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i 

94–749 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–38] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

NUCLEAR FORCES 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 15, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Benedict, VADM Terry J., USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs 

Harencak, Maj Gen Garrett, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic 

Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Department of Defense 

Hopkins, Dr. Arthur T., Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, Department 

of Defense 

Scher, Hon. Robert M., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, 

and Capabilities, Department of Defense 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Benedict, VADM Terry J. ................................................................................ 51 

Harencak, Maj Gen Garrett ............................................................................. 67 

Hopkins, Dr. Arthur T. .................................................................................... 40 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 21 

Scher, Hon. Robert M. ...................................................................................... 23 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

November 2014 Message to the Force from the Secretary of Defense ......... 79 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Ashford ....................................................................................................... 84 

Mr. Bridenstine ................................................................................................. 84 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 83 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 83 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 90 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 89 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 88 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 87 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

NUCLEAR FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 15, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. I want to call this hearing of the 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee to order. And we are going to be called for votes at 4:30, so 

in order to make sure we can get plenty on the record in the way 

of questions, the ranking member and I have agreed to dispense 

with opening statements. And we would ask each of the witnesses 

to submit theirs for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 21.] 

Mr. ROGERS. And we will go straight to questions after I introduce our distinguished panelists. 

We have with us today the Honorable Robert Scher, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense; Dr. Arthur Hopkins, Acting Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, U.S. Department of Defense; Vice Admiral 

Terry Benedict, Director of Strategic Systems Programs, U.S. Navy; 

and Major General Garrett Harencak, Assistant Chief of Staff for 

Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force. 

Mr. ROGERS. And with that, I thank the witnesses for being here. 

I really appreciate the time and energy it takes to prepare for these 

hearings, and it matters a lot. We appreciate you making the time 

for us. 

[The prepared statements of Secretary Scher, Dr. Hopkins, Admiral Benedict, and General Harencak can be found in the Appendix 

beginning on page 23.] 

Mr. ROGERS. And I’ll recognize myself for the first round of questions. In the opening statement I submitted for the record, I mentioned a message to the force from then Secretary of Defense 

Hagel, which is in your binder. It is dated November of last year. 

And without objection I would like to enter that into the record. 

Hearing none, so ordered. 
2 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 79.] 

Mr. ROGERS. The letter is a remarkable statement of defense priorities, and it makes clear that the nuclear deterrence is the Nation’s number one priority defense mission. We have seen this priority reflected in statements from many senior DOD [Department 

of Defense] officials, and I believe we have started to see that priority reflected in budget requests. We have also seen it in Secretary 

Carter’s policy documents, including his guidance for employment 

of the force and readiness availability priorities. 

Mr. Scher, from a policy perspective tell us why nuclear deterrence is the Nation’s, quote, ‘‘highest priority defense mission,’’ 

close quote, as Secretary Hagel stated in his letter to the force. 

Secretary SCHER. Certainly, Chairman, be happy to. 

So simply put, nuclear forces are critical to ensuring that we and 

our allies can effectively address threats, especially from nuclear 

states. That is the key focus. We believe that nuclear forces deter 

attack on the United States and our allies, and nuclear weapons 

are also critical to ensuring that adversaries don’t think they can 

escalate out of a crisis if conventional forces aren’t useful for them. 

So it is imperative that we maintain the nuclear forces, that we 

maintain the deterrence, that these forces are credible, effective, 

reliable, and can be used in multiple options across a range of activities should this so happen. We still believe that the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely, but we are not willing to take the chance 

that it couldn’t happen because the catastrophic consequences 

should it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Hopkins, please take a minute to explain what 

the Department sees as the key investment priorities for the nuclear deterrence mission in fiscal year 2016 and beyond. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As noted in our written statements, I think you will see a fair 

amount of consistency there, the Department’s priorities are for the 

sustainment and modernization of the complete triad of the full 

force. And that starts with the submarine force, the life extension 

program for the Trident II missile, and the bombers, the LongRange Strike Bomber, as well as the cruise missile, Long-Range 

Stand-Off Missile. 

Along with that, we also are partnered with the Department of 

Energy. It is very important that our programs be synchronized so 

that the delivery systems and the weapons arrive at the same time. 

Mr. ROGERS. This will be for Admiral Benedict and General 

Harencak. In February, Admiral Haney told this committee that 

DOD spends less than 3 percent of its budget on nuclear forces, 

and that during the peak years of modernization only 5 to 6 percent of defense spending will go toward nuclear forces. To both of 

you, how should we be looking at this question of, quote, ‘‘affordability,’’ of nuclear modernization given the priority DOD assigns 

to the nuclear deterrence mission? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes sir. Thank you for the question. 

Sir, I would submit that while the percentage of the defense 

budget is as you stated, 3 to 6 percent, I think that the leadership 

should be expecting from the United States Navy and the United 

States Air Force options to ensure that that money is effectively 
3 

spent. And to that, the United States Navy and the United States 

Air Force has been working the topic of commonality to ensure 

that, whatever resources we are provided, that those are utilized 

as efficiently as possible. 

I would submit that as a response, sir. 

General HARENCAK. Mr. Chairman, to add to that, as the United 

States Air Force modernizes and recapitalizes its two legs of the 

triad, every time we begin a process of looking at what to do, affordability is always the key aspect of what we are doing. To that 

end, we are—believe that we can have an affordable triad as long 

as we continue the great efforts we have been doing the past few 

years with the United States Navy and then leveraging the great 

innovation of our industry partners to make sure that we can have 

a safe, secure, and effective stockpile. 

Mr. ROGERS. And let’s stay with you, General. Why does the 

United States need the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon, the followon to the current Air-Launched Cruise Missile? 

General HARENCAK. Well, thank you for that question. The 

ALCM is the Air-Launched Cruise Missile, it was a 1982 weapon 

with a 10-year service life. And it is a key aspect of our nuclear 

deterrent. It is a main priority focus of STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic 

Command]. And it gives us a unique capability to give the government and the President of the United States a wide range of options across the entire spectrum of conflict. 

A cruise missile is a stand-off weapon, and much like every other 

aspect of human conflict, the nuclear deterrent option also needs 

a stand-off and a direct attack. And what that allows us to do is 

across the entire spectrum, across any possible scenario out there, 

to give options, however the President may decide to use those options, but it gives options where we could respond to a wide range 

of threats. 

