S. HRG. 113–714 

OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND 

EMERGENCY PLANNING PROGRAMS TO PREVENT AND ADDRESS CHEMICAL THREATS, INCLUDING THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE 

EXPLOSIONS IN WEST, TX AND GEISMAR, LA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 27, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND EMERGENCY PLANNING PROGRAMS TO PREVENT AND ADDRESS CHEMICAL THREATS, INCLUDING 

THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE EXPLOSIONS IN WEST, TX AND GEISMAR, LA 
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95–874 PDF 2015

S. HRG. 113–714 

OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND 

EMERGENCY PLANNING PROGRAMS TO PREVENT AND ADDRESS CHEMICAL THREATS, INCLUDING THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE 

EXPLOSIONS IN WEST, TX AND GEISMAR, LA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 27, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

ROGER WICKER, Mississippi 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

BETTINA POIRIER, Majority Staff Director 

ZAK BAIG, Republican Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

JUNE 27, 2013 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ........................ 1 

Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana ............................ 7 

Fischer, Hon. Deb, U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska ............................. 8 

WITNESSES 

Moure-Eraso, Rafael, Chairperson, U.S. Chemical Safety Board ........................ 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Response to an additional question from Senator Gillibrand ....................... 24 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Vitter ............................................................................................ 26 

Senator Crapo ............................................................................................ 32 

Breen, Barry, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and 

Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ........................ 36 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 45 

Response to an additional question from Senator Gillibrand ....................... 48 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Vitter ............................................................................................ 49 

Senator Crapo ............................................................................................ 54 

Sawyer, Randall, Chief Environmental Health and Hazardous Materials Officer, Contra Costa Health Services ...................................................................... 225 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 227 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 244 

Webre, Rick, Director, Ascension Parish Office of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness .................................................................................... 246 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 249 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Vitter ................................ 254 

Orum, Paul, Consultant, Coalition to Prevent Chemical Disasters .................... 256 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 258 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 264 

Mannan, M. Sam, PE, CSP, DHC, Regents Professor and Director, Mary 

Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M University System ........... 292 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 294 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Vitter ................................ 322 

Nibarger, Kim, Health and Safety Specialist, Health, Safety and Environment 

Department, United Steelworkers International Union ................................... 337 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 339 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 343 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 

Statement of the Agricultural Retailers Association and The Fertilizer Institute ........................................................................................................................ 354 

Letter to Senator Boxer and Senator Vitter from the Institute of Makers 

of Explosives ......................................................................................................... 361 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL RISK MANAGEMENT 

AND EMERGENCY PLANNING PROGRAMS TO 

PREVENT AND ADDRESS CHEMICAL 

THREATS, INCLUDING THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE EXPLOSIONS IN WEST, TX 

AND GEISMAR, LA 

THURSDAY, JUNE 27, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 406, 

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Boxer, Vitter, Fischer, Barrasso, and Boozman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Good morning, everyone. Senator Vitter and I 

are here because of tragedies that have occurred in our Nation. We 

want to look at these and see what we can do. 

Before I start my time, so we will not start it now, I have a couple of items of business. 

In the audience, I am just looking for him, is Timothy White. 

Timothy, where are you? Would you stand? Timothy White is the 

brother-in-law of Kevin Sanders, a firefighter who was killed in the 

explosion in West, Texas, and he is here representing their family. 

He is also a chemist who wrote us a very thoughtful letter and, before I place it in the record, I am just was going to quote a little 

part of it. If I could have the last page of the letter? Thank you. 

He starts off by saying let me begin by thanking you for the opportunity to address the Committee regarding the explosion at the 

fertilizer plant in West. My brother-in-law, Kevin, was one of the 

first responders that was killed in the explosion. The profound impact of this tragedy continues to affect our family and while the 

changes proposed here will not bring Kevin back to us, they will 

help ensure that other families and our Country do not experience 

this type of tragedy again. 

And so, I am going to place, without objection, your full letter in 

the record and the importance of finding alternatives to these highly explosive materials that are used in fertilizer and, in the meantime, storing these in an appropriate fashion. So, we will put that 
2 

in the record. We really thank you for being here. It means a lot 

to us. 

So, we will start my time. We have votes at 11:30, so we are 

going to have to finish this entire discussion by 11:45. 

What brings us here today is the tragic loss of life and injuries 

caused by a chemical explosion in West, Texas. After we announced 

our hearing, another tragic chemical explosion occurred in Louisiana. We must look at why these tragedies and others occur and 

what we can do to help prevent such disasters in the future. 

Let us walk through what happened at West. On April 17th, a 

massive explosion and fire destroyed a fertilizer distribution plant 

and caused widespread destruction. At least 14 people died, hundreds of people were injured and homes, businesses and three unoccupied schools were damaged or destroyed. An owner of a local 

business there said ‘‘It was like a war zone last night. It was like 

a nightmare, something you would see in a movie.’’ 

Just 2 weeks ago another deadly tragedy occurred in Louisiana 

where more than 100 people were injured and two workers lost 

their lives. In that case, a vapor cloud of flammable petroleum 

gases exploded at a petrochemical refinery, releasing more than 

62,000 pounds of toxic chemicals and causing a serious fire. 

And then, in August 2012 in my State of California in Richmond, 

a refinery released flammable petroleum gases and formed a vapor 

cloud that ignited. Six workers were injured, thousands of people 

from nearby residential areas went to local hospitals for medical 

treatment. 

I want to express my deepest condolences to the first responders, 

the workers and others who lost the lives or were injured in chemical disasters in these communities and others across this Nation. 

Federal safety and health officials must use all of their available 

tools, including, and most important, updated risk management 

plans which are required under the law. They must also use the 

best training methods and new technologies. Lives are at stake and 

action must be taken now. Not tomorrow. Not down the road. We 

do not need new legislation for a lot of this. We can do it now. 

Our Federal Risk Management and Emergency Response laws 

were written after two tragic disasters in the mid–1980’s. In 1984, 

a facility in Bhopal, India released a toxic chemical that killed over 

2,000 people. The following year, a facility in West Virginia released thousands of pounds of dangerous chemicals into a nearby 

community, sending more than 100 people to the hospital. 

In 1986, Congress passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act to enhance to address chemical disasters. 

And in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, which passed 

with a huge bipartisan vote, Congress required risk management 

planning to help save people’s lives at facilities that handle dangerous chemicals. 

Those risk management plans have to, and I want to thank the 

Chemical Safety Board for their clarity on this, the risk management plans have to address the risk. If they leave out an obvious 

risk, such as the regulation or storage of ammonium nitrate, they 

are not addressing the risks. 

In the days following the West, Texas disaster, I wrote to the 

Chemical Safety Board and the EPA requesting information about 
3 

the explosion, the Risk Management Program, the safeguards 

under the law. This is part of the CSB’s, the Chemical Safety 

Board’s, letter to me. The CSB considers the West explosion to be 

among the most serious U.S. chemical incidents affecting the public 

in many decades. That is what they said. 

So, this should be a wake up call for all of us. And we must take 

steps to ensure that all such disasters never happen again. And 

here is the good news. EPA can strengthen safety at facilities that 

handle dangerous chemicals under existing law. They have the 

power, the authority, and indeed, I would argue, the responsibility 

to do it. 

The CSB has already identified problems that may have contributed to the disaster at West including large amounts of combustible materials stored in the same areas as wooden containers that 

hold ammonium nitrate which can explode when heated. This CSB 

also found that the West, Texas facility was not required to install 

sprinklers or other fire suppression systems and that EPA’s Risk 

Management Program does not require the special handling for reactive or explosive materials like ammonium nitrate. 

I look forward to the CSB’s final reports on West and on their 

final reports on Louisiana and California and to the adoption of 

any recommendations that CSB makes to help prevent other tragic 

explosions and loss of life. 

You know, this is an entity that does not get much credit. And 

I want to say today thank you, because roughly 72 percent of your 

recommendations have already been adopted. That is a good thing. 

But it does mean that 28 percent of those recommendations have 

not been adopted. And I hope the EPA and other Federal agencies 

and the industry itself will act quickly to adopt safety measures 

that will save lives. 

In 2002, the CSB recommended that EPA strengthen the Risk 

Management Program by including ammonium nitrate and other 

dangerous chemicals. Again, that was a very prescient call. And it 

did not happen. Unfortunately, EPA has not acted on CSB’s 2002 

recommendation. And I am calling on EPA today to adopt this critical safeguard and to report back to me on this request within the 

next 2 weeks. Acting on just that safety measure alone is critically 

important because, hear me, there are thousands of facilities across 

the Nation that handle ammonium nitrate. And we do know that 

if this dangerous chemical is not handled safely, disaster and loss 

of life could follow. 

As we review what happened and the recent explosions, we must 

make safety the highest priority so we can protect not only the first 

responders but the workers there and the people in the community. 

You know in West, I talked to some local people about the facility 

at West. When it started, there was hardly anyone around that facility. But over the years, population moved in, schools were built, 

nursing homes were built, very close to the facility. You have to 

look at a risk management plan not just once, but over the years. 

Local authorities can play a key role in enhancing safety protections. Mr. Randall Sawyer is here from my home State of California to testify on behalf of Contra Costa’s Health Department. I 

look forward to hearing from him, as well as other witnesses, on 
4 

the steps that the EPA, State and local authorities and industry 

can take to eliminate these chemical disasters. 

We need action. And again, really, we do not need legislation. 

Again, I want to thank Tim White for his heartfelt letter and for 

his dedication to call for enhanced safety measures so that other 

families do not have to suffer the same loss that his family did. 

And with that, I call on Senator Vitter. 

[The referenced letter follows:] 
5 
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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Chairman Boxer, for convening this 

important hearing today. And I, too, would like to begin by saying 

our thoughts and prayers are with all of the people of Geismar, 

Louisiana, Donaldsonville, Louisiana and West, Texas who were affected by these recent horrible accidents. 

