The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 

1991–1992

Susan J. Koch

CASE STUDY SERIES 

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

5
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Defense University

DR. JOHN F. REICHART

Director

DR. W. SETH CARUS

Deputy Director, Distinguished Research Fellow

Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD Center) has been at the forefront of research on the 

implications of weapons of mass destruction for U.S. security. Originally 

focusing on threats to the military, the WMD Center now also applies its 

expertise and body of research to the challenges of homeland security. The 

center’s mandate includes research, education, and outreach. Research focuses 

on understanding the security challenges posed by WMD and on fashioning 

effective responses thereto. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has 

designated the center as the focal point for WMD education in the joint 

professional military education system. Education programs, including its 

courses on countering WMD and consequence management, enhance 

awareness in the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD 

threat as it relates to defense and homeland security policy, programs, 

technology, and operations. As a part of its broad outreach efforts, the WMD 

Center hosts annual symposia on key issues bringing together leaders and 

experts from the government and private sectors. Visit the center online at 

www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/. 

Cover: President George H.W. Bush announces the Presidential Nuclear 

Initiative in a televised address to the Nation on September 27, 1991.

Photo courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library 


The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 

1991–1992

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Case Study 5

Case Study Series General Editor: Paul I. Bernstein

by Susan J. Koch

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 

1991–1992

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

September 2012
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Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

or reviews.

First printing, September 2012
vii

Contents

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

A Determined President. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A Willing National Security Team. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Crafting the Package. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The September 27 Announcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

The Soviet Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 

The Path to PNI II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

PNI II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

The Russian Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Appendix A. Text of Presidential Nuclear Initiative Announcements. . . 23

Appendix B. Summary of Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

About the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

1

Introduction1

On the morning of September 28, 1991, then-Colonel Frank Klotz witnessed an historic 

moment at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. As he and other senior officers from the 

base bomber and missile units watched, the crews for the B-1 strategic bombers that had been 

on alert that day climbed into their cockpits, started the planes, and taxied one after another 

away from the alert aircraft parking area.2

 That scene was repeated at all 11 Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in the United States. By the end of the day, there were no U.S. bombers on 

alert for the first time in over 30 years.

Although the numbers varied over time, a significant portion of U.S. strategic bombers had 

been on continuous alert since 1957: fully fueled, loaded with weapons, with crews in a special 

nearby area—ready to launch in a few minutes. On September 28, 1991, Secretary of Defense 

Dick Cheney signed an Execute Order to end that practice immediately.3

 It has never resumed. 

The termination of strategic bomber alerts was only one of many major changes to U.S. nuclear forces and practices that President George H.W. Bush announced to the Nation in a primetime television address on September 27, 1991. Known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives 

(PNIs), the measures were described as unilateral/reciprocal. That is, the United States intended 

to act on its own, but also challenged the Soviet Union to take comparable steps. President Bush 

declared additional PNI actions in his State of the Union address on January 28, 1992. The Soviet and Russian responses came in dedicated television addresses by Soviet President Mikhail 

Gorbachev on October 5, 1991, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on January 29, 1992.4

President Bush’s first PNI announcement was unprecedented on several levels. First, in its 

scope and scale; it instituted deeper reductions in a wider range of nuclear weapons systems 

than had ever been done before. Second, the PNIs were primarily unilateral—not to be negotiated, but instead implemented immediately. While Soviet/Russian reciprocity was encouraged, 

it was not required for most of the U.S. measures. Third, the decisions announced on September 

27, 1991, were prepared with a speed and secrecy that had never been seen before in arms reduction, and have yet to be duplicated. The PNIs were developed in just 3 weeks and involved 

very few people. In contrast, most arms control measures, before and after the PNIs, required 

months and often years of interagency and international debate and negotiation by scores of 

military and civilian officials. 

Why did this happen, and how was it possible? This case study discusses the general context in which the PNIs were developed, the concerns and goals that motivated them, and the 

national and international processes that led to them. The focus is on the initial announcement 
2 

WMD Center Case Study 5

by President Bush, because it was the pathbreaker. The three subsequent declarations by the 

Soviet Union, United States, and Russia are also addressed, but in less detail. 

The Context

Although the specific PNI decision process took less than a month, the context began to 

emerge nearly 2 years before, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. That momentous event marked the beginning of the end of the Warsaw Pact, of the Soviet threat to Western Europe, and eventually of the Soviet Union itself. Six months after the Wall fell, President 

Bush announced significant changes to planned tactical nuclear forces in Europe—cancelling 

the Follow-On to Lance short-range, ground-launched missile, as well as modernization of 

nuclear artillery warheads deployed in Europe. At the same time, he called for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in summer 1990 “to launch a wide-ranging NATO 

strategy review for the transformed Europe of the 1990’s.”5

 The result was the “Declaration on a 

Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” issued by the NATO Summit in London on July 6, 1990. 

The London Declaration went beyond President Bush’s May 1990 statement by calling for the 

elimination of short-range nuclear artillery in Europe. Still, that would apply to just a portion 

of tactical nuclear weapons and occur only pursuant to a U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement.6

Slightly over a year later, the PNI went much further. 

On the strategic forces side, Secretary Cheney had directed in November 1989 a comprehensive review of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the U.S. nuclear war plan—or more 

accurately, series of plans reflecting a range of nuclear strike options. The SIOP Review was completed in April 1991, in the same time period as the dramatic changes in Europe. Concluding that 

the United States had far more strategic nuclear weapons than required for robust deterrence of the 

Soviet Union, the SIOP Review gave the President and his defense advisors confidence that they 

could reduce nuclear forces significantly without military risk. The Review made clear that U.S. security interests would be well protected under the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty, signed 

by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev on July 31, 1991—and under even greater reductions.7

 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in 1987, was the first U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms 

control agreement to provide for real reductions and intrusive on-site verification. In fact, it eliminated an entire class of weapons. The START Treaty did not eliminate any weapons classes or types, 

but it did provide for real reductions and intrusive verification. START reduced accountable strategic 

warheads to 6,000 and deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1,600 on each side. 

Meanwhile, change within the Soviet Union and Central Europe was accelerating. The 

Warsaw Pact effectively ceased to function after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and finally dissolved 
3

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

officially on March 31, 1991. Ukraine and the Baltic States pressed ever more strongly for independence from the Soviet Union. On June 12, 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the 

Russian Republic, in the first democratic election in Russian history. 

Beginning in January 1991, Gorbachev oversaw the preparation of a so-called New Union 

Treaty, in an effort to salvage the Soviet Union by reorganizing it into a confederation. Eight 

republics were to sign the Treaty on August 20, 1991. But that signing was cancelled after a 

hard-line group instituted a coup against Gorbachev on August 19. The plotters could not accept even a weakening of the Soviet structure, let alone its dissolution. Their efforts collapsed 

quickly, ending on August 21. Yeltsin’s courageous opposition to the coup went far to ensure its 

failure, and greatly raised his national and international standing. The huge changes in the political relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union are shown in the transcripts 

of President Bush’s telephone conversations with Yeltsin on August 20, and with Gorbachev on 

August 21. The President clearly viewed Yeltsin as a leader along with Gorbachev, and stressed 

his desire to move forward with the relationship after the failure of the coup.8 The stage for the 

PNIs was set. 

A Determined President

All those involved in the initial U.S. PNI decision process who were interviewed for this 

case study agreed that President Bush was the driving force. One official remarked that, in decades of public service, he had observed no comparable case in which a President led the way 

for such sweeping, decisive actions in the military sphere.9

 In the words of then-National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft: 

The President wanted to take the initiative in arms control. . . . I’m clear up to September 1991, and the dramatic move on tactical nuclear weapons, together with a 

strategic arms control proposal. Those were all done, basically, in the White House, 

by a President who wanted to stay out in front, and who saw intuitively that there 

was a new world forming, and didn’t want to be behind the power curve and be 

driven either by the Congress and the budget, or by the Pentagon’s resistance.10

Several different, but complementary, factors motivated the President and other principal 

players to pursue the PNI. First, they reportedly had been seriously concerned about the 

reliability of Soviet nuclear command and control during the failed coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991. That concern remained after Gorbachev’s 
4 

WMD Center Case Study 5

reinstatement, given the obvious weakness and questionable future of the Soviet center, and 

led directly to one little-noticed element of the PNI, on nuclear command, control, and 

security.11 Perhaps even more important was the specter of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, 

Belarus, and Kazakhstan; by September 1991, it was clear that each was poised to become 

independent in the very near future, in the process inheriting the Soviet nuclear warheads 

and delivery vehicles on their territories. 

Further, President Bush saw dramatic nuclear reductions as both reflecting and accelerating the changed relationship with the Soviet Union. If there was to be any chance of reciprocity, those reductions had to be decided upon quickly, while there were still known Soviet and 

Russian leaders in Gorbachev and Yeltsin. The START negotiations, completed in July 1991, 

had lasted for almost a decade. President Bush appeared to see a repeat of long, drawn-out negotiations as unnecessary and, indeed, counterproductive, in view of both the new U.S.-Soviet 

relationship and the uncertainties about the future of the Soviet Union and its leaders.12

Although they differ on some details, all senior participants who have written about the 

genesis of the PNI agree that it was directed by President Bush at a National Security Council 

(NSC) meeting on September 5, 1991.13 President Bush and Scowcroft have reported that they 

discussed possible tactical and strategic nuclear arms reductions over the Labor Day weekend 

in Kennebunkport, Maine, the Bush family summer home. The initial ideas for tactical reductions came from Scowcroft, but were immediately adopted and pressed by the President.14 Three 

days after Labor Day, the President chaired the NSC meeting to discuss future strategy toward 

the Soviet Union in the wake of the failed coup against Gorbachev and in light of the very real 

possibility that the Soviet Union could break up in the near term. Then-Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates describes the discussion: 

The President finally moved to the real agenda—how to respond to the dramatic 

events of the preceding two weeks. He had resolved late in August, after the coup 

attempt, to propose a whole new series of initiatives to reduce arms further. He 

had run into doubts from Cheney about going further at this point. Now, in this 

meeting, he asked if there was anything we could do militarily to save money and 

to signal that we recognized there was a new world out there. The President concluded by urging a “dramatic statement” of initiatives that would give the United 

States the offense in global perceptions of the changes under way. An intensive 

effort to develop such initiatives culminated three weeks later in a presidential 

address to the nation.15
5

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

A Willing National Security Team

The concept of making significant changes to the Nation’s tactical nuclear capabilities was 

not a new one inside the Department of Defense (DOD). Ideas for doing so had been circulating for some time, especially among senior military officers. Still, it is questionable if such 

changes would have come to anything without Presidential leadership. At a minimum, it seems 

clear that Presidential direction was critical to the scope and scale of the initiative, and the speed 

and decisiveness with which it came to fruition. It became evident to all involved in shaping the 

initiative that “No” was not an option because of the President’s clear intent. 

It helped, of course, that senior DOD leaders, both uniformed and civilian, either shared 

the President’s vision or were at least willing to accept the changes desired by the Commander 

in Chief. Many senior Navy officers hoped for an end to all naval nuclear weapons except for 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). One key participant has argued that the Navy 

saw nuclear weapons on surface ships as an obstacle to its freedom of movement, a barrier 

to their being—and being seen as—globally dominant.16 The presence of nuclear weapons on 

board complicated and constrained port visits, and entailed procedural requirements that commanders viewed as onerous and out of proportion to the weapons’ value. Another former official has noted concerns that deployment of nuclear-armed Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles (TLAM-N) on the decks of surface ships could be vulnerable to terrorist attack.17

As for ground-launched weapons, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell had 

long favored a major reduction in the Army’s nuclear mission. In the spring of 1991, Powell raised with Cheney a proposal to eliminate “small, artillery-fired nukes because they were 

trouble-prone, expensive to modernize, and irrelevant in the present world of highly accurate 

conventional weapons.” At the time, the four Service Chiefs, Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy Paul Wolfowitz, and Secretary Cheney all opposed the idea.18 By September, the time had 

come for those proposals to be revived and even expanded. 

National Security Advisor Scowcroft was, if anything, even more interested than was President Bush in arms reductions without agreements. That interest had been well demonstrated 

in 1989, when President Bush and Scowcroft successfully pressed both within the U.S. Government and in NATO to propose dramatic cuts in U.S. and Soviet conventional forces in Europe.19

Further, Scowcroft saw in September 1991 an opportunity

to solve a number of tactical nuclear weapons questions at the same time. In 

Europe, for example, the unification of Germany rendered short-range nuclear weapons undesirable, since they would detonate on German territory. . . . In 
6 

WMD Center Case Study 5

connection with its efforts to engage North Korea, South Korea was suggesting the 

removal of the US nuclear weapons located there. We did not wish to make such a 

move solely in Korea, concerned that the North might take our actions as the beginning of a US withdrawal. The Navy’s problem was different. A number of countries 

were reluctant to allow our warships carrying nuclear weapons into their ports. . . . 

In addition, these were no longer the preferred weapon against submarines. The 

sum of all these issues led me to suggest that we unilaterally declare we were getting 

rid of all tactical nuclear weapons (except air-delivered ones).20

The views of Chairman Powell and Navy leaders on tactical nuclear weapons were 

strengthened substantially by the seismic strategic changes of 1989–1991. First were the end 

of the Cold War and the progressive diminution of the Soviet threat. Second was the emergence of new zones and forms of conflict—highlighted by Operation Desert Storm in 1991 

against Iraq—in which U.S. conventional military force would have primary, and growing, 

importance. Further, advances in conventional weaponry led the U.S. military to conclude 

that conventional forces could now accomplish many missions that earlier required nuclear 

weapons. As a result of those changes, many military leaders came to view both ground- and 

sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons as impediments to conventional superiority and military dominance, rather than as assets. 

