Docket No. 93760–Agenda 5–March 2003.

In re WILLIAM M., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois,  								Appellant, v. William M., Appellee).

Opinion filed June 19, 2003.

	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

	At issue in this case is the issue left open in In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313 (2001): whether a postadmission motion pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) is a

jurisdictional prerequisite to taking a delinquency appeal. For the

following reasons, we hold that it is not.

BACKGROUND

	The State filed a four-count delinquency petition against

respondent, William M., in the circuit court of Kankakee County

charging him with burglary and criminal trespass to two

automobiles. On October 2, 2000, respondent appeared in court

with his appointed counsel. Respondent’s counsel informed the

court that pursuant to a plea agreement, respondent would admit

to the burglary allegations in exchange for the dismissal of the

criminal trespass charges, as well as the dismissal of an unrelated

domestic battery charge. The trial court admonished respondent

that an admission waived his right to remain silent, to require the

State to prove the charges, to a hearing, to present evidence and

witnesses, and to cross-examine the State’s witnesses. The trial

court also informed respondent that the burglary charges would

have been Class 2 felonies if he had been charged as an adult.

Respondent acknowledged that he had not been coerced and was

acting voluntarily. The trial court entered a finding of delinquency

and adjudicated respondent a ward of the court.

	On November 15, 2000, a dispositional hearing was held.

Respondent was committed to the Department of Corrections,

Juvenile Division, for an indeterminate period. The trial court

advised respondent of his right to appeal and further advised

respondent that if he planned to appeal, he had to file a motion to

withdraw his plea or a motion to reconsider his sentence within 30

days. At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, respondent’s counsel requested the filing of a notice of appeal and the

appointment of the appellate defender. The trial court granted both

requests. The clerk of the court filed the notice of appeal on

November 27, 2000. Respondent’s counsel, however, did not file

a motion to withdraw respondent’s guilty plea or a motion to

reconsider his sentence.

	On appeal, respondent argued that the adjudication of

delinquency must be vacated because the record failed to show that

he was aware of the consequences of his admissions or that he was

informed of the potential dispositions he could receive if he was

adjudicated a delinquent minor. 328 Ill. App. 3d 974, 976.

Respondent acknowledged, however, that he had failed to file a

postadmission or postdisposition motion pursuant to Rule 604(d)

prior to filing his notice of appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 976. The

State argued that the appellate court was required to dismiss

respondent’s appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 976. The State claimed

that because respondent had failed to file a motion pursuant to

Rule 604(d), the appellate court was without jurisdiction to

consider respondent’s appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 976.

	Citing People v. McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1996), the appellate court held that a Rule 604(d) motion is not jurisdictional

in the same sense that a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. 328 Ill.

App. 3d at 976-77. The appellate court stated that the failure to file

a Rule 604(d) motion raises questions of waiver as opposed to

questions of jurisdiction. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. Consequently, the

appellate court characterized the issue before it as whether it

should consider respondent’s appeal, rather than whether it could

consider the appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. The appellate court

noted that if the case were a criminal case, the proper procedure

would be to dismiss the case and allow respondent to pursue his

remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS

5/122–1 et seq. (West 2000)). 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. However, because the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to

juvenile proceedings, dismissal of respondent’s appeal would

foreclose all review of respondent’s claims, including a claim with

constitutional implications and a claim of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. Consequently, the appellate

court held that respondent’s failure to file a postdisposition motion in accordance with Rule 604(d) did not require dismissal of his

appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. The appellate court, however, did

not consider the merits of respondent’s appeal, but instead

remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings in

compliance with Rule 604(d). 328 Ill. App. 3d at 978. This court

then granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.

315(a).

ANALYSIS

	This court recently held that Rule 604(d) applies to juvenile

proceedings. In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 322 (2001). Because the minor in that case had filed a postadmission motion, however, this

court left open the issue of whether the filing of such a motion is

a jurisdictional prerequisite to taking a delinquency appeal. In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 322.