In particular, our deepest sympathies to the families of Rocky 

Morris of Belle Rose, Louisiana, Scott Thrower of St. Amant and 

Zachary Green of Hammond, all of whom lost their lives in the two 

Louisiana explosions, as well as the families of the 15 people who 

were killed in West, Texas. 

I am pleased to welcome all of our witnesses today. In particular, 

I want to acknowledge and welcome Rick Webre who serves as the 

Director of the Ascension Parish Office of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness and Dr. M. Sam Mannan who is not only 

an expert in process safety and chemical security, but also a registered professional engineer in Louisiana and Texas. 

You know, when horrible accidents like these occur, it is imperative that they are thoroughly and expeditiously investigated so we 

can all understand their causes and ensure that future incidents 

are prevented. 

I was pleased to talk to Chairman Rafael Moure-Eraso of the 

Chemical Safety Board shortly after the horrible accident in 

Geismar and I am encouraged that the CSB could be on the ground 

in Louisiana to begin investigation so quickly. And I thank the 

Chairman for that follow up. 

Louisiana, as in some other places, is experiencing a boom in 

new chemical plants and expansions driven by low natural gas 

prices and our strategic advantages. Louisiana economic development counts more than $30 billion in investments announced in 

Louisiana starting in 2011. And that does not even include a number of upgrades. 

While we certainly welcome that investment in our State and all 

of the jobs it means, of course we must ensure that all of these facilities are absolutely as safe as possible for the workers and for 

the local communities. 

Despite these horrible accidents we are discussing today, the 

good news is the chemical industry has a strong safety record overall. It has an injury rate about 45 percent lower than overall manufacturing in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. And in 2012, the 

industry invested nearly $15 billion in environmental and health 

and safety and security programs. So, that is the good news. 

But obviously we always can do better and that is what we are 

going to learn about today. As we do that, of course, we need to 

have all of the facts and all of the officials directly investigating 

these incidents, local, State and Federal, including CSB, need the 

time to conclude their investigations before we reach any specific 

conclusions about these incidents. 

It is vital we take that time to properly understand what caused 

these horrible accidents and work hard to make sure something 

like this never happens again. 

Again, Madam Chair, thanks for holding this important hearing. 
8 

Senator BOXER. Senator Vitter, thank you very much. Again, my 

heart goes out to you and your State. 

Senator Fischer. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and Ranking 

Member Vitter, for holding this hearing today. 

I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here and for 

their willingness to share their time and their expertise with our 

Committee. 

In Nebraska where agriculture is our No. 1 industry, we are very 

mindful of the key role chemicals play in enhancing our productivity and efficiency. There are 870 million undernourished people 

in the world today. As we work to grow food and provide other necessities for a world population that is expected to exceed 9 billion 

by 2050, we know we will become increasingly reliant upon chemical solutions. 

Innovation in chemical products has helped to grow our economy 

and improve lives across the globe. Chemical users understand that 

our utilization of these powerful products is not without risk. Recent events in Texas and Louisiana are devastating reminders of 

our responsibility to remain vigilant in our efforts to prevent, mitigate and address chemical threats. 

I am pleased that we are meeting today to conduct oversight of 

our Federal Risk Management and Emergency Planning Programs 

that we rely upon for occupational safety, environmental protection 

and homeland security. Industry-led initiatives are also an important part of our chemical risk management efforts. I am encouraged that producers, manufacturers, transporters and retailers 

have established an industry working group to develop a code of 

practice and management system to promote continuous improvement in the storage and handling of fertilizer and other chemicals. 

Among the guiding principles for such a code of practice is coordinate communication with employees, communities and emergency responders, as well as a third-party auditing and inspection 

process for those facilities. These industry-driven approaches are 

essential to improving chemical safety in a way that is workable 

for both regulatory authorities and the regulated community. 

Thank you again, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing. I look 

forward to the testimony and questions. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. 

We will turn to our honored speakers. Our first panel, Rafael 

Moure-Eraso, Chairman of the Chemical Safety Board. Please proceed. I am going to hold you to 5 minutes, each witness, just because we have those votes in an hour or so. 

Go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF RAFAEL MOURE-ERASO, CHAIRPERSON, U.S. 

CHEMICAL SAFETY BOARD 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Chairman Boxer, Senator Vitter, Senator 

Fischer and distinguished Committee members, thank you for inviting me today and thank you for the kind words about the CSB 

that you said. 
9 

I am CSB Chairperson Rafael Moure-Eraso. The two explosions 

that we are discussing today, West Fertilizer and Williams Olefins, 

are tragedies of the kind that should be prevented. The destruction 

I personally saw in West, the obliteration of homes, schools and 

businesses by an ammonium nitrate explosion, was almost beyond 

imagination. The loss of life was horrible. 

The CSB has determined that ammonium nitrate fertilizer, its 

storage, falls under a patchwork of U.S. safety standards and guidances, a patchwork that has many large holes. Those holes include 

allowing the use of combustible wooden buildings and wooden storage bins, the lack of the sprinklers that are not required, and there 

is no Federal, State or local rules restricting the storage of large 

amounts of ammonium nitrate near homes, schools and hospitals. 

Existing fire codes have some useful provisions for ammonium 

nitrate. But Texas, among its counties, has no fire code. So at 

West, the fire code provisions were strictly voluntary and West Fertilizer had not volunteered. Our investigators learned that combustible seeds were stored near the ammonium nitrate, not separated 

by any fire-resistant partitions. 

OSHA had some similar provisions for ammonium nitrate fertilizer in its explosives standard, 1910.109. However, OSHA has 

not focused extensively on ammonium nitrate storage and had not 

inspected West since 1985. 

Other nations have gone much further than the U.S. on ammonium nitrate safety. The UK recommends dedicated non-combustible storage buildings and non-combustible bins. The U.S. manufacturer, CF Industries, recommends the same and sprinklers as 

well. But the fertilizer industry tells us that U.S. sites commonly 

store ammonium nitrate still in wooden buildings and use wooden 

bins, even near homes, schools and other facilities. This situation 

must be addressed. 

Preventing the risk of fire essentially eliminates the potential for 

an explosion like we saw in West by removing one of the preconditions of detonation. Facilities like West fall outside existing 

Federal explosive safety standards which were developed in the 

1990s and are list based. Ammonium nitrate would likely have 

been included if EPA had adopted our 2002 recommendation to include in the list reactive chemicals under its Risk Management 

Program. But the RMP program of EPA is not a panacea. It already covers large refineries of Petra Chemical’s size, including 

Williams Olefins. And yet, we still have serious accidents. 

The Williams plant has over 100 workers producing ethylene and 

propylene. On June 13, there was a catastrophic failure involving 

a heat exchanger and associated piping which broke loose from a 

distillation tower. The ensuing explosion led to the deaths of two 

employees. We join and mourn in their loss. It is too soon in our 

investigation to tell why the equipment failure occurred. 

The biggest picture in process safety is that EPA and OSHA resources are under duress. Regulations need to be modernized but 

more inspection and prevention are needed as well. In the meantime, we are finding encouraging alternatives to the current situation. Following the Chevron refinery fire last year, and acting upon 

CSB recommendations, California is poised to triple the number of 

dedicated process safety inspectors funded by industry fees. 
10 

Another promising approach is the safety case successfully used 

in other nations which insurers say have much lower petrochemical 

accident rates than we do. Companies identify and commit to follow 

the best safety standards from around the world, subject to approval and oversight of a competent and well-funded regulator. 

Many experts believe this is the best safety regime for complex 

technological industries rather than the U.S. system which calls 

upon a prescriptive and often outdated rule book. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moure-Eraso follows:] 
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Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

And now we call on Mr. Barry Breen, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA. 

STATEMENT OF BARRY BREEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

Mr. BREEN. Thank you, Chairman Boxer, and thank you, Senators. 

I am Barry Breen, as you said, and thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today on EPA’s Risk Management Program as well as the 

Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know issues. And 

thank you as well to Mr. White for being here. We appreciate it. 

The West, Texas facility fire and explosion have highlighted the 

importance of properly managing the risks posed by chemical facilities and the need for an effective Community Right to Know Program. 

The Clean Air Act provides the authority for EPA’s Risk Management Program. Those regulations apply to the owner or operator of 

a stationary source producing, processing, handling or storing more 

than a threshold quantity of a covered, regulated substance. The 

list includes 63 flammable gases and liquids and 77 acutely toxic 

chemicals. 

Many of these substances are also included on the Emergency 

Planning and Community Right to Know Act Extremely Hazardous 

Substance List. Approximately 12,800 facilities are currently covered under EPA’s Risk Management Program. 

Risk Management Program facilities must develop and submit a 

risk management plan that includes facility hazard assessments including worse case release and alternative release scenarios, facility accident prevention activities such as the use of special safety 

equipment, employee safety training programs and processed hazard analyses, past chemical accidents at a facility and facility 

emergency response programs and plans. 

Under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act there is also a general 

duty to identify hazards which may result from releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques to design and maintain a 

safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases 

and to minimize the consequences of accidental releases which may 

occur. 

The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act establishes authorities for emergency planning and preparedness, 

emergency release notification reporting, Community Right to 

Know reporting, and toxic chemical release reporting. It is intended 

to encourage State and local planning for and response to releases 

of hazardous substances and to provide the public, local governments, fire departments and other emergency officials with information concerning chemical hazards present in their communities. 

Subtitle A of EPCRA established the framework for local emergency planning, while Subtitle B established Community Right to 

Know requirements to ensure information on chemicals in the community is provided to the public as well as emergency responders. 

The Act requires that EPA publish a list of extremely hazardous 

substances. The list was established by EPA to identify chemical 
37 

substances that could cause serious, irreversible health effects from 

accidental releases. 

