On Mamba Station

U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990 – 2003

U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

by

Major James G. Antal

U.S. Marine Corps

and

Major R. John Vanden Berghe

U.S. Marine Corps

History and Museums Division

United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.

2004

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public

Release; Distribution is unlimited 
Other Publications in the Series

U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991: With Marines in Operation Provide

Comfort. 1995

Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991. 1995

A Skillful Show of Strength: U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 1991-1996. 2003

PCN 19000413300
This monograph tells the story of thousands of U.S. Marines who supported Operations Sharp Edge,

Assured Response, Quick Response, Noble Obelisk, and Joint Task Force Liberia, the noncombatant evacuation operations in 1990, 1991, 1996, and 2003 from Liberia, in 1996 from the Central African Republic,

and in 1997 from Sierra Leone.

The traditional concepts of employing Marines predicated their involvement in West Africa on protecting American lives and property that might be in danger. Before its actions in West Africa, the Marine

Corps was frequently called on for noncombatant evacuation operations. Classic examples of which

include recent evacuation operations in Cyprus in 1974, South Vietnam in 1975, Cambodia in 1975, and

Lebanon in 1982 and 1984. Marine involvement in the Liberian evacuations during the country’s 14 years

of civil war went beyond the permanent presence of the Marine Security Guard detachment at the U.S.

Embassy in Monrovia, requiring a total of six Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and one Fleet Antiterrorism

Security Team platoon to deploy in Liberia. Supporting elements were present in Sierra Leone, Sengal,

and Spain. As a testament to operational flexibility, the Marines in Liberia reached as far as the Central

African Republic, when a Marine Air-Ground Task Forces successfully launched an additional noncombatant evacuation operation from the Liberia area of operations to support the evacuation of U.S. citizens

from Bangui. The civil war in Liberia from 1989 to 2003 caused much bloodshed, death, suffering, and

destruction. The Marine Corps efforts focused on protecting Americans lives and property and resulted in

the evacuation of Americans and foreign nationals from the violence and chaos of civil war.

The authors of this volume, Majors James G. Antal and R. John Vanden Berghe, served as historical

writers assigned the History and Museums Division. Major Antal previously served in a variety of infantry

and intelligence billets and commanded the Marine Corps Security Force Company in Naples, Italy. He

retired from active duty in 1998. Major Vanden Berghe, an infantry officer, served as the assistant operations officer and the operations officer of Battalion Landing Team 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, during that

unit’s participation in Operation Sharp Edge. He retired from active duty in 2002.

In pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the History and Museums Division welcomes comments from

interested individual.

John W. Ripley

Colonel

United States Marine Corps (Retired)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

Foreword

iii

This monograph examines the decisions, deployments, and actions of United States Marine Corps

forces in Liberia associated with Operations Sharp Edge, Assured Response, and Joint Task Force Liberia,

and in the Central African Republic with Operation Quick Response and Noble Obelisk in Sierra Leone.

The United States Marine Corps’ support of the American Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia, during the country’s civil war (1989 to 2003) involved six different Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. The study begins with

interactions between the Marine’s forward command element and the embassy staff from May through

August 1990. Reviewed in detail are significant actions leading up to the embassy’s 4 August 1990 decision to evacuate and draw down selected sites. Marines conducted security, support, and noncombatant

evacuation operations from 5 August 1990 to 15 February 1991. The concurrent actions of West African

peacekeeping forces and Liberian peace efforts are included to provide the context of Marine actions in

Monrovia. A short discussion of the interim civil war years follows. With the reintroduction of American

forces in April 1996 comes the arrival and deployment of the Marines as a joint task force. Accordingly,

the study examines the deployment, command relationships, political-military relationships, the fighting,

and Marine’s actions at the embassy. Next is an account of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task

Force, the last Marine unit in Liberia. Included is a narrative of the unit’s deployment, turnover, actions

ashore, and their final phased withdrawal from the embassy on 3 August 1996. The account of the May

1996 evacuation (Quick Response) from the Central African Republic provides a related example of

Marine responsiveness in noncombatant evacuation operations. This monograph illustrates the flexibility

and utility of naval expeditionary forces, specifically, Marine expeditionary units, to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations in an uncertain world.

This monograph could not have been published without the professional efforts of the staff of the

History and Museums Division. The authors would like to thank Mr. Charles D. Melson, Mr. Charles R.

Smith, Dr. David B. Crist, and Mrs. Wanda J. Renfrow for their meticulous review and corrections to both

style and content, and Mr. Charles R. Smith, for his contributions to the text. We also would like to thank

Ms. Evelyn A. Englander, the research librarian, Mr. Frederick J. Graboske and his staff in the Archives

Section, and the Reference Section, headed by Mr. Danny J. Crawford.

Preface

v

James G Antal R. John Vanden Berghe
Table of Contents

Foreword ..................................................................................................................................iii

Preface .......................................................................................................................................v

Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................vii

Part I - Operation Sharp Edge 1990-1991

Chapter 1 - Liberian Unrest Turns Violent .......................................................................1

The Geography of Liberia ........................................................................................................1

Samuel Doe’s Rise to Power ....................................................................................................4

Civil War Begins ........................................................................................................................5

The Need for U.S. Involvement ...............................................................................................5

First Look at Monrovia ..............................................................................................................8

Chapter 2 - Preparing for Operation Sharp Edge .........................................................11

From Predeployment Training to the Mediterranean ...........................................................11

Point Men in Monrovia ...........................................................................................................12

Circling at Mamba Station .......................................................................................................16

Frantic Negotiations Fizzle ......................................................................................................19

Marines Poised for Insertion ..................................................................................................21

The Call to Evacuate ...............................................................................................................23

Chapter 3 - Evacuation Operations ..................................................................................27

A Rainy D-Day ........................................................................................................................27

Into the Embassy .....................................................................................................................30

West African Peacekeepers Arrive .........................................................................................35

Evacuation from Buchanan ....................................................................................................38

Rotation of Marine Forces ......................................................................................................41

Turnover and Departure .........................................................................................................42

Chapter 4 - Operation Sharp Edge ...................................................................................43

Deployment of the 26th MEU ................................................................................................43

26th MEU and the Formation of the CMAGTF in Liberia ....................................................46

Peacekeepers, Fighters, and Contigency MAGTF...................................................................47

Rotation and Reduction of CMAGTF Marines ........................................................................62

Completion of Sharp Edge .....................................................................................................63

The Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team and the Departure of the Marines .......................64

Part II - Continuing Operations 1996-2003

Chapter 5 - 22d MEU in Operation Assured Response .................................................67

Civil War Continues .................................................................................................................67

Introduction of American Forces ...........................................................................................69

Marines Take the Reins ...........................................................................................................73

Actions Ashore ........................................................................................................................74

vi
Marines Return Fire .................................................................................................................76

Reduction of Marine Forces ..................................................................................................83

Chapter 6 - Operation Quick Response ...........................................................................85

Violence to the East ................................................................................................................85

Call in the Marines ..................................................................................................................88

Marine Operations in Bangui .................................................................................................90

Planning for Reinforcements ..................................................................................................93

Reduction of Presence and Withdrawal ................................................................................94

Chapter 7 - Planning, Deployment, and Action ............................................................95

Special Purpose MAGTF Deploys ..........................................................................................95

The Special Purpose MAGTF as the Assured Response Joint Task Force ..........................98

Marines Draw Down and Depart .........................................................................................100

Epilogue - A Stabilizing Presence.....................................................................................103

Notes .....................................................................................................................................117

Appendices

Appendix A: Chronology ......................................................................................................129

Appendix B: Command and Staff List ..................................................................................135

Appendix C: Citations ...........................................................................................................137

Appendix D: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations ...........................................................139

Index .....................................................................................................................................141

vii

The Geography of Liberia

Liberia is geographically situated between

Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast on the

western bulge of Africa. In total landmass, the

country is slightly larger than the state of

Pennsylvania. Its narrow coastal strip, from 20 to

50 miles wide, is interlaced with swamps, tidal

lagoons, and marshes. The coastal areas lead to

rolling hills that range from 400 to 1,200 feet high

and are covered with dense broadleaf and evergreen forests. Timber and rubber plantations

abound in these areas of abundant natural

resources. Along Liberia’s northern border, the

rugged Guinea highlands divide the Niger River

basin to the northeast from streams flowing across

the country. The dominant mountain ranges of

the Wologisi and Nimba, with elevations to 5,748

feet, are found along the country’s eastern and

northeastern borders. Both of these mountain

ranges, as well as the lower Bong Hills, are rich

with iron ore deposits and littered with gold

mines. The country’s six major rivers drain northeast to southwest into the Atlantic Ocean. Three

of the country’s seven significant diamond mines

are located near the Lofa River. Major port cities

include Buchanan, Harper, Monrovia, and

Robertsport. The tropical climate has very distinct

wet and dry seasons. During the wet season,

which runs between April and November, the 

Chapter 1

Liberian Unrest Turns Violent
average accumulation of rainfall is between 150

and 170 inches with almost daily torrential thunderstorms in the late afternoon. In the capital 

city of Monrovia, the mean temperature is 82

degrees Fahrenheit with an average humidity of

90 percent.

Liberia traces its origins back to the 1816 establishment of the American Colonization Society.

Intended to sponsor the repatriation of former

American slaves to West Africa, this organization

established its first successful settlement on Cape

Mesurado in 1821. That site grew into the city of

2 ON MAMBA STATION
Monrovia. By 1847, more than 45,000 freed men,

as well as Africans rescued from slave ships, had

settled there. Most of these settlers died of disease

or in conflicts with local tribesmen. The settlers

declared independence from the American

Colonization Society’s jurisdiction in 1847 and

established a republic constitutionally modeled

after the United States. European nations quickly

recognized the new country, but the United States

failed to establish diplomatic ties until 1862.1

Liberia’s seemingly democratic structure was,

in fact, a façade. Territory claimed by AfricanAmerican settlers and their descendents (AmericoLiberians) and those rescued from slave ships

(Congoes) extended eastward into the interior,

which was populated by at least 16 indigenous

tribal groups. The ruling Americo-Liberian elite

had no interest in assimilating the African population and referred to them as the “Country People.”

Adopting the attitudes and lifestyle of antebellum

southerners, Americo-Liberians regarded the

native Afro-Liberians as uncivilized inferiors.

Although Liberians considered their state

Christian, only about 10 percent of the population

belonged to one of the Christian denominations;

20 percent were Muslim, and the remaining 70

percent maintained traditional African beliefs.

English is the official language, but there are more

than 20 dialects derived from Niger-Congo linguistic groups. A pidgin “Liberian English” is the

common tongue.

The True Whig Party, which represented the

interests of a small group of interrelated families

that dominated the country, monopolized political

power for 133 years. This group comprised only

5 percent of the population. This ruling class

resided mainly in the coastal urban centers, principally Monrovia, and exploited Liberia’s natural

resources of rubber, iron ore, and lumber using

labor coerced from the rural population. Firestone

Tire and Rubber Company established the world’s

largest rubber plantation at Harbel in 1936,

heralding a period of increased American economic involvement in the country. An Open Door

Policy, implemented after the election of

President William S. Tubman in 1944, led to

increasing foreign investment and modest prosperity. During World War II, the United States

built Roberts Airport and the Freeport of

Monrovia, further developing the county’s infrastructure.

Unfortunately, more emphasis was placed on

exporting raw materials than on expanding

Liberia’s industrial capacity. In addition, a

National Unification Policy aimed at assimilating

rural Afro-Liberians fell short of incorporating the

native population into the political power structure. Tubman, in fact, had no tolerance for any

form of political opposition. When former

President Edwin James Barclay’s Independent

Whig Party challenged Tubman in the 1955 presidential elections, his supporters were harassed

LIBERIAN UNREST TURNS VIOLENT 3

Photo courtesy of the authors

In government since 1935, William Richard

Tolbert, Jr., succeeded to the presidency of Liberia

upon William S. Tubman’s death in 1971.

Instituting reforms to close the disparity between

Americo-Liberians and indigenous tribesmen,

Tolbert raised expectations while the economy

failed, stimulating opposition and a military

coup.
4 ON MAMBA STATION

and Barclay’s party was eventually banned.

Although Liberia prospered, only the True Whig

oligarchy benefited and repression maintained

the chasm between them and the majority of the

population. This situation continued during the

presidency of William K. Tolbert, who assumed

office upon Tubman’s death in 1971. But discontent led to organized opposition and the

Movement for Justice in Africa was formed at the

University of Liberia in 1973. Then in 1975,

Liberian students in the United States organized

the Progressive Alliance of Liberia. An unpopular

increase in the cost of rice led to a demonstration

on 14 April 1979, which escalated into rioting,

looting, and the deaths of nearly 100 people in

Monrovia.

Samuel Doe’s Rise to Power

A year later, Tolbert died when 17 noncommissioned officers, led by Master Sergeant Samuel

Kenyon Doe, stormed the Executive Mansion.

They murdered the president in bed and killed 26

members of his security guard. After advising tribal soldiers not to obey Americo-Liberian officers,

the enlisted men assumed control of the government and proclaimed themselves the People’s

Redemption Council. The public initially welcomed the end of 133 years of Americo-Liberian

rule with enthusiasm, but the televised execution

of 13 Tolbert Administration officials by drunken

soldiers foreshadowed the imposition of a military

dictatorship. Doe promised a return to civilian

rule by 1985; political activity was banned until

1984. Of 14 political parties that were organized,

only four were allowed to participate in the presidential and legislative elections held on 15

October 1985. Many of Doe’s opponents were

detained or otherwise harassed, and when the

election still seemed to turn against him, representatives of his own National Democratic Party

of Liberia manipulated the vote count and proclaimed him the victor with 50 percent of the

votes (80 percent of the legislative seats being

claimed by his party). Meanwhile, Doe removed

many of his fellow 1980 coup conspirators from

the government, increasing the concentration of

power to members of his own Krahn tribe. The

Krahn, like the Americo-Liberians before them,

became a despised minority ruling over a

repressed majority. On 12 November 1985, former

People’s Redemption Council member General

Thomas Quiwonkpa led an unsuccessful coup

attempt. Quiwonkpa’s failure led to his execution

and that of 16 of his supporters, followed by

widespread persecution of their Gio and Mano 

tribesmen. Approximately 3,000 were killed,

especially in Quiwonkpa’s own Nimba County.

Many fled the country to await an opportunity for

revenge.2

During the early 1980s, Liberia was viewed as

a bastion against Soviet expansionism and Libyan

influence in Africa and American aid flowed into

the country. The end of the Cold War and increasing alarm over Doe’s abysmal human rights

record led to a reduction of aid by the end of the

decade. This decline, coinciding with decreases in

the value of Liberia’s exported raw materials and

the corruption and incompetence of the regime,

resulted in economic chaos and widespread

unemployment.

Then came Charles Taylor. An AmericoLiberian educated in Massachusetts, Taylor was an

expatriate opponent of the Tolbert regime.

Present in Liberia during the 1980 coup, his

degree in economics and glib personality earned

him the leadership of the General Services

Administration, which was responsible for centralized government purchasing. He was accused

of embezzling about $1 million U.S. dollars in

Photo courtesy of the authors

Leaders of the voilent 1980 military coup that

overthrew President Tolbert were: (left) Sgt

Nicholas Podier, who became speaker of the interim National Assembly; Sgt Thomas “Strongman”

Quiwonkpa, commander of the Armed Forces of

Liberia; MSgt Samuel Kenyon Doe, head of state;

and Sgt Thomas Weh Syen, deputy head of state.

All died violently. Three were killed on orders of

Samuel Doe, and Doe himself was killed in the

midst of the 1990 civil war.
1983 and fled to the United States, where he lived

as a fugitive until he was arrested by U.S. marshals. In September 1985, Taylor escaped from

Massachusetts’ Plymouth County Jail, where he

was awaiting extradition. He made his way to

Libya where Muammar Qadhafi allowed him to

train an insurgent force. After additional training

in Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast, Taylor’s

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) crossed

the border into Nimba County on Christmas Eve,

1989.3

Civil War Begins

Initially, few in the government took the threat

seriously. By late December, however, Doe sent

the 2d Battalion of his army to suppress the guerrillas. Targeting Gio and Mano tribesmen associated with Quiwonkpa’s 1985 attempt, the Krahndominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) alienated the population with indiscriminate murder,

rape, and pillage. As civilians began to fear government soldiers more than the NPFL, Taylor’s

force grew. Many soldiers likewise fled to the

rebels, taking their weapons with them. The

insurgents lured some AFL units into ambushes by

passing false messages on captured radios, gaining more arms in the process. Children as young

as 10 years old fought as well, some to avenge

slain family members and others simply because

they had no option.4

As popular support grew, the NPFL expanded

its initial focus on killing government troops and

officials to persecution of Doe’s Krahn and their

Mandingo associates. By 6 January 1990, more

than 10,000 refugees had fled to the Ivory Coast,

spreading word of atrocities committed by both

government and rebel forces. Meanwhile, Doe

tightened his own security by establishing numerous checkpoints throughout Monrovia and dispatching additional troops into the interior.5

The insurgents successfully eluded Doe’s

forces, moving across mountains and through

forests to seize the town of Tapeta, which gave

them control of the coastal road and split the

country in half. On 7 March, the United States

Congress passed House Resolution 354, condemning atrocities committed by both parties in

the conflict.6 On 24 March, an American missionary was killed in crossfire. In Monrovia, government troops began harassing Liberians employed

by the American Embassy. Threats directed

against embassy officials over the security guards’

radio net culminated in the burning of an

embassy warehouse by two disgruntled employees on 29 March. As Taylor’s forces advanced into

Grand Gedeh County in early April, the number

of Liberians seeking refuge in neighboring counties grew to more than 140,000.7 On 23 April, an

embassy travel advisory stated the security situation was deteriorating as random acts of violence

against foreigners increased. Three days later, the

voluntary evacuation of official dependents and

nonessential personnel was authorized. Within a

week, the official American community shrank

from 621 to 143 as embassy families, Peace Corps

volunteers, and employees of the Voice of

America and the United States Agency for

International Development (USAID) left the country.8

Meanwhile, Doe urged Krahn chiefs to: “get

their cutlasses and single barrel guns and get into

the bush and pursue the rebels,” prompting further atrocities.9 Loyalist troops arrested 150 Gio

soldiers suspected of treason. Many of Monrovia’s

primarily Mandingo taxi drivers fled to Sierra

Leone and Guinea while AFL troops manning a

growing number of checkpoints throughout the

city detained, harassed, and extracted bribes from

motorists. In addition, the number of mutilated

corpses multiplied. On 24 May, the U.S. State

Department issued another travel advisory ordering all nonessential personnel to leave.

The Need for U.S. Involvement

As the situation continued to deteriorate, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff began looking at four possible actions that had been presented by the U.S.

European Command. The maritime option included the employment of a Marine amphibious force.

The other three involved Army airborne or U.S.

Special Operations Command forces seizing

LIBERIAN UNREST TURNS VIOLENT 5

During the early 1980s, Liberia was

viewed as a bastion against Soviet

expansionism and Libyan influence in

Africa and American aid flowed into

the country. The end of the Cold War

and increasing alarm over Doe’s

abysmal human rights record led to a

reduction of aid by the end of the

decade.
Roberts International Airport. The American

Embassy in Monrovia wanted a military option

available, but did not favor a direct military presence ashore. Personnel were still being evacuated

by commercial charter flights, and although there

was no government opposition to their departure,

nor any apparent physical threat, numerous roadblocks had to be negotiated on the way to the airport. Evacuees traveled in convoys escorted by

the embassy’s regional security officer and locally

hired guards. While it appeared a noncombatant

evacuation operation conducted by U.S. forces

was unnecessary, the maritime option provided

the most viable contingency force. After review,

President George H. Bush, with the advice of the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General

Colin L. Powell, and the Secretary of Defense,

Richard B. Cheney, approved the European Command’s plan to station off the Liberian coast 2,500

Marines equipped for an amphibious landing.

On 25 May 1990, the 22d Marine Expeditionary

Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)),

as part of its Landing Force Sixth Fleet deployment 2-90 (the second MEU deployed to the

Mediterranean that year), was training at Camp de

Canjuers near the port of Toulon in southern

France. The MEU comprised a command element

(the MEU staff); Battalion Landing Team 2d

Battalion, 4th Marines (BLT 2/4); Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron 261 (HMM-261); and MEU

Service Support Group 22 (MSSG-22), the MEU’s

logistical support element. When the deployment

order came in from General Powell, the MEU’s

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier detachment,

based ashore at Hyeres Naval Air Station east of

Toulon, abruptly shifted its focus from routine

training to “mounting out” on board ship. The following day, Admiral Jonathan T. Howe,

Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe,

issued the deployment order directing the

Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)

with the 22d MEU to proceed to the vicinity of

Monrovia. Upon arrival off the Liberian coast, the

Marines would prepare for evacuations and security operations at U.S. installations ashore to be

conducted with or without permission from the

Liberian government. Colonel Granville R.

“Granny” Amos, commanding officer of 22d MEU,

had been monitoring the situation for some time

and immediately directed that equipment and personnel be embarked in compliance with a 12-

hour standby plan.10

Government and rebel forces continued fighting at the key towns of Garbande and Buchanan.*

The rebel tactics were to first attack checkpoints

and convoys outside a town, then encircle it.

Once surrounded, government troops usually

retreated into the town, haphazardly firing mortars, rockets, and machine guns. The terrorized

civilian population suffered most. Doe’s troops

generally deserted or fled, allowing the rebels to

win easy victories.11 Taylor’s rebels employed

these very tactics on 26 May to seize the city of

Kakata, about 30 miles northeast of Monrovia.

Arbitrary arrests and detentions in Monrovia continued, as did the indiscriminate killing of Gios

and Manos by Krahn soldiers. As fighting drew

closer, more refugees flocked into the capital.

Seeking protection from the violence, a large

group gathered outside the compound of the

United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

U.N. personnel granted entry to about 1,500.

On the evening of 29 May, government AFL

troops broke into the compound firing automatic

weapons, wounding two guards and killing a

third. Between 30 and 40 men and boys, including Gio and Mano UNDP employees, were

forcibly removed. At least eight were tortured,

executed, and mutilated on a nearby beach.

Michael Heyn, the U.N. representative in Liberia,

described the attack as “incredible, and a violation

of international law.”12 On 30 May, the U.N. evacuated its entire staff. Although Doe visited the

compound the following day, promising the survivors he would find the culprits, he either could

not, or had no intention of, controlling his army. 

Prior to this incident, the commander of the

Sixth Fleet, Vice Admiral James D. Williams, USN,

authorized the dispatch of the 22d MEU’s forward

6 ON MAMBA STATION

* Buchanan is a port linked by road and rail to both Monrovia

and the interior.

On the evening of 29 May, government

AFL troops broke into the compound firing automatic weapons, wounding two

guards and killing a third. Between 30

and 40 men and boys, including Gio and

Mano UNDP employees, were forcibly

removed. At least eight were tortured,

executed, and mutilated on a nearby

beach. 
command element to Liberia. Serving as a liaison

between State Department personnel and the

MEU, the employment of a forward command element is standard procedure for any evacuation

operation.13 Unfortunately, the embassy in

Monrovia had not requested the forward command element, which made coordination difficult.

The team’s five original members were reduced to

two due to problems with travel arrangements.

Encumbered by personal weapons, ammunition,

pyrotechnics, satellite communications equipment, cryptology gear, rations, uniforms, and

civilian clothes, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J.

Labadie, Jr., the 22d MEU’s executive officer, and

Major Glen R. Sachtleben, executive officer of BLT

2/4, flew from the USS Saipan (LHA 2) by helicopter on 29 May.

After landing at Rota Naval Station in Spain, the

pair sought transportation for themselves and

their equipment to Liberia. Commercial transportation presented several problems. Not only

was it extremely expensive, but their equipment

would be difficult to pass through customs. They

also had no visas, and the circuitous route (connecting at Madrid, Paris, and Amsterdam) would

take 46 hours to complete. A Navy Beech D-12

Super King airplane was available, but it could

not carry both them and all their baggage. The

officers considered crossing to Morocco, renting a

car, and driving to Monrovia. Meanwhile, Colonel

Amos decided to send the three remaining forward command element members: Captain David

J. Mollahan, officer in charge of the MEU’s air

naval gunfire liaison company detachment;

LIBERIAN UNREST TURNS VIOLENT 7

DVIC DN-SC-90-08850

A port view of the amphibious assault ship USS Saipan (LHA 2). In the Mediterranean participating with

the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit in NATO southern region exercise Dragon Hammer ’90, the Saipan

and other ships in the amphibious ready group would be ordered to waters off Liberia.
Lieutenant Commander Robert Peterman, officer

in charge of the Amphibious Squadron 4’s

(Phibron 4) naval special warfare group detachment; and Sergeant Scott R. Widdifield, from the

MEU’s radio battalion detachment. While the trio

traveled to Rota, Major Sachtleben met

Commander Phillip G. Hobbs, the commanding

officer of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 22

(VR-22), a Navy Lockheed C-130 Hercules

squadron based at the naval station. That night,

the two officers agreed that a VR-22 Hercules

would fly the forward command element to

Monrovia, provided each got the approval of their

respective chains-of-command. While the forward

command element spent 30 May getting vaccinations and Malaria pills, VR-22 helped them obtain

personal clearances to travel to Liberia and submitted an aircraft clearance request. At 0500 on 31

May, their C-130 left Rota for Monrovia.

First Look at Monrovia

Lieutenant Colonel Labadie, Major Sachtleben,

and the remaining members of the forward command element arrived at 1205 local time. The aircraft spent only 15 minutes on the ground, just

long enough to quickly offload its passengers and

their equipment. Roberts International Airport, 35

miles from Monrovia, was closed to commercial

traffic due to nearby rebel attacks. Lieutenant

Colonel Bruce Newman, USA, assistant chief of

the military mission at the embassy welcomed the

forward command element. The five-man team

then drove to the embassy’s Greystone compound, where Lieutenant Colonel Labadie directed them to establish communications with the 22d

MEU while he met with the embassy staff.14

The staff briefed the forward command element on the current situation. At the meeting of

the Economic Community of West African States 

on 30 May in Banjul, Gambia, the participants

called for an immediate ceasefire and established

a standing mediation committee to help resolve

the conflict. But the insurgents had already

reached Harbel (site of the former Firestone rubber plantation, now Japanese owned), bringing

them within 20 miles from the capital. This

advance effectively closed all air traffic to Roberts

8 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of the authors

Armed Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia soldiers drive past the American Embassy on

United Nations Drive. The rebel soldiers belonged to one of two factions challenging government forces

for control of the capital. 
International Airport. In addition, Taylor’s NPFL

had split into two factions, which further complicated the situation. Former army captain and ethnic Gio, Prince Yormie Johnson, broke with

Taylor in February to form a new faction called

the Independent National Patriotic Front of

Liberia (INPFL). This group was challenging both

the government forces and their former comrades

for control of the capital. Control of more than

two-thirds of the country was now split between

the two rebel factions, each of which continued to

advance in spurts, pausing to reorganize between

attacks.

On 26 May, the 22d MEU completed loading its

personnel and equipment on the ships of the

ARG, which sailed from Toulan the following day.

As the group passed Rota, HMM-261 helicopters

picked up additional personnel, supplies, and

maps of Liberia. The ships then headed south

after taking on fuel and supplies. The Saipan and

USS Sumter (LST 1181) proceeded together while

the USS Ponce (LPD 15), delayed by repairs, followed later.

Recognizing the MEU might be given a contingency mission in Liberia prior to receipt of the

deployment order, Colonel Amos directed the

MEU staff to refine their plans. Using rapid planning techniques, they were a day ahead when the

order was received on 26 May. The following day,

the staff briefed General James P. McCarthy, USAF,

Deputy Commander in Chief, European

Command; Brigadier General Richard Potter, USA,

Commander, Special Operations Command,

Europe; Admiral Jonathan Howe, USN,

Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe;

and Vice Admiral James D. Williams, USN,

Commander, Sixth Fleet, on board the Saipan.

The briefing detailed various courses of action

open to the MEU, should it be called upon to execute a noncombatant evacuation operation in

Monrovia, now designated Operation Sharp Edge.

Reports on the deteriorating situation led to an

all-out effort to get the Marines to Liberia quickly.

Accompanying the ships of Phibron 4, which

formed the ARG, was the destroyer USS Peterson

(DD 969). The MEU transferred a reinforced plaLIBERIAN UNREST TURNS VIOLENT 9

DVIC DN-ST-90-11228

The American Embassy in Monrovia became the focal point for American citizens and other foreign

nationals to gather in preparation for evacuation during Liberia’s political unrest and civil war.
toon of Marines and one helicopter to the

destroyer so they could arrive prior to the rest of

the task force. These 75 Marines would provide

quick reinforcement if called upon, and included

an evacuation control center to coordinate an

evacuation. A detachment of Navy SEALs (Sea,

Air, Land) from Naval Special Warfare Group 2 

also boarded the Peterson. Traveling at 30 knots,

the destroyer arrived off Liberia on 2 June.

The operation order for Sharp Edge directed

the task force to be ready to conduct an evacuation within 24 hours of notification. It also

assigned Admiral Williams, the commander of the

Sixth Fleet, as the commander of the joint task

force (JTF).15 The JTF, now officially formed,

comprised approximately 2,300 Marines from the

22d MEU and 1,900 sailors from the ARG. When

the Saipan and Sumter arrived on 3 June, the

Marines on the Peterson returned to the Saipan.

With the arrival of the Ponce on 4 June, the JTF

went into a modified location at sea, designated

Mamba Station.*

The embassy compound was located on a

peninsula at the western edge of Monrovia with

the ocean to the west and south and the

Mesuardo River to the north. To the east were the

business district, central market, Tubman Stadium,

and the AFL’s Barclay Training Center. The

Executive Mansion and Capitol were southeast of

the training center. Tubman Boulevard, the city’s

main thoroughfare, passed eastward through the

Sinkor District, Spriggs-Payne Airport, and Congo

Town. Tubman Boulevard branched off at

Paynesville. Traveling northeast, it was eight miles

to the U.S. Omega navigation transmitter site and

22 miles to the Voice of America transmitter. Six

miles further east the road forked again, leading

either northeast to Kakata or southeast to Herbel.

The other fork in Tubman Boulevard led eastward

along the coast toward the U.S. telecommunications transmitter and Roberts International

Airport. Two bridges crossed the Mesuardo River

north of Monrovia, connecting the capital with

Bushrod Island where the Freeport was located.

The road continued north across the St. Paul

River, passing through Brewersville to the Voice

of America receiving station and American

telecommunication office receiver site.

The American community was spread out

among the city of 400,000 people. An embassy

warehouse was on Bushrod Island.16 The USAID

library was located in the central business district.

The Graystone compound was located one block

east of the Mamba Point embassy compound and 

housed diplomatic personnel. The embassy’s

Marine Security Guard detachment lived at Marine

House on United Nations Drive. A U.S.

Government Services Organization warehouse

was within a block of the Barclay Training Center,

while the American Cooperative School, USAID

Headquarters, Peace Corps Office and training

center, and housing for several embassy staff

members and other American citizens were located in Sinkor and Congo Town. Americans working in outlying areas such as the Omega and

Voice of America transmitter sites lived in either

Monrovia or its suburbs. 

Both the embassy staff and senior Navy and

Marine commanders of the task force were clearly aware of U.S. policy toward the Doe regime.

During the 1980s, approximately $500 million in

economic, military, and social aid flowed into

Liberia, making it West Africa’s largest per capita

recipient of American assistance.17 Because of the

country’s long-standing ties with the United

States, and the Cold War access to Africa it gave

the American government, the two nations had

strong mutual interests.** Yet the Doe regime’s

corruption, incompetence, and appalling human

rights record could not be ignored.18 As the rebel

factions closed in on Monrovia, Marines and

sailors waiting off the coast faced an increasingly

complex and volatile situation.

10 ON MAMBA STATION

** United States aircraft could land and refuel in Liberia on 24

hours’ notice. The Omega navigation station assisted international shipping by providing navigational fixes, while the

American telecommunications relay site provided communications for diplomatic traffic between embassies in subSaharan Africa. The Voice of America relay station transmitted

broadcasts throughout the region.

* Mamba Station was named for Mamba Point, the location of

the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia.

During the 1980s, approximately $500

million in economic, military, and social

aid flowed into Liberia, making it West

Africa’s largest per capita recipient of

American assistance.
From Predeployment Training to the

Mediterranean

In the course of training for its deployment, the

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable) practiced three noncombatant evacuation operations. For the 22d MEU’s

“graduation” special operations exercise, Battalion

Landing Team 2/4 (BLT 2/4) conducted two different site noncombatant evacuation operations

concurrently. One evacuation took place at a

mock embassy and the other at an outlying site.

Using rapid planning techniques, the MEU executed the multisite noncombatant evacuation

operations exercise at Camp Lejeune, North

Carolina, within six hours of receiving the warning order. Company E performed the outlying site

mission and Company H the mock embassy mission.19 By coincidence, the exercise mirrored

closely the subsequent actions of the unit in

Liberia.

Before the deployment, the staff studied a

number of contingency areas, including Liberia.

The MEU’s intelligence officer, Major Stephen L.

Sayko, explained: “Prior to the deployment we

started to take a look at the map, and Africa kind

of stood out at us.” If a contingency arose that

needed a maritime option, “the Med MEU would

be the only game in town.” The intelligence section took the standard contingency planning

materials for West Africa, which included

Liberia.20

The 22d MEU’s deployment began on 8 March

1990 when it sailed from Morehead City, North

Carolina. As the next unit in the normal rotation

to the Mediterranean, they steamed across the

Atlantic and arrived at Naval Station, Rota, Spain,

on 26 March. While at Rota, the staff received its

first dispatch on Liberia, which reported an

American citizen had died from a gunshot wound

to the leg. After this initial message, the MEU staff

began receiving other reports from the embassy

in Liberia, including information on the 29 March

burning of the U.S. Embassy warehouse in

Monrovia.

By 23 April, in Cannes, France, the MEU

learned that the State Department had issued a

travel advisory on Liberia. The advisory recommended that American citizens leave the country,

and noted the start of a reduction of official personnel at the embassy. That same day, the Fleet

Marine Officer at the U.S. Navy’s European headquarters, Colonel Willis H. “Bill” Hansen, together

with U.S. European Command representatives,

briefed the MEU staff. Colonel Hansen had led a

four-man European Command assessment team

to Liberia earlier that month and had acquired an

excellent understanding of the embassy’s situation

as well as possible evacuation sites.21 The firsthand assessment gave the MEU commander and

his staff helpful planning information and access

to recent pictures taken in Liberia. Colonel

Hansen reviewed all possible force options available to European Command if an evacuation was

required, but the staff focused on the one maritime option that included the MEU. With this new

and updated information, Major Sayko’s intelligence section began to develop detailed support

plans in earnest.22 * Meanwhile, the Marines continued their scheduled training and exercises in

the Mediterranean.

In the first week of May, the MEU participated

in Dragon Hammer, a North Atlantic Treaty

Organization exercise in Sardinia. After the exercise, the MEU sailed to San Rapheal, France, and

off-loaded equipment and personnel on 16 May

for training at nearby Camp de Canjuers. When

the Mediterranean-based Amphibious Ready

Group (ARG) anchored in Toulon on 17 May, the

MEU split for training and liberty. While one half

trained for 10 days at Camp de Canjuers, the other

Chapter 2

Preparing for Operation Sharp Edge

* The planning included obtaining the embassy’s Emergency

Action Plan from U.S. European Command.
half enjoyed liberty in Toulon. With messages

from the American Embassy in Monrovia indicating a steadily worsening situation, Colonel

Granville Amos wanted his Marines prepared to

react quickly. He directed his staff and subordinate commanders at Camp de Canjuers to ready

plans for a possible 12-hour return to the ships at

any point in the training cycle. Realizing the seriousness of the deteriorating situation, Colonel

Amos, a veteran of the evacuations of Phnom

Penh and Saigon, as well as operations in

Grenada and Beirut, wanted to be ready for any

eventuality.23

Early on the morning of 25 May, Colonel Amos

officially learned about the possible contingency

mission in Liberia. The alert order issued by the

Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the

22d MEU and Amphibious Squadron 4 (Phibron

4) to get under way for Liberia.24 The ships sailed

two days later after a quick loading of equipment

and personnel back on board. As they steamed

out of the Mediterranean, the ships received fuel

and fresh supplies. The Marines received personnel augmentation.* On the way to Liberia, the

MEU received European Command’s Operation

Order Sharp Edge while conducting mass casualty drills and evacuation operation reception

rehearsals.25 The orders directed the MEU to be

prepared to protect and evacuate American citizens and other foreign nationals from Liberia.

Point Men in Monrovia

In preparation for the evacuation, the MEU

sent a five-man forward command element to the

embassy in Monrovia to assess the situation.

Arriving on 31 May, the team’s reception indicated that many of the embassy officials considered

their presence premature. Gathering at their quarters on the day of their arrival, Lieutenant Colonel

Stephen J. Labadie’s team met with Colonel David

Staley, USA, the chief of military mission in

12 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-90-11531

Stationed off the coast of Liberia, Marines of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit practice body-search

techniques on the flight deck of the amphibious assault ship USS Saipan (LHA 2) in preparation for

Operation Sharp Edge.

* Personnel augmenting the joint task force included intelligence specialists, such as a four-man joint intelligence liaison

element.
Monrovia. Colonel Staley instructed the team on

its conduct, to whom the team could talk, what

the members could wear, and where it could go.

Essentially, the forward command element could

talk to anyone, but if it needed to talk to any

Armed Forces of Liberia personnel, the team had

to first clear coordination with Colonel Staley.

Directed to wear only civilian clothes, the team

could travel freely unless going to some unusual

place. In those cases, the team needed advance

clearance for the visit from the chief of military

mission. Speaking frankly, Staley stated he really

did not know why the Marines had come, and

said the embassy had a good handle on the situation. He further informed the team the embassy

expected a coup and anticipated it would take

two or three days. That would likely be followed

by a great deal of killing and other acts of retribution for the excesses of the Doe government.

Once that was over, Staley said the U.S. would

recognize the new government and the embassy

would go back to business as usual.* Colonel

Staley did not anticipate any need for an evacuation because the embassy had already drawn

down staff and dependents. He then expressed

the hope that Lieutenant Colonel Labadie and his

Marines would have a nice stay, however brief,

and reaffirmed that he would support the team in

any way he could.26

Given the nature of the alarmist message traffic coming out of the embassy, the forward command element reacted with surprise. Major Glen

Sachtleben put it plainly:

Of course we were shocked. We

expected to land and fight our

way to the Embassy and then

saw that it wasn’t that way. The

checkpoints we went through

were very quick, no problems at

all. The soldiers we saw walking

around all had weapons, but

they were all lackadaisical looking. There was no feeling that

this country was falling apart in

our first impression.27

Their dismay at the low level of urgency deepened as the team met other embassy officials during the remainder of that first day. Most of the

embassy staff, including the deputy in charge of

mission, members of the defense attache office,

and the chief of station appeared surprised to see

them, unconvinced and unsure of why Marines

were there. Only Larry Hartnett, the regional security officer, and Colonel Staley appreciated the

Marines’ presence and fully understood their mission. Major Sachtleben felt the attitude among the

embassy staff was that of “this isn’t going to happen guys.”28 The forward command element team

members knew their tasks and wanted to get to

work. The tasks included conducting liaison and

assessing the overall situation, surveying helicopter landing zones and landing beaches, determining the number of evacuees, and estimating the

level of hostilities likely to be encountered during

an evacuation. Unfortunately, the prevailing opinion of the staff, that an evacuation was not necessary, led to a reluctance of certain key embassy

personnel to support the Marines’ effort.