	In the context of adult defendants, this court has stated that a

Rule 604(d) motion is a condition precedent to an appeal from a

guilty plea. People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 107 (1988). Consequently, this court held in Wilk that the appellate court properly dismissed the appeals of those defendants who had not

filed motions to withdraw their guilty pleas in accordance with

Rule 604(d) prior to filing the appeals. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 105-06. This court recognized that a defendant is denied the effective

assistance of counsel, appellate review, and other potential

constitutional issues when his attorney fails to adhere to Rule

604(d) despite hearing the admonishments required by Supreme

Court Rule 605(b) (188 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)). We noted, however,

that the dismissal of the defendants’ appeals did not leave those

defendants without a remedy, because relief was available to those

defendants pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 107.

	At issue in this case is the interpretation of the “condition

precedent” language in Wilk. The State interprets the “condition precedent” language in Wilk as establishing that the failure to file a Rule 604(d) motion deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction

over an appeal. The State further argues that because Rule 604(d)

has been held to apply in the juvenile context, its jurisdictional component must also apply. In support of its argument that Rule

604(d) is jurisdictional, the State cites In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d 473 (1989).

	In In re A.W., the appellate court relied on Wilk in holding that a juvenile’s failure to file a motion to withdraw his admission of

juvenile delinquency prior to filing his notice of appeal required

dismissal of the appeal. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 474. The appellate court rejected the juvenile’s attempt to distinguish Wilk on the ground that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to a

hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, while a juvenile

has no corresponding right. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 475. The appellate court acknowledged that there was language in Wilk indicating that the holding in that case would not leave defendants

without a remedy. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 475. The court concluded, however, that the language was not central to the

court’s holding and dismissed the juvenile’s appeal. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 475.

	In contrast, respondent argues in favor of the appellate court’s

interpretation of the “condition precedent” language in Wilk. As noted, the appellate court in this case relied upon People v. McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1996), in holding that a juvenile’s failure to file a Rule 604(d) motion does not require dismissal of

his appeal. The McKay court held that Wilk and its progeny do not withdraw jurisdiction from the appellate court, but instead

withdraw the decision whether waiver should bar the appeal of a

defendant who has not filed a Rule 604(d) motion. McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 111. In following McKay, the appellate court in this case acknowledged that its decision was in direct conflict with In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d 473 (1989), but nonetheless held that respondent’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d) did not require

dismissal of his appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977.

	Upon review, we find that the court in McKay was correct in its determination that Wilk and its progeny do not stand for the proposition that the filing of a Rule 604(d) motion is required to

vest the appellate court with jurisdiction. In arguing that Rule

604(d) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a notice of appeal,

the State points to language from of decision of this court

subsequent to Wilk. Specifically, the State notes that in People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469 (1996), this court stated that when a defendant fails to file a motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), “the

appellate court must dismiss the appeal, leaving the Post- Conviction Hearing Act as a defendant’s only recourse.” (Emphasis

added.) Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 471. The State contends that the use of the word “must” indicates that compliance with Rule 604(d) is

jurisdictional. The State, however, overlooks the preceding

sentence, which provides that “[t]hough the appellate court may have jurisdiction, Rule 604(d) precludes it from considering the appeal of such an error unless the defendant” first files a written

motion pursuant to Rule 604(d). (Emphasis added.) Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 471. Contrary to the State’s argument, then, a written motion

pursuant Rule 604(d) is not required in order to vest the appellate

court with jurisdiction over a defendant’s appeal.

	Moreover, as respondent argues, if the failure to comply with

Rule 604(d) deprived a court of jurisdiction, such noncompliance

would always require dismissal of a defendant’s appeal. However,

since our decision in Wilk, this court has recognized certain exceptions to the written motion requirement of Rule 604(d). For

example, in Foster this court recognized an “admonition exception” to Rule 604(d). Specifically, this court held that where

a trial court fails to issue Rule 605(b) admonitions, the appellate

court may entertain an appeal from a sentence despite defendant’s

noncompliance with the written motion requirement of Rule

604(d). Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 473. We explained, however, that “[w]here the appellate court may consider an appeal despite a

defendant’s noncompliance with Rule 604(d), the appellate court

has no discretion and must remand for strict compliance

therewith.” Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 474.