EPA was directed to establish a threshold planning quantity for 

each extremely hazardous substance. The purpose of the list is to 

focus initial efforts in the development of State and local contingency plans. Inclusion of a chemical on the list indicates a need for 

the community to undertake a program to investigate and evaluate 

the potential for accidental exposure associated with the production, storage or handling of a chemical at a particular site and to 

develop a chemical emergency response plan around those risks. 

Under EPCRA, a facility that has an extremely hazardous substance onsite in excess of its threshold planning quantity must notify the State Emergency Response Commission and local Emergency Planning Committee as well as participate in local emergency planning activities. Under the statute, the LEPC then develops a Community Emergency Response Plan. Emergency response 

plans contain information that community officials can use at the 

time of a chemical accident. 

EPA will continue its efforts to help prevent chemical accidents 

and releases under the Risk Management Program. Strong chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response programs rely 

on effective partnerships with the public at all levels of government. We will continue our outreach efforts to stakeholders and 

work with our Federal, State and local partners to promote chemical safety, address chemical process safety issues and explore opportunities for improving chemical safety. 

Chairman Boxer, that concludes my statement and I would be 

happy to answer any questions you or other members may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Breen follows:] 
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Senator BOXER. Mr. Breen, I am going to ask you a series of 

questions. But that was the most vague testimony I have ever 

heard. You never talked about what happened in my State, you did 

not talk about what happened in West, you did not talk about happened in Louisiana and I do not sense in your voice any type of 

shock or desire to use your authority to move forward. 

That is just a comment about the tone and lack of urgency that 

I heard in your voice. Now, maybe as I ask you questions, something else will come about. So, let me give you a minute to think 

about what I just said which, by the way, you do not have to agree 

with. It is one person’s reaction after we have this tragic loss of life 

in two and, since 2012, in three States, including my own, including the Ranking Member’s and, of course, West. So, if I am the relative sitting here, I am thinking OK, that is vague. What is your 

timeframe, what do you want to do? 

I want to talk for a minute to the Chairman of the Chemical 

Safety Board, Chairman Moure-Eraso. Thank you for your testimony. 

Now, my understanding is that about 30 percent of what you 

have recommended has not been adopted by any of the agencies. 

Would you be willing to sit down with my staff and go through 

those recommendations with them, in writing, and then if we need 

to talk with you, so we can get a sense of what is out there that 

has not been embraced by the agencies? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Thank you very much for the offer, Senator. 

I will be very, very glad to sit with my staff and your staff and look 

at what is still on, what we waiting for actions on our recommendations. 

Senator BOXER. That would be very helpful to me because, again, 

as I said in my opening statement, some of these will need legislation but a lot of them can be done without legislation. 

Mr. Breen, a 2002 Chemical Safety Board report found an average of five fatalities a year in our Nation related to incidents with 

reactive chemicals such as this ammonium nitrate and that more 

than 50 percent of these incidents involved chemicals that were not 

covered by EPA or OSHA safeguards. 

Among other issues, CSB recommended that EPA’s Risk Management Program ‘‘explicitly cover catastrophic reactive hazards that 

have the potential to seriously impact the public.’’ And I say it is 

not the potential. They have injured the public, they continue to injure the public and they are not handled in the way the CSB has 

recommended. 

I do not know the extent of your authorities or who you have to 

check with, but I am asking you, is it time for the EPA to adopt 

this recommendation that was made in 2002 given the tragedies 

that have occurred since then? 

Mr. BREEN. Thank you very much. 

Senator BOXER. Yes. 

Mr. BREEN. Thank you, Senator, and I think that point is worth 

some clarification. I saw in the Chairman’s testimony the statement, let me pull it, it was in his testimony just now, that the 2002 

recommendation was to list ‘‘reactive chemicals’’ on the RMP. I actually went back and looked at the 2002 recommendations and it 

says to revise the RMP program ‘‘to explicitly cover chemical reac-
61 

tive hazards’’. And then I went behind that recommendation into 

the report itself, which has that recommendation and makes the 

following observations. 

I will start with one of the key findings. It is under ‘‘Conclusions.’’ ‘‘Using lists of chemicals is an inadequate approach.’’ The 

difference is between a ‘‘list of chemicals’’ and ‘‘reactive hazards,’’ 

so the CSB report states on page 1 of the—— 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Breen. 

Mr. BREEN. Yes, Madam. 

Senator BOXER. Please. Are you questioning the fact that the 

CSB never said what Mr. Moure-Eraso said here today, that you 

ought to take a look at, and I will quote him, storing these reactive 

chemicals in non-combustible bins? Are you saying they never suggested anything like that, that you look at your Risk Management 

Plans and amend those so that the storage of these potentially explosive chemicals is changed? Are you suggesting they never said 

that? 

Mr. BREEN. Thank you. So, let me at the outset be clear that this 

was a tragedy and more must be done—— 

Senator BOXER. I am asking a question. 

Mr. BREEN. I understand, Senator. 

Senator BOXER. Are you questioning what he told us today? 

Mr. BREEN. Senator, let me turn to that in just a moment. But 

I wanted to be clear because of the point you made earlier about 

recognizing the tragedy. It is a tragedy and more must be done. 

What the CSB said in 2002 is important. And what it said was 

that ‘‘reactivity,’’ and I am reading, ‘‘is not necessarily an intrinsic 

property of a chemical substance.’’ It is ‘‘related to process specific 

factors.’’ And so, it went on to conclude that ‘‘lists of chemicals is 

an inadequate approach’’ and specifically questioned, for example, 

several lists that were extant at the time. 

So, the actual recommendation I did not read as including the 

idea of finding a list of reactive chemicals and adding them to the 

RMP, but instead to deal with reactive hazards. 

Senator BOXER. Well, sir, I do not agree. And I would like to ask 

the Chairman of the Chemical Safety Board here, it sounds to me 

like EPA is kind of putting a slant on what your recommendation 

was. Could you tell us what your recommendation was on the way 

to store these potentially explosive chemicals? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Well, our idea was to address situations that 

could have a catastrophic effect in the community. That was the 

aim of it. And we were looking at reactive chemicals as a not addressed situation on both an OSHA PSM and on EPA RMP. The 

idea was the concept of reactive chemicals, and specific reactive 

chemicals that were known to cause catastrophic effects, will be included in these recommendations. 

I would like to review with you, as you said, specifically this recommendation that you said you wanted to look at with us because 

this is still open with us and EPA, to clarify specifically what will 

help to try to prevent what happened here in West. 

Senator BOXER. The bottom line is, as I read it, and I have got 

your report here, I am going to put it into the record, to EPA you 

say revise the accidental release prevention requirements to explicitly cover catastrophic reactive hazards that have the potential to 
62 

seriously impact the public including those resulting from self-reactive chemicals and a combination of chemicals and process specific 

conditions. So, we will put that in the record and that stands in 

stark contrast to what you said, Mr. Breen. 

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Senator BOXER. Now, Mr. Breen, if you do not want to listen to 

the Chemical Safety Board, what about this? What about the fact 

that in 2012, labor, health and environmental justice groups petitioned EPA to use the Clean Air Act Section 112 rulemaking authority and the General Duty Clause to require facilities that handle dangerous chemicals to use safer technologies to prevent or 

eliminate threats from uncontrolled chemical releases wherever 

feasible? 

What is the status of EPA’s review of this petition and for requiring the use of inherently safer technologies where feasible under 

the Risk Management Program? 

Mr. BREEN. Thank you, Senator. And thank you for entering the 

2002 full report into the record as well. We are grateful for that. 

So, we have the petition from the groups from July 2012. The petition calls on us to adopt regulations under 112(r) of the Clean Air 

Act to require, where feasible, inherently safer technology. This is 

a different matter than what would be under the RMP program. 

Senator BOXER. I understand. I am asking you the second, there 

are two things here. The way you store these chemicals or making 

sure we get the opportunity to look at safer alternatives where feasible. I understand that. How are you responding? You did not 

much say how you are responding to the first. But now the second, 

how are you responding to this petition? 

Mr. BREEN. Thank you. So, again in the theme that more must 

be done, we are looking at a number of potential policy options in 

addressing this tragedy. One idea is that put forward by the petition to use provisions of 112(r)(7), they suggest, to write regulations 

and 112(r)(1) to write guidance, the General Duty Clause. Separately, we have had recommendations, not in the form of a formal 

petition but nonetheless important recommendations, to use the 

General Duty Clause, 112(r)(1) to write regulations. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I am asking you, what is the status of 

these recommendations? What are you doing? What is your time 

line? When will we know what your recommendations are? 

Mr. BREEN. Thank you. So, inherently safer technology has some 

attraction. And it has worked at site-specific ways with important 

results. And the Chemical Safety Board has helped in that respect. 

The Chemical Safety Board’s Strategic Plan for 2012 through 

2016 identifies inherently safer technology as an issue of concern, 

one of four issues of concern, and their letter to you of May 17th 

indicates they are looking into it quite seriously and that will be 

quite helpful. We are looking into it as well. 

At the same time, the petition importantly asks us to require it, 

where feasible. And the literature on this issue indicates that—— 

Senator BOXER. What is your timeframe? 

Mr. BREEN. Let me just address—— 

Senator BOXER. Sir, I do not have enough time to hear your entire biography. Just tell me. Please answer the question. What is 

your timeframe on responding to this petition? 

Mr. BREEN. Senator, thank you. What I wanted to mention is 

that the Congressional Research—— 

Senator BOXER. What is your timeframe? 
214 

Mr. BREEN [continuing]. Service points out that in order to establish that timeframe, we need to understand the issue better. So, 

that is what we are doing now. 

Senator BOXER. All right. Here is the situation. I am sympathetic 

to the fact that there is work to be done. I am unsympathetic to 

the attitude that I hear, which is the lack of urgency, because lives 

are being lost and recommendations were made a long time ago 

and nothing is happening. 

Now, there is another, there is another correspondence to you, 

this is your own National Environmental Justice Advisory Council. 