Personality conflicts among the embassy staff also

lead to certain members of the staff obstructing

the team’s efforts simply because of its association

with another staff member.29 All of this made the

work of the team more difficult.30

The forward command element met with the

Marine security guard detachment, which was

headed by Staff Sergeant Timothy Love. Team

members noted that Guard Post One was located

at the main entrance to the chancery. At the post,

the Marine guard on duty monitored local communications and functioned as the net control station for one of the five radio nets at the

embassy.31** The posted Marine was the communication link for Lieutenant Colonel Labadie’s

team when they conducted reconnaissance forays. As the violence escalated, the Marine security guard detachment’s quick relaying of messages

PREPARING FOR OPERATION SHARP EDGE 13

* This line of thinking originated from past Liberian events.

Samuel K. Doe’s bloody but successful coup in Monrovia, 12

April 1980, ended quickly. The city also rapidly returned to

business as usual after a failed coup attempt on 12 November

1985.

** For official Americans and government employees, these

radio nets allowed the passing and receiving of messages to

warn them of potential problems. In case of emergencies or

dangers, most official and nonofficial U.S. citizens received

notification or warnings by radio using a tiered contact system. Nonofficial (non-government employed U.S. citizens)

Americans in Liberia maintained contact through a warden

system with the missionary radio networks, or through commercial companies’ communications with their Monrovia

offices. Backup for nonofficial Americans was by telephone or

short wave radio. “Liberia Emergency Planning Handbook,”

dtd 1990, Annex B (Sharp Edge HistColl, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.).
and reassuring assistance when called helped

embassy staff and forward command element

personnel in potentially life threatening situations.

In addition to the Marine security guard detachment, the embassy’s local guard force stood post

outside the gate and inside the embassy compound. The embassy employed a very loyal contract guard force composed of Liberians hired by

Wackenhut Corporation. Darrell M. Lowe, a

retired Marine lieutenant colonel, oversaw the 550

guards, who carried only nightsticks.32 This force

manned more than 200 posts throughout the capital to protect official American citizens and property.33* Stationed at all U.S. properties, the guards

proved to be a source of local information to the

Marines, passing on reports as to who controlled

certain areas and what types of activities took

place during the fighting.34 As a testimony of their

loyalty, throughout the crisis many of the guards

remained on post and reported information even

after the rebels had overrun the surrounding

areas. Some guards were beaten and others were

killed in the violence.

With the destroyer USS Peterson (DD 969)

steaming toward Liberia, members of the forward

command element were almost certain European

Command would select the maritime evacuation

option that included the Marines. Once the

destroyer arrived, the MEU and ARG constituted

the quickest response for the emergency and rendered the three other European Command force

options irrelevant. Lieutenant Colonel Labadie

believed the Marines on board Navy ships just offshore and over the horizon best suited the embassy’s diplomatic intentions. Colonel Staley assured Lieutenant Colonel Labadie that the deputy

chief of mission, Dennis C. Jett (in charge of the

embassy in the absence of the ambassador),

would not allow the U.S. Army to bring in troops

and simply leave them at the airport, which could

enflame an already delicate situation.35

Lieutenant Colonel Labadie and Major

Sachtleben found the State Department’s

approach extremely frustrating, often putting

14 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC SN-DT-90-11420

Officers of the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit gather in the Marine Expeditionary Unit commander’s office

on board the USS Saipan (LHA 2) for a briefing on the situation in and around Monrovia.

* In addition to the unarmed guards at the embassy, other

unarmed guards manned posts at the Graystone compound,

U.S. Information Service (USIS) building, USAID Library,

USAID compound, Peace Corps compound, DoD military mission, American Cooperative School, official Americans’ residences, and the navigation and communication site facilities.
them at odds with embassy officials. According to

Major Sachtleben: “We think of things in terms of

seconds, minutes, hours, and days, and then we

roll in on top of the State Department who have

a totally different philosophy. They think of things

in terms of weeks, months, years, and decades. So

here were these two different elements, the

Department of Defense and the Department of

State, kind of bucking up against each other. So it

was extremely frustrating.”36*

Despite the hindrances, members of the forward command element set out to collect information for a possible noncombatant evacuation

operation. They began by surveying helicopter

landing zones.** Traveling in civilian clothes,

Lieutenant Colonel Labadie, Captain Mollahan,

and Sergeant Widdifield visited every designated

landing zone (LZ) in the area. The site surveys

included the American Telecommunications

Office, the Voice of America, the Barclay Training

Center (AFL compound), and the American

Cooperative School. The team gathered updated

information on size, slopes, obstacles, directions

of flight access and egress, surface materials, and

dominant terrain of each landing zone. That information was then relayed to the MEU through

messages and phototelesis.37

The results of the survey excluded some landing zones from the list of evacuation sites. The

presence of AFL soldiers at the Barclay Training

Center and the extensive overhead wires supporting the antennas at Voice of America sites eliminated these landing zones from consideration.

The survey also identified some new landing

zones, such as the basketball court in the embassy

compound. Named LZ Magic after the professional basketball player “Magic” Johnson, the basketball court became the primary helicopter landing

zone for Operation Sharp Edge.38

Because the evacuation could employ either

helicopters or landing craft, Lieutenant Colonel

Labadie felt it prudent to survey possible landing

beaches. Lieutenant Commander Robert Peterman

and Major Sachtleben were assigned to this task.

The two officers, dressed in civilian clothing and

carrying concealed weapons, hiked to seven area

beaches. Aware of the delicacy of the situation—

traveling the countryside without visas and looking at beach landing sites for what could be construed as an evacuation or an invasion, depending on your point of view—both men acted as

circumspect as possible. They looked at every

designated landing beach and Peterman conducted a swimming survey in the surf zone at most of

them. The two officers discovered hidden rocks,

undertows, and plunging surf at every beach. The

team especially concentrated on the beach next to

the compound, known as Red Beach, conducting

surf observations twice each day for several

weeks. When the AFL put the beach under surveillance, the surf observations for Red Beach

stopped. The team recommended Navy SEALs

conduct a comprehensive beach survey before

using Red Beach as a landing site.39

The chief of station, Jim McWilliams, opposed

the idea of conducting further beach surveys. In

their first meeting, McWilliams assured Lieutenant

Colonel Labadie that special operations personnel

from European Command already had assessed

the beaches and approved them for evacuation.

Lieutenant Colonel Labadie knew the beaches

required a more detailed hydrographic survey,

but McWilliams and the military attache did not

agree. With Jett’s initial support, Lieutenant

Colonel Labadie submitted the proposal up the

PREPARING FOR OPERATION SHARP EDGE 15

* Deputy Chief of Mission, Dennis C. Jett, expressed an

embassy staff viewpoint of the forward command element

after about a month ashore. Jett stated that “embassy relations

with the military were beginning to fray” by July. Dennis C.

Jett, “Evacuations During Civil War, Liberia 1990,” in Embassies

Under Siege: Personal Accounts by Diplomats on the Front

Line, Joseph G. Sullivan ed. (Washington: Brassey’s, 1995), p.

138.

** The forward command element brought with them a copy

of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Intelligence

Support Handbook (NISH) that contained imagery and data

on key landing zones, landing beaches, routes, and locations

in Liberia for a NEO.

“We think of things in terms of seconds,

minutes, hours, and days, and then we

roll in on top of the State Department

who have a totally different philosophy.

They think of things in terms of weeks,

months, years, and decades. So here

were these two different elements, the

Department of Defense and the

Department of State, kind of bucking up

against each other. So it was extremely

frustrating.” — Major Glen Sachtleben
chain-of-command.* Higher headquarters disapproved the request and the Marines made due

with the results of the forward command element’s limited surveys.40

Work such as reinforcement of the embassy

still required the team’s attention. The forward

command element planned for the reinforcement

of the embassy, which included specific posts to

defend and harden. The regional security officer

closely cooperated with the team on its plan. To

identify specific embassy evacuation responsibilities, the team worked with the consular section.

The rush for visas as people tried to leave the

country kept the consular office extremely busy.

Despite the surge of people, the consular officer,

Mrs. Penny McMurtry, coordinated with the forward command element. Incrementally, the

Marines gained the required information and

completed the basic reinforcement plan by the

time the ARG arrived.41

The team also worked with the embassy staff

in planning a more detailed evacuation than what

was in the embassy’s emergency evacuation plan.

This, too, proved difficult because almost all the

embassy staff thought an evacuation was unnecessary. The staff believed its draw down arrangements to be sufficient. No one at the embassy

actively obstructed the Marines’ efforts, but many

on the staff simply did not feel an evacuation plan

constituted an urgent priority or merited their

immediate attention. Despite this indifference, the

team completed a detailed evacuation plan.42

Circling at Mamba Station

Once off the coast of Liberia, the ARG waited

in the overpowering heat and humidity at a position officially designated Mamba Station. For the

16 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-90-11412

LtCol Emerson N. Gardner, Jr., commanding officer of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261, delivers a pre-operation brief to his officers and pilots in the squadron ready room on board the USS Saipan

(LHA 2).

* Deputy Chief of Mission Dennis C. Jett later stated, “since the

surveys would have been conducted within site of the

Executive Mansion and the army’s main base, an armed confrontation was entirely possible.” The forward command element eliminated this particular beach early in the planning for

the same reason.
next two months, while the ships steamed slowly

in a circular ocean track, the embarked Marines

kept busy. Virtually every day they rehearsed various evacuation plans with all units and considered all location options. One particularly sensitive plan concerned the extraction of President

Doe if he decided to leave Liberia. The MEU practiced the contingency based on two different

options. The first involved a helicopter evacuation

from the embassy, while the second was a direct

flight from Spriggs-Payne Airport by fixed-wing

aircraft. In both options, once evacuated, Doe

would fly in one of the MEU’s Lockheed KC-130

Hercules aircraft to a country that would provide

him sanctuary.43 A maritime special purpose force

(MSPF), composed of the MEU’s Marine force

reconnaissance detachment and the ARG’s SEAL

detachment, repeatedly primed for these options,

conducting day and night full dress rehearsals.

Acting as the covering force for the MSPF,

Company H also practiced its role in the preparations. The plan remained on stand-by and in early

July the group’s alert times shortened temporarily

to a one-hour alert to execute.* During June, most

of the cabinet officials fled their posts, with the

exception of one or two ministers, while

President Doe doggedly maintained he could

reverse the growing victories of the rebels in

Liberia.

In anticipation of the evacuation, the designated commander of the joint task force ordered the

PREPARING FOR OPERATION SHARP EDGE 17

DVIC DN-ST-90-11421

Marines of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit gather in the hanger bay of the USS Saipan (LHA 2) for a

briefing on the situation in Monrovia. Also outlined were the rules of engagement governing their mission once ashore.

* Although the vacillating President Doe eventually refused a

U.S. offer for safe passage, the Marines remained ready.
establishment of a forward logistics site at Lungi

airfield in Freetown, Sierra Leone.* The MEU

based its KC-130 aircraft detachment from Marine

Aerial Refueling Squadron 252 (VMGR-252) at

Lungi. Two aircraft arrived on 5 June with the

mission of providing aerial refueling and supporting the logistical air bridge between Rota or Dakar

and Freetown. Marine and Navy helicopters also

began conducting short-range logistics flights

from the ARG ships to the airfield. Later, the

Freetown forward logistics site would serve as a

transit point for evacuees arriving by helicopter or

ship.44

At the beginning of June 1990, the Monrovia

embassy staff maintained its daily routine, including shopping in town. The staff appeared to

reflect the city’s “wait and see” outlook. Since all

the fighting between armed factions had taken

place in the countryside, Monrovia appeared

deceptively calm. Gradually, however, the fighting outside Monrovia started to disrupt the calm

facade. Rebels overran the city’s satellite earth station and international telephone service ceased.45

The voluntary draw down turned mandatory after

the Department of State granted the embassy’s

request for an authorized departure status.

(Authorized departure status implied there was

imminent danger to State Department employees

or their dependents.) Sunday charter flights continued to depart with American citizens from their

temporary homes in Monrovia, most leaving with

just suitcases. Organized convoys of Americans

departed from the embassy to the airport in town,

Spriggs-Payne, with the regional security officer

and his local guards providing security.

Approximately 1,450 Americans remained in

Liberia, down from 10,480 five months earlier.46

By 7 June, Taylor’s NPFL forces controlled

Herbel and the international airport areas. The

advancing fighters established roadblocks and

camps to the east of Monrovia. Denied access to

the international airport, many foreigners trying to

leave crowded onto the remaining commercial

flights at Spriggs-Payne Airport. On 10 June, the

U.S. Embassy extricated 360 more Americans

using charted Air Guinea Boeing 737 aircraft.47

Colonel Amos decided to send three members

of the MEU’s radio battalion detachment to

Monrovia by boat to augment the forward command element. Embassy officials turned down a

helicopter insertion feeling it would frighten

Liberians or draw attention to the embassy and

send the wrong message about American intentions.48 A helicopter-announced arrival might

have confused many Liberians involved in the

conflict, as word had gotten out to local newspapers that a Marine task force waited offshore.

Liberians, especially those who came from the

interior where most of the NPFL troops originated, may never have seen or heard a helicopter

before. For them, such a sight might incite fear,

curiosity, or both. Many Liberians wanted the

18 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-90-11540

Marines prepare to fire automatic M249 light

machine guns, known as Squad Automatic

Weapons or SAWs, during weapons training held

on the stern of the USS Saipan (LHA 2). Fielded in

the 1980s, the SAW filled the void created by the

retirement of the Browning Automatic Rifle.

* Among the Commander of Fleet Air Operations

Mediterranean’s (ComFAirMed) responsibilities was positioning and operating the forward logistics site, supported by a

CH-53E helicopter detachment from the Navy helicopter

squadron, HC-4. The site periodically received additional

logistic help from Navy Lockheed C-130 Hercules and Douglas

C-9 Skytrain aircraft. (JO2 William Davis, “HC-4 Continues

Operation Sharp Edge Support,” Signature (Naval Air Station,

Sigonella), 26Oct90, p. 1; HMM-261 ComdC 1 Jul-31Dec90, p.

3; HC-4 ComdHist 1990, encl., p. 3).
Marines to come ashore primarily as a peacekeeping force to stop the fighting and relieve the

suffering. Some factions wanted the Marines to

support President Doe, and others wanted the

Marines to remove President Doe and allow the

NPFL to take over the government.49

On 12 June, Colonel Staley, Thomas J. White,

the embassy’s economics officer, and the four

members of the forward command element went

out to the Saipan. They made the trip to the ship,

located below the horizon off the coast of

Monrovia, in a 21-foot sailboat belonging to the

station chief. The group conferred with Colonel

Amos and his staff on board the Saipan for about

two hours. They conveyed Jett’s thoughts on why

the embassy did not feel a sense of urgency as

expressed in earlier and recent messages. Colonel

Staley, White, and members of the forward command element explained that rather than conduct

an immediate evacuation, as the MEU had anticipated, the Marines needed to wait. The quintessential force, the MEU could hold at Mamba

Station until the situation ashore reached a crisis

point.50 Following the briefings, the forward command element, White, and Colonel Staley, accompanied by three previously selected members of

the radio battalion detachment, headed back to

Monrovia.

Once at the embassy, the radio battalion

detachment, headed by Sergeant Kenneth M.

Sharp, set up their intercept equipment. With an

abundance of unsecured chatter on Motorola-type

handheld radios, the detachment listened to the

radio nets of the various fighting factions in and

around Monrovia.51 The Liberian’s lack of operational security made the collection effort easy.

Most government and rebel forces spoke Liberian

English, although they spoke in dialects when

they wanted a secure conversation. The rebels

incorrectly believed the Americans could not

translate these dialects. During the entire MEU

operation in Liberia, the detachment provided the

Saipan useful daily reports for analysis.52

Frantic Negotiations Fizzle

As the rebels gained ground and moved into

the Monrovia area, Doe’s AFL forces responded to

the increased pressure by engaging in random

shootings, beheadings, mutilations, and other

atrocities. In the Clay-Ashland District of central

Monrovia, an AFL squad executed 14 AmericoLiberians. On 14 June, a group of more than 1,000

Liberians conducted a peace march in Monrovia

and stopped in front of the embassy. The Marine

security guard detachment and extra State

Department security personnel deployed throughout the chancery and compound in defensive and

observation posts. Fortunately, the demonstration

led by church officials did not turn violent. The

embassy, meanwhile, on 16 and 17 June, flew out

210 more American citizens by chartered aircraft.53

With the situation in Monrovia worsening rapidly, respected Liberians frantically made an

attempt at peace negotiations. The Liberian

Council of Churches, encouraged by outside

organizations such as the Organization of African

Unity and the Economic Community of West

African States, organized and chaired the meeting.

Negotiations sponsored by the Interfaith

Mediation Committee of the Liberian Council of

Churches met in Sierra Leone but failed to reach

an agreement. Apparently, Taylor’s delegation

PREPARING FOR OPERATION SHARP EDGE 19

DVIC DN-ST-90-11402

Marines are led to one of Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron 261’s Boeing CH-46E Sea

Knight helicopters on board the USS Saipan (LHA

2) during a rehearsal for Operation Sharp Edge.
believed their forces were about to achieve a military victory and saw no need for further discussion and arrogantly walked out of the talks.

The fighting by 23 June had advanced to the

outskirts of Monrovia. Johnson’s INPFL rebels

attacked Taylor’s NPFL rebels from positions just

13 miles northeast of the capital city in

Bensonville and Careysburg. A large crowd

demonstrated for peace on 26 June, calling for a

ceasefire and demanding the Liberian president

leave the county. About 500 Liberians broke off

from the main body demonstrating downtown,

marched to the gates of the American Embassy,

and chanted for the U.S. to intervene while diplomatic security personnel and the embassy’s

Marine security guards took up defensive positions. But the demonstration remained nonviolent.54 The next day in central Monrovia, AFL soldiers fired on another peace demonstration killing

and wounding many in the crowd near the U.S.

General Services Organization compound. During

the shooting and ensuing panic surrounding the

march, stray rounds penetrated the chancery and

ricocheted off some of the taller buildings in the

compound. One round hit the bulletproof glass in

front of Corporal James Landherr’s standing post

one.55

The following afternoon, the NPFL, many in

bizarre costumes such as carnival masks, wigs,

football helmets, women’s dresses, shower caps,

and even toilet seats, attacked Liberian army positions at Roberts International Airport.* On 28 June

1990, the new American Ambassador, Peter De

Vos, arrived in Monrovia. By this time the Sunday

charter flights had reduced the official embassy

staff to approximately 40 essential personnel.56 As

if to welcome him, the INPFL seized the hydroelectric plant at the Mount Coffee Dam the next

day and cut off electricity to the city.

Early July found Taylor’s rebels firmly in control of most of the Liberian countryside, including

the cites of Buchanan and Gbarnga. The offensive

temporarily halted to replenish supplies. A few

days later, Prince Johnson’s INPFL rebels clashed

again with Taylor’s NPFL fighters outside

Monrovia. Formerly allies, now opposing forces,

both meant to destroy the other and Doe.57

Fighting on 8 July moved to the city’s suburbs

with heavy fighting occurring at the Spriggs-Payne

Airport and the Sinkor area just west of the U.S.

military mission quarters. The city’s population

feared the rebels and the daily random searches,

arson, looting, shooting, executions, and rapes

committed by government soldiers. Rebel

advances resulted in rice and gasoline shortages

and cut off water in the city. Embassy water and

fuel tank trucks ran a daily gauntlet of hostile

checkpoints and the effort became progressively

more difficult as the month continued.58 For safety, the Ambassador moved all official U.S. personnel inside the compound or to the Sam and E

building across the street from the embassy.

The resumption on 5 July of peace talks, now

mediated by the Economic Community of West

African States, offered only a glimmer of hope for

the citizens of Liberia. During talks in Freetown,

Sierra Leone, the NPFL demanded that Doe step

down before the fighting could stop. The talks

broke off the latter part of July due to the lack of

agreement and progress among the warring parties.

Fighting continued among all three factions

throughout the month of July with the army

attacking the NPFL near Paynesville and Camp

Schiefflin. Prince Johnson’s and Charles Taylor’s

fighters fought near Bensonville on 9 July.

Another violent clash between the INPFL and

NPFL near Careysburg and Paynesville took place

as Johnson’s INPFL moved south from the Bong

Mine area toward Monrovia. As a result, the U.S.

Omega station went off the air and the station

operators subsequently abandoned the site. With

Omega off the air, ships and aircraft could no

longer receive navigation fixes from that station.**

Thousands of uprooted and homeless Liberians

swamped the Omega and Voice of America sites

seeking protection. Jett, in a letter to his wife,

stated: “There are displaced people anywhere

they feel safe: 500 came over the wall of the

American Community School: 6000 at the Voice of

America: 2000 at Omega.”59

In Monrovia on 12 July, Taylor’s fighters invaded the Nigerian Embassy. To prevent the massacre

of their citizens, Ghana and Nigeria sent ships to

aid in the evacuation. Guinean soldiers crossed

the Guinea border into Nimba county to evacuate

and protect that country’s citizens. The American

Embassy continued to schedule chartered flights

20 ON MAMBA STATION

* Many fighters wore these items as symbols of good luck or

good “juju.” Skulls of victims often decorated checkpoints or

vehicles to show the fighter’s ruthlessness and to frighten

potential enemies.

** Although the Liberian Omega station was off the air, the

Amphibious Ready Group’s ships and aircraft received accurate Omega fixes from other stations located around the

world.
for Americans wanting to leave. Throughout the

country, foreigners and Liberians fled from the

fighting.

On 14 July, the embassy requested approximately 20 additional Marines from the Marine

Security Guard Battalion.60 The June convoy

escorts, peace marches and groups of refugees at

the embassy had taxed the two-dozen diplomatic

security personnel brought in to assist the regional security officer.61* By mid-July, the increased

violence prompted Larry Hartnett, the regional

security officer, to direct his diplomatic security

personnel to man posts along the perimeter and

conduct night patrols inside the compound. On

the roofs of buildings near Gate One and Gate

Two, diplomatic security personnel set up defensive positions and placed American flags over the

protective cinder blocks.62 Many Liberians and

some Americans mistook the armed diplomatic

security personnel for Marines.63 The request for

additional Marine security guard personnel highlighted the embassy’s need for extra security. The

forward command element had advised De Vos to

bring in a rifle company from off-shore and

objected to the request, but the Ambassador

believed Marine security guard augmentation

under Harnett offered the best solution.**

Marines Poised for Insertion

Marines offshore were placed on two-hour

alert to reinforce the embassy on 20 July after

President Doe accused Colonel Staley, the chief of

the military mission, of directing rebel attacks

against the government. President Doe’s accusation sparked a new wave of anti-American sentiment within the disillusioned, disintegrating army.

Declaring him persona non grata, Doe ordered

Colonel Staley to leave the country.64 Colonel

Staley departed the next day and flew to

Freetown, Sierra Leone, where he provided up-todate information to an awaiting MEU debriefing

team.

Late in the morning on 20 July, Prince

Johnson’s forces crossed the St. Paul River bridges

to Bushrod Island, increasing the pressure on

Monrovia. Traveling in a protected convoy,

Ambassador De Vos visited President Doe the following day. Approximately 25 AFL soldiers

stopped De Vos’ vehicle at gunpoint and threatened the Ambassador. After a heated argument

that almost escalated into gunfire between De

Vos’ security and the AFL, the troops allowed the

vehicle to proceed to the Executive Mansion.65

Two days later, while the MEU rehearsed the Doe

extraction and the reinforcement of the embassy,

President Doe, holed up in his mansion, accused

the United States of again siding with the rebel

factions and saying a U.S. submarine had shelled

the Executive Mansion. The Ambassador denied

PREPARING FOR OPERATION SHARP EDGE 21

DVIC DN-ST-90-11544

A plane director signals to the pilot of a

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II aircraft

taxiing on the flight deck of the USS Saipan (LHA

2) during Operation Sharp Edge rehearsals. The

six-plane Harrier detachment was part of the 22d

Marine Expeditionary Unit’s composite helicopter

squadron.

* Primarily there to provide personal protection service, the

diplomatic security special security team focused its attention

on security for ambassadors and key embassy officials. The

team performed other security missions such as escorting

Americans leaving the country under authorized departure status as well as escorting the water and fuel trucks attempting

to make daily runs in town.

** On 24 July, 20 Marines left Quantico, arriving on board JTF

shipping on 28 July. By the time they arrived, the 22d MEU

could not bring them in by helicopter because of fighting

around the embassy. The augmentation remained on board

ship the entire time the MEU operated ashore. When analyzing what size force was needed to replace the 22d MEU,

European Command staff considered a Marine Security Guard

augmentation option.
the preposterous submarine attack accusation but

Doe had again fueled his soldiers’ anti-American

sentiment.

Prince Johnson’s INPFL took control of

Bushrod Island and brought the war into downtown Monrovia. Crossing over the Mesurado River

bridges from the north on 23 July, INPFL rebels

entered Crown Hill, the central business district

and the capital by-pass areas. Fierce firefights

took place between INPFL and government soldiers as droves of civilians fled Monrovia by ship,

vehicle, and foot. With more than 32,000 displaced and homeless Liberians concentrated in

the city, large groups wandered about looking for

shelter in local churches, schools, international

nongovernmental organization compounds, and

abandoned U.S. Embassy properties.66 In a

humanitarian gesture, the embassy opened

Graystone compound to the frightened and

homeless Liberians, who quickly filled the area.

Highlighting the deteriorating situation, on 24

July gunfire one block from the embassy caused

approximately 30 to 50 people to rush the gates

and scale the outside wall.67 Some of the panicked crowd gained access to the courtyard in

front of the administrative annex. Alerted Marine

security guards moved to defensive positions in

the interior of the chancery.* The crowd desperately “crawled through every conceivable crack

and opening in that embassy wall and were inside

within seconds because the embassy simply was

not ready to defend itself,” Major Sachtleben

recalled.68 A diplomatic security guard fired five

shots into the air to disperse the crowd and to

control the situation inside the compound.69 The

incident ended without bloodshed with diplomatic and contract security guards finally rounding up

the intruders.

While rebel forces infiltrated further into the

city, government soldiers looted the central business district supermarkets and the U.S.

Information Service building. Roving bands of

government soldiers entered an International Red

Cross-protected compound and the John F.

Kennedy Hospital. They captured, beat, and

killed those of Gio and Mano tribal backgrounds

who did not escape.** President Doe further

inflamed the situation with more absurd assertions, accusing the United States of sending black

Marines to assist the rebel forces. These false

assertions fueled yet another wave of antiAmerican sentiment in the AFL, who thought the

U.S. favored the rebels. With no celebrating, the

AFL spent Liberian Independence Day, 26 July,

conducting house-to-house searches for rebels

and rebel sympathizers, and black “Marines.” A

Ghanaian ship from Freetown, Sierra Leone,

arrived to evacuate 1,500 of its citizens.

Thousands more refugees now crowded into various abandoned American properties in an effort

to escape the AFL.

Fighting between the AFL and the INPFL intensified on 27 July as the INPFL moved deeper into

downtown Monrovia from its base on Bushrod

Island. The fighting included exchanges of rocket

barrages as well as small arms fire. On the other

side of town, AFL soldiers efficiently looted the

Peace Corps compound, bringing in trucks to take

the property away.70 Government soldiers at the

Barclay Training Center conducted beachfront

executions of opponents, dumping many bodies

into the ocean.*** The Agence France Presse

reported rebel forces within sight of the presidential palace on 29 July.71 Just five blocks from the

U.S. Agency for International Development headquarters in Monrovia, government soldiers burst

into St. Peter’s Lutheran Church on 29 July and

reportedly killed 200 and wounded 70 or 80 other

civilians who sought shelter.72  In one of the

worst atrocities of the war, AFL soldiers fired into

a crowd until they ran out of ammunition; the

troops then killed the survivors with machetes.73

22 ON MAMBA STATION

**  Government soldiers rounded up some 250 medical students and executed them at the end of Spriggs-Payne Airport

runway. Visiting U.S. Coast Guardsmen and British and

Nigerian reporters viewed their skeletal remains in February

1991.

*** Many Marine helicopter crews routinely reported seeing

bodies floating offshore in August.

**** United Nations officials in October 1990 confirmed the

number killed. Returning U.N. officials investigated the massacre and directed the interment of approximately 600 bodies

in the church.

* The Marine security guard detachment responded to 16 separate internal defense alerts and five emergency recalls for

demonstrations between 25 May and 2 October 1990.

Roving bands of government soldiers

entered an International Red Crossprotected compound and the John F.

Kennedy Hospital. They captured, beat,

and killed those of Gio and Mano tribal

backgrounds who did not escape.
In desperation, a large group fleeing from the

killings broke through the perimeter fence of the

U.S. Agency for International Development compound looking for safety. The embassy could not

confirm the exact numbers killed because of the

heavy fighting taking place in the city.

The U.S. controlled Graystone compound now

housed more than 5,000 refugees. Because of the

geography of the city, the compound received a

great deal of overhead small arms fire. The street

fighting intensified with all three factions

exchanging automatic weapons fire and rocketpropelled grenade barrages. Corpses littered the

streets. INPFL fighters maneuvered by foot and

vehicles down United Nations Drive directly in

front of the embassy late in the morning on 30

July.74 A short time later, the sound of heavy

machine guns and small arms fire echoed in the

compound and numerous stray rounds passed

overhead. Elements of the Liberian army engaged

INPFL forces just below the Marine House down

the street from the embassy and killed approximately a dozen men. This type of sporadic but

vicious fighting continued intermittently throughout the city during the latter part of July.75

By 2 August, the city was indeed a battleground, with violent clashes frequently occurring

between the two rebel groups near the American

Embassy. On the afternoon of 3 August, De Vos

directed all mission personnel temporarily to the

chancery’s ground floor after several artillery

rounds landed near the embassy.76 Corporal

Phillip L. McClaine, a member of the Marine security guard detachment, recalled the rounds

impacting just south of the compound near the

British Embassy.77 The intensity of the fighting

halted all flights out of the city’s Spriggs-Payne

Airport and many of the AFL units broke apart as

the rebels advanced.

The INPLF leader, Prince Johnson, held an

interview with the press on 4 August at his field

headquarters on Bushrod Island, boasting of his

intention to force a U.S. intervention by taking

American or British citizens hostage. Located in

INPFL controlled territory, the Americans at the

American Telecommunications Office receiver site

would make excellent potential hostages. Johnson

emphatically stated he wanted to “create an international incident so that foreign troops can intervene.”78 Reinforcing his ruthlessness, a burst from

his AK-47 assault rifle resulted in the summary

execution of a Liberian International Red Cross

worker handcuffed to a French relief worker.

Described as an “alcoholic psychopath,” Prince

Johnson appeared that day to live up to the

description.79

Embassy officials had no choice but to react to

Johnson’s publicized threats against American citizens. At 1400 on 4 August, Ambassador De Vos

called Lieutenant Colonel Labadie and Major

Sachtleben into his office to discuss an evacuation

of the embassy. The ambassador proposed three

courses of action: one diplomatic and two military. After discussions with the country team and

appropriate officials, the State Department decided not to negotiate directly with Johnson. Instead,

they looked to two military options—evacuating

and closing down the embassy or drawing down

the staff while simultaneously reinforcing security.80

The Call to Evacuate

Lieutenant Colonel Labadie notified Colonel

Amos at 1820 that Ambassador De Vos had recommended through State Department channels

that Marines would assist in an evacuation of

American citizens from Monrovia.81 Colonel Amos

then alerted BLT 2/4 of the imminent possibility

of an evacuation. All subordinate units of the

MEU began preparations, in particular the company commanders of Companies H and E. At

approximately 2035, the Ambassador used a forward command element radio to personally call

Colonel Amos to notify him of the necessity of an

evacuation.82* De Vos specifically informed the

MEU commander and the JTF commander that the

State Department had approved a draw down and

reinforcement of the embassy beginning the

morning of 5 August. De Vos and Colonel Amos

decided that landing hour would be at 0900.83

After the Ambassador’s call, the MEU commander ordered his staff to prepare for a total

evacuation option plus a draw down and reinforcement option.** Approval came for the second

option that involved the evacuation and closing of

PREPARING FOR OPERATION SHARP EDGE 23

* According to LtCol Emerson N. Gardner, Jr., the Ambassador

called directly to the ship using the forward command element satellite communications only two times. The first

occurred the day before, when he talked with the MEU’s

executive officer, LtCol Labadie. LtCol Emerson N. Gardner

intvw, 24Oct90 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.). 22d

MEU Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC) Watch Log,

5Jun-21Aug90, 3Aug90 (Sharp Edge HistColl, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.).

** With President George H. Bush’s approval, the national

command authority directed the geographic combatant commander, U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, to implement his

execute order.
the American Telecommunications Office receiver

and transmitter sites, the draw down of the

embassy staff, the insertion of a reinforced rifle

company into the embassy, and the provisioning

of logistic support to the embassy. At 2100, the

MEU and ARG staffs convened a crisis action team

meeting to review and refine the existing plans.

The meeting on board the Saipan went into the

early morning hours.

As the crisis action team met, the commanding

officer of BLT 2/4, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L.

Pugh, tasked his company commanders to prepare for the two branch plans of the approved

reinforcement and draw down option. Later that

night, the Marines adjusted their orders when the

embassy decided not to use the American

Cooperative School as an evacuation site.

Embassy officials eliminated the site because they

were unsure if any significant numbers would

show up due to the short notice. Catching up with

MEU actions at 0043 the next morning, European

Command issued the execute order. The landing

force operations center finally received the message at 0223.84 The Navy and Marine staffs

adjourned at 0300 on 5 August and agreed to

meet again at 0500 for a final confirmation brief.

The final plan called for securing each evacuation site with a reinforced platoon and the establishment of a hasty defense. Led by its company

commander, Captain Gary R. Oles, the force for

the receiver site consisted mainly of the 3d

Platoon, Company E. Company E’s 2d Platoon

would secure the transmitter site. Each rifle platoon received reinforcements, including a

machine gun squad, two shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon teams, and a firepower

control team from the MEU’s air naval gunfire liaison company detachment.* Each 45-man platoon

included a small command element. In addition to

the transport helicopters supporting the company

at both sites, the plan called for an escort consisting of two Bell AH-1T Cobra attack helicopters.

The attack helicopters would remain over the

24 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-90-10898

Alerted by Col Granville R. Amos, 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit’s commander, of the imminent possibility of an evacuation, Marines of Battalion Landing Team 2/4 gather on the hanger deck of the USS

Saipan (LHA 2) to draw ammunition and load their magazines.

* The 83mm man-portable, shoulder-launched multipurpose

assault weapon is used to destroy bunkers or other fortifications. With the dual mode rocket model, it also can destroy

armored vehicles.
ocean in a ready and on-call status. Oles anticipated 18 evacuees at the receiver site and three

evacuees at the transmitter site.85

The MEU’s composite squadron, commanded

by Lieutenant Colonel Emerson N. Gardner, Jr.,

would take Company E Marines to the receiver

site. The plan required three Boeing CH-46E Sea

Knight helicopters filled with Marines and two

empty CH-46Es to provide transportation for the

evacuees. The Marines would disembark first and

about two minutes later two empty helicopters

would land and embark the evacuees, if ready. A

third helicopter of Marines would land if required.

Until called for, all helicopters not used in the initial landing were to remain a few miles away over

the water. Surrounded by an encampment of

approximately 5,000 to 6,000 displaced Liberians,

the Marines and Americans at the site believed it

was important to evacuate quickly. No one knew

how the refugees, or the INPFL in the area, would

respond to the helicopters or the presence of

Marines. Fortunately, the excellent communications with the potential evacuees at the receiver

site allowed the Marines to pass on their requirements to expedite the evacuation.

A similar plan for the transmitter site involved

three transport helicopters; two loaded with

Marines and one empty for evacuees. Two Cobra

attack helicopters would escort the transport helicopters and remain over the water within sight

of the Marines in the landing zone. In the first

wave, two helicopters, a Boeing CH-46E Sea

Knight and Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion loaded

with Marines, would land, unload passengers, and

then take off immediately. Establishing hasty

security, the Marines would concurrently conduct

a quick screening of the evacuees. If the evacuees

were ready, the Marines would quickly call in the

third empty helicopter, a CH-46, to pick up the

evacuees. Again the plan called for all helicopters

not used in the initial landings to remain over the

water until called. Although the company executive officer, First Lieutenant Richard E. “Ted”

Anders, did not have direct communications with

PREPARING FOR OPERATION SHARP EDGE 25

DVIC DN-ST-90-11339

Standing by on the USS Saipan (LHA 2), Marines make final adjustments prior to boarding Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 helicopters for the short flight to Monrovia where they would augment

security and assist in the evacuation of American and foreign nationals.
the site, the Marines had more time to accomplish

the task since there were no nearby refugees and

only three evacuees at the site.

As the outlying evacuations occurred, two CH53 helicopters would fly to the embassy to deliver Company H Marines, who would provide security and assist in the draw down. Two Bell UH-1N

Huey helicopters would provide escort.

Lieutenant Colonel Pugh intended to establish all

positions within the compound since the MEU did

not have authority to move outside the embassy.86

Colonel Amos wanted the insertions to take place

simultaneously so the fighting factions would not

have time to react.

Because of limited launch space on board the

Saipan, the CH-53s were to lift off first and orbit

above the ship as other helicopter waves formed.

The Sea Stallion helicopters held more fuel and

could remain airborne longer than the CH-46s.

With the CH-53s off, the flight deck crews

planned to launch the CH-46 helicopters, along

with the four escort gunships. Upon clearing the

Saipan of all helicopter assault waves, the launch

plan called for the spotting of fully-armed AV-8B

Harrier jets on the flight deck that could be airborne at a moment’s notice. The Saipan’s helicopter direction center staff and squadron staff

plan reflected detailed planning and critical timing

since it entailed the launching of 22 helicopters

from two ships.87

At 0500 on 5 August 1990, MEU officers attended a confirmation brief held in the wardroom. By

0600, the companies had staged in the hangar bay

of the Saipan, ready to draw ammunition and

load onto the helicopters. Once the confirmation 

brief ended, the bands on the ammunition crates

were cut and the company gunnery sergeants

supervised the issue of ammunition to their

Marines. At 0730, the helicopter launch cycle

began and the Marines loaded on to the CH-53s

in 15 minutes. The heavy lift helicopters carried

Company H Marines slated for the embassy and

some of the Company E Marines for the transmitter site evacuation. Loaded and ready at 0800, the

CH-53 helicopters launched from the deck of the

Saipan.88

26 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-90-10896

Marines board a CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter on the flight deck of the USS Saipan (LHA 2). Two AH-1W

Bell Cobra attack helicopters and fully armed AV-8B Harrier jets were on stand-by should the Marines

encounter resistance.
A Rainy D-Day

Although the weathermen on board the USS

Saipan had predicted clear skies for 5 August,

Mother Nature had other ideas and greeted the

pilots of HMM-261 with a rainy, cloudy day.

