Filed 7/28/23 In re D.E. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re D.E., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D081744

 (Super. Ct. No. NJ15881AB)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Michael J. Imhoff, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Liana Serobian, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 
2

INTRODUCTION

After finding it true that nine-year-old D.E. and seven-year-old A.E. 

had been exposed to ongoing domestic violence between their parents, the 

juvenile court removed the children from both parents, placed them with 

their maternal grandparents, and ordered liberal, supervised visits for R.R. 

(Mother).1 Mother did not request any specific visitation order but asked the 

court to continue to vest the San Diego County Health and Human Services 

Agency (Agency) with discretion to expand her visits. The court did so and 

granted the Agency discretion to lift supervision of Mother’s visits, as well as 

to allow Mother to have overnight visits and live in the grandparents’ home 

with the children.

Mother challenges the dispositional order, on two grounds: First, she 

asserts substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s removal 

order because reasonable alternatives existed to prevent the children’s

removal from her custody. Alternatively, she asserts the court’s visitation 

order was erroneous because it set no minimum frequency or duration for 

Mother’s visits and improperly delegated “all judicial authority” to the 

Agency over Mother’s visits. We conclude the record provides substantial 

evidence to support the court’s removal order and Mother forfeited her claim 

regarding the visitation order. As a result, we affirm the court’s 

jurisdictional and dispositional orders. 

1 T.E. (Father) is not a party to this appeal.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I.

Dependency Petitions

In October 2022, the Agency filed dependency petitions on behalf of 

D.E. and A.E., each alleging Mother and Father failed to protect the children 

from exposure to the parents’ ongoing domestic violence, pursuant to Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).2 The Agency’s 

investigation revealed the following facts.3

On August 9, 2022, police officers responded to the family’s home when 

J.R. (Maternal Grandmother) reported domestic violence had occurred in the 

home. Mother told the officers Father threatened to break her cellphone,

pushed her two times, and threw a roll of pennies at her, striking her in the 

chest. She had slight bruising to her right wrist and right breast. According 

to Maternal Grandmother, Father did break the cellphone. While officers 

were speaking with Mother, Father fled the home and later forcefully resisted 

arrest and tried to kick one of the officers. He was arrested for corporal 

injury to a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and resisting arrest with 

force (Pen. Code, § 69). The children were at a nearby park during the 

incident but saw officers arrest Father.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.

3 “In accord with the usual rules on appeal, we state the facts in the

manner most favorable to the dependency court’s order.” (In re Janee W.

(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1448, fn. 1.)
4

On August 12, 2022, a three-year criminal protective order (CPO) was 

issued. It prohibited Father from contacting Mother or coming within 100 

yards of her, as well as her home, employment, or vehicle. 

Maternal Grandmother was caring for the children on the weekends as 

a result of the August 9, 2022 domestic violence. On August 22, Maternal 

Grandmother reported she encountered Father at Mother’s home when she 

dropped off the children, in violation of the CPO. Because Mother was not at 

home, she left the children in Father’s care. Maternal Grandmother told the 

Agency Father was a “heavy drinker” and she believed “the majority” of the 

parents’ domestic violence occurred when Father was intoxicated.

On September 27, 2022, the parents engaged in another violent

incident, eight days after both had declined voluntary services to address

domestic violence in their relationship. This time Father threw a glass plate 

at Mother, cutting her arm. When the police responded, Mother lied to

officers that Father was not in the home; they found him and arrested him 

for violating the CPO. Mother had three small bruises on her arm and a 

scratch on her wrist. She told the officers she received the injuries from

“tripping” over tools.4 Mother eventually told the officers she had invited 

Father to the home to help move furniture after a pipe burst in her home. 

She did not want the CPO, nor did she want Father to be prosecuted for 

violating the CPO. She said she intended to go to court to “remove” the CPO.