Your own, from EPA says ‘‘We have already witnessed in countless 

environmental justice communities what can and has happened is 

chemical releases, explosions, fires, train derailments and refinery 

releases have wreaked havoc upon local communities.’’ The Council, 

your own Council, recommended that EPA use its authorities to 

eliminate the risks. 

So, again, what are you doing about this communication? So, now 

you have outside groups, inside groups, the Chemical Safety Board, 

everyone is saying to you do something. So, how are you responding to your own Council? 

Mr. BREEN. Yes. And I need to find a way to convey to you that 

we share your sense of urgency. 

Senator BOXER. Good. Convey it. Say it. It is good. 

Mr. BREEN. Thank you. We share it. More must be done and this 

was a tragic loss. I share in that. We all do, of course. The important thing is to get it right in addition to getting it fast. With regard to the National Environment Justice Advisory Committee—— 

Senator BOXER. Fast? It goes back to 2002. Please. The Chemical 

Safety Board talked about this in 2002. Am I right? So, do not say 

fast to me because this was before EPA, and I do not know if you 

were there, I am not blaming you personally, I do not know if you 

were there in 2002. Were you there in 2002? 

Mr. BREEN. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Yes. OK, so they called this out in 2002. And 

now you are telling me fast? How many more of these do we have 

to have? So, let me just cut to the chase because others want to 

ask questions. 

I understand that should you decide, in your wisdom, which I 

hope you have, that these kinds of potentially explosive materials 

should be stored in ways that people are saying would be far safer, 

segregated, not near wooden bins and so on. If you did that, I understand that is a regulation and it would take about 18 months 

to get it done. 

But I also understand that under EPA’s rules you could issue an 

alert, a guidance. What are you thinking about issuing an alert or 

a guidance? How many more accidents does it take before you issue 

an alert or a guidance on storage? 

Mr. BREEN. Thank you, Senator. I am showing now the ‘‘Explosion Hazard from Ammonium Nitrate’’ alert that EPA issued and 

in which it warns that a fire involving ammonium nitrate in an enclosed place could lead to an explosion. 

Senator BOXER. When did you do that? 

Mr. BREEN. December 1997. 
215 

Senator BOXER. OK. You have not issued an alert since 1997. Do 

you not think it would be a good thing since we have now seen 

what has happened? This adds even more impact to the fact that 

you have done nothing in terms of your Risk Management Plan if 

you knew it, way back then, even before 2002. 

So, you are reading to me, and taking credit for, something that 

happened in the last century? We are in this century. I would like 

to see a new alert, a new guidance. Is that something you will look 

at, Mr. Breen, and report back to me on? 

Mr. BREEN. Senator, naturally we would like to keep you up to 

date on all of this—— 

Senator BOXER. No, no. I am not asking up to date. Would you 

consider issuing an updated alert since that one is from the last 

century and we have had many accidents since then, a new alert 

and a new guidance, a guidance, and then potentially a rule? 

Mr. BREEN. Senator, I do not want to leave you with a 

misimpression. This alert is posted on our website—— 

Senator BOXER. I understand. 

Mr. BREEN [continuing]. And continues to be vital. 

Senator BOXER. And you think it is adequate what is, all these 

years, my staff says it is inadequate. 

Mr. BREEN. What we would like to do then is better understand 

the ways in which it is inadequate and as part of a panoply of making sure events—— 

Senator BOXER. So, you have an alert. You are taking credit for 

having an alert that goes back to 1996. Now, one would think technologies have changed just a bit since then. And there are other 

ways that we can guide people on how best to avert these disasters 

before there is a rule change. 

So, I am going to stop now. But I wanted to say, express my clear 

disappointment in your defensive testimony. You are looking back. 

You are not looking forward. You are defending non-action and 

some alert that was put up in 1996. And I feel that EPA has to 

step up to the plate here and do a lot more. And I will talk to my 

Ranking Member after this hearing. He may not agree with me on 

this. He may. But I do plan to oversee what you are going to do 

and that means alert guidance rulemaking. 

And I will turn to my colleague. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Chairman, following the tragic incident in Geismar, we 

talked on the phone and you were very gracious to act very, very 

quickly and have had folks on the scene. Can you give me a quick 

update on that particular investigation? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Yes, Senator. We have deployed with an investigating team there. We have engaged a number of consultants, 

especially structural engineers. We have concerns about the safety 

of the people that have to enter to look at the specific site of the 

explosion. We customarily do not enter until the structural engineer tells us it is safe because there is still hanging debris in the 

place in there. 

In the meantime, we are taking views with a, you know, we are 

taking photographs, aerial photographs, of the site. We have interviewed close to 14 people that have been witnesses, direct witnesses of what happened, and we are preparing to enter into the 
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place immediately that our safety engineer tells us that we will be 

safe to do it. 

But we are at this time mostly engaged on interviewing people 

on the site. 

Mr. VITTER. OK, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, it has also 

come to my attention that EPA has recently tried to subpoena information from CSB and even CSB investigators themselves in 

order to help EPA in their enforcement actions. 

Now, I am concerned about this because Congress from the get 

go has separated those two roles and I am concerned about it because you basically, CSB basically relies on cooperation with the 

site in question, the company in question. And if EPA is going to 

subpoena everything you get, I am guessing you are going to get 

less cooperation, you are going to get less documents and information and that is going to hamper your doing your job. 

Can you elaborate on your concerns about this attempt by EPA? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Yes, Senator. We, normally in these catastrophes we conduct parallel investigations with our sister agencies 

in the Federal Government and the local government. For the issue 

of our witnesses, we base our work mostly in what a witness will 

tell us in good faith that was their experience before the accident. 

But we believe very strongly that workers and managers should 

be allowed to tell the truth to the CSB on these accidents without 

fear of retaliation or prosecution. We are focusing on conducting a 

safety investigation, that is to find out the hows and the whys of 

why something happened. And we want that to be a focus that is 

what we consider just as important as the other focus that other 

agencies are investigating. I mean, their goals are different than 

our goals but we believe that both goals of finding out law enforcement, and our goal of finding out the root causes of the accidents, 

are just as important and we should be able to work together to 

obtain this information. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Breen, let me turn to you with the same question. And this 

really does concern me because I think it fundamentally threatens 

CSB’s ability to do its job and thereby prevent future accidents. 

In his February letter, Chairman Moure-Eraso wrote ‘‘It is our 

belief that EPA should use its own staff resources and authorities 

in conducting civil and criminal investigations rather than to seek 

the wholesale repurposing of the CSB investigative record.’’ And he 

went on to cite that EPA ‘‘has more than 400 times as many employees and more than 750 times the budget of the Chemical Safety 

Board.’’ Can you respond to these concerns? 

Mr. BREEN. Only partially, Senator. The Department of Justice 

would have an important role in any response and I cannot represent what the Criminal Division or other parts of the Department of Justice would say to these issues. The Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco and Firearms is part of the Department of Justice as well. 

I can share with you, Senator, that—— 

Senator VITTER. If I can just interrupt and I will certainly let you 

finish however you want. But the Department of Justice would not 

be trying to subpoena CSB stuff on behalf of EPA unless EPA was 

asking them to do that. So, sort of pointing to your lawyer is an 

evasion. Why is it EPA’s policy to try to subpoena CSB’s documents 
217 

and investigators when that is a different type of investigation fundamentally and also when it depends on cooperation which, in my 

opinion, these actions are going to shut down? 

Mr. BREEN. Senator, cooperation is important in this regard. And 

there are important civil as well as important criminal needs to be 

met in the investigation. Perhaps there is more than ought to be 

said in an open hearing, and if you would like we can ask representatives of the criminal program to come and brief you or your 

staff. 

Senator VITTER. Well, I would like that, No. 1. No. 2, I see no 

reason why we cannot talk about it in public. And No. 3, I am not 

trying to prevent you from slowing down any, in terms of any enforcement action, or justice, including a criminal action if it is appropriate. But that has to be separate. And once you start subpoenaing CSB’s information and documents and witnesses, they depend on cooperation. That is 95 percent of their ability to do their 

job. You are going to shut it down. 

Mr. BREEN. Thank you, Senator. Again, cooperation and a dual 

approach are important and we would be happy to fill you in more 

fully when we are able to. 

Senator VITTER. I will certainly follow up on that. I do not understand why you are not able to this morning. 

That is all I have. 

Senator BOXER. Senator Fischer. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Senator Boxer. 

Mr. Chairman, in your testimony you mentioned that recent investigations have ‘‘further taxed the CSB’s already overstretched 

staffing and resources’’ and that you are facing a backlog of cases 

to investigate. Can you tell me how you prioritize your work and 

what can be done to ensure that the use of CSB’s limited resources 

result in maximum safety improvements? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Thank you, Senator. When I started my job 

at the CSB as the Chair in 2010, I was faced with a backlog of 22 

investigations that were already in the pipeline. We have added at 

least five new major ones during my estate, and we have finished 

with nine and currently our backlog is 15 investigations. 

Congress frequently calls on the CSB to investigate root causes 

of some of the most complex tragic industrial accidents in the U.S. 

For example, the Water Horizon is in the pipeline, Chevron that 

we finished the preliminary report, and, you know, in the last 2 

months we have gotten requests to deploy at West and at Williams 

Olefins. 

That has a really ripple effect on all of our investigations. We 

have to move the teams that are currently working on and finished 

a report to deploy in the field to start a new one. We believe that 

the situation is that I must tell this Committee that when the next 

serious accident comes along in the near future in the petrochemical industry, and believe me, they are coming, we will not be 

able to have the researchers to deploy. 

Senator FISCHER. Can you tell me how you prioritize? Do you 

take it by the dates that they occur, by the chemicals that are involved, by the number of fatalities, the destruction that takes 

place? How do you prioritize which accident you are going to move 

to though? 
218 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Yes. We have a department that takes care 

of evaluating the incidents that are constantly being monitored on 

a daily basis. They have the relevant algorithm by which you determine, based on the consequences of the accident, we can classify 

them as major, medium or minor. 