	Similarly, in People v. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d 378 (2002), this court again addressed the written motion requirement of Rule

604(d). There, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of first

degree murder after his court-appointed psychiatrist found him fit

to stand trial. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 379. At the defendant’s sentencing hearing, the psychiatrist testified that he would have

found the defendant insane at the time of the alleged offense under

the prior version of the insanity statute. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 380. While the defendant’s appeal was pending before the appellate court, the defendant alerted the appellate court to the fact that the

public act creating the new version of the insanity statute had been

declared unconstitutional by this court. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 381. Nonetheless, the appellate court denied the defendant’s request to

vacate his guilty plea or to allow him leave to file a motion to

withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 381.

	On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the

appellate court had erred in denying his request to vacate his guilty

plea. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 382. The State argued that the defendant could not challenge the validity of his guilty plea because

he did not file a written motion to vacate his guilty plea in the trial

court prior to challenging that plea on appeal. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 382. This court agreed that, in the usual case, the defendant’s

failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea within the time

allotted by Rule 604(d) would leave him without a remedy.

Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 382. We stated, however, that:

		“[w]hile it is true this court does not approve of any

failure to comply strictly with the explicitly stated

requirements of Rule 604(d) (People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103 (1988)), the unusual and fact-specific

circumstances found in this case lead us to believe that the

ends of justice will be better served by permitting

defendant leave to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea

in the trial court.” Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 382.

We therefore remanded the cause to the trial court to give the

defendant an opportunity to file a motion to vacate his guilty plea. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 383-84.

	The fact that this court has recognized exceptions to the

written motion requirements of Rule 604(d), then, reinforces our

statement in Foster that those requirements are not jurisdictional. Because failure to comply with the written motion requirement of

Rule 604(d) does not deprive a court of jurisdiction in the adult

context, it follows that the failure to comply with the written

motion requirement does not deprive the appellate court of

jurisdiction in the juvenile context. Consequently, we affirm the

appellate court’s finding that respondent’s failure to file a written

motion pursuant to Rule 604(d) did not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the appeal. To the extent that the appellate court’s

decision in In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d 473 (1989), suggests that the appellate court must dismiss a juvenile’s appeal for lack of

jurisdiction when the minor fails to comply with the written motion

requirement of Rule 604(d), that decision is hereby overruled.

	We next must determine whether the appellate court properly

remanded this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings in

compliance with Rule 604(d). As discussed, in the context of adult

defendants, we have acknowledged that an attorney’s failure to

adhere to Rule 604(d) despite hearing the admonishments required

by Rule 605(b) falls “short of providing competent representation.”

Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 105-06. We recognized that:

		“[t]he defendant, through no fault of his, is deprived of a

right to be heard in the appellate court. Such assistance of

counsel, coupled with the denial of appellate review, raises

effective assistance of counsel constitutional questions.

Furthermore, many of the grounds for withdrawal of guilty

pleas, consideration of which is denied because of

counsel’s failure, themselves may raise constitutional

questions.” Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 106.

We observed, however, that a defendant is not left without a

remedy because the defendant can raise his claims in a

postconviction petition.

	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act, however, has never been

held to apply in juvenile proceedings. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 321-22 (“this court has not reviewed holdings of the appellate

court concluding that relief from such [juvenile court] proceedings

is unavailable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act”).

Consequently, dismissing a juvenile defendant’s appeal for failing

to comply with the written motion requirements of Rule 604(d)

may leave a juvenile without a remedy for his claims, including

those claims alleging constitutional violations.

	The State contends that juveniles would not be left without a

remedy in this situation because they could present their claims in

a section 2–1401 motion (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2000)).

Section 2–1401, however, does not provide a juvenile defendant

with a remedy equivalent to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Although the remedial powers of section 2–1401 have been held to

extend to criminal cases, such a motion is intended “to correct all

errors of fact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown to

the petitioner and court at the time judgment was entered, which,

if then known, would have prevented its rendition.” People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 461 (2000). A juvenile’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a written motion pursuant

to Rule 604(d) does not fall within those parameters. Moreover, a

section 2–1401 petition is not intended to provide for a general

review of all trial errors or as a substitute for a direct appeal.

Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d at 461, quoting People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 314 (1978). Consequently, we find that section 2–1401 is not

adequate to preserve a juvenile’s claims on appeal when his

attorney fails to comply with the written motion requirements of

Rule 604(d).

	Because a juvenile does not have an adequate means for

presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion

pursuant to Rule 604(d), we find that dismissal is too harsh a

sanction for a juvenile defendant’s failure to comply with Rule

604(d). We emphasize, however, that this court requires strict

compliance with Rule 604(d) in both the juvenile and the adult

context. We therefore hold that when a juvenile defendant fails to

comply with the written motion requirements of Rule 604(d) prior

to filing an appeal, the appellate court has no discretion and must

remand the cause to the circuit court for strict compliance with

Rule 604(d). Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court’s order in

this case remanding this cause to the circuit court for further

proceedings in compliance with Rule 604(d).

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court

is affirmed.

Affirmed.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring:

	I write separately to address the dissents’ related contentions

that certain statements in the majority opinion are irreconcilably

inconsistent and that the majority’s conclusion is improperly based on the implicit assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act

does not apply to juvenile proceedings. I believe that the

statements can be reconciled and that our conclusion is supported

by sound reasoning.

	As the majority opinion states, the Post-Conviction Hearing

Act has never been held to apply to juvenile proceedings. Slip op.

at 7. In the absence of such an affirmative holding, juvenile

defendants necessarily face the possibility that no avenue of review

exists for their claims, even when those claims allege constitutional

violations. Slip op. at 7. In this case, however, the State argues that

section 2–1401 offers such an avenue. We explicitly reject that

argument, holding that a juvenile cannot use a section 2–1401

motion to present a claim that trial counsel failed to comply with

the mandates of Rule 604(d). Slip op. at 8. After addressing these

initial matters, we conclude that “[b]ecause a juvenile does not

have an adequate means for presenting his claims when his attorney

fails to file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), *** dismissal

is too harsh a sanction.” Slip op. at 8.

	This last statement forms the basis for the dissenters’

contentions that the opinion is internally inconsistent because it

both claims that the application of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act

in juvenile cases is an open question and implicitly assumes that it

does not apply. I believe these contentions are premised on an

unduly loose interpretation of our statements and, thus, write

separately to explain that the majority’s conclusion, read in its

proper context, does not suffer from a fatal flaw.

	In this opinion, we recognize the absence of any holding

authorizing the use of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act for review

of juveniles’ claims. Slip op. at 7. We also reject juveniles’ use of

section 2–1401 for this purpose. Slip op. at 8. Properly read in this

limited context, our statement that “a juvenile does not have an

adequate means for presenting his claims when his attorney fails to

file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d)” merely

acknowledges the absence of any precedential authority supporting

the conclusion that juveniles such as the respondent have a viable

means of appellate redress. See Slip op. at 8. It neither creates an

inherent conflict with our prior statements nor necessarily relies on

an implicit assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is inapplicable in juvenile proceedings. It merely recognizes the

unsettled state of the law in this matter.

	As for the dissenters’ contention that the majority should

address the issue of whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act

applies to juveniles in this case, I believe that our decision to

decline that opportunity is well justified. The parties offer minimal

argument on the issue. Indeed, as appellant, the State does not

even raise the issue in its opening brief. Even more telling, the

respondent’s brief explicitly requests that we simply affirm the

appellate court’s remand, arguing that doing so would have the

same effect as a decision on the merits of the substantive issue, plus

have the additional benefits of serving the court’s interest in judicial

economy, and avoiding the potential for overburdening relatively

uneducated juveniles with the filing of pro se postconviction petitions capable of surviving first stage review. Based on only this

limited adversarial context, resolving an issue as important as the

applicability of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act in juvenile

proceedings would be premature and unwise. A question of such

magnitude should be fully briefed and argued by opposing parties

zealously advocating the relevant arguments prior to its definitive

resolution by this court. Lacking the benefit of such strong

adversarial testing, this court declined to address the merits of the

issue in this case. Thus, it remains an open question wisely left for

another day.

	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

	I join fully in Justice Freeman’s partial concurrence and partial

dissent. I write separately only to underscore the internal

inconsistency in the majority’s resolution of the appeal in the case

at bar.

	The majority concludes that “dismissal is too harsh a sanction

for a juvenile defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d)”

because “a juvenile does not have an adequate means for

presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion

pursuant to Rule 604(d).” Slip op. at 8. Necessarily implicit in this

conclusion is the determination that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. Otherwise there would

be adequate means for a juvenile to present his claims when his

attorney fails to file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d). See People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 107-09 (1988) (when a defendant’s attorney fails to file a motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea

in compliance with Rule 604(d), defendant may not pursue

appellate review, “[t]he appropriate remedy for these defendants

lies in our Post-Conviction Hearing Act”).

	 However, only a few paragraphs earlier, the majority states

that it is leaving as an open question whether the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. Quoting In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 321-22 (2001), the majority notes that “ ‘this court

has not reviewed holdings of the appellate court concluding that

relief from such [juvenile court] proceedings is unavailable under

the Post-Conviction Hearing Act’ ” and concludes that “dismissing

a juvenile defendant’s appeal for failing to comply with the written

motion requirements of Rule 604(d) may leave a juvenile without a remedy for his claims.” (Emphasis added.) See slip op. at 7.

	If the question whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act

applies to juvenile proceedings is truly an open one, as the majority

claims, the majority should not be deciding this appeal as it does,

based on the assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act

does not apply to juvenile proceedings. As Justice Freeman points out, this court could just as readily assume that the Post-

Conviction Hearing Act does apply to juvenile proceedings. In so doing, however, the appeal in the case before us would necessarily

be decided differently.

	It should be apparent that resolution of the appeal in the case

at bar is dependent on deciding whether the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. For this reason, the

court has no discretion to avoid addressing the issue. The issue

needs to be confronted head on.

	Like Justice Freeman, I concur in the majority’s holding that

a defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d) does not deprive

an appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s

appeal. However, because the majority assumes, without deciding, that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile

proceedings in reaching its conclusion that “dismissal is too harsh a sanction for a juvenile defendant’s failure to comply with Rule

604(d)” (slip op. at 8), I, like Justice Freeman, cannot join fully in

the majority opinion.

	JUSTICES FREEMAN and RARICK joins in this partial

concurrence and partial dissent.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN, also concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

	I agree with the majority’s initial determination that a

defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R.

604(d)) does not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction to

consider the defendant’s appeal.   I also agree with the majority that,

where the circuit court gives proper Rule 604(d) and Rule 605(b)

(188 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)) admonitions to an adult defendant and the

defendant fails to comply with Rule 604(d), it is not appropriate for

the appellate court to remand the cause to the circuit court for

strict compliance with Rule 604(d).   Instead, the appellate court

must dismiss the appeal because the defendant has an adequate

remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS

5/122--– 

1 et seq. (West 2000)).   See People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93 (1988).   I part company with the majority, however, because it

assumes, without analysis or citation to authority, that the Post-

Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings,

and does not provide an adequate remedy for the juvenile in the

case at bar. 

 Moreover, the assumption the majority makes affects

the very outcome of the present cause and is therefore contrary to

principled judicial review.   In my opinion, whether the Post-

Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings is an issue

of great import which this court must decide to reach the proper

resolution of this cause.

ANALYSIS

	In Wilk, in the context of criminal proceedings, this court considered what should be the effect of the defendants’ failure to

comply with Rule 604(d).   Both defendants had filed   notices of

appeal of their guilty pleas without prior Rule 604(d) motions to withdraw the guilty pleas.   This court first acknowledged the impact

upon a defendant’s rights when there is a failure to comply with

Rule 604(d):

			“[A]n attorney who stands with his client in a criminal

proceeding, hears the admonishments of the court required

by Rule 605(b), and fails to adhere to Rule 604(d) by

moving to withdraw the plea prior to filing a notice of

appeal has fallen short of providing competent

representation. *** The defendant, through no fault of his,

is deprived of a right to be heard in the appellate court. 

