

htm. 

10. Ibid.

11. David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: 

An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines’,” in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, Carlisle, PA: 

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007.

12. Chapter 5, “Using the Military Strategic Guidelines for the 

New Period to Maintain the Overall Situation of Army Building,” 

in PLA General Political Department, Outline for Studying Jiang 

Zemin Thought on National Defense and Army Building, 2003, cited 

in Finkelstein, 2007. Thanks to David Finkelstein for finding this 

source and citing it in his 2007 article.

13. Shou Xiaosong, (寿晓松), chief editor, Science of Strategy 

(战略学教程), Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 2013, p. 168.

14. “The Dialectical Relationship between the Primary Strategic Direction and Other Strategic Directions” (“主要战略方向

与其他战略方向的辩证关系”), April 4, 2006, available from www.

chinamil.com.cn/site1/ztpd/2006-04/04/content_448207.htm. See also 

Zhangpu County (Fujian) county government, “Views on Chihu 

Township Militia Political Work in 2010” (“赤湖镇二O一O年年民

兵整组政治工作意见”), March 20, 2010, available from chz.zhangpu.gov.cn/admin/manage/news/news_show.asp?id=610.

15. Chen Yongjian (愖永建), ed., Army Tactical Modules: 

Research on Employment of Integrated Operations (陆军战术模

块 一体化作战运用研究), Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 

2006, p. 19. 

The Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Era . . . shifted 

the primary strategic direction from southeast coast to focus 

on the Taiwan Strait, and the important strategic directions 

are the South Sea and the Sino-Indian border.
53

16. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to 

Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China 2013, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, available from www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_

final.pdf. 

17. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, eds., 

Learning By Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad, Carlisle 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012.

18. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 

2012-13: China’s Military Challenge, Seattle WA, and Washington, 

DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012. Richard P. Hallion, 

Roger Cliff, and Phillip Saunders, eds., The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2012. Phillip C. Saunders et al., ed., The 

Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles, Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, 2011. Dennis J. Blasko, 

The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st 

Century, 2nd Ed., London, UK, and New York: Routledge, 2011.

19. Daniel M. Hartnett, Towards a Globally Focused Chinese 

Military: The Historic Missions of the Chinese Armed Forces, CNA 

document number CME D0018304.A1, Alexandria VA: The CNA 

Corporation, June 2008. 

20. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., 

Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other than Taiwan, Carlisle PA: U.S. 

Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009.

21. People’s Republic of China, State Council Information 

Office, “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” 

Beijing, China, April 2013. 

22. See International Energy Agency, World Energy 

Outlook 2013.

23. Ibid.

24. David Shambaugh makes this argument persuasively in 

China Goes Global: The Partial Power, New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2013.
54

25. Defined as the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and the waters east of Taiwan. Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology (中国人民解放军军语), Beijing, 

China: Military Science Press, 1997.
55

DOMESTIC, EXTERNAL, 

AND TECHNOLOGICAL DRIVERS 

OF PEOPLE’S LIBERATION 

ARMY MODERNIZATION

57

CHAPTER 3

DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF 

CHINA’S FUTURE MILITARY MODERNIZATION

Joseph Fewsmith

If there is any tenet of Chinese foreign policy that 

seems to have held over the decades, it is that foreign 

policy serves the needs of domestic politics. Thus, the 

whole policy of “reform and opening” adopted by the 

Dengist leadership beginning in 1978 was designed to 

support China’s economic development by opening 

up markets, bringing in new technologies, and encouraging large-scale foreign investment. Deng Xiaoping 

undertook three major foreign trips—to Japan in October 1978, to Southeast Asia in November 1978, and 

to the United States in January-February 1979—to 

help create a peaceful international environment to 

support his reform program.1 Throughout the 1980s, 

“peace and development,” a theme officially endorsed 

in 1984, dominated China’s approach to foreign policy. In 1989 and in the years immediately following, 

China adopted the policy of “avoiding the limelight 

and keeping a low profile” (taoguang yanghui 韬光养

晦). Evolving over the 1990s to include such phrases 

as “get some things done” (有所作为) and “never take 

the lead” (决不当头), this policy was expressed differently at different times, but it always undergirded a 

policy of caution.2

Over the first decade of the new century, however, 

China’s taoguang yanghui policy came under increasing criticism for being too weak. Finally, in 2009, Hu 

Jintao said China should adopt a strategy of “upholding avoiding the limelight and keeping a low profile 
58

and proactively (积极的) getting some things done.”3

That more pro-active approach to foreign policy has 

continued to the present.

What needs to be explained is why China would 

move beyond a foreign policy that had been so successful for it and adopt a more active or assertive 

foreign policy that seems, at least from the outside, 

to have many negative consequences for China itself. The most obvious factor is that China is simply a 

much stronger actor than it was either coming out of 

the Cultural Revolution when its economy and polity were in shambles or in 1989 and the early-1990s 

when its economy was still not strong, its military not 

yet well-modernized, the Soviet Union—the strategic 

basis for Sino-U.S. relations—had broken up, when 

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself had been 

badly shaken by the events of Tiananmen, and when 

socialism around the world seemed headed quickly 

for the dust bin. Twenty-five years later, China has 

emerged as the second largest economy in the world, 

its military is vastly improved, and the world, if not 

quite multipolar, is certainly less unipolar than it has 

been any time since the fall of the Soviet Union. Basic 

international relations theory suggests that countries 

that are stronger economically and militarily are simply going to pursue their interests more vigorously on 

the world stage. 

Yet, the stronger economy and military still does 

not explain why, in this particular period, China has 

adopted a more activist foreign policy, especially when 

its previous policy, which employed a healthy dose 

of reassurance to offset concerns aroused by China’s 

rapid economic growth and military modernization, 

seemed to serve China’s interests so well. It seems that 

one needs to turn to domestic factors, including issues 
59

of social stability, legitimacy, nationalism, and generational change to have a more nuanced understanding 

of why China’s foreign policy stance has evolved and 

where the country may go in the future.

SOCIAL ORDER

It has been evident for some time that China faces 

challenges of governance and legitimacy, and these 

challenges appear to be growing over time. As is well 

known, the Public Security Bureau reported that there 

were 8,700 “mass incidents” in 1993 and that by 2005, 

the last year the Public Security Bureau reported such 

figures, the number of mass incidents had increased 

to 87,000. Later, there was a widely reported figure of 

180,000 mass incidents for the year 2010. The definition of a “mass incident” has generally been more than 

five people engaged in public protest, but that definition has varied enough over time that there can be no 

confidence that these figures are accurate or consistent 

in terms of what is being reported. Moreover, there 

are obvious reasons why some authorities might want 

to minimize the numbers, while others might want to 

exaggerate. Whatever the accuracy of the numbers, 

there is widespread agreement that the number of 

mass incidents has been increasing, the number of 

people involved is growing, and the level of violence 

is increasing.

As early as 1993, Wan Li, the head of the National People’s Congress (NPC) reported that when the 

peasants in Renshou County (仁寿县, the location of a 

particularly large mass incident that year) were asked 

what they needed, they said, “We need nothing but 

Chen Sheng and Wu Guang (陈胜and吴广),” the legendary leaders of the peasant rebellion who brought 
60

down the Qin dynasty in 209 BCE.4 In 2003, more 

than 3.1 million people participated in mass incidents 

(Chung, Lai, and Xia, 2006), and there were at least 

248 mass incidents involving more than 500 participants between 2003 and 2009.5

Increasing concern with social stability was reflected in a new policy of “social management” 

(“社会管理”), which was introduced at a collective 

study session of the Politburo in September 2010. As 

Hu Jintao would later explain, social management 

would include “supporting people’s organizations”; 

forming “scientific and effective mechanisms” for coordinating interests, expressing demands, and mediating contradictions; and improving the “management of 

and services for” the transient population and special 

groups. There was also a coercive aspect of social management that revolved around “stability maintenance” 

(“维稳”).6

Perhaps the most direct evidence of growing concerns with social order comes from the creation and 

growth of new organs assigned to deal with the issue. 

In 1991, the party created the Central Commission on 

Comprehensive Social Order (中央社会治安综合治理

委员会) to better coordinate among departments of the 

State Council. The new commission was headed concurrently by the head of the Political and Legal Commission, giving the two organs a largely overlapping 

leadership, but the latter organ had a broader mandate. In 1993, nine new ministries became members 

of the Commission on Comprehensive Social Order, 

including Post and Telecommunications, Communications, People’s Bank of China, and the Ministry of 

Personnel. In 1995, the scope of the commission was 

expanded yet again to include the Central Discipline 

Inspection Commission, the Ministry of Supervision, 
61

the Family Planning Commission, and others.7 In 

2003, the 610 office, whose duties are to handle “heterodox religions” (“邪教”), was added, and in 2011, 

the Commission was expanded yet again, adding 11 

new departments and changing its name to the Central 

Commission on Comprehensive Social Management 

(中央社会管理综合治理委员会), reflecting the new focus on “social management.” 

As the commission expanded, its budget rose accordingly. It should be noted that figures are difficult 

to obtain, in part because so much of security expenditures are off-budget—they come from funds obtained 

through fines and penalties. For instance, in 1996, the 

budget expenditures for public security in Guangdong 

province were only 30 percent of their total spending. 

In Qinghai and Gansu, 40 percent of county-level expenditures were financed through fines and penalties. Overall, according to official figures, spending 

on public security increased more than 10-fold from 

28 billion yuan in 1995 to 390 billion yuan in 2009. By 

2013, the public security budget had risen to 769 billion yuan ($123 billion), exceeding China’s announced 

defense budget of 720 billion yuan.8

Despite the increase in the amount of money and 

personnel devoted to maintaining social stability, as 

noted previously, the number of mass incidents has 

increased. This is surprising not only because protest 

is a high-risk activity, but also because the state made 

a serious effort to respond to a major cause of unrest, 

namely overtaxation. Although not the only cause of 

unrest, the 1994 tax reform, which recentralized much 

of China’s fiscal system, left local government—counties and townships—largely bereft of funds. Local 

party cadres, under a mandate to continue economic 

growth, responded by overtaxing local residents. 
62

Whereas rural taxes were not supposed to exceed 5 

percent of income, local governments often taxed 30-

40 percent. No wonder mass incidents increased.

In 2006, however, the government responded by 

abolishing agricultural and miscellaneous taxes, cutting off this revenue source for local governments. 

Local governments, ever resourceful, responded by 

turning to land sales, and in order to sell land, they 

had to requisition it first. Although land is collectively 

owned, it is farmed by individual households through 

the contract system. One would think that overtaxation would affect everyone, generating widespread 

discontent, but that requisitioning land would only 

affect those unfortunate enough to have their land 

taken from them (compensation varied but was widely viewed as inadequate). Although the local state has 

continued to do things, whether to pay civil servants 

or collect funds for necessary projects, in general peasants have had their financial burdens reduced. Nevertheless, the number of mass incidents continued to 

increase, suggesting widespread discontent with local 

government.

It has often been noted that the concepts “state” 

and “society” are not so neatly divided in China (and 

Asia in general) as they are in the West. There can 

often be a dynamic interaction in which contesting 

interests negotiate with each other, reaching accommodations that do not threaten the authoritarian government on the one hand or legitimize societal actors 

on the other. Indeed, protest can provide information 

to the regime and provide a safety valve for societal 

frustration. Moreover, as Ching Kwan Lee has recently suggested, there seems to be an increasingly salient 

“market nexus” between state and protest in which 

the state buys off protestors and protestors seem to be 
63

willing to monetarize their citizenship rights. Nevertheless, the continued increase in the number of mass 

incidents suggests a gradual undermining of state 

authority. Although the sort of cash nexus that Lee 

discusses could extend the life of the regime, she also 

sees it as introducing a “creeping erosion of state authority” that may “subject the regime to a deep-seated 

vulnerability. . . .”

When one looks at public opinion polls, there are 

two results that suggest that such an erosion of state 

authority has already set in. First, citizens routinely 

rate the effectiveness of the central government more 

highly than they do their own local government—the 

one they come into contact with more often. Moreover, 

the more citizens come into contact with government, 

the less satisfied they are with it. Second, the group 

that citizens see as benefiting the most from reform 

and opening are cadres.9 Such survey results suggest 

that the state is right to spend more money on “stability maintenance” even though such expenditures are 

likely to feed further dissatisfaction.

When one looks closely at the causes of mass incidents, it is apparent that the fundamental cause is 

structural—the cadre management system forces cadres to fulfill mandates given by their superiors, not to 

respond to the needs or desires of their constituents.10

This suggests that the problems of governance are 

likely to get worse over time even if specific issues are 

addressed.

NATIONALISM

It is difficult to discuss nationalism in contemporary China because nationalism has been the leitmotif 

of 20th century China. Yet, China’s policy of reform 
64

and opening was accompanied—for the most part—

by a new wave of cosmopolitan thinking, epitomized 

if not limited to the 1988 television series “River 

Elergy” (河殇).11 Part of the backlash against such cosmopolitan trends came in the early-1990s as the government sponsored a “patriotic education campaign,” 

as populist nationalism spread with the publication 

of such books as China Can Say No (中国可以说不) 

and Looking at China through a Third Eye (第三支眼睛

看中国), and the development of the so-called “New 

Left,” which built on neo-Marxist thought to critique 

China’s policy of reform and opening.12 This “new 

nationalism,” as it is sometimes called, was certainly 

rooted in previous nationalist traditions but was new 

in its juxtaposition to the intellectual trends of the 

previous decade.

There were several incidents that fed into and exacerbated such trends in the 1990s. First, there was 

China’s bid to host the Olympics in the year 2000. 

When that bid failed, the United States was widely 

blamed; indeed, the Congress had passed nonbinding 

resolutions opposing the Chinese bid, thus fanning 

the flames. It was after that event that one often heard 

statements such as the United States was not opposed 

to the Chinese government for human rights violations but rather was opposed to China. This was an 

early expression of the popular belief that the United 

States is trying to “contain” China, a narrative that 

seems quite wide spread in recent years. Second, there 

was the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis, an event that not 

only kicked People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization into high gear but also generated expressions 

of popular nationalism, such as China Can Say No. It is 

useful to recall that there had been no popular discussion of Chinese foreign policy in the years before that. 
65

Such expressions certainly had support from some official quarters, but they also appealed to many people. 

Third, there was the Milky Way incident, in which a 

ship thought to be carrying precursor chemicals for 

the making of chemical weapons was stopped and 

searched before entering the Straits of Hormuz. No 

chemicals were found; and no apology was issued. 

The popular impression of the United States as the 

“world’s policeman” spread. Finally, there was the 

U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 

which touched off days of demonstrations against the 

United States.13

The question is: How widespread is such nationalism? How intense is it? Does it affect Chinese foreign 

policy, and, if so, how? These questions are not easy 

to answer. There are questions about how to measure nationalism, about how widespread nationalism 

needs to be to have an effect on foreign policy, and 

how such nationalism is perceived by policy elites. 

For instance, it is apparent that strong nationalistic 

opinions are expressed on the Internet, but it is far less 

clear how representative of the Chinese people such 

expressions are.

Although many scholars, including myself, have 

subscribed to the belief that nationalism is widespread 

and rising, Alastair Iain Johnston has used survey 

results to argue that nationalism is not particularly 

widespread, not particularly intense, and, moreover, 

tends to decrease as people become more affluent and 

travel more. Assuming that Chinese citizens are likely 

to become more affluent and travel more, perhaps the 

issue of nationalism is a passing one.14

But even assuming that Johnston’s survey research has accurately measured nationalist feelings in 

China, officials may still be right to focus on the sorts 
66

of people who post highly nationalistic rants on the 

Web after all; such people are more likely to take to 

the streets over some incident. In other words, even if 

the “echo chamber” of Chinese nationalism is smaller 

than many presume, it may still be large enough for 

Chinese officials to be wary of it.15

The really interesting question, however, is how 

policy elites interact with public opinion. Before trying to answer this question, however, it is necessary to 

look at issues of legitimacy and the sense of crisis that 

seems to be prevailing.

LEGITIMACY ISSUES

Evidence has mounted in recent years that many 

intellectuals are clearly unhappy with the pace of political reform. Intellectuals may not have the social 

status and impact that they once did, but they can 

still mobilize significant public opinion—which is 

why the government keeps such a close eye on them. 

About a decade ago, a group of intellectuals tried 

to bring about political reform by focusing on the 

law. The catalyzing event was the Sun Zhigang case 

(孙志刚事件). Sun Zhigang was an unemployed college graduate who travelled to Guangzhou in search 

of employment. Mistaking him for a migrant laborer, 

police asked to see his identification. Unfortunately for 

Sun, he had forgotten to carry his, and he was quickly detained under China’s custody and repatriation 

(收容遣送) system whereby unemployed migrants are 

detained before being sent back to their villages. What 

happened next is not clear, but for some reason, he 

was badly beaten and died. 

In response, three recent Ph.D.s in law—Xu Zhiyong (许志永), Teng Biao (滕彪), and Yu Jiang (俞江)—
67

wrote an appeal to the NPC Standing Committee, the 

body charged with interpreting China’s constitution, 

arguing that the custody and repatriation system 

violated the constitution. The system had long been 

controversial, and the Standing Committee took the 

opportunity of the legal appeal to rule the system illegal. This fascinating case seemed to open up a path 

to political reform not by confronting the government 

but by pressuring it to enforce its own laws. Quickly 

dubbed the “rights protection movement” (维权运

动), the Sun case quickly spawned a group of public 

interest lawyers.16

Unfortunately, the so-called “color revolutions” 

broke out the following year, and before long the 

growing ranks of “stability maintenance” police began to look at the rights protection movement as a 

problem for social stability. This contest between popular rights and social stability has continued through 

to the present, not only derailing an effort to build law 

but also resulting in the recent arrest and conviction 

of Xu Zhiyong, one of the founders of the movement.

The issue was rejoined shortly after China’s President Xi Jinping took office at the Eighteenth Party 

Congress in November 2012. Like Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao before him, Xi Jinping gave a major 

speech on the 10th anniversary of the promulgation 

of China’s 1982 constitution, declaring, “protecting 

the authority of the constitution means protecting 

the authority of the common will of the party and the 

people.” He went on to assert: 

To manage state affairs according to law, first we must 

run the country in accordance with the Constitution. 

The key to holding power in accordance with the law 

is to first rule in accordance with the Constitution. The 

party leadership formulates the Constitution and the 
68

law, and the party itself must act within the scope of 

the Constitution and the law to truly achieve the party 

leadership’s establishment of the law, ensuring the enforcement of the law, and taking the lead in abiding 

by the law.17

Xi’s strong comments seem to have led liberalminded reformers to push ahead, either believing that 

Xi was inclined to support them or that circumstances 

would convince the new party chief that he should 

support them. In December 2012, 70 scholars signed 

a petition calling for political reform, particularly constitutional government.18 The Guangzhou-based paper, Southern Weekend (南方周末), picking up on Xi’s 

theme of a “China dream,” wrote a New Year’s editorial for the paper—“China’s Dream is the Dream of 

Constitutional Government”—that was rewritten by 

Guangdong provincial propaganda chief Tuo Zhen as 

a paean to the party. Journalists at Southern Weekend 

objected and petitioned provincial authorities; soon 

they went on strike, only to have the editor removed. 

The Global Times then ran an article, republished 

throughout China, saying with unusual bluntness 

that “anyone with common sense knows that in China 

there is no room for a ‘free press,’ and that the media 

should not harbor the unrealistic hope of becoming a 

‘political special zone’.”19

This incident was particularly important because 

the new Xi administration reacted particularly strongly in asserting ideological control. In April 2013, the 

General Office promulgated “Document No. 9” denouncing seven trends it found pernicious. The first 

one was propagating the idea of “constitutional government,” which it denounced as a way to negate 

the leadership of the party and “import the Western 

political system into China.” Document No. 9 set off 

a wide-ranging debate as conservative publications 
69

supported the government’s position and liberal intellectuals took to the Internet to support constitutional 

government.

The important point was that it became evident in 

the course of the debate that both sides had significant 

support within the party. Such a politically charged 

argument about China’s direction suggested deep 

division within the party, sharp division among politically active intellectuals, and a very weak middle 

position that might potentially restrain debate.25

SENSE OF CRISIS

During the Jiang Zemin era, China made significant 

progress in extricating itself from the diplomatic isolation in which it found itself following Tiananmen. Perhaps ironically, given today’s tensions between China 

and Japan, it was Tokyo that took the lead in breaking 

ranks with the Western nations that had imposed economic sanctions following Beijing’s crackdown. Before long, China established diplomatic relations with 

Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, 

and South Africa, stealing diplomatic partners from 

Taiwan and breaking out of the near pariah state that 

China had been in only 3 years before. Economically 

China’s gross domestic product (GDP) moved ahead 

rapidly, growing from about 1.7 trillion yuan in 1989 

to about 12 trillion yuan in 2002 when Jiang Zemin left 

office.26 Jiang’s doctrine of the “Three Represents” was 

much lampooned, but it dealt with a critical issue in 

China’s political economy, namely the political status 

of entrepreneurs. As Jiang advisor Li Junru (李君如) 

wrote at the time, if China did not absorb the most 

dynamic sector of the economy—entrepreneurs and 

young intellectuals—it would inevitably push them 

into opposition.27
70

In his first term, Hu Jintao was rather active. He effectively reinterpreted the “Three Represents” by emphasizing the third principle (representing the interests of the vast majority of the people) rather than the 

first principle (representing the advanced productive 

forces), by introducing the “scientific development 

concept,” talking about the need to create a “harmonious society,” and launching China onto the path of 

a welfare state by emphasizing a “service-oriented” 

government. Although spending on welfare (health 

care, education, pensions, and so forth) continued to 

grow in Hu’s second term, it is difficult to point to any 

major initiatives in those 5 years. Whether this slowdown was due to Hu’s weak personality, the size of 

the Politburo Standing Committee (which stood at 

nine members), interference from retired leaders, or 

the growth of so-called “vested interests,” there was a 

sense that stagnation had set in. 

This sense that the Hu Jintao administration, particularly the second term, had been a period of stagnation was put pointedly by Deng Yuwen (邓聿文), 

deputy editor of Study Times (学习时报), the weekly 

publication of the Central Party School, in a famous 

article. As Deng said, “It cannot be denied that this 

decade has seen the festering or creation of immense 

problems” and “the decade of the Hu and Wen has 

seen no progress, or perhaps even a loss of ground” 

with regard to several issues, including the economic 

structure, environment, “ideological bankruptcy,” 

and political reform.28

Although Deng expressed his frustration from 

the “right” side of the political spectrum, the “left” 

felt equal frustration. These were the years in which 

leftists looked to Mao Zedong for political inspiration 

and when, politically, Bo Xilai (薄熙来) promoted the 
71

Chongqing model, which drew on Maoist populism 

to go after organized crime, implement new land exchange schemes, build new housing for the disadvantaged, and—most famous of all—re-emphasize socialism through the signing of “red” songs.29

There was also a sense of vulnerability—that China’s political system might follow those of other socialist nations onto the dustbin of history. For instance, a 

debate on the cause of the failure of the Soviet Union 

heated up around the 20th anniversary of that event. 

The orthodox view that Russian President Mikhail 

Gorbachev was the cause that was countered by more 

liberal commentators who blamed the demise of the 

Soviet Union on structural problems.30 This concern 

with the fate of the Soviet Union, which has been even 

stronger in the period of Chinese President Xi Jinping 

reflects the continued debate about the appropriate 

course for China to follow and the sense that, unless 

appropriate measures are taken, China could go the 

same way.

XI JINPING AND THE EMERGENCE 

OF A NEW GENERATION

When popular nationalism emerged in the mid1990s, despite support from some quarters in the political system, it was still very much on the periphery. 

Two decades later, however, following impressive 

economic growth that is nonetheless accompanied by 

inequality, social instability, legitimacy issues, and 

growing populism, a new generation of leaders has 

emerged on the scene. As the children of revolutionary leaders, they are “to the manor born.” This is not 

to say that all “second generation revolutionaries” 

(“红二代”) are united; on the contrary, there have been 

some very obvious divisions and, no doubt, there are 
72

others that are not as visible. However, Xi Jinping 

and his close associates are quite different than Jiang 

Zemin, who was promoted to general secretary unexpectedly in a crisis situation, or Hu Jintao, whose father was a small entrepreneur (小业主). Although the 

dynamics of leadership succession are not well understood, Xi Jinping has certainly been able to move much 

faster than his predecessors to consolidate power and 

set an agenda. His family background and network 

among the political elite account for at least some of 

this. As suggested earlier, there is a sense of urgency 

stemming from a sense of vulnerability derived from 

legitimacy issues and a sense that the party pursues 

departmental interests more than national interests.

Some of what we have seen from Xi in the first 

year and more of his administration reflects, in part, 

what all new leaders need to do—consolidate power 

(by prosecuting rivals), carrying out campaigns, and 

adopting new ideological slogans. But what Xi and the 

new leadership have been doing, both domestically 

and in terms of foreign policy, exceeds a new leadership’s need to set an agenda. The strong reaction to 

the Japanese arrest of a fishing captain who rammed 

two Japanese Coast Guard ships, the reaction to the 

Philippine fishing in Scarborough Shoal, the extremely strong reaction to the Japanese purchase of three of 

the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the sudden declaration 

of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ), the apparent effort to take control of Second Thomas Reef, 

and the movement of an oil-drilling rig into waters 

claimed by both China and Vietnam suggest a pattern 

of behavior that is more provocative than China’s past 

behavior.

The question is why, when China is facing enormous domestic challenges, would it pursue a seem-
73

ingly provocative foreign policy? Why has China’s 

policy moved from the cautious “avoid the limelight 

and keep a low profile” stance of the 1990s to emphasize the more “proactively get some things done.” As 

suggested earlier, this evolution was largely the result of a debate carried out by policy elites in the first 

years of this century, but behind that evolution lies a 

volatile combination of a sense of stagnation (in the 

Hu-Wen years) and vulnerability (legitimacy remains 

uncertain), the seeming self-confidence of a particular group of “princelings,” and nationalistic emotions among parts of the public and the policy elite. 

Moreover, a certain degree of assertiveness in China’s 

foreign policy, particularly combined as it is with the 

articulation of ideals of greatness (the China Dream), 

depictions of victimhood (the exhibit on China’s 

“Road to Renaissance” in the Revolutionary History 

Museum), the campaign against corruption, and the 

revival of certain revolutionary traditions (the mass 

line, criticism and self-criticism), appears to have certain benefits for the new leadership: nationalism and 

assertive policy appear to facilitate centralization (resistance appears unpatriotic), it builds off of and coopts the populist neo-Maoist ideas of Bo Xilai, and it 

appears to allow the new leadership to confront—to 

some still unknown extent—some of the factions and 

vested interests that might otherwise be expected to 

resist the leadership’s initiatives.

It must be noted that the concern of the new leadership with the fate of the former Soviet Union, a 

concern never far from the surface in any leadership, 

seems to have become a near obsession. There was Xi’s 

internal but widely reported remarks in Guangdong 

in December 2012 when he reportedly asked: 
74

Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the 

Soviet Communist Party collapse? An important reason was that their ideals and convictions wavered. . . . 

Finally, all it took was one quiet word from Gorbachev 

to declare the dissolution of the Soviet Communist 

Party, and a great party was gone. In the end nobody 

was a real man, nobody came out to resist.31

Since then there have been many similar, if less 

colorful, warnings. For instance:

• In October 2013 a “Ren Zhongping” (“任仲平”) 

(short for “Important Commentary from People’s Daily” [“人民日报重要评论”]) commentary 

said unusually bluntly: 

Today, the Soviet Union, with its history of 74 

years, has been gone for 22 years. For more than 

2 decades, China has never stopped reflecting on 

how the communist party and nation were lost 

by the Soviet Communists.

• In September 2013, National Defense University produced a film called “Silent Contest” 

(“较量无声”), which warned of Western attempts to subvert China through propaganda 

and spreading ideas like constitutional government.32

• In October or November 2013, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, the Chinese 

Academy of Social Sciences, and the Research 

Center on World Socialism jointly produced a 

four-part documentary called, “In Memory of 

the Collapse of the Communist Party and the 

Soviet Union” (“苏联亡党亡国20年祭”).33

• In November 2013, the party’s theoretical journal, Qiushi (求是), published an article by its 
75

commentator that warned, “The collapse of a 

government usually starts in the field of ideology. . . . What caused the dissolution of the Soviet Union?” the journal asked, “An important 

reason was the wavering of ideals and beliefs.”

• In November 2013, Li Zhanshu (栗战书), the 

head of the General Office and reportedly a 

close friend of Xi Jinping, wrote an article in 

People’s Daily in which he said that the Soviet 

Union and the countries of Eastern Europe 

had undertaken “reform” (it was in ironic quotation marks in the original), but it had gone 

array, leading to the “burying of the socialist 

enterprise. The lesson is extremely deep,” Li 

declared.34

As long as this strategy is not over played, i.e., 

does not lead to real conflict or set loose uncontrollable populism, and is put in the service of attaining 

the economic reform objectives put forward by the 

Third Plenum in November 2013, it could prove to be 

a relatively effective strategy, albeit one that inevitably kicks the most difficult issues down the road.

DURABILITY

At the moment, it seems that domestic political 

factors and the dynamics of the new leadership are 

aligned to support, if not drive, a continued assertive security policy. Whether one considers the current more proactive policy as a matter of responding 

to significant domestic issues, including social issues, 

weak legitimacy, and a sense of vulnerability, or more 

a matter of competition among elite actors, any which 

of whom could face criticism if a “weak” policy was 
76

adopted, the current dynamic supports a more assertive policy. One caveat is in order, and that is that tension seems to serve the leadership well, but conflict, 

with its much greater consequences, does not. Thus, 

we may see some ratcheting down of tensions if the 

costs rise significantly.

Would domestic issues and/or pressures permit 

or drive a yet more assertive policy and the degree of 

investment in military modernization that would be 

necessary to support it? To the extent that the military 

pursues institutional interests, it seems likely to continue to pursue military modernization, which may, 

to a greater or lesser extent, conflict with broader political goals. But defense spending as a percentage of 

central government revenues (which is different than 

GDP growth) has remained quite consistent in recent 

years, suggesting that there are real limits that domestic expenditures are not likely to exceed. These trends 

suggest that a PLA focused on more than regional 

issues is unlikely, despite nationalistic trends.

The social and economic challenges China faces 

in the not so distant future—a slower growth rate, an 

aging population, a more expensive labor force, environmental challenges, a shrinking labor force, and the 

loss of a demographic dividend in terms of a young 

work force—all suggest that there are real limits to 

China’s ability to support the development of the 

PLA as a global expeditionary force. The possibility 

that defense expenditures could compete with social 

expenditures—health care, education, environmental 

control, pensions, and so forth—seems real. This is 

something that has not happened over the 3 decades 

of reform and opening, so it would take something of 

a political upheaval to imagine a significant reduction 

in military expenditures.
77

CONCLUSION

The emergence of the new nationalism, however 

widespread or narrow it might be, certainly supports 

China’s turn toward a more assertive foreign policy, 

but it does not, in and of itself, propel China in such 

a direction. However, the migration of nationalism 

from the periphery toward the policymaking elite 

is a new and significant trend. But however nationalistic China’s new leadership is, it appears that it is 

more their concern with issues of social stability, legitimacy, and systemic vulnerability that drive their 

more assertive nationalism. Public opinion, aided by 

the power of social media, makes it more difficult to 

back down—and disaffected elites seem ready to turn 

to social media to suggest that the leadership is too 

“weak.” Elite competition, the institutional interests 

of the PLA, concerns with social and regime stability 

all seem to bias the system toward a more assertive 

policy, and 3 decades of economic development and 

military modernization support such inclinations.

Although the emergence of a more assertive foreign policy predates the Eighteenth Party Congress 

(remember Hu Jintao’s vow to “proactively get some 

things done”), the new leadership seems better positioned to use nationalistic appeals to quell elite divisions, centralize power, and possibly to carry out an 

economic reform agenda.

To the extent that such strategies are successful, 

they will reinforce more assertive policies. But, so far 

at least, there is a caution underlying China’s policies. 

There is no indication that China welcomes armed 

conflict, much less that it would initiate such conflict. 

Given the socio-economic issues likely to dominate 
78

Chinese politics over the next decade or more, it seems 

likely both that a degree of nationalistic assertiveness 

will continue, but that it is unlikely to undergird the 

sort of national effort that would be required to support a global expeditionary force.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, 

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. 280-293, 

297-308, and 333-345.

2. On the evolution of this policy, see Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang, “Lying Low No More? China’s New Thinking on 

the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” China: An International Journal, 

Vol. 9, No. 2, September 2011, pp. 195-216.

3. Ibid., p. 212. See Zhu Weilie (朱威烈), “韬光养晦:世界主

流文明的共有观念” (“Avoiding the limelight and keeping a low 

profile: An idea shared by mainstream civilization throughout 

the world”), originally published in Wenhuibao (文汇报), August 14, 2010, available from www.news365.com.cn/jy/201008/

t20100814_2798784.htm.

4. Thomas P. Bernstein, “Farmer Discontent and Regime Responses,” Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The 

Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

University Press, 1999, pp. 197-219.

5. Tong, Tanqi and Shaohua Lei, “”Large-Scale Mass Incidents and Government Responses in China,” International Journal 

of China Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 487-508.

6. Joseph Fewsmith “’Social Management’ as a Way of Coping with Heightened Social Tensions,” China Leadership Monitor, 

No. 36, Winter 2012.

7. Ibid.
79

8. Xie Yue (谢岳), 维稳的政治逻辑, (The Political Logic of Stability Maintenance), Hong Kong: Tsinghua Publishing (清华书局), 

2013, pp. 141-142.

9. Xie Yue (谢岳), “Rising Central Spending on Public Security 

and the Dilemmas Facing Grassroots Officials in China,” Journal of 

Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 2, 2013, p. 83.

10. Ibid., p. 88.

11. Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, “China’s Wen Warns 

of Inequality and Vows to Continue Military Buildup,” The New 

York Times, March 5, 2013.

12. Ching Kwan Lee, “State & Social Protest,” Daedalus, Spring 

2014, pp. 124-134.

13. Wang Junxiu (王俊秀), Yang Yiyin (杨宜音), and Chen 

Wuqing (陈午晴), “2006 年中国居民生活质量调查报告” (“Survey 

Report on China’s Social Mood, 2006”), in Ru Xin (汝信), Lu Xueyi 

(陆学艺), and Li Peilin (李培林), eds., 2007 年: 中国社会形势分

析与预测, (China’s Social Circumstances, Analysis and Prediction: 

2007), Beijing, China: Social Sciences Archive Press (社会科学文

献出版社), 2007, p. 66.

14. Wang Junxiu et al., “Survey Report on China’s Social 

Mood, 2006,” p. 68.

15. Joseph Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in 

China, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

16. If the thrust of the 1980s was toward more cosmopolitan 

thinking, there was also sharp resistance, including the 1983 campaign against “spiritual pollution” and the 1987 campaign against 

“bourgeois liberalization.”

17. Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Intellectuals’ Quest for National 

Greatness and Nationalist Writings of the 1990s,” The China Quarterly, No. 152, December 1997, pp. 725-745; and Suisheng Zhao, 

“State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in 

Post-Tianamen China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 

Vol. 31, No. 3, September 1998, p. 287-302.
80

18. Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen, 2nd Ed., 

Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

19. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Chinese Middle-Class Attitudes 

Toward International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?” The China Quarterly, No. 179, September 2004, pp. 603-628; and Alastair 

Ian Johnston, “The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion Toward 

the United States, 1998-2004,” Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert 

S. Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, 

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 340-378.

20. I borrow the term “echo chamber” from Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007.

21. Keith Hand, “Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The 

Sun Zhigang Incident and the Evolving forms of Citizen Action

in the People’s Republic of China,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, No. 114, 2006-07.

22. 人民日报, People’s Daily, December 5, 2012.

23. Zhang Qianfang, “Proposal for Consensus on Reform,” 

Caijing Online, December 26, 2012.

24. Ching Cheong, “Xi Faces the Test of His Reform Image,” 

Straits Times Online, January 11, 2013; David Bandurski, “Inside 

the Southern Weekly Incident,” China Media Project, January 

8, 2013.

25. See Joseph Fewsmith, “Debating Constitutional Government,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 42, Fall 2013.

26. These are official figures drawn from the China Statistical 

Yearbook, 2011, Bejing, China: China Statistics Press, 2011.

27. Li Junru (李君如), “正确理解和坚持党的阶级性” (“Correctly Understand and Uphold the Party’s Class Nature”), Lilun 

dongtai (理论动态), July 20, 2001.

28. Deng Yuwen, “The Hu-Wen Legacy,” originally posted to 

Caijing wang.
81

29. For a review of the Chongqing model from a supporter, 

see Cui Zhiyuan, “Partial Intimations of the Coming Whole: The 

Chongqing Experiment in Light of the Theories of Henry George, 

James Meade, and Antonio Gramsci,” Modern China, No. 37, No. 

6, 2011, pp. 646-660.

30. Contrast Zhou Xincheng (周新城), “历史在这里沉思—苏

联解体近 20 年的思考” (“History Here Pondered—Reflections 

on the Breakup of the Soviet Union Nearly 20 Years on”), and 

Xu Yuangong (徐元宫), “揭秘挡安对苏联阶梯原因研究的意义” 

(“The Significance of Declassified Files for Research of the Causes 

of the Dissolution of the Soviet Union”), Xuexi shibao (学习时

报),December 26, 2011.

31. Christopher Buckley, “Vows of Change Belie Private 

Warning,” The New York Times, February 15, 2013.

32. The film can be watched at www.youtube.com/

watch?v=M_81SjcoSw8.

33. The film can be watched at v.youku.com/v_show/id_

XNDEOMjI4NDEy.html.

34. Li Zhanshu (栗战书), “遵循四个坚持的改革经验” (“Follow 

the Reform Experience of the ‘Four Persistents’”), People’s Daily 

(人民日报), November 26, 2013.

83

CHAPTER 4

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY TRAJECTORIES:

INTERNATIONAL DRIVERS

Eric Heginbotham 

Jacob Heim

INTRODUCTION

It takes only modest imagination and a cursory 

look at the historical record to understand that external events, even those that do not directly involve a 

given country, can profoundly shape its military trajectory. The Franco-Prussian War, a war in which Britain did not participate, sparked the most fundamental 

army reforms there since Oliver Cromwell’s day, as 

well as a reevaluation of England’s long-standing antipathy toward peacetime continental commitments. 

The Great Depression not only facilitated the rise of 

fascist and fascist-leaning regimes, but also caused 

strains within the community of democratic nations 

that made confronting Germany and Japan far more 

difficult. As a rapidly rising state, China’s strategic direction may be as subject to redirection or redefinition 

as America’s or Germany’s was during the late-19th 

or early-20th centuries, as both of those countries assumed the mantles of great power. 

This chapter assesses the impact of external variables on four potential futures: (1) a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) focused on its immediate periphery; 

(2) a regionally oriented PLA with some power projection capability; (3) a globally expeditionary PLA; 

and (4) a weakened PLA. The Chinese military, once 

focused overwhelmingly on its immediate periphery, 
84

is already set on a path to acquire capabilities relevant 

to wider regional and, to a very limited extent, global 

missions. The discussion of variables and their impact 

assesses movement off of the current trajectory. In 

other words, the question is not what could prompt 

the PLA to develop power projection capabilities, but 

rather what could cause the PLA to accelerate the acquisition of power projection capabilities or, alternatively, to refocus on forces optimized for conflict in its 

immediate periphery? 

Following is a discussion of the differences between 

a PLA optimized for combat in China’s immediate periphery from one with a wider regional orientation—a 

distinction that results in a slight modification of the 

trajectories discussed by Lonnie Henley in his excellent introduction to this volume. We then move on to 

discuss a range of external variables. The first three 

groups of variables primarily affect the geographic 

focus of the Chinese military. These include: (1) the 

degree of conflict with China’s regional neighbors, including Taiwan, Japan, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines; (2) U.S. power, strategy, and Sino-American 

relations; and, (3) the development of Chinese interests or challenges outside the region. We also examine 

a set of possible developments that could produce a 

weakened PLA: military failure that could discredit 

the military, foreign overcommitment that could strain 

resources, a loss of external sources of technology, and 

external support for domestic Chinese insurgency or 

terrorism. 
85

PERIPHERAL VS. WIDER REGIONAL 

CAPABILITIES

Discussion of a “regional” military capability in 

Asia can be somewhat misleading for those who may 

not fully appreciate the distances involved. With a bit 

of rearranging, the combined 37 countries of Western Europe, Southern Europe, and Northern Europe 

would fit more than twice into mainland China; they 

would fit almost two more times in Australia; and, if 

placed in the South China Sea, they would spill just 

a bit outside the sea’s maritime exits. Flying a mission from China’s Hainan Island to Bali (3,000 kilometers [km]) would be roughly the same distance 

as flying from Madrid to the Crimea; and even the 

distance from Hainan to the Spratly Islands (1,700-

km) would be equivalent to that of Madrid to the 

Czech border.

Military and Operational Distinctions. 

Given the great area encompassed by Asia, we 

differentiate a PLA optimized for operations along 

the immediate periphery (operationalized as roughly 

1,000-km from the Chinese mainland) from a PLA 

optimized for fighting in the wider regional space 

(between 1,000 and 3,000-km). The ability to project 

power can always be evaluated on a continuum, and 

from one perspective, this parsing of regional distances simply adds an intermediate distance into the 

equation. However, the military distinctions between 

capabilities required for a close fight in China’s immediate periphery and one at more distant locations 

in the region are important. The types of anti-access/

area denial (A2/AD) capabilities developed by China 
86

in recent years are most relevant to its immediate periphery, and, while it could develop another, longerrange layer to its A2/AD capabilities, the costs would 

be higher—making the trade-offs involved more 

questionable. 

The 1,000-km distinction made here is useful for 

several reasons. It corresponds to the 1,000-km range 

definition of short range ballistic missiles (SRBM), 

which are generally one-stage systems and therefore 

cheaper than generally two-stage medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM).1

 The distinction also roughly 

matches the unrefueled combat radius of fighters and 

strike aircraft (which are somewhat less than 1,000-

km for single-engine fighters and roughly 50 percent 

more than this for larger, twin-engine aircraft). Just as 

important is the relative ability to use ground-based 

or air-breathing (as opposed to space-based) communications and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems.2

 Although range limitations 

may be less clear cut, the relative utility of diesel submarines, green water surface craft, and even lighter 

frigates and destroyers, would be more in scenarios 

within 1,000-km of China than in contingencies farther from home. Finally, the distinction also has political significance within Asia, roughly corresponding 

to those areas inside the first island chain and those 

outside of it. 

Mapping Strategic Depth: Taiwan vs. the Rest. 

The PLA’s focus on Taiwan during the 1990s and 

early-2000s drove it toward short range forces with 

limited power projection capabilities. As China’s focus has shifted beyond Taiwan since the mid-2000s, 
87

the PLA has begun to place greater emphasis on limited regional power projection capabilities. While an 

escalation in tensions with Taiwan could encourage 

the PLA to redouble its attention to peripheral capabilities, the same would not necessarily be true of tensions with other neighbors. Taiwan is unique among 

China’s potential military targets in terms of its lack 

of strategic depth—i.e., in terms of the size of territory across which forces opposing China could be 

deployed and in terms of the most distant militarily 

usable territory from China. 

Taiwan is the only major neighboring “state” (using the term to denote territory controlled by an independently functioning government) in East or West 

Asia that falls entirely within range of Chinese shortrange combat systems. Measured by the distance from 

the closest part of mainland China (including Hainan) 

to the most distant point of each neighboring state, 

Taiwan’s depth runs to roughly 380-km, while the other neighboring countries with which combat is most 

thinkable (including Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, 

and India) range between 1,170-km and 2,160 or 2,500-

km in depth (depending on how distances against Japan are measured). Taiwan is also far smaller than the 

others in its total land area and in length of coastline.
88

Table 4-1. Indicators of Strategic Depth 

vis-à-vis China.

Using SRBMs and ground-launched cruise missiles, China could strike all air and naval bases on 

Taiwan.3 If the PLA could suppress Taiwanese air-defenses, most of China’s 4th generation strike fighters 

could range over the entire country without refueling. 

PLA naval forces, including diesel submarines, could 

move to positions off all ports and harbors relatively 

quickly or easily.4 To be sure, major Taiwan scenarios (including either blockade or invasion) would be 

extremely demanding for the PLA, and an invasion 

could fail even without U.S. intervention. Power projection capabilities would be useful for the PLA in 

Taiwan scenarios for a variety of purposes. But the 

trade-offs between “tooth” (combat capabilities) and 

power projection “tail” (support capabilities) would 

be different against Taiwan than against virtually all 

other plausible opponents. 

U.S. participation in a Taiwan scenario would 

vastly complicate the PLA task and could potentially 

expand the potential battle area. But the impact of 

Max distance from 

PRC Mainland 

(in km)

Total land area 

(in km2)

Length of Coastline 

(in km)

Taiwan 380 32,300 1,600

Vietnam 1,170 310,100 3,400

Japan 1,260/2,500* 364,500 29,800

Philippines 2,160 298,200 36,300

India 2,380 2,973,193 7,000

* If measured across the Korean Peninsula, the shorter distance 

applies. The longer distance applies to distances measured 

around third party airspace.
89

this new depth would be limited unless significant 

adjustments were made to U.S. force posture. (See 

the upcoming section on U.S. military force posture 

and strategy for more on this topic.) U.S. forces are 

overwhelmingly concentrated in a few bases in Northeast Asia, almost all well within range of Chinese 

MRBMs.5 The United States operates a single U.S. Air 

Force Base (Kadena) and a single Marine Corps Air 

Station (Futemna) within unrefueled fighter range 

of Taiwan—against roughly 40 for China, as shown 

in Figure 4-1.6 Under some circumstances, Chinese 

leaders might believe that they could either deter the 

United States from entering a conflict by holding even 

a handful of bases hostage, or, potentially, hold off 

U.S. attacks long enough to achieve their objects with 

regard to Taiwan. 

Figure 4-1. PLAAF, USAF, and USMC Air Bases

within 1,000-km of Taiwan Strait.
90

In contrast, other regional states that have conflicts with China have significantly greater strategic 

depth than Taiwan and would require a greater mix 

of at least regional power projection capabilities. As 

Table 4-1 indicates, all have areas that would constitute sanctuaries against a Chinese adversary armed 

exclusively with short range systems. In reality, China 

already has the capability to launch limited punitive 

operations against any of these states. Nevertheless, 

if PLA leaders anticipate the possibility that an adversary could extend the campaign in time or space, they 

would have significant incentives to invest further in 

at least some types of limited power projection capabilities. Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines, and India 

all have the strategic depth to support and continue 

a fight from positions beyond the range of Chinese 

short range air and missile systems. Hence, even if a 

conflict began over a flashpoint in China’s immediate periphery, such as the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands, it 

may need to engage forces significantly further away. 

In the Senkaku case, the PLA would presumably want 

to be able to strike Yokota Air Base (the U.S. Air Force 

Base near Tokyo) or even more distant locations even 

if it would prefer to keep the conflicted limited.

IMPACT OF RELATIONS WITH 

REGIONAL ACTORS

China’s relations with neighboring states will be an 

important driver of PLA direction. In addition to geography, political factors and the military capabilities 

of regional states will also affect the degree and manner in which tensions or conflict with regional states 

will influence future PLA trajectories. This section 

provides a very brief country-by-country overview of 
91

political and military issues related to each actor. It 

begins with Taiwan, which represents the only case 

where, if the relationship sours and military conflict 

becomes more likely, the PLA will refocus relatively 

greater efforts on peripheral capabilities. It then goes 

on to address other potential competitors in Asia: Japan, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Increased 

conflict with all of these would push China, on balance, toward the acquisition of a regional power projection capability. Given limited space, Indonesia and 

Malaysia are not discussed, though they each have at 

least minor territorial disputes with China and could 

potentially come into sharper conflict with it. 

Taiwan. 

In addition to Taiwan’s unique geographic position 

(discussed earlier), Taiwan is also a special case from 

the political dimension. Under Beijing’s one-China 

policy, Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. When 

Chinese senior leaders deliver formal remarks on the 

state’s “core national interests,” sovereignty over Taiwan and Tibet are often the only examples they provide.7

 Indeed, some sources suggest that the language 

of “core national interests” was created by Beijing in 

order to better control the discussion of Taiwan.8 Preventing Taiwan’s de jure independence is central to 

the Chinese government’s legitimacy.9 Should China 

feel that Taiwan is moving toward de jure independence, the military requirements for Taiwan contingencies will likely take precedence over those of other 

contingencies even if the latter scenarios also become 

more likely. 

Although Taiwan’s defense capabilities have suffered a prolonged decline relative to China’s, they 
92

remain potent. This is especially true in the context of 

an amphibious invasion; capability against a blockade 

campaign would be somewhat more questionable. 

Taiwan operates 192 4th generation fighters (a combination of F-16s and Mirage 2000s) and 26 surface 

combatants (including three classes of U.S. ships and 

six La Fayette class frigates), in addition to substantial 

ground forces. If it felt an invasion might be necessary, 

China would probably seek to acquire more modern 

amphibious ships, and given the possibility of U.S. intervention, would also probably seek to reinforce its 

A2/AD capability and fighter forces. While it could 

accomplish many tasks using short range capabilities, 

it would nevertheless benefit from tankers, airborne 

early warning and control aircraft (AWACS), and 

conventionally armed MRBMs and IRBMs. 

Japan.

After Taiwan, China’s security position vis-à-vis 

Japan is probably the second most important to the 

legitimacy of the government in Beijing. Against a 

backdrop of distrust dating from Japan’s imperial era 

(and fed by Chinese propaganda and Japanese nationalist rhetoric), territorial disputes over the sovereignty 

of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the economic exclusion zone boundary in the East China Sea, and the oil 

and gas deposits under the East China Sea serve as 

potential flashpoints.10 Both sides are extraordinarily 

sensitive to perceived unilateral changes in the status 

quo affecting these interests. 

Among regional states, Japan stands out as having the largest defense budget after China’s. Japan’s 

47 principal surface combatants include two Hyuga

class helicopter destroyers, each carrying up to 11 
93

helicopters and designed primarily for anti-submarine 

warfare (ASW) and amphibious landing functions. 

(They could also potentially support short take-off 

and vertical landing aircraft.) Japan operates 18 submarines, all commissioned post-1990. The five most 

modern are Soryu class boats with air independent 

propulsion (AIP). The Japan Air Self-Defense Force 

operates almost 300 modern fighter aircraft (the F-2 

and the F-15J), supported by a small fleet of AWACS 

and aerial tankers. 

Given the political importance of Japan issues, the 

country’s strategic depth, and its potent military capabilities, significantly increased tensions with Japan 

could encourage the PLA to increase regional power 

projection capabilities and acquire a sizable number 

of tankers and AWACS, MRBMs, large surface combatants, and nuclear and conventionally powered 

submarines.11 Liu Yazhou, a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 

General at the Chinese National Defense University, 

has cited the failure to reform military institutions 

prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 as a key factor in China’s loss.12 The reference comes in the context of a contemporary discussion military reforms 

today that would likely enhance the status of the PLA 

Navy (PLAN) and PLAAF and better support power 

projection.13

India. 

India is the only neighbor with which China has 

significant continental territorial disputes (centered 

on Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh). Having decisively bested India in the 1962 border war, China 

looms far larger in the minds of Indian strategists 

than India does in Chinese thinking.14 However, 
94

media reforms in China have produced increased reporting on Indian perceptions of rivalry and opened 

the door to negative feedback dynamics between the 

two. The Indian acquisition of additional power projection, missile, and nuclear capabilities, often justified by the Chinese threat, has caught the attention of 

the Chinese strategic community.15

India’s defense budget is large and, unlike Japan’s, 

has grown rapidly over the last decade. Administrative and organizational problems endow it with capabilities that are not necessarily equal to the funds 

spent, but it does have pockets of strength. India’s 25 

principle surface combatants include two aircraft carriers (one acquired from the Unitd Kingdom (UK) and 

one from Russia), and it is building two additional 

carriers at home. The Indian navy also operates 14 

modern submarines. The Indian air force has roughly 300 modern fighters (including the MiG-29, Su-30 

variants, and the Mirage 2000), supported by small 

numbers of AWACS and tankers. Increased tensions 

or crises with India would, on balance, push China 

toward acquiring more regional power projection capabilities, including conventionally armed MRBMs 

and IRBMs, AWACS and tanker capabilities, nuclear 

and conventional submarines, and, possibly, more aircraft carriers. They would also justify continued modernization of the ground forces, perhaps especially 

army aviation.

Vietnam.

Similar to the Indian case, China looms larger in 

Vietnamese strategic thinking than Vietnam does 

in China’s, but maritime disputes between the two 

keep Vietnam in the Chinese news. Recent collisions 
95

between vessels, protests, and riots over China’s deployment of an oil rig in Vietnam’s claimed waters 

led China to evacuate thousands of Chinese citizens 

from Vietnam and provided a sharp reminder of China’s sensitivity to the stability of its relations with its 

southern neighbor. 

Despite its limited resources and small defense 

budget, Vietnam has taken steps to modernize its 

military such that it could offer some resistance to 

China in the air and at sea, and mount a more serious challenge on the ground. Vietnam has begun to 

acquire a small but capable force of modern fighter 

aircraft and submarines. As of late-2013, it had a total 

of 34 Su-27s and Su-30s in service with another 14 on 

order. As of April 2014, it had taken delivery of two 

Kilo-class submarines, and has four more on order. Its 

two Russian-built frigates (the Dinh Tien Hoang class) 

have reduced radar signatures and field modern antiship cruise missiles and air defenses. Continued friction between China and Vietnam could encourage the 

PLA to further modernize its land forces, as well as 

further develop its fleet of large surface combatants, 

MRBMs, and modern fighter aircraft, and AWACS. 

Aircraft carriers and tankers would be relatively less 

important in this case, given the proximity of Vietnam 

to Chinese bases. 

Philippines.

Like Vietnam, ongoing maritime disputes between 

China and the Philippines provide an ongoing source 

of concern for Beijing. The Philippines lacks any modern air or naval power, but unlike India, Japan, and 

Vietnam, military operations against even the closest Philippines territory would require considerable 
96

reach. (The nearest point on Luzon is some 650-km 

from the mainland.) While it is starting essentially 

from scratch, the Philippines has begun the process 

of modernizing its forces by acquiring jet training 

aircraft from South Korea.16 A recently concluded 

agreement with the United States to expand access to 

Philippine bases could also facilitate the modernization of Philippines’ military capabilities.17 Anticipated 

military conflict with the Philippines could encourage 

the PLA to increase its power projection capabilities 

including large surface combatants, flat-deck amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, MRBMs, IRBMs, tankers, 

and AWACS. The quantity of forces required, however, would be less than in the case of India, due to the 

much smaller scale of the Philippines military.

Lastly, for completeness, a quick survey of the PLA 

serves to highlight the military balance between it and 

the other selected regional powers. (See Table 4-2.) 