Lieutenant Colonel Emerson N. Gardner, Jr.,

squadron commander of the “Raging Bulls” of

HMM-261, planned to have the helicopters rendezvous in the appropriate groupings for the

scheduled landings as soon as all the aircraft lifted off the ship, but the low ceiling and rain prevented the squadron helicopters from flying

through the clouds in specific groups. Instead,

Gardner directed the helicopters to take radar

vectors through the storm system and meet up in

landing groups on the other side. As Gardner

recalled: “We did that, and it worked out real

well.”89

During the flight through the clouds, the helicopter direction center vectored the helicopters to

prevent mid-air collisions and then helped sort

out the helicopters once they arrived on the other

side of the rain clouds. Once in the clear, the helicopters grouped together according to landing

sites. The direction center’s effort to keep the two

Chapter 3

Evacuation Operations

Photo courtesy of BGen Granville R. Amos

At Landing Zone Magic, Marines of Company H quickly exit a Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion and fan out

to cover Gate One and Gate Two and establish several blocking positions just outside the American

Embassy compound.
CH-53s together caused some initial confusion,

but that was quickly sorted out and the helicopters and Marines they carried sped on their way

toward the Liberian coast. The passage through

the storm caused a six-minute delay, which did

not prove to be critical.90

Led by Lieutenant Colonel Gardner, the helicopter group of five CH-46s and two AH-1Ts

arrived by 0906 at the American

Telecommunications Office receiver site north of

Monrovia.91 Three of the CH-46s carried Company

E Marines to provide site security for the evacuation while the two empty CH-46s carried 18 sets

of life vests and protective helmets for the evacuees. The Marines got their first glimpse of the

site, a huge cleared area covering about two

square miles, as the helicopters carefully navigated the approach around support cables and other

antenna field hazards. The extensive receiver site

encompassed three different landing zones.

Within the site, a small perimeter fence enclosed

a cluster of cement communications and support

buildings. Outside the fence line surrounding the

site were thousands of refugees living in a large

makeshift shantytown of plastic sheeting and

palm frond lean-twos.92 The designated landing

zone, named Dove, was located inside the communications site fence line and stood out like an

28 ON MAMBA STATION
island among the sea of refugees. The landing

zone provided enough room for two helicopters

to land in front of the two-story main building.

Two helicopters landed and Marines quickly

unloaded and secured the interior perimeter

fence. The helicopters took off again as soon as

the last Marine was out. Hundreds of refugees

pressed up to the perimeter fence line to see what

all the activity was about. Some Liberians attempted to climb the fence and were warned: “Stay

back! We are U.S. Marines!”93 While the two

empty CH-46s landed, the fifth loaded helicopter

remained airborne with the Cobras to kept watch

on the situation on the ground. Jack Quin, part of

the embassy’s communications support unit at the

receiver site, already had divided his personnel

into two nine-man groups, or “sticks,” for loading

onto helicopters. The Marine company commander, Captain Gary R. Oles, and Quin quickly verified the identities of every civilian on the evacuation list while the evacuation control team, headed by Staff Sergeant Effard T. Henson, searched

and screened the evacuees for weapons using

hand held metal detectors. The evacuees, their

equipment, and four escorting Marines lifted off

in two helicopters at 0913. With their task completed, the Marines pulled back and boarded the

helicopters at 0919.94 As the last helicopter left the

zone, Captain Oles observed two men with shotguns running toward the gate of the compound.

Fortunately, no shots were fired and the Marines

departed without incident.95 The rapid evacuation

of the American Telecommunications Office

receiver site completed one task of the MEU’s

mission.

Seven minutes after the receiver site evacuation, the evacuation of the American

Telecommunications Office transmitter site southeast of Monrovia began. As the helicopter-borne

force approached Landing Zone Condor,

Company E Marines observed about 20 armed

men within 400 meters of the landing zone along

the main road to the south. A few of the men

began moving toward the transmitter site along an

entrance road. Once on the ground, the Marines

fanned out and established a hasty perimeter.

EVACUATION OPERATIONS 29

Photo courtesy of BGen Granville R. Amos

A Marine rifle squad positioned atop the American Embassy’s Gate Two overlooking United Nations Drive,

the main thoroughfare running the full length of the Embassy compound.
Second Lieutenant Michael S. Bodkins’ platoon

spotted seven NPFL rebels moving along the

entrance road leading into the site. The site’s

unarmed local security guard and two Marines

waved and yelled at the approaching rebels,

ordering them to stop and turn around. The

rebels complied and made no further attempt to

interfere with the evacuation operation. (The

Marines later learned a radio intercept had overheard the rebels being told to “blast” any U.S. helicopters.) While a Cobra gunship orbited nearby,

the evacuation control team identified the three

evacuees by their passports, scanned them with

metal detector wands, and embarked them on the

waiting CH-53. About 11 minutes after landing,

the 2d Platoon collapsed the landing zone security and extracted at 0936.

The evacuees from the receiver site arrived at

0935 on the Saipan. Minutes later, the ship

received radio confirmation of the evacuation of

the transmitter site. By 0950, all evacuees and

Marines from both sites were on board. With their

mission complete, the Marines of Company E

stood down and turned in their ammunition.96

Into the Embassy

While evacuations were underway at the

telecommunications sites, the MEU began its main

effort at the American Embassy in Monrovia with

Marines from Company H, BLT 2/4, setting down

at Landing Zone Magic at 0910 to reinforce the

security and draw down the embassy staff.97 The

first wave involved two CH-53 with each succeeding wave consisting of two CH-46 aircraft.

When the first wave landed, Lieutenant

Commander Robert Peterman of the forward command element notified the 3d Platoon commander, First Lieutenant Gary S. Johnston, about a

potential threat outside Gate Three. Johnston

ordered one squad to immediately cover Gates

One and Two, while he and another squad followed Peterman through Gate Three to establish

a blocking position near the corner of United

Nations Drive and Sekou Toure Avenue. The

sounds of sporadic gunfire echoed in the compound as they moved out. Captain Daniel S.

Rogers, commanding officer of Company H, met

Major Glen Sachtleben in the landing zone.

Rogers received a quick update on the possible

threat outside Gate Three. He immediately

responded by ordering First Sergeant Luther T.

Rymer to inform incoming platoons of the situation upon their arrival in the landing zone.98

While establishing security, Marines climbing a

ladder to a defensive position on the building at

Gate One spotted a cluster of INPLF fighters coming down the road about 50 meters to the north.

Someone quickly parked a nearby armored

Suburban sideways and the fire team took up

positions behind it. A newly arrived squad from

3d Platoon swiftly moved outside Gate One and

turned north toward the threat on United Nations

Drive. Captain Rogers, his radio operator, and

Major Sachtleben followed the squad. The rebels

paused when Major Sachtleben warned them by

bullhorn to turn around. The Marine squad began

to leapfrog toward the fighters with fire teams

moving from one covered position to the next. A

French journalist that had been walking with the

INPFL group joined the Marines as they tactically

moved up the street. The rebels, observing the

advancing Marines, backed away slowly up

United Nations Drive and moved into a house at

the junction of Benson Street, a main thoroughfare. Major Sachtleben then gave another bullhorn

warning, telling the INPFL troops to leave the

building; a few obeyed. To eliminate the threat

the fighters posed to the Marines, the squad

leader, Sergeant Todd Alverson, ordered his men

to clear the building. Fire teams lead by Corporal

Dennis Tuzinoski and Corporal Sean Collins

methodically cleared each room, forcing the

remaining fighters to escape out the rear of the

building. With the house clear, the squad moved

east down Benson Street and set up positions

covering the road. The squad’s position looked

straight down Benson Street, the left flank

anchored at the Masonic Temple grounds and the

right anchored by a deep ditch next to the wall of

the Graystone compound.99

By this time, 2d Platoon had arrived and

relieved the 3d Platoon squad at the corner of

Sekou Toure Avenue and United Nations Drive

and Gate Three.100* The 3d Platoon squad then

moved up United Nations Drive to establish a

third blocking position just north of the United

Nations Drive and Benson Street intersection. This

northern-most blocking position had its right

flank anchored on the rock quarry and the left

flank extended up the slope of Mamba Point

Lighthouse Hill, giving the squad a clear view to

30 ON MAMBA STATION

* Sekou Toure Avenue was named after the despotic ruler of

Guinea who led the fight for independence from France in

1956 and ruled the country from independence to 1984. He

claimed to be a descendent of the legendary Malinke chief,

Samori Toure, a Guinean guerrilla leader who fought the

French in the 19th century.
monitor the movement of vehicles approaching

from the north.

In the embassy compound, 1st Platoon set up

as the company’s reserve, manning observation

posts on the west side of the embassy at Gates

Four and Five. The platoon established a temporary blocking position outside the northwest corner of the compound to cover a secondary landing zone near the quarry north of the embassy.

Weapons Platoon set up 60mm mortar positions

in an open area just south of the embassy’s

Landing Zone Magic. Roving patrols initiated by

1st Platoon covered the interior of the compound

and 2d Platoon occupied defensive positions at

Gate Three. The Marines established observation

posts in the compound and across the street in

the Wellington apartment building and the Sam

and E building. The observation posts outside the

embassy gave them better visibility and provided

an early warning position if any armed personnel

approached the embassy.*

The small size of the makeshift landing zone

meant helicopters could only come in one at a

time. By 1100, 237 Marines equipped with fast

attack vehicles occupied defensive positions.

Each of the six fast attack vehicles (modified and

reinforced jeeps) had a .50-caliber machine gun

or 40mm Mark 19 grenade launcher mounted to

them. The Marines positioned one vehicle at each

of the northern blocking positions and two more

vehicles at the southern blocking position.

Constituting the reserve, the remaining two vehicles were directly behind Gate Two. The Marines

then strung concertina wire across the road at all

three blocking positions. Heavy machine guns,

medium machine guns, antitank weapons, and a

rifle squad at each roadblock protected the critical approaches to the embassy.101

Marines from Company H established three

blocking positions outside the embassy, while

inside the compound they began the hasty evacuation of waiting noncombatants. The infantrymen, working with the embassy staff, evacuated

38 employees by helicopter at 1045.102

Company H Marines moved to man gate security positions and observation posts, and a reaction force was positioned in the compound. The

unit manned additional observation posts across

EVACUATION OPERATIONS 31

* According to the monthly status report from the regional

security officer, Department of State diplomatic security personnel began manning the observation posts in the apartment

buildings outside the embassy on 6 August. (AmEmbassy

Monrovia msg to SecState WashDC, 171109ZSep90)
the street in the Sam and E apartments near Gate

One and at the Wellington apartments near Gate

Three. Upon learning that his Marines manned

blocking positions outside the embassy, the BLT

commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Pugh,

provided reinforcements ashore with the 81mm

Mortar Platoon from Weapons Company and the

Light Armor Infantry Platoon, constituting an additional reserve.*

The MEU received word later that afternoon it

did not have authority to put blocking positions

outside the embassy. European Command directed the Marines located at the roadblocks to pull

back into the embassy and remain on Americancontrolled property.103 Concerned about exposure

and another Beirut-type bombing, Vice Admiral

James D. Williams and Colonel Granville Amos

came ashore to assess the situation. They walked

the ground and supported the employment of

blocking positions. 

By 1730, the MEU had ordered Company H

back into the compound.104 Abandoning the

blocking positions, the Marines assumed security

positions within the embassy grounds that afforded less observation, narrower fields of fire, and

less reaction time. A couple of nearby buildings

dominating the embassy and the Graystone compound caused serious concern for the company

commander. Small arms or rocket-propelled

grenade fire could easily be directed at the

embassy from the buildings near the compound.105

But evacuations continued in earnest, and by

1535 the control center evacuated 14 more

employees.106 By the end of the day, the 22d MEU

had accomplished two goals: the evacuation of 74

noncombatants and the establishment of defensive positions at the embassy.** President George

H. Bush’s press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater,

explained the Marines’ actions at a morning press

conference: “The purpose of this operation is to

32 ON MAMBA STATION

* Capt Daniel S. Rogers and LtCol Robert L. Pugh decided later

that additional reinforcements were not needed and withdrew

these Marines the next day. ** The MEU flew 51 of the evacuees to Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Photo courtesy of BGen Granville R. Amos

Two modified and reinforced jeeps, each mounting a .50-caliber machine gun, were used by the Marines

to buttress the blocking positions protecting vital approaches to the American Embassy.
safeguard lives, to draw down the number of

Americans at the embassy staff and to provide

security for those who remain....The Marines’

presence does not indicate or constitute any

intention on the part of the U.S. Government to

intervene militarily in the Liberian conflict. We call

on all parties in that conflict to ensure the safety

of American citizens.”107

In the days that followed, the MEU continued

to provide security and evacuate Americans and

foreign nationals and worked on defensive positions within the compound. They also strung telephone lines to ensure redundancy in communications. The company used Motorola or MX-300

hand-held radios, tactical radios, and field telephones to link each position with the company,

BLT, and MEU headquarters.

On 7 August, quick action by Company H prevented a potential firefight in front of the

embassy. An AFL patrol of 30 to 60 men appeared

in camouflage uniforms and helmets and armed

with assault rifles and a few machine guns and

started slowly advancing north up United Nations

Drive toward the embassy. The Marines warned

the AFL troops not to continue and advised them

to turn around. Readying their weapons and CS

riot control agents (tear gas), the Americans

repeated they allowed no armed foot traffic in

front of the embassy. The Liberian soldiers paused

and passed the warning to their commander, a

Major Tilley, who could be distinguished by a

“Rambo-like” headband. Clearly, if his men continued up the road they risked a confrontation

with the Marines.108 Using a bullhorn, the Marines

told the fighters they would employ tear gas if the

soldiers continued. To his credit, Major Tilley

ordered his soldiers to turn around. Less than a

minute later on the same United Nations Drive, a

small INPFL patrol appeared north of the embassy

and started moving south. Immediately after the

EVACUATION OPERATIONS 33

Photo courtesy of BGen Granville R. Amos

Col Granville R. Amos (foreground), the Marine expeditionary unit commander, and LtCol Thomas W.

Parker, his operations officer, walked the ground visiting each security position inside and outside of the

American Embassy compound. Col Amos came away supporting the initial tactical decision establishing

blocking positions outside the embassy.
Liberian soldiers had disappeared, the Marines

warned the INPFL patrol to turn around. As with

the first group, the INPFL patrol left.

Concerned about this incident, the Ambassador

conferred with the MEU staff. He made it clear he

did not want the Marines to threaten or use tear

gas. The published rules of engagement did allow

for the escalation of force, except under certain

circumstances.* Although the embassy had a copy

of European Command’s rules of engagement, the

Ambassador’s initial interpretation was more

restrictive. The Marines felt bullhorn warnings

were effective only when accompanied with

directly threatening action. First Lieutenant James

D. Chaney, 2d Platoon commander, was frustrated that riot control agents, while authorized by

European Command, were “no longer a viable

option.”109 To the Marines on post it seemed the

MEU’s nonlethal option consisted only of verbal

warnings. The initial word passed to Company H

was clarified in a subsequent meeting between

the Ambassador and ground commanders, which

resolved the misunderstanding.110 Daily meetings

between Captain Rogers, the BLT executive officer, the Ambassador, and security officer were

held to review the posture and make necessary

adjustments.

To prevent similar incidents from happening,

the Marines posted signs outside the embassy and

distributed written standardized verbal warnings.

The MEU’s nonlethal inventory consisted of a set

of proportional, escalating force; first verbal warnings, then CS gas, and finally warning shots.

Ambassador De Vos agreed to allow the use of CS

gas or smoke grenades if the new verbal warnings

did not work. While fighters from both factions

continued to travel by foot on United Nations

Drive, the embassy also directed the Marines to

allow vehicles to use the road if they showed no

hostile intent and did not stop. If the vehicle did

stop, the Marines told the vehicle occupants to

move on. The Ambassador accepted the risk of a

firefight directly outside the embassy by allowing

the factions to use the road next to the embassy.

34 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of BGen Granville R. Amos

Marines and American Embassy personnel ready a group of noncombatants for evacuation. From the

assembly point near the embassy they would be taken to the landing zone and loaded onto a helicopter

for the flight to Freeport, Sierra Leone.

* BLT 2/4 handed out copies of the rules of engagement to its

Marines. The handout stated: “In the event that the host nation

is unable or unwilling to provide the necessary protection to

U.S. forces, the military on-scene commander will employ the

following to overcome the threat: 1. Warning to demonstrators. 2. Show of force, including the use of riot control formations. 3. Use of riot control agents. 4. Warning shots fired

over the heads of hostile elements. 5. Other reasonable use of

force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to

the threat.” (BLT 2/4 ROE, Aug90 [Sharp Edge HistColl,

MCHC])
That evening, Marines watched the trajectories

of 122mm rockets launched from the Capitol Hill

area and heard the impacts in the Crown Hill,

Vaitown, and West Point sectors. The AFL attempted to stop the advance of Johnson’s fighters in the

center of the city. Prince Johnson seized a number of foreign hostages, including an American,

24 hours after the initial Marine helicopter landings. He released 28 foreign hostages by 8 August,

unharmed, due to pressure from the U.S. and

other embassies and after receiving information

about a soon to be deployed peacekeeping

force.111

West African Peacekeepers Arrive

One day after the Marines came ashore, the

Economic Community of West African States met

to establish the peacekeeping force. At the summit in Banjul, Gambia, the Economic Community

of West African States standing mediation committee held its first ever session and called on all

parties in Liberia to observe an immediate ceasefire.* The committee also established an Economic

Community of West African States Ceasefire

Monitoring Group to deploy to Liberia.**

Observers from the Organization of African Unity

approved the establishment of a multinational

EVACUATION OPERATIONS 35

Photo: DVIC DN-ST-91-00814

Two Marines man a security post on the roof of the American Embassy. The Marine on the right is armed

with an M16 rifle, while the other Marine is leaning on an M136 AT4 light anti-armor weapon covered

with a poncho.

* The standing mediation committee’s purpose in case of a

dispute or conflict by member states included initiating mediation procedures. Conflicts occurring within states when

action was sustained or supported from the outside allowed

for the provision of a collective defense to be invoked according to Articles 17 and 18 of the Economic Community of West

African States security protocol. The Liberian situation prompted the establishment of the committee.

** The decision to send the peacekeeping force was made by

the members of the standing mediation committee, not the full

membership of the Economic Community of West African

States. Objections by the Bukinaban head of state noted the

committee had no “competence to interfere in member states

internal conflicts, but only in conflict breaking out between

member states,” (Weller, Regional Peacekeeping, doc. no. 59,

p. 89.) Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo made up the

committee’s members. Nigeria led the effort to send the

peacekeeping force. The decision played on the existing rivalries between African English speaking and French speaking

countries in the region.
West African force, knowing it signified the first

real attempt of a regional organization to assume

a peacekeeping role. The two-day summit’s final

communiqué embodied a strong humanitarian

rationale.112 It called for a ceasefire, surrendering

of all arms and ammunition, the secession of arms

imports, release of all prisoners and cooperation

with the monitoring group.113 President Bush’s

announcement on the same day that the United

States would send troops to Saudi Arabia to halt

Iraqi aggression in Kuwait overshadowed the historic 7 August decision. The West African coalition

consisted of 2,500 troops from Gambia, Ghana,

Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The commander stated

military force would not be used to contain the

situation in Monrovia.114

Meanwhile, in Monrovia, the Marines observed

122mm rockets impacting indiscriminately in the

Mamba Point and Bushrod Island areas nightly.

Foreign embassies urgently requested American

assistance to evacuate their citizens and officials

due to the escalating level of chaos. On 8 and 9

August, the Marines evacuated the British and

French ambassadors and other foreign diplomatic

personnel. By the end of the day on 11 August,

199 persons had been evacuated and flown first

to the Saipan and then on to Lungi Airport at

Freetown.

A large part of the MEU’s mission included providing parts and supplies needed for the embassy.

To that end, KC-130 detachment flights delivered

critical parts and supplies to Freetown. Helicopter

sorties from the MEU then picked up the supplies

and shuttled them from Freetown to the ship and

then to Monrovia. The economic counselor officer, Thomas J. White, acknowledged the importance of the supply runs, commenting, “we were

getting real low and might have run out of everything.”115 All outside commercial flights had

ceased, which left the embassy entirely dependent on the MEU. According to the commanding

officer of MEU Service Support Group 22 (MSSG36 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-00810

Marines unload boxes of medical supplies and foodstuffs. With the cancellation of all outside commercial aircraft flights, the American Embassy was entirely dependent on 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit for

resupply. 
22), Lieutenant Colonel James W. Head: “Colonel

Amos wanted to get the embassy to a level of selfsufficiency. Food, fuel, and water were the three

big areas they needed support.”116 For more than

a week, Marine working parties labored in the

heat and humidity to unload 30 pallets of food

and medical supplies.117 The MEU Marines

amassed more than 30 days of supplies at the

embassy.

Lieutenant Colonel Head’s Marines spent much

of their time providing fuel for the embassy.

When the embassy’s underground fuel tanks

dropped to a dangerously low level, the Marines

kept the generators running by flying CH-53s in a

round robin pick up and fuel delivery service

using the 500-gallon bladders of helicopter expeditionary refueling systems. Marines of the MSSG

delivered and pumped more than 35,000 gallons

of fuel while in Liberia.

The MEU also flew in a reverse osmosis water

purification unit to draw water from the nearby

ocean. It could produce 600 gallons of potable

water per minute from a raw water source.

However, the cliffs below the embassy and the

rough surf prevented MSSG-22 engineers from

getting the unit to function despite repeated

attempts. The MEU solved the problem by flying

a 400-gallon water trailer (commonly called a

water buffalo or water bull) in daily to support the

embassy. The MEU also consolidated all fivegallon water cans onto pallets and flew them in

when needed.

The three factions continued to clash throughout the city while Marines provided security and

support for the embassy.* Marines heard the disjointed sounds of automatic weapons in Mamba

Point, the whomp of mortars, and rocket explosions from the battle raging near the Executive

EVACUATION OPERATIONS 37

Photo courtesy of the authors

Marines of Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 22 supervise the pumping of diesel fuel from

500-gallon bladders into a truck for distribution. More than 35,000 gallons of fuel was delivered by helicopter to the American Embassy compound during Operation Sharp Edge.

* No major ground firefights took place at night. Many

Liberian fighters believed in “juju,” and that harmful events

could happen to them if they fought at night. Juju is magic

attributed to or associated with jujus, which are fetishes,

charms, or amulets of West African peoples.
Mansion and Spriggs-Payne Airport. Marine observation posts also sighted black smoke from burning buildings and explosions. Charles Taylor’s

NPFL fighters sacked many of the embassies,

including those of Guinea and Nigeria. The

Marines also received reports the NPFL fired on

and scattered the occupants of the German and

Swedish Embassies. The NPFL took charge of a

large number of these European diplomatic personnel, essentially holding them hostage. On 11

August, Taylor announced he would grant safe

passage out of Monrovia to the European diplomats. He then took them over land to Buchanan,

stopping along the way at the refugee filled, nonfunctioning Omega site.

Evacuation from Buchanan

Responding to Taylor’s movement of foreign

diplomatic staff to Buchanan, European

Command issued an execute order to the JTF to

conduct an evacuation from Buchanan.118 On 12

August, the Saipan and USS Peterson traveled

down the coast of Liberia to Buchanan. On board,

the MEU staff developed a plan for the evacuation

that called for both a boat and a helicopter

option. The plan, as approved in the confirmation

brief, called for Lieutenant Commander Peterman

and a Navy SEAL security force to come ashore by

landing craft. Once in the port of Buchanan,

Peterman’s mission included establishing contact

with the NPFL and finding a landing zone for the

evacuation. Aerial photography revealed a number of potential landing zones, but intelligence

reports deemed these unacceptable due to possible mining.119 Once a landing zone had been

identified, a helicopter would fly in with the commander of noncombatant evacuation operations,

Lieutenant Warren T. Parker, and a team of

Marines. The evacuation would begin upon

agreement with the NPFL.

At 0630 on 13 August, with the blazing sun

already dominating the eastern morning sky,

Commodore Stanley D. Gastar, the Amphibious

Ready Group (ARG) commander, made radio contact with the NPFL in Buchanan. In calm seas,

38 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of BGen Granville R. Amos

LtCol Thomas W. Parker (left center), 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit operations officer, meets with one

of rebel leader Charles Taylor’s officers at the port of Buchanan, south of Monrovia, to facilitate the evacuation of foreign diplomatic staff.
Lieutenant Commander Peterman and the accompanying SEALs departed from the Saipan on

board a LCM-8 landing craft (know to Marines as

a Mike boat) and moved toward Buchanan’s general cargo quay. Docking at 0825, Peterman met

with members of the NPFL.120 After confirming a

suitable landing zone, Peterman called in the helicopter carrying Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W.

Parker, the 22d MEU’s operations officer. The

embassy’s consular officer and two other State

Department representatives accompanied the

Marines to assist in the sensitive negotiations. The

helicopter also carried Parker’s team, which consisted of a security detachment, a radio operator,

the battalion air officer, the air, naval gunfire liaison company detachment assistant officer in

charge, two photographers, and the MEU’s flight

surgeon. The flight surgeon accompanied the

team because one of the evacuees, the Spanish

Ambassador to Liberia, had a heart condition.121

The Marines did not arrive with a display of

overwhelming force because they did not want

the highly sensitive NPFL fighters to get the

impression they posed a threat or wanted to

invade. Even so, the NPFL appeared offended by

the weapons the Marines carried, which implied

the NPFL could not be trusted to protect the citizens that were to be evacuated. The NPFL leaders

made it clear they thought Marines posed a danger to NPFL soldiers. Illustrative of the level of

suspicion, some of the fighters closely followed

Lieutenant Colonel Parker everywhere he went.

Parker ignored the intrusive followers.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker and NPFL representatives discussed the precise manner of evacuation in a beach house compound in Buchanan,

one of several such compounds owned by the

American Mining Company the NPFL had occupied. To reduce tension, Parker gave the NPFL

delegation, led by a “General Major,” some cigarettes as he talked. According to Lieutenant

Colonel Parker: “After some negotiation about

who, what, when, and where, we reached a general agreement about how we would conduct the

evacuation. They had [the] people. I couldn’t see

where they were, but they had them staged off. I

asked them to bring them to me 15 at a time to

the LZ and I would only fly one helicopter into

EVACUATION OPERATIONS 39

Photo courtesy of BGen Granville R. Amos

Evacuees from the German Embassy carry their belongings to a waiting helicopter on the beach at

Buchanan. After being given protective helmets and life jackets, a group of 15 boarded the CH-46E helicopters for the 10-minute flight to the USS Saipan (LHA 2).
the LZ at a time so as not to present a confusing

picture to these people.”122

Having reached an agreement, Parker suggested to Colonel Amos that the number of Marines

on the ground in Buchanan be reduced despite

the presence of several hundred NPFL troops, all

armed with Communist bloc weapons. With

Amos’ approval, Parker sent the security detachment back. With the detachment’s departure, the

only personnel left were Lieutenant Colonel

Parker, Lieutenant Commander Peterman, the battalion air officer, the air, naval gunfire liaison officer, the radio operator, the photographers, and

the flight surgeon. Once both sides were satisfied

with the situation, NPFL escorts began moving the

foreign diplomats and their families toward the

evacuation landing zone.

The NPFL brought 96 evacuees, in groups of 15

and surrounded by 30 to 40 armed troops, to the

landing zone. Once in the landing zone, the Marines swept the evacuees with a metal detector

wand and searched their baggage for contraband.

A few dignitaries, including the Spanish

Ambassador, the Swiss Charge’ de’Affairs, and the

Papal Nuncio received no inspection. After being

given protective helmets and life jackets, each

group of evacuees boarded a CH-46E helicopter

and lifted off for the Saipan, a 10-minute flight.

The helicopter flights ferried out one at a time,

taking all but three of the evacuees, who left by

LCM-8 and arrived on board the Saipan at about

1400 that afternoon, thus concluding the evacuation.

Scared, tired, and glad to see the Marines,

many of the evacuees expressed their relief the

ordeal had ended. The diplomats and Americans

experienced a harrowing and exhausting time in

the hands of the ruthless and highly volatile fighters. They never knew from one moment to the

next what the NPFL troops might decide to do. As

40 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-00811

A squad of Marines from Company H, Battalion Landing Team 2/4, boards a CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter on the grounds of the American Embassy, beginning of the process of the 22d Marine

Expeditionary Unit’s relief.
Lieutenant Colonel Parker put it: “They [the NPFL]

would not hesitate to shoot somebody. They

would not have hesitated, under the right circumstances, to shoot those diplomats and take a

chance on blaming it on somebody else.”123

While the Buchanan evacuation was taking

place, the Marines at the embassy in Monrovia

evacuated 12 people. That same day, the MEU

reduced the size of the security force in the

embassy compound to a reinforced rifle platoon.

When the INPFL learned of the cooperation

between the NPFL and the Marines in the

Buchanan evacuation, they issued a variety of

threats against the United States, although none

were carried out.124

Rotation of Marine Forces

On 14 August, Company E, which had conducted the evacuations of the two American

Telecommunications Office sites nine days earlier,

relieved Company H from security duties at the

embassy. Despite the heavy fighting around

Monrovia, the size of the security force ashore

remained at about 90 to reduce the chance of

Marine casualties from frequent stray rounds.

Company E assumed security duties by manning

three main posts: Gate One, Gate Two, and the

roof of the American Telecommunications Office

building. The Marines then began a routine of

patrolling the compound, manning observation

posts and defensive positions, and maintaining a

small reaction force. The MEU actually established

guard orders for all posts.125 While the embassy

was still well protected, Company E could call for

reinforcements and firepower from the ships if

the need arose.

On 15 August, another 12 individuals were

evacuated, including the Italian Ambassador to

Liberia, and Marines monitored a peaceful

EVACUATION OPERATIONS 41

Photo courtesy of BGen Granville R. Amos

Wearing a protective helmet and life jacket, a young boy clutches a box of his possessions on the flight to

safety. During its stay in Liberia, the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit evacuated more than 3,200

American citizens, foreign nationals, and Liberian citizens.
demonstration of 500 Liberians outside the

embassy under INPFL guard.126 The next day,

Marines processed 359 people, mainly Indian

nationals, the largest group evacuated to that

point.127 One woman gave birth to a baby after

reaching the safety of the Saipan.

While the Marines involved themselves with

local security and evacuations, fighting continued

in the city. A mortar round hit the Korean

Embassy while Taylor’s NPFL again attempted to

seize the nearby Spriggs-Payne Airport. Fighting

closed the German and Italian Embassies and

stranded the Ghanaian Ambassador in his

embassy. In the midst of the fighting, the government’s AFL forces shot an American Baptist missionary in the legs and captured him. He later

died and the AFL allowed embassy personnel to

recover his body from the Executive Mansion in

Monrovia, where the besieged President Doe

remained holed up, guarded by AFL troops.128

The MEU received assistance on 17 August

from an unexpected source when the amphibious

readiness group welcomed the USS Barnstable

County (LST 1197) to Mamba Station. On board

were Marines of a two-platoon detachment from

Company D, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion, 2d

Marine Division, who received orders to divert

from their course home to assist the MEU in

Liberia. Serving as part of the West Africa Training

Cruise 90 and commanded by First Lieutenant

Joseph F. Augustine, III, they officially joined the

Liberian evacuation effort.129

On 17 August, an additional 88 people left

from Landing Zone Magic. The evacuees told Marines that AFL members were actively seeking out

Americans. The evacuees also related horrific stories of AFL soldiers rampaging in the Sinkor and

Congo Town areas.130 On 18 August, the evacuation control center and consular personnel processed 754 people, making that day’s evacuation

the busiest day the MEU had experienced.131* The

MEU intelligence section used interrogator translators who spoke Arabic and French to assist

evacuation control center Marines in communicating with the Lebanese nationals, who made up

the majority of the evacuees. Sadly, the body of

the Baptist missionary shot two days earlier by

AFL troops went out that day with the evacuees.

As the rush to evacuate continued, the MEU flew

109 more third-country nationals to JTF shipping.132

Normally, after some additional processing and

a two-hour flight from shipping, the evacuees

arrived at Freetown. Later, the larger groups of

refugees were transported to Freetown by ship.

By mid-August, the Queen Elizabeth quay in the

port of Freetown and Lungi Airport bustled with

activity. Commercial jets, Marine and Navy helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, and Nigerian

Lockheed C-130s delivering West African peacekeepers shared the airport runway. The West

African monitoring group picked Freetown as the

staging area for its soldiers heading to Liberia. The

troops waited in assembly areas, cooked, listened

to radios, and lounged at the port as additional

forces arrived by plane and ship. Five ships from

the West African countries anchored at the Queen

Elizabeth quay after passing the ARG on their way

to Freetown. These included Nigeria’s NNS Ambe

and Ghana’s MV Tano River troop transports,

jammed full with trucks, supplies, and ammunition destined for Monrovia.133

Turnover and Departure

As the West African ships sailed toward

Freetown, Mediterranean-based ARG 3-90 sailed

toward the West African coast to relieve ARG 2-90.

On 20 August, the 22d MEU welcomed its relief to

Mamba Station by evacuating eight civilians to the

26th MEU’s ships. The 22d MEU conducted a

detailed briefing for the 26th MEU on board the

Saipan. The next day, the 26th MEU officially

relieved the 22d MEU in a blue-water turnover off

the shore of Liberia. The 21 August turnover at the

embassy went smoothly with Company E, BLT

2/4 relieved of its duties by Captain James K.

Shannon’s Company K, BLT 3/8. The 22d MEU

and ARG 2-90 left Liberian waters after evacuating

1,648 civilians: 132 American citizens and 1,516

foreign nationals.134

As Colonel Amos left the embassy, he bid

goodbye to Ambassador De Vos. Lieutenant

Colonel Pugh, the BLT 2/4 commander, said: “The

performance of the troops, especially the small

unit leaders, was truly magnificent. It was a good

plan and the extraction and reinforcement were

executed flawlessly.”135 One evacuee, before she

carried her baby on board a waiting helicopter,

summed it up: “Thank God for the United States

and the Marines. They’re always there to help

when people are helpless.”136

42 ON MAMBA STATION

* The 18 August flight manifest, 22d MEU Manifest, August 18

Flights, Drawdown Evacuation 1990 (Sharp Edge HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), however, listed 802 evacuees.
Deployment of the 26th MEU

As Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) 3-90, the

third group deployed in 1990, and the 26th MEU 

sailed toward the West African coast to relieve

ARG 2-90 and the 22d MEU, ships loaded with

West African peacekeepers also sailed toward

Freetown, Sierra Leone. The Marines of the arriving MEU and the soldiers of the Economic

Community of West African States Monitoring

Group would soon encounter one another in

Monrovia, Liberia.

Departing on 7 August, Marines of 26th MEU

left Morehead City, North Carolina, to relieve the

22d MEU. A large crowd of journalists and television cameramen met the Marines that morning as

they arrived at the port to embark on board their

ships. The recent invasion of Kuwait created

national interest in any deployment with journalists asking where the Marines and sailors of 26th

MEU were going. Many of the Marines did not

know themselves if their unit’s mission would

change or remain focused on Liberia. Adding to

the Marines’ uncertainty, President George H.

Bush had announced that morning he intended to

send troops to Saudi Arabia. While America’s

attention was focused on Saudi Arabia, Colonel

William C. Fite III, commanding officer of the 26th

MEU, concentrated on his unit’s mission to

Liberia, which included providing security to the

embassy and conducting noncombatant evacuations and limited humanitarian relief operations in

benign or hostile conditions.

Dispatching the 26th MEU to Liberia posed

operational concerns. Sending it to the West

African coast left the Mediterranean without an

amphibious ready group. General John R. Galvin,

USA, Command in Chief, Europe, Lieutenant

General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commanding General,

Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and Admiral Powell

F. Carter, Jr., Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet,

questioned the ability of the ready group and

MEU to respond quickly to other crises while

involved in Liberia. The start of American involvement in the Gulf War raised the possibility of

unrest spreading to the southern Mediterranean

coast. If the ARG and MEU remained floating off

Liberia, the U.S. European Command would not

have an equivalent force available for contingencies in the Mediterranean. The Sixth Fleet’s

amphibious force could not redeploy rapidly to

the Mediterranean. According to the European

Command Joint Historian: “On 14 August 1990, an

interagency meeting hosted by the Department of

State on the Liberia crisis concluded that the withdrawal of the Marines from Liberia should take

place. The participants in the Washington, D.C.

meeting could not agree as to when.”*

Three things appeared to point to the mission

ending soon: the build-up of Operation Desert

Shield forces; the economic embargo of Iraq; and

the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean. At the

operational level, the continued presence of the

Marines in Liberia seemed unlikely given

President Doe’s refusal to leave, the fact that most

of the Americans had been evacuated, and the

impending deployment of West Africa peacekeepers. The commander of the Sixth Fleet, Admiral

James D. Williams, thought the remaining operations in Liberia would be short-lived. As Colonel

Fite recalled: “They just decided that the bulk of

the work had been done, and the threat would be

so reduced they could afford to get some presence back in the Mediterranean or possibly move

forces on to the Persian Gulf and still handle the

problem down in Liberia.”137 Consequently, the

Atlantic Fleet and European Command considered

splitting the ready group and embarked expeditionary unit to deal with both the Mediterranean

and Liberia.

Chapter 4

Operation Sharp Edge

* EuCom JHO, The Politics of NEO: Sharp Edge, undated.

(Chapter Two, EUCOM JHO NEO manuscript, Sharp Edge

files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
Colonel Fite expressed reservations in a plan

that would break up a well-trained team and

employ subcomponents that did not normally

conduct independent operations. Considering the

serious developments in Southwest Asia, he did

not know if the 26th MEU would join the assembling forces in Saudi Arabia. Fite viewed conditions in Liberia as dangerously volatile and was

unsure whether the Marines left at the embassy in

Monrovia could deal with a worst-case scenario, a

deliberate attack. Each of the three warring factions in the Liberian civil war had proved to be

erratic and unreliable when it came to keeping

agreements. With each faction’s strength estimated at approximately 1,000 combatants, no matter

how incompetent the factions appeared, Fite considered any sustained attack by the fighters to be

very dangerous.138

Colonel Fite wanted the remaining Marines not

only to be able to defend themselves and the

embassy, but to do so while carrying out a noncombatant evacuation against a hostile force. The

embassy guards needed quick reaction forces

with firepower. As Colonel Fite commented: “I

was reasonably sure that with the whole MEU

there, that we could come in there whether they

[Liberian factional fighters] liked it or not, either

into the compound or on the little beach beside

the embassy and conduct an evacuation.”139

In the end, European Command’s security concerns for the Mediterranean littoral and the desires

of Admiral Williams, the Sixth Fleet commander,

outweighed the reservations expressed by

Colonel Fite. European Command decided to split

ARG 3-90, which was composed of Amphibious

Squadron 2 (Phibron 2) and the 26th MEU. Only

about 400 Marines and sailors of the expeditionary unit, Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task

Force (CMAGTF) 3-90, would remain off the coast

of Liberia, “to maintain presence on station, continue with the evacuation, and maintain support

and security for the embassy.”140 While CMAGTF

3-90 remained, the rest of the MEU would steam

to the Mediterranean to satisfy the security and

44 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-05943

Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit wait on board the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) to be

transferred to other ships off the coast of Liberia, during cross-decking operations to reconfigure the

amphibious ready group for the upcoming mission ashore.
scheduled exercise requirements of the Sixth Fleet

and the European Command.

The decision to split the 26th MEU resulted in

Colonel Fite consulting his staff on how best to

divide the force based on its mission, capabilities,

available shipping, logistics, and personnel. The

staff also considered Colonel Fite’s guidance

important to accomplishing the reconfiguration

with the least amount of movement of Marines

and equipment between ships at sea. Dividing a

Marine expeditionary unit normally not organized

to operate in two parts meant risking not having

the proper depth in equipment or personnel. The

Marine and Navy staffs both worked energetically

on the plan to ensure both portions could perform all required missions. Guidance from

Admiral Williams included the assumption “that

whoever stayed back wouldn’t have to stay there

very long.”141

The right ship mix for both missions also

required careful consideration. Early in the mission planning, Colonel Fite conferred with the

ready group’s commander, Commodore Stanley

D. Gastar, USN, about designating a ship for the

contingency task force.* The USS Whidbey Island

(LSD 41) provided the best platform considering

the overall needs for aviation, logistics, and personnel support. Forming CMAGTF 3-90 required

the designation of command, air, ground, and

combat service support elements, the common

building blocks to all Marine air-ground task

forces. On board the USS Inchon (LPH 12), the

26th MEU commander named Major George S.