What concerns us is basically whether a statute has called us do 

to, that is to look at accidents that cause fatalities, that cause people to go to hospital, that cause destruction in the environment and 

in the communities, and that will be applicable and could be able 

to generalize to a sector so we can learn something out of them so 

that we can develop recommendations for prevention of further accidents to happen this way. 

So, once we gather all of this information on a particular incident, we meet in our headquarters with all of the department 

heads, get all of the inputs, look at the algorithm, look at how it 

is being classified, and then we make a decision of deployment. 

Senator FISCHER. On all of your investigations, do you make recommendations on safety improvements? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Yes, we make recommendations to a number 

of stakeholders. We make recommendations to the company itself, 

to the sector which that company belongs to. We make recommendations also to the regulatory agencies when we feel that 

the particular regulations have not been enough to prevent what 

has happened. We make recommendations especially to OSHA and 

to EPA. 

We also make recommendations to the private organizations that 

establish guidelines for safety like the National Fire Protection Association, the American Petroleum Institute and other organizations like that. 

Senator FISCHER. And these are just recommendations and 

guidelines? Are there any teeth in them? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. We believe they do have some teeth. We have 

established in our organization a recommendations department and 

their job is not only to formulate these recommendations but to follow up with a very specific system that we have to find out what 

is the action that is being taken. 

We send 180-day letters in which we ask the stakeholders, the 

people that we make the recommendations to, saying what is the 

recommendation and asking them what specific actions are going 

to be taken in that period. These are public letters, public information, and we use that information basically to be sure that our recommendations that are public are also answered in public by the 

receivers of our recommendations. 

And, as you can see, we have a very good, our tracking record 

tells us that over 70 percent of what we have recommended has 

been acted upon in a way that we are have declared the recommendations closed and acceptable. 

Senator FISCHER. Also, Mr. Chairman, in your written testimony 

you state that ‘‘The CSB has had a number of discussions with fertilizer industry representatives since April 17th, including officials 

from the Fertilizer Institute and the Agriculture Retailers Association. We believe the industry has a strong and sincere interest in 

learning from the tragedy in West and taking steps to prevent fu-
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ture incidents involving ammonium nitrate including the development of new audit tools and product stewardship programs.’’ 

Can you please elaborate on this part of your statement and 

what role do you see industry-led initiatives have in advancing 

chemical safety? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. We have had conversations with the Fertilizer Institute and the Agriculture Retailers Association on this 

issue. Normally, these organizations are the ones that are going to 

determine for their affiliates what is the state-of-the-art for issues 

of safety. And we have learned that they, for the prevention of future accidents, it is very useful that they be, that they understand 

and that they embrace the issue of safety. And we find out that the 

Fertilizer Institute and the Agriculture Retailers Association do 

have programs and of course they are similarly interested on the 

particular situation to prevent this from happening. 

I would like to add that this complements the effort that should 

be done at the level of the Federal Government and the State organizations because even though this is, we applaud their programs, 

voluntary programs by themselves are not substitutes for eventually having regulations. 

Senator FISCHER. Do you feel that you have a good working relationship, though, with the private industry and trying to reach better safety requirements? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. I believe we do. I believe we do. We have discussions with the Fertilizer Institute in which they have described 

to us the programs that they have and we are encouraging them, 

they have, they want very much to see the results of our investigation and they are very positive about supporting the work that we 

are doing. So yes, we have very good relationship with them. 

Senator FISCHER. OK, thank you. Also in your testimony regarding West Fertilizer, you state that no manufacturing occurred in 

the site, only blending of fertilizers for retail customers. Can you 

tell us, maybe better explain what the difference is between manufacturing and blending of fertilizer? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Yes. Manufacturing of a chemical is done in 

a chemical plant in which you have reactors and you have a system 

by which you use raw materials to come out with a product at the 

end, a chemical product, like in this case it would be ammonium 

nitrate. You have to use ammonia as a raw materials, you have to 

you nitric acid, and there is a whole, it is a chemical process. 

That is not what was happening in West. They would receive the 

finalized product that had already been classified as a fertilizer. 

They were receiving it by train and they would store it in a storage 

place and from that storage place, in bulk form was the storage, 

it was sold to farmers from the region that come to get the 

amounts that they need for planting. 

So, basically what the operation was is a distribution center of 

an already finalized product. It was a retail operation. 

Senator FISCHER. I would assume you would have different recommendations for regulations on the chemical process and the storage process. Is that correct? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. Yes, it is correct. When you store substantial 

amounts of a particular chemical that is a strong oxidizer like ammonium nitrate, there are specific recommendations of how it 
220 

should be done safely. The key issue is that you have to avoid a 

fire hazard by all possible means because fire is one of the components that could make the chemical detonate, not by fire itself. 

Senator BOXER. Sorry. I am sorry. Because we are running out 

of time, we do not want to short the other panel, I am going to 

have to stop the questioning of this panel—— 

Senator FISCHER. OK. Thank you so much. 

Senator BOXER. We are going to move forward. Senator Barrasso, 

we have run out of time here, so can I have you lead off the questioning of the next panel? Is that all right with you? Unless you 

would like to make a 5-minute statement now. 

Senator BARRASSO. Madam Chairman, I could limit myself to the 

5 minutes. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Go right ahead. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I am 

pleased that you are having this hearing to discuss the issues surrounding chemical safety and learn more about the tragic events 

that occurred in Texas and Louisiana. 

I would like to say that my home State of Wyoming is the largest 

consumer in the U.S. of ammonium nitrate, a chemical oxidizer 

that was implicated in the West, Texas accident. Mining companies 

in Wyoming use 1.5 billion pounds of ammonium nitrate each year 

in places like Powder River Basin to extract coal. 

At these mining sites, ammonium nitrate is mixed with fuel oil, 

pumped and poured into the blast hole which is fitted with an initiation system. The subsequent explosion gets rock out of the way so 

that we can get to coal. Through this process, Wyoming and other 

States can provide essential building materials and affordable energy for families and small businesses across the Country. 

Now, ammonium nitrate was not always the chemical used to do 

this work. In the past, nitroglycerin-based explosives were used 

which were less safe and led to accidents and cost lives. 

And, Madam Chairman, I would recommend to you a book Senator Mansfield, Mike Mansfield, we go to the Mansfield Room for 

our leadership lunches, he was the leader and a Democrat in the 

Senate and had a history as a miner. And as you go through this, 

he talked about working with nitroglycerin. And through his entire 

career they would always say to Mike, tap it light because you do 

not want to tap it too hard and cause the explosion that causes 

these kinds of significant injuries. 

And the transition to ammonium nitrate from nitroglycerin has 

produced inherently safer products. Today, ammonium nitrate comprises at least 90 percent of all the commercial explosive material 

and the use of ammonium nitrate is so pervasive that there is no 

viable substitute for the chemical explosives industry. 

So, I do have a couple of questions. I see I have some time left. 

The first to Mr. Moure-Eraso. 

You referenced a series of past events where ammonium nitrate 

was involved in the explosions in Texas as well as in France in 

2001. Is it not true that the type of ammonium nitrate involved in 

the 1947 Texas City tragedy that you talk about is vastly different 

than the type manufactured today? Simply yes or no. 
221 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. I concluded, I do not have the data about 

what was exactly the chemical composition of the Texas City and 

we are waiting for the data on West. 

Senator BARRASSO. Well, with regard to the one in France, is it 

not true that the ammonium nitrate involved in that explosion was 

contaminated? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. I could not tell you. I am sorry, Senator. 

Senator BARRASSO. OK. Now in the 1974 ruling, OSHA ruled to 

ensure the safe handling and storage of ammonium nitrate. Are 

there any examples of accidental detonations of ammonium nitrate 

where ammonium nitrate was handled and stored in compliance 

with the rules, if they actually did it properly within the rules? 

Mr. MOURE-ERASO. I am not aware of them, Senator. 

Senator BARRASSO. Mr. Breen, does the EPA have enough personnel and inspectors to police the facilities like the West Fertilizer 

Company if ammonium nitrate was included under a Risk Management Plan as some have advocated? When you take a look at some 

of these reports, it sounds like there are about 12,800 different facilities which might then be covered if we went and expanded this 

and right now I think you are looking at about 500 a year. I do 

not know how many more facilities you would have to inspect each 

year and do you have the personnel to do that? What would the 

cost be? 

Mr. BREEN. Senator, the President’s Fiscal Year Budget asks for 

additional funding for this program and that would allow for additional inspectors as well. 

Senator BARRASSO. And how many more do you think you would 

have to go, from 500 a year to—— 

Mr. BREEN. The number of inspections, Senator? 

Senator BARRASSO. Yes. 

Mr. BREEN. I do not have an answer for that. 

Senator BARRASSO. OK. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Senator, thank you. 

What we are talking about is the way to safely store AN. I mean, 

that is my perspective here. So, we want to thank the panel. 

I just want to say to the EPA, I am going to be working with you 

much more than you would like. We need to do better than point 

to an alert that was written in 1997. I have looked up, many States 

have moved beyond that type of an alert. Many States have guidance. Many other countries have guidance. 

And I would like to put in the record a June 2014 editorial in 

the Nebraska Journal Star that calls on EPA to update your Risk 

Management Plans to ensure that this type of potential explosive 

is stored safely. 

This does not seem to me to be an unsolvable problem. We have 

seen what happens when it is not stored correctly. Let us fix it. 

And you have the tools, sir, and we are going to work with you and 

if we have to against you. I mean I do not want to, but if we cannot 

work with you we are going to have to, you know, make sure this 

happens. We are going to make sure that this alert is updated, that 

this guidance is updated, and that you have perhaps a rules change 

so that what Senator Barrasso says is accurate, that this is used 

but it is used safely. 
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Thank you very much. 