The PLA Air Force’s roughly 600 modern fighters are 

a mix of J-10s, J-11s, and Su-27/Su-30 variants. These 

are supported by a handful of tankers (converted H-6 

bombers) and a growing inventory of AWACS. Its 70 

surface combatants include its first aircraft carrier, 15 

modern destroyers, and 54 frigates. Its modern submarines include Shang SSNs, as well as Kilo, Song, 

and Yuan SSKs. 
97

Sources: The Military Balance, Vol. 114, No. 1, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014; “Vietnam Navy 

Receives 2 Russia-Made Project 636 Kilo Class Diesel Electric 

Submarines,” April 6, 2014, accessed on May 8, 2014, available 

from www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/year2014-news/april-2014-navy-naval-forces-maritime-industry-technology-security-global-news/1725-vietnam-navy-receives-2-russia-madeproject-636-kilo-class-diesel-electric-submarines.html.

Table 4-2. Key Military Capabilities of Selected 

Regional Powers.

IMPACT OF U.S. POWER, POSITION, AND 

MILITARY STRATEGY 

Despite periodic Chinese debates about the potential decline of American power—and assertions about 

the continued advance of multipolarity—the United 

States remains by far the most significant factor in 

Chinese foreign and security policy. The United States 

receives singular treatment in successive editions of 

Chinese national defense white papers, whether by 

name or clear implication. Article searches in PLA 

Daily suggest that discussions of disputes involving 

the United States and those involving other neighbors 

2013 Defense 

Budget (in 

billions$)

Modern 

Fighter 

Aircraft

Principle 

Surface 

Combatants

Modern 

Submarines

Active Duty 

Military 

Personnel

Taiwan 10.3 192 26 0 290,000

Japan 51.0 277 47 16 247,150

India 36.3 312 25 14 1,325,000

Philippines 2.2 0 0 0 125,000

Vietnam 3.8 34 2 2 482,000

PRC 112.0 ~600 70 35 2,333,000
98

have generally co-varied over time (see Table 4-3). 

This stands to reason, as the United States is generally 

drawn into disputes with China’s neighbors and is often seen as the instigator by Beijing. In other words, 

the degree of disputation with neighbors and that 

with the United States is not zero-sum—an increase 

in the former will not diminish the importance of the 

United States in Chinese security planning. 

*Neighbors included Japan, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and 

Taiwan. 

Source: 解放军报 full text database, The China National Knowledge 

Infrastructure, Bejing, China.

Table 4-3. Articles in JFJB Discussing 

U.S. Disputes and Selected PRC Neighbors’ 

Disputes.*

*Article searches included country name (e.g., 美国) in title and 

“dispute” (分歧 or 争端) anywhere in the article text. Note that 

not all of the disputes mentioned were necessarily with China. 

Thus, the data should only be taken as a very aggregate indicator 

of threat perception in the context of other, qualitative evidence.

Year U.S. Disputes Other Neighbors'

Disputes*

Ratio

US:Others

1984-1988 14 10 1.4

1989-1993 18 14 1.3

1994-1998 51 34 1.5

1999-2003 72 57 1.3

2004-2008 64 50 1.3

2009-2013 103 70 1.5

Total 322 235 1.4
99

By almost any measure, U.S. power relative to China’s has declined over the last 20 years, and Chinese 

official publications see a continuing trend toward 

multipolarity in the international system. In the military realm, China has increased its military spending 

faster than the United States, and, in part because of 

its low starting position and the availability of military technology from international sources, China has 

been able to narrow (but not close) the technology 

gap. Nevertheless, U.S. comprehensive national power remains superior to that of China, and a number 

of Chinese specialists predict that the United States 

will remain the world’s premier power for at least the 

next 20 or 30 years.18 In the military realm, the readjustment of U.S. military assets toward the Pacific and 

the pursuit of entirely new types of technologies have 

mitigated the impact of Chinese modernization. Even 

if U.S. dominance has waned somewhat, the United 

States remains the only military in Asia with clearly 

superior military capabilities. 

Several U.S.-related developments could shift Chinese calculations and produce incentives to adjust the 

balance of capabilities toward one of the trajectories 

discussed earlier: (1) distracted or diminished U.S. 

power; (2) changes to U.S. military strategy or posture; 

(3) Sino-American crises that highlighted the danger 

of war between the two; or, (4) a more cooperative relationship that was more welcoming of a significant 

Chinese role in global security.

Distracted or Weakened U.S. Power. 

A United States that was seriously distracted by 

events elsewhere, or a significant weakening of relative U.S. military power such that continuing “rebal-
100

ancing” would no longer significantly mitigate the 

impact, could produce uncertain results. The United 

States has been the great equalizer of Asian military 

power, especially around China’s immediate periphery. Potential U.S. involvement in a Taiwan conflict, 

for example, has maintained the standoff between a 

country of 1,300 million people and one of 20 million. 

Viewed from one perspective, then, the weakening of 

U.S. commitment might free Chinese military planners to focus on other, more distant tasks, if they believed their capabilities were sufficient for security in 

the immediate periphery. 

There is, however, another equally plausible outcome. Balancing by regional states—and in particular, 

a strong lean toward the United States—has sometimes 

led Beijing to moderate its international approach lest 

it push neighbors further into the U.S. camp. A diminished U.S. commitment might lead Chinese leaders to 

take more forceful positions with regard to local disputes, leading to more crises and worse relations with 

neighbors. This, in turn, could lead the PLA to focus 

on capabilities maximized for peripheral or wider regional warfighting. Even in this latter case, however, 

the withdrawal of the U.S power would reduce the requirement for some types of A2/AD capabilities, such 

as the DF-21D ASBM, and increase the incentives to 

acquire systems that might allow it to control air or 

sea areas against regional foes. 

U.S. Military Force Posture and Strategy. 

The impact of the United States on Chinese military strategy will not simply rest on the maintenance 

of U.S. composite or military power or its degree of 

commitment to Asia. It will also depend on the U.S. 
101

military strategy and force posture. Since the end of 

the Cold War, the United States has pursued operationally offensively oriented doctrines and operational 

practices.19 Although these practices have developed 

partly as a function of America’s dominant military 

position, they may have become an enduring habit. 

In recent wars, the United States has had the initiative and been able to launch early and intensive attacks, leading with airpower and missile strikes.20 The 

U.S. forward-leaning posture in Asia, its permanent 

rotational deployment of bombers to the region, and 

the AirSea Battle concept all suggest that the United 

States might rely heavily on offensive action from the 

outset of a conflict in Asia, even if it did not initiate 

hostilities.21

However, with the diminution of U.S. all-aspects 

dominance in Asia and increased pressure on the 

defense budget, there is some debate about whether 

the United States should rethink its forward-leaning 

strategy. There has, for example, been some discussion about whether a blockade strategy could either 

complement or replace a strategy that relies on early 

and intensive strikes.22 Less noted but potentially as 

consequential is the discussion about improving operational resiliency through a combination of measures that might include: operating from more bases, 

in smaller packages, with greater mobility and flexibility, and with improvements to active and passive 

defenses.23 Unlike a blockade strategy, which faces 

strong resistance from within the military (especially 

the navy), the concept of resiliency has strong support 

(at least in principle), and some funds have already 

been allocated. Key elements to improve operational 

resilience, including new techniques for rapid runway 

repair, hardening of critical infrastructure, and operat-
102

ing aircraft in an expeditionary manner, have already 

begun.24 This strategy could include the dispersion of 

assets to bases or locations at greater distances from 

China, followed by phased operations taking the force 

closer as Chinese A2/AD capabilities were degraded.

If the United States moves more concertedly toward an approach that capitalizes on strategic depth 

within Asia (either as part of a blockade strategy or 

phased entry strategy or both), it will likely accelerate 

the Chinese development of power projection forces. 

The distinction between a center of gravity in the first 

island chain and one spread over the first and second 

island chains and extending into southern Southeast 

Asia and the Indian Ocean may appear one of degrees. 

But for Chinese military planners, the differences 

would be important. 

If U.S. forces are able to operate from hundreds of 

miles away from the Chinese coast and still threaten 

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) values in the 

event of war, Chinese planners would have more incentives to develop longer range strike systems, and, 

especially, a far more robust support structure for regional power projection. Assuming that they wished 

to challenge U.S. operations near their source of operations, or at least interdict attacks coming from distant locations, greater U.S. depth would place a premium on Chinese space-based communications and 

ISR. Aircraft would require a large number of tankers 

to extend the PLAAF’s range beyond the first island 

chain. Operating beyond the range of land-based air 

surveillance and C2 sites would create a greater need 

for airborne early warning and command and control 

aircraft. Naval platforms would require more at-sea 

replenishment capacity, driving a requirement for a 

larger Chinese combat logistics fleet. 
103

China might also seek, on balance, larger and 

longer-ranged systems. Longer-range bombers may 

be sought, as smaller strike aircraft may no longer 

have the range to strike key U.S. bases or command 

facilities. More and larger destroyers, especially airdefense destroyers, would be useful to provide enduring presence in operational areas. The PLA might also 

seek to increase the proportion of nuclear powered attack submarines in the submarine force, since submarines may be required to operate even beyond areas 

of U.S. presence in order to isolate U.S. basing areas 

and prevent the flow of reinforcements to them. To 

the extent that China wished to extend its TBM range 

to newly relevant operational areas, it would have to 

build multi-stage conventionally armed MRBMs and 

IRBMs—though given the expense, it might also shift 

to relatively greater reliance on cruise-missile armed 

bombers. 

In the multistep game of positioning for advantage 

during peacetime, China will, like the United States, 

have many options, and it would not have to adopt the 

force structure discussed previously. The PLA could, 

for example, conceivably adopt a hedgehog strategy. It 

could continue to strengthen its shorter-range capabilities, allowing it to decisively influence events around 

its immediate periphery and then dig-in and ride-out 

more attacks into its operational periphery—much 

as Japan sought to do during World War II. However, this would cede initiative to the United States, 

and it is more likely that China would shift relatively 

greater resources toward an ability to influence events 

farther away. 

The PLA forces designed to contest areas in more 

distant parts of Asia may not require the same kinds 

of very large lift aircraft or support ships that a more 
104

globally oriented strategy would. Nevertheless, these 

intermediary steps would move the PLA incrementally toward a more global power projection capability. 

Intensified Sino-American Tensions or Clashes. 

If U.S. military capabilities remained strong relative to those of China and Sino-American relations 

grew appreciably worse, punctuated by clashes or 

more frequent crises, the PLA would have greater 

incentives to maintain its high priority on defensive, 

A2/AD, and peripheral warfighting capabilities. Chinese leaders might rate the chance of being attacked 

at home (even as part of a war that the United States 

might be fighting defensively) more highly, and might 

therefore seek to continue improving defensive capabilities. While offensive and support systems could 

still be useful, they are expensive and the relative 

value of expenditures on them would lessen. Consequently, more might be spent on short range fighters, 

surface-to-air missiles, and improvements to basing 

infrastructure. On the naval front, there would be less 

incentive to build aircraft carriers, which would be 

vulnerable to U.S. submarine and air attack. Submarines might remain the naval weapon of choice. 

U.S. Welcome for Larger Chinese Global Role. 

When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke 

of the “new model of major-country relations” to a 

Brookings audience in September of 2013, he said: 

China is prepared to engage in all-dimensional cooperation with the United States at regional and global 

levels. . . . China is ready to shoulder international 
105

responsibilities commensurate with its national strength 

and realities, and together with the United States, offer more quality public goods for the international 

community.25

China is already a major contributor to United Nations (UN)-sponsored international peacekeeping efforts, as well as to some ad hoc international efforts, 

such as anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. At 

a minimum, improved relations with the United States 

would, on balance, free up resources that might otherwise be devoted to defensive or peripheral tasks. A 

more enthusiastic or explicit welcome by Washington 

of global roles for China might further encourage it 

to engage in peacekeeping and other operations overseas. On balance, this should increase incentives to develop a range of support systems, such as long range 

air- and sea-lift and satellite communications and ISR, 

as well as “harder” power projection capabilities, such 

as aircraft carriers and, possibly, nuclear submarines. 

IMPACT OF GLOBAL INTERESTS 

AND DISTANT CHALLENGES

The growth of Chinese material and human interests overseas, as well as the development of strategic 

military relationships with foreign states, could also 

prompt China to invest relatively greater resources in 

developing a globally oriented military. 

Protecting Overseas Assets and People. 

China’s 2013 white paper on national defense included a section on “protecting overseas interests”—

the first time the topic has been addressed in a Chi-
106

nese defense white paper. The document observes the 

growth of Chinese interests overseas and stipulates, 

“vessel protection at sea, evacuation of Chinese nationals overseas, and emergency rescue have become 

important ways and means for the PLA to safeguard 

national interests.”26

China’s overseas trade has grown rapidly over a 

period of 30 years. However, its overseas investments, 

which may be a bigger driver of overseas residency, 

have only grown to significant levels in the last decade. In 2005, Chinese overseas investments and 

contracts totaled around $18 billion yuan, a figure 

that rose more than 600 percent to $132 billion yuan 

by 2013. While the first and second largest recipients 

of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) are the 

United States and Australia, Chinese investment in 

developing countries, including a number of unstable 

ones, is disproportionately large. For example, Africa 

accounts for around 2.5 percent of total global gross 

domestic product. Less than 4 percent of China’s total 

trade between 2005 and 2013 was with African states. 

But fully 18 percent of China’s outgoing FDI over that 

same period was in Africa, where it made investments 

in 30 different countries.27

The number of Chinese citizens overseas has risen 

as a function of both overseas investment and growing 

wealth. A total of 97 million Chinese traveled overseas 

for tourism in 2013, up from 29 million in 2004.28 Some 

9.3 million Chinese went abroad to work or study in 

2013, up from 4 million in 1990.29 The Chinese business presence has become a popular and political 

target in countries where local entrepreneurs or labor 

struggles, and anti-Chinese riots have been witnessed 

in Solomon Islands (2006), Tonga (2006), Lesotho 

(2007), Algeria (2009), Papua New Guinea (2009), and 
107

Zambia (2012).30 Riots in Vietnam, sparked primarily 

by the activities of Chinese energy companies in Vietnamese claimed exclusive economic zones, were also 

fed by dissatisfaction over labor conditions. In 2011, 

Thai soldiers were charged in the killing of 13 Chinese 

sailors in Thailand.31 Kidnappers have also targeted 

overseas Chinese, taking 29 construction workers 

in Sudan and 25 workers in Egypt in 2012. Closer to 

home, ethnic Chinese have been targets of violence 

and discrimination for much longer. Ethnic Chinese 

were attacked in both the post-1965 anti-communist 

purges in Indonesia and in riots in May 1998 on the 

eve of Suharto’s fall.32

Historically, China has not taken a forceful position with regard to the protection of overseas citizens 

or, especially, noncitizen ethnic Chinese. This may 

be changing. While the Chinese government was 

relatively passive as Indonesian Chinese came under 

attack in 1998, the Chinese government came under 

pressure from overseas ethnic Chinese to act, forcing 

it to condemn the violence and encourage restraint.33

The increased flow of information to and within China since the 1998 riots, as well as higher expectations 

concerning national power, may make it even harder 

in future cases for the Chinese government to satisfy 

its public with statements of condemnation. Indeed, 

the recent production of a documentary in Indonesia 

depicting the post-1965 killings there triggered public 

calls in China for Beijing to write the massacre into 

history books and cease aid to Indonesia—all over a 

case that is now nearly 50 years past.34

As the 2013 white paper suggests and the 2011 

Libyan case demonstrated, the PLA is ready and willing to participate in the evacuation of Chinese nationals. In the Libyan case, it diverted a destroyer from 
108

the Gulf of Aden to the Libyan coast and dispatched 

four Il-76s on 40 sorties to evacuate 1,655 people to 

Sudan.35 Chinese pundits and netizens have begun 

to debate whether China should develop capabilities 

that would make more forceful measures possible. Of 

the killing of Chinese sailors in Thailand, an editorial 

posted on Tencent (腾讯网) said, “Many netizens feel 

that the appropriate authorities in this case were not 

tough enough” and asked “if the dead were American, would an aircraft carrier already have sailed to 

Thailand?”36 In 2011, Wei Xudong, a professor at the 

Chinese National Defense University recommended 

considering the establishment of a special strike unit 

and conducting prior consultation with overseas 

governments so that action to assist Chinese nationals could be conducted with the cooperation of local 

authorities.37

A 2013 article by Yue Gang, a former colonel with 

the PLA general staff, offers perhaps the most ambitious proposal.38 Gang writes: 

The PLA should protect Chinese people overseas. . . . 

The army should act as a deterrent against those who 

attempt to harm Chinese people. We will not allow 

any repeat of such tragedies as the May 1998 riots in 

Indonesia.39

He suggests the PLA should do four things to 

strengthen its ability to protect overseas assets. First, it 

should increase its transport capacity, to include large 

transport aircraft. Even when the Y-20 enters service, 

he notes, it will have less than half the lift capacity of 

a U.S. C-5 aircraft. Second, it should increase its “forward” presence. Third, it should deepen its international military-to-military cooperation. And fourth, it 

should build up its military capacity to show its “will 

and determination.”
109

Two things could increase the relative emphasis 

on protecting assets and people overseas. The first 

would be the continued rapid increase of investment 

and travel overseas. This would increase the stakes for 

China overseas and increase the incentives for China 

to develop the kinds of global power projection capabilities that would enable it to protect its interests 

around the world. The second would be a large-scale 

attack on Chinese nationals or diaspora, or the nationalization or destruction of important material assets or investments overseas.40 There are a number of 

different capabilities that could be considered. Most, 

however, would involve the acquisition of naval and 

air lift and long-range capabilities, as well as the development of special operations forces with functions 

similar to those of the U.S. Delta Force or SEALs. 

One question is what sort of global economic and 

security environment would correlate with and help 

propel Chinese overseas investment. It stands to reason that a stable and prosperous global economy will 

make overseas investment relatively safe and lucrative. Notably, commodity prices would also rise, 

and much of China’s current overseas investment is 

in these areas. A sharp global downturn or instability overseas could put Chinese investments at risk, 

increasing the incentives to develop the capability to 

defend or evacuate assets and people, but the interests 

themselves will grow faster during periods of growth.

Strategic Military Relationships. 

Another set of interests that could push the PLA 

toward a global trajectory is the development of strategic military relationships with overseas partners. 

The further expansion of overseas trade and invest-
110

ment would provide some incentives for developing 

or deepening such strategic relationships, as the PLA 

might seek, for example, to protect an ever larger 

volume of shipping and might, therefore, look for 

dependable locations from which it could provision 

ships on escort duty. 

However, other factors, some less well appreciated, could also work to promote overseas strategic relationships. One such driver would be a desire to consolidate and build on common geopolitical interests with 

states that share Chinese views on global governance 

or specific international problems. Sharper differences 

between the developed world and rising powers on 

such issues as trade, the environment, and, especially, 

sovereignty norms could cause Chinese leaders to cement ties with other like-minded states by increasing 

military cooperation or assistance. 

Expanded military-industrial ties could also serve 

to cement new strategic relations. China’s arms sales 

have a checkered history. Previous sales, such as Chinese sales of armored vehicles to Thailand during the 

1980s, came with very little support, were of shoddy 

quality, and gained China a reputation as a poor supplier. However, the quality of and support for Chinese 

sales is improving. Chinese arms sales remain modest, but are increasing rapidly. In 2013 (the most recent 

year for which data are available), China is estimated 

to have exported roughly $3.3 billion worth of military equipment.41 The total value of arms sales for the 

5 years between and 2009 and 2013 were more than 

three times those of the period from 2004 to 2008. (See 

Figure 4-2.)
111

Source: Arms Transfer Database, Stockholm, Sweden, Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institute, 2013.42

Figure 4-2. Annual Chinese Arms Exports, 2000-13.

Although China is best known for the sale of small 

arms and other relatively light weapons, it is moving 

toward the export of larger and more complex platforms, such as fighters, frigates, and submarines.43 A 

more significant departure (since it has exported some 

larger platforms in the past) is the increasing tendency 

to include licensed production or “joint” development 

as part of its deals. The JF-17, for example, was designed for Pakistan to be a low-cost 4th generation 

aircraft utilizing avionics and other features from the 

J-10, and Pakistan has committed to purchase 250 of 

the aircraft. JF-17 Block 2 production began in 2013, 

with Pakistan’s share of the airframe production stipulated at 58 percent.44 The fighter is currently being 

marketed in Latin America and the Middle East, with 

co-production being negotiated with Argentina.45

As the JF-17 example demonstrates, China is also 

marketing its weapons, with some success, to a wider 
112

range of clients. Turkey’s announcement that it would 

purchase the FD-2000 (an export version of the HQ-9 

long-range SAM system) surprised many—and elicited warnings from Turkey’s U.S. North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) ally—but Ankara, the Turkish 

capital, was drawn to the deal by both the low cost 

and the Chinese willingness to co-produce the systems.46 Turkey is also interested in the FJ-17 for largely 

the same reasons. Indonesia is looking to license produce the Chinese C-705 anti-ship missile.47 Thailand, 

a long-time partner, is deepening its military-industrial relationship with China by jointly developing a 

guided multiple rocket launcher system (the DTI-1G) 

as follow-on to earlier unguided systems imported 

from China.48 It is also considering a range of portable 

Chinese SAM systems.49

Although China is currently the world’s fifth largest arms exporter, it lags far behind the United States 

and Russia. However, the combination of low price, 

reasonable (and much improved) quality, good terms 

(often including co-production), few political conditions, and a growing range of available sub-systems 

and weapons could mean China is on the cusp of significant expansion in overseas arms sales. The consequences would likely be significant. Military-industrial ties bring senior military leaders into regular contact 

to discuss issues of common military interest. Arms 

sales are often accompanied by the dispatch of technicians and advisors to recipient nations, and licensed 

production and joint development may involve technology transfers greatly appreciated by the receiving 

nation.50 The Chinese expansion of arms sales, licensed 

production, and joint development overseas will likely create interests that China will want to secure. 
113

In general, closer strategic relations with more distant powers (to include those in southern Southeast 

Asia) will encourage the PLA to place greater emphasis on power projection capabilities. Transport aircraft, possibly supported by long range tankers, may 

be a desirable way of bringing equipment, units, and 

delegations to partner countries—even if commercial 

transportation would be just as practical. Similarly, replenishment ships could support an expanded schedule of fleet visits. Finally, a wider range of military and 

strategic partners could, at the margins, also increase 

the incentives to deploy and maintain aircraft carriers 

and other large surface ships that could carry the flag 

and increase Chinese prestige in distant locations. 

INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES 

AND A WEAKER PLA

Many of the most important developments that 

would impinge on PLA strength are Chinese domestic 

factors, rather than international ones. At the most extreme, domestic variables would include serious domestic instability, such as that brought on by regime 

collapse or civil war, or an economic meltdown. Smaller, but nevertheless important developments would 

include unchecked or more widely publicized corruption within the military, a more pronounced economic 

slowdown than that currently being experienced, or 

significantly increased nonmilitary demands on the 

military budget. Although the most likely drivers of 

a weaker PLA would be domestic, there are several 

international developments that could also contribute 

to that outcome. 
114

Military Failure and Misbehavior. 

Military failure, especially failure that was accompanied by apparent incompetence, misbehavior, or civilian suffering, could undermine support for the PLA 

at home. For example, a sharp defeat in a conventional 

conflict against Japan might create pressure to find a 

military culprit for manifest humiliation at the hands 

of an old enemy. Should China become involved in a 

conflict farther afield, such as one that might grow out 

of a peacekeeping operation in Africa or elsewhere, 

widely publicized misbehavior by Chinese forces 

could similarly discredit or embarrass the military. 

Loss of support is not the only possible outcome of 

defeat, and a number of other intervening variables 

would come into play. Domestic economic and social 

maladies almost certainly exacerbated the U.S. reaction to the Vietnam War and even more significant 

domestic problems conditioned Soviet responses to 

losses in Afghanistan. 

Imperial Overstretch. 

Chinese leaders are likely to remain extraordinarily 

cautious about overseas military commitments. However, should this change and China find itself engaged 

in large scale, protracted operations to protect overseas 

interests, PLA modernization efforts could be undermined. China’s military budget is far smaller than that 

of the United States, and although PLA units are unlikely to deploy with all the amenities that accompany 

U.S. forces, resources could be severely stretched and 

crowd out modernization priorities. Alternatively, the 

PLA might, like U.S. forces conducting stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, be forced to specialize 
115

in particular types of skills and structures that would 

not translate well to high-intensity operations against 

more capable foes. Weighed against these potential 

negative effects would be the accumulation of combat 

experience and a likely acceleration of lift acquisition. 

Failure of Sino-Russian Military-Industrial 

Relationship. 

With the continued development of China’s own 

defense industries, foreign arms purchases and technology acquisition have become progressively less 

important to the PLA. Nevertheless, Russian military 

industry remains significantly ahead of China in a 

number of areas (e.g., aircraft engines, stealth technology, SAM systems, and systems integration more 

generally). A shift in Russian threat perception or a 

further deterioration in Russian confidence with regard to Chinese intellectual property rights protection 

could impinge on China’s ability to leverage its relationship with Russia to acquire key capabilities. Alternatively, a major surge in Russian arms purchases for 

its own military might consume its industrial capacity 

and crowd out exports for a period. A similar result 

could obtain from a collapse of the Russian arms industry brought on, for example, by serious political or 

social instability, or by Western sanctions.

External Support for Domestic Chinese Terrorists. 

Although the degree of internal threat faced by the 

regime will be determined largely by domestic variables, external support for domestic insurgencies or 

terrorists could increase the level and intensity of the 

threat. The most plausible scenarios would involve 
116

support to Uighur separatists from extremist groups. 

This would be particularly problematic for China if 

it included weapons, such as advanced explosives or 

portable surface-to-air missiles that could neutralize 

the Chinese military’s mobility and firepower advantages. Intensified domestic threats could force the 

PLA to turn inwards, toward counterinsurgency missions. Although this could provide incentives for the 

acquisition of helicopters and other short range lift assets, it would generally detract from the PLA’s ability 

to optimize its capabilities to counter more advanced 

opponents. 

SUMMARY AND OUTCOMES: 

DESCRIBING FUTURE WORLDS

Having discussed a range of key variables, this 

section returns to the trajectories themselves and summarizes which combinations of variables might push 

China toward each outcome. 

Trajectory 1: PLA Optimized for Operations 

in the Immediate Periphery. 

The PLA is currently developing greater regional 

power projection capabilities. While a variety of factors 

may be leading the PLA in this direction, it is possible 

to imagine changes in the international environment 

that would threaten China in its immediate periphery 

and push it to refocus on short range systems. These 

would include a relatively strong United States with 

poor relations with China, perhaps brought on by 

international crises that led Washington to recommit 

itself to regional defense beyond the current pivot to 

Asia. The impact would be particularly pronounced if 
117

it were accompanied by additional U.S. investments 

in systems that could be used to strike targets in mainland China (such as prompt global strike or long range 

hypersonic missiles). Poor Chinese relations or crises 

with Taiwan, and anticipated military conflict with it, 

could have similar effects. Under these circumstances, 

Chinese political and military leaders might believe 

that anti-access capabilities and large numbers of 

short range platforms might be a cost effective way to 

maximize its ability to prevail in relevant areas.

Trajectory 2: A PLA Prepared for Regional Power 

Projection and Warfighting. 

A different combination of factors could push 

China to accelerate its acquisition of regional power 

projection capabilities. If relations with Taiwan remained stable, while those with other states in Southeast, East, or South Asia worsened, the incentives to 

develop capabilities to influence events further from 

home will grow. Wildcards, such as naval or air 

clashes with regional states or large-scale attacks on 

the Chinese diaspora or citizens in these areas, would 

provide additional incentives to acquire such capabilities. Positive regional developments (from China’s 

perspective) could also draw Chinese military farther 

from home. For example, were China to develop more 

robust strategic relations with regional states, perhaps 

cemented in part through military-industrial cooperation, Beijing might wish to develop the lift and other 

capabilities to support exchanges or the transportation of heavy equipment or units for combined training exercises. Needless to say, a region in which some 

countries are military or key strategic partners and 

some present challenges is entirely possible, and this 
118

combination could draw China powerfully toward a 

wider regional strategy. 

Trajectory 3: Accelerated Investment 

in Global Power Projection. 

A peaceful environment in Asia and the shelving 

or resolution of disputes with neighbors would provide the permissive environment in which the PLA 

could accelerate its acquisition of global capabilities. 

The growth of Chinese foreign investments, drawing 

more Chinese companies and workers farther afield, 

would provide the positive incentives for a globally 

oriented PLA. The development of close strategic ties 

with powers outside the region, underpinned in some 

cases by military-industrial cooperation, could create 

practical demands for the ability to deliver and sustain equipment and people to distant locations. An 

environment of global economic growth and prosperity is more likely to be associated with this outcomes 

than is one in which the world economy stagnates. 

A Washington that welcomed Beijing’s cooperation 

in peacekeeping or stability operations overseas, 

while not necessary, would provide yet another 

boost for the development of small but high quality 

expeditionary forces. 

Trajectory 4: A Weaker PLA. 

The most plausible variables that might weaken 

the PLA are domestic. Less likely, but still important, 

external developments could contribute to a weaker 

PLA. A high-profile military failure overseas could 

undermine support for the PLA and PLA modernization at home. Alternatively, protracted overseas 
119

military operations could drain resources away from 

modernization. Although China’s defense industries 

have become progressively less dependent upon foreign assistance, a loss of access to Russian technology 

might slow PLA’s modernization in key areas. Finally, foreign support for domestic Chinese insurgency 

or terrorism, particularly in Xinjiang, could turn the 

PLA’s focus inward and produce a military less well 

suited for operations against foreign states.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. By convention, MRBMs have ranges between 1,000 and 

3,000-km, and IRBMs have ranges between 3,000 and 5,500-km. 

As an example of the cost of an MRBM, the average procurement 

cost of the two-stage Pershing II missile produced by the United 

States in the 1980s would be roughly $11 million per missile in 

2014 dollars. See Sharman Stein, “Missile Makeup Pershing II’s 

Path Typical in U.S. Defense Industry,” Orlando Sentinel, May 27, 

1985. Procurement spending for 254 Pershing II MRBMs was approximately $1.3 billion in 1985, which implies an average cost 

of 1,300/254 = $5.118 million per missile in 1985 dollars. the BLS 

inflation calculator was used to adjust to 2014 dollars.

2. By way of illustration, an aircraft flying at 40,000 feet has a 

line of sight of approximately 400-km. Thus, when preparing to 

project force beyond 1,000-km, beyond-line-of-sight communications, such as satellite-based communications, becomes critical in 

a way that it is not for shorter range operations.

3. David A. Shlapak, David T. Orleysky, Toy I. Reid, Burray 

Scot Tanner, and Barry Wilson, A Question of Balance: Political 

Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute, MG-888, 

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009, pp. 31-51.

4. For example, at an average cruising speed of 10 knots, Chinese submarines could move from the North Sea Fleet to the vicinity of Taiwan in under 4 days. Transit from the East and South 

Sea Fleets would take even less time. 
120

5. The exception is Andersen AFB on Guam, which is currently only within range of the aging nuclear-armed DF-3 IRBM. China has announced that it will field a new conventionally-armed 

IRBM by 2015, which will pose a new threat to Guam. See Zhang 

Han and Huang Jingjing, “New Missile Ready by 2015,” People’s 

Daily Online, February 18, 2011; Doug Richardson, “China Plans 

4,000-km Range Conventional Ballistic Missile,” Jane’s Missiles and 

Rockets, March 1, 2011.

6. Kadena is roughly 770-km from the center of the Taiwan 

Strait and about 650-km from the nearest point on Mainland China. It is well within range of the DF-21C, with a range of roughly 

1,750-km. The new DF-16 is estimated to have a range between 

800 and 1,000+-km. As a much smaller and lighter missile, it could 

potentially be produced in greater numbers than the DF-21 and 

potentially used against Kadena and other facilities on Okinawa. 

“DF-21 (CSS-5),” Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, September 6, 

2013; and “DF-16,” Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, December 

4, 2013. 

7. This was true, for example, of President Hu Jintao’s comments on the subject when he visited Washington in January 2011. 

See Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part One: 

On ‘Core Interests,’” in China Leadership Monitor, No. 34, p. 11. 

8. An Gang, “The Core of the Issue: China’s Declaration of 

its Key Interests Misinterpreted by Many,” Beijing Review, August 

26, 2013.

9. Taiwan’s importance to China stems from a host of factors, 

including its historical importance as a reminder of past perceived 

humiliations, the threat it poses to the legitimacy of the CCP, the 

strategic importance of Taiwan’s geography, and its role as a key 

organizing mission for the PLA. See, for example, Drew Thompson and Zhu Feng, “Why Taiwan Really Matters to China,” Jamestown China Brief, No. 4, Vol. 19, 2004; Alan M. Wachman, Why 

Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity, Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.

10. Jian Yang, “Of Interest and Distrust: Understanding China’s Policy Towards Japan,” China: An International Journal, Vol. 

5, No. 2, 2007, pp. 250-275. Public opinion surveys indicate wide-
121

spread mistrust between the Japanese and Chinese populations; 

Voice of America, “Survey: Mistrust High between Japanese, 

Chinese Citizens,” VOA News, January 7, 2013, available from 

www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1579369.html, accessed on May 

20, 2014.

11. In order for MRBMs to range Japan’s full strategic depth, 

China would need to launch them from northeastern China. The 

quickest way to achieve this would be by relocating some of its 

road-mobile MRBM units from the south. If China wished to 

make a more permanent threat to the full extent of Japan, then it 

could build a new home garrison for an MRBM brigade in Northeastern China.

12. “刘亚洲:甲午战争是日本制度的胜利” (“Liu Yazhou: The 

Sino-Japanese War was a Victory of the Japanese System”), 参考

消息 (Reference News), April 12, 2014.

13. “Chinese Leader, Seeking to Build Its Muscle, Pushes 

Overhaul of the Military,” The New York Times, May 24, 2014. 

14. Tien-sze Fang, Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in IndiaChina Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014; Lionel 

Martin, “Mistrust and Cooperation: Analyzing Sino-Indian Relations,” Jamestown China Brief, No. 4, Vol. 21, 2004; Lora Saalman, 

“Divergence, Similarity, and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat 

Perceptions,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, 2011, 

pp. 169-194.

15. See, for example, 章节根 (Zhang Jiegen), “印度核战略对

中国安全环境及南亚政策的影响” (“Impact of Indian Nuclear 

Strategy on China’s Strategy Environment and South Asia”), 同

济大学学报 (Tongji University Journal, Social Sciences Section), 

April 2011. 

16. See Frances Mangosing, “PH Acquires P23.7B-Worth 

of Fighter Jets, Helicopters,” Inquirer.net, March 28, 2014, 

available from newsinfo.inquirer.net/589890/ph-acquires-p23-7bworth-of-fighter-jets-helicopters, accessed on May 8, 2014.

17. Mark Landler, “U.S. and Philippines Agree to a 10-Year 

Pact on the Use of Military Bases,” The New York Times, April 

27, 2014.
122

18. See, for example, “王缉思:20年内美国仍是唯一超级大国” 

(“Wang Jisi: For the Next 20 Years, the United States will Remain 

the Lone Superpower”), 环球时报 (Huanqiu Shibao), August 6, 

2011; and《美国问题研究报告(2011):美国的实力与地位评估》

[Research Report on U.S. Topics: Evaluation of U.S. Power and Position], Bejing, China: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2011. 

19. To some extent, this was already true by the end of the 

Cold War. During the 1980s, the United States adopted the AirLand Battle concept, which called for deep interdiction of the 

battle area, as well as high-intensity offensive action. However, 

despite some calls for attacks into Eastern Europe, it was generally understood that the United States and its NATO allies would 

be on the defensive in a strategic and operational sense, at least 

during the opening phases of conflict. 

20. This approach has been on display in all of America’s recent wars, including Operation DESERT STORM (1991), Operation ALLIED FORCE (1999), Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

(2001), Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2003), and (in modified 

form) Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (2011). Our colleague Alan 

Vick has argued that there were five key components to the American way of war in these conflicts: (1) rapid forward deployment 

of air, ground, and naval forces; (2) creation of rear area sanctuaries; (3) close monitoring of enemy forces; (4) denial of enemy 

forces’ ability to monitor U.S. forces; and, (5) generation of large 

number of aircraft sorties essentially at will. See Alan Vick, “Challenges to the American Way of War,” Global Warfare Symposium, 

Los Angeles, CA, November 11, 2011, available from secure.afa.

org/events/natlsymp/2011/scripts/AFA-111117-Vick.pdf, accessed on 

May 19, 2014.

21. U.S. forces are overwhelmingly concentrated in Northeast 

Asia, well within range of Chinese systems, and the United States 

has maintained a rotational bomber deployment on Guam since 

2004. The AirSea Battle is an operational concept rather than a 

strategy, but many of the examples of synergies that might be developed involve ISR and strike systems cooperating to “disrupt, 

destroy, and defeat” adversary A2/AD capabilities, which would 

be highly useful in offensive strategies. “Barksdale AFB: B-52’s 

Deploying to Guam, Part of Routine Rotation of Continuous 

Bomber Presence on Guam,” Pacific News Center, August 28, 2013; 
123

Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert and General Norton A. Schwartz, 

“Air-Sea Battle,” The American Interest, February 20, 2012; and 

Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address 

Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 2013.

22. See, for example, Douglas C. Peifer, “China, the German 

Analogy, and the New Air-Sea Operational Concept,” Orbis, Vol. 

55, No. 1, Winter 2011; Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, 

Conduct and Consquences of an American Naval Blockade of 

China,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2013; Evan 

Branden Montgomery, “Reconsidering a Naval Blockade of China: A Response to Mirski,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, 

No. 4, 2013; T. X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” Washington, DC, NDU Strategic 

Forum, June 2012.

23. Funding for some limited measures has already been allocated under the Pacific Airpower Resiliency (PAR) initiative. 

These measures include hardening key logistical facilities and 

improving the ability to recover runways and disperse aircraft 

after attack. See “Pacific Sites Named in Massive U.S. Military 

Construction Plan,” Pacific Islands Report, Washington, DC: EastWest Center, April 2013, available from pidp.eastwestcenter.org/

pireport/2013/April/04-16-01.htm. 

24. The USAF has been working to improve rapid runway 

repair with the Critical Runway Assessment and Repair (CRATR) 

capability, See R. Craig Mellerski, “Airfield Damage Repair—The 

Future Now,” The Civil Engineer, August 2009. Efforts to protect 

critical infrastructure from current threats have been conducted 

under the Hardened Installation Protection for Persistent Operations (HIPPO) applied research and development effort. See U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, July 5, 2013, available from www.erdc.

usace.army.mil/Media/NewsStories/tabid/9219/Article/15844/twoyear-hardened-installation-effort-ends-on-a-high-note.aspx, accessed 

on August 13, 2013. Efforts to rapidly deploy fighter plans to austere bases and operate are underway. In 2013, the USAF tested 

a “Rapid Raptor” concept that uses a single C-17 transport aircraft to deploy four F-22s to a forward location and have them 

combat-ready within 24 hours. See Marc V. Schanz, “Rapid Raptor Package,” Air Force Magazine, September 27, 2013, available 
124

from www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2013/September%202013/

box092613rapid.aspx, accessed on May 8, 2014. The USMC has also 

exercised its ability to rapidly open and operate from an austere 

airfield, such as during the Geiger Fury exercise on Tinian in 2012. 

See Brett Kelman, “Marines head to Tinian for Exercise Geiger 

Fury,” Marine Corps Times, May 15, 2012, available from www.

marinecorpstimes.com/article/20120515/NEWS/205150329/Marineshead-Tinian-Exercise-Geiger-Fury, accessed on May 8, 2014.

25. Speech by Wang Yi to Brookings.

26. “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” Bejing, China: PRC, Information Office of the State Council, 

August 2013. 

27. Trade statistics are from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics database. FDI figures are from the “China Global Investment 

Tracker” database, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 

available from www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map. FDI statistics are notoriously inconsistent, and the Heritage figures do not match with those of 

the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, which lists just over $90 billion in non-financial overseas investments in 2013 (as opposed to 

the $132 billion figure provided by Heritage). 

28. “97 Million Chinese Tourists Went Abroad in 2013,” South 

China Morning Post, February 10, 2014. 

29. “Big Rise in Chinese Overseas,” China Daily, January 

22, 2014. 

30. “Overseas and Under Siege: An Apparent Rise in Violence 

Against Chinese Labourers Working Overseas,” The Economist, 

August 11, 2009; Mathieu Duchatel and Bates Gill, “Overseas Citizen Protection: A Growing Challenge for China,” SIPRI Newsletter, February 12, 2012; and ZAMBIA. 

31. “Thai Soldiers ‘Murdered’ Chinese sailors,” The Telegraph, 

October 2011.

32. In the latter case, estimates of the number killed range 

between 1,000 and 1,500. Rape was also reportedly widespread, 
125

though impossible to quantify due to the under reporting of 

sexual assaults. 

33. With the Chinese government largely silent, Joe Tan, an 

ethnic Chinese living in New Zealand, organized protest through 

his website, Global Huaren. Demonstrations were organized near 

Chinese embassies around the world, and forceful statements by 

prominent Hong Kong and Taiwanese officials and politicians 

generated additional pressures. Sheng Ding, “Digital Diaspora 

and National Image Building: A New Perspective on Chinese Diaspora Study in the Age of China’s Rise,” Pacific Affairs, Winter 

2007-08. 

34. “Chinese Demand Apology as Indonesian CommunistPurge Film Gets Oscar Nod,” South China Morning Post, January 

21, 2014. 

35. “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.” 

36. “If the 13 Dead Crewmembers were Americans,” Tengxunwang, October 25, 2011. The editors ultimately caution against the 

use of force and suggest strengthening consular functions instead. 

37.韩旭东 (Wei Xudong), “国防大学教授:保护海外中国人 亟

待我组建准军事力量介入” (“Chinese National Defense University 

Professor: We Must Urgently Establish Military Forces for Intervention in Order to Protect Overseas Chinese Citizens”), 环球时报

(Global Times), October 25, 2011.

38. 岳刚 (Yue Gang), “中国军力增长应捍卫海外利益” (“The 

PLA Must Protect China’s Overseas Interests”), 中国新闻网 (China News online), April 18, 2013. The article identifies Yue as a 

former colonel with the General Staff Department.

39. Ibid.

40. The increasing Chinese stake in resource extraction from 

unstable regions increases the probability of threats. For example, 

China Metallurgical Group’s 30-year lease of the Mes Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan could be threatened if instability in Pakistan or Afghanistan increases over the next few decades.
126

41. Estimates are from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 

and represent an estimate of the value of weapons actually transferred, rather than the actual price paid or the value of new contracts. SIPRI numbers are provided in constant U.S. 1990 dollars, 

with the figure on 2012 arms transfers cited in the previous text 

having been converted to 2012 dollars using the U.S. CPI, available from www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. Note that IHS 

Jane’s reports a figure for 2012 of $2.2 billion, which may reflect 

different methodologies, for example, an estimate based on executed contracts or actual (reported) sales prices.

42. Estimates are from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 

and represent an estimate of the value of weapons actually transferred, rather than the actual price paid or the value of new contracts. SIPRI numbers are provided in constant U.S. 1990 dollars, 

available from www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers, accessed on 

May 23, 2014.

43. “Chinese Arms Industry Makes Global Inroads,” The New 

York Times, October 20, 2013. Pakistan took delivery of the last of 

four F22P (improved Jiangwei-class) frigates and is negotiating 

for six S20 (modified Yuan-class) submarines. It has long been a 

client for fighter aircraft, with quality and sophistication improving rapidly in recent years. “China-Pakistan Set for Submarine 

Deal by the End of the Year, Says Officials,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 

February 3, 2014. 

44. In all, Pakistan is expected to purchase 250 JF-17 aircraft. 

“PAC Announces Start of JF-17 Block 2 Construction,” Jane’s 

Defense Weekly, December 19, 2013. 

45. “Argentina—Air Force,” Jane’s World Air Forces, January 

27, 1914. In addition to the appeal of co-production and the lowprice (estimated at roughly $20-$25 million), the ability to employ 

an increasingly wide range of highly capable air-to-air, air-toground, and anti-ship missiles provides significant appeal.

46. “Update: Turkey Remains Defiant About Co-Producing 

Missile Defense System with China,” Defense Update, October 

25, 2013. 
127

47. “Indonesia and China Move Closer to Deal on C-705 Production Agreement,” Jane’s Navy International, August 22, 2013. 

48. “Thailand, China to Jointly Develop Multiple Rocket 

Launchers,” The Economic Times, April 28, 2012. 

49. “China Offers Thailand Collaboration on Missiles, Armoured Vehicles,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 3, 2013.

50. As in the case of general trade, arms sales and militaryindustrial cooperation can also create new tensions, such as those 

between China and Russia over the former’s questionable adherence to the terms of agreements. But the impact will be generally 

positive. 

129

CHAPTER 5

CAPACITY FOR INNOVATION: 

TECHNOLOGICAL DRIVERS OF 

CHINA’S FUTURE MILITARY MODERNIZATION

Richard A. Bitzinger 

Michael Raska

DEFINING CAPACITY FOR INNOVATION

Innovation is generally seen as critical, if not central, to military modernization. Throughout history, 

process of innovation—that is, the process of turning ideas and invention into more effective products 

or services (in this case, the creation of more effective militaries)—was at the heart of gaining military 

superiority over a rival (or rivals). This includes the 

introduction of new ways of fighting (i.e., the phalanx, 

used to great effectiveness by the Greek city-states in 

antiquity), of organization (i.e., the lévee en masse of 

the French Revolution), or of technology (i.e., the socalled “gunpowder revolution” of the 16th century, or 

aviation and mechanization in the 20th century). Accordingly, while the literature on military innovation 

has portrayed innovation through multiple facets, it 

has been conceptualized primarily in the context of 

major military change in relation to existing ways of 

war.1 Stephen Rosen, for example, conceptualized 

military innovation in the context of major “change 

that forces one of the primary combat arms of a service to change its concepts of operation and its relation 

to other combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade 

traditional missions.”2 Rosen differentiated between 

major military innovations (MMIs) and technologi-
130

cal innovations, with MMIs further subdivided into 

peacetime and wartime processes. Theo Farrell and 

Terry Terriff also distinguished major military change 

or “change in the [organizational] goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization,” and 

minor change or “changes in operational means and 

methods (technologies and tactics) that have no implications for organizational strategy or structure.”3

More recently, Michael Horowitz equated major military innovations as “major changes in the conduct of 

warfare, relevant to leading military organizations, 

designed to increase the efficiency with which capabilities are converted to power.”4

 Dima Adamsky, too, 

focused on disruptive military innovation through the 

lens of military-technical revolutions (MTRs) or revolutions in military affairs (RMAs), when “new organizational structures together with novel force deployment methods, usually but not always driven by new 

technologies, change the conduct of warfare.”5

Inherent in the above definitions is the emphasis on 

the theory, process, and debate of radical/disruptive 

change, a large-scale RMA-oriented innovation defined by the synergy of technological change, military 

systems development, operational innovation, and 

organizational innovation.6 However, in a historical 

perspective, most military changes concomitant with 

select military innovations have arguably followed a 

distinctly less than revolutionary or transformational 

path, consisting of incremental, often near-continuous, improvements in existing capabilities.7

 In other 

words, while major, large-scale, and simultaneous 

military innovation in military technologies, organizations, and doctrines have been a rare phenomenon, 

military organizations have progressed through a sustained spectrum of military innovation ranging from a 
131

small-scale to large-scale innovation that have shaped 

the conduct of warfare.8

Military innovation can therefore take multiple 

facets and rarely proceeds in a synchronized rate, 

path, or pattern. Given the prevailing external and internal variables—enablers and constraints that shape 

the capacity of states to integrate, adapt, and utilize 

military innovation under local circumstances, military innovation is not sequential nor does it follow a 

particular model. Generally, however, we can distinguish between two types of innovation: (1) disruptive

and (2) sustaining. According to Peter Dombrowski, 

Eugene Gholz, and Andrew Ross: 

Sustaining innovations are defined by improvements 

in product quality measured by familiar standards: 

they offer new, better ways to do what customer organization have been doing using previous generations 

of technology.9

On the other hand, disruptive innovations “establish a trajectory of rapid performance improvements 

that . . . overtakes the quality of the old market-leading 

product even when measured by traditional performance standards.”10 In other words, disruptive innovation changes nearly everything about doing business—in this case, the business of war. At the same 

time, however, disruptive military innovation must 

be always viewed in a relative context—through the 

lens of the competitive dimension reflected in the efforts to develop effective counterinnovation strategies 

and measures. In such view, military innovation is always contextual, relative, and limited in duration. 

Accordingly, a capacity for military innovation 

can be conceptualized as an input, process, and outcome.11 Input factors include “hard innovation capa-
132

bilities”—input and infrastructure factors intended 

to advance technological and product development 

such as research and development (R&D) facilities, 

manufacturing capabilities, access to foreign technologies and markets; and “soft innovation capabilities”—process-related innovation activities, including 

political, institutional, relational, social and ideational 

factors that shape innovation.12 These are embedded 

in defense management processes in the planning, 

organizing, and controlling armed forces and their 

supporting systems to achieve national security objectives; in the development of advanced, reliable, costeffective defense industrial base capable of producing innovative defense technologies, products, and 

services; and ultimately, combat proficiency and capabilities to engage in a range of military operations, 

and the potential to integrate and exploit innovative 

concepts, organizational structures, and technologies in combat. A capacity for innovation can be then 

viewed in the context of strategic, organizational and 

operational adaptability—not only in detecting new 

sources of military innovation, but more importantly, changing military posture quickly and easily over 

time in response to shifts in geostrategic environment, 

military technology, the realities of cost, performance, 

and organizational behavior and national priorities.13

CHINA’S SEARCH FOR INNOVATION: 

HISTORICAL PATH DEPENDENCE

Although military innovation/modernization is 

typically a “holistic” event, incorporating technological change with changes in organization, doctrine, and 

tactics, technology is still generally the starting-point 

for innovation, and therefore it will be central to this 
133

chapter. The People’s Republic of China has, going 

back to its founding, strived to become self-reliant in 

the development and manufacture of arms.14 The current phrase to express this desire for autarky in defense production and acquisition is, according to Tai 

Ming Cheung, 自主创新, or “innovation with Chinese 

characteristics.”15 Bates Gill and Taeho Kim argue that 

China’s desire to wean itself off foreign dependencies 

for armaments actually goes back more than 150 years, 

when the country was too weak militarily to fend off 

the encroaching Western powers.16 For most of its history, however, the results of these endeavors have 

been decidedly mixed. Even with sizable economic 

inputs, access to foreign technologies, and considerable political will, China, up until the late-1990s, experienced only limited success when it came to the local 

design, development, and manufacture of advanced 

conventional weapons. Most systems were at least a 

generation or two behind comparable military equipment being produced at the time in the West or in the 

Soviet Union, and problems with quality and reliability abounded. In addition, overcapacity, redundancy, 

inefficient production, and, above all, a weak defense 

R&D base all conspired to impede the development of 

an advanced indigenous arms production capability. 

Overall, these circumstances left China in the unenviable position of pursuing great power status with a 

decidedly “Third World” arms industry.

To be sure, the Chinese have long been aware of 

the deficiencies in their defense technology and industrial base, and they have undertaken several rounds 

of reforms since the late-1980s in order to improve 

and modernize their military innovation and R&D 

processes. Most of these efforts fell well short of their 

intentions, however, because they failed to tackle the 
134

basic if endemic problems facing the defense industry: lack of competition, lack of accountability, excess 

capacity, lack of capital, lack of human skills, and a 

“statist” corporate culture. These prior failures make 

the post-1997 reform efforts even more significant, because they, more than earlier attempts, have tried to 

attack the very nature of Chinese arms development, 

production, and acquisition. This will enable these 

efforts to, first, inject rational, requirements-based 

planning into the arms procurement process, and, 

second, to spur the defense state-owned enterprises to 

act more like true industrial enterprises. These efforts 

therefore will: (1) be more responsive to their customer base (i.e., the People’s Liberation Army [PLA]), and 

(2) reform, modernize, and “marketize” their business 

operations. 

These goals in particular are central to the PLA’s 

new requirements—as laid out in China’s 2004 defense white paper—for fighting limited local wars 

under conditions of informatization.17 This, in turn, is 

linked to a “generation leap” industrial strategy when 

it comes to armaments development and production—that is, skipping or shortening the stages of R&D 

and of generations of weapons systems. This process, 

according to You Ji, entails a “double construction” 

approach of mechanization and “informatization” in 

order to concurrently upgrade and digitize the PLA.18

This “two-track” approach calls for both the near-term 

“upgrading of existing equipment combined with the 

selective introduction of new generations of conventional weapons”—a so-called “modernization-plus” 

approach—together with a longer-term “transformation” of the PLA along the lines of the information technologies-led revolution in military affairs 

(RMA).19 Cheung argues that this plan was formalized 
135

in both the 2006-20 Medium- and Long-Term Defense 

Science and Technology Development Plan and the 

11th Five-Year Defense Plan, both of which emphasized acceleration of PLA modernization and a new 

defense R&D drive.20 Part of this two-track approach 

also depends on China’s “latecomer advantage” of being able to more quickly exploit technological trails 

blazed by others, as well as avoiding their mistakes 

and blind alleys.21

One of the most important developments of late 

was the demotion of old Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) 

to an ancillary role in coordinating defense R&D, and, 

at the same time, creation of a new PLA-run General 

Armaments Department (GAD), which was intended 

to act as the primary purchasing agent for the PLA, 

overseeing defense acquisition and new weapons 

programs. As a 2005 RAND report put it, the GAD is 

part of a process “to create a system that will unify, 

standardize, and legalize the [Chinese] weapons procurement process.”22 As such, the GAD is supposed to 

ensure that local arms producers meet PLA requirements when it comes to capabilities, quality, costs, and 

program milestones. The GAD was given the authority to implement a “robust” regulatory, standards, and 

evaluation regime that would enforce quality control 

and performance, and incentivize competition and 

innovation.23 More importantly, the establishment 

of the GAD exemplified a major change in how the 

Chinese approached defense innovation. According 

to Cheung, since the mid-1980s, the Chinese military 

research, development, and acquisition (RDA) system 

has gradually transitioned from a “technology-push” 

model (i.e., weapons programs driven mainly by what 

the defense industries can deliver) to a “demand-
136

pull” type—that is, driven by PLA requirements, 

and “ensuring that military end-user needs are being 

served.”24 This process was only fully implemented 

with the creation of the GAD, which gave the PLA 

leading authority over defense innovation and R&D. 

