Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 16, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00147-CV

JOE BROCK RAMEY, Appellant

V.

FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 13-CCV-051957

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Joe Brock Ramey brings this pro se appeal from a judgment of possession 

favoring Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) in a forcible 

detainer action. In three issues, Ramey contends that (1) he did not receive proper 

notification of the evidence to be presented by Freddie Mac, (2) the trial court 

erred in failing to ascertain whether Ramey had sufficient opportunity to examine 

the evidence and whether he understood the evidence, and (3) Freddie Mac’s 
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evidence was flawed. We affirm.

Background

Freddie Mac filed its forcible detainer action in justice court, seeking 

possession of the property located at 11810 Scottsdale Court, Stafford, Texas. 

After the justice court ruled in Freddie Mac’s favor, Ramey filed an appeal with

the county court at law, which considered the claims de novo. Ramey represented 

himself throughout the proceedings. The county court judge began the brief 

hearing on the matter by stating that Ramey was an occupant of the property. The 

judge further stated that after having been sworn in as a witness, Ramey informed 

the court that the other identified occupant, Andrew Demers, no longer lived at the 

property. The judge further stated that “[a]fter some medical issues [Ramey] has 

been trying to get out of the house, and . . . he has come to an agreement with 

[Freddie Mac’s counsel] that he’s going to get about a week and a half with a 

vacate date of February 14th.”

Freddie Mac’s counsel then tendered three documents to the court. When 

the judge asked if the documents had been tendered previously, Ramey responded, 

“I have my copies.” The judge then said, “All right. So, no objection to those 

exhibits?” and Ramey responded, “No.” Counsel next explained each of the 

documents, and the trial judge admitted them into evidence. Counsel requested the 

judge enter a judgment of possession based on the three documents, and the judge 

announced judgment for Freddie Mac and signed the judgment of possession

giving Ramey until February 14, 2014 to vacate the property. Ramey did not make 

any further statements during the hearing.

The three documents admitted into evidence included (1) a substitute 

trustee’s deed, demonstrating that a foreclosure sale occurred and that the subject 

property was conveyed to Freddie Mac; (2) a deed of trust, signed by Ramey and 
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Demers and including provisions that in the event of a foreclosure sale, the 

borrowers, or any person holding possession through them, would be required to 

surrender possession, and if possession is not surrendered, the occupant would 

become a tenant at sufferance subject to removal by a writ of possession; and (3) a

business records affidavit attaching a notice to vacate addressed to Demers “and/or 

all occupants.”

Discussion

In his first two issues, Ramey contends that he did not receive proper 

notification of the evidence to be presented by Freddie Mac and did not have 

sufficient time to review the evidence and that the trial court erred in not sua 

sponte making inquiries regarding when Ramey received the evidence and whether 

he understood it. In making his arguments, Ramey relies heavily on the fact that 

he was representing himself in the proceedings. He acknowledges that the county 

court judge may not have been aware of when Ramey first received the documents 

but insists the judge should have made inquiries to ascertain the facts.

In order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have 

presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the 

specific grounds for the desired ruling, if they are not apparent from the context of 

the request, objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); White v. Zhou Pei, 452 

S.W.3d 527, 544 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The record 

does not demonstrate that Ramey made any request, objection, or motion in the 

trial court regarding the evidence about which he now complains on appeal. 

Indeed, when the trial court asked if he had any objection to the documents

admittance into evidence, he said, “No.”

The fact that he was representing himself in the proceedings does not excuse 

Ramey’s failure to preserve his complaint. Pro se litigants are held to the same 
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standards as licensed attorneys and are not relieved of preservation-of-error 

requirements. See, e.g., Hampton v. Nguyen, No. 01-10-00473-CV, 2011 WL 

3240681, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 28, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.);

Jackson v. Jackson, No. 14-07-00917-CV, 2009 WL 1124354, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 28, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). Ramey does not cite any 

authority, and we are aware of none, that would have required the trial judge to 

make inquiries regarding Ramey’s knowledge and understanding of the evidence 

under the circumstances presented. Accordingly, we overrule his first two issues.

In issue three, Ramey asserts that Freddie Mac presented “flawed 

[e]vidence” because it offered only the original deed of trust from 2006 and not the 

modified deed of trust that he signed when Demers entered a loan modification in 

2010. The record on appeal, however, does not contain any mention of a modified 

deed of trust. Our review is generally limited to the record of the proceedings in 

the trial court. See, e.g., Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 259 (Tex. 2001) (“[I]t is 

well-settled in Texas that an appellate court’s review is confined to the record in 

the trial court when the trial court acted.”); Carlisle v. Philip Morris, 805 S.W.2d 

498, 501 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, writ denied) (“It is elementary that, with 

limited exceptions not material here, an appellate court may not consider matters 

outside the appellate record.”). Because the record before us does not provide any 

support for Ramey’s contention in his third issue, we overrule that issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Busby, and Brown.