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TUNISIA’S FRAGILE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 14, 2015

Serial No. 114–69

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Mark Green, president, International Republican Institute ...... 5

Mr. Leslie Campbell, senior associate and regional director, National Democratic Institute ...................................................................................................... 14

Mr. Aaron Zelin, Richard Borow Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy ............................................................................................................ 15

Mr. William Sweeney, president and chief executive officer, International 

Foundation for Electoral Systems ....................................................................... 27

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Mark Green: Prepared statement ................................................ 8

Mr. Aaron Zelin: Prepared statement .................................................................... 19

Mr. William Sweeney: Prepared statement ........................................................... 29

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 56

(1)

TUNISIA’S FRAGILE DEMOCRATIC 

TRANSITION 

TUESDAY, JULY 14, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize any 

member seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from 

our witnesses. Thank you to our witnesses for being here. I apologize that we did not get a chance to shake your hand and say 

thank you beforehand. 

The witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the 

record. Members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

Before we begin, I would like to recognize the Tunisian Ambassador to the United States, who is in attendance today. We welcome the Ambassador when he comes, and look forward to continuing to work with Tunisia to help its people realize their goal 

of a democratic future. The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

Perhaps it is fitting that Tunisia, the nation that started the 

Arab Spring, is the only country in the Middle East and North Africa that has made any significant progress toward democracy. But 

that future success is still very far from certain. Despite all of the 

positive gains that Tunisia has made over the past 11⁄2 years-plus, 

from adopting a new constitution to electing a new Parliament and 

the first real free and fair Presidential elections since its independence, it has been two high profile terror attacks in Tunisia that has 

really, sadly, captured the world’s attention in this North African 

country. And with greater scrutiny over Tunisia’s security situation, the international community has also highlighted some of the 

other struggles the current government is facing as it strives toward democracy. 

One of the major stumbling blocks for the new Tunisian Government is turning its economy around. As the recent terror attacks 

at the hotels on the east coast of the country reminded us, Tunisia 

is largely dependent on the tourism industry. Tourism is responVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:26 Aug 18, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\071415\95513 SHIRL
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sible, in fact, for some 15 percent of the total GDP. Tunisia’s tourism industry is already taking a hit from the economic troubles in 

Europe. They might just not be able to recover if there is any lasting damage to its tourism economy. In fact, Tunisia’s President 

stated that another terror attack like the one last month could 

cause the collapse of his government. But cracks in the country’s 

economic outlook were already there. The government needs to do 

more to fundamentally address the economic challenges as well as 

the security challenges if it is to continue to have the support of 

the people of Tunisia. 

And that is why programs like the Tunisian-American Enterprise 

Fund, which invests in small and medium businesses to spur economic growth and employment, are steps in the right direction. Democracies aren’t formed overnight, but it becomes difficult for people who have been through so much and who have come so far to 

be patient and to understand that this is a long process, and that 

there will be ups and downs along the way. 

The nascent government needs some major accomplishments that 

it can point to in order to really solidify its support for Tunisia’s 

democracy project. And that is where the United States could play 

a very important role. The stability of Tunisia and the viability of 

its democratic transition are not only strategically important to the 

United States and the region, but it is important to all of us who 

believe in democracy and what the people of Tunisia are trying to 

accomplish for themselves. 

It would reaffirm the significance of the demonstrations that millions of Tunisians participated in to get this started. And it could 

still prove to be the spark for change across the entire region—the 

example for others to emulate. That is why it is critical that the 

U.S. invests our assistance in Tunisia wisely, and that our policy 

puts the people of Tunisia in the best place to achieve their goals. 

We need to ensure that our security assistance is going to building up Tunisia’s capability to protect its citizens, to enforce its 

laws, to defend its borders from the terrorist threats coming from 

Libya and Algeria or returning from fighting with the terror groups 

in Iraq and Syria. 

Last week’s designation of Tunisia as a major non-NATO ally 

was a very positive step forward. We are going to need not only a 

partner willing to cooperate with us in the fight against ISIL, alQaeda, and any other terror group, but an able partner as well, because make no mistake, Tunisia is home to the most foreign fighters that have flocked to Iraq and Syria. 

Once these guys return and put into practice what they have 

learned on the battlefield, Tunisia will have its hands full. We 

must also ensure that we are helping Tunisia build the foundation 

for democracy by supporting the rule of law, civil society, and respect for human rights. We need to help the Tunisian Government 

strengthen its institutions and consolidate the political gains that 

they have made in these past 4 years. In short, we need to invest 

in Tunisia’s future if we want to ensure that the future will be a 

democratic one. 

I commend the people of Tunisia for not letting the recent terror 

attacks disrupt their progress toward democracy, and for their commitment to this transition that they began in 2010 and have paid 

3

a very high price for. They deserve our support. And with that support, they could one day be the model for other countries in the region. With that, I would like to turn to my good friend, the ranking 

member, Ted Deutch, for his opening statement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this very 

timely and important hearing. And thanks for our witnesses for the 

great work that your institutions do around the world to support 

democracy. 

Tunisia has been hailed as the success story of the Arab Spring. 

It has by any measure been the most promising transition from autocracy to democracy. Constitutional reforms have progressed, parliamentary elections have now been held twice. Political parties 

have proven that they can not only peacefully transfer power, but 

they can govern together in a coalition. But transitions are not 

without bumps. As is the case with every democracy, whether a few 

years old or a fewer centuries old, there are internal tensions within society. But the success of a democracy is in part based on foundations established within a country that allow and encourage debate and freedom of expression from all parts of society. 

For example, the parliamentary elections of 2014 showed an electorate that wanted its government to go in a different direction. 

The election of the Nidaa Tounes party over the Islamist Ennahda 

party could have been a disastrous change of power, but the Parliament committed to a transition that, even if challenging, would 

nevertheless remain peaceful. I have to say this was very much noticed and respected here in Congress. With the expansion of civil 

society groups, political parties, and media outlets in Tunisia, more 

voices are contributing to the national dialogue about the current 

state of the country and the best decisions for moving forward. 

The government should pay heed to the discourse and act in the 

best interests of the Tunisian people and the stability of the state. 

Since the revolution, Tunisia has struggled to regain economic 

prosperity. There is great concern that Tunisia cannot fully stabilize and complete its democratic transition if the economy doesn’t 

grow. Tunisia is currently facing an unemployment rate of 15 percent, and that rate nearly triples among working class youth. But 

Tunisia is a sophisticated society with an educated and professional workforce, and the government must implement reforms to 

open and expand the economy. Achieving success and political reforms, which includes receiving popular legitimacy, must go hand 

in hand with improving the people’s economic opportunities. 

Tourism, long a key revenue stream for the country, has struggled, particularly amid the recent terrorist attacks that have 

caused countries such as Great Britain to discourage travel, and 

foreign investment and trade have suffered as well. I support our 

country’s aid efforts to support the Tunisian economy, such as the 

establishment of the Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund and sovereign loan guarantees. We all fear that the recent spate of terror 

attacks threaten to undermine Tunisia’s success. I offer my condolences to the victims and their families of the deadly terrorist attacks this year on the Bardo Museum in Tunis and in Sousse, 

many of whom were foreign nationals. Tunisia is struggling with 

homegrown terror cells, the proliferation of terrorist groups such as 

4

AQIM, Ansar al-Sharia, and the Islamic State within its borders, 

as well as external threats coming from Libya and Algeria. 