In particular, the GAD had the ability to concentrate 

R&D funding on “select high-priority projects,” with 

the intended effect of injecting a modicum of competition among R&D institutes when it came to winning 

R&D work.25 Concurrently, COSTIND’s role in overseeing the defense industrial base was substantially 

reduced, basically to “the making and administration 

of government policies toward the defense industry.”26

Oversight and administration of the defense industry 

enterprises was placed under a new organization, the 

State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 

Commission (SASAC), which reports directly to the 

State Commission (the PRC’s chief administrative 

authority). This diminished status was followed by 

COSTIND’s eventual demotion in 2008 from a ministerial level entity to a bureau within the Ministry of 

Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), subsequently renamed the State Administration of Defense 

Science, Technology, and Industry (SASTIND).27

Additionally, China in the late-1990s began to seriously pursue the idea of leveraging advanced technologies and manufacturing processes found in the 

commercial sector in order to benefit defense R&D 

and production. According to many analysts, such 

civil-military integration (CMI) is a central feature of 

defense industry reform.28 CMI is viewed as a fast (or 

at least faster) and ready means to shortcut the R&D 

process when it comes to advanced weapons systems; to cherry-pick civilian manufacturing practices 

in high-tech sectors (e.g., computer-aided design and 
137

manufacturing [CAD/CAM], program management 

tools, etc.); exploit dual-use technologies (e.g., space 

systems for surveillance, communication, and navigation) to support the military; and, in particular, to 

take advantage of the latent capabilities found in commercially based information technologies (IT) in order 

to harness the IT-based RMA. Such civil technologies 

could be both domestically developed or obtained 

from foreign sources via joint ventures, technology 

transfer, or even espionage.29

This new strategy is embodied in the principle of 

“locating military potential in civilian capabilities” 

(“寓军于民”), enunciated at the 16th Party Congress 

in 2003.30 Subsequently, this strategy has been made a 

priority in the last several Five-Year Defense Plans, as 

well as the 2006-20 Medium- and Long-Term Defense 

Science and Technology Development Plan. These 

plans all emphasize the importance of the transfer of 

commercial technologies to military use, and they call 

upon the Chinese arms industry to not only develop 

dual-use technologies, but to also actively promote 

joint civil-military technology cooperation. Consequently, the spin-on of advanced commercial technologies both to the Chinese military-industrial complex 

and in support of the overall modernization of the 

PLA has been made explicit policy.31

The key areas of China’s new focus on dual-use 

technology development and subsequent spin-on include microelectronics, space systems, new materials 

(such as composites and alloys), propulsion, missiles, 

computer-aided manufacturing, and particularly information technologies. Over the past decade, Beijing 

has worked hard both to encourage further domestic development and growth in these sectors and to 

expand linkages and collaboration between China’s 
138

military-industrial complex and civilian high-technology sectors. Factories were also encouraged to invest 

in new manufacturing technologies, such as CAD, 

computer numerically controlled (CNC) multi-axis 

machine tools, computer integrated manufacturing 

systems (CIMS), and modular construction in shipbuilding, as well as to embrace Western management 

techniques. In 2002, for example, the Chinese government created a new industry enterprise group, the 

China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, 

to promote national technological and industrial developments in the area of defense-related electronics. 

Defense enterprises have formed partnerships with 

Chinese universities and civilian research institutes to 

establish technology incubators and undertake cooperative R&D on dual-use technologies. Additionally, 

foreign high-tech firms wishing to invest in China 

have been pressured to set up joint R&D centers and 

to transfer more technology to China. 

 “INDIGENOUS INNOVATION” STRATEGY

Over the past decade, China’s military modernization has gradually progressed with the advances in 

China’s civilian science and technology base, which 

in turn has been increasingly linked to global commercial markets and scientific networks. Technology 

transfers, foreign R&D investment, and training of 

Chinese scientists and engineers at research institutes 

and corporations overseas are part of China’s “indigenous innovation” drive to (1) identify, (2) digest, (3) 

absorb, and (4) reinvent select technological capabilities, both in civil and military domains.32 In order to 

advance indigenous defense science and technology 

(S&T), China has embarked on an aggressive campaign 
139

to acquire and exploit foreign technologies. According to William Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna 

Puglisi, this process of foreign technology acquisition 

is part of an unprecedented and aggressive effort, directed by the central Chinese government—a “deliberate, state-sponsored project to circumvent the costs 

of research, overcome cultural disadvantages, and 

‘leapfrog’ to the forefront by leveraging the creativity 

of other nations.”33 China, they assert, is engaged in a 

multipronged effort to gain foreign advanced technologies through both legal and illegal means. These include exploitation of open sources, technology transfer and joint research, the return of Western-trained 

Chinese students, and, of course, industrial espionage 

(both traditional and, increasingly, cyber espionage). 

Hannas, Mulvenon, and Puglisi document a number 

of cases whereby Chinese intelligence organizations 

stole technology and other defense secrets from the 

West, and these were ostensibly incorporated (or will 

be incorporated) into Chinese weapons systems.34

China’s “indigenous innovation” strategy is embedded primarily in the 2006 National Medium to 

Long-term Plan (MLP) for the Development of Science 

and Technology (2005-20).35 The MLP is Beijing’s most 

ambitious S&T plan to date with special long-term 

total funding estimated at 500 billion yuan (U.S.$75 

billion). The plan is as a follow-up to the highly acclaimed National High Technology Program (“863”) 

launched in March 1986—the most important China’s 

civilian-military R&D program next to the “Two 

Weapons, and One Satellite” S&T development plan 

of 1956-67.36 The 863 Program featured a concurrent 

development of dual-use technologies applicable in 

both civilian and military domains. The program had 

initially focused on developing seven strategic prior-
140

ity areas: laser technology, space, biotechnology, information technology, automation and manufacturing technology, energy, and advanced materials. In 

the mid-1990s, China expanded these areas in size, 

scope, and importance, shifting its trajectory toward 

cutting-edge technological products and processes.37

The 863 Program is ongoing, funding projects such as 

the Tianhe-1A and Tianhe-2 supercomputers.38 In the 

process, China is benchmarking emerging technologies and similar high-tech defense-related programs 

in the United States, Russia, India, Japan, Israel and 

other countries.39

Central to the MLP are 16 National Megaprojects—vanguard S&T programs—”priorities of priorities”—designed to transform China’s S&T capabilities 

in areas such as electronics, semiconductors, telecommunications, aerospace, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, clean energy, and oil and gas exploration. The 

megaprojects include both civilian and military areas, 

with 13 listed and three “unannounced” areas classified. Indeed, the 16 Megaprojects have been a source 

of considerable controversy and debates both in China 

and abroad, given the continuing structural, technological, and manufacturing challenges that inhibit 

disruptive innovation in Chinese defense S&T system. 

The debate has also focused on the three classified 

megaprojects. Recent analysis suggests three prime 

candidates for the military megaprojects:40

Shenguang Laser Project for Inertial Confinement 

Fusion.

The Shenguang (神光 Divine Light) laser project 

explores the inertial confinement fusion (ICF) as an 

alternative approach to attain inertial fusion energy 
141

(IFE)—a controllable, sustained nuclear fusion reaction aided by an array of high-powered lasers. The lasers essentially heat and compress pellet-sized targets 

typically containing two hydrogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium, sending shock waves into the center and releasing energy that heats the surrounding 

fuel, which may also undergo fusion. Shenguang aims 

to achieve such “burn”—fusion ignition and plasma 

burning—by 2020, while advancing research in solving the complex technological challenges associated 

with controlling the nuclear reaction.41

Shenguang’s target physics, theory and experimentation, began as early as 1993. By 2012, China 

completed the Shenguang 3 (Divine Light 3), a highpowered super laser facility based in the Research 

Center of Laser Fusion at the China Academy of Engineering Physics—the research and manufacturing 

center of China’s nuclear weapons located in Mianyang. In this context, Shenguang has two strategic implications: it may accelerate China’s next-generation 

thermo-nuclear weapons development, and advance 

China’s directed- energy laser weapons programs.42

Second Generation Beidou Satellite Navigation 

System.

The second prime candidate for China’s “unlisted” 

megaprojects is likely the Beidou-2 Satellite System 

(BDS), formerly known as the Compass Navigation 

Satellite System (CNSS). According to IHS Jane’s, by 

the end of 2012, China had 16 operational Beidou satellites in orbit—six geostationary satellites, five Medium Earth Orbit spacecraft, and five satellites in Inclined GeoStationary Orbits covering the Asia-Pacific 

region. By 2020, Beidou 2 envisions a full-scale system 
142

of at least five geostationary and 30 non-geostationary 

satellites providing a global coverage in two modes: 

free “open” services available to commercial customers with 10-meter location- tracking accuracy, and restricted “authorized” services providing positioning, 

velocity and timing communications estimated at 10 

centimeter accuracy for the Chinese government and 

military.43

Beidou 2 satellites, developed by the China Academy of Space Technology, are also designed with effective protection against electromagnetic interference 

and attack. Notwithstanding its wide commercial 

utility, the BDS will enable the PLA to significantly 

enhance its global navigation, tracking, targeting capabilities, providing guidance for military vehicles, 

ballistic and cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. Most importantly, the BDS eliminates China’s dependency on 

the U.S. GPS and Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation systems that could be deactivated in select areas 

in times of conflict.44

Hypersonic Vehicle Technology Project.

While data on China’s hypersonic research remains scarce, there are signs that China is developing 

conceptual and experimental hypersonic flight vehicle 

technologies such as hypersonic cruise vehicles (HCV) 

capable of maneuvering at Mach 5 speeds (6,150+ kilometers [km] per hour [/h]), and flying in near-space 

altitudes. Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins analyzed China’s Shenlong (神龙 Divine Dragon) spaceplane project, including its apparent test flight in 2011 

and noted subsequent profusion of Chinese research 

articles on the subject.45 Similarly, Mark Stokes from 
143

the Project 2049 Institute identified new research institutes focusing exclusively on the design and development of hypersonic test flight vehicles, including the 

10th Research Institute (also known as the Near Space 

Flight Vehicle Research Institute) under the China 

Academy of Launch Technology (CALT)—China’s 

largest entity involved in the development and manufacturing of space launch vehicles and related ballistic 

missile systems. The Qian Xuesen National Engineering Science Experiment Base in Beijing’s Huairou district is also one of China’s key HCV research centers.46

Taken together, China’s government views “indigenous innovation” strategy as mutually supporting both PLA’s military modernization as well as the 

country’s economic future to achieve a long-term 

sustainable growth, efficiency and productivity gains, 

while mitigating serious problems including labor 

shortages, stretched resource supplies, unequal distribution of income, social tensions, and unprecedented 

environmental pollution. In October 2010, the State 

Council formerly announced its decision to target 

“seven strategic industries” for focused development: 

(1) energy saving and environmental protection; (2) 

new generation information technology (IT); (3) biotechnology; (4) high-end equipment; (5) new energy; 

(6) new materials; and, (7) new energy cars.47 These 

focus areas are perceived as the forefront of a new 

round of information revolution, bringing new and 

significant growth opportunities for China’s economy. From 2010-15, China reportedly planned to invest 

$1.5 trillion to boost the development of seven strategic emerging industries.48 Inherently, these have the 

potential to propel the next wave of China’s military 

innovation. Technological breakthroughs in alternative energy sources, nano-materials and new compos-
144

ites, propulsion technologies, bio-medicine can fulfil 

multiple purposes and have applications in diverse 

military domains for the PLA. 

ASSESSING CHINA’S CAPACITY 

FOR INNOVATION

Today, China’s defense industrial base is certainly 

much more capable than it was in the late-1990s. The 

weapons systems coming out of its factories and shipyards are vastly superior to what was being produced 

less than 15 years ago. Progress in innovation at the 

level of defense R&D is undeniable; at the same time, 

production facilities are humming, and the defense 

industry is turning unprecedented profits. What then 

are the keys to China’s recent successes as a developer 

and manufacturer of advanced armaments, therefore? 

Notwithstanding the range of factors shaping comprehensive innovation capabilities, two factors have 

been perhaps the most critical in the developments 

of China’s defense, science, technology and innovation (DSTI) system: money and technology. In the first 

case, China’s dramatic and continuing expansion in 

defense spending has meant more money for innovation, more money for R&D, more money to increase 

procurement (and therefore production runs), and 

more money to upgrade the defense industrial base 

with new tools, new computers, and new technical 

skills. China has experienced double-digit real (i.e., after inflation) growth in defense spending nearly every 

year since the late-1990s. Even according to its own 

official national statistics, which most expert observers believe substantially understate spending levels, 

China’s defense budget from 1999 to 2008 expanded 

at a rate of 16.2 percent per annum.49 Most recently, 
145

in March 2013, Beijing announced that it would allocate 740.6 billion yuan, or U.S.$119 billion for defense, 

an increase of 10.7 percent over 2012. Overall, since 

1997, Chinese military expenditures have increased 

at least 600 percent in real terms. As a result, since 

the late-1990s, China has moved up to become the 

second-largest defense spender in the world, outstripping Japan, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom 

(UK); only the United States currently spends more 

on defense.

The impact on defense R&D and procurement has 

been equally astounding. In real terms, PLA annual 

spending on equipment procurement has increased 

from around U.S.$3.1 billion in 1997 to an estimated 

U.S.$40 billion in 2013. Of this, perhaps U.S.$5 billion 

to U.S.$7 billion is dedicated to defense R&D. This 

likely makes China the second highest spender in the 

world in terms to procurement and perhaps the second or third highest when it comes to defense R&D 

spending.50 This upward trend is likely to continue for 

some time. In May 2006, for example, Beijing approved 

a 15-year national development plan for defense science and technology, with the goal of “transforming 

the PLA into a modernized, mechanized, IT-based 

force” by 2020.51 This program is intended to boost 

military R&D spending, focusing on high-technology 

weapons systems (and specifically on “IT solutions”), 

supporting advanced manufacturing technologies, 

and cultivating collaborative international defense 

R&D efforts.52 Arguably, if anything has had a positive impact on the defense industry, it is this explosion 

in defense spending—by increasing procurement and 

therefore production; by expanding R&D spending; 

and by subsidizing the upgrading and modernization 

of arms manufacturing facilities. Consequently, Chi-
146

na’s defense industrial base is better suited than ever 

to absorb and leverage advanced, militarily relevant 

technologies and therefore provide the PLA with the 

advanced military systems it requires. 

In addition to greater resources being made available to underwrite armaments production, the acquisition of new technologies—and especially foreign technologies—has had a significant effect on the growth 

and modernization of the Chinese military-industrial 

complex. China has undertaken several initiatives in 

recent decades to advance its military S&T base. These 

include the 863 Program (launched in 1986 to promote 

research into such areas as information technologies, 

spaceflight, lasers, new materials, biotechnology, and 

automation), the Torch Program (intended to commercialize new and advanced technologies, as well 

as establish technology incubators and science parks), 

and, most recently, the 2006-20 Medium- and LongTerm Defense Science and Technology Development 

Plan. Concurrently, it has greatly expanded its S&T 

education program, training a new generation of defense scientists, engineers, and technicians.53

Money and technology, of course, go hand-inhand. Ian Anthony once stated that arms production is 

a “capital- and technology-intensive industry,” 54 and 

capital is a critical enabler of technology acquisition. 

Consequently, more than any structural, organizational, or cultural reform initiatives—or even greater 

efforts at civil-military integration—China’s success 

as an emerging producer of advanced conventional 

weaponry is due mostly to a rather traditional, even 

prosaic strategy: throwing more money and technology at the problem of military modernization. It may 

be less glamorous than radical reform, but then again, 

one cannot argue with this approach’s accomplish-
147

ments. At the same time, however, critical weaknesses remain. The Chinese arms industry still appears 

to possess only limited indigenous capabilities for 

cutting-edge defense R&D, and Western armaments 

producers continue to outpace China when it comes 

to most military technologies, particularly in areas 

such as propulsion (aircraft/missile engines), navigation systems and defense electronics, and high-end 

composites. 

Indeed, the high entry and technological barriers 

coupled with technical challenges in acquiring extensive knowledge and experience, as well the limited number of cutting-edge technological enterprises 

preclude Chinese defense manufacturers to make 

significant strides toward disruptive/revolutionary 

innovation. These barriers can be seen in the R&D and 

production of select advanced materials and composites, including high-end aluminum alloy products, 

aramid fiber, carbon fiber, high performance steel, nitrocell, titanium alloy, and tungsten alloys. Only a few 

Chinese companies are qualified suppliers of technologies required for the production of high-performance 

materials that are essential for the next generation of 

engines, target detection systems, navigation systems, 

and many other subsystems used in diverse weapon 

platforms. For example, high-end aluminum alloy 

products require a large hydraulic press which is both 

cost-intensive and difficult to manufacture. Currently, 

China only has five domestic companies capable to 

make such press machine.55 Similarly, in the production of aramid fiber used in armor plates in tanks or 

engine cases on aircraft, China still relies on imports 

for roughly 70 percent of its consumption (including 

30 percent for defense). Currently, China has only two 

domestic makers of aramid fiber (Suzhou Zhaoda and 
148

Tayho), which commenced production in 2010 and 

2011, respectively. China’s most domestic makers of 

carbon fiber are also new, without the necessary longterm experience to stabilize product quality.56

Overall, China is still more of a “fast follower,” always playing technology “catch-up,” or else be niche 

innovator when it comes to military R&D. Again, this 

is not necessarily a bad strategy to pursue. As Hannas, 

Mulvenon, and Puglisi put it:

China’s genius, as it were, is in putting together a 

system that capitalizes on its practical skill at adapting ideas to national projects, while compensating for 

its inability to create those ideas by importing them 

quickly at little or no cost.57

Additionally, it may be acceptable to be niche innovator if one’s military is only looking to gain asymmetric niche advantages, such as the PLA using an 

antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) to attack aircraft 

carriers. 

Consequently, China’s capacities to innovate, and 

those drivers and enablers of innovation, may not 

have to differ much from each other, depending on 

the three potential military futures for the PLA, i.e., a 

PLA focused on regional issues, a globally expeditionary PLA, or a weakened PLA. To take the last scenario 

first, a weakened PLA would most likely continue to 

muddle through with its present—and perhaps even 

diluted—process of modest, incremental modernization, with a focus perhaps more on innovating mainly 

for the sake of a defensive defense posture; such a future would likely witness reduced commitments and 

efforts, both technological and funding-wise, than 

have been taking place within the Chinese militarytechnological industrial base over the past 15 years or 
149

so. Instead, given China’s current (ambitious) trajectories when it comes to military R&D and technology, it 

is more likely that present innovation capabilities and 

activities would more closely match a PLA focused 

on a regionalized military capacity. Many of the innovations and military systems coming out of Chinese 

armaments enterprises more fit a PLA that is striving 

to be an assertive force in and around its near-abroad, 

both offensively and defensively (the latter epitomized by its growing anti-access/area denial [A2/

AD] capabilities). In this regard, therefore, the limitations to China’s military-industrial complex, when it 

comes to innovation, do not present nearly as great a 

challenge. It is only in the case of the PLA attempting 

to become a truly globalized and expeditionary that 

the Chinese innovation system still lets down the military. The PLA still lacks many of the basic building 

blocks of a truly global force (sustained and sizable 

power-projection capabilities, long-range strike, global reconnaissance capacities, etc.). To be sure, some of 

these requirements are driving innovation in the Chinese military (e.g., hypersonics, satellite navigation, 

stealth, etc.), but it will be decades before the Chinese 

could obtain such a global operational capacity—and 

it may be that China does not even desire such a capacity, in which case the military innovation system 

will not be driven to deliver one.

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL 

IMPLICATIONS

The Chinese defense, science, technology, innovation, and industrial base has made undeniable advancements over the past decade and a half in terms 

of developing, manufacturing new, relatively modern 
150

military systems. As long as the defense budget continues to grow and the Chinese continue to be able 

to acquire and exploit foreign technologies, this pace 

of defense development and production will likely 

quicken in the decades ahead. U.S. Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Frank Kendall recently alluded to China’s growing 

technological prowess when he testified before Congress that the U.S. military is “being challenged in 

ways that I have not seen for decades,” adding that 

“technological superiority is not assured and we cannot be complacent about our posture.”58

At the same time, however, it would be premature 

to argue that China will catch up to the defense-technological state-of-the-art any time soon. To employ 

Tai Ming Cheung’s analytical framework, while the 

Chinese defense S&T base is perhaps proficient at the 

lower tiers of innovation—i.e., duplicative imitation, 

creative imitation, creative adaptation, and incremental adaptation—the higher levels of innovation—architectural innovation, modular innovation, and radical innovation—still eludes it for the most part. To 

reiterate, China is still more of a “fast follower,” or, 

at best, a niche innovator when it comes to military 

R&D. In a sense, therefore, China’s defense innovation system remains stuck in a version of the “pockets 

of excellence” conundrum that it suffered through in 

the 1980s and 1990s. This time around, however, these 

pockets of excellence are not necessarily sectoral (such 

as shipbuilding and missiles), but rather promising 

breakthroughs in certain technological niches: ASBMs, 

stealth aircraft, hypersonics, etc.; even then, most of 

these innovations remain at the prototype stage, and 

there are no guarantees that they will ever be operationally deployed. Even if some or many of these pro-
151

totypes are turned into working weapons systems, it 

could still be some time before they deployed in sufficient quantities so as to be military “game-changers.” 

Again, however, being a “creative adaptor” or a 

niche innovator is not necessarily a bad strategy to 

pursue. If China is mostly keen, at this juncture, in 

achieving an A2/AD,59 then a vigorous and directed 

process of sustaining innovation—what Peter Dombrowski has termed a “modernization-plus” approach—could be sufficient for the PLA to achieve 

its operational objectives. Moreover, China’s defense 

innovation process has always been less about finesse 

than it has been about brute force, i.e., throwing a lot 

of resources—especially money and manpower—at a 

limited number of programs. This is as true today as 

it was in the 1950s and 1960s, when China pursued its 

“two bombs and one satellite” project. The primary 

difference today is that China possesses the resources 

to pursue a broader range of weapons programs. Still, 

most of these projects are about catching up or finding 

asymmetrical A2/AD counters, rather than engaging 

in radical, transformative innovation. 

Consequently, it may not take that much innovation for the PLA to pose challenges to the Asia-Pacific 

security structure, or the to regional balance of power. 

The PLA’s current operational guideline is to fight 

“Limited Local Wars Under Conditions of ‘Informatization,’” entailing short-duration, high-intensity conflicts characterized by mobility, speed, and long-range 

attack; employing joint operations fought simultaneously throughout the entire air, land, sea, space, and 

electromagnetic battlespace; and relying heavily upon 

extremely lethal high-technology weapons. PLA operational doctrine also increasingly emphasizes preemption, surprise, and shock value, given that the 
152

earliest stages of conflict may be crucial to the outcome of a war. In this context, China’s long-term DSTI 

programs reflect not only Beijing’s scientific aspirations, but also changing strategic priorities and PLA’s 

long-term operational requirements embedded in the 

concept of “diversified missions” (The Diversified 

Employment of China’s Armed Forces) that are vital 

to China’s “core interests.” Ever since the late-1990s, 

the PLA has been selectively upgrading its existing 

weapons systems and platforms, while experimenting with the next generation of design concepts. These 

can be seen in the gradual modernization of China’s 

nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles, integrated 

air, missile, and early warning defense systems, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, submarines, surface combat vessels and the introduction of fourth/

fifth generation of multirole combat aircraft.60 With 

the qualitative shifts in “hardware,” the PLA has been 

also revamping its “software”—military doctrine, organizational force structure, and operational concepts 

that are now focused on “local, limited wars under 

informatization.”61

In particular, the prevailing emphasis in Chinese 

strategic thought is on “integrated networked attack 

and defense” air, sea, land, cyber and space operations 

that would amplify PLA capabilities in terms of early 

warning, intelligence, and information superiority, 

firepower, mobility, and operational reach. By 2030, 

for example, Chinese air power doctrine envisions 

conducting independent air campaigns within 3,000-

km radius of China’s periphery—shifting its primary 

missions from traditional land-based air defense, interdiction, and close air support operations, toward 

deterrence and strategic strike at sea. In this context, 

PLAAF’s concept of “integrated attack and defense”—

joint counterair strike campaigns in conjunction with 
153

the Second Artillery’s ASBM capabilities are seen as 

vital in defending China’s territorial and sovereignty 

claims, as well as in limiting potential adversaries 

(U.S.) strike, access options, and maneuver capabilities. Consequently, in potential future conflict flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait, Korean Peninsula, 

East and South China Seas, selected PLA units may be 

able to mitigate, at least to a limited extent the traditional operational advantages and unrivaled freedom 

of action of U.S. forces in East Asia.

As such, the PLA has acquired or is in the process 

of acquiring a number of new high-tech weapons systems, including 4th generation fighter aircraft, large 

surface combatants, new nuclear and diesel-electric 

attack submarines, precision-guided munitions (including land-attack cruise missiles and supersonic 

antiship missiles), airborne early warning aircraft, airto-air refueling aircraft, improved air defenses, and 

the like. Moreover, in accordance with the principles 

of “informatization,” the Chinese military has put 

considerable emphasis on upgrading its command, 

control, communications, computers, and intelligence 

surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets—including launching a constellation of communication, 

surveillance, and navigation satellites—while also developing its capabilities to wage “integrated network 

electronic warfare”—an amalgam of electronic warfare (jamming the enemy’s communications and intelligence-gathering assets), and offensive information 

warfare (disrupting the enemy’s computer networks), 

and physical attacks on the enemy’s C4SIR network. 

In addition, similar to the U.S. Army’s “Land Warrior” program, the PLA is reportedly experimenting 

with “digitizing” its ground forces, right down to outfitting the individual soldier with electronic gadgetry 

in order to provide him with real-time tactical C4ISR. 
154

Ultimately, the PLA hopes to turn itself into a 

modern, network-enabled fighting force, capable of 

projecting sustained power far throughout the AsiaPacific region, and which, in the U.S. Department of 

Defense’s (DoD) words, would “pose credible threats 

[sic] to modern militaries operating in the region.” But 

is what the PLA doing technically a radical process 

of transformation? In fact, there is very little evidence 

that the Chinese military is engaged in a transformation-like overhaul of its organizational or institutional 

structures. The bulk of the PLA ground forces, for example, remain traditional infantry units. The PLA’s 

highly hierarchical and top-down command structure 

does not seem to have changed, and even the Pentagon acknowledges the PLA’s deficiencies when it 

comes to things like jointness. It is also worth noting 

that much of the transformational activities being undertaken by the Chinese military are still very nascent 

and even experimental, and we possess only a vague 

idea as to the PLA’s paths and progress in many areas of informatization, such as information warfare or 

digitization, or whether these programs will ever be 

effectively implemented. 

Moreover, recapitalizing the Chinese military with 

modern equipment—and in particular pursuing improvements in C4ISR—does not, in and of itself, constitute an RMA-like transformation; on the contrary, 

acquiring these systems makes perfect sense even 

without worrying about “transforming the force.” A 

military does not need to believe in the RMA in order to appreciate the importance of precision-guided 

weapons, modern fighter jets and submarines, and 

better intelligence. On the whole, therefore, the PLA 

seems to have done a better job adopting the rhetoric

of transformation while pursuing a “modernization-
155

plus” approach to transforming itself. China’s current 

military buildup is ambitious and far-reaching, but it 

is still more indicative of a process of evolutionary, 

steady-state, and sustaining—rather than disruptive 

or revolutionary—innovation and change. Not that 

this is necessarily a wrong path for the Chinese military, nor is it one that should not give other nations 

considerable cause for close attention. Perfection, it is 

said, is the enemy of good enough, and even absent 

a full-blown transformation, the PLA is adding considerably to its combat capabilities. For better or for 

worse, the PLA is emerging as a much more potent 

military force, and that, in turn, will increasingly complicate regional security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific 

and even beyond.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and 

Modern Military, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. 

2. Ibid. p. 134.

3. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, ed., The Sources of Military 

Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner 

Publishers, 2002, p. 5. 

4. Michael Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes 

and Consequences for International Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 2010, p. 22.

5. Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 

2010, p. 1.

6. Andrew Krepinevich, The Military-Technical Revolution: A 

Preliminary Assessment, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments, 1992, p. 3.
156

7. Andrew Ross, “On Military Innovation: Toward an Analytical Framework,” IGCC Policy Brief, No. 1, 2010, pp. 14-17.

8. Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas Mahnken, Andrew Ross, 

“Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese Defense and Military Innovation,” Policy Brief No. 27, San Diego, CA: University of California, San Diego, September 2011, p. 80.

9. Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and Andrew L. Ross, 

“Selling Military Transformation: The Defense Industry and Innovation,” Orbis, Summer 2002, p. 527. See also Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, New York: HarperBusiness, 2000.

10. Ibid., p. 527.

11. Tai Ming Cheung, ed., Forging China’s Military Might: A 

New Framework for Assessing Innovation, Baltimore, MD: Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 2014, p. 24.

12. Ibid.

13. Paul Davis, “Defense Planning in an Era of Uncertainty: 

East Asian Issues,” Natalie Crawford and Chung-in Moon, eds., 

Emerging Threats, Force Structures, and the Role of Air Power in 

Korea, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000, pp. 25-47.

14. The Chinese defense industry has been the object of considerable study in recent years. See, for example, Richard A. 

Bitzinger et.al., “Locating China’s Place in the Global Defense 

Economy,” Tai Ming Cheung, ed., Forging China’s Military Might; 

Mikhail Barabanov, Vasiliy Kashin, and Konstantin Makienko, 

Shooting Star: China’s Military Machine in the 21st Century, Minneapolis, MN: East View Press, 2012; Tai Ming Cheung, “The Chinese Defense Economy’s Long March from Imitation to Innovation,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, June 2011; James 

Mulvenon and Rebecca Samm Tyroler-Cooper, China’s Defense 

Industry on the Path of Reform, prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, October 2009; Tai Ming 

Cheung, “Dragon on the Horizon: China’s Defense Industrial 

Renaissance,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, February 

2009; Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a 

Modern Defense Economy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
157

2008; Richard A. Bitzinger, “Reforming China’s Defense Industry: Progress in Spite of Itself?” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 

Fall 2007; Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James 

C. Mulvenon, A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005; Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan S. 

Medeiros, James C. Mulvenon, and William H. Overholt, Modernizing China’s Military, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005; Evan 

S. Medeiros, Analyzing China’s Defense Industries and the Implications for Chinese Military Modernization, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

February 2004; David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: 

Progress, Problems, and Prospects, Berkeley, CA: University of 

California Press, 2002, pp. 225-283; John Frankenstein, “China’s 

Defense Industries: A New Course?” James C. Mulvenon and 

Richard H. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999; Richard A. Bitzinger, 

“Going Places or Running in Place? China’s Efforts to Leverage 

Advanced Technologies for Military Use,” Susan Puska, ed., The 

PLA After Next, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2000; John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, “Current 

and Future Challenges Facing Chinese Defense Industries,” China 

Quarterly, June 1996.

15. Cheung, “The Chinese Defense Economy’s Long 

March,” p. 326.

16. Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions from 

Abroad: A Quest for “Superb and Secret Weapons,” Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1995, 

pp. 2-3, 8-18.

17. See “Chapter 3: Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” China’s National Defense in 2004, Beijing, 

China: State Council Information Office, 2004, available from 

www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html.

18. You Ji, “China’s Emerging National Strategy,” China Brief, 

November 24, 2004.

19. Cheung, “Dragon on the Horizon,” pp. 30-31.

20. Ibid. See also Richard A. Bitzinger, “Modernizing China’s 

Military, 1997-2012,” China Perspectives, No. 2011/11, November 
158

2011, pp. 7-8; and Richard A. Bitzinger, “China’s ‘Revolution in 

Military Affairs’: How Fast? How Furious?” Stockholm Journal of 

East Asian Studies, December 2007.

21. Ji, “China’s Emerging National Strategy.”

22. Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military, p. 165.

23. Cheung, “Dragon on the Horizon,” pp. 30, 36.

24. Tai Ming Cheung, “Innovation in China’s Defense Research, Development, and Acquisition System,” Policy Brief No. 

20, Study of Innovation and Technology in China, September 2011, 

pp. 35-36.

25. Ibid.

26. Cheung, “Dragon on the Horizon,” p. 36.

27. Ibid., pp. 36-38; Barabanov , Kashin, and Makienko, Shooting Star: China’s Military Machine in the 21st Century, pp. 3-4.

28. Eric Hagt, “Emerging Grand Strategy for China’s Defense 

Industry Reform,” Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew 

Scobell, eds., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2010, pp. 481-484; Brian 

Lafferty, Aaron Shraberg, and Morgan Clemens, “China’s CivilMilitary Integration,” Research Brief 2013-10, Study of Innovation 

and Technology in China (SITC), January 2013, pp. 58; Mulvenon 

and Tyroler-Cooper, China’s Defense Industry on the Path of Reform, 

pp. 57-58.

29. Hagt, “Emerging Grand Strategy for China’s Defense 

Industry Reform,” pp. 514-518; Mulvenon and Tyroler-Cooper, 

China’s Defense Industry on the Path of Reform, pp. 35-37, 38-43; 

Cheung, “Dragon on the Horizon,” p. 47.

30. Mulvenon and Tyroler-Cooper, China’s Defense Industry on 

the Path of Reform, p. 5.
159

31. Hagt, “Emerging Grand Strategy for China’s Defense 

Industry Reform,” pp. 481-484.

32. Cheung, “The Chinese Defense Economy’s Long March 

from Imitation to Innovation,” pp. 343-344.

33. William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military 

Modernization, New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 78. 

34. See Ibid., Appendix I, pp. 256-270.

35. “China Issues S&T Development Guidelines,” Xinhua, February 9, 2006, available from english.gov.cn/2006-02/09/

content_183426.htm.

36. Ministry of Science and Technology of the PRC, “National 

High-tech R&D Program, 863 Program,” Bejing, China, available from www.most.gov.cn/eng/programmes1/200610/t20061009_

36225.htm.

37. Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build 

a Modern Defense Economy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 

2008, pp. 193-196.

38. Brian Tsay, ”The Tianhe-2 Supercomputer: Less than 

Meets the Eye?” SITC Bulletin Analysis, July 2013, available from 

escholarship.org/uc/item/1839q9q8.

39. DoD Defense Science Board, Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat, Washington, 

DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, 2013.

40. Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Spaceplane Development Becomes a New Dimension of Emerging U.S.-China 

Space Competition,” China SignPost, No. 62, August 16, 2012.

41. Michael Raska, “Scientific Innovation and China’s 

Military Modernization,” The Diplomat, September 3, 2013.

42. Ibid.
160

43. Jon Grevatt, “China Outlines Satellite Navigation System 

Plans,” IHS Jane’s Defense Industry, October 20, 2013.

44. Mark Stokes and Dean Cheng, “China’s Evolving Space 

Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests,” Report Prepared 

for The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 

April 26, 2012, available from origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/

files/Research/USCC_China-Space-Program-Report_April-2012.pdf.

45. Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Spaceplane Development Becomes a New Dimension of Emerging U.S.-China 

Space Competition,” China SignPost, No. 62, August 16 2012.

46. Mark Stokes and Dean Cheng, “China’s Evolving Space 

Capabilities,”pp. 17-23.

47. “China to Nurture 7 Strategic Industries in 2011-15,”

Xinhua, October 27, 2010.

48. “China Eyes New Strategic Industries to Spur Economy,” 

Reuters, July 23, 2012.

49. “China Plans to Boost 2009 Military Spending by 14.9%,” 

Bloomberg, March 4, 2009.

50. In 2009, for example, France spent approximately U.S.$14 

billion on procurement and U.S.$5.8 billion on defense R&D; that 

same year, the UK spent U.S.$10.9 billion and U.S.$4.2 billion, respectively, on procurement and R&D. Defense Data of EDA (Economic Development Administration) Participating Member States 

in 2009, Washington, DC: EDA, p. 11. China defense R&D budget is unknown, but based on its overall military spending, it is 

not unreasonable to assume that the Chinese allocate anywhere 

between U.S.$5 billion and U.S.$10 billion on military R&D.

51. Ben Vogel, “China Embarks on 15-Year Armed Forces 

Modernization Program,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 1, 2006.

52. Ibid.; 2011 Report to Congress, Washington, DC: Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 2011, p. 45.

53. Cheung, “Dragon on the Horizon,” pp. 52-54. 
161

54. Ian Anthony, “The ‘Third Tier’ Countries: Production 

of Major Weapons,” Herbert Wulf, ed., Arms Industry Limited, 

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 365.

55. The five hydraulic press makers include Shanghai Heavy 

Machinery, China First Heavy Machinery, China Second Heavy 

Machinery, North Heavy Industrial, and China Heavy Machinery 

Research Institute.

56. David Cui, Tracy Tian, and Katherine Tai, “China: Defense, Defensive in an Age of Turbulence,” Bank of America Merrill 

Lynch Equity Strategy Brief, January 30, 2014. 

57. Hannas, Mulvenon, and Puglisi, Chinese Industrial 

Espionage, pp. 241.

58. “China threatens US military superiority: Defense 

official,” AFP, January 29, 2014.

59. According to the A2/AD operational concept, a defending 

force would first attempt to restrict the enemy’s ability to enter 

a war zone (“anti-access”), through such actions as aerial or sea 

blockades, or blocking landing operations; should anti-access efforts fail or being only partly successful, one would then attempt 

to disrupt or impede the enemy’s ability to operate freely in the 

war zone (“area-denial”).

60. Anthony H. Cordesman, Ashley Hess, Nicholas S. Yarosh, 

Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013.

61. Andrew Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “Informatization and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy,” Phillip Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew 

Nien-Dzu Yang, The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving 

Roles, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

2011, pp. 247-287.

163

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

165

CHAPTER 6

THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY IN 2020-30 

FOCUSED ON REGIONAL ISSUES

Bernard D. Cole

The views in this paper are the author’s alone and do 

not represent those of the National War College or any 

other agency of the U.S. Government.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes a Chinese military in the 

decade 2020 to 2030 that is focused on regional issues 

and prepared for conflict on China’s periphery, particularly its maritime frontier. The People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) budget, organization, doctrines, training 

and personnel, platforms, and space-based assets will 

be addressed.1

These elements are meaningful indicators of the 

PLA’s focus a decade and more hence; in fact, they reflect China’s leaders’ view of the utility of the military 

instrument of statecraft. A regionally focused PLA 

will require different systems and organization than 

will a globally focused military; this chapter argues 

that the former overshadow the latter. 

That said, the future PLA will address missions 

identical in name—deterrence and power projection 

for instance—but different in requirements and intention. Missions are not the drivers in military developments, as much as are the intended theaters of operations—regional rather than global.

The “region” in this chapter is defined as the waters lying within the first and second island chains. 
166

The first encompasses the Yellow, East China, and 

South China Seas and is delineated by a line from the 

Kuriles through Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and then west through Indonesia. The second 

adds much of the Philippine Sea to that previously 

mentioned and is delineated by a line from the Kuriles 

through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, Palau, and 

then west through Indonesia.

THE PLA BUDGET

The assessment period encompasses the 14th and 

15th Five-Year Plans (2021-25 and 2026-30) used by 

Beijing to evaluate, adjust, and guide its economy. 

Although China’s economy is not without potentially 

serious problems, continued economic growth is a 

viable assumption.

Beijing announced the PLA’s 2013 budget as 

720.2 billion yuan (U.S.$114.3 billion), a 10.7 percent 

increase from the 2012 budget. Almost all observers 

think this is a significantly underestimated figure, but 

Dennis Blasko has offered a reasonable conclusion to 

the different budget estimates:

Whatever the true numbers may be, the Chinese military has much more money to spend on fewer troops 

than it did 15 years ago. At the same time, personnel, 

equipment, and training costs for a more modern, 

technologically advanced military are significantly 

higher than in previous decades . . . the growth of the 

defense budget in fact appears to be coordinated with 

the growth of the Chinese economy. . . . If need be, the 

government could increase spending even faster. . . .2

Increasing military budgets are consistent with 

Beijing’s official policy “that defense development 
167

should be both subordinated to and in the service of 

the country’s overall economic development, and that 

the former should be coordinated with the latter.” 

Thus, PLA budget growth has followed China’s gross 

domestic product (GDP) and inflation rate; it has not 

diverted massive funding away from important civilian projects necessary for maintaining economic development.3

 This paradigm should continue into the 

next decade and to mid-century, barring an unforeseen, major national security emergency.

Four factors support a continually increasing Chinese defense budget:

1. President Xi Jinping’s apparent determination to 

ensure continued growth and reduce income disparities by maintaining high government spending.4

2. China’s emergence as the world’s second leading economy, increasing global military presence, and 

determination to act and gain recognition as a global 

power.5

3. Beijing’s actions in support of maritime and insular territorial claims demonstrate its determination 

not to waver on sovereignty issues.6

4. The influence of the military commanders, 

determined to continue modernizing their forces.

A regionally focused PLA will not require Beijing 

to make the large investments demanded for a global 

military. It will not change its current modernization 

process to try to match the United States ship for ship, 

or missile for missile, but will continue focusing on 

strategic, essentially defensive capabilities.

A decision to increase, decrease, or maintain the 

present percentage of the national budget dedicated 

to the PLA will be driven much more by political than 

economic concerns. Future military modernization in 
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China will not be determined by economic resources, 

but by political decisions.

THE REGION

“East Asia” is a description that rolls off the tongue 

for an area on which a 2025 PLA would focus, but that 

is too easy, just as “Indo-Pacific” is too broad. China’s 

current strategic military interests focus on defense of 

the homeland, to include all 14 of its land borders, as 

well as the vast maritime expanse to its east, into the 

Philippine Sea, and to the south, to the Singapore and 

Malacca Straits.

The most immediate maritime concern is the “three 

seas,” or “near seas,” composed of the Yellow, East 

China, and South China Seas, which cover the water 

area inside the “first island chain.”7 The island chain 

construct is credited to Admiral Liu Huaqing, who in 

the mid-1980s described it as bounding an area over 

which the PLA Navy (PLAN) should aspire to exert 

control by 2020. Liu’s concept of “control” is not the 

same as classic Mahanian “command of the sea,” but 

aims for the capability to control specific areas for 

specific periods of time. 

The PLAN did not meet Liu’s 2000 date for controlling the area within the first island chain, but was 

close to that goal in 2014, by virtue of its increasingly 

sophisticated surveillance capabilities, expanded submarine fleet, and missile arsenal headlined by the 

near-initial operating capability (IOC) of the DF21 

antiship ballistic missile (ASBM).8 This mix of capabilities, including the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and 

Second Artillery, means that the goal of sea control is 

not a function of just the PLAN, but of the entire PLA. 
169

REGIONAL ISSUES 

Taiwan’s status was the PLA’s most crucial planning contingency in 2014, but is likely to continue subsiding in crisis intensity, as discussed later. The PLA’s 

missions focused on border defense will retain their 

priority.9 These are both continental and maritime, extending through the three seas today but out to Liu’s 

“second island chain” by 2030. This line defines an 

area over which the PLA should aspire to exert control 

and includes much of the Philippine Sea, in addition 

to the near seas. It is a vast ocean expanse, extending 

approximately 1,800 nautical miles (nm) eastward 

from the Asian mainland, sometimes described as the 

“middle sea.”10

It would also establish an extensive defensive security structure by the 100th anniversary of the founding 

of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2049.11 The 

2006 defense white paper included this goal in a list 

of modernization target dates, as “the strategic goal 

of building informationized armed forces and being 

capable of winning informationized wars by the mid21st century.”12

Military Forces as an Instrument 

of Chinese Statecraft.

Beijing has not hesitated to defend national security interests, including its maritime claims. PLAN 

ships defeated Vietnamese units to consolidate Chinese control of the Paracel (Xisha) Islands in 1974 and 

several Spratly (Nansha) Islands in 1988. Less dramatic PLA engagements in the South China Sea have included the seizure of Mischief (Meiji) Reef in 1995 and 

Scarborough Shoals (Huangyuan Dao) in 2012 against 

Philippine claims.13
170

Chinese government and perhaps commercial 

ships under government direction have also confronted other nation’s vessels, ranging from fishing craft to 

U.S. survey ships on many occasions. These confrontations have included very aggressive Chinese actions, 

resulting in the loss of life and significant damage. In 

one incident between China and South Korea, a South 

Korean Coast Guard officer was murdered when he 

boarded a Chinese fishing boat.

Confrontations involving both civilian-manned 

and PLAN craft have become commonplace in the 

East China Sea between Japanese and Chinese vessels 

and aircraft. No loss of life has occurred—although 

the risk may be increasing with each confrontation. 14

The past 4 years’ events in the East and South China 

Seas demonstrate Beijing’s use of uniformed and civilian services to enforce its maritime and insular territorial claims. That is not unique to China, of course, but 

Beijing’s apparent faith in its ability to control such 

incidents and prevent unintended escalation are both 

unrealistic and troubling.15

Japan, India, and the United States are viewed as 

posing threats of various degrees to China’s national 

security.16 The first is both a historic enemy and as a 

current contestant to sovereignty and resource issues 

in the East China Sea; India’s nuclear arsenal is threatening to Beijing’s ally, Pakistan, as well as to China 

itself; while the United States is the only nation with 

the economic, political, and military power to frustrate China’s ambitions. 

Additionally, Beijing faces an East Asia generally pursuing naval modernization. Japan and South 

Korea continue to improve their already formidable 

naval and coast guard capabilities, while Vietnam, 

Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia are 
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engaging in long-term modernization of their submarine fleets and other naval units. The Indian Navy 

aspires to a very ambitious modernization program 

based on a future force of three aircraft carrier battle 

groups and nuclear powered submarines.17

President Xi Jinping’s statement that “We are 

strongly committed to safeguarding the country’s 

sovereignty and security, and defending our territorial integrity” is not just rhetoric, but addresses an 

obvious and lasting strategic goal.18

PLA PERSONNEL 

PLA Army.

The army (PLAA) dominates the military in terms 

of command and numbers. There are indications, however, that this dominance will change by the middle 

of the next decade. First, China’s 2004 defense white 

paper stated that: 

The PLA will promote coordinated development of 

firepower, mobility and information capability, enhance the development of its operational strength 

with priority given to the Navy, Air Force and Second 

Artillery Force (PLASAF) in order to strengthen the 

capabilities for winning both command of the sea and 

command of the air, and conducting strategic counter 

strikes.19

Second, at the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 

Eighteenth Party Congress, in November 2012, President Hu Jintao emphasized that the army would be 

yielding influence to the other services. Hu asserted: 
172

we must make major progress in modernizing national 

defense and the armed forces . . ., striving to basically 

complete military mechanization and make major 

progress in full military IT [information technology] 

application by 2020. . . . We should attach great importance to maritime, space and cyberspace security . . . 

enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of 

military tasks, the most important of which is to win 

local war in an information age.20

Third, writing about the Decision of the CPC Central Committee . . . at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 

18th CPC [Communist Party of China] Central Committee, General Xu Qiliang reported “it is imperative 

to . . . lay stress on strengthening the building of the 

Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery.”21

Then, in November 2013, a senior Military Region 

(MR) commander described a future, more balanced 

PLA, with the army being deemphasized in favor 

of the navy and air force.22 Finally, in January 2014, 

Chinese military analysts described a “new joint command system” reflecting “naval prioritization.”23

The PLA of a half-century ago focused on continental threats and missions; logically, the army dominated. China’s national security concerns in 2014 are 

concentrated on the maritime arena, which should 

empower the PLAN and PLAAF. It also lends weight 

to the Second Artillery’s conventional capabilities. A 

maritime, eastern orientation will continue with the 

unresolved status of Taiwan, disputes with Japan, and 

South China Sea issues. 

These indicators mean reduced army personnel 

numbers, with increased navy, air force, and Second 

Artillery Force manning. It likely will lead to a lessening of army influence and budget allocation, with 
173

concomitant increases in the other services’ shares of 

budget resources and leadership positions. This reorientation, in recognition of 21st century strategic goals, 

will allow a reorganization of PLA infrastructure, to 

include simplifying the MR structure. 

Changes in PLA organization by 2025-30 should 

include interservice rotation among many of senior 

command positions. For instance, an admiral in command of the Guangzhou MR would recognize the 

PLAN’s leading role in confronting South China Sea 

challenges. Similarly, a PLAAF or Second Artillery 

general in command of the Nanjing and Jinan MRs 

would be directly in control of the air- and missilefocused forces responsible for exercising anti-access/

area denial (A2/AD) operations within the first island 

chain—particularly the East China Sea.

PLA MISSIONS IN 2025 

Hence, the PLA in the next decade will reflect a 

more balanced personnel and resource structure 

among the three primary services, with the navy and 

air force gaining at the army’s expense. The Second 

Artillery likely will maintain its present position—

with personnel and resources sized only to ensure the 

presence of a viable, effective nuclear and conventional deterrent force. 

The most important future PLA development will 

be continuation of the post-2000 improvements in 

personnel management. Professional military education (PME) and training for all ranks will continue to 

increase in flexibility and professionalism—maximizing the accuracy and honesty of training and exercise 

evaluation and reporting.
174

Two important challenges confront the PLA. One is 

the elimination of corrupt accession, assignment, and 

promotion practices. Second is the PLA’s decade-long 

attempt to develop a professional, career noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. The extent of this effort’s 

success should be apparent by the mid-2020s.24

China’s working age population—the prime pool 

for military entrants—is expected to begin declining 

as early as 2015, described as “a drastic decline in the 

young labor force,” despite recent decisions relaxing the “one-child policy.”25 However, in view of the 

burgeoning need to find more and more jobs for the 

country’s increasing work force and continuing conscription means that future manpower resources will 

not be a limiting factor on future PLA manning.

Homeland Defense.

Homeland Defense obviously will remain the primary mission for all services and branches. However, 

increased attention to developing jointness and the 

continued increase in ballistic and cruise missile capability noted earlier may well lead to the establishment 

of a separate command responsible for that mission. 

This would be a “supported command,” without its 

own forces but empowered to secure operational forces from the different services to carry out its mission.

The maritime defense mission will remain primarily a PLAN responsibility, but will require greater 

naval aviation capability and coordination with the 

PLAAF. The newly organized coast guard forces 

will gain in coherence and capability over time and 

their operations will be increasingly influenced by 

the PLAN. Required defense of China’s recently announced air defense identification zone (ADIZ), the 
175

acquisition of aircraft carriers and advanced surface 

combatants, all with flight decks, will shift more of 

this mission to seaborne aviation assets, both rotary 

and fixed-wing.

Nuclear Deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence will remain a vital PLA mission, with the Second Artillery in the lead, but with 

a division of labor with the PLAN, the service responsible for the actual operation and maintenance 

of ballistic missile submarines, and with the PLAAF, 

responsible for the actual operation and maintenance 

of nuclear weapons-capable aircraft. Second Artillery 

control of nuclear-capable intercontinental missiles 

will be unchallenged, but as the navy and air force 

acquire longer range and more sophisticated conventionally armed cruise and regional ballistic missiles, 

Beijing may decide that these weapons embody too 

much political impact to be left in the hands of the 

individual services. Establishing a more centralized, 

joint command and control authority over long-range 

missiles would be a logical step.26

Power Projection.

Employing military power to enforce sovereignty 

claims includes power projection, a phrase often used 

to describe a navy mission. It should more accurately 

be defined in whole-of-military terms. 

PLA power projection capabilities in 2014 take several forms, including amphibious assault by army or 

marine corps troops transported by navy or commercial vessels’ air and missile strikes launched from the 

sea or from territorial possessions against a foreign 
176

force or country, or by the threat of such force being 

exercised.

These capabilities will increase, as China continues modernizing its military. PLA power projection 

effectiveness will also improve as a result of “lessons 

learned” from the more-than-5 years of PLAN deployments to the Gulf of Aden and beyond.27

Presence.

Presence, or employing military forces as a diplomatic instrument, is as old as naval history—the Athenians employed their own and allied maritime forces 

throughout the Peloponnesus on this mission. China 

has deployed its naval vessels on diplomatic port visits since the mid-1970s, when PLAN ships conducted 

port calls throughout Southeast Asia. The pace of 

interregional port calls will continue to increase until, by 2025, PLAN warships and support vessels call 

routinely in East Asian countries. 

PLAN warships joining the large, biannual, multilateral rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in Hawaiian waters in the summer of 2014 were a significant 

Chinese demonstration of both presence and power 

projection. This major exercise likely signaled a new 

naval balance in Asian-Pacific waters for both China 

and the United States.28

Maintaining Order at Sea. 

This mission has been part of PLAN and coast 

guard operations since the organizations were founded. The PRC’s early years included PLA defensive operations against Nationalist raids; seizing islands held 

by those forces; fighting piracy and other criminal 
177

activities in riverine and littoral waters; and enforcing 

customs regulations, conducting salvage, navigation, 

and safety of life operations. These included participation by the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and other 

national agencies, as well as provincial and municipal 

authorities.

China’s military and civilian ability to ensure order at sea has been significantly improved. The 2013 

reorganization of coast guard-like services has yet 

to have a significant impact, but eventually should 

provide a rational, effective organization for executing these missions. It also represents a trend of civilmilitary integration that will continue, while the impressive acquisition of ships and aircraft will provide 

the platforms necessary to ensure maritime order and 

security. 

Significant command and control arrangements 

were apparently left unresolved by this reorganization. Operational requirements and bureaucratic inertia will continue to drive integration of various “coast 

guard” organizations into the administrative control 

of a national ministry, while operational control gravitates to the PLAN.29

Nontraditional Missions. 

The PLA will increase its participation in “military 

operations other than war” (MOOTW).30 These include noncombatant evacuations (NEO), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and peacekeeping. 
178

NEO.

The Libyan NEO in 2012, when 48,000 Chinese citizens were evacuated, was just the latest NEO; between 

2006 and 2010, 6,000 Chinese citizens were evacuated 

from Chad, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, the Solomon 

Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Tonga.31

NEO operations are difficult to predict; Beijing’s 

willingness to participate in such operations, perhaps 

in cases where no or very few Chinese citizens are 

among foreigners threatened in a situation of violent 

civil unrest or natural disaster, will likely increase. 

Humanitarian Assistance and 

Disaster Relief (HA/DR).

Hospital ships, large amphibious ships, and large 

transport aircraft increase the PLA’s ability to conduct HA/DR missions throughout East Asia and beyond during times of man-made or naturally caused 

emergencies to relieve human suffering. The PLAN’s 

modern hospital ship, Peace Ark, has by 2014 carried 

out long voyages to the Indian Ocean, the Southwest 

Pacific, and the Caribbean Sea.32 The ship also is an 

ideal platform for Beijing to employ in the event of a 

domestic catastrophe in one of its coastal or riverine 

provinces.

The PLAN in 2014 deploys just three large amphibious ships, Yuzhao-class landing platform docks 

(LPD), named Kunlunshan, Jingganshan, and Changbaishan. At least two or three more of these very capable 

vessels soon will join the fleet.33

Expansion of the HA/DR mission for the air force 

will be enhanced by acquisition of additional large 

cargo aircraft capable of long-range flights. These may 
179

include additional Il-76 aircraft acquired from Russia, 

but are more likely to consist of advanced models of 

the Chinese-manufactured Y-20 aircraft.34

China was deficient in HA/DR capability when 

the December 2004 tsunami struck Southeast and 

South Asia; capacity had improved significantly when 

Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines in November 

2013, but Beijing lacked the political willingness to engage. The two cases are different, but, as of 2014, China 

has yet to employ the PLA in providing humanitarian 

relief from a disinterested position. 

Extensive PLA participation in HA/DR missions 

will result from a political decision by Beijing; the military capability is already present. The Chinese government will have to decide that participation in HA/

DR operations, especially those not concerned directly with succoring Chinese citizens, is in the national 

interest. 

Counterpiracy.

Piracy and other criminal activity at sea and in 

coastal areas has historically been a continuing problem in East Asian waters. Much news reporting has 

resulted from the PLAN’s deployments to the Gulf of 

Aden and beyond since December 2008. This mission 

has demonstrated China’s ability to conduct longdistance military operations over an extended period 

of time. 