Specifically, the ALCM, as I already said, it is a 10-year lifespan 

and it is growing. So we have absolutely committed as the United 

States Air Force to providing an affordable long-range strike option 

which allows us to have wide-ranging capabilities across the entire 

spectrum of conflict. And certainly in the closed session we can talk 

about the very specific classified reasons why we will need that capability in A2/AD [anti-access/area-denial] environment. 

Mr. ROGERS. And why do we need a nuclear-armed cruise missile 

if we have a penetrating bomber and the B61 nuclear gravity 

bomb? 

General HARENCAK. Well, sir, simply because we need stand-off 

and we need direct attack in this particular mission set as the airdelivered portion of the triad. It creates opportunities for us. It 

vastly, vastly complicates a potential enemy’s defenses. And most 

importantly, as I said, it gives options, options that we would perhaps someday wish we had if we don’t pursue this. 

As I said, ever since human conflict, we have had direct attack 

and we have had stand-off. And in this particular mission set is no 

different than any other mission set. We need that capability for 

our airmen that are going to be given a very difficult task in a 

number of highly important scenarios. We believe it is a capability, 

and so does Admiral Haney in STRATCOM, that we absolutely 

must fill. 
4 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Hopkins, would the Nuclear Weapons Council 

agree with that assessment? 

And, Mr. Scher, would OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] 

Policy agree with it. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Mr. Chairman, the Nuclear Weapons Council 

would agree with that. 

Secretary SCHER. Absolutely. The only thing I would add on top 

of the excellent answer from my Air Force colleague is that we 

should not be in a position where the only option that we give the 

President to use the air leg of the triad is putting a piloted airplane 

over enemy airspace to drop a gravity bomb. 

Mr. ROGERS. With that, I will yield to my friend and colleague 

from Tennessee, the ranking member, for any questions he may 

have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your holding this hearing, and I look forward to the classified session to follow. 

In the meantime, let me return to basics here. This hearing is 

really on the 2016 budget and the adequacy thereof, or not, for our 

nuclear forces. So isn’t the first and most important point is we 

need at least the President’s budget request, and nothing less will 

suffice? 

Secretary SCHER. Sir, if I can answer, agreed, absolutely. I would 

say that is the case for the overall defense budget. We have been 

very clear that we need the President’s budget request. We think 

it solves and fixes some of the problems that were created with sequestration that we are still trying to get out of. The nuclear enterprise is no different from any of those. 

And especially because this budget reflects changes and increases 

to the nuclear enterprise budget that we put in as a result of the 

studies of the Nuclear Enterprise Review [NER], it is even more 

critical to make sure that we have the President’s budget request 

for the sustainability of the current force and the modernization of 

the future force that we are committed to doing. Sequestration 

would be a disaster for the Defense Department, the strategy, but 

also especially the nuclear enterprise. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, let me editorialize for a moment. The good 

news is it looks as if we will avoid the disaster you are describing 

and we will come in with a number slightly above the President’s 

request. The bad news is we are pretending that OCO, overseas 

contingencies operations, will pay for that, which is off budget, 

which is like borrowed money, which is like a bandaid. So we really 

haven’t fixed sequestration if we are not really paying for our nuclear forces, but pretending we are going to pay for our nuclear 

forces. 

So that, I am afraid, is the situation we are in, but I don’t want 

to get any of the witnesses in trouble by agreeing or disagreeing 

with me on that. 

But let me note, I thought Dr. Hopkins’ testimony was particularly well summarized, going through a number of the weapons 

programs and what the process of modernization involves. But on 

page 7 of Dr. Hopkins’ testimony there are sentences that I think 

should be highlighted for the purposes of this hearing. This one 

should be noted for the record: Quote, ‘‘The Nuclear Enterprise Re-
5 

view highlighted evidence of systemic problems in the strategic deterrent forces that threaten the future safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear forces.’’ Wow. That is a heavy-duty sentence, and everybody who is aware of our nuclear enterprise should 

take that to heart. 

Another sentence we need to focus on is this: The fact that the 

Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group [NDERG], chaired by 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Work, will be focusing attention and 

resources at all levels of the DOD on this essential mission. So the 

NER noted huge problems, the NDERG is going to fix them, hopefully with a little cooperation of the subcommittee and of Congress. 

But nothing is more important. As our Navy friends are always excellent at emphasizing their testimony, they usually lead with the 

importance of the nuclear enterprise here. 

I don’t want to go over too much dirty laundry, but there have 

been a sad litany of failures and problems in recent years, and we 

would hope that with this budget request going forward we will fix 

these problems. 

Again, my purpose isn’t to get any of the witnesses in trouble 

here, but I think we should have a heightened level of responsibility, because past witnesses may have mouthed the words, but 

somehow safe, secure, and reliable was not necessarily the result. 

If, in fact, there was only one wrench for three missile fields in the 

Plains States, and apparently that wrench had to be FedEx-ed 

from spot to spot, that is just probably one of the more visible examples of failure in the system, but there have been others. 

Do any of the witnesses have recommendations for this subcommittee as to what we should focus on other than giving you 

enough money for your work? 

Secretary SCHER. I will just take the opportunity to perhaps get 

myself in trouble, but nonetheless I think the money for the work, 

we appreciate the subcommittee and the full committee’s support 

of the Defense Department’s and the President’s budget request. 

And, in fact, to just put a finer point on the OCO [overseas contingency operations] discussion that you had, this plan, being able 

to plan, to be able to put in a systematic plan to put across budget 

years is critical for us. Stability and clarity and transparency of 

budget figures is important for us to be able to deal with not just 

this year, but future years. So we would ask, and I know we are 

working to try to get to a situation where we are not reliant on 

OCO to cover the funding gaps. 

Mr. COOPER. Dr. Hopkins. 

Dr. HOPKINS. In addition to the resources, both in fiscal year 

2016 and over the sustained period, I think that your—you asked 

about what this subcommittee could do—your attention and your 

concern for the get-well plan in the aftermath of the Nuclear Enterprise Reviews is very helpful. 

As you know, the Deputy Secretary is chairing this Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group, which is a sustained attention to 

the problem. And as far as the assistance, I think the attention 

from this group and the concern expressed for this group is helpful. 

Mr. COOPER. Do you need any more help than that or would Congress just be getting in the way? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Not that I can think of. 
6 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no more questions at this time. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Scher, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated the cost of maintaining nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles to be $348 billion over the next decade, or about $35 billion 

per year, including inflation. Do you agree with this figure? 

Secretary SCHER. I don’t have the exact figure for 10 years. We 

do extensive planning for the 5-year plan, but about 3 percent of 

the budget is what we see for this over this fiscal year, and then 

I think we get up to right around 3 percent, maybe a little bit 

more, the peak is at fiscal year 2020 in the plan. So I would have 

to take a look at the specific numbers to make sure that they track 

with ours. We have looked at in depth the 5-year development plan 

versus the 10-year. 

Mr. BROOKS. And, Mr. Scher, what action is the United States 

taking as a result of Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty? 

Secretary SCHER. The first action that we are taking is working 

and trying to convince the Russians to come back into compliance 

with the INF Treaty. As you know, we have reported that the Russians have violated the INF Treaty. We hope that we can show and 

demonstrate to them that there was a reason why their predecessor 

government, the Soviet Union, went into this treaty in the first 

place, that was in their security and benefited their security to do 

so. 

Simultaneously with trying to convince them of that, we are looking at what actions we can take to ensure that any violation of the 

INF Treaty does not provide significant military advantage to the 

Russians. And as people have testified previously to this subcommittee and elsewhere, we look at that in sort of three categories 

of military activities. 

One is active defense, what we can do to defend places in Europe, locations that the INF Treaty-violating missile could reach. 

Another one is taking a look at how we could go about and actually 

attack that missile where it is in Russia. And then subsequently, 

a third part is looking at understanding that it is not simply attacking that capability, but that we can look at what things we can 

hold at risk within Russia itself. 

We are still looking at all of those possibilities, narrowing down 

what we think would be the most effective, and working very closely with our allies to determine how to best deter this aggression 

from Russia, deter and bring Russia back in. 

Mr. BROOKS. With respect to your efforts to convince or persuade 

the Russians to get back into compliance, has this administration 

been successful with respect to any of the breaches by Russia of the 

INF Treaty? 

Secretary SCHER. The one breach that we have reported to you, 

we have not been successful at getting them to understand that 

that is something that is not in their interest to do, we believe. We 

will continue to work on them while looking at the military options, 

but our patience is not limitless on this. 
7 

Mr. BROOKS. At what point in time does the United States start 

taking more aggressive action concerning the Russian Government’s failure to comply with their treaty obligations? 

Secretary SCHER. We are still from an interagency perspective 

working to figure out the exact timelines, especially in consultation 

with our allies. I will note that we have had increasingly detailed 

discussions with our allies about Russia overall, and this weighs 

into when we could make the decision. But we do want to see if 

there is a chance that they could realize that they are better off 

by coming back into compliance. 

Mr. BROOKS. The same question with respect to NATO [North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization]. Is NATO doing anything to try to 

force Russia to comply with its INF Treaty obligations? 

Secretary SCHER. So we are working as part of the NATO alliance very carefully, both on the conventional side, as well as meeting as part of the NPG, the Nuclear Planning Group, looking at 

what NATO should be doing in response to the Russian violation 

of the INF Treaty, but also to look at this as a whole and understand that this is part of a broader aggressive posture from Russia. 

And I can go into more details if you would like about and the ins 

and outs of that in a closed session. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. 

And to all of our witnesses, please describe the impacts and Nuclear Enterprise Review on the Nation’s nuclear forces and the men 

and women that serve in them. You can go in whatever order you 

prefer. 

Secretary SCHER. So I will just say from a policy perspective, we 

look at the Nuclear Enterprise Reviews, both the internal one and 

the external one, as critical looks at the enterprise and giving us 

key understanding of what some of the problem areas certainly 

were, the need for broader accountability and attention to the nuclear enterprise throughout the Department, and ensuring that it 

is supported throughout the Department and that it is integrated 

into all the ways we look at forces and operations in the Department. 

And we are a part of that accountability mechanism. We have 

clear roles, along with other people and other institutions represented here. And we welcomed the opportunity to really look at 

the results of that review and implement fixes that will fix this 

now and into the future. 

Mr. BROOKS. Dr. Hopkins. 

Dr. HOPKINS. The Nuclear Enterprise Reviews identified some 

issues, some longstanding issues that have been in the nuclear enterprise for a while. And the fixes aren’t going to be easy, they are 

not going to be inexpensive. But the good thing that has happened 

is the Department has stepped up to this. The Department is putting a billion dollars in 2016 alone in starting the fixes and adding 

more money over the future years program. 

I think perhaps one of the best things that come up of it has 

been a recognition of what a fine force we have out there, in general, and a recognition that the professionalism of the nuclear 

forces is paramount. 

The second good thing that has happened is, we mentioned the 

NDERG, the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group chaired 
8 

by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the highest levels of the Pentagon are engaged on this. And this isn’t for one-time fixes. The 

Pentagon has established an enduring, persistent self-examination 

process using the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office 

to track every single recommendation made by the enterprise reviews and make sure we get at the root causes. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. A question for you, Mr. Chairman. When will 

the classified session take place? 

Mr. ROGERS. Immediately after we conclude. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Then I will keep to just one question. That has 

to do with the question that was raised earlier about the 10-year 

time horizon and the cost associated with it. 

Dr. Hopkins, apparently you have a 25-year time horizon that 

you have been working on. Have you associated costs with that? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you for the question, sir. I do not have an 

associated cost with it. We of course will have cost estimates based 

on previous experience with the development of programs from earlier years, but we don’t have a cost estimate with that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you have associated estimated costs? 

Dr. HOPKINS. I believe we do. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And they are? 

Dr. HOPKINS. I don’t have that number. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. When can you get that number for us? 

Dr. HOPKINS. I will take it for the record and get back to you. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Tomorrow? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Certainly. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Tomorrow? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Sure. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 83.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. My office number is—— 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Coffman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Major General Harencak, can you describe to me the need for the 

next generation manned bomber as part of the triad? 

General HARENCAK. Yes, sir. We believe that the essence of the 

United States Air Force is the ability to hold at risk any target in 

the world in a matter of hours or at most days. And this ability 

allows no sanctuary for defense. The ability to penetrate enemy air 

defenses and prosecute the target is fundamental to what the 

United States Air Force does. 

And our ability to do that is in long-range strike aviation, specifically bombers, is not going to be possible with our legacy systems, 

the youngest of which is a B–2 bomber that is about 25 years old. 