Both children were present during the September 27, 2022 domestic 

violence. D.E. reported to the Agency that her parents “ ‘got into a fight’ ” 

because her “ ‘dad thinks [her] mom is cheating on him.’ ” Father then threw 

4 A month later, Mother told the Agency Father angrily threw a plate at 

her and that it would have hit her face but she blocked it with her arm. She 

went to the hospital because she believed her wrist was broken.
5

a glass plate “ ‘on the ground.’ ” She said, “ ‘When he gets mad, he likes to 

throw things.’ ” D.E. reported her “ ‘mom had a cut on her wrist and it hit a 

nerve and [her] dad got a cut on his thumb.’ ” Since then, Father has called 

Mother “ ‘a few times,’ ” telling her “ ‘he misses her and he is tired.’ ” Mother 

responded by “ ‘asking when he was coming back home.’ ” D.E. said she was 

afraid when her parents fight and explained, “ ‘My grandma’s house is the 

only peaceful place I am in.’ ” A.E. reported that he “ ‘heard a glass break’ ”

and when Father left, he saw the glass on the ground. A.E. said what 

happened made him feel “ ‘not so good’ ” and when asked how his parents 

fight, he responded, “ ‘They fight.’ ”

Father, who was in custody, told the Agency he was not at the home on 

September 27, 2022 and denied any domestic violence had occurred with 

Mother. He denied “know[ing] anything about a plate.” He saw that Mother 

had “a cast” on because she had a cut on her arm, although he did not know 

how she was cut. The Agency spoke to him again more than a week later and 

told him “various people” had reported to the Agency about the September 27

domestic violence. In response, Father asked if Mother was one of the people. 

Father then told the Agency “everything” it was told “ ‘was true.’ ” He 

claimed, however, Mother “ ‘attacked him’ ” because she was mad that he had 

told D.E. about Mother’s boyfriend. She grabbed a shoe and threw it at him, 

and he reacted by throwing a plate at her. He admitted he was in violation of 

the CPO.

The parents had a documented history of domestic violence. Mother 

told the Agency she had called the police twice in the past because of “verbal 

arguments,” “ ‘nothing crazy.’ ” She denied the arguments were “physical,” 

and explained they were “just more ‘rowdy.’ ” The Agency obtained two police 

reports of domestic violence occurring on November 15, 2020 and December 
6

1, 2021. On November 15, 2020, Mother called the police because Father spat 

twice in her face, grabbed her left arm and “flung her onto the bed,” and 

choked her with his hands. She was not able to breathe. Officers observed 

she had an abrasion to her left wrist. Mother did not want Father 

prosecuted. On December 1, 2021, Mother reported Father took money from 

her purse so she punched him twice in the forearm. Father then pushed 

Mother twice, causing her to fall back onto the couch and floor, and pulled a

“clump” of hair from her head. Officers saw redness to her back and the 

clump of hair on the ground. Mother told the officers she had been in “ ‘four 

or five’ total domestic violence incidents” with Father.

II.

Detention Hearing

At the detention hearing in October 2022, the juvenile court made a 

prima facie finding on the petitions, detained D.E. and A.E. with the 

maternal grandparents, and ordered liberal but separate, supervised visits 

for Mother and Father. It vested the Agency with discretion to lift 

supervision and allow the parents to have unsupervised and overnight visits, 

and to detain the children with the parents with the agreement of the 

children’s counsel. The court also gave the Agency discretion to allow Mother 

to reside in the maternal grandparents’ home with the children, with the 

agreement of the children’s counsel. The court ordered reunification services 

for Mother and Father, including domestic violence treatment and parenting 

classes, and referred them to a substance abuse specialist for evaluation. It 

also authorized therapy for the children 
7

III.

Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing

The contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was held on 

February 10, 2023. While Maternal Grandmother was present, neither 

parent attended the hearing. The court clerk attempted to call Mother and 

Father but reached an out-of-service message for each. Counsel for Mother 

requested a continuance so Mother could attend. Noting that Mother’s last 

appearance was in October 2022, the juvenile court found Mother had 

received proper notice of the hearing and denied the continuance request. 