Tunisians have traveled at an alarming rate to train with ISIS. 

And the threat of their return home looms. And with reportedly 

one of the largest foreign contingents in Iraq and in Syria, the 

country must address ways to improve security conditions. The government’s decision to issue a state of emergency certainly speaks 

to the high level of threats facing the country, but it must be careful to provide for the security of its citizens without restricting 

basic civil liberties guaranteed by the Tunisian constitution. 

I support President Obama’s decision to designate Tunisia a 

major non-NATO ally and the decision to enter into a memorandum of understanding with Tunisia. These are clear signs that 

this administration recognizes the country’s post-2011 achievements, its commitment to cooperating on mutual security threats, 

and the national security interests for our country, and bolstering 

the capabilities of a North African ally in a very tumultuous neighborhood. It is also important to acknowledge the great work that 

each of your organizations have done and continue to do every day. 

I often speak about the role of our foreign assistance program. 

And I believe that it is within our national security interests to 

offer not only military assistance, but also political, social, and economic aid to our overseas partners. The programs run by your organizations and the successes they have achieved offer strong evidence for the incredible return on these investments. 

Tunisia has taken great steps toward democracy, and the 

progress achieved since 2011 should be lauded. To sustain success, 

sustain success and to push forward, the government must continue to work across political parties to address the priorities of today’s Tunisia. And it is my great hope that it does not sacrifice this 

progress in the name of security. 

I look forward to discussing with our witnesses today how U.S. 

policy can support Tunisia’s path forward to democracy, economic 

prosperity, and greater security. And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

I now would like to yield to Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this important hearing. Tunisia could be a model in many ways to its 

neighbors in the region for having forged a democratic government 

following the revolutionary overthrow of its authoritarian regime in 

2011. And as we all know, it had a dramatic impact because it essentially set off the Arab Spring throughout the area. And we have 

seen tumultuous both positive and negative outcomes of that. 

But it did start really in Tunisia. At the same time, the growing 

terrorist threat in Tunisia is worrisome as terrorist networks have 

gained influence and ground. The recent mass disappearance of 33 

people is a sign of radicalization among some young Tunisians 

along the border with Libya. And it is clear that Tunisia now faces 

another challenge of impeding, stopping this recruitment, and preventing further attacks against its citizens and the effect that that 

will have on the tourist industry, which is absolutely critical to the 

country. 

And so we look forward to the hearing, and I want to especially 

thank Ambassador Green, who is a friend and colleague of many 

5

of us, who served about 8 years here in Congress together. And he 

was a leader on a whole range of issues. And it is good to have him 

back. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I echo that sentiment. Thank you so much, 

Mr. Chabot. 

And now I would like to introduce our witnesses. First, we are 

pleased to welcome Ambassador Mark Green, who is the president 

of the International Republican Institute. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania, and served as a Member of Congress, as Mr. 

Chabot just pointed out, representing Wisconsin’s 8th District from 

1999 to 2007. It is always a delight to see you, Ambassador. 

Second, we welcome back Mr. Leslie Campbell, who is the senior 

associate and regional director of the National Democratic Institute. Previously, he was the chief of staff to the leader of the New 

Democratic Party in the Canadian House of Commons, and has 

served as a guest lecturer at Georgetown University. Welcome 

back. 

Third, we also welcome back Mr. Aaron Zelin, who is the Richard 

Borow fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He 

has conducted extensive research on jihadi groups, with a focus on 

North Africa and Syria, and is writing his dissertation for Kings 

College in London on the Tunisian jihadi movement. As a recipient 

of that final degree, my condolences to you. Good luck with that. 

And last, but certainly not least, we welcome back Mr. William 

Sweeney, who serves as the president and CEO of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Formerly, he served in 

the board of directors of IFES, conducting several high profile elections across the world, and served as vice president of Global Government Affairs for EDS. 

And I would like to commend our panelists today, and I hope 

that you have all had the opportunity to see the newspaper The 

Hill this morning. Our panelists wrote a great op-ed, which was 

published in The Hill, on Tunisia. So thank all of you for your commitment to the people of Tunisia and for promoting U.S. values to 

a key ally in the region. Great job. And Mr. Ambassador, we will 

begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK GREEN, PRESIDENT, 

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

Ambassador GREEN. Great. Thank you. Thanks, Chairwoman 

Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and Mr. Chabot. I am honored to be here and to have this opportunity to speak on the brightest hope for democracy in Middle East and North Africa, Tunisia. 

At IRI, we believe that Tunisia’s remarkable journey toward democracy can serve both as an inspiration for those hoping to shape 

their own democratic path, and also a rejoinder to those who claim 

that democracy has little chance outside the Western world. 

Tunisia’s story should also serve as a symbol to policymakers of 

what nonprofit organizations like IRI, NDI, and IFES can do with 

U.S. Government support when we work as one team. I had the 

privilege of observing the parliamentary round of voting in last 

year’s elections. Like others, I was struck by how Tunisia’s political 

stakeholders showed a truly unwavering commitment to democratic 

principles throughout the process. 

6

Both in victory and in defeat, Tunisia’s political competitors accepted the voters’ will. That is particularly striking in a region too 

often haunted by polarization, sectarianism, and extremist violence. In my view, the Tunisian people have shown their mettle. 

And as the country faces its new challenges, we must show our 

mettle and our willingness to help. 

The administration should be commended for joining with Congress to expand U.S. security assistance to Tunisia through foreign 

military financing, military training, and security sector reform efforts. We must also be smart about the kind of security assistance 

we provide. We want to help the country reform security services 

that were created under an authoritarian President’s reign to ensure that they are now ethical, citizen-centered, and just. The administration and Congress should also be commended for the considerable economic assistance being provided. 

Tunisia’s economy, as noted, has floundered largely since 2011, 

and the terrible June 26 terrorist attack will only create even 

greater economic pressure on a country still grappling with the effects of previous mistakes and bad policies. IRI’s most recent polling in Tunisia shows that unemployment and the economy are the 

issues weighing most heavily on the minds of Tunisians, particularly young Tunisians, surpassing even security. 

Tunisia needs to carry out reforms that will remove stifling bureaucracy, encourage small and medium enterprise growth, attract 

foreign direct investment, and produce a skilled workforce. As they 

take on those reforms, we should all be there to help. Since the 

elections, IRI has focused its attention on helping the new government identify and meet key policy priorities by strengthening interministerial planning, coordination, and communications. We are 

supporting the Tunisian-led process of decentralization to ensure 

that all of Tunisia’s regions are listened to. 

As many of you know, the disconnect between Tunisia’s coastal 

and interior regions was a key factor prompting the 2011 revolution. We are also supporting a national accountability network that 

is strengthening the involvement of Tunisian youth. As we noted 

in our election statements last year, the lack of youth voter participation is a serious concern that Tunisian leaders must address. 

Our polling shows great interest on the part of youth in building 

a more democratic and entrepreneurial Tunisia. At the same time, 

however, many youth apparently don’t carry that interest over to 

participating in key democratic institutions. That obviously must 

change. 