Piracy will persist, but is best described in 2014 as 

“manageable,” a description that will remain apt in 

2030. Its prevalence, however, may rise or decline in 

conjunction with rising or falling economic prosperity among professional sea goers, especially in coastal 

waters. In any case, these missions in littoral waters 
180

will decrease for the PLA in the next decade, if the 

new coast guard units develop administrative coherence and operational capability in nonmilitary law 

enforcement at sea and on regional rivers.

Counterterrorism.

The PAP and Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 

civilian police forces have been primarily responsible 

for domestic incidents Beijing classifies as terrorism, 

although the PLAA may be called upon in extreme 

cases.35 Very few terrorism incidents have occurred 

at sea; the PLAN would be assigned to resolve such 

incidents if beyond the capability of the Coast Guard 

or other maritime security organization, but this will 

remain a minor mission for the navy.

Maintaining Civil Order.

Societal peace and order is a bottom-line mission 

for all Chinese security forces, from local police to the 

PLA. This mission ties directly to countering terrorism. The PLA will retain ultimate responsibility for 

domestic stability.

Taiwan.

Taiwan probably will not be a primary operational 

concern for the PLA by the end of the next decade. 

Resolution of the island’s status vis-à-vis the mainland 

before 2030 is supported by several factors. One is the 

increasingly intertwined economic and social relationship between the island and the mainland.36

Second is the lack of clear sentiment among Taiwan’s population in favor of formally declaring in-
181

dependence.37 This is seen in the Taiwan government 

failing since at least 2000 to have made dramatic efforts to improve the island’s military capabilities. 

Third is the lack of international support for a 

formally independent Taiwan, reflected in the declining number of nations that recognize the Republic of 

China.38 Fourth is Taiwan’s inability to gain entry into 

international organizations without the support of 

the PRC. 

Fifth is the de facto decline in U.S. support for an 

independent Taiwan, which exacerbates the point 

about Taipei’s defense posture referenced previously—relying on Washington to defend the island will 

not be an effective policy in the long term. 

Three Seas.

The PLA’s headline-grabbing strategic issues of 

2014 are unlikely to have been resolved by the middle 

of the next decade, including disputed sovereignty 

claims over land features and ocean areas within the 

East and South China Seas. Very little prospect exists 

that China will achieve a settlement with Japan over 

their conflicting continental shelf claims in the East 

China Sea, although a modus vivendi is possible. 

There is even less chance that they will agree on 

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands sovereignty, an issue that 

rests largely on nationalism, although many analysts 

view these land features as a crucial part of the first 

island chain, serving in Japanese hands to constrain 

PLAN operations.39 In both cases, the lack of material benefit will not prevent a military confrontation 

between China and Japan occurring during the next 

decade and a half, but reduces that possibility.40
182

The South China Sea disputes are more substantive, important, and complex than those in the East 

China Sea. The PLA has long been used by Beijing to 

enforce territorial claims and expel forces perceived as 

encroaching on China’s sovereignty, including 1974, 

1988, 1995, 2005, 2007, 2012, and 2013. 

THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

Organization.

PLA reorganization has received attention in the 

wake of the fall 2013 Third Party Plenum, often featuring a reduction in the number of MRs from seven 

to perhaps four theaters.41 The navy, with three fleets, 

has direct administrative links to just three MRs—Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou. If two or all of these 

are combined, presumably their assigned fleets might 

be combined into two—a North Sea Fleet focused 

on Japan and a South Sea Fleet focused on the South 

China Sea.

What will the PLA look like in 2025-30 if the services become “more balanced”? A regionally focused 

PLA will not require an army even as large as the 2014 

force, absent unexpected conventional warfare on 

China’s northern or western borders. The 2014 army 

of mixed divisions and brigades will continue reorganizing into brigades, with increased special forces and 

aviation units, and reduced headquarters personnel.

A smaller PLAA might well shift at least two more 

divisions to a primary amphibious role; its mission in 

the maritime arena outlined earlier and the acquisition of more and larger amphibious warships would 

enable it to fulfill the adage of “a projectile fired by the 

navy.”42 There is no evidence that the current marine 

corps of just 12,000 personnel will be expanded. 
183

PLAAF and Naval Aviation.

A future, regionally focused PLA will deploy enhanced naval and air force capabilities to confront national security concerns about the Diaoyutai, Taiwan, 

and the South China Sea. 

The air force would realign with a new MR structure. Each associated air force will continue to focus 

on defense of the homeland, using a national ADIZ 

covering both East and South China Seas. This will 

likely be a mission of both the PLAAF and Naval 

Aviation, but with a central controlling organization 

in each MR, and with cross-MR coordination.

By the middle of the next decade, the PLAAF and 

Naval Aviation inventory will include low-observable 

aircraft derived from either the J-20 or J-21. Less certain is whether the J-21 is destined to become Naval 

Aviation’s primary carrier aircraft. The J-15 is currently filling that role but reportedly is so weight-restricted at launching from the ship’s ski-jump ramp that its 

significant redesign or replacement is likely, perhaps 

by a version of the Russian-designed Su-33.43

Homeland defense will focus on the maritime theater, the area delineated by the island chains. These 

enclose China’s littoral waters, in which a doctrine 

of A2/AD would be exercised, requiring increased 

numbers of airborne warning and control aircraft 

(AWACS), aerial refuelers, cruise missile launching 

aircraft, short-range ballistic missiles, and, especially, 

anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. 

The PLA also is acquiring increasing numbers of 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which will play increasingly important roles, particularly in surveillance 

and targeting, and which offer significant advantages 

when compared to manned aircraft.44 UAVs offer sev-
184

eral advantages in reduced procurement and maintenance costs, personnel manning, and even plausible 

deniability. They are by themselves, however, suited 

to regional rather than global employment.45

PLAN.

One very significant MR realignment would be 

combining the Jinan and Nanjing regions, with the 

PLAN disestablishing the East Sea Fleet, and the North 

and South Sea Fleets dividing the former fleet’s area of 

responsibility. As far as force structure is concerned, 

the navy would continue its present, impressive pace 

of warship construction. 

China’s ship building programs support the concept of a regionally focused PLAN. The first aircraft 

carrier, Liaoning, provides increased airpower at sea 

but with a “ski jump” flight deck is limited in its aircraft capability. China’s indigenously designed and 

constructed carriers may have the catapults necessary 

for greater airpower generation, which would engender significantly higher costs, in terms both of financial and personnel resources.46 Should China build 

larger, flat-deck, catapult-equipped carriers, it would 

indicate a more global than regional intent for its fleet 

missions. Similarly, the low number of replenishment-at-sea (RAS) ships in the PLAN, currently just 

six, indicates regional missions, not involving distant 

deployments on a regular basis.47

The 2030 surface fleet will center on three or four 

aircraft carriers, all indigenously constructed, 18 air 

defense destroyers with Aegis-like anti-air warfare 

systems, and 36 frigates and corvettes equipped primarily for ASW, with defense of sea lines of communication their primary mission.48 This major acquisi-
185

tion program in a regionally focused PLA reflects 

as much national pride as it does national security 

requirements.

A force of 50-60 attack submarines will be maintained, not more than ten nuclear powered, but twice 

that number equipped with air-independent-propulsion (AIP) conventional power plants. The conventionally powered boats will retain as a primary mission enforcing A2/AD within the first island chain, 

but as more AIP submarines join the fleet, the PLAN 

will begin extending its operations into the Philippine 

Sea, moving toward a goal of regularly patrolling out 

to and beyond the second island chain. 

Nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) are more expensive to build and much more expensive to maintain 

and operate than attack submarines; the basic justification for building the former is to assign them to 

long-range missions.49 Hence, a regionally focused 

PLAN will not require that a significant percentage of 

its submarine force be nuclear powered.

The PLAN faces several challenges to improve 

its numerically large submarine force’s capability. A 

particular challenge for China’s naval architects is to 

improve their boat’s covertness; the current fleet of 

nuclear powered submarines is surprisingly noisy, 

greatly increasing their detectability by opposing 

forces.50 Conventionally powered submarines are inherently quieter and more difficult to detect, if their 

equipment is properly maintained.51

By 2025, China should be able finally to deploy 

nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), 

a goal unfulfilled in 2014, after 3 decades of effort. At 

least two or three Jin-class SSBNs are already operating in the South Sea Fleet, but lacking their main battery of JL-2 missiles. Even when successfully tested 
186

and loaded onboard, these missiles will be incapable 

of reaching mainland U.S. targets except from narrow 

ocean areas.52

Construction of the major submarine base at Yalong Bay, near the city of Sanya on Hainan Island, 

and the existing naval base at Yulin, may indicate that 

China will opt for a Soviet-style “bastion strategy” for 

operating its SSBNs, once a longer-range missile becomes operational.53 Although locating the SSBNs at 

Hainan may just be due to the South China Sea offering the steep sea floor gradient that allows submarines 

to submerge into deep, safe waters almost immediately upon leaving the island’s southern ports.

Beijing could have these submarines patrol continuously, as did the United States and the Soviet Union 

during the Cold War, or they might choose to have 

the boats leave homeport for patrol as a signal, during 

times of crisis. The maritime element of China’s early 

warning infrastructure—especially a seabed listening 

and monitoring system—also would play an important role in defending the bastion against intruders.54

ASW capability is key PLAN weakness, while 

the U.S. submarine force is its navy’s most lethal element. By 2020, however, the U.S. Navy is predicted to 

deploy a total of just 39 SSNs.55

The Second Artillery.

The current arsenal of approximately 72 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is organized into seven brigades, including one DF-4, three DF-5A, one DF31, and two DF-31A units. The older missiles will have 

been mothballed by 2030, and the Second Artillery is 

likely to deploy only DF-31A or DF-41 brigades.56 The 

number of missiles and brigades will remain approxi-
187

mately the same, unless Beijing believes that the U.S. 

and allied anti-ballistic missile defense structure is 

significantly improved. 

The size of China’s ICBM nuclear force will continue to be determined by a policy of “credible minimum 

deterrence.”57 The 2014 strength of approximately 400 

missiles, ranging from the DF-3A to the DF-15, may 

remain in 2025-30, but will be affected by at least three 

factors. First is Beijing’s confidence in the effectiveness of its missile force; second is its view of the effectiveness of U.S. and other nation’s countermeasures. 

Third is Beijing’s evaluation of its security environment; even if regionally focused, the PLA’s missile 

inventory will have to recognize India’s potential for 

employing nuclear weapons. 

The short- and medium-range ballistic missiles inventory is more likely to increase, as are the 

air- and sea-launched cruise missiles in which China 

“has invested heavily” in a program described by the 

Pentagon as “the most active in the world.”58

Systems Improvements.

The PLA is emphasizing cyber operations and 

space-based systems, which define the 21st century 

command, control, communications, computers, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) environment, 

as well as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. PLAN commander Wu Shengli’s insistence in 2008 on access to 

space-based systems to support the navy’s deployments to the Gulf of Aden was followed by his 2009 

statement that “the Navy will move faster in researching and building new-generation weapons to boost 

the ability to fight in regional sea wars under the circumstances of information technology.”59
188

Future developments are likely to focus on systems integration to maximize the effectiveness of the 

complex system of systems that characterize modern 

warfighting platforms. A recent report emphasized 

the PLA’s continued difficulties in this area; it decried 

the lack of jointness and even teamwork between 

units, noting that “without standardization, there is 

no informatization” and demanding that “each military branch [must] completely remove its ‘departmental selfishness’ barriers.”60

PLA writings frequently call for greater jointness in 

capabilities and doctrine. The need and call for jointness will continue, as the military gains in capability 

and expanded mission scope. 

Strategy.

Beijing has not issued a “national security strategy,” “military strategy,” or “maritime strategy,” as 

such. In each case, however, documents are available 

that delineate China’s strategic concerns. The regionally focused PLA of the next decade will be primarily occupied with the maritime concerns mentioned 

previously.

Applicable documents include the 1998 National 

Ocean Policy of China and the series of biennial defense 

white papers, published from 1998 to 2014. The tenets 

of maritime strategy discerned in these documents 

include developing and defending coastal and offshore economic resources, “reinforcing oceanographic 

technology,” and establishing a “comprehensive marine management system.” Other points noted are to 

“harmonize national and international law,” integrate 

China’s agencies responsible for maritime security, 

coordinate traditional and nontraditional maritime 
189

security concerns, and deploying a navy of “new 

types of submarines, frigates, aircraft, and large 

support vessels.”61

CONCLUSION

The Dream.

Military modernization has been linked to the 

PRC’s 100th anniversary by all three post-Deng 

Xiaoping presidents. President Jiang Zemin spoke in 

the late-1990s of making important progress in military modernization by mid-century, while President 

Xi Jinping has set 2049 for the fulfillment of the “China 

dream.” The goal is “to recapitalize China’s armed 

forces to achieve mechanization and partial informatization by 2020.” 62

The PLAN and other maritime enforcement agencies should have the capability to confront threats to 

China’s claimed fisheries, sea bed resources, and economic interests connected to sea lines of communication by 2025, a significant achievement. At the end 

of the next decade, Beijing may believe its naval and 

coast guard forces strong enough to control East Asian 

regional sea lanes. This would strengthen Chinese 

ambitions to turn the “three seas” into a “no-go” zone 

if it suits.

The congressionally mandated Office of the Secretary of Defense report on the PLA for 2013 sums up 

current and possible near-term developments in China’s military. It states that: 

the PRC continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win 
190

short-duration, high-ntensity regional military conflict, . . . Its military modernization has also become 

increasingly focused on investments in military capabilities to conduct a wider range of missions beyond 

its immediate territorial concerns, including counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and regional military operations. . . . These 

missions and capabilities can address international security challenges, [as well as] more narrowly defined 

PRC interests and objectives, including advancing territorial claims and building influence abroad.63

When—or will—the PLA be able to meet these goals 

and control the huge maritime area delineated by the 

second island chain?64

While it took the PLA approximately 2 decades 

(1996-2014) to close in on the 2000 goal attributed to 

Liu Huaqing, that process has engendered a momentum enhanced by the continuing growth of China’s 

economy, development of Chinese defense industries, 

and the increasing PLA budget. Hence, the ability to 

control—or for the PLA to estimate that it can control—the water area delineated by the second island 

chain may be effective by 2030. Again, this does not 

mean classic “command of the sea,” but the ability 

to use a specific area of the sea for a specific period 

of time. 

A PLA focused on global operations would require weapons systems not necessary for a military 

focused on regional issues, especially those inherent 

in China’s long maritime frontier. First, the regionally 

focused navy will continue to build many more conventionally than nuclear powered submarines, given 

the respective ranges of each. Second, fewer replenishment ships are also appropriate to a PLAN focused 
191

on regional rather than far-sea operations. Third, a 

navy built around even three aircraft carriers would 

be focused on regional issues, since the conventional 

wisdom that three such ships are required to maintain 

one in full operational status remains realistic. Another relevant factor is the requirement for two aircraft 

carriers to operate together to conduct the 24-hour a 

day flight operations typically required in a far-sea 

scenario. This implies that a globally oriented PLAN 

would incorporate at least six carriers.65 Finally, a significantly increased inventory of heavy-lift aircraft 

in the PLAAF would indicate Beijing’s intentions to 

operate more consistently at greater distances. None 

of these “global” systems appear immediately in 

the offing.

Predicting Chinese military capabilities and intentions for a decade or more hence of course is constrained by fundamental unknowns; even a regionally 

focused PLA will continue certain out-of-area operations, to include ship visits to Western Hemisphere 

and European ports. Furthermore, the Indian Ocean 

presence represented by post-2008 counterpiracy 

deployments, as well as exercise participation, will 

continue.

 First, corruption and bureaucratic complexity are 

problems hindering PLA effectiveness. In the words 

of one observer: 

It’s not just corruption. More than three decades of 

peace, a booming economy, and an opaque administrative system have taken their toll as well, not to mention that the PLA is one of the world’s largest bureaucracies -- and behaves accordingly.66

Second, the PLA’s position within China’s “national command authority” faces an unknown future. Ellis 
192

Joffe once said there was no reason why Chinese military officers could not be both professionally competent and politically reliable. Nonetheless, continuing 

Mao Zedong’s declaration that “Our principle is that 

the Party commands the gun and the gun must never 

be allowed to command the Party” remains a concern 

of China’s succeeding leaders. For instance, three of 

Jiang Zemin’s “Five Sentences on Army Building” 

addressed political reliability of the military.67

More recently, President Xi Jinping demanded the 

army’s “absolute loyalty, purity and reliability.” The 

military, he continued “should absolutely follow the 

command of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission at any time and under any 

circumstances, . . .”68

The near-complete absence of uniformed personnel in the most senior CCP organs attests to PLA 

subservience to civilian leadership, with little significant change from the 2006 observation that “senior 

uniformed military leaders are primarily focused on 

military issues.”69 The danger of a developing feeling 

in the PLA that only it understands what is required 

to protect la patria is possible but not on the horizon.

Third and most importantly, future PLA capabilities will be influenced by Beijing views of China’s 

strategic situation. The immediate regional concerns 

posed by Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South 

China Seas greatly outweigh more distant issues, 

such as counterpiracy, counterterrorism, NEO, or 

HA/DR. Furthermore, the Asian maritime picture 

in 2030 will present China with a challenging venue 

of capable, modernizing navies. Beijing’s efforts to 

build a dominant regional military force are not assured of success. Not only will the Japanese Maritime 

and Air Self-Defense Forces continue to acquire and 
193

deploy state-of-the-art weapons systems and platforms, but even Vietnam, for instance, will have deployed at least six Kilo-class submarines, MiG-29 

aircraft, and Russian-designed frigates armed with 

modern cruise missiles.

China’s military modernization over the next decade and a half will be impressive. It should not be 

constrained by budget or other resource shortages, including personnel availability. However, its political 

drivers—national security concerns—logically will be 

more regional than global.

A PLA focused on but not necessarily restricted to 

an East Asian regional arena will continue modernizing its command and control structure, and will 

become increasingly aware of international factors. 

Service rivalries will always be present, but PLA jointness will increase both operationally and in military 

command positions. As noted previously, MR commanders will quite possibly include navy and air force 

officers by the end of the next decade.70

A regionally focused PLA in 2030 will have developed into a smaller, but more professionally competent military. “How effective will it be in combat” is an 

impossible question to answer with assurance, but the 

PLAN’s increasing operational experience certainly 

indicates greater competence, as does the evolving 

personnel and unit education and training system. 

The question is not one of PLAN versus the U.S. Navy 

or the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force but the degree to which Beijing believes its forces must be engaged—to win decisively or to “teach a lesson”—in a 

given scenario.

The PLAN and PLAAF will have increased their 

share of budget and personnel resources; the Coast 

Guard and other ancillary forces will have developed 
194

into coherent, increasingly competent forces. The 

strategic goal of controlling events within the three 

seas will be largely achieved and the next goal of controlling events within the second island chain will 

have made impressive progress.71 In regional terms, 

China will have completed the near-unprecedented 

development into both a continental and maritime 

military power.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. My chapter is based on personal observation of PLA developments during the past 20 years, extended discussions with 

PLA officers and analysts, and learning from many China hands. 

I especially thank Ken Allen, Tom Bickford, Dennis Blasko, John 

Corbett, Dave Finkelstein, Paul Godwin, Roy Kamphausen, Mike 

McDevitt, Eric McVadon, Susan Puska, Alan Romberg, Stapleton 

Roy, Michael Swaine, Scott Tanner, Cynthia Watson, and Larry 

Wortzel.

2. Zhou Erjie, “China Defense Budget to Grow to 10.7 Pct in 

2013: Report,” Xinhua, March 5, 2013, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/05/c_132207943.htm, accessed December 5, 2013. Sweden’s SIPRI estimates the 2013 military budget 

at 1.5 times higher than reported by Beijing, or about U.S.$171.5 

billion; South Korea’s KRISS applies a 1.5 to 2.0 multiple; India’s 

IDSA gives an estimate of U.S.$187 billion; Great Britain’s IISS estimated China’s 2011 defense budget at U.S.$136.7 billion, although 

Beijing’s figure for that year was U.S.$90.2 billion. Jane’s Information Group in 2012 estimated China’s defense budget would 

increase from $119.80 billion to $238.20 billion between 2011 and 

2015, a figure larger than the defense budgets of all other major 

Asian nations combined, but still smaller than the estimated U.S. 

2013 defense budget of $525.40 billion. Dennis J. Blasko makes his 

point in “An Analysis of China’s 2011 Defense Budget and Total Military Spending: The Great Unknown,” China Brief, No. 11, 

Issue 4, Jamestown Foundation, March 11, 2011, available from 

www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news

%5D=37631&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=517#.UqTo_I4aU00, accessed December 8, 2013.
195

3. This discussion, including the previous quote, relies on J. 

Taylor Fravel and Dennis J. Blasko, “Xi Jinping and the PLA,” The 

Diplomat, March 19, 2013, available from thediplomat.com/2013/03/

xi-jinping-and-the-pla/, accessed December 29, 2013.

4. See for instance, Arthur R. Kroeber, “Xi Jinping’s Ambitious Agenda for Economic Reform in China,” Washington, DC: 

The Brookings Institution, November 17, 2013, available from 

www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/17-xi-jinping-economic-agenda-kroeber, accessed December 8, 2013.

5. Supporting facts include China’s prominent role in global 

economics; major role supporting United Nations peacekeeping 

operations; prominent roles in or with the Shanghai Cooperative 

Organization, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Arctic 

Council, and other multilateral organizations; and an apparent 

determination to accompany its growing stature with the military 

historically deployed by global powers; more than 5 years’ continuous naval deployments to the Gulf of Aden and beyond; and 

an understandable determination to have the capability to defend 

the homeland and associated national security interests and areas.

6. See, for instance, “Xi Jinping Vows Peaceful Development While Not Waiving Legitimate Rights,” CCTV report, 

January 30, 2013, available from english.cntv.cn/program/china24/20130130/102378.shtml, accessed December 8, 2013. Also see 

“Xi Jinping Stresses Diplomatic Work With Neighboring States,” 

The Nation, November 1, 2013, available from www.nation.com.pk/

international/01-Nov-2013/xi-jinping-stresses-diplomatic-work-withneighbouring-states, accessed December 8, 2013.

7. The “near seas” recently were described as “nearly 875,000 

square nautical miles” by Jesse Karotkin, “Trends in China’s 

Naval Modernization,” Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, January 2014, available from www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Karotkin_

Testimony1.30.14.pdf, accessed February 6, 2014. 

8. See Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile, 

(ASBM), Development: Drivers, Trajectories and Strategic Implications, Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2013.
196

9. Border disputes with India remain unresolved and statements from Beijing and New Delhi promise no early resolution of 

the Western Sector sovereignty contest over the Aksai Chin area, 

particularly since it concerns Jammu and Kashmir, or in the Eastern Sector dispute over Arunachal Pradesh. The PLA in 2014 is 

also concerned with the North Korean border; a collapse of that 

state would involve employing China’s military to safeguard the 

nation’s border, possibly to secure nuclear weapons, and to prevent South Korean or U.S. military forces from encroaching too 

far north of the 38th parallel. Another strategic border defense 

issue concerns the Islamic countries to China’s west, including 

the former Soviet republics of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. First, Russian President Vladimir Putin 

and possibly his successors may not be reconciled to the loss of 

these former Soviet states from Moscow’s domination; second, an 

aggressive Russo-Chinese contest for the region’s energy reserves 

may supersede the two nations’ 2014 “strategic relationship.”

10. One nautical mile (nm) equals 1.15 statute miles. The distance from Hong Kong to Agana is 1821.5-nm. See the maps in Kimberly Hsu and Craig Murray, “China’s Expanding Military Operations in Foreign Exclusive Economic Zones,” U.S.-China Economic 

and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder, 

June 19, 2013, available from www.uscc.gov/Research/china’s-expanding-military-operations-foreign-exclusive-economic-zones, accessed 

January 18, 2014.

11. Dennis Blasko note to the author, December 30, 2013, highlighted in PLAN exercise report by Bai Ruixue, “If We Run Swiftly in Small Steps, the Many Small Successes We Have Achieved 

Will Add Up to a Big One,” Liaowang Dongfang Zhoukan, No. 42, 

OSC-CHR2013121032596896, Shanghai, November 7, 2013, p. 36: 

In the days to come, [the PLAN] will certainly become stronger than before, but this process will require the continuous 

explorations and efforts made by successive generations of our 

navy’s officers and men.

Blasko commented that “the idea that it will take ‘successive 

generations’ for the PLAN to finish its ‘developmental process’ 

[fits] into the PLA’s ‘Three Step Development Strategy’ that sees 

modernization concluding in 2049.”
197

12. The 2006 defense white paper is available from www.fas.

org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html#4, accessed January 18, 

2014, quote is in “Section II. National Defense Policy.”

13. The Paracels and Spratlys are called Hoang Sa and Quan 

dao Truong Sa in Vietnamese; Hanoi and Manila call Mischief 

Reef Da Vanh Kahn and Panganiban Reef, respectively, while the 

Scarborough Shoal is called Panatag Shoal by Manila. 

14. Choe Sang-Hun, “Chinese Fisherman Kills South Korean Coast Guardsman,” The New York Times, December 12, 2011, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/world/asia/chinesefisherman-kills-south-korean-coast-guardsman.html?_r=0, accessed 

December 14, 2013. A particularly egregious shooting incident 

occurred in 2005, resulting in the death of five Vietnamese fishermen, reported in Jason Folkmanis, “Vietnam Accuses China of Violating Law After Fishermen Killed,” Bloomberg, January 23, 2005, 

available from www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&

sid=aXAIKIyrExFU. The Chinese press reported this incident as 

Chinese police killing “Vietnamese robbers,” in “Eight Vietnamese Robbers Shot Dead in China Sea,” People’s Daily, January 23, 

2005, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-01/23/

content_411498.htm, both accessed December 14, 2013. 

15. See Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, London, UK: Routledge, 2006, 21 ff; Peng Guangqiang and 

Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy, Beijing, China: AMS, 

2001), Chap. 8, Parts II-IV.

16. The author’s conversations with several PLA officers since 

1994 have listed Japan, India, the United States, and occasionally 

Russia as threatening China’s foreign security.

17. Discussed in Bernard D. Cole, Asian Maritime Strategies: 

Navigating Troubled Waters, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2013, “Conclusion,” 190 ff. 

18. Quoted in Shen Dingli et al., “China’s Maritime Disputes,” 

New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, available from 

www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/china-maritime-disputes/p31345, accessed December 14, 2013.
198

19. Dennis Blasko reminded me about this declaration. The 

2004 defense white paper may be found https://www.fas.org/nuke/

guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html, accessed December 30, 2013.

20. Hu’s address is available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/2013npc/2012-11/18/content_16261308_10.htm, accessed 

December 29, 2013.

21. Xu Qiliang, “Firmly Push Forward Reform of National 

Defense and the Armed Forces,” Beijing Renmin Ribao Online, 

OSC-CHL20131121127590483, November 21, 2013, p. 6, available 

from https://www.opensource.gov/wiki/display/nmp/Renmin+Ribao+-

-+China, accessed December 30, 2013. Xu is a Central Military 

Commission vice-chairman.

22. The MR commander spoke to a small group at the U.S. 

National Defense University (NDU).

23. Yang Yi, “New Joint Command System ‘On the Way’,” Xinhua, January 3, 2014, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2014-01/03/c_133015371.htm, accessed January 18, 2014.

24. At an earlier Carlisle conference, a former U.S. defense attaché to China expressed doubt about the PLA developing a U.S.-

style NCO corps, based on Chinese cultural factors. Non- and 

commissioned officer training will be the same for a regionally 

or globally oriented PLA up to a point, that at which long-range/

distant sea logistical and C4ISR requirements must be practiced.

25. See Feng Wang, “China’s Population Destiny: The 

Looming Crisis,” Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 

September 2010, available from www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/09/china-population-wang; “China’s Population: The Most 

Surprising Demographic Crisis,” The Economist, May 5, 2011, 

available from www.economist.com/node/18651512, both accessed 

January 31, 2014.

26. Similarly, operational control over China’s fleet ballistic 

missile submarines is to a degree not transparent, with the PLAN 

and PLASAF both having an interest in that capability.

27. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, “No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf 
199

of Aden,” China Maritime Studies No. 10, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval 

War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, 2014.

28. “PACOM Supports China Invite to RIMPAC 2014,” Navy 

Times, September 19, 2012, available from www.navytimes.com/

article/20120919/NEWS/209190323/PACOM-supports-China-inviteRIMPAC-2014; “China to Attend RIMPAC 2014,” Xinhua, June 

9, 2013, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-

06/09/c_132443566.htm, both accessed February 2, 2014.

29. “Transcript of PRC National Defense Ministry’s News 

Conference,” PRC Ministry of Defense News Conference, in OSCCHL2013122847385798, December 26, 2013. Continued expansion 

of PLAN roles was indicated in a December 26, 2013, Ministry of 

National Defense news statement that reported military exercises 

in “counterterrorism and counterpiracy, as well as humanitarian 

assistance and disaster mitigation.” A senior State Oceanographic 

Administration official told the author in April 2014 that, so far, 

little had been accomplished by the reorganization.

30. A unique PLAN mission is participating in the multi-national escort of ships carrying Syrian chemical weapons. This and 

other MOOTW missions are discussed in Koh Swee Lean Collin, 

“Westward Ho: Expanding Global Role for China’s Navy,” RSIS 

Commentary 005/2014, January 7, 2014, available from www.rsis.

edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0052014.pdf, accessed January 

18, 2014.

31. China’s contribution to the Libyan NEO is described in 

Gabe Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Implications of China’s 

Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya, March 11, 2011, 

available from www.andrewerickson.com/2011/03/implicationsof-china’s-military-evacuation-of-citizens-from-libya/; and “35,860 

Chinese Evacuated From Unrest-Torn Libya,” Xinhua, March 3, 

2011, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-

03/03/c_13759456.htm, both accessed December 31, 2013. A more 

complete accounting is in Mathieu Duchatel and Bates Gill, 

“Overseas Citizen Protection: A Growing Challenge for China,” 

Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, February 2012, available from www.

sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/february12, accessed February 

12, 2014.
200

32. See, for instance, Glen Mohammed, “‘Peace Ark’ Drops 

Anchor,” Trinidad Express Newspapers, October 9, 2011, available from www.trinidadexpress.com/news/_Peace_Ark__drops_anchor-133508968.html; and “Peace Ark Hospital Ship Returns to 

China,” China Military Online, October 15, 2013, available from 

english.people.com.cn/90786/8425558.html, both accessed December 

31, 2013. The hospital ship also has a combat mission, receiving 

wounded suffered during power projection operations ashore or 

as the result of a sea battle.

33. A senior PLAN officer told the author in February 2011 

that China planned to build five of these ships.

34. See Zhang He and Li Wei, “SAF Expert: 20 Outperforms 

Il-76, China Military Online, January 21, 2013, available from english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8099537.html, accessed December 

31, 2013.

35. See, for instance, William Wan, “Chinese Police Say Tiananmen Square Crash was ‘Premeditated, Violent, Terrorist 

Attack’,” The Washington Post, October 30, 2013, available from 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinese-police-saytiananmen-square-crash-was-premeditated-violent-terroristattack/2013/10/30/459e3e7e-4152-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html; and “Chinese Police Kill Eight in Xinjiang ‘Terrorist 

Attack’,” Reuters, December 31, 2013, available from 

www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/30/us-china-xinjiang-idUSBRE9BT02V20131230, both accessed December 31, 2013.

36. See, for instance, Peggy McInerny, “The China-Taiwan 

Cross-Strait Relationship: Stable But Fragile,” Los Angeles, CA: 

UCLA, May 7, 2013, available from www.international.ucla.edu/

china/article/131770, accessed January 21, 2014.

37. Polling data vary. See, for instance, Chris Wang, 

“Less Support for Independence,” Taipei Times, February 

1, 2013, available from www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/02/01/2003553953; and Chris Wang, “Taiwanese 

Prefer Independence Over Reunification,” Taipei Times, October 31, 2013, available from www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/10/31/2003575806, both accessed January 17, 2014.
201

38. Twenty-two as of January 2014--Belize, Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 

Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, 

Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Lucia, Saint 

Vincent and the Grenadines Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tuvalu, 

and the Vatican.

39. See Alan Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales 

for China’s Territorial Integrity, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford, 2007.

40. Fortunately, hubris and nationalism are the chief attractions to both nations. If, however, very significant seabed energy 

deposits were discovered in the disputed area of the East China 

Sea, the economic stakes for China and Japan would be raised, 

with both countries viewing the use of military force as more justified. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 2014 East China Sea 

oil estimate was 60 to 100 million barrels (mmbbl) of “proven and 

probable reserve,” noting that more accurate estimates are “difficult to determine.” The DOE estimate for natural gas in the East 

China Sea is even less precise: 1 to 2 trillion cubic feet. Chinese 

National Overseas Oil Company, CNOOC estimates for the East 

China Sea are 70-160 mmbbls of oil, both “proven and undiscovered,” and 300 billion cubic feet of natural gas. By comparison, 

China’s total proven oil reserves were estimated at 20 billion barrels in 2011. Estimates are at available from www.eia.gov/countries/

analysisbriefs/east_china_sea/east_china_sea.pdf, accessed December 

30, 2013.

41. MR reduction has long been discussed; most recently, 

in late-2013 and early-2014. See Yoimuri Shimbun, “Reorganization Plan Under Consideration for PLA,” The Japan News, 

January 13, 2014, available from the-japan-news.com/news/article

/0000911699; and Bai Tiantian and Liu Yang, “No Joint Command,” Global Times, January 6, 2014, available from UtLDV44aU00, both accessed on January 13, 2014. A summary of recent reports on PLA reorganization is in “Chinese Armed Forces 

to Undergo Immense Change,” Detachment Report ASD14C03051, 

U.S. Army Asian Studies, January 4, 2014, in OSC.

42. Britain’s foreign secretary in the years leading to World 

War I, Edward Grey, is credited with saying that “The British 

army should be a projectile fired by the British navy” in a quote 
202

considered disparaging to the army. Margaret MacMillan, The 

War That Ended the Peace: The Road to 1914, New York: Random 

House, 2013, p. 399.

43. The Military Balance 2013, p. 254, discusses the two stealth 

aircraft. J-15 limitations are discussed in Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “China’s J-15 No Game Changer,” The Diplomat, 

June 23, 2011, available from thediplomat.com/2011/06/chinas-j15-no-game-changer/, accessed January 18, 2014.

44. PLA acquisition/employment of UAVs is discussed 

in Wendell Minnick, “Report: China’s UAVs Could Challenge 

Western Dominance, Defense News, June 25, 2013, available from 

www.defensenews.com/article/20130625/DEFREG03/306250021/

Report-China-s-UAVs-Could-Challenge-Western-Dominance; Trefor 

Moss, “Here Come . . . China’s Drones,” The Diplomat, March 2, 

2013, available from thediplomat.com/2013/03/here-comes-chinasdrones/?allpages=yes, both accessed January 18, 2014.

45. Obviously, drones may be transported great distances by 

ships or aircraft before launching.

46. As a comparison, the new Indian ski-jump aircraft carrier, 

Vikrant, is being built at an estimated cost of U.S.$2 billion, not 

including embarked aircraft, while the next U.S. carrier, Gerald 

R. Ford, is reported to cost at least U.S.$13.5 billion, not including aircraft. Liaoning will also suffer air conditioning and engineering plant problems common to Soviet-designed ships, unless 

China replaced these systems during the 8 years it had the ship in 

dry dock.

47. Beijing would have to build two to three times this 

number of RAS ships to support a globally oriented navy.

48. The total number of surface combatants in the PLAN in 

future years is not as important as their capabilities, but in 2013 

alone, China reportedly commissioned 17 new combatants, including two DDGs, three FFGs, nine corvettes, two replenishment-at-sea ships, and one minesweeper. See “Opinion: Intensive 

Commissioning of PLAN Warships In Line With China’s Goal to 

Safeguard its Maritime Rights and Interests,” China Military Online, January 9, 2014, available from eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-chan-
203

nels/china-military-news/2014-01/09/content_5727866.htm, accessed 

January 18, 2014.

49. U.S. submariners have for decades strongly and successfully campaigned against building other than nuclear powered 

submarines, based primarily on the logical argument that U.S. 

submarines must be capable of global operations. At the time 

VADM William Owens, himself a submariner, had a study conducted in 1992-93 about the feasibility of and rationale for adding 

SSs to the U.S fleet. No conclusion was offered.

50. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence published a report 

in 2009 that showed China’s newest ballistic missile submarine, 

the Jin-class, generating a significantly higher level of self-noise, 

Ns than even a 30-year-old Soviet Delta III-class boat. China’s 

newest SSNs, the Shang-class, were shown to generate a significantly higher level of Ns than any other country’s SSN. This 

table is available blogs.fas.org/security/2009/11/sub noise, accessed 

December 30, 2013.

51. I have not been on board a Chinese submarine, other than 

an old Whiskey-class boat, but my visits to approximately a dozen surface warships have left me with an impression of only average maintenance practices.

52. Hans M. Kristensen, “China’s Noisy Submarines,” FAS 

Strategic Security Blog, November 21, 2009, p. 2, available from blogs.

fas.org/security/2009/11/subnoise, accessed December 30, 2013.

53. The Soviet bastion strategy is explained in Christopher A. 

Ford and David A. Rosenberg, “The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan’s Maritime Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 

Vol. 28, No. 2, 2005, pp. 379-409.

54. See Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight “Wired for Sound 

in the ‘Near Seas’,” Naval Institute Proceedings 140/4/1, 334, April 

2014, pp. 56-61, for a convincing argument that China is deploying a sea bed surveillance system, which has the potential significantly to enhance its ASW capability in regional waters.

55. See, however, William Murray, “Underwater TELs and 

China’s Antisubmarine Warfare: Evolving Strength and a Cal-
204

culated Weakness,” China’s Near-Seas Combat Capabilities, CMSI 

Study 11, Peter Dutton, Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, 

eds., Newport, RI: Navy War College, 2014, pp. 17-30. 

56. Numbers are from The Military Balance 2013, p. 287.

57. Jeffrey Lewis, “Minimum deterrence,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2008, pp. 38-41. Also see Brad Roberts, 

Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto, “China the Forgotten Nuclear Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July-August 

2000, pp. 53-63. In an often misinterpreted statement, a Chinese 

official told Ambassador Chas W. Freeman in 1995 that China no 

longer feared U.S. use of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict, 

because of China’s own nuclear arsenal. In Freeman’s words: 

I did not consider the Chinese statements either threatening or particularly significant. Nor did I interpret them as 

a reflecting a Chinese fixation with Taiwan. Rather, I heard 

them as a straightforward deterrent statement, directed at 

escalation control in Taiwan contingencies. The actual statement was something like: ‘you will not continue to threaten 

us with nuclear attack because we can now retaliate and, in 

the end, you care more about Los Angeles than you do about 

Taipei.’ That is not easy listening but it’s hardly menacing. 

January 22, 2014 exchange between Ambassador Freeman and the 

author. The publicized but erroneous account is in Joseph Kahn, 

“Chinese General Threatens Use of A-Bombs if U.S. Intrudes,” 

The New York Times, July 15, 2005, available from www.nytimes.

com/2005/07/15/international/asia/15china.html?_r=0, accessed December 10, 2013. The Chinese defense white papers have typically 

used words like “small but effective nuclear counterattacking 

force,” 2000, “limited nuclear counterattack ability,” 2002, “credible nuclear deterrent force,” 2006, and “lean and effective deterrent force,” 2008. Additionally, The Science of Military Strategy, 

p. 213, states that “deterrence” includes “a limited but effective 

nuclear deterrence.”

58. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, Washington, 

DC: DoD, 2010, cited in Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “China’s Ballistic Missiles, A Force to Be Reckoned With,” The Wall 
205

Street Journal Online, August 24, 2012, available from blogs.wsj.

com/chinarealtime/2012/08/24/chinas-ballistic-missiles-a-force-to-bereckoned-with/, accessed January 22, 2014. 

59. Quoted in “Navy Admiral: China to Develop Sophisticated Marine Weapons systems,” Xinhua, April 15, 2009, available 

from news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/15/content_11191749.htm, 

accessed January 21, 2014.

60. The PLA’s difficulty in overcoming this problem may be 

seen in sources dating from Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at 

Sea, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001, pp. 111-112; and 

Xia Hongping, Wei Bing, and Shi Binxin, “Standardization, an Urgent Issue for ‘System of Systems’ Operations,” Jiefangjun Bao Online, Beijing, China, OSC-CHR2013121030965419, December 10, 

2013, p. 2. 

61. The National Ocean Policy is an old but apparently still 

pertinent document, issued in Beijing in May 1998. Also see 

“China Issues Plan for Maritime Development,” Xinhua, April 26, 

2012, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-04/26/

content_15152578.htm; the 2012 White Paper may also be found 

at news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm, 

both accessed January 30, 2014.

62. Blasko “note,” n. 5, in the full citation found in n. 2 of 

in this chapter.

63. “Executive Summary,” Annual Report to Congress, p. i.

64. Defense Minister Chang Wanquan to U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hegel, April 8, 2014: “We are prepared at any time to 

cope with all kinds of threats and challenges . . . the Chinese military can assemble as soon summoned, fight immediately upon 

arrival and win any battle.”

65. This model assumes one carrier in overhaul, one in training, and one operational. A four-carrier minimum actually may 

be more realistic, given the transition times required between the 

three phases.
206

66. Nan Li, quoted in John Garnaut, “Xi’s War Drums,” Foreign Policy, April 30, 2013, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/

articles/2013/04/29/xis_war_drums#sthash.t3tT2ymZ.dpbs, accessed 

December 29, 2013. A senior U.S. intelligence official commented 

to the author 2 years ago that in the PLA “if it is valuable, it is 

for sale.”

67. Quoted in Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, London, UK: 

Routledge, 2011, p. 6.

68. Quoted in “Xi Jinping Calls for Powerful Missile Force,” 

December 12, 2012, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2012-12/05/c_132021964.htm, accessed December 29, 2013. 

Japan’s National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS) supported 

this view in its 2012 conclusion that “It is nearly inconceivable 

that the PLA, as the ‘Party’s Army,’ should take arbitrary action against, or not in line with the will of the senior leaders of 

the CPC.” See NIDS Security Report 2012, Tokyo, Japan: NIDS, 

2012, p. 54.

69. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, pp. 8, 181.

70. Recent exercises have also demonstrated improved jointness, with PLAAF generals commanding both ground and air 

units. See, for instance, “CCTV-7 ‘Junshi Jishi’ Recalls Chinese 

Military’s Progress, Incidents in 2013,” January 9, 2014 report 

on “Maneuver-5” and “Mission Action-2013” exercises, in OSCCHO2014011404757157; “Special Report on Shenyang Military 

Region Live-Forces Exercise Joint-2013, Part 2,” Shenyang Qianjin Bao, reported that “the Army and the Air Force took turns 

playing the main role and director of the joint operations, and 

this was the first time the Military Region had done so.” See 

OSC-CHR2013121477178103, October 28, 2013, p. 1, both accessed 

January 30, 2014.

71. This ambition reflects the intensely maritime character of 

China’s defined area of concern, out to the second island chain 

but again, does not require “command of the sea” in the sense 

attributed to Alfred Thayer Mahan. Rather, Beijing intends being able to counter military actions it considers threatening to its 

national security interests.
207

CHAPTER 7

A GLOBAL EXPEDITIONARY PEOPLE’S 

LIBERATION ARMY: 

2025-30

Oriana Skylar Mastro

Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro would like to thank 

Mariangela Taylor, Xingjun Ye, and Elaine Li for their 

excellent and timely research assistance.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, the Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) has been undergoing a comprehensive 

reform process to move from a personnel-heavy, lowtech force designed to expel invaders to one that is 

technology-intensive and focused on operating beyond China’s coasts. The PLA is currently focused on 

traditional warfighting missions, with an emphasis 

on winning local wars under informationized conditions shaping its military preparedness.1

 While China’s ability to project conventional military power 

beyond its periphery remains limited2 as China gains 

greater influence within the international community, 

it is becoming increasingly focused on modernizing 

its military capabilities to include “a wider range of 

missions beyond its immediate territorial concerns, 

including counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian 

assistance/disaster relief (HADR), and regional military operations.”3

Since 2004, China has increasingly focused on coping with nontraditional security threats and safeguarding the state’s development and overseas interests.4
208

This has inspired the Chinese military to increasingly 

conduct missions beyond its immediate territory, in 

particular to handle threats to Chinese citizens and 

economic interests abroad.5 Chinese armed forces are 

already emphasizing how they would be employed 

during peacetime for military operations other than 

war (MOOTW) to: 

strengthen overseas operational capabilities such as 

emergency response and rescue, merchant vessel protection at sea and evacuation of Chinese nationals, and 

provide reliable security support for China’s interests 

overseas.6

The PLA’s experience to date with such expeditionary operations is limited, but expanding rapidly. 

Since 2002, the PLA has undertaken 36 urgent international humanitarian aid missions.7

 Chinese naval 

vessels have engaged in expeditionary goodwill tours 

such as the 2012 voyage of the PLAN ship Zheng He 

and the 2010-13 “Harmonious Missions” of a hospital ship to provide medical aid in Asia, Africa, and 

Latin America.8 To date, China’s participation in the 

anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden is the most 

notable example of the PLA conducting expeditionary 

operations. As one Chinese Rear Admiral notes, the 

main point of the operation was not to combat pirates, 

as the Chinese navy’s main mission was not to attack 

or detain them, but to protect Chinese overseas economic interests.9

 The mission began in January 2009 

when a Chinese naval flotilla consisting of a replenishment ship and two destroyers arrived in the Gulf 

of Aden off Somalia to protect merchant ships from 

pirates.10 Over the course of 500 operations, this force 

has protected more than 5,000 commercial vessels.11

The humanitarian aspect of the operation allowed the 
209

PLA to operate outside China and gain valuable deployment experience, without being seen as a threat.12

The amount of resources China dedicates to its 

global missions will be influenced by a number of 

variables, including the U.S. response to this evolution, and China’s relations with regional states such 

as Japan, North Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines. But domestic and international imperatives 

could ensure that China develops power projection 

capabilities regardless. Furthermore, the Chinese 

leadership is likely to believe that the capabilities 

necessary for such expeditionary capabilities could 

also be employed in regional contingencies, thereby 

increasing the political support for their development. 

In this chapter, I will outline what doctrine, force 

structure, and organization and training would most 

likely characterize a globally expeditionary PLA. The 

chapter then addresses the implications of a global 

expeditionary PLA capable of operating to a limited 

degree overseas for regional and global security.

FUTURE NATURE AND DIRECTION OF 

CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION

A range of domestic and international factors—

from the need to protect overseas Chinese interests 

to the status of regional issues—could, by 2025-30, 

compel the PLA to act increasingly globally. A global 

expeditionary PLA is not inevitable, but one of three 

possible scenarios of the PLA’s development covered 

in this volume. In this alternative future, by 2025-30 

a global expeditionary PLA could be able to project 

limited power in a limited area for a short duration 

anywhere in the world. This global expeditionary capability will allow China to play a role in peacekeep-
210

ing, HADR, and stability operations regionally and 

globally. China could also develop capabilities such 

as expeditionary strike groups and special operations 

to conduct raids, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), security operations, counterblockades, 

strikes, and amphibious exercises. If the Party leadership mandates the PLA to modernize and train to 

operate beyond the first and second island chain, the 

majority of those efforts would be undertaken by the 

PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF). This 

section addresses the likely developments in doctrine, 

force posture, and organization and training of a PLA 

capable of projecting power globally.

DOCTRINE, STRATEGIC GUIDELINES, 

AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

Doctrinal changes would likely accompany any 

changes in the direction and focus of Chinese military 

evolution to account for the addition of global expeditionary missions. Since 1949, China’s doctrine has 

evolved as the Party leadership’s threat perceptions 

and China’s ability to meet them have changed.13 In 

this future scenario, the state of the international environment, potential threats to China, the most likely 

type of war and the best ways to fight that war will 

shift significantly, calling for an addition to the current formulation of “local war under informationized 

conditions.” In terms of equipment, integration, and 

training, China plans to have the process of mechanization (the deployment of advanced military platforms) and informatization (bringing them together 

as a network) completed by 2020. Around this time, 

in this scenario, President Xi Jinping would announce 

a corollary to local war, win-win global operations, 
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asserting that China must also develop the skills and 

platforms necessary to project power globally to be 

a responsible great power. Within the top echelons 

of government, there would be more discussion and 

formalization of the basis for MOOTW and a focus 

on creating the ability to conduct simultaneous operations in different locations globally, in addition to 

joint operations. 

Additionally, Chinese operational concepts will 

likely evolve to account for shifting priorities and 

frequency of certain types of missions. For obvious 

reasons, the joint island landing campaign is the most 

prominent operation currently found in publicly 

available Chinese writings. This campaign objective’s 

would be: 

to break through or circumvent shore defense, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and 

material to designated landing sites in the north or 

south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets and/or the entire 

island.14

Strategic air raids designed to leverage the PLA’s 

asymmetric advantages over potential adversaries 

to achieve localized air superiority is another type of 

campaign currently at the top of Beijing’s priorities.15

But as the PLA begins to operate farther from China’s 

shores, ensuring its own ability to conduct operations may take precedence over capabilities designed 

to degrade an adversary’s capability. A reprioritization of campaigns coupled with the addition of new 

campaigns could shift the focus from defense-oriented campaigns to security operations and strikes. By 

2025-30, Chinese strike capability could move beyond 

the Second Artillery to give equal strategic weight to 
212

strikes conducted by the PLA, PLAN and PLAAF—

a doctrinal change that has institutional and strategic 

implications. 

Lastly, Chinese leaders would begin to consider 

the framework needed to build the type of strategic 

partnerships necessary for expeditionary operations. 

To date, China has been focused on developing relationships that will help it improve its capabilities and 

increase its political power. China has already begun 

this process, though to a limited degree. For example, 

in February 2014, China signed a security and defense 

agreement with Djibouti to promote regional stability in the Gulf of Aden region.16 China participated in 

RIMPAC 2014, the biennial naval exercise hosted by 

the United States that involves 23 nations. Within the 

framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO), China and other SCO member states have conducted a total of nine bilateral and multilateral exercises.17 China has also conducted joint exercises with 

Thailand, Singapore, Romania, Indonesia, Pakistan, 

Belarus, Venezuela, Colombia, Russia, Australia, New 

Zealand and Turkey since 2010. 18

While Chinese leaders have been adamantly against 

formal alliances, given the operational necessity of 

this global expeditionary scenario, a debate could ensue in China about changing its approach, akin to the 

way China changed its approach to peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. Chinese strategists are currently 

ideologically averse to overseas bases partly due to the 

national narrative that only hegemonic powers seek 

such arrangements.19 Though useful in operations, establishing overseas bases or hubs are in direct conflict 

with Chinese foreign policy, defense policy, and military strategy.20 Mutual defense treaties and permanent 

bases are therefore unlikely at this stage, but Beijing’s 
213

ideology is elastic, and could be reshaped to fit pragmatic realities if required. China could begin to pursue 

formal treaties to institutionalize arrangements to use 

facilities in other countries. To maintain the appearance of consistency, Beijing would retain its rhetoric 

against alliances and put forth strategic guidance that 

describes these arrangements as win-win agreements 

between equal partners seeking to enhance stability 

and security in the region. According to one Chinese 

naval officer, if China were to go this route, first experts would have to posit and discuss the idea, then 

revisions would have to be made to the white paper, 

supported by diplomatic efforts. But he noted it was 

unlikely China would station troops overseas or operate from overseas bases, because such a change would 

require major changes to Chinese defense and grand 

strategy, in addition to a major diplomatic undertaking.21 Increased multilateral exercises and operations 

would likely follow to reassure countries that China 

will not unilaterally pursue changes in the status quo 

through the use of force. 

FORCE POSTURE

In order to conduct global operations, the PLA 

would start to develop the ability to force open denied 

air and sea space far from Chinese territory in order to 

be able to operate beyond immediate periphery and 

in hostile environments away from friendly ports.22

In addition to building the relevant air, naval, and 

ground forces, the PLA will prioritize the systems and 

skills necessary for joint operations. For any type of 

expeditionary operation, conducted in peacetime or in 

war, China will need to make major advances in information warfare—space, cyber, and electronic warfare. 
214

Chinese writings suggest that the PLA believes these 

three types of technologies not only enable operations, 

but should also be treated as separate domains that 

must be seized and denied to an adversary.23

In terms of space assets, China will be able to call 

upon communication and navigation satellites, and a 

robust, space-based ocean surveillance system in particular for its operations. The PLA also understands 

that in order to be effective in modern conflicts and 

MOOTW, it must have the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capacity to carry out joint 

operations. By 2025-30, a global expeditionary PLA 

must have made great strides in C4ISR integration including creating a model system to facilitate interoperability of its information technology systems.24 Digital C4ISR connectivity will revolutionize the PLA’s 

ability to conduct modern combined arms military 

operations.25 The incorporation of improved C4ISR 

networks into training will ensure that the forces are 

consistently provided with real-time data transmission within and between units, enabling better command and control during operations.26

Cyber and electronic warfare capabilities will also 

enhance China’s ability to conduct global operations, 

especially in contested environments. Currently, 

China is more focused on cyber warfare as a means to 

exfiltrate data from vulnerable networks, to serve as 

a force multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks, 

and to target an adversary’s networks to constrain 

its actions or slow its response time.27 As the Chinese 

military begins to operate abroad, cyber warfare will 

become a critical tool in gathering intelligence on 

potential areas in which the PLA may be required 

to operate, known as intelligence preparation of the 
215

operational environment (IPOE). The PLA will also 

work to expand their electronic warfare capabilities, 

which consist of technologies that weaken and destroy 

electronic equipment and systems and protect one’s 

own electronic equipment and systems. During air 

operations, these systems would be employed against 

communication nodes, radars, command centers, and 

air-defense weapon control systems in particular. If 

conducting operations at sea, such as a counter blockade campaign, electronic warfare forces would be 

used against enemy ships and airborne and sea-based 

anti-missile systems. 28

While this section focuses on the assets needed to 

sustain operations far from China’s shores, the PLA 

will simultaneously continue to improve its warfighting capabilities with a focus on regional contingencies. Current plans suggest that by 2020, China will be 

able to employ satellites and reconnaissance drones; 

thousands of surface-to-surface and anti-ship missiles; more than 60 stealthy conventional submarines 

and at least six nuclear attack submarines; increasingly stealthy surface combatants and stealthy manned 

and unmanned combat aircraft; and space and cyber 

warfare capabilities. It is also possible that China will 

invest in additional aircraft carriers.29 But even as the 

PLA prepares to fight local wars under high-tech conditions within the region, it will expand its attention 

on expeditionary capabilities in the air, on the sea, and 

on the ground.

Air.

China will invest in large fleets of tankers and 

long-range large transport aircraft for various missions such as NEOs. China has ordered but not taken 
216

delivery of four IL-78/MIDAS tankers, but even these 

can support at most a squadron of Su-30s in combat 

operations, so the PLA would look to use a more advanced platform by 2025-30.30 China will be looking 

to expand its inventory of large transport airplanes 

capable of carrying large cargo for long-range flights. 