The juvenile court received into evidence the Agency’s reports to date 

from the filing of the petitions. The Agency’s social worker was present to 

testify, but counsel for Mother and Father chose to not cross-examine her, nor 

did they present any affirmative evidence. The court found the petitions true 

by clear and convincing evidence and assumed dependency jurisdiction over 

the children. It then found the requirements of section 361, subdivision 

(c)(1), had been met by clear and convincing evidence and removed D.E. and 

A.E. from each parent. It ordered the children be placed with relatives and 

continued all prior orders, including its order granting Mother liberal 

supervised visitation with discretion to the Agency to expand the terms of her 

visitation.

In addition to what we have already summarized, the Agency’s reports 

provided the court with the following additional facts to support its 

jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders:

A. The Children’s Progress

D.E. had been demonstrating anxious behavior, including picking at 

her nails. She asked to talk with someone because “she had been feeling 
8

more sad than usual.” She explained “she would see hitting” when her 

parents fought and she felt unsafe to be with them, even if they separated.

A.E. tended to become “extremely angry” and had “difficulty calming 

himself down.” On one occasion, he scratched Maternal Grandmother when 

she tried to calm him. He reported “feeling sadder than usual because he 

miss[ed] his parents” and said things “as if he wants to die.” Maternal 

Grandmother reported he was saying “ ‘crazy stuff’’ like ‘I wish I was dead,’ ” 

and would get “extremely angry very quickly.” A.E. reported, “ ‘My dad 

always hurt my mom, he’s not safe around us. I saw him kicking her.’ ” He 

felt safe with his parents but only if they separated. If he had a magic wand 

to change anything, he said it would be to “ ‘[m]ake my parents not fight 

anymore.’ ”

B. Father’s Progress

Father was living in a car that his grandmother had lent him. He had 

not started his domestic violence classes, counseling, or substance abuse 

services. Although the children clearly enjoyed their supervised time with 

Father, he was inconsistent. He had multiple missed visits and provided late 

notice to the Agency, all of which caused the children to become “distraught.”

Father acknowledged he committed domestic violence against Mother. 

He explained he and Mother would hit each other and he had strangled 

Mother once. But in his view, Mother was the antagonist who usually started 

the physical altercations. He reported the domestic violence had only 

recently started the past two years. He believed the children were usually 

outside playing or in their room during the domestic violence, but when asked 

if the children would hide during any incident, he responded, “ ‘I guess so.’ ” 

Father denied he and Mother were in contact and asserted he was 

complying with the CPO. Father denied he had an alcohol dependency 
9

problem, although he admitted he was charged with driving under the 

influence three times over the last 10 years. He explained he would drink 

“for a week straight” when he was depressed to “ ‘take the edge off.’ ” Father 

denied the domestic violence with Mother resulted from his drinking. 

C. Mother’s Progress

Mother had enrolled in her domestic violence services but, for reasons 

not her fault, the classes began late (in January 2023) and her first class was 

cancelled. Mother did not have stable housing and was apparently staying in

the homes of various friends.

Like Father, Mother had also been inconsistent with her visits with the 

children. Although she “had significant opportunities to fully parent [them] 

given that she conduct[ed] almost all of her visits in the maternal 

grandmother’s home,” Maternal Grandmother reported to the Agency that 

she was “minimal in her interactions with the children, often late to visits, 

and often does not show up for her visits.” Mother explained she had been 

skipping visits because she was struggling with “ ‘a lot of emotions.’ ” 

Mother reported the domestic violence started five years ago in her 10-

year relationship with Father and “it was mostly verbal altercations.” She 

acknowledged there had been “pushing” and “shoving” but described it as 

“ ‘rough housing, being too rough.’ ” Father has hit and kicked her but “that 

was years ago” and he also strangled her once. Later she said Father had 

choked her at least twice and left her neck sore for “2-3 weeks” and she felt 

like “it ‘messed up [her] vocal cords.’ ” Mother believed the domestic violence 

resulted from their inability “ ‘to control [their] emotions’ ” and the fights 

were over infidelity and “deep trust issues.” She denied starting the physical 

altercations and explained she would only shove Father back “in defense.” 