Madam Chair, we have been asked to offer some recommendations for Tunisia going forward, and we are honored to do so. For 

Fiscal Year 2016, the administration is seeking to more than double last year’s level of assistance. We agree with that plan. However, according to one analysis, only 16 percent of that assistance 

will fall into the category of governing justly and democratically. 

We respectfully suggest that much more needs to be done. 

We need to see in this new strategy real support for continued 

political party development. If Tunisians don’t believe that political 

parties effectively represent their interests, especially at the local 

level, it can worsen regional tensions and undermine confidence in 

the national democratic process. Furthermore, if political parties 

7

aren’t seen as issue-based, there is much greater potential for renewed polarization, especially with respect to secular and Islamist 

political groups. 

Tunisia will hold elections, probably, in 2016. The time to foster 

genuine democratic competition is right now. It is to go to work especially to bring in young Tunisians. We think it is very, very important. We also need to continue to support the work of civil society groups, in many ways the first and most immediate way that 

young people could become involved in the process. And again, if 

it is a broken record in our testimony, we think it is crucial that 

young people be connected to constructive democratic institutions 

so that they have a stake in the survival of democracy. 

To wrap up, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, we have all 

seen remarkable things take place in Tunisia in these last several 

years. Much has been accomplished. Again, we are proud at IRI, 

working with our sister organizations NDI and IFES, to have 

played a role in that effort, but we know that the transition is fragile, and it needs all of us and our help. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Green follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Campbell. 

STATEMENT OF MR. LESLIE CAMPBELL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE 

AND REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Deutch, members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here 

again to talk about Tunisia. Nearly 5 years after the protests toppled Ben Ali, Tunisia has adopted a modern constitution, and for 

the first time democratically elected a new legislature and President. The process of getting to those elections was not without its 

challenges, with a prolonged constitution drafting process that was 

tested by occasional political deadlock, and twice rocked by political 

assassinations. 

The road forward toward consolidating democratic gains, building the capacity and sustainability of governing institutions, ensuring the protection of freedoms achieved through the revolution, and 

enacting much needed economic and security sector reforms has 

not and will not be easy. Tunisia’s fragile polity today seems more 

vulnerable than at any other point to date. But on a hopeful note, 

I have to say that several factors have differentiated Tunisia from 

regional neighbors which have struggled with their process’s transitions, either succumbing to a return to authoritarianism or slipping 

into violent chaos. 

What makes Tunisia or what has made Tunisia different? Number one, Tunisia took time to develop a constitution, undertaking 

a deliberative and representative process rather than rushing into 

snap elections that could have exacerbated regional differences and 

partisan polarization. As it has historically, the Tunisian military 

stayed out of politics and refrained from interfering with economic 

policy. It remained a neutral institution focused on defending the 

country’s borders, and it did not enter the political fray. Civil society was allowed to flourish, and secured a role in the transitional 

process, demanding dialogue, compromise, and inclusivity. Civil society organizations, trade unions, women’s groups, community development associations were treated as important partners in the 

democratic transition. 

And finally, number four, Tunisia’s political leadership generally 

avoided hyperbole and polarization, seeking compromise, and embracing the concept of no victor, no vanquished. These factors 

manifested in the highly competitive, but ultimately peaceful and 

credible elections, of 2014. Beyond voting in significant numbers, 

tens of thousands of people participated as candidates, poll workers, candidate representatives, and citizen monitors. 

Notably, Tunisia defied the oft repeated warnings of naysayers 

that Islamists would never give up power once elected to office, the 

notion of one vote, one time—one vote—one person, one vote, one 

time, and the majority Ennahda party conceded defeat in the legislative elections and joined its opponents in a national unity government. 

Throughout this transition, NDI and IRI and IFES, working together, as was said, we provided Tunisia’s democratic leadership 

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opment (USAID), the State Department’s Middle East Partnership 

Initiative, the group that is represented here received funding to 

establish programs within weeks of Ben Ali’s departure. Ahead of 

the 2014 elections, NDI’s U.S. Government-supported activities 

helped create a space for inclusive political debate that would inform citizens and expose them to various political options. 

We worked to keep parties, political parties focused on building 

lasting structures and creating platforms that incorporate citizen 

concerns. The parties’ investments in their internal structures, recruitment of party activists, and platform development have already contributed to democratic stabilization. The calls from the 

United States and the international community during the uprising 

of 2011 demanding that the Tunisian Government listen to pleas 

for dignity lent important legitimacy to citizen aspirations throughout the Arab world. Despite Tunisia’s numerous challenges, there 

are reasons for great hope. 

Tunisia’s transition, symbolized by the adoption of its new constitution, remains on track, setting it apart. But in terms of recommendations, Tunisia is in need, still in need of assistance to democracy, to its economy and to security reform, and the United 

States should continue to support popular demands for transparency, accountability, and freedom. 

One of the themes for today I think is going to be how to find 

that balance between freedom and security. And I look forward to 

questions on that exact topic. But this means as a hopeful exception in the Arab world, which is managing and inspiring a fragile 

transition, Tunisia wants, needs, in fact demands Western solidarity and investment. And I hope that we can respond adequately 

to that. 

The administration and U.S. Congress should be steadfast at 

supporting an enabling environment for parties and civil society to 

continue to build a democratic Tunisia, and support the aspirations 

of both Tunisian citizens and those around the world who look to 

Tunisia for inspiration. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Campbell, very much. 

[Mr. Campbell did not submit a prepared statement.] 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Zelin. 

STATEMENT OF MR. AARON ZELIN, RICHARD BOROW FELLOW, 

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. ZELIN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, members of the 

committee, for giving me the opportunity to testify today on 

Tunisia’s transition, in particular focusing on recommendations related to the jihadi threat. 

Currently, there are two main groups that are attacking the Tunisian state, an al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb cutout called 

Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi, and the Islamic State, which has a safe 

haven in Libya as well as cells inside of Tunisia. Since the elections 

late last year, there have been 11 known terrorist attacks claimed 

or believed to be conducted by AQIM or the Islamic State. In response, there have been 21 arrests of those suspected of planning 

attacks or being connected to attacks that have already occurred. 

The Tunisian military has also been involved in operations 

against insurgents 10 times in this time span. This illustrates that 

16

the threat from jihadis is very real, but also that the Tunisian 

State has been quite proactive in attempting to stem any more attacks, whether in the form of terrorism or insurgent activity. You 

can get more specifics on the background of both AQIM and the Islamic State’s activities in Tunisia in my written testimony, as well 

as what policies the Tunisian Government and the U.S. have already implemented over the past 1⁄2 year, which has largely been 

military focused, or we can talk more about it in the Q and A. 

Since we only have short amount of time, I wanted to focus more 

on recommendations that can complement the military options already taken. They might seem less sexy, but they are just as important. Regarding the strengthening of the rule of law, Tunisia’s 

draft security bill is highly controversial and has major critics, 

which could lead to a repeat of the 2003 terrorism law passed by 

Ben Ali that was regarded as against human rights. It had many 

loose definitions, and unjustly led to many arrests that had nothing 

do with terrorism. 

