United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 22-30546 

____________ 

Vanoy Allen, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Incorporated, 

 

Defendant—Appellee, 

Our Lady of the Lake Hospital Physicians Group, L.L.C., 

Respondent—Appellee. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana 

USDC No. 3:19-CV-575 

______________________________ 

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Stewart and Dennis, Circuit 

Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Vanoy Allen alleges she was subjected to a hostile work environment 

due to her race while employed at Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc. 

_____________________ 

*

 This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

May 5, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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2 

(Hospital) and brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. She further alleges 

that this treatment constituted constructive discharge in violation of Title VII 

and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted summary judgment in favor 

of the Hospital on both claims. Because Allen failed to raise a genuine dispute 

of material fact as to whether her treatment rose to the level of a hostile work 

environment or constructive discharge and the evidence is insufficient as a 

matter of law to support her claims, we affirm. 

I

Allen began working as a registered nurse (RN) at the Hospital in 

2011, then in 2012 was in the Cardiac Intensive Care Unit (CICU), and 

transferred to the Heart and Vascular Universal Cardiac Unit (HVCU) in 

2013. In December 2014, Allen changed her employment status from RN to 

PRN, which indicated that she worked on an “as needed” basis to provide 

supplemental staffing. Evidence in the record indicates PRNs did not receive 

the same benefits as fulltime nurses. She continued to work as a PRN until 

she resigned in October 2018. 

When Allen was categorized as an RN, she performed some shifts as 

a charge nurse, a position with higher pay. However, she stopped receiving 

charge nurse shifts when she voluntarily changed her employment status to 

PRN. Kathy Hussain, a supervisor, testified that generally, the expectations 

were that PRN nurses would not perform in the charge role and generally 

would not admit patients directly from the Operating Room immediately post 

open heart surgery. 

Allen alleges she faced discrimination while working at the Hospital. 

She filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC) on December 15, 2017, alleging discrimination based 

on race, age, and retaliation. The EEOC found no cause and issued a right to 

sue letter in 2019. Allen then filed this lawsuit pro se. 

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In her complaint, Allen alleged racial discrimination, racial 

harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act1

and Louisiana state law; racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981; and intentional infliction of emotional distress and age discrimination 

under Louisiana state law. The Hospital filed a motion for partial dismissal, 

and the district court dismissed: Allen’s race discrimination, harassment, age 

discrimination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims brought 

under state law; hostile work environment and harassment claims to the 

extent they went beyond the scope of the EEOC charge; and allegations 

relating to discrete acts of discrimination more than three hundred days 

before the EEOC charge. 

Allen then retained counsel and filed an amended complaint, which 

asserted a race-based hostile work environment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 

and constructive discharge and retaliation claims under Title VII and 42 

U.S.C. § 1981. The Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, which 

Allen opposed as to her hostile work environment and constructive discharge 

claims. She did not oppose the motion for summary judgment regarding her 

retaliation claim. 

The district court granted the Hospital’s motion for summary 

judgment. The district court entered final judgment, and Allen timely 

appealed the dismissal of her hostile work environment and constructive 

discharge claims. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. 

The district court summarized Allen’s evidence as: 

[T]he sum of Plaintiffs[’] competent summary judgment 

evidence shows the following: Dr. Boedefeld publicly 

_____________________ 

1

 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. 

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complained that Plaintiff was hired only because she was Black 

(in 2012/2013); Dr. Boedefeld twice refused to discuss cases 

with Plaintiff (in 2012/2013); Dr. Boedefeld twice publicly 

yelled at Plaintiff (in 2012/2013); Dr. Boedefeld once 

“questioned” Plaintiff’s supervisor (in 2017); a co-worker 

once publicly referred to Plaintiff as a “bitch” (in 2016); 

Supervisor Hussain once said at a staff meeting “Vanoy you 

don’t have a voice” (unspecified date); Plaintiff once 

requested to work a shift in the CICU, and the shift was 

awarded instead to two “full-time nurses” from another unit 

(in 2018); and, finally, Supervisor Hussain once refused 

Plaintiffs[’] request for a meeting to discuss Plaintiff’s annual 

performance review (in 2018). 

The district court concluded that “[e]ven assuming that all of the foregoing 

slights were racially motivated, the aggregate of these insults falls well-short 

of what is required to save a hostile work environment claim from summary 

judgment” and that the burden for a constructive discharge claim was even 

higher. 

Allen argues that the district court also should have credited 

(1) evidence that white nurses Paulette Savoy and Dani Coss were given 

charge nurse duties while under PRN status, which resulted in higher pay, 

even though Allen was not; (2) testimony from Melissa White, a secretary, 

indicating “that white nurses were given charge nurse shifts 90% of the 

time;” (3) testimony from Barbara Hill that Dr. Boedefeld made generalized 

complaints about black nurses when Allen was not present and “reneged on 

a directive to fire a nurse upon learning she was white, and not black;” 

(4) unauthenticated interview notes from Samantha Valentine showing that 

white nurses were permitted to attend a training that black nurses were not; 

and (5) evidence a co-worker once referred to Allen as “hostile” when 

talking to a supervisor. 

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II

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same standard as the district court.2

 “We will affirm the district 

court’s decision if we ‘find that no genuine issue of material fact remained 

for trial and that judgment was proper as a matter of law.’”3

 “An issue of 

material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmovant,”4

 and the “facts must be particularized, not vague or 

conclusory.”5

 “While we review the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, ‘conclusional allegations and unsubstantiated 

assertions may not be relied on as evidence by the nonmoving party.’”6

 We 

will first address Allen’s hostile work environment claim and then address 

her constructive discharge claim. 

A

Allen argues that the district court erred in dismissing her hostile work 

environment claim. As the district court explained, courts apply the same 

rubric to analyze racial discrimination claims under Title VII and under 42 

_____________________ 

2 See West v. City of Hous., 960 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing 

Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 2019)). 

3 Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 893 F.2d 98, 102 (5th Cir. 1990)); see also Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). 

4 Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 

5 Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 161 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Kariuki 

v. Tarango, 709 F.3d 495, 505 (5th Cir. 2013)). 

6 West, 960 F.3d at 740 (citing Carnaby v. City of Hous., 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 

2011)). 

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U.S.C. § 1981.7 “To survive summary judgment on a hostile work 

environment claim based on race . . . discrimination, a plaintiff must show 

that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered unwelcomed 

harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her membership in a protected 

class; (4) the harassment ‘affected a term, condition, or privilege of 

employment’; and (5) ‘the employer knew or should have known’ about the 

harassment and ‘failed to take prompt remedial action.’”8

 “To be 

actionable, the work environment must be ‘both objectively and subjectively 

offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one 

that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.’”9

The district court’s analysis primarily assessed the fourth factor, 

whether the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or 

privilege of employment. “To affect a term, condition, or privilege of 

employment, the harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 

the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working 

environment.”10 “The alleged conduct must be objectively and subjectively 

hostile or abusive,” and “[t]he totality of the employment circumstances 

determines whether an environment is objectively hostile.”11 “Although no 

single factor is determinative, pertinent considerations are (1) ‘the frequency 

of the discriminatory conduct’; (2) ‘its severity’; (3) ‘whether it is physically 

_____________________ 

7 See Johnson v. PRIDE Indus., Inc., 7 F.4th 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2021); Lauderdale v. 

Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., Institutional Div., 512 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 2007). 

8 West, 960 F.3d at 741 (quoting Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 

2002)). 

9 Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998)). 

10 West, 960 F.3d at 741-42 (quoting Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 

473, 479 (5th Cir. 2008)). 

11 Id. at 742 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993)). 

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threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance’; and (4) ‘whether 

it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’”12 In 

determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, we consider 

whether a reasonable jury could find the conduct so severe or pervasive as to 

alter a term or condition of employment.13 We agree with the district court 

that Allen failed to provide evidence that would defeat summary judgment. 

1

We begin by analyzing whether the evidence credited by the district 

court is sufficient for Allen’s claim to survive summary judgment. First, 

although we do not require a plaintiff to show a certain number of instances 

of harassment,14 Allen has failed to show that the harassment she faced was 

frequent.15 The evidence credited by the district court consists of ten 

_____________________ 

12 Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). 

13 See Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2005). 

14 See E.E.O.C. v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Under 

the totality of the circumstances test, a single incident of harassment, if sufficiently severe, 

could give rise to a viable Title VII claim as well as a continuous pattern of much less severe 

incidents of harassment.” (citations omitted)). 