The Secretary of Defense and his staff were less eager than the military leadership to reduce dramatically—still less to eliminate—ground- and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons. 

Unlike the military, they considered forward deployment of those weapons to be essential for 

extended deterrence and allied reassurance. However, they also recognized growing pressures 

to reduce tactical nuclear weaponry. U.S. ground-launched nuclear forces in NATO required 

modernization to enhance their safety, reliability, and effectiveness. The NATO Allies were increasingly resistant, and had begun discussing withdrawal of those forces after the fall of the 

Warsaw Pact.21 Those changing Allied views led directly to President Bush’s May 1990 decision 

to cancel Follow-On to Lance and nuclear artillery warhead modernization, and to the July 

1990 NATO Summit call for a negotiated elimination of short-range nuclear artillery in Europe. 

Political and budgetary realities also were important factors behind several strategic force 

elements of the September 1991 PNI. There was much public discussion at the time of a “peace 

dividend.” Earlier in September 1991, the U.S. Senate had voted against funding the mobile 

versions of the Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and Small ICBM as well 

as the advanced Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM II). On September 27, the President an-
7

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

nounced the cancellation of all three programs (as well as cancellation of the theater-delivered 

version of the SRAM-II).22 At the September 28 press conference to explain the PNI details, 

Secretary Cheney stressed that those actions would not entail significant savings in the short 

term, but would do so in the long run. He estimated life-cycle savings for the three cancelled 

programs at $20.2 billion.23

Retaining strategic bombers on continuous alert appeared unnecessary and too expensive 

with the diminution of the Soviet threat. Moreover, ending the practice could send a positive 

message to the Soviet Union about U.S. hopes for a changed relationship. Deactivating Minuteman II ICBMs would not save any money in and of itself, but would send a positive political 

message at no military cost. The Minuteman II force was scheduled to be eliminated under the 

START Treaty signed in July 1991; accelerating that process once START was ratified would 

save funds over the longer term. 

Crafting the Package

The process leading to the first PNI announcement was very closely held. The specific 

measures were developed by a small number of military and civilian officials in the Department 

of Defense, endorsed by the four military Service Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and the Secretary of Defense, and approved by the President. Arms control staff in the 

State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) were not involved 

in preparing the package. Experts from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were asked for 

data on Soviet nuclear forces, but were not told the reason for the request or included in the 

decision process.24

Immediately after the NSC meeting on September 5, 1991, Chairman Powell tasked the 

Director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Henry Vicellio, USAF, to prepare a list of possible unilateral measures to meet the President’s guidance. Vicellio turned to then-Brigadier 

General Gary Curtin, USAF, who had been the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the 

START negotiations until July 1991 and was now Deputy Director for International Negotiations, Joint Staff J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy). Curtin convened a meeting with his military 

Service counterparts on the morning of September 6. The military Service representatives initially advocated a fairly traditional arms control approach to the task, wanting to retain U.S. 

options for future trades with the Soviet Union. However, Curtin conveyed that Chairman 

Powell wanted options for the Joint Chiefs and Secretary Cheney to implement immediately. 

The group was directed to formulate realistic and forward-leaning options for immediate 

consideration by the Joint Chiefs.25
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WMD Center Case Study 5

The Curtin group then developed a wide-ranging, ambitious package in just a few days. 

There was little discussion of motives or goals; instead the group was simply ordered to devise 

proposals. As Major General Curtin has described it, development of the PNI was a “bizarre 

process” for those accustomed to traditional arms control negotiations.26

Another departure from normal arms control policy practice concerned the interaction—

or more accurately, the absence of interaction—between the military and civilian staffs in DOD. 

Under standard procedures, the Joint Staff would have coordinated its proposals with Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy offices. For the PNI, however, the Curtin group proposals 

went directly to Chairman Powell through the Director, Joint Staff J5, Major General Ed Leland, 

USA, and Lieutenant General Vicellio, without discussion with OSD staff. The Curtin group 

was surprised when Powell endorsed all its recommendations.27

It appears that Chairman Powell then took the package to Secretary Cheney. In turn, 

Cheney sent it to the OSD Policy staff for its review. Only a few OSD officials were involved. The 

main players were Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Stephen Hadley, his Principal Deputy J.D. Crouch, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Forces and Arms 

Control Policy Frank Miller, and Director of the Strategic Forces Policy Office Gil Klinger.28 

Within a few days this group presented its recommendations to Secretary Cheney. 

In general, the OSD staff supported the Joint Staff package, but with some significant differences. They concurred with the removal from deployment of all ground and naval tactical nuclear 

weapons. However, they proposed to keep in storage a significant portion of both types of weapons, allowing for their redeployment, if required. Secretary Cheney staked a middle ground on 

this question in the proposal he presented to the President.29 On September 27, President Bush announced that all U.S. ground-launched—but only “many” naval—tactical nuclear warheads would 

be destroyed. On September 28, Chairman Powell specified that “many” meant about one-half.30

Additionally, and importantly, the OSD officials who worked on developing the PNI wanted to “challenge” the Soviet Union to reciprocate. The White House, the Joint Staff, and the 

military Services had all thought only in terms of unilateral U.S. actions, though they certainly 

hoped for some comparable actions by Moscow. OSD staff added the explicit “challenge” for Soviet reciprocity, and Cheney repeatedly used that word in the September 28 press conference.31

Even though the desire for Soviet action became an important aspect of the PNI, there was no 

advance consultation, even in the most general of terms, with Soviet or Russian officials until 

the day of the announcement. 

The call for Soviet reciprocity was driven primarily by concern over the security of Soviet 

nuclear warheads. Tactical nuclear warheads were a particular worry, given that they were wide-
9

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

ly dispersed, smaller, and easier to transport than weapons associated with strategic systems. In 

that view, reciprocity in tactical nuclear elimination (and central storage of the remaining weapons) would be especially welcome—even as Secretary Cheney and his staff agreed that the U.S. 

PNI measures could be taken unilaterally. In addition, they welcomed the PNIs’ separation of 

arms reductions from negotiations and treaties. They considered formal arms control as unduly 

time-consuming and counterproductive, with each side freezing weapons inventories to avoid 

any unilateral concessions.32

Despite the addition of the reciprocity challenge, all concerned with the development of 

the PNIs emphasize that the U.S. Government was fully prepared to implement them unilaterally.33 As discussed below, the only U.S. PNI elements to require reciprocity were the proposals 

for U.S.-Soviet dialogues and for a formal agreement that became START II. 

At some points in the process, General Lee Butler, commander in chief, SAC, and then the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the package.34 It appears that the Joint Chiefs discussed the initial 

Joint Staff proposals before Chairman Powell submitted them to Secretary Cheney, and likely 

formally approved the final package after Secretary Cheney’s compromise decision on groundand sea-launched tactical weapons. Secretary Cheney and Chairman Powell then submitted the 

proposals to the President, who approved them without change. 

There is no public record of any formal NSC meeting to discuss the package. A small number of State Department and ACDA officials were brought into the process a few days before the 

initiative was announced to help execute it. That included the preparation of pre-announcement 

communications to Moscow and some other capitals, and diplomatic communications to circulate background information worldwide immediately after the announcement. To underscore 

that this was a White House initiative, the briefings to State and ACDA officials took place in 

the White House complex, even though they were given by Frank Miller of OSD. By that time, 

the substance of the initiative was set.35

The Soviet Union and close allies of the United States were apprised of the PNI only at the 

most senior level, and just hours before the announcement. Presidential letters outlining the 

initiative were delivered to selected heads of government and the NATO Secretary-General at 

their opening of business on September 27. Beginning shortly after 7:00 a.m. in Washington, 

President Bush followed up with telephone calls to French President Francois Mitterrand, British Prime Minister John Major, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft called NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.36 It 

is not known how many other heads of government were informed in advance of the PNI, but 

the number appears to have been small. 
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The President asked Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Major, Mitterrand, and Kohlfor their reactions to 

the initiative before his announcement. Still, the last-minute nature of his written and telephonic communications with them demonstrates that he was not seeking a detailed consultation. We 

do not know what would have happened if any of the leaders had objected to one or more PNI 

elements. However, it appears there were no objections. Yeltsin, Mitterrand, and Kohl warmly 

welcomed the proposals, without qualification. Major raised two issues, but does not seem to 

have opposed the package.37

The President’s conversations with Gorbachev and Yeltsin are particularly noteworthy. 

First, it was both unusual—and a sign of White House expectations for the future—that President Bush telephoned Yeltsin on a foreign and defense policy matter. Second, Bush told Gorbachev he would be doing so (the Gorbachev call occurred about 3 hours before the call to 

Yeltsin). The Yeltsin conversation lasted just 3 minutes; the one with Gorbachev for 30 minutes. 

Gorbachev was positive, but somewhat cautious, and had several questions about what would 

and would not be included in the PNIs. Alone among the leaders with whom President Bush 

spoke, Gorbachev said that he had asked experts in his government for their initial reactions. 

Bush and Gorbachev engaged in some speech-drafting, working out what the President 

would say on television that night about the Soviet leader’s reaction. According to the Memorandum of Conversation, the exchange was as follows:

■ President Gorbachev: George, thank you for those clarifications. Since you’re urging 

that we take steps, I can only give an answer in principle—since there is much that 

must be clarified—and that answer is a positive one.

■ The President: I understand. How about if I say that I’ve consulted with Mikhail 

Gorbachev, and although he has had no time to study my initiative, that I am inclined to believe his response will be positive.

■ President Gorbachev: I think that will be very good.38

In his speech that night, President Bush used virtually the same words: “Today I consulted 

with President Gorbachev. And while he hasn’t had time to absorb the details, I believe the Soviet response will clearly be positive.”39

The September 27 Announcement

President Bush announced the PNI in a rare televised address at 8:00 p.m. on Friday, 

September 27, 1991. He gave such prime-time speeches only a few times, and never before (or 

after) on arms control issues. This despite the fact that his administration saw the signature 
11

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

of an unprecedented number of major arms control treaties: START, START II, the Chemical 

Weapons Convention, and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The following 

afternoon, Secretary Cheney and Chairman Powell explained the PNI details in a Pentagon 

press conference. 

The first PNI is remembered primarily for tactical nuclear reductions. While those were 

dramatic, the September 27 announcement also included several important unilateral measures 

on strategic nuclear weapons and proposals for new U.S.-Soviet cooperation.40 At the same time, 

President Bush, Secretary Cheney, and Chairman Powell all stressed the importance of retaining a strong nuclear deterrent and developing and deploying defenses against ballistic missiles. 

They emphasized that the PNI would not significantly affect air-launched tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the ballistic missile-carrying submarine (SSBN) force, or the nonmobile versions 

of the Peacekeeper and small ICBM. All of that was destined to change, to varying degrees, over 

the next few months. 

Tactical Nuclear Forces 

Under the September 27 PNI, all U.S. ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons—about 

1,000 artillery rounds and 700 Lance surface-to-surface missile warheads—would be removed 

from Europe. Those, and another 400 nuclear artillery and Lance warheads in the United States, 

would all be destroyed.41

All nuclear weapons would be removed from surface ships, attack submarines, and landbased naval aircraft. Those included: 100 nuclear TLAM-N that were routinely deployed; Mark 

57 and Mark 61 naval nuclear bombs; and nuclear depth bombs associated with land-based 

nuclear naval P-3 aircraft and carrier-based S-3 aircraft. All in this latter category—approximately half of the total naval tactical nuclear stockpile—would be destroyed. The remainder, including all TLAM-N, would be put in storage.42 The Department of Defense put notable public 

emphasis on the intention to retain the ability to redeploy TLAM-N—considered an important 

element of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Asian allies.43

The September 27 PNI included only one element that concerned air-launched tactical 

nuclear forces in Europe: the cancellation of the SRAM-T (or Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile—

TASM), the tactical version of the SRAM II. No PNI measures would affect currently deployed 

air-launched tactical nuclear warheads in Europe. That changed less than a month later. In its 

final communiqué from its October 17–18, 1991, meeting in Taormina, Italy, the NATO Nuclear 

Planning Group (NPG) announced: “In addition to the elimination of ground-launched nuclear 

systems [under the PNI], the number of air-delivered weapons in NATO’s European stockpile 
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will be greatly reduced.”44 Press reports indicated that the NPG decided to cut deployed airdelivered tactical nuclear warheads by 50 percent, from about 1,400 to 700 gravity bombs.45

Strategic Nuclear Forces

As discussed above, the foundation for the September 27 PNI measures concerning U.S. strategic 

forces was laid by the 1989–1991 SIOP Review. Many of the PNI strategic elements were also driven by 

budget considerations and the desire to send positive political signals to the Soviet Union. Those appear to have been the two primary motives behind the decisions to end strategic bomber alert, cancel 

the SRAM II program, and accelerate the elimination of Minuteman II ICBMs after entry-into-force of 

the START Treaty. The same two factors were important motivators for the cancellations of the mobile 

Peacekeeper and mobile small ICBM development programs, along with the growing recognition that 

mobile ICBM deployment in the United States would almost certainly never be feasible politically. 