All of our B–52s are 1961, 1960 models, these are old aircraft. The 

B–1s are also aged. In fact, as our chief has said many times, our 

entire bomber fleet in any State in the union could qualify for antique license plates. 
9 

The ability that we must have, and certainly in a classified situation we could give you, again, a lot of very compelling data as to 

the need to a long-range strike, but I like to tell people it is because no one ever wants to walk into the Oval Office and say, Mr. 

President or Madam President, I am so very sorry, but we cannot 

neutralize that threat to America. And we need the Long-Range 

Strike Bomber so no one ever has to do that. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Given all the advances, you talked about the 

cruise missile, that has been around for a long time, all the advances in a guidance system, precision guided munitions, that can 

be armed with nuclear weapons. I mean, obviously, we understand 

the air component part of the triad, but why can’t unmanned capability replace manned capability in terms of that delivery system? 

General HARENCAK. Well, I am not saying at some time in the 

future they cannot. What we have to deal with is the capabilities 

we currently have and what we foresee to be the capabilities in the 

future. 

We believe from the nuclear aspect it is important to the triad, 

but I think it is important to realize that should the great day 

come when nuclear weapons disappear from the world, and if that 

happened tomorrow we would still need to build the Long-Range 

Strike Bomber because we must have a capability, again, to range 

with long-range, persistent, high-volume capability to destroy targets and allow no sanctuary, anywhere to go. 

So that is currently best accomplished with a cranium in the 

cockpit. And there may come a time where that is not required, but 

certainly it is required in the near and midterm future. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Scher, some of us have been very concerned about the announcements of the framework points with Iran. The concerns that 

we have are that essentially it appears that these are going to replace the longstanding U.N. resolutions that required Iran to dismantle their uranium enrichment and plutonium production capabilities and that that is going to be replaced with a framework that 

in our minds, literally, notwithstanding the claims that it would 

lengthen the breakout period, but that in the ultimate sense this 

would allow Iran a protected zone of time, a buffer, as it were, to 

develop some of their ancillary research and other things that gives 

them an even more sure opportunity to ultimately become a nuclear-armed nation. 

Henry Kissinger and George Shultz opined that, quote, ‘‘This 

deal will reinforce, not resolve the world’s challenges in that region.’’ And we certainly believe that. 

Now, to ameliorate some of our concerns the administration has 

put forth this ostensible idea that they will now make sure that our 

Middle East allies are under our nuclear umbrella. And some of us 

are concerned that that creates a whole host of new strategic questions and risks. And I would like essentially just to make a deal 

that is, in my judgment, a very, very dangerous deal work, that 

they would literally try to quell our concerns by putting some of 

our Middle Eastern allies under our nuclear umbrella. 
10 

Is that true from your point of view? And does that, you think, 

enhance the national security perspective of the United States? 

Secretary SCHER. I certainly, Congressman, have seen reports 

where individuals have opined, but not from the administration, 

about nuclear assurance and guarantees from Middle East colleagues and allies and friends. 

Mr. FRANKS. But you know nothing, that there is no consideration on the part of the administration to do that? 

Secretary SCHER. I think there is consideration about a range of 

things. I will tell you that the people who are involved directly with 

the Middle East affairs, I certainly can get an answer from them 

as to where we are now. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 83.] 

Secretary SCHER. But my understanding is that we are continuing to look at ways that we can reassure our friends in the 

gulf. But I have not seen where administration officials have spoken about nuclear guarantees as part of that. I can’t say that no 

one is, but I have not seen that. 

And my understanding is that we are focused on the assurances 

for our friends and allies that we have had in the past in terms 

of working closely with them, interoperability, foreign military 

sales, and especially missile defense cooperation in the Gulf Cooperation Council individual nations. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I would just suggest that putting Iran on a 

surer footing, a surer track to become a nuclear-armed nation does 

not encourage our allies in the region. And ‘‘terrified’’ is probably 

a good word here. 

It seems the administration has chosen to punt here rather than 

deal with the real issue, and they only make the equation more 

complicated down the road. And whatever the dangers are in preventing Iran from gaining a nuclear weapons capability, and there 

certainly are risks and costs to do that, they will pale in comparison to dealing with them once they have a nuclear weapons capability. 

With that, General Harencak, I will move on to you, sir. Regarding our aging nuclear infrastructure, I was hoping you could tell us 

what the analysis of alternatives is for the follow-on to the Minuteman III regarding the cost, as opposed to simply refurbishing and 

extending the life of the current Minuteman III. In other words, 

juxtapose that from acquiring a new missile system or refurbishing 

the old one. 

Also, we have an aging fleet of B–52s. I would love to hear your 

story about that. I know it is a very compelling one. How old is the 

B–52? How old will it be when we plan to retire it? And do you 

have any specific insight into it? 

General HARENCAK. Well, sir, thank you for the opportunity to 

talk about the GBSD [Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent]. 

We believe that the best way to maintain the foundational aspect 

of the ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] that are what we 

believe to be foundational to our triad and nuclear deterrent is— 

the Minuteman III is a 1970 weapon, as you know. The great airmen out there are doing a fantastic job of sustaining this missile 

as a weapon system with silos that are sometimes even older than 
11 

the missiles themselves. And it is an amazing engineering challenge to keep that system up and functioning as well as it did. 

And certainly, the nuclear reviews that we talked about a little 

bit have mentioned some of the things specifically focused on 

ICBMs that we need to reevaluate and work in a systemic and productive manner and we are certainly doing that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

Chair is now going to recognize the gentleman from Nebraska, 

Mr. Ashford, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ASHFORD. If this has been asked, I apologize, I was a bit late. 

The global strike force at Offutt, the functional component command, could you just—if you have already talked about that—but 

could you just—if you have, I am sorry to ask it again—but could 

you talk about that, the Offutt Air Force Base joint command, functional command facility, just about its future and how you see it 

evolving? 

I could ask, General, if you could talk about that. And if that 

question is too obtuse, I apologize. Well, the joint functional command component at Offutt, how do you see that evolving into the 

future, whether it has the capability or the resources moving forward? 

General HARENCAK. Unfortunately, sir, I will have to get back to 

you for the record on that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 84.] 

Mr. ASHFORD. I don’t have anything else. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

When NATO published its Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, DDPR, in 2012, NATO explicitly saw Russia as a cooperative 

partner for peace in Europe and the wider world. That was in 2012. 

That was after the invasion of Georgia, the current occupation of 

South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 

Since 2012, Russia has illegally annexed Crimea, they have destabilized broader eastern Ukraine. Certainly their actions and of 

course, I guess, their language towards other European nations has 

been hostile. And so we have got these challenges with Russia. 