Mother loved Father but acknowledged “the fights were getting worse.” She 
10

admitted she and Father sometimes drank together and “it would get even 

worse.” 

D. Reported CPO Violations

On November 15, 2022, Maternal Grandmother called the police 

because Father was seen across the street going into her apartment complex. 

Maternal Grandmother told the Agency that whenever Father called or 

texted, Mother would “always” text or call a few seconds later; she found the

timing “strange.” She told the Agency she was upset by Mother’s behavior 

and not sure if Mother should continue to have visits with the children in her

home. 

On February 1, 2023, Maternal Grandmother reported that although 

“things [had been] going well” with Mother, she suspected Mother was seeing 

Father again. She explained Mother had become “very inconsistent” with her 

visits with the children and felt “ ‘something shady [wa]s going on.’ ” Mother 

had been staying with friends and was usually dropped off “right in front of 

the driveway” at her home when visiting the children. But now, Mother was 

walking down the street to be picked up. Maternal Grandmother checked her 

“Ring” surveillance camera and saw an older white Toyota Rav-4. This car 

had picked up Mother “multiple times” and she suspected it was Father. 

Maternal Grandmother reported that Mother was “ ‘coming and going at 

weird times, she’s not cooking now, the routine is not as consistent’ ” and she 

had to monitor Mother to “ ‘keep[ ] the kids on track.’ ”

On February 6, 2023, just four days before the contested hearing, 

Maternal Grandmother reported that Ra.R. (Maternal Aunt) told her she just 

saw Mother and Father walking together. Maternal Grandmother knew 

Father parked near an old apartment complex they used to live at and went 

to investigate. When she drove up to the complex, Maternal Grandmother 
11

saw Father sitting in a white Toyota Rav-4, the same vehicle she had seen on 

her “Ring” surveillance camera. She did not see Mother in the car, but 

“assumed” she was probably hiding or had left.

Maternal Aunt confirmed she saw Mother and Father walking “arm-inarm” on the side of the road as she was driving to Maternal Grandmother’s 

home on February 6, 2023. She was “100% sure” it was Mother and Father 

because she saw their faces. The week prior, Maternal Aunt received a text 

from Mother asking her to pick Mother up at a Circle K gas station. When 

she arrived, Maternal Aunt saw Mother get out of a similar white car and, in 

hindsight, believed it was Father, who worked at a Circle K gas station.

DISCUSSION

I.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Removal Order

On this record, we disagree with Mother’s contention that there was

insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s removal order because 

reasonable alternatives existed to prevent the children’s removal from her 

custody. 

“A child may not be taken from a parent’s physical custody during 

juvenile dependency proceedings, except for a temporary detention period, 

unless clear and convincing evidence supports a ground for removal specified 

by the Legislature.” (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 525.) 

Section 361 is the governing statute, and it imposes restraints on the juvenile 

court’s authority to remove a child from a parent’s physical custody. (§ 361, 

subd. (c).) It provides that “[a] dependent child shall not be taken from the 

physical custody of his or her parents, . . . unless the juvenile court finds clear 

and convincing evidence” that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to 

the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of 
12

the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable

means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without 

removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, 

subd. (c)(1).) The statute further provides “[t]he court shall consider, as a 

reasonable means to protect the minor,” the option of removing the offending 

parent from the home (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)(A)), and whether the nonoffending 

parent “presents a plan acceptable to the court demonstrating that he or she 

will be able to protect the child from future harm (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)(B)).

“In determining whether a child may be safely maintained in the 

parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court may consider the parent’s past 

conduct and current circumstances, and the parent’s response to the 

conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.” (In re D.B. (2018) 26 

Cal.App.5th 320, 332.) “The parent need not be dangerous and the minor 

need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus 

of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 

Cal.App.4th 126, 135–136.) The court has broad discretion in selecting a 

disposition that serves the child’s best interests. (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 

Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179.) 