15 Compare West, 960 F.3d at 742 (concluding plaintiff failed to show her 

harassment was frequent or pervasive when some conduct occurred “once,” “twice,” or 

“occasionally” and plaintiff failed to provide evidence of frequency of “other complainedof conduct”), Mendoza v. Helicopter, 548 F. App’x 127, 129 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) 

(unpublished) (“[T]he complained of conduct occurred sporadically over a several year 

period and cannot accurately be described as pervasive.”), and Hockman v. Westward 

Commc’ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding conduct was not 

pervasive when the plaintiff “did not even estimate how many times [the] conduct 

occurred”), with Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435, 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2011) 

(holding a genuine dispute existed when the plaintiff “endured a pattern of name-calling of 

a half-dozen times daily” that “may have interfered with his pecuniary interests” and 

when, “[o]n many occasions, there were incidents of physical intimidation and/or 

violence” involving the plaintiff’s supervisor), Lauderdale v. Tex. Dept. of Crim. Just., 512 

F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding harassment pervasive when plaintiff received 

unwanted phone calls “ten to fifteen times a night for almost four months”), and FarpellaCase: 22-30546 Document: 00516739994 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/05/2023
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incidents over seven years. Allen argues that the district court erred by 

requiring her to show she suffered from severe and pervasive conduct 

amounting to a certain number of harassing incidents. Allen is correct that 

the standard is severe or pervasive and that, by requiring conduct to be both 

severe and pervasive, the district court “impose[d] a more stringent burden 

on [her] than required by law.”16 Even so, none of her allegations 

substantiated by evidence are sufficiently egregious that they are actionable 

without being pervasive.17

 Additionally, Allen has failed to show that the alleged actions were 

severe, physically threatening, or humiliating. Hostile work environment 

claims are not intended to function as a “general civility code.”18 Sporadic 

use of abusive language, one shift denial, and one refused meeting are not 

severe or humiliating under the governing standard,19 and Allen has not 

alleged any physical threats. 

_____________________ 

Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding harassing 

conduct was pervasive when it was described as occurring “two or three times a week”). 

16 See Harvill, 433 F.3d at 435. 

17 See id. at 435-36; Dailey v. Shintech, Inc., 629 F. App’x 638, 640, 644 (5th Cir. 

2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming grant of summary judgment for employer on 

hostile work environment claim even though plaintiff’s supervisor called him “a ‘black 

little motherf—r’ on at least two occasions,” the supervisor said “he would ‘kick his black 

a—s,’” and a coworker called plaintiff “a ‘ni—er’”). 

18 See Lauderdale, 512 F.3d at 163 (“Title VII . . . is not a ‘general civility code,’ and 

‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will 

not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” 

(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998))). 

19 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (“Properly applied, [the standards for judging 

hostility] will filter out complaints attacking ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, 

such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional 

teasing.’”) (quoting B. Lindemann & D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in 

Employment Law 175 (1992)); Vallecillo v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 155 F. 

App’x 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (concluding that supervisors 

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 Finally, Allen has not alleged that these actions prevented her from 

succeeding in the workplace. On the contrary, she argues that “[t]he fact 

that Allen continued to perform her job well, and that [the Hospital] did not 

discipline her, or terminate her employment in the traditional sense, should 

not detract from [Allen]’s showing of pervasive or severe conduct sufficient 

to alter the terms and conditions of her employment.” 

 Therefore, even assuming, as the district court did, that all the actions 

were based on Allen’s race, the evidence is insufficient to survive summary 

judgment.20 Objectively, a reasonable person would not find the actions 

Allen experienced to be offensive enough to constitute a hostile work 

environment.21 We now turn to the evidence that Allen argues was 

improperly credited or not credited by the district court. 

_____________________ 

calling the plaintiff “Che Guevara” and an “aggressive Hispanic” were “not sufficiently 

severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment” “even if these statements 

can be classified as racially offensive”). 