[The referenced article follows:] 
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Senator BOXER. We will call up our next panel. We are sorry it 

took so long to get you up here but we are going to give you each 

5 minutes and then I will turn to Senator Vitter first to question 

because he had the tragedy most recently in his State. 

So Mr. Randall Sawyer, Dr. Rick Webre, Mr. Paul Orum, Dr. 

Sam Mannan, Mr. Kim Nibarger. And I think we are going to try 

to, if you can cut down to 4 minutes that would be far better because then we will have some time to question. 

So, let us get started. As you are seating, I am going to have to 

just move forward. 

Mr. Randall Sawyer, I am so honored you are here. You are the 

Chief Environmental Health and HazMat Officer in Contra Costa 

County, a large county in California and one that has some of these 

companies in it. So, I am very pleased you are here. Please go 

ahead. 

STATEMENT OF RANDALL SAWYER, CHIEF ENVIRONMENTAL 

HEALTH AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OFFICER, CONTRA 

COSTA HEALTH SERVICES 

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member 

Vitter. Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing. 

As you know, my name is Randy Sawyer and I am the Contra 

Costa Health Services Chief Environmental Health and Hazardous 

Materials Officer. 

Contra Costa County is a safer place to work and live because 

of the actions taken by the citizens of the county, the county’s 

Board of Supervisors, United Steelworkers local unions, the Hazardous Materials Program staff and the regulated industry. The 

safety culture of the petroleum refineries and chemical facilities 

have dramatically improved over the last 15 years. 

Contra Costa County is located on the San Francisco Bay Estuary. It is home to four petroleum refineries and several small to 

medium chemical facilities. In the 1990s, there were many chemical accidents and releases, some of which caused the death and injury of workers and impacted communities, causing the public to 

seek medical attention. 

As a result, two actions were taken to address the accidents and 

concerns raised by the community and the county’s Board of Supervisors. First was installation of the most integrated community 

warning system in the Country and the second was implementation 

of the most encompassing accidental release prevention program in 

the Country. 

The Industrial Safety Ordinance was adopted by the county and 

the city of Richmond. The Industrial Safety Ordinance requirements go beyond those required by the U.S. EPA Risk Management 

and Federal OSH Process Safety Management Programs. The Industrial Safety Ordinance requires regulated stationary sources to 

consider inherently safer alternatives, perform root cause analysis 

as part of their accident incident investigation programs, perform 

human factors analysis and perform a safety culture assessment at 

least once every 5 years. 

The Contra Costa Health Services Hazardous Materials Program 

engineers have industrial experience and perform in-depth audits 

of the regulated sources at least once every 3 years. These audits 
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may take five engineers 4 weeks to perform and may be the most 

thorough audits in the Country. 

The results of these actions is a change in the way industry does 

business in Contra Costa County. In addition to putting safeguards 

in place, they are also looking at how to avoid hazards all together. 

As a result, from May 1999 to August 2012, there was not an accidental release from a regulated source that had a major impact on 

the surrounding community or caused serious injury or death of a 

regulated sources worker. 

On October 6, 2012, the Chevron Richmond Refinery had a major 

release and fire and more than 15,000 sought medical attention. 

Five different investigations were performed, Cal OSHA issued 25 

citations with 11 being willful, 12 being serious and fines totaling 

$963,200. Chevron issued their investigation report on April 12th, 

U.S. EPA and Bay Area Air Quality Management District investigations are ongoing. 

The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board issued its 

interim report on April 19th with recommendations to Chevron, the 

city of Richmond, Contra Costa County, the State of California and 

the U.S. EPA. Contra Costa County and the city of Richmond are 

working together to address these recommendations and is in the 

process of modifying the Industrial Safety Ordinance. The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board plans to have a final 

report issued by the end of this year with additional recommendations. 

Contra Costa Health Services is hiring a third party to perform 

a safety evaluation of the refinery. The selection of the third party 

will occur next week and it is expected the work will begin in August. Governor Brown has established a task force to look at the 

refinery’s safety and the task force is planning to issue a report in 

July. 

The Community Warning System and the Industrial Safety Ordinance has made a dramatic positive impact on refinery and the 

chemical facility safety in Contra Costa County that has resulted 

in reduced accidents. Last year’s incident at Chevron Richmond underscores the need for continued vigilance around these efforts to 

prevent such occurrence and continue the overall trend toward a 

safer worker environment for the employees of the petroleum refineries and the chemical plants and a safer community for our citizens to live. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sawyer follows:] 
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Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. And thank you for taking 

action to protect my constituents. And clearly you just cannot sit 

back and wait for EPA. That is obvious. So thank you. 

Mr. SAWYER. You are welcome. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Rick Webre. And would you like to introduce 

him, David? 

Senator VITTER. Sure. I began to, in my opening. Rick Webre is 

Director of the Ascension Parish Office of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness. If there is any good news about the two 

incidents there it is that the response after the horrible accidents 

seemed to go very well, be very, very well coordinated. That is not 

by accident. It is because of a lot of work and practice. 

And so, Mr. Webre, thanks for your service and welcome. Thank 

you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF RICK WEBRE, DIRECTOR, ASCENSION PARISH 

OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 

Mr. WEBRE. Madam Chairman, Senator Vitter, I appreciate the 

opportunity to testify. 

I understand that the purpose of this hearing is to conduct oversight of Federal programs addressing chemical threats. My job is 

at the local level of government, so I will only provide insight from 

a local emergency management perspective. 

Emergency managers perform the coordination efforts for all hazards within their jurisdiction. Petrochemical threats are only one 

of these hazards. They coordinate and plan through a Local Emergency Planning Committee, or LEPC, mandated by the Federal 

Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986. 

A well-managed LEPC is one of the most critical functions that 

a community can form to prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover 

from an industrial incident. I cannot emphasize enough that all 

disasters are initially local. 

Federal legislation governing chemical threats are unfunded 

mandates that are written at the strategic level of management, 

then interpreted operationally at the State level of government. 

Unfortunately, in many cases the tactical core at the local level of 

government is either overlooked or not well enforced. I believe that 

these Federal laws are not well enforced for the following reasons. 

One is a lack of formal training and education for emergency 

managers in overseeing the LEPC. It is nearly nonexistent. 

Chairing the LEPC should be the responsibility of the duly appointed local emergency manager at the County level of government and should never be assigned to any other entity or the 

chemical industry. 

There are no consequences should a State or local government 

choose not to enforce or poorly enforce the EPCRA mandates for an 

LEPC. 

The Federal mandate to plan and coordinate with industry at the 

local level of government is unfunded. Funding that is available to 

local governments through Federal grants in many cases are retained at the State level of government. Chemical inventory filing 

fees that could assist in managing an Emergency Management Of-
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fice and coordinating with industry are at times retained at the 

State level of government. 

And metrics or standards do not exist in determining the performance level of an LEPC or SERC. 

For over a decade, new Homeland Security doctrine has been 

drafted and significantly changed the emergency management environment in this Country. However, none of this superseded legislation from the U.S. Department of Transportation governing railway 

and pipeline incidents nor any element of the EPCRA law. 

I believe that because of the new Federal doctrine, much less emphasis has been placed on EPCRA and the LEPC. However, I do 

not believe that more Federal legislation is required. I believe that 

the State and Federal legislation regarding chemical facilities, 

pipeline and railway incidents need to be compared, assessed and 

de-conflicted. 

Instructions to first responders during a chemical incident must 

be predetermined and very simplistic. Complexity can result in 

poor performance on scene. My staff has developed very complex 

emergency operations plans which are excellent documents for 

training and planning and resourcing, but they are almost useless 

during an incident. 

Creating one common operating picture between the chemical industry and the 911 center, the emergency operations center and 

the first responders on scene is absolutely critical. A simple few 

pages site-specific plan can contain the critical data that is needed. 

And I cannot express how important the radio communications 

layer is during a petrochemical incident. There are 33 chemical facilities within our jurisdiction and each of them possesses a radio 

capable of communicating directly with the 911 center, the emergency operations center and the first responders on the ground. 

They communicate while referring to a site-specific plan that I 

mentioned earlier and this is what I referred to as one common operating picture. 

None of this could have been accomplished without a having a 

strong LEPC in place. Our local chemical industry has been absolutely instrumental in coordinating with the LEPC as well as funding and managing the Ascension Parish Community Awareness 

Emergency Response Committee and the Geismar Area Mutual Aid 

Association. Between these two organizations, they fund and maintain the community siren system, defray the cost of our reverse 911 

system, manage public outreach for the near-site population, provide mutual aid across a three-county jurisdiction, and manage the 

installation of our emergency radios. 

I have been in my position for 7 years. Before June 2013, we experienced only two general emergencies resulting in zero fatalities 

and injuries. Now 2 weeks ago we experienced two general emergencies in 2 days resulting in three fatalities and over 100 injuries 

to chemical workers. 

No other injuries were sustained by first responders or the general public and no damage was reported to adjacent critical infrastructure. I attribute this in large part to the ability of the first responder community and the chemical industry being able to operate effectively under a unified command. 
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I see that my time is up. My recommendations, Madam Chairman, were included in my written testimony. 

[The prepared statement Mr. Webre follows:] 
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Senator BOXER. Thank you so very much, Mr. Webre. 

Mr. Paul Orum, Consultant, Coalition to Prevent Chemical Disasters. Welcome, sir. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL ORUM, CONSULTANT, COALITION TO 

PREVENT CHEMICAL DISASTERS 

Mr. ORUM. Good morning. My name is Paul Orum and I thank 

the Committee for the opportunity to present views important to a 

broad coalition of environmental health, labor, and community organizations. I have worked 25 years in government information 

policy on hazardous materials from the community perspective. 

We all know what happened in Texas and that chemical plant incidents are common. I will depart from my written testimony just 

for three overall points. First, the explosion at West Fertilizer was 

preventable. Second, prevention is ultimately always more effective 

than response. And third, EPA should be using existing authorities 

to do more to prevent these incidents. I hope we can agree on the 

need for better public protections. 

Returning to the specifics as listed in my written testimony, first, 

risk management planning should include reactive chemicals like 

the ammonium nitrate that detonated at West Fertilizer. Where 

there is serious potential harm to the public, reactive chemicals 

should be included in risk management planning which is, after all, 

the Clean Air Act program designed to cover such hazards. And, as 

has been noted, the Chemical Safety Board has in fact an open recommendation to EPA to do this. 

Second, management systems and controls do fail. This seems 

mundane but we should plan on it. This goes to Senator Barrasso’s 

point about rules and regulations. We should plan on failures. 

Chemical companies should be held responsible not only to understand their own hazards but also to understand less hazardous alternatives that are available in their industry. 

Surveys show that risk management planning prompts some 

companies to remove avoidable hazards and there are examples in 

my written testimony. EPA should better incorporate methods that 

prevent potential consequences into risk management planning. 

Third, the explosion in Texas illustrates the importance of the 

Clean Air Act’s general duty to operate safely. West Fertilizer was 

subject to an incomplete patchwork of regulations. The general 

duty holds firms responsible for operating safely regardless of the 

completeness or incompleteness of Government actions. We would 

strongly oppose restricting the general duty in ways that could 

hamper enforcement or prevention. 

Fourth, emergency planning notification is incomplete. The ammonium nitrate that exploded in Texas was not on the list of substances that require emergency planning notification. This is 

EPCRA 302. These notifications are only the starting point for 

emergency planning and do not guarantee follow up. Nonetheless, 

EPA should make sure that this list is more complete. 

Fifth, EPCRA inventory reporting, this is Section 312, is valuable 

but insufficient. West Fertilizer did report ammonium nitrate to 

the State of Texas, a Tier II report. However, simple reporting on 

chemical inventories is not sufficient. We need to get from providing information to assuring communication. There should be fee- 
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based programs to support prevention, pre-fire planning, inspections, drills and hazmat training for first responders. 

Sixth, independent investigations are important. The Chemical 

Safety Board provides credible public information and focused recommendations for change. When we hear about barriers to investigations such as site access and preservation, we think they 

should be resolved. 

A couple of quick issues beyond EPCRA and the Clean Air Act. 

Schools and nursing homes should not be in potential blast zones. 

State and local planners could benefit from Federal guidelines for 

safe setbacks. Site criteria for federally funded projects should take 

into account proximity to hazards. 

And then, finally, hazardous chemical operations should not be 

underinsured. 

In summary, sustained improvement is long term and involves a 

range of actions, not any one thing. But among immediate lessons 

from the recent explosions are the need for EPA to make sure that 

major recognized hazards first, are included in programs designed 

to address them, second, are subject to safer alternatives analysis 

by companies that hold them, and third, are covered by appropriate 

lists and thresholds and by the general duty to operate safely. 

Thanks for the opportunity to testify. I would be glad to take any 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Orum follows:] 
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Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Next we go to Dr. M. Sam Mannan, Regents Professor and Director, Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M. 

STATEMENT OF M. SAM MANNAN, PE, CSP, DHC, REGENTS 

PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR, MARY KAY O’CONNOR PROCESS SAFETY CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY SYSTEM 

Mr. MANNAN. Good morning, Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member 

Vitter and other distinguished members of the Committee. 

My name is Sam Mannan and I am Director of the Mary Kay 

O’Connor Process Safety Center, holder of the T. Michael O’Connor 

Chair I in Chemical Engineering, and Regents Professor at Texas 

A&M University. The center seeks to develop safer processes, 

equipment, procedures and management strategies that will minimize losses in the chemical process industries. The opinions presented during this hearing represent my personal position on these 

issues. 

Risk management and emergency planning programs to prevent 

and address chemical threats are of extreme importance for the 

protection of the work force, public and the environment. These 

programs are also of great importance for the U.S. national economy and security. 

So, what should we do in the aftermath of the incidents in West, 

Texas and Geismar, Louisiana? I believe that before we start looking at new regulations or revising regulations, we owe it to ourselves to determine if the existing regulations are being implemented and enforced in a comprehensive and universal manner. As 

I have elaborated in my written report, I do not think we are currently doing that, that is enforcing existing regulations through a 

comprehensive screen scheme and plan of inspections and audits. 

I have made a total of nine recommendations in my written report but, in order to stay within the time allotted, I will address 

a few of those. 

I sincerely believe that the establishment of a national chemical 

incident surveillance system for process safety incidents is essential. There is presently no reliable means for evaluating the performance of industry and limiting the number and severity of accidental chemical releases. 

I strongly urge Congress to mandate a risk-based study to determine the hazards and risks and develop a regulatory map of hazardous materials oversight. This study should take into consideration types of facilities, their locations, chemicals involved and 

their quantities in order to determine what agencies do or do not 

regulate these facilities. 

All Federal agencies with responsibility to regulate risk and associated issues should be required to conduct a comprehensive 

screening to determine their regulatory landscape, that is, create 

an exhaustive list of facilities covered by their respective regulations. 

Once the regulatory landscape is determined, each Federal agency should be charged with developing a plan and schedule for ensuring compliance through regular inspections. Congress should 

consider directing Federal agencies to create verifiable and certifi-
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able third party auditing and inspection systems. This approach 

has worked for ISO–9000 certifications and other programs. There 

are market-based approaches through which this regime can be implemented without causing a major burden on the regulatory authority or the regulated community. 

I urge Congress to look into ways to utilize the local emergency 

planning committee framework in a much more effective manner. 

I urge Congress to look into ways to encourage States and local 

governments to improve and enforce risk-based zoning and land 

use planning. 

In summary, I applaud Congress for providing leadership in this 

important area of risk management and emergency planning programs to prevent and address chemical threats. We have made a 

lot of progress in moving forward to overcome the challenges we 

face in using chemicals to improve our lives without hurting the industry employees, the public or the environment. 

We all can agree that chemicals do improve our lives and we also 

can agree that they can hurt us, too. And I have often said, if we 

do not the right things, they can make us extinct as well. 

This is a serious matter and I am pleased that people at the 

highest level of Government are involved in looking into this matter. 

Thank you for inviting me to present my opinions and I would 

be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mannan follows:] 
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Senator BOXER. Thank you. And then we call on, last but not 

least, Mr. Kim Nibarger. Mr. Nibarger is a Health and Safety Specialist at United Steelworkers International Union. 

STATEMENT OF KIM NIBARGER, HEALTH AND SAFETY SPECIALIST, HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT, UNITED STEELWORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION 

Mr. NIBARGER. Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Vitter and 

members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

at this hearing. 

We represent the majority of organized workers in the petrochemical industry as well as hundreds of thousands of workers who 

use chemicals on the job. I worked in a West Coast oil refinery for 

17 years. 

First I would like to point out that the two events under discussion, the explosions at the West, Texas fertilizer plant and the Williams chemical facility, are in no way isolated incidents. Also in 

April of this year, 12 workers were burned at the Exxon Mobile Refinery, two of who subsequently died from their injuries. Later that 

month, eight workers were sent to the hospital after an explosion 

and fire at the Chevron Port Arthur refinery. And on this past 

Monday, an explosion at a fertilizer plant in Indiana killed one person. 

Since 2008, the oil industry has reported an average of over 45 

fires a year. So far, 2013 appears to be right on track with 22 fires 

through June 21st. These are industry self-reported and do not include many small fires that our members bring to our attention. It 

also does not include oil rigs, pipelines or storage terminal fires 

and does not include chemical plants. 

These sometimes deadly and potentially catastrophic events take 

place all too often in this industry. The first response from industry 

after a tragedy is that the safety of their employees is their top priority. The widowed wives and husbands, children left without a father or mother, may feel differently. More must be done to prevent 

these types of incidents from occurring in the first place. 

The regulatory process relies on much self-reporting which, in essence, allows the industry to self-regulate. As seen in the November 2012 EPA Risk Management Inspection at the ExxonMobil facility in Baton Rouge, the company had never done a compliance 

audit for risk management planning although it is required to be 

done every 3 years. 

In order to assess compliance, the EPA reviewed the PSM audits, 

which they had conducted, since they were similar. The EPA evaluation found that not only were required elements missing altogether, but even where an element was addressed the company did 

not follow the appropriate technical procedures and practices. 

One of the problems with the Process Safety Management Standard which governs the health and safety of facilities using a specified volume of highly hazardous chemicals is that it is performance 

based. The standard tells you what to do but how it is done is left 

up to the company. 

This is necessary to a degree in that it allows the employer to 

bring in new technology or what is termed Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices, or RAGAGEP, to make 
338 

improvements under the standard. But what we typically see are 

employers riding on past practices, that this was RAGAGEP at the 

time it was put into place so we do not need to upgrade it now. 

OSHA is under-funded and under-staffed. The Process Safety 

Management Standard requires considerable technical expertise to 

enforce and there are not enough adequately trained compliance officers to address the PSM covered sites as is the case with RMP 

under EPA. 

The Process Safety Management Standard itself is written to require certain plans but there is no requirement that these plans be 

good, only that certain items be addressed. For example, an MOC 

meets the regulatory compliance if it is done. So, all you need is 

a check sheet or a checklist. 

We also hear that workers have stop work authority, that if they 

identify an unsafe condition they can stop the work until it is 

deemed safe to continue. That was not the case for members at the 

Chevron Richmond refinery in California. Workers who wanted to 

take the unit that caught fire off line were overruled. While as 

workers we have the authority, we certainly do not have the power. 

This is a fallacy in talking about a safety culture. It is based on 

a harmonized model. Without the power, the authority means nothing. 