This may include more IL-76s from Russia, but more 

likely the advanced models of the indigenously manufactured Y-20 aircraft. The Y-20 should give China the 

ability to quickly ship troops, vehicles, and supplies 

over long distances, though the PLA may need to upgrade the engines at some point for the Y-20 to be able 

to do so efficiently.31 The PLAAF will also continue to 

progress in its Airborne Early Warning (AEW), Electronic Warfare, and command and control systems, 

including significant unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

development.32

In addition to developing and acquiring systems 

designed to sustain operations abroad, the PLA will 

continue to progress in traditional warfighting capabilities. The PLAAF will likely phase out its aging H6 

fleet. 33 The new H-6K, which was unveiled in 2013, is 

likely only a stopgap measure. Though China’s intentions are unclear at this point, the PLA will likely have 

a stealthier platform by 2025-30.34 The PLAAF’s 2025-

30 inventory will include a low-observable aircraft a 

low-observable aircraft derived from either the J-20 

or J-31.

UAV development over the next 15 years will be 

significant; the PLA will likely have several massive 

fleets of mostly cheap drones operated by the ground 

forces, the General Staff Department (GSD), PLAN, 

PLAAF, Second Artillery, and Coast Guard.35 Each 

will bolster the operational requirements of the respective service or unit they serve.36 These assets will 
217

probably be truck-launched to keep them operationally flexible and survivable, or some could be based 

on carriers. While most will be used regionally, larger 

drones could serve as long-range reconnaissance platforms or focus on decoy, jamming, and swarming 

tactics for penetrating enemy air defense systems in 

expeditionary operations. However, China will likely 

continue to suffer from a lack of bases outside China. 

Sea.

China’s defense white paper articulates the desire 

to develop blue water navy capabilities for conducting operations, carrying out international cooperation and countering nontraditional security threats, 

and enhancing capabilities of strategic deterrence and 

counterattack.37 But currently, strategic sealift beyond 

Taiwan is quite limited. China has never possessed a 

robust capability to transport and land troops under 

combat conditions.38 China has three Yuzhao class 

landing platform dock (LPD) ships, each capable of 

transporting one battalion of marines and their vehicles and two large multiproduct replenishment ships 

that carry fuel, water, ammunition, and other supplies.39 But to be a global expeditionary PLAN, the service will need to increase the number of LPDs as well 

as the number of large, multiproduct replenishment 

ships to support long-range patrols.40 China would 

also have to address the limitations of inadequate air 

defense, lack of experience in formation steaming, and 

lack of ability and training in cross-beach movement 

of forces to enhance its amphibious assault capabilities.41 The Chinese navy may also invest to a greater 

degree in a marine corps as an offshore expeditionary force given the increased need to prepare for 
218

amphibious landings and assaults. China’s marines 

will have to expand from the current two brigades 

of 6,000 men each, but the ultimate level of forces 

depends on the type of amphibious operations the 

PLA stresses in 2025-30 and the forces of surrounding 

countries.42 China may also put off such investments 

given the extraordinarily difficult nature of amphibious operations—at this point, only the United States 

has a robust capability. Even now, China currently 

has more marines than naval powers such as Australia, Great Britain, and Japan. 

Currently the PLAN possesses approximately 77 

principal surface combatants, more than 60 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships and 

roughly 85 missile-equipped small combatants.43 The 

PLAN would develop the capabilities and assets needed to protect the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 

and engage in operations far from its shores. To that 

end, the PLAN has already begun the process of retiring legacy combatants in favor of larger, multi-mission 

ships, equipped with advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and 

anti-submarine weapons and sensors.44 China may 

also commission more carriers, along with their aircraft and UAVs, with the justification that carriers are 

useful in maritime security operations and operations 

other than war. These carriers, plus 18 air defense 

destroyers with Aegis-like anti-air warfare systems, 

and 36 frigates and corvettes equipped primarily for 

anti-submarine warfare (ASW), will be tasked with 

defending the SLOCs.45

China may expand the number of attack submarines (SSNs) for sustained patrols in distant waters or 

to conduct counterblockade operations, though China 

will rely heavily on conventionally powered submarines equipped with air-independent-propulsion to 
219

patrol out to the first and eventually the second island chains. China’s economic growth relies heavily 

on its access to natural resources, and its petroleum 

comes primarily from the Middle East, which has to 

pass through a number of vulnerable chokepoints including the Luzon and Taiwan straits and the Strait of 

Malacca and Strait of Hormuz. China currently cannot project naval control over these chokepoints, but 

future capabilities may be developed to address this 

vulnerability. To date, China has stressed anti-surface 

warfare over ASW. But China may start to focus on 

developing counterblockade capabilities to protect vital SLOCs, such as more advanced sonar operations 

and airborne ASW.

Ground. 

As China’s focus expands from homeland defense 

to regional contingencies, to global expeditions, the 

relative role of the PLA Army (PLAA) with respect to 

the other services will decrease. By 2025-30, the number of active and reserve soldiers in the PLAA will 

likely be reduced to fewer than two million, unless 

there is a conventional flare up with India, Vietnam, 

Russia, or instability on the border with North Korea. 

The PLAA, however, will still have critical missions 

within a global expeditionary PLA. The PLAA is reorienting itself already from theater operations to transtheater mobility focusing on army aviation troops, 

light mechanized units and special operations forces 

(SOF), and enhancing building of digitized units, 

making its units small, modular, and multi-functional 

to enhance capabilities for air-ground integrated operations, long-distance maneuvers, rapid assaults, and 

special operations. 
220

China’s reluctance to get involved globally on 

a large scale may translate to a prioritization of development of China’s special operations capabilities. 

China created its elite special forces and Rapid Reaction Units (RRU) in the 1980s. Today, their training extends into more unconventional warfighting missions 

such as sabotage, and no-contact long range warfare 

(indirect attacks against an enemy from beyond the 

line of sight), with the United States and Japan as potential enemies. According to the PLA Army Daily:

Special forces warfare includes detailed battle theories, such as special forces reconnaissance, attacks and 

sabotage, and comprehensive battle theories, such as 

integrated land-sea-air-space-electronic combat, alldimensional simultaneous attacks, nonlinear combat, 

no-contact long-range warfare, asymmetrical combat, 

large-scale night combat and ‘surgical’ strikes.46

According to On Military Campaigns, one of several 

special operations missions include: 

raids to kill or capture enemy command personnel (including military and government leaders), or destroy 

small units in the enemy’s rear area or key command 

and control, intelligence, or logistics systems.47

China’s Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) currently 

consist of army special forces, army aviation units, 

the marine corps, and airborne troops. They focus 

primarily on border defense, internal armed conflict, 

maintaining public order, and conducting disaster 

relief missions.48 While all “rapid reaction,” the army 

special forces and airborne troops would split off and 

develop the core SOF mission, while the marine corps 
221

and army aviation will progress to address more traditional warfighting tasks. Chinese writings suggest a 

traditional understanding of SOF in that they would 

be used for special reconnaissance, decapitation, 

counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and also have a psychological effect that will impose caution by increasing the risk of war.49 Some specific missions include: 

“prisoner snatch operations; raids on enemy missile 

sites, CPs, and communications facilities; harassment 

and interdiction operations to prevent or delay enemy 

movements; strategic reconnaissance; anti-terrorist 

operations.”50 The PLA may heavily rely on types of 

special operations forces to accomplish their goals 

overseas partly because of the small footprint, but 

primarily because training and readiness of regular 

troops will continue to be a weakness of their military 

forces.51

By 2025-30, joint use of special forces with the 

PLA’s amphibious and airborne forces, expected improvements in sealift and airlift capabilities, coupled 

with the increasing mechanization of airborne and 

army and marine amphibious units will increase the 

reach and effectiveness of these forces. By the end of 

that decade, PLA forces may be capable of capturing 

ports and airfields in neighboring states, leading to a 

victorious campaign on land.52

ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND LOGISTICS

Reforms beyond hardware in terms of organization, training, and readiness must be undertaken as 

well for the PLA to expand its operational reach. First, 

China will need to improve the movement of military units within China. The PLA still conducts long 

distance maneuver training at speeds measured by 
222

how fast the next available cargo train can transport 

its tanks and guns forward.53 To improve its air and 

sealift, China will have to mobilize the civilian sector, especially in the area of aviation. Furthermore, 

the Chinese Communist Party will have to move to 

strengthened interior ground, air, and waterway lines 

of communication. The PLA will also have to consider 

the logistics needed to deploy globally and sustain 

operations abroad. A reorganization of the current 

Military Region (MR) system is a necessary step to improve mobility. Since 2010, the PLA has attempted to 

improve its trans-MR maneuvers by carrying out a series of campaign level exercises and drills, codenamed 

Mission Action.54 China could reduce the number of 

MRs from seven to perhaps four and implement a 

joint operational command structure.55 Given the new 

importance of the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery, another major step toward “jointness” would 

be assigning a navy or air force officer as an MR 

commander.56

The PLA will have to consider how to fit global 

logistics into this MR system; given its diverse set 

of tasks and missions, the PLA will need to improve 

its logistical system so that it is flexible, distributed, 

and nimble.57 Analysis of past operations such as the 

PLAN’s deployment to the Gulf of Aden demonstrates 

that the issue of preparedness during emergency, the 

problem of preserving consumables over long periods of time, and the lack of nearby Chinese facilities/

bases to which it can send vessels for maintenance and 

repair continue to plague long-distance PLAN operations.58 Because the PLA’s ability to force open denied 

air and sea space far from Chinese territory will likely 

still be constrained in 2025-30, it will still be challenging to operate beyond its immediate periphery and 
223

in hostile environments away from friendly ports.59

Bringing along military supply ships with 3 months’ 

worth of fuel, food, fresh water, and spare parts, as 

China did in the Gulf of Aden, will not be a viable 

strategy if China is to conduct larger, more prolonged, 

or contested, operations.60 Overseas bases may be the 

only way for China to be able to deploy and fight on 

the high seas; the lack of such resources is one of the 

major differences between major and minor naval 

powers.61 China may need them as forward operating 

bases and logistics platforms, as well as to conduct 

amphibious assaults.62

Some believe that China wants to build a series 

of bases in the Indian Ocean to support naval operations along the routes linking China to Persian Gulf 

oil sources. There, Beijing can pursue access in countries such as Oman, Pakistan, and Burma that are 

politically insulated from Indian and U.S. pressure. 

Others believe that the PLAN only wants to have 

places in the Indian Ocean where it can restock and 

refuel, rather than its own bases.63 The latter is probably the more likely scenario, especially given the lessons learned from the Soviet Union’s overextension, 

and the priority of concerns closer to home.64 Leaving 

aside China’s ideological aversion to overseas bases, 

it is also important to keep in mind that in these areas, facilities are difficult to defend and host nations 

may not be sufficiently stable to support operations.65

Given these obstacles, for China to start prepositioning supplies overseas or establishing institutional arrangements to allow operations from other countries, 

the driver would have to be more than just the need 

to operate escort vessels like in a Gulf of Aden type of 

operation.66

The PLA will need to improve training to enhance the ability to conduct multiple joint operations 
224

simultaneously. China currently conducts exercises 

frequently; for example, during the month of January 

2014, a three-ship flotilla from the Nanhai Fleet began 

combat exercises in the West Pacific Ocean and East 

Indian Ocean.67 Additionally, nearly 100,000 Chinese 

soldiers and thousands of vehicles from the 16th and 

39th Army Groups of the Shenyang MR mobilized for 

a winter exercise to prepare for a potential crisis over 

the Korean peninsula.68

However, despite the scale and frequency of these 

exercises, PLA individual and unit training standards 

remain low, and are improving only gradually. Currently, PLAAF pilots typically get less than 10 hours 

of flight time a month and only last year began to submit their own flight plans.69 China’s naval infantry and 

other amphibious warfare units train by landing on big 

sandy beaches, an unrealistic environment to train for 

conflict over disputed islands.70 Moreover, in recent 

exercises, PLA troops have lacked the emotional fortitude to succeed in high-pressure situations, possibly 

one of the reasons for President Xi Jinping’s focus on 

enhancing combat readiness among the PLA.71 Therefore, Chinese exercises will need to become larger and 

more complicated coupled with training that is more 

frequent, intense and realistic for the PLA to become a 

global expeditionary force by 2025-30. 

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This chapter presents how the PLA may evolve 

with respect to doctrine, force structure, organization, 

and training if it were to transition to a force capable 

of conducting global expeditionary operations. However, such new and expansive PLA capabilities will 

have significant implications for China’s willingness 

to use force as well as regional stability. 
225

Propensity to Use Force. 

The breadth of capabilities the PLA would acquire 

to conduct global expeditionary operations could also 

augment Beijing’s options in resolving both global 

and regional disputes. Augmented sea and airlift, advanced SOF capabilities, a greater number of surface 

vessels and aircraft, and most significant, operational 

experience for its forces, could encourage China to 

expand the scope of its interests and willingness to 

use force to protect those interests. China could become more forceful, confident in its ability to achieve 

its objectives by support alone with the backing of 

its people. 

While China may currently have no intention of 

becoming a global hegemon, the introduction of new 

capabilities in turn could drive changes in Chinese 

grand strategy away from limited regional aims. Chinese strategists and netizens have already launched a 

debate about whether China should aspire to become 

a global military power. Currently, those debates are 

couched in discussions about how China should approach its territorial disputes, especially in the East 

and South China Seas.72 But influential thinkers such 

as Colonel Liu Mingfu, a former professor at the PLA 

National Defense University, writes in his book China 

Dream that China should aim to surpass the United 

States as the world’s top military power.73 In a March 

2010 newspaper poll, 80 percent of respondents responded positively to the question, “Do you think 

China should strive to be the world’s strongest country militarily?” However, less than half of respondents approved of a policy to publicly announce such 

an objective.74
226

Stability and Balance of Power.

Even if this future scenario spurs a growth in traditional power projection capabilities or increased use 

of force abroad, the implications for the United States 

and its regional allies and partners are uncertain. This 

could create balancing backlash in Asia and instability 

as incentives for preventive war increase with the rapid shifts in the regional balance of power. However, 

this future scenario could also create a more assertive 

China that is positioned to provide public goods to the 

international community and region, further enmeshing Beijing into the current world order, and reducing 

the incentives to use force to resolve disputes. 

Globally, increased expeditionary capabilities 

could increase the potential for Chinese interference 

in issues in which the United States may prefer China’s traditional hands-off approach. Chinese interests in the Middle East, Africa, and South America, 

as well as Beijing’s preference for stability over other 

factors such as human rights, may clash with those of 

the United States. With increased capabilities, China 

may take actions in countries around the world that 

have negative second order effects for U.S. national 

interests. Furthermore, because Chinese actions are 

not transparent, Washington has limited sense about 

what exactly China is doing. This makes it difficult 

for the United States to adjust its policies accordingly 

to minimize any potential damage to U.S. interests 

and maximize its ability to achieve its foreign policy 

goals.75

A number of factors could divert the PLA from developing a global expeditionary force. For example, if 

China were to engage in a war, even a limited one, 
227

retrenchment and rebuilding may follow, delaying 

the unfolding of this scenario. Furthermore, flareups closer to home or the emergence of significant 

threats to its near-seas interests may make it difficult 

for Beijing to sustain far seas operations.76 But as long 

as China continues to spend a double-digit percentage of GDP on defense spending, and GDP growth 

continues, even on a more conservative level, China 

should be able to simultaneously develop traditional 

warfighting capabilities to address regional challenges and global expeditionary capabilities to confront 

threats farther from home. In this way, flare-ups or 

resolutions of persistent regional issues may delay or 

accelerate this future scenario, but not necessarily prevent it.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. For more on this, see Information Office of the State Council 

of the People’s Republic of China, “The Diversified Employment 

of China’s Armed Forces: V. Safeguarding World Peace and Regional Stability,” Beijing, China, 2013, available from www.china.

org.cn/government/whitepaper/2013-04/16/content_28556977.htm, 

accessed on May 12, 2014.

2. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: 

The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, Washington, DC: DoD, Executive Summary, available from www.defense.

gov/news/jul2005/d20050719china.pdf.

3. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: 

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China 2013, Washington, DC: DoD, Executive Summary, available 

from www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf. Hereafter 

cited as DoD China Report 2013.

4. Chen Zhou, An Analysis of Defensive National Defense Policy 

of China for Safeguarding Peace and Development, China Military Science, Beijing, China: Academy of Military Sciences, 2007.
228

5. DoD China Report 2013. 

6. “Diversified Employment.”

7. Ibid.

8. It visited five countries in Asia and Africa and four in Latin 

America and completed 193 days of voyage, covering 42,000 nautical miles, providing nearly 50,000 people with medical supplies. 

See Lieutenant Commander Jeff W. Benson, “China: Birth of a 

Global Force?” USNI News, January 7, 2013, available from news.

usni.org/2013/01/07/china-birth-global-force, accessed on March 

25, 2015.

9. Zhang Zhaozhong (张召忠) “中国在海外建军事基地的可

能性不大” (“It Is Unlikely for China to Establish Military Bases 

Abroad”), Tengxun Xinwen, January 19, 2010, available from news.

qq.com/a/20100119/002913.htm, accessed on March 25, 2015.

10. “Chinese Naval Fleet Carries Out First Escort Mission Off 

Somalia,” People’s Daily, January 6, 2009, available from english.

peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6568232.html, accessed on 

May 30, 2014.

11. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, “No Substitute for Experience Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf 

of Aden,” U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Studies, Vol. 10, 

2013, p. 1. 

12. Richard Weitz, “Operation Somalia: China’s First Expeditionary Force?” China Security, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2009, p. 31.

13. While Chinese strategists would not term this doctrine, 

but use terms like military thought, national military strategy, 

and strategic guidelines, these concepts can be understood as 

the codification of what military institutions hold as fundamental principles for guiding their actions in pursuit of national 

objectives.

14. DoD China Report 2013, p. 57. 
229

15. For more on the strategic air raid campaign, see Peng 

Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds.), The Science of Military Strategy

Beijing, China: Military Science Publishing House, 2005, p. 21.

16. Clint Richards, “Could China and Japan Work Together 

in East Africa?” The Diplomat, March 20, 2014, available from thediplomat.com/2014/03/could-china-and-japan-work-together-in-eastafrica, accessed on May 30, 2014.

17. “Diversified Employment.”

18. Ibid.

19. Huang Yingxu, (黄迎旭),”未来中国需要什么样的军事力

量?”(“What Kind of Military Power Does China Need in the Future?”),学习时报 (Xuexi Shiba, [The Study Times]), available from 

www.people.com.cn, accessed on May 12, 2014.

20. Zhang 2010.

21. Ibid.

22. Abraham M. Denmark, “PLA Logistics 2004-11: Lessons 

Learned in the Field,” Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis 

Tanner, eds., Learning by Doing The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad,

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2012, p. 317.

23. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, 战略学, The Science of 

Strategy, Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 2001, p. 358. For 

more on Chinese recent advancements in information warfare, 

see Kevin Pollpeter, “Controlling the Information Domain: Space, 

Cyber, and Electronic Warfare,” Ashley Tellis and Travis Tanner, 

eds, Strategic Asia 2012-2013: China’s Military Challenge, Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012.

24. Daniel Alderman, The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing 

the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2010, pp. 2-4.

25. Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization Building 

for Regional and Global Reach, Stanford, CA: Stanford University 

Press, 2010, p. 113.
230

26. China is starting to do this, but given limited realistic 

training and space systems, the force is fare from informationalized. See DoD China Report 2013, p. 58. 

27. Pollpeter, p. 172.

28. Ibid., pp. 177-179. 

29. “China’s Military Rise, The Dragon’s New Teeth, A Rare 

Look Inside the World’s Biggest Military Expansion,” The Economist, August 9, 2013.

30. M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Search for Military Power,” 

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2008, p. 135. 

31. David Axe, “China’s Air Power Future Is Visible in These 

Two Photos,” Medium, January 5, 2014, available from https://medium.com/war-is-boring/645be6841203, accessed on May 30, 2014.

32. For more on trends in PLAAF modernization, see Lee Fuell, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commissions,” Department of the Air Force, January 30, 

2014, available from www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Lee%20Fuell_

Testimony1.30.14.pdf, accessed on May 30, 2014.

33. Fravel, p. 139.

34. Wendell Minnick, “China’s Future Bomber Requirements 

Murky,” Defense News, January 31, 2013, available from www.

defensenews.com/article/20130131/DEFREG03/301310016/China8217-s-Future-Bomber-Requirements-Murky, accessed on May 

30, 2014. 

35. The following discussion on UAVs in based on author’s 

correspondence with Ian Easton, a Research Fellow at the Project 

2049 Institute and author with L.C. Russell Hsiao of “The Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities,” Arlington, 

VA: Project 2049 Institute, March 11, 2013, available from project2049.net/documents/uav_easton_hsiao.pdf.
231

36. For example, Second Artillery would invest in strategic strike UAVs, GSD in national intelligence collecting UAVs, 

PLAAF in air defense and land attack UAVs, PLAN for anti-ship 

UAVs, etc.

37. “Diversified Employment.”

38. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 2nd Ed., Annapolis, 

MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010, p. 152.

39. Fravel, p. 135. 

40. Sources suggest that the PLAN currently plans on building a total of five. This would allow Beijing to assign one or more 

to each of its three fleets—North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea. 

See Ibid.

41. Cole, p. 135. 

42. Christopher P. Isajiw, “China’s PLA Marines an Emerging Force,” The Diplomat, October 17, 2013, available from www.

thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-pla-marines-an-emerging-force/, 

accessed on May 1, 2014.

43. Jesse L. Karotkin, “Trends in China’s Naval Modernization: U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission 

Testimony,” January 30, 2014, available from www.uscc.gov/sites/

default/files/Karotkin_Testimony1.30.14.pdf, accessed May 30, 2014.

44. Ibid.

45. For more on the future modernization of the PLAN, 

see Ibid.

46. Scott J. Henderson, “In the Shadow: Chinese Special Forces Build a 21st-Century Fighting Force,” Foreign Military Studies 

Office, July-August 2006, p. 30.

47. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and 

Transformation for the 21st Century, 2nd Ed., New York: Routledge, 

2012, p. 132.
232

48. Andrew N. D. Yang and Colonel Milton Wen-Chung Liao, 

“PLA Rapid Reaction Forces: Concept, Training, and Preliminary 

Assessment,” James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The 

People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, 1999, p. 49.

49. Yuan Lin and Li Chengfeng, “中国特种部队素描” (“A 

sketch of Chinese Special Forces”), Conmilit, Vol. 2, 1998, p. 23; 

Luo Maofu, Wang Shupeng and Jiang Linfang, “浅谈特种部队战

士财务保障” (“Tentatively on Wartime Financial Support for Task 

Forces”), Military Economic Research, Vol. 3, 1996; Zhang Mihua, 

Zhang Quanli and Ma Chuangang,“提升特种部队完成多样化军

事任务能力的几点思考” (“The Instructions of Enhancing the Special Force’s Capability to Accomplish Diverse Military Tasks”), 

National Defense Science & Technology, Vol. 5, 2009.

50. Blasko, p. 192.

51. One article articulates the dangerous belief that Special 

Forces alone can accomplish the critical wartime tasks. Luo Wang 

and Jiang.

52. Stephen J. Blank, “China’s Military Power: Shadow Over 

Central Asia,” Lexington Institute, August 2006, p. 8.

53. Ian Easton, “China’s Deceptively Weak (and Dangerous) 

Military,” The Diplomat, January 31, 2014, available from thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinas-deceptively-weak-and-dangerous-military/, 

accessed May 30, 2014. 

54. “Diversified Employment.”

55. MR reduction was most recently discussed in the wake 

of the third plenum. A Japanese news source claims China will 

reduce the number of MRs to five to enhance its ability to respond 

swiftly in a crisis. See “China considers revamping military regions: report,” The Japan Times, January 1, 2014, available from 

www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/01/asia-pacific/china-considersrevamping-military-regions-report/#.UvAX_Xkywgg, accessed May 

30, 2014. Chinese sources deny any planned change. See Bai Tiantian and Liu Yang, “No Joint Command,” Global Times, January 

6, 2014, available from www.globaltimes.cn/content/835937.shtml#.

UtLDV44aU00, accessed May 30, 2014.
233

56. Blasko, pp. 38-39.

57. Denmark, p. 327.

58. Ibid., p. 310.

59. Ibid., p. 317.

60. According to one Chinese RADM, food and water supply 

were not a problem, the biggest issue was repair and maintenance 

of the ships (维修设施). Zhang.

61. Wei Tian (卫天), “突破远洋的束缚:中国远洋补给能力及

未来发展” (“The PLA-Navy’s Deep-Sea Replenishment Capability and its Future”), 舰载武器 (Shipborne Weapons), Vol. 10, 2010, 

pp. 20-35.

62. Chen Chuanming (传明),”中国海军的未来海上基地

战略” (“Strategy for China’s Future Sea Base”), 现代舰船

(Modern Ships), Vol. 10, 2011, pp. 20-23.

63. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications 

for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, RL33153, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 

10, 2014, p. 35.

64. Andrew Erickson, China’s Modernization of Its Naval and 

Air Power Capabilities, Seattle, WA, and Washington, DC: The 

National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012, p. 96. 

65. Ibid., p. 87. The ideological constraints also permeate strategic thinking; Chinese publications on sustaining naval operations abroad in general put forth more arguments against rather 

than for overseas basing. 

66. Zhang.

67. “Chinese Navy Starts Open Sea Drill,” Sina English, January 

20, 2014, available from english.sina.com/china/2014/0120/664926.

html, accessed May 30, 2014.
234

68. “PLA’s New Tank Deployed in N Korea Border Exercise,” 

WantChinaTimes, January 21, 2014, available from www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=11&

id=20140121000012, accessed May 30, 2014. For more on current 

annual exercises, see DoD China Report 2013, p. 11.

69. Previously, staff officers assigned pilots their flight plans 

and would not even allow them to taxi and takeoff on the runways by themselves. See Easton, “China’s Deceptively Weak.” 

70. “Chinese troops conduct Normandy style amphibious landing exercise for future military conflicts over islands,” 

LiveLeak, September 20, 2013, available from www.liveleak.com/

view?i=ad1_1379695188, accessed May 30, 2014.

71. Easton, “China’s Deceptively Weak.”

72. For example, one TV show discusses whether the aircraft 

carrier would be useful in dealing with the Japanese in the island 

dispute: available from v.ifeng.com/mil/mainland/201210/fdf13f3a8f39-4168-bdbc-2ef0067db861.shtml, accessed May 30, 2014.

73. For an interview with Col Liu on the topic, see Cheng 

Gang, “解放军大校主张中国世界第一军事强国” (”PLA Senior 

Colonel Suggests China to be World’s Top Military Power”), 

Global Times, March 2, 2010.

74. Ibid.

75. For more on the evolution and drivers of China’s noninterference principle, see Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Noninterference 

in Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy: Fact or Fiction?” Donovan Chau and Thomas Kane eds., China and International Security: 

History, Strategy, and 21st Century Policy, Vol. 2, Santa Barbara, 

CA: ABC-CLIO, 2014, pp. 95-114.

76. Erickson, China’s Modernization, p. 96. 
235

CHAPTER 8

CHINA’S MILITARY FORCE POSTURE UNDER

CONDITIONS OF A WEAKENED 

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY:

ALTERNATIVE MILITARY FUTURES, 2020-30

Daniel Gearin

Erin Richter

The views expressed in this chapter are the authors’ 

alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Department of Defense or any other element of the 

U.S. Government.

This chapter examines an alternative future in 

which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is weakened. We first describe what a weakened PLA might 

look like; then consider circumstances under which 

the PLA might become weaker, of which economic 

factors are treated as the most critical; examine the 

missions of the PLA; and study the force postures of 

the PLA Army (PLAA), PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air 

Force (PLAAF), and Second Artillery Force (SAF). The 

chapter concludes with a discussion of implications of 

a weakened PLA. 

WHAT IS A WEAK PLA?

The PLA described here is one that either struggles 

with or is incapable of fulfilling its military missions 

due to a necessary shift in national economic and security priorities from their current trajectory. One or a 

combination of drivers force Beijing to make tradeoffs 
236

in budgeting and force employment to better address 

more pressing concerns which may include domestic 

stability and economic development needed to maintain party control. While China will be able to field the 

majority of equipment and execute force restructuring planned through 2020, new priorities may require 

the PLA to slow development and production of new 

combat systems, refocus training, extend maintenance 

cycles, and make unplanned force reductions. Over 

time these factors will leave the PLA with a reformed 

organizational structure and more modern order of 

battle, but with declining troop proficiency and combat readiness. The PLA will remain capable of prosecuting limited military operations to defend China’s 

sovereignty and territorial claims, but unable to effectively respond to military contingencies outside of 

China’s immediate periphery. 

PATHS TO A WEAKENED PLA

There are many potential factors that could lead to 

a future where China’s military is left weakened. We 

chose to focus on economic and domestic factors as the 

primary drivers, as we view them to be the most plausible, but provide brief consideration to a few others. 

A military conflict, which involved significant losses 

for the PLA or caused Beijing to radically change its 

perceptions of the international security environment, 

could result in a weakened PLA. Although the recent 

tensions among China and its maritime neighbors certainly increase the possibility of accident, inadvertent 

escalation and the use of force, neither China nor the 

other maritime claimants appear likely to purposefully initiate a military conflict in the near term.1

 Thus we 

assume that any military conflict between now and 
237

the early-2020s would likely be limited in scope and 

unlikely to significantly alter the trajectory of the PLA. 

A resolution to one or all of the various territorial disputes would also likely alter Beijing’s security 

calculus and impact force allocation decisions. However, recent trends suggest that tensions surrounding 

these disputes are exacerbating rather than trending 

toward resolution. Furthermore, successful resolution on a bilateral basis (China’s apparent preferred 

method) would unlikely change Beijing’s perception 

that the United States intends to contain China’s rise, 

and China would continue to field a military capable 

of projecting power around its periphery.

Alternatively, a more prosperous and confident 

China could lead Beijing to shed the deep-seated sense 

of historical victimization and national grievance. 

Such a change in leadership perception could lead 

to a more relaxed and nuanced approach to foreign 

relations, thus no longer requiring as much military 

might. However, rhetoric of the current administration (which will be in power into the 2020s) inextricably links the vitality of the country with the vitality of 

the military, suggesting that as the country continues 

to grow, so too will the military along with it.2

Primary Driver.

The most compelling causes for concern for the 

future of China’s military are domestic ones, particularly an economic downturn and the social instability that would like result. While the PLA will have 

achieved substantial progress in the realm of military 

modernization into the beginning of the 21st century, 

we argue that long delayed and much required economic reforms initiated in the mid-2010s will bring 
238

about an economic slowdown, inhibiting additional 

increases in defense expenditures and exacerbating 

internal stability problems. In the following decade, 

Beijing would likely begin a series of structural adjustments to realign elements of the Chinese armed 

forces to better address their most pressing concerns, 

emphasizing border defense, police, civil engineering, 

and emergency response missions.3

Under these conditions, it is likely that faced with 

declining military budgets, the production of new 

combat systems will be slowed or halted, maintenance 

cycles extended, and maintenance intensive legacy 

weapons systems purged. The numbers of live training exercises will be reduced and PLA units will increasingly rely on virtual training systems to maintain 

operational proficiency. The PLA will remain capable 

of prosecuting limited military operations to defend 

China’s sovereignty and territorial claims, but overall 

combat readiness will decline. Operational planning 

will emphasize domestic stability, border defense, 

and anti-access operations and increasingly rely on 

its “assassin’s mace” systems to ensure territorial 

sovereignty. These changes will impact the various 

missions assigned to China’s military.

China’s Military Missions.

China’s official defense white papers state that 

China’s military is tasked with safeguarding national 

sovereignty, maintaining social stability, accelerating 

the modernization of the armed forces, and maintaining world peace and stability. Safeguarding national 

sovereignty is in many ways the most challenging requirement for China’s military due to the large number of unresolved sovereignty issues ranging from 
239

Taiwan, various maritime claims, and the border with 

India. China’s various territorial claims span a geographically enormous and diverse area, requiring the 

Chinese military to be able to move troops across great 

distances and operate in a wide range of conditions. 

If the perception of a PLA with declining combat 

capability takes hold, regional claimants may attempt 

to take advantage of the situation by altering the status quo and bolstering their territorial claims. Conversely, if Beijing perceives that its military capability 

to enforce a territorial claim is in decline, China may 

attempt a military resolution to a dispute before their 

chances of success further deteriorate. 

Maintaining social stability includes a variety of 

tasks such as ensuring continued support for the ruling government, preventing widespread domestic 

unrest,4 counterterrorism, and disaster relief. While 

many of these tasks are also managed by paramilitary and civilian organizations (People’s Armed Police [PAP], Ministry of Civil Affairs, etc.) they remain 

major missions for the PLA. If, due to economic and 

social pressure, widespread domestic unrest threatens 

perceptions of regime survival, social stability missions will take priority over all other requirements 

and the military will be expected to play a larger role 

than it might otherwise have been expected to.

China’s goal of accelerating the modernization of 

the armed forces is in part driven by the desire to have 

a military commensurate with its overall status in the 

world. Faced with the choice between the preceding priorities and continued military modernization, 

China is likely to shift resources away from military 

modernization in order to address more urgent needs. 

The relegation of national defense to the “fourth 

modernization” in 1978 provides precedent for such 

a decision. 
240

Lastly, the goal of “maintaining world peace and 

stability” can be viewed as China’s desire for its 

military to engage with and influence the rest of the 

world. Although the PLA remains a largely regional 

military, over the years it has increased its visibility on 

the global stage through counter piracy missions, support to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, 

navy hospital ship deployments, and various other 

activities.5 These activities remain largely symbolic, 

and China currently has no significant global military 

capability. A PLA faced with declining resource and 

expanding domestic requirements would be unlikely 

to expand upon these current efforts and may even 

curb such activity if it were viewed as too costly.

These four broad categories cover a large number 

of various goals and expected tasks for China’s military. They also demonstrate the relative importance of 

each category. National sovereignty and social stability are inherently linked to the survival of the regime. 

As a result, the military will be unable to shed these 

requirements, regardless of its actual capability to 

fulfill them. Conversely, military modernization and 

engagement with the wider world are natural choices 

for a country seeking to become a global power, but 

luxuries when faced with political defeat.

The PLA Army.

The PLA Army (PLAA) is tasked to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity 

by executing mobile operations and multi-dimensional offense and defense.6

 Core missions include executing offensive and defensive operations and support 

to military operations other than war (MOOTW).7

Recognizing the diverse and complex security situa-
241

tions the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is likely to 

face at home and abroad in the coming decades, the 

PLAA has focused on restructuring and equipping its 

ground forces to provide flexible military responses to 

accomplish a wide variety of military tasks.

By 2020, the PLAA will be completing a transition 

to an army with advanced weapons systems and a 

modular organizational structure capable of task-organizing units to execute mobile warfare, special operations, and amphibious and airmobile operations.8

Increased production of attack and transport helicopters,9

 new armored and motorized weapons systems,10

and a decade of training emphasizing combat readiness, strategic maneuver, and civil-military integration will increase the speed with which the PLA can 

mobilize and deploy ground units for contingencies.11

Coupled with improved artillery, air defense, and 

electronic warfare capabilities supported by a command and control system which enables a common 

operating picture and real-time data transmissions 

between units, the ability of PLA ground forces to execute rapid precision-strike operations will be greatly 

enhanced.12

In spite of advanced systems, the PLAA will continue to face major challenges in the human domain 

of warfare. At this time, with its continued reliance on 

conscripts and a developmental noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, the PLA will probably continue to 

struggle with attracting sufficient numbers of enlisted 

personnel capable of operating the numerous high 

tech systems the PLA’s “new type combat forces” 

rely on.13 Force restructuring in the latter half of the 

2010s will likely require several years of training by 

commanders and staffs before these modular forces 

can be employed effectively in large joint force opera-
242

tions due to the diverse missions and tasks to which 

they may be assigned.14 In addition, corruption and 

nepotism will continue to hinder the professionalization of the PLA since the majority of PLA officers will 

continue to serve in one unit for the majority of their 

career.15 Promotions will likely continue to be heavily determined by relationships, and officers will have 

little opportunity for career broadening, likely reducing the flexibility of PLA force employment. 

The conditions under which the PLA becomes 

weak may not have a significant impact on PLA 

ground force organization and capabilities in the near 

term, but long-term changes in mission priorities and 

requirements could dramatically alter the shape of the 

force by 2030. Even after significant personnel reductions likely to take place in the late-2010s, the ground 

forces will continue to represent approximately 70 

percent of total PLA strength. In addition to its role 

in offensive military operations, the PLA principally 

shoulders the task of deterring foreign aggression, ensuring internal stability, and supporting humanitarian 

assistance and disaster response operations. In most 

scenarios, leadership concerns about public opinion, 

nationalism, and domestic satisfaction mean that the 

PLA will not be able to cut ground force personnel 

drastically in order to shore up funding shortfalls or 

focus all available funds on a warfighting mission, 

should one arise.16

Major changes in the international security environment could relieve the PLA of some missions and 

thereby cost savings. For example, in the event of a 

rapprochement with Taiwan, the PLA would be relieved of the requirement to execute large scale amphibious landing operations, though maintaining a 

small number of amphibious capable forces on the 
243

eastern seaboard might remain a priority if Japanese 

relations sour further or Beijing perceives an increasing threat of war on the Korean Peninsula.17 In the unlikely event of a reunification on the Korean peninsula 

with a friendly government in Seoul, Beijing may be 

comfortable with moderate ground force reductions 

in northern China, particularly of armored units.

More likely is that the deterioration of the domestic 

security environment will compel Beijing to reapportion forces to better respond to internal security and 

natural disaster contingencies. The trifecta of a lasting economic, environmental, and health crisis compounded by systemic corruption and persecution of 

ethnic minorities have the potential to push China’s 

population into widespread unrest. In China’s growing urban centers, these effects would be particularly 

pronounced and threatening to party elites. Under 

such conditions, the PLA could become decisively 

engaged in supporting PAP riot control, conducting 

counterterrorism, and providing humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, it is likely that a portion of PLA 

ground force units would be transferred to the PAP to 

enhance security in eastern China.

Increased threats to China’s border security such 

as an influx of North Korean refugees or successful 

infiltration of foreign-trained Uyghur terrorists could 

draw operational forces away from training for offensive missions in order to reinforce border defense forces. Major domestic security concerns could also prevent the PLA reorganization from seven MRs to three 

or four joint theaters.18 While an outwardly focused 

PLA would benefit from the consolidation of military 

capabilities under a joint command headquarters to 

execute regional operations, an inwardly focused PLA 

would require more responsive localized military and 
244

internal security responses for which the seven MR 

system was essentially designed.

If the PLA’s main operational forces are committed to internal contingencies, it is possible that PLA 

leaders will be less likely to execute large scale military operations which require significant commitment on the part of ground forces, like compelling 

Taiwan reunification through invasion. In such cases, 

the PLA would likely rely on precision strike assets 

and naval platforms to coerce its adversaries. Under 

these circumstances, it is possible that PLA ground 

force will deemphasize training for many offensive 

tasks and that readiness of armor, artillery, electronic 

warfare, and point air defense systems will deteriorate as maintenance cycles are extended to preserve 

operating budgets.

The PLA Navy.

The PLAN is tasked with safeguarding China’s 

maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of 

its territorial seas along with its maritime rights and 

interests.19 The PLAN has focused on extending its 

area of operation over the previous decades, moving 

from a primarily “brown-water navy” to an increasingly “blue-water navy.” Owing in part to China’s expansive maritime claims, the PLAN greatly expanded 

its presence within the “first-island chain” during the 

21st century, and began participating in a growing 

number of global deployments under the auspices of 

counterpiracy, UN peacekeeping, and good will visits. As the service with the most interaction with foreign militaries, the PLAN also serves as the “face of 

China’s military.” 
245

By 2020, the PLAN will have a largely modern 

force more numerous than at any time since the earlyto-mid-1990s with significantly enhanced weapons 

systems.20 The PLAN will field next generation surface 

combatants, submarines, and naval aircraft with longrange anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and sensors 

to enable the PLAN to achieve sea dominance across 

the “first island chain.” A small number of amphibious ships, one to two aircraft carriers, and carrierbased fighter aircraft will enhance PLAN capabilities 

to assert and defend China’s territorial claims, and 

combined with a modest replenishment capability, to 

conduct a greater diversity of out-of-area missions. 

The PLAN will also achieve a near continuous at-sea 

nuclear deterrent capability through the deployment 

of five JIN Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) armed 

with JL-2 nuclear capable intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).21 Future 

modernization programs will continue to focus on 

weapons systems and C4ISR to enhance the PLAN’s 

capabilities to safeguard China’s maritime security 

and conduct international cooperation farther afield.

Considering China’s role as both a continental 

and maritime power and its heavy dependence on 

the sea to fuel economic growth and domestic consumption, there are few conditions under which the 

Beijing would consciously choose to sequester PLAN 

equipment development and operational modernization. Major changes in the regional security environment resulting in significantly closer ties with China’s 

maritime neighbors, while highly unlikely, could lead 

to reductions in the PLAN’s budget and reduce the 

priority of future weapons development programs. 

It is also possible that political infighting, a major naval defeat by a regional neighbor, or PRC leadership 
246

perceptions of overly aggressive and uncontrolled 

PLAN operations could result in a decision to curtail 

PLAN future capabilities, particularly the continued 

development of aircraft carriers and SSBNs. However, the most likely circumstances under which the 

PLAN would become significantly weaker are major 

domestic instability requiring a dramatic shift in military resources or a financial crisis which necessitates 

significant and long-term military budget reductions.

Under conditions of severe domestic upheaval, 

PLAN operations are likely to be curtailed for the duration, though it is likely that PLAN vessels will continue to be deployed to defend against intervention 

or opportunistic behavior by regional actors. Barring 

a major political shift upon the conclusion of the crisis, PLAN regional operations would likely continue 

though future naval modernization could be curtailed 

depending on the long-term economic effects of such a 

crisis. Long-term disruptions to PLAN budgets could 

severely hinder programs to develop capabilities to 

equal or defeat other regional naval actors.

Considering the high cost associated with a number 

of platforms of limited value for the PLAN’s traditional security missions of near-seas defense, the PLAN 

may slow or delay the construction of new high-end 

platforms for blue water power projection, most notably the construction of additional aircraft carriers 

and associated air wings and future variants of ballistic and attack submarines and destroyers. Additional 

cost savings may be achieved through reductions in 

operating expenditures and cuts to maintenance and 

fleet modernization programs. 

Under these conditions, outdated platforms could 

be cut from the force to reduce costs including outdated frigates, patrol craft, and submarines. The PLAN’s 
247

overall operational tempo could decrease with less 

out-of-area naval operations and large scale exercises. 

Maintenance cycles will likely be extended and system upgrades delayed. If operating or maintenance 

costs are severely cut, the PLAN may have to reduce 

the number and frequency of patrols to its more distant territorial claims like the Spratly Islands which 

will likely be routine by 2020. 

Long-term reductions in training may have a detrimental effect on the proficiency of PLAN officers and 

crews as the training and evaluation cycle it depends 

on to modernize and refine operational capabilities 

will slow. This is likely to frustrate PLAN goals of improving the integration of naval air, surface, and subsurface capabilities through combined operations and 

the fusion of information systems as well as overall 

PLA efforts to fully integrate these systems in support 

of joint operations. It is possible; however, that funding for improved maritime surveillance and targeting systems and the production of more precise long 

range precision strike weapons may be sheltered from 

budget cuts in order to maintain credible regional 

deterrence in light of a weakened fleet.22

With a weaker navy, Beijing may become less confident in its ability to forcefully coerce its maritime 

neighbors into recognizing the primacy of its territorial claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea. 

It is possible in such a case that Beijing would alter its 

approach toward regional claimants to appear more 

conciliatory, cooperative, or legalistic. At the same 

time, Chinese reaction to security threats to overseas 

interests will be to employ a combination of diplomacy and economic coercion rather than to commit military forces. In addition, China’s leadership may be unwilling to provide significant support to international 
248

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions 

that further strain military budgets and domestic perceptions of military priorities. 

The PLA Air Force.

The PLAAF is China’s mainstay for air operations, 

responsible for territorial security and maintaining 

a stable air defense posture nationwide. In line with 

strategic requirements for conducting offensive and 

defensive operations, PLAAF modernization has focused on strengthening the development of the combat force structure that focuses on reconnaissance and 

early warning, air and missile defense, and strategic 

projection.23 In addition, the PLAAF has prioritized 

development of weapons and information systems 

to effectively conduct long range precision strike operations.24 Basic PLAAF wartime missions are to destroy enemy air and air defense forces; weaken enemy 

ground forces; strike key communication, transportation, political, military, and economic targets; defend 

against enemy air raids; and to safeguard important 

targets.25

By the early-2020s, the PLAAF will likely have 

fielded 4th generation,26 multirole fighters and fighterbombers, and barring a major disruption in China’s 

military aircraft production industry, will be in the 

late stages of operationalizing 5th generation fighters.27 They will have achieved nascent but credible 

strategic force projection capabilities in the forms of 

Y-20 large transport aircraft,28 aerial refuelers29 and 

refuelable combat aircraft, and an upgraded bomber 

fleet capable of carrying new longer range missiles.30

China’s integrated air defense systems will remain 

formidable and will likely be fortified through the 
249

acquisition of the Russian S-400 surface to air missiles31 and improvements to reconnaissance, data relay, navigation, and communication systems, both air 

and spaced based. Improvements in electronic warfare, low observable materials, and unmanned aerial 

vehicle (UAV) technologies will further enhance both 

PLAAF offensive and defensive capabilities.32

In order to streamline air operations from training 

to mission execution, by 2020 the PLAAF will complete its force realignment to modular brigade and 

base structures enabling greater integration of air force 

capabilities and interoperability in joint formations.33

As the PLAAF transitions to more capable aircraft, 

this brigade structure will likely allow a PLAAF-wide 

reduction in the total number of flying squadrons and 

a more optimal balance of support personnel to aircraft. Reforms to the PLAAFs training, education, and 

NCO programs will have achieved some success in 

improving the quality of pilots and technical personnel, though there will continue to be a high ratio of 

officers to NCOs in technical specialties as the recruitment and development of NCOs will remain a work 

in progress.34

If the PLA experiences major budget reductions 

PLAAF leaders may need to make hard decisions of 

how to best balance military capabilities and equipment development. If the cuts occur after 2020, it is 

possible that PLAAF restructuring programs already 

carried out could enable moderate savings in operating and training costs and significant personnel savings without major disruption to core warfighting 

capabilities. Under such conditions, the PLAAF may 

choose to accelerate the retirement of older aircraft 

and equipment to include its J-7 and J-8 fighters, cutting the number of aircraft in the PLAAF by nearly 
250

half with corresponding cuts to associated personnel 

and infrastructure.35 Reductions to air defense and 

surface-to-air missile units are less likely as they will 

be required to extend coverage to compensate for the 

loss of combat aircraft. The PLA could also choose to 

decrease pay and benefits for its officers and NCOs, 

however, this would likely exacerbate the problems 

it is already having in recruiting and retaining high 

quality technical personnel and risks deteriorating 

operational readiness over the long term.

A sudden reduction in the number of older aircraft maintained by the force may allow the PLAAF 

to preserve modernization programs and continue 

personnel training and retention initiatives, however, 

it would likely require significant adjustments to PLA 

planning for major contingencies. It is likely that as the 

PLA increases the precision of its weapons systems, 

any military operation against Taiwan will require 

less combat aircraft for air interdiction and strike missions. Such a dramatic reduction in force will limit 

PLAAF capabilities to support multiple air campaigns 

which may be required in high-end contingencies.36

The PLAAF’s ability to support counterintervention, 

anti-air raid, and border-defense operations effectively could be seriously degraded.37

Factional disputes, political infighting, or corruption could also disrupt PLAAF modernization, particularly under conditions of retrenchment. Those acquisition programs championed by the best connected 

and therefore best resourced officials may receive 

preference over others regardless of their strategic 

value. Competition between PLAAF and PLAN officials over missions and budget allocations could also 

affect production and fielding priorities, particularly 

for surface strike systems. If PLAAF acquisition and 
251

development slow significantly, the cost per platform 

would likely increase, negating the value of these 

measures while degrading air capabilities over the 

long term in relation to regional competitors. These 

variables could be mitigated through foreign sales, 

however, if the economic issues disrupting PLA modernization are related to a global or regional economic 

crisis, this may not be an option.

It is possible that under these conditions, the 

PLAAF may argue for more aggressive policies toward regional competitors in order to showcase newly developed offensive air capabilities and attract patronage of PRC political elites. This could increase the 

risk of conflict within the region as PLAAF commanders may request and authorize less restrictive rules of 

engagement as they become anxious to demonstrate 

the value of their service to China’s overall national 

defense. Such activities could include more aggressive ISR collection and air intercepts, harassment, and 

active jamming.

Another possible future, particularly under fiscal 

constraints, is to shift equipment development programs toward more efficient systems with greater 

average value. The PLAAF may increase the development of unmanned aerial systems and deemphasize platforms which require trained pilots and flight 

crews. Without the limitations of human pilots, the 

PLAAF would be able to develop a wider variety of 

high altitude, long duration, and hypersonic systems 

which could provide strategic strike capabilities, potentially at a reduced overall cost.38 In addition, significant saving could be achieved in personnel costs, 

since such platforms would likely require less manpower for operations and maintenance.
252

The long-term transition of the PLAAF toward 

predominantly unmanned offensive strike platforms 

would necessitate additional structural and personnel 

reforms as the training and management requirements 

differ from the current force. Such a force would also 

demand major enhancements to PLA C4ISR and data 

fusion systems as well as signals encryption in order 

to control multiple platforms effectively in combat 

with confidence, manage airspace in both peacetime 

training and during wartime operations, and integrate 

joint fires at the campaign and strategic levels. 

Major changes in international security environments could also greatly impact PLAAF modernization priorities and related resources. One unlikely 

scenario would be a relatively benign security environment in which the air force concentrates on air 

defense and ISR missions to maintain security along 

China’s periphery and reduces overall investments 

in precision strike to a minimum credible deterrence 

capability.39 Another scenario is that the Taiwan issue 

becomes resolved, which would allow the PLAAF to 

cut the number of fighters in its inventory, particularly 

dedicated to short range air-to-air missions. While an 

uncertain regional security environment would still 

require significant air force capability, contingency 

planning and platform development could concentrate more on counterintervention capabilities.

Another scenario would involve a major deterioration in China’s relationship with Russia before China’s defense industries are able to complete transition 

to domestic production of critical airframes, engines, 

and components. This scenario would be characterized by a major disruption in trade between the two 

countries rather than heightened military tensions. 

Loss of Russian support for the maintenance of air 
253

and air defense systems and Russian manufactured 

engines could degrade PLAAF readiness, particularly 

if it occurs in the near term or China fails its longterm efforts to develop jet engines independently for 

military applications.40

The Second Artillery Force.

The SAF is responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, carrying out nuclear counterattack if deterrence fails, and 

has the mission to conduct precision strikes with conventional missiles.41 The SAF is the primary operator 

of China’s nuclear arsenal, with the PLAN having a 

relatively smaller, but growing role in nuclear deterrence. The SAF’s primary conventional mission likely 

involves gaining air and information superiority over 

Taiwan, either as a coercive tool to deter Taiwan independence or as part of a larger military operation 

against the island. The SAF also serves as the key 

operator of asymmetric conventional systems meant 

to deter the United States from intervening in any 

conflict involving the PLA. 

Under conditions of PLA retrenchment, the SAF is 

the least likely to be affected by force reductions as the 

utility of the missile force will experience a relative 

increase due to the deterioration of the wider military. 

By 2020, the mission and doctrine of the SAF nuclear 

force will largely resemble what it is today, absent significant changes in the global nuclear force posture. 

The SAF nuclear force will remain small in number 

relative to the United States and Russia, however, 

the gap will have narrowed with the fielding of additional systems, while the United States and Russia 

attempt further reductions. It is unlikely China would 
254

revise its “No First Use” (NFU) policy in these circumstances, as NFU is politically advantageous, and 

China’s nuclear force posture makes the feasibility 

of a disarming first strike difficult to impossible. Significant advancements in U.S. ballistic missile defense 

systems, or precision long range conventional strike 

systems are possible factors that would alter the SAF 

nuclear force posture. Either scenario would likely 

lead to increases of the SAF nuclear force numbers 

and survivability, as well as domestic BMD and new 

conventional missile technologies. 

The SAF conventional force will remain the primary coercive tool to deter Taiwan independence and 

third party intervention into a conflict with Taiwan. 

With the deteriorating ability of the PLAA to conduct 

a large scale amphibious invasion, the SAF importance 

in contingency plans against Taiwan will increase and 

the likelihood of employing the conventional force in 

demonstrative launches similar to those seen in the 

mid-1990s will increase. Lastly, declining budgets will 

mean that the SAF is unable to field conventional systems capable of striking out to the second island chain 

and a full suite of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). 

Expected modernizations to the nuclear force will 

be delayed in recognition of the high cost of these 

systems and the unlikelihood of a nuclear conflict. 

China will likely complete enhancements to its silobased intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, 

as these systems offer the best rapid response times 

for China’s nuclear force. The SAF will likely deploy 

additional road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 2 nuclear ICBMs, 

the most modern road-mobile and survivable nuclear 

ICBM. But the expected follow-on road-mobile ICBM 

system, capable of carrying multiple independently 

targetable re-entry vehicles, will likely be postponed 
255

in recognition of the cost and difficulty of continued 

research and development of this system. Absent significant changes in the nuclear forces of the rest of the 

world, combined with the continued low probability 

of a nuclear conflict, Beijing will likely delay additional investments into their global nuclear strike capability.42 For the regional nuclear force, the SAF will likely 

opt to retain legacy CSS-5 Mod 2 nuclear MRBMs as 

their primary regional deterrent and slow the operational testing and deployment of more accurate and 

survivable follow-on system. 

In 2020, the SAF conventional short range ballistic 

missiles will be more accurate, survivable, and multirole than the earlier generation systems, providing 

China with the capability to cripple key targets across 

the strait in the early stages of a conflict. The medium 

range conventional land-attack and anti-ship ballistic 

missile systems, the CSS-5 Mod 4 and CSS-5 Mod 5, 

respectively, will remain China’s primary systems for 

targeting regional military targets and carrier battle 

groups. Under conditions of PLA-wide retrenchment, 

the SAF will likely retain a larger inventory of missiles 

in order to mitigate the loss of regional strike capabilities cause by PLAAF downsizing. This will likely 

require a significant reduction in the number of live 

fire training exercises in order to avoid added production costs.43

Longer range conventional systems with the capability to strike as far as the second island chain will 

be fielded in limited numbers, but the prospects for a 

large ramp-up in the number of these systems is less 

likely given the associated costs. Thus, the SAF will 

have a limited capability to strike U.S. military bases as far as Guam, but will lack the ability to sustain 

strikes for a prolonged period of time.44
256

The SAF’s experience with road-mobile missiles 

and strategic systems make it the most likely operator of China’s road-mobile ASAT systems. However, 

like the longer range conventional systems, the ASAT 

will only be fielded in limited numbers due to cost 

considerations. The system will serve as a conventional deterrent, providing the threat of escalating a 

conventional conflict to the space realm and deterring 

destruction of China’s growing satellite constellation.