One PNI measure affecting strategic forces was purely symbolic: removal from alert of all 

the Minuteman II ICBMs slated for elimination under the START Treaty. That action could be 

reversed as quickly and easily as it had been implemented.46 

A final PNI measure on strategic forces addressed the organization of DOD. President 

Bush announced that SAC would be replaced by a joint command, the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), responsible for all three legs of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad. Several military leaders had been interested in this concept for some years, and Congress 

had recommended it in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986.47 Further, the SIOP Review made clear the need for a single command able to develop 

requirements as well as targeting plans for the entire strategic force.48

Calls for Reciprocity

While all of those measures for U.S. nuclear forces were unconditional, the President called 

on the Soviet Union to take reciprocal actions. He offered several specific ideas, suggesting that 

the Soviet Union: 

■ eliminate all its ground-launched nonstrategic nuclear forces, including nuclear artillery, nuclear warheads for short-range ballistic missiles and air-defense missiles, and 

nuclear land mines 

■ remove all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and submarines, withdraw nuclear weapons for land-based naval aircraft, destroy many naval tactical warheads and 

consolidate the rest in central storage areas

■ limit ICBM modernization to one single-warhead system 
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

■ end all programs for future ICBMs with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) 

■ confine mobile ICBMs to garrison.

The calls for reciprocity recognized the differences between U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces. 

For example, Soviet strategic bombers were not routinely kept on alert, while the United States 

had no mobile ICBMs. Therefore, a logical Soviet corollary to the U.S. termination of bomber 

alerts was to end movement of mobile ICBMs. To eliminate all their ground-launched tactical 

nuclear weapons, both sides would have to destroy nuclear artillery and short-range ballistic 

missile warheads, but the Soviets would also have to eliminate systems the United States no 

longer had: nuclear landmines and nuclear warheads for air defense. 

Calls for Cooperation

President Bush further proposed to the Soviet Union important new forms of cooperation. 

First, he suggested that the two governments explore cooperation on safe and secure nuclear 

warhead command and control, storage, transport, dismantlement, and destruction. President 

Bush acknowledged in his speech that this proposal built on an earlier one by French President 

Mitterrand, but it also went further. The idea reflected the strong concerns of the time about 

Soviet nuclear command and control, the need to consolidate as many nuclear weapons as possible in Russia, and the hope for major Soviet warhead reductions.49

President Bush also proposed U.S.-Soviet cooperation on practical steps to allow limited 

ballistic missile defenses beyond those permitted by the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. 

This led in early 1992 to the so-called Ross-Mamedov talks, led by Dennis Ross, director of the 

State Department Policy Planning Staff, and Georgiy Mamedov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister. Some observers believe the Ross-Mamedov talks held promise of a productive outcome, but 

they were cancelled by the new Clinton administration in early 1993.50 They were immediately 

replaced by talks between Mamedov and Strobe Talbott, then Special Advisor to the Secretary 

of State for the New Independent States; however, those were not focused on missile defense. 

Finally, President Bush suggested that the United States and Soviet Union “seek early agreement to eliminate from their inventories all ICBMs with multiple warheads.” He described what 

apparently would be a very simple, perhaps informal, agreement, under which the sides would 

agree on a timetable to eliminate MIRVed ICBMs (through missile destruction and/or warhead 

downloading), and use START Treaty procedures to implement it. This was the first serious 

public proposal to emerge from a longstanding U.S. concern about the dangers that MIRVed 
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ICBMs posed to strategic stability. U.S. civilian and military experts worried that there would be 

a strong temptation to launch MIRVed ICBMs preemptively in a crisis, given their vulnerability 

to attack and the potential loss of many warheads to only one or two enemy weapons. The eventual outcome of the September 27 proposal was the START II Treaty, signed in January 1993. 

START II was more detailed and formal than envisioned when the “de-MIRVing” idea was first 

raised, but it met the same U.S. strategic goals. However, the treaty never entered into force.

The Soviet Response

At midday on October 5, 1991, a U.S. interagency team led by Under Secretary of State for Arms 

Control and International Security Reginald Bartholomew arrived in Moscow. The team intended 

to meet with Soviet counterparts to explain the September 27 PNI more fully and to urge a positive 

Soviet response. However, shortly after arriving, Bartholomew was called to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and provided a copy of the television speech that President Gorbachev would give that evening. 

The Soviet response was faster, wider-ranging, and more positive than even the most optimistic U.S. official would have predicted. A few of the measures proposed by Gorbachev were 

long-standing, ritual demands that the Soviet Government knew the United States would never 

accept: e.g., calls for a universal pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and for withdrawal 

of all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. However, most were very much in the spirit of the 

U.S. initiative and demonstrated the Soviet President’s willingness—even eagerness—to reduce 

military forces and advance a new relationship with the United States and NATO. 

Tactical Nuclear Forces

Gorbachev committed to sweeping reductions of tactical nuclear weapons, most of which followed the U.S. measures and calls for reciprocity. He announced that the Soviet Union would eliminate all nuclear artillery, short-range missile nuclear warheads, and nuclear mines. The proliferation 

potential of the large number of ground-launched Soviet tactical nuclear weapons still deployed 

outside Russia, and especially in Ukraine and Belarus, undoubtedly provided a powerful motive 

for this Soviet commitment. Non-Russian republics might be loath to allow the transfer of tactical 

nuclear weapons from their territory if they thought they would simply add to the Russian arsenal. 

Their attitude toward those transfers would be far more positive if the weapons were to be destroyed 

and if the action was part of a unilateral/reciprocal arrangement with the United States.51 

Gorbachev also announced that the Soviet Union, like the United States, would remove 

from deployment all tactical nuclear weapons for surface ships, submarines, and land-based 
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

naval aircraft. He stated that “some” of those naval weapons would be eliminated, and the remainder placed in central storage. The Soviet Union did not at the time specify what portion of 

its tactical air defense or naval nuclear warheads would be destroyed; however, Yeltsin did so in 

January 1992. The practical consequences of removing Soviet weapons to “central storage” are 

unclear. Many U.S. observers concluded that the weapons would be stored in a few sites well 

away from operational bases, but that does not appear to be the case. Instead, “central storage” 

seems to have been—and to remain—only an organizational concept, specifying that the warheads would be under the control of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (12th

GUMO), rather than the navy, army, or air force. The concept has no locational implications.52

Strategic Nuclear Forces

Gorbachev also echoed many of the U.S. measures for strategic nuclear forces, and responded 

at least somewhat positively to one of President Bush’s calls for reciprocity. He announced that the 

Soviet Union would remove from alert 503 ICBMs, including 134 MIRVed ICBMs, and all strategic bombers. The last was essentially meaningless, because Soviet bombers were not routinely on 

alert. Like President Bush, Gorbachev stated that his government would cancel development of its 

mobile small ICBM and short-range nuclear missile for bombers. He partially met U.S. reciprocity 

calls by announcing that the Soviet Union would not increase or modernize its rail-mobile SS-24 

ICBM and would confine that system to garrison. No such commitments were made regarding the 

road-mobile SS-25 ICBM—whether on numbers, modernization, or deployment patterns.

Further, Gorbachev emulated President Bush in announcing that the Soviet Union would 

create a single operational command over all strategic nuclear weapons, including strategic defensive systems. That decision appears never to have been implemented. Responsibility for the three 

legs of the Russian triad remains with the Strategic Rocket Forces (ICBMs), navy, and air force. 

In some respects, Gorbachev’s October 5 response went beyond President Bush’s September 

27 measures on strategic forces. He announced that the Soviet Union would remove three SSBNs from active duty (in addition to three that had already been removed). He also declared that 

the Soviet Union would reduce its total accountable strategic warheads to 5,000 (1,000 below the 

START ceiling) by the end of the treaty reduction period. Both actions simply reflected previously 

planned changes to Soviet strategic forces. The SSBNs were slated for elimination to meet START 

limits, and it seemed clear that the Soviet Union would not be able to sustain the 6,000 accountable 

warheads allowed under the treaty. 

Finally, Gorbachev announced a 1-year unilateral moratorium on Soviet nuclear testing, 

“hoping to achieve the comprehensive cessation of nuclear testing.” He had instituted previous 
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testing moratoria from August 1985 to October 1987 and from November 1989 to October 

1990. The last acknowledged Soviet (or Russian) test was in October 1990.53 In their telephone 

conversation about the PNI on September 27, Gorbachev urged President Bush to “consider 

moves on testing” to accompany the reductions in numbers and types of nuclear weapons. President Bush replied that the United States was “reluctant on testing,” but that the sides “would 

need to consult on that.”54

Calls for Reciprocity

Gorbachev proposed two measures on tactical nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union 

would take only if the United States reciprocated. Both were longstanding Soviet proposals that 

the leadership probably expected to fail. That was certainly the case with one proposal: “to withdraw from combat units on frontal aviation, all nuclear weapons and place them in centralized 

storage sites.” This was code for the removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe—a position that was unacceptable at the time to the United States and most (if not all) NATO Allies. 

The second reciprocity proposal—to “eliminate fully . . . all tactical nuclear weapons of naval 

forces”—would, as discussed above, be positively received by many in the U.S. Navy. However, 

there appeared to be no U.S. interest in reopening that issue after Secretary Cheney’s compromise decision allowing for only partial elimination of such weapons. Almost 19 years would 

elapse before the DOD decided to retire the TLAM-N. 

Gorbachev made two references to multilateralizing the PNI: “The USSR calls other 

nuclear powers to join in these far reaching Soviet-American steps with respect to tactical 

nuclear weapons” and “we sincerely hope that, in the final analysis, other nuclear powers 

will actively join the efforts of the USSR and the United States.” Two obvious targets of 

those statements were the United Kingdom and France. They reprised a favorite Soviet 

theme—for years, the Soviet Union insisted in the INF Treaty negotiations that any equal 

limits apply to the Soviet Union on one side and to the United States, UK, and France combined on the other. But Gorbachev did not stress the issue in his October 5 speech; instead, 

these references appear to have been a ritual nod to hard-line Soviet positions. In any case, 

the idea was a nonstarter for the United States. President Bush did not mention third-party 

nuclear forces in his September 27 address; the first point he made to both Prime Minister 

Major and President Mitterrand in their conversations that morning was that the PNIs were 

completely separate from British and French nuclear force decisions.55

Gorbachev’s third multilateral proposal on October 5 was for a “joint declaration of all 

nuclear powers on no first use of nuclear weapons.” Here, the major target appears to have been 
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

the United States: “a step of the American side in this direction would be an important milestone on the path toward establishing a durable structure of mutual security.” Whether the proposal was for bilateral or multilateral declarations, it would be ignored by the United States—as 

Gorbachev and his advisers no doubt understood.

Calls for Cooperation 

Gorbachev accepted President Bush’s proposals for U.S.-Soviet discussions on missile defense 

and nuclear warhead safety, security, and command and control. On missile defense, he added a 

proposal to discuss possible development of joint early-warning systems. He was less forthcoming 

on nuclear warhead safety and security, appearing to want to limit discussion to relevant technologies, rather than to venture into more sensitive areas of nuclear weapons practice and procedures.56

Gorbachev did not respond to President Bush’s call for an agreement to eliminate U.S. and 

Soviet MIRVed ICBMs. Instead, he proposed that the sides negotiate, immediately after START 

entry-into-force, a new treaty that would reduce each side’s strategic forces by about one-half. 

Gorbachev also proposed an agreement to end U.S. and Soviet fissile material production. There 

is no evidence that the George H.W. Bush administration followed up on that idea, but President Bill Clinton proposed a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) in September 

1993. The United Nations Conference on Disarmament has had the issue on its agenda ever 

since, without being able to agree to begin negotiations. 

The Path to PNI II

Immediately after the Gorbachev speech, the U.S. interagency team that had come to Moscow to urge Soviet PNI reciprocity turned its attention to implementation. The U.S. and Soviet 

teams discussed how each government planned to implement its unilateral commitments, and 

agreed to inform each other of progress through periodic implementation reports. They also 

set up initial discussions on missile defense, concepts of strategic stability, and nuclear warhead 

safety and security, which occurred later that fall. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev stressed 

to the U.S. group the importance of the proposal for deep strategic reductions after the START 

Treaty; he was convinced that Russia would have to accept major cuts if it was to persuade 

Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to give up the nuclear forces on their soil.57

As the Kozyrev discussion shows, the few months between the Bush-Gorbachev PNI 

announcements in September-October 1991 and the Bush-Yeltsin ones in January 1992 were 

dominated by the prospect and then the reality of the fall of the Soviet Union. The process moved 

with astonishing speed. By December 1, all the Soviet republics had declared their independence. 
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On December 8, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, meeting in Minsk (Belarus), declared the 

dissolution of the Soviet Union and creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The 

same basic points were made by 11 republic heads in the Alma-Ata Declaration on December 21.58

On December 25, Gorbachev submitted his resignation as President of the Soviet Union, and the 

Russian tricolor flag was raised over the Kremlin in place of the hammer and sickle. 

The United States was active during this period in seeking to help ensure a peaceful transition, to establish productive relationships with the new republics, to keep on track U.S.-Soviet 

arms reduction agreements (whether formal or informal), and to work to prevent weapons of 

mass destruction proliferation. On December 12, just a few days after the Minsk Declaration, 

President Bush signed into law the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, creating the 

Nunn-Lugar program. In mid-month, Secretary of State James A. Baker III led an interagency 

team to Moscow, Alma-Ata, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), Kiev (Ukraine), and Minsk, to discuss the future U.S. relationship with the independent republics; nuclear weapons issues were a major, but 

not exclusive, focus of his talks. In mid-January 1992, Under Secretary of State Bartholomew led 

another interagency team to Moscow, Alma-Ata, Kiev, and Minsk, for the first of many detailed 

discussions of Russian weapons reductions, Ukraine-Belarus-Kazakhstan denuclearization, and 

potential Nunn-Lugar assistance in both areas. Finally, Russian President Yeltsin was invited for 

talks with President Bush and his senior advisors on February 1, 1992, at Camp David. 