While we complain about the lack of regulatory involvement, 

what about the companies’ responsibility to act? When the leak was 

discovered at Chevron, the decision should have made to de-pressure and shut the unit down based on material and volume. To 

maintain the idea that it is safer to operate a unit with a hole in 

the pipe which was not going to get better than to shut a unit down 

is absurd. If that is the case, you need to take a serious look at 

your operating procedures and parameters. Calling this type of operation risk-based management is not managing the risk at all. It 

is just taking a risk. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to raise some fears workers 

have about the state of process safety in the petrochemical industry. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nibarger follows:] 
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Senator BOXER. Thank you. It was very well said. 

I am going to ask Senator Vitter to lead off with the questions, 

then I will follow and we will finish in time to vote. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you all, again, for your work and your 

testimony. 

Mr. Webre, based on the recent Ascension Parish incidents, you 

all have demonstrated that the emergency preparedness after the 

fact is first rate. How do you coordinate and integrate your emergency management system with all of your emergency response organizations and social services and volunteers? And specifically, 

what has been your experience with the local chemical industry 

and their engagement with the Local Emergency Planning Committee? 

Mr. WEBRE. The key to making is successful, Senator, is to have 

a robust LEPC. And within our LEPC, it is all about first responder, community, fire, EMS, law enforcement communications 

as well as the chemical industry. It is looking at the risk assessments and what is the most probable from those risk assessments 

within the chemical industry. And not just the chemical industry. 

We look at it from an all hazards perspective. 

As far as the reaction from the chemical industry, they have been 

instrumental in supporting in us. I mean, our alerting and warning 

sirens, they pay for and maintain. Our reverse 911 system, our 

mass casualty bus, the CARE committee helped fund. I can go on 

and on and on about some of the things, the hazmat team, they 

have supported us on. 

I have never met one of the plant managers or any of the chemical workers that were not willing to support the LPEC. They want 

to do the right thing. They live in our community and they have 

supported us 100 percent. 

Senator VITTER. Great. Thank you. 

Dr. Mannan, one concern I have whenever something horrible 

like this happens is that it is used and abused, quite frankly, to 

advance some preexisting agenda that does not really relate to 

whatever happened. 

So, with that in mind, I want to ask you about an issue that certainly comes up here and may come up again, Inherently Safer 

Technologies. Would mandating IST have prevented the incidents 

and explosions in West, Texas or in Ascension Parish, Louisiana? 

Mr. MANNAN. Just because I am occupying the seat that the EPA 

Administrator was sitting on does not mean that it is still the hot 

seat. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MANNAN. But I appreciate your question and I think it is 

very important question to look at. 

Inherently Safer Technology, there is no question that that is 

something that should be looked at, something that should be evaluated. But I am still, as I have testified before in other Committee 

in Congress, I am still not sure that inherent safety as a regulation 

is a good thing to do because you have got to understand, this is 

not a technology that you just take off the shelf and implement. 

And there are lots of opportunities for unintended consequences to 

occur, like risk transfers, accumulation and things like that. 
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Having said that, exactly what it would have done in the case 

of West or Geismar, I think we have to wait and see what actual 

root cause the investigations indicate. I know a little bit more 

about West because we have been looking into that much more 

closely. 

I can tell you this. They were covered by OSHA 109. And if you 

look at OSHA 109, a lot of those requirements that are in there, 

if they had followed that, my guess is the probability of this incident would have been almost none. 

And if you think about it, what would IST have caused them to 

do? Well, naturally they could have looked for alternate chemicals. 

That is a possibility and we should always look at that. They could 

have looked at the issue of contamination and all of that. 

But my point is, if any of that is put in, the ultimate issue still 

comes down to enforcement. And until we come up with a regime 

where we are doing the enforcement comprehensively in a manner 

that yields good results, we are not going to accomplish anything. 

We just add another legislation that does not get enforced. 

Senator VITTER. Great. Thank you all very much. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. The vote started at 11:35. I am going 

to do my questions and if there is a timeframe left, I will ask Senator Boozman. 

Does anyone disagree with what I am about to say? So, listen 

carefully. And if you disagree, please speak up. If you prevent ammonium nitrate from being exposed to fire, would that not be an 

obvious safety measure? So, would you agree that if you, just forget 

about all of the ifs, ands and buts around it, if it is isolated from 

fire, that would be a measure. Does anyone disagree with that? 

No. So, to me, what I like to do in my life is kind of take the 

big, complicated issues and see can we start somewhere. So, it 

seems to me we know this. It almost seems to me we know, as a 

result of this important hearing, that the Chemical Safety Board 

had made that suggestion in 2002. We also know from the EPA 

that they have not done that and we also know that their safety 

alert goes back to 1997 and has not been updated. 

So, for my question, I want to talk to Mr. Orum who is looking 

at the issue overall. And as I listened to you, and I went over your 

recommendations, you talk about the general duty clause that 

holds firms responsible for understanding and managing their 

chemical hazards regardless of what the Government does or does 

not do. And I think it is worth repeating that the industry has an 

obligation. Am I stating that correctly, Mr. Orum? 

Mr. ORUM. Yes. We basically do not want to see a situation 

where Government actions are deliberately tied up in delay and 

then the Government is unable to use prevention strategies or enforcement and these delays—— 

Senator BOXER. Well, that is not answering my question. Is it 

your opinion that the general duty clause holds firms responsible 

for understanding and managing their chemical hazards regardless 

of Government actions or lack of actions? 

Mr. ORUM. Well, yes. 

Senator BOXER. OK. That is what I want to get at. And do you 

also believe, I mean, you have written this but I just want it so 

clear in your testimony, you wrote that risk management planning 
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should include reactive chemicals like that ammonium nitrate that 

detonated at West Fertilizer. Very straightforward recommendation. Do you stand behind that? 

Mr. ORUM. Yes. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. OK. I mean, I do agree with Mr. Mannan that 

you have to enforce. I mean, you could put out the alerts, you can 

change the regs, but you still have to send out folks to enforce. 

But I have to say, it is a bad example to use these days, but 

practically all of us do pay our taxes regardless of the fact that 

some people may say well that tax is unfair and I do not like the 

IRS. Obviously, most of us are not audited and most of us do the 

right thing. 

So at some point, I mean we are not going to be able to look at 

every single thing, but let me ask you specifically, since you talked 

about enforcement, in the case of West could you point to one particular regulation that, if it was enforced, could have prevented 

what happened at West, since you site the lack of enforcement of 

existing regs as a problem? 

What, give me an example of what enforcement could have 

stopped this problem, of the existing laws? 

Mr. MANNAN. Thank you, Chairman Boxer, for that question. 

Specifically OSHA 1910.109, the Explosive and Blasting Agents 

Standard, that has a paragraph (i) that is specific to ammonium nitrate. 

Senator BOXER. OK. 

Mr. MANNAN. And in there, I will quote just one part, it says ammonium nitrate shall be in a separate building or shall be separated by approved-type firewalls of not less than 1 hour fire resistance rating from storage of organic and on and on. 

Right there is just one critical element of what you said. Separate ammonium nitrate from combustible—— 

Senator BOXER. OK. So, are you saying that if OSHA had inspected, they would have caught this problem? 

Mr. MANNAN. If OSHA had some competent inspector who had 

gone there on a regular basis and made that enforcement, yes, they 

would have looked at that. 

Senator BOXER. So, the company is in violation of an OSHA 

standard? 

Mr. MANNAN. It is in violation of an OSHA standard if what we 

are seeing and hearing now is true. 

Senator BOXER. All right. And does that mean that all large facilities are in violation of the OSHA standard if they do not store 

AN separately? 

Mr. MANNAN. I would have to look at that. 

Senator BOXER. Or most facilities? 

Mr. MANNAN. Most of them, yes, if they do not follow the standard they are in violation. 

Senator BOXER. Well, it would be nice if the EPA did a little bit 

of consulting with OSHA and their alert could update, update their 

alert to state that OSHA has this regulation. That would be the 

minimum they ought to do this afternoon. 

Do you know what year that OSHA regulation went into place? 

Mr. MANNAN. No, Madam Chairman, I do not. But if I could take 

just a few seconds to say something. 
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Senator BOXER. Please, go ahead. 

Mr. MANNAN. OSHA has 109 in the books. While EPA issued the 

guidance and should, as you suggested, updated that guidance, we 

all should be careful that we should not have overlapping regulations. So, if OSHA, through 109, can accomplish the objectives, that 

is what we should do. 

Senator BOXER. Well, see, I do not agree with that at all. If this 

can cause multiple deaths, it does not bother me that a couple of 

health and safety agencies have similar laws on the books. But let 

me just stop you there because I want to give some time to the 

Senator because the vote has how many minutes left? Four minutes left. 

Can I just say thank you, all of you. I mean, I am so happy you 

are here. This was very important. I am going to be following up 

with a very important letter to, which will include the White 

House, about what needs to be done and you have all really helped 

me, all of you, each of you. Senator. 

Senator BOOZMAN. I also want to thank you for being here. I 

apologize for just being here at the end. I had a conflict with a 

markup in another Committee. 

But in the interest of time, Madam Chair, I think what I would 

like to do is just submit my questions for the record and see if we 

can get it done that way. Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Of course. Senator, absolutely. And I have other 

questions as well that I was unable to do because we have these 

very big votes now on immigration. 

So, we are going to head out. Thank you to all. If our Tim is still 

here, I think he is, again I want to say thank you so very much 

for being here and we, I want you to know, and you tell the family, 

that we are not stopping until we make positive reforms that will 

make the likelihood of this far less than it is today. 

And to the Chemical Safety Board, if I could just say something 

to you, in this particular case, and you know, I do not know what 

you are going to do tomorrow, I just, you are my heroes in this. 

And please do exactly what you are doing, get to the bottom of this, 

and do not be afraid to say what you believe. It is critically important. And I am very proud of the work you have done. 

Thank you very much. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:] 
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