alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Before the Second Division,

December 14, 1965

No. 69690.

#### Weston Electrical Instrument Corp. and Inter-Maritime Forwarding Co., Inc., et al. *v.*United States,

protests 211708-K, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Ford, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of parts of testers and other meters similar in all material respects to the Toho testers and meters the subject of *United States*v. *G. L. Electronics, Inc., Arrow Sales, Inc.*(49 CCPA 111, C.A.D. 804), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
Exhibit 32.1


Certification of Principal Executive Officer


Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010 (the “Report”) of United States Short Oil Fund, LP (the “Registrant”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Nicholas D. Gerber, the President and Chief Executive Officer of United States Commodity Funds LLC, General Partner of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.





Date: March 30, 2011
By:
/s/ Nicholas D. GerberName:
Nicholas D. GerberTitle:
President and Chief Executive OfficerUnited States Commodity Funds LLC,General Partner of United States Short Oil Fund, LP
[if !vml]>[endif]>

[if !vml]>[endif]>

You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title: Motorvehicle use map. Salt Lake Ranger District, Uinta-Wasatch-Cache NationalForest, Utah**
 
2011 | 2015| 2016 | 2018
 
SuDoc Number:A 13.28:UI 5/15/
Item Number:0080-G (online)
CGP systemNumber: 000956126
 
July 17, 2018
#### Elizabeth Kelly et al., Respondents, v Earl Lewis et al., Appellants.

[632 NYS2d 186]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Leone, J.), entered June 1, 1994, as, upon reargument, adhered to a prior determination in an order dated September 17,1993, permitting alternative service of process upon the defendant Earl Lewis pursuant to CPLR 308 (5).

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The court has discretion to direct alternative service of process pursuant to CPLR 308 (5) when it has determined that the methods set forth in CPLR 308 (1), (2), and (4) are "impracticable”. The standard for impracticability under CPLR 308 (5) is different from the more stringent one of "due diligence” under CPLR 308 (4). That is, to meet the standard on impracticability does not require satisfying due diligence, or even showing that actual prior attempts to serve a party under each and every method provided in the statute have been undertaken *(see, e.g., Tremont Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v Ndanusa,*144 AD2d 660, 661; *see also, Dobkin v Chapman,*21 NY2d 490; *Markoff v South Nassau Community Hosp.,*91 AD2d 1064, 1065, *affd*61 NY2d 283; *Liebeskind v Liebeskind,*86 AD2d 207, 210-211, *affd*
      *48658 NY2d 858; McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C308:5, at 314-315).

After the plaintiffs made three unsuccessful attempts at three different times on three different weekdays to serve the defendant Earl Lewis at his last known residence address, the court reasonably concluded that service was impracticable under the other relevant sections of CPLR 308 and properly directed alternative service, on Lewis’s attorneys, pursuant to CPLR 308 (5). Moreover, though not required to demonstrate due diligence, the plaintiffs’ efforts also satisfied that standard *(see, e.g., Hochhauser v Bungeroth,*179 AD2d 431). Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Ritter, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information  extracted  from  the
Osteotech,  Inc. and Subsidiaries Consolidated Balance Sheet as of September 30,
1999 and the Condensed  Consolidated Statement of Operations for the nine months
ended  September  30, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                 DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                      SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                             17,258,000
<SECURITIES>                                        3,946,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                      11,054,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                          134,000
<INVENTORY>                                         3,547,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   45,143,000
<PP&E>                                             42,191,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                     13,177,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     79,770,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              11,905,000
<BONDS>                                             3,624,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                       0
<PREFERRED>                                                 0
<COMMON>                                              140,000
<OTHER-SE>                                         63,666,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       79,770,000
<SALES>                                             2,163,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   55,877,000
<CGS>                                               1,285,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      41,882,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                            0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                            0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     55,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    16,381,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                        6,631,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 9,750,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                             0
<CHANGES>                                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                                        9,750,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                               .70
<EPS-DILUTED>                                             .67



</TABLE>
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28 Page 1 ORDER - [3:05-cv-5650-RBL-KLS]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

DELAINA LAWSON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Civil No. 3:05-CV-5650-RBL-KLS

ORDER FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(B)

THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the undersigned upon Plaintiff's Motion

for Attorney's Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and Defendant's Objection, the Court having

considered the contentions of Plaintiff and Defendant, good cause having been shown for entry of

the Order, now therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's attorney Elie Halpernis awarded attorney's fees pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $19,200.00, minus any processing fees allowed by statute and

it is further,
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28 Page 2 ORDER - [3:05-cv-5650-RBL-KLS]

ORDERED that Plaintiff's attorney refund $4,984.00, to Plaintiff, the sum received as attorney's

fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, which represents the total of the smaller fee to the

claimant. Pub. L. No. 99-80, §3 99 Stat. 183, 186 (1985); Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789,

796 (2002).

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2008.

A

RONALD B. LEIGHTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Presented by:

s/ RICHARD M. RODRIGUEZ

Special Assistant United States Attorney

Office of the General Counsel

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 MS/901

Seattle, Washington 98104-7075

Telephone: (206) 615-3748

FAX: (206) 615-2531

richard.rodriguez@ssa.gov
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 390 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 390

Recognizing the importance of the Ouachita National Forest on its 100th 
                              anniversary.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 9, 2007

    Mr. Ross (for himself, Mr. Berry, Mr. Snyder, and Mr. Boozman) 
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 
                          on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
Recognizing the importance of the Ouachita National Forest on its 100th 
                              anniversary.

Whereas on December 18, 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt created by 
        proclamation the Arkansas National Forest on reserved public domain 
        lands south of the Arkansas River;
Whereas on April 29, 1926, President Calvin Coolidge issued an Executive Order 
        to change the name of the Arkansas National Forest to the Ouachita 
        National Forest to reflect both the name of the mountains embraced by 
        the national forest and the name of the principal river which drains the 
        national forest;
Whereas Ouachita is the French spelling of a Native American word meaning ``good 
        hunting ground'';
Whereas the Ouachita National Forest today encompasses approximately 1.8 million 
        acres in Arkansas and eastern Oklahoma and offers a variety of 
        recreation areas, scenic areas, wilderness areas, historic resources, 
        and timber and other forest products to the Nation; and
Whereas the Ouachita National Forest is the largest and oldest national forest 
        in the southern region of the United States: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved,  That on the 100th anniversary of the creation of the 
Ouachita National Forest, the House of Representatives recognizes the 
important contributions of the Ouachita National Forest to the success 
of the United States in conserving the environment and ensuring that 
our natural resources remain sources of pride for our citizens, our 
communities, and our Nation.
                                 <all>
```
1

Filed 3/10/16 In re J.F. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

----

In re J.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

C077569

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. 69519)

Minor J.F. appeals from a juvenile court order continuing him as a ward of the 

court and placing him on probation subject to a 360-day commitment to the San Joaquin 

County Camp. Minor contends he is entitled to additional predisposition custody credit. 

We will modify the juvenile court’s order awarding predisposition credit to award 66 

days of predisposition credit, and affirm the order as modified. 
2

BACKGROUND

We need not recount the facts of minor’s offenses as such details are not relevant 

to the contention on appeal. It is sufficient to explain that on November 16, 2012, minor 

admitted allegations in a delinquency petition that he committed felony battery on a 

police officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)),

1 felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)(2)),

misdemeanor resisting an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), misdemeanor disorderly conduct 

(§ 647, subd. (f)), and misdemeanor unlawful use of a controlled substance (Health & 

Saf. Code, §§ 11550). The juvenile court granted deferred entry of judgment but 

subsequently lifted it when minor admitted an allegation in a second petition that he 

committed misdemeanor false imprisonment. (§ 236.) The juvenile court committed 

minor to 360 days at the San Joaquin County Camp, suspended execution of the 

commitment, and placed minor on probation. 

Minor subsequently admitted violating probation. At the disposition hearing, the 

juvenile court lifted the stay on the commitment to the San Joaquin County Camp, 

awarded 39 days of predisposition credit, and reinstated probation. 

DISCUSSION

Minor claims the trial court did not award the predisposition custody credit to 

which he was entitled. The Attorney General agrees and we do too.

Juveniles are entitled to precommitment credit for time spent in custody. (In re 

Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 536.) Minor was in custody two times before the 

disposition hearing: from November 4, 2013 to December 2, 2013, a total of 29 days, 

and from August 6, 2014 to September 11, 2014, a total of 37 days. Accordingly, minor 

spent 66 days in predisposition custody. The juvenile court awarded 39 days of 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

predisposition credit, but we will modify the order to award 66 days of predisposition 

credit.

DISPOSITION

The order awarding predisposition credit is modified to award 66 days of 

predisposition credit. The juvenile court’s order is affirmed as modified.

 /S/

Mauro, J.

We concur:

 /S/

Nicholson, Acting P. J.

 /S/

Butz, J.
From: scoy46@aol.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 10:10:11 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Sam COY

Dallas, OR 97338
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26 ORDER - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

DR. MAX ARNETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

OHIO NATIONAL INSURANCE AGENCY,

INC., an Ohio Corporation,

Defendant.

Case No. C05-5639 FDB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

SUBSTITUTE DEFENDANT

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to substitute Ohio National Life

Assurance Corporation as the correct name of the Defendant in this case. Defendant does not object

to the substitution insofar as the originally named defendant, Ohio National Insurance Agency, Inc. is

dismissed from this action, with prejudice. The Plaintiff implicitly concedes this point as he has

requested the substitution. The Court is in agreement. The Court will order the substitution. The

case caption will reflect that Ohio National Life Assurance Corporation is the named defendant. 

Ohio National Insurance Agency, Inc. will be dismissed from this action, with prejudice. This Order

is not to be construed as a basis to extend discovery deadlines or as a comment on other pending

motions.

Case 3:05-cv-05639-FDB Document 18 Filed 10/11/06 Page 1 of 2
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ACCORDINGLY;

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute Defendant [Dkt #9] is GRANTED.

2. Defendant Ohio National Insurance Agency, Inc. is dismissed from this action, with

prejudice

3. The case caption should reflect that Ohio National Life Assurance Corporation is the

sole named Defendant.

DATED this 11th day of October, 2006.

AFRANKLIN D. BURGESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-05639-FDB Document 18 Filed 10/11/06 Page 2 of 2
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ORDER

Page - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

SCHAWN J. CRUZE,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent.

Case No. C05-5744FDB

ORDER GRANTING I.F.P.

 APPLICATION

Petitioner's application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Petitioner does not

appear to have funds available to afford the $5.00 filing fee.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Order to petitioner.

DATED this 1st day of December, 2005.

_/s/ J. Kelley Arnold_______ J. Kelley Arnold

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 3:05-cv-05744-FDB Document 3 Filed 12/01/05 Page 1 of 1
Before the First Division,

April 22, 1964

No. 68478.

protests 62/15731, etc. (San Francisco).

#### E. F. Clements and Frank P. Dow Co., Inc., et al. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Oliver, C.J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of plastic paperweights similar in all material respects to those the subject of Abstract 67488, the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
Case No. 10,234.

#### NICHOLLS et al. v. WARFIELD.

[2 Cranch. C. C. 429.] 1

Circuit Court, District of Columbia.

Oct. Term, 1823.

Limitations of Actions — Conditional Promise.

The defendant’s expressing a willingness to pay a debt barred by the action of limitations, if a certain account snould be allowed as a set-off, is not such an acknowledgment as will take the case out of the statute.

[See Ash v. Hayman, Case No. 572.]

[See Case No. 10,233.]

Assumpsit [by W. S. Nicholls and J. S. Nicholls] for goods sold and delivered.

The defendant [P. Warfield] pleaded the act of limitations. The plaintiffs’ witness testified, that he called on the defendant with the' plaintiffs’ account for payment. The defendant said he did not like to pay money when money was due to him, and that he had an account against J. S. Nieholls. and would settle in that way, or words to that effect. The witness did not recollect the exact words, but is positive that the defendant made no objection to the account and expressed a willingness to pay it, if his account against J. S. Nicholls was allowed.

1

 [Reported by Hon. William Cranch. Chief J udge.]

THE COURT (nem. con.) decided, in conformity with the case of Wetzel v. Bussard, 11 Wheat. [24 U. S.] 309, and Jenkins v. Boyle [Case No. 7,2621, in this court, at June term, 1816, and Clementson v. Williams, 8 Cranch [12 U. S.] 72, that there was not evidence of such a promise as would take the ease out of the statute of limitations.
From: drfmmf@sutv.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 9:33:58 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Don Flickinger

Wellington, KS 67152