Mr. Scher, you sit on the U.S. representative to the High Level 

Group within NATO, which does NATO’s nuclear planning. Is 

NATO going to revisit the basic assumption of the DDPR that Russia is a partner? 

Secretary SCHER. Congressman, I can’t speak to where the alliance is coming down on the political issues. What I can speak to 

broadly in this forum and will be happy to do in more detail in the 

classified session is note that we on the HLG, the High Level 

Group, as support to the Nuclear Planning Group, the NPG, as the 

ministers sit in that forum, are taking a look at the capabilities 

that exist in Europe amongst all countries and determining how we 

can best ensure that the alliance remains safe and secure, and the 

deterrence is maintained, and if deterrence fails, how we as an alliance can protect our interests and protect ourselves against any adversary that exists. 
12 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I understand that the alliance has 28 nations, 

and of course they all have various interests and it is sometimes 

hard to come to a specific resolution on these important matters. 

But Russia is calling NATO a threat. Are we indicating to NATO 

that maybe we ought to consider Russia a threat? 

Secretary SCHER. We are certainly working with NATO. As you 

well know, as you said, it takes a while for 28 nations to come to 

consensus on things. But I have no doubt and can assure you that 

NATO is looking at the actions of Russia and looking to see and 

understand that these are actions that are assertive and aggressive 

towards friends and partners in the region and that we need to 

start taking a look at both the actions and the capabilities of the 

Russian Federation. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The DDPR called for NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense. NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense. Is it your recommendation that we should rewrite the 

DDPR? 

Secretary SCHER. Certainly, we are no longer looking at any cooperation in missile defense with Russia at this point. In fact, 

NATO has specifically said that we will—and we will not have any 

interactions with Russia given the actions that they have taken. 

The Wales Conference looks very clearly and makes very clear 

statements about Russia’s recent actions over the course of the past 

year. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So should we rewrite the DDPR then? 

Secretary SCHER. That is for my colleagues at the State Department to determine with ministers at that level. But certainly I can 

assure you that we are looking at actions that understand that the 

situation has changed since the writing of the DDPR. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Can you give us in this session any conversations that NATO has had regarding Russia’s violation of the INF 

Treaty? 

Secretary SCHER. I would prefer to keep that for the classified 

session, sir. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Admiral Benedict, question for you. When we think about our 

space communications architecture for nuclear deterrence, we use 

AEHF [Advanced Extremely High Frequency] satellites. There is 

some talk about using some of that capacity for tactical purposes, 

as well as strategic purposes. Is there a concern there that we 

might be cannibalizing some of our capacity for tactical? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, thank you for the question. There is an 

actual ongoing review of what we call NC3 [nuclear command, control, and communications] from an end-to-end perspective right 

now, led at the OSD level. That information has not yet been reported out, but I am confident that that action that you referred 

to is part of that review. And I would respectfully request that we 

wait until that review—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Sure. Do you know when that review would be 

complete? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sometime this summer, sir. I don’t have the 

exact date, but I can get back to you. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. And I would love to have a copy of that, 

if possible. 
13 

Admiral BENEDICT. Understood. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 84.] 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. And I will yield back. I am out of time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Benedict, what is the minimum number of Ohio-class replacement submarines that are required to fulfill STRATCOM’s requirements for sea-based deterrence? And I know we have talked 

about this before, but I think it is important to go on record about 

this. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. That would be the number in the 

program of record, which is 12, with 16 tubes per submarine, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And what happens if you have less than 12? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, if we have less than 12, then—we have 

done the analysis and provided that to STRATCOM—we will not 

be able to meet the STRATCOM requirement of numbers at sea in 

alert and mod-alert status, as well as numbers at sea to support 

the STRATCOM requirement for a certain number of hours to have 

certain numbers at sea. 

Mr. LAMBORN. So if you have X number in the fleet, some are 

always going to be at a base somewhere or being resupplied, and 

some will be trained. 

Admiral BENEDICT. And maintenance, yes, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And only a subset of that number will be available 

at any given time. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. Based on the analysis, 12 gives us 

confidence from a statistical standpoint that we will always have 

10 ready for sea, which is the number necessary for STRATCOM. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Excellent. Thank you so much. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. Scher, President Obama’s nuclear employment guidance rejects the notion of, quote, unquote, ‘‘de-alerting’’ 

U.S. nuclear forces, though continuing to examine options to reduce 

the role of ‘‘launch under attack.’’ Please explain why the President 

chose to reject de-alerting U.S. ICBM forces. 

Secretary SCHER. The way that we looked at this was that it did 

not make any great sense to de-alert forces, that we thought that 

all the forces that were there needed to be ready and effective and 

able to prosecute the mission at any point in time. And that was 

the determination made, that that was valuable for presenting 

multiple options for the President and for safety, security, and surety of the nuclear enterprise. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

And following up on that, General Harencak, some critics have 

said that our ICBMs are under hair-trigger alert. Is that an accurate categorization? 

General HARENCAK. It is an absolutely not accurate. And it is an 

emotional aspect that people attach to this that is not fundamentally factual to what goes on in our ICBM launch control facilities. 
14 

So absolutely not, sir. They are not under hair-trigger alert. They 

are very responsive, the most responsive aspect of our nuclear 

triad. But that characterization is inaccurate and unfair. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you for clarifying. And there are many 

safeguards and checks and balances that are built and put into 

place, right? 

General HARENCAK. A holistic system of safeguards put into 

place, absolutely, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. I have been to F.E. Warren and seen 

the underground command center. I have seen how this has tremendous amounts of fallback, fail-safe provisions. It is a great 

thing that has been done in setting up the system in an appropriate way. But, nevertheless, the Nuclear Enterprise Review in 

2014 identified a whole bunch of corrective actions that the Air 

Force should carry out to fix leadership morale, culture, and other 

problems, and some of those were in the ICBM force. So what actions are being taken to improve the ICBM force? 

General HARENCAK. A large slate of actions, sir, have been under 

place, and they started during our Force Improvement Plan, which 

actually we started prior to the external review reports and the internal review reports and the STRATCOM report that the NERs 

are all referencing now, and the tracking. 

A number of issues, from personnel management, to sustainment 

issues, to the ability of us to ensure that the morale and career progression of our missileers is enhanced, has allowed a lot of positive 

improvements that have already been seen and continue to be seen 

in our ICBM force. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And one specific action. And I too, like the ranking member, was distressed when I heard about the wrench that 

had to be shared among several locations. Is there any situation 

like that today that you are aware of? 