From 2003 to 2011, a number of individuals that were arrested 

were not terrorists, but while they were in prison they became 

radicalized. As we saw following the March 2011 prisoner amnesty, 

many of the individuals that had been radicalized in prison then 

were involved with Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia. Therefore, if the security bill is passed, it will only lead to a repeat of what has already occurred, which would suggest the Essebsi-led Government 

has not learned from the past. The U.S. should provide advice on 

a security bill that is more in line with the rule of law and best 

practices in other democratic states. 

Regarding security sector reform, many Tunisians think that 

nothing drastic will change unless major steps are taken to address 

the corruption in the ministry of interior. There have been very little reforms made in the past 4 years. 

Further, the new minister, Najem Gharsalli, was a judge under 

Ben Ali, who has been accused of deep corruption by many within 

civil society. Many of the old practices of the former regime are 

creeping back too, including within the prison system. For example, 

the Tunisian Organization Against Torture is currently investigating almost 70 torture cases in 2015. 

Torture is an easy way to radicalize anyone. This must end, and 

the United States should not stand idly by and ignore this wretched trend. As a result, prison reforms need to take place as well. 

Moreover, there are many arbitrary arrests that are once again occurring, even if they have no connections to jihadi networks or attacks that have occurred. This could be a source of radicalization 

as well. It is imperative that the United States works with the Tunisian MOI and its police forces to professionalize what it does. 

They need to better learn the art of intelligence gathering, and 

then once a case starts, doing the proper paperwork for preparing 

it to go to court. 

A major retraining and reeducation could be something the 

United States helps with in terms of capacity building. This type 

of effort needs patience, though, since Tunisia is coming out of 45 

years of authoritarian rule. Therefore, it is crucial for there to be 

a sense of duty and discipline instilled within the police force. The 

key is to transform the body into a force that is seen as a protector, 

17

not a force that takes away individuals’ rights or are involved in 

abuses of power. Related to this, during the uprisings many courts, 

police stations, and police equipment were destroyed. Therefore, instead of providing only money, it would be worthwhile if the United 

States funded specific rebuilding projects. That way it would cut 

down on potential corruption from the government, but also provide new jobs for locals since the economy remains the most important issue for the average Tunisian. Therefore, it will provide tangible benefits that the local populace can see instead of monetary 

promises that might seem distant. 

And finally, related to public relations and transparency, since 

the uprising the Tunisian Government has had difficulty with its 

ability to properly communicate after attacks have occurred. In all 

high profile cases, the government has been slow at articulating 

transparently what occurred and what the government is doing 

about it. If it wants to solidify its democratic bona fides it needs 

to leave the more shadowy and murky as well as secretive aspects 

of investigations in the past. The public has a right to know. 

There are two recent examples in the aftermath of the Sousse 

beach attack that highlight some of these deficiencies. First, when 

Essebsi announced the reimplementation of the state of emergency, 

he stated, ‘‘If similar attacks occur again, the state will collapse.’’ 

Not only was this comment irresponsible, it was also quite amateurish. He should have been reassuring the public. Moreover, on 

the same day, the MOI spokesman explained that it did not want 

to blame the attack in Sousse on the Islamic State because advertising their involvement would radicalize the public. This illustrates a lack of trust by the government in the public to remain 

vigilant and resilient. This is something the United States can provide advice on how to more professionalize the government’s public 

persona and ability to articulate properly to the public. 

Beyond reforming issues related to the security front, as everyone is well aware, there needs to be serious economic reforms that 

affect the entire country, and not just those on the coast. At the 

end of the day, Tunisians just want to support their families, live 

a good life, and be able to travel within their country without feeling insecure. 

Not all is lost, and the Tunisian Government can right the ship, 

but it needs to do more and not fall back on old habits from the 

Ben Ali era, which have already proven failures. It needs to also 

have a vision which goes beyond rhetoric. It needs to inspire the 

younger generation, otherwise individuals that have connections or 

are well off will move to Germany or France, while those that 

might not have those opportunities could be swayed easier into 

joining up with jihadis who could provide guidance and a vision, 

even if the individual does not necessarily agree with the ideology 

from the beginning. 

The United States should be there to lend a helping hand based 

off our own experiences and best practices with transitioning countries in Asia, South America, and eastern Europe. The Tunisian 

people deserve an honest and good ally, and the United States can 

be that. 

18

Let’s help the Tunisian people complete their dream that started 

more than 4 years ago. America can provide that guidance and assistance. Thank you very much for your time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zelin follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Sweeney. 

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM SWEENEY, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION 

FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 

Mr. SWEENEY. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could push that little button there to 

amplify your remarks. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf 

of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, better 

known as IFES, I deeply appreciate this opportunity to discuss 

Tunisia’s fragile democratic transition. 

Before I begin, I would like to echo my colleagues’ statements on 

the Sousse tragedy. Our thoughts are with our partners in Tunisia 

and those around the world who lost loved ones. 

Madam Chairman, it is not the first election that establishes a 

democracy, but those that take place years or even decades later. 

Tunisia’s planned 2016 municipal and regional elections will be the 

country’s next democratic test. Continued support by the U.S. Government and its allies in the international community is imperative to the success of the municipal and regional elections. 

To briefly summarize our written statement, there are several 

key electoral issues the Tunisians and their international partners 

must address prior to the local elections planned for 2016. 

The first priority should be the drafting of a legal framework for 

municipal and regional elections. None currently exists. IFES recommends the adoption of a unified consolidated electoral law that 

will regulate all types of elections and referendums in Tunisia. One 

national process and standard will build trust and prevent confusion. 

Second, the ISIE, the Tunisian Election Commission, should be 

made a permanent entity, with the protections of civil service, and 

be further developed to provide professional, efficient, and sustainable election administration. As an independent agency, the ISIE 

must build the capacity and professionalism of its regional offices 

to undertake the organizational burden of the local elections. 

A third priority is to confront and implement lessons learned 

from the 2014 elections. For example, campaign finance regulations 

were overly strict, while enforcement measures were lax. The ISIE 

should also seek to improve its voter and civic outreach strategies. 

Media, particularly radio outlets, should improve standards on 

election coverage. Finally, demographics demand a focus on youth. 

Over a third of Tunisians between 15 and 29 remain jobless. To 

this group, a dictatorship and a democracy are still much the same. 

Madam Chairman and Ranking Member Deutch, I conclude by 

reiterating that while Tunisia is a job well done, it is also a job not 

finished. American assistance, particularly for democracy and governance activities, will continue to play a critical role in strengthening Tunisia’s fledgling democracy. IFES commends the people of 

Tunisia for their hard work, sacrifice, and continued dedication 

even in the face of unspeakable violence and intimidation. We are 

28

proud to partner with ISIE to ensure there is a vote for every Tunisian voice. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sweeney follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And thank you to all of our panelists. And 

to start our question and answer period, we will begin with Mr. 

Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I appreciate 

you giving me the time. 

The high profile attacks at Tunis and Sousse have certainly exacerbated Tunisia’s economic challenges. Tourism, after all, is a significant percentage of Tunisia’s GDP. And those attacks probably, 

they certainly appear to have been aimed at the tourism industry, 

which would then in turn probably spur dissension amongst the 

Tunisian people against the government. 