IMPLICATIONS

In this scenario, while China will be able to field 

the majority of equipment and execute force restructuring planned through 2020, new priorities may require the PLA to slow the development and production of new combat systems, refocus training, extend 

maintenance cycles, and make unplanned force reductions. Over time, these factors will leave the PLA with 

a reformed organizational structure and more modern 

order of battle, but with declining troop proficiency 

and combat readiness. The PLA will remain capable 

of prosecuting limited military operations to defend 

China’s sovereignty and territorial claims, but unable 

to effectively respond to military contingencies outside of China’s immediate periphery.

Barring reunification, Taiwan will remain the primary strategic direction for Beijing.45 Concerned that 

the readiness and proficiency of China’s military has 

declined to a state where it would be incapable of 

conducting a large scale military campaign that spans 

the strait, Beijing will rely on coercive plans of action 

which seek to deter Taiwan from declaring independence. Although Beijing recognizes that its military 

capability to compel the reunification of Taiwan will 
257

be in decline, the risks associated with a large scale 

conflict, with the possibility of third party intervention, outweigh the calculation that China should 

utilize their military might before it faces further 

deterioration. 

The perceived significance of sovereignty disputes 

in the maritime realm will not change in the eyes of 

Beijing, but their ability to enforce their claims will diminish. The PLAN patrols will be sporadic and more 

reactive in nature.46 With the declining ability of the 

PLA to patrol these areas routinely, the various maritime claimants in the region will be left emboldened 

and encouraged to take advantage of the situation, 

making the prospects for conflict more likely. 

The weaknesses of the PLA will be most apparent 

in areas beyond China’s periphery, and particularly 

beyond the second island chain. Despite having air 

and naval systems that are capable of conducting military operations far from shore, the PLA will remain 

chained to China’s periphery for the host of reasons 

described above. The United States will remain the 

preeminent military power in Asia, but China will retain a substantial ability to challenge the United States 

militarily if a conflict were to break out. Furthermore, 

China will grow increasingly sensitive to U.S. presence 

within the second island chain in light of its declining military prestige and the belief that Washington is 

encouraging various countries in the region provoke 

Beijing over maritime claims. 

Faced with a future in which they will be unable to 

achieve the strategic goals of “being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century,” 

Beijing will likely conclude that the “strategic period 

of opportunity” has closed.47 How China will respond 

to this perception is unclear, however, if past is prece-
258

dent, Beijing’s self-perception as a victim of the machinations of Western powers will prevail. Having failed 

to close the gap with the United States, Beijing will 

continue to press Washington to accommodate its rise 

and put the impetus for stable relations on the United 

States. Beijing’s suspicions of U.S. intentions to “contain” China would likely persist, with accusations that 

Washington was responsible for and benefitted from 

the end of the “period of opportunity.”

Such a situation bodes ill for any effort to “manage” China’s rise and encourages it to become a more 

responsible stakeholder in the region. With its ambitions slighted and position vis-à-vis the United States 

in a worse state than Beijing had desired, China would 

be less likely to take on greater responsibility in the 

region arguing that its domestic problems take precedent. While this is not an argument that a stronger 

China would result in a more responsible stakeholder 

and positive influence in the region, it does suggest 

that a China in decline would be no more willing to 

accommodate on the issues that are currently of greatest sensitivity (maritime claims, Taiwan arms sales, 

sensitive reconnaissance operations, etc.).

With respect to Chinese military aggression in general, under conditions of a weakened PLA two possibilities exist. China may accept the new status quo in 

the short term in order to maintain or regain party control and domestic stability and will have no appetite 

for external conflict. Under such conditions, Beijing 

would likely respond to security threats to overseas 

interests by employing a combination of diplomacy 

and economic coercion rather than to commit military 

forces. Direct threats to China’s sovereignty and territorial claims, however, may draw more aggressive 

demonstrations of controlled military deterrence and 
259

counterintervention up to and including offensive cyber and counterspace operations. 

Alternatively, a strong sense of grievance and offended nationalism may drive China to become more 

hostile toward the outside world. Perceiving threats 

on all fronts and blaming foreign powers for its internal chaos, Beijing may be more willing to respond 

to perceived threats with military force in an effort 

to shore up its perception as a global power at home 

and abroad. Under such circumstances, Beijing may 

further expand territorial claims and execute limited 

offensive operations against regional actors with a 

limited ability to contain escalation.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Jane Perlez, “Philippines and China Ease Tensions in Rift at 

Sea,” The New York Times, June 18, 2012.

2. Edward Wong, “China’s Communist Party Chief Acts to 

Bolster Military,” The New York Times, December 14, 2012.

3. Zhu Ningzhu, “Xi Leads China’s Military Reform, Stressing 

Building of Strong Army,” Xinhua, March 15, 2014.

4. Although China’s defense white papers often include domestic separatist activity (Tibet, Xinjiang) in the national sovereignty section, the likely military responses are similar to what 

would be required for maintaining social stability, in the views of 

the authors.

5. Liu Xiaopeng (刘晓朋), “中国海军和平方舟医院船到达菲律

宾灾区” (“China’s Navy’s Peace Ark Arrives at the Philippines 

Disaster Area”), 新华网(Xinhua), November 24, 2013.

6. “Full Text: the Diversified Employment of China’s Armed 

Forces,” Xinhua, April 16, 2013.
260

7. Cui Yafeng (崔亚峰) ed; 陆军作战学 (Science of Army Operations), 解放军出版社 (PLA Press), June 2009, p. 152.

8. Jiang Daohong (姜道洪), “瞄准 ‘五化’:迈开陆军建设转型

步伐” (“Aim at the ‘Five Goals’ of Ground Force Building”), 解放

军报 (PLA Daily), July 14, 2011, p. 10.

9. Hu Wei and Qiu Boxing, “It Is Heartening To See Our LandForce Aviation Forces Realize Transformation and Are Ready To 

Fly—Our Land-Force Aviation Forces, Which Are Referred to as 

‘Light Cavalry in the Air,’ Are Quickening Their Pace in Pushing Forward Their Transformation Into Tactical-Type, Combined 

Offensive-Transportation, and Main-Battle Assault Forces,” 解

放军报 (PLA Daily), June 15, 2012, p. 1; “Z10 Armed Helicopter 

in Jingdezhen,” Kanwa Asian Defense Review, No. 87, January 1, 

2012, p. 21.

10. Andrei Pinkov Bangkok, “More Details of T96A MBT Revealed,” Kanwa Asian Defense Review, No. 92, June 1, 2012, p. 12; 

Wang Xueping, “The ‘King of Land Warfare’ Calls For Ability to 

Strike in the Air,” PLA Daily, January 19, 2012, p. 10. 

11. Hu Haijun, Yang Zurong, “PLA Makes a New Leap Forward in Using Civilian Vessels to Enhance Strategic Projection 

Capacity; 36,000-ton Roll-On/Roll-Off Ferry ‘Bohai Cuizhu’ Started Its Maiden Voyage From Yantai,” PLA Daily, August 9, 2012, 

p. 3; Wei Jiawei, Liu Zhongshu, and Zhao Weijiang, “Research 

on Organizing and Commanding Cross-Region Mobile Transportation,” Auto Applications, June 2011, p. 14; Li Xinyang and 

Wu Yuanqin, “On the Construction of Resources for Integrated 

Civil-Military Material Procurement Support, Military Economic 

Research,” Vol. 9, 2011, p. 31; Luo Weiran, Huang Tengfei, and 

Zhou Dongrui, “An Armored Regiment of the Chengdu Military 

Region Seeks the Truth and Is Pragmatic in Sorting Through and 

Correcting New Equipment Training Concepts—‘Replacing a 

Shotgun With a Cannon: Certain ‘Sayings’ Lack Thought,” PLA 

Daily , December 19, 2013, p. 7; Che Yin, You Chengfeng, “Group 

Army’s Weaponry Combat Readiness Rate Hits 96 Percent,” PLA 

Daily, February 19, 2013.

12. Ni Eryan, “PLA Quietly Advances Reforms in Organizations and Structures,” December 31, 2011, available from 

Hong Kong Wen Wei Po Online, accessed March 3, 2014. 
261

13. Chen Silin, “Current Difficulty in Recruiting Military Personnel’ and ‘Difficulty in Recruiting High-Caliber Military Personnel’: Main Causes and Countermeasures,” National Defense

(Guofang) Magazine, August 2011, pp. 60-65; Zhang Yuhai, “The 

Thorough Implementation of the Objective of Building a Strong 

Army Requires the Constant Improvement of the Quality of NonCommissioned Officer Selection Work—Military Region Headquarters Department Military Affairs Department Chief Zhang 

Yuhai Answers Questions on This Winter’s Non-Commissioned 

Officer Selection,” Zhanyou Bao, November 9, 2014, p. 1; “Conscientiously Building Non-Commissioned Officer Ranks and Using 

Them Well” PLA Daily, November 1, 2012, p. 1; Zhang Liang, Wei 

Guo, and Liang Shenhu, “Why Is the New Transceiver Not Functioning?—One Experience by a Jinan Military Region Division 

in Improving the Informatized Attainments of the Officers and 

Men,” PLA Daily, September 9, 2013. 

14. “PLA Daily on Lanzhou MR Brigade’s Enhancement of 

‘System of Systems’ Capabilities,” PLA Daily, June 16, 2013, p. 

1; Ge Chong, “International Peacekeeping Heads to the Open 

Ocean—Possessing Attack and Defense To Protect Sovereignty; 

The People’s Liberation Army Increases Combat Power—Rebirth 

Should be a Challenge,” October 26, 2013, available on Hong 

Kong Wen Wei Po Online, accessed April 4, 2014.

15. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, Routledge 

Press, 2012, p. 64; Mu Muying (穆木英), “解放軍臃散疲墮現狀惡

化” (“PLA’s Swollen, Dispersed, Exhausted, Degenerated Status 

Worsens”), 爭鳴 (Cheng Ming), December 1, 2013, pp. 11-12.

16. Cortez A. Cooper III, “‘Preserving the State: Modernizing 

and Task-Organizing a ‘Hybrid’ PLA Ground Force,” Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, September 

2007, pp. 250-251.

17. Ibid., p. 270.

18. “中国軍 有事即応型に” (“Chinese Armed Forces Will 

Change to Be Able to Rapidly Respond to Emergencies”), 読売新

聞 (Yomiuri Shimbun), January 1, 2014, p. 1.
262

19. “Full Text: the Diversified Employment of China’s 

Armed Forces.”

20. Andrew S. Erickson, “Rising Tide, Dispersing Waves: Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese Seapower Development,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies, May 28, 2014, p. 8.

21. Ibid, pp. 5-14; Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Naval Capabilities—Background and 

Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, June 5, 2014.

22. Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Naval Capabilities—Background and Issues for 

Congress,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

September 30, 2013.

23. “Full Text: the Diversified Employment of China’s 

Armed Forces.” 

24. Wang Faan, 中国和平发展中的强军战略 (China’s Strategy 

for Invigorating the Armed Forces amid Peaceful Development), Bejing, 

China: Military Science Press, June 1, 2011, pp. 44-113.

25. “Science of Campaigns,” The Diplomat, 2006, pp. 557-559.

26. Chinese Terminology Differs; What Westerners Call 4th 

Generation Fighters, The Chinese Call 3d Generation, and So 

Forth. For the purposes of this chapter, western terminology will 

be applied.

27. “AMR Air Force Directory 2014,” Asian Military Review, 

February 1, 2014, pp. 25-48; OSD, “Annual Report to Congress: 

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013,” Washington, DC: DoD, 2013.

28. Huanqiu Wang, “First Anniversary of Y-20 Maiden Flight 

Reveals More Secret Photos,” January 27, 2014, available from 

www.huanqiu.com, accessed February 15, 2014; “Top Five Pieces of 

News on Chinese Military Aviation in 2013,” PLA Daily, January 

8, 2014.
263

29. Huanqiu Wang, “ Summary: Photos Allegedly Show 1st 

PLA Il-78 Midair Refueling Aircraft,” March 27, 2014, available 

from www.huanqiu.com, accessed January 9, 2014.

30. Wang Wenbin and Zhang Li, “The Warplanes of an Aviation Regiment of the Air Force Stage Assaults on Targets Thousands of Miles Away in a Day of Heavy Rains” PLA Daily, April 

9, 2014, p. 4; “Long-range Stealth Bomber Under Development,” 

January 9, 2014, available from www.wantchinatimes.com, accessed 

January 9, 2014.

31.“China May Become First Importer of Russian S-400 Missile Systems,” Interfax, February 20, 2013; “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China 2013.”

32. Nanfang Dushi Bao, “Summary: PLA’s Second Model 

Stealth Fighter Reportedly Conducts Another Test Flight,” Nanfang Daily, July 19, 2013, available from www.nanfangdaily.com.

cn, accessed March 14, 2014; Minnie Chan: “China Unveils New 

Fifth-Generation Stealth Fighter,” October 31, 2012, available from 

www.scmp.com, accessed January 11, 2014; Ren Yong, Fu Shengjie, 

and Liu Zhe, “Impact Produced by New Technology Development on the Form of Air-Force-Mounted Combat Operations,” 

PLA Daily, January 28, 2010., p. 4; “Annual Report to Congress: 

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013.” 

33. Kenneth W. Allen, “The Organizational Structure of the 

PLAAF,” Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders 

eds., The Chinese Air Force Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities, 

National Defense University, 2012, p. 104.

34. Ken Allen, “PLA Air Force Aviation Cadet Recruitment, 

Education, and Training,” China Brief, Vol. 12, Issue 5, March 2, 

2012; “Names of Two Pilots Killed in Su-27 Fighter Crash Released, Speculation on Causes of Crash,” 解放军报 (PLA Daily), 

April 3, 2013; Ge Chong: “International Peacekeeping Heads to 

the Open Ocean—Possessing Attack and Defense To Protect Sovereignty,” Xinhua, April 2, 2013; “The People’s Liberation Army 

Increases Combat Power—Rebirth Should be a Challenge,” October 26, 2013, available from Hong Kong Wen Wei Po Online, 

accessed February 2, 2014.
264

35. “The Military Balance, 2014,” London, UK: International 

Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014.

36. David Shlapak, “Equipping the PLAAF: The Long March 

to Modernity,” Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. 

Saunders, eds., The Chinese Air Force Evolving Concepts, Roles, and 

Capabilities, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2012; 

“Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013.”

37. Science of Campaigns, pp. 557-559.

38. Ian M. Easton and L. C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities,” Arlington, 

VA: Project 2049 Institute, March 11, 2013, p. 14; “China’s Lijian 

Stealth Drone Set for Maiden Flight: Report,” Want China Times, 

May 24, 2013.

39. Phillip C. Saunders and Erik Quam, “Future Force Structure of the Chinese Air Force,” Roy Kamphausen and Andrew 

Scobell, eds., Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army, pp. 381.

40. Ibid, pp. 408-410.

41. “Full Text: the Diversified Employment of China’s 

Armed Forces.”

42. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, Annual Report to Congress,” Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013, pp. 5, 30-31. 

43. Ibid, pp. 38, 42.

44. Ibid.

45. “主要战略方向与其他战略方向的辩证关系” (“The Dialectical Relationship between the Primary Strategic Direction and 

Other Strategic Directions”), April 4, 2006, available from www.

chinamil.com.cn, accessed March 3, 2014.
265

46. Zhu Hu and Yang Yang, “Destroyer Detachment Party 

Committee Leads Naval Troops to Work Hard at Modernization,” PLA Daily, July 28, 1995.

47. Xu Jian, “Rethinking China’s Period of Strategic Opportunity,” San Francisco, CA: California Institute of Integral Studies, May 28, 2014, available from www.ciis.org.cn, accessed June 

9, 2014.

267

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION, WORLD,

AND U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

269

CHAPTER 9

REGIONAL DYNAMICS IN RESPONSE TO 

ALTERNATIVE PLA DEVELOPMENT VECTORS

Michael McDevitt

INTRODUCTION—CHINA’S STRATEGIC 

APPROACH TO ITS NEIGHBORHOOD

In October 2013, a high-level policy symposium 

was held in Beijing on the topic of China’s peripheral 

region. For the first time, all the political bureau standing committee members attended along with the leadership of China’s foreign policy establishment. President Xi Jinping chaired the meeting, and in a speech 

sketched out a peripheral strategy that combined 

elements of the past 2 decades approach, focused on 

economic integration, along with some new ideas. He 

made the point that the strategic objective remains 

the same—a stable and peaceful periphery to pursue 

economic development and his “China Dream.” He 

did make one important caveat directly relevant to 

the question this chapter is addressing. He said China 

must also maintain its national sovereignty, security, 

and economic development interests. In other words, 

maintaining a stable and peaceful periphery should 

not come at the expense of China’s broader interests.1

This suggests that China has concluded that it has 

no need to compromise on fundamental (core) interests with its neighbors because its comprehensive 

national power is adequate to maintain “peace and 

stability” on the periphery, despite the existence of 

maritime sovereignty disputes. It implies that Beijing 

can and will exercise a combination of hard and soft 
270

power with its neighbors, depending upon what interests are involved. In cases of sovereignty disputes with 

its neighbors, China will seek peaceful outcomes, but 

will not compromise on its claims, and, as necessary, 

be willing to use some aspect of coercion (diplomatic, 

economic, constabulary, or military) to strengthen its 

claims while weakening the ability of its neighbors to 

mount an effective defense.2

FRAMING THE ANALYTIC APPROACH 

With this appreciation of China’s likely approach 

to its neighborhood as context, when forecasting east 

and south Asian regional responses in 2025 to different People’s Liberation Army (PLA) development 

objectives, it is important to bound the analyses. This 

chapter will not address the countries that share a border with China: Russia, Mongolia, the Central Asian 

states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, or Afghanistan. Nor will it address Bhutan and Nepal. It 

will not consider China’s two closest friendly bordering states, North Korea and Pakistan; although, in the 

case of North Korea, the behavior of Kim Jong-un in 

the December 2013-January 2014 time frame implied 

a less than collegial relationship between Pyongyang 

and Beijing.3 It is altogether imaginable that by 2025, 

the “Young General” may have been consigned to 

the dustbin of history and a regime more inclined to 

follow Beijing’s advice takes its place; or North and 

South Korea are engaged in some sort of reunification 

dialogue. 

Of China’s remaining bordering neighbors: India, 

Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam, this exploration will 

look more closely at Vietnam and India. While Thailand does not directly border China, it is close enough 
271

to the Chinese frontier to be extremely attentive to its 

relationship with Beijing. All five countries face the 

difficult strategic reality that because the PLA can 

either walk or drive to their frontier no matter what 

vector the PLA takes in the future, these nations face 

a threat of invasion that cannot be ignored. India and 

Vietnam have experienced this since 1950. It seems 

probable that in 2025 Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, and 

Vietnam will continue to be very careful about taking 

any action that would so provoke Beijing that China’s 

leaders would feel compelled to “teach them a lesson.”

In the case of India, a nuclear weapons state that 

has been reasonably clear that a portion of its nuclear 

capabilities target Chinese cities, New Delhi should 

have less reason to be concerned about a Chinese invasion, and hence less anxiety about PLA developments. 

In fact, however, the development of a global expeditionary PLA is likely to cause considerable anxiety 

in New Delhi, a response that will be addressed in 

more detail.

For China’s neighbors fortunate enough to be 

separated from China by some expanse of ocean, specifically South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, 

Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Australia, 

the primary threat from the PLA, no matter what form 

its developmental vector takes, is its naval (including 

amphibious assault capabilities), air, and conventional missile capabilities. These Chinese capabilities 

currently far outmatch the defenses of all of the aforementioned states except Japan, and that gap is closing. 

It goes without saying that China’s nuclear weapon 

capabilities threaten all, and provide China with clearcut escalation dominance against any nation that does 

not have a formal alliance with the United States that 

includes an extended deterrence guarantee, or like 

India, has its own ability to retaliate in kind. 
272

Finally, when forecasting the responses of China’s 

neighbors to all circa 2025 PLA developmental vectors, 

some assumptions have to be made about how the 

ongoing sovereignty disputes between China and its 

neighbors have played out between today and 2025. If 

there were violent confrontations between China and 

one or more of its peripheral states, the neighborhood 

response to a circa 2025 PLA would almost certainly 

be very different from a situation where force has not 

been used. As a working assumption, this chapter 

posits that the sovereignty and maritime demarcation disputes that have heretofore defied resolution 

will remain unresolved by 2025. Unresolved does 

not necessarily mean that today’s tensions will persist a decade hence, co-development schemes and a 

live and let live approach could make these disputes 

less dangerous. In any event, for the purposes of this 

chapter, the analysis assumes that none of the tension 

producing maritime claims will have been settled by 

the overt use of force, mainly because China is likely 

to have systematically altered the status quo through 

nonviolent measures. 

THE NEAR NEIGHBORHOOD RESPONSE 

OF CHINA’S GROWING POWER—

NORTHEAST ASIA

South Korea.

In 2025, it seems probable that the Republic of 

Korea (ROK) military will still be postured against 

a North Korean invasion, but the ROK navy and air 

force will also have to consider its powerful neighbors, China and Japan.4

 The U.S.-ROK alliance will remain in place, and operational command transfer will 
273

have been put on hold permanently as long as Seoul 

and Washington judge that the North Korean threat 

remains credible.5

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to speculate 

about the state of North-South relations, except to note 

that U.S.-led efforts to halt and then roll back North 

Korea’s nuclear weapons program will not have succeeded by 2025. As a result, the South Korean and, 

for that matter, Japanese defense budgets, continue 

to invest heavily in missile defense. South Korea will 

have joined U.S.-led efforts to integrate U.S.-JapaneseROK missiles defenses, much to China’s displeasure 

because this missile defense organization could also 

mitigate the effectiveness of China’s nuclear posture 

against Japan and the United States. But because this 

is driven by North Korea, Beijing’s displeasure has 

been quietly ignored by Seoul. 

In general, Seoul and Beijing have remained on 

good terms, and the only major security issues South 

Korea has with China are, first, its continued support 

of North Korea, which keeps the Kim, or a successor regime, afloat which prevents progress toward 

reunification. 

South Korea does have one other issue with China and that revolves around disputes in the Yellow 

(West) Sea because the overlapping South Korean and 

Chinese economic exclusion zones (EEZ) have not 

been reconciled. Both China and South Korea claim 

the submerged Iedo/Suyan/Socotra Rock, which 

is located closer to South Korea in its EEZ, but it is 

also within China’s claimed EEZ. South Korea has 

raised China’s ire by building a maritime research 

laboratory on the reef.6 In addition, Chinese fishermen 

continue to venture into South Korean waters. South 

Korea continues to ask China to respect the median 
274

line between the two countries in the Yellow Sea and 

restrict fishing to the Chinese side of the median until a permanent settlement of overlapping EEZs can 

be reached. Throughout the decade low-level skirmishing between South Korean coast guardsman and 

Chinese fishermen has continued. These differences 

with China, however, pale in comparison to the historic animosity between Korea and Japan which has 

grown over the years as South Korea has emerged as a 

vibrant well-to-do democracy. 

Finally, Seoul’s ambitions to be perceived as a 

global player7 have created the political space for more 

naval shipbuilding. By 2025, the ROK Navy will be 

a medium sized highly effective hybrid navy; hybrid 

in the sense that it combines coast defense missions, 

especially a renewed focus on shallow water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) against North Korea, with very 

credible blue-water capabilities such as around 10 AEGIS equipped destroyers and 18 frigates. By 2025, the 

submarine force will have over 40 years’ experience 

and employ around 18 modern conventionally powered submarines. In private conversations with senior 

ROK navy officers, they make clear that they see the 

development of a credible navy as a hedge against 

Japan.8

Whether the poisonous atmosphere between Japan 

and Korea will persist through the decade leading to 

2025 is hard to predict, but South Korea’s historic antipathy toward Japan is currently getting worse, not 

better; while thanks to its growing economy, burgeoning South Korean self-confidence feeds an urge 

to settle scores.

Finally, the ROK has a powerful incentive to develop blue water naval capabilities regardless of what 

trajectory the PLA takes. It is very dependent upon 

international trade, which creates an imperative to 
275

protect its sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) with 

significant naval capabilities. The best example of 

Seoul’s concerns with sea lanes is its active participation in international maritime peacekeeping such as 

anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden where they 

are current working with China, Japan and India in 

organizing convoys through higher threat areas. Like 

the Chinese, the anti-piracy mission has provided the 

ROK navy with the first out-of-area mission in its history. The ROK navy has learned how to sustain warships halfway around the world while conducting 

sustained operations with other major navies.9

Japan.

Japan is the country in East Asia most affected by 

China’s military modernization, no matter what vector the PLA takes. Today’s PLA is daunting enough 

for Japan, the PLA Second Artillery Force can reach 

out and touch Japan with both conventionally armed 

ballistic missiles, long-range land attack cruise missiles, and of course, with nuclear armed ballistic missiles. China’s large submarine fleet poses a really severe threat to Japan’s sea lanes. This is not an abstract 

problem for Tokyo, they lived it during 1944-45.10 The 

PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is introducing modern jet aircraft at a rate which that will, on paper, shift the air 

balance of power to China. Finally, and most strategically important to Japan, is the fact that China area denial and anti-access (what the PLA refers to as counterintervention) capability is becoming more credible 

by the day; which means that the United States may 

not be able to fulfill its alliance defense responsibilities 

because the PLA could keep American reinforcements 

from arriving from the west coast of the United States 

in time to be effective.11
276

Clearly, a PLA that in 2025 has continued to improve its regional capabilities means that its “counterintervention” capabilities have been strengthened 

to the point that Tokyo would have serious doubts 

regarding the operational credibility of Washington’s 

extended conventional deterrent. From Tokyo’s perspective, the ongoing capabilities completion between 

Washington and Beijing that pits anti-access versus 

assured access is one that Japan and the United States 

have to win. For Japan, Washington’s ability to solve 

this problem, with support from Japan because of revised roles and missions, will be an important factor 

in Japanese calculations regarding building its own 

second strike nuclear weapons force.

Japan has the third largest economy in the world, 

so it has the financial resources necessary to afford 

all the capabilities it needs to be able to defend all of 

Japan’s home islands, including the entire Ryukyu 

chain. By 2025, Japan will have completed its current 

shift of strategic focus to the southwest. That will include fielding a regimental sized amphibiously qualified army force specially trained to either defend, or 

retake any small islands that border the East China 

Sea. By 2025, the Air Self-Defense Force should have 

replaced its F-4 Phantom fleet and some of the older F15s with modern next generation fighters (F-35A and 

F-15Js) The Japan Air Self-Defense Force will also have 

to expand its training syllabus, and weapons delivering capabilities in order to support operations by the 

new Japanese marine force. These plans will continue, 

no matter what vector the PLA takes. Japan is likely 

to continue to improve its already world-class ASW 

capabilities in response to the number of modern submarines the PLA Navy (PLAN) order of battle is likely 

to have by 2025.12
277

Japan cannot neglect the problems posed by North 

Korea and, as already mentioned, it will continue to 

develop its ballistic missile defense capabilities. Having a redundant capability versus North Korean missiles is an important strategic issue for Tokyo. It seems 

likely that over the next decade, Japan will also develop or buy land attack cruise missiles it can fit on its 

submarine force. This will provide a limited capability 

to deal with North Korean missiles before they can be 

launched.

In short, Japan has strategic issues with the PLA 

modernization no matter what vector the PLA takes. 

Clearly, the vector characterized as a “weakened PLA” 

would probably not be seen by Tokyo as a weakened 

PLA, rather it would be seen in mere slowing of PLA 

modernization, which obviously could lessen the urgency to improve the self-defense force. But since a 

“weakened PLA” is not losing capability, it has just 

stopped adding it as fast, it seems more likely that Japan will continued to be concerned about living in the 

shadow of a militarily imposing China.

A Japan-Inspired Multilateral Response?

An expeditionary PLA implies that China would 

be able to interdict Japan’s sea lanes anywhere in the 

world, not just in the waters around Japan. Tokyo is 

hedging against an expeditionary PLA by working 

diligently to improve its military relations with India 

and Australia. Since all three of these countries would 

have strategic equities at risk by an expeditionary 

PLA, it seems plausible that military relations and cooperation between India, Australia, and Japan in 2025 

will have developed beyond today’s nascent stage. If 

the PLA continues on the expeditionary vector, some 
278

sort of Indo-Pacific multilateral response fostered by 

Japan and Australia is likely to emerge.13

Taiwan.

Currently, Taiwan is in a terrible position when it 

comes to the military “imbalance” across the Strait. 

The PRC has the ability to bombard the island with 

hundreds of missiles, followed by fixed-wing aircraft 

attacks, and create all sort of mayhem for Taiwan’s 

economy through cyber attacks and expropriation of 

Taiwanese assets on the mainland. As in the case of 

Japan, the trajectory of PLA modernization is essentially immaterial to Taipei. The PLA already has what 

it needs to “punish” Taiwan; and Taipei can do nothing to reverse this situation. Again, as in the case of 

Japan, the ability of the United States to deal successfully with China’s “counterintervention” capabilities 

has major implications for Taiwan’s security. Where 

Taiwan still has military leverage lies in the fact that 

so long as the will to resist exists in Taipei, the PLA 

faces the daunting task of successfully crossing the 

100 miles of ocean between the mainland and Taiwan, 

landing on a defended beachhead, and successfully 

effecting regime change by invasion.

Taiwan is currently in the midst of a very expensive shift to an all-volunteer force that hopefully will 

yield a smaller but more effective army that would be 

able to prevent the PLA from gaining a foothold on 

the island. An agile army armed with Apache gunships, combined with shore based anti-ship cruise 

missiles, and fast-attack craft would form a credible 

anti-invasion capability. Even though the prospect of a 

Chinese invasion attempt is extremely remote, having 

this mix of capabilities does introduce an element of 
279

deterrence by denial into PLA calculations. Of course, 

Taiwan totally depends on arms purchases from the 

United States for those items it cannot produce itself. 

Over the course of the next decade, both Washington and Taipei will face difficult decisions regarding 

the modernization of Taiwan’s air force. Meanwhile, 

Taipei is poised to begin the development of its own 

conventionally powered submarine force. This will be 

difficult and expensive, but if current plans actually 

pan out, by 2025, the ROC navy would have a valuable new capability in its anti-invasion arsenal.14

THE FAR NEIGHBORHOOD RESPONSE 

TO CHINA’S GROWING POWER

—SOUTHEAST ASIA 

PLA modernization over the next decade is likely 

to provoke the same reactions that have characterized Southeast Asia’s response to China’s growing 

power over the past 10 years. They will continue to 

have a close relationship with America, but they will 

be careful to try and avoid to be perceived by Beijing 

as becoming part of an anti-Chinese coalition. The objective is to hedge or balance their relations between 

Beijing and Washington. China is the largest trading 

partner of each of its near neighbors, and none of them 

wants to upset the economic relationship with China. 

Yet, they look to Washington for moral and security 

oriented support where they have disagreements 

with China. In this regard, the reaction of Southeast 

Asian nations to the disputes in the South China Sea is 

instructive.15
280

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

and Multilateralism.

China’s neighbors to the Southeast can be broadly divided into three camps: those on the front lines 

of the sovereignty issue, especially Vietnam and the 

Philippines; those with significant interests in the outcome of the territorial disagreement (specifically, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei); and those 

inclined to accommodate China, including Cambodia, 

Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. This division was on 

full display during the November 2012 East Asia Summit, which President Barack Obama attended. The 

end result of the summit was a split between six countries (the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 

Vietnam, and Brunei) that favored broader discussion 

of the SCS, and four (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and 

Thailand) that did not. Countries without sovereignty 

disputes with China do not wish to anger China.16

The result is that it is unlikely that the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) inspired multilateral institutions with a security focus, such as the East 

Asia Summit (EAS) or the ASEAN Defense Minister 

Meeting (ADMM+), are likely to be unable to reach 

a consensus that could be construed as being antiChinese. Unless China is particularly maladroit in its 

regional diplomacy this is likely to be the case in 2025.

 Many Southeast Asian countries are counting 

(hoping) the U.S. rebalance strategy will act as a brake 

on Chinese assertiveness.17 As a result, when forecasting 2025, the past is likely to be a prologue. Each 

ASEAN member will continue to carefully hedge its 

relationships between Beijing and Washington. Examples of this behavior abound, in April 2012, for 

instance, U.S. ally Thailand elevated its bilateral rela-
281

tionship with China to “strategic partnership,” and in 

July 2012, it dispatched a senior military delegation to 

visit China as a minister of defense counterpart. More 

recently, Thailand opted to include the PLA as a participant in the 2014 Cobra Gold exercise. Vietnam, as a 

frontline state in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes, 

has been careful to avoid making its relationship with 

China any worse, and has seemingly “walled off” its 

SCS disputes from broader Sino-Vietnam relations. 

That policy may be revised in the wake of the nasty 

May 2014 dispute with China over oil exploration in 

Vietnam’s EEZ. 

Malaysia and Indonesia have also been careful to 

balance their engagements with Washington and Beijing. Malaysia held its first bilateral “defense and security consultation” with China in September 2012 and 

agreed to strengthen military exchanges and cooperation, while, in April 2014, agreed to a “comprehensive 

partnership” with Washington.18 Jakarta, for its part, 

values its “comprehensive partnership” with Washington, but also emphasizes developing good defense 

relations with China. In August 2012, an agreement 

was reached with China that permitted Indonesia to 

produce China’s C-705 anti-ship cruise missile under 

license.19 Indonesia has also embarked on a gradual 

military modernization based on co-production understandings so that over time it will create an indigenous defense industrial base.20 This includes a submarine procurement from South Korea, which would 

be a very relevant capability if the issue of China’s 

SCS nine-dashed line overlapping with Indonesia’s 

Natuna gas field becomes militarized.21

Singapore plays an important role in enabling 

Washington’s rebalance strategy, by agreeing to permit four U.S. Navy warships to be stationed rotation-
282

ally in Singapore. This gives the United States easy 

naval access to the SCS, and suggests a more or less 

permanent U.S. naval presence in the SCS. That said, 

Singapore is very careful to remain neutral between 

China and the United States; it rationalizes its 2-decades-old security relationship with the United States 

as a hedge against Indonesia and Malaysia.22 At the 

same time, Singapore is improving its ability to look 

after its maritime interests. The Republic of Singapore 

navy is already the best equipped navy in Southeast 

Asia. It is an example of a how a small navy can transcend its physical limitations and make an important 

contribution to regional and international security.23

The fact that Singapore’s modernization is not directly driven by China is an important point. Simply 

put, Southeast Asia military modernization is not all 

about China. Regional rivalries are alive and well. 

Submarine procurement is a good example: Singapore, 

Malaysia, and Indonesia are embarked on submarine 

programs that are as much about keeping-up with one 

another as patrolling their respective EEZs. Nonetheless, submarines like most modern weapons systems 

are inherently multimission; provided these countries 

are able to properly maintain them and operate them 

professionally they also provide an important capability for Malaysia and Indonesia to use in defending 

SCS claims against Chinese assertiveness. It is worth 

keeping in mind that by 2025, the SCS, a relatively 

confined body of water, will be the area where an impressive number of submarines from the littoral states 

plus China and the United States will operate. Developing some sort of water space management scheme 

could become a significant ASEAN issue.
283

The Philippines.

The Philippines is a front-line state in the confrontation with China over SCS sovereignty disputes. Not 

surprisingly, the government of the Philippines has 

warmly embraced Washington’s rebalance strategy; it 

has had to. The April 2012 standoff with China over 

Scarborough Shoal highlighted the fact that it is virtually defenseless at sea or in the air. Because of their 

security incapacity, the Philippines will hardly notice 

the difference between a regional PLA, an expeditionary PLA, or a PLA whose modernization momentum 

has slowed. No matter what the vector the PLA takes, 

the Philippines will remain woefully overmatched. 

Moreover, Manila cannot afford a major increase in 

defense expenditures. As a result, Manila has sought 

to ensure its security through developing a close security relationship with the United States, and in April 

2014, signed an agreement that will allow U.S. military 

access to five former U.S. bases in the Philippines for 

the next 10 years.24 This was the culmination of over 

2 years of increased periodic presence of U.S. naval 

ships, submarines, and aircraft. Particularly important 

to both parties will be access to the former Cubi Point 

Naval Air Station in Subic Bay, which will facilitate 

aerial reconnaissance over the SCS.25

However, the U.S.-Philippine security relationship 

is susceptible to the ebb and flow of Philippine public 

opinion regarding the “return” of a U.S. military presence versus how assertive Beijing is in its dealings with 

Manila. Beijing is not happy with Manila’s decision to 

challenge its claims in the SCS at the International Tribunal for the Law of Sea. Whether that unhappiness 

will persist over next decade, is difficult to predict. It 

is not difficult to anticipate, however, that as long as 
284

Manila encourages or facilitates an improvement in 

U.S. military posture along the SCS littoral, that the 

Sino-Philippine relationship will be difficult.

It is reasonable to expect that, over the next 10 

years, the Philippines’ maritime and aviation capability will show incremental improvements; but not to 

the extent that Manila could ensure the security of its 

maritime claims on its own.

Vietnam.

Vietnam’s defense budget has grown by over 80 

percent over the first decade of the 21st century. Much 

of this growth was due to purchases that contribute to 

its ability to defend its EEZ and disputed claims in the 

SCS: specifically naval ships and submarines, coastal 

defense cruise missiles, and surveillance. At the urging of the leadership, the Vietnam People’s Army 

(VPA) has embraced the idea of defense dialogues, 

strategic partnership agreements, and practical bilateral military cooperation, and has placed a priority on 

cultivating defense links with neighbors and developing Vietnam’s role in multilateral organizations as a 

critical component of national defense.26

Vietnam has not issued a maritime strategy, but 

Hanoi did publish a defense white paper in 2009, 

in which the navy’s responsibility was described as 

strictly managing and controlling “the waters and 

islands in the East Sea under Vietnam’s sovereignty” 

to include maintaining maritime security, sovereignty and sovereign rights, jurisdiction, and national 

interests at sea.27

Vietnam’s most newsworthy purchase related to 

SCS defense has been the six Kilo-class submarines ordered from Russia in 2009, the first of which arrived in 
285

January 2014. Professor Carlyle Thayer, a specialist on 

the Vietnamese military at Australia’s Defense Force 

Academy, reported in 2009 that Vietnam was seeking a credible deterrent against China, hoping to defend its own claims to the SCS. “It’s a very bold step,” 

Thayer was quoted as saying. He continued:

It has been apparent for some time now that Vietnam’s 

sovereignty is under threat in the South China Sea, and 

that is something that is painfully felt in Hanoi. Hanoi 

knows it could never hope to match the Chinese Navy, 

but it can at least make them think very hard before 

any attempt to, for example, drive Vietnam off some 

of their Spratly Islands holdings. Even a few Kilos 

makes that a very complicated business, indeed, you 

suddenly have to factor in losing ships.28

The May 2014 deployment of a mobile drilling 

platform by China’s National Off-shore Oil Company 

to an area within Vietnam’s EEZ and on its continental 

shelf has infuriated Hanoi, and is likely to reinforce 

the need to be able to defend its off-shore resources.29

Vietnam has not just acquired submarines. It also has 

ordered four Russian-built Gepard-class corvettes. 

Vietnam is also producing under license at least 10 

550-ton fast-attack craft that are fitted with anti-ship 

cruise missiles. These will be combined with the socalled Bastion Coastal Defense System, also from Russia, which consists of truck-mounted anti-ship cruise 

missiles, along with its 20-odd Su-27/30 aircraft that 

are capable of maritime strike; and four very modern 

Dutch corvettes of the SIGMA class. Altogether, Vietnam is putting into place a formidable off-shore naval 

force.30

All these off-the-shelf purchases must still be knitted together into an integrated force, with effective 
286

surveillance and command and control, but Hanoi’s 

intent is clear. There is little question that Chinese 

naval capability is the focus of these procurements. 

Vietnam wants to make certain that it can defend its 

maritime claims, and that it will avoid a replay of 

the 1988 South Johnson Reef clash with the PLAN, in 

which two Vietnamese landing craft were sunk, a third 

was badly damaged, and more than 70 Vietnamese 

were killed. 

As in the case of Japan, Vietnam is intent on improving its capabilities no matter what vector the PLA 

takes over the next decade. Vietnam has centuries of 

experience in dealing with China, including repeated 

invasions, but dealing with China in the maritime domain is a novel experience for Hanoi. By 2025, most 

of the ongoing procurements should be in place. This 

should provide Hanoi with a very reasonable maritime access denial capability. Again, as in the case 

of other neighbors of China, Vietnam is likely to do 

what it can to modernize its military no matter what 

developmental vector the PLA takes. The confrontation that started in May 2014 over drilling for oil in 

Vietnam’s EEZ, and subsequent outburst of public anger at China, has undoubtedly reinforced the need for 

Vietnam to be able to defend its interests in the South 

China Sea.

INDIAN OCEAN STATES RESPONSES

—AUSTRALIA AND INDIA

Australia.

In 2009 Australia issued a defense white paper that 

announced plans to add significant capabilities to the 

Australian Defense Force. It rationalized this across 
287

the board modernization plan by offering a somewhat 

pessimistic picture of Australia’s future strategic environment and the potential negative consequences 

of China’s military modernization. It was straightforward:

 China will also be the strongest Asian military power, 

by a considerable margin. Its military modernisation 

will be increasingly characterised by the development 

of power projection capabilities. A major power of 

China’s stature can be expected to develop a globally 

significant military capability befitting its size. But the 

pace, scope and structure of China’s military modernisation have the potential to give its neighbours cause 

for concern if not carefully explained, and if China 

does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans. . . . If it does not, there is 

likely to be a question in the minds of regional states 

about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernisation 

appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what 

would be required for a conflict over Taiwan.31

Today, Australia’s problem is how to align a very 

ambitious force structure plans with shrinking, or at 

least stagnating, defense budgets. The 2013 white paper changed the strategic narrative by sounding more 

optimistic about China’s rise. It did not, however, 

change the planned force structure. Instead, it deeply cut the defense budget. The reason for this about 

face, according to a senior analyst at the Australian 

Strategy Policy Institute is:

It is not that Australia has suddenly felt more secure. 

If anything, events in the region have elevated fears 

that the rise of China will upset the strategic stability upon which Australia’s prosperity is built. Nor is 

there any sense that Australia can relax because the 
288

United States has reasserted its commitment to the 

Asia-Pacific. Rather the recent retrenchment in Australian defense spending is largely the result of domestic 

politics. The Australian polity has an acute aversion to 

deficits and debt.32

Upon taking office in October 2013, Prime Minister 

Tony Abbott vowed to restore defense spending to 

2 percent of gross domestic product from its current 

1.59 percent over the course of the decade, conditioned 

by the caveat that the increase would be subject to 

economic conditions.33

Meanwhile, all of Australia’s services are pressing on, within budgetary limits, with modernization 

plans. The Australian army is restructuring the regular army into three multirole combat brigades, one of 

which is currently designated to be the backbone of a 

new amphibious capability. The new capability will 

be centered on two large, Spanish designed 27,000-ton 

landing helicopter docks, the Canberra class. These 

two ships are under construction, and will be the largest ships ever in Australia’s inventory. 

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) also aims 

to procure a range of highly sophisticated new aircraft. The original plan to acquire 100 F-35A’s from the 

United States will be cut to 72. The former Gillard government also decided to purchase 12 F-18 Growlers, 

the electronic attack version of the F-18 along with 24 

F-18E/F, these are going forward. If these decisions all 

reach fruition, by 2025 the RAAF would emerge with a 

second-to-none air combat capability in its immediate 

neighborhood, and certainly be able to overmatch any 

PLAN aircraft carrier based expeditionary air power. 

The RAAF also intends to introduce a new maritime 

patrol aircraft, the P-8A Poseidon, as well as the new 

C-27J strategic airlift. 
289

Its submarine force is a key to Australia’s strategy 

for defending its maritime approaches. The current 

Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Collins class submarines 

have been an operational disappointment; plagued 

with reliability problems. There has been considerable 

debate whether to give up on the Collins class and 

start a new submarine program, or to make a serious 

attempt to fix what ails the class and put off starting 

the new class of 12 submarines to several years in the 

future. It seems probable that the budgetary situation 

will dictate that the start of a new submarine program 

will be delayed. At the same time the RAN also plans 

to replace its aging ANZAC-class frigates. Moreover, 

the government has raised the possibility of building a 

fourth air warfare destroyer as a means to save the domestic shipbuilding industry from losing ship building expertise because of insufficient orders. 

Working on assumption that the Abbot government’s next Defense Capability Plan will generally 

sustain Australia’s current modernization direction, 

by 2025, Australia will remain technologically far superior to any Southeast Asian country, and buttressed 

by its alliance with the United States, will be confident 

about its security situation vis-à-vis a Chinese expeditionary capability.

India.34

India faces a two-front strategic problem with China. It has a disputed frontier that has already been the 

cause of a ground war and continues to be the trigger 

for ground and air force posture improvements for 

India’s armed forces. Recent Chinese “provocations” 

have highlighted the fact that China can mobilize 

a very large force in Tibet. As a counter, New Delhi 
290

decided to establish an 80,000-man mountain strike 

corps in Panagarah, West Bengal, with supporting 

air power. The stated objective of this force is to deter a serious PLA incursion.35 Should deterrence fail, 

and India and China come to blows on the Northeast 

frontier, Indian defense officials believe India’s geographic location, astride the Indian Ocean sea lanes 

that China relies upon, is an asymmetric advantage.36

It provides a way to inflict pain on China that it cannot easily counter. The Indian belief is that its submarine force, land-based air power and surface navy 

has the ability to create a serious sea lane problem for 

China.37

But Indian strategists worry that this advantage 

may be short-lived. The main problem is that Indian’s 

sclerotic procurement process will ensure that India 

will be out-built, and as a result, perhaps as soon as 

2025, the PLAN will be able to turn the tables on India. The PLAN will have the capability to interdict the 

sea lanes which bring oil and other resources from 

the Persian Gulf and East and West Africa that India 

needs for its economic development. As the PLAN 

just demonstrated in late-2013, one of its nuclear attack submarine (SSN) could operate with virtual impunity against India in the Arabian Sea.38

The Indian naval view is that, piracy or no piracy in 

the Gulf of Aden, China is in the Indian Ocean region 

(IOR) to stay.39 Piracy provided a chance for China to 

build its navy and its profile. But, from India’s perspective, there is a clear logic governing China’s interest in the IOR and, without piracy, the Chinese will 

find some other reason to justify their presence there. 

In short, India is very conscious of the implicit 

threat posed by across the board Chinese military 

modernization. They are also very aware of the short-
291

comings associated with their own procurement processes.40 Should the PLA embark on the expeditionary 

vector and begin to operate routinely more substantial 

forces in the Indian Ocean region, India may be forced 

to come to terms with its internal defense procurement problems. It will also have to decide how far it 

wants to move internationally in aligning itself with 

western democratic sea powers like the United States, 

Australia, and Japan. Moving further away from its 

cherished nonaligned (strategic autonomy) heritage 

would be politically difficult, and is likely to be decided upon only if New Delhi is persuaded its position in 

the Indian Ocean region is in jeopardy.

What about an Indo-Pacific Multilateral Response 

to a PLA Expeditionary Capability? 

Over the last decade, a number of initiatives have 

been explored by official government suggestions, as 

well as research centers in the United States, Japan, 

Australia, and India suggesting some sort of maritime coalition. For example, the Japanese suggested in 

2004 a maritime coalition of democracies in Asia. At 

the tactical level, this has been manifested by inviting 

one another to participate in well-established multilateral maritime exercises. The governments in all four 

countries have taken only hesitant steps in the direction of formalizing such an arrangement because they 

did not want Beijing to conclude that some sort of an 

anti-China alliance was forming. However, over the 

next decade, these nascent steps could become more 

formal if China pursues an expeditionary emphasis in 

PLA modernization while continuing its disturbingly 

assertive approach to dispute settlement with neighbors whose sovereignty claims conflict with China’s 
292

view of its territory.41 As its power continues to grow, 

will China take a similar approach to other neighborhood disputes, ignoring established rules and established dispute mechanisms, while attempting to rewrite or ignore rules that do not favor its interests? 

The combination of these factors could easily trigger a 

multilateral hedge against China.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

China is not starting with a blank slate when it 

comes to PLA military capabilities. Beijing already 

possesses very capable systems that can “reach out 

and touch” all of its neighbors. This has already triggered reactions by most of its neighbors to improve 

their security by modernizing their militaries, moving 

closer to the United States, or both. As a result, a series 

of security related decisions from regional countries 

are already in progress that will be relatively unaffected by whatever modernization vector the PLA 

pursues.

Anxiety regarding China’s military modernization 

is directly related to how China behaves diplomatically, economically, and politically toward its neighbors. Despite the cautions of strategists and military 

planners to focus on PLA capabilities and not on Beijing’s political intentions, which can change in an instant. The reality is that good relations tend to greatly 

reduce anxiety about military modernization. How 

China interacts with its neighbors will have major 

implications on how nervous they become if the PLA 

proceeds along one of the postulated vectors focused 

on enhancement.

Obviously, the vector that has the PLA slowing 

the pace of modernization, if combined with art-
293

ful Chinese “smile diplomacy,” will have the greatest influence on lessening the urgency its neighbors 

demonstrate in addressing their own modernization 

programs. But, since many of these programs are well 

underway today, it seems unlikely that the political 

establishments in the capitals of China’s neighbors 

would simply halt those plans in the face of a more 

regionally benign China.

For Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the 

efficacy of their defense treaties with Washington 

will continue to be questioned in the face of an everimproving PLA, particularly one that is focused on 

regional security. South Korea does not share Japan’s 

or the Philippines’ sense of insecurity when it comes 

to China. Many South Korean security analysts think 

that a united Korea could comfortably co-exist with a 

powerful Chinese neighbor. The major problem Seoul 

has with Beijing is China’s support for North Korea. 

EEZ demarcation and fishing disputes are issues that 

can be managed by both capitals. 

Japan, on the other hand, has few choices other 

than the United States to ensure its security. However, 

it is important to keep in mind that very bad relations 

have not been the post-World War II norm for SinoJapanese relations and by 2025, they could be better. 

But Japan’s growing sense of insecurity in the face of 

PLA capabilities that has the potential to ruin Japan’s 

economy has finally persuaded Tokyo that China is a 

long-term threat. If Tokyo’s decisionmakers come to 

believe that the U.S. alliance does not have the capability or political will to underwrite Japan’s security, it 

seems likely it will develop its own nuclear deterrent 

in the face of a PLA that continues to grow and overmatch Japan’s conventional forces.
294

Further afield, an expeditionary PLA will cause 

Australia and India to look very closely after their 

own defenses, and spur multilateral approaches as a 

hedge against Chinese power. In Australia’s case, security based on confidence in U.S. alliance rests on a 

much firmer foundation than the U.S.-Japan alliance 

because of the realities of geography.42 Australia is 

far enough away from the locus of Chinese power 

to make PLA area denial a not particularly credible 

threat. India faces the threat from both a regional PLA 

on its northern frontier as well as an expeditionary 

PLA in the Indian Ocean. This may convince Indian 

strategic planners it is surrounded, confronted with a 

two-front, or if Pakistan is involved, a three-front security challenge.

Finally, I believe that the PLA will continue to improve its regional capabilities as well as improve its 

expeditionary forces; they are not mutually exclusive 

and that, at least in the Indo-Pacific region, we will 

see a PLA well-poised to defend China and its territorial claims; as well as one, that, for the first time since 

Ming Dynasty’s Admiral Zheng He, be able to project 

power in pursuit of limited aims anywhere along the 

Indo-Pacific littoral.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. Commentary during RSIS Singapore workshop on “China’s 

Regional Diplomacy,” December 9-10, 2013; and Bonnie Glaser, 

“China’s Grand Strategy in Asia, Statement before the U.S.-China 

Economic and Strategic Review Commission, Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), available 

from csis.org/files/attachments/ts140313_glaser.pdf. 

2. It is important to keep in mind that, barring illness or some 

massive internal disruption, Xi Jinping is likely to remain China’s 

leader until 2023, which implies great continuity of policies that 

have his personal imprimatur.
295

3. Scott Snyder, “China-Korea: Crying Uncle No-More: 

Stark Choices for Relations,” Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, Vol. 15, No. 3, 

Pacific Forum CSIS, January 2014, available from csis.org/files/

publication/1303qchina_korea.pdf.

4. For hedging against China, see, for example, Christopher 

Hughes, “China’s Military Modernization: U.S. Allies and partners 

in Northeast Asia,” Ashley Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2012-2013, China’s Military Challenge, Seattle, WA: The 

National Bureau of Asia Research, 2012, pp. 224-227. For hedging 

against Japan, see “62% of South Koreans View Japan as a Credible Military Threat,” The American Interest, November 3, 2013, 

available from www.the-american-interest.com/blog/2013/11/03/62-

of-south-koreans-view-japan-as-credible-military-threat/.

5. The May 2014 visit by President Obama to South Korea 

signaled an understanding between the two countries that postponing OPCON transfer until the threat from North Korea abates 

would be a wise decision. Ellen Kim, “President Obama’s Visit to 

South Korea,” cogitASIA, A blog of the CSIS Asia Program, April 29, 

2014, available from cogitasia.com/president-obamas-visit-to-southkorea/.

6. China’s East China Sea ADIZ encompassed Ieodo Rock, 

and, when Seoul asked Beijing to modify the ADIZ boundary, 

Beijing refused. Seoul responded in kind and expanded its ADIZ 

to also cover the rock. Lily Kuo, “Will a Tiny Submerged Rock 

Spark a New Crisis in the East China Sea,” The Atlantic online, December 9, 2013, www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/12/will-atiny-submerged-rock-spark-a-new-crisis-in-the-east-china-sea/282155/.

7. Terence Roehrig, “Republic of Korea Navy and China’s 

Rise: Balancing Competing Priorities,” Chap. in CNA Maritime 

Asia Project Workshop Two: Naval Developments in Asia, Alexandria, 

VA: CNA Center for Naval Analyses, 2012.

8. Ibid.

9. Michael McDevitt, “The Maritime Relationship,” Scott Snyder, ed., The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Meeting New Security Challenges, Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2012, pp. 36-39.
296

 10. See for example, Clay Blair, Jr., Silent Victory: U.S. Submarine War Against Japan, Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 

2001 Ed.

11. For a short discussion of anti-access area denial, see Michael McDevitt, “The Evolving Maritime Security Environment 

in East Asia: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” PACNET 

33, May 31, 2012, available from https://csis.org/files/publication/

Pac1233.pdf.

12. Hughes, pp. 203-216. 

13. Kei Koga and Yogesh Joshi, “Japan-India Security Cooperation,” The Diplomat, July 17, 2013, available from thediplomat.

com/2013/07/japan-india-security-cooperation/2/; and Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense White Paper 2013, Section 2, “Promotion 

of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges,” Tokyo, Japan, available 

from www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2013/38_Part3_Chapter2_

Sec2.pdf.

14. This section is based on Department of Defense, Annual 

Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People’s Republic of China 2013, Section 5.55-59, Washington, DC, 

available from www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf.

15. There are a number of excellent analyses of Southeast 

Asia’s response to growth of Chinese power and the subsequent 

U.S. rebalance strategy. The one that I found most helpful and 

current is Euan Graham, “Southeast Asia in the U.S. Rebalance: 

Perceptions from a Divided Region,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 

Vol. 35, No. 3, December 2013, pp. 335-332, available from https://

bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/1942.