20 See, e.g., Friend v. McAdams, 861 F. App’x 825, 830 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) 

(unpublished) (concluding evidence African American employee was assigned to work 

under captain who (1) did not like black people; (2) screamed at her; (3) did not name her 

to her preferred position’ (4) refused to meet with her; (5) stated she would not be around 

much longer; (6) directed a supervisor to write up things she did wrong; (7) became upset 

when her name was mentioned; and (8) required her in her role as a police officer to dismiss 

tickets issued to white people did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive); Harris v. Drax 

Biomass Inc., 813 F. App’x 945, 948 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished) (holding 

evidence that plaintiff (1) was yelled at for not doing job correctly; (2) requested but did not 

receive training on certain equipment; (3) heard racist comments made by supervisor to a 

different African American employee; and (4) would not be allowed by supervisor to wait 

in a group of African American employees for work to begin to be insufficiently severe or 

pervasive). 

21 See Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009). 

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2 

Allen argues that the district court erred by crediting testimony from 

Hussain that PRN nurses would generally not perform the charge nurse role. 

Allen argues that (1) her testimony and the testimony of Coss and Savoy 

discredit the testimony of Hussain; (2) the written guidelines were not 

created until after she was denied charge nurse shifts; and (3) Hussain is an 

interested witness. Allen’s testimony included “that she believed she was 

denied charge nurse shifts because of her race” and that she asked Hussain 

and her supervisors why she was not given charge nurse shifts and they 

responded with no reason until eventually informing her that it was because 

she was a PRN. Coss and Savoy’s testimony included that they were white 

and received charge nurse shifts despite being PRN nurses. 

The district court explained that Allen “fail[ed] to specifically cite 

evidence controverting that PRN nurses ‘provide supplemental staffing’” 

and “traditionally did ‘not perform in the charge role and generally would 

not admit patients directly from the Operating Room immediately post open 

heart surgery.” The district court, citing Allen’s opposition to summary 

judgment, concluded that “a fair reading of her evidence tends to support” 

certain shifts not generally being available to nurses with PRN status. In 

explaining why it did not credit Allen’s evidence of discriminatory shift 

denials, the district court stated that “Plaintiff contends that from 2014 

onward, [the Hospital] systematically refused to schedule her for charge 

nurse shifts or for fresh post open heart surgery shifts—i.e., precisely the 

shifts that were not traditionally available to PRNs under [the Hospital’s] 

unwritten and written guidance.” 

Evidence that two white PRN nurses received charge nurse shifts, 

Allen’s supervisors did not immediately provide her with an explanation for 

her shift assignments, and a policy not initially in writing does not create a 

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genuine dispute of material fact regarding a hostile work environment. Allen 

admits that she acted as a charge nurse while she worked as an RN but 

stopped receiving charge nurse shifts when she voluntarily changed to PRN 

status. Additionally, Allen admitted in her opposition to summary judgment 

that the Hospital had a policy regarding tasks for PRN nurses, though she 

disputed that it was consistently applied. Allen has failed to show a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to why she was denied charge nurse shifts after 

changing to PRN status. 

3 

Allen argues that the district court “erroneously raised or altered 

Allen’s burden of proof and erroneously declined to consider CSR White’s 

deposition testimony.” In her deposition, White testified that she could not 

remember how often white nurses would be assigned charge nurse shifts and 

could not remember having previously told Allen’s counsel that ninety 

percent of the time charge shift nurses were white. However, Allen’s counsel 

played back a recording of a prior conversation to refresh White’s memory. 

After her recollection was refreshed, White was asked: “Is that correct, then, 

your belief that about 90 percent of the time the white nurses would be given 

charge nurse shifts?” and responded: “Yes, because it may have had seven 

Caucasian nurses versus three black nurses, but the seven Caucasian nurses 

may have had more experience at being a charge nurse.” 

The district court stated that if it was established that ninety percent 

of the time white nurses were assigned to be charge nurses, “conceivably” 

that “could be relevant to Plaintiff’s remaining claims of hostile work 

environment and constructive discharge.” However, it stated “that this 

testimony is too vague and conclusory for purposes of creating an issue of fact 

at summary judgment. Accordingly, it is disregarded.” 