Let me ask you this. What steps are the Tunisians taking to prevent additional attacks in the future? And what would you think 

would be the impact should there be another terrorist attack of this 

sort on the political environment, on the economy of Tunisia? And 

I would welcome anybody who might like to address that. 

Ambassador Green, if you wanted to take it first, that would be 

fine. 

Ambassador GREEN. Sure. Thank you. Thanks for the question. 

Well, first off, obviously if, and let’s hope it never occurs, but if 

there were another attack, it certainly would continue to increase 

anxiety, put pressure on the government, and rattle the nerves of 

the principal audience for tourism, which is just miles away in Europe. 

So I think several things are important here. First off, again, to 

recognize the current impact on the economy. Tourism is awfully 

important to Tunisia, as you mentioned in your question. And this 

has certainly rattled tourism. The Tunisians have taken a number 

of steps to provide immediate security in some of the tourism 

areas. And while the images may be unsettling of having armed 

guards along the beaches and in some of those sites, they are certainly understandable. I think everyone recognizes how difficult 

they can be. 

But I think the more important steps that need to be taken are 

addressing the underlying problems in the economy. This is an 

economy built by an authoritarian regime at a different time, an 

overwhelming bureaucracy that stifles entrepreneurship and adds 

not only tremendous burdens to entrepreneurs inside the country, 

but openly discourages foreign direct investment. And while the 

government obviously needs to take on security challenges and to 

worry about tourism, it cannot put off much longer some of these 

fundamental reforms that are the key to creating opportunity down 

the line. 

As was mentioned by my colleagues, we have very high youth 

unemployment, some of the highest youth unemployment anywhere. As long as young people believe that there is future hope 

for opportunity, I think they are prepared for some of the hard 

choices that will need to be made. 

However, if they don’t see opportunity, if they don’t believe that 

they have a government committed to taking on some of these 

tough choices and underlying reforms, then when you see security 

rattled by terrorist strikes it only raises the anxiety, increases the 

frustration, and sadly, I fear, also causes young people to disengage 

42

more and more from democratic institutions that are so essential 

to the country’s future. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Let me turn to another question rather 

than go down the line or I won’t get another question out. Is the 

U.S. doing enough by way of security assistance in cooperation 

with Tunisia? How do we help Tunisia solidify its democratic gains 

made thus far? 

And briefly, maybe I will start with you, Mr. Sweeney, if we can 

just go down the line this way, what are your organizations doing 

to assist them in democratic foundation? Mr. Sweeney? 

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, sir. First of all, our organization is not 

involved with security issues except insofar as how they affect an 

election process. I would say that the United States is stepping up 

in response to the requests of the Tunisian Government. 

The NATO designation, a number of other steps that have been 

taken in the last few weeks are all very positive. But I would also 

go back to your last question, sir. The attack by terrorists is not 

just at the tourist industry. The tourist industry is 15 percent of 

the economy. 

The attack is at the legitimacy of the democratic progress and 

the remaining 85 percent of the economy that Ambassador Green 

very pointedly made the comment that this 85 percent was built up 

under an authoritarian period, and now there are so many efforts 

to open that economy and bring it into the 21st century. And all 

of that progress is under threat by terrorism as well. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. Zelin, briefly. 

Mr. ZELIN. The U.S. has been doing a lot over the past 6 months 

in terms of providing different types of assistance, whether it is 

more Blackhawks, whether it is in terms of the NATO designation, 

as well as helping out in other types of military equipment. 

One of the key issues here is that Tunisia has had this jihadi 

problem bubbling up under the surface for a good 20 years. The 

issue is, is that many different realize it because most of the 

Tunisians involved in it had been involved in it outside of Tunisia 

because of the authoritarian system of Ben Ali. So after the uprising in 2011, a lot of it started coming back into the country. And 

now because of some of the policies that occurred post-2011 in the 

early years in terms of not necessarily taking the threat as very 

serious, we are now seeing some of the backlash as a result of this. 

So it didn’t come out of nowhere necessarily. It is more a process 

that is coming into the fore moreso because of things that have already occurred. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. Campbell—Madam Chair, can he 

respond briefly? Okay. You can respond very briefly, Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I will defer to Mr. Zelin on the security. But just 

to amplify Ambassador Green’s point and add to that quickly, that 

in terms of structural changes that are needed in Tunisia that may 

help address the security, it is a top-down country, very centralized, with great regional disparities. And they have an opportunity 

coming up this year and next year to decentralize, to put decisionmaking more at the local level, and to engage citizens in helping 

to control the decisions that affect their lives at the local level. 

It won’t have the same immediate impact as the security sector 

reform, but I think it is a part of the longer term solution. 

43

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. And Mr. Green, very briefly. 

Ambassador GREEN. Yeah, if I might, I think it is important to 

remember that many of the militaries in this part of the world 

were created to protect the government from its people. 

This is a military that is transitioning to being what we would 

refer to a military that protects the country from its threats. That 

is a difficult transition, A. 

And B, we have talked a bit about I think what Les has referred 

to is a non-sexy issue, and he is right, improving the ability of ministries to communicate, to work together, to control expectations in 

the public, and to encourage the public to buy into the solutions. 

If you don’t have those communications, when the military moves, 

people will run in the opposite direction. 

Fostering that investment, that personal investment in that capacity is crucial for a country that is trying to make the transition 

they are. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. Excellent 

questions. Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I just 

had a couple questions about the perception of the people and the 

way they view government. 

First, the decision by Ennahda to join a secular-led government, 

I would like our witnesses to offer your thoughts on whether that 

was a decision that was a top-down decision or does it reflect the 

will of the people? And ultimately, what does it mean long term for 

a party like that to have made that decision to enter a secular government? Ambassador? 

Ambassador GREEN. It is interesting. And the organizations represented here, many of us held our meetings together with the 

ministries in advance of the elections. And they were talking even 

back then of trying to foster what is enshrined in the constitution. 

And that is the separation of church and state, and to enshrining 

freedom of worship. 

The fact that you saw the Islamist party move so quickly to condemn the Charlie Hebdo attack, that you saw it move so quickly 

to concede defeat and congratulate the winner after the election, I 

think that shows that there is really buy in and momentum around 

this idea of a uniquely Tunisian Government and structure of government that respects faith. 

I think it is great in the wake of an election in which everyone 

feels very good about what has happened, it is great in the wake 

of the success of the constitution. What I think we are saying is 

it is vitally important we stand with them to build the capacity of 

the government to be effective, to be able to meet the needs of average Tunisians so that that important sense and philosophy can continue. 

Mr. DEUTCH. All right. Mr. Campbell? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. It is a great question. And I wondered that myself. I remember sitting in the Ennahda office, you know, not long 

after they made the decision, before they stepped down but when 

they were making the decision to step aside. And I too wondered 

about motivations. But I think in the Middle East generally, but 

44

especially in Tunisia, looking for moderation, I don’t think we have 

to question motivations too much. 