General HARENCAK. No, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And was that an accurate report at the time? 

General HARENCAK. It is. Actually, like everything else, there is 

a little bit more to the story. That particular wrench was only used 

about 5 times in 8 years. And so somebody, believing that they 

were actually doing something good, decided why don’t we FedEx 

them, it would save a certain amount of money. In retrospect, that 

was a bad decision, but it was a decision based on the best of intentions. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you gentlemen all for your service. 

Mr. ROGERS. We have a little bit of time. They are calling us for 

votes right now, but we have a little time. 

Dr. Hopkins, your boss, Under Secretary Kendall, is the chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council and you are the executive director. Very briefly, do you think the Council would benefit from 

having new members, like, for example, the director of CAPE [Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation] and its equivalent from 

NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration], or the DOD 

comptroller and his equivalent from NNSA? Why or why not? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that question. As you know, Mr. Kendall chairs the Nuclear Weapons Council, and the other four members are the Vice Chairman of the Joint 
15 

Chiefs, the head of Strategic Command, the Under Secretary for 

Policy, and STRATCOM. And as the Nuclear Weapons Council does 

meet, it has a number of advisers on it. And as you know, CAPE 

is an adviser and so is the comptroller, along with each of the three 

services and the Office of the General Counsel. 

The Nuclear Weapons Council is a very collaborative body, they 

operate on consensus, and it is working very efficiently at this 

point. And I would not recommend any changes to the membership, 

primarily because the way it is operating, the chairman and the 

members take into account fully the recommendations and the 

comments from all of the advisers, including CAPE and including 

the comptroller. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Hopkins, what was the DOD’s reaction to an 

annual requirement to give Congress a 25-year plan with expected 

budgets and funding for DOD with nuclear forces? Would this be 

overly burdensome, and would it be useful or accurate looking that 

far ahead? 

Dr. HOPKINS. You want me to speculate on the DOD’s reaction? 

I think the initial reaction would be, oh, no, not another report. In 

general, the report would be perceived as burdensome. So that is 

the mechanics of it. 

In fact, as you know, we do look out. These programs we are 

talking about go well beyond the 5-year defense program time 

limit. We have to think well into the future years. And right now 

we submit a 10-year report that does have programs and costs on 

it. 

We do look out 25 years and longer in order to actually see this 

modernization mountain that we have been talking about in the 

2020s. As you would expect, looking out that far, 25 years, the 

credibility of the numbers would be very, very suspect. 

However, the ability to look out that far and anticipate the need 

for future modernization, additional resources, or gauge the impact 

of decisions that we make today is very important to us. 

I would not recommend a new report, but I would instead recommend we do what we are doing now, which is sharing the baseline plan, which does go out 25 years, and share that information, 

as we have been. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Let’s talk about the B61. In our hearing with 

General Klotz last month we heard that NNSA’s part of the B61 

life-extension program [LEP] is proceeding well, on time and on 

budget. Let’s hear from the other side of the river. General 

Harencak, how is the Air Force portion of the B61 LEP going? Are 

we going to get a full tail kit for this bomb that is on time and on 

budget? What are the primary risks for this program? 

General HARENCAK. Yes, we are on time, we are on budget. We 

see absolutely nothing that would risk us not being able to deliver 

for 2020 as required. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

Mr. Scher, what is DOD’s position on the cost for the U.S. to ask 

our NATO allies to pay for part of the B61 LEP. 

Secretary SCHER. Certainly our NATO allies have a lot of burden 

sharing in the DCA [dual-capable aircraft] mission, but I would not 

recommend sharing some of the costs of the B61 would be part of 

that. They do a lot of burden sharing in terms of site security, in 
16 

term of sharing some of the costs for the storage, for NATO percentage costs. 

But to share costs on the B61 I think would open up a lot of 

other issues, such as them having some understanding or wanting 

to be involved in some of the engineering and the design. All of 

that is quite sensitive and I really don’t think is something that we 

would want to open up to our NATO allies, especially because the 

B61 is not just for the Europe DCA mission, but is for nuclear missions for us around the world. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. And I want to clarify, the House is going into 

recess for 15 minutes. At 4:30 they will call us for votes. 

I yield to the ranking member for any additional questions he 

may have. 

Mr. COOPER. I have no more questions at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay, then. Mr. Garamendi, do you have anymore 

questions before we go into classified session? Okay. 

With that, we will recess while we travel down to 2337 in the 

SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility] for the classified portion of this hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 15, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 15, 2015 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 15, 2015 

(79) 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 15, 2015 

(83) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Secretary SCHER. Deterrence in the Middle East is a complex challenge, and nuclear proliferation in the region would only exacerbate the tensions and potential 

for instability there. This is one reason the Administration continues to work towards a comprehensive solution that that will verifiably prevent Iran from obtaining 

a nuclear weapon. 

Regardless of the arrangement of that deal, we will continue to work with our 

partners to maintain a range of capabilities for regional deterrence in the Middle 

East. Our objective is to build and sustain a robust regional security and deterrence 

architecture based on U.S. conventional military capabilities, expanded cooperation 

on missile defense, and our partners’ capabilities. The United States has not, however, offered extended nuclear deterrence guarantees to our partners in the Middle 

East. 

The objective of our missile defense cooperation is to establish a regional missile 

defense architecture in which all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States participate and contribute to the extent practical, leading to a layered defense network. 

This architecture would strengthen deterrence and increase the collective ability of 

the GCC to defeat a ballistic missile attack while reducing the burden on limited 

U.S. regional missile defense assets. [See page 10.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Dr. HOPKINS. DOD generally does not develop 25-year cost estimates but provided 

10-year estimates to the committee within 24 hours of the hearing. Forecasting 

DOD costs over a 25-year period with any useful accuracy is extremely difficult 

given the challenges of predicting developments in the international security environment and ongoing technological advancements. Table 1 resubmits the 10-year 

DOD cost estimates for sustaining and modernizing these weapons systems as documented in the ‘‘Fiscal Year 2016 Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear 

Weapons Command Control System Specified in Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.’’ [See page 8.] 
84 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE 

Admiral BENEDICT. The NC3 review mentioned in my testimony is still ongoing, 

and does not specifically address use of military satellite communications (AEHF) 

for tactical versus strategic requirements. In answer to your original question, 

AEHF is designed to meet protected SATCOM requirements based on both Strategic 

and Tactical Scenarios. Accesses on the satellites are requested via Satellite Access 

Requests and are assigned based on mission priorities. In an actual strategic scenario, strategic users would have top priority. [See page 13.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ASHFORD 

General HARENCAK. The operational planning performed by the U.S. Strategic 

Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike remains essential to the nation’s ability to conduct nuclear assurance, deterrence, and global 

strike operations. The Air Force supports this important mission in a number of 

ways, particularly through Eighth Air Force and its 608th Air and Space Operations 

Center. [See page 11.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 15, 2015 

(87) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. President Obama’s Nuclear Employment Guidance rejects the notion 

of de-alerting U.S. nuclear forces while continuing to examine options to reduce the 

role of ‘‘Launch under Attack’’ in U.S. planning. Please explain why the President 

chose to reject de-alerting U.S. ICBM forces? 