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Allen argues the district court placed a higher burden on her than is 

appropriate at summary judgement because it required her to “‘definitively’ 

establish or prove that white nurses were given charge nurse shifts 90% of the 

time” whereas she only needed to raise a genuine issue of fact. Further, she 

argues that the testimony was not vague or conclusory. However, we agree 

with the district court that, especially in light of the conflicting evidence that 

Allen was denied the shifts due to her status as a PRN, White’s testimony 

was too vague to raise a genuine issue of fact. It was proper for the district 

court to disregard the evidence on this ground.22

4 

Finally, we need not decide whether the district court erred by not 

crediting (1) testimony from Barbara Hill that Dr. Boedefeld made 

generalized complaints about black nurses when Allen was not present and 

“reneged on a directive to fire a nurse upon learning she was white, and not 

black;” (2) unauthenticated interview notes from Samantha Valentine 

showing white nurses were permitted to attend training that black nurses 

were not; and (3) evidence that a co-worker once referred to Allen as 

“hostile” when talking to a supervisor. Assuming arguendo that this evidence 

is credible, it shows that complaints were made about black nurses outside of 

_____________________ 

22 See Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 161 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[W]hen 

we have held self-serving affidavits or depositions insufficient to create a fact issue, it is 

because their contents were either conclusory, vague, or not based on personal 

knowledge.” (citations omitted)); Kariuki v. Tarango, 709 F.3d 495, 505 (5th Cir. 2013) 

(“[W]ithout more, a vague or conclusory affidavit is insufficient to create a genuine issue 

of material fact in the face of conflicting probative evidence.” (citation omitted)); TIG Ins. 

Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating a non-movant 

cannot defeat summary judgment by presenting “conclus[ory] allegations and denials, 

speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic 

argumentation” (citation omitted)). 

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Allen’s presence,23 Allen may have missed one training event,24 and a 

coworker once insulted Allen. Even were we to consider this additional 

evidence, the totality of the evidence is insufficient to support a hostile work 

environment claim. 

Allen argues for the first time in her reply brief that other evidence 

also created genuine issues of material fact. However, issues raised for the 

first time in a reply brief are forfeited.25

We agree with the district court that Allen has failed to raise a genuine 

dispute of material fact regarding whether the harassment was severe or 

pervasive. We therefore do not address the remaining factors. Because the 

district court did not err in determining that there was no genuine dispute of 

material fact as to Allen’s hostile work environment claim and that the 

Hospital was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the 

dismissal of Allen’s hostile work environment claim. 

B

Allen argues that the evidence above creates genuine issues of material 

fact which preclude the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment as to 

Allen’s constructive discharge claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. 

As the district court ably explained, “[t]o prove a constructive discharge, a 

‘plaintiff must establish that working conditions were so intolerable that a 

_____________________ 

23 See Septimus v. Univ. of Hous., 399 F.3d 601, 612 (5th Cir. 2005) (examining sexbased hostile work environment and stating “[a]ll of [plaintiff]’s other summary judgment 

evidence on this claim pertained to other women in the [company], not [plaintiff], and 

therefore is not relevant”). 

24 See Harris v. Drax Biomass Inc., 813 F. App’x 945, 948 (5th Cir. 2020) (per 

curiam) (unpublished) (holding evidence not severe or pervasive even though plaintiff 

requested but did not receive training on certain equipment). 

25 See United States v. Ponce, 896 F.3d 726, 727 (5th Cir. 2018). 

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reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.’”26 This “requires a 

greater degree of harassment than that required by a hostile environment 

claim.”27 The district court correctly reasoned that because Allen did not 

show a sufficiently hostile environment to support a hostile work 

environment claim, she cannot succeed on her constructive discharge 

claim.28 We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim. 

C

Finally, Allen argues that the district court erred by failing to rule on 

her motion to compel discovery prior to ruling on summary judgment. 

According to Allen, the motion to compel discovery requested information 

regarding “potential comparators.” The district court reasoned that 

comparator evidence could not save Allen’s hostile work environment or 

constructive discharge claims “because such evidence is not relevant to the 

dispositive issue of whether [Allen] was subjected to objectively severe, 

pervasive, and/or intolerable harassment” and Allen had “waived the right 

to argue that comparator evidence is relevant . . . by failing to even brief the 

issue.” An argument is forfeited if the party with the burden of proof or 

persuasion fails to brief it in the district court.29 We therefore do not address 

it here. 

_____________________ 

26 Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Faruki v. 

Parsons, 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997)). 

27 Id. (citing Benningfield v. City of Hous., 157 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir.1998)); see also

Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 512 F.3d 157, 167 (5th Cir. 2007). 

28 See Vallecillo v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 155 F. App’x 764, 768 (5th Cir. 

2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citation omitted). 

29 See Grogan v. Kumar, 873 F.3d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 2017). 

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* * * 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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