Such assistance of counsel, coupled with the denial of

appellate review, raises effective assistance of counsel

constitutional questions.   Furthermore, many of the

grounds for withdrawal of guilty pleas, consideration of

which is denied because of counsel’s failure, themselves

may raise constitutional questions.”   Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 105-06.

This court also emphasized, however, the importance of Rule

604(d): 

		“[The] purpose [of Rule 604(d)] is to ensure that before a

criminal appeal can be taken from a guilty plea, the trial

judge who accepted the plea and imposed sentence be

given the opportunity to hear the allegations of

improprieties that took place outside the official

proceedings and dehors the record, but nevertheless were unwittingly given sanction in the courtroom.   Rule 604(d)

provides for fact finding to take place at a time when

witnesses are still available and memories are fresh.

[Citation.] A hearing under Rule 604(d) allows a trial

court to immediately correct any improper conduct or any

errors of the trial court that may have produced a guilty

plea.”   Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 104.

The court then noted that exceptions to Rule 604(d) fashioned by

various panels of the appellate court had circumvented and

defeated the purpose of the rule:

		“If the appellate court elects to retain jurisdiction of the

appeal and considers the merits of the defendant’s contentions, the rule has been ignored.   If the appellate

court remands the case for a motion to withdraw, to be

filed and to be considered by the trial court, the case has

taken a needless trip to the appellate court, wasted that

court’s time, extended the time within which the motion to

withdraw must be filed under Rule 604(d), and attaches no

consequences to the ignoring of the requirements of the

rule of this court.”   Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 106-07.

Balancing the various interests at issue, this court affirmed the

dismissal of the defendants’ appeals.   The court noted that, pursuant

to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the defendants had an

appropriate vehicle for the vindication of their rights.   Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 107.

	In the case at bar, as in Wilk, respondent’s attorney failed to comply with Rule 604(d).   Counsel did not file a motion to

withdraw respondent’s guilty plea or a motion to reconsider the

sentence.   Since respondent is a juvenile and not an adult, the

question then becomes whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act

applies to juvenile proceedings.   If the Post-Conviction Hearing Act

applies to juvenile proceedings, respondent, like the adult

defendants in Wilk, has an adequate remedy for counsel’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d).   Conversely, if the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings, respondent

does not have an adequate remedy for counsel’s failure to comply

with the rule.   Due process considerations would dictate that, rather

than dismiss respondent’s appeal, this court remand to the circuit

court for strict compliance with Rule 604(d).   See People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469 (1996) (this court remanded the cause for strict

compliance with Rule 604(d) where the trial court failed to give the

defendant the Rule 605(b) admonitions regarding Rule 604(d)).   

	The appellate court recognized that whether the Post-

Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings is a crucial

issue in this case.   The court observed:

			“Since the issue is one of waiver rather than jurisdiction,

the question is not whether we can consider respondent’s appeal but whether we should.   Of course, if this were a criminal case Wilk would dictate dismissal, leaving the respondent to his remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act ***.” (Emphasies in original.) 328 Ill. App. 3d

at 977.

The court then held that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not

apply to juvenile proceedings.   328 Ill. App. 3d at 977.   Being

aware, however, that by its holding the juvenile’s claim of

constitutional violations would escape scrutiny, the court advanced

an alternate resolution of the case:

	“Because a juvenile, unlike an adult offender, has no

alternative means of presenting his claims, we believe it is

appropriate to invoke Supreme Court Rule 615(a): ‘Plain

errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed

although they were not brought to the attention of the trial

court.’ ” 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977-78.

The appellate court remanded the cause to the circuit court for

strict compliance with Rule 604(d).   328 Ill. App. 3d at 978.