16. Natasha Bererton-Fukui, “Sea Tensions Erupt at Asian 

Summit,” The Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2012. 

17. “The U.S. Rebalance: Potential and Limits in Southeast 

Asia,” Strategic Comments, Vol. 18, Comment 49, London, UK, 

IISS website, www.iiss.org, December 2012, available from www.

iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2012-bb59/

us-rebalance--potential-and-limits-in-southeast-asia-c5a7.
297

18. Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint statement by President 

Obama and Prime Minister Najib of Malaysia,” Washington, DC: 

The White House, April 27, 2014, available from www.whitehouse.

gov/the-press-office/2014/04/27/joint-statement-president-obama-andprime-minister-najib-malaysia.

19. “U.S. rebalance,” IISS Strategic Comments.

20. Richard Bitzinger, “Revisiting Armaments Production in 

Southeast Asia: New Dreams, Same Challenges,” Contemporary 

Southeast Asia, Vol. 35, No. 3, December 2013, p. 384, available 

from www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-354576536/revisiting-armaments-production-in-southeast-asia.

21. Yoshihiro Makino, “Indonesia buys 3 submarines from 

South Korea,” Asahi Shimbum, December 6, 2011, available from 

ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/korean_peninsula/AJ201112060032.

22. As former Singapore Prime Minster Lee Kwan Yew famously put it in his memoirs, “Singapore is a Chinese island in 

a Malay Sea.” See Lee Kwan Yew, From Third World to First: The 

Singapore Story 1965-2000, Singapore: Times Media, 2000, p. 25.

23. Swee Leon Collin Koh, “The Best Little Navy in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Republic of Singapore Navy,” Michael 

Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller, eds., Small Navies: 

Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in Peace and War, Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2014, pp. 117-132. 

24. Press Briefing by Deputy National Security Advisor for 

Strategic Communication Ben Rhodes and NSC Senior Director 

for Asian Affairs Evan Medeiros, Grand Millennium Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, April 27, 2014, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/27/press-briefing-deputy-nationalsecurity-advisor-strategic-communication.

25. Simone Orendain, “Philippines Readies for Increased U.S. 

Presence,” December 12, 2012, available from www.voanews.com/

artcilceprintview/1563453.html.

26. Le Hong Hiep, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy Against 

China since Normalization,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 35, 
298

No. 3, December 2013, pp. 353-356, available from https://bookshop.

iseas.edu.sg/publication/1942.

27. Ministry of Defense, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 

“Vietnam National Defense,” Hanoi, 2009, available from admm.

org.vn:6789/TempFiles/ba88fe13-f154-48aa-b9b7-27ffaa18b3b4.

pdf. See also Bernard D. Cole, Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2013, p. 179.

28. Carlyle Thayer, quoted in Greg Torode, “Vietnam Buys 

Submarines to Counter China,” South China Morning Post, December 17, 2009, available from www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/vietnam_

buys_submarines_SCMP.htm.

29. Carlyle Thayer, “China’s Oil Rig Gambit: South China 

Sea Game Changer?” The Diplomat, May 12, 2014, available from 

thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-oil-rig-gambit-south-china-sea-gamechanger/.

30. Le Hong Hiep, pp. 355-356.

31. Ibid., p. 34.

32. Mark Thompson, “Confusion Down Under: Australia and 

the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” Asia-Pacific Bulletin, No. 180, East-West 

Center, September 18, 2012, available from www.EastWestCenter.

org/APB.

33. Jason Scott, “Australia Pledges to Lift Defense Spending 

from 7-Decade Low,” Bloomberg News, May 13, 2014. available 

from www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-13/australia-pledges-to-liftdefense-spending-from-7-decade-low.html.

34. Over the last 5 years, I have directed a bilateral workshop 

series with India’s National Maritime Foundation (an India Navy 

funded nongovernmental organization) that has focused on Indian Ocean maritime issues and the naval relationship between the 

United States and India. Many of the insights and analysis found 

in this section are drawn from the strategic discussions held during these not for attribution events.
299

35. Ranjit Pandit, “Army Kicks-Off Raising New Mountain 

Strike Corps against China,” The Times of India, January 9, 2014 

available from articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2014-01-09/

india/46028828_1_new-corps-liberation-army-two-new-infantrydivisions.

36. An excellent short overview of India’s strategic situation, 

with good maps, is “India as a Great Power: Know Your Own 

Strength,” The Economist, March 30, 2013, available from www.

economist.com/news/briefing/21574458-india-poised-become-one-fourlargest-military-powers-world-end.

37. Dr. David Brewster, “Looking Beyond the String of 

Pearls: The Indian Ocean Is where India Holds a Clear Advantage over China,” India Today, May 16, 2013, available from 

indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-ocean-india-china-strategic-rivalrytensions/1/271324.html.

38. Sandeep Unnithan, “Hidden Dragon on the High Seas,” 

India Today, March 31, 2014, available from indiatoday.intoday.in/

story/china-nuclear-powered-attack-submarine-south-chinasea/1/350573.html.

39. Staff Report, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, “China Extends Its Combat Reach into the Indian 

Ocean,” March 14, 2014, available from origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/

default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Navy%20

Extends%20its%20Combat%20Reach%20to%20the%20Indian%20

Ocean.pdf.

40. Debe R. Mohanty, “India’s Defense Sector Still Plagued 

by Corruption,” Strafor, February 14, 2014, available from www.

stratfor.com/the-hub/indias-defense-sector-still-plagued-corruption.

41. See for example, Lisa Curtis, Walter Lohman, Rory Medcalf et al.,” Shared Goals, Converging Interests: A Plan for U.S.-

Australian-Indian Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” Heritage 

Foundation, November 3, 2011, available from www.heritage.org/

research/reports/2011/11/shared-goals-converging-interests-a-planfor-u-s-australia-india-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific; and Ashok 

Sharma, “The Quadrilateral Initiative: An Evaluation,” South Asia

Survey, Vol. 17, No. 2, September 2010, pp. 237-253. 
300

42. This is not to say there have not been serious debates in 

Australia over the need to hedge its security by not putting all 

its eggs in the alliance basket. For the most noted proponent of 

this point of view, see Hugh White, “Australia’s Choice: Will 

the Land Down Under Pick the United States or China?” Foreign 

Affairs, September 4, 2013, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/139902/hugh-white/australias-choice.
301

CHAPTER 10

IMPLICATIONS: 

CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Phillip C. Saunders

Views expressed are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the policies of the National Defense 

University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. 

Government. I would like to thank Denise Der and Jessica Drun for research assistance; and Lonnie Henley, 

Ellen Frost, and Susan Lawrence for helpful comments 

on the outline and draft.

To analyze China’s potential role in the 2025 international system under the three alternative futures 

considered in this volume, it is first necessary to describe the key elements of the current international 

system and assumptions about what that system will 

look like in 2025. China will influence the evolution of 

the future international system, but Beijing is unlikely 

to have either the power or the ambition to overturn 

the current international system and replace it with 

one that fully matches its interests. China is best understood as a “moderately revisionist” power that 

will seek reforms that increase its influence within 

the international system and adjustments of some international rules and norms to better match Chinese 

preferences. 

This chapter begins with a brief description of the 

current international system to provide a baseline assessment for analysis. The second section describes 

China’s relationship with the current international 

system and examines Chinese debates about where, 

whether, and how China should push for change in 
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international rules and norms. The third section considers potential changes in Chinese international behavior under three alternative futures: 1) a People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) focused on regional issues; 

2) a global expeditionary PLA; and 3) a weakened 

PLA. The conclusion seeks to identify common behavioral elements across the alternative futures and the 

most important drivers of Chinese behavior toward 

the international system and regions outside Asia. It 

also notes the interconnected nature of Chinese bilateral, regional, and global policy and the challenges in 

assessing any single area in isolation.

THE CURRENT AND FUTURE 

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Today’s International System.

The current international system includes a number of formal governance structures, most of which are 

parts of the United Nations (UN) system established 

after World War II. The UN General Assembly and 

subsidiary UN bodies are important in terms of global 

political governance, and the UN Security Council is 

the closest thing to an authoritative global security institution, albeit one where permanent Security Council 

members have veto power. In economic governance, 

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 

Bank play important roles in maintaining financial 

stability and fostering economic development, while 

the World Trade Organization (WTO) defines, and 

seeks to enforce, global trade rules. Multilateral organizations such as the Group of Seven (G-7), the Group 

of Twenty (G-20), and the Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development (OECD), although not 
303

formally part of the UN system, have become important vehicles for coordinating policy among major 

global economies. UN institutions are supplemented 

by international treaties and international law which 

prescribe rules of conduct in various functional areas 

and sometimes establish institutions to encourage cooperation and compliance. 

In addition to global institutions and treaties, 

groups of states in different regions have established a 

variety of regional institutions. Examples include the 

European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the 

Organization of American States, and a range of AsiaPacific institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic 

Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO), and others. Regional institutions vary widely 

in the extent to which their member states accept formal commitments and rules, with the EU perhaps 

the strongest example of an institution where member states have given up significant sovereignty to a 

supranational organization. In most cases, regional 

organizations have a relatively limited ability to bind 

their member states.

While most global organizations and many regional ones establish formal rules and norms of behavior, 

the anarchical nature of the international system can 

make enforcement problematic, especially when powerful states are involved. Global and regional institutions structure interactions between sovereign states 

and provide incentives that shape state behavior, but 

their ability to constrain powerful states is finite. As a 

result, patterns of international behavior reflect both 

formal rules and norms and the calculations of individual states about when to adhere to norms and 

when to violate them.1 Powerful states like the United 
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States, Russia, China, and major European countries 

are often reluctant to accept hard limits on their ability 

to wield power, preferring looser rules and norms that 

give them greater ability to use their superior power 

to shape or dictate outcomes. Powerful states can also 

often choose which of several overlapping global and 

regional organizations (or potential new ones) will 

best serve their interests in particular cases. 

One important constraining factor is that powerful 

states would be much worse off in a world of pure 

anarchy, where states are so concerned about relative power and security that they are unwilling to engage in much mutually beneficial cooperation (such 

as trade). Even powerful states are therefore usually 

careful to preserve existing institutions even if those 

institutions do not perfectly serve their interests.2

States are also sometimes willing to accept and adhere 

to rules that limit their individual power (what John 

Ikenberry calls “binding”) in order to produce cooperative outcomes that advance their broader interests.3

The institutions, rules, and norms of today’s international system were heavily shaped by the United 

States, the most powerful country by far after the end 

of World War II.4 Since its establishment, the postWorld War II international system has been affected 

by several important developments. One was the 

post-war economic reconstruction of Japan, Germany, 

and Western Europe, which strengthened the West 

in Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. A 

second was decolonialization in the 1950s and 1960s, 

which dismantled European colonial empires and 

greatly increased the number of sovereign states in 

Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. A third development was the collapse of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, which ended Cold War 
305

economic and political divisions and gradually integrated Eastern Europe and former Soviet states into 

a global economy. A fourth significant development 

is the EU institutionalization and geographical expansion into an organization that can give European 

countries a greater collective voice on some issues.

The net result has been a reduction in the U.S. 

preponderance that existed after World War II, a 

dramatic improvement in global living standards as 

countries took advantage of development opportunities in a globalized economy, and a redistribution of 

global power as rapid and differential growth rates altered the relative power of major states. Germany and 

Japan were the principal beneficiaries in the 1960s and 

1970s, followed by other East Asian countries in the 

1980s and China from the 1990s to the present. Major 

developing countries such as India, Brazil, and Indonesia have become regional powers with aspirations 

to global power status. It is important to note that the 

growth of all of today’s major powers has required 

greater integration into the global economy to acquire 

needed capital, technology, and resources and to take 

advantage of international markets and the benefits of 

participation in production networks. Today’s major 

powers can use economic power as leverage to achieve 

political or security ends, but would make themselves 

worse off if such efforts destroy or severely damage 

the foundations of the global economy. 

Within the current system, the United States is still 

the most powerful actor, but has become less willing 

to bear the burdens and costs associated with global 

leadership. These costs not only include the U.S. role 

in maintaining global security, but also U.S. willingness to serve as the “lender of last resort” and to provide market access to keep the global economy func-
306

tioning.5 U.S. allies in Europe and Asia helped support 

the dominant U.S. economic and security role via joint 

action and participation in institutions such the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the OECD, and 

the G-7. However, the post-Cold War international 

system also includes powerful countries such as Russia and China that do not share U.S. values or support a permanent U.S. leadership role. Rapid growth 

in large developing countries such as Brazil and India 

coupled with Japan’s economic stagnation and the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on the United 

States and Europe has reduced the relative power of 

those states supporting U.S. international leadership. 

The result is a significant reduction in U.S. global authority and ability to dictate outcomes. This reduction 

is symbolized by the shift from the G-7 to the G-20 as a 

more inclusive (and hence more legitimate) venue for 

global economic decisionmaking.6

In analyzing the three alternative futures, this 

chapter draws upon the assumptions about the international system and global technology in 2025 

presented in Chapter 2.

CHINA’S CALCULUS OF CHANGE

Over the last 20 years, China has benefitted more 

than any other country from access to the global economic and governance institutions created and sustained by the United States. These institutions (and 

a receptive U.S. attitude toward Chinese economic 

development) have permitted unprecedented rapid 

growth which has raised living standards, helped sustain the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic 

power, and transformed China’s position within the 
307

regional and global power structure. Although Chinese leaders may have initially hoped to use the international system solely as a means to increase China’s 

national power and automony, China has become increasingly dependent on the functions performed by 

international institutions in order to sustain economic 

growth.7 U.S. policymakers have called upon China 

to become a stronger supporter of the current international system, most notably in Deputy Secretary 

of State Robert Zoellick’s 2005 call for China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international 

system.8

Chinese leaders disclaim any intent to challenge 

the U.S. leadership role in the international system or 

any aspirations to replace the United States in that role. 

Yet, given China’s vulnerability to U.S. power, they 

are reluctant to endorse any steps that will strengthen 

the foundations of U.S. hegemony or endorse a special leadership role for Washington. Chinese dependence on the United States for critical functions such 

as protection of China’s sea lines of communication 

constitutes a significant strategic vulnerability. Most 

Chinese analysts (and policymakers) believe that the 

United States is committed to maintaining its dominant position and therefore will inevitably seek to 

constrain China’s rise.9

Chinese officials and analysts believe that China 

benefits from a global trend toward multipolarity (defined as power distributed more evenly among the 

major states and increased willingness of major states 

to act independently of the United States).10 Multipolarity gives China more diplomatic freedom to maneuver and makes it less vulnerable to hostile action 

by the United States, which is still the most powerful 

actor in the international system and the most able to 
308

facilitate or obstruct Chinese goals. Chinese scholars 

often note that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

was not a full participant in the construction of the 

post-World War II international order and that current international rules are not necessarily optimal for 

Chinese interests.11

Chinese official policy statements seek to reassure 

the United States that China has neither the capability nor the intent to challenge U.S. dominance. Several 

studies argue that there is little evidence that China 

seeks fundamental changes in the current international system, and that the current system serves China’s 

most important interests.12 Academic studies of Chinese compliance with existing international rules and 

norms generally find a record of increasing compliance, albeit with exceptions in some areas.13 Chinese 

officials and scholars argue that China only seeks reforms in global governance that will make the current 

system fairer.14 At the same time, China regularly calls 

for creation of a more just international economic order (which implies significant changes to current rules 

and norms and a reduction in U.S. global influence). 

The People’s Bank of China has publicly supported a 

reduction in the U.S. dollar’s role as the global reserve 

currency, which would weaken the foundations of 

U.S. financial power.15

Chinese scholars and officials have articulated a 

range of areas where China seeks modifications in international rules and norms. One study identifies three 

areas where there is widespread Chinese support for 

change: 1) ensuring that China and other developing 

countries have more influence in global institutions; 

2) increasing the degree to which the United States is 

constrained by global rules and norms; and 3) reducing the role of U.S. alliances and military deployments 
309

that might constrain China.16 Chinese complaints are 

usually couched in terms of the need for fairness for 

developing countries and increased “democracy” in 

international relations, but the underlying demand is 

for a Chinese seat at the table and a greater role for 

Beijing in shaping international rules and norms. 

China benefits from its privileged position as a 

veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council and has resisted efforts to allow countries such as Japan and India similar status. Given 

Beijing’s structural power as a permanent member 

of the UN Security Council, it is not surprising that 

China emphasizes the centrality of the UN in global 

security governance. In practice, China regularly uses 

its veto power to encourage resolution of conflicts via 

dialogue, to limit the role of sanctions, and to restrict 

the ability of the United States and other major powers to use force. Chinese leaders regularly emphasize 

the importance of respecting national sovereignty and 

opposing interference in internal affairs and seek to 

delegitimize military interventions not authorized by 

the UN.17 Under the rubric of “respecting choices of 

development paths,” China seeks to reduce the role 

of democracy as a precondition for participation in 

global and regional institutions such as the OECD and 

the International Energy Agency.18

China historically has been suspicious of multilateral institutions due to the potential for others to 

gang up against a weaker China. Chinese leaders 

have gradually recognized multilateral organizations as important venues for world politics and have 

learned to effectively synchronize their bilateral and 

multilateral diplomacy.19 China generally prefers institutions where it enjoys formal (via veto power) or 

informal (via consensus decisionmaking) blocking 
310

power, which gives Beijing a degree of control over 

both agenda and outcomes. In regional diplomacy, 

China appears to have a preference for institutions 

such as ASEAN+3 where the United States is not represented, and China has greater influence. However, 

multilateral organizations which exclude the United 

States are not a viable option for most global issues. 

China has supported the establishment of some alternative global institutions, such as the BRICS (Brazil, 

Russia, India, China, and South Africa) group. However, the conflicting interests of the members, and the 

fact that they all have equally important relationships 

with the United States, has limited the influence of 

such alternative institutions.

China and other powers not fully satisfied with the 

current international system have a range of potential 

responses. These include:

1. Accept existing rules even if not optimal.

2. Selective noncompliance.

3.Adjust existing rules to better reflect their 

interests or carve out exemptions.

4.Create alternative institutions with different 

rules (SCO, BRIC cooperation, regional trade blocs, 

regional organizations, etc.).

5. Challenge current leader of the international system in order to replace current institutions and rules 

with new ones.

The first three responses involve working within 

the current international system, often while seeking 

to mitigate its negative aspects (via noncompliance or 

exemptions) or pressing for reforms to disadvantageous rules. The fourth response involves setting up 

a “parallel universe” of alternative institutions with 

more favorable rules, norms, and membership. Such 
311

parallel institutions would compete with and (if successful) potentially replace existing institutions. Only 

the fifth option entails a direct and explicit challenge 

to U.S. leadership of the current international system, 

a challenge sometimes referred to as a “power transition” and often accompanied by a war between the 

established hegemon and the rising challenger.20 Chinese leaders have explicitly disclaimed any intention 

to challenge U.S. leadership even as China becomes 

more powerful; such assurances are a critical part of 

the proposal to build a “new type of major country 

relationship” between a dominant United States and 

a rising China.

China has employed the first four responses to 

different degrees in different issue areas (e.g., global 

security governance; international trade; international 

finance; regional security). These four options potentially can be combined or employed to different degrees in different areas. Efforts to change international 

institutions or rules in one area need not be part of a 

comprehensive challenge to the dominant power; significant changes are possible without hegemonic war. 

Some rules have explicit mechanisms that respond to 

changes in relative power (for example, World Bank 

and IMF voting shares are a function of the percentage 

of capital that a country contributes). Others respond 

to changes in relative power in a de facto manner (for 

example, increasing Chinese influence within the UN 

Security Council and General Assembly).

China is not the only country interested in changing international rules. This can either encourage or 

discourage Chinese attempts at change. If China can 

build a coalition of powerful, like-minded countries to 

change international rules, then the costs of pushing 

for change are shared and therefore reduced.21 Some 
312

argue that the BRICS countries22 or other groups of developing countries could form such a coalition.23 On 

the other hand, change produced through a coalition 

effort implies goals acceptable to all members; in such 

circumstances China may not be able to dictate new 

rules that best match its interests. Moreover, many 

countries benefit significantly from the current international system and may not support Chinese efforts 

at reform that might disrupt the functioning of current 

international institutions.24

China is best understood as a “moderately revisionist” power that seeks to reform the international 

system and adjust international rules and norms to 

better suit Chinese interests. Chinese support for the 

current international system is contingent on the costs 

and benefits of seeking adjustments in global rules and 

on China’s willingness to bear the burdens of a larger 

leadership role. A stronger China may be inclined to 

seek more significant revisions of global rules and 

norms, either on its own or in conjunction with others. However, many Chinese scholars who argue for 

modest revisions to the current international order 

cite China’s reluctance to take on more international 

responsibilities, concerns about provoking a confrontation with the United States, and China’s lack of sufficient power to remake international rules to better 

accord with its interests.25

Although Chinese leaders will almost certainly 

continue to try to avoid a direct challenge or a military 

confrontation with the United States, the more China’s 

relative power approaches U.S. power, the more likely Beijing is to push for adjustments in international 

rules and norms. Beijing’s reluctance to take on what 

Robert Sutter calls “costs, risks, and commitments” 

will be a constraint on Chinese ambitions to push 
313

for more radical change.26 Although current Chinese 

leaders proclaim a willingness to make more global 

contributions, in practice China has been reluctant to 

take on binding commitments. Moreover, in times of 

crisis Chinese leaders often fend off international demands for action by describing their most important 

responsibility as managing the Chinese economy and 

the welfare of 1.3 billion Chinese citizens.27

Another factor in the Chinese calculus is the degree of confidence Beijing has that China can achieve 

its national goals within the structure of current international institutions and rules. If China is prospering, more confident and secure Chinese leaders may 

feel less need to push for changes. On the other hand, 

a China that is faltering economically and facing internal turmoil will have a greater stake in defending sovereignty and pushing for international rules 

(on issues such as Internet security and control of 

information) that enhance the leadership’s ability to 

maintain control.

China’s historical experience with imperialism has 

led it to adopt foreign policy principles that emphasize respect for sovereignty and noninterference in the 

internal affairs of other countries. Yet, the exigencies 

of pursuing access to natural resources and protecting 

concrete Chinese interests overseas have led to deeper 

Chinese involvement in domestic politics in Burma, 

South Sudan, and elsewhere.28 Some Chinese analysts 

are critical of the ways in which China’s policy of noninterference has hindered diplomatic effectiveness in 

advancing Chinese economic and strategic interests.29

As Chinese dependence on imports of energy and raw 

materials increases and the Chinese overseas “footprint” in terms of investments, construction projects, 

and Chinese nationals working abroad expands, there 
314

will be domestic pressure for China to take a more active and assertive international role.30 China is likely 

to maintain its formal policy of respect for sovereignty 

and noninterference, but these policies may be interpreted more loosely if significant Chinese economic 

and strategic interests are threatened by instability or 

by political forces hostile to Chinese interests coming 

to power in important countries.

THREE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

Alternative Future 1: A PLA Focused on 

Regional Issues. 

In this future, the PLA’s primary mission remains to 

prepare for conflict on China’s periphery, particularly 

its maritime frontier along the southeast coast and, 

in particular, to fight a high-intensity war against 

U.S. military forces intervening on behalf of Taiwan, 

Japan, Vietnam, or whoever else China is fighting. 

The Taiwan issue has not been resolved to China’s 

satisfaction, or some other issue has loomed as large 

as Taiwan was before. The Chinese government has 

its internal issues well enough in hand to continue 

prioritizing and funding military modernization. The 

PLA is not confident that its modernization through 

2020 was sufficient to meet the U.S. threat, and outof-region missions continue to take a back seat as 

the PLA responds to the previously-unexpected increase in U.S. military capabilities. Regional conflict 

remains the central focus of PLA military modernization through 2030, and its ability to project power to 

other regions of the world increases only as an adjunct 

to developing combat capabilities out to the second 

island chain.30a

This future implies a China that is doing reasonably well economically, that is strategically focused 
315

on maritime territorial and political disputes in Asia 

(including Taiwan’s unresolved status), and that has a 

much more competitive relationship with the United 

States and with U.S. regional allies. Competition will 

be most intense within the Asia-Pacific region, which is 

where China’s most important interests are located.31

Intensified regional competition with Washington 

will also color China’s broader approach to the international system and its ties with other powers outside 

Asia. A key question for this chapter is the extent to 

which U.S.-China competition can be contained within Asia, or whether it expands to an intensified zerosum competition at the global level.32 Under these circumstances, Beijing is likely to pursue an incremental 

approach to changes in the international system.

China would likely seek to balance intensified regional competition with Washington with a degree 

of cooperation outside the region in order to avoid a 

confrontation with the United States. Beijing would 

not challenge the U.S. global role directly, but would 

continue to promote multipolarity, look for strategic 

partners among other developing countries and major powers, and seek opportunities on the margin to 

work with others to weaken the U.S. long-term power 

position (or at least limit U.S. efforts to entrench its 

dominance). This would include efforts to work with 

other developing countries to adjust global trade and 

finance rules in order to better serve the interests of 

developing countries. China would continue to promote increased use of the RMB as a settlement currency for international trade (thus increasing its international economic influence and reducing the U.S. 

dollar’s global role). Economic tensions between the 

United States and China and the increasing economic 

power of major developing countries are likely to 
316

make further multilateral trade liberalization difficult 

at the global level. Trade action may be more intense 

at the regional level, where China is likely to promote 

the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 

(RCEP) as an alternative to the U.S.-backed TransPacific Partnership (TPP). (However, some Chinese 

economists have warmed to TPP recently, viewing 

it as akin to WTO entry as a mechanism for forcing 

China to undertake necessary but politically difficult economic reforms.) China would likely increase 

its foreign aid, investment, and economic cooperation activities within the Asia-Pacific to increase its 

regional influence.

China would seek opportunities to demonstrate 

its contributions to global stability in order to offset 

the tensions its actions in Asia are producing.33 This 

might include a greater willingness to work with 

Washington on areas of mutual interest, such as 

nuclear nonproliferation, energy security, sea lane 

protection, counterpiracy, and other global issues. 

China’s willingness to cooperate with Washington in 

the UN Security Council would depend on the nature 

of the issue, with Beijing blocking actions that might 

adversely affect its important interests, but compromising or acquiescing on other issues where its stakes 

are lower. China would be reluctant to authorize any 

U.S. military interventions for fear of setting negative 

precedents.

Because China would be concerned about limiting 

the U.S. ability to intervene in its territorial disputes 

and on sovereignty issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, and 

Xinjiang, it would continue to emphasize the importance of UN authorization for military interventions 

and to highlight respect for sovereignty and nonintervention as the dominant norms of international 
317

behavior. This would be in greater tension with China’s expanding overseas economic footprint in terms 

of trade, investment, and construction projects. Beijing 

may become more involved in the domestic politics of 

resource-rich countries when critical Chinese interests 

are at stake, but Chinese leaders will try to maintain 

the fig leaf of noninterference in such cases. 

Political instability in individual countries and 

broader transnational threats such as terrorism and 

piracy are likely to put Chinese global interests at 

greater risk than they are today. Despite its focus on 

the Asia-Pacific and its limited power projection capabilities, China might increase its contributions to UN 

peacekeeping missions and its cooperation in capacity building efforts with regional organization such as 

the AU and the SCO. These are measures that might 

help increase stability in regions outside Asia (thereby 

protecting Chinese interests), but which would not require large increases in Chinese resource or military 

commitments.

China would be somewhat deferential to the security interests of major regional powers outside Asia so 

long as it can maintain the economic access it needs 

within their regions. (Although other regional powers 

will likely not have as much influence within their regions as Russia does in Central Asia, the way China has 

pursued its economic and energy interests in Central 

Asia, while paying lip service to Russian prerogatives, 

may be a useful model for Chinese behavior.) China 

will cooperate with some major regional powers within global institutions to advance common interests of 

developing countries (sometimes at the expense of the 

United States and the West) and within regional institutions to maintain stability in key resource-rich countries. China will rely primarily on economic and dip-
318

lomatic means to pursue its interests outside Asia, but 

arms sales, security assistance, intelligence relations, 

and technology transfer are likely to play more prominent roles than in the past. Using these and other tools, 

China will continue to be willing to cultivate ties with 

countries that have hostile relations with Washington 

when this advances concrete Chinese interests. SinoIndian relations would be something of a wild card 

in this future, with some possibility of China trying to 

resolve the border dispute and pursue closer ties so as 

to keep India out of Washington’s orbit.

Alternative Future 2: A Global Expeditionary PLA. 

The PLA’s primary focus has shifted to military power 

projection beyond China’s maritime periphery, whether because regional tensions have faded, because the 

PLA has satisfied Chinese leaders that it has achieved 

what needs to win regional conflicts, or because unexpected events elsewhere in the world have raised 

Beijing’s sense of urgency about protecting Chinese 

interests farther afield. The government has internal 

issues under control and can afford the required new 

military capabilities. For most of the decade between 

2020 and 2030, the PLA focuses on power projection, 

the details of which we leave to other contributors to 

explore.33a

This future implies a China that is doing well 

economically and that has resolved tensions with its 

neighbors, either because it has established clear regional dominance through economic attraction and 

selective military coercion or because maritime disputes have been resolved peacefully or set aside in 

favor of economic development. Chinese regional 

dominance implies a United States with a weakened 

or dysfunctional regional alliance system and reduced 
319

military presence and political influence in Asia. This 

could produce different U.S. responses, depending 

on the underlying causes. If this outcome is the result 

of a lagging U.S. economy and reluctance to sustain 

U.S. commitments to Asia (e.g., a more isolationist 

U.S. mood), then U.S. policymakers may encourage 

greater Chinese contributions to the stability of other 

regions of the world to make up for reduced U.S. resources and engagement. This implies the potential 

for greater U.S. cooperation in other regions with a 

more confident and more capable China. On the other 

hand, if this outcome is viewed as the product of U.S. 

policy failure, a rancorous partisan political debate 

over “who lost Asia” could produce a much more suspicious U.S. attitude toward an expanded and more 

active Chinese presence in other regions. Significant 

PLA Navy (PLAN) progress toward blue water navy 

capabilities—including frequent deployments outside 

Asia—would also aggravate these concerns. If maritime disputes are resolved peacefully or fade in political importance, then regional developments have 

no particular implications for U.S. power relative to 

China. This could be consistent with “peaceful co-existence” between a relatively strong United States and 

a stable and more confident China. 

Chinese leaders enjoying a stable regional security environment, economic growth, and few internal 

challenges would be relatively confident about the future and have a broader range of choice about their international ambitions. China’s success under prevailing international rules and norms might decrease the 

perceived benefits of pushing for changes in the international system. Even within current rules, China’s 

improved power position will yield greater influence 

within most international institutions and increased 
320

status and prestige at both the regional and global levels. U.S.-China disputes over military activities within 

China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Chinese 

efforts to advance maritime territorial claims would 

not generate the current level of bilateral tensions and 

strategic suspicions, either because the United States 

was not conducting such activity or because the two 

countries had worked out a modus vivendi, perhaps 

based on more parallel and routinized patterns of 

surveillance.34

Much would depend on how Chinese leaders 

choose to use their increased power to advance (rather 

than just protect) China’s global economic and political interests. China might be willing to take on more 

international responsibilities (accepting costs, risks, 

and commitments) and make more contributions to 

the functioning of the international system. Chinese 

leaders would expect—and likely receive—a greater 

voice and more influence in exchange for greater contributions. Alternatively, Beijing might make more 

active efforts to use its increased power to reshape 

international rules to better serve its interests, which 

would produce significant friction with Washington. 

Even if the gap between U.S. and Chinese power narrows significantly, Chinese leaders are unlikely to 

seek fundamental changes in the international system 

both due to the risk of a confrontation with the United 

States and because a dominant leadership role would 

require China to assume significant costs and risks 

both to change the international system and to keep it 

running.35 Such a decision would be inconsistent with 

Chinese practice in avoiding major long-term costs 

and commitments and Beijing’s narrow focus on obtaining concrete benefits for China.
321

Accordingly, China is likely to seek evolutionary changes in the international system that increase 

China’s influence or advance specific Chinese interests without a direct challenge to Washington. Beijing 

will promote multipolarity, look for partners among 

other developing countries and major regional powers to support its desired changes, and decline to 

shore up U.S. global leadership or support U.S. efforts to improve its long-term power position. China 

might make more active efforts to defend the rights 

of foreign countries to choose nondemocratic systems 

of government and seek to limit political and human rights criteria for international assistance. China 

would cooperate with other powers to advance common interests of developing countries within global 

institutions. The net result might be to weaken the 

economic and political foundations of U.S. leadership, potentially producing a “G-Zero” world without 

a clear international leader.36 China will continue to 

proclaim norms of sovereignty and nonintervention 

even as its economic interests lead to much deeper 

involvement in the domestic politics of resource-rich 

countries in other regions. 

A more powerful and confident China might also 

be less deferential to the political and security interests of major regional powers outside Asia, especially if instability in their regions threatens Chinese 

investments, citizens, and access to natural resources 

and markets. The current liberal international order 

facilitates Chinese access to resources and markets in 

other regions, but major regional powers such as Russia, India, and Brazil might well seek to limit China’s 

access to regional resources. More likely, a reduction 

in the willingness of the United States (and limited 

capacity of great powers and major regional powers) 
322

to intervene to resolve civil wars or domestic insurgencies may produce greater instability in countries 

important to Chinese economic interests. 

China will employ a range of instruments to protect its interests outside Asia, including arms sales, 

deployment of peacekeeping troops, extensive security assistance and military training programs, and 

intelligence cooperation, especially in politically unstable countries that have critical resources or which 

host large Chinese investments. In cases of domestic 

instability, China’s initial response will be to work 

with the host government to improve its capacity to 

maintain order (and thereby protect Chinese interests). In this alternative future, China’s ambassador, 

defense attaché, and Ministry of State Security station 

chief may be more important than their U.S. counterparts in most developing countries, and better able to 

deliver significant resources to help host governments 

maintain stability. In cases where governments are 

unable to maintain order, the PLA would help conduct noncombatant evacuation operations to rescue 

Chinese citizens. If the frequency of such operations 

increased dramatically, the PLA might become a supporter of greater Chinese political or military involvement to produce stability. The same might be true of 

counterpiracy or counterterrorism operations. ThenPLA Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde suggested as 

much in a May 2011 speech, when he cited the strains 

counterpiracy operations were placing on the PLAN 

and noted that solving the piracy problem required 

action on land rather than at sea.37

China will become a more important military and 

diplomatic player in global and regional efforts to 

respond to regional crises, and may be willing to act 

outside the UN framework when significant Chinese 
323

interests are at stake. (The evolution of the SCO toward norms of “mutual assistance” and periodic multinational counterterrorism exercises might provide a 

preview of this aspect of China’s role.) However, Beijing will still be very selective about when and how 

it supports outside intervention and which interventions it participates in. In this alternative future, there 

will be some examples of Chinese-led intervention to 

restore stability in internal conflicts, usually under a 

fig leaf of invitation from the UN, a regional organization, or the host government and sometimes as part 

of an international coalition. However, Chinese political and military leaders perceive U.S. interventions 

in Afghanistan and Iraq as a significant drain on U.S. 

wealth and national power, and are therefore likely 

to be highly selective in where they choose to act and 

seek to limit the length of any military operations.38

Alternative Future 3: A Weakened PLA. 

Chinese leaders are overwhelmed with China’s internal problems and the resources available for military 

modernization have dropped sharply. The PLA has 

failed to achieve the development it intended, and the 

decade through 2030 is consumed in a protracted effort to achieve capabilities relative to the United States 

that it intended to achieve by 2020. Internal missions 

including disaster relief, internal security, and assistance to civil authorities consume a great deal of the 

PLA’s time. The external situation remains tense, the 

possibility of conflict has not diminished, and Chinese 

interests remain threatened in other parts of the world, 

But the PLA does not have the time or resources to address those challenges as well as it would wish.38a

This future implies a China doing poorly economically (and environmentally), with a leadership focused 
324

primarily on maintaining domestic control. The ambitious economic reform agenda announced in the November 2012 plenum will have failed to reverse slowing growth. China may become caught in a “middle 

income trap” where rising costs make labor intensive 

products less competitive, but where Chinese companies lack the innovation and management skills to 

produce more advanced products that are competitive 

in a global marketplace. While a gradual slowdown in 

growth is the most likely scenario, a major domestic 

financial crisis could cause a dramatic recession and 

sudden, widespread economic dislocation, casting 

doubt on CCP performance in managing the economy. 

Environmental problems caused by resource intensive growth and poor enforcement of environmental 

standards will worsen. The Chinese government will 

have fewer resources available to mitigate the effects 

of air and water pollution and may be more reluctant 

to enforce regulations that raise costs and aggravate 

employment problems by slowing growth. Flagging 

political support due to faltering performance will 

make CCP leaders more paranoid about external support for Chinese activists and democracy advocates.

Internal problems will likely heighten concerns 

about separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang. There may 

be more incidents of political violence or domestic 

terrorism directed against local CCP officials and 

against Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, Chinese 

businessmen, and Chinese citizens abroad. The PLA 

will face increasing demands to help local authorities 

and the People’s Armed Police maintain order and to 

demonstrate the party’s ability to respond to natural 

disasters and other emergencies. This will absorb an 

increasing share of flat PLA budgets, and may also 

interfere with current military modernization efforts 
325

by increasing demand for ground troops and derailing attempts to reform the military region system to 

support advanced joint operations.

In this future, China still has significant tensions 

with the United States and its regional allies, but Chinese leaders are more focused on defensive goals (such 

as preventing Taiwan independence and maintaining 

territorial claims) than on achieving unification or consolidating control over disputed territories. Chinese 

leaders would be more open to managing maritime 

territorial disputes through a modus vivendi or joint development arrangements, but would also be willing to 

use demonstrations or limited force to deter challenges 

or when they feel provoked. China’s evident domestic problems, slower growth rate, and more restrained 

military modernization program would ease regional 

and global concerns about an aggressive China. They 

may also ease the over-confidence that has supported 

more assertive Chinese security and sovereignty policies and fueled nationalist calls for China to punish 

the United States and other countries for transgressions against Chinese interests.

Within global institutions, China would be prickly 

and defensive, with narrower goals of fending off external interference (on issues such as human rights, 

environmental standards, or Internet freedom) that 

might complicate efforts to maintain control. China 

would also resist more intrusive economic rules and 

enforcement of existing rules that might aggravate domestic economic challenges. China would emphasize 

the importance of sovereignty and noninterference and 

make common cause with other authoritarian governments and developing countries to protect those interests. Chinese leaders would continue to view the 

United States as ideologically hostile and rooting for 
326

China to fail, but this suspicion will not greatly limit 

Beijing’s willingness to cooperate on common interests. Chinese leaders might blame “hostile foreign 

forces” for domestic problems, but they are unlikely 

to use territorial disputes or external conflicts (e.g., 

diversionary war) to build internal unity or distract 

attention from domestic challenges. 

China’s more constricted global and regional diplomatic agenda would help ease U.S. concerns about 

China as a rival and open the possibility of broader bilateral cooperation, especially outside Asia. However, 

China will have fewer concrete things it can deliver, 

either in economic or military terms. China would be 

somewhat more deferential to the security interests 

of the United States and other major regional powers in the hopes of maintaining the economic access 

it needs and winning assistance in protecting PRC 

citizens and interests. Beijing would cooperate within 

global and regional institutions to maintain stability 

in key resource-rich countries, although it will remain 

reluctant to authorize military intervention for fear of 

setting adverse precedents. 

China would increase bilateral intelligence and security cooperation with Turkey, Russia, and the Central Asian members of the SCO to help manage separatist threats. Heightened concerns about such threats 

may increase bilateral tensions with Pakistan if Islamabad is unwilling or unable to crack down on training camps and insurgent activity. Beijing has strong 

incentives to resolve the border dispute with India in 

order to gain New Delhi’s cooperation in managing 

the Tibet issue and resisting Islamic separatists. 

Slower economic growth would help ease Beijing’s 

current obsession with access to energy and natural 

resources, as Chinese demand growth slows. China 
327

would rely primarily on economic and diplomatic 

means to pursue its interests outside Asia, but will 

be more resource constrained than at present. Less 

expensive security tools such as arms sales, security 

assistance, intelligence sharing, and technology transfer will play more prominent roles than they do today. Beijing would make efforts to ensure that these 

activities are coordinated in support of national interests, but low-level economic incentives may produce 

a return to the days of unauthorized arms sales and 

proliferation activities. Beijing would be somewhat 

more sensitive to the concerns of the United States and 

major regional countries when making foreign policy 

decisions on issues outside Asia.

CONCLUSION

As a “partial power,” China will have significant 

limitations on its ability to project economic, military, and ideational power outside Asia and to force 

major changes in international rules and norms on a 

reluctant United States by 2025, even under the most 

optimistic assumptions about alternative futures. 

The ability of the U.S. to maintain its own economic 

growth, continue technological innovation, support 

a capable modern military, and continue to play its 

post-World War II international role will have a major 

influence on China’s international opportunities and 

constraints. However, a full assessment of the likely 

role of the United States in 2025 is beyond the scope of 

this chapter.39

Common elements across all three alternative futures include the importance of economic growth in 

driving the expansion of China’s international economic ties (and associated interests), China’s desire to 

avoid a military confrontation with the United States, 
328

and the importance of domestic and regional stability 

in enabling or constraining a more ambitious Chinese 

international role. The assumption that China will 

maintain a narrow focus on what is good for China 

and will lack the ideological appeal needed to build 

lasting international coalitions will continue to constrain China’s ability to build an enduring support 

bloc across a range of issue areas even if Beijing is 

more powerful. When the United States seeks to build 

a coalition for a positive goal, it starts with treaty allies 

and countries with whom it has cooperated regularly 

and successfully in the past. There are not many examples of coalitions led by China; the few that exist tend 

to be coalitions opposing international action (e.g., 

on human rights or intervention) rather than those 

catalyzing positive change. Beijing lacks experience in 

exerting international leadership for positive goals; if 

Chinese leaders choose to try, they may discover that 

China is not very good at it.

One major challenge is the interconnected nature of 

the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, the increasingly 

competitive U.S.-China relationship in the Asia-Pacific, and China’s role as a global power that cooperates 

with Washington on many issues and simultaneously 

seeks to weaken U.S. power. Examining any single 

aspect in isolation is likely to produce a misleading 

picture, yet the connections between the bilateral, regional, and global levels are not fully understood.40

Given the impossibility of analyzing all the interactions within the available space, this chapter has focused on the connections judged to be most important in understanding China’s relationship with the 

international system in the three alternative futures. 

A fuller answer must draw upon the other chapters to 

draw out the connections between drivers of Chinese 
329

policy, future PLA postures, and the implications for 

future Chinese behavior at the bilateral, regional, and 

global levels.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. For an overview of international regimes, see Stephen D. 

Krasner, ed., International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 

Press, 1983.

2. This is the general case considered by Robert Gilpin, War 

and Change In World Politics, New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1983. 

3. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 2001.

4. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and 

Transformation of the American System, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 2011.

5. See Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A 

History of Financial Crisis, New York: Basic Books, 1978. 

6. Although the G-20 was a U.S.-Canada initiative, it is widely 

interpreted in China and elsewhere as a symbol of the increased 

economic power of major developing countries.

7. See Li Lianqing, Breaking Through: The Birth of China’s 

Opening-Up Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

8. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks to National 

Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York City, September 

21, 2005.

9. See Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-

China Strategic Distrust,” John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series, No. 4, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 

March 2012; also see Li Xiangyang, “Recognizing the Global 

Economic Order’s Restraint on China’s Peaceful Development,” 
330

Contemporary International Relations, May-June 2013, pp. 61-64; 

and Zhang Ruizhuang, “The Changing World Order and China,” 

Contemporary International Relations, May-June 2013, p. 50.

10. This is clearly evident in the way Chinese defense white 

papers employ positive terms when multipolarity is viewed as 

increasing and negative terms to describe a slowdown in movement toward a multipolar world. For an illustration applied to 

the U.S.-Europe transatlantic alliance, see Wang Xiangsui, “Shifts 

in Global Power Gravity,” Contemporary International Relations, 

January-February 2012, pp. 23-34.

11. See Ruan Zongze, “China Should Participate More In 

Making Int’l Rules,” People’s Daily Online, October 17, 2012, available from english.people.com.cn/90883/7979484.html.

12. See Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s 

Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West, New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2010 and Thomas Fingar, “China’s Vision of World Order,” 

Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2012-13: 

China’s Military Challenge, Washington, DC: National Bureau of 

Asian Research, 2012.

13. See Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order, New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 2008; and Gerald Chan, China’s Compliance in Global Affairs, 

Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2009.

14. See the Wang Jisi and Zhang Yunling chapters in Ashley 

J. Tellis and Sean Mirsky, eds, The Crux of Asia: China, India, and 

the Changing Global Order, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, 2013, available from carnegieendowment.

org/files/crux_of_asia.pdf.

15. “China Reiterates Call for New World Reserve Currency 

(Update 4),” Bloomberg News, June 26, 2009, available from www.

bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5z7pjiZoYpg.

16. Fingar, pp. 369-371.

17. For a recent illustration of Chinese principles and priorities, see Wang Yi, “China at a New Starting Point,” statement at 

the UN General Assembly, New York, September 27, 2013.
331

18. Ibid.

19. Marc Lanteigne, China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power, New York: Routledge, 2005; and Phillip 

C. Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools, 

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006. 

20. See Gilpin. For potential applications to the U.S.-China 

relationship, see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s 

Grand Strategy and International Security, Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press, 2005; and John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy 

of Great Power Politics, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2014, 

Updated Ed.

21. For an illustration in the economic sphere, see Wang Ying 

and Li Jiguang, “China and the G20,” Contemporary International 

Relations, July-August 2012, pp. 1-14.

22. See Ji Peiding, “BRICS will reshape the International Landscape,” Foreign Affairs Journal, No. 107, Spring 2013, pp. 61-70.

23. Although Hong Yousheng and Fang Qing downplay 

China’s potential to lead such a coalition, their favorable comments about the potential for developing countries to cooperate in 

changing international economic rules illustrates this line of argument. See “Shift in the Center of Global Economic Governance,” 

Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 56-79.

24. Fingar, pp. 342-373.

25. For overviews of Chinese debates, see Fingar; Alison 

Kaufman, “The ‘Century of Humiliation’ Then and Now: Chinese 

perceptions of International Order,” Pacific Focus, Vol. 25, No. 1, 

April 2010, pp. 1-33; the contributions in the May-June 2013 issue 

of Contemporary International Relations; and the report from the National Intelligence Council-CICIR dialogue on global governance.

26. Robert Sutter, U.S.-China Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic 

Present, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010.

27. This posture characterized China’s initial response to the 

2008 global financial crisis. 
332

28. See Mathieu Duchatel, Oliver Brauner, and Zhou Hang, 

“Protecting China’s Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift away from 

Non-interference,” SIPRI Policy Paper No. 41, Stockholm, Sweden: 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2014.

29. See the analysis and summaries of Chinese writings in 

“The End of Non-Interference?” China Analysis, Asia Centre and 

European Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. 

30. Protecting Chinese national interests overseas is one part 

of the “New Historic Missions” Hu Jintao gave the PLA in 2004.

30a. This alternate future is from Lonnie D. Henley, “Whither 

China? Alternative Military Futures, 2020-30,” Chapter 2 in this 

volume, p. 49.

31. For an explication of Chinese interests in Asia and its regional strategy, see Robert Sutter’s contribution to this volume; 

and Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Role in Asia: Attractive or Assertive?” David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, eds., International Relations in Asia, 2nd Ed., Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 2014, pp. 147-172.

32. For a sense of what that might look like, see David 

Frelinger and Jessica Hart, “The U.S.-China Military Balance Seen 

in a Three-Game Framework,” Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, 

and Phillip C. Saunders, eds., The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities, Washington, DC: National Defense 

University, pp. 347-369. For policy advice on ways of managing 

U.S.-China strategic competition, see Phillip C. Saunders, “Managing Strategic Competition with China,” INSS Strategic Forum

No. 242, July 2009; and Michael D. Swaine, America’s Challenge: 

Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century, Washington, 

DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011.

33. This echoes contemporary Chinese debates about whether 

China should significantly expand cooperation with the United 

States to cement a “New Type of Major Country Relationship” 

that will limit U.S. efforts to press China within Asia.

33a. This alternate future is from Lonnie D. Henley, “Whither 

China? Alternative Military Futures, 2020-30,” Chapter 2 in this 

volume, pp. 49-50.
333

34. See the discussion in Mark E. Redden and Phillip C. Saunders, “Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War 

Lessons and New Avenues of Approach,” China Strategic Perspectives, No. 5, September 2012. 

35. Although the United States derives considerable material 

and status benefits from being the dominant power, U.S. politicians and policymakers sometimes chafe at the costs of serving as 

the lender of last resort, the market of last resort, and the global 

policeman. Such views were one reason for the limited U.S. response to the 1998 Asian financial crisis and complaints about the 

Obama administration’s efforts to stabilize the world economy 

after the 2008 financial crisis.

36. Ian Bremmer and David Gordon, “G-Zero,” Foreign Policy, March-April 2011; and Ian Bremmer, Every Nation for Itself: 

Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World, New York: Portfolio, 2012.

37. General Chen Bingde, “Forging a New China-US Militaryto-Military Relationship Featuring Mutual Respect, Mutual Benefit, and Cooperation,” speech at U.S. National Defense University, 

May 18, 2011.

38. This might produce some similarities with post-Lebanon 

U.S. military interventions in the 1980s, which sought limited 

missions, decisive action, and clear time lines for withdrawal in 

order to avoid open-ended commitments.

38a. This alternate future is from Lonnie D. Henley, “Whither 

China? Alternative Military Futures, 2020-30,” Chapter 2 in this 

volume, p. 50.

39. Robert Sutter’s writings on China and Asia consistently 

emphasize the importance of comparing China’s strengths and 

weaknesses against an accurate baseline of U.S. strengths and 

weaknesses. This advice is even more useful when thinking about 

China’s global and extra-regional influence.

40. One preliminary effort to think about the connections between the three levels is Maintaining U.S.-China Strategic Stability, 

State Department International Security Advisory Board Report, 

Washington, DC, October 26, 2012.

335

CHAPTER 11

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA 

STRATEGIC DYNAMICS

Robert Sutter

I would like to thank Lincoln Hines of National Bureau 

of Asian Research, who provided effective research assistance for this article.

INTRODUCTION

Prediction of future U.S.-Chinese relations over 

the course of 15 years requires prudence to avoid 

gross miscalculations. Prudence requires a close look 

at what can be learned from the development of the 

relationship up to the present. Careful examination 

of the recent context of U.S.-Chinese relations highlights factors that determine recent behavior. These 

determinants have a long history. The likelihood that 

they will be upset in future years is offset by several 

realities: the United States and China are very large 

countries—the largest in the world; their leaders have 

long-standing priorities; and they exert great and often dominant influence as they interact with lesser 

powers. The latter countries like Japan, India, Taiwan, 

and North Korea plausibly could take actions that 

upset the recent trajectory of U.S.-Chinese relations, 

but it is more likely that much stronger America and 

China will shape those lesser powers. Extreme developments such as regime disintegration, international 

economic collapse or major war also could seriously 

disrupt U.S.-Chinese relations, but chances seem 

much more probable that relations will be governed 

by factors that have shaped them up to now.
336

FRAGILE BUT ENDURING STRATEGIC 

EQUILIBRIUM

The end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War destroyed the strategic framework for the Sino-American 

cooperation initiated by U.S. President Richard Nixon 

and Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong. Sometimes dramatic crises since that time have seen policymakers, 

strategists, and scholars in both the United States and 

China register concern and sometimes alarm over 

potential conflict. Major turning points included:

• The multiyear virulent popular and elite American opposition to Chinese leaders responsible 

for the crackdown against demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

• The face-off of U.S.-Chinese forces as a result of 

the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995-96.

• The crisis in 1999 prompted by the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and 

resulting mass demonstrations and destruction 

of U.S. diplomatic properties in China.

• The crash in 2001 of a Chinese fighter jet and 

a U.S. reconnaissance plane over international 

waters near China and the resulting crisis over 

responsibility for the incident and release of the 

American crew and damaged plane that made 

an emergency landing in China.

• The explicit and growing U.S.-Chinese competition of influence in Asia featuring U.S. President Barack Obama administration’s so-called 

pivot or rebalancing policy to the Asia Pacific 

coincident with greater Chinese assertiveness 

in dealing with differences with the United 

States and its allies and associates over issues 

of sovereignty and security along China’s rim.1
337

In 2012, growing Chinese-U.S. competition in Asia 

headed the list of issues that challenged the abilities 

of Chinese and American leaders to manage their differences, avoid confrontation, and pursue positive 

engagement. Competition for influence along China’s 

rim and in the broader Asia-Pacific region exacerbated 

an obvious security dilemma featuring China’s rising 

power and America’s reaction, shown notably in the 

two sides’ respective military build-ups.

Hyperbolic attacks on Chinese economic and security policies were features of the Republican presidential primaries. President Obama also resorted to harsh 

rhetoric, calling China an “adversary.” He highlighted his administration’s reengagement with countries 

in the Asia-Pacific region as a means to compete with 

China in security, economic, and other terms.2

China demonstrated state power, short of direct use 

of military force, in response to perceived challenges 

by U.S. allies, the Philippines, and Japan, regarding 

disputed territory in the South China Sea and the East 

China Sea. Top Chinese leaders criticized American 

dealing with the disputed claims and also highlighted 

regional trade arrangements that excluded the United 

States, seeking to undermine the American-led TransPacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact.3

Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi highlighted pervasive and deeply rooted distrust between the two 

governments.4 David Shambaugh concluded that the 

overall U.S.-China relationship was “more strained, 

fraught and distrustful.” Intergovernmental meetings meant to forge cooperation were becoming more 

pro-forma and increasingly acrimonious, he said. 

The two sides wrangle over trade and investment issues, technology espionage and cyber hacking, global 

governance challenges like climate change an Syria, 
338

nuclear challenges like Iran and North Korea, and 

their security postures and competition for influence 

in the Asia-Pacific.5

Unexpectedly, increased competition and tension 

in Sino-American relations in 2012 was followed by 

the California summit in June 2013 and an overall 

moderation in Sino-American differences. These developments supported conclusions regarding realities 

seen by a number of American and Chinese experts 

as defining the current overall strategic equilibrium in 

the relationship. The experts averred that the equilibrium was characterized by many areas of convergence 

and divergence amid changing calculations of interests influenced by changing circumstances. Nonetheless, prevailing trends including the constraints on 

both powers explained below, showed that avoiding 

serious confrontation and endeavoring to manage 

differences through a process of constructive engagement remains in the overall interests of both countries.6

There are three general reasons for this judgment:

1. Both administrations benefit from positive engagement. It supports stability in the Asia-Pacific, a 

peaceful Korean peninsula, and a peaceful settlement 

of the Taiwan issue. It fosters global peace and prosperity, advances world environmental conditions, 

and deals with climate change and nonproliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction. 

2. Both administrations see that ever growing China-U.S. interdependence means that emphasizing the 

negatives in their relationship will hurt the other side 

but also will hurt them. 

