RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 23, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0713-MR

MICHAEL D. SMITH APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-CI-00034

DEREK GORDON; RACHEL YAVELAK;

THOMAS LYONS; JOE JARRELL;

STEPHEN MILNER; WILLIAM HAYES;

PATRICK NASH; GUTHRIE TRUE;

WILLIS COFFEY; JULIE ROBERTS GILLUM;

JEFF HOOVER; ANGGELIS & GORDON, PLLC;

COFFEY & FORD, PSC; HAYES LAW GROUP;

TRUE, GUARNIERI, AYER, LLP; THE 

COURIER JOURNAL; WKYT 27 NEWS; WDKY

FOX NEWS; WLEX COMMUNICTIONS;

WTVQ 36 NEWS; THE LEXINGTON HERALD

LEADER; AND UNKOWN OTHERS1 APPELLEES

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

1

 Pursuant to the usual practice in our Court, the names of these party-appellees are taken 

verbatim from the appellant’s notice of appeal. Here, this means including names which are 

misspelled, as well as the common names for media enterprises rather than the appropriate

corporate owners. We need not consider the legal effect of this latter error in order to affirm the 

circuit court’s dismissal of the appellant’s suits.
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BEFORE: GOODWINE, JONES, AND MAZE, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Michael D. Smith appeals from multiple orders dismissing his

complaint with prejudice which were entered by the Garrard Circuit Court on April 

1, 2021, April 15, 2021, and June 3, 2021. The circuit court’s orders dismissed 

Smith’s complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to CR2 12.02(f). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Over twelve years ago, Smith owned and operated oil and gas 

companies operating in multiple states, including Kentucky. His business dealings

came to an ignominious end when he was accused of misrepresenting the viability 

and productivity of oil and gas wells to his investors. “In 2010, a federal jury 

convicted Smith of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.[3] §

1349, and multiple substantive counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

1341.” United States v. Smith, No. 21-5371, 2021 WL 7210170, at *1 (6th Cir. 

Nov. 15, 2021) (unreported). The federal trial court then sentenced Smith to one 

hundred twenty months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Id. 

The Sixth Circuit thereafter affirmed the conviction and sentence. United States v. 

Smith, 749 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2014).

2

 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

3

 United States Code.
-3-

Since being released from prison in February 2020, Smith has been 

uniquely focused on the idea that his indictment did not constitute a “true bill” 

because it did not contain signatures from the grand jury foreperson and the 

government’s prosecuting attorney. Smith, 2021 WL 7210170, at *1. In actuality, 

however, the indictment was merely sealed, and a redacted version used, in order

to ensure the confidentiality of the grand jury. Id. In late 2020 through early 2021, 

Smith filed multiple motions in federal district court requesting unredacted copies 

of his indictment, followed by multiple coram nobis petitions asserting his actual 

innocence. Id. The district court denied Smith’s motions and, in a written order,

stated, “[t]he Court has reviewed the document in question and CERTIFIES that 

the indictment was properly brought with the signature of the foreperson of the 

grand jury, resulting in the conviction of Smith on some, but not all, of the charges 

listed therein.” Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this order in its unreported opinion. 

Id. at *2.

After the federal courts denied his motions and petitions, Smith,

currently residing in Lancaster, Kentucky, turned his efforts at vindication toward 

the Kentucky courts. On February 19, 2021, Smith filed the pro se complaint 

relevant to the present appeal in Garrard Circuit Court. The defendant-appellees

may be broadly categorized into three groups: (1) attorneys who previously 

represented Smith; (2) attorneys who represented Smith’s codefendants; and (3) 
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media organizations which covered Smith’s federal criminal case. The complaint 

is unfocused, but it generally alleges that the attorneys and media all conspired 

with the government to imprison Smith despite his actual innocence, which Smith 

asserts is proven by the lack of an indictment for his criminal charges. Smith’s 

complaint essentially claims the attorneys committed legal malpractice, the media 

organizations defamed him, and all of the parties engaged in a civil conspiracy

against him.