Hartley, the executive officer of Battalion Landing

Team (BLT) 3/8, to lead CMAGTF 3-90.

The aviation personnel and assets came from

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162 (HMM162). The commanding officer of HMM-162

“Golden Eagles,” Lieutenant Colonel Darrell A.

Browning, assigned Major Daniel P. “Doc”

Johnson to lead the aviation detachment. The aviation aircrews consisted of six officers and 22

enlisted men. The detachment also included landing zone control, helicopter maintenance, and

helicopter support teams. Three of the squadron’s

CH-46E helicopters completed the air combat element.

After consultations with his staff and the BLT

commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Essink,

Colonel Fite determined that a reinforced rifle

company provided enough combat power and

depth to allow for the rotation of the Marines.

Lieutenant Colonel Essink picked Company K’s

commanding officer, Captain James K. Shannon,

as the ground combat element commander.

Although Shannon’s Marines formed the bulk of

the ground combat element, he received augmentation from the BLT’s Headquarters and

Service Company, Battery G, Weapons Company,

as well as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle and

Combat Engineer Platoons on board the USS

Barnstable County (LST 1197).

A difficult decision involved the mix of combat

service support personnel and supplies.

Lieutenant Colonel Jonathon W. Stull, the commanding officer of MEU Service Support Group

26 (MSSG-26), was concerned he did not have the

necessary depth of manpower and adequate supplies to support both CMAGTF 3-90 and the

remainder of the MEU. Stull selected the engineer

support platoon to form the bulk of the combat

service support detachment (CSSD) since its mission included utility support for the embassy. The

engineer support platoon commander, Chief

Warrant Officer 3 Edwin E. Deering, was selected

as the officer-in-charge, and the detachment reinforced with aviation support, water supply, and

bulk fuel personnel. 

Embassy support was a large part of the 27-

man CSSD’s mission in Liberia. Since the

embassy’s logistical support needs were difficult

to anticipate, the Marines did not hold a large

supply block afloat. For the Marines ashore, anticipated supplies included food, barbed wire, and

sand bags. The MSSG staff picked two large

pieces of support equipment to go ashore, a

reverse osmosis water purification unit and a generator pump capable of pumping 600 gallons per

minute. This left the MEU with one water purification unit to support later Mediterranean exercises. As Lieutenant Colonel Stull explained:

“Dividing that up between Mamba Station and the

Med made things precarious to sustain support in

both locations. It came out okay, but those two

areas were probably the trickiest—supply and

equipment density.”142

The 26th MEU reached Mamba Station on 19

August following 12 days in transit. The incoming

unit received turnover briefings from 22d MEU on

board the USS Saipan (LHA 2) the next day. On

the morning of 21 August, helicopters flew the 2d

Platoon of Captain James Shannon’s Company K,

BLT 3/8 ashore, where they assumed embassy

duties from Captain Gary Oles’ Company E, BLT

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 45

* Captain Stanley D. Gastar, while in command of the

Amphibious Ready Group, held the title of commodore.
2/4. The relief went smoothly and took a little

more than two hours for Company E to turn over

all defensive positions and ammunition. Around

noon, the last of the 22d MEU left Company K

with 90 Marines in defensive positions to guard

the embassy and departed Monrovia from

Landing Zone Magic.143 The 22d MEU completed

the blue-water turnover at approximately 1400 on

21 August and left Mamba Station, officially

relieved.144

26th MEU and the Formation of the

CMAGTF in Liberia

Colonel Fite went ashore after the turnover and

met with his forward command element and

Ambassador Peter De Vos. Upon arrival, he

received a briefing from his team, who had

already been ashore for 12 days. The eight-man

team, headed by the executive officer of the 26th

MEU, Lieutenant Colonel Richard H. Kunkel, Jr.,

had flown to Liberia the day before the MEU

sailed from Morehead City and had observed

evacuations, transmitted updated information,

and familiarized themselves with the personalities

at the embassy during their interim stay. 

As the turnovers took place, work to reconfigure the amphibious ready group began. Personnel

were transferred to and from the designated flagship of the task force, the Whidbey Island. The

new load plan to accommodate the contingency

task force required the concerted effort of all

hands. At one point, the combined Marine and

Navy effort resulted in the entire deck of the LSD

being covered with vehicles, ConEx boxes,

105mm howitzers, and other MEU equipment.*

The reconfiguration, undertaken at sea, required

46 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-05947

During the shift of personnel and equipment among the ships of the amphibious ready group, Marines

from the USS Inchon (LPH 12) disembark from a CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter of Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron 162 on the flight deck of the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), their temporary home.

* A ConEx box is a large metal shipping container.
numerous helicopter lifts and night runs with aircushioned landing craft and well-deck operations

to transfer all the equipment, supplies, and personnel. Helicopters with loads slung beneath

repeatedly transferred equipment between the

Whidbey Island and other ready group ships. The

Inchon, USS Nashville (LPD 13), USS Newport

County (LST 1179), and USS Fairfax County (LST

1193) also experienced changes to billeting and

load-plan configurations. The MEU’s 155mm howitzers below the main deck and deep within the

Whidbey Island remained on board, impossible to

move. During the reconfiguration, the MEU could

not pull all other equipment and supplies from in

front of the guns to allow for their transfer off the

ship. The artillery pieces remained on board even

though “there was absolutely no prospect of them

being used there [Liberia].”145 Most of the BLT’s

vehicles also remained below decks on the

Whidbey Island for the same reason.146 The

Marines and sailors completed the task after three

days of labor-intensive cross-decking, moving

equipment, countless tons of supplies, and hundreds of men. 

As the reconfiguration started, the MEU’s executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kunkel, and

members of the forward command element continued to monitor the situation at the embassy.

The chancery conference room, filled with radios

that allowed communications with each post, the

flag ship and U.S. European Command headquarters, served as the command post. The location

gave the command element quick access to key

embassy personnel. Later that week, Captain

Shannon moved in to the conference room as the

primary on-scene commander for the ground

combat element of CMAGTF 3-90. 

Other elements of the forming task force joined

Company K ashore. The CSSD arrived at the

embassy and found people awaiting evacuation.

As Chief Warrant Officer Deering stated: “We

landed on the 23d of August and immediately

took care of the processing and loading of the

awaiting evacuees.”147 In the first lift, an American

and 30 foreign evacuees flew on a CH-53 helicopter to Freetown, Sierra Leone.148

The final transfer separating CMAGTF 3-90

from the 26th MEU ended when three CH-46 helicopters landed on the Whidbey Island.149 With

the completion of cross-decking on 24 August and

the movement of the Marines, sailors, and equipment ashore, the task force assumed its mission.

Most the task force remained on board the

Whidbey Island and Barnstable County in support

or reserve.* 150 Late in the afternoon, the 26th

MEU sailed for Rota, Spain, leaving the task force

behind in Liberian waters.151

The movement of helicopters to the Whidbey

Island was significant since the ship normally did

not house a permanent aviation detachment.

Because of this and the lack of a hangar, the

Marines stored some aviation supplies on the

flight deck in front of landing spot one.** The

crew helped the aviation Marines settle into work

spaces not designed for an aviation detachment.

As far as anyone on board knew, the arrival of the

helicopters constituted the first instance of an aviation detachment embarking on a landing ship

dock for extended operations.152 The ship also

presented the newly arrived aviation Marines with

some practical challenges. First, the ship did not

have an air boss or someone accustomed to running an air control tower. Fortunately, a few of

the sailors on board did have flight deck experience, so they operated the tower for a few weeks

until the amphibious squadron sent an experienced air traffic controller. Second, with the helicopters positioned on the exposed flight deck, the

first few rainy weeks complicated routine maintenance—plastic sheeting and ponchos helped

somewhat.

Peacekeepers, Fighters, and

Contingency MAGTF

While the MEU completed forming the contingency task force, transport ships loaded with

troops and equipment of the five-nation

Economic Community of West African States

Military Observation Group (ECOMOG) entered

the port of Monrovia.*** During the afternoon of

24 August, Nigeria’s NNS Ambe (LST 1123) and

Ghana’s MV Tano River maneuvered to the mouth

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 47

* U.S. European Command limited the number of Marines

ashore, gradually reducing that number as the deployment

continued into the fall and early winter of 1990.

** The air detachment normally launched one aircraft at a

time. In case it needed to launch two helicopters, spot two

was shifted further aft. The lower flight decks of the Whidbey

Island and Barnstable County received increased salt spray as

aircraft approached or departed. Frequent inspections by the

detachment and increased maintenance hours identified

potential corrosion problems.

*** An emergency meeting of the Economic Community of

West African States Standing Mediation Committee composed

of Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, and Gambia took place from 5

July to 20 July in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The committee discussed the concept of deploying a ceasefire monitoring force

to Liberia, but reached no agreement.
of the jetty area of Freeport.153 They temporarily

withdrew after receiving some sporadic mortar

fire and reentered the port later that evening.

After docking, a small mix of troops debarked.

Awaiting the peacekeepers on the dock, Prince

Johnson, head of the INFPL, attempted to contact

the embassy over a Motorola radio, possibly one

stolen from the embassy’s local guards. Johnson

asked for U.S. help in welcoming the African

peacekeepers and securing the port.154 The

Marine security guard on duty, monitoring all the

radio networks at Post One in the chancellery, did

not respond to the request.

Later that night the military observation group

commander, Ghanaian Lieutenant General Arnold

Quainoo, met with Prince Johnson. The West

African soldiers ashore bivouacked haphazardly

in abandoned warehouses in the port area.*

General Quainoo viewed his force’s mission as

peacekeepers to assist the warring factions in

observing a ceasefire.155

Regardless of the peacekeepers actions, the

mission of the Marines encompassed: providing

security for the compound; evacuating designated

Americans and foreign nationals; providing limited logistic support to the embassy; and supporting limited humanitarian relief operations.156

Major Hartley, the Marine task force commander

responsible for accomplishing the mission, reported to Captain Francis. P. Grause, USN, the commander of Joint Task Force (JTF) Sharp Edge.**

Colonel Martin R. Berndt from the U.S. European

Command assisted the JTF commander for a few

weeks in the embassy as the military liaison to the

West African peacekeeping force.

Joining their forces ashore, the remaining West

African troops moved off their ships and ventured

into greater Monrovia. This 25 August attempt to

begin the mission of enforcing a ceasefire

involved some collaboration with Prince

48 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of the authors

A Nigerian armored vehicle patrols the streets of Monrovia. While one rebel faction assured unfettered

passage to members of the five-nation West African peacekeeping force, other factions attempted to prevent their deployment throughout the capital.

* The rapidly formed force lacked supply support. Many

newly arrived soldiers did not have personal weapons, uniforms, and boots. Prince Johnson, leader of the INPFL, later

provided uniforms and boots as gifts to the Nigerian troops,

according to Major General C.Y. Iweze, “Nigeria in Liberia:

The Military Operations of ECOMOG,” in Nigeria in

International Peacekeeping, p. 231.

** Since the turnover on 21 August, Commander Thomas L.

Breitinger, the commanding officer of the Whidbey Island,

temporarily commanded the JTF until the arrival of Captain

Francis P. Grause, who previously commanded Naval Beach

Group Two.
Johnson’s INPFL, which controlled Bushrod

Island. The negotiations allowed the 2,500 peacekeepers to move freely through INPFL areas.

Leaving the port area, a Nigerian battalion moved

north and secured the St. Paul River bridges while

a Ghana and Sierra Leone battalion deployed just

short of the north end of the Mesurado River 

bridges. 

The peacekeepers already knew Charles

Taylor’s NPFL would likely try to prevent their

deployment. Taylor opposed the idea of a ceasefire and his delegation at the Banjul, Gambia,

talks of 6 and 7 August 1990 flatly stated that until

President Doe resigned, no agreement on a ceasefire could be reached. As the peacekeeping

troops deployed throughout the day, Marines on

post heard sporadic machine gun fire and the

explosions of mortars and rocket-propelled

grenades. Despite the fighting, Marine CH-46 helicopters flew their first mission into Landing Zone

Magic as members of CMAGTF 3-90 delivered fuel

for the embassy generators.157

As the fighting flared on and off, one NPFL

gunner’s rocket-propelled grenade hit a Nigerian

armored car. The attack near the St. Paul bridges

wounded two Nigerians.158 The peacekeepers

asked the embassy if the Americans could evacuate the two seriously wounded Nigerian soldiers.

A Marine helicopter crew went on stand-by that

evening, awaiting the result of the embassy’s consultation with Washington. The State Department

denied the peacekeeper’s evacuation request the

following day.159

On the morning of 26 August, Marine helicopters evacuated an American citizen who arrived at

the embassy with a group of refugees. Previously,

a detachment of Navy Sikorsky CH-53E Super

Stallion helicopters picked up evacuees and flew

them directly to Freetown. That evening, the path

of the evacuation switched from direct flights to

Freetown to a more judicious route. The JTF

established the procedure of flying evacuees to

the Barnstable County and placing a Marine helicopter on board. The ship would then sail to

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 49

DVIC DN-SC-91-06093

A Marine shows a group of evacuees how to properly don helmets before boarding a helicopter on the

grounds of the American Embassy. From the embassy they would be flown to one of the ships off shore.
Freetown, Sierra Leone. After arriving in

Freetown, the CH-46 would fly the evacuees to

Lungi Airfield for further processing and transfer.

The Marines and sailors at the Lungi forward

logistics site loaded the returning helicopter with

critical parts, supplies, and mail for the ship. Once

all the evacuees had departed the ship, the

Barnstable County with its helicopter steamed

back to Mamba Station. The combination of LST

and helicopter evacuations effectively managed

the flow of evacuees for the contingency task

force. The Marines repeatedly used this method

for about three weeks until the Navy helicopters

supporting the operation, which had previously

been grounded, could fly again.160*

On 26 August, evacuation control center

Marines administratively processed 90 persons. To

process the evacuees, embassy staff passed the

word by radio and telephone about scheduled

helicopter lifts and the available passenger seats.

On the appointed day, potential evacuees came to

the embassy (with their passports) and filled out

an application. Consular personnel screened the

applicants, giving priority to citizens of the United

States, followed by foreign diplomats, foreign

nationals associated with a foreign embassy, and

other third-country nationals.

While the evacuees’ administrative documents

were being processed, the evacuation control

center Marines concentrated on security and

preparing evacuees for the flight.** Working on a

consular computer, Marines recorded the evacuees’ names and nationalities for the flight manifests. On the day of the flight, Marines searched

the evacuees for contraband, which involved

searching each person and their baggage for any

drugs or weapons. Despite the anarchy and violence in the city, the Marines found only one

weapon, a pistol. However, “suspicious-looking

50 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-05963

Four civilians disembark from a Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162 Sea Knight helicopter at Lungi

Airport, just north of Freetown, Sierra Leone. The civilians were processed on board a U.S. Navy ship off

the coast of Liberia before being flown to Sierra Leone.

* Earlier in Sharp Edge operations, evacuees departed the

embassy for Freetown, Sierra Leone, on Sikorsky CH-53E

Super Stallion helicopters belonging to the Navy’s Helicopter

Support Squadron 4 (HC-4). The two-aircraft HC-4 detachment

routinely flew from Sierra Leone to Liberia laden with supplies, mail, and other cargo. Once helicopters landed at the

embassy in Liberia, they off-loaded supplies and returned to

Sierra Leone loaded with evacuees. The Navy C-130 or C-9 aircraft flew numerous flights to Freetown bringing supplies originating in the Mediterranean or continental United States. In

late August, both HC-4 helicopters were temporarily grounded for parts and maintenance. With the number of refugees

wanting to leave increasing, the CMAGTF took over this critical role using the Barnstable County and one CH-46. 

** The State Department charged third-country nationals a fee

for the evacuation, reportedly $300 for evacuation to

Freetown.
powders in bags” were found on several different

evacuees.161 Like the pistol, the Marines delivered

the confiscated bags to the regional security officer for disposal. The luggage was staged after the

search and each person was issued a flight helmet. Once a helicopter landed, Marines led the

evacuees, assisting the young and the old, on to

the aircraft. The helicopter launched after all evacuees had buckled their seat belts.

Along with processing evacuees, the combat

service support detachment attempted to solve

the problems experienced earlier in supplying the

embassy with fresh water. With the end of the

rainy season coming, the CSSD again attempted to

draw water from the ocean using the water purification unit left by the 22d MEU. At the top of a

cliff directly above the ocean, the engineers wrestled with the water purification unit and pump

and concluded the existing pump lacked the necessary power. The engineers were able to draw

seawater to the water purification unit at the top

of the cliff after having a helicopter place a more

powerful pump on shore, but the problem of

drawing the water from the ocean still remained.

The purification unit used a suction pipe running

from the shore out into the ocean, but severe surf

action repeatedly broke the pipe. Consequently,

the detachment was only able to pump water

from the ocean at high tide when there was less

surf action. The pump achieved strong suction at

high tide on 26 August, which allowed the unit to

produce about 6,000 gallons of potable water.

Chief Warrant Officer Deering said: “We

processed the water and it turned out to be real

excellent water.”162 The Marines gave samples of

the water to the embassy staff, whose concerns

about quality were eased by the surprisingly

agreeable taste of the water. Unfortunately, the

exceptionally heavy surf action at Mamba Point 

ripped the plumbing out of the pump within the

week and washed it away. No longer able to rely

on purified ocean water, the Marines looked for

other sources to supply the compound. Collecting

rainwater was the obvious choice, since in August

it rained quite frequently. To that end, engineers

set up a couple of 3,000-gallon bladders on low

spots in the embassy compound and placed pipes

to channel the water into the bladders. It rained

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 51

DVIC DN-SC-91-06073

Marines scan United Nations Drive, the main street bordering the American Embassy compound, from a

sandbagged guard post on the roof of an embassy building.
hard enough to collect 6,000 gallons of water in

two hours. The accumulation, processed by the

purification unit, delivered clean drinking water

for the Marines.*

Marines continually worked to maintain defensive positions, which rapidly deteriorated in the

rainy weather. While CSSD Marines worked on

water and power, Captain Shannon’s infantry

improved its defenses. Marines rotated in a new

rifle platoon about every seven days. The platoons, reinforced with machine gunners and

60mm mortar men, set up three rotating guard

shifts of eight hours each. Once familiar with the

posts, the platoon sergeants and squad leaders of

Company K rotated men among the posts to

reduce boredom.

To augment these infantrymen, snipers from

the Surveillance and Target Acquisition platoon of

BLT 3/8 came ashore. After assessing the limited

fields of fire from inside the compound, the

snipers concluded the Wellington and Sam and E

apartments outside the compound afforded better

observation of the city. Unfortunately, Marine

snipers from the previous command had already

been withdrawn from those positions under

European Command orders to remain inside the

compound. But diplomatic security personnel,

although not as well trained in tactical surveillance techniques as the snipers, did not have the

same restrictions and were directed to man observation posts in both apartments. The diplomatic

security outposts afforded an excellent view of

strategic parts of the city and indirectly gave the

Marines early warning when fighting broke out.

Evacuees slowly trickled in and Marines evacuated two American citizens and three foreign

nationals on 27 August. The next day, Sergeant

Brian J. Bonfiglio, a member of the Weapons

Company detachment, stopped a group of armed

Liberians from summarily executing a fellow citizen. The incident began when a group of fighters

started yelling, kicking, and brutally beating their

victim. Quickly grabbing a loudspeaker and using

a commanding voice, Sergeant Bonfoglio persuaded the group of fighters to stop and let the

individual live. Since the action was not directed

at them or other Americans, the Marines could not

use force. 

The rules of engagement, the same used by the

22d MEU, allowed for an escalation of force if a

fighter or a group of fighters initiated hostile

action against Americans or the embassy.163

Undisciplined Liberian fighters frequently pointed

weapons at everyone, not realizing their actions

constituted a hostile act. Individual Marines handled the leeway given to them by the rules of

engagement with restraint. As Captain Shannon

stated:

There were many times where

the INPFL or some AFL guys

would ride in front of the U.S.

embassy on [United Nations]

Drive, and not aim in but point

their weapons in a very sarcastic

manner at the Marine positions.

The Marines had the presence of

mind to discern who was kidding and who may not be kidding. Though the [rules of

engagement] allowed them to

fire at any of those vehicles who

showed hostile intent such as

pointing a loaded weapon,

which had a magazine in the

weapon, at the positions.164

Flights evacuating third-country nationals continued, and on 29 August, the Barnstable County

left Liberian waters for Sierra Leone carrying evacuees and one of the air combat element’s three

helicopters. As fighting escalated the following

day, 76 evacuees transferred to the Barnstable

County and made the trip to Freetown. At the

embassy in a recreation cabana hut located close

to Landing Zone Magic, a stray 7.62mm round hit

Lance Corporal Davis J. Cassady. The round came

through the open-sided hut’s roof and bounced

off the floor. Fortunately, it was deflected by

Cassady’s flack jacket. 

The forces fighting for control of Liberia rang

in September with heavy fighting near the AFL’s

Barclay Training Center and Spriggs-Payne

Airport. Stray rounds from small arms fire passed

over and through the compound. As Captain

Shannon explained: “Where we were positioned

in the embassy compound, [which was at the end

of a] beaten zone along the gun-target line, which

means you are in receipt of many small arms.

Regardless of whether they’re firing at you or not,

you’re going to receive a lot of small arms, as well

52 ON MAMBA STATION

* The embassy cistern system also collected rainwater. By

using a complex system of gutters on the roofs of several

embassy buildings, the water flowed by pipes into two underground reservoirs in the embassy compound. Between the

two reservoirs, the embassy water storage capacity equaled

about 200,000 gallons; a three-week supply at the rate the

embassy used water. 
as automatic fire.”165 During a daytime roving

patrol, Marines found a small hole in the fence

directly behind the recreation center and two

more American citizens and 21 foreign nationals

were evacuated.166

The fighting among opposing sides in the civil

war continued on 2 September, with 20 artillery,

mortar, and high-angle rocket-propelled grenade

rounds impacting close to the embassy. The random shelling increased the number of noncombatants seeking evacuation. U.S. forces evacuated

six more American citizens and 57 foreign nationals during a lull in the fighting.167 That night, the

Barnstable County again left for Freetown carrying evacuees to safety and bringing back supplies

and mail.168

Monrovia appeared calmer for a few days as

the West African peacekeepers renewed efforts to

deploy throughout the city. On 3 September,

Marines spotted the first observation group foot

patrol, who waved as they passed the embassy.169

The brief calm allowed Marine helicopters to

assist in replenishing the Whidbey Island’s supplies from the USNS Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO187).170 On 5 September, a Marine observation

post watched a NPFL fighter shoot at a passing

civilian vehicle in front of the Wellington apartments. The routine rotation of rifle platoons and

combat service support Marines took place on 6

September and the helicopters evacuated six

more American citizens and 73 foreign nationals.

Filled with refugees, the Barnstable County made

yet another trip to Freetown that night.171

On 9 September, the Armed Forces of Liberia

shelled the Freeport area from the Capitol Hill 

area. The exposed peacekeeper’s ships temporarily withdrew from the port. The following morning, a convoy of INPFL fighters passed the

embassy and headed south on United Nations

Drive. At Barclay Training Center, meanwhile, 50

to 75 Liberian army troops formed up to escort

President Doe to the peacekeeping force’s headquarters. Both forces met and exchanged small

arms fire just a few blocks east of the embassy.

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 53

Photo courtesy of the authors

The American Embassy’s recreation hut housed the Marine command post until a stray round from outside the compound hit one Marine, who was not injured in the incident. 
One of the INPFL fighters passing by a Marine

post accidentally discharged his weapon, but

immediately apologized to the Marines on post.172

President Doe ventured out of the Executive

Mansion later that morning for the first time since

June to visit the peacekeepers’ headquarters. After

Doe arrived at the headquarters at Freeport,

INPFL fighters in a number of trucks pulled up

and started arguing with the guards. Gunfire

erupted and the fighters of Prince Johnson’s

INPFL forced their way into the building and

began shooting at Doe’s bodyguards. In the fray,

the soldiers ran for cover while Prince Johnson’s

men searched from room to room for Doe and his

men (members of the Krahn tribal group).

Johnson’s fighters killed more than 60 men from

Doe’s escort, wounded and captured Doe and

took him to their base at Cadwell.173 Word of the

capture spread quickly throughout Monrovia and

resulted in evacuees flocking to the gates of the

embassy. Marines heard sporadic exchanges of

small arms fire throughout the day, and by nightfall, Marines had evacuated nine more American

citizens and 87 foreign nationals.174

Returning to Cadwell, Prince Johnson tortured

and killed President Doe while his men recorded

the grisly event on video. Amidst Doe’s screams,

Prince Johnson questioned him and narrated the

video while drinking a beer. Foreign observers

thought President Doe’s death would signal the

end of the fighting. 

That same evening, the peacekeeping force

asked for American assistance to evacuate some

of their casualties, prompting the aviation Marines

to prepare their aircraft for the expected mission.

As Major Daniel P. “Doc” Johnson stated: “We

were scrambling around at that time trying to get

helicopters ready, trying to get them spotted, trying to get crews together to go in, at night, to the

embassy and extract these casualties of the ECOMOG forces.” While the Marines got ready, the

request for a decision went up the chain-ofcommand. It took about four hours before the

Joint Chiefs of Staff approved. “We all knew that

if it was going to be done,” Johnson continued, “it

was going to be done at night. Well, about 10:00

[PM] they came down and said, ‘We’re cleared to

do it, but do it tomorrow morning.’” The Marines

54 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-06094

A Marine buckles the chinstrap on a child’s helmet before a group of evacuees board a helicopter for the

flight to the initial processing center offshore.
spotted their aircraft and retired for the night,

anticipating a launch before first light the next

day. The medical evacuation plan called for the

most seriously injured to be treated on the

Whidbey Island while those who could travel

safely were to go to the Barnstable County for

further passage to Sierra Leone. According to

Johnson: “The next morning [10 September] we

got up and started briefing and getting aircraft

ready. We were all strapped in, ready to go, and

[the embassy] called back and said the ECOMOG

forces decided to take care of their own wounded and send them back by one of their own

ships.”175 During the remainder of the day, the

Marines on post watched numerous convoys of

armed peacekeepers and INPFL troops drive past

the embassy. As night fell, the Barnstable County

sailed to Sierra Leone with 96 evacuees.176

On 11 September, the sounds of sporadic fire

from artillery, mortars and close heavy machine

guns echoed throughout the embassy grounds. A

firefight between INPFL and AFL flared up about

200 meters from the embassy gates with a barrage

of stray small arms rounds impacting inside the

compound. U.S. Ambassador DeVos, in the interim, met with Charles Taylor to discuss ways to

end the conflict.177

Attempts to control the Barclay Training Center

shifted the fight to the east, but the embassy compound took an increasing volume of fire during

the next two days. Small arms fire hit both Post

Two (Gate Two), and Observation Post One,

located on the top floor of the Sam and E apartment building across the street from Gate One.

Artillery rounds landed in the water behind the

British Embassy. Several Marines had close calls

with one round passing through a trouser leg and

other rounds impacting the sand bags around

defensive positions. Reacting to the increased

fighting, Major George S. “Steve” Hartley augmented security inside the compound and

brought 60mm mortars ashore. Conducting the

weekly rotation, 75 Marines returned to the ship

and 92 Marines came ashore. During the rotation,

the evacuation control center evacuated 12 more

American citizens and eight foreign nationals.

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 55

DVIC DN-ST-91-05978

A woman carries her daughter across the flight deck of the USS Barnstable County (LST 1197) after disembarking from a CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter.
While Marines reinforced, Ambassador DeVos 

again met with NPFL leader Charles Taylor in the

embassy.178

The fighting shifted closer on 14 September

and bullets hit Post One and Gate One. Other

embassy posts received a peppering of small arms

fire, but with no effect. Bloated bodies washed up

on the beach below the embassy.179

Later in the morning, INPFL leader Prince

Johnson conducted his first embassy visit. As a

show of force, Major Hartley mobilized all available Marines and placed them in visible locations

where the Marines could be seen cleaning

weapons and manning posts. More than 60 of

Prince Johnson’s armed fighters waited outside

the embassy on United Nations Drive while he

met with the Ambassador. After Johnson’s departure, intermittent firefights in the city increased.

The infantrymen on post spent the night listening

to the largest volume of rounds passing overhead

thus far in the operation.180

On 15 September, fighting came very close to

the embassy. Incoming indirect fire became

extremely heavy, especially at Post Two. A gun

battle occurred near Gate Two, which continued

sporadically throughout the night as INPFL units

maneuvered to within a block of the embassy.

With fighting so close, even the most junior

Marines realized they would be in Liberia for an

extended period.181

Firing started early on the morning of 16

September at about 0430 with a small arms

exchange just south of the embassy. Prince

Johnson arrived later that morning and met again

with the Ambassador for continued discussions.

He brought a crowd of about 90 INPFL fighters,

who waited outside the embassy on United

Nations Drive. Meanwhile, the volume of fire

landing in the compound and passing overhead

held steady. Rounds hit the telecommunications

office located in the southwest corner of the compound. In spite of all the stray rounds, Marines

56 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-05981

A civilian lifts his arms to be searched by a Marine while being processed on board the USS Barnstable

County (LST 1197). Marines also conducted a quick search of luggage brought on board and provided

the evacuees with refreshments.
evacuated six more American citizens and 46 foreign nationals. Later, Marines observed sustained

heavy machine gun fire aimed at the Barclay

Training Center from Mamba Point’s Lighthouse

Hill.182

Late in the morning of 17 September, Prince

Johnson, accompanied by his bodyguard of 50

INPFL fighters, returned to the embassy and met

with the Ambassador in what had become almost

a daily routine. All appeared calm until just before

noon. 

The Marine task force’s intelligence chief

ashore received a report that indicated a strong

AFL force was moving toward the embassy, possibly to engage Prince Johnson’s bodyguard.

Responding to the report of 150 AFL soldiers and

one armored vehicle (a Romanian armored personnel carrier) moving toward the embassy,

Captain Shannon called for a “Sparrow Hawk”

reaction force consisting of a reinforced rifle platoon.183 Calling to the Whidbey Island, he

explained to Major Hartley that it made sense to

reinforce with the infamous and unpredictable

Major Tilley now leading the AFL fighters.* 

Major Hartley quickly sent a rifle platoon by

helicopter to the embassy and the reaction force

deployed inside the compound within 34 minutes. The same helicopters also evacuated three

awaiting American citizens and 46 foreign nationals during a pouring rain. In addition, Captain

Shannon mobilized the combat service support

Marines ashore, who stopped their work and

quickly manned their assigned positions.

Supporting the Marines, Captain Francis P. Grause

moved his ships to within sight of the city.

Fortunately, the AFL soldiers encountered other

fighters as they advanced up United Nations Drive

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 57

* Major Tilley of the Armed Forces of Liberia reportedly directed the massacre of more than 600 Liberians in late July 1990

at St. Peter’s Lutheran Church in Monrovia, a designated Red

Cross shelter. Captain James K. Shannon intvw, 15Apr91, p.

10. (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

DVIC DN-ST-91-00663

Two air crewman from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162 carry an elderly woman from their

CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter after arriving at Lungi Airport in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
and never appeared. The platoon of reinforcements stood down later that day.184

Prince Johnson received an escort from the

West African peacekeeping force during his second meeting at the embassy that day. Marines

watched the escort, who waited outside the compound like Johnson’s men earlier. The meetings

resulted in an appointment for Johnson to meet

with Herman Cohen, the Under Secretary of State

for West African Affairs.185

Under Secretary Cohen arrived by Marine helicopter the next day to conduct an assessment of

the situation and meet with the factional leaders.

The embassy saw the Marine force as an enabler,

allowing the State Department to exercise a continuing influence in the negotiations between the

factions and the interim government. The Under

Secretary’s visit underscored the American commitment to finding a solution to the crisis. That

same day, the Marines conducted a normal rotation as sporadic small arms fire periodically flew

over and through the embassy compound. 

By 18 September, the West African states decided to support the reinforcement of its contingent,

which eventually doubled the size of the force.

The new field commander of the force, Nigerian

Army Major General Joshua Dogonyaro,

announced the force’s mandate had changed from

peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The recent

artillery attacks on the force’s positions may have

influenced his decision. A call for reinforcements

resulted in new Nigerian and Ghanan battalions

joining up in Freetown and embarking on ships to

Monrovia.186

On 21 September, Charles Taylor announced

his acceptance of an unconditional ceasefire to

begin the next day. While Marines listened to the

sounds of gunfire, the number of dead buried on

the grounds of the nearby refugee-crowded

Greystone compound reached 45.187 More than

300 civilians fleeing the Liberian army gathered in

front of the embassy about mid-day. The large

crowd pleaded for assistance and refuge. But the

crowd quickly became agitated and started to create a disturbance. As Marines readied for a confrontation in the face of the unpredictable situation, the embassy’s local guard force commander,

Dan Showalter, a retired Marine lieutenant

58 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of the authors

West African peacekeepers not only guarded vital facilities throughout Monrovia, they transported the

head of the differing factions to the American Embassy compound for discussions with State Department

personnel concerning a ceasefire.
colonel, quietly walked outside the compound

gate and into the hostile crowd. Speaking firmly,

he first calmed and then persuaded the Liberians

to disperse after explaining how to apply for

evacuation.188 At first light the next morning, a

crowd of about 100 Liberians gathered at the

embassy gate with their documents in hopes of

being evacuated.189

Arriving to review the Marines’ situation on 23

September, Rear Admiral Layton W. “Snuffy”

Smith, USN, J-3 of the European Command, went

ashore to meet with Ambassador DeVos. Major

Hartley noted during the discussions that Admiral

Smith strongly encouraged the Ambassador to

conserve resources because of Contingency

MAGTF 3-90’s limited logistical capabilities.190

Almost as a reminder of the efforts to support the

embassy in the face of logistical limitations, the

Barnstable County departed Liberian waters with

evacuees for another trip to Freetown.191

While Charles Taylor had announced he would

accept a ceasefire two days earlier, it took until 23

September for the NPFL leader to actually agree to

adhere to that ceasefire.192 But the Americanbrokered halt in the fighting lasted only until the

night of 25 September. That night, several rounds

passed through the embassy compound and the

Marines on post spotted numerous muzzle flashes in town. Clashes again took place in the

Mamba Point area over the next few days. On 27

September, Marines at Post One observed shots

fired from a house across the street, and early the

next day, artillery and mortars impacted east and

northeast of the embassy. The Marines saw sporadic firing arc through the helicopters’ approach

path later that afternoon. Inside the compound,

the intense overhead fire sounded very close.193

The new escalation of intense fighting near the

compound temporarily halted all evacuations.

The official announcement to end the ceasefire

came on 29 September. Despite the danger posed

by indirect small arms fire, evacuations resumed.

Major Johnson flew a CH-46 that brought

Commodore James M. Drager, USN, the temporary commander of the joint task force, and Major

Hartley ashore. Rounds started popping in the

grassy areas around the landing zone as the helicopter touched down and Major Hartley ran back

to the helicopter after clearing the aircraft rotor

blades and pointed out to the commodore the

rounds impacting into the water. Commodore

Drager and Major Hartley could hear the small

arms fire even over the sound of the helicopter

engines. 

Believing the fire came from inside the compound, Major Hartley ordered Captain Shannon to

find its source.194 Captain Shannon alerted and

deployed his reserve element, and after a thorough search, the Marines discovered the source of

the rounds impacting around the landing zone did

not originate from anyone in the compound. The

landing zone, the recreation hut (sometimes

referred to as Oceanside hut), and the communications building appeared to be at the end of the

beaten zone for a nearby firefight.195

Later rounds struck the sandbags surrounding

Post One and Post Two. Marines on post initially

thought someone deliberately fired at them, but

without being able to pinpoint the source, the

Marines held their fire. The firing died down after

about three hours, but not before a 12.7mm round

shattered the office window of the deputy chief of

mission.196 The small arms fire continued intermittently the next day but moved away from the

embassy.197

The sounds of occasional artillery and gunfire

signaled the start of October. The West African

force commander, Major General Dogonyaro, initiated a series of actions against NPFL forces to

gain control of the city. Although the Marines

heard rocket, artillery, and mortar fire, the amount

of small arms fire around the embassy dropped

off dramatically. During the first week of the

month, Marines observed long convoys of INPFL

vehicles and West African troops passing by the

embassy. Nigerian peacekeepers established

roadblocks nearby, one north of the embassy at

the intersection of United Nations Drive and

Benson Street and the other south of the embassy

at the intersection of United Nations Drive and

Sekou Toure Avenue.198 Not surprisingly, they

located the roadblocks near locations where the

22d MEU had set up roadblocks on 5 August.

Cooperating with the West Africans, the INPFL

commenced attacks against the NPFL. Even the

AFL, holed up in the Barclay Training Center and

Executive Mansion, launched probes against

Charles Taylor’s NPFL forces. 

Fighting around the embassy continued to

decrease as October progressed. The Nigerian

forces gained loose control over central Monrovia

while Charles Taylor’s undisciplined NPFL fighters

withdrew to the eastern suburbs of the city. The

peacekeepers’ trucks, loaded with soldiers, and

Panhard AML-60 reconnaissance vehicles frequently drove by the compound’s posts. After

West African aircraft bombed the city of

Buchanan, the NPFL retaliated by shelling the

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 59
Freeport area. Marines watched Ghanaian

Aermacchi MB-339 jets flying ground attack missions. Later in the month they observed Nigerian

Dassault/Dornier Alpha Jets fly overhead almost

daily.199*

These developments allowed task force

Marines to settle into a quieter routine while

assisting in the periodic evacuation of noncombatants. Working smoothly with Edward J. Fisher,

the consular officer, Marines also helped process

the administrative paperwork of those wishing to

leave the country. The Marines received additional training on screening, identification, and passports to assist in determining who would be evacuated. The embassy staff efficiently “would get

the word out to the people in the street to come

in and fill out an application and bring their necessary paperwork, which eliminated a lot of the

administrative burden.”200

Among the challenges faced by the Marines

was the cancellation of scheduled flights. On several occasions, weather and maintenance problems interfered with the times helicopters were

scheduled to arrive. The CSSD Marines would get

the evacuees processed and down to the landing

zone and the helicopter would never arrive.

According to Chief Warrant Officer Deering, when

unexpected cancellations of evacuation flights

occurred, “You’d have to tell the people, ‘So sorry.

Come back in three days,’ which wasn’t a big deal

for us, but if you were one of the people trying to

get out of Liberia, and you just sold your soul to

whomever to get on board this helicopter and get

out of the country it was a very depressing

sight.”201 The Marines knew cancellations frustrated the evacuees, especially after they had been

through the entire preparation process. Deering

noted that, “we would have to send the people

back out. At certain points it was dangerous out

in the streets and these people had, obviously,

come some distance to get in the embassy and

were anxious to get out [of Liberia].”202

Parts and supplies for the helicopters came

from a long, thinly stretched supply line.** A difficult maintenance problem for the air combat element occurred at the end of October when the

Marine helicopters needed a mandatory rotor

head modification. The sleeve on the hubs of the

rotor heads of CH-46 helicopters had a tendency

to crack and all the helicopters in the Department

of the Navy were limited to lifting 22,000 pounds

of gross weight instead of the usual 24,300

pounds until they were equipped with the modification. After receiving a Naval Aviation System

Command message requiring all CH-46 helicopters to be modified, Major Johnson’s helicopters

got top priority. 