3. Both leaderships are preoccupied with a long list 

of urgent domestic and foreign priorities; in this situation, one of the last things they would seek is a serious 

confrontation in relations with one another.
339

Looking out, few foresee the Obama administration well served, with a more assertive U.S. stance 

leading to a major confrontation with China. Indeed, 

the U.S. Government reached out to President Xi Jinping and the new Chinese leadership in holding the 

California summit and seeking greater engagement 

through senior level interchange in cabinet-level visits and structured dialogues. Its criticism of Chinese 

economic practices adverse to American interests remains measured. It has responded firmly when Chinese actions over disputed territory along its maritime 

rim escalate tensions and endanger stability, underlining America’s commitments to regional stability and 

the status quo. Its posture on the preeminent issue of 

Taiwan has been supportive of Taiwan President Ma 

Ying-jeou’s reassurance of and greater alignment with 

China.7

Comprehensive treatment requires consideration 

of possible serious shifts in American policy leading 

to greater tension in U.S.-Chinese relations. Those possibilities are considered below, but they seem much 

less likely and important than the more immediate 

consequences of China’s growing assertive role in the 

Asia-Pacific and what that means for U.S.-Chinese cooperation or conflict. As argued in the next sections, 

such Chinese assertiveness will remain troublesome 

but probably will be held in check, allowing pragmatic U.S.-Chinese engagement to endure for the period 

of this assessment.

CHINA’S TOUGHER STANCE 

IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

China’s tough stand on maritime territorial disputes evident in the 2012 confrontations with the Philippines in the South China Sea and with Japan in the 
340

East China Sea has endured through China’s leadership transition and now marks an important shift in 

China’s foreign policy with serious implications for 

China’s neighbors and concerned powers, including 

the United States.8 China’s success in advancing its 

claims against the Philippines and in challenging Japan’s control of disputed islands head the list of reasons why the new Chinese policy is likely to continue 

and perhaps intensify in the future. 

Concerned governments recognize that China’s 

“win-win” formula emphasizing cooperation over 

common ground is premised on the foreign government eschewing actions acutely sensitive to China 

over Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, and that the scope 

of Chinese acute sensitivity had now been broadened 

to include the maritime disputes along China’s rim. 

They have been required to calibrate more carefully 

their actions related to disputed maritime territories. Unfortunately, the parameters of China’s acute 

concerns regarding maritime claims remain unclear. 

Meanwhile, the drivers of China’s new toughness on 

maritime disputes include rising patriotic and nationalist sentiment in Chinese elite and public opinion 

and the growing capabilities in Chinese military, coast 

guard, fishery, and oil exploration forces. The latter 

are sure to grow in the coming years, foreshadowing 

greater Chinese willingness to use coercion in seeking 

advances in nearby seas. 

For now, a pattern of varied regional acquiescence, 

protests, and resistance to China’s new toughness 

on maritime claims seems likely. It raises the question about future Chinese assertiveness, challenging 

neighboring governments with disputes over Chinese 

claims, and challenging American leadership in promoting stability and opposing unilateral and coercive 

means to change the regional status quo.
341

There are forecasts of inevitable conflict between 

the United States and China as they compete for influence in the Asia-Pacific or of a U.S. retreat in the 

Asia-Pacific in the face of China’s assertiveness.9 Such 

forecasts are offset in this writer’s opinion by circumstances in China and abroad that will continue to 

constrain China’s leaders. The circumstances are seen 

to hold back Chinese leaders even if they, like much 

of Chinese elite and public opinion, personally favor 

a tough approach in order to secure interests in the 

Asia-Pacific. 

CONSTRAINTS ON CHINESE ASSERTIVENESS

There are three sets of constraints on Chinese 

tough measures in foreign affairs related to the United 

States that are strong and are unlikely to diminish in 

the foreseeable future.

Domestic Preoccupations.10

The Chinese leaders want to sustain one-party 

rule, and to do so, they require continued economic 

growth which advances the material benefits of Chinese people and assures general public support and 

legitimacy for the Communist government. Such economic growth and continued one-party rule require 

stability at home and abroad, especially in nearby 

Asia where conflict and confrontation would have a 

serious negative impact on Chinese economic growth. 

At the same time, the need for vigilance in protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains among 

the top leadership concerns as evidenced by the long 

and costly build-up of military forces to deal with a 

Taiwan contingency involving the United States and 
342

more recent use of various means of state power to advance territorial claims in nearby disputed seas. There 

is less clarity as to where Chinese international ambitions for regional and global leadership fit in the current priorities of the Beijing leaders, but there is little 

doubt that the domestic concerns get overall priority.

Domestic concerns preoccupying President Xi 

Jinping leadership involve:

• weak leadership legitimacy highly depends on 

how the leaders’ performance is seen by popular and elite opinion at any given time;

• pervasive corruption viewed as sapping public 

support and undermining administrative efficiency;

• income gaps posing challenges to the Communist regime ostensibly dedicated to advancing 

the disadvantaged;

• social turmoil reportedly involving 100,000-

200,000 mass incidents annually that are usually directed at government officials and/or aspects of state policies; managing such incidents 

and related domestic control measures involve 

budget outlays greater that China’s impressive 

national defense budget;

• highly resource intensive economy (e.g., China 

uses four times the amount oil to advance its 

economic growth to a certain level than does 

the United States); enormous and rapidly growing environmental damage results;

• need for major reform of an economic model in 

use in China for over 3 decades that is widely 

seen to have reached a point of diminishing 

returns.
343

The Chinese leadership set forth in November 

2013 an ambitious and wide ranging agenda of economic and related domestic reforms. How more than 

60 measures set forth for reform will be implemented 

and how they will be made to interact effectively with 

one another are widely seen to require strong and 

sustained efforts of top Chinese leaders, probably for 

many years.11 Under these circumstances, those same 

leaders would seem reluctant to seek confrontation 

with the United States. Xi’s accommodation of President Obama in meeting in California in 2013, and his 

leadership’s continued emphasis on the positive in 

U.S.-China relations in seeking a new kind of major 

power relationship underlines this trend. Xi has presided over China’s greater assertiveness on maritime 

territorial issues that involve the United States, but, 

thus far, the Chinese probes generally have been crafted to avoid direct confrontation with the superpower.

Strong Interdependence.

The second set of limits on Chinese tough measures 

leading to serious tensions with the United States involves ever growing interdependence in U.S.-Chinese 

relations. At the start of the 21st century, increasing 

economic interdependence reinforced each government’s tendency to emphasize the positive and pursue 

constructive relations with one another. A pattern of 

dualism in U.S.-China relations featured constructive 

and cooperative engagement on the one hand, and 

contingency planning or hedging on the other. It reflected a mix of converging and competing interests 

and prevailing leadership suspicions and cooperation.

Reflecting the dualism, each government used engagement to build positive and cooperative ties while 
344

at the same time seeking to use these ties to build interdependencies and webs of relationships that had 

the effect of constraining the other power from taking actions that oppose its interests. The Council on 

Foreign Relations was explicit about this approach in 

a book entitled Weaving the Net, arguing for engagement that would over time compel changes in Chinese 

policies in accord with norms supported by the United 

States. While the analogy is not precise, the policies of 

engagement pursued by the United States and China 

toward one another featured respective “Gulliver 

strategies” that were designed to tie down aggressive, assertive, or other negative policy tendencies of 

the other power through webs of interdependence in 

bilateral and multilateral relationships.12

Chinese leaders also are seen as continuing to 

hedge their bets as they endeavor to persuade the 

United States and other important world powers of 

China’s avowed determination to pursue the road of 

peace and development. New Chinese diplomatic and 

international activism and positivism not only foster 

a positive and beneficent image for China; they serve 

an important practical objective of fostering norms 

and practices in regional and international organizations and circumstances that create a buffer against 

suspected U.S. efforts to “contain” China and to impede China’s rising power. Roughly consistent with 

the image of the “Gulliver strategy” noted earlier, 

they foster webs of interdependent relationships that 

tie down and hamper unilateral or other actions by 

the U.S. superpower that could intrude on important 

Chinese interests in Asian and world affairs.13

Both sides have become increasingly aware of how 

their respective interests are tied to the well-being and 

success of the other, thereby limiting the tendency of 
345

the past to apply pressure on one another. In effect, 

interdependence has worked to constrain both sides 

against taking forceful action against each other.

China’s Insecurity in the Asia-Pacific.

China’s insecure position in the Asia-Pacific region 

poses the third set of constraints on Chinese tough 

measures against the United States. Nearby Asia is the 

world area where China has always exerted greatest 

influence and where China devotes the lion’s share of 

foreign policy attention. It contains security and sovereignty issues (e.g., Taiwan) of top importance. It is 

the main arena of interaction with the United States. 

The region’s economic importance far surpasses the 

rest of the world (China is Africa’s biggest trader, but 

it does more trade with South Korea). Stability along 

the rim of China is essential for China’s continued economic growth—the lynchpin of leadership legitimacy 

and continued Communist rule. Given the previous 

discussion, without a secure foundation in nearby 

Asia, China will be inclined to avoid serious confrontation with the United States.14

Among Chinese strengths in the Asia-Pacific 

region are: 

• China’s position as the leading trading partner 

with most neighboring countries and the heavy 

investment many of those countries make in 

China;

• China’s growing web of road, rail, river, electric 

power, pipeline, and other linkages promoting 

economic and other interchange with nearby 

countries.
346

• China’s prominent leadership attention and active diplomacy in interaction with neighboring 

countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally;

• China’s expanding military capabilities.

Nevertheless, these strengths are offset by various 

weaknesses and limitations. Some Chinese practices 

alienate near-by governments, which broadly favor 

key aspects of U.S. regional leadership. Leadership 

in the region involves often costly and risky efforts to 

support common goods involving regional security 

and development. Chinese behavior shows a well-developed tendency under the rubric of the ubiquitous 

“win-win” formula to avoid risks, costs, or commitments to the common good unless there is adequate 

benefit for a narrow win-set of tangible Chinese interests.15 A major reason for China’s continued reluctance 

to undertake costs and commitments for the sake of 

the common goods of the Asia-Pacific and broader 

international affairs is the long array of domestic challenges and preoccupations faced by Chinese leaders. 

Chinese assertiveness toward several neighbors 

and the United States have put nearby governments 

on guard and weakened Chinese regional influence. 

They have reminded China’s neighbors that the 60-

year history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

has, much more often than not, featured China acting 

in disruptive and domineering ways in the region.16

China’s success in reassuring neighbors and advancing influence in the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold 

War period—a period now extending almost 25 years 

—is mediocre. China faces major impediments, many 

home grown. China’s long-standing practice of building an image of consistent and righteous behavior in 

foreign affairs blocks realistic policies, especially when 
347

dealing with disputes and differences with neighbors 

and the United States. Most notably, the Chinese government has the exceptional position among major 

powers as having never acknowledged making a mistake in foreign policy. As a result, when China encounters a dispute with neighbors, the fault never lies with 

China. If Beijing chooses not to blame the neighbor, 

its default position is to blame larger forces, usually 

involving the United States. Adding to this peculiar 

negative mix, Chinese elites and public opinion remain heavily influenced by prevailing Chinese media 

and other emphasis on China’s historic victimization 

at the hands of outside powers like the United States, 

Japan, and others. They are quick to find offense and 

impervious of the need for change and recognition of 

fault on their part.17

Arguably Asia’s richest country and the key ally of 

the United States, Japan heads the list of China’s most 

important relationships in the Asia-Pacific. The record 

shows relations seriously worsened to their lowest 

point amid widespread Chinese violence, extra-legal 

trade sanctions, and intimidation well beyond accepted international norms over territorial and resources 

claims in the East China Sea.18 India’s interest in accommodation with China has been offset by border 

frictions, and competition for influence among the 

countries surrounding India and in Southeast Asia and 

Central Asia.19 Russian and Chinese interest in close 

alignment has waxed and waned and has appeared 

to remain secondary to their respective relationships 

with the West.20

Relations with Taiwan changed for the better with 

the election of a new Taiwan government in 2008 

bent on reassuring Beijing. The government was reelected in 2012, but the political opposition in Taiwan 
348

remained sharply critical of recent trends and improved its standing with Taiwan voters.21

South Korean opinion of China declined sharply 

from a high point in 2004, despite close Sino-South 

Korean economic ties. China’s refusal to condemn 

North Korea’s sinking of South Korean warship and 

North Korea’s artillery attack on South Korea in 2010 

strongly reinforced anti-China sentiment. Chinese efforts to improve ties with a new South Korean president in 2013 became sidetracked by provocations from 

North Korea and Chinese advances in disputed territory claimed by South Korea.22

South China Sea disputed claims are seriously complicating developing Chinese relations with Southeast 

Asian countries. China’s remarkable military modernization raised suspicions on the part of a number of 

China’s neighbors, including such middle powers as 

Australia.23 They endeavored to build their own military power, and work cooperatively with one another 

and the United States in the face of China’s military 

advances.

Beijing has depended heavily on the direction and 

support of the Chinese government to advance its 

influence on the post-Cold War period. Nongovernment channels of communication and influence have 

been limited on account of China’s repeated aggression against neighbors during the Cold War. So-called 

overseas Chinese communities in southeast Asian 

countries have represented political forces supportive 

of their home country’s good relations with China, but 

those same communities have a long and often negative history in southeast Asian countries.24

The areas of greatest Chinese strength in Asia—

economic relations and diplomacy—also have shown 

limitations and complications.25 As half of Chinese 
349

trade is conducted by foreign invested enterprises in 

China, the resulting processing trade sees China often add only a small amount to the product; and the 

finished product often depends on sales to the United 

States or the European Union. A Singapore ambassador told Chinese media in August 2013 that 60 percent of the goods that are exported from China and 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

are ultimately manufactures that go to the United 

States, Europe, and Japan. Only 22 percent of these 

goods stay in the China-ASEAN region.26 These facts 

seemed to underscore Chinese interdependence with 

the United States and allied countries. Meanwhile, the 

large amount of Asian and international investment 

that went to China did not go to other Asian countries, 

hurting their economic development. What is known 

shows that actual China’s aid (as opposed to financing 

that will be repaid in money or commodities) to Asia 

is very small, especially in comparison to other donors, with the exception of Chinese aid to North Korea 

and, at least until recently, Myanmar. The sometimes 

dizzying array of agreements in the active Chinese 

diplomacy in Asia did not hide the fact that China remained reluctant to undertake significant costs, risks, 

or commitments in dealing with difficult regional 

issues.

North Korea is a special case in Chinese foreign relations. China provides considerable food aid, oil, and 

other material support. China is North Korea’s largest trading partner and foreign investor. China often 

shields Pyongyang from U.S.-led efforts at the United 

Nations to sanction or otherwise punish North Korea 

over its egregious violations of international norms. 

Nevertheless, North Korea repeatedly rejects Chinese 

advice and warnings. At bottom, Chinese leaders are 
350

loath to cut off their aid or otherwise increase pressure 

on North Korea for fear of a backlash from the Pyongyang regime that would undermine Chinese interest 

in preserving stability on the Korean peninsula.27

U.S. Leadership and China’s Rise. 

Comparing the previously mentioned Chinese 

strengths and limits with those of the United States 

listed here underlines how far China has to go despite 

over 2 decades of efforts to secure its position in Asia. 

Without a secure periphery and facing formidable 

American presence and influence, China almost certainly calculates that seriously confronting the United 

States poses grave dangers for the PRC regime.28

The foreign policies of the George W. Bush administration were very unpopular with regional elites and 

public opinion, weakening the U.S. position in the 

Asia-Pacific region. As the Obama administration has 

refocused U.S. attention positively on the region, regional concerns shifted to worry that U.S. budget difficulties and political gridlock in Washington seemed 

to undermine the ability of the United States to sustain 

support for regional responsibilities. 

The following factors provide the main U.S. 

strengths in the Asia-Pacific region:29

• Governments are strong and viable in most of 

Asia; they make the decisions that determine 

direction in foreign affairs. In general, the officials see their governments’ legitimacy and success resting on nation-building and economic 

development, which require a stable and secure international environment. Unfortunately, 

Asia is not particularly stable, and most regional governments privately are wary of and tend 
351

not to trust each other. As a result, they look to 

the United States to provide the security they 

need. They recognize that the U.S. security role 

is very expensive and involves great risk, including large scale casualties if necessary. They 

also recognize that neither China, nor any other 

Asian power or coalition of powers, is able or 

willing to undertake even a fraction of these 

risks, costs, and responsibilities.

• Support for the nation-building priority of 

most Asian governments involves export-oriented growth. The United States has run a massive trade deficit with China, and a total annual 

trade deficit with Asia valued at over $350 billion. Asian government officials recognize that 

China, which runs an overall trade surplus, 

and other trading partners of Asia are unwilling and unable to bear even a fraction of the 

cost of such large trade deficits, that nonetheless are very important for Asia governments.

• Effective in interaction with Asia’s powers was 

a notable achievement of the Bush administration. The Obama administration has built on 

these strengths. Its emphasis on consultation 

and inclusion of international stakeholders 

before coming to policy decisions on issues of 

importance to Asia and the Pacific has been 

broadly welcomed. Meanwhile, U.S. military 

security and intelligence organizations have 

grown uniquely influential, with wide ranging 

webs of security and intelligence relationships.

• Reinforcing overall U.S. influence are uniquely 

powerful and long-standing American business, religious, educational, media, and other 

nongovernment interactions. Almost 50 years 
352

of generally color-blind U.S. immigration 

policy since the ending of discriminatory U.S. 

restrictions on Asian immigration in 1965 has 

resulted in the influx of millions of Asia-Pacific 

migrants who call America home and who interact with their countries of origin in ways that 

undergird and reflect well on the American position in the region.

• The success of U.S. efforts to build webs of 

security-related and other relationships with 

Asia-Pacific countries has to do in part with active contingency planning by many Asia-Pacific governments. As power relations change in 

the region, notably on account of China’s rise, 

regional governments generally seek to work 

positively and pragmatically with rising China 

on the one hand; but on the other, they seek the 

reassurance of close security, intelligence, and 

other ties with the United States amid evidence 

that rising China shifts to more assertiveness. 

The U.S. concern to keep stability while fostering economic growth overlaps constructively 

with the priorities of the vast majority of regional governments.

A CLOSER LOOK AT CHINA’S CURRENT 

CHALLENGE TO THE UNITED STATES

The Obama administration has more than 5 years 

of experience dealing with rising China. The experience shows that U.S. expectations of significant breakthroughs in the relations are justifiably low. The Chinese have proven to be difficult partners. Worst case 

thinking about U.S. intentions is married with mediapropaganda campaigns establishing China’s identity 
353

as resisting many aspects of American leadership. The 

government-sponsored outlets provide an array of information that demonizes American intentions while 

reinforcing Chinese self-righteousness.30

As Chinese capabilities grow, Beijing is likely to 

take actions that will further challenge the international order supported by the United States.31 The 

challenges to the security and stability in the AsiaPacific have been clear and seem primed to continue 

and perhaps advance. China’s erosion of international 

economic norms is more hidden. China seems to support free trade by the United States and others in its 

ongoing efforts to exploit this open environment with 

state-directed means, widespread theft, intimidation, and coercion of companies and governments in 

a wholesale grasp of technology, know-how, capital, 

and competitive advantage in a head long drive for 

economic development at the expense of others. 

Americans will face continuing impediments from 

China in dealing with nuclear proliferation by North 

Korea and Iran; China was of little help in dealing 

with Syria’s use of chemical weapons or Russia’s annexation of Crimea and coercion of Ukraine. Chinese 

leaders remain determined to support the Leninist 

one-party system in China that treats human rights 

selectively and capriciously, with eyes focused on sustaining the Communist state.

Taken together, these issues represent the focus of 

the China challenge for the United States in the immediate period ahead. They promise numerous headaches and problems for U.S. policymakers; American 

officials may grow somewhat weary in efforts to deal 

with various Chinese probes and machinations. However, the previously mentioned assessment shows that 

the China challenge is not a fundamental one, at least 
354

not yet. The United States can have some confidence 

that prevailing circumstances and constraints seem to 

preclude China seeking confrontation or power shift 

in Asia. Some aver that China has adopted a slow and 

steady pace as it seeks to spread its influence and undermine that of the United States, especially in the all 

important Asia-Pacific region.32 Maybe so, but the record of Chinese advances over the past 25 years shows 

such mediocre results and conflicted approaches that 

the prospect of Chinese leadership in the Asia-Pacific 

region seems remote. More likely, China will continue 

to rise in the shadow of a United States increasingly integrated among a wide range of independent-minded 

Asian-Pacific governments viewing the United States 

as critically important to their stability, growth, and 

independence.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SCENARIOS 

FOR U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS

The three scenarios or “alternative futures” that 

provide a focus for this book rightly concentrate on 

Chinese military power and activity, which represents 

an important determinant in U.S.-Chinese relations. 

Of course, the U.S.-Chinese relationship has been and 

will continue to be influenced by several determinants 

on the Chinese and U.S. sides. For example, the 2012 

U.S. presidential campaign showed that Chinese economic practices were no longer the positive force of 

the past in promoting convergence between Washington and Beijing. They topped the list of American 

criticisms of China—a trend likely to continue along 

with Beijing’s continued exploitation of the international free market system in ways that disadvantage 

the United States.33 Meanwhile, American ideologi-
355

cal antipathy regarding China’s Communist system 

reached extraordinary height in the decade after the 

Tiananmen crackdown—driving an enormous wedge 

between the United States and China that explains to a 

considerable degree the distrust prevailing in the current relationship over 20 years later.

Against that background, this section addresses 

the implications for future U.S.-Chinese relations of 

the three scenarios. It does so with the understanding 

that the military scenarios reflect elements important 

in determining the degree of convergence or divergence between the United States and China, but other 

factors not considered in these scenarios also may be 

important in influencing the degree of convergence 

and divergence in the relationship. Where appropriate, I will note such factors in the discussion.

As seen in the discussion, I find the first alternative 

future more clearly defined and more realistic than 

the other two. It provides an opportunity for some detailed forecasting. The other two scenarios are plausible. They depart greatly from the current context and 

are broadly defined. As such, they allow for general 

considerations but less detailed forecasting. 

Alternative Future 1: A PLA Focused 

on Regional Issues.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) buildup is an 

obvious challenge to the United States. As in the recent past, an effective U.S. response can help to keep 

tensions manageable. 

This scenario seems to imply that China remains 

encumbered in its protracted rise in Asia. It shows no 

substantial change in China’s overall approach to the 

region, including the strong self-righteousness and 
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narrow win-win mindset seen in the recent past. As 

in the recent past, the U.S.-China tensions over the 

Obama administration’s rebalancing policies and 

over economic, political, nonproliferation, and other 

differences probably will not reach the point of conflict. If Chinese and U.S. leaders remain preoccupied 

with other issues at home and abroad, and as expected 

interdependence and possibly cooperation grow between the two sides, tensions over differences can be 

managed effectively. 

If the United States somehow has rebounded from 

its recent problems and resumes the kind of highly 

competitive activist international role seen at times 

after the Cold War, there is a danger of confrontation 

and crisis caused by greater U.S. pressure on areas of 

difference with China. More likely on the U.S. side is 

the kind of engagement policy toward both the AsiaPacific region and China seen in the Obama administration’s rebalancing policy initiatives. The reasons 

seem obvious and strong:

• The region is an area of ever greater strategic 

and economic importance for the United States;

• The United States remains strongly committed 

to long-standing U.S. goals of supporting stability and balance of power; sustaining smooth 

economic access; and promoting U.S. values in 

this increasingly important world area.

Future dynamics in Asia are seen as determined by 

five sets of factors:34

1. The changing power relationships among Asia’s 

leading countries (e.g., the rise of China and India; 

changes in Japan; rising or reviving middle powers—

South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia).
357

2. The growing impact of economic globalization 

and related international information interchange.

3. The ebb and flow of tensions in the Korean 

peninsula, southwestern Asia, and the broader U.S.-

backed efforts against terrorism and proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction.

4. The rise of Asian multilateralism.

5. The changing extent of U.S. engagement with 

and withdrawal from involvement with Asian 

matters.

In addition, a survey of leadership debates over 

foreign policy among Asian-Pacific leaders35 shows 

movement toward perspectives of realism in international relations theory in the United States, China, 

Japan, Russia, India, and several middle and smaller 

powers including Indonesia, Australia, South Korea, 

Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore.36 Such perspectives are important in how these leaders view the 

changing power dynamics and security issues seen 

notably in factors 1, 3, and 5. At bottom, the United 

States can best understand Chinese actions by using a 

realist perspective.

While vigilant regarding changing circumstances 

that could have an impact on their security, sovereignty, and other important interests, the Chinese government leaders also clearly recognize the importance of 

economic development, the lynchpin of their political 

legitimacy. Thus, they endeavor to use the liberal international economic order in ways that benefit them 

and their countries, and in so doing, they subscribe 

in various ways and to varying degrees to aspects of 

liberalism in international relations theory. As noted 

earlier, such Chinese use of liberalism is best seen as 

serving the realist approaches of Beijing’s leaders to 

build Chinese wealth and power in world affairs.
358

Asian-Pacific leaders also show support for aspects of the international relations theory of constructivism. Such support is manifest in their ongoing efforts to build regional and international organizations 

and to support international norms as effective means 

to manage interstate tensions and differences and to 

promote greater interstate cooperation. Domestically, 

most Asian-Pacific governments also foster a strong 

identity for their nation as an independent actor in 

regional and global affairs representing the interests 

and qualities of the peoples of their respective countries. Supporting such an identity is an important element in their continued political legitimacy.37 Again, 

the Chinese practice is to use stronger identity and 

involvement in international organizations in large 

measure to support along the lines of realist thinking 

regime goals of preservation and developing wealth 

and power.

A continuation of the type of U.S. engagement 

policy seen in the Obama administration’s rebalancing initiatives fits well with most of these regional 

dynamics. The U.S. strengths look even stronger 

when compared with China’s recent and likely future 

approaches. 

Like China and other Asian governments, the 

United States also relies heavily on a realist perspective in its involvement in the Asia-Pacific. America 

has a proven record of bearing the costs and risks of 

sustaining regional stability that is essential for the development and nation-building sought by the regional government leaders. The United States takes these 

actions not so much because of liberal or constructivist beliefs, but rather out of a broad sense of American national interest tied to the ever more important 

regional order in the Asia-Pacific. 
359

At present and for the foreseeable future, there is 

little perceived danger of offensive U.S. military, economic, or other policy actions amid repeated stress by 

American leaders against unilateral change in the status quo. By contrast, China has accompanied its rise 

in regional prominence with a conflicted message of 

closer economic cooperation on a mutually beneficial 

(win-win) basis and often strident Chinese threats 

and coercive actions backed by civilian and military 

government power against neighbors that disagree 

with China, especially on issues of sovereignty and 

security. The fact that China’s stridency on these matters has grown with the expansion of coercive civilian and military power alarms many Asian neighbors 

who seek reassurance from closer relations with the 

United States in a variety of forms, thereby deepening 

and strengthening the American integration with the 

region. 

Meanwhile, Chinese leaders continue focus on a 

narrow win-set of Chinese interests. They avoid the 

kinds of costs and risks borne by the United States in 

support of perceived American interests in the broader regional order that are well recognized by regional 

governments, reinforcing the regional governments’ 

support for closer American involvement in regional 

affairs. Asian leaders watch closely for signs of U.S. 

military withdrawal or flagging American interest 

in sustaining regional stability. The Obama administration has affirmed its commitment to sustain the 

robust American security presence involving close 

military cooperation with the vast majority of AsianPacific governments built during the post-Cold War 

period. This engagement builds on the strong engagement efforts of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush 

administrations, enjoys bipartisan political support in 
360

Congress and seems likely to continue for the reasons 

noted earlier.

China’s role as a trader, site for investment, and 

increasing important foreign investor will continue to 

grow in regional affairs. Unlike the United States, China has a great deal of money that could be used to the 

benefit of its neighbors. The governments engage in 

sometimes protracted talks with Chinese counterparts 

to find ways to use the money consistent with China’s 

ubiquitous win-win formula. In general, China will 

part with its money only if there is assurance that it 

will be paid back, and the endeavor will support China’s narrow win-set. China’s location and advancing 

infrastructure connecting China to its neighbors are 

major positive attributes supporting closer Chinese 

relations with neighboring states. 

Of course, much of the trade remains dependent 

on foreign investment and access to markets in the 

United States in particular. The United States almost 

certainly will not quickly reverse the large trade deficit that undergirds the export-oriented economies of 

the region. Asian leaders are watchful for signs of 

American protectionism, but the continued American 

economic recovery reinforces support for enhanced 

free trade initiatives from the United States. 

By contrast, China’s commitment to free trade remains selective and narrow. Beijing’s tendency to go 

well beyond international norms in retaliating against 

others over trade and other issues has grown with 

the advance of China’s economic size and influence. 

Its cyber theft of trade and economic information and 

property is enormous. Its currency manipulation and 

other neo-mercantilist practices are used deliberately 

to advance China’s economy without much consideration of how they disadvantage neighboring economies along with the United States. China’s recent 
361

extraordinary pressure on Japan for the sake of territorial claims risks enormous negative consequences for 

the regional economic growth. In contrast, the United 

States probably will see its interests best served in endeavoring to calm the tensions and play a role of stabilizer highly valued by most regional governments.

The growing U.S. security, economic, and political relationships with the wide range of Asian-Pacific 

governments built by the Clinton, Bush and Obama 

administrations have the effect of strengthening these 

governments and countries, reinforcing their independence and identity. While many of these governments 

continue to disagree with U.S. policies regarding the 

Middle East Peace process, electronic spying, and 

other issues, American interest in preserving a favorable balance of power in the region is supported by 

the prevalence of such stronger independent actors. 

By contrast, China’s assertiveness shows its neighbors 

that Beijing expects them to accommodate a growing 

range of Chinese concerns, even to the point of sacrificing territory. 

The range of Chinese demands probably will 

broaden with the growth of Chinese military, economic, and other coercive power. Strengthening those 

in the region that resist China’s pressure is seen in 

Beijing as a hostile act. The recent willingness of the 

Obama administration to strengthen security and other ties with Japan, the Philippines, and other countries 

facing Chinese coercion and intimidation shows the 

kinds of actions that can be taken effectively by the 

United States to demonstrate to Beijing the significant 

downsides of its assertive “nibbling” of territory also 

claimed by China’s neighbors. Overtime, effective U.S. 

reassurance and resolve can shape and direct Chinese 

assertiveness along less disruptive paths. 
362

It is important to reiterate here that most AsianPacific governments probably will expect the U.S. 

Government to carry out its improvement of relations 

in the region in ways that do not seriously exacerbate 

China-U.S. tensions and thereby disrupt the AsiaPacific region. The Obama administration has used 

the positive incentives of top-level engagement efforts 

with China along with the negative incentives of firm 

support of allies facing Chinese pressure and has a 

variety of other such carrots and sticks in its foreign 

policy tool box.

The Obama administration has also advanced 

markedly U.S. relations with the various regional organizations valued by Asian governments as part of 

their “constructivist” efforts to create norms and build 

institutions to ease interstate rivalries and promote cooperative relations. While U.S. orientation tends to follow more realist lines to advance American influence, 

the Obama administration seems sincere in pursuing 

interchange that is respectful of the regional bodies. 

These initiatives enjoy broad bipartisan support in the 

Congress and are likely to continue. China also depicts close alignment with these groups, though Chinese more assertive ambitions regarding disputed territories have seen Chinese leaders grossly manipulate 

these bodies or resort to coercion and intimidation.

Bottom Line. 

This scenario suggests a continuation of trends seen 

in recent years in China’s rise in Asia and the broader 

American leadership role in the Asian-Pacific region 

that have been examined here. I assess that those 

circumstances will continue to encumber China and 

preoccupy Chinese leaders who will remain cautious 
363

and unwilling to engage in serious military confrontation with the United States. The circumstances also 

are seen to support a stronger American leadership 

position increasingly well integrated with regional 

governments and organizations.

Wild Cards. 

Heading the long list of variables that could disrupt the previously mentioned assessment are the actions of third parties and their impact on U.S.-Chinese 

relations. These include new leaders in Taiwan, Japan, 

India, and Southeast Asian states who may take actions that could provoke confrontation with China. In 

response to repeated challenges posed by leaders in 

Taiwan and Japan in the recent past, U.S. and Chinese 

maneuvers have sometimes raised tensions but have 

avoided confrontation. There is no guarantee that future challenges will be dealt with in this way, but the 

ability of the big powers to influence the lesser powers and the desire to avoid disastrous Sino-American 

war support a more optimistic than pessimistic outlook on these possible problems. More worrisome and 

uncertain is the situation in North Korea. The North 

Korean leaders are capable of wide swings in behavior 

and the underlying stability of the regime remains in 

doubt. The collapse of the North Korea state would 

pose an enormous challenge to American and Chinese policymakers seemingly well beyond the scope 

and intensity of past crises during the post-Cold War 

period.
364

Alternative Future 2: A Global Expeditionary PLA.

The implications of this scenario depend greatly 

on how and why the PLA shifted to power projection 

beyond China’s periphery. There are a wide range of 

possibilities ranging from those with very positive 

implications for U.S.-Chinese relations to those with 

very negative implications for U.S.-Chinese relations. 

At one end of the spectrum, the global expeditionary PLA could be the result of a peaceful and mutually 

agreeable understanding over Taiwan that was welcomed by such concerned powers as the United States 

and Japan. It could be accompanied by effective Chinese reassurance of its neighbors and the United States 

that their interests would remain secure. Against that 

background, the PLA activism could be seen as part of 

greater international cooperation by a confident China ready and willing to work closely with the United 

States and others in fostering international peace and 

stability. The distrust that has prevailed in Sino-American relations for so long would dissipate with ever 

greater U.S.-Chinese coordination on peace building 

and stabilization in troubled regions of the world.

At the other end of the spectrum, a globally expeditionary PLA could be the result of successful Chinese 

coercion and intimidation of Taiwan, and perhaps 

Japan and other neighbors, in the context of weakening American leadership in the Asia-Pacific. In effect, 

China will have used coercion, intimidation, and other manifestations of growing power to break through 

the encumbrances to China’s sovereignty and security ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region. Against that 

background, the globally expeditionary PLA would 

signal great expansion of Chinese scope and activism 

as China endeavors to alter the world order in its fa-
365

vor after having successfully consolidated dominance 

in the Asia-Pacific, pushing out the United States. 

The implications of this outcome for American interests in the Asia-Pacific and the world seem quite 

negative, but the outcome for U.S.-Chinese relations 

could vary. In particular, America may give way to 

Chinese ambitions and seek agreement with Beijing 

on divided world leadership that may satisfy China, 

perhaps for some time. There presumably will be a variety of international, economic and other areas where 

the United States and China could deepen cooperation. A key obstacle would be the need to overcome 

long-standing American prejudice against appeasement as a tool of statecraft, but the circumstances 

could support an appeasement of rising China. A 

more contentious outcome would result if the United 

States fell back from China’s periphery but continued 

to resist Chinese expansion from off-shore in the AsiaPacific and elsewhere. The success of this approach 

would require overcoming international skepticism of 

American power that failed to thwart the advance of 

coercive Chinese power in the Asia-Pacific.

A development to consider in any scenario of a 

globally engaged PLA is how such a new presence, 

whether the result of benign or adverse circumstances 

for America, will affect U.S. interests. Even under the 

optimistic possibility noted here, China’s presence 

will compel a reduction of U.S. international security leadership in the face of an expeditionary PLA. 

Whether or not U.S. leaders will make the adjustment 

smoothly remains uncertain, though the optimistic 

possibility shows circumstances that would support 

pragmatic adjustment and accommodation in the face 

of new power realities. 
366

Alternative Future 3: A Weakened PLA.

This scenario could arise because of pressure from 

the United States. It also could arise mainly because 

of domestic and other external factors undermining 

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime. In both 

cases, it is logical to expect more U.S. interference and 

pressure, so long as the CCP regime persists. The continuation of the CCP regime matters greatly in future 

U.S.-Chinese relations. Broad American antipathy 

to China’s authoritarian Communist system has remained strong for decades and is likely to continue to 

drive American policy. At the same time, it is not in 

American interests that regime change in China comes 

with major disruption to regional and global peace 

and prosperity. At bottom, in this scenario, continuing 

U.S. practices that weakened the PLA and other security bulwarks of the Communist government without 

causing governance collapse leading to widespread 

chaos seem in line with American objectives. Finding 

this proper balance will be difficult.

These scenarios of weakened and preoccupied 

Chinese Communist leaders probably mean greater 

American involvement in the Asia-Pacific. Chinese 

domestic concerns probably will open the way to expanding American engagement, while concerns of 

regional governments with China’s uncertain future 

will likely prompt ever closer consultations among 

them and the United States.

A non-Communist China moving toward political pluralism and democracy probably will be much 

better treated by the United States than the current 

CCP regime. Such a non-Communist regime in China 

probably could expect strong U.S. support to deal 

with internal problems and less, if any, U.S. pressure. 
367

The United States also could be expected to use its enhanced involvement in the Asia-Pacific to work closely with concerned regional powers to stabilize and 

support such a non-Communist Chinese government.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. This section summarizes findings in Robert Sutter, U.S.-

Chinese Relations, Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013. For 

other perspectives, see, among others, David Shambaugh, ed., 

Tangled Titans, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012.

2. Don Keyser “President Obama’s Re-election: Outlook for 

U.S. China Relations in the Second Term,” Nottingham, UK: Nottingham University, China Policy Institute, November 7, 2012.

3. Balancing Acts, Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, 2013, p. 39, available from www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/

assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf.

4. Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-China 

Strategic Distrust, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 

March 2012.

5. David Shambaugh, “The Rocky Road Ahead in U.S.-China Relations,” China-U.S. Focus, October 23, 2012, available from 

www.chinausfocus.com/print/?id=20902.

6. This author participated in consultations in Washington, 

DC, involving groups of visiting Chinese specialists assessing 

U.S.-China relations after the U.S. elections and groups of concerned American specialists, November 8, 15, and 16, 2012. 

7. Balancing Acts, pp. 7-10.

8. Among treatments of this subject, see Timothy Adamson 

“China’s Response to the U.S. Rebalance,” in Balancing Acts, pp. 

39-43. See also tri-annual coverage of these issues in articles in 

Comparative Connections, available from www.csis.org/pacfor.
368

9. Aaron L. Friedberg, Contest for Supremacy. China, America 

and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: W. W. Norton and 

Company, 2011; Hugh White, “The China Choice” book review 

by Andrew Nathan, Foreign Affairs January-February 2013, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138661/hugh-white/thechina-choice-why-america-should-share-power.

10. See the treatment, among others, in Andrew J. Nathan and 

Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security, New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2012. See also treatment of Chinese constraints 

in Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, pp. 275-286; and Robert Sutter, 

“China and America: The Great Divergence?” Orbis, Vol. 58, No. 

3, Summer 2014, pp. 1-18.

11. Stephen Roach, “China’s Policy Disharmony,” Project Syndicate, December 31, 2013, available from www.projectsyndicate.org.

12. Robert Sutter, “China and U.S. Security and Economic Interests: Opportunities and Challenges,” Robert Ross and Oystein 

Tunsjo, eds., U.S.-China-EU Relations: Managing The New World 

Order, London, UK: Routledge, 2010, pp. 143-163; James Shinn, 

Weaving the Net, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1996.

13. Phillip Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools, Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional 

Paper, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, June 

4, 2006, pp. 8–9.

14. This section summarizes findings in Robert Sutter, Foreign 

Relations of the PRC, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013, 

pp. 1-26, 311-327.

15. Ibid., p. 315.

16. John Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of 

China, Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993.

17. Gilbert Rozman, East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism, Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 2013.
369

18. James Przystup, “Japan-China Relations,” Comparative 

Connections, Vol. 14, No. 3, January 2013, pp. 109-117.

19. Lawrence Saez and Crystal Chang, “China and South 

Asia: Strategic Implications and Economic Imperatives,” Lowell 

Dittmer and George Yu. eds., China, The Developing World, and the 

New Global Dynamic, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010, pp. 83-

108; John Garver and Fei-ling Wang, “China’s Anti-Encirclement 

Struggle,” Asian Security, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2010, pp. 238-263; Satu Limaye, “India-US Relations,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 15, No. 

3, January 2014, pp 137-143.

20. Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Guns and Games of August: Tales of Two Strategic Partners,” Comparative Connections, 

Vol. 10, No. 3, October 2008, pp. 131–38; Yu Bin, “China-Russia 

Relations,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 15, No. 3, January 2014, 

pp. 121–133.

21. Richard Bush, Unchartered Strait, Washington, DC: The 

Brookings Institution, 2013.

22. Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations,” Comparative 

Connections, Vol. 15, No. 3, January 2014, pp. 87-94.

23. Linda Jacobson, “Australia-China Ties: In Search of 

Political Trust,” Policy Brief, Lowy Institute, June 2012.

 24. Sutter, Foreign Relations of the PRC, p. 319.

25. Yu Yongding, “A Different Road Forward,” China Daily, 

December 23, 2010, p. 9.

26. Pu Zhendong, “Singapore Supports Strengthened 

Free-Trade Agreement with Beijing,” China Daily, August 30, 

2013, available from usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-08/30/

content_16932418.htm.

27. Jonathan Pollack, “Why Does China Coddle North Korea? 

The New York Times, January 12, 2014, available from www.nytimes.

org; Scott Snyder, “China’s Post-Kim Jong Il Debate,” Comparative 

Connections, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2012, pp. 107-114.
370

28. Robert Sutter, “Assessing China’s Rise and U.S. Influence 

in Asia—Growing Maturity and Balance,” Journal of Contemporary 

China, Vol. 19, No. 65, June 2010, pp. 591-604.

29. Author’s findings based on interviews with more than 200 

officials from 10 Asian-Pacific countries discussed most recently 

in Sutter, Foreign Relations of the PRC, pp. 321-326.

30. Gilbert Rozman, “Chinese National Identity and Foreign 

Policy,” Gilbert Rozman, ed., China’s Foreign Policy, Seoul, South 

Korea: The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2012, pp. 151-182.

31. For a review of the issues and disputes, see Susan Lawrence, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues, Report 

R41108, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service of the 

Library of Congress, August 1, 2013.

32. Friedberg, Contest for Supremacy.

33. Richard Wike, “Americans and Chinese Grow More Wary 

of Each Other,” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, June 13, 

2013, available from www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/05/

americans-and-chinese-grow-more-wary-of-each-other/.

34. Robert Sutter, The United States in Asia, Lanham, MD: 

Rowman and Littlefield, 2009, pp. 154-166; Suisheng Zhao, “Shaping the Regional Context of China’s Rise: How the Obama Administration Brought Back Hedge in its Engagement with China,” 

Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 21, No. 75, May 2012, pp. 369-

390; Robert Sutter, “Rebalancing, China and Asian Dynamics—

Obama’s Good Fit,” Pacnet #1, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 5, 2014, available from 

www.csis.org/pacfor.

35. Henry Nau and Deepa Ollapally, World Views of Aspiring 

Powers, New York: Oxford, 2012. 

36. Author interviews in Foreign Relations of the PRC.

37. Rozman, East Asian National Identities.
371

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

RICHARD A. BITZINGER is senior fellow and coordinator of the Military Transformations Program at 

the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. His 

work focuses on security and defense issues relating to 

the Asia-Pacific region, including military modernization and force transformation, regional defense industries and local armaments production, and weapons 

proliferation. Mr. Bitzinger was previously an Associate Professor with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security 

Studies (APCSS), Honolulu, HI, and has also worked 

for the RAND Corporation, the Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Affairs, and the U.S. Government. In 

1999-2000, he was a senior fellow with the Atlantic 

Council of the United States. Mr. Bitzinger has written several monographs and book chapters, and his 

articles have appeared in such journals as International 

Security, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Orbits, China 

Quarterly, and Survival. He is the author of Towards a 

Brave New Arms Industry? (Oxford University Press, 

2003), “Come the Revolution: Transforming the AsiaPacific’s Militaries,” Naval War College Review (Fall 

2005), and “Military Modernization in the Asia-Pacific: Assessing New Capabilities,” Asia’s Rising Power

(National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010). He is also 

the editor of The Modern Defense Industry: Political, 

Economic and Technological Issues (Praeger, 2009). Mr. 

Bitzinger holds a master’s degree from the Monterey 

Institute of International Affairs and has pursued 

additional postgraduate studies at the University of 

California, Los Angeles, CA.

BERNARD D. COLE is Professor of Maritime Strategy at the National War College, Washington, DC. He 
372

served 30 years in the U.S. Navy, retiring as a Captain; 

commanded USS Rathburne (FF1057) and Destroyer 

Squadron 35; served with the Third Marine Division in Vietnam from 1967 to 1968. He is the author 

of many articles, book chapters, and seven books, the 

most recent of which is Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters, published in 2013. Dr. Cole 

holds an A.B. in history from the University of North 

Carolina, an M.A. in national security affairs from the 

University of Washington, and a Ph.D. in history from 

Auburn University.

JOSEPH FEWSMITH is Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Boston University’s 

Pardee School for Global Studies. He is an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian 

Studies at Harvard University and the Pardee Center 

for the Study of the Longer Range Future at Boston 

University. Dr. Fewsmith is the author or editor of 

seven books, including, most recently The Logic and 

Limits of Political Reform in China (Cambridge University Press, January 2013). Other works include China 

since Tiananmen (2nd Ed., 2008) and China Today, China 

Tomorrow (2010). Other books include Elite Politics in 

Contemporary China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), 

The Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and 

Economic Debate (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 

and Party, State, and Local Elites in Republican China: 

Merchant Organizations and Politics in Shanghai, 1890-

1930 (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). 

His articles have appeared in such journals as Asian 

Survey, Comparative Studies in Society and History, The 

China Journal, The China Quarterly, Current History, The 

Journal of Contemporary China, Problems of Communism, 

and Modern China. 
373

DANIEL GEARIN is a China military capabilities 

analyst with the Department of Defense (DoD). Prior 

to joining DoD, he completed internships with the 

Center for a New American Security, National Defense University, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, and the Brookings Institution. 

Mr. Gearin holds a bachelor’s degree from Northeastern University in international affairs with a focus on China and a master’s degree from George 

Washington University.

ERIC HEGINBOTHAM is a senior political scientist at 

the RAND Corporation specializing in East Asian security issues. At RAND, he has led projects examining 

Chinese nuclear strategy, Chinese and U.S. Military 

capabilities, and regional dynamics in Northeast and 

Southeast Asia. Before coming to RAND in 2005, he 

was a senior fellow of Asia studies at the Council on 

Foreign Relations. He taught as a visiting faculty member of Boston College’s Political Science Department 

and served for 16 years in the U.S. Army Reserves and 

National Guard. Dr. Heginbotham has co-authored 

or edited several books, including Chinese and Indian 

Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm (2012), and 

has published articles on Japanese and Chinese foreign policy and strategic issues in Foreign Affairs, International Security, The Washington Quarterly, Current 

History, and The National Interest. Dr. Heginbotham 

holds a B.A. from Swarthmore College and a Ph.D. 

from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

JACOB HEIM is an associate policy analyst with the 

RAND Corporation, specializing in strategic assessment and defense analysis with a background in international relations and mathematics. His research ar-
374

eas include the military balance in the Western Pacific, 

U.S. overseas force posture, and the challenge posed 

by anti-access/area-denial capabilities. Previously, 

he was a senior operations research analyst with the 

MITRE Corporation. Mr. Heim holds an M.A. with 

honors from the Johns Hopkins University School 

of Advanced International Studies and a B.A. with 

distinction in mathematics from Amherst College.

LONNIE D. HENLEY is an employee of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA) on detail to the Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence. As National 

Intelligence Collection Officer for East Asia, he develops integrated intelligence collection strategies 

on high-priority East Asian issues across the United 

States Intelligence Community. Mr. Henley has been 

a China specialist for over 35 years, beginning with 

22 years as a China foreign area officer and military 

intelligence officer in Korea, at the DIA, on Army 

Staff, and in the History Department at West Point, 

NY. Upon retiring from the U.S. Army, he joined the 

senior civil service as Defense Intelligence Officer 

for East Asia and then Senior Intelligence Expert for 

Strategic Warning at DIA. After leaving DIA in 2004, 

he worked 2 years as a senior analyst with CENTRA 

Technology, Inc., then returned to government service 

as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia 

in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

He rejoined DIA in 2008, serving for 6 years as the 

agency’s senior China analyst, overseeing intelligence 

assessments on Chinese military and strategic issues 

across DoD. In addition to his government duties, 

Mr. Henley is an adjunct professor in the Security 

Policy Studies Program at The George Washington 

University. Mr. Henley holds a bachelor’s degree in 
375

engineering and Chinese from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and Masters’ degrees in Chinese 

language from Oxford University, which he attended 

as a Rhodes Scholar; in Chinese history from Columbia University; and in strategic intelligence from the 

National Defense Intelligence College (now National 

Intelligence University).

R. LINCOLN HINES was a Bridge Award Fellow 

with the Political and Security Affairs Group at the 

National Bureau of Asian Research from 2013 to 2014. 

Prior to this position, he was a David L Boren National 

Security Fellow studying in Beijing, China. Mr. Hines 

earned his BA in foreign affairs and East Asian studies 

from the University of Virginia, and his M.A. in international affairs from the American University School 

of International Service. He will begin his Ph.D. in 

government at Cornell University in the fall of 2015.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN is a senior advisor at The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), an adjunct 

associate professor at Columbia University’s School 

of International and Public Affairs, and a senior advisor to the University of Connecticut, Office of Global 

Affairs. Previously, he was senior vice president for 

Political and Security Affairs and Director of NBR’s 

Washington, DC, office. Prior to joining NBR, Mr. 

Kamphausen served as a U.S. Army officer, a career 

that culminated in an assignment in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense as Country Director for ChinaTaiwan-Mongolia Affairs. Previous assignments include the Joint Staff as an intelligence analyst and later 

as China Branch Chief in the Directorate for Strategic 

Plans and Policy (J5). A fluent Chinese (Mandarin) linguist and an Army China Foreign Area Officer, Mr. 
376

Kamphausen served 2 tours at the Defense Attaché 

Office of the U.S. Embassy in the People’s Republic of 

China. He is a member of the National Committee on 

U.S.-China Relations, the Asia Society, and the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. 

His areas of professional expertise include China’s 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), U.S.-China defense 

relations, U.S. defense and security policy toward 

Asia, and East Asian security issues. Mr. Kamphausen 

has co-authored the last eight volumes from the Carlisle PLA Conference. Mr. Kamphausen holds a B.A. in 

political science from Wheaton College and an M.A. in 

international affairs from Columbia University. 

DAVID LAI is Research Professor of Asian Security 

Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. 

Army War College. Prior to this position, he was on 

the faculty of the U.S. Air War College in Montgomery, AL. Dr Lai’s research and teaching cover U.S.-

China and U.S.-Asian relations and Chinese strategic 

thinking and military operational art.

ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO is an assistant professor 

of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of 

Foreign Service at Georgetown University where her 

research focuses on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, and 

coercive diplomacy. She is also an officer in the U.S. Air 

Force Reserve, for which she works as a reserve air attaché for the Asia-Pacific region. Previously, Dr. Mastro was a fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security program 

at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a 

University of Virginia Miller Center National Fellow 

and a Center for Strategic and International Studies 

(CSIS) Pacific Forum Sasakawa Peace Fellow. Addi-
377

tionally, she has worked on China policy issues at the 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, RAND 

Corporation, U.S. Pacific Command, and Project 2049. 

Dr. Mastro holds a B.A. in East Asian studies from 

Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in politics 

from Princeton University.

MICHAEL MCDEVITT, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy 

Ret., is a senior fellow associated with CNA Strategic Studies, a division of CNA, and a not-for-profit 

federally-funded research center in Washington, DC. 

During his Navy career, Rear Admiral McDevitt held 

four at-sea commands, including an aircraft carrier 

battle group. He was a CNO Strategic Studies Group 

Fellow and the Director of the East Asia Policy Office for the Secretary of Defense during the George H. 

W. Bush Administration. He also served for 2 years 

as the Director for Strategy, War Plans, and Policy 

(J-5) for the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). 

Rear Admiral McDevitt concluded his 34-year active 

duty career as the Commandant of the National War 

College in Washington, DC. He is a graduate of the 

National War College and holds a B.A. in U.S. history from the University of Southern California and a 

master’s degree in American diplomatic history from 

Georgetown University.

MICHAEL RASKA is a research fellow in the Military 

Transformations Program at the S. Rajaratnam School 

of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research interests focus on 

military innovation and force modernization trajectories in East Asia. Dr. Raska is the author of Military Innovation in Small States—Creating a Reverse Asymmetry

(Routledge, 2015), and co-editor of Security, Strategy 
378

and Military Change in the 21st Century: Cross-Regional 

Perspectives (Routledge, 2015). He holds a Ph.D. from 

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National 

University of Singapore. 

ERIN RICHTER is a senior intelligence analyst for the 

Defense Intelligence Agency where she has specialized in Chinese military capabilities and civil-military 

interdependencies for the last 10 years. She has served 

for the last 17 years in the U.S. Marine Corps as a logistics and intelligence officer, completing reserve and 

active duty assignments in Japan, the Middle East, 

Balkans, and within the continental United States. Ms. 

Richter is a graduate of the Marine Corps Command 

and Staff College and holds a B.A. in anthropology 

from the University of Maryland and an M.A. in international affairs from American University.

PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS is Director of the Center for 

the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic 

Research, both part of National Defense University’s 

Institute for National Strategic Studies. He previously worked at the Monterey Institute of International 

Studies as Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation 

Program from 1999 to 2003, and served as an officer 

in the U.S. Air Force from 1989 to 1994. Dr. Saunders 

is co-author of The Paradox of Power: Sino-American 

Strategic Restraint in an Era of Vulnerability (National 

Defense University Press, 2011) and co-editor of books 

on PLA influence on Chinese national security decisionmaking, China-Taiwan relations, the Chinese 

navy, and the Chinese air force. Dr. Saunders attended Harvard College and holds an M.P.A. and Ph.D. 

in international relations from the Woodrow Wilson 

School at Princeton University.
379

ROBERT SUTTER is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of International 

Affairs (ESIA), George Washington University. He 

also directs the ESIA program of Bachelor of Arts in 

International Affairs, involving more than 1,000 students. He taught full-time at Georgetown University 

(2001-2011) and part-time for 30 years at Georgetown, 

George Washington, Johns Hopkins Universities, or 

the University of Virginia. Dr. Sutter’s government 

career (1968-2001) involved work on Asian and Pacific affairs and U.S. foreign policy. He was the Senior 

Specialist and Director of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research 

Service. He also served as the National Intelligence 

Officer for East Asia and the Pacific at the U.S. Government’s National Intelligence Council, the China 

Division Director at the Department of State’s Bureau 

of Intelligence and Research, and a professional staff 

member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

In 2013, Dr. Sutter published his 20th book, Foreign 

Relations of the PRC: The Legacies and Constraints of 

China’s International Politics since 1949 (Rowman and 

Littlefield), and the 2nd edition of U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present (Rowman and 

Littlefield).The 3rd edition of his award-winning survey, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since 

the Cold War (Rowman and Littlefield), was published 

in 2012. Dr. Sutter holds a Ph.D. in history and East 

Asian languages from Harvard University.
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