PNI II

It was in this context that President Bush presented additional PNI measures—often referred 

to as “PNI II”—in his State of the Union address on January 28, 1992. On September 27–28, President Bush, Secretary Cheney, and Chairman Powell had stressed the importance of retaining strong 

nuclear forces. Thus, the administration stated that it would move forward with production of the 

silo-based Peacekeeper ICBM and the B-2 strategic bomber, and with development of the silo-based 

small ICBM. No changes would be made to the strategic submarine force, or to U.S. air-delivered 

tactical nuclear forces beyond the cancellation of SRAM-T. Nevertheless, as we have seen, reductions 

in air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons were announced just a few weeks later. By late January, it 

was the turn of several strategic programs. 

There does not appear to have been a dedicated process to develop a PNI II package—or at 

least not one that was comparable to the September effort. Instead, most of the PNI II decisions 

seem to have emerged from preparation of the President’s budget request for Fiscal Year 1994. 

There was strong pressure at the time to maximize the “peace dividend” resulting from the fall 

of the Soviet Union and the development of a new partnership with the Russian Federation. 
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

While the first PNI is remembered mainly for its tactical nuclear reductions, PNI II 

concerned strategic forces exclusively. The President cancelled the silo-based small ICBM 

program, ended production of the Peacekeeper ICBM, capped production of B-2 strategic 

bombers at 20 aircraft, and terminated procurement of additional advanced cruise missiles. 

Further, the President announced an end to production of new W-88 warheads for the Trident II D-5 SLBM.59 

The PNIs are renowned for being unilateral/reciprocal—arms control without agreements. 

But one of the most important elements of PNI II was a proposal for a “de-MIRVing” treaty 

that built on—but was much more detailed than—the one in the PNI package of September 

27. President Bush announced that he had told President Yeltsin that if Russia eliminated all 

its MIRVed ICBMs, the United States would eliminate all Peacekeeper ICBMs, download all 

Minuteman ICBMs to one warhead, reduce deployed SLBM warheads by “about one-third,” and 

“convert a substantial portion of our strategic bombers to primarily conventional use.” Those 

few words outlined the core of what became the START II Treaty. Compared to the PNIs, the 

process leading to START II was more of a traditional negotiation involving interagency teams 

on both sides. Still, it moved much faster than the preceding U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. It could do so in part because of the changed political environment, and in part because 

it relied on many START I provisions, including verification. 

The Russian Response

While Gorbachev learned of the September 27, 1991, PNI just hours before it became 

public, it appears that Yeltsin was given more advance notice of President Bush’s January 1992 

proposals. President Bush noted in his State of the Union address that he had informed Yeltsin 

of the de-MIRVing proposal, and Yeltsin offered his PNIs in considerable detail in a television 

address the very next day. Yeltsin’s speech reaffirmed many elements announced by Gorbachev 

on October 5, but also included new unilateral commitments and proposals for reciprocal or 

joint action with the United States. 

With respect to tactical weapons, Yeltsin reaffirmed that nuclear warheads for groundlaunched short-range missiles, nuclear artillery shells, and nuclear land mines would be eliminated. He added, without explanation, that “measures in this direction have already been 

taken.”60 Going beyond Gorbachev’s announcement, Yeltsin was more specific on plans to eliminate other tactical nuclear weapons types. He stated that Russia would destroy one-half of all 

air-defense nuclear warheads and one-third of sea-based tactical nuclear warheads. Even more 

important, he announced a new commitment to eliminate one-half of Russian air-launched 
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tactical nuclear weapons; Gorbachev had offered no measures on such weapons other than the 

proposal for reciprocal withdrawal to central storage. 

With respect to strategic forces, Yeltsin added substantially to the measures put forth 

earlier by Gorbachev. Much of what he announced may have been motivated at least in part 

by a desire to improve relations with the United States and NATO. The most important considerations, however, probably were the severe economic difficulties facing Russia, and the 

recognition (shared with Gorbachev) that unrestrained military spending was not possible 

if the country was to be modern, democratic, and fiscally stable. Yeltsin announced an end 

to production of the Backfire and Blackjack bombers, current air-launched cruise missiles 

(ALCMs), and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). He also committed not to 

produce new types of SLCMs. Further, Yeltsin declared a goal of reaching the START Treaty 

limit of 6,000 deployed warheads by 3 years after entry-into-force—4 years before the end of 

the treaty reduction period. 

Yeltsin also introduced changes to expensive military practices. There would be no more 

military exercises with over 30 bombers, and SSBN combat patrols had “been halved and will be 

reduced further.” Finally, Yeltsin appeared to reaffirm several of the Gorbachev statements about 

early preparations for START reductions.61

Yeltsin also made several proposals for U.S.-Russian reciprocal steps. One repeated Gorbachev‘s proposal to place all remaining air-launched tactical nuclear weapons in central storage. The others were new: to eliminate all existing long-range nuclear SLCMs, foreswear production of new ALCM types, end SSBN combat patrols, and eliminate existing antisatellite 

weapons (ASATs). None of these was in any way acceptable to the United States. 

Two Yeltsin proposals for negotiations were also nonstarters for the United States: one 

aimed at an ASAT ban and one at further limits on nuclear testing. His repetition of Gorbachev’s proposed bilateral agreement to end fissile material production was much less objectionable, but again, there was no reported follow-up during the remaining year of the Bush 

administration. 

Yeltsin also proposed a new treaty to reduce accountable strategic warheads to 2,000–2,500 

warheads on each side. That was farther than the United States was willing to go at the time; the 

final START II limit was 3,000–3,500.62 Yeltsin added his hope that China, France, and the UK 

would join the nuclear reduction process, but he implied that would be in a later stage of the 

arms control process.63

The Bush administration may have seen the most promise in Yeltsin’s expression of willingness “to continue discussion without prejudice of the U.S. proposal for limiting non-nuclear ABM 
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

systems.” Potentially even more important was the statement that “we are ready jointly to work out 

and subsequently to create and jointly operate a global system of defense in place of SDI [the U.S. 

Strategic Defense Initiative].” The aforementioned Ross-Mamedov talks began shortly thereafter. 

Conclusion

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives instituted the most sweeping nuclear arms reductions in 

history. Between December 1990 (months before the first PNI announcement) and December 1994 

(when the START Treaty entered into force), the U.S. nuclear stockpile of active and inactive warheads fell by 50 percent, from 21,392 to 10,979. No other period in U.S. nuclear history witnessed 

such a large reduction—whether measured in numbers or as a percentage of the total—in such a 

short time.64 The speed and decisiveness of the decision processes involved were equally unique. 

The PNI were inspired—and made possible—by an extraordinary confluence of factors: 

■ a U.S. President who was fully expert in, and placed a high priority on, national security issues, who enjoyed historically high approval ratings, and who had a vision of the 

international future 

■ a national security team at Cabinet level and below that shared (or at least accepted) the 

President’s vision and could work together effectively

■ world-changing developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 

whose pace was astonishing—and accelerating

■ the decisive U.S. victory in Operation Desert Storm that underscored the strength of 

U.S. conventional military capabilities 

■ declining support among the NATO Allies and in the Congress for nuclear weapons 

modernization.

Of these, the most critical factors were the President’s leadership and the geopolitical 

changes in Central-Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Those changes did not permit long 

deliberation or great caution. They demanded—but also allowed—rapid, dramatic action. The 

President and his team saw in them both a need and an opportunity that they were prepared 

and able to seize. 

The PNIs were universally welcomed when they were announced, but their implementation proved disappointing to many. Serious concerns developed within just a year or two about 

the extent to which Russia was fulfilling its PNI commitments. The sides exchanged detailed 

implementation reports at the beginning, but the Russian submissions grew progressively less 
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informative over time, until finally the report exchanges ceased. The question of Russian PNI 

“obligations” is a tricky one, given that the PNIs are not legally binding. Nevertheless, in 1991–

1992, both governments considered their unilateral measures to be firm political commitments. 

The United States continues to hold that view, but the Russian Government apparently does not. 

In recent years, several Russian Government officials have denied that the PNIs remain a political obligation. Many reportedly see the PNIs as an unpleasant reminder of the time when the 

dying Soviet Union and newly independent Russia were weak.65

Those major doubts about Russian implementation of the PNIs have led many observers to 

conclude that the initiatives were failures. It is noteworthy that no one interviewed for this case 

study who was officially involved in the U.S. PNIs shares that negative judgment. All emphasize 

that they view the PNIs as a success. First, the President and the DOD leadership were completely willing at the time to implement the PNI measures unilaterally. Second, the United States 

did not expect that the Soviet Union would take up the reciprocity “challenge” as quickly and 

fully as it did. Under those circumstances, these officials see even incomplete Russian implementation as far better than nothing, involving significant reductions. 

Twenty years later, the issues of U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons, and their potential 

reduction, are once again at the forefront. On December 22, 2010, the U.S. Senate, by a vote of 71 

to 26, consented to ratification of the New START Treaty. One of the Senate conditions required 

the President to certify that the United States would seek negotiations with Russia to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in an equitable, verifiable manner.66 In doing so, the Senate made clear that 

it would not favor a revival of the unilateral/reciprocal methods of the PNIs. Still, there remains 

some interest in “arms control without agreements” both within and outside the U.S. Government. 

While the outcome is at best uncertain, it appears clear that the political and strategic environment 

in both the United States and Russia has changed too much for a return to unilateral/reciprocal 

measures of the scope and scale of 1991–1992. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, and their decision processes, were unique at the time, and will almost certainly remain so.
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

Appendix A

Text of Presidential Nuclear Initiative Announcements 

President George H.W. Bush

The White House

Friday, September 27, 199167

Good evening. 

Tonight I’d like to speak with you about our future and the future of the generations to 

come. The world has changed at a fantastic pace, with each day writing a fresh page of history 

before yesterday’s ink has even dried. And most recently, we’ve seen the peoples of the Soviet 

Union turn to democracy and freedom, and discard a system of government based on oppression and fear.

Like the East Europeans before them, they face the daunting challenge of building fresh 

political structures, based on human rights, democratic principles, and market economies. 

Their task is far from easy and far from over. They will need our help, and they will get it.

But these dramatic changes challenge our Nation as well. Our country has always stood for 

freedom and democracy. And when the newly elected leaders of Eastern Europe grappled with 

forming their new governments, they looked to the United States. They looked to American democratic principles in building their own free societies. Even the leaders of the U.S.S.R. Republics 

are reading The Federalist Papers, written by America’s founders to find new ideas and inspiration.

Today, America must lead again, as it always has, as only it can. And we will. We must also 

provide the inspiration for lasting peace. And we will do that, too. We can now take steps in 

response to these dramatic developments, steps that can help the Soviet peoples in their quest 

for peace and prosperity. More importantly, we can now take steps to make the world a less 

dangerous place than ever before in the nuclear age.

A year ago, I described a new strategy for American defenses, reflecting the world’s changing security environment. That strategy shifted our focus away from the fear that preoccupied 

us for 40 years—the prospect of a global confrontation. Instead, it concentrated more on regional conflicts, such as the one we just faced in the Persian Gulf. 

I spelled out a strategic concept, guided by the need to maintain the forces required to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively in crises, to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, and to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should that be needed. 
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We are now moving to reshape the U.S. military to reflect that concept. The new base force 

will be smaller by half a million than today’s military, with fewer Army divisions, Air Force 

wings, Navy ships, and strategic nuclear forces. This new force will be versatile, able to respond 

around the world to challenges, old and new. 

As I just mentioned, the changes that allowed us to adjust our security strategy a year ago 

have greatly accelerated. The prospect of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe, launched with 

little or no warning, is no longer a realistic threat. The Warsaw Pact has crumbled. In the Soviet 

Union, the advocates of democracy triumphed over a coup that would have restored the old 

system of repression. The reformers are now starting to fashion their own futures, moving even 

faster toward democracy’s horizon.

New leaders in the Kremlin and the Republics are now questioning the need for their huge 

nuclear arsenal. The Soviet nuclear stockpile now seems less an instrument of national security, 

and more of a burden. As a result, we now have an unparalleled opportunity to change the 

nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps—some on our own, some on their own, 

some together—we can dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world’s nuclear weapons. We 

can more effectively discourage the spread of nuclear weapons. We can rely more on defensive 

measures in our strategic relationship. We can enhance stability and actually reduce the risk of 

nuclear war. Now is the time to seize this opportunity. 

After careful study and consultations with my senior advisers, and after considering valuable counsel from Prime Minister Major, President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, and other allied leaders, I am announcing today a series of sweeping initiatives affecting every aspect of our 

nuclear forces on land, on ship, and on aircraft. I met again today with our Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

and I can tell you they wholeheartedly endorse each of these steps. 

I’ll begin with the category in which we will make the most fundamental change in nuclear 

forces in over 40 years, non-strategic or theater weapons. 

Last year, I cancelled U.S. plans to modernize our ground-launched theater nuclear weapons. Later, our NATO allies joined us in announcing that the alliance would propose the mutual elimination of all nuclear artillery shells from Europe as soon as short-range nuclear force 

negotiations began with the Soviets. But starting these talks now would only perpetuate these 

systems, while we engage in lengthy negotiations. Last month’s events not only permit, but indeed demand swifter, bolder action. 

I am therefore directing that the United States eliminate its entire world-wide inventory of 

ground-launched short-range, that is, theater nuclear weapons. We will bring home and destroy all of 
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

our nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads. We will, of course, ensure that 

we preserve an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe. That is essential to NATO’s security. 