We review a dispositional order removing a child from a parent for 

substantial evidence, “ ‘keeping in mind that the trial court was required to

make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing

evidence.’ ” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.) “[A]ppellate review of 

the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a finding requiring clear and 

convincing proof must account for the level of confidence this standard

demands.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995.) In applying

this standard of review, “the question before the appellate court is whether

the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
13

fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at

pp. 995−996.) We view the record in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have

evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and

drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence. (Ibid.) Here, Mother, as the 

party challenging the juvenile court’s order, has the burden to show there is

insufficient evidence to support the court’s decision. (In re Lana S. (2012) 207

Cal.App.4th 94, 103.) 

As noted, section 361 restrains a juvenile court from removing a child

from the physical custody of her parents unless there is clear and convincing

evidence of two conditions: (1) “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to

the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of

the child if she is returned home, and (2) “there are no reasonable means by

which the [child’s] physical health can be protected without removing” her

from the parent’s physical custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Mother does not 

challenge there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that 

there was or would be substantial danger to D.E. and A.E. if they were 

returned to her custody.5 Instead, she contends only that there was 

insufficient evidence of the second condition. 

Specifically, Mother argues there were reasonable protective measures 

“less drastic” than removing the children from her custody, including an 

order that Mother reside in the maternal grandparents’ home with the 

5 The record demonstrated the children’s exposure to the pattern of 

volatility and violence in their parents’ relationship was, at minimum, 

emotionally harmful to them. The negative impact on both D.E. and A.E.

was evident in the fear they expressed for their own safety and the mental 

health issues they were exhibiting, including comments by A.E. that arguably 

suggested thoughts of self-harm.
14

children under the court’s supervision, while Father is ordered out of the 

home. She contends this arrangement, combined with other measures such 

as unannounced visits, periodic interviews of the children and Maternal 

Grandmother, and conditioning the placement on Mother not permitting 

Father to have unsupervised or unauthorized access to the children outside 

the Agency’s scheduled visits, would adequately protect the children from the 

defined risk of harm⎯exposure to the parents’ pattern of ongoing domestic 

violence. We are not persuaded.

Mother and Father had a documented history of serious and continuous 

domestic violence that posed a substantial danger to the children’s safety and 

well-being. Even Mother recognized she needed to “not have [Father] around 

the home” in order to make it safe for the children to return to her care. She 

acknowledged the court’s “main concern” in the dependency case was “the 

CPO being broken.” Despite articulating this insight, Mother repeatedly and 

willfully disregarded the CPO and failed to comply with her dependency case 

plan, which required compliance with all court orders. A juvenile court could 

reasonably determine, based on a parent’s prior violations of court orders

including a restraining order, that a child could not be safely placed in the

parent’s custody in the hope the parent would comply with court orders or 

Agency supervision. (See In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1127.) 

On appeal, Mother neither admits nor denies having contact with Father in 

violation of the CPO. She argues instead that “even if this was true,” the 

contact was peaceful with no reported arguments and occurred away from the 

children. Mother’s continuing attempt to excuse the parents’ violations of the

CPO only further supports the juvenile court’s finding that no reasonable 

alternatives existed to protect the children short of their removal from her 

custody. 
15

Mother’s suggestion that removing Father from “the home” was 

another option to protect the children is also unpersuasive. While the 

juvenile court is required to consider removal of the offending parent from the 

home as a reasonable means of protecting a child, Mother’s reliance on 

section 361, subdivision (c)(1)(A), overlooks that, at the time of the contested 

hearing, Father was living in a car, not in the home with the children. It also 

overlooks that even after Father had been removed from the home pursuant 

to the CPO, Father and Mother continued to have contact which resulted in 

another domestic violence incident on September 27, 2022. This time the 

violence occurred in the presence of the children and again resulted in injury 

to Mother. 

