1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER ON MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

WANECHEK MINK RANCH and SMITH

MINK RANCH CORPORATION, on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v.

ALASKA BROKERAGE INTERNATIONAL.

INC., et al., 

Defendants. 

CASE NO. C06-89RSM 

ORDER ON MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

Certain defendants have moved for reconsideration of the Court’s May 5, 2009 Order denying

their motions to dismiss. Dkt. # 166. Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and will be denied in

the absence of “a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal

authority which could not have been brought to its attention earlier. . . .” Local Rule CR 7(h)(1). The

Court deems it unnecessary to direct defendants to respond to the motion. 

Defendants contend that the Court should reconsider its ruling based on “new controlling

precedent” found in a Supreme Court opinion issued May 18, 2009. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937

(2009). However, the Supreme Court in Iqbal simply applied the pleading requirements set forth in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) in the context of a prisoner civil rights (“Bivens”)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDER ON MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION - 1

action; it did not announce any new precedent. This Court applied Twombley in its analysis in deciding

the motion to dismiss, and that analysis is not affected by the “new precedent.”

Defendants attempt to use this new Supreme Court opinion to re-argue matters already decided. 

In so doing, they have selectively quoted from the Court’s Order, focusing on the Court’s repeated use

of the word “agreed” rather than on the details of the substance of the agreements. See, Motion for

Reconsideration, Dkt. # 166, p. 4 lines12 - 18. The actual language used by the Court summarized the

allegations of plaintiffs’ Amended and Consolidated Class Action which it found sufficient to meet the

Twombley pleading requirements. These were that the defendants “allocated certain lots among

themselves, agreed not to bid on certain lots, agreed to a collusive bidding strategy, and agreed to

distribute pelts acquired by one Defendant at auction to other Defendants. . . . Further, defendants

agreed to bid and pay, and did bid and pay, artificially low prices for the furs sold by Plaintiffs and

other members of the Class.” Order, Dkt. # 164, p. 3 (emphasis in original). While the Court

emphasized the word “agreed,” it was not the simple allegation of “agreement,” but the actual substance

of the acts to which the defendants allegedly agreed, which rendered the allegations sufficient under

Twombley. Defendants renewed argument that these are simply conclusory allegations is unpersuasive. 

 Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is accordingly DENIED, for failure to meet the standard

set forth in Local Rule CR 7(h)(1). 

Dated this _6_ day of July, 2009.

A

RICARDO S. MARTINEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE