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95–576 2015

POLITICAL PLURALISM IN THE OSCE 

MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 16, 2014 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 


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(II) 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

SENATE HOUSE 

BENJAMIN CARDIN, Maryland, 

Chairman 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

ROGER WICKER, Mississippi 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey, 

Co-Chairman 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 


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POLITICAL PLURALISM IN THE OSCE 

MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS 

JULY 16, 2014 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Chairman, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 1 

Hon. Alcee Hastings, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 3 

Hon. Steve Cohen, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 4 

WITNESSES 

William Roebuck, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Egypt and 

Maghreb Affairs, Department of State .................................. 4 

William Taylor, Vice President for Middle East and Africa, 

United States Institute for Peace (USIP) .............................. 13 

Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, University of Maryland ................................................ 15 

Zeinab Abdelkarim, Regional Director for Middle East and 

North Africa, International Foundation for Electoral Systems .......................................................................................... 19 

APPENDICES 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin Cardin ........................ 31 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Alcee Hastings ............................ 33 

Prepared Statement of William Roebuck .................................. 34 

Prepared Statement of William Taylor ..................................... 38 

Prepared Statement of Shibley Telhami ................................... 40 

Prepared Statement of Zeinab Abdelkarim .............................. 42 


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POLITICAL PLURALISM IN THE OSCE 

MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS 

JULY 16, 2014 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, Washington, DC. 

The hearing was held from 10:00 a.m. to 11:47 a.m. in Capitol 

Visitor Center Room SVC 203/202, Washington, D.C., Senator Benjamin Cardin, Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Steve Cohen, 

Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; 

and Hon. Alcee Hastings, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: William Roebuck, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Egypt and Maghreb Affairs, Department of State; William Taylor, Vice President for Middle East and Africa, United States Institute for Peace (USIP); Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for 

Peace and Development, University of Maryland; Zeinab 

Abdelkarim, Regional Director for Middle East and North Africa, 

International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 

HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, welcome to the Helsinki Commission hearing. 

I want to welcome everyone here. It’s a pleasure to have this hearing on the OSCE, ‘‘Political Pluralism in the OSCE Mediterranean 

Partners,’’ and I’m particularly pleased that Congressman Hastings 

is with us because—Alcee, the ranking Democrat on the Helsinki 

Commission in the House, has been the leader on the Mediterranean partnership issues, and he has invested a great deal of time 

by his personal visits to the region. And the last hearing that we 

had on the Mediterranean partnership was in 2009, I’ve been told, 

and that was coupled with the international seminar of parliamentarians from the region that Congressman Hastings organized, and 

one of the most, I think, productive discussions that we had that 

led to some very concrete proposals, so it’s good now that we have 

another opportunity to evaluate where we are. 

And let me just make a couple brief opening comments, and then 

I’m going to turn it to my colleague for his comments. The OSCE, 

as I think everyone here knows, consists of 57 participating states. 

But that’s not the borders of the OSCE influence, as is clear from 

the Partners for Co-operation that we do have. And we do have, in 

the Mediterranean, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and TuVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:34 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095576 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A576.XXX A576

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nisia that are Partners for Co-operation. And they recognize the 

value of the OSCE document. They understood that this is a consensus organization, so you’re not giving up any of your sovereignty 

by being—participating in the OSCE. They recognize the value of 

the OSCE in dialogue, to sit down and talk with your neighbors 

and resolve issues. And they recognize the core principles of the 

OSCE that deal with issues of respect of territorial integrity, that 

deal with peaceful resolutions of conflicts, and the core values that 

recognize that security is not just your military might, but also 

your commitment to economic justice and your commitment to good 

governance and human rights. And that’s why the Helsinki OSCE 

principles have been so widely desired and has had a major impact 

within the Mediterranean partnership itself. 

Coming out of the seminar that I referred to in 2009 that Congressman Hastings was instrumental in convening, that seminar 

recommended functional partnership initiatives with our Mediterranean partners, including projects for youth exchange and 

broader accessibility of the OSCE initiatives for participants from 

the region. Our efforts also identified priorities for more leadership 

of the Mediterranean partnership from the region, which has become particularly relevant with the emerging empowerment of 

long-disenfranchised voices of political opposition. 

The OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly have been able to 

generate unique opportunities for assistance in this new area of regional cooperation. For example, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly was able to deploy an observation and assistance mission for 

the October 2011 elections to the Tunisian Constituent National 

Assembly. So they’re using our mechanisms as a result of the initiatives that the Helsinki Commission has moved forward with on 

the Mediterranean partners. 

The OSCE has been able facilitate exchanges with young diplomats from the region to serve in the OSCE Secretariat. And additionally, key materials from the thematic units of the OSCE and 

ODIHR have been translated into Arabic. So we think we’ve made 

a lot of progress in this region. Civil society and experts from the 

region have become increasingly active in the OSCE events and 

dialogue opportunities, coupled with expert visits from the OSCE 

institutions to advise governments as they review their structural 

reforms. 

All of these activities have been possible through the OSCE Partnership Fund of extraordinary budget contributions from participating states and partners. These activities truly demonstrate the 

depth of the relationship stemming back to Helsinki Final Act of 

1975, and leading us into the future. 

I might just point out that in Baku, the 23rd annual Parliamentary Assembly meeting that took place just a few days ago, the 

partners were very much present, and we had very good discussions, and they were totally engaged in the work. They don’t have 

a vote, but they were totally engaged in the work. They treat their 

partnership with OSCE as a real opportunity for progress in their 

countries. 

And I might just add: The experience of the Mediterranean partners has generated a lot of interest in other regions of the world 

to use the OSCE framework. As we all know, President Park of the 


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Republic of Korea, when she addressed a joint session of Congress, 

mentioned that she would like to have a dialogue opportunity with 

the countries in the Northeast Asia region. As a result of that suggestion, I have followed up with the countries in Northeast Asia. 

I chair the Asian—Northeast Asia—the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I have followed up, and we are engaged to see whether they want to work 

within the OSCE itself or set up a similar mechanism for dialogue 

and cooperation. 

So we’re very proud of the progress that we have made and this 

hearing gives us an opportunity to hear firsthand from some—from 

experts as to how we can build on the success that we’ve made, 

planning into the future. 

And with that, let me turn it over to Congressman Hastings for 

his comments. 

HON. ALCEE HASTINGS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Senator. I think you’ve 

summed up real adequately a number of our activities. I’d like to 

thank you for holding this hearing, in addition to thank our presenters who are here as well as our distinguished guests that are 

present. 

I spent a number of years traveling among all of our Mediterranean partners on behalf of several different OSCE Parliamentary 

Assembly presidents. And even before the Arab awakening, I 

sought, along with others, to empower the voices of the disenchanted in the region and to press those who were in power to 

let pluralism flourish. From Rabat to Cairo to Algiers to Oman, I 

observed a common thirst for meaningful civic engagement. 

The popular uprisings since the end of 2010 have shown the need 

for capacity development among the youthful population of the region, and I think all of us are mindful that each of our Mediterranean partners are full up with young people. And it was difficult 

sometimes to see so many, particularly young men, in Morocco and 

in Tunisia and Algiers and Egypt and throughout unemployed. 

The senator has talked about the conference that we convened 

here in Washington, and we’re fortunate to have had an extraordinary staff working with us in that regard, and Alex Johnson 

helped, along with Robert Hand and countless others, Marlene 

Kaufman, and we’ve done a lot of follow-up work, Mr. Roebuck. For 

example, I took an interest in refugee issues, and I might add it 

is only heightened by ongoing events in that area of the world 

today. And I perceive some serious difficulties if we do not address, 

in a meaningful way, not just humanitarian issues, but other concerns of countries having to absorb these numbers of refugees. 

I smile at events—today, we are talking 50,000 or 60,000 people 

on our border. Would that someone would be on the Jordanian border and see how many people have a quest to get in from Syria and 

Iraq and from elsewhere. 

Mediterranean partner states are beginning to come to the table 

and invest in the OSCE Partnership Fund. Morocco and Tunisia 

have even requested legal reviews for their structural reforms from 

the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 


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ODIHR. As I have recommended for years, investments are underway for youth exchanges and greater contributions from civil society in the region, and I applaud these efforts and especially look 

to our panel to remark on how we can do better, acknowledging the 

demographic trends and political realities. 

I’d be remiss to not mention the violent conflicts in Iraq and 

Syria, which have displaced millions and vastly changed the political landscape of the region. We are on a dark trajectory if we don’t 

strategically invest in positive civic engagement and much-needed 

educational resources for those vulnerable populations. As I’ve said 

over and over, if we don’t engage those populations, we will see 

them again in another form, and their demands will not be met 

through peaceful political channels. 

I look forward to our panelists on the role of the United States 

and the international community in affirming the aspirations of 

those who took to the streets demanding responsive government 

and basic civil liberties. I have had substantial meetings with 

Tunisians recently, and I suspect that of all of the countries in the 

region as far as pluralism is concerned, Tunisia at this moment is 

a little more advanced in addressing the subject, as well as Morocco is as well. 

But anyway, I’m so glad you’re here. I see Ambassador Taylor 

just walked in, so we’ll hear from him a little bit. We met along 

the way. Anyway, thank you. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you, Congressman Hastings. 

I should point out, of course Congressman Hastings was the 

president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and now represents the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly as the special representative for the Mediterranean Partners. 

Congressman Cohen. 

HON. STEVE COHEN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. COHEN. I just want to thank the chairman for putting together this panel. This is a very important part of the world and 

I’m here to learn. And I’m happy to see Mr. Roebuck here. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you. Well, our first panel consists of Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs for Egypt and 

the Maghreb Bill Roebuck, a distinguished career Foreign Service 

officer with experience throughout the region, including service at 

a pivotal time as charge ́ d’affaires in Tripoli, as well as the head 

of the Political Section acting deputy chief of mission in Damascus. 

Thank you for being here. And as is the tradition of this committee, 

your written statements and all the written statements from the 

witnesses, without objections, will be included in the record. And 

you may proceed as you wish. 

WILLIAM ROEBUCK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 

EGYPT, AND MAGHREB AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. ROEBUCK. Great. Thank you, Chairman Cardin. Congressman Hastings, Congressman Cohen, thank you very much. I will 

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fore you today on North Africa. It’s a particular honor for me to do 

so before the U.S. Helsinki Commission. 

Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt of course all participate in 

the OSCE Mediterranean Partners Forum, which provides an avenue for engagement with the OSCE, its institutions and the 57 participating states in promoting a vision of comprehensive security 

that includes political, military, economic, and environmental and 

human dimensions. We welcome initiatives such as this one that 

make important contributions to promoting democratic transitions 

and bolstering regional stability. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, North Africa is a region of tremendous potential, the birthplace of the Arab Awakening, or Arab 

Spring. It’s currently undergoing a difficult but critical transition, 

the likes of which it has not experienced since the beginning of 

decolonization. And each country in our region is at a different 

stage along the path of democratic transition. Let me speak just 

briefly about each country in North Africa that we’ll deal with. 

Tunisia, as Congressman Hastings mentioned, has achieved 

much success already and continues to realize the democratic 

promise of its 2011 revolution. It’s made positive strides with the 

ratification of a new constitution and the swearing in of an independent government that will lead it to elections later in 2014. 

However, it still faces a challenge from violent extremists, particularly Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, that seek to counter its democratic transition; thwart the government’s authority; insert an extreme form of Islam through harassment, incitement of violence 

and terrorist acts. We commend the government’s efforts so far to 

counter this threat and we’re optimistic about Tunisia’s democratic 

transition. 

Libya, on the other hand, faces many difficulties and I think we 

must take the long view in assessing Libya’s progress towards democracy. After 42 years of dictatorship, Libya suffers from instability and poor governance. And these are challenges that Libya 

must confront, not alone but alongside those of the international 

community, particularly the partners, who have been heavily involved like ourselves, and Libyans themselves. We will work together to bring stability and security to Libya’s fledgling democratic transition. 

Libya is making progress, evidenced by its recent free and fair 

elections for a new Council of Representatives. This is the third 

successful set of elections that Libya has held since 2012. These 

elections represent an important milestone in Libya’s path towards 

achieving the aspirations of its February 17 Revolution. Equally 

important for Libya is the work currently being undertaken by the 

Constitutional Drafting Assembly, which was also elected back in 

February. 

On the bilateral relationship with Morocco, we have a very 

strong bilateral relationship. It’s focused on promoting regional stability, supporting democratic reform efforts, countering violent extremism, and strengthening trade and cultural ties. Indeed, Morocco is one of our closest counterterrorism partners in the region. 

It’s an active member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and 

it’s been a non-major—a major non-NATO ally since 2004. From an 

assistance perspective, our relationship with Morocco is robust and 


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supports a range of activities to increase political participation, 

strengthen women’s rights and counter violent extremism. 

Algeria and the United States also build on a strong bilateral relationship, characterized by our shared interest in combating terrorism and facilitating greater stability in the region. Our cooperation with Algeria on a range of issues further strengthens our relationship and provides greater security in the region. We appreciate, 

for example, the work that Algeria has done with Tunisia to combat smuggling and terrorism, and we continue to encourage Algeria 

to use their expertise and their capabilities to ensure greater stability in the Maghreb and the Sahel, where Algeria can be a big 

player. 

Lastly, Egypt faces tremendous political, economic and security 

challenges. We believe a stable, prosperous and democratic Egypt 

will make the strongest and most effective partner as we pursue 

our shared interests. We do view Egypt as a strategic, long-standing partner with us, and we are working on that relationship. We 

share several crucial interests with Egypt, including countering 

transnational threats of terrorism, weapons trafficking, and maintaining regional stability on several fronts. The foremost among 

them is peace with Israel. 

At the same time, it’s also critical that we encourage a trajectory 

in Egypt that advances economic reform, democracy and respect for 

human rights and fundamental freedoms. And these two policy imperatives are reflected in our assistance. Through our economic assistance, we’re seeking to demonstrate our commitment to achieving prosperity and improving the lives of the Egyptian people. And 

through our military assistance, we’re helping Egypt protect its 

borders and counter violent extremism that threatens Egypt and 

the broader region. We also continue to engage diplomatically with 

Egypt and the broader region, but particularly with the Egyptian 

government, to underscore the need for democratic and economic 

reform, and we continue to work closely with Congress to ensure 

that our assistance supports broad strategic interests in Egypt and 

in the region. 

These are historic times in North Africa and the U.S. government is working with our partners to assist and to provide support 

during this transition. Chairman Cardin, Congressmen, I want to 

thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. Certainly 

we are aware that our budgets are facing increasing pressure, but 

this region remains vital to protecting our national interests. With 

careful, targeted assistance and smart diplomatic engagement, 

we’re successfully advancing our strategic interests in this region. 

Thank you again for your time and your attention, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, thank you for your testimony and thank you 

for your service. Let me at least get your view as to how helpful 

OSCE can be in Northern Africa particularly. We know that they 

have governance issues and election issues. ODIHR provides incredible help to member states of OSCE in regards to those issues. 

We know they have free media issues. We have a special representative for the media. We know that they have tolerance problems. 

We had the special representatives that deal with the different tolerance areas. 


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Has the OSCE been effective in Northern Africa, and can it be 

more effective in trying to accomplish the goals that you elaborated, which is basically good governance and stability and stronger allies for the United States? 

Mr. ROEBUCK. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman, for the—for the 

question. The answer is yes. I think the OSCE and the partners 

have been—it has been an effective organization. It has—it has already done, I think, several things that have been successful in 

strengthening governance, helping with civil society. I’ll just lay 

out a couple of examples of what they’ve been able to do. 

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has 

been engaged with these partner countries, as you mentioned. This 

office gathered government and civil society representatives in 

Warsaw, for example. And these were representatives from Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Egypt for basically workshops on human 

rights and the democracy dimension that can help in these regions. 

The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has also 

trained election observers in several of these countries, and these 

observers have played a critical role in ensuring that these elections in Tunisia, for example, in Morocco and Egypt, were technically acceptable and, generally speaking, free and fair. They have 

also worked with women’s participation in political processes, 

which is a very important area, and gender equality. 

I do think there are areas where we can do further cooperation. 

You mentioned, for example, work with media. I think that’s a very 

important area where there could be cooperation. A lot of these 

countries struggle with trying to develop free media. And the work 

that we’re doing in these countries, and they’re struggling with, 

continues on good governance, organizing elections, and strengthening civil society. In all these areas I think there’s tremendous 

area for further cooperation. 

Mr. CARDIN. You mentioned Libya in your review. Is it worth exploring a partnership of Libya and OSCE? There have been other 

countries that have shown an interest of affiliating with OSCE. I’m 

not aware of Libya’s interest. Is that something we should be encouraging? 

Mr. ROEBUCK. Yes, sir, I believe it is. Libya is interested in joining the partnership. In fact, they have—I believe they have put forward an application to do so. It requires, I believe, a consensus decision, so it’s still being deliberated but we’re strongly supportive 

of including Libya. 

As I noted in my opening remarks, Libya is a country that faces 

tremendous challenges going forward in terms of governance, in 

terms of establishing basic security, protecting its borders, getting 

control of violent extremists who are using ungoverned space in 

Libya. And we believe that a partnership—that this is one example—participating in the Mediterranean Partnership with OSCE is 

one example of trying to bring Libya into—further into the international community, integrating it more closely with its neighbors. 

It’s going to have to rely very closely with its neighbors and with 

help from partners in Europe as it moves forward to try to grapple 

with security challenges like controlling its borders and also with 

governance—building good governance institutions inside Libya. So 


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we’re strongly supportive of Libya becoming further engaged with 

the OSCE. 

Mr. CARDIN. The conflict in Syria, and now with the problems in 

Iraq, are having major impact on partner countries. Jordan is directly affected by this. Egypt is directly affected by this. And obviously the underlying problems spill out to all of the partner countries. Can you just give us your assessment as to what these conflicts meant in regards to advancing OSCE principles in the partner countries? 

Mr. ROEBUCK. I’ll say a few words about these conflicts in Syria 

and Iraq. It’s a little outside my area of expertise but I’ll comment 

on the way they affect the countries in North Africa and the 

Maghreb, and I’ll be happy to provide any further information you 

would like. 

A couple of points. First, the situations in Syria and Iraq have, 

I think, more than anything else, created a counter-narrative to the 

Arab Spring democratic transitions. And this has been—this is— 

this has helped undercut, in some ways, the progress that these 

countries in North Africa made in 2011 to 2012 and into 2013. In 

some ways Iraq was a legacy situation that had already—the war 

had already taken place. Syria in some ways was an Arab Springtype development in the beginning. But both these—both these 

countries have developed in different ways. The conflicts there have 

developed in ways that have created a counter-narrative to the 

Arab Spring democratic transition, and this has been problematic. 

In addition to that, of course, these conflicts have spawned the 

increase in violent extremism. It was already a problem in the region. I think it’s gotten a new footing in the region because of these 

conflicts. And finally, it’s created humanitarian and refugee issues 

that have actually had spillover effect into North Africa. Libya, 

Egypt and Morocco, for example, are all dealing with refugee issues 

that have—Syrian refugees that have come to escape that conflict. 

They’re also dealing with jihadi elements in their own countries 

that want to go and fight in these conflicts. Iraq was a source for 

this, a magnet for this earlier, but Syria is a—is a strong, strong 

magnet for it now. They go and fight for a year or two in Syria 

then come back to these countries and pose major security challenges in a country like Morocco, for example. The countries are 

struggling to deal with this through operational counterterrorism 

means, through soft-side countering violent extremist ideology, and 

through regional counterterrorism efforts. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you. 

Congressman Hastings. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you 

very much, Secretary Roebuck. 

I want to take advantage of the fact that you and Ambassador 

Taylor are here and have had rather extraordinary experiences in 

your respective capacities and roles in not just an area of vital interest that we have pointed to about pluralism with our Mediterranean partners, but I can’t let events in the last three days—and 

it seems a lot of times when we schedule matters, events kind of 

overtake matters, but in this instance the two of you have had experiences in Gaza and in the West Bank. And in previous years 

when difficulties occurred, or in the Mubarak era with Egypt, 


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Egypt played a rather pivotal role in helping to quiet the ongoing 

events in the respective years that those events exploded. 

Now we see an even worse situation, quite frankly. And the question I guess I have is there a role that Egypt can play, and what, 

if anything, from the perspective of the United States, can we do 

to assist in trying to bring some peaceful resolution and political 

resolution to ongoing problems that exist between Israel and 

Hamas? 

One of the concerns I have, of course, is that a different role 

seems to be taking place in Egypt, and specifically as it pertains 

to Hamas, they’ve cut off, rightly, I think, a lot of the channels that 

had been open, the tunnels and—in the Sinai, a couple of things 

along those lines. But just give me your take, and I’ll stick to Egypt 

because I don’t think that they are the only ones that ought to 

weigh in. I certainly think Qatar and Arab Emirates and Saudi 

Arabia, which aren’t a part of this particular matter today, have 

significant roles to play. But how can we activate it? How can we, 

with LCC, get he and others involved, in light of the fact that they 

have ongoing conflicts in their own countries? 

Mr. ROEBUCK. Thank you, Congressman Hastings. First I would 

say that we do believe that Egypt can play a role in helping to deescalate the situation in Gaza and with regard to Hamas and its 

conflict with Israel that’s ongoing. We have talked with the Egyptians about this. Secretary Kerry has raised this issue. We believe 

that the Egyptian government wants to be helpful and that they 

have the capability of doing so. 

As you note, historically they have had the ability to work with 

Hamas as a mediating-type influence that can de-escalate. It’s true 

that in the last few years, because of Arab Spring developments, 

they have been more absorbed internally, with internal developments, and that this to some degree may have affected their—at 

least their focus. But we still believe that they have the capability 

to play this role, and they’ve indicated a willingness to do so, and 

we’ve asked them to help out, and they are doing so and counseling 

both sides, but particularly Hamas, to de-escalate. 

With regard to the broader aspect of your question about their 

efforts in the Sinai and on counterterrorism there, the current government has been very active in the Sinai, a very up-tempo set of 

operations. They have closed a lot of these tunnels that have been 

used for smuggling into Gaza. They have mounted counterterrorism operations against some of these extremist groups like 

Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, and they’ve had some success against these 

groups. And we want to be supportive of these efforts. 

So overall, focus has been a bit internal, but we believe they can 

help, and we have asked them to do so and believe they will do so. 

Mr. HASTINGS. I appreciate that. Just one—there are several 

questions I wanted to ask about Egypt and the Islamist issue and 

where you thought they were going to go with that, but I’ll pass 

on that because I really do believe that in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, we have, in my judgment, an opportunity to undertake to do 

some things perhaps in a more unique fashion. For example, I 

would ask of you what role, if any—and it may be early in their 

developing pluralism, but what role, if any, do you see trade playing? And I see opportunities with reference particularly to Tunisia, 


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and I would make one added comment. You and Senator Cardin 

mentioned Libya, and you also mentioned border control. While it 

is a major concern for us in our own country controlling our own 

borders, the simple fact of the matter is, for example, in Tunisia, 

Libyan matters, not just the terrorist matters, but refugees as well, 

spill over. The same thing comes to Tunisia from Mali and that 

area. Those problems spill over. 

And I think if anything, we could begin thinking about trade, at 

least talk about it, and two, that we could do what we can with 

these respective countries to assist them in border security, recognizing the limitations that we have. And there’s a lot in this. I’ll— 

we’ve gone in one of our funds for support from $4 million to 

$500,000. That’s just a real small amount of money, and I don’t 

know how you and others coordinate it, but it would seem to me 

that we—if there was ever a time when the agencies who are directly involved need to be coordinating their activities, it would be 

now. 

Mr. ROEBUCK. Thank you, sir. On the—let me start with the border issue, and then I’ll go back to the trade issue. 

I agree with you completely about the imperative of trying to 

help these countries with their border challenges. You’re absolutely 

correct that part of the internal security problems that Tunisia 

faces are caused by spillover from Libya. Terrorists in Tunisia are 

fleeing into Libya and finding ungoverned space they can use for 

training camps and for safe haven and then going back across that 

border to, when they can, mount operations against the Tunisian 

government. 

We’re working with the Tunisian government. We’re working 

with the Libyan government also on trying to shore up border security efforts. We have a significant border security effort with Libya 

that we’re getting off the ground. It’s a—Global Security counterterrorism—Contingency Fund, GSCF, which will cooperate with an 

EU effort on the borders in Libya. It’s going to be a big challenge, 

and it’s going to take years to get it under—they’re—basically, 

their border control mechanisms have collapsed. So it’s going to be 

a big challenge. In Tunisia, we are also doing border security efforts with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior 

through some of our 1200 series programs, 1207, 1206, that type 

of thing. 

So it’s a huge challenge, and then the other way that we try to 

tackle the borders is through regional efforts, which can also be effective through the—like, the trans-Sahara counterterrorism partnership is one avenue that we use for this. But we do need to redouble our efforts. It’s a huge challenge. 

On the trade side, I agree with you, trade and promoting economic development, private sector development, job creation—these 

types of efforts are critical. Youth unemployment in many of these 

countries is over 50, 60 percent, and the populations of these countries is about 50 percent youth. So huge numbers of these young 

people, particularly young males who might be tempted by more 

extremist ideology, are not gainfully employed, so that’s one subset 

of the whole trade and economic revitalization effort that’s needed. 

We have a free trade agreement with Morocco. It has boosted 

trade on both sides significantly. We have trade and investment 


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framework agreements with Algeria and with Tunisia. The 

Tunisians are interested in a free trade agreement. We have not 

moved forward on that at this time, but we’re working with them 

to invigorate—reinvigorate the TIFA, the trade and investment 

framework agreement. We also have an enterprise fund, TunisiaAmerican Enterprise Fund, that’s capitalized at, I think, a hundred 

million dollars, and a similar fund in Egypt capitalized at two or 

three times that size because of the bigger size of the country. 

So these are huge issues. Trade can be used to help stabilize the 

situations in these countries and help with governance and capacity-building of the youth, which is critical. 

Mr. HASTINGS. All right, thank you. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. CARDIN. Congressmen Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My main concern is ISIS. And I’m not that aware of their tentacles. Do they have allies, cohorts, sympathizers throughout the 

Maghreb? 

Mr. ROEBUCK. They—it’s not clear yet. There have been some 

preliminary indications that the group I mentioned in the Sinai, 

Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, for example, which is a violent Islamist extremist organization with some possible ties to—or al-Qaida—there 

are indications recently that they have pledged allegiance to ISIS. 

I would say that those reports so far are very preliminary and 

might not end up being confirmed, but they are out there. 

If the situation in Iraq and Syria continues, that type of influence could spread. I would say for right now, it’s relatively limited 

in the region. I would say the broader trends that I mentioned, the 

flow of foreign fighters, the more general rise of violent extremism 

are the two trends that are more worrisome. I don’t think they’re 

specifically focused on ISIS at this point, but that could develop. 

Mr. COHEN. ISIS’s goal, I guess, is they want to have a state in 

Syria and Iraq, Islamic state. But I would think their goal is to 

have a larger caliphate that encompasses the entire region. Is that 

not something you would surmise as well? 

Mr. ROEBUCK. That is what their ideology sort of ascribes to, 

Congressman. I mean, there are different inflections of that depending on which group it is you’re talking about, but that is a traditional ambition of these types of groups. My sense is that for now 

what they’ve been able to achieve in Syria and Iraq is a significant 

partial meeting of that ambition. I wouldn’t say they’re satisfied 

with it, but I would say that they have made significant gains towards that broader Islamic caliphate-type ambition, and that’s why 

it’s so important, the efforts that we are undertaking with others 

to counter that effort. 

Mr. COHEN. And what type of influence do they have in Jordan, 

if any? 

Mr. ROEBUCK. Congressman, on that one, I may have to get back 

to you. I don’t have the information at my fingertips. I would—I 

mean, just in general terms, I would say because Jordan is right 

on the border of both of these countries and historically has been 

very influenced by developments in Syria and Iraq, it’s inevitable 

that—they’re right on the front line of what’s going on. Border controls on the Iraq side, for example, have fallen to these elements, 


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and that inevitably implicates Jordan immediately border control 

and how to deal with these elements. I suspect there are also ideological influences that are beginning to penetrate into Jordan. But 

beyond that, I might have to defer to my experts on Jordan and 

get back to you. 

Mr. COHEN. The Arab Spring didn’t hit Jordan and Morocco particularly. Morocco was kind of a soft spring, but with kind of reform, limited constitutional extensions. How secure do you believe 

the monarchies are in those two countries from the same aspirations that we saw exhibited in Tunisia and Libya and Egypt? 

Mr. ROEBUCK. Thank you, Congressman Cohen. I think the—in 

some ways, the traditional monarchies have helped those regimes, 

whether some of the instability and unrest that swept through 

other parts of the Arab—North Africa and shaped the Arab Spring. 

In Morocco, for example, I think the—that monarchy is hundreds 

of years old, and I think it provided some legitimacy to the government, and there’s significant respect for the monarchy there. And 

in—I think it sort of softened the unrest that went through there. 

I also think that the king put forward some reforms that helped 

take the—some of the force out of the unrest that was developing 

in Morocco. He put forward a series of reforms. They voted on a 

constitution that had a lot of those reforms in them in 2011, and 

that has helped. 

Mr. COHEN. But they’re minimal reforms, are they not? I mean, 

they really haven’t gone very far, it’s—and the king still has a 

great deal of power. And I’ve been reading lately that it seems like 

the Moroccan people are not particularly satisfied. Have you—is 

that something that you’ve observed or been made aware of? 

Mr. ROEBUCK. I would say yes and no on the question. They— 

the reforms are relatively limited, you’re correct. I mean, they did 

try to put some minimal limits on the king’s power, particularly his 

power to appoint certain types of individuals. They—the reforms 

sought to strengthen the role of the legislature. These types of reforms are—I would call them works in progress. But you are absolutely correct, the king and the palace retain significant, extensive 

power and influence in Morocco, and the strengthening of those 

democratic institutions—there remains a lot to be done. 

On the dissatisfaction that Moroccan citizens feel and their desire for further reform, I think the evidence for that is mixed. I 

would surmise that you’re probably correct that—because I think 

people generally speaking, everywhere have a desire for more freedom, and they want to develop democratic institutions. But there 

has not been significant unrest in Morocco since the Arab— 

Mr. COHEN. So you’re not concerned about the monarchies in Jordan and Morocco being able to sustain themselves, to survive? 

Mr. ROEBUCK. No, not at this point, no, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. OK. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROEBUCK. Thank you. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you very much for your testimony. We appreciate it very much. 

Mr. ROEBUCK. Thank you. Thank you very much for having me. 

Mr. CARDIN. We’ll now turn to our second panel. And we’re 

pleased to invite up Ambassador Bill Taylor, vice president of the 

Middle East and Africa of the United States Institute for Peace. 


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Ambassador Taylor is very well-known. His most recent public 

service was State Department special coordinator for Middle East 

transition, coordinating support to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria. 

We know Ambassador Taylor for his work in the Mideast Quartet 

as well as the former ambassador to Ukraine. We will not question 

him today on Ukraine, but we could certainly do that. 

Dr. Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat professor for peace and 

development at the University of Maryland—that is—I’m very familiar with that position. 

And Brookings Institution fellow—Dr. Telhami has made pivotal 

contributions to the Arab-Israeli peace process negotiations, is an 

expert on public opinion trends in our countries of interest today. 

So thank you very much for being here. We appreciate it very 

much. 

Then we have Zeinab Abdelkarim, the regional director for the 

Middle East and North Africa at the International Foundation for 

Electoral Systems. Her expertise in electoral systems will help us 

characterize the state of reforms in the political processes throughout our countries of interest. 

So we welcome all three of you to this hearing. As I explained 

earlier, your prepared written statements will be made part of the 

record without objection. You may proceed as you wish. And we’ll 

start with Ambassador Taylor. 

WILLIAM TAYLOR, VICE PRESIDENT FOR MIDDLE EAST AND 

AFRICA, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE 

Mr. TAYLOR. Senator Cardin, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Cohen, thank 

you very much for the opportunity to be here. Glad to join my distinguished colleagues on this panel. 

Political pluralism in several of the Arab countries is a very 

timely topic, as you’ve already referred to this morning. I’m very 

pleased to follow Bill Roebuck, a good friend from earlier times, 

and pleased that he had made many of the points that I will try 

to reinforce. 

The views I express today are solely my own and do not represent those of the United States Institute of Peace, which doesn’t 

take policy positions, as you well know. I’ll concentrate this morning on two of the OSCE Mediterranean partners for cooperation, 

Tunisia and Egypt. 

Tunisia has demonstrated remarkable maturity and commitment 

to the idea of political inclusiveness, and I’m sad to say, the Egyptians have not. At the beginning of 2013, Tunisia was struggling 

politically and economically and, was facing violent unrest. The 

elections in 2012, we recall, had given the moderate Islamist party 

Ennahda a plurality. It formed a coalition with two secular parties, 

it was called the troika. This troika was attempting to govern and 

create a new constitution at the same time. 

After broad consultations around the country on various aspects 

of this new constitution, parliamentary work, which was required 

to finish the work, had stalled by early 2013. The attack on the 

U.S. embassy in Tunis by extremists Islamist forces in September 

2012 had demonstrated the weakness of the government and of its 

security forces. The instability was then exacerbated in 2013, early 


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2013, February, with the assassination of prominent opposition 

party member, Chokri Belaid. 

While the extent of violence in Tunisia was small compared to 

the numbers killed in other countries of this region, these incidents 

shocked Tunisians and led to two events: first, the resignation of 

the Ennahda prime minister, and second, an effort by civil society 

leaders to pull the country back from the crisis. Several political 

parties supported the effort. Ennahda did not. 

At the same time—this is the beginning of 2013—the Islamist 

government that had formed in Egypt under Mohammed Morsi was 

also struggling to govern and to write a constitution. Unlike in Tunisia, however, the main Islamist party in Egypt, the Muslim 

Brotherhood, had won a majority in the parliamentary elections, 

and Mr. Morsi had won a tight race for president. 

Also unlike Tunisia, the Islamist majority in the Egyptian parliament and the Islamist president forced through a constitution 

without attempting to achieve consensus. Further, security forces 

and the Muslim Brotherhood supporters attacked peaceful demonstrators. Women’s rights were violated, journalists were suppressed, and police abuse continued. 

President Morsi issued a decree that exempted his decisions from 

judicial review. Demonstrations grew in opposition to the government’s handling of the constitutional process as well as the social 

legislation in the parliament and economic mismanagement, leading to a large army-sponsored demonstration on June 30th, 2013, 

and a military coup on July 3rd that installed a military-backed civilian government. 

At this point, events in Tunisia and events in Egypt intersect. 

Before the coup in Egypt, the Tunisian Islamist party, Ennahda, 

had resisted efforts by civil society to bridge political differences in 

Tunisian society. After the coup and another political assassination 

in Tunis, Ennahda decided to join what was then being called the 

Tunisian national dialogue. The Quartet-led discussions—there 

were four members of civil society in Tunisia—decided to bring in 

political parties. These discussions then lasted through the fall and 

into the winter. 

In January 2014, this civil society-led but with participation of 

the main political parties reached agreement on three important 

points. They agreed on a text of the constitution, which had not 

been able to be accomplished, achieved in previous times when it 

was just in the parliament. Second, they agreed that new elections, 

long-stalled, would happen by the end of this year, by the end of 

2014. And even more remarkably, the Ennahda-led coalition government agreed to step down and hand over power to a nonpolitical 

interim government that would take governmental influence out of 

the preparations for the elections later on this year. 

In Egypt, meanwhile, the military-installed government had 

begun a harsh crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, killing more 

than a thousand Egyptians, jailing and prosecuting thousands 

more. Hundreds at a time have been convicted, sentenced to death, 

often on little evidence. The repression, which the new militarybacked government defended as a fight against terrorists, soon extended to journalists, activists, and liberal groups accused of supporting terrorists. 


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This year Field Marshal and Defense Minister al-Sisi declared 

his candidacy for president under a newly ratified constitution and 

in May won an overwhelming victory, even though turnout in the 

election was disappointingly low. U.S. assistance to the government 

of Egypt, cut off after the coup, as called for by U.S. law, was partially restored. 

Political pluralism, the topic of these discussions, in the region 

I believe is at its broadest in Tunisia, which is why I wanted to 

focus attention on this aspect of the Arab Awakening, the Arab 

Spring. The constitution was approved as a result of wide consultation across the country, full debate in the parliament, political compromise struck by civil society leaders and adherence to agreed 

rules as the parliament ratified the constitution overwhelmingly, 

with the parliamentarians standing to sing the Tunisian national 

anthem after the historic vote. 

The leading role of civil society pulling the country back from violence, division and gridlock is the model of dialogue over confrontation and conflict. The Tunisian national dialogue, led by non-governmental quartet, as I said, was able to find consensus, bring in 

the quarreling political parties into the discussion, forge compromises that have set Tunisia on a positive if still fragile course 

toward a successful transition. 

Egypt’s political pluralism, on the other hand, is at best reminiscent of previous military dictatorships. The new military-backed 

government under President al-Sisi has not limited security measures to violent extremists, and it has instead used police and the 

courts to eliminate political opposition. 

My recommendations: first, the United States and the international community should increase support for the Tunisian government and people as they continue to demonstrate that political 

pluralism is compatible with Islamic societies and is the formula 

for a successful transition to democracy. This assistance should include financial support from Western governments, international financial institutions, and the international private sector. Second. 

The United States should negotiate and sign a free trade agreement with Tunisia. And third. The United States and Europe 

should increase opportunities for Tunisian students to study 

abroad. 

In Egypt, the United States and the international community 

should continue to condemn the repression, publicly and privately, 

as counterproductive and short-sighted. U.S. assistance to Egypt 

should concentrate on programs that enable Egyptians to take advantage of educational opportunities, both in Egypt and abroad. A 

large program of scholarships for Egyptian young people, with an 

emphasis on women and underdeveloped parts of the country, could 

pay great dividends for Egypt and for U.S.-Egyptian relations. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m glad to answer questions. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, thank you. Appreciate that. Dr. Telhami. 

SHIBLEY TELHAMI, ANWAR SADAT CHAIR FOR PEACE AND 

DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 

Mr. TELHAMI. Thanks very much. Mr. Chairman, allow me as a 

citizen of—resident of Maryland and professor at the University of 


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Maryland to thank you for your service to our state and to the 

country. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you. 

Mr. TELHAMI : I’d like to focus my comments on really the macro 

level of what’s driving all this change in the Middle East. Let me 

start by acknowledging that this is not a good time for pluralism, 

freedom and democracy in the region. It’s obvious to all of us. The 

question is, why is that the case? It’s not that the region has been 

exactly known for democracy, for freedom and pluralism, it is that 

we really had high expectations, particularly with the advent of the 

Arab uprisings in 2010. The Tahrir Square pictures really generated a lot of excitement and hope across the globe as well as in 

the region. So what has happened? Why isn’t it going the way we 

expected? That’s what I’d like to talk about. 

Let me start by talking about what is profoundly new in what’s 

happening in the Middle East over the past few years. What is this 

Arab uprising? What’s profoundly important and likely enduring in 

these Arab uprisings? 

Let me start with one thing that is the most profoundly important, and that is that we’re witnessing the empowerment of the individual on a scale we had never witnessed before, and it is enabled by an expanding information revolution. It’s not going to go 

away. It’s going to stay with us. And if you want to understand the 

scale of it, you have to compare it at some level with the Industrial 

Revolution: the empowerment of the individual, for very different 

reasons, in the West through industrialization and economic independence of the individual. We are seeing something akin to that 

because of the information revolution, and therefore people want 

their voices heard. That aspect of the Arab uprisings is here to 

stay. It’s not going to go away. There’ll be some reversal here and 

there, but it’s expanding. 

And in the long term, it’s only good news because frankly, that’s 

what’s needed to happen in the long term. But in the short to medium term, it brings exactly the opposite. And here is why; I’ll give 

you a focus on five issues why that is the case in most of the region. 

Now, as we have seen, the region is not unified and there are 

some bright spots and some places that are worse than others or 

are better than others. But by and large, aggregately, it doesn’t 

look very good. And there are five reasons for why this isn’t going 

like some people expected, I think unreasonably. 

First, when we say the public is empowered or the individual is 

empowered, it doesn’t mean the public is unified. When you get empowerment of the people, you get empowerment of the religious and 

the secular, the Shia and the Sunni and the Muslim and the Christian and the rich and the poor, and now everybody wants the same 

thing; they all are vying for a piece of the pie in a changing polity 

where central authority is weakened and the rules of the games 

have changed. So the fact is it’s a prescription for more competition 

and more conflict, even without sectarianism. 

We focus on sectarianism. Obviously, that’s an easy one to focus 

on in places like Syria or Iraq, but Egypt doesn’t have that kind 

of sectarianism. And yes, it has 10 percent Christians, and minorities tend to suffer more than others in these kinds of competitions, 


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but the 90 percent of Egyptians who are Muslim are overwhelmingly Sunni, and yet look at the black-and-white divisions that 

have emerged. It was the zero-sum game that if you’re not our 

friend, you’re our enemy. And they’re all, by the way, religious. 

Over 90 percent of Egyptians say they’re religious. So it’s not even 

about religiosity, it’s about the role of religion in politics and a 

power struggle, and those divides happen in society no matter what 

you have. And so the empowerment of the individual in the short 

term doesn’t add up into stability, it adds up to exactly the opposite. 

Second, even when we say that the publics are empowered, 

publics are rarely the main factor in shaping politics. Even in democracies, we see that in our country, yes, publics matter in our 

electoral system, but we know the source of money and the source 

of corporations, and all the distribution of power is uneven in society. And so they’re vying in a new system—to write new rules of 

the game against existing institutions. The bureaucracies haven’t 

disappeared. The multinational corporations haven’t disappeared. 

People with deep pockets haven’t disappeared. The military institutions, above all, haven’t disappeared, and they’re all going to fight 

against this public empowerment to make sure that they have a 

piece of the pie in the new rules of the game that are being written. 

And if you look at that, you see for example in Egypt that particularly the military institution is very important. Frankly, in 

every single episode of the Arab uprisings, the military institution 

has been perhaps the most determined aspect of the game because 

when Ben Ali was ordered to leave, essentially it was a military 

decision in Tunisia. When Mubarak left, it was with the encouragement of the military. And when Assad didn’t leave, it was because 

the military backed him. And when the king of Bahrain didn’t acquiesce, it was because of the military—in every single case, the 

initial outcome of the uprisings and what transpired afterwards is 

a function of a military decision. We saw what happened in Egypt 

with the military asserting itself again in the process that is unfolding. In Tunisia, they haven’t made that decision. Don’t rule it 

out completely depending on what happens. It’s militaries that will 

remain. It’s critical to the outcome of every single uprising. 

The third point I want to make is that we all understand that 

when we look at the history of politics anywhere, not just in the 

Middle East, we understand that transitions are destabilizing and 

unpredictable. And it means that by and large, you have often 

emerging insecurity and economic deprivation that trump pluralism and democracy and work in favor of those who want to rule 

with an iron fist because you have people who are very terrified of 

anarchy, and people who are certainly very terrified of not having 

food for their children on the table. And that trumps everything 

else, including their toleration. 

By the way, I happened to meet with President Sisi in Egypt just 

before the election. And he said to me, I understand what my priorities are. I understand what the Egyptian people want me to do 

now. Number one, security. Number two, the economy. And he’s 

frankly right. And that’s how he sees it in setting up his priorities. 

Now, whether we agree with the way he’s doing it or not is a separate question, but it’s very clear that’s the case. 


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And by the way, this dynamic of the public being terrified of anarchy and economic deprivation in a way that trumps pluralism, 

democracy and human rights is one thing that other rulers in the 

region are using to terrify their publics against the expansion of 

the uprisings. One reason why the uprisings have stalled is that 

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would tell its people, do you want Damascus or do you want Riyadh? The King of Jordan can tell his 

people, do you want Aleppo or do you want Amman? And for now, 

no one wants Aleppo or Damascus or Tripoli, for that matter. And 

that’s one of the things that is happening. 

Fourth, while each country in the region has specific conditions 

that have to be evaluated separately, it is fair to say that there are 

commonalities in the Arab world. Sometimes we don’t understand 

the regional dynamics. Yes, we have to look at every country separately for sure. They are different. Tunisia and Egypt are different. 

But there is a regional dynamic that cannot be separated from the 

domestic dynamic. And let me give you just a couple of examples. 

In all of the polling, we see that there are common Arab aspirations as well as unique aspirations domestically. When we looked 

at the emergence of the uprisings starting in Tunisia and then expanded to the Arab world, they expanded across the Arab world 

but not into other countries and not even into other neighboring 

Muslim non-Arab countries because there is an Arab dynamic of 

aspiration. But more importantly, look at how the uprisings have 

been unfolding. In every single case, with the possible exception of 

Tunisia, in every single case you cannot understand what’s happening without understanding the role of outside regional powers 

or, for that matter, global powers. Look at Syria: Saudi Arabia and 

Iran are in competition, all of the neighboring states, without the 

Saudi intervention in Bahrain. Even Egypt that we think of as autonomous with no military intervention, look at the tens of billions 

of dollars that are coming from the Gulf that are a very essential 

part of what might be likely to happen. So you can’t divorce these 

two. 

One final point I want to make, Mr. Chairman, has to do with 

the one non-Arab state in the group, Israel. And I say that now, 

obviously, we’re all facing what seems to be a horrific set of killings 

that we witnessed; ugly killings that make all of us sick and obviously generate hostilities that might erupt into a larger-scale conflict. But the aspect I want to talk about is more about pluralism 

and democracy and the threat to pluralism and democracy that has 

emerged with that conflict. 

Let me just very quickly focus on this issue. Israel within its 

1967 borders has been a successful democracy. It has done a good 

job—not perfect, but a good job—as a democracy. Its relationship 

with the Palestinians in the occupied territories, in the West Bank 

and Gaza, has of course been rationalized by all of us as a temporary situation of occupation—which it is, theoretically, under 

legal law. And we all correctly focus our attention on getting a political settlement along the lines of a two-state solution to solve 

this problem. 

If people conclude that the two-state solution is no longer an option and we look at occupation as a semi-permanent situation, the 

relationship between Israel and the Palestinians will start looking 


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differently and be evaluated in the context of one country, and that 

is going to be incredibly troubling for those who want equality and 

human rights—that’s number one. 

Number two, the spillover effect of that into Israel’s own Arab 

population, the 20 percent who are citizens of Israel who can vote 

and get elected, who have participated democratically—they’re legally equal citizens in practice; obviously, they are second-class citizens, but by and large, Israel has a done a reasonably good job over 

the years to expand that. We are beginning to find now that if 

there is no two-state solution we’re beginning to feel it now because 

a large majority of Israelis and large majority of Palestinians say 

there will never be a two-state solution in my own polling that I 

do there—with that, you find then that the Israelis who want a 

Jewish majority state start being fearful of the demographics. And 

when you’re fearful of demographics, you start thinking Jew and 

Arab. And when you’re thinking Jew and Arab, you’re no longer 

thinking about Israel and Palestine; you’re thinking domestically. 

And we see how that has played into the hands of extremists on 

both sides within Israel itself in a way that undermines its democracy and pluralism. So we really have to be watchful of these 

trends that are going to potentially have consequences far beyond 

just the conflict but also into the nature of democracy and pluralism in the region. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you for that very thorough analysis. 

Ms. Abdelkarim. 

ZEINAB ABDELKARIM, REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE 

EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION 

FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 

Ms. ADBELKARIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

commission, for the opportunity to testify today. I appreciate the 

chance to share with you IFES’ considerable experience and expertise in assessing the overall political, socioeconomic, security and 

other issues surrounding the region’s democratic transition. I will 

begin with a brief symposium of IFES’ work in order to 

contextualize my testimony. Then I will provide background information and context to key considerations I would like to share with 

you today for you to take in consideration when addressing issues 

of pluralism in the region. They mirror to greater extent what Dr. 

Telhami has already covered. And then I will conclude with a few 

remarks. 

Broadly speaking, IFES supports citizens’ rights to participation 

in free and fair elections by strengthening electoral systems and by 

building local capacity to deliver sustainable solution for countries 

that seek to enhance their governance structure. We have been active in the Middle East and North Africa region for over two decades, advocating for societies where citizens have the opportunity 

to play an active role in making decisions that affect their lives and 

in holding their government accountable. Our approach empowers 

both the recognized local authorities as well as civil society by providing information and access to resources and training on democratic norms and international standards for election and political 

processes. 


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Indeed, the overall situation throughout the Middle East and 

North America remains fragile and very pluralized. Newly formed 

governments and elected institutions continue to face firm resistance from their opponents and have not been successful thus far 

in ushering major reforms or managing the mistrust or the economic uncertainty and internal security issues. 

In deeply divided societies where ethnic, social, tribal and political affiliations are key considerations, it is imperative that the 

countries’ transitions are managed in a manner that is inclusive 

and consultative and transparent. It is particularly important for 

citizens to perceive government affairs, legal reform processes and 

the country economic plans as open and transparent. The biggest 

danger is the growing tendency to reduce democratic practices to 

voting, constitutional drafting and electoral events. 

A new constitution or the presence of electoral processes does not 

necessarily mean that a democratic transition of transparency and 

accountability have taken root. This kind of development across the 

region cannot be considered evidence of a new social contract between the transitioning states and their citizens. At best, these developments could be described as constitutional engineering led by 

small but dominant elites. Understandably, undeveloped and disorganized political and civil forces, as well as nascent civil movement in places like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, are unable to wield 

much influence on near-term outcomes of the transition in these 

countries. 

However, it is important to note that modern democratic practices evolve over centuries. It makes no sense to look for similarities in a remarkably different context, particularly so early in the 

game. Rather, it is best to let these political developments run 

their natural course. They are changes that are best measured in 

decades, not years. Each and every state will evolve in its own distinctive way and adapt to national, regional and global changes 

over time. 

We all can agree that analysis in the midst of the current event 

is never easy and the future itself remains clouded with uncertainty. However, as these events and their causes unfold, eight key 

issues and concern that cover a range of political, economic and social factors must be taken into consideration when addressing pluralism in the regions. 

And these are, first, a declining political legitimacy in authorities 

charged with overseeing the transition in a number of countries in 

the MENA region. The biggest challenge to democracies is their inability to provide services and effectively govern. Low public credibility can in some cases engender voter apathy, violence, ineffective 

governance and long-term political instability. 

Second, a breakdown in security, rising instability and an increase in both human and weapon trafficking across borders will 

continue to cause human suffering and burden local governments. 

Third, the lack of serious efforts to address continued economic 

meltdown and extreme poverty in some countries in the region does 

not bode well with stabilization or democratic development and 

could lead to more protests, insecurity if not addressed in the near 

term. 


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Fourth, increased tension between Islamist, socialist, liberal and 

other political entities. The struggle over the constitutional drafting 

process in these countries is a prime example of growing divide between Islamist and liberal as they debate the inclusion of Sharia 

as the source of all legislation, the role of men and women, the 

rights of ethnic and religious minority, the criminalization of attacks against religion and sacred values. These debates have been 

the center of the political discussion across the region for decades 

and it’s going to stay for some time. 

Fifth, the struggle for dominance in the Persian Gulf and the Levant remain unsolved. For decades there have been fierce competitions between the Salafist school of thought and Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran. Both sides have provided military and political backing to their allies across the region and it makes them an ineffective player in influencing the regional political transformation. 

Six, as Dr. Shibley has indicated, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 

remains a destabilizing factor for the Arab world. And can I leave 

it at that? He covered it very extensively. 

Seven, the U.S. presence in the region faces a crisis in legitimacy 

where mistrust and suspicions are dominant features of the region—perceptions towards the U.S. involvement. 

Eighth, shrinking space for democracy-building program, which 

in part is due to the resistance to U.S. involvement. A growing 

number of governments across the region are starting to crack 

down on democracy-building programs and publicly denounce democracy assistance, describing it as illegitimate political meddling 

in internal affairs and clear attempt to subvert political order. 

Transition to democratic governance is neither fast nor easy, and 

the path to introducing and implementing democratic political reforms varies across countries. It is difficult to predict how long the 

transformation of the region will take and how far it will go. However, the regional upheaval is far from over and the highly motivated young generation who was on the forefront of the call for 

transformation will continue to challenge the present circumstances and guard the flame of change. And that’s my conviction. 

To remain effective, the international community and groups 

that promote democracy must come to grips with these new trends 

and a complicated history of democracy promotion globally and 

genuinely rethink their strategies of engagement. The emphasis on 

democratic election, participation by civil society, empowerment of 

the marginalized and ethnic groups, and competition between political parties will not guarantee that the state will respond to its citizens’ needs for social and political accountability. 

Undoubtedly there is a need to re-evaluate the way in which democracy is supported and sustained. The human security challenges facing the region today requires the promotion of a broader 

concept that includes tolerance, consensus and peace-building processes, accountability, human rights protection, capacity building for 

social and economic development, promotion of public involvement 

and consultation, and improvement on the political and political 

processes. 

Disengaging or limiting democratic governance aid to the region 

at this juncture is a huge mistake. However, the international comVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:34 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095576 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A576.XXX A576

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munity should continue to leverage existing international frameworks, diplomacy and bilateral agreements to find ways to encourage democratic practices and a space for democracy-building programs. Efforts to plan future assistance have to take into consideration that democracy-building is highly political and not only a 

technical exercise. 

Better understanding of the local context and norms, local ownership and respect for viewpoints and experiences of the targeted 

populations are key principles that must guide the international 

community efforts. Any intervention can easily lose credibility if 

perceived by local populations as ineffective or tainted by intervening countries’ political self-interest. 

With that, I conclude my remarks and I’m happy to answer any 

question you may have. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, let me thank all three of you. I thought your 

presentations were extremely helpful and put it in context. You’re 

right, this is about political pluralism. And we’re patient and we 

understand that it will not happen overnight. But it’s very interesting: In 1975, when the Helsinki Accords were attained, it was 

not U.S. values. These were universal values. The Soviet Union 

fully participated in this process. So when you mentioned the fact 

of U.S. involvement in these areas of interest to our—to try to promote—or suspicion of promoting our values, it really is—what we’re 

after is universal values. 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. True. 

Mr. CARDIN. And the core principles of OSCE—and I have them 

in front of me because it’s part of the Ukraine resolution—Russia 

resolution we adopted in Baku—talks about sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, the territorial integrity, 

peaceful settlements of disputes, noninterference in internal affairs, respect for human rights, et cetera. 

I mention that because when Ukraine—when Russia invaded 

Ukraine, it was OSCE that was on the ground. And it was a mechanism that allowed for, I think, an international, objective account 

of what was happening. And it provided the technical help that I 

think has been extremely helpful to Ukraine coming back and recognizing what it needs to do moving forward. In Northern Africa 

there is no comparable organization that I know of. Yes, we talk 

about the Partners for Cooperation, but that is—it doesn’t have the 

same resources and the same visibility that a partner state has 

when it is jeopardized. 

Ambassador Taylor, I was very much interested in your analysis 

of the civil societies—Tunisia. I guess my question to the panelists 

is, what mechanisms are available to provide that type of universal 

view of what’s going on in the country, not Western view but universal view that what a country needs to do for stability—I thought 

your analysis about the challenges to pluralism—that just because 

you empowered individuals does not mean you’re going to have pluralism. In fact it, in the short term, looks like it works against pluralism because they want stability and they go for more effective 

leadership, which many times denies pluralism. 

So what type of institutions exist? What type of regional institutions or what type of societies exist in Northern Africa that we 

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able progress towards pluralism, knowing that it will not happen 

next year and that it will take time? Should it be civil societies? 

Is it different in each country? What is your thoughts on that? 

Mr. TAYLOR. When I look at the advantages/disadvantages of the 

Helsinki process in the Middle East, in comparison to Eastern Europe, we don’t have the same kind of challenges. The information 

revolution wasn’t there. And this created a whole opening for a 

whole set of people who might be linked to the outside world. We 

don’t really have that in the Arab world. If anything, the Arabs 

now have probably more information than they can handle and, despite all of the attempts to close it. I mean, they’ve got tens of 

channels that are coming their way, and the Internet and everything else, and they just can’t have information. 

So the question is, who are they going to look up to as a measure? And here is the positive thing about the Helsinki process: it 

isn’t set up as an American process or a U.S. process, because obviously with all—for us as Americans we have a role to play for sure. 

I don’t think that we should detach ourselves, but we should understand the limits of our ability because people have this sense that 

we’re trying to dominate. And even when we intervene for really 

good humanitarian reasons, the next morning they’ll say we did it 

for imperialist reasons, and if—somebody might try to use that 

against us and against those who are accepting aid from the U.S. 

The good thing about the Helsinki process is that it is set up as 

a universal values kind of process, and that should be the focal 

point of the approach. How you do that, whether it links up directly to groups, I think it could be, or whether it could use international institutions to create more visibility in terms of holding up 

societies to particular standards, not the secretary of state is saying you’re not living up to our standards, but somebody else is saying you’re not living up to the international standards, I think 

that’s the approach. 

But here is the problem with civil society groups—and we’ve seen 

that in Egypt, we see it up to a point in Tunisia, but we see it elsewhere—they can easily be delegitimized because of linkages to the 

outside world. And that’s usually the kind of the fine line that you 

have to figure out: How do you help them without de-legitimizing 

them? And I’m not sure I have a good answer for that. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, is the Tunisia—is the Tunisia model the right 

model? Does that work in other countries or is that unique to Tunisia? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I think Ms. Abdelkarim made a very 

good point. That is, local context is really, really important in each 

of these areas. I think the answer to your question about Tunisia 

is that there—Tunisia’s civil society has pulled together into an organization and to an institution of some informal sort. And it was 

the lead union, the largest union in the country. It was a similar 

association of employers. It was the bar, so the lawyers that got together and then the legal human rights defenders. And that 

group—— 

Mr. CARDIN. But did those groups have contacts outside of Tunisia? 

Mr. TAYLOR. To a small degree I think so, but that was not what 

was going on. They were really internally generated. The Tunisians 


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did this, Tunisian civil society. Those four organizations, they had 

legitimacy and this large public service—this large union that was 

across the country mobilizing more than any political party. Its 

members went across the country and were able to really provide 

the political muscle. But it drew in these others and drew in the 

employers. It drew in the lawyers and the human rights defenders. 

So that gave it a real breadth and strength to do this. But, Mr. 

Chairman, I think it really was Tunisian. And we can help them 

with caveats that she just mentioned about delegitimizing. They 

didn’t ask for any outside support and they didn’t need it. They did 

it themselves on this thing. 

Just while—I’ll mention, your point about institutions that can 

help countries in Northern Africa, in the Middle East, is a very important one. The Helsinki Commission is a great example of how 

Eastern Europeans—and you mentioned the excellent work it’s 

been doing in Ukraine—East European and Central European 

countries had OSCE, Helsinki. They could hold the Russians to 

those standards that the Russians had signed up to, but they also 

had the EU, with its own set of standards, both economic and political, human rights, that they wanted to join, that they wanted to 

measure up to, and in order to join they had to meet those standards. 

Many of them wanted to join NATO and did, because they still 

had security concerns. It turns out they had legitimate security 

concerns, and that others would like to join NATO at this point. 

We’re seeing that. But in the Middle East and in North Africa we 

don’t have those same kinds of attractive institutions that they can 

kind of lean toward. 

Mr. CARDIN. Good point. 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. I would like to add, I agree with Ambassador 

Taylor that Tunis didn’t have the same restriction on civil society 

when it comes to, receiving foreign funding. Looking at other places 

in the region, such as, Egypt and Jordan, the restrictions that are 

put on the implementations of these programs and their finances 

and even the attendance of events by local actors is huge and is 

actually going to impact, in the long run, the effectiveness of these 

programs. Civil society enjoys completely different status in Tunis 

than other places in the region. 

And I also agree that we don’t have a regional institution. The 

Arab League is very weak. Yes, it has the charters on human 

rights and economic and free trade and so forth, but it’s not a 

strong institution to bring the region together. So definitely looking 

for the international community is where most of the assistance is 

actually—could be coming from. 

Mr. CARDIN. I would make this—as I said, we’re patient. We recognize it’s going to take time, and they do not have the same institutional support that Europe has. There’s no question about that. 

I think the two points—or three points that you raised concerning constitutional reform and electoral reform are critically important that we see progress made. I would add a third, which 

would be fighting corruption, which sort of—this goes through all 

of this. I mean, we saw in Ukraine that it was more about a corrupt government than it was a pro-Russian government or a proEurope government that the people brought down. 


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And I think the people have strong desires for a government that 

is not corrupt, and that can bring down even the most—and also, 

you got to make economic progress, and without ridding your country of corruption, it’s hard to make the economic progress which is 

necessary for pluralism and democracy to flourish. 

So as I look at this, how do we judge whether sufficient progress 

has been made in these countries so that we reward that, whether 

it’s trade agreements or whether it is a strategic partnership for security? We’ve had a mixed relation with Egypt in recent times. 

How do we judge whether these countries have made real progress 

on constitutional reform, anti-corruption, electoral reform? 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. They made some reform and progress, but not 

enough. It’s just the first step. And it’s going to evolve over time. 

And as I mentioned, we’re waiting for the legislative bodies to be 

elected, the long-lasting ones, to see whether or not the elected representatives will continue to push for the necessary reforms. 

Just from looking at my 10 years of working in the region, electoral process and the support that we’ve been providing to multiple 

countries, including Jordan, Yemen and Egypt, things have evolved 

tremendously over the years. Reforms have been made, and gaps 

in laws and legal frameworks have been addressed. But they’re just 

the first step, and a lot more need to be done. So—— 

Mr. TELHAMI. Yeah. Well, with constitutions, obviously there are 

some things that are clear pertaining to rights and defining the 

state. But frankly, it’s all about how you implement it and interpret it. We know that for sure—and we see it in Egypt because 

right now—— 

Mr. CARDIN. China has constitutional reform, but it doesn’t work 

very well. 

Mr. TELHAMI. Yeah, and when you also—I mean, look at what 

are our issues of good intention with Egypt, particularly when we 

talk about human rights and pluralism—it’s not just the action 

that we’re taking vis-a ́-vis the Muslim Brotherhood, but you can 

see these court rulings. And then when you ask the Egyptians and 

say, as I did ask Sisi, how do you explain how this takes place, he 

says, well, there’s a separation of powers. Well, of course that’s true 

in some ways constitutionally, you want a separation of powers, 

but you want those powers to be responsible, behaving responsibly. 

How do you reform the judiciary? How do you reform the Interior 

Ministry, separate from what the rules of the games are, because 

these institutions have legacies? These are what people call the 

deep state. 

And it’s a very hard thing to do because as you’re trying to govern and you are focused on specific issues like security and the 

economy, and you take on these power centers that are entrenched 

at a time when people don’t want you to be an authority leader 

that actually intrudes other powers—not an easy issue to do. But 

we need to watch for that. We need to push for that. 

As Ambassador Taylor said, no matter what our capacity is, we 

need to speak with clarity. And I think we speak with clarity even 

more when we are appealing to universal values, not to what we 

like as American foreign policy. We have that moral authority. 

Handcuffing the U.S. particularly as a player is not simply the fact 

that people have this mixed view of us—on the one hand, they 


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don’t trust what we do, on the other hand, they want us to intervene—but more than that is that let’s be frank, human rights and 

democracy, we all want it. Our presidents want it. Our Congress 

wants it. The American people want it. But we want security and 

strategic interests even more. 

And so our relationship with the Egyptian government, for example, is above all about the military-to-military relationship, the 

strategic cooperation now vis-a`-vis Gaza or vis-a`-vis something else, 

and those issues don’t always go hand in hand. So we have limitations that therefore again speak to going outside that process, to 

finding some other mechanism too. 

One final point on Tunisia, because I think we’ve focused on Tunisia as a success case, and I think it is. Tunisians should be applauded, I think, commended for moving in a right direction, and 

I’m hopeful that they will get here, although it’s unclear still. It’s 

an unsettled situation—if you look at it, you have to understand 

that we’re still in the beginning of the process, not the end of the 

process. 

But I happen to think that we underestimated two factors in why 

they’ve moved in this direction, beyond their unique domestic situation or civil society or groups. One factor is actually, they were 

frightened by what happened in Egypt. And so the fact that the 

Muslim Brotherhood was overthrown scared them and made the 

Islamists far more conciliatory in the final process as they moved 

in the constitutional process. So they learned from what happened. 

But the second thing is I think historical accident, and it’s not 

having to do with an institution. Rashid al-Ghannushi, who happens to be an exceptionally astute leader of the Islamists, and not 

only because of the particular values of his philosophy, but because 

he understood one thing that I think the Muslim Brotherhood in 

Egypt didn’t understand. He said that when you have a mature democracy like the United States, it’s enough for a president to win 

half plus one, 50 percent plus one; that’s enough. When you’re in 

a transitional period or the like that we are in, it’s not enough; you 

need a consensus to be able to sustain minimum stability. And I 

think that is a unique understanding. 

That’s why I think we also have to pick our allies pretty carefully. We see what we’ve done in various places where we were 

choosing allies based on expediency, not necessarily ones that are 

going to take us on the right path. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I’d add is to your 

question about how to measure our response in these areas, in— 

it’s—Tunisia is one case, and Egypt’s another. Tunisia is a pretty 

straightforward answer. It’s apparently doing the right thing, at 

least as we’re looking at it now. It’s fragile, as Shibley says, but 

it is clearly going in the right direction on these areas that we’ve 

talked about. So we should respond, in ways that we can, whether 

it’s trade or whether it’s international financial support, direct support to the [?]—we should respond in that way. 

Egypt is more complicated because they’re not going in the right 

direction on political pluralism, and the repression is pushing them 

backwards and is probably destabilizing them, but they are important to us in some security ways. I’m less convinced about the importance of overflight rights and access to the canal and that kind 


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of business, but the concern about ISIS or the Islamic State in Iraq 

and Syria, is a real concern. I don’t know how big yet because it’s 

not clear to me how much traction ISIS is going to have with its 

declaration of a caliphate, even among extremist Muslim organizations, much less the broad body of Muslim people. But that’s important to us, and they will be able to play a role. 

They did play a role in Gaza, but it was under President Morsi 

that they played this positive role. And it’s not clear yet if they’re 

going to be able to play that positive role. 

Mr. CARDIN. That’s very helpful. 

Congressman Hastings. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I am grateful to all three of you and your presentations. They are 

illuminating. Regrettably, not enough of our colleagues in the Senate or the House are privy to the same kind of information with 

regularity. 

Mine is more of an observation, I think, at this point than any 

questioning of either of you. Obviously, you all know your subjects, 

and you’ve studied them very carefully. 

I think the takeaway for me is summed up in the senator’s question about how do we measure and Ms. Abdelkarim’s sentence in 

her closing remarks. Any intervention can easily lose credibility if 

perceived by the local population as ineffective or tainted by the intervening country’s political self-interests. And then Mr. Telhami 

speaks to all of that at some point in his presentation. 

And what I find interesting is I don’t see how our country can 

help without having a self-interest, period. And then there are 

those that do not get accused as the United States does and manage successfully in many of these areas of conflict. I’ve always had 

a complete fascination with how the Dutch go in and out of Africa 

and get the diamonds, and they don’t care who’s fighting, but 

they’ve managed, somehow or another, to do that. 

And what I’m finding fascinating in the last 20 years is China’s 

hands-off approach to many of the issues that other countries are, 

Russia and the United States especially, involved in proxy activities in other areas. And China swoops in after all of the conflict, 

and let me use Iraq as an example. I don’t know how long it will 

last with the current developments, but if we were talking two 

years ago, then China had the lead number of contracts in oil in 

Iraq and did not lose a soul. The persons who are doing most of 

the mining in Afghanistan today are the Chinese, and there is no 

plan, it doesn’t seem, for the United States to benefit after having 

lost life and treasure. 

So as one who has a continuing interest in this area—and I do 

serve as the co-chair of the Tunisia caucus, and I’ve been involved 

in all of these other countries with regularity and intend to stay 

so. Let me just sum up by saying this: There is an inseparable triumvirate of inadequate jobs, inadequate housing and inadequate 

educational opportunity. Looked at in the long range, the best 

thing that we could do as a country, for ourselves and for the 

world, is to encourage intercultural and educational exchanges— 

and I think, Ambassador Taylor, you spoke to some of that in your 

remarks—and to make special emphasis of education on small children, small meaning pre-K, and helping in that regard. 


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I believe that’s where the greatest emphasis is needed. I don’t 

see any real immediate solutions to any of these ongoing conflicts. 

I think America has been very naı ̈ve in thinking that democracy 

can be implanted in a lot of places, and I’ve expressed that often. 

I feel very strongly that one of the things that happens—and I’ve 

seen it here in my own country, and I’ve been a part of it. As an 

African-American here in this country, one thing I can say is government does things to people. I’m talking the United States government, not outside the government. I’m talking in Altamonte 

Springs, Florida, and the places where I’ve lived—does things to 

people rather than with people. And therein lays a part of the problem. And then when you are going abroad and start doing it, you 

have to know who the people are you’re doing it with. And that has 

been a continuing sort of travail. 

I’ve asked in this institution, and I continue to ask, that at the 

very least, we should have experts come in. I asked Gingrich and 

Gephardt. I asked Pelosi and Hastert. I haven’t done so recently, 

but as early as 1992, and way before the ongoing circumstances, I 

said if we are going to be in these conflicts, then we at least ought 

to know the difference between a Sunni and a Shiite. We ought to 

at least know what a Pashtun is, what some cultural aspects are. 

And we don’t. You couldn’t get—we could go out here right now 

and find—I can find you 300 congresspeople that don’t know that 

there are Christians in Iraq, or just as—for example, they may 

know a little bit about a few Christians in Egypt, but they don’t 

have any idea about what’s going on, and yet we make these interventions, and we make these policies without having a clear understanding. 

That’s my story, and I’m sticking to it. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, thank you, Congressman Hastings. 

And let me thank all three of our panelists. I agree with Congressman Hastings. This has been extremely helpful to us to get 

a better understanding. We’re Americans, and we’re impatient by 

definition, so we also—I think it just does underpin the merits of 

the OSCE process from the beginning. It was nonthreatening to a 

participating state because it’s consensus, that you can’t force anything upon—there’s no enforcement within the OSCE framework. 

And look at the impact it’s had in developing universal values. 

And the reality that if you’re going to have a stable country, people have to have an economy that allows them opportunity—you 

can talk about—all about the—all the military presence, but if you 

don’t have an economy that produces, you’re not going to have a 

stable regime. And we’ve seen that over and over again in the Middle East because of that issue. And yes, people do want their individual rights heard. They do want the electoral process. But that’s 

part—that in and of itself doesn’t produce democracy. And I 

think—and pluralism. 

So I think this has been extremely helpful for us, as Congressman Hastings said, to get a better understanding and reality of 

what the challenges are, and we certainly will be following up on 

this. 

So again, thank you all very much for your testimony. 


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A P P E N D I X 


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PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished witnesses and guests, I wish to welcome you 

to this Helsinki Commission hearing on ‘‘Political Pluralism in the OSCE Mediterranean Partners?’’ The Helsinki Commission has long prioritized engagement with our 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Partners for Cooperation in both the Mediterranean and Asia. I have seen the potential for the Helsinki 

Process as a model for both partner regions and I have led Commission efforts over 

the years on this concept. Our Commissioners, including Representative Alcee Hastings as OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs, have led efforts in the OSCE PA to promote the interests of our 

Mediterranean Partners and forge a meaningful exchange for mutual learning; not 

just one-sided engagement in the region by external actors. 

We could say that the political transitions resulting from popular uprisings at the 

end of 2010 have changed the face of OSCE engagement with the region. These 

years since have brought successes with some structural reforms and challenges in 

the development of viable political parties and electoral systems. Our Partners, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, have had very different experiences based on their different political systems. I see this hearing as a timely opportunity to explore common elements of transition among these countries and revisit 

how best to foster cooperation through OSCE mechanisms. As exemplified by the 

deployment of OSCE resources and expertise to manage the crisis in Ukraine, the 

OSCE remains a functional tool for fostering human security and a potential model 

for advancing common human security in the Mediterranean. 

The Helsinki Commission last convened a hearing taking stock of political developments and overall engagement with all of our OSCE Mediterranean Partners for 

Cooperation in 2009. That year, I worked with Representative Hastings to convene 

a hearing on ‘‘The Future of the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation’’ 

coupled with an international seminar of parliamentarians from throughout the region exploring Mediterranean Partner engagement. This event recommended functional partnership initiatives with our Mediterranean Partners including projects for 

youth exchange and broader accessibility of OSCE initiatives for participants from 

the region. Our efforts also identified priorities for more leadership of the Mediterranean Partnership from the region, which has become particularly relevant with the 

emerging empowerment of long disenfranchised voices of political opposition. Those 

voices have been both productive and disconcerting. Yet, the establishment of impartial electoral systems will lead the region to responsive governments that address 

the motivations of those who took to the streets. 

The OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly have been able to generate unique opportunities for assistance in this new era of regional cooperation. For example, the 

OSCE PA was able to deploy an observation and assistance mission for the October 

2011 elections to the Tunisian Constituent National Assembly. The OSCE has been 

able to facilitate exchanges with young diplomats from the region to serve in the 

OSCE secretariat. Additionally, key materials from thematic units of the OSCE and 

the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights have been translated into 

Arabic. Civil society and experts from the region have become increasingly active 

in OSCE events and dialogue opportunities coupled with expert visits from OSCE 

institutions to advise governments as they review their structural reforms. All of 

these activities have been possible through the OSCE Partnership Fund of extrabudgetary contributions from participating States and Partners. These activities 

truly demonstrate the depth of a relationship stemming back to the Helsinki Final 

Act of 1975 and leading into the future. 

Our first panel features Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs for Egypt and the Maghreb Bill Roebuck. A distinguished career Foreign Service officer with experience throughout the region, including service at pivotal times 

as Charged’ Affaires to Tripoli, as well as Head of the Political Section/Acting Deputy Chief of Mission in Damascus. We look forward to hearing your perspectives on 


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strategic investments through the OSCE, international partnerships and other initiatives like the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) to address political 

reforms in the region. 

Our second panel will feature a broad cross-section of expertise on the region 

starting with Ambassador Bill Taylor, Vice President for Middle East and Africa of 

the United States Institute of Peace. Ambassador Taylor most recently served as 

State Department Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions coordinating support to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria following a distinguished career at State 

and work in the region. He will be followed by Dr. Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat 

Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and Brookings 

Institution Fellow. Dr. Telhami has made pivotal contributions to Arab-Israeli Peace 

Process negotiations and is an expert on public opinion trends in our countries of 

interest today. Our expert panel will be concluded by Ms. Zeinab Abdelkarim, Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Her expertise in electoral assistance will help us characterize the state of reforms in the political processes throughout our countries of interest. 

I see this hearing as an opportunity to examine not only the OSCE’s development 

of institutional cooperation, but also the role of international actors and civil society 

in fostering political systems that respond to the needs of the region. As noted in 

the Helsinki Final Act, the security of Europe is closely linked with security in the 

Mediterranean as a whole. We look to our panels now for their thoughts on the development of political pluralism in the Mediterranean in recognition of our common 

security interests. Thank you for taking the time to join us. 


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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALCEE HASTINGS, COMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Distinguished guests, I also wish to welcome you and I thank my friend Chairman 

Cardin for convening this U.S. Helsinki Commission hearing on ‘‘Political Pluralism 

in the OSCE Mediterranean Partners?’’ During my service as OSCE Parliamentary 

Assembly (OSCE PA) Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs, I spent a 

number of years traveling among all of our Mediterranean Partners on behalf of 

several different OSCE PA presidents. Even before the Arab Awakening, I sought 

to empower the voices of the disenchanted in the region and press those who were 

in power to let pluralism flourish. From Rabat to Cairo, Algiers to Amman, I observed a common thirst for meaningful civic engagement. The popular uprisings 

since the end of 2010 have shown the need for capacity development among the 

youthful population of the region and made engagement with the OSCE more functional than it has ever been. 

I worked in 2009 to convene parliamentarians and experts from throughout the 

Partners in Washington for a seminar to reinvigorate what had been a diminishing 

partnership. This seminar yielded key recommendations that prompted efforts to 

add value to the partnership. This event also encouraged greater ownership of affiliated projects and initiatives by our friends from Partner States, so that our collective efforts would be meaningful to them. That same year was the last time that 

the OSCE convened its annual Mediterranean Conference in a Partner State. Political turmoil, instability and a lack of support for Israel’s contribution to the partnership has kept some Partners from taking a leadership role in bringing the conference back to the Southern shore of the Mediterranean. We must change that. We 

must show that meaningful exchange will only come from dialogue of equally invested partners. 

Mediterranean Partner States are beginning to come to the table and invest in 

the OSCE Partnership Fund. Morocco and Tunisia have even requested legal reviews for their structural reforms from the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions 

and Human Rights (ODIHR). As I had recommended for years, investments are underway for youth exchanges and greater contributions from civil society in the region to OSCE events. I applaud these efforts and especially look to our expert panel 

to remark on how we can do better; acknowledging the demographic trends and political realities. 

I would be remiss not to mention the violent conflicts in Iraq and Syria, which 

have displaced millions and vastly changed the political landscape of the region. We 

are on a dark trajectory if we do not strategically invest in positive civic engagement 

and much needed educational resources for those vulnerable populations. As I have 

said, time and time again, if we do not engage those populations, we will see them 

again in another form. And their demands will not be met through peaceful political 

channels. 

I look forward to thoughts from our panelists on the role of the United States and 

the international community in affirming the aspirations of those who took to the 

streets demanding responsive government and basic civil liberties. Thank you for 

sharing your expertise with us. 


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PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM ROEBUCK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

EGYPT AND MAGHREB AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you, Chairman Cardin and Co-Chairman Smith, for inviting me to testify 

before you today on North Africa. It is a particular honor for me to do so before 

the U.S. Helsinki Commission. Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt, of course, all 

participate in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 

Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation forum, which provides an avenue for engagement with the OSCE, its institutions, and its 57 participating States in promoting a vision of comprehensive security that includes political/military, economic 

and environmental, and human dimensions. We welcome initiatives, such as this 

one, that make important contributions to promoting democratic transitions and bolstering regional stability. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, North Africa—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and 

Egypt—is a region of tremendous potential. The birthplace of the Arab Awakening, 

it is currently undergoing a difficult but critical transformation, the likes of which 

it has not experienced since the beginning of decolonization. Tunisia has achieved 

much success already and continues to realize the democratic promise of its 2011 

revolution, even as it faces significant security and economic challenges. Libya faces 

many difficulties and we must take the long view in assessing its progress toward 

democracy. However, Libyans are committed to making progress. For the second 

time since its revolution, Libyans across the country went to the polls in June and 

voted in free and fair parliamentary elections, selecting members for a new Council 

of Representatives. Morocco and Algeria are also undergoing reform processes that 

will benefit their economies and societies at home and increase stability in the region as a whole. Finally, our longstanding relationship with Egypt and its centrality 

to the region as a whole, require our commitment to democratic development in that 

country. These are historic times in North Africa and the U.S. government is working with our partners to assist and support during this transition. 

Tunisia 

Tunisia remains one of the Middle East and North Africa’s best hopes for a successful transition to democracy and has made positive strides in the past few 

months—with the ratification of a new constitution and swearing in of an independent government to lead the country to elections in 2014. On January 26 of this 

year, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) ratified the constitution by a landslide vote of 200 for, 12 against, and four abstentions. The new constitution enshrines democratic principles such as rule of law, pluralism, gender equality, and 

freedom of belief. 

As with all transitions, of course, there are also challenges. Tunisia’s economy has 

struggled since the 2011 revolution in the face of political uncertainty and security 

incidents. The Tunisian government has an ongoing commitment to reform its economy, aided by an IMF Stand-By Arrangement. Through this reform program, Tunisia is taking steps to address the vulnerabilities in its banking sector, reorient its 

budget toward a more pro-growth composition, and implement a comprehensive 

structural reform agenda to promote private sector development. As announced by 

President Obama in April, the United States and Tunisia signed a loan guarantee 

agreement in June allowing Tunisia to borrow up to $500 million at concessionary 

rates to support this reform agenda. 

Security remains vital to the success of the transition. However, violent extremists pose an ongoing threat as they seek to counter the democratic transition, thwart 

the government’s authority, and impose their extremist understanding of Islam 

through harassment, incitement of violence, and attacks. Yet over the past year the 

Tunisian government has shown an increasingly strong resolve to manage the extremist threat. The Tunisian military and security forces require additional training 

and equipment to counter the newly-evolving terrorist threat. To do so, we have bolstered our assistance to help Tunisia reform its criminal justice sector to improve 

its ability to protect Tunisians and foreigners alike, as well as confront domestic and 

regional security challenges. We are also working with Tunisia to explore ways to 

provide at-risk groups with alternatives and prevent further marginalization or disconnection of these groups. 

We continue to provide assistance through a number of mechanisms to support 

Tunisia’s transition to a prosperous democratic country, to spur job creation, to provide entrepreneurship training, and to enhance access to finance for small and medium enterprises, and support the democratic transition. We are also working with 

Tunisian civil society to ensure a transparent electoral process by supporting domestic election monitoring, and we will be supporting international election observation 

of the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. 


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Libya 

Since the 2011 revolution, Libya has faced significant political and security challenges. Yet it remains in our national security interest to ensure Libya becomes a 

stable and democratic partner capable of addressing regional security challenges 

and advancing our shared interests. Despite the challenges, the Libyan people are 

committed to making progress. On June 25, Libya successfully held nationwide elections for the Council of Representatives (COR), a 200-member legislative body that 

will replace the General National Congress. Although turnout was lower than in 

2012, COR elections represent for many Libyans a new beginning and important 

milestone for the country as it transitions to democracy. We expect the official results of these elections by July 20 and are ready to assist the new parliamentarians 

as they assume their duties, as requested. Furthermore, the Constitutional Drafting 

Assembly (CDA), a 60-member body tasked with drafting a permanent constitution, 

has begun its work in Bayda in eastern Libya after being elected in February. 

Yet while the government is making progress toward democracy and legitimacy, 

it lacks the ability to project its authority across the country or fulfill many core 

government functions. Further complicating efforts to achieve national consensus is 

retired General Khalifa Hifter’s recent campaign to eradicate Islamist-leaning militants from Benghazi. Although many Libyans support his goals, they are wary of 

his methods and future intentions. We continue to affirm that a political agreement—and not violence—is necessary to advance the transition and enable the constitution drafting process to unfold. Accomplishing this will require buy-in from a 

wide range of Libyans. At the request of the Secretary, Ambassador David 

Satterfield is working in his personal capacity to build consensus among key Libyan 

influencers around a set of 10 principles that will guide the way forward. His efforts, along with those of the international community, are essential to helping 

Libya move past its current challenges. 

After 42 years of dictatorship, Libya suffers from instability and poor governance 

due to weak institutions, porous borders, huge stockpiles of loose conventional weapons, and the presence of militias. Some of these militias have extremist ties and continue to wield local and regional power, including blocking for over a year production and exports at many of Libya’s onshore oil and gas facilities. However, we are 

beginning to see progress on this front and on July 1, Prime Minister Al Thinnai 

announced that militias controlling two ports in eastern Libya (Ras Lanuf and EsSidr) agreed to cease these disruptions, which has the potential to increase Libya’s 

oil export potential by 560,000 barrels per day. 

Libyans have grown weary of the pervasive lack of security in their country and 

have become impatient with their leaders’ inability to restore stability. Elected officials, including the Prime Minister, have stated security is their top priority and we 

are working with the government to improve its ability to establish stability 

throughout the country. At the UK-hosted G–8 Summit in June 2013, we pledged 

to train a 5,000–8,000 member General Purpose Forces (GPF), prompting the UK 

and Italy to pledge to train 2,000 members each. The GPF assistance will be paid 

for by the Libyan government, and we are continuing to plan for this effort, which 

will take place later this year. 

Border security is also a critical concern to the U.S. and our international partners in Libya. Libya’s porous borders permit the flow not only of destabilizing Qadhafi-era conventional weapons, but also violent extremists throughout North Africa, the Middle East, and the Sahel. We are in the process of re-scoping a border 

security program in coordination with the European Union Integrated Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to provide technical expertise, training, and limited 

equipment to build Libya’s inter-ministerial border security capacity to address security along its western land border. We will also continue to work with international partners and allies to support a broad range of activities to help the Government of Libya in securing excess, at-risk, or easily proliferated conventional 

weapons. 

Although Libya has great national resources, it has weak institutions, and requires targeted support now to develop the structures necessary to fund its own development. Alongside the international community, we are working with the Libyan 

government to build institutional public financial management capacity. 

Morocco 

We continue to enjoy a very strong bilateral relationship with Morocco, focused 

on promoting regional stability, supporting democratic reform efforts, countering 

violent extremism, and strengthening trade and cultural ties. Morocco—a major 

non-NATO ally since 2004—is one of our closest counterterrorism partners in the 

region, and an active member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. We also enjoy 

a strong economic relationship; a bilateral free trade agreement entered into force 


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in 2006 that has helped triple bilateral trade, and in November 2013 we signed a 

Trade Facilitation Agreement. 

President Obama hosted King Mohammed VI of Morocco in Washington on November 22, 2013, underscoring the long-term cooperation and friendship between 

our two countries. On this occasion we reaffirmed our close strategic partnership 

with Morocco and discussed the best means of promoting security and prosperity in 

the region. 

Under King Mohammed VI, the Moroccan political system has gradually liberalized; the King founded the Arab world’s first truth and reconciliation commission— 

to investigate abuses that occurred during his father’s reign—and expanded women’s rights. A new constitution was adopted in 2011, and Morocco’s first Islamistled government won nationwide democratic elections, but much progress remains to 

be made on implementing the guarantees and reforming institutions. 

We will continue to support Morocco as it undertakes these important reform efforts. Our bilateral assistance focuses on promoting economic, political, democratic 

and social reforms; deepening our security partnership; promoting export control 

and countering violent extremism efforts; developing a professional criminal justice 

system; and encouraging broad-based economic growth. Our flagship assistance program has been Morocco’s $698 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 

compact, which closed in September 2013 and focused on agriculture, fisheries, and 

small business development. Morocco was selected as eligible to develop a second 

compact by MCC’s Board of Directors in 2012 and is in the project definition phase 

of program development. With regards to the Western Sahara, we support the 

United Nations-led process designed to bring about a peaceful, sustainable, and mutually-acceptable solution to the Western Sahara question. We also support the 

work of the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, Ambassador Christopher Ross, and urge the parties to work toward a resolution. 

Algeria 

Algeria and the United States have built a strong bilateral relationship, characterized by our shared interests to combat terrorism and facilitate greater stability 

in the region. 

Algeria has made progress on human rights and political transparency over the 

past 20 years. We are encouraging the government to create space for a more vibrant civil society and inclusive democratic process through supporting small civil 

society initiatives, such as funding training for local election monitors. We also aim 

to increase educational exchanges with young Algerians, including promoting 

English language learning. 

The wealth from Algeria’s significant hydrocarbon reserves has empowered the 

state at the expense of overall economic development. We continue to encourage Algeria to make market oriented changes that expand job opportunities and increase 

its attractiveness to foreign direct investment. With that in mind, we are working 

to strengthen our trade relationship with Algeria, and are seeking to reactivate the 

2001 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. In 2013, General Electric 

signed deals worth $3 billion to provide gas turbines to Algeria, an example of the 

benefits of our efforts to promote U.S. business in Algeria. This will help create or 

sustain 4,000 American jobs. 

We have encouraged Algeria to continue to expand its regional leadership role to 

help stabilize neighboring states. Algeria’s experience fighting an Islamist insurgency during the 1990s resulted in a well-equipped and battle-hardened military 

that constitutes the strongest counterterrorism force in the region. We appreciate 

the work that Algeria has done with Tunisia to combat smuggling and terrorism, 

and we will continue to encourage Algeria to use their expertise to train and partner 

with less experienced militaries and law enforcement units in the region to help ensure greater stability in the Sahel and Maghreb. 

Egypt 

Egypt has undergone dizzying changes in the last three years. While its path forward is still being charted, its current trajectory has raised legitimate concerns 

about the future of democracy and human rights in Egypt. Egypt is also facing dramatic economic challenges as it moves to address unemployment, diversify and 

strengthen its economy, rebuild its tourist sector, and attract investment. We want 

Egypt to become a stable, prosperous, democratic country. While changes in Egypt 

have been shaped by internal dynamics, we recognize that these changes have 

broader implications for the region. Egypt is the most populous Arab nation—representing a quarter of the Arab world—and remains a bellwether for political and 

social trends across the Middle East and North Africa. 


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Egypt also remains a critical partner of the United States as we pursue our national security interests in the region and globally. We share several crucial interests, including countering the transnational threats of terrorism and weapons trafficking and maintaining regional stability on several fronts, foremost among them 

peace with Israel. Egypt is supportive of these interests and we believe a stable, 

prosperous, and democratic Egypt will make the strongest and most effective partner. 

We remain deeply concerned about the state of human rights and political freedoms in Egypt, particularly the imprisonment of journalists and democracy activists, the lack of individualized justice and mass death sentences, and the enforcement of a harsh demonstrations law that is being used to close off space for dissent. 

These tactics are troubling: they reflect a profound lack of due process and complicate the achievement of political reform. Such tactics are at odds with the demands of the Egyptian people for justice; they further polarize Egyptian society and 

radicalize those whom they exclude from the political environment. 

Secretary Kerry made these views clear during his visit last month when he emphasized our strong support for upholding the universal rights and freedoms of all 

Egyptians, including freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association. We 

will continue to call on President Al-Sisi and the new government to take steps to 

support a democratic transition in Egypt, one built on a foundation of the rule of 

law, civil liberties, and open political discourse. So, in Egypt, we are pursuing dual, 

though by no means contradictory, policy imperatives: protecting our shared strategic interests and encouraging political and economic reform in Egypt. Through our 

economic assistance, we are seeking to demonstrate our commitment to achieving 

prosperity and improving the lives of the Egyptian people. We are striving to sharpen that commitment, by focusing on key issues such as higher education, private 

sector growth, and longer term establishment of democratic institutions. Through 

our military assistance, we are helping Egypt protect its borders and counter violent 

extremism that threatens Egypt, the broader region, and U.S. interests. We know 

that respect for human rights and a more democratic political environment are also 

critical to achieving those goals. 

We will continue to engage diplomatically with the Egyptian government to underscore the need for political and economic reform, and work closely with Congress 

to ensure our assistance—military and economic—supports our broad strategic interests in Egypt and in the region. 

Chairman Cardin and Co-chairman Smith, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. Certainly, we are aware that our budgets are facing increasing pressure, but this region remains vital to protecting our national interests, as we look to maintain relationships with key allies and to nudge nascent 

democracies through difficult transitions, with the hope of promoting stability and 

countering extremist threats in the Middle East and Africa. With careful, targeted 

assistance, and smart diplomatic engagement, we are successfully advancing our 

key strategic interests. 

Thank you again for your time and attention. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 


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PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM TAYLOR, VICE PRESIDENT FOR MIDDLE EAST AND

AFRICA, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

Chairman Cardin, Co-chairman Smith, Members of the Commission, thank you 

for the opportunity to present my views on political pluralism in several of the Arab 

Spring countries. The views I express today are solely my own and do not represent 

those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not take policy positions. 

I commend you for this timely and important hearing. 

In addition to my current position as vice president for the Middle East and Africa 

at USIP, I had the opportunity in 2011–2013 to coordinate assistance to Tunisia, 

Egypt, Libya and Syria at the State Department. 

I will concentrate this morning on two of the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for 

Cooperation—Tunisia and Egypt. I believe they demonstrate the range of experience 

and practice that we can see in this region. Tunisia has demonstrated remarkable 

maturity and commitment to the ideal of political inclusiveness; Egypt has not. 

I will review briefly several of the events of the past two years in these two countries; I will then evaluate briefly the actions taken by leaders in Tunisia and Egypt. 

At the beginning of 2013, Tunisia was struggling politically and economically and 

facing violent unrest. The elections in 2012 had given the moderate Islamist party 

Ennahda a plurality. It formed a coalition with two secular parties, called the Troika, and was attempting to both govern and write a new constitution. After broad 

consultations around the country on various aspects of a new constitution, parliamentary work on the constitution had stalled by early 2013. 

The Tunisian economy, like others in the region, was suffering from low investment, low tourism and high unemployment. 

The attack on the U.S. embassy in Tunis by extremist Islamist forces in September 2012 had demonstrated the weakness of the government and its security 

forces. The instability was then exacerbated in early 2013 with the assassination 

of a prominent opposition party member, Chokri Belaid. While the extent of violence 

in Tunisia was small compared to the numbers killed in other countries of the region, these incidents shocked Tunisians and led to two events: first, the resignation 

of the Ennahda prime minister, and second, an effort by civil society leaders to pull 

the country back from the crisis. Several political parties supported the effort; 

Ennahda did not. 

At the same time—the beginning of 2013—the Islamist government that had 

formed in Egypt under Mohammed Morsi was also struggling to govern and write 

a constitution. Unlike in Tunisia, however, the main Islamist party in Egypt, the 

Muslim Brotherhood, had won a majority in the parliamentary elections, and Mr. 

Morsi had won a tight race for president. Also unlike Tunisia, the Islamist majority 

in the Egyptian parliament and the Islamist president forced through a constitution 

without attempting to achieve consensus. Further, security forces and Muslim 

Brotherhood supporters attacked peaceful demonstrators, women’s rights were violated, journalists were suppressed, and police abuse continued. President Morsi 

issued a decree that exempted his decisions from judicial review. Demonstrations 

grew in opposition to the government’s handling of the constitutional process as well 

as to social legislation in the parliament and economic mismanagement, leading to 

a large, army-sponsored demonstration on June 30, 2013, and a military coup on 

July 3 that installed a military-backed civilian government. 

At this point, events in Tunisia and events in Egypt intersect. Before the coup 

in Egypt, the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda had resisted efforts by civil society 

to bridge political differences within Tunisian society. Ennahda had rejected invitations to join a dialogue sponsored by four parts of Tunisian civil society known as 

the Quartet and made up of the largest labor union, the association of employers, 

the Tunisian bar association and the league of human rights advocates. After the 

coup in Egypt—and another political assassination in Tunis—Ennahda decided to 

join what was then being called the Tunisian National Dialogue. The Quartet-led 

discussions lasted through the fall and into the winter, until, in January 2014, they 

reached agreement on three important points: 

• They agreed on the text of a new constitution, which was then referred to the 

parliament and won overwhelming approval from its members. 

• They agreed that new elections, presidential and parliamentary, would take 

place by the end of the year, that is, before December 2014. 

• Even more remarkably, the Ennahda-led coalition government agreed to step 

down and to hand over power to a non-political, interim government that would take 

governmental influence out of preparations for the elections. In Egypt, meanwhile, 

the military-installed government had begun a harsh crackdown on the Muslim 

Brotherhood, killing more than 1,000 Egyptians and jailing and prosecuting thousands more. Hundreds at a time have been convicted and sentenced to death, often 


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on little evidence. The repression, which the new military-backed government defended as a fight against terrorists, soon extended to journalists, activists and liberal groups accused of supporting terrorists. This year, Field Marshal and Defense 

Minister al-Sisi, who once professed no interest in the military taking over the country, declared his candidacy for president under a newly ratified constitution and, in 

May, won an overwhelming victory, even though turnout in the election was disappointing. U.S. assistance to the government of Egypt, cut off after the coup as 

called for by U.S. law, was partially restored. 

Political pluralism in the region is at its broadest in Tunisia today. The formation 

of a coalition government including both the Islamist Ennahda and two secular parties demonstrated that Islamist and secular political parties are able to work together. Islamist leaders soon learned that extremist violence, rather than reinforcing their position, undermined it, and that strong security measures were required to quell such attacks and maintain stability. 

The Tunisian constitution, drafted after extensive consultation across the country, 

is considered a model in the region, acknowledging the Muslim foundation of Tunisian society and guaranteeing rights to religions, sexes and political streams of 

thought. The constitution was approved as a result of wide consultation across the 

country, thorough debate in the parliament, political compromise struck by civil society leaders, and adherence to agreed rules as the parliament ratified the constitution overwhelmingly, with the parliamentarians standing to sing the Tunisian national anthem after the historic vote. 

The leading role of civil society—pulling the country back from violence, division 

and gridlock—is a model of dialogue over confrontation and conflict. The Tunisian 

National Dialogue, led by the non-governmental Quartet, was able to find consensus, bring the quarreling political parties into the discussion, and forge compromises that have set Tunisia on a positive—if still fragile—course toward a successful transition. 

In Egypt, on the other hand, political pluralism is, at best, reminiscent of previous 

military dictatorships. Freedom of the press and for civil society organizations may 

be more constrained now than under previous governments. 

Islamist leaders drew the wrong lessons from their elections, ignoring voices of 

minorities in parliament and society. Ramming through a constitution that was not 

broadly supported contributed to the rise of the opposition. 

The new military-backed government under President al-Sisi has not limited its 

security measures to violent extremists and has instead used police and the courts 

to eliminate political opposition. 

The cases of Tunisia and Egypt point the way toward potentially effective U.S. 

and international strategies for the region. First, the United States and the international community should increase support for the Tunisian government and people as they continue to demonstrate that political pluralism is compatible with Islamic societies and is the formula for a successful transition to democracy. This assistance should include financial support—in the form of loan guarantees, project financing, and incentives for private investment—from Western governments, international financial institutions and the international private sector. The United 

States should negotiate and sign a free-trade agreement with Tunisia. Western governments should provide training and equipment to Tunisia’s security forces. The 

United States and Europe should increase opportunities for Tunisian students to 

study abroad. 

Second, on Egypt, the United States and the international community should continue to condemn the repression, publicly and privately, as counterproductive and 

short-sighted. We have learned a lot in the past few years about governance in the 

Middle East; one clear lesson is that political oppression is not an effective tactic 

to increase stability. 

U.S. assistance to Egypt should concentrate on programs that enable Egyptians 

to take advantage of educational opportunities, both in Egypt and abroad. A large 

program of scholarships for Egyptian young people, with an emphasis on women 

and underdeveloped parts of the country, could pay great dividends for Egypt and 

U.S.-Egyptian relations. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to answer questions. 


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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHIBLEY TELHAMI, ANWAR SADAT CHAIR FOR PEACE AND

DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

This is not a good time for pluralism and human rights in the Middle East and 

North Africa, although there are important degrees and variations. In my short 

comments today, I will limit myself to describing some broad dynamics affecting pluralism, human rights, and democracy in the region so that we can have a context 

for a constructive discussion of the trends and possibilities. My focus will be on the 

challenges faced and not on the possibilities or the bright spots. 

Let me start with the impact of the Arab uprisings and three issues that need 

to be understood. 

The most profound, and probably enduring, change that has occurred in the region with the advent of the Arab uprisings is the empowerment of the individual 

in a region where the individual has counted less politically and culturally. This empowerment is driven principally by an expanding information revolution, especially 

satellite TV, the Internet, and social media, that is not going away. Governments 

have lost control of information, people’s expectations are rising because of what 

they see outside their own countries, and the interactive nature of the Internet and 

social media is empowering. This public empowerment is in the long term an important and constructive force that is likely to push for more freedom, pluralism, and 

human rights. But in the short term, there are dynamics that lead to exactly the 

opposite, as we have witnessed in a number of states swept by public uprisings. It 

should be noted, however, that even countries that have felt only a limited impact 

of the uprisings, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria, are not immune to the public 

pressure that comes with the empowerment generated by an expanding information 

revolution. 

First, the fact that the public is empowered doesn’t mean it is unified. In fact 

there Arab societies—and Israel’s—are highly diverse, and that diversity had been 

muted by authoritarianism, in the case of the Arab states, and intense external conflict in the case of the Israelis. This diversity is not limited to the kind of sectarianism that we see in states like Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain. There are 

ideological, economic, and geographic divisions that surface to the top as we have 

seen in Egypt, aside from the roughly 10% of the population who are Christians, 

the Muslim majority is overwhelmingly Sunni. The divide between secularists and 

Islamists, among others, has pitted people against each other in a zero-sum confrontation that is at least as divisive as sectarianism. Public empowerment means 

that every group wants its voices heard and wants a share of power in a changing 

political empowerment. This is especially so as central authority weakens, and new 

rules of the game are being set up. 

Second, in the struggle for a new system, and everyone vying for influence and 

a share of the pie, not everyone is equal. In these environments, minorities are most 

vulnerable as the state weakens, and we see this already in a number of states, 

where groups like Christian Arabs have become particularly vulnerable. In addition, 

the public is still fighting against existing sources of power that want to assert 

themselves in a new polity. This includes state bureaucracies, corporations, individuals and groups with deep pockets, and, above all, military institutions. In fact, in 

all the states with significant uprisings, the initial outcome, and the resulting conditions, could not be understood without understanding the roles of the military institutions: In Egypt and Tunisia, the initial toppling of rulers came with support or 

at least the acquiescence of the military, and the different results so far are partly 

a function of the decisions each institution has taken. The outcome will continue to 

depend on the decisions of each institution. In Syria, Bahrain, and Libya, the army 

supported the rulers and the outcome was ultimately dependent on that decision. 

Third, transitions are destabilizing, and that usually is not a good thing for democracy, pluralism, and human rights. Deep insecurity and economic deprivation, 

often short-term results of a weakened central authority, provide fertile ground for 

those who want to rule with an iron fist—as fear trumps pluralism and human 

rights. We see this in many of the states facing the uprisings to varying degrees, 

and we see this also playing into the hands of those governments that have not had 

to deal with their own major uprisings. In fact, one reason why the Arab uprisings 

have not expanded beyond the early cases is that the anarchy, such as in Syria and 

Libya, and economic deprivation and limited insecurity, as in Egypt, have given rulers a way of frightening their own public: Do you want to be in Aleppo and Tripoli, 

or Amman and Riyadh? 

Fourth, while each country in the region has its own specific conditions that have 

to be evaluated separately, it is fair to say that there are commonalities in the Arab 

world. And regional politics are interwoven with domestic politics; the international 

is sometimes hard to separate from the national. Polls indicate common aspirations 


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and, more centrally, note the early spillover from Tunisia across the Arab world, but 

not into other regions, including non-Arab Muslim countries. In addition, it is also 

obvious that the way the uprisings have unfolded in every country—with the possible exception of Tunisia—cannot be explained without reference to major external 

intervention. Syria is of course experiencing upheavals that are at the core internal, 

but the intensity, nature, and ultimately outcome of the struggle cannot be understood without the role of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Syria’s neighboring states, not 

to mention the United States and Russia. Even in Egypt, where there is no military 

intervention from the outside, the infusion of billions of dollars from the Arab Gulf 

states is an important factor of what happens in Egypt as President Sisi tries to 

stabilize the economy. 

Fifth, the case of the non-Arab Middle Eastern state in the group, Israel, is of 

course unique, but there are potential troubles ahead for pluralism and democracy, 

whose prospects remain partly tied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel is a successful democracy with the pre-1967 war boundaries. But two things suggest troubling trends: the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have not had full independence, and the international toleration of this situation has been predicated on 

the assumption that occupation is temporary and that the focus should be on achieving a political settlement that leads to two states. If the hope for two states is lost, 

and a sense emerges that the status quo is semi-permanent, the Israeli-Palestinian 

inequality will be evaluated differently. Second, as the Israeli aspiration for a Jewish majority state becomes threatened within existing boundaries, we will see more 

ultra-Jewish nationalism reflected not only in the relationship between Israel and 

the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, but also in the internal dynamics between Israel’s Jewish minority and the 20% of its population who are Arab citizens—as we have begun to see already. In turn, the absence of independence for 

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza will generate empathy among Israel’s Arab 

citizens in a manner that plays into the hand of extremists on both sides—thus 

jeopardizing the coexistence of Jews and Arabs even within Israel’s pre-1967 borders 

. . . 


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42 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ZEINAB ABDELKARIM, REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE

EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, for the opportunity 

to testify today on the topic of Political Pluralism in the OSCE Mediterranean Partners. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you IFES’ considerable expertise 

and experience assessing the overall political, socio-economic, security, humanitarian and other issues likely surrounding the region’s democratic transition. 

I will begin with a brief synopsis of IFES’ work in order to contextualize my testimony. Broadly speaking, IFES supports citizens’ right to participate in free and fair 

elections by strengthening electoral systems, and by building local capacity to deliver sustainable solutions to problems facing countries that seek to enhance their 

governance structures. 

IFES has been active in the Middle East region for over two decades advocating 

for participatory societies where citizens have the regular opportunity to play an active role in making decisions that affect their lives and in holding their government 

accountable. IFES utilizes an integrated and innovative approach that empowers 

both the recognized local authorities, local actors and civil society activists by providing information on democratic norms, elections and political processes, international standards and best practices; carrying out trainings for key stakeholders 

on democratic and transitional issues; and providing resources and tools for civil society activists to implement civic education activities and prepare the country for 

a democratic transition. 

The Arab uprisings reaffirmed the importance of democratic representation and 

the need for opportunity, access and freedom. Today, IFES programming continues 

to respond to challenges across the region in countries such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt 

and Yemen. Our work across the region was made possible by direct funding assistance from the U.S. Government and other international donors, including the British, Swiss, Canadian and Dutch governments. 

The overall situation throughout the Middle East and North Africa remains fragile and very polarized. As Syria’s civil war rages on and Iraq’s security and stability 

deteriorate, threats from Al Qaeda, foreign mercenaries and other radical groups 

stretching from the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula to Africa continue to undermine regional stability. 

The trends that played a major role in the Arab uprisings just a few years ago— 

such as demographic challenges, struggling economies, poor internal security, insufficient access to justice, ineffective governance and stagnant social transformation— 

continue to affect both the region and individual States. These trends will remain 

sources of instability, and in some cases violence, in the near future. 

Newly-elected governments and institutions continue to face firm resistance from 

their opponents and have not been successful thus far in managing political distrust, economic uncertainty and internal security. In deeply divided societies where 

ethnic, social, tribal and political affiliations are key considerations, it is imperative 

that countries’ transitions are managed in a manner that is inclusive and consultative and engenders trust across these divisions. While any future elections in the 

transitioning countries will represent an opportunity for a population to express its 

degree of satisfaction with the country’s state of affairs, the simmering political and 

societal conflicts that have plagued the countries of this region for decades, and the 

slow pace of political reform, will pose challenges for democratization moving forward. The biggest danger is the tendency to reduce democratic practices to voting, 

constitutional drafting and electoral events. A new constitution or the presence of 

electoral processes does not necessarily mean that a democratic tradition of transparency and accountability have taken root. It is particularly important for citizens 

to perceive government affairs, legal reform processes and the country’s economic 

plans as open and transparent. The current developments across the region cannot 

be considered to evidence a new social contract between regional States and their 

citizens, in any regard. At best, it can be described as constitutional engineering led 

by a small elite faction of the dominant force or ethnic/religious group. 

Understandably, undeveloped and disorganized political and civil forces as well as 

nascent civil movements in places like Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Jordan are unable 

to wield much influence on near-term outcomes of the transition in these countries. 

However, it is important to note that modern democratic practices evolved over centuries; it makes no sense to look for similarities in a remarkably different context, 

particularly so early in the game. Rather, it is best to let the political development 

run its natural course. These are changes that are best measured in decades, not 

years. It is not realistic to expect a fast and seamless transition to democracy. The 

history of colonial and imperial rule across the region, as well as the State’s domination of the economy and society, shaped a culture of authoritarian political tradiVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:34 Aug 19, 2015 Jkt 095576 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A576.XXX A576

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tions that needs time and comprehensive locally-driven efforts to overcome. Each 

and every State will evolve into its own distinctive way as it adapts to national, regional and global changes over time. 

Additionally and most importantly, the lack of political and societal consensus 

around major issues—such as the role of Islam and Shariah in the affairs of the 

State and society, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, and the rights and 

role of women in their respective societies—is a fundamental internal struggle that 

cannot be ignored. Any external intervention on these issues has little influence 

over what is considered an internal struggle that can only be addressed when the 

peoples of the region genuinely seek to invoke civil liberties, justice and the rule 

of law regardless of the governing system they choose to implement. 

Analysis in the midst of current political and regional events is never easy, especially as events unfold and their causes and the future itself remain clouded with 

uncertainty. In retrospect and based on close monitoring of recent and current 

events, this testimony seeks to reexamine these regional developments and offer a 

short outlook on key issues and concerns that will affect the development of political 

pluralism across the region. The following issues and concerns cover a range of political, economic and social factors that must be discussed when addressing pluralism in the region: 

1. A decline in political legitimacy in some countries: Political forces overseeing 

transitions have suffered a serious decline in political legitimacy and public confidence in a number of the countries. The lack of commitment to change, or even 

attempts to introduce serious changes to the political and socio-economic status quo, 

have resulted in serious questions about those new governments’ true commitment 

to pluralism and democratic principles. Their refusal to exercise inclusive and transparent governance; the ongoing human rights abuses (including the excessive use 

of force); torture and other ill-treatment by security forces; unfair trials; and discrimination against women and other religious and ethnic minorities will continue 

to lead to widespread protests and eventually contribute to further destabilization 

in what has proven to be an exceptionally fluid environment. 

2. A breakdown in security, rising instability and an increase in both human and 

weapons trafficking: Security has been declared the top priority for most governments across the region. There has been a serious lack of stability since the inception of the 2011 uprisings as the security situation has steadily deteriorated and 

been further compounded by trans-border security threats. Bomb attacks, assassinations and weapons proliferations continue to be a daily problem for most governments, and arms have flowed out across borders and found their way to radical 

groups operating in the Levant, Arabian Peninsula, Sinai and North Africa. Impunity for political assassinations and other politically and religiously motivated violence is also on the rise across the region. The assassination of the Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan that took place in Beirut in October 2012 was a dangerous 

twist that mirrored other successful attempts in Libya, Tunisia, Iraq and Yemen. 

The recent assassination of Salwa Bugaighis, a Libyan human rights attorney, has 

also sent a chill through democracy activists across the region. 

Furthermore, the ongoing conflict between the different rebel factions in Syria, 

coupled with the inability of the Iraqi government to establish a viable non-sectarian political system or find a workable relationship between the central government in Baghdad and the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, is bound to 

fuel the sectarian wars across the border for many years to come. As a result, parts 

of Syria and Iraq may well be threatened by secession or disintegration and a more 

dangerous security situation will emerge for the citizens of these territories. 

3. Economic meltdown and extreme poverty in some countries in the region: The 

unstable security climate is one of the main impediments to economic development, 

and it remains to be seen whether the current governments can continue the pace 

of political, economic, and social reform over the long-term that many analysts see 

as crucial to addressing some countries’ endemic economic problems. The lack of effort to seriously address these problems does not augur well for stabilization or 

democratic development and could lead to more protests/insecurity if not addressed 

in the near-term. 

4. Increased tension between Islamists, socialists, liberals and the other political 

entities: Islam was largely absent from the mantras that gave birth to the uprisings; 

nor has it been at the forefront of any of the nonviolent mass movements in the 

region since. Recent analysis indicates that the primary cause of discontent and mobilization that lead to regime change in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen was an 

outcry for justice, rights, economic and political reforms. In fact, most of the Islamist 

movements in these countries did not join the demonstrations in their relevant 

countries until sometime after they started. However, in most of the transitioning 

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form, Islamists are a force in the new political order as they sought to portray themselves as the vanguard of opposition to the status quo. Examples of this tension can 

clearly be seen in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The struggle over the constitutional 

drafting process in these countries is a prime example of the growing divide between 

Islamists and liberals as they debated the inclusion of Shariah as the source of all 

legislation, the role of men and women, and criminalization of attacks against religion and sacred values. These debates have plagued the region for many years and 

will continue to be at the forefront of the region’s political sphere for years to come. 

5. A decline in the status of women, ethnic and religious minorities: The possibility for all citizens to participate in the management of public affairs is at the very 

heart of democracy. In the majority of MENA countries, however, the political arena 

remains largely dominated by men, and is exclusively monopolized by men in some 

countries. Many fear the new political order of the region will impact universal 

human rights negatively, especially the already-sparse legal rights and protections 

in place for women and ethnic minorities. As the current governments in Tunisia, 

Egypt, Yemen and Libya struggled to put together their new constitutions and representative bodies, the issue of the role of women and minorities was embodied in 

the debates on constitutional articles and quotas. 

6. Power shifts and the geopolitics of the region: The struggle for dominance in 

the Persian Gulf and the Levant remains unresolved, volatile and highly dangerous. 

For decades, there has been fierce competition between the Salafi Saudi-Wahhabi 

school of thought and the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran. Both sides have provided 

military and political backing to their allies across the region for years. Iran on one 

hand has been one of Iraq and Syria’s strongest allies in the Middle East and has 

stepped up its military and political backing to these two governments in recent 

years. Similarly, Iran has also provided support, financially and militarily, to Lebanon’s Shiite Hezbollah for decades, and is suspected of providing financial support 

and arms to the Houthi Shiite opposition in its struggle against the Yemeni government. Conversely, the Bahraini government and six other Gulf countries have accused Iran of meddling in its sovereignty and inciting the Shiite uprising. On the 

other hand, given its vast resources, Saudi Arabia could play a pivotal and decisive 

role in determining the trajectory of development in Syria, Egypt and Yemen. Its 

efforts have been aimed at stabilizing neighboring countries, particularly Yemen, 

Jordan and Bahrain, containing Iran’s agenda in the region, and ensuring that the 

new political order in the countries undergoing transition does not bring the Muslim 

Brotherhood or an Islamic-democratic model, along the lines of Turkey’s AK Party, 

into power; the Kingdom has serious ideological differences with these two groups. 

External regional players, in particular the U.S., Europe, Russia and China and 

their delayed and sometimes unwelcomed engagement make them ineffective players in influencing the region’s political transformation. 

7. Changing regional priorities regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: The 

peace process between Israel and Palestine is no longer the main regional pre-occupation, with the Arab region spiraling dangerously into further conflict and sectarianism. Yet the conflict remains a destabilizing factor that is also spiraling out 

of control, with no end in sight to the cycle of violence, revenge, killings, 

kidnappings, bombings and rocket attacks. The role of Hamas in the Gaza strip, as 

well as the Jewish settlements in lands that are meant to be part of the future Palestinian state, have been the main deal breakers each time the peace negotiations 

seemed to be about to produce change. Without a political solution that includes an 

end to the occupation, there is no telling when the current violent cycle will end. 

8. Continued resistance to U.S. involvement in the region: The U.S. presence in 

the region, both ideologically and physically, faces a crisis in legitimacy, where mistrust and suspicion are the dominant features of the regions’ perception towards the 

U.S. The post-Saddam period in Iraq has proved to be filled with human tragedies 

and grave tactical errors; including terror, violence, political instability and a brewing, potentially catastrophic civil war. Additionally, U.S. selectivity in forcing democratization or applying sanctions and embargoes on Middle Eastern countries has 

been met with much criticism in the region, and it faces sustained disapproval in 

relation to its reaction or lack thereof to the mass revolts that spread across the 

region. Most importantly, the self-inflicted disappointments against America’s democratic principles and international standards through the torture of prisoners and 

detainees at U.S.-run facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan; the holding of hundreds of 

persons in legal limbo at Guanta ́namo Bay; the turning over of foreign detainees 

to foreign countries known to practice torture; and the astonishing scale of the U.S. 

drone and surveillance programs abroad continue to be at the forefront of the regional debate over the U.S. sincerity to uphold justice. 

9. Shrinking space for democracy-building programs: A growing number of governments across the region are starting to crack down on democracy-building programs 


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45 

and publicly denouncing democracy assistance, describing it as illegitimate political 

meddling in internal affairs and a clear attempt to subvert political order. It is important to note this backlash against and skepticism of democracy aid is global and 

not limited to the Middle East and is best understood as likely to persist for the 

foreseeable future. In recent years, some governments have expelled implementers 

of democracy assistance programs from their soil, prohibited local groups from taking foreign funds, and prosecuted local persons who have participated in trainings 

conducted by international implementers. They have further formalized this backlash by passing controversial new laws which impose heightened controls on local 

and foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the country. There 

can be little doubt that the proponents of this resistance are clearly learning from 

and feeding off one another, and we should anticipate the space for democracy promotion to continue shrinking in the immediate future. Also, within the space that 

some of these countries will leave slightly open for this type of programming, we 

will see a spike in the level of scrutiny that will be imposed by governments on the 

finances, implementation and participation by local actors on these programs, which 

can have huge implications on their effectiveness. 

Transition to democratic governance is not easy or fast, and the path to introducing and implementing democratic and political reforms varies across countries. 

It is difficult to predict how long the transformation of the region will take and how 

far it will go. However, the regional upheaval is far from over and the highly motivated young generation who is on the forefront of the call for transformation will 

continue to challenge the present circumstances and guard the flame of change. To 

remain effective, the international community and groups that promote democracy 

must come to grips with these new trends and the complicated history of democracy 

promotion and genuinely rethink their strategies of engagement. There are clear 

signs of a decline in the legitimacy of democratic systems in many parts of the region, including a crisis in representation, poor voter turnout at elections and 

referenda, a loss of trust due to poor performance by political parties, corruption, 

severe dissatisfaction among young people and an increase in human loss due to ongoing armed conflicts. It is critical that democracy promotion move beyond electoral 

politics and mobilization of the streets to enabling human rights, physical well-being 

and human development. Unfortunately, the emphasis on democratic elections, participation by civil societies, empowerment of marginalized and ethnic groups and 

competition between political parties will not guarantee State responses to its citizens’ needs or the social and political accountability of the ruling regime in 

transitioning societies. To the contrary, and as evident by the quick call for elections 

immediately after the fall of the former regimes in the transitioning countries, open 

competitive politics often accentuate social differences and lead to violent conflicts. 

Undoubtedly, there is a need to re-evaluate the ways in which democratization is 

supported and sustained. The human security challenges facing the region today require the promotion of a broader concept that includes consensus and peace-building 

processes, accountability, human rights protection, capacity building for social and 

economic development, promotion of public involvement and consultation and improvement of political and electoral processes. Disengaging or limiting democratic 

governance aid to the region at this juncture is a huge mistake; however given the 

restrictions referenced above, the international community should continue to leverage existing international frameworks, diplomacy and bilateral agreements to find 

ways to encourage democratic governance and the space for these programs. Efforts 

to plan future assistance have to take into consideration that democracy building 

is highly political and not only a technical exercise. Better understanding of the 

local context and norms, local ownership, and respect for the viewpoints and experiences of the targeted population are key principles that must guide the international community’s efforts. Any intervention can easily lose credibility if perceived 

by the local population as ineffective or tainted by the intervening country’s political 

self-interest. 

Æ 


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