Secretary SCHER. The President’s decision not to de-alert the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force was the result of analysis that indicated doing so would 

be destabilizing, not stabilizing, in a crisis or conflict. A race to ‘‘re-alert’’ in crisis 

could prompt one side to strike preemptively. 

Maintaining continual at-sea presence of ballistic missile submarines strengthens 

crisis stability by ensuring that a decision by the President to delay U.S. response 

to a nuclear attack would not mean loss of assured response capability. Maximizing 

Presidential decision time in this way allows us to reduce the role of Launch Under 

Attack in U.S. planning. 

Extensive safeguards and an extremely secure command and control system make 

the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized ICBM launch remote. Furthermore, 

the current practice of ‘‘open-ocean targeting’’ of all ICBMs and SubmarineLaunched Ballistic Missiles ensures that, in the highly unlikely event of an accidental launch, the missile would land in the open ocean. 

Mr. ROGERS. Did the Nuclear Posture Review and its related implementation 

study examine in detail various options for the structure of U.S. nuclear forces, including a dyad and potential monad? What did these analyses show about the risks 

of moving away from the triad? Why did the Administration choose to remain with 

the triad—explicitly rejecting the elimination of one or more legs of the triad? 

Secretary SCHER. In the lead up to the 2010 Nuclear Posture review (NPR), DOD 

conducted a series of separate analytic studies looking at the appropriate size, composition, and posture of U.S. nuclear forces. These studies influenced the NPR and 

the 2010 ‘‘1251 Report to Congress’’ on the DOD preferred force structure under the 

New START Treaty. 

These studies used various attributes and metrics to evaluate a range of force 

structure options in terms of their ability to support policy goals, including strategic 

deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance of allies and partners. The study 

analytics were applied to various monads, dyads, and triads at numerous force levels. 

Taken together, these studies concluded that retaining all three legs of the nuclear Triad under the New START Treaty at negotiated lower force levels is the best 

way to affordably maintain strategic stability, sustain effective nuclear deterrence 

of potential adversaries and assurance of allies and partners, while credibly hedging 

against geopolitical changes or technical problems and vulnerabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. Last year, Secretary Hagel provided a report (which I will introduce 

for the record) assessing the requirements for plutonium pit manufacturing. This report reaffirmed the requirement for a pit production capacity of 50–80 pits per year, 

correct? This report is about a year old—has its conclusion that we need a capacity 

of 50–80 pits per year changed? 

a. Should pit production capacity be tied solely to the needs of the life extension 

programs, or should the requirement for a responsive infrastructure also influence 

when we achieve a pit production capacity of 50–80 per year? 

b. What analysis underpins this number? How do pits in storage, planned life extension programs, and the expected lifetimes of pits factor in? 

Dr. HOPKINS. The conclusion of the ‘‘Assessment of Nuclear Weapon Pit Production Requirements’’ report, that the Nation requires a pit production capacity of 50– 

80 pits per year, remains unchanged. The report explains that pit production capacity is tied to four factors: policy objectives for the nuclear deterrent; stockpile aging 

(including pit age and plutonium aging); military requirements (including planned 

life extension programs); and infrastructure costs and capacity. The National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan details NNSA’s plutonium investment strategy that leads to 

war-reserve-quality production of 30 plutonium pits per year by FY 2026 and 50 to 

80 pits per year by 2030. 
88 

Pits in storage represent the Nation’s only source of plutonium for newly manufactured pits. They also enable pit reuse alternatives for future life extension programs that can mitigate near-term production workload. 

Mr. ROGERS. Did the Nuclear Posture Review and its related implementation 

study examine in detail various options for the structure of U.S. nuclear forces, including a dyad and potential monad? What did these analyses show about the risks 

of moving away from the triad? Why did the Administration choose to remain with 

the triad—explicitly rejecting the elimination of one or more legs of the triad? 

Dr. HOPKINS. In preparation for the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD executed 

several studies looking at the appropriate size, composition, and posture of U.S. nuclear forces. These studies evaluated a range of force structure options to support 

policy goals, including strategic deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance of 

allies and partners. The study analytics were applied to various monads, dyads, and 

triads at numerous force levels. Conclusions from these studies agreed that maintaining all three legs of the nuclear triad at negotiated lower force levels is the best 

way to sustain effective nuclear deterrence of potential adversaries and assurance 

of allies at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems and 

vulnerabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Harencak, does the Air Force maintain a capability to put 

multiple independently retargetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on its Minuteman III 

ICBMs? Will it continue to maintain this capability on the follow-on to Minuteman 

III, the ground-based strategic deterrent (GBSD) program? 

In your military judgment, why is this capability important? 

General HARENCAK. Yes, in accordance with national guidance, the United States 

retains the ability to upload non-deployed warheads to the Minuteman III ICBM in 

MIRV configuration. To support this requirement, the Air Force continues to periodically conduct MM III flight tests with multiple warheads. 

The Air Force intends to retain the ability to upload multiple warheads in the 

Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). In my military judgment, maintaining 

this capability in the follow-on ICBM is an important aspect of preserving the credibility and effectiveness of the ICBM force in the decades ahead. ICBM MIRV capability enhances the resiliency of the Triad by providing an effective hedge against 

technical failure in another leg of the Triad or geopolitical surprise. The risk mitigation benefits it offers are extremely valuable, especially as the U.S. reduces its strategic force structure to comply with arms control treaty requirements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please provide information on the planning, timelines for research and development, production timelines, and costs of the Department of Defense’s nuclear sustainment and modernization strategy. This information should be 

comparable to the information in the National Nuclear Security Administration’s 

annual report to Congress on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, 

which details the priorities and planning for nuclear weapons modernization over 

25 years, including estimates of per-year costs and life-cycle costs. 