The defendant-appellees filed separate motions to dismiss the 

complaint based on its failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, and

the circuit court granted these motions with prejudice in a series of orders entered 

in April and June 2021. Smith moved the circuit court to alter, amend, or vacate 

the judgments, as well as to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 

circuit court denied the motions, ruling that its dismissals pursuant to CR 12 did 

not consider matters outside the pleadings and that no findings or conclusions were 

required in such cases by our Rules of Civil Procedure. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Smith appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal for failure to state a 

claim pursuant to CR 12.02(f). We review such appeals de novo. Hardin v. 

Jefferson County Board of Education, 558 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. App. 2018). “It is 

proper to grant a CR 12.02(f) dismissal motion if . . . ‘it appears the pleading party 
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would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in 

support of his [or her] claim[.]’” Id. (quoting James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883

(Ky. App. 2002)). For purposes of the dismissal motion, we must accept the 

complaint’s factual allegations as true; however, we will strip the complaint of any

statements which are merely conclusory. Moss v. Robertson, 712 S.W.2d 351, 352 

(Ky. App. 1986). “Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the 

complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?” James, 95 

S.W.3d at 884.

For his sole issue on appeal, Smith asserts the circuit court 

erroneously dismissed his complaint. His pro se brief covers similar ground as his 

pro se complaint, asserting he is the victim of a conspiracy by the appellees which 

resulted in his conviction and sentence in federal prison. He asserts there was no 

indictment in his criminal case, presuming any redacted indictment without 

signatures must be fraudulent. Furthermore, Smith apparently asked for a copy of 

the unredacted indictment in a Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts (FOIPA) 

request he sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He then points to the 

response letter from the FBI, which was “unable to identify records responsive to 

[his] request,” as proof that he was convicted without a bona fide indictment.

The appellees assert the circuit court properly dismissed Smith’s 

complaint for a number of different reasons, but all of them agree that Smith’s 
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complaint is untimely. Smith’s conviction was over ten years ago. The attorney 

appellees point to KRS4 413.245, which requires professional service malpractice 

suits to be brought within one year of being discovered by the injured party. They 

also cite KRS 413.140(1)(c), which contains a one-year statute of limitation for

conspiracy actions. Similarly, the media appellees point out that defamation 

claims must be brought within one year pursuant to KRS 413.140(1)(d). 

Smith contends his imprisonment constituted a disability tolling the 

limitation statutes. However, the General Assembly repealed the statutory basis 

for prison inmate disability, KRS 413.310, more than thirty years ago.5 We are 

obliged to carry out the legislative intent of a constitutional enactment. See, e.g., 

University of the Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668, 683-84 (Ky. 

2010); Hale v. Combs, 30 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Ky. 2000). The expired statutes of 

limitation on Smith’s claims provide sufficient grounds to affirm the circuit court’s 

order dismissing Smith’s complaint. 

Furthermore, the appellees cite numerous other grounds, many of 

which are well taken, supporting the circuit court’s dismissal of the complaint. 

The attorney appellees cite the Exoneration Rule announced in Lawrence v. 

4

 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

5

 1990 Ky. Acts ch. 176, § 2 (eff. Jul. 13, 1990); see Hamilton v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., No. 

2002-CA-001246-MR, 2003 WL 22064128, at *3 n.1 (Ky. App. Sep. 5, 2003); Duffy v. Kindred 

Healthcare, Inc., No. 2004-CA-001523-MR, 2005 WL 1057547, at *2 n.3 (Ky. App. May 6, 

2005).
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Bingham, Greenebaum, Doll, L.L.P., 567 S.W.3d 133 (Ky. 2018). This Rule is 

summarized as follows:

[T]o survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim in a professional malpractice case against a 

criminal defense attorney, the convicted client must plead 

in his complaint that he has been exonerated of the 

underlying criminal conviction. He or she need not 

prove actual innocence, but they also may not rely solely 

upon a claim of actual innocence in the absence of an 

exonerating court decision through appeal or postconviction order.