Unfortunately, the ship was not equipped with

a crane capable of lifting the rotor heads, so the

modification maintenance crew could not perform the work on board. The forward logistic site

on Lungi Airfield secured a crane and the space

needed to make the modifications. The helicopters were flown to Freetown one at a time for the

modification. However, the modification team at

Freetown encountered other problems, including

a lack of the necessary spare parts. Only two helicopters remained available while work continued

on the third. The project took longer than expected and it was two weeks before all three helicopters were modified and back to Liberian waters.203

The West African soldiers continued to make

headway and attacked the NPFL using the INPFL

as allies.204 By 30 October, some signs of a return

to normalcy in Monrovia appeared when the

power briefly came on.205 The number of Marines

ashore providing security gradually declined with

the fighting. Based on input from Captain Grause

and Major Hartley that the worst appeared to be

over, European Command reduced the number of

Marines allowed at the embassy. The next question was how long the Marines would have to

stay.

Logistics support grew as the direct threat to

the American Embassy shrank. A large part of the

Marine task force’s logistic support in Operation

Sharp Edge involved diesel fuel, which powered

the embassy’s generators. With the power grid in

Monrovia shut down, the five generators ran

almost around the clock and used 800 to 1,200

gallons of diesel fuel each day. To support this

level of consumption, the aviation detachment

brought the fuel ashore in 500-gallon bladders,

which weighed about 3,000 pounds each when

filled.206

Supporting the embassy’s fuel needs required a

tremendous amount of work. Before they

repaired the rotor heads at the end of October,

60 ON MAMBA STATION

* The Nigerians deployed four Dassault-Breguet/Dornier

Alpha Jets to replace the Ghanaian jets after 20 October. The

aircraft is a tandem seat jet designed for reconnaissance, training, and light ground attacks.

** Parts came from worldwide naval aviation supply activities.

Normally routed to Rota, Spain, these critical supplies would

be flown by Navy aircraft to Freetown, Sierra Leone. To complete the 3,500-mile journey, the helicopters of HC-4 ferried

the parts to the Marine aviation maintenance detachment off

the coast of Liberia. 
the CH-46 helicopters were limited to 22,000

pounds gross weight. Because of the fuel’s weight

and the distance the aircraft had to travel, a helicopter carrying a fuel bladder could not carry a

full load of fuel for itself. As such, a helicopter

would take on as much internal fuel as it could

manage, fly the fuel bladder to the embassy, and

then return to the ship. After refueling, the helicopter could then carry another bladder. Since

each flight and unloading process took between

three and four hours, transferring the fuel made

for a long flight day.207

The fuel supply effort kept the onshore support Marines busy. Helicopters brought in 2,000

gallons three times a week to satisfy the

embassy’s needs. As each 500-gallon bladder

arrived in the landing zone, the bulk fuel handlers

from the CSSD Marines took over. Using two

pumps (one pumped at 125-gallons per minute

and the other pumped at 50-gallons per minute),

they would transfer the fuel from the bladder into

a fuel truck, which held 2,000 gallons. Once the

truck was full, it would be driven to the generator sites where the fuel would be pumped into the

generators’ tanks.208

Performing both their evacuation and logistics

responsibilities, service support Marines helped to

bring in tons of foodstuffs and dry goods for the

State Department’s commissary and exchange. By

November, the embassy supply flights routinely

brought in luxury items such as 50 pallets of beer

and liquor, 500 gallons of ice cream, and pet

food.* The Marines occasionally felt like hired

hands. But Chief Warrant Officer Deering said his

Marines “didn’t feel bad about showing them

what they could do.” Some of the CSSD Marines

went beyond the required effort, helping to pour

a concrete slab from the landing zone to the road,

as well as undertaking wiring and electrical troubleshooting for the embassy.209

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 61

DVIC DN-SC-91-06066

A Marine CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter lowers a fuel bladder onto Landing Zone Magic in the continuing effort of the amphibious ready group to supply the embassy.

* The Marines also delivered pallets of carbonated beverages

to the embassy. Initially, the embassy sold a can of soda to the

Marines for 50 cents and then raised the price to $1. As a

result, the Marines stopped buying the embassy’s stock.
Rotation and Reduction of

CMAGTF Marines

A relatively quiet Monrovia resulted in only 62

Marines ashore during November. On 3

November, the USS Newport County (LST 1179)

arrived at Mamba Station bringing Company L,

BLT 3/8 to relieve the Marines of Company K. The

platoon commanders and squad leaders went in

after receiving a situation orientation for the

turnover. Within days of the Newport’s arrival, the

joint task force commander released the

Barnstable County, which departed Liberian

waters with Marine combat engineers onboard.

On 14 November, Captain William F. Crenshaw’s,

Company L assumed security responsibilities

ashore. Company K remained in reserve onboard

the Whidbey Island to support Company L with a

standby reaction force. 

As the month progressed, the number of weekly evacuees dwindled. The combat service support Marines onboard continued to provide logistics assistance to the embassy and the Marines

ashore. Helicopters from the forward logistic site

in Freetown delivered pallets of rice and baby

food to the embassy as part of a humanitarian aid

package. The stable situation allowed the West

African force, along with some Liberian support,

to fill the vacuum left by Doe’s death as an interim government was appointed. The government’s

real power, however, extended only to the outskirts of the city. Ambassador DeVos attended the

22 November ceremony together with the peacekeeping force commander and his soldiers.

Subsequent negotiations lead by the Economic

Community of West African States resulted in all

factions agreeing to another ceasefire on 28

November.210

On 30 November, the USS Nashville (LPD 13)

arrived at Mamba Station to rotate the command

element of the Contingency MAGTF. Major

Hartley, his staff, and subordinate commanders

briefed their replacements on the current situation

in Liberia. While the briefings took place, the necessary transfers of equipment and personnel

occurred. During the transition that day, fighting

flared up briefly between the AFL, INPFL, and

peacekeepers at the Barclay Training Center. The

62 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-SC-91-06089

Marines at the American Embassy unload a container of hot food. All outside commercial aircraft flights

had been cancelled, making the embassy dependent on 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit for resupply.
firefight resulted in stray rounds hitting the U.S.-

leased Sam and E apartment building just outside

the compound. At Post Two, one of the rounds

hit a Marine, knocking him down and creating a

three-inch crease in his Kevlar helmet. Unharmed,

the round resulted in only a bruised forehead.

The lance corporal and his scarred helmet

became the object of much attention according to

his platoon commander, First Lieutenant Walter E.

Lavrinovich, Jr.211

Command of the Contingency MAGTF changed

on 1 December with the executive officer of the

26th MEU, Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Kunkel,

assuming command from Major Hartley. The transition was completed early on the morning of 2

December, when the Whidbey Island with the

Marines of the original Contingency MAGTF 3-90

left Mamba Station. 

As the Nashville arrived in Liberian waters, a

European Command modification to the execute

order directed a reduction in Marine presence

ashore. Although the total number for the task

force remained constant, only about 40 Marines

remained onshore. Evacuation criteria changed

with the new State Department policy that virtually eliminated most remaining applicants.

Lieutenant Colonel Kunkel recalled the Marines

evacuated less than 50 people during

December.212* The leadership at European

Command, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and the

MEU believed the time to pull the Marines out

had arrived.

A sense of peace returned in the streets of the

city. Many of the markets reopened and people

moved about conducting their daily activities.

Deployed throughout the city and manning

checkpoints, the West African peacekeepers’ presence improved the security situation. The INPFL

remained at their Cadwell base area and the AFL

at the Barclay Training Center. The calm allowed

some of the Marine task force staff to venture out

and view the wholesale destruction firsthand. As

Lieutenant Colonel Kunkel noted: “The first time

we went out, it was clearly a city that had been at

war. It looked like Berlin: you know, burned out

buildings, collapsed buildings, streets blocked,

burned out cars.”213 The look and mood of the

city, however, changed within weeks as the new

Marine task force commander noted:

The city was getting back to normal: lots of people out and

about, open-air markets....

Vehicles moving: taxicab very,

very busy.... Local police started

coming out of the woodwork

and back on duty. There was a

concerted effort to clean the city

up, clean the port up, clean the

housing areas up. It was a mess,

but it was slowly getting back to

normal. There was an unofficial

ceasefire and there was no fighting between any of the three factions.214

Other evidence of a return to normalcy included the reopening of Spriggs-Payne Airport on 8

December, when two of the peacekeeper’s Alpha

Jets landed. This allowed United Nations charter

flights to begin using the airfield. Both the INPFL

and NPFL opened rice distribution centers in

areas under their control.

Completion of Sharp Edge

Preparing to bring their mission to a close in

early January 1991, the task force reduced the

number of personnel and support equipment

ashore. The 26th MEU by this time had evacuated

831 noncombatants.215

A notable achievement of the 26th MEU

involved the logistic support provided to the

embassy. Marines brought in countless tons of

food, supplies, and more than 100,000 gallons of

fuel to the compound. Despite the small size of

the MEU, which made it incapable of being divided, it also successfully operated two geographically separated MAGTFs. Lastly, in the midst of

the turmoil, the accomplishment of a major instream reconfiguration of equipment and transfer

of forces spoke highly of amphibious ready group

and Marine expeditionary unit teamwork, as well

as the flexibility it gave to the commander of the

European Command. 

A total of 2,439 persons were evacuated during

Operation Sharp Edge, involving citizens from 59

countries. Less than 10 percent of the evacuees

were Americans.216 Dennis Jett, the deputy chief

of mission, summed up the contribution of the

Marines by stating: “We could have not maintained our presence without your efforts. That

ability to remain here allowed us to monitor and

influence events, to speed relief operations, and

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 63

* The Marines also conducted a pet evacuation in which all

the embassy’s pets were evacuated by helicopter.
to evacuate those U.S. citizens and nationals of

other countries who wanted to leave. In doing so,

you were responsible for savings hundreds, and

probably thousands of lives.”217

The Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team

and the Departure of the Marines

Considering the large buildup in the Persian

Gulf and the apparent stability and security in

Monrovia, European Command felt the time was

right to end the mission. The Ambassador

believed, however, that a security presence would

still be required. Through additional consultations

with the Department of State, an interagency

group in Washington, D.C., recommended a

Marine presence remain at the embassy.

European Command requested U.S. Atlantic

Command’s support. Consequently, Admiral

Carter tasked Marine Corps Security Force

Battalion, Atlantic, with the embassy security mission.

Alerted and called off leave on 28 December,

the 5th Platoon, Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security

Team (FAST) Company, from Marine Corps

Security Force Battalion, Atlantic, received the

tasking. The 50-man platoon left Norfolk, Virginia,

on 6 January 1991 and arrived at Lungi Airfield,

Sierra Leone, a day later. They were the first FAST

platoon to support an embassy.218

At the airfield, the platoon transferred their

equipment, supplies, and ammunition from Navy

C-130 aircraft to Navy CH-53E helicopters. One of

the Navy helicopters belonging to HC-4 was

undergoing repairs, leaving only one operational

CH-53E to shuttle the FAST platoon and its equipment to Monrovia. The entire platoon arrived by

the afternoon of 7 January, completing a long

2,000-mile journey in two days. Once on the

ground, the FAST platoon commander, Captain

Glen N. Cheatham, together with Company L’s

commanding officer, Captain Crenshaw, conducted a turnover and toured the defensive positions.

After a quick briefing, Captain Cheatham’s pla64 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-05949

A Marine CH-46E helicopter approaches the flight deck of the USS Nashville (LPD 13). With the arrival of

a platoon of the Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team Company, which assumed security responsibility

from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, the Nashville departed, officially ending Operation Sharp Edge.
toon officially assumed security responsibilities,

manning posts, exchanging frequencies, and signing for ammunition and rations.219

Dressed in civilian clothing, Company L’s liaison, the defense attache, and FAST Marine representatives went to Spriggs-Payne Airport to meet

an arriving Navy C-130 loaded with the FAST platoon’s follow-on equipment, ammunition, and

supplies. Still along the edges of the airstrip were

human remains; skeletons with rotting flesh still

on them and piles of skulls.220 West African

peacekeepers now controlled the airfield, but the

control tower had been peppered by small arms

rounds during fighting and was not functioning.

There also was a gaping rocket-propelled grenade

hole in the tower. A Marine forward air controller

talked the arriving aircraft in from the embassy

and the Marines quickly unloaded and moved

their cargo to the compound. 

Late that day, Company L Marines flew out of

the embassy and back to the Nashville. The

turnover was complete with the delivery of additional ammunition stocks on the morning of 8

January. Operation Sharp Edge officially came to

an end on 9 January when Contingency MAGTF

3-90 departed Mamba Station. The Nashville’s

departure concluded the longest running noncombatant evacuation operation to date. 

The arrival of the FAST platoon provided the

embassy with a highly trained security force with

close quarters battle capability and robust crewserved firepower. Manning three day posts and

five night posts, they worked on improving selected positions. The Marines ate in the embassy’s

cafeteria and resided in vacant staff quarters. The

FAST command structure also differed from that

of the contingency task force. Reports went

directly to the team’s higher headquarters, the

commander of the Sixth Fleet. Daily reports of the

platoon covered the routine movement of the

peacekeepers’ military vehicles and personnel up

and down United Nations Drive in front of Post

One and Post Two. Armed factional fighters,

mostly located outside Monrovia, never came

near the Marine’s positions. One large, very vocal

demonstration occurred in late January directly

outside the embassy. The Marines asked the

Liberians why they were demonstrating and they

responded they wanted “U.S. protection.” The

crowd of 200 to 300 persons eventually dispersed.

Even with the apparent normalcy, 5th Platoon

Marines on post heard random shots fired many

times throughout their stay. 

The embassy no longer depended on the

Marines for fuel or water. The administrative officer renegotiated contracts for fuel and water out

in town. Opening the airport allowed additional

supplies to come by Navy C-130.* The embassy

staff frequently ventured out in the city and airport to carry on official business. Even the Marine

security guards went out routinely to conduct

physical training runs.

The cessation of fighting allowed West African

peacekeepers to hold a parade for their rotating

battalions on 9 February. The event was attended

by the interim President of Liberia, the U.S.

Ambassador, the defense attache, and the FAST

platoon commander. At the parade, Captain

Cheatham noted that Major General Dogonyaro,

the peacekeeping force’s commander, reminded

his audience that his Nigerian troops now played

a major part in the control of the city.221

Charles Taylor’s NPFL fighters remained on the

city’s outskirts and Prince Johnson’s INFPL at the

Cadwell area. Some of the non-governmental

relief agencies within the city re-established limited services. The formal signing by all factions of

a ceasefire monitoring agreement took place in

Lome, Togo, on 13 February 1991.222

Monrovia and its environs remained overall

peaceful during January and February 1991. With

the ongoing buildup of forces in Kuwait, both the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and European Command

wanted the Marines to depart. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff directive ordering redeployment of the FAST

Marines finally arrived in the second week of

February from the Sixth Fleet. The Ambassador’s

reservations were overcome by developments in

the Persian Gulf region, which dictated the mission’s end. 

In concert with the United Nations’ 15 February

deadline for the Iraqis to withdraw from Kuwait,

the commander of the Sixth Fleet ordered the

FAST platoon to depart Liberia the same day by

Navy C-130. The morning arrival of the C-130 and

C-9 aircraft at Spriggs-Payne Airport signaled the

start of regular semi-monthly supply flights for the

embassy. For the Marines, the platoon’s 15

February departure ended a 194-day presence of

Marine combat units ashore in Liberia. Marine

combat units would return approximately five

years later to the same long-running civil war.

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 65

* Navy Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 58 (VR-58) conducted the supply flights into Spriggs-Payne Airport.

Civil War Continues

A tenuous ceasefire remained in effect in

Liberia from the time Marines departed in

February 1991 until October 1992, but frequent

ceasefire violations occurred after the Lome truce.

Because of the failure to get all sides involved,

peace remained elusive. Fighting quickly spread

eastward into neighboring Sierra Leone in March

1991. Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of

Liberia (NPFL) fighters worked with the fledgling

Revolutionary United Front against the government of Sierra Leone and captured several lucrative diamond-mining areas. Within a year, the

West African peacekeeping force and the Sierra

Leone army had prodded the rebels out of most

of the occupied cities and villages and into the

Sierra Leone countryside. A new Liberian militia

group, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia

for Democracy (ULIMO), attacked NPFL forces

from Sierra Leone and moved into western

Liberia. Many former Armed Forces of Liberia

(AFL) soldiers joined ULIMO.

In October 1991, a series of negotiations

attended by all factions at Yamoussoukro, Ivory

Coast, produced an agreement requiring all factions to confine their fighters to camps, disarm

under the peacekeepers’ supervision, and agree

to support elections.223 In accordance with the

agreement, the NPFL allowed peacekeepers to

deploy into the countryside. The NPFL also recognized the authority of the peacekeepers, a primarily English speaking African force, and its parent organization, the Economic Community of

West African States. The peacekeepers added

1,200 Senegalese soldiers to balance the force

with substantial French speaking African

troops.224

But Taylor’s NPFL and other factions did not

disarm. Taylor increased his power by creating a

shadow state, issuing money and selling timber,

gold, and diamonds in NPFL controlled areas.225

By 1992, NPFL fighters killed a few Senegalese

troops and temporarily took more than 400

peacekeepers hostage. Clashes continued and the

peacekeepers withdrew to the greater Monrovia

area. On 15 October, major hostilities resumed as

the NPFL launched an offensive to take the capital. Heavy fighting took place when the fighters

entered the suburbs of the city, which resulted in

the displacement of an estimated 200,000

Liberians.226 On 20 October, the U.S. Embassy

conducted an ordered departure of American citizens. In four days, charter and military aircraft

evacuated 170 Americans.227 Twenty embassy

personnel stayed behind, including the Marine

security guard detachment.*

Deployed in the U.S. European Command’s

area of responsibility, the 26th MEU (Special

Operations Capable) closely tracked the developments in Liberia. Alerted for possible evacuation

contingencies during the fighting in October 1992,

the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group

(ARG), composed of the 26th MEU (SOC) and

Amphibious Squadron (Phibron) 8, at the time

supported both Operation Provide Comfort and

scheduled Sixth Fleet exercises. No attempt was

made to assist in contingency operations in

Liberia while the Mediterranean ARG conducted

split operations.228 Fortunately, Taylor’s troops

never entered the city. The West African peacekeepers blunted Taylor’s offensive on the outskirts of the city using tanks, artillery, naval gunChapter 5

22d MEU in Operation Assured Response

* Initially, the regional security officer directed part of the

Marine security guard to evacuate due to a mandated number

of personnel that were to remain behind. But those numbers

conflicted with the embassy’s existing emergency action plan,

which mandated the number of personnel to be evacuated.
fire, and air support. Eventually, the peacekeepers

regained control of greater Monrovia. 

As the bloodletting continued into 1993,

ULIMO stepped up its attacks on the NPFL, but

the peacekeepers eventually disarmed them. A

massacre of 600 civilians on 6 June by the AFL

occurred in the West African-controlled city of

Harbel.229 The incident seriously weakened confidence in the peacekeepers as protectors, as they

appeared to favor certain factions. In another

round of negotiations by the Economic

Community of West African States at Contonou,

Benin, the factions again agreed to a ceasefire and

a timetable for disarmament and elections.

Signatures from representatives of the

Organization of African Unity and United Nations

added support to the accords in July. As a result,

the United Nations established a 368-man observer force, called the United Nations Observer

Mission Liberia.230 The accord replaced the interim government of Amos Sawyer with a Liberian

national transitional government. After considerable delay, the transitional government took control in March 1994, but the plans for elections in

September collapsed. During September, former

AFL elements staged an unsuccessful coup.

Significant disarmament and demobilization of

the factions did not take place due to differences

over political and economic power. While negotiations continued, the fragile peace quickly disintegrated as outbreaks of fighting occurred in the

countryside. In 1994, the ULIMO group split into

two ethnic factions, the ULIMO-K (predominately

Mandingo and Muslim) under Alhiji Kromah and

ULIMO-J (predominately Krahn) led by Roosevelt

Johnson. Another Krahn faction, the Liberia Peace

Council (LPC) headed by George Boley, also

appeared and began fighting the NPFL.

Competing factions eventually mushroomed into

seven separate militia groups.

68 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of the authors

Armed National Patriotic Liberation Front fighters skirt the southern edge of the American Embassy compound in search of United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy militia members. Escalating

conflict between the two groups again forced many American citizens into the embassy.
Areas outside the Monrovia-BuchananGbarnga peacekeeping zone remained inaccessible due to deteriorating security. Fighting

between the factions resumed with Taylor losing,

then regaining his headquarters at Gbarnga. The

lack of security in the countryside forced the U.N.

military observers to reduce the size of this mission and its activities. The continuing flow of arms

and the unwillingness to uphold a ceasefire

fueled more violence. 

At Abuja, Nigeria, negotiations ended with the

factions signing the 13th peace accord in August

1995. The plan formed a new Liberian transitional national government composed at first of a

five-person, then later a six-person, Counsel of

State. Sworn in on 1 September, faction leaders

Charles Taylor (NPFL), Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO-K),

and George Boley (LPC) received cabinet posts

together with three civilians. 

By December, the ceasefire again broke down

and fighting occurred between ULIMO-J and West

African peacekeepers at Tubmanburg, which

began initially over control of diamond mines.

With all the factional leaders living in Monrovia,

clashes between other cabinet ministers’ factions

took place and only token disarmament occurred.

Council calls for the arrest of Roosevelt Johnson

(ULIMO-J) on 12 March 1996 sparked a brief

outburst of violence in the city. At the beginning

of April, another attempt to arrest Johnson

spurred an outbreak of widespread fighting in

Monrovia.

Introduction of American Forces

The NPFL, ULIMO-J, and other Krahns smuggled arms and fighters into the city, creating a

potential powder keg. In early April, the situation

came to a head when Council member Taylor

(NPFL) issued a 72-hour ultimatum to Johnson

(ULIMO-J) to turn himself in. Similar to the March

incident, a combined NPFL and ULIMO-K force

went to arrest Johnson. The ensuing fighting started at approximately 0300 on 6 April and created

chaos inside the city, which previously had been

a safe haven from the conflict in the countryside.231 By mid-morning, Americans fleeing from

the violence began arriving at the embassy. The

fighters who had infiltrated the city drew on hidden caches of arms and ammunition and the violence quickly escalated. The Emergency Action

Committee met that evening at the U.S. Embassy

with Sergeant Luiz E. Sanchez, the acting Marine

security guard detachment commander, in attendance.* The staff expressed concern for the safety and accountability of Americans and the meeting ended with a request for security assistance

and for permission to draw down the staff. 

On directions from the embassy’s regional

security officer, Sergeant Sanchez put an additional Marine security guard at Post One, doubling the

number of guards at that post. Inundated with

calls on seven different radio nets, Post One

Marines remained extremely busy controlling

access, monitoring nets, talking on radios, and

passing messages. The Marines frequently heard

sounds of gunfire or rocket-propelled grenades

exploding in the city. One mortar round exploded in the U.N. observer compound just across the

street from the embassy. Sergeant Sanchez frequently observed fighters moving within the view

of the embassy’s closed-circuit television camera

security system. The fighters brandished weapons

as they drove by the embassy in stolen vehicles.

Refugees, looters, and groups of drunk or

marijuana-high fighters roamed the streets. The

Marines also received reports of fighting at the airport, Barclay Training Center, and in the Mamba

Point area. The violence increased as additional

NPFL and ULIMO-K troops poured in from the

countryside.232

The escalation forced humanitarian aid organizations to depart as combatants pillaged aid

organizations’ buildings and warehouses. By

Easter Sunday, 7 April, more than 400 people

waited in the compound for evacuation. The

embassy opened the gates of Graystone compound to provide refuge for the Liberian population and 15,000 displaced Liberians quickly filled

the American-controlled compound while others

roamed the streets looking for safe haven.233

American citizens in town were taken off guard

by the violence and were quickly caught in the

middle of the fighting. Many telephoned the

embassy for help. Marine security guards relayed

calls to the regional security officer who repeatedly left the compound to intervene, accompanied at times by a faction liaison officer. To get to

the embassy, Americans had to run a gauntlet of

roadblocks where they were shaken down or

seized. Chaos and terror reigned throughout the

22D MEU IN OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE 69

* Staff Sergeant Jerry A. Blandford, the commander of the

Marine security guard detachment at the time of the outbreak

of fighting, was on leave in the United States. He and one

replacement, after a number of flights, flew into the embassy

about a week later on helicopters from Special Operations

Command, Europe. (Sergeant Luiz E. Sanchez interview,

27Oct97 [Oral History Collection])
city as armed fighters robbed, looted, broke into

homes, and threatened citizens. Mobs invaded the

facilities of the U.N. relief agencies and stole more

than 300 vehicles, pillaging warehouses and

destroying property as they went. At the airport,

two aircraft were hit by rocket fire and exploded

into flames.

Acting similar to the warring factions, many

peacekeepers abandoned their posts as the fighting spread or did nothing to intervene to stop the

fighting or looting. Groups of soldiers from the

West African force actually participated in the

looting. Many of the Nigerian soldiers had not

been paid in four months and some sold ammunition or handed over their weapons to the

Krahns. Most peacekeepers hastily retreated to

their bases, although some remained guarding

selected facilities and businesses while allowing

the looting to go on around them.234

The embassy’s request for military support

prompted a presidential announcement on 9 April

to send in U.S. forces to assist in the evacuation

of Americans and other foreigners.235 Responding

to the tasking from the national command authorities, European Command established a joint task

force headed by U.S. Army Brigadier General

Michael A. Canavan, the commanding general of

European Special Operations Command.236 The

special operations forces received alert orders on

6 and 7 April to move to Dakar, Senegal, and

Freetown, Sierra Leone, to assemble in support of

evacuation operations in Liberia. The 10-day

operation was the first time the command element

of the European Special Operations Command

formed as a joint task force.237 Named Assured

Response, the operation’s deployment order

directed the pre-positioning of equipment and aircraft at an intermediate support base in Dakar,

Senegal, and at a forward support base in

Freetown, Sierra Leone. The mission of the joint

task force was to conduct a noncombatant evacuation and protect the lives of American citizens

and designated third- and host-country nationals

in Monrovia.238

A succession of firefights took place in front of

the embassy before the joint task force arrived.

Johnson’s ULIMO-J fighters gathered in an area

near Gate One, later nicknamed “Crack Alley” by

70 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DF-SD-01-09185

This view down United Nations Drive, which borders the full length of the American Embassy’s landward

wall, shows where much of the looting of other nations’ embassy and consular buildings took place.
the Marines. Near the Wellington apartments, a

number of armed fighters in vehicles and on foot

roamed around looking for places to loot. The

fighters on the street, within view of the

embassy’s Mezbau Gate, repeatedly fired random

shots. In a risky move aimed at dissuading the

fighters from breaking in and stealing the visible

U.S. government vehicles, Lance Corporal Edward

A. Davis, III, dashed from cover, unarmed and

under full observation of the armed fighters, and

placed an American flag on a chain-link fence

gate. This action helped deter the fighters, who

later invaded and looted other buildings near the

embassy.239

With a Special Operations Command, Europe,

assessment and Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) teams

on the way, Marine security guards and the local

guard force prepared the embassy’s landing zone

by taking down the basketball court backboards,

hoops, and poles, cutting trees, and placing light

markers on the fence line. A six-person survey

and assessment team landed first, followed by an

18-man SEAL team. Both elements disembarked

on 9 April from Sikorsky MH-53J Pave Low helicopters in the embassy landing zone. The team

established security positions in conjunction with

the regional security officer and the five Marine

security guards.* The two helicopters left fully

loaded with evacuees who were waiting in the

compound.240

Fighting continued outside the embassy and on

11 April, after beating two local unarmed guards,

fighters with weapons entered the embassy

grounds and attempted to break into the diplomatic quarters. The SEALs reacted by rounding up

the fighters with no casualties and then releasing

them. Additional special operations personnel

soon arrived. Rounds from small arms posed a

constant threat to the helicopters landing in the

embassy landing zone. One rocket-propelled

grenade exploded near an incoming helicopter,

prompting the joint task force to switch to night

helicopter landings. During the day, fire was

22D MEU IN OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE 71

DoD (USAF) 960411-F-0954H-005

American citizens evacuated from Monrovia exit the tail of a U.S. Air Force MH-53 Pave Low helicopter

in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The helicopter and its crew deployed from the 352d Special Operations Group,

Mildenhall, United Kingdom.

* Marine Security Guard Detachment, Monrovia, normally consisted of seven Marines.
heaviest in the afternoon and most U.S. personnel

remained inside to avoid stray rounds regularly

impacting within the compound. By 16 April, the

South European Army Task Force’s initial ready

company, Company C, 325th Airborne Combat

Team, manned defensive positions and ran security patrols in the compound.241

Sporadic fighting continued throughout the city

with heavy fighting taking place between the

NPFL, ULIMO-J, and Krahns. Smoke from fires set

by looters or started by shelling billowed from the

city. Evacuees gave firsthand accounts of Guinean

peacekeeping troops joining in the looting and

selling weapons to the fighters. Although West

African tanks rolled through parts of the city, the

troops remained ineffective in restoring order. At

the Barclay Training Center, Krahn and Johnson’s

ULIMO-J men defended the compound while

holding peacekeepers hostage against NPFL

attacks.242 The Barclay Training Center repeatedly

received barrages of machine gun fire and volleys

of rocket-propelled grenades. In the central business district and on Bushrod Island, gangs of

armed youth roamed the area pillaging and burning businesses.

The bitter fighting resulted in special operations forces and diplomatic security personnel

conducting a number of rescues to save American

citizens outside the compound. After nine days,

more than 2,200 noncombatants representing 73

countries, including approximately 540

Americans, had been evacuated. Most evacuees

left the embassy landing zone by helicopters and

flew to the forward support base at Lungi Airfield

in Sierra Leone. By 18 April, Lungi had become

home to the special operations forces command

element, which comprised nine helicopters, two

aircraft, and approximately 650 personnel. From

the airfield, aircraft delivered the evacuees to a

safe haven at Dakar, Senegal. Once at the Dakar

airport terminal, embassy and joint task force personnel assisted in processing the evacuees to their

final destinations. At the height of the deployment, the special operation forces positioned 11

aircraft and close to 600 support personnel in

Dakar.243 On arrival, the Marines inherited only a

72 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DF-SD-01-09184

Civilian evacuees waiting on board a Lockheed MC-130H Combat Talon II aircraft from the 352d Special

Operations Group for their next flight to Dakar, Senegal, where they would be turned over to U.S. State

Department representatives for the last segment of the evacuation from Liberia.
22D MEU IN OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE 73

small portion of General Canavan’s special operations forces, assets, and support bases.

Marines Take the Reins

As early as 10 April, U.S. Army General George

A. Joulwan, Commander in Chief, European

Command, wanted to ensure the return of his

special operations forces. After issuing the execute order for Assured Response, his staff followed with a modification of the plan, which

called for replacing the special operations joint

task force with a Marine joint task force if the situation did not stabilize quickly. The modification

would provide the right force for any lengthy

operation. Since the inception of Assured

Response, General Joulwan recognized the utility

of the Mediterranean ARG for any long-term situation. 

Alerted by telephone the day before, the 22d

MEU (SOC) commander, Colonel M. Wayne

Forbush, received the first modification to the

European Command Assured Response execute

order on 11 April. The order directed the

Mediterranean ARG with the embarked Landing

Force Sixth Fleet to sail at best speed to Monrovia,

Liberia. With no relief from Sixth Fleet’s ongoing

exercise requirements, Colonel Forbush understood the situation required split-MEU operations.

The additional mission now assigned to 22d MEU

was to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations and to provide security for the American

Embassy in Liberia. Three of the ships, USS Guam

(LPH 9), USS Trenton (LPD 14), and USS Portland

(LSD 37), located in the Adriatic Sea, got underway immediately. The last ship, the USS Tortuga

(LSD 46), was undergoing repairs at the port of

Haifa, Israel. The majority of the MEU staff also

was in Israel planning for exercise Noble Shirley.

MEU elements on the Tortuga, the artillery,

Battery B, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, and the

light armored reconnaissance company, Company

D (-), 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion,

went ashore in Israel to conduct a scheduled

exercise. No cross-decking or reconfiguration was

necessary other than transporting six weapons

carrier high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (humvees) to Sierra Leone from Israel.244

A forward liaison cell departed the Guam on

14 April 1996 with a mission focused on liaison

and preparation for the turnover of the forces at

the embassy. Lieutenant Colonel James F. Barnes,

the 22d MEU executive officer, led the four-man

team. Flying by C-130 to Freetown, Sierra Leone,

the team went to the joint task force rear headquarters located at the airport’s lounge building.

Inside the building, Lieutenant Colonel Barnes

recalled: “There must have been 25 colonels and

50 lieutenant colonels.”245 Seeing the large number of officers, soldiers, and airmen present at the

joint task force headquarters, Barnes realized the

expeditionary unit needed to bring in additional

MEU staff to coordinate operations. 

At the embassy, Ambassador William B. Milam

learned of the deployment of the Marines during

one of his live interagency secure teleconferences

after the special operations force’s arrival. On 15

April, the Marines of the forward liaison cell

arrived at the embassy in Monrovia and coordinated with the European Special Operations

Command’s forward headquarters, the U.S. Army

infantry battalion commander, and the Ambassador and his staff. Ambassador Milam previously

had worked with Marines and met Lieutenant

Colonel Barnes during Operation Sea Angel.246

The forward liaison cell relayed an initial

assessment to the MEU recommending the introduction of the same size force the special operations joint task force had at the embassy, as well

as staff visits before the ship arrived in Liberian

waters. Agreeing to the suggestion of staff liaison

visits, the 22d MEU commander sent 11 members

of his staff and subordinate elements to visit Lungi

Airfield headquarters and the embassy in

Monrovia from 17 to 19 April. By 18 April, special

operations elements at Freetown and Dakar were

ordered to redeploy because of the arrival of the

Army’s initial ready company. The special operaUSS Guam (LPH 9) MARG 1-96 Deployment Cruise Book

In mid-April, Col Melvin W. Forbush was appointed Joint Task Force Assured Response commander

when the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit

assumed the evacuation and security mission

from the Army.
tions forces immediately began breaking down

tents and packing equipment for departure. 

By 18 April, the special operations joint task

force had completed evacuation of all Americans

in an “authorized departure status,” those wanting

to leave voluntarily. Only 18 official American and

State Department personnel remained at the

embassy.* On 19 April, emergency talks sponsored by the Economic Community of West

African States brought a temporary halt to the

fighting in Monrovia, but the situation remained

tense. 

That same day, ships carrying Marines arrived

at Mamba Station located off the coast of Liberia.

The 22d MEU commander, Colonel Forbush,

received another modification to the European

Command order, which directed the Marines to

assume the European Special Operations

Command evacuation and security mission. He

quickly recalled his visiting staff on 19 April to

help the MEU command element assume the

additional responsibilities as a joint task force

headquarters. Upon completion of the turnover,

Colonel Forbush relieved Brigadier General

Canavan and assumed command of Joint Task

Force Assured Response. The joint task force initially included: the 22d MEU; Amphibious

Squadron 2 (the Guam ARG) led by Captain

William D. Young, USN; the Air Force’s 4050th

Operations Squadron led by Colonel Wayne

Mudge, USAF; and a detachment from the Navy’s

Fleet Air Mediterranean at the forward support

base in Freetown, commanded by Captain Charles

White, USN.

The 22d MEU staff members assumed new

responsibilities as the joint task force staff and

adjusted to meet the requirements of both the

MEU commander and the commander in chief.

With the staff already split, planning sustained

operations required long hours from the staff’s

remaining junior officers and staff noncommissioned officers. The MEU requested and received

from the II Marine Expeditionary Force minimal

individual staff augmentation for the joint task

force.

Actions Ashore

At 0600 on 20 April, the first helicopter sorties

carrying Marines arrived to replace the soldiers at

the embassy in Monrovia. The well briefed platoon guides from Company F and Weapons

Company BLT 2/2 came ashore first. The main

body of Marines began arriving at the basketball

court landing zone one hour later. Company F

arrived first, quickly followed by the small 22d

MEU forward command element and some MEU

Service Support Group 22 (MSSG-22) personnel.

Fast attack vehicles debarked carrying .50-caliber

machine guns, Mk19 grenade launchers, and

tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided

missiles, commonly called TOW missiles. These

vehicles combined with the mortars, machine

guns, and sniper weapons already on station at

the embassy significantly enhanced the Marines’

firepower. The MEU completed the entire lift by

1015. 

Company F, commanded by Captain Eric M.

Mellinger, assumed security of the compound.

The smooth transition left Marine squad leaders

and platoon commanders with fire plans and field

sketches drawn by the departing airborne troops.

Starting at about 1230, soldiers from Company C,

3d Battalion, 325th Infantry, left in six sorties of

three Boeing MH-47D Chinook helicopters. The

last flight out of the embassy at 2015 included the

outgoing commander of the European Special

Operations Command’s Joint Task Force Assured

Response. That evening, more than 275 Marines

protected the compound. Captain Mellinger noted

the embassy staff seemed overjoyed the Marines

had arrived.247

The 22d MEU staff formed a joint operations

center forward at the embassy. Colonel Forbush’s

main headquarters remained on board the Guam

to minimize the footprint ashore. The evacuation

control center, a detachment of nine Marines from

MSSG-22, set up in the embassy’s dining facility

and went to work processing evacuees. At 1415,

with his forward deployed headquarters ashore,

Colonel Forbush officially assumed command of

Joint Task Force Assured Response. Most of the

approximately 1,970 personnel of the 22d MEU

(SOC), which was composed of BLT 2/2, MSSG22, and HMM-162, remained afloat.248

The next day the joint task force established a

forward support base at Freetown, Sierra Leone.

74 ON MAMBA STATION

* The 22d MEU called on its Marine KC-130 detachment to

transport essential staff members. Detachment “A,” Marine

Aerial Refueling Squadron 252 (VMGR-252) performed the

mission. The two aircraft detachments, normally on stand-by

in the continental U.S., had already deployed to support the

planned Noble Shirley exercise in Israel. Although the aircraft

were normally under the operational control of Sixth Fleet,

European Command’s modification to the Assured Response

execute order placed the aircraft under control of the commander of the joint task force on 24 April 1996. (Major James

K. Kazin interview, 12 Sep96 [Oral History Collection, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.])
The forward support base, coordinated by

Captain White, was the nexus of all traffic in and

out of Liberia. Using the same evacuation routing

established by the previous joint task force, the

Navy-run forward support base transferred evacuees from helicopters to awaiting aircraft that flew

to the safe haven in Dakar, Senegal.

On 22 April, Marine helicopters flew

Ambassador William H. Twadell (Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State for African Affairs) and his interagency support team to the embassy. The team,

which included Major General Michael J. Byron,

Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint

Staff, conducted discussions with West African

field commander General John M. Inenger at his

headquarters, and later with factional leaders.

During their two-day visit, meetings with the

peacekeepers centered on the West African

force’s efforts to restore order and a proposed

U.S. aid package of $30 million to assist peacekeeping operations. Colonel Forbush and Captain

Paul A. Shelton, the MEU’s assistant intelligence

officer, accompanied the team when it visited the

peacekeeping force’s headquarters. Frank comments by the Nigerian commander gave Colonel

Forbush an excellent understanding of the peacekeepers’ disposition and desires. The Nigerian

general requested a long list of military equipment support, including McDonnell Douglas AH64 Apache helicopter gunships.249 Given the

peacekeeper’s historically poor maintenance and

limited logistical capabilities, the request for

Apache helicopters did not receive serious consideration.

Colonel Forbush flew to Freetown the next day

and held a component commander’s conference

at the forward support base. At the 24 April meeting, he passed on General Joulwan’s intent to

reduce the overall force and presence ashore and

to redeploy all remaining special operations

troops. The reduced Air Force component of the

special operations force briefed their ongoing

redeployment plans. The joint task force would

retain two Air Force AC-130 gunships for on-call

support, but by 28 April the Air Force component’s AC-130s had left Freetown. The Navy com22D MEU IN OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE 75

Photo courtesy of the authors

Replacing U.S. Army soldiers, Marines of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit set up a sniper position on

the grounds of the American Embassy. The M40A1 sniper rifle pictured here was based on the Remington

model 700 and was manufactured by specially trained Marine Corps armorers.
ponent would keep one Lockheed EP-3 for reconnaissance and a two-helicopter detachment for

support on station.

Expanded from what the Marines defended in

1990, the embassy grounds in 1996 included the

former British Embassy within its boundaries. The

Marines at the embassy quartered themselves in

available rooms throughout the compound. The

joint task force forward, housed in the chancellery, occupied a majority of the ground floor.

Company F set up most of its defensive positions

away from the boundary of the embassy, primarily located on top of buildings with views of

United Nations Drive. 

The Marines worked on improving and adding

positions during the first week. One position was

established on the second floor of the Ambassador’s quarters, which was formerly the British

Embassy. The expanded U.S. Embassy boundary

faced the end of a natural avenue of approach

from the east up Sekou Toure Drive and United

Nations Drive.250 Any American property, however, drew displaced Liberians like a magnet. By

now more than 20,000 Liberians had gathered in

the nearby U.S.-controlled Greystone compound

looking for a safe haven from the violence.

Ghanaian mediators for the Economic Community

of West African States negotiated a truce on 20

April, and the Krahns released 78 foreigners held

at the Barclay Training Center. The Liberians

began a limited clean up of the city, although

marauding fighters continued moving about.

During the next few days the MEU’s intelligence

section received reports of more NPFL fighters

and heavy weapons, including mortars, entering

the city, while Krahn factions remained at the

Barclay Training Center.251

Marines Return Fire

On 27 April, Company G relieved Company F

and improved the new defensive positions,

including building dummy positions. The company commander, Captain Jeffrey J. Kenney, knew

the terrain quite well after deploying to Liberia as

a company executive officer in 1990 during

Operation Sharp Edge.

Serious fighting started up again on 28 and 29

76 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of the authors

The joint task force commander, Col Melvin W. Forbush, briefs key task force personnel at the forward

support base in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Decisions made at the meeting reduced the force’s footprint

ashore.
April.252 Stray rounds constantly passed over the

heads of the Marines and fighters in stolen vehicles or on foot frequently passed in front of the

Marine positions brandishing and pointing their

weapons at the Marines, who often responded

with stern warnings. Although the fighters congregated close to the embassy and attempted to

provoke the Marines, the Marines clearly understood the rules of engagement, which allowed the

Marines to return fire if fired upon, or if the fighters showed hostile intent. While the pointing of

weapons was common in Liberian culture, the

Marines could easily have interpreted the action

as a hostile intent. But the Marines on post exhibited considerable restraint.

A pattern of fighting soon developed near the

embassy. The NPFL normally received ammunition the night before a fight. Then the next day,

late in the morning, the NPFL would attack to the

east. Later in the day, the Krahns would push

them back west toward the embassy. When it was

over, both sides would return to their assembly

areas only to start the performance again the next

day.253

On 30 April, earlier than normal, the Marines

heard automatic weapons fire and explosions in

the city. The Krahns were attempting to break out

of the Barclay Training Center. Marines reported

heavy fire, concentrated outside the southern half

of the embassy opposite Post Seven at the facility

maintenance building, and Post Eight at the

Ambassador’s residence. At about 0845, 25 to 30

NPFL fighters armed with AK-47s and several

rocket launchers assembled in the open field to

the east of the embassy and moved east toward

the Barclay Training Center. A short time later,

about 15 to 20 more NPFL fighters followed. The

Marines watching knew something was about to

happen. 

At 1030, several heavy bursts of fire hit a cluster of shanties outside the fence line near the

Ambassador’s residence. Civilians living there ran

for cover or fled in terror. Marines from the 2d

Platoon watched as a group of NPFL fighters congregating on United Nations Drive about 400

meters from the southern part of the embassy and

started moving toward the beach. The fighters’

target appeared about 300 to 500 meters out in

the water. Six to 10 persons rowing frantically in

a canoe were apparently trying to paddle around

Mamba Point. The NPFL fighters moved along the

beach, chasing and shooting at the canoe.

Marines of the 2d Platoon warned the first group

of about a dozen fighters to turn around when

they reached an area below the embassy fence

line, but the NPFL fighters continued to fire.

Captain Kenney at Post Eight yelled: “You guys

can’t go there!” The fighters paused and their

leader demanded passage to shoot the men in the

canoe. Kenney, now near the chain link fence,

told the NPFL leader to leave and the Marines

would take care of the men if the canoes landed.

The Marines knew if the men in the canoe

returned fire, the embassy and their positions

would be in the line of fire. A Marine ordered the

squad accompanying the company commander to

chamber their rounds and train their weapons on

the fighters. The audible sound of chambering

rounds convinced the NPFL leader to back down.

Apparently satisfied, he thanked the company

commander and ordered his men to withdraw to

a building behind the old national public health

22D MEU IN OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE 77

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck magazine

Battalion Landing Team 2/2 Marines not only

improved existing defensive positions such as the

one atop the main building of the American

Embassy, but also built new ones, including

dummy positions. 
services building, which the Marines called the “IHop.” After the incident, the 2d Platoon’s area in

the southern half of the embassy settled down for

about an hour.254 Around 1200, Marines again

heard the sound of gunfire to the north of the IHop building. By about 1245, fire echoed

throughout the embassy compound as skirmishing started outside while refugees streamed past.

By 1310, a number of firefights broke out near

the embassy. With all Marines on post alerted and

many observing the fire and rocket explosions,

reports from the Marines flooded the command

post. Post Eight, a sandbagged balcony on the

second floor of the Ambassador’s residence,

offered a good view of the southern sector of

United Nations Drive. A surveillance and target

acquisition team headed by Corporal Jason S.

Farrand, a trained scout sniper, manned the post.

Corporal Farrand’s Barrett .50-caliber sniper rifle

lay positioned between himself and First

Lieutenant Aaron E. Bennett, the surveillance and

target acquisition platoon commander.* Lieutenant

Bennett had gone to the post to relieve one of the

team members. Both watched as a firefight erupted about 150 meters to their front. While behind

his rifle and observing the firefight through the

rifle’s scope, Corporal Farrand moved his eyes off

the scope to observe the origins of a shot just

fired to his left. The ricocheting round grazed

Corporal Farrand’s collarbone, continued into the

inside collar of his flak jacket, and dropped to the

ground. The impact caused him to drop his

weapon, fall backward and break the leg of the

chair on which he sat. “It felt like a huge steel ball

hit my shoulder,” Farrand commented. Farrand

got up and ripped off his flak jacket to check his

wound. Nearby Marines pushed the corporal back

down for his own protection and after a quick

assessment by a corpsman, Farrand left for the

battalion aid station. Post Eight Marines believed

a stray round caused the incident, so they did not

return fire.

Corporal Farrand returned to the post after a

corpsman cleaned the wound. Farrand came back

because he thought “they were going to try and

evacuate me to the ship,” and he wanted to be

with his team because he “knew something was

going to happen.” After the incident, Captain

78 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck magazine

Marines manning the American Embassy’s front gate had a bulletproof-window view of the constant

chaos along United Nations Drive.

* The Barrett M82A1A Special Application Scoped Rifle (SASR)

is a semi-automatic sniper rifle chambered for the .50-caliber,

Browning machine gun cartridge.
Kenney told all posts over the radio to exercise

caution and watch out for “flagging.”*

Adding to the Marines concern, 100 or so

refugees had gathered along the western fence

line to avoid the shooting. At around 1400,

Marines spotted a group of about 10 NPFL fighters moving up Sekou Toure Drive. Corporal

William A. Gardner, 2d Platoon’s 3d Squad leader,

was checking his men’s positions at Post Seven

and Seven Bravo and he watched from Seven

Bravo as the fighters advanced in quasi-tactical

formation toward the embassy. Marine combat

engineers had built post Seven Bravo, a sandbagged position on top of the roof of the facility

maintenance building, just the day before. When

the NPFL squad reached the area around Gibson

Street, about a block from the embassy, one fighter aimed and fired at the position. The round hit

the plywood support for the sand bagged walls

about six inches from Corporal Gardner and

Lance Corporal Wade M. Ward, a squad M249

automatic weapon gunner. Plywood splinters

from the round hit Lance Corporal Ward in the

cheek. After dropping for cover, Gardner immediately ordered the Marines on post to return fire.

Popping back up, the Marines returned fire using

M16s, an M60 machine gun, and an M249, killing

at least three of the NPFL. Gardner yelled ceasefire and the Marines immediately reloaded. One

fighter lying in a prone position in the street fired

a round at the Marines. Gardner ordered his

machine gunner to fire again and the impact of

the rounds flipped the militiaman onto his back.

After calling a second ceasefire, the squad leader

and his Marines watched two fighters, with arms

raised high, cautiously move toward the bodies in

the street and drag off two of the wounded. Other

fighters stripped the dead of their weapons and

boots and the survivors fled the scene.255

Indiscriminate fire continued to strike the area

around Post Seven from an unknown location. At

1500, a group of fighters again fired on Post

Seven, but the Marines were unable to locate the

source and did not return fire. Interspersed with

civilian refugees, a different group of NPFL fighters, who had not engaged the Marines, retreated

from the area of the I-Hop building toward the

embassy. Wanting no trouble, they flashed peace

signs and pointed their weapons away from the

compound as they ran past along United Nations

Drive.256

At 1515, a group of 40 to 50 Krahn fighters

fired from the hip as they moved west by squads

on United Nations Drive. The Krahns pursued a

ragged group of NPFL fighters who started running north along United Nations Drive and then

through the open field in front of Post Eight to

escape the fire. After dispersing the group, the

lead element of the Krahn force hesitated,

regrouped, and moved north. Captain Kenney, on

Post Eight, yelled at the lead fighter to stop. Just

35 meters from the post on the other side of the

wall, the lead fighter, who was wearing white

shorts, grinned at Kenney and fired his weapon at

the Marines. After taking a burst of machine gun

fire, Captain Kenney gave the command to fire.

Marines on Post Eight and other nearby positions

opened fire on the lead fighter, who immediately

dropped for cover. 

Using a Barrett sniper rifle, a Marine engaged a

fighter popping up and shooting from the ruins

across the street. After a few shots, the fighter

22D MEU IN OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE 79

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck magazine

A battalion landing team Marine patrols the fence

line of the American Embassy compound, which

had been extended to incorporate the British

Embassy.

* Flagging was a slang term used by the Marines of 22d MEU

to describe a factional fighter’s action of pointing his weapon

at Marines.
staggered out and the Marines followed up with a

burst of M60 machine gun fire. One fighter

attempted to engage the Marines with a rocketpropelled grenade, but was hit by a Marine

sniper’s round. After exchanging fire with the

Marines for some time, the Krahns withdrew.

Some of the fighters used civilians as shields as

they moved back to the east behind the I-Hop

building, while others dragged their wounded

away. Krahn casualties numbered at least one

killed and four wounded. 

Six of the withdrawing Krahn marksmen positioned themselves in the I-Hop building and

engaged Post Seven and Post Eight with small

arms fire. Not wanting to cause civilian causalities,

Captain Kenney restricted fire to well aimed shots

to ferret out the snipers. Marines, including

Corporal Farrand, returned fire. Employing a

Barrett sniper rifle, an M40A1 sniper rifle, and

M16A2 rifles, they left at least two dead on an outside staircase and second story balcony of the IHop building. The disciplined fire drove the last

few fighters away around 1545.257

After Company G’s effective response, Mamba

Point became unusually calm. The embassy’s

local guard project manager, Hershel Hernandez,

a retired Marine lieutenant colonel, went out and

physically verified at least six dead and numerous

blood trails from skirmishes. The bodies of the

dead remained untouched in the street for the rest

of the day. That evening, in deference to the

Marines, NPFL fighters needing resupply called

the embassy to request permission to drive by in

two vehicles. Fighters gathered at the I-Hop building but did not come near the Marines. From then

on, the fighters avoided pointing weapons at the

Marines and many times would raise them over

their heads to signify peaceful intentions as they

approached the embassy. The NPFL later called

the embassy to claim its leaders did not launch

the attack against the Marines and recommended

roadblocks at both ends of the streets approach80 ON MAMBA STATION

USS Guam (LPH 9) MARG 1-96 Deployment Cruise Book

A Marine sniper fires from a fortified position in the upper floors of the American Embassy’s main building. To minimize civilian casualties, fire was restricted to ferreting out opposing snipers in the buildings

across United Nations Drive.
ing the embassy to prevent any misunderstandings. At the direction of the regional security officer, the embassy’s local guards erected unmanned

roadblocks to reroute the fighters away from the

embassy.258

However, automatic weapon fire still echoed

throughout the city, especially near Barclay

Training Center where machine gun and rocketpropelled grenades slammed into the training

center’s grounds as doctors treated wounded

fighters. As a result of the violence, Mr. George

Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African

Affairs working at the embassy, called off negotiations. After consulting with the Ambassador and

Mr. Moose, Colonel Forbush received permission

from European Command to move the Guam,

Trenton, and Portland within sight of the city.

Both Colonel Forbush and Ambassador Milam

thought the movement would allow a quick turnaround if an evacuation became necessary. After

the firefights the day before, the demonstration of

the naval presence gave a visible reminder of the

strength of Joint Task Force Assured Response.

Charles Taylor called the Ambassador to express

his concern about the proximity of the ships.

Sensitive to the political implications, European

Command on 2 May ordered the joint task force

to move the ships back over the horizon.259

Marines from Company G rotated out on 3 May

as Company E Marines moved into defensive

positions around the embassy. The same day,

Roosevelt Johnson (ULIMO-J), with a West African

escort, left the Barclay Training Center in an

armored car and headed for the U.S. Embassy.

The Economic Community of West African States

delegation had made the offer to evacuate him

earlier, but the economic community-sponsored

peace talks scheduled for 7 and 8 May in Accra,

Ghana, afforded him a plausible reason to leave.

While awaiting evacuation by Marine helicopter

to Sierra Leone, Johnson actually apologized to

the MEU commander for his fighters engaging the

22D MEU IN OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE 81

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck magazine

Manning Post Five, a .50-caliber heavy machine gun position on the balcony of one of the American

Embassy’s residences, Marines cover a likely avenue of approach combatants might use to storm the compound.
Americans. The Marine helicopter then flew

Johnson to Freetown, Sierra Leone, where a

Ghanaian aircraft delivered him to Accra,

Ghana.260

The tempo of fighting ashore slowed as the

NPFL considered the latest ceasefire offer. But the

NPFL soon rejected that offer and attacked the

Krahns. Fighters loyal to Roosevelt Johnson continued the battle at the Barclay Training Center.

By Sunday, 5 May, Johnson’s Krahns broke out of

the besieged Barclay Training Center. Burning,

looting, and fighting went on throughout the city

during the weekend. 

Around noon on 6 May, a group of retreating

NPFL engaged a group of Krahns advancing

westward along Sekou Toure Drive on Mamba

Point. During this advance, the Krahns repeatedly

engaged Marine positions with fire, especially

Post Seven. Manning the sector were Marines

from Company E’s 3d Platoon, who returned fire

with automatic weapons. The Krahns changed

their route of advance and moved north on

Gibson Street. Neither side took casualties.261

Since the beginning of Assured Response, the

amphibious ready group and the MEU had conducted split operations in consideration of the

Sixth Fleet’s exercise schedule. The exercises,

combined with the orders to reduce the forces

ashore and overall Assured Response presence,

resulted in Marines from BLT 2/2 cross-decking.

Specifically, on 8 May, Company D (-), 2d Light

Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Company E,

2/2, and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, left

the Guam and the Portland and transferred to the

Trenton. The Trenton left for the coast of Spain to

join with the repaired Tortuga, and there participate in Exercise Matador 96. The Guam and the

Portland remained on station off the Liberian

coast. The Nigerian registered freighter Bulk

Challenge also remained in West African waters.

After leaving Liberia overloaded with refugees,

other West African countries had refused to grant

the ship safe harbor in their ports.262

Thousands fled as thick clouds of smoke hung

over the city. With all aid and relief agencies

gone, the situation in the city approached disaster

82 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck magazine

During lulls in the fighting, Marines check evacuees waiting for an inbound helicopter, which flew them

to safety in Freetown, Sierra Leone.
level with an estimated 60,000 people displaced

by the fighting and the Liberians reporting cases

of cholera. The calls for a ceasefire at the

Economic Community of West African States summit on 7 and 8 May in Accra, Ghana, went

unheeded. Sporadic firing continued throughout

the Mamba Point area. At the embassy, Company

F took over from Company E on 9 May, but the

situation remained tense. On 11 May, numerous

stray rounds again flew overhead with one round

grazing a sergeant’s biceps as he walked between

posts. 

Colonel Forbush called the fighting on 15 May

the heaviest he had seen up to that time. Evacuee

numbers increased proportionally. During the

next several days, fighters from the NPFL

launched attacks against the Barclay Training

Center in another attempt to dislodge the ULIMOJ and Krahns. Ironically, Charles Taylor had

announced earlier he had ordered his NPFL fighters to withdraw from the city. Fighters commanded by “General Butt Naked,” a nom de guerre of

one of the NPFL leaders, conducted frenzied

assaults against the Krahns in the Mamba Point

district. Taking and holding no ground, they

would withdraw by mid-day and leave the dead

where they lay.263

On 18 May, the Mamba Point fighting moved

close to Gate One of the embassy in the area the

Marines called Crack Alley. Fighting erupted next

to the Greystone compound late in the morning.

The skirmish resulted in more than 30 rocketpropelled grenade explosions that sent the

Marines ducking for cover. The Marines watched

fighters shoot at each other at point blank range

as the fighting took place up and down the alley.

Krahn fighters attempted to seize the house of

Charles Taylor’s mother, while others requested

permission to use United Nations Drive to outflank their NPFL enemy. Marines on post refused,

and the fighters turned around and went back

into the alley. One rocket-propelled grenade

exploded inside the embassy compound near

Gate One, wounding a civilian embassy employee. Marines then observed executions of prisoners

by the NPFL who dumped the bodies on the

beach near the embassy.

Reduction of Marine Forces 

Although the West African peacekeepers set up

checkpoints in the city, their troops repeatedly

retreated when fighting flared up. The peacekeepers’ commander, not satisfied with the support he was receiving, stated on 20 May that his

force, which numbered around 7,500, required

twice the number of peacekeepers than it currently had.264 With promises of American funds

and logistical support, the peacekeeping force

deployed throughout the city in mid-May to

regain control. They manned checkpoints north

and south of the embassy. In a radio broadcast,

the force’s field commander stated that from then

on his troops would allow no guns on the streets

and insisted that all fighters leave the city.

Responding by radio broadcast, Charles Taylor’s

NPFL and Alhaji Kromah’s ULIMO-K said they

would observe the order and withdrew some

forces from the city. The fighting died down and

the peacekeeping force exerted its authority by

seizing weapons caches. The Marines continued

to observe fighters, but they carried no weapons.

Many of the displaced began returning home and

the number of persons at the embassy’s

Greystone compound dropped. Incidental fire by

24 May ceased around the embassy. Two days

later, the peacekeeping force completed its redeployment throughout the city.265 When Colonel

Forbush reconnoitered the city by embassy vehicle on 31 May, he believed the fighting had essentially stopped. 

The beginning of June saw Liberians clearing

debris and sweeping streets. Volunteers and

health worker also started digging up the hundreds of hastily buried corpses. Starvation, disease, and wounds from the fighting accounted for

most of the dead. The standoff at the Barclay

Training Center was settled when the fighters of

Roosevelt Johnson’s ULIMO-J left unarmed. The

ethnic Krahns, one of the seven factions in

Liberia’s six-year-old civil war, agreed to disarm.

As a result of the Ghanaian-led economic community negotiations, 500 Krahn fighters safely

withdrew from the Barclay Training Center and

turned over a token number of weapons.266

Marines at the embassy remained vigilant with

Company G rotating in and Company F leaving

the compound. Evacuation flights slowed, and by

7 June, the last evacuees left from the embassy.

The Marines enjoyed the city’s calm. The quiet

allowed the Ambassador to take leave and the II

Marine Expeditionary Force commander was able

to visit the Marines ashore. About this time, a

maintenance problem arose involving the swash

plates on CH-53E helicopters. The problem

grounded all of the MEU’s CH-53Es. Colonel

Forbush, as the joint task force commander,

22D MEU IN OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE 83
ordered the Guam to remain at Mamba Station so

the pilots could test the helicopters once mechanics made the repairs. Because the Sixth Fleet had

previously scheduled the Guam’s departure,

Forbush’s decision created a furor at Sixth Fleet

headquarters, which communicated its displeasure to the highest command levels. Since Sixth

Fleet was not in the operational chain-of-command, the issue of whether the joint task force

commander could control the deployment of his

ships constituted a sore point with Colonel

Forbush. The question of who was the supporting

command (Sixth Fleet), and who was the supported command (22d MEU) came up on at least

three occasions. All three times when Colonel

Forbush mentioned ship movements, calls came

from the Sixth Fleet, and it seemed as though the

relationship was reversed. Fortunately, by 22

June, Marines of HMM-162 received the parts to

fix the problem, which allowed the testing of the

aircraft before the planned departure.267

On 14 June, the joint task force-sponsored Air

Force assessment team confirmed that SpriggsPayne Airport was capable of landing C-130 aircraft. Commercial air traffic subsequently resumed

on 17 June in Monrovia, thus ending the need for

Marine evacuation flights. The next day during the

turnover of rifle companies, HMM-162 extracted

six fast attack vehicles from the embassy in anticipation of the turnover. By this time, the 22d MEU

had evacuated 49 Americans and 260 thirdcountry nationals from the embassy. With a special purpose air-ground task force steaming to

Liberia, the Portland departed on 20 June. The

ship’s departure left only the Guam to represent

the ARG in Liberian waters.268

84 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck magazine

While fighting and chaos reigned, Marines of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162 continued to

evacuate civilians and foreign nationals by CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters.
Violence to the East

While the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit conducted operations in Liberia, another threat to

Americans developed in the Central African

Republic, which is situated on the eastern boundary of the U.S. European Command’s area of

responsibility. Spanning an area slightly smaller

than the state of Texas, the country borders

Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, and Zaire. With a population of a little more than 3 million, this landlocked country joins the Sudanese savanna zone

to the Congo River basin. Nearly half of the

Central African Republic’s population is ethnically

Banda and Baya, but most political leaders have

come from the smaller Obangui-region tribes.

Sangho constitutes the national language, with

only a small portion of the population speaking

French, the official language.269 The Central

African Republic’s transportation system is poor—

it is in fact one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world. External trade relies on the

Obangui River, which forms the country’s southern boundary. Major exports include diamonds,

cotton, and timber. Agricultural goods account for

half of the gross domestic product and the majority of the populace works in agricultural production. In May of 1996, approximately 2,500 French

and 254 Americans lived in the Central African

Republic.270

Once the Oubangui-chari territory of French

Equatorial Africa, the Central African Republic

achieved independence in 1960. The first noncolonial ruler of the Central African Republic was

the democratically elected David Dako. In 1966,

Colonel Jean-Bedal Bokassa displaced his cousin

Dako by coup d’etat. A former French colonial

soldier, Bokassa became President in 1967,

President for life in 1972, and crowned himself

Emperor Bokassa I in 1976, renaming the country

the Central African Empire. Bokassa’s complete

disregard for any democratic sentiments spurred a

successful counter-coup in 1979 by Dacko.

French military units assisted in the coup,

Operation Barracuda, after learning of Bokassa’s

orders that resulted in the massacre of hundreds

of school children.* 

In 1981, General Andre-Dieudonne Kolingba

lead the country’s military in another coup.

Kolingba became the leader of the Central African

Republic and his policies led the country into economic stagnation. Strong internal opposition and

French pressure resulted in legislative elections in

1987 and a presidential election in 1993.271

Elected president in 1993, Ange-Felix Patasse

replaced Kolingba’s regime with a coalition government. The new president’s plans for restructuring and decentralizing the government provoked opposition, especially from the unions,

which demanded back salaries. The currency

devaluation of other French-speaking African

nations in 1994 further aggravating the situation

by causing a 45 percent inflation of the country’s

currency. When Patasse’s government found it

impossible to pay salaries, civil servants, health

workers, and teachers responded with protests,

riots, and work stoppages.272

A security agreement between France and the

Central African Republic, which was made when

the republic proclaimed its independence,

allowed for the stationing of French troops in the

country. The military contingent numbered

approximately 1,300 men spread out between

numerous garrisons. Camp Bealle and M’Poko

military bases constituted the major facilities in

the city of Bangui. The aviation detachment at

M’Poko Airfield included four Areospatiale SA-330 

Chapter 6

Operation Quick Response

* Jean-Bedel Bosska’s brutality included the torturing, killing,

and even eating of slain political opponents. Julian Nundy,

“Cannibal Emperor Buried With Honors in Central African

Republic, (Electronic Telegraph, 5Nov96, issue 531.)
Puma helicopters, five Mirage fighters, and two

Transall C-160 cargo aircraft.273* Although the

French presence was a source of frequent nationalist agitation, the Patasse government depended

heavily on security assistance from the French

troops.274

On 18 April 1996, armed rebellion broke out.

The incident started with a protest by 80 soldiers 

who had not received pay. The group of mutineers, soldiers mainly from Kolingba’s Yakoma

tribe and Bokassa’s Gbaka tribe, fortified their

barracks at Camp Du Kassai in the capital,

Bangui.275 The number of mutineers quickly grew

to 400 as they seized a number of key installations

in the city. In the ensuing fight a number of civilians caught in the crossfire were killed or wounded. President Patasse deployed the presidential

guard battalion in hopes of disarming the soldiers,

but the move resulted in more bloodshed.

Because of the presidential guard’s failure, Patasse

fled to the French garrison. French Foreign

86 ON MAMBA STATION

* The French signed the 1960 defense agreement with four

countries in the region. After the 1966 coup d’etat, the new

president, Andre Kolingba, demanded a revision to the

accord. In October 1966, the military cooperation accord

signed in Paris allowed for two bases, one at Bangui and the

other at Bour, and the stationing of 1,400 French military personnel in the country. The French called the force the French

Operational Assistance Elements (EFAO).
Legionnaires deployed from Camp Bealle, and

after some minor skirmishing, restored order on

20 April. After escorting the mutineers back to

their base, negotiations between the soldiers and

the government occurred and France provided

financial aid to help pay the soldier’s salaries.276

On 18 May, a unit of the presidential guard battalion attempted to take control of an armory from

the former mutineers. The soldiers reacted violently, breaking into the armory, seizing weapons,

and forcing the presidential guard unit to withdraw. Fighting broke out in the city the following

day, some of it taking place in front of the U.S.

Embassy. French units deployed to protect French

property and the Presidential Palace. Civil control

broke down as rebelling soldiers and rioters looted commercial districts and private residences.

Rebel soldiers established roadblocks and robbed

travelers at gunpoint. This effectively closed the

route to the airport, where commercial air traffic

ceased.277 The revolt gained momentum as the

rebels seized the city’s main fuel depot and the

national radio station, which was close to the U.S.

Embassy. Public transportation ground to a halt;

shops, schools, and markets closed, and most of

the people remained indoors. Stray bullets struck

the U.S. Embassy and the staff received numerous

reports of fighting and looting near American residences. 

French troops retook the radio station killing

nine rebels. French armored personnel vehicles

patrolled the streets on Monday, 20 May, to rescue and round up roughly 1,000 foreigners caught

up in the violence. While negotiations started

between President Patasse and the mutineers,

clashes occurred between presidential units and

the rebels. The mutineers, mainly from the combined arms regiment, numbered approximately

500. In response to the increased violence some

French units withdrew to Camp Bealle and

M’Poko Airfield.278

The French decided to send military reinforcements to the Central African Republic, initially

from the surrounding sub-Saharan states hosting

French units, Gabon and Chad. Christened

Operation Almandin II, the French commander,

General Bernard Thorette, headed for the Central

African Republic with other reinforcements from

France.279 Troops already in Bangui deployed to

support the Patasse government and prevent the

mutiny from escalating into a coup before

Thorette’s reinforcements could arrive. 

After seeing gun battles in front of the U.S.

Embassy and receiving reports of Americans

being accosted in their homes and on the street,

Ambassador Mosina H. Jordan requested the State

Department authorize an ordered departure of

numerous U.S. Government personnel and

American citizens. The request included asking

for security support and military transportation to

assist in the evacuation. As the violence spread

throughout the city, the embassy advised

Americans unable to leave their homes to remain

indoors. 

When the revolt broke out on 18 June, the

European Command’s theater command center, a

24-hour operations center, monitored the crisis.

After receiving authorization from national command authority, European Command began contingency discussions with the French military concerning the safety of U.S. citizens. Marine

Brigadier General David M. Mize, the deputy

operations officer for European Command, flew

to Paris to coordinate the military action.280 The

French agreed to cooperate and assist in the evacOPERATION QUICK RESPONSE 87
uation. As the fighting escalated, Secretary of State

Warren Christopher commented: “It’s a violent situation; we’re concerned about American personnel and we’re trying to do everything we can to

ensure their safety and to evacuate those who can

leave.”281

The French agreed to transport American evacuees to collection points from which they would

proceed to the main evacuation point at M’Poko

Airfield. From there, U.S. aircraft would fly the

evacuees to the designated safe haven, Yaounde,

Cameroon. The French further agreed to evacuate

Americans from remote sites using their helicopters or cargo transport aircraft and to assist a small

American force designated to provide security for

the embassy in Bangui.282 The U.S. Embassy in

the capital city of Bangui had not had a Marine

security guard detachment since 1993. Only

unarmed local contract guards provided security.

The nearest diplomatic security support, a regional security officer, resided in another country.283

Call in the Marines

At 0700, 20 May, the commander of Joint Task

Force Assured Response, Colonel Forbush,

received a call from Brigadier General Mize at

European Command. As commanding officer of

the 22d MEU, Colonel Forbush had already split

his forces between Liberia and the Mediterranean

to provide security, sustainability, and evacuation

assistance to the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, while

simultaneously conducting exercises and training

in support of U.S. Sixth Fleet commitments.

General Mize was familiar with these dispositions,

having just returned from a visit to the U.S.

Embassy in Monrovia.284 The two officers focused

their discussion on the crisis in the Central African

Republic. In a verbal warning order, General Mize

told Colonel Forbush to prepare Marines for

deployment to the capital city, Bangui, to assist in

the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens. The

Marines would protect the embassy until an

ordered departure took place or until other forces

relieved them. In addition, the Marine force

would offer military advice to the Ambassador,

maintain liaison with the French forces, and provide for the logistical sustaining of the embassy.285

Already ashore at the embassy in Monrovia,

Colonel Forbush talked with Captain Richard E.

Luehrs, II, telling him that he would deploy to the

Central African Republic. Captain Luehrs, the

officer-in-charge of the air, naval gunfire liaison

company detachment, flew back to the USS

Guam (LPH 9) with Colonel Forbush.286 That

evening, as General Mize released the European

Command’s warning and execute orders, the joint

task force’s operation was well underway.287

On board the Guam off the coast of Liberia,

Colonel Forbush called his key staff together and

they immediately began planning and alerting

units. The agreement with the French allowed for

a small Marine security and liaison group. Initially,

35 Marines and sailors would make up the Marine

security and liaison team. The 81mm mortar platoon of Weapons Company, Battalion Landing

Team 2/2 (BLT 2/2), received word it would provide security and evacuation control. Colonel

Forbush picked Major Norman J. Robison to command the mission, now designated Operation

Quick Response. Major Robison, originally from

Marine Forces Atlantic, Standing Joint Task Force,

had joined Joint Task Force Assured Response to

assist.288

To get the Marines to Bangui, located almost

200 miles from the task force’s location, required

using the 22d MEU’s KC-130 detachment. The

two-plane detachment arrived in theater in April

to support a scheduled training exercise and

remained there to support Operation Assured

Response in Liberia. A little after 0700 on 20 May,

one of the detachment’s aircraft started its engines

to conduct a routine resupply flight on the airfield

tarmac at Rota, Spain. While the engines were

running and the crew worked on a small maintenance problem, the pilot, Captain David A. Krebs,

received an order to shut down the aircraft. Over

the radio, the 22d MEU contact stated Krebs

would fly to a capital that began with the letter

“B.” Returning to the detachment’s office, Captain

Krebs and Major John T. Collins, the detachment

commander, determined their destination was

Bangui.289 The joint task force’s air combat element operations officer then provided additional

information and tasking. Although the task force

staff was still developing the plan, the operations

officer told Krebs the mission called for him to fly

3,000 miles from Rota, Spain, to Dakar, Senegal,

and then to Freetown, Sierra Leone. The aircraft

was expected to remain overnight at Dakar before

picking up Marines in Sierra Leone. Once at Lungi

Airfield in Sierra Leone, it would pick up awaiting

Marines who would provide liaison, evacuation

control, and security for the U.S. Embassy, and fly

them to Bangui, Central African Republic.290 Major

Collins, needing detailed information on Bangui,

requested charts of the Bangui airfield from his

parent squadron, Marine Aerial Refuelling

88 ON MAMBA STATION
Squadron 252 (VMGR-252), located at Marine

Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina.

The detachment’s intelligence chief also visited

the Navy’s Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron 2

(VQ-2), at Rota, to gather information about the

fighting.291

Launching at 1100, the KC-130’s crew did not

have all the information on the mission, as the

task force staff was still in the process of developing it. Once in the air, Major Collins received

word that after refueling in Dakar and loading in

Freetown, his aircraft would continue on to

Bangui. Colonel Forbush decided to extend the

crew day, normally 12 hours, to accomplish the

task.* The stop in Dakar, Senegal, allowed only

enough time to refuel and pick up a fax from

Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, which

contained airfield approach and information for

Bangui.292

Back on the Guam, the Marine security and

liaison team received a briefing by Major Robison 

around noon and then drew weapons and ammunition.293 The security and evacuation control center Marines left the ship by CH-53E helicopters

and arrived at Lungi Airfield at 1700 to wait for

the KC-130. While at Lungi, the Marines formulated a detailed security plan for the embassy with

the help of Staff Sergeant Scott T. Livengood, a

former member of the Marine detachment in

Bangui.294 The KC-130 arrived at 2000. Marines

installed a satellite communication system

(AN/PSC-3 radio) in the KC-130 using a hatchmounted antenna. A communicator had joined

the crew in Dakar to operate the system. The aircraft loaded the personnel, pallets of bottled

water, and meals ready-to-eat for the evacuees

and the Marines. After refueling, the flight departed at 2200 with no assurance of clearances to fly

over Cameroon or to land in Bangui. As the plane

headed for Bangui, the State Department worked

on obtaining flight clearances, a process that normally took 36 to 72 hours. To avoid flying over

countries for which clearances had not been

obtained, the aircraft skirted the coast of West

Africa in international airspace. To accomplish the

mission, the pilots needed clearances from both

Cameroon and Central African Republic.295 Thirty

OPERATION QUICK RESPONSE 89

Photo courtesy of Maj David A. Krebs

Capt David A. Krebs (left) and Capt Homer W. Nesmith stand with the crew of the first Marine Refueler

Transport Squadron 252 Lockheed KC-130 Hercules aircraft to land at M’Poko Airport in Bangui,

Central African Republic, following a long flight from Rota, Spain, by way of Dakar, Senegal, and

Freetown, Sierra Leone. 

* If an aircraft with autopilot takes off before 0500, the flight

time for a crew can be extend to 18 hours. With an augmented crew, maximum flight time per day is 24 hours. (VMGR-252

Det A, “KC-130 Gouge,” 20Jun96 [Assured Response

Collection, MCHC, Washington D.C.])
minutes before crossing into Cameroon airspace,

the aircraft’s pilots learned they had received

clearance to fly over Cameroon and land in the

Central African Republic.296 As the KC-130

approached M’Poko Airfield from the south, the

aircraft broke through the clouds and Major

Collins observed the city for the first time, noting

green tracer rounds crisscrossing the area.297

Marine Operations in Bangui

At 0600, The KC-130 landed at M’Poko Airfield.

As it taxied to the French military compound, the

pilot, Captain Krebs, noted numerous French

fighting positions on the eastern side of the runway, which indicated the seriousness of the situation.298 As the plane taxied up the ramp, Captain

Krebs and Major Collins saw crowds of people.

The fenced-in compound located on the east side

of the airfield, which normally contained 300

French military personnel, was crowded with

more than 1,000 civilians awaiting evacuation.

The majority were French nationals, but citizens

of other nations, including Canada and

Cameroon, had made their way to the compound.

The French had evacuated several Americans,

including Peace Corps volunteers from outlying

sites, while others made it to the airport on their

own. One American family told the Marines of

rebel soldiers invading their home and stealing

food and money. Other refugees described

harassment by rampaging gangs of soldiers.299

Major Robison coordinated with waiting U.S.

Embassy personnel and spoke with the French

operational assistance element’s command at

M’Poko to arrange transportation. Several French

military trucks arrived and the Marines embarked.

Five Marines from MEU Service Support Group 22

and one corpsman, which comprised the evacuation control center, remained at the airfield under

the leadership of First Sergeant Allan M. Slater.

The other Marines, including a seven-man liaison

element and an 18-man security element, moved

by truck to Camp Bealle, escorted by French

wheeled armored personnel carriers. Marines

coordinated with the French at the camp and met

their liaison officer, Captain Thierry Paquereau.

Leaving for the embassy, the Marines made their

way through the city but saw no rebels, nor did

they hear any shooting. The temporary ceasefire

in effect that morning contributed to a false sense

of calm.300

Arriving at the embassy, Ambassador Jordan

greeted the Marines, who immediately deployed

throughout the compound. Major Robison and his

second in command, Captain Luehrs, received a

brief on the current situation. After assessing its

layout, the Marines initiated security patrols within the embassy compound. They also established

two defensive positions, one on the chancery roof

facing southward toward David Dacko Road, and

the other atop the General Service Office maintenance building facing the opposite direction

toward Avenue du 18 Victoire. As the Marines

constructed positions with the help of local

embassy workers, a lone rifleman in a building

nearby took aim at the Marines. Six to eight

Marines immediately reinforced the position and

zeroed in on the rebel, who quickly placed his

weapon down on the rooftop, waived a white

flag, and retreated from the position. The Marines

held their fire.301

Back at the M’Poko Airfield, the aircrew realized no additional Americans would arrive any90 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of Maj David A. Krebs

American Peace Corps volunteers and

Cameroonian refugees crowd on board the first

Marine KC-130 evacuation flight from Bangui to

Yaounde, the capital of the Republic of Cameroon.
time soon. Calling back to the joint task force by

established satellite communications, they asked

for permission to depart. Captain Krebs wanted to

get the evacuees and crew to Nsimalen Airfield in

Yaounde, Cameroon, recognizing that remaining

longer in Bangui would increase fatigue. After

receiving permission, the KC-130 departed at 1130

with 13 evacuees, mainly Peace Corps volunteers

and missionaries. When they landed at Nsimalen

the crew-day had reached 36 hours with 18.3

hours of actual flying time. The American

Ambassador in Cameroon and his staff greeted

them. The embassy staff, expecting approximately 80 evacuees, quickly processed the 13 civilians

while the crew and pilots contacted the joint task

force and received tasking for the next day.302

In Bangui, a firefight broke out around the

embassy at 1300. The rebels and the French

employed automatic weapons and small arms fire.