In turn, I have asked the Soviets to go down this road with us, to destroy their entire inventory of ground-launched theater nuclear weapons: not only their nuclear artillery and nuclear 

warheads for short-range ballistic missiles, but also the theater systems the U.S. no longer has, 

systems like nuclear warheads for air-defense missiles, and nuclear land mines.

Recognizing further the major changes in the international military landscape, the United 

States will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships and attack submarines, 

as well as those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft. This means removing all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. ships and submarines, as well as nuclear 

bombs aboard aircraft carriers. The bottom line is that under normal circumstances our ships 

will not carry tactical nuclear weapons. 

Many of these land and sea-based warheads will be dismantled and destroyed. 

Those remaining will be secured in central areas where they would be available if necessary 

in a future crisis.

Again, there is every reason for the Soviet Union to match our actions: by removing all 

tactical nuclear weapons from its ships and attack submarines; by withdrawing nuclear weapons 

for land-based naval aircraft; and by destroying many of them and consolidating what remains 

at central locations. I urge them to do so.

No category of nuclear weapons has received more attention than those in our strategic arsenals. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, which President Gorbachev and I signed 

last July was the culmination of almost a decade’s work. It calls for substantial stabilizing reductions and effective verification. Prompt ratification by both parties is essential. 

But I also believe the time is right to use START as a springboard to achieve additional 

stabilizing changes. 

First, to further reduce tensions, I’m directing that all United States strategic bombers immediately stand down from their alert posture. As a comparable gesture, I call upon the Soviet 

Union to consign its mobile missiles to their garrisons where they will be safer and more secure.

Second, the United States will immediately stand down from alert all intercontinental ballistic missiles scheduled for deactivation under START. Rather than waiting for the treaty’s reduction plan to run its full 7 year course, we will accelerate elimination of these systems, once 

START is ratified. I call upon the Soviet Union to do the same.

Third, I am terminating the development of the mobile Peacekeeper ICBM, as well as the 

mobile portion of the small ICBM program. The small single-warhead ICBM will be our only 
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remaining ICBM modernization program. I call upon the Soviets to terminate any and all programs for future ICBMs with more than one warhead, and to limit ICBM modernization to one 

type of single warhead missile, just as we have done.

Fourth, I am cancelling the current program to build a replacement for the nuclear shortrange attack missile for our strategic bombers.

Fifth, as a result of the strategic nuclear weapons adjustments that I’ve just outlined, the 

United States will streamline its command and control procedures, allowing us to more effectively manage our strategic nuclear forces.

As the system works now, the Navy commands the submarine part of our strategic deterrent, while the Air Force commands the bomber and land-based element. But as we reduce our 

strategic forces, the operational command structure must be as direct as possible. And I have 

therefore approved the recommendation of Secretary Cheney and the Joint Chiefs to consolidate operational command of these forces into a U.S. strategic command under one commander 

with participation from both services. 

Since the 1970’s, the most vulnerable and unstable part of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces 

has been intercontinental missiles with more than one warhead. Both sides have these ICBM’s 

in fixed silos in the ground, where they are more vulnerable than missiles on submarines. 

I propose that the U.S. and the Soviet Union seek early agreement to eliminate from their 

inventory all ICBM’s with multiple warheads. After developing a timetable acceptable to both 

sides, we could rapidly move to modify or eliminate these systems under procedures already 

established in the START agreement. In short, such an action would take away the single most 

unstable part of our nuclear arsenals. 

But there is more to do. The United States and the Soviet Union are not the only nations with ballistic missiles. Some 15 nations have them now, and in less than a decade, 

that number could grow to 20. The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf demonstrates in 

no uncertain terms, that the time has come for strong action on these growing threats to 

world peace. 

Accordingly, I am calling on the Soviet leadership to join us in taking immediate, concrete steps, to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited 

ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source, without undermining the credibility of existing 

deterrent forces. And we will intensify our efforts to curb nuclear and missile proliferation. 

These two efforts will be mutually reinforcing. To foster cooperation, the United States soon will 

propose additional initiatives in the area of ballistic missile early warning.

Finally, let me discuss yet another opportunity for cooperation that can make our world safer. 
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

During last month’s attempted coup in Moscow, many Americans asked me if I thought 

Soviet nuclear weapons were under adequate control. I do not believe that America was at increased risk of nuclear attack during those tense days. But I do believe more can be done to 

ensure the safe handling and dismantling of Soviet nuclear weapons. Therefore, I propose that 

we begin discussions with the Soviet Union to explore cooperation in three areas: First, we 

should explore joint technical cooperation on the safe and environmentally responsible storage, 

transportation, dismantling, and destruction of nuclear warheads. Second, we should discuss 

existing arrangements for the physical security and safety of nuclear weapons and how these 

might be enhanced. And third, we should discuss nuclear command and control arrangements, 

and how these might be improved to provide more protection against the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons.

My friend, French President Mitterrand, offered a similar idea a short while ago. After 

further consultations with the alliance and when the leadership in the U.S.S.R. is ready, we will 

begin this effort.

The initiatives that I’m announcing build on the new defense strategy that I set out a year 

ago, one that shifted our focus away from the prospect of global confrontation. We’re consulting 

with our allies on the implementation of many of these steps which fit well with the new postcold war strategy and force posture that we’ve developed in NATO. 

As we implement these initiatives we will closely watch how the new Soviet leadership responds. We expect our bold initiatives to meet with equally bold steps on the Soviet side. If this 

happens, further cooperation is inevitable. If it does not, then an historic opportunity will have 

been lost. Regardless, let no one doubt we will still retain the necessary strength to protect our 

security and that of our allies and to respond as necessary.

In addition, regional instabilities, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and as we 

saw during the conflict in the Gulf, territorial ambitions of power-hungry tyrants, still require 

us to maintain a strong military to protect our national interests and to honor commitments to 

our allies. 

Therefore, we must implement a coherent plan for a significantly smaller but fully capable 

military, one that enhances stability but is still sufficient to convince any potential adversary that 

the cost of aggression would exceed any possible gain.

We can safely afford to take the steps I’ve announced today, steps that are designed to reduce the danger of miscalculation in a crisis. But to do so, we must also pursue vigorously those 

elements of our strategic modernization program that serve the same purpose. We must fully 

fund the B-2 and SDI program. We can make radical changes in the nuclear postures of both 
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sides to make them smaller, safer, and more stable. But the United States must maintain modern 

nuclear forces including the strategic triad and thus ensure the credibility of our deterrent. 

Some will say that these initiatives call for a budget windfall for domestic programs. But 

the peace dividend I seek is not measured in dollars but in greater security. In the near term, 

some of these steps may even cost money. Given the ambitious plan I have already proposed 

to reduce U.S. defense spending by 25 percent, we cannot afforded [sic] to make any unwise or 

unwarranted cuts in the defense budget that I submitted to Congress. I am counting on congressional support to ensure we have the funds necessary to restructure our forces prudently and 

implement the decisions that I have outlined tonight.

Twenty years ago when I had the opportunity to serve this country as Ambassador to the 

United Nations, I once talked about the vision that was in the minds of the U.N.’s founders, how 

they dreamed of a new age when the great powers of the world would cooperate in peace as they 

had as allies in war. 

Today I consulted with President Gorbachev. And while he hasn’t had time to absorb the 

details, I believe the Soviet response will clearly be positive. I also spoke with President Yeltsin, 

and he had a similar reaction, positive, hopeful.

Now the Soviet people and their leaders can shed the heavy burden of a dangerous and 

costly nuclear arsenal which has threatened world peace for the past five decades. They can join 

us in these dramatic moves toward a new world of peace and security. 

Tonight, as I see the drama of democracy unfolding around the globe, perhaps we are 

closer to that new world then [sic] every [sic] before. The future is ours to influence, to shape, 

to mold. While we must not gamble that future, neither can we forfeit the historic opportunity 

now before us. 

It has been said, “Destiny is not a matter of change. It is a matter of choice. It is not a thing 

to be waited for. It’s a thing to be achieved.” The United States has always stood where duty required us to stand. Now let them say that we led where destiny required us to lead, to a more 

peaceful, hopeful future. We cannot give a more precious gift to the children of the world. 

Thank you, good night, and God bless the United States of America. 
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

President Mikhail Gorbachev

Saturday, October 5, 199168

Dear compatriots, a week ago US President Bush put forward an important initiative on 

nuclear weapons. This initiative confirms that a new way of thinking has been widely supported by the world community. George Bush’s proposals are a worthy continuation of the drive 

started in Reykjavik. This is my principled opinion. I know that Boris Yeltsin and leaders of 

other republics share this opinion. In this statement I will announce our reciprocal steps and 

countermeasures. First, with respect to tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union will take the 

following steps:

■ All nuclear artillery munitions and nuclear warheads for tactical rockets shall 

be eliminated.

■ Nuclear warheads for air defense missiles shall be withdrawn from the troops and concentrated in central bases, and a portion of them shall be eliminated. All nuclear mines 

shall be eliminated.

■ All tactical nuclear weapons shall be removed from surface ships and multi-purpose 

submarines. These weapons, as well as nuclear weapons on land-based naval aviation, 

shall be stored in central storage sites and a portion shall be eliminated.

In this fashion, on the basis of reciprocity the Soviet Union and the United States 

will take essential steps aimed at the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. [The procedures and timing for carrying out these measures could be agreed on between the sides 

through consultations.69]

Moreover, we propose that the United States eliminate fully, on the basis of reciprocity, all 

tactical nuclear weapons of naval forces. In addition, on the basis of reciprocity, it would be possible to withdraw from combat units on frontal (tactical) aviation, all nuclear weapons (gravity 

bombs and air-launched missiles) and place them in centralized storage bases. The USSR calls 

upon other nuclear powers to join in these far reaching Soviet-American steps with respect to 

tactical nuclear weapons.

Second, together with the US, we are in favor of the quickest possible ratification of the 

historic START treaty, signed in Moscow this summer. As president of the USSR, I intend to 

present this issue at the first session of the Supreme Soviet in its new composition.

Taking into account the unilateral measures on strategic offensive arms, declared by President Bush, we are undertaking the following actions: 
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■ Our heavy bombers, just as the American ones, shall not be on alert status, while their 

nuclear arms shall be placed in storage with military units.

■ We are stopping the development of the modified nuclear short-range missile for Soviet 

heavy bombers.

■ We are stopping the development in the USSR of the small mobile intercontinental 

ballistic missile.

■ The number of rail-mobile ICBM launchers will not be increased above the current 

number and such missiles will not be modernized. In this fashion, the number of our 

mobile MIRVed ICBMs will not be increased.

■ All our rail-mobile ICBMs will remain in their permanent basing areas.

■ As a reciprocal step, the Soviet Union will remove from alert status 503 ICBMs, including 134 MIRVed ICBMs.

■ The Soviet Union has already decommissioned three nuclear missile submarines with 

44 launchers of SLBMs and will decommission an additional three submarines with 

48 launchers.

Third, we have decided on deeper reductions of strategic offensive arms than provided for 

in the START treaty. As a result, at the end of the seven-year period of reductions, the number of 

strategic nuclear warheads on our side will be 5,000, rather than the 6,000 required by the treaty.

We would, of course, welcome a similar approach from the US side.

We propose to the US that immediately after the ratification of the START treaty, we begin intensive negotiations on further radical reductions of strategic offensive arms by approximately one-half.

We are ready to discuss the US proposal on non-nuclear ABM systems.

We also propose to the US side to examine the possibility of developing joint early warning 

systems of nuclear attacks with land- and space-based elements.

Fourth, with a view to giving new impetus to nuclear disarmament, we announce the introduction, beginning today, of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing for one year, hoping 

to achieve the comprehensive cessation of nuclear testing.

We are for reaching agreement with the United States on the verified cessation of the production of all weapons-grade fissionable materials.

Fifth, we express our readiness to enter into a substantive dialogue with the United States on 

the development of safe and ecologically sound technologies for the storing and transportation of 

nuclear warheads, methods of recycling nuclear weapons devices, and enhancing nuclear security.
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

With the aim of enhancing the reliability of control over nuclear weapons, we will unite 

under a single operational command all strategic nuclear forces. We will include strategic defensive systems in a single military service.

Sixth, we sincerely hope that, in the final analysis, other nuclear powers will actively join 

the efforts of the USSR and the United States.

A joint declaration of all nuclear powers on no first use of nuclear weapons could play 

an exceptionally useful role in the strengthening of stability and mutual trust. The USSR has 

already firmly adhered to this principle for a long time.

I am convinced that a step of the American side in this direction would be an important 

milestone on the path toward establishing a durable structure of mutual security.

Seventh, we note with satisfaction the plans of the US Administration to reduce the American armed forces by 500,000 men in the next few years. In this connection, we intend to reduce 

the Soviet armed forces by 700,000 men. 

In conclusion, I want to emphasize the following: Acting in this fashion (in one case unilaterally, in a second on a compromise basis, in a third through negotiations) nonetheless we are 

resolutely furthering the disarmament process, thereby approaching the goal which was proclaimed back at the beginning of 1986: toward a nuclear-free world. There is much work here: 

for governments, experts, agencies. We have here a new stage of strengthening strategic stability 

and creating durable, general security.

Evidently, the question also arises of a new USSR-US summit. I have been speaking to US 

President George Bush. I told him about our countersteps in connection with his initiative. At 

the same time, I voiced proposals for a summit meeting. There was a good exchange of views. 

He gave me a positive assessment of our proposals, and stated his satisfaction with how we are 

acting and addressing some of the most major issues in world politics.
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WMD Center Case Study 5

President George H.W. Bush

Excerpts from State of the Union Address

January 28, 199270

Two years ago, I began planning cuts in military spending that reflected the changes of the 

new era. But now, this year, with imperial communism gone, that process can be accelerated. 

Tonight I can tell you of dramatic changes in our strategic nuclear force. These are actions we are 

taking on our own because they are the right thing to do. After completing 20 planes for which 

we have begun procurement, we will shut down further production of the B-2 bombers. We will 

cancel the small ICBM program. We will cease production of new warheads for our sea-based 

ballistic missiles. We still stop all new production of the Peacekeeper missile. And we will not 

purchase any more advanced cruise missiles. 

This weekend I will meet at Camp David with Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation. 

I’ve informed President Yeltsin that if the Commonwealth, the former Soviet Union, will 

eliminate all land-based multiple-warhead ballistic missiles, I will do the following: We will 

eliminate all Peacekeeper missiles. We will reduce the number of warheads on Minuteman 

missiles to one and reduce the number of warheads on our sea-based missiles by about onethird. And we will convert a substantial portion of our strategic bombers to primarily conventional use. President Yeltsin’s early response has been very positive, and I expect our talks 

at Camp David to be fruitful. 

I want you to know that for half a century, American presidents have longed to make such 

decisions and say such words. But even in the midst of celebration, we must keep caution as a 

friend. For the world is still a dangerous place. Only the dead have seen the end of conflict. And 

though yesterday’s challenges are behind us, tomorrow’s are being born.

The Secretary of Defense recommended these cuts after consultation with the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. And I make them with confidence. But do not misunderstand me. The reductions I 

have approved will save us an additional billion over the next 5 years. By 1997 we will have cut 

defense by 30 percent since I took office. These cuts are deep, and you must know my resolve: 

This deep, and no deeper. To do less would be insensible to progress, but to do more would be 

ignorant of history. We must not go back to the days of “the hollow army.” We cannot repeat the 

mistakes made twice in this century, when armistice was followed by recklessness and defense 

was purged as if the world were permanently safe.

I remind you this evening that I have asked for your support in funding a program to protect our country from limited nuclear missile attack. We must have this protection because too 
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

many people in too many countries have access to nuclear arms. And I urge you again to pass 

this Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI.

There are those who say that now we can turn away from the world, that we have no special 

role, no special place. But we are the United States of America, the leader of the West that has 

become the leader of the world. And as long as I am President, I will continue to lead in support 

of freedom everywhere, not out of arrogance, not out of altruism, but for the safety and security 

of our children. This is a fact: Strength in the pursuit of peace is no vice; isolationism in the 

pursuit of security is no virtue. 
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President Boris N. Yeltsin

January 29, 199271

Respected citizens of Russia. My address today is devoted to an issue of vital 

significance. It is a matter of practical measures by Russia in the sphere of the limitation 

and reduction of weapons. 

Our fundamental position is the following: Nuclear weapons and other means of mass 

destruction in the world must be eliminated. Of course, this must be done gradually and on an 

equal basis. In this vitally important matter we are open to cooperation with all states and international organizations, including within the framework of the United Nations. 

The measures I will speak about today have been prepared on the basis of constant interaction among member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and in accordance 

with the accords reached at the meetings of their leaders in Minsk, Alma-Ata, and Moscow.

Russia considers itself the legal successor to the USSR in terms of responsibility for carrying out international obligations. We confirm all of our obligations with regard to the bilateral 

and multilateral accords in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament which were signed 

by the Soviet Union and are in operation at the current time.

The Russian leadership confirms its adherence to the course of radical reduction of nuclear weapons, guaranteeing the maximum security of nuclear weapons, and guaranteeing the 

security [of] all of the facilities connected with the development, production, and operation 

of such weapons. 

Russia is proposing an initiative on the creation of an international agency to ensure the 

reduction of nuclear arms. During the subsequent stages this agency could gradually take under 

its control the whole nuclear cycle from the mining of uranium and the production of deuterium and tritium, to the storage of waste.

The measures we are taking in the disarmament sphere in no way undermine the defense 

capabilities of Russia or the CIS states. We are talking specifically about a reasonable, minimum 

sufficiency of nuclear and conventional arms.

This is our main principle in building the armed forces. Implementing it will make it possible to save considerable funds. These funds will be directed for civilian purposes for social 

issues and the implementation of reforms.

Conditions are prime today, making it possible to take a number of new, major steps 

in arms reduction. We are undertaking a proportion of these unilaterally, and others on a 

reciprocal basis.
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

We have done, and intend first and foremost to do the following: First, in the area of strategic offensive weapons: We will submit for ratification to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian 

Federation the treaty on strategic offensive weapons. The process of ratifying this treaty has also 

begun in the United States. I believe that the implementation of this vital document, including 

its approval by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, should be carried out as promptly as possible. Even before the treaty on strategic offensive weapons comes into force, Russia will take 

a whole range of major steps aimed at cutting the strategic arsenal. About 600 land and seabased strategic ballistic missiles, or almost 1,250 nuclear warheads, have been removed from 

operational readiness. A total of 130 intercontinental ballistic missile launch silos have been 

destroyed or are being prepared for destruction. Six nuclear submarines have been prepared for 

the dismantling of their missile launchers. Programs for the development or modernization of 

several types of strategic offensive weapons have been halted. Strategic nuclear arms deployed 

on the territory of Ukraine are to be dismantled sooner than planned. The appropriate accords 

have been reached.

Let me stress that this is not a case of our unilateral disarmament. Parallel steps are being 

taken by the United States as a goodwill measure. Now, however, we can and need to advance 

significantly further along this path.

Recently the following decisions have been made: The production of TU-160 and TU95Ms heavy bombers has ceased. 

We are stopping the production of air-launched long-range cruise missiles of the existing 

types. We are prepared to renounce the creation of new types of such missiles on a reciprocal basis with the United States. The production of the existing types of sea-based long-range 

nuclear cruise missiles is ceasing. New types of such missiles will not be created.

At the same time we are prepared, on a reciprocal basis, to eliminate all existing sea-based 

long-range nuclear cruise missiles. We are renouncing the holding of exercises with the participation of large numbers of heavy bombers. This means that not more than 30 of them may be 

involved in one exercise. The number of atomic submarines with ballistic missiles—submarinelaunched nuclear ballistic missiles—which are on combat patrol has been halved and will be 

reduced further. We are prepared to renounce altogether the practice of combat patrol with the 

aid of such submarines, on a reciprocal basis. Russia will reduce the number of strategic offensive weapons on operational readiness to the agreed number within a three-year period instead 

of seven years. 

Thus, we will arrive four years earlier at the level that is envisaged by the relevant treaty. 

Given that there is mutual understanding with the United States, we could proceed in this 
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direction even faster. We are in favor of the strategic offensive weapons retained by the United 

States and Russia after the reduction not being aimed at Russian and US targets, respectively.

Important talks with leaders of Western countries are to take place in the forthcoming 

days. Proposals have been prepared on new, in-depth several-fold cuts in strategic offensive 

weapons, up to 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear weapons on each of the sides. In doing so we 

hope that other nuclear powers like China, Britain, and France will join the process of real 

nuclear disarmament.

Second, tactical nuclear weapons: Major measures concerning their reduction have already been undertaken simultaneously with the United States.

During the recent period production has been stopped of nuclear warheads for land-based 

tactical missiles, and also production of nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines. Stocks of 

such nuclear devices will be eliminated. Russia is eliminating one-third of sea-based tactical 

nuclear weapons and one-half of nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles. Measures in this 

direction have already been taken. We also intend to halve stocks of air-launched tactical nuclear munitions. The remaining tactical air-launched nuclear armaments could, on a reciprocal 

basis with the United States, be removed from combat units of the frontline tactical air force and 

place[d] in centralized storage bases.

Third, antimissile defense and space: Russia confirms its adherence to the ABM treaty. It 

is an important factor in maintaining strategic stability in the world. We are ready to continue 

discussion without prejudice of the US proposal for limiting non-nuclear ABM systems.

Our principle is known: If it strengthens strategic stability in the world and Russia’s security, we will support this approach. I also announce that Russia is ready, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States, to eliminate the existing anti-satellite systems and to work out an 

accord to ban completely the weapons which have been specially constructed to hit satellites. 

We are ready jointly to work out and subsequently to create and jointly operate a global system 

of defense in place of SDI.

Fourth, the testing of nuclear weapons and the manufacture of fissile materials for arms 

purposes: Russia is resolutely in favor of a ban on all nuclear arms testing. We are faithful to the 

annual moratorium on nuclear explosions announced in October 1991, and we hope that other 

nuclear powers will likewise refrain from carrying out nuclear testing. A climate of mutual 

restraint would facilitate the attainment of accords on not carrying out such tests altogether, 

possibly curtailing the number of tests gradually. 

In the interests of resolving this task once and for all, we propose to the United States that 

bilateral talks on further limiting the testing of nuclear arms be resumed. 
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The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

Russia intends to continue fulfillment of the program for ending the production of weapons grade plutonium. Industrial reactors for making weapons grade plutonium will be stopped 

before the year 2000, and several of them will be stopped in 1993 under an accelerated timetable.

We confirm the offer to the United States that agreement be reached on a controlled cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons.

Fifth, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery: 

Russia confirms its obligations under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, including those as a 

depository. We are counting upon the treaty being joined as quickly as possible as non-nuclear 

states by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and also other CIS member states. Russia states its 

full support for the activity of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is in favor 

of the effectiveness of its guarantees being intensified.

We are taking additional steps to prevent our exports leading to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Work is now being conducted aimed at bringing Russia in line with the 

principles of an all-embracing IAEA guarantee as a condition of our peaceful nuclear exports. 

Russia, in principle, intends to join the international regime of nonproliferation of missiles and 

missile technology as an equal participant. 

We support the efforts of the so-called Australia Group for control over chemical exports. 

The Russian Federation plans to adopt domestic legislation regulating the export from Russia 

of dual use materials, equipment and technology that could be used to create nuclear, chemical, 

and biological weapons or combat missiles. A government system to control such exports is 

being established. We are going to establish very close cooperation and coordination between 

all participating CIS states on these matters. Russia supports the guiding principles on the arms 

trade approved in London in October 1991.

Sixth, conventional weapons: A motion to ratify the treaty on conventional armed forces 

in Europe has been tabled in the Russian parliament. The other CIS member states whose territory is covered by this treaty likewise attach importance to its ratification. Russia reaffirms its 

intention—along with the other members of the Commonwealth—to cut the actual numbers of 

the former USSR armed forces by 700,000.

Russia attaches great significance to the talks currently under way in Vienna on personnel 

reductions and confidence-building measures, and also to the new talks on security and cooperation in Europe. The latter could become a standing pan-European forum for seeking ways of 

creating a collective, pan-European security system.

In cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, Russia will press to reach an 

accord with China at talks regarding cuts in armed forces and armaments in the border region. 
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A decision has been made not to hold major exercises in 1992 involving more than 13,000 

men—and not just on the European part, but also on the Asiatic part of CIS territory. 

We also hope that there is a possibility in the near future to sign a treaty on the open 

skies issue.

Seventh, chemical weapons: We are for the speediest possible conclusion, in 1992, of a 

global convention banning chemical weapons. This is essential in order to securely close the 

paths leading to the possession of chemical weapons, without detriment to the legitimate economic interests of the signatories to the convention. Russia adheres to the agreement with the 

United States on the non-production and elimination of chemical weapons, signed in 1990. 

However, the timescale envisaged therein for the destruction of such weapons requires 

certain amendments. All of the chemical weapons of the former USSR are on the territory 

of Russia, who takes responsibility for their destruction. We are preparing an appropriate 

state program. We are open for cooperation in this matter with the United States and other 

interested countries. 

Eighth, biological weapons: Russia favors the rigorous implementation of the 1972 convention banning biological weapons, and the creation of an appropriate mechanism on a multilateral basis for monitoring the implementation of measures for building confidence and 

openness. Considering that there is a lag in implementing the convention, I can now state that 

Russia is renouncing that section of provisos concerning the possibility of the retaliatory use of 

biological weapons. These provisos were made by the USSR under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 

banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war. 

Ninth, the defense budget: Russia will continue to make substantial reductions in its defense budget, imparting a social orientation to this area. In 1990 and 1991, defense expenditure 

was already reduced by 20 percent in terms of comparable prices, including a 30 percent reduction for purchases of weapons and equipment. In 1992, we intend to reduce military expenditure by another 10 percent in terms of 1991 prices. The volume of weapons purchases this year 

will be reduced by approximately half compared with last year. 

Tenth, conversion: Russia welcomes international cooperation in the area of conversion 

of military production. Russia favors faster work in this regard. On our part, we will encourage 

this cooperation by creating a most favored treatment system and by establishing tax benefits 

for relevant joint projects. 

Esteemed citizens of Russia: I have just set out a plan of action for the Russian Federation 

concerning the issues of arms reductions and disarmament. I hope it will meet with your support and with understanding on the part of all CIS peoples. I am convinced that it is fully in 
39

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

keeping with the interests of our country and other states of the world. If it is possible to implement it, our life will not only become more calm and secure, but also qualitatively better.

Several hours ago US President Bush addressed the US people and proposed cuts of nuclear potential. We are constantly engaged in mutual consultations on these issues in preliminary terms. We are engaged in a dialogue on the practical implementation of this line and the 

initiatives that have been proposed. The closeness of the positions of both sides is noteworthy. 

Therein lies a guarantee of success on the path of reducing offensive nuclear arms.

Thank you for your attention.
40 

WMD Center Case Study 5

Appendix B

Presidential Nuclear Initiatives Summary

Bush 9/27/91 Gorbachev 

10/5/91 Bush 1/28/92 Yeltsin 1/29/92

Groundlaunched 

nonstrategic 

nuclear 

weapons 

(NSNW)

• GroundLaunched NonStrategic Nuclear 

Weapons 

(NSNW)

• Call on Russia 

to do same, as 

well as eliminate 

other groundlaunched NSNF 

(e.g. air defense 

and land mines)

• Eliminate 

nuclear artillery 

munitions, 

nuclear mines, 

and tactical 

rocket warheads

• Consolidate 

nuclear air 

defense 

missile nuclear 

warheads in 

central sites 

and eliminate 

“a portion”

• Production 

ended of landbased tactical 

missiles, nuclear 

artillery, and 

nuclear mines

• Eliminate 

one-half of 

air defense 

missile nuclear 

warheads

Sea-launched 

NSNW

• Remove nuclear 

weapons from 

surface ships and 

attack submarines. Withdraw 

nuclear warheads associated 

with land-based 

naval aircraft

• Destroy “many.” 

Place remaining 

in central storage

• Call on Soviets 

to remove all 

NSNF from 

ships and submarines, withdraw nuclear 

weapons for 

land-based naval 

aircraft, destroy 

many, and consolidate rest at 

central locations 

• Remove tactical 

nuclear weapons 

from surface 

ships and multiple-purpose 

submarines. Put 

in central storage, along with 

nuclear weapons 

on land-based 

naval aircraft. 

Eliminate “a 

portion”

• Propose that the 

U.S. “eliminate 

fully, on the 

basis of reciprocity, all tactical 

nuclear weapons 

of naval forces”

• End production 

of long-range 

sea-launched 

cruise missiles 

(SLCMs). No 

new types of 

such missiles 

will be created

• Prepared on a 

reciprocal basis 

to eliminate all 

existing longrange nuclear 

SLCMs

• Eliminate onethird of seabased tactical 

nuclear weapons
41

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

Bush 9/27/91 Gorbachev 

10/5/91 Bush 1/28/92 Yeltsin 1/29/92

Air-launched 

NSNW

• Cancel 

program to 

modernize 

tactical version 

of short-range 

attack missile 

(SRAM-T or 

TASM)

• “On the basis 

of reciprocity, 

it would be 

possible to 

withdraw 

from all 

combat units 

on battlefield 

aviation all 

nuclear charges 

and place them 

in centralized 

storage sites”

• Halve stocks of 

air-launched 

tactical nuclear 

munitions. 

Remaining, on 

a reciprocal 

basis with the 

U.S., could 

be placed in 

central storage
42 

WMD Center Case Study 5

Bush 9/27/91 Gorbachev 

10/5/91 Bush 1/28/92 Yeltsin 1/29/92

Intercontinental 

ballistic 

missiles 

(ICBMs)

• Remove from 

alert all ICBMs 

to be eliminated under Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

(START). Accelerate elimination once 

START ratified. 

Call on Soviets 

to do the same

• End development of mobile 

small ICBM 

and mobile 

Peacekeeper. 

Retain only 

small singlewarhead ICBM 

program

• Call on Soviets 

to limit ICBM 

modernization 

to one single 

warhead system, and end 

all programs for 

future MIRVed 

ICBMs

• Propose U.S.-

Soviet agreement to eliminate MIRVed 

ICBMs.

• Remove 

from alert 

503 ICBMs, 

including 134 

with multiple 

independentlytargetable 

reentry 

vehicles 

(MIRVed)

• End 

development 

of small mobile 

ICBM

• Do not increase or 

modernize rail 

mobile ICBMs. 

Keep rail mobile ICBMs 

in permanent 

basing areas

• Cancel small 

ICBM program

• Stop new 

Peacekeeper 

production
43

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

Bush 9/27/91 Gorbachev 

10/5/91 Bush 1/28/92 Yeltsin 1/29/92

Strategic 

Bombers

• Cancel program to replace nuclear 

short-range 

attack missile 

(SRAM)

• End bomber 

alert. Ask 

Soviets to reciprocate by 

confining mobile ICBMs to 

garrison

• End development of nuclear short-range 

missile for 

bombers

• End bomber 

alert

• End B-2 

production at 

20 bombers

• End purchase 

of advanced 

cruise missiles

• End Backfire 

and Blackjack 

production

• End 

production 

of current 

ALCMs

• Prepared to 

renounce creation of new 

air-launched 

cruise missile 

(ALCM) types 

on reciprocal 

basis

• End exercises 

with more than 

30 bombers

Submarinelaunched 

ballistic 

missiles 

(SLBMs)

• Remove from 

active duty 3 

ballistic missile 

submarines 

SSBNs with 48 

launchers

• End 

production 

of new SLBM 

warheads

• Further reduce 

SSBN combat 

patrols

• Prepared on 

reciprocal basis 

to end combat 

patrols
44 

WMD Center Case Study 5

Bush 9/27/91 Gorbachev 

10/5/91 Bush 1/28/92 Yeltsin 1/29/92

Strategic 

General

• Create U.S. 

Strategic 

Command

• Reduce 

warheads 

below START 

limits, to 

5,000 by end 

of reduction 

period. Would 

welcome U.S. 

reciprocity

• Propose 

negotiating 

strategic cuts 

up to a factor 

of two after 

START entryinto-force

• Create single 

operational 

command over 

all strategic 

nuclear 

weapons, 

including 

defensive

• Meet START 

deployed 

warhead level 

in 3 years

• Propose 

strategic 

reductions, up 

to 3,000–2,500 

on each side. 

Hope other 

nuclear powers 

will join 

process
45

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

Bush 9/27/91 Gorbachev 

10/5/91 Bush 1/28/92 Yeltsin 1/29/92

Other • Call on Soviets 

to join in im-

mediate prac-

tical steps to 

allow limited 

ABM defenses

• Explore U.S.-

Soviet coop-

eration on safe 

warhead stor-

age, transport, 

dismantlement, 

and destruc-

tion. Discuss 

existing ar-

rangements 

and possible 

enhancements

• Call on all other 

nuclear powers 

to join measures 

against tactical 

nuclear weapons

• Discuss U.S. 

ABM proposal

• Propose exami-

nation of pos-

sible groundand space-based 

joint early 

warning system

• Unilateral 

nuclear test 

moratorium

• Propose 

U.S.-Soviet 

agreement on 

ending weap-

ons-grade fis-

sile material 

production

• Ready to dia-

logue on tech-

nology for nu-

clear warhead 

storage, trans-

port, command 

and control, 

and enhancing 

security

• Propose joint 

declaration 

by all nuclear 

powers on nofirst-use

• Reduce Soviet 

military by 

700,000 men

• If Russia 

eliminates 

all MIRVed 

ICBMs, 

eliminate all 

Peacekeepers, 

download all 

Minutemen to 

one warhead, 

reduce SLBM 

warheads by 

about onethird, and 

convert “a 

substantial 

portion” of 

heavy bombers 

to primarily 

conventional 

(Note: this 

proposal led to 

START II)

• Confirm re-

sponsibility for 

all Soviet arms 

control accords

• Propose inter-

national agen-

cy to ensure 

nuclear reduc-

tions; would 

gradually take 

control of 

nuclear cycle

• Continue dis-

cussion of U.S. 

proposal for 

limiting ABM

• Ready jointly 

to create and 

operate a global 

defense system 

in place of SDI

• Ready with U.S. 

to eliminate 

existing ASATs 

and to agree to 

ban dedicated 

ASATs

• Resume U.S.-

Soviet talks on 

further limiting 

nuclear testing

• End pro-

duction of 

weapons-grade 

plutonium by 

2000. Confirm 

offer for agree-

ment on end to 

production of 

fissile material 

for weapons

47

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

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28, 1991, Department of Defense,” C-Span video, at <www.c-spanvideo.org/

program/21624-1#>. 

George Bush Presidential Library and Museum. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation:

President Boris Yeltsin, December 23, 1991, 8:08 a.m.-8:31 a.m.,” at <http://bushlibrary.

tam.edu/r5esearch/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-12-23—Yeltsin.pdf>. 

_____. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Prime Minister Jim Bolger of New 

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edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-09-28—Bolger.pdf>. 

_____. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin, President of the

Republic of Russia, September 27, 1991, 12:23-12:36 pm,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.

edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-09-27—Yeltsin.pdf>.This memorandum and 

the memorandum of Bush’s conversation with Kohl on the same date (see below) state 

that the two conversations occurred at the same time. It is unknown which is correct. 

_____. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of

 Germany, September 27, 1991, 12:23-12:36 pm,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/

research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-09-27—Kohl.pdf>. 

_____. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, 

President of France, September 27, 1991, 7:13-7:20 a.m.,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.

edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-09-27—Mitterrand.pdf>. 

_____. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev, President

 of the Soviet Union, December 25, 1991, 10:03-10:25 a.m.,” at <http://bushlibrary.

tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-12-25—Gorbachev.pdf>. 
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WMD Center Case Study 5

_____. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev, President

 of the USSR, September 27, 1991, 9:22-9:50 am,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/

research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-09-27—Gorbachev.pdf>. 

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the UK, September 27, 1991, 7:45-7:57 a.m.,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/

research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-09-27—Major.pdf>. 

_____. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Secretary General of NATO,

Manfred Woerner, September 27, 1991, 11:25-11:37 am,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.

edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-09-27—Woerner.pdf>. 

_____. Public Papers – 1990 – May, “The President’s News Conference 1990-05-03,” at <http://

bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1842&year=1990&month=5>. 

_____. Public Papers – 1990 – August, “Remarks at the Aspen Institute symposium in Aspen, 

Colorado, 1990-08-02,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id

=2128&year=1990&month=8>. 

_____. Public Papers – 1991 – September, “Address to the Nation on Reducing United States 

and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, 1991-09-27,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/

public_papers.php?id=3438&year=1991&month=9>.

_____. Public Papers – 1992 – January, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress 

on the State of the Union, 1992-01-28,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/

public_papers.php?id=3886&year=1992&month+1>. Gorbachev, Mikhail. “President 

of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, televised announcement, October 5, 1991,” 

in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World 

Armaments and Disarmament. London: Oxford University Press, 1992, 87–88. NATO 

Ministerial Communiqué, Nuclear Planning Group, Taormina, Italy, October 17-18, 

1991. Final Communiqué, at <www.nato.int/doc/comm/49-95/c911018a.htm>. NATOOfficial Text. Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance: Issued by the Heads 

of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (“The 

London Declaration”), at <www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-2690DF86-9DC09412/natoolive/
49

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

official_texts_23693.htm>. “Treaties 111th Congress (2009-2010) 111-5,” at <thomas.

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U.S. Department of State. Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons

Stockpile. May 3, 2010.

Yeltsin, Boris. “President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin, record of televised statement,

 January 29, 1992: Excerpts,” in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 

SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament. London: Oxford 

University Press, 1992, 89–92.

_____. “Statement on Disarmament by Russian Federation President Boris Nikolayevich 

Yeltsin on 29 January,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-Central 

Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-92-019, January 29, 1992.

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Butler, Pat. Rocky Flats Site History: Events Leading to the Creation of the Weapons Complex 

 and Events at the Rocky Flats Site from the 1930s to Present, n.d. [2002], at <rockyflats.

apps.em.doe.gov/references/199-Rocky Flats History Thru 1-2002.pdf>.

Cheney, Dick, with Liz Cheney. In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir. New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 2011.

Command Historian’s Office, United States Strategic Command. History of the United States 

 Strategic Command, June 1, 1992–October 1, 2002, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, 

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 in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World 

Armaments and Disarmament. London: Oxford University Press, 1992, 65–84.
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WMD Center Case Study 5

Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How 

They Won the Cold War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

Medalia, Jonathan. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current 

 Developments, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL 35548, January 6, 2010.

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 Missile National Historic Site, South Dakota, Prepared for United States Department 

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gov/history/online_books/mimi/hrst.htm>.

Pifer, Steven. NATO, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control. Brookings Arms Control Series 

Paper 7. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, July 2011.

Pomper, Miles A., William Potter, and Niklolai Sokov. Reducing and Regulating Tactical 

 (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe. Monterey Institute: James Martin Center 

for Nonproliferation Studies, December 2009.

Powell, Colin L., with Joseph E. Persico. My American Journey. New York: Random House, 1995.

Scowcroft, Brent. Interview, November 12–13, 1999, George H.W. Bush Oral History 

 Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, at <web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_1999_111_scowcroft.pdf>. 

Shoumikhin, Andrei. “Evolving Russian Perspectives on Missile Defense: The Emerging 

Accommodation.” Comparative Strategy 21, no. 4 (2002), 311–336.
51

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

Notes

1 General note on sources: Interviews with key participants in the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives decision and implementation processes were an invaluable part of the research for this case study. 

Where possible, the sources are identified by name. The offices noted are those that they held in the fall 

of 1991. Where the information was provided on a background basis, the source is simply noted as “interview,” with the date. Interviews were conducted with current and former U.S. Government officials 

who had been in the following agencies in 1991–1992: White House National Security Council (NSC) 

staff, Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 

2 Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, USAF (Ret.), former Commander, 321st Operations Group, 

Missile Wing, Grand Forks Air Force Base, interview by author, September 1, 2011. 

3 Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Colin Powell, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, September 28, 1991, C-Span video, 

“Nuclear Weapons Reductions, September 28, 1991, Department of Defense,” at <www.c-spanvideo.org/

program/21624-1#>. 

4 See appendix A for the texts of the U.S., Soviet, and Russian PNI announcements. 

5 George Bush, Public Papers – 1990 – May, “The President’s News Conference 1990-05-03,” at 

<bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1842&year=1990&month=5>.

6 NATO–Official Text, Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance: Issued by the Heads 

of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (“The London Declaration”), at <www.nato/int/cps/en/SID/2690DF86-9DC09412/natoolive/official_texts_23693.htm.> 

7 Franklin C. Miller, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and 

Arms Control Policy, interview by author, January 30, 2012.

8 Memoranda of telephone conversations at <bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-08-19—Yeltsin.pdf>, and <bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-08-21—Gorbachev.pdf>.

9 James Timbie, Department of State, interview by author, August 31, 2011.

10 Brent Scowcroft, interview, November 12–13, 1999, George H.W. Bush Oral History 

Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 77–78, at <web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/

ohp_1999_1112_scowcroft.pdf>.

11 Major General Gary Curtin, USAF (Ret.), former Deputy Director for International Negotiations, Joint Staff J-5, interview by author, September 22, 2011; Douglas MacEachin, former Special 

Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Arms Control and Chief, Arms Control Intelligence 

Staff, interview by author, September 22, 2011; and Miller interview, August 18, 2011.

12 See George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 

1998), 540–547; also, interview, September 19, 2011; and Miller interview, August 18, 2011. 

13 Attendees at the meeting are uncertain. Then-Deputy National Security Advisor Robert 

Gates described it as a session in the Oval Office of the “Gang of Eight,” but did not clearly identify the 

members. It appears likely that they were: the President; Scowcroft; White House Chief of Staff John 
52 

WMD Center Case Study 5

Sununu; Secretary of State James A. Baker III; Secretary Cheney; Chairman Powell; Acting Director of 

Central Intelligence Richard Kerr; and Gates. See Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 

529.

14 Bush and Scowcroft, 545.

15 Gates, 530. See also: Bush and Scowcroft, 539–547; Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, 

My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 541; Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, In My 

Time: A Personal and Political Memoir (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 232–233.

16 Interview, September 19, 2011.

17 Miller interview, August 18, 2011.

18 Powell, My American Journey, 540.

19 Gates, 461–464; and interview, September 19, 2011.

20 Bush and Scowcroft, 545.

21 Miller interview, August 18, 2011.

22 The theater version of the SRAM II was known as SRAM-T or Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM).

23 Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Colin Powell, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, September 28, 1991.

24 Timbie interview, August 31, 2011; Douglas MacEachin, former Special Assistant to the 

Director of Central Intelligence for Arms Control and Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff, interview 

by author, October 3, 2011; and Ronald F. Lehman II, former Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, interview by author, November 3, 2011.

25 Curtin interview, September 22, 2011.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Miller interview, August 18, 2011. See also Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick 

Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, September 28, 1991. 

29 Miller interview, August 18, 2011.

30 Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Colin Powell, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, September 28, 1991.

31 Ibid.

32 Interview by author, September 19, 2011; and Miller interview, August 18, 2011.

33 Interview by author, September 19, 2011; Curtin interview, September 22, 2011; MacEachin 

interview, October 3, 2011; Miller interview, August 18, 2011; and Timbie interview, August 31, 2011. 

See also Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Colin Powell, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, September 28, 1991.

34 Curtin interview, September 22, 2011.

35 Timbie interview, August 31, 2011.

36 Memoranda of Conversation on the telephone calls are at <bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/

memcons_telcons.php>. The memoranda on the calls to Mitterrand, Kohl, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and 
53

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

Woerner have been released in full. Only the memorandum on the Major telephone conversation has 

been redacted. 

37 Memoranda of Conversation at <bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/memcons_telcons.php>. 

Because parts of the memorandum of the Major conversation remain classified, the two issues that the 

Prime Minister raised have not been publicly identified. There are a few possibilities, including: U.S. 

support for the United Kingdom (UK) Trident ballistic missile-carrying submarine (SSBN) force; the 

future of TASM, which the UK hoped to deploy, but the PNI canceled; the implications for UK airdelivered nuclear weapons deployed in Germany; and/or the future of the UK nuclear-certified units for 

which the United States deployed tactical nuclear weapons. 

38 “Memorandum of Conversation: Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the 

USSR, September 27, 1991, 9:22-9:50 a.m.,” at <bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/memcons_telcons/1991-09-27—Gorbachev.pdf>.

39 See appendix A. All quotations in this paper from the Bush speeches of September 27, 1991, 

and January 28, 1992, the Gorbachev speech of October 5, 1991, and the Yeltsin speech of January 29, 

1992, are from the texts at appendix A.

40 See appendix B for a chart summarizing the U.S. and Soviet/Russian PNI commitments in 

1991–1992.

41 The numbers of ground-launched weapons to be withdrawn and destroyed were provided by 

Secretary Cheney and Chairman Powell in their September 28, 1991, press conference. They also specified that three types of nuclear artillery warheads were involved: W-33 8”; W-79 8”; and W-48 155 mm. 

Press Conference by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin 

Powell, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, September 28, 1991.

42 Ibid.

43 Over time, the capability to redeploy TLAM-N deteriorated, until the Department of 

Defense decided in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review to retire the system. U.S. Department of 

Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, 28. 

44 NATO Ministerial Communiqué: Nuclear Planning Group, Taormina, Italy, October 17–18, 

1991, Final Communiqué, at <www.nato.int/doc/comm/49-95/c911018a.htm>.

45 Richard Fieldhouse, “Nuclear weapon developments and unilateral reduction initiatives,” in 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament (London: Oxford University Press, 1992), 65.

46 Klotz interview, September 1, 2011. The dealerting process was a simple and speedy one, 

involving removal of the physical code units from each Minuteman II Launch Control Facility (LCF). 

That took about 1 hour at each LCF, and could be done simultaneously at several of the 15 Minuteman 

II LCFs. This action (known as “dissipating launch codes”) meant that the missiles could no longer 

launch. No funds were saved, because missile crews still had to be on duty at each LCF as long as any 

of its silos retained missiles and warheads. Although the dealerting process was readily reversible, that 

never happened. No Minuteman II missiles were returned to alert status before the entire force was 

eliminated under the START Treaty. Instead, the Air Force began in late 1991 to implement the much 

more time-consuming deactivation process of removing the Minuteman II warheads and missiles. Minuteman II system elimination was completed in 1997, which was 4 years before the end of the 7-year 
54 

WMD Center Case Study 5

START Treaty reduction period. The Missile Plains: Frontline of America’s Cold War, Historic Resource 

Study, Minuteman Missile National Historic Site, South Dakota, Prepared for United States Department of the Interior National Park Service Midwest Regional office, 2003, at <www.cr.nps.gov/history/

online_books/mimi/hrst.htm>.

47 Command Historian’s Office, United States Strategic Command, History of the United States 

Strategic Command, June 1, 1992–October 1, 2002, January 2004, 14–17.

48 Miller interview, January 30, 2012. 

49 U.S.-Soviet meetings in fall 1991 on nuclear safety and security issues were disappointing, 

with the Soviet side reluctant to discuss its practices. However, in the next several years, these issues 

formed central elements of the Nunn-Lugar initiative that entered into law in December 1991. The 

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program included important work between the United 

States and Russia in nuclear storage and transport security, as well as on the denuclearization of 

Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and facilitation of Russian warhead dismantlement.

50 See for example Andrei Shoumikhin, “Evolving Russian Perspectives on Missile Defense: The 

Emerging Accommodation,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 21 (2002), 311–336.

51 MacEachin interview, October 3, 2011.

52 See Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical 

(Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Monterey Institute, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, December 2009), 9. See also Steven Pifer, NATO, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control, 

Brookings Arms Control Series Paper 7 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, July 2011), 14. 

53 Over the years, concerns have been expressed by several observers that Russia has repeatedly 

violated the moratorium by conducting low-yield nuclear tests at its Novaya Zemlya test site. However, 

those allegations have not been publicly proven or acknowledged. See for example, Jonathan Medalia, 

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL 35548, January 6, 2010, 5. 

54 “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the 

USSR, September 27, 1991, 9:22-9:50 am,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-09-27—Gorbachev.pdf>. The George H.W. Bush administration did not take the initiative 

on a nuclear-testing moratorium. Instead, the Congress imposed one in September 1992, under the 

Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment to the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1993. 

Although the administration opposed the amendment, the President did not veto the bill. The last U.S. 

nuclear weapons test to date, a Los Alamos National Laboratory test codenamed Divider, was conducted on September 23, 1992.

55 “The President: There are several points that I would like to make. I could not and would not 

lock British forces into the old argument that they have to be included in our proposals. We will support 

the difference in these forces.” “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Prime Minister 

John Major of the UK, September 27, 1991, 7:45-7:57 a.m.,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/

pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-09-27—Major.pdf>. 

“The President: My first point...is we don’t want to cause any problem for French nuclear forces. 

French forces, and their modernization, are separate from what we’re proposing.” “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Francois Mitterrand, President of France, September 27, 1991, 7:13-7:20 
55

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

a.m.,” at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1991-09-27—Mitterrand.pdf>.

56 “...we express our readiness to enter into a substantive dialogue with the United States on the 

development of safe and ecologically sound technologies for the storing and transportation of nuclear 

warheads, methods of recycling [i.e., dismantling] nuclear weapons devices, and enhancing nuclear 

security.”

57 MacEachin interview, October 3, 2011.

58 The Alma-Ata Declaration was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The government of Kazakhstan changed the name of Alma-Ata to Almaty in 1993.

59 The W-88 decision made a virtue out of necessity. The warhead was produced at the Rocky 

Flats plutonium processing plant in Colorado. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Environmental 

Protection Agency raided the facility in June 1989 for environmental violations, and nuclear weapons 

production there ceased in November 1989. It never resumed. See Pat Butler, Rocky Flats Site History: 

Events Leading to the Creation of the Weapons Complex and Events at the Rocky Flats Site from the 1930s 

to Present, n.d. [2002], at <rockyflats.apps.em.doe.gov/references/199-Rocky Flats History Thru 1-2002.

pdf>, 16–18.

60 In a somewhat confusing statement, Yeltsin noted that production of all those systems had 

ended “during the recent period.” It would make little sense for production to have continued after 

Gorbachev’s October 5 announcement—if the Soviet Union intended from the outset to fulfill his commitments. One positive interpretation is that the “recent period” could mean immediately after October 

5, even though that was almost 4 months before Yeltsin’s speech. 

61 We say “appeared” because the Gorbachev and Yeltsin PNI speeches did not present the 

information in identical ways. Yeltsin claimed that: about 600 ICBMs and SLBMs, with almost 1,250 

warheads, had been taken off alert; 130 ICBM silos had been destroyed or were being prepared for 

destruction; and 6 SSBNs had been prepared for SLBM launcher dismantlement. 

62 In 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the 2,000–2,500 deployed strategic warhead limit would be part of a START III Treaty. START III was never fully negotiated, but subsequent 

U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction agreements featured even lower levels: 1,700-2,200 under the 

2002 Moscow Treaty; and 1,550 under the 2010 New START Treaty. 

63 “Proposals have been prepared on new, in-depth severalfold cuts in strategic offensive weapons, up to 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear weapons on each of the sides. In doing so we hope that other 

nuclear powers like China, Britain, and France will join the process of real nuclear disarmament.” 

64 See U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, May 3, 2010. The yearly stockpile totals do not include retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. Therefore, many of the warheads noted as “reduced” had been moved from the active/inactive 

stockpile to the dismantlement queue. Actual dismantlement took considerably longer. 

65 See Pomper, Potter, and Sokov, 2;. also, Timbie interview, August 31, 2011. 

66 “Treaties—111th Congress (2009–2010) 111-5,” at <thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Thomas>. 

67 Text at <bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers>. 

68 Text in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1992, 87–88.

69 Sentence included in official text, but not delivered in televised speech.
56 

WMD Center Case Study 5

70 Text at <bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers>.

71 Text in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-Central Eurasia, FBISSOV-92-019, January 29, 1992. Also, major excerpts are available in Stockholm International Peace 

Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1992, 89–92.
57

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992

About the Author

Dr. Susan J. Koch is an independent consultant specializing in policy issues regarding arms 

reduction and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. She is a Distinguished Research 

Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense 

University, and an associate faculty member in the Defense and Strategic Studies Department 

at Missouri State University. She also serves on the Department of Defense (DOD) Threat Reduction Advisory Committee and the Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Task Force of 

the U.S. Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group. From 1982 until 2007, Dr. Koch held 

a series of senior positions on the White House National Security Council Staff, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

focused on nonproliferation and arms reduction policy. Dr. Koch began her government career 

in the Directorate of Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency, studying West European 

political issues.

Dr. Koch has received the Presidential Distinguished Executive Award, Presidential Meritorious Executive Award, DOD Distinguished Civilian Service Medal (five times), Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency Distinguished Honor Award, and Department of State Meritorious 

Honor Award. Before her government service, she taught international and comparative politics at 

Mount Holyoke College and the University of Connecticut. Dr. Koch received a B.A. from Mount 

Holyoke College and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University.



Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Case Study Series

Case Study 1

President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program 

by Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan

October 2009

Case Study 2

U.S. Withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty 

by Lynn F. Rusten

January 2010

Case Study 3

The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction

by Paul I. Bernstein and Jason D. Wood

April 2010

Case Study 4

U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

by Jonathan B. Tucker

December 2011

For additional information, including requests for publications and instructor’s notes, please 

contact the Center directly at WMDWebmaster@ndu.edu or (202) 685-4234 or visit the Center 

Web site at <www.ndu.edu/wmdcenter>.