Secretary SCHER. I have reviewed Dr. Hopkins’ response to this question, and concur with the information he provided. [See below.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please provide information on the planning, timelines for research and development, production timelines, and costs of the Department of Defense’s nuclear sustainment and modernization strategy. This information should be 

comparable to the information in the National Nuclear Security Administration’s 

annual report to Congress on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, 

which details the priorities and planning for nuclear weapons modernization over 

25 years, including estimates of per-year costs and life-cycle costs. 

Dr. HOPKINS. The United States will maintain a triad composed of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers 

capable of carrying nuclear gravity bombs and cruise missiles, within New START 

Treaty central limits. Additionally, DOD will maintain nuclear dual-capability on 

fighter aircraft in the future with the F–35. Current Triad systems are beyond their 

original expected service lives and are being sustained until they can be replaced 

in the 2025–2035 timeframe. 

A high-level view of the joint Department of Defense (DOD) and National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear weapons sustainment and modernization 

strategy is presented in the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) Baseline Strategic 

Plan. The plan, which provides the basis for nuclear weapons budget planning, is 

a 25-year view summarizing the timelines for production and deployment of nuclear 

warheads, DOD delivery systems, and associated NNSA production infrastructure 
89 

such as pit and tritium production. DOD generally does not develop 25-year cost estimates but has provided 10-year estimates. Forecasting DOD costs over a 25-year 

period with any useful accuracy is extremely difficult given the challenges of predicting developments in the international security environment and ongoing technological advancements. Table 1 summarizes 10-year DOD cost estimates for sustaining and modernizing these weapons systems as provided in the ‘‘Fiscal Year 

2016 Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear Weapons Command Control 

System Specified in Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.’’ 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. The Navy and the Air Force have successfully collaborated on the 

joint fuse program, saving both Services time and money. Could the witnesses 

please: provide examples of other joint programs and subsystems opportunities for 

Air Force and Navy collaboration; detail the barriers to such collaboration; and outline what mechanisms should be implemented to overcome such barriers and help 

strengthen future collaboration. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Additional examples of productive collaborations between the Air 

Force and Navy include the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program, 

missile and reentry body technology development, and use of common production 

and repair facilities. Collaborations can be limited by differing operational requirements, peacetime employment and sustainment for nuclear weapons systems, and 

the timing of acquisitions programs. 

To help reduce these limitations and to foster strategic collaboration, the Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) 

and the Military Departments have existing mechanisms that increase collaboration 

across the Departments and ensure that DOD leverages investments in a fiscally 

constrained environment. AT&L leads a semi-annual review of Air Force and Navy 

science and technology efforts under the Technology for the Sustainment of Strategic Systems Integrated Product Team, in part to identify areas for collaboration 

between the two Military Departments. This effort leverages investments in key 

technical and system areas and supports critical skills and capabilities within the 

strategic systems community. In addition, a 2012 Navy/Air Force Memorandum of 

Agreement (MOA) signed by the Director of Navy Strategic Systems Programs, the 

Commander of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, and the Air Force Program 

Executive Officer for Strategic Systems provides a framework to identify opportunities for collaboration and to coordinate investments in current and follow-on strategic systems. Such governance mechanisms serve to overcome barriers and help 

strengthen future collaborations. 
90 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. The Air Force’s hub for ICBM sustainment and modernization is at 

Hill AFB in Utah. Over 18 month ago, the Air Force awarded the Follow-on Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Sustainment and Acquisition Concept (FISAC) Integration Support Contract to BAE Systems, after 54 years with Northrup Grumman. 

Please explain how the contract transition has been managed and on the systems 

engineering and acquisition support to date, in helping the Air Force sustain the 

existing Minuteman III fleet and develop its proposed follow-on, the Ground-Based 

Strategic Deterrent. Additionally, funding is critical to correcting past neglect of the 

nuclear enterprise. What are your thoughts on the funding levels required to sustain and modernize the ground based component of the United States’ nuclear triad? 

General HARENCAK. The Future ICBM Sustainment and Acquisition Construct 

(FISAC) evolved from an evaluation of multiple options for weapon system support 

and includes an Integration Support Contract (ISC) and four subsystem (Propulsion, 

Guidance, Re-Entry, and Ground Systems) contracts. Transition risk was mitigated 

by extending the ICBM Prime Integrated Contract (IPIC) support through award of 

the Partial Bridge Contract (PBC) to Northrop Grumman. Transition to FISAC is 

being completed in phases beginning with the award and transition of the ISC followed by subsequent award and transition of each of the subsystem contracts. As 

each transition phase is completed, the PBC is de-scoped proportionally to remove 

any unnecessary duplication of effort. 

The ISC contract was awarded to BAE in July 2013 and transition was completed 

in June 2014. BAE has met all of their hiring targets and have received excellent 

ratings on their first Contractor Performance Assessment Report in July 2014. BAE 

has, and will continue to provide, the critical system engineering and integration expertise required to adequately support the Government’s organic workforce through 

the transition. 

The Re-Entry subsystem contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin in June 2014, 

and transition was completed in September 2014 with no significant issues. The 

Ground subsystem contract was awarded to Northrop Grumman in January 2015 

with transition still ongoing. The Guidance Subsystem contract was awarded to Boeing in January 2015 with transition still ongoing. The Propulsion Subsystem contract is in source selection with award anticipated in first quarter 2016 with transition anticipated to be complete by the end of 2016. 

The Integrated Support Contract (ISC) has been indispensable in assisting the Air 

Force with sustaining the existing Minuteman III fleet. The ISC currently provides 

approximately 60% of the workforce tasked with the development of early acquisition products supporting of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent effort. 

Regarding funding levels, Secretary James has emphasized that restoring the 

health of the nuclear enterprise is an undertaking that will require sustained, longterm focus and effort. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 budget request represents an important step towards that goal. It seeks key investments in the sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization of the ground-based portion of the Triad, in addition 

to other critical Air Force nuclear weapon systems, supporting infrastructure, and 

nuclear command, control, and communications capabilities. 

The Air Force will continue to support nuclear enterprise requirements in future 

budget submissions. As Secretary James and General Welsh have stated, because 

of the severity of cuts mandated by the Budget Control Act, no mission area (including nuclear operations) would be spared from its impact should the Air Force have 

to operate at sequestration-level funding in FY16. 

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