Multiple rocket-propelled grenade explosions, as

well as the sound of .50-caliber machine gun fire

from French armored personnel carriers, reverberated throughout the compound. Neither side

directed any fire toward the embassy. Later that

afternoon, a number of extended firefights

occurred at an intersection southeast of the

embassy. Stray rounds flew overhead until midnight.303

At the airfield, First Sergeant Slater’s evacuation

control center processed arriving Americans

throughout the first night. Early on the morning of

22 May, the KC-130 returned from Cameroon,

taxiing to the civilian aircraft ramp in an area

secured by French Foreign Legionnaires. When a

firefight erupted between the rebels and loyalist

troops at the end of the runway, the Legionnaires

responded with machine gun fire and the shooting ceased.304

At 1400, the Marines moved a group of 77

Americans and third-country nationals to the

awaiting KC-130. After all were on board, the aircraft, which was cleared for takeoff, experienced

a “flame out” in its number two engine. The evacuees were offloaded and waited in the shade of

the wings to protect them from temperatures of

more than 110 degrees Fahrenheit. After deterOPERATION QUICK RESPONSE 91
mining repairs were required, the pilots parked

the plane at the terminal’s civilian ramp.305

The evacuees and aircrew moved to a new

evacuation control center located in a maintenance building where they remained until 2300

when a second KC-130 arrived from Rota, Spain.*

A Cable News Network camera crew arrived and

filmed the Marines as they offloaded supplies by

hand.306 The French, meanwhile, evacuated civilians from the military camp with their own C-130

and C-160 cargo aircraft. At 0100 on 23 May, the

new KC-130 departed for Nsimalen Airfield with

59 evacuees and most of the crew from the disabled aircraft.** A handful of Americans, anticipating the restoration of order, elected to remain at

the evacuation control center.307

During the early morning of 22 May, shots

again rang out near the U.S. Embassy. Marines

later spotted 30 rebel troops operating in the

vicinity. Fighting between the rebels, the presidential guard, and French troops broke out later

that afternoon. The poorly trained rebels rarely

shouldered their weapons, preferring to fire from

the hip or raising the weapon overhead to fire.

French Puma helicopter gunships flew overhead

and engaged the rebel forces near the radio station. Stray rounds impacted the chancery’s roof

and outside walls. Nearby rocket-propelled

grenade explosions kept the Marines on post vigilant. One government armored personnel carrier

positioned itself near the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) facility next

to the chancery. Marines soon heard its 20mm

cannon fire at rebels, who responded with

machine guns. The Marine reaction force quickly

escorted embassy employees to safe locations

within the compound. French Mirage jets, conducting reconnaissance flights, flew overhead.

The day’s fighting started a large fire in a building

92 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of Maj David A. Krebs

American evacuees seek shelter from the heat under the wing of a KC-130 at M’Poko Airport shortly after

the aircraft’s number two engine flamed out during the power up in preparation for take off.

* That same day, the 22d MEU received a U.S. European

Command modification to the execute order that directed

Joint Task Force Assured Response to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation and assume control of one additional KC-130.

** Parts for the aircraft arrived the next day. The detachment

swapped aircraft when two KC-130s from Detachment A,

VMGR-252 arrived in Freetown shortly thereafter. The aircraft

needed phase maintenance every 250 hours, which took

about five days to accomplish. The 2d Marine Aircraft Wing

normally planned the aircraft rotations for more in-depth routine maintenance.
close by, but the flames eventually subsided without damaging the compound.308

The embassy advised all American citizens to

stay at home, but had neither an accurate roster

for, nor the locations of, Peace Corps and USAID

workers in the countryside.* The directors of both

organizations, trapped in town, possessed this

information and needed to bring it to the

embassy. Major Robison coordinated their transportation with the French liaison officer, Captain

Paquereau, and French soldiers escorted the

Peace Corps and USAID directors to the

embassy.309 Once at the embassy, the directors

notified the remaining workers of the evacuation

plan through an emergency recall system of

radios and telephones.

At 0820 on 23 May, approximately 2,000

demonstrators arrived in front of the U.S.

Embassy. Marines watched as the crowd shouted

anti-French slogans and demanded President

Patasse’s departure. The demonstrators chanted

pro-American slogans such as, “U.S. yes,” and

“United with you!” As the crowd conducted a sitin, someone fired at the demonstrators and

wounded two. The crowd attempted to move

toward the French Embassy and Marines on Post

One (the chancery) heard bursts of machine gun

fire and a rocket-propelled grenade explosion.

The crowd dispersed when French troops arrived.

French patrols soon passed by the embassy and a

firefight ensued in an area northeast of the

embassy, dubbed “Hooterville” by the Marines.

Despite all the fighting that day, the embassy

received only stray rounds and bits of shrapnel.

The rebels did not target the embassy.310

At the M’Poko Airfield, the evacuation control

center processed arriving Americans flown in

from remote sites by French military aircraft. The

compound became a beehive of activity as French

military and commercial aircraft transported

French evacuees, while Mirage jets and Puma helicopters took off for missions above the city. The

Marines at the airfield heard small arms fire during the day and watched tracer fire at night in the

city.311 The Marines at the embassy improved

their positions throughout the next two days,

stringing concertina wire while protests and firefights continued nearby. Hundreds of civilians

looted the MoCaf Brewery, located just down the

street from the chancery, but were dispersed by

the presidential guards. At the airfield, the evacuation control center processed 160 evacuees while

French vehicles carried supplies from the airport

to the embassy.312

Planning for Reinforcements

Colonel Forbush expressed considerable concern over the 22d MEU’s ability to reinforce the

Marine security and liaison team. At the joint task

force headquarters at the U.S. Embassy in

Monrovia, the situation was being monitored and

contingency plans were developed for a largescale reinforcement. Major Robison requested

additional assistance from Lieutenant Colonel

Michael E. Dick, the joint task force operations

officer. Based on the seemingly deteriorating

security situation, Marine planners considered flying in 13 light armored vehicles and 10 high

mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles

(humvees) using a Lockheed C-5A Galaxy aircraft.

Elements of the 22d MEU conducting Operation

Matador, a combined training exercise in Spain,

could provide this force. After assessing the

requirements, European Command decided if a

larger force were needed in the Central African

Republic, Special Operations Command, Europe,

not the 22d MEU, would provide the bulk of the

forces. 22d MEU assets designated in the final

concept of operations for the reinforcement of

Bangui were limited to 27 Marines and two

humvees.313

European Command issued a third modification to the execute order on 25 May, directing

reinforcement by designated Marines, who began

arriving in Bangui that day. The remaining elements arrived by KC-130 at 1700 on 26 May.

Additional Marines augmented the evacuation

control center at the airfield, moved to the

embassy by convoy, and joined the French operational assistance element at its headquarters at

Camp Bealle. A total of 61 Marines now provided

security and evacuation support.314 Two KC-130

flights evacuated 122 people on 25 May. On 26,

27, and 28 May, the daily number of evacuees

taken out by KC-130 flights from M’Poko Airfield

ranged from 184 to 190. The French maintained

assistance with helicopters and armored vehicles,

transporting 12 additional Americans from outlying areas to the airfield. With French Legionnaires

providing ground security, a French Transall C160 transport aircraft rescued the remaining Peace

OPERATION QUICK RESPONSE 93

* The embassy had the annual State Department report showing how many Americans were currently residing in its jurisdiction, but the report did not provide locations or contact

information on individuals.
Corps volunteers and delivered them to the evacuation control center at M’Poko Airfield.

Negotiations between the rebels and the government allowed the rebels to return to their

camps under French military escort and President

Patasse agreed to pass a law granting them

amnesty. On 27 May, the French liaison officer,

Captain Paquasse, informed the Marine commander, Major Robison, that the majority of the

rebels had returned to their base at Camp Du

Kassai.315 On the evening of 28 May, the last

American citizens requesting evacuation were

flown to Cameroon. The total number of evacuees

processed by the Marines included 190 Americans

and 258 foreign nationals. More than 43 people

died and 248 received wounds during the mutiny.

Although looting in the city continued, French

patrols dispersed most of the remaining looters

while negotiations between the government and

rebel leaders took place.316

Reduction of Presence and Withdrawal

On 30 May, Colonel Forbush received verbal

approval to begin a draw down from the Central

African Republic. The Joint Task Force Assured

Response staff on board the Guam initiated plans

to conduct this evolution in phases. The next day,

30 Marines and one vehicle left Bangui, and seven

additional Marines departed on 1 June. On 13

June, Captain Leuhrs assumed command from

Major Robison and 11 more Marines departed,

which left 13 at the embassy. Bangui had suffered

considerable damage during the mutiny with

many businesses looted or burned. The population, however, returned to their normal routines

and the security situation relaxed with no threat to

either the embassy or Americans.317 On 27 June,

First Lieutenant John Himes and 11 Marines and

sailors from the Special Purpose Marine AirGround Task Force (MAGTF) arrived to assume

security duties from the 22d MEU. The KC-130

that brought in their relief flew Captain Luehrs

and his detachment to Freetown, Sierra Leone,

where they boarded helicopters for a flight to the

Guam. The Marines of 22d MEU evacuated 448

citizens from 21 countries in eight days from a

location 2,200 miles from their nearest support.

Their professionalism, and that of the KC-130 aircrews working with them, made this achievement

possible.318 As one Peace Corps worker enthusiastically stated: “The Marines were great!” First

Sergeant Slater, in charge of the evacuation control center at M’Poko Airfield, likewise praised the

French for their cooperation. Bangui remained

essentially peaceful while the squad of Marines

from the Special Purpose MAGTF guarded the

embassy. The Marines settled into a guard post

routine and received periodic resupply by KC130. On 1 August, the last KC-130 flight landed in

Bangui and picked up the waiting Marines.

Operation Quick Response ended when they

rejoined the Special Purpose MAGTF on board

the USS Ponce (LPD 15).

94 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of Maj David A. Krebs

A Marine KC-130 departs Bangui for Yaounde, Cameroon. More than 400 American citizens and foreign nationals were evacuated during Marine Refueler Transport Squadron 252’s stay in the Central

African Republic. 
Special Purpose MAGTF Deploys

During April and May, Generals George A.

Joulwan and John M. Shalikashvili discussed the

replacement of the 22d MEU. As early as 15 April,

Marine Forces, Atlantic, staff met to discuss the

alternatives. One of the options called for a

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force

(MAGTF) and a two-ship amphibious ready

group. Any force deployed by ship would come

from 2d Marine Division’s designated amphibious

ready force, which at that time was the 8th

Marines, commanded by Colonel Tony L.

Corwin.*

By 18 April, II Marine Expeditionary Force (II

MEF) identified the 8th Marines regimental staff as

the command element for any special purpose

task force. From mid-April through May operational planners at II MEF and subordinate commands considered what forces the mission would

require. During the planning, the 8th Marines’

staff and subordinate units were heavily involved

in Exercise Purple Star, a combined joint task

force training exercise at Camp Lejeune, North

Carolina. The units forming the combat service

support element that were not involved in Purple

Star began planning in mid-April.319 When the

exercise ended in late May, the commander of

Marine Forces, Atlantic, designated the 8th

Marines staff as the Special Purpose MAGTF headquarters for planning purposes. Working up plans

for two options, the 8th Marines’ staff assumed

that one large-deck amphibious ship or one smalldeck amphibious ship would be available. By the

end of May, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic, made

it clear the only available ship was a small-deck

amphibious ship, specifically, a landing platform

dock (LPD).320 The U.S. Atlantic Command issued

a planning directive on 28 May and Major General

Michael D. Ryan, the commanding general of II

MEF, followed up with an alert order to the 8th

Marines on 31 May. Following additional guidance from the commanding general, the 8th

Marines regimental staff and subordinate units

that would form the special purpose task force

launched into mission planning analysis efforts.321

Planners first looked at the task force flagship,

the USS Ponce (LPD 15), commanded by Captain

Leon F. Mahoney. The small-deck ship was not

configured to function as a flagship and lacked

the appropriate communications assets to control

a joint task force. The designated task force commander, Colonel Corwin, requested quadruple

satellite communication terminals and two deckmounted tactical satellite radios to enhance command and control communications and intelligence support for the joint task force. Even with

these add-ons, the lack of command configuration

ultimately resulted in a less than optimum command and control communications capability.322**

Further, Marine planners learned the ship was

poorly equipped for the control of aircraft in bad

weather and could not assist aircraft in performing precision instrument approaches. The LPD’s

lack of weather radar forced the Marines to rely

on satellite photos for weather forecasting. The

lack of an embarked navy tactical air control

squadron likewise required much more detailed

aircraft control coordination. Adding to the challenge was the small size of the Ponce’s flight deck

Chapter 7

Planning, Deployment, and Action

* The 2d Marine Division rotated the amphibious ready force,

air contingency force, and maritime preposition force contingency duties between the three infantry regiments every eight

months.

** The Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force requested the Commander Navy Surface Fleet, Atlantic, install four

Magnavox MX 2400 Inmarsats—international maritime satellite

communication network systems. The Marines used two

AN/PSC-3 man-packed satellite communication terminals. The

dial-in data rates were generally limited to between 2.4K and

4.8K and often could not be established at all during daylight

hours. (S-6, SPMAGTF “Article Input,” undated [Assured

Response Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.])
and hangar, which limited the number of helicopters on board as well as the amount of maintenance space. Because of the ship’s insufficient

aviation maintenance facilities, the task force staff,

in coordination with the air combat element,

planned to embark three maintenance vans.

Unfortunately, the vans further limited space and

the squadron could realistically launch only one

aircraft at a time.323

The planners considered two helicopter

options—using either CH-53s or CH-46s. The 8th

Marines staff thought the CH-53E best fit the aviation needs of the task force on the LPD. Because

of their longer range and availability under guidance from II MEF, the task force joined two CH53E Super Stallion helicopters from Marine Heavy

Helicopter Squadron 461 (HMH-461) and two Bell

UH-1N Huey helicopters from Marine Light Attack

Helicopter Squadron 167 (HMLA-167).324

The task force did not have the luxury of a

long work up. The regimental staff formed a command element that more than doubled its size.

What also differed from the 22d MEU was the

addition of 26 Marines from II MEF headquarters

assigned specifically to assist the joint task force

commander. The regimental staff had little experience working at a joint level and less time to

train with the new augmentation. Responsibilities

of the regimental staff also grew as the personnel

officer, in a period of three weeks, joined all of

the task force Marines and sailors.

Joining the special purpose task force was

Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines (-), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Paul E. Lefebvre. The BLT consisted of two rifle

companies rather than three, the normal number

of rifle companies, as well as augmenting reinforcements. Approximately 100 Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lance R. McBride,

formed Combat Service Support Detachment 28 

(CSSD 28).325

By 7 June, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff issued a warning order for a Special Purpose

MAGTF to replace the 22d MEU in Liberia and

assume responsibilities as the joint task force

headquarters. Tasked by European Command, the

special purpose task force mission focused on

providing the necessary protection and sustainability of personnel at the embassy. The order

directed the task force to stay on station until the

ordered departure of official American citizens or

until the reinforcement of the Marine security

guard detachment was no longer required. With

approximately 60 days of logistics support plus a

heavy reliance on limited aviation assets, Colonel

Corwin assumed the threat level would remain

unchanged or decrease. He also assumed the

96 ON MAMBA STATION
embassy desired to return to pre-crisis operations

as soon as possible.326

On 12 June, the Ponce embarked the Marines

at Morehead City, North Carolina. At the last

minute, the two CH-53E helicopters were

replaced with six CH-46 helicopters due to a

worldwide grounding of all CH-53E helicopters.

With only 66 hours of preparation, 105 Marines

from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264

(HMM-264) replaced the HMH-461 detachment.327

On 14 June, the Ponce departed with the

Special Purpose MAGTF composed of approximately 732 Marines and sailors, five light armored

vehicles, and nine amphibious assault vehicles.

During the trip, Marines of the BLT watched

detailed videotapes of the embassy’s positions

and rehearsed for the coming mission. The ship

itself was crowded and living and workspaces

were cramped. The Marines endured long lines

for chow and just about any other services the

ship offered.328

For long-haul aviation support, the task force

employed Detachment A, Marine Aerial Refueling

Squadron 252 (VMGR-252). The detachment,

already in theater, was to provide critical KC-130

logistical support, conducting operations from

Rota, Dakar, Bangui, and the forward logistics site

in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Members of the

squadron remained in Rota, Spain, to help move

supplies and parts. One replacement aircraft

joined the detachment on 13 June, picking up the

task force’s advance party at Marines Corp Air

Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina.329

On 15 June, the advance party of the special

purpose task force flew to Freetown, Sierra

Leone, by Marine KC-130. The advance party

transferred to the USS Guam (LPH 9) by helicopter for briefings and then continued on to the

embassy. Composed of 32 Marines, the party was

led by the MEU’s executive officer, Lieutenant

Colonel Christopher J. Gunther, and included

Lieutenant Colonel Lefebvre and the commanding

officer of Company L, Captain Jeffrey E. Lister.

The group concentrated its efforts on becoming

familiar with the operating climate at the embassy

and the responsibilities of the joint task force.

With the city relatively calm, the advance party,

dressed in civilian clothes and transported in

PLANNING, DEPLOYMENT, AND ACTION 97

DVIC DM-SD-98-02794

CWO Michael Dominguez instructs Marines of Company L, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, in the use of the

M16A2 service rifle from the sling arms position on the flight deck of the USS Ponce (LPD 15) during its

transatlantic voyage.
embassy vehicles, reconnoitered the area and visited the headquarters of the West African peacekeepers. Lieutenant Colonel Gunther recalled his

impressions of the city, stating that fighters had

“looted, burned, or pillaged almost every building

we saw.” Viewing the peacekeepers while conducting a reconnaissance of the city, Gunther

noted the peacekeepers’ checkpoint or roadblocks consisted of any junk they could place in

the road. He further observed West African soldiers shaking down Liberians at the checkpoints

and extracting a “road tax,” as West African soldiers were not routinely paid.330

The Special Purpose MAGTF as the

Assured Response Joint Task Force

Colonel Corwin spoke with the Marines on

board the Ponce on 25 June, and reminded them

that he did not know when the mission would

end and that it could go on anywhere from two

to six months.331 A European Command order

arrived that day directing the special purpose task

force to relieve the 22d MEU and assume the

MEU’s mission.332

Arriving off the coast of Sierra Leone the next

day, the special purpose task force sent detachments to Rota, Spain; Dakar, Senegal; and

Freetown, Sierra Leone, to support the movement

of logistics for the joint task force. The detachment sent to Lungi Airfield, near Freetown, came

from CSSD 28, and provided security at the forward support base for cargo waiting to be picked

up. As the Ponce steamed toward Mamba Station

off the coast of Liberia, a helicopter from the 22d

MEU also picked up Lieutenants David M. Fallon,

Seth I. Lapine, Johnny J. Cooper, II, and James A.

Tenaglia of Company L, Farrell J. Sullivan, the

BLT’s heavy machine gun platoon commander,

and Robert S. Peterson, the BLT’s surveillance and

target acquisition platoon commander, and delivered them to the embassy to prepare for the

turnover.333

At sunrise on 27 April, Marines of the special

purpose task force came ashore on board the 22d

MEU helicopters. Company L, 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines, led by the executive officer, First

Lieutenant Charles N. Black, landed at the

embassy’s Landing Zone Bravo and relieved

Captain Eric M. Mellinger’s Company F, BLT 2/2.

The Marines of Company L conducted a thorough

98 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DM-SD-98-02801

Col Tony L. Corwin, commanding officer of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Liberia,

addresses his Marines two days prior to landing in Liberia.
post and ammunition turnover as they had come

ashore with no ammunition. The special purpose

task force commander, in coordination with the

22d MEU commander, placed the same size force

ashore to minimize any appearance of change. At

1400, Colonel Corwin assumed command of Joint

Task Force Assured Response. The new joint task

force arrived at the start of the monsoon season

and would enjoy only three days of sunny weather the entire time ashore.334

Similar to the 22d MEU, the special purpose

task force’s mission called for the Marines to provide protection for embassy personnel and support the logistical needs of the embassy.

Organized to accomplish several contingency missions, the assigned tasks included the tactical

recovery of aircraft and personnel, hydrographic

surveys, and noncombatant evacuation operations. The operation order noted the Marines

would remain until all official Americans departed

or until a security detachment was no longer

required.335

From the inception of the special purpose task

force, a phased draw down, envisioned by the

Commander in Chief, European Command, constituted a major factor in Marine planning. Colonel

Corwin and Ambassador William Milam worked

together on developing a series of conditions to

define when the Marines would end their security mission. They listed eight conditions that

helped define the criteria for withdrawal of the

Marines for European Command.336

Ashore, the Marines operated the main joint

operations center from the embassy. This was different from the 22d MEU, which operated a forward joint operations center there while keeping

its main joint operations center on board ship.

Since space was at a premium on the Ponce, placing the main joint operations center ashore made

sense.337 The commander of the reinforced rifle

company ashore, Captain Jeffrey E. Lister, directed his Company L Marines to enhance their

defensives positions. Captain Lister, a veteran of

Sharp Edge, had a variety of non-lethal weapons

available if needed. These included beanbag shotgun rounds, pepper spray, stinger grenades, and

tear gas. The company also had its normal complement of ammunition and weapons. Later,

PLANNING, DEPLOYMENT, AND ACTION 99

DVIC DM-SD-98-02804

Marines of the special purpose task force arrive at the American Embassy by CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters. The Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Marines assumed the embassy security mission from the 22d

Marine Expeditionary Unit.
when Captain Eric L. Geissler’s Company K rotated into the compound, the detachment from

Company C, 2d Combat Engineers, put up chicken wire and black screening to mask the positions

of Marines manning the compound.* The rifle

companies rotated out every six to nine days in

the humid, rainy weather.338

The only armed troops the Marines saw were

the West African peacekeepers. Periodically,

peacekeeper vehicles and foot patrols traveled in

front of the embassy. In more than a few

instances, the peacekeepers pointed weapons at

the Marines. Familiar with the rules of engagement, Marines dealt with these incidents by first

reacting defensively and then directing the soldiers to point their weapons away from the

embassy. Several false alarms occurred each night

during the first week, which kept the sentries on

alert. Unarmed factional fighters gathered occasionally within sight of the embassy at the house

of Charles Taylor’s mother, but they never

appeared with weapons. The Marines observed

numerous persons missing limbs pass by the

embassy, a visual reminder of the human cost of

the fighting.339

Company K replaced Company L on 4 July and

both units enjoyed a 4th of July celebration.

Around noon, in the middle of the company’s

turnover, some 80 to 100 Liberians arrived in front

of Gate One. The crowd demonstrated their support for the Americans for about an hour and then

departed. That afternoon the Ambassador gave a

speech in which he thanked the Marines and

stressed his hope for a return to normalcy. To celebrate the occasion, the Ambassador, the Marines

of the joint task force, and the Marine security

guard detachment held a ceremony and cookout

at the Marine House.340

Marines Draw Down and Depart

On 9 July, Lieutenant Colonel Gunther flew to

European Command headquarters and briefed the

command’s staff on the task force draw down

options.341 He recommended 15 August as the

departure date to Marine Brigadier General David

M. Mize, the deputy joint operations officer for

100 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DM-ST-02-00484

Marine rooftop defensive positions dot the south side of the Ambassador’s residence at the American

Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia.

* The concern for extra force protection measures came in the

wake of the bombing of the U.S. Air Force’s Khobar Towers

in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 25 June 1996.
European Command. General Mize asked if the

joint task force could withdraw sooner. After a

number of discussions and assessments at different levels, European Command agreed that all

forces could withdraw by 3 August. The plan

acted as a catalyst for a decision by the national

command authority to begin a phased withdrawal.342

On 10 July, the Marines and sailors on the

Ponce celebrated the ship’s 25th birthday while

planning for the accelerated withdrawal began.343

By 15 July, with the plan approved, a phased

draw down began with one third of the force

ashore moving to the ship. The battalion landing

team reduced the number of Marines manning

Posts Four, Six, and Eight Alpha. Assets focused

on intelligence collection remained ashore at full

strength until the end, but CSSD 28 started taking

down positions as the infantry company no

longer manned them.344 Lieutenant Colonel

Lefebvre, BLT 3/8 commanding officer, stated:

“The methodology, if you will, for the draw down

was to: First, reduce posts that were redundant;

second, reduce those with the least risk and to

offset those [closed posts] with increased

patrolling.” The landing team initially kept crewserved weapons in place and reduced the manning of posts by ones and twos. The Marines

incrementally closed the non-essential posts, but

the posts that were absolutely essential remained

manned until the final withdrawl.345

Monrovia remained calm. As Marine forces

withdrew, the West African peacekeeping force

grew with the arrival of 1,500 Nigerian reinforcements.346 The larger force increased its activity

and became more visible on the streets.347 Regular

commercial fights at the Spriggs-Payne Airport

resumed by mid-month and the embassy’s logistical needs were met through commercial channels.

A reflection of the return to normalcy was the

gradual reduction of the number of refugees in

July at the embassy’s near-by Greystone compound. By 19 July, the security situation was back

to normal, with Monrovia completely secured by

the West African force.348 On 23 July, in an effort

to reinforce the peace and head off any further

fighting, the Economic Community of West

African States met in Accra, Ghana, to discuss the

PLANNING, DEPLOYMENT, AND ACTION 101

DVIC DM-SD-98-02807

A Marine stands guard at Post Two. The only other armed troops the Marines observed were West African

peacekeepers.
Liberia situation. The summit resolved to implement fully the Abuja Accords and impose sanctions against the heads of the factions if the truce,

disarmament, and scheduled elections did not

occur.349 Both the visible reinforcements and the

talks reaffirmed that Monrovia would remain stable.

On 25 July, 45 personnel from the special purpose task force’s advance party departed for the

U.S. by Navy C-9 and C-130 flights from Freetown,

Sierra Leone. Marines closed Posts Three, Two

Alpha, and the .50-caliber positions. The next day,

European Command issued the redeployment

order for the Special Purpose MAGTF.350

On 1 August, in a message to the State

Department recommending the termination of

evacuation status for Monrovia, Ambassador

Milam stated: “the main faction leaders declared,

in Abuja, Nigeria, a nationwide cessation of hostilities and their intentions to disarm their fighters

by the end of September. I have recommended

that the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task

Force depart on 3 August.”351

On 2 August, Joint Task Force Assured

Response closed down the small liaison detachment in Dakar, Senegal, followed the next day by

the closing of the forward logistics site in

Freetown, Sierra Leone. Early that morning,

before light, Marines of Company L left their

remaining defensive positions and gathered near

the embassy’s landing zone. As the sun rose, they

began their departure. The movement of forces

from the embassy took a total of six hours. Seven

Marines, assigned as security guards, were left

behind.352

After departing Mamba Station, the task force

steamed to the Canary Islands for some welldeserved liberty before heading home. The special purpose task force, formed for a contingency,

moved more than 620,000 pounds of cargo and

2,400 passengers in 300 sorties during the monsoon season. More importantly, it accomplished

the goal of providing security for the embassy,

which allowed the State Department to continue

working for a peaceful solution to the long and

bloody Liberian civil war.

102 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DM-SD-98-02810

Local Liberians dance in the street outside the American Embassy during a peaceful demonstration on

the 4th of July. They hold signs asking for American assistance and wishing the United States a happy

Independence Day.
“Throughout all of West Africa you can wake

up on any given morning and find one or more

of the governments overthrown,” noted

Lieutenant Colonel Barry M. Ford following the

1997 noncombatant evacuation in Sierra Leone.

“The entire continent is really in desperate trouble. Over the next few years we’re going to be

spending a lot of time in Africa.”

The comments of Lieutenant Colonel Ford, a

Headquarters Marine Corps analyst specializing in

Africa and the Middle East, would prove to be

prophetic.353 Marines would be deployed to

Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, and the Congo in 1998,

Mozambique in 2000, and again to Liberia in

2003.

In 1996, while attempts were being made to

find a peaceful solution to the Liberian civil war,

factional fighting in Rwanda and the successful

gains by Tutsi forces prompted many Hutus to

flee in mass to neighboring Republic of Zaire.

This exodus resulted in the establishment of a

number of large refugee camps in eastern Zaire,

creating areas of instability and tensions. In

October, Rwandan troops entered Zaire to halt

Hutu incursions. At about the same time, an

armed Tutsi coalition, led by Laurent-Desire

Kabila and known as the Alliance of Democratic

Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL),

was formed when local officials in Zaire attempted to expel them at the behest of Hutu groups.

With the goal of forcibly ousting Zaire’s President

Mobutu Sese Seko, the ADFL, supported by

Rwanda and Uganda, began a military campaign

to capture the capital, Kinshasa.

As conditions in Zaire deteriorated, the United

States prepared for the possible evacuation of

about 500 American citizens, 320 of whom were

in Kinshasa along with an estimated 7,000

Europeans. In response, a three-part plan was

launched. A 350-member U.S. Army enabling

force from U.S. European Command was

deployed to Brazzaville, Congo, across the river

from Kinshasa, and Libreville, Gabon. In addition,

a small group of communicators was sent to Zaire

to establish a communications facility in the capital, and a 325-man permissive force, complete

with helicopters and transport aircraft based in

Libreville and Brazzaville, prepared to evacuate

people if necessary. The third leg of the tripartite

plan was the deployment of an amphibious

assault ship with a scaled down Marine expeditionary unit, or “mini-MEU.”354

In November, the amphibious assault ship

Nassau (LHA 4), the amphibious transport dock

Nashville (LPD 13), and the dock landing ship

Pensacola (LSD 38), with the 26th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

(MEU (SOC)) on board, departed the East Coast

on Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group 97-1

deployment. In March 1997, Colonel Emerson N.

Gardner, Jr.’s Marine unit took part in Operation

Silver Wake, the noncombatant evacuation of

Albania. While stationed off Albania, the Nassau,

with elements of the MEU, was dispatched more

than 5,100 nautical miles from the Adriatic Sea to

the eastern Atlantic Ocean near the Congo, just

north of Zaire, and ordered to prepare for the

possible evacuation of American citizens should

the civil war spread to the capital. The remainder

of the 26th MEU (SOC) on board the Nashville

and Pensacola stayed behind in the

Mediterranean to provide strategic reserve for the

NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia. Prior to leaving the Adriatic, a detachment of the MEU’s CH46 and UH-1 helicopters was exchanged for AH1W Super Cobras from the other ships and

ANGLICO, the unit’s air, naval gunfire support

team.

Epilogue

A Stabilizing Presence
On 5 April 1997, the 26th MEU assumed the

main effort for the planned noncombatant evacuation from the Joint Special Operations Task

Force, in Brazzaville, allowing the number of U.S.

Army forces on the ground to be cut. “Our concept is to maintain a light footprint at the MEU forward headquarters...in Brazzaville,” Colonel

Gardner explained. “We’re going to keep the bulk

of our Marines aboard USS Nassau poised and

ready to respond to orders.”355 The Nassau

remained on station for approximately one month

while the Marines ashore conducted several

rehearsal evacuation drills, waiting to be called to

rescue Americans in Zaire in case that country’s

civil war spilled into Kinshasa. As the Nassau

stood sentinel duty off Zaire, the amphibious

assault ship Kearsarge (LHD 3), with elements of

Colonel Samuel T. Helland’s 22d MEU (SOC) on

board, departed Norfolk, Virginia, on 15 April,

two weeks ahead of schedule, and headed for the

west coast of Africa to relieve the Nassau on 2

May, ensuring the Nassau got home within her

scheduled rotation date. The other two ships of

the Kearsarge’s amphibious ready group—the

amphibious transport dock Ponce (LPD 15) and

the dock landing ship Carter Hall (LSD 50)—

remained behind and later deployed to the

Mediterranean with the rest of 22d MEU’s Marines

for exercises in Spain.356

Colonel Helland forward-based 123 Marines, 2

CH-53 Sea Stallions, 2 CH-46 Sea Knights, and 2

AH-1W Super Cobras more than 350 miles inland

at an airfield near Brazzaville, across the Congo

River from Kinshasa. Back-up forces, if needed,

remained on board the Kearsarge.357 Following

failed peace talks between Kabila and Mobutu in

early May, Mobutu left the country and Kabila’s

forces peacefully marched into Kinshasa on the

17th. Kabila declared himself president, consolidated power around himself and the ADFL, and

renamed the country the Democratic Republic of

Congo. The Marines had evacuated no one.

On 25 May, soldiers led by Major Johnny Paul

Koromah of the Armed Forces Revolutionary

Council seized power in Sierra Leone. Koromah

formed a new military government consisting of

104 ON MAMBA STATION

DoD (USAF) 970403-F-7910D-502

Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) prepare to move out after

arriving in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo. Command and support elements were deployed as part of

contingency planning for a possible evacuation of American citizens and others from Zaire.
both soldiers loyal to him and Revolutionary

United Front rebels who had fought the ruling

governments for the past five years. The coup

ousted President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a 20-year

United Nations diplomat and the first democratically elected government, after only one year in

office and after five years of civil war that left

more than 10,000 dead and forced an estimated

million to flee.

A former British colony about the size of South

Carolina sandwiched between Guinea and

Liberia, Sierra Leone boosted beautiful beaches

and bountiful resources. But after decades of civil

strife, the country’s infrastructure remained poorly developed and the gap between the few

wealthy elite and the rest of the country’s population had grown immense.

Chaos reigned following the coup. Work

stopped, stores closed, and looters ruled the

streets of the Freetown, pillaging homes and businesses. The situation in the capital had deteriorated to near anarchy. “It has become a very dangerous place with a bunch of 13-year-olds running around and out of control,” the American

charge d’affairs reported. “These are a bunch of

thugs and lunatics having a free reign of terror

with the army joining in.”358 At the request of the

Department of State, Secretary of Defense William

S. Cohen directed U.S. European Command to

prepare for yet another noncombatant evacuation

operation. Ironically, Sierra Leone had been used

the year before as a safe haven for evacuees fleeing neighboring Liberia.

In standby status off the coast of the Congo,

the 22d MEU (SOC) was selected to spearhead the

effort, codenamed Noble Obelisk. Within hours of

being alerted, Marines were rushed back on

board the Kearsarge from the base camp in

Brazzaville, Congo, and the ship sailed north at

full speed on 25 May. Four days later, the

Kearsarge was 20 miles off the coast of Freetown,

Sierra Leone. Once the deputy chief of mission in

Freetown gave the word to begin the evacuation,

the plan called for a Marine security force to land,

assess the situation, and then begin processing

and loading evacuees on helicopters for the flight

to the ship. After a few days, the evacuees would

be taken to Conakry, Guinea, for transportation

arranged by the State Department to their final

destination.359

Before dawn on the 30th, a company of

Marines from the lst Battalion, 2d Marines, boarded CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters for the flight to

Freetown despite a coup-imposed flight ban.

Backed by heavy weapons, fast attack vehicles,

AH-1W Super Cobra gunships, and AV-8B Harrier

attack jets, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C.

Greenwood’s Marines established an evacuation

site near the Mammy Yoko Hotel where hundreds

of evacuees had gathered. From a control center

established inside the hotel, members of MEU

Service Support Group 22 began processing the

waiting evacuees. The frightened men, women,

and about 200 children then streamed on board

Marine helicopters as fast as the aircraft could

move in and out of the landing zone. Ten hours

and 85 sorties later, more than 900 evacuees had

been moved to the Kearsarge. Once on board

ship, the evacuees underwent further processing

and screening and were provided food, clothing,

medical treatment, and entertainment. The folEPILOGUE 105

DoD (USAF) 970409-F-7910D-503

Marine Cpl Joseph Calebro uses an AN/PSC-3

satellite communications radio to establish a link

from the tarmac at Point Noire, Republic of

Congo. Cpl Calebro was attached to Aerial

Refueler Transport Squadron 252 to provide KC130 Hercules aircraft with secure communications.
lowing day, pilots and crewmen of Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 transported the

evacuees to the designated safe haven up the

coast in neighboring Guinea.360

While Marines were busy evacuating

Americans and other foreign nationals, U.S. Army

Special Forces rescued two other Marines, members of the security guard tasked with closing the

embassy and safeguarding classified documents,

who had become trapped in the chancellery.

Passing unopposed through several rebel checkpoints, the small team of soldiers got the Marines

out without incident. 

Two days after the first evacuation, Marines

again boarded helicopters following reports of

further unrest in the city. Working from the same

landing zone near the Mammy Yoko Hotel,

Marines encountered no hostile gunfire while

evacuating more than 400 Americans and thirdcountry nationals in less than five hours.

Following the routine established during the first

evacuation, the second wave of evacuees were

screened, processed, and quickly transferred to

Conakry, Guinea. Among them were 18 orphans

and Pinkie McCann-Willis, who headed the

Freetown office of the Indianapolis, Indianabased Americans for African Adoption agency.

McCann-Willis said she and the children had

spent two days pinned down by gunfire before

she was able to pile the children into the back of

her pickup truck and make a dash for the Mammy

Yoko Hotel.

Fighting and chaos again increased ashore, this

time exacerbated by Nigerian warships (whose

government opposed the coup) that were bombarding positions held by Koromah’s forces. A

third and final evacuation was planned, but

Koromah’s forces were now targeting the beachfront Mammy Yoko Hotel where a contingent of

Nigerian soldiers that had deployed ashore had

set up their command post. With the Mammy

Yoko Hotel untenable for the evacuees, the evacuation site was moved to the Cape Sierra HotelRestaurant, less than two miles south along the

beach. The MEU still planned to use helicopters to

transport a majority of the evacuees.

Prepared for possible heavy fighting,

Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood’s Marines came

106 ON MAMBA STATION

DoD (USN) 970530-N-8506C-002

Evacuees from Freetown, Sierra Leone, are directed from a Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter across

the flight deck of the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3). On 30 May, more than 900 persons from 40 countries were

evacuated.
ashore at first light on 3 June with heavy

weapons, including six light armored vehicles

equipped with 25mm and 7.62mm machine guns.

The weapons were not needed, and more than

1,200 persons, including 10 carried out on stretchers, were evacuated in five hours in the absence

of any resistance. On board the Kearsarge, the

ship’s medical facilities were swamped with casualties and individuals traumatized by the past

days’ events. Despite the operational tempo of the

evacuation, Marine and Navy helicopters began

transferring individuals to Conakry the same

day.361 In three safe, fast, and efficient waves, the

Navy-Marine Corps team had rescued more than

2,500 persons.

While Marines of the 22d MEU (SOC) completed their evacuation efforts in Sierra Leone and

prepared to sail to the Canary Islands for a welldeserved liberty call, Brazzaville, Congo, was

plunged into chaos when government troops

were sent in to disarm the private militia of a rival

party. Dozens of Americans were hold up at the

U.S. Embassy and other pockets throughout the

city. Although the 22d MEU was put on standby,

European Command officials instead decided to

rely on the French to evacuate the bulk of

American citizens and sent a 12-man U.S. Army

Special Forces team to the embassy to provide

security and extra communications. 