	The majority opinion tracks the reasoning of the appellate

court in determining that compliance with Rule 604(d) is not

jurisdictional.   However, unlike the appellate court opinion, the

majority opinion does not determine, with proper analysis and

citation to authority, whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act

applies to juvenile proceedings.   Rather than determine this crucial

question, the majority merely assumes that the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings.   The majority

states:

		“The Post-Conviction Hearing Act, however, has never been held to apply in juvenile proceedings.   See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 321-22 (‘this court has not reviewed holdings of the

appellate court concluding that relief from such [juvenile

court] proceedings is unavailable under the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act’).   Consequently, dismissing a juvenile defendant’s

appeal for failing to comply with the written motion

requirements of Rule 604(d) may leave a juvenile without a

remedy for his claims, including those claims alleging

constitutional violations.”   Slip op. at 7.

Further, in rejecting the State’s contention that a juvenile would

not be left without a remedy but could resort to a section 2–1401

motion (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2000)), the majority states:

		“Section 2–1401, however, does not provide a juvenile

defendant with a remedy equivalent to the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act.   Although the remedial powers of section

2–1401 have been held to extend to criminal cases, such

a motion is intended ‘to correct all errors of fact occurring

in the prosecution of a cause, unknown to the petitioner

and court at the time judgment was entered, which, if then

known, would have prevented its rendition.’ [Citation.]   A

juvenile’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing

to file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d) does not

fall within those parameters.”   Slip op. at 7-8.

The majority concludes that:

			“Because a juvenile does not have an adequate means

for presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a

written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), we find that

dismissal is too harsh a sanction for a juvenile defendant’s

failure to comply with Rule 604(d).   We emphasize,

however, that this court requires strict compliance with

Rule 604(d) in both the juvenile and the adult context.   We

therefore hold that when a juvenile defendant fails to

comply with the written motion requirements of Rule

604(d) prior to filing an appeal, the appellate court has no

discretion and must remand the cause to the circuit court

for strict compliance with Rule 604(d).”   Slip op. at 8.

	With due respect, my colleagues of the majority err in that

they make an assumption which affects the very outcome of this

case.   Consider the alternate assumption, that the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings.   In that case,

respondent, like the defendants in Wilk, has an adequate remedy for counsel’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d).   Applying Wilk, it would also follow that the proper resolution of this case is to

dismiss respondent’s appeal.      

	I note that this court is entrusted with the responsibility for a

just result and the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of

precedent.   People v. Wilson, 155 Ill. 2d 374, 379 (1993), quoting American Federation of State , County,  & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. County of Cook, 145 Ill.and 20 d 475, 480 (1991), cciting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967).   Where, as here, an issue of import is relevant to the final determination of the cause and is

not yet decided by this court, the court is duty bound to consider

the issue and arrive at a reasoned decision concerning the issue.  

The court should not assume, without analysis or authority, that

the issue has been decided in a particular manner.   Nor should the

court divorce itself from its responsibility by observing that no

other court has ever decided the issue in a particular manner.   In the

case at bar, this court is duty bound to consider whether the Post-

Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings.   The court

may not merely assume that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does

not apply to juvenile proceedings.   

	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a remedy for a

defendant who has suffered a substantial violation of his or her

constitutional rights in the proceedings which resulted in the

conviction.   See 725 ILCS 5/122--–  1 (West 2000).   In assuming that

the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile

proceedings, this court has, without analysis, deprived all juveniles

of the comprehensive remedies afforded by the Act.   I do not here

imply that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act should apply to

juvenile proceedings.   Rather, I suggest that this court, as the

supreme judicial body of this state, must shoulder its

responsibilities and come to a reasoned decision about the issue. 

CONCLUSION

	I cannot join fully in the majority opinion because the majority

refuses to decide an important issue in the case at bar, and because

the majority makes an assumption about that issue which controls

the very outcome of the case.   While I concur in the majority’s

holding that a defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d) does

not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the

defendant’s appeal, I respectfully dissent from the balance of the

opinion.      

	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW and JUSTICE RARICK join

in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.