Id. at 141. No such exoneration has occurred in Smith’s case. In addition, the 

attorney appellees who did not directly represent Smith cite Shoney’s, Inc. v. 

Lewis, 875 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1994), which discusses how lawyers are bound by 

professional ethics and the Supreme Court Rules to refrain from communicating 

about the subject of representation with those represented by other lawyers. Id. at 

515 (citing SCR6 3.130 (4.2)). Pushing aside the matter of not owing Smith a duty 

which would give rise to a negligence claim, the attorney appellees who did not 

represent Smith ran the risk of violating professional ethics rules if they had 

attempted the sort of aid which Smith now claims they should have provided.

For their part, in addition to the statute-of-limitation defense, the 

media appellees also assert Smith’s claims against them are inadequately pleaded. 

Smith fails to allege any of the essential elements of defamation: “1. defamatory 

6

 Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
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language 2. about the plaintiff 3. which is published and 4. which causes injury to 

reputation.” Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781 (Ky. 2004)

(citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Toler v. Süd-Chemie, Inc., 458 

S.W.3d 276 (Ky. 2014). Smith identifies no specific incidents of defamation by 

the media appellees. The media appellees further assert that Smith cannot show 

their reporting of Smith’s trial contained fabrications, and the truth is a complete 

defense to defamation claims. Estepp v. Johnson County Newspapers, Inc., 578 

S.W.3d 740, 744 (Ky. App. 2019). 

All of these defenses bear considerable merit, in addition to showing 

the simple untimeliness of Smith’s claims. However, we would be remiss if we 

did not mention that Smith’s complaint is problematic because it rests upon a claim

that there was no valid indictment in his federal criminal case – a claim which is 

completely refuted by the record. Smith repeatedly asserts he was convicted upon 

a fraudulent indictment because it lacked the signatures required. However, in 

doing so, he confuses a sealed and redacted indictment for either an invalid 

indictment or no indictment at all. We have reviewed the record, and a copy of 

Smith’s redacted indictment is contained within. Additionally, the federal district 

judge went so far as to send an order to Smith and the circuit court which denied 

requests for the unredacted indictment, but the district judge personally certified 

that the sealed indictment was properly brought with the appropriate signatures. 
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Put bluntly, a null premise lies at the core of Smith’s complaint, and the circuit 

court did not err in dismissing it.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Garrard Circuit Court’s 

orders of dismissal.

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Michael Smith, pro se

Lancaster, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ESTATE OF 

STEVE MILNER:

Katherine T. Watts

Patricia C. Le Meur

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES GUTHRIE 

TRUE AND THE LAW FIRM OF 

TRUE, GUARNIERI, AYER, LLP; 

WILLIAM HAYES AND THE LAW 

FIRM OF HAYES LAW GROUP; 

WILLIS COFFEY AND THE LAW 

FIRM OF COFFEY & FORD, PSC; 

JULIE ROBERTS GILLUM; AND 

JEFF HOOVER:

J. Hadden Dean

Danville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES DEREK 

GORDON; RACHEL YAVELAK;

AND ANGGELIS & GORDON, 

PLLC:

Kyle M. Virgin

David T. Cecil

Daenayia Harris

Lexington, Kentucky
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BRIEF FOR APPELLEES THE 

LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER; 

THE COURIER JOURNAL; WLEX 

COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; WKYT 

27 NEWS; WTVQ 36 NEWS; AND 

WDKY FOX NEWS:

Jon L. Fleischaker

Michael P. Abate

William R. Adams

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES PATRICK 

NASH AND NASH MARSHALL, 

PLLC:

Matthew W. Breetz

Bethany A. Breetz

Louisville, Kentucky

Joshua F. Barnette

Lexington, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE JOE A. 

JARRELL:

Joe A. Jarrell, pro se

Paris, Kentucky