There is also substantial evidence to support a finding that allowing 

Mother to live with the maternal grandparents, even with unannounced 

visits, was not a viable option. In the months before the contested hearing, 

Mother was taking calculated steps to see Father in secrecy, away from the 

maternal grandparent’s home. Mother’s behavior upset Maternal 

Grandmother. It caused her to lose confidence that Mother was prioritizing 

the children’s safety and she no longer supported Mother’s visits with the 

children in her home. 

In sum, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

removal order.

II.

Mother Forfeited Her Challenge to the Visitation Order

Mother contends that if we affirm the removal order, the juvenile 

court’s visitation order must be reversed because it did not set a minimum 

frequency or duration for her visits and improperly delegated “all judicial 
16

authority” over her visits to the Agency. On this record, we conclude Mother 

has forfeited this issue.

“Visitation is a necessary and integral component of any reunification 

plan.” (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.) Section 362.1, 

subdivision (a)(1), provides that visitation “shall be as frequent as possible, 

consistent with the well-being of the child.” “At the same time, visitation 

orders must provide for ‘flexibility in response to the changing needs of the 

child and to dynamic family circumstances.’ ” (In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 

Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.) “It is the juvenile court’s responsibility to ensure 

regular parent-child visitation occurs while at the same time providing for 

flexibility[.]” (In re S.H., at p. 317.) 

“A visitation order may delegate to a third party the responsibility for 

managing the details of visits, including their time, place and manner.” (In 

re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123.) However, the discretion to decide 

whether any visitation occurs at all must remain with the court. When the 

court abdicates its discretion in that regard and permits a third party, 

whether social worker, therapist, or the child, “ ‘to determine whether any 

visitation will occur, the court impermissibly delegates its authority over 

visitation and abuses its discretion.’ ” (In re Korbin Z. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 

511, 519; In re S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 317–318.) 

After the juvenile court made its jurisdictional findings, the court 

invited counsel’s positions on the appropriate disposition. Mother’s counsel 

submitted on the Agency’s recommendation that the children remain in 

Maternal Grandmother’s placement and that Mother continue with 

supervised visitations and not be allowed to live with the children in 

Maternal Grandmother’s home. Mother did not ask for a more specific inperson visitation order, or that the court specify the frequency or duration of 
17

her visits. Instead, she requested only that “all discretions for expansion be 

in place.” The court so ordered. Mother cannot complain now for the first 

time on appeal that the court erred in its visitation order by failing to set a 

minimum frequency or duration for her visits, or by vesting the Agency with 

discretion to expand her visits. We conclude she has forfeited the claim.6 (In 

re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1528 [argument not 

raised below is forfeited on appeal]; In re A.S. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 131, 151 

[failure to object in the juvenile court forfeits the issue on appeal].)

6 Although we conclude Mother has forfeited her challenge to the 

visitation order, we note that throughout the dependency proceeding, Mother 

was able to visit with the children regularly except for times she did not show 

up for her visits. She does not claim, and there is nothing in the record 

indicating that she was precluded or prevented from visiting the children at 

any time for any reason, or that this would change going forward. The 

visitation order here also does not delegate to any party the ability to veto 

Mother’s visits. (Compare with In re T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1122–1123 [concluding that ordering the father to have supervised 

visitation “ ‘to be determined by the parents’ ” was an abuse of discretion 

where the mother, who was the custodial parent had objected to the father 

having any visitation at all and “could conceivably agree to only one visit a 

year or less without violating the letter of the court’s order”]; and In re S.H., 

supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 318–319 [where the mother’s sons had refused 

visits and all the children were fearful of the mother, reversing visitation 

order that stated “ ‘if the children refuse a visit, then they shall not be forced 

to have a visit’ ” because the order granted the children “de facto veto 

power”].)
18

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s February 10, 2023 jurisdictional and dispositional 

orders are affirmed.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.