The Kearsarge continued on to the Canary

Islands and later to the Mediterranean where she

linked up with the other two ships of the

amphibious ready group. In Sierra Leone,

Nigerian-led Economic Community Ceasefire

Monitoring Group forces ousted the Koromah

government after 10 months in office, and the

democratically elected government of President

Kabbach was reinstated in March 1998.

Following the close down of Joint Task Force

Assured Response and the departure of the

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force in

August 1996, the United States, the United

EPILOGUE 107

DoD (USN) 970530-N-8506C-001

A child clings to a crewman on the flight deck of the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) after a frightening first ride

in a helicopter. She was among the first evacuees to arrive on board the Norfolk, Virginia-based amphibious assault ship.
Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and

the Economic Community of West African States 

(ECOWAS) embarked on negotiations to disarm

and demobilize the warring factions in Liberia.

After considerable progress, special elections

were held in July 1997 with Charles Taylor and his

National Patriotic Party emerging victorious, primarily due to the fear of a return to war had

Taylor lost. For the next six years, the Taylor government made little investment in the country’s

infrastructure. Nor did it attempt to improve the

lives of Liberians. Instead, Taylor supported the

rebel factions in neighboring states and fomented

unrest and brutal excesses in the region, which

led Taylor’s former adversaries to resume their

armed rebellion.

On 4 June 2003 in Accra, Ghana, the ECOWAS

facilitated the beginning of peace talks between

the Government of Liberia and rebel groups—the

Liberians United for Reconciliation and

Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for

Democracy in Liberia (MODEL).362 LURD, the

larger of the rebel groups, was based in neighboring Guinea and claimed 3,000 to 4,000 troops,

while Cote d’Ivoire-based MODEL, also know as

Lima Force, claimed 800 to 1,000. They largely

represented elements of the former ULIMO-K and

ULIMO-J factions that had fought Taylor during

Liberia’s civil war. That same day, the Chief

Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone

issued a press statement announcing the opening

of a sealed indictment accusing Taylor of “bearing

the greatest responsibility” for atrocities in Sierra

Leone since November 1996.

As the intense fighting in the western suburbs

threatened to spread into Monrovia, the only part

of the West African nation Taylor controlled, the

international staffs of the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations were forced to evacuate the capital. On 7 June, French helicopters

swooped in to rescue more than 500 fleeing

Americans, Europeans, and other foreign nationals from the American and European Union compounds. The evacuees were transported to a

French warship offshore and then to Abidjan,

Ivory Coast. American Ambassador John W.

Blaney stayed behind with a heavy security presence.363

With the violence escalating, Ambassador

Blaney requested military aid should additional

embassy personnel and American citizens have to

be evacuated. At the direction of the Secretary of

Defense, the European Command sent a small

military support team to augment the security

forces at the embassy in Monrovia, support State

Department personnel with the orderly departure

of United States citizens wishing to leave the

country, and to be pre-positioned to aid in any

evacuation. The deployment was given the name

Shining Express. The Kearsarge, then returning

home with elements of the 2d Marine

Expeditionary Brigade after combat service in

Operation Iraqi Freedom and providing support

to President George W. Bush during his summits

with Arab leaders in Egypt and Jordan, was directed down the west coast of Africa to provide security and lift support for the operation. The

increased American presence was enough to

influence the Taylor government and two rebel

groups to agree to a ceasefire on 17 June that

envisioned a comprehensive peace agreement

within 30 days. With stability somewhat reestablished, the State Department decided that an evacuation and the Kearsarge’s presence were no

longer necessary, and on 19 June she turned her

bow to the west and set out for a 28 June return

to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

The three Liberian factions repeatedly broke

the ceasefire, resulting in the resumption of bitter

fighting and increasing pressure on the United

States to take a more active role in the Liberia

conflict. On 30 June, at the request of United

Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, the

108 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of the authors

Liberian President Charles Ghakay Taylor, known

as “Pappy” to his supporters, was accused of masterminding regional conflicts while the plight of

his country’s 3.3 million people worsened.
Security Council met to discuss the possible

deployment of a multinational force to Liberia.

Secretary Annan raised the prospect of American

involvement, which later was echoed by West

African mediators. The Bush administration was

reported to be weighing its options, among them

the deployment of 2,000 troops. “We’re exploring

all options as to how to keep the situation peaceful and stable,” President Bush said. “One thing

has to happen: Taylor needs to leave the country.

In order for there to be peace and stability in

Liberia, Charles Taylor needs to leave now.”364

While the United States determined what form

its assistance would take, the West African States

took action. Meeting in Accra, Ghana, ECOWAS

military chiefs pledged on 4 July to raise 3,000

troops from member countries for an intervention

force to restore peace in Liberia. But the ability of

West African countries to send enough troops was

plagued by financial and logistical constraints,

said Ghana’s Lieutenant-General Seth Obeng,

chairman of the economic community’s Defense

and Security Commission. “ECOWAS and the

African Union should intensify their initiatives to

get an advanced country, possibly the United

States, to spearhead peace efforts in Liberia, just

as Britain and France did for Sierra Leone and

Cote d’Ivoire,” he suggested. The recommendations of the commission were forwarded to the

community’s Mediation and Security Council for

ratification.365

Bowing to American demands, President

Taylor said on 4 July he would step down from

power, but only after a U.S.-led peacekeeping

force arrived in the war-torn country.

Demonstrators took to the streets of the capital

insisting that Taylor quit immediately.

Government soldiers opened fire on the group of

more than 500 protestors, wounding one. But the

group continued their march on the U.S. Embassy,

chanting ‘Taylor kingdom must come down. Satan

Taylor must go.’ Two days later, Taylor agreed to

leave the country and take up asylum in Nigeria,

but only after an orderly exit from power supported by an international peacekeeping force to

“prevent chaos and disruption in Liberia.”366

EPILOGUE 109

Photo courtesy of the authors

Widespread looting, rape, and lawlessness characterized the campaign carried out by Liberian rebel

fighters, many of which were children. Drunk or often under the influence of drugs, they meted out

instant retaliation to any civilian who talked back or denied them a favor.
With the warring factions again honoring a

truce, some shops and supermarkets reopened

and a United Nations chartered vessel began to

evacuate some of the thousands of trapped Sierra

Leonean refugees. During the lull in the fighting,

a 32-member American humanitarian assistance

survey team arrived from Europe at Roberts

International Airport, about 12 miles south of the

capital, and then flew to the embassy’s Mamba

Point diplomatic enclave. Composed of medical

personnel, civil engineers, logistics specialists,

water purification experts, and a public affairs

officer, the group was to assess the security environment and determine what type of humanitarian support the United States could offer.

Supporting the group were 15 Marines from the

Rota, Spain-based Marine Corps Security Force

Company, Europe. They were to act as a smaller

version of the company’s Fleet Antiterrorism

Security Team (FAST). Initially termed Operation

Sheltering Sky, the codename for the United

States effort in Liberia would later be changed to

Joint Task Force Liberia.

Apart from reviewing the security situation, the

assessment team was to visit various refugee

camps and meet with ECOWAS officials to discuss

American support for the West African peacekeeping force. The team’s recommendations

would be forwarded to General James L. Jones,

commander of U.S. Forces in Europe, who would

then relay them through Secretary of Defense

Donald H. Rumsfeld to the President. “The decision on a larger deployment of a peacekeeping

force will be made by President Bush,” said

Ambassador Blaney when asked if the arrival of

the team marked the beginning of a U.S. peacekeeping operation in Liberia.367

The Liberian capital braced for a fresh attack

by the LURD rebel group in mid-July. Troops

loyal to President Taylor reported that rebel forces

were massing near the strategic town of Key

Junction, 23 miles northwest of Monrovia. The

fragile ceasefire agreed to on 17 June was in danger of breaking down again due to the standoff

between Taylor, who refused to step down and

go into exile until international peacekeepers

110 ON MAMBA STATION

DoD (USAF) 200417125553

Marines with the Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team based out of Rota, Spain, prepare to depart Freeport,

Sierra Leone, for Monrovia. The team was assigned to provide security for the American Embassy in

Liberia.
arrived, and LURD, which threatened to attack

any peacekeepers who landed in Liberia before

Taylor left. On 17 July, LURD forces overran Key

Junction and moved west, raising fears they could

mount a third assault on Monrovia. During the

first two assaults in June, several hundred were

killed and more than 100,000 were made homeless. MODEL forces also attacked government

positions at the port town of Greenville, southeast

of the capital, and at Belliewaley to the northeast.

By 19 July, thousands of terrified civilians with

their meager belongings headed for the center of

Monrovia, fleeing the city’s western suburbs as

fighting between Liberian government soldiers

and LURD rebels escalated around Virginia and

Saint Paul Bridge, about 6 miles away. In the

Ghanaian capital, were peace talks were being

held, the various factions began reviewing a comprehensive peace plan drafted by West African

mediators. In addition, ECOWAS began initial

moves to deploy the 1,000-man vanguard force of

peacekeepers, which would enable President

Taylor to go into exile and allow American troops

to join the West African economic community in

ending Liberia’s civil war.

Despite West African community leaders and

MODEL calls for LURD forces to halt their assault

on Monrovia, the capital city continued to be

pounded with mortar fire and fierce street fighting

persisted as reinforcements moved to cut off

roads to the interior. In a fresh wave of looting,

many government fighters took advantage of the

anarchy to break into closed shops. Venting their

anger and frustration, a group of Liberians

dumped mangled and bloodied bodies outside

the gates of the embassy, some saying, “If you

had intervened this would not be happening.” To

defend the embassy in the midst of the fighting,

41 Marines of Yorktown, Virginia-based 2d FAST

Company, who were training in Rota, Spain, were

flown in on three U.S. Air Force HH-60G Pave

Hawk helicopters from 56th Expeditionary Rescue

Squadron from Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland.

The unit arrived as mortar fire rained on residential areas and struck the commissary and adjacent

Graystone compound across from the embassy.

The helicopters had been sent to Sierra Leone on

13 July to support the survey team along with a

Royal Air Force MC-130P Combat Shadow

deployed to Senegal from its base in Mildenhall,

England. On their return trip, the helicopters

evacuated members of the humanitarian survey

team. 

In addition to approving the Ambassador’s

request that his Marine security guard be reinforced, Secretary Rumsfeld also signed an order

moving the Iwo Jima amphibious ready group

and its embarked 26th MEU (SOC) from the Red

Sea near Djibouti, where it was supporting Joint

Task Force Horn of Africa, into the Mediterranean.

Once there, the ready group could reach the coast

of Liberia in seven to 10 days if needed.

During the last week of July, the beleaguered

government of President Taylor came under

attack on a second front as rebels battling to capture the capital launched a simultaneous attack on

the port city of Buchanan, 75 miles to the southeast. Meanwhile, rebel forces advanced their positions within Monrovia, gaining access to Somalia

Drive, the ring road encircling the northern outEPILOGUE 111

DoD (USAF) 200417104632

Marines with the Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team provide security for a U.S. Air Force HH-60 Pave

Hawk helicopter from the 56th Rescue Squadron as it lands at the American Embassy in Monrovia,

Liberia.
skirts of the city. The rebel forces ignored a plea

by Ambassador Blaney to cease fire, withdraw

from Monrovia, give up their attempts to seize

Buchanan, and allow breathing space for the

peacekeepers to arrive. It looked to many

observers that both rebel movements had now

decided to disregard the 17 June agreement and

launch an all-out offensive to finish off Taylor’s

regime before the international force arrived.

With the embassy locked down, Monrovia

under siege, and most of the city’s million inhabitants now living in squalid conditions on the

brink of starvation, the Bush administration,

although pressured by military commitments in

Iraq and Afghanistan and leery of another openended mission, ordered the deployment of the

Iwo Jima amphibious ready group and 26th MEU

(SOC) to the west coast of Africa. Within 24 hours,

the joint task force’s forward coordination element was deployed to the embassy where it

served as the task force’s liaison to the embassy

and provided the staff with early noncombatant

and medical evacuation plans. The forward coordination element would remain at the embassy for

next 65 days. The administration also offered to

pay more than $10 million toward the cost of

deploying West African peacekeepers to

Liberia.368 The West African economic community

estimated it would need $104 million to keep the

force in country for six months. 

On 2 August, President Taylor announced he

would resign as head of state on 11 August and

leave the country on an unspecified date. His

commitment fell short of the economic community’s demand that he step down and leave Liberia

within three days of the arrival of Nigerian peacekeeping troops. Taylor’s attempt to delay his

departure did not impress the United States,

which now had 2,300 Marines sitting 31 miles off

the coast waiting to intervene if necessary.

Commanded by Colonel Andrew P. Frick, the 26th

MEU (SOC) comprised the 1st Battalion, 8th

Marines, with attached artillery and vehicle transport; Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264, a

composite squadron of helicopters and Harrier

jets; and MEU Service Support Group 26. The

MEU was divided between the three ships of the

amphibious ready group: the amphibious assault

ship Iwo Jima (LHD 7); the amphibious transport

dock Nashville (LPD 13); and the amphibious

dock landing ship Carter Hall (LSD 50). All were

veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Two days later, the first contingent of Nigerian

troops arrived in a heavy rain at Roberts

International Airport on board two white United

Nations helicopters from neighboring Sierra

112 ON MAMBA STATION

DoD (USN) 030718-N-8933S-0011

The amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) and the landing ship dock USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)

pause for an underway replenishment to take on supplies while enroute to the west coast of Africa.
Leone. The mission of the 60-man vanguard was

to secure the airport for the eventual deployment

of more than 3,200 troops, made up of contingents from Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Togo,

Benin, and Gambia. Once on the ground, the

Nigerian peacekeepers, whose strength would

quickly grow to two battalions, moved cautiously

toward the capital where an informal truce

between government and rebel troops was in

effect. The same day, the U.S. Army’s South

European Task Force (Airborne) (SETAF)

deployed a 45-member forward headquarters to

the Iwo Jima. The headquarters, headed by Major

General Thomas Turner, the SETAF and Joint Task

Force Liberia commander, was composed of a

majority of SETAF personnel and was designed to

make maximum use of the Army task force’s

capability to reach back to Southern European

task force’s main headquarters near Vicenza, Italy.

In addition to command and control of the forces

operating in Liberia, the forward headquarters

coordinated with officials from the embassy,

Department of State, United Nations, and humanitarian organizations operating ashore. 

On 6 August, the first of 20 Marine contingents

authorized to go ashore arrived by helicopter at

the embassy where it linked-up with the forward

coordination element. The seven-man liaison

team was to coordinate the efforts of civilian contractors who were providing humanitarian services and logistical help to the Nigerian troops and

to assist in reopening the port and coordinating

needed repairs and maintenance to Roberts

International Airport. In addition, a casualty evacuation and quick reaction force was established

on board ship to support U.S. and multinational

personnel ashore.

The following day, the West African peacekeepers formally moved into the city of Monrovia

and received a rapturous welcome from thousands of Liberians waving palm branches and

white flags and chanting, “We Want Peace! No

More War!” But the Nigerian troops were not

ready to cross over to the port area on Bushrod

Island, which was held by LURD forces.

Meanwhile, President Taylor confirmed to the

Liberian parliament that he would resign on the

11th and hand over power to Vice President

EPILOGUE 113

DoD (USMC) 03814-M-9750-B-502

Peacekeepers control a peaceful yet peace-hungry crowd as they move into the capital. Under the leadership of Nigerian Gen Festus Okonkwo, Nigeria’s contribution would swell to more than 1,500 soldiers.
Moses Blah in view of what he called “a broadbased international conspiracy against my government.”

As he pledged, Charles Taylor ended his sixyear rule of Liberia on 11 August by handing over

the green presidential sash of office to Vice

President Blah and flying into exile in Nigeria.

Dressed in his trademark white safari suit, he was

somber, but still defiant. “I want to be the sacrificial lamb, I will be the whipping boy,” but, he

said, “God willing, I will be back.”369 Blah, a

friend and ally of Taylor during the civil war in

the 1990s, would rule until October when he

would hand over the reigns of power to an interim president chosen by the Liberian peace conference under way in Accra, Ghana. Timed to

coincide with the resignation and departure of

Taylor, the amphibious ready group appeared

over the horizon as fixed and rotary aircraft conducted air patrols in the skies over Monrovia. The

show of force not only prevented serious incidents from occurring during the transition of

power, but also provided a psychological boost to

both the citizens of Monrovia and the West

African peacekeepers on the ground. On 13

August, President Bush informed Congress of his

actions as required by the War Powers Resolution,

noting, “it is anticipated that U.S. forces will redeploy when ECOMIL [ECOWAS Mission in

Liberia] forces have transitioned to the follow-on

U.N. stabilization operations.”370

Shortly after dawn on 14 August, nine CH-46

Sea Knight and CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters

carrying 150 combat-equipped Marines of Battery

L, 10th Marines, touched down at Roberts

International Airport. The Marines would operate

as a quick reaction force (QRF) should peacekeepers come under significant attack. “The QRF

is not there in a security role,” a Department of

Defense spokesman stressed. “They’re merely

standing by to provide a reaction capability if

something unexpected occurs with regard to an

ECOMIL unit, and only to stabilize the tactical situation so [ECOMIL forces] can restart their mission.”371 The shipboard QRF remained on 60-

minute alert, while the casualty evacuation team

remained at 180-minute alert. Another 60 Marines

landed in four amphibious assault vehicles in the

114 ON MAMBA STATION

DoD (USN) 030814-N-6204K-028

Marines from 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit wait on the deck of USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) prior to boarding helicopters bound for Monrovia, Liberia.
port area. Task force representatives, along with

Ambassador Blaney, were then able to successfully negotiate the withdrawal of LURD forces

from the port. 

As helicopters and two Harrier jets flew overhead, Nigerian armored personnel carriers moved

across two bridges spanning the Mesurado River

onto Bushrod Island and formally secured the

strategic port area. As they did, LURD fighters

were still in the process of withdrawing their pickup trucks with looted items to the Po River on the

northern edge of the city. Under the protection of

a Marine security platoon and Nigerian troops,

American combat engineers, explosive ordnance

disposal personnel, and U.S. Navy Sea, Air, Land

(SEAL) teams began a survey of the heavily looted port to permit much needed humanitarian

supplies to be put ashore. The survey also noted

EPILOGUE 115

Photo courtesy of 26th MEU

A CH-53E Super Stallion with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264 drops off supplies to the Marines

at Robert International Airport.

Photo courtesy of 26th MEU

Maj James E. Donnellan (right), executive officer

of 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, goes over plans at

the international airfield for an immediate action

drill with Maj Lojah, the commanding officer of

Delta Company, 1st Nigerian Battalion.
depths and obstacles for any possible amphibious

landing by the Marines afloat.372

On 18 August, as more peacekeeping forces

arrived, two force reconnaissance teams and a

headquarters element were inserted into Bushrod

Island and Roberts International Airport to act as

liaison with the two Nigerian battalions. The

teams were tasked with providing communications and coordination between Joint Task Force

Liberia and the multinational force. Additional

logistics personnel also were put ashore. Later

that day, the Liberian government and two rebel

movements signed a peace agreement in Accra,

Ghana, that paved the way for an interim government headed by an independent civilian to take

power in October, thus ending 14 years of near

constant civil war. The chairman of the West

African regional body, Ghana’s President John

Kufuor, “reminded the former warring factions

that genuine political power comes from the ballot box and democracy rather than from the barrel of the gun.”373 Despite the peace agreement

and relative calm in the capital, government and

rebel forces continued to clash throughout the

interior, which created new waves of refugees.

A week after the signing of the peace accord

the 150-member Marine force withdrew from the

airport to ships of the amphibious group off

shore. The decision “reflects the situation on the

ground,” said Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N.

Collins, the Southern European Task Force 

spokesman. “We’re here to support [the West

Africans], but we can do it better from the ship.”

About 100 Marines remained on the ground, 70

guarding the embassy and 30 acting as liaisons

with West African peacekeepers. “They’re forsaking us,” said a young Liberian. “We wish they’d

stay until peace would come. Their presence here

puts fear in our fighters. It makes them think if

they carry on hostilities, they’ll be handled by the

Americans.”374

During the next month as additional West

African peacekeepers arrived, boosting their numbers to more than 3,000, Marines of the 26th MEU

waited off shore conducting daily reconnaissance

flights and remaining ready to respond if needed.

On 5 September problems arose. Two Marines

suffering from low blood pressure, fever, diarrhea, vomiting, and liver and kidney dysfunction

were evacuated to Landstuhl Army Regional

Medical Center in Germany. An additional 15

Marines developing similar symptoms were crossdecked to the Iwo Jima’s intensive care unit with

follow-on evacuation to Bethesda Naval Medical

Center in Maryland. Additional cases were evacuated several days later. At Bethesda they were

diagnosed with malaria. “We know everybody

took their medication,” said Captain Gregory 

Martin, USN, a physician specializing in infectious

diseases. “We don’t know if somebody missed a

dose here or there. Probably so.”375 By the end of

the month, all the evacuated personnel had been

released from the Naval Medical Center and were

placed on convalescent leave.

With the West African troops due to become

part of the United Nations peacekeeping force in

early October, the 26th MEU began the retrograde

of its liaison teams. By the end of September, all

were on board ship except 55 Marines who

would remain in Monrovia to beef up security at

the embassy. The Carter Hall and Nashville left

the West African coast on the 28th followed by the

Iwo Jima three days later. The ships of the amphibious ready group would rendezvous at Rota,

Spain, where they would conduct a wash-down

and the personnel given some needed liberty

before getting underway for the United States.

“When you see the Iwo Jima, the Nashville and

Carter Hall off the coastline, it shows that the

American public cares and that there is a definite

military presence,” said Colonel Frick. “We provided a stabilizing presence which allowed the

multinational forces from other Western African

countries to come in and handle the problem

regionally.” Marine helicopters and jets flying

overhead and U.S. Navy ships looming on the

horizon “reassured the humanitarian relief organizations and African peacekeeping forces that it

was safe to go back to work.”376

116 ON MAMBA STATION

Photo courtesy of 26th MEU

1stLt Matthew A. Markham (left), with Battery L,

discusses tactics with his Nigerian counterpart

during a quick reaction drill at Roberts

International Airport.
Source material used in the preparation of this

publication was derived from the Sharp Edge and

Assured Response files, Archives Section, Marine

Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington,

D.C. The command chronologies of the Marine

units involved are located in the Archives Section,

MCHC, Washington, D.C. All oral history tapes referenced are located in the Center’s oral history

collection in the Archives Section. All Department

of State messages and related materials are located in the authors’ backup file on Liberia.

Chapter 1

Liberian Unrest Turns Violent

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter was derived from the following sources: 22d

MEU Command Chronology (ComdC), 1Jan31Jun90; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives,

“Congressman Yarton speaking on Regarding

Human Rights in Liberia, H. Res. 354,”

Congressional Record, 101st Cong., 2d sess., vol.

136, 24Apr90, pp. 1627-1630, hereafter, U.S.

Congress, House, 24Apr90; American Embassy

Monrovia, Liberia Emergency Planning Handbook, hereafter, American Embassy, Plan-ning

Handbook; LtCol Stephen R. Labadie, Jr., intvw,

25Oct90 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),

hereafter, Labadie intvw; LtCol Glen R.

Sachtleben, “Operation Sharp Edge: The Corps’

MEU (SOC) Program in Action,” Marine Corps

Gazette, Nov91, pp. 77-86, hereafter, Sachtleben,

“Operation Sharp Edge;” Dennis C. Jett

“Evacuations during Civil War, Liberia 1990,” from

Joseph B. Sullivan, ed., Embassies Under Siege:

Personal Accounts by Diplomats on the Front Line,

(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995), pp. 133-147,

hereafter, Jett, “Evacuations during Civil War”; Bill

Berkeley, Liberia: A Promise Betrayed (New York:

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986),

hereafter, Berkeley, Promise Betrayed; Yekutiel

Gershoni, Black Colonialism: The AmericoLiberian Scramble for the Hinterland (Boulder,

Co: Westview Press, Inc. 1985), hereafter,

Gershoni, Black Colonialism; Mark Huband, The

Liberian Civil War (London: Frank Cass, 1998),

hereafter, Huband, Civil War; Human Rights

Watch, Easy Prey: Child Soldiers in Liberia (New

York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), hereafter,

Human Rights Watch, Easy Prey; J. Gus Liebenow,

Liberia: The Quest for Democracy (Bloomington,

In: Indiana University Press, 1987), hereafter,

Liebenow, Quest for Democracy; Roger Rinehart

et al., Liberia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.:

American University, 1985), hereafter, Rinehart,

Country Study; Stephen P. Riley, Liberia and

Sierra Leone: Anarchy or Peace in West Africa

(London: Research Institute for the Study of

Conflict and Terrorism, 1996), hereafter, Riley,

Liberia and Sierra Leone; Amos Sawyer, The

Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia: Tragedy and

Challenge (San Francisco, Ca: Institute for

Contemporary Studies, 1992), hereafter, Sawyer,

Emergence of Autocracy; Willi Schulze, The New

Geography of Liberia (London: Longman Group,

1973), hereafter, Schulze, Geography of Liberia;

Marc Weller, ed., Regional Peace-keeping and

International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis,

Cambridge International Documents Series, vol. 6

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994),

hereafter, Weller, Regional Peace-keeping.

1. Gershoni, Black Colonialism, pp. 4-5;

Liebenow, Quest for Democracy, pp. 16-18;

Sawyer, Emergence of Autocracy, pp. 21-22.

2. Berkeley, Promise Betrayed, p. 42.

3. Huband, Civil War, pp. 18-19.

4. Human Rights Watch, Easy Prey, pp. 1-2.

5. “Thousands of Refugees Reportedly Flee

to Cote d’Ivoire, 6 January 1990,” BBC Monitoring

Report, 8Jan90, doc. 10 in Weller, Regional Peacekeeping, p. 34.

Notes
6. 101st United States Congress, 2d Session,

House of Representatives Resolution 354, 7Mar90,

doc. 16 in Weller, Regional Peace-keeping, p. 36.

7. U.S. Congress, House, 24 Apr90, pp. 1627-

30.

8. Linda Shuster, “The Final Days of Doctor

Doe,” Granta, no. 48, 1994, pp. 57-58.

9. “Doe Calls on Citizens to Join Fight

Against Rebels, 18 May 1990,” doc. 18 in Weller,

Regional Peace-keeping, p. 38.

10. CinCNavEur msg to ComSixFlt,

261043ZMay90 (Sharp Edge files, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.).

11. “Liberia Army Seen Crumbling Before

Rebels,” Reuters News Service (Monrovia),

22May90.

12. Nats Agbo, “Down, Down, Down...,”

Newswatch: Nigeria’s Weekly Newsmagazine,

11Jun90, pp. 27-28; “UN Orders Evacuation of

Personnel: Senators Offer to Resign, 30 May

1990,” BBC Monitoring Report, 1June90, doc. 22

in Weller, Regional Peace-keeping, p. 40.

13. FMFLant, Marine Expeditionary Unit,

Special Operations Capable (MEU [SOC])

Operations Playbook (Norfolk, Va: FMFLant,

1989), p. F-6-7.

14. Labadie intvw; American Embassy,

Planning Handbook, Sec. 1500, Exhibit 1544-A.

15. CinCNavEur msg to ComSixFlt,

312122ZMay90 (Sharp Edge files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

16. American Embassy, Monrovia, msg to

SecState, Washington, D.C., 111628ZApr90 (Sharp

Edge files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

17. Linda K. Knight, Can there be Peace in

Liberia? (Unpublished Paper, 1April95)

18. U.S. Congress, House, 24Apr90, p. 1630.

Chapter 2

Preparing for Operation Sharp Edge

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter was derived from the following sources: 22d

MEU ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun90; 22d MEU ComdC,

1Jul-31Dec90; 22d MEU Forward Command

Element AAR, 17Aug90, hereafter, 22d MEU FCE

ARR (Sharp Edge files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

19. Capt Gary R. Oles intvw, 22Oct90, p. 2,

hereafter, Oles intvw, 1990.

20. Maj Stephen L. Sakyo intvw, 24Oct90, p. 1,

hereafter, Sakyo intvw.

21. Col Willis H. Hansen, FMO CinCNavEur,

Sharp Edge History, e-mail to author, 31Jan96,

(Sharp Edge files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),

hereafter, Hansen e-mail; BLT 2/4, MCLLS Long

Report, MCLLS no. 81664-41409 (00082), dtd

13Sep90 (Sharp Edge files, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.).

22. Sakyo intvw, p. 2.

23. BGen Granville R. Amos, biographical file

(RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

24. 22d MEU ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun90, encl. 1,

p. 10; CJCS msg to CinCEur 24300ZMay90;

CinCEur msg to TF62 250315ZMay90; LtCol

Emerson N. Gardner intvw, 24Oct90, p. 2., hereafter, Gardner intvw; Labadie intvw, p. 1;

Sachtleben intvw, p. 2.

25. LtCol James W. Head intvw, 23Oct90, p. 2,

hereafter, Head intvw.

26. Sachtleben intvw, p. 7.

27. Ibid.

28. Sachtleben intvw, p. 9.

29. Sachtleben intvw, pp. 14-15. 

30. Labadie intvw, pp. 6-7; Sachtleben intvw,

pp. 13-14.

31. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, Telephone

Directo-ry, 2Jan90; AmEmbassy, Planning Handbook, p. 3. 

32. Mr. John Freeze, RSO Monrovia, intvw,

3Sep96, hereafter, Freeze intvw; Darell M. Lowe

telephone intvw with author, 24Feb97. 

33. Hansen e-mail; Sachtleben intvw, p. 15. 

34. Sachtleben intvw, p. 15.

35. Labadie intvw, p. 5; Sachtleben intvw, p.

3, p. 8.

36. Labadie intvw, p. 6.

37. Capt David J. Mollohan intvw, 23Oct90, p.

5, hereafter, Mollohan intvw; Sachtleben intvw, p.

8. 

38. BLT 2/4, MCLLS Long Report, MCLLS no.

83179-87254 (00102), dtd 13Sep90 (Sharp Edge

files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); 22d MEU FCE

AAR; Gardner intvw, p. 11; Mollohan intvw, p. 6.

39. 22d MEU FCE AAR; BLT 2/4, MCLLS Long

Report, MCLLS no. 83179-87254 (00102), dtd

13Sep90 (Sharp Edge files, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.); Sachlteben intvw, pp. 8-9.

118 ON MAMBA STATION
40. Labadie intvw, p. 7.

41. Sachtleben intvw, p. 9. 

42. Ibid; 22d MEU FCE AAR.

43. Gardner intvw, p. 5.

44. VMGR-252 ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun90, encl. 1,

p. 4; HMM-261 ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun90, p. 4;

Gardner intvw, pp. 4-5.

45. Jett, “Evacuations during Civil War,” p.

137.

46. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 3111624ZJan90; AmEmbassy,

Monrovia, msg to SecState, Washington, D.C.,

031259ZJun90.

47. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 121547ZJul90.

48. Labadie intvw, p. 7.

49. Ibid; Schuster, “The Final Days of Doctor

Doe,” p. 68.

50. Sachlteben intvw, p. 10.

51. Ibid; SSgt Kenneth M. Sharp telephone

intvw with author, 15Jan97. 

52. Ibid. 

53. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 121547ZJul90.

54. Ibid; CO, Co.G, MSG Bn ltr to SecNav

(OP-09B19), Subj: Recommendation for Navy Unit

Commendation, dtd 4Sep91 (Sharp Edge files,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

55. Phillip K. McLaine, 1990 MSG Det member, telephone intvw with author, 23Feb97; CO,

Co.G, MSG Bn ltr to SecNav (OP-09B19), Subj:

Recom-mendation for Navy Unit Commendation,

dtd 4Sep91 (Sharp Edge files, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.).

56. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 231748ZJul90.

57. John Jameson “Liberia Prince of

Darkness,” Soldier of Fortune, Mar91, p. 33-38.

58. Jett, “Evacuations during Civil War,” p.

137; Sachtleben intvw, p. 9; Mollohan intvw, p. 7. 

59. Schuster, “The Final Days of Doctor Doe,”

p. 77.

60. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., and MSG Bn Quantico,

141952ZJul90. 

61. Sachtleben intvw, p. 10.

62. Labadie intvw, p. 9; Sachtleben intvw, p.

13; AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 271101ZAug90.

63. Labadie intvw, p. 8; Paul Eagle, “Who Will

Mind the Garden,” At Home in the World: The

Peace Corps Story (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996),

p. 48.

64. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 271101ZAug90; Labadie intvw,

p. 12. 

65. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 271101ZAug90.

66. CinCNavEur msg to AGI 296, 021820ZAug90.

67. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 271101ZAug90.

68. Sachtleben intvw, p. 10.

69. 22d MEU FCE, FCE Report no. 054, 24 Jul.

90.

70. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 271101ZAug90. 

71. Weller, Regional Peace-keeping, doc. no.

43, p. 62; Oles intvw, 1990, p. 8.

72. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 271101ZAug90.

73. John Jameson, “Liberia Prince of

Darkness,” Soldier of Fortune, Mar91, p. 381; LtCol

Thomas W. Parker, “Operation Sharp Edge,”

Naval Institute Proceedings, May91, p.104, hereafter, Parker, “Sharp Edge”; Sachlteben intvw, p. 1.

74. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 301134ZJul90.

75. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 271101ZAug90. 

76. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 171109ZSep90; AmEmbassy,

Monrovia, msg to AmEmbassy Abidjan, 021405ZOct90. 

77. Phillip K. McLaine telephone intvw with

author, 23Feb97.

78. Michael Goldsmith, “Liberian Leader Says

He Has Ordered Arrest of Foreigners,” Associated

Press, Monrovia, Liberia, 4Aug90.

79. Robert D. Kaplin, The Ends of the Earth

(New York, NY: Random House, 1996), p. 22.

80. Labadie intvw, p. 9; Sachtleben intvw, p.

16.

81. 22d MEU, Landing Force Operations

Center (LFOC) Watch Log, 5Jun-21Aug90, dtd

4Aug90 (Sharp Edge files, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.), hereafter, 22d MEU LFOC Log.

NOTES 119
82. 22d MEU LFOC Log, 4Aug90.

83. Ibid; Capt Gary R. Oles, Co. E Diary of

Events, 4-5Aug90 (Personal Papers, Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA), 4Aug90, hereafter, Oles,

Co. E Diary; Sachlteben intvw, p.16. 

84. 22d MEU LFOC Log, 5Aug90.

85. Oles, Co. E Diary, 4Aug90.

86. Capt Daniel S. Rogers, Field Notes 9May13Aug90 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA),

5Aug90, hereafter, Rogers, Field Notes; Co. H, BLT

2/4 OpO, p.1, 4Aug90 (Sharp Edge files, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.). 

87. Gardner intvw, p. 9.

88. Oles, Co. E Diary, 5Aug90; Capt Daniel S.

Rogers, Hotel Company Commander’s Record

30May-16Aug90 (Gray Research Center, Quantico,

VA), 5Aug90, hereafter, Rogers, Record. 

Chapter 3

Evacuation Operations

89. Gardner intvw, p. 9.

90. Gardner intvw, p. 11.

91. Oles, Co. E Diary, 5Aug90, indicated landing at 0908; 22d MEU ComdC, Jul-Dec90, reported the landing at 0906.

92. Gardner intvw, p. 10.

93. Maj Gary E. Oles telephone intvw with

author, 13Feb97.

94. 22d MEU ComdC 1Jul-31Dec90, encl. 2, p.

2, reported mission completed at 0916; Oles, Co.

E Diary, 5Aug90, recorded the mission completed

at 0919.

95. Oles, Co. E Diary, 5Aug90.

96. Ibid.

97. 22d MEU ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec90, indicated

the time as 0910; Rogers, Record, 5Aug90, reported landing at 0907. 

98. Rogers, Record, 5Aug90.

99. Ibid; Sachtleben intvw, p. 17.

100. 1stLt James D. Chaney intvw, 22Oct90, pp.

3-4, hereafter, Chaney intvw.

101. Rogers, Field Notes; Sachtleben,

“Operation Sharp Edge,” p. 85.

102. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 051104ZAug90.

103. Rogers, Field Notes, 6Aug90.

104. Labadie intvw, pp. 13-14.

105. Rogers, Record, 5Aug90; LtCol Thomas W.

Parker intvw, 23Oct90, p. 10, hereafter, Parker

intvw.

106. Parker intvw, p. 10; Rogers, Field Notes,

5Aug90.

107. Weller, Regional Peace-keeping, doc. no.

46, p. 64.

108. Capt Robert C. Carney, Liberia, August

1990, 40 minutes, Personal Video of 22d MEU

actions in Liberia (Library, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.).

109. Chaney intvw, p. 4.

110. BLT 2/4, MCLLS Long Report, MCLLS no.

80657-91953 (00073), 13Sep90 (Sharp Edge files,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.). 

111. Michael Goldsmith, “Foreign Hostages

Released by Rebel Faction in Liberia,” Associated

Press, Monrovia, Liberia, 8Aug90.

112. Weller, Regional Peace-keeping, p. xxii.

113. Ibid, doc. no. 50, p. 67.

114. Ibid, doc. no. 59, p. 85.

115. “Marines support Embassy,” USS Saipan

News (ModLoc, Mamba Station, Liberia), 15Aug90,

p. 1, in 22d MEU ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec90, encl. 1,

item 17. 

116. Head intvw, p. 7.

117. 22d MEU ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec90, encl. 2,

p. 3; Maj Donald P. Edwards intvw, 23Oct90, pp.

8-10.

118. 22d MEU ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec90, encl. 2,

p. 3; Parker intvw, p. 12. 

119. Parker intvw, p. 13.

120. Parker, “Sharp Edge,” p. 126.

121. 22d MEU LFOC Log, 12Aug90;

AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 121313ZAug90; Parker, “Sharp

Edge,” p. 106; Parker intvw, p. 13. 

122. Parker intvw, p. 13.

123. Parker intvw, p. 15.

124. 22d MEU ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec90, encl. 1,

p. 7.

125. Oles, Co. E Diary; CO, Co.E, BLT2/4 ltr to

26 MEU, Subj: Guard Instructions, Aug90 (Sharp

Edge files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

126. Oles, Co. E Diary; 22d MEU ComdC, 1Jul31Dec90, encl. 1, p. 7.

127. 22d MEU Manifest, August 16 Flights,

120 ON MAMBA STATION
Draw down Evacuation 1990 (Sharp Edge files,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

128. 22d MEU ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec90, encl. 1,

p. 7.

129. HQMC, Monthly OpSum, Aug90, p. B-7.

130. 22d MEU ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec90, encl. 1,

p. 8.

131. Ibid, encl. 1, p. 7.

132. 22d MEU Manifest, August 18 Flights,

Draw down Evacuation 1990 (Sharp Edge files,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

133. Segun Aderiye, “ECOMOG Landing,” in

The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt

At Regional Peace Keeping, Margaret A. Vogt ed.

(Lagos: Gabumo, 1992), pp. 97-100, hereafter,

Aderiye, “ECOMOG Landing.”

134. 22d MEU ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec90, encl. 1,

p. 5.

135. SSgt John La Vallee, “Marine Evacuate Embassy,” Leatherneck, Oct90, p. 32.

136. Ibid.

Chapter 4

Operation Sharp Edge

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter was derived from the following sources: 26th

MEU ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun90; 26th MEU ComdC,

1Jul-31Aug90; 26th MEU ComdC, 1Sep-30Sep90;

26th MEU ComdC, 1Oct-30Oct90; 26th MEU

ComdC, 1Dec-31Dec90; BLT 3/8 ComdC, 1Jul31Dec90; BLT 3/8 ComdC, 1Janl-31