What seems important to me is that Ennahda, whether because 

of, you know, I don’t know if it was, you know, genuine commitment to the principles that they espoused or not, but because of 

what happened in Egypt they wanted to avoid that, which I think 

was important. Because they felt constrained by public opinion, especially after the political assassinations, there was lot of blowback 

when secular politicians were assassinated. Because of international expectations. There was pressure from the international 

community saying, you know, we want you to behave democratically. I think for those sort of outside reasons they decide to step 

aside. 

And I think what is important in a democratic transition is not 

necessarily that the actors are motivated by, sort of, you know, 

thoughts that we would prefer, but that they feel somehow constrained both by domestic opinion but also by international pressure. And they certainly felt constrained, and they acted in a way 

that we would I think applaud. And I think if we would continue 

to reward that behavior we would gt more of the same behavior. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. You are nodding, Mr. Zelin? 

Mr. ZELIN. I agree pretty much with what everybody says. But 

on the other hand, I also think that it also is a sign of the fragileness of the system as it is, where a winner can’t take all just yet, 

otherwise people might feel that things could really get bad. 

So I do believe that in terms of the next national election, if a 

party wins and takes all and then becomes truly ruling party instead of in this broader national collection, that is when I think we 

could really see signs that this democracy is really solidifying in 

many respects. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Sweeney? 

Mr. SWEENEY. I concur with just about everything that has been 

said by my three colleagues. And the question is really can the consensus toward shared values and tolerant society and a belief in 

democratic values and an acceptance of the results of the ballot 

process continue to be accepted? 

And Tunisia had a very, very rocky, difficult time. And the two 

assassinations forced a great many Tunisian leaders to have long 

conversations with themselves and their colleagues about how they 

wanted their society to evolve. And that is why the 2014 election 

was so important to all of us, particularly the Tunisians, about how 

they wanted their society to move forward. And I think that is the 

challenge ahead. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Sweeney, how much of the decision do you 

think is made because of their views of what is best for Tunisia or 

their views based on dealing with or avoiding certain externalities, 

as Mr. Campbell touched on? 

Mr. SWEENEY. All of the above, sir. I mean you have a variety 

of motivations that came into play, as with any political decision. 

And that political decision resulted in a desire to go forward 

through an electoral process and then live with the results of that 

electoral process. 

And I think those of us who were in Tunisia and saw the reaction to the assassinations in particular knew that this society and 

45

the political leaders in the society and the religious and business 

leaders in the society knew that they had the challenge to come together or else they would lose their country. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Before yielding 

back, I just would like to note that while we have enjoyed two 

hearings together today, I do not believe we will have a hearing tomorrow together, which makes this the most opportune time to 

wish you a happy early birthday. And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thirty-nine again. Do you believe it, Mr. 

Deutch? 

Mr. DEUTCH. Another anniversary. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You don’t believe it, I know. Thank you, Ted. 

And now I will yield my time to Mr. Wilson, who is not here. Mr. 

Trott. 

Mr. TROTT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I want to thank 

the ranking member as well for holding this hearing. And I apologize I came late and did not hear some of your statements, gentlemen. So if I ask questions that you covered, it is a scheduling issue 

here in Congress. 

And my question is to any member of the panel. How big of a 

problem is corruption in Tunisia? Obviously, we have never successfully solved the problem in Afghanistan. I am just curious how 

big of a hurdle, an obstacle that will be going forward? 

Ambassador GREEN. I think corruption is a very significant problem in the country. Again, it dates back quite some ways, but certainly rose to its peak under Ben Ali and the authoritarian regime 

that he led. And it has stifled individuality, entrepreneurship, and 

touched nearly every aspect of Tunisian life. 

That is why organizations like those represented here believe so 

strongly in the need to work on democracy and governance and 

build government capacity. It really gives them the tools and the 

ability to take on these issues. It is hard to see them succeeding 

if they don’t. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. You know, I agree, although I would say that, 

you know, having traveled the world a lot, Tunisia doesn’t feel immediately as corrupt as you might find say in Afghanistan, just as 

an example, in terms of the day to day feeling. 

What I view as the bigger issue, and I think many Tunisians will 

express this maybe in slightly different terms than I do, is the 

economy is run on the basis of cartels, franchises, concessions. You 

know, it is crony capitalism. So certain families. If you are in the 

right family and you get the right conferred by the government to 

have a, you know, monopoly over cement production or something 

like that, you are filthy rich, and everyone associated with you is 

filthy rich. 

And I think the prevailing feeling in Tunisia is if you aren’t in 

those circles, then you are really in deep trouble and you are, you 

know, scraping and so on. And if you are not in the right region, 

so you are not in the right family, the right neighborhood, the right 

region, you feel like you are shut out and there is no opportunity 

to get ahead. 

So this may sound like Pollyanna-ish sort of thinking, but the 

idea of equal opportunity of a meritocracy, for example government 

jobs being awarded on the basis of qualifications rather than some 

46

kind of, you know, hand me down, these are important things. And 

this is the hard and very unsexy work of democracy assistance is 

trying to work on government reforms that don’t simply allow people to give out, you know, franchises that allow certain people to 

become billionaires. 

So that is the kind of corruption I think is probably more relevant to this discussion in Tunisia. And it exists there. 

Mr. TROTT. And is there a desire, Mr. Campbell, by the business 

community to try and move away from crony capitalism and create 

some equal opportunity? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I actually accompanied Raj Shah when he was 

the head of USAID on a trip to Tunisia. And he met with a lot of 

business leaders, not something I normally do. But it was interesting to be a fly on the wall. They talk that way in the sense that 

business leaders were looking for modernization. So for example 

they were looking for access to capital. You know, capital is all 

kind of tied up and hard to get. 

They are looking for modern approaches to real estate and to 

property ownership and so on. So I think in that sense they want 

access to money, they want the modern systems, I think they 

would like to join the clubs, the economic clubs around the world. 

But having said that, when you are in those circles you get a real 

sense that this is an elite. And you see even with the, you know, 

with the now ruling party, I support what they have done, I think 

they are doing a good job, but there is a kind of an unsettling undercurrent within the ruling party of the crony capitalists having 

again circled the wagons. 

So I think the answer is 50–50. Sure, they would like to have a 

modern economy, but I don’t think they are going to give up the 

monopoly power they have. 

Mr. TROTT. Does the new constitution make inroads toward protecting, you know, and addressing some of those issues? Hopefully, 

it addresses civil liberties and gender equality, but how about business concerns? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. That is a good question. I don’t think I can answer that accurately. I believe it does, but I haven’t looked at that 

specifically. 

Mr. SWEENEY. If I might go back to my prior experience heading 

global policy for a Fortune 100 company, it is hopefully not in the 

constitution, but in the series of economic reforms that can be more 

easily changed in response to developments within the marketplace. 

Constitutional change, as we know in this country, tends to be 

very, very difficult. The question becomes around terms of foreign 

direct investment. International companies will not invest in 

Tunisia’s economy as long as it is maintained by crony capitalists 

who are circles and families and cartels, which is an appropriate 

description. 

I think, as, going back to Ambassador Green’s statement, there 

are a number of important reforms underway in the Tunisian process, which hopefully will attract foreign investment. Foreign investment is as much under attack as the tourist industry, because you 

are not going to invest where you don’t think there is security to 

47

set up an organization and your people are safe. That is as much 

a threat of the terrorism. 

However, going to your question, there is hope for Tunisia because making a great deal of progress, and one of the national conversations they have been having at the legislative and political 

level is how do we make Tunisia attractive for foreign investment 

so that other companies and other countries can invest and create 

jobs here? 

Mr. TROTT. Madam Chairwoman, I see my time has expired, but 

I just have one other question. You know, the border security issue 

is particularly acute given the threats from Libya. Is the U.S. doing 

enough? 

And how can Tunisia improve its border security, which I think 

is a key part of the success going forward? Particularly if the U.S. 

is doing enough. That is the question I want to hear answered. 

Mr. ZELIN. Yeah, the Tunisian Government has been doing a lot 

more related to the border security with Libya, in particular in the 

past 6 months or so, starting in February when they sent more reenforcements from various parts of the security apparatus, and 

now they have announced only last week that they are trying to 

put up a border fence as well as in some areas sort of a moat between the borders. 

But the reality is, is that, it is not just necessarily an issue of 

people that are going to Libya and getting training going back. You 

have individuals who are already in the country that have access 

to weapons or people that are coming from Algeria, so it is not just 

a Libya issue here. 

It is sort of a wholistic approach that needs to be taken, and, you 

know, obviously helping out with the border security is definitely 

something the U.S. has already been doing with drones, aerial surveillance, I believe, already. And I know that the Algerians have 

been assisting with the Tunisian Government a lot on these issues 

as well, since they do share a border. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. TROTT. Thank you gentlemen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Trott. Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And welcome 

to our panel. To pick up on the sort of the Libya aspect here, if you 

look at Tunisia and Libya, they are both overwhelmingly Sunni 

Muslim population, 97 and 98 percent. Libya’s GDP per capita is 

actually higher. It is 6623 with a literacy rate of 91 percent. Tunisia is 4,415 and 80 percent respectively. And the female literacy 

gap is actually less severe in Libya. 

So there are a lot of commonalities here. What is the nature of 

the divergence? Is it the violent history? Is it Qadhafi? Why are we 

seeing two very different paths with these two neighboring nations? Mr. Zelin. 

Mr. ZELIN. I think one of biggest ones is that, unlike Ben Ali, 

who actually abdicated his power and went to Saudi Arabia, and 

the military didn’t intervene but allowed sort of a transitional process to begin, in Libya of course as we know, Qadhafi wasn’t interested at all in losing any power, and he went all the way until he 

got killed. I think that that is one of the biggest differences. 

48

And then as a result of that you have seen trends add on top of 

there exponentially from there in part because then there became 

a huge weapons bazaar in Libya and therefore a proliferation of 

different militias. 

And part of it, too, is that historically Libya or Qadhafi the way 

he ruled, sort of ruled different tribes as well as regions of the 

countries against each other, and that is why you are sort of seeing 

these different battles between different parts of Libya. 

Whereas in Tunisia, obviously there has been issues between sort 

of the coastal and interior, but it is just different historically. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. If I can jump in, I mean, I think there is an obvious answer and then a couple less obvious answers. I the obvious 

difference is the French Colonial history. And one of the, you know, 

leftovers of that or leave-behinds, as well as enlightened Tunisian 

leadership in the 1950s and 1960s was a series of institutions, including civil Saudi institutions like trade unions. And so there was 

some sort of glue that held the country together. So that is kind 

of an obvious one. But I think it is important. We could tease it 

out, but it is very important. 

The second big difference is the tribal makeup of Libya. Traditionally territories that were very, very separate, ruled as fiefdoms 

by tribes, kind of artificially stitched together. And I think if you 

take the tribal nature versus Tunisia, which was much more 

urban, much, much more urban, much less tribal, so if you take the 

existing institutions which came in part because of Colonialism, 

but also because of a very a, you know, very strong national structure, and then look at the tribalism of Tunisia with absolutely no 

institutions, those are the two big things that explain the differences. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah. Ambassador Green. 

Ambassador GREEN. Thank you. I was struck by, in the days 

leading up to the election, we asked the acting President whether 

Tunisia could serve as a model for the region, and he said no, not 

a model; maybe an inspiration. And I thought that was right. 

Tunisia in a number of ways is unique. The process that they undertook after Ben Ali fled, was a remarkable one. I think for all 

of us as observers watching the long process of the forums, the 

public forums they held around the country, I or I and NDI 

partnered in most of those forums. They listened patiently and took 

input, and they seemed to sincerely process that input. They were 

very cognizant of those youthful crowds that took to the streets in 

2011. 

So I think there were a number of steps that they took early on 

that created a unique mix. I think they are right. I am not sure 

we would ever say, okay, let’s take this model and transplant it 

next-door. But I think the spirit and the ethos that has been 

brought to bear is something hopefully that can be fostered elsewhere. 

And again, I think what you are hearing from us over and over 

again is we all look at this as a place where something good has 

happened through patient, persistent Tunisian-led work. We should 

never impose anything upon them, but where they are reaching out 

for help, as they are, we have a tremendous opportunity to help 

foster this and to reenforce it so that as the difficult challenges 

49

come up—and they are facing them right now—this special model 

that they have created can survive. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. My time is up, but I think the point you make 

is a very good one, Mr. Ambassador, your two organizations, NDI 

and IRI, working around the world, I think you are right. It is not 

necessarily a model, but within the Tunisian experience, there are 

things that can be replicated or at least benchmarked against. 

And that is what we, I hope, can identify as the evolution continues so that others can benefit from the experience without slavishly saying it ought to be like Tunisia. Thank you. Thank you, 

Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly, very much. Dr. 

Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I appreciate you all 

being here. This is a good hearing because we see this as a fledgling democracy growing in an area that they are not very well welcomed. And I see the biggest threat is, you know, the surrounding 

countries see Tunisia as an example of, you know, freedom, liberty, 

starting to develop, and it scares them; and so they are going to 

do everything they can to erode that. 

What can we do? And I know this question was asked earlier. Is 

there more that we can do or the Tunisian Government asking us, 

what would be probably the most significant benefit that we can 

afford them to help them keep their democracy going? Mr. 

Sweeney, if you want to start. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, sir. The quick answer is there is always more, and particularly in the area of economic assistance, 

both in terms of direct grants, as well as helping with the Tunisia 

investment funds and a number of other areas. 

In terms of security, I will defer to my colleague in terms of democracy and governance. Ambassador Green noted in his testimony 

that only 16 percent of programming is right now directed toward 

democracy and governance activities. And if we are to help keep 

Tunisians on the path toward democracy and full engagement in 

their society, we suggest there is more that can be done there as 

well. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Ambassador Green, let me ask you, because 

you were talking about—I lost my train of thought—you were talking about how the democracy was coming up, and there was a lot 

of corruption in the government—I think it was you—and that a 

lot of the people at the top were wealthy and they were, you know, 

crony capitalism. 

How do you change that dynamic to where the people on the 

lower income scales seize opportunity? Because without opportunity, it is hard to support a government like that. What are we 

doing to change that—not we because I think the more we meddle, 

the more it gets messed up. What are they doing to change that 

internally? 

Ambassador GREEN. Well, and I think my colleague, Les Campbell, put it well. The type of corruption they have is a crony capitalism and is a cartel-dominated system. So much of the Arab 

Spring which began here was out of frustration for lack of opportunity. 

50

So I think what we can do is help to provide support for the fundamental policy reforms in the economy that they need to take and 

which they know they need to take. So we have to help them undertake those reforms to get rid of this stifling bureaucracy that is 

a holdover from the Ben Ali days so that young people—they have 

a very high percentage of college graduates. They have an exceptionally good education system in that sense. 

But they have got this large population of college graduates, fairly well-educated, know there is something better, and are on the 

outside because they aren’t one of those big families, as Les made 

reference to. 

The government knows that we need to provide the technical assistance and the training as well as the investment to stand behind 

them as they get rid of this bureaucracy and create a vibrancy that 

will create a hope for the future. 

Mr. YOHO. And let me ask, with the war going on in Syria, I just 

read an article that, I think, 33 Tunisians left to go to Libya for 

training to join ISIS and that the recruiters are being paid $3,000 

to $10,000 per recruit; and when you are in a country that has 33 

percent unemployment in the youth, I mean, that is attractive. 

If the Syrian civil war, if we were to negotiate some type of negotiation through the U.N. With other nations to bring that to an 

end, would that help the situation in Tunisia? Mr. Campbell, you 

want to weigh in on that. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think I would defer to Mr. Zelin on that one 

since he studies this specifically but——

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. ZELIN. You know, there are so many individuals involved in 

this movement now, that even with the Syrian conflict ending, 

which it doesn’t seem like it is going to happen any time soon, I 

still think it is going to be an issue. And I have actually met 

Tunisians that have fought in Syria and returned to Tunisia; and 

some of them went purely for economic reasons because then they 

are able to provide remittances to their parents. 

So, while there definitely people that go for ideological reasons, 

at least in the case of Tunisia, some go for economic reasons, too. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. And this is kind of off the mark here, but with 

the Iran nuclear negotiation and Iran going to gain more power 

and hegemony in the Middle East, how do you see this affecting 

the situation in Tunisia where fledgling democracy is trying to rise 

up, promoting liberties and freedoms different than what is normal 

in that situation, and do you think Iran will stand by and allow 

that to happen? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Maybe I will take a crack at this somewhat, but 

just to mention something that we haven’t brought up because this 

is about Tunisia, but North Africa, or the Maghreb, we think of 

Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. They have many things in common, 

including the French language, but the big thing that they have in 

common is that they are all staunch U.S. allies; so you do have a 

very strong series of three countries together, very strong U.S. allies, very much anti-Iran, no question. I mean I don’t think you 

would find any sympathy for Iran in any way, shape, or form, in 

any part of society in Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia. 

51

These are countries that want and choose to be close to the U.S., 

to Western partners. They are countries that want and accept all 

sorts of security assistance and so on. And the countries, Morocco 

and Tunisia particularly, that have the express desire and goal of 

transitioning to democracies. 

So I think my answer is it is a little bit broad because Iran is 

so far away from them, but my answer would be these are bulwarks against the kind of extremism we are trying to fight. They 

are U.S. Allies, and they are looking and asking for assistance, so 

it is a wonderful opening. 

And the three countries together, if they were to economically integrate more, could become a powerful and attractive force. 

Mr. YOHO. Let’s hope they do that and that democracy shows and 

shines over there of what freedom does. And I appreciate it. Thank 

you, ma’am. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. Mr. Clawson. 

Mr. CLAWSON. What percent of the population would you all estimate is sympathetic, supportive of extremists that have violent 

goals? And if someone else has already asked that, I apologize for 

coming in a little bit late, but that tells me what kind of fertilizer 

is in the country. Right? So go ahead. 

Mr. ZELIN. I can try and answer this sort of by proxy. So from 

about April 2011 until the end of August 2013, there is an organization in the country called Ansar al-Sharia, and it was openly able 

to proselytize its ideas without much government intervention until 

they designated a group at the end of August 2013. 

And during their second conference, which was the last conference they were able to hold, there was about 40,000 individuals 

that attended it. They were going to have a third conference in 

May 2013, but the government didn’t allow it, and they said that 

potentially up to 100,000 people were going to attend. Of course, 

it is difficult to verify because it didn’t happen, but the country has 

about, I believe, 11 million people; so that is maybe 1 percent at 

best, if you are doing the most liberal estimate. 

So it is really not that many individuals. And the thing to remember about Ansar al-Sharia is some of these people got involved 

just more for the proselytization aspects of it and not necessarily 

for the violent aspects that happened afterwards, because after the 

group was designated, many individuals actually quit the organization because they didn’t want to be involved in the violent parts. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Everybody agree with that? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would just add one thing to this. Unfortunately 

it is hard to really quantify, but people are always struggling to 

find reasons why young Tunisians go abroad and join jihadist 

groups. I think there are many reasons, and we have tried to address some of those today, and other members, Representatives, 

have mentioned some of this as well. 

But one of the reasons that is put forward by Tunisians that 

Tunisians go abroad is that there is not a lot of support for violent 

jihadi talk and behavior in Tunisia. Certainly it happens. We have 

seen these attacks, but it is not embraced and accepted. And there 

are a lot of other countries in the region where you can join a group 

and be open about it and sort of brag about being violent and killing people, and it is not a problem. 

52

In Tunisia that is not an acceptable thing. And so, again, I don’t 

know how that translates into numbers; but at least for right now, 

Tunisia is not an enabling environment, and it is exporting people 

because people that feel that way have to go elsewhere. It is not 

the only reason they go elsewhere, but it is part of the reason they 

go elsewhere. 

Mr. CLAWSON. So there is not a certain portion of the mosques 

or others where there was open celebration to what occurred? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I can’t answer specifically. I am not aware of 

that. I mean, I look at the Tunisian news. If it happened, it wasn’t 

very obvious. 

Ambassador GREEN. If I can, I think it is very hard to get specific 

numbers to think of it in those terms, but what I think you can 

do is look at the outside objective indicators. This is the country 

that is constructed by popular assent, the most moderate constitution in the region. In the Arab world, a constitution which protects 

freedom of religion, that is remarkably progressive in so many 

ways, enshrined the role of women. 

So in the constitution, which they adopted by vote, it would certainly push back and be contrary to the extremism that we have 

seen in so many other places. And I found what Les said intriguing. Maybe that is one of the reasons why it is such a big source 

of foreign fighters in Syria. But the logical conclusion of that is 

when one day that conflict in Syria ends or winds down, we do 

have to think about what happens when they come back, and that 

will be a threat to the institutions in Tunisia because some of them 

will have been radicalized by their involvement in Syria. Again, another, I think, opportunity for the U.S. as a friend to offer assistance and to help as we can. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Clawson. 

And we are in the midst of votes. We have 5 minutes left, so I 

will not be able to ask my questions, but I had the honor of visiting 

Tunisia with Speaker Boehner in a CODEL he led just a few 

months ago. It was after the museum attack and before this latest 

attack, and it certainly is a land of great promise; so we will pray 

and work for the people of Tunisia and throughout the region. 

Thank you gentlemen, for your time and for sharing your wisdom 

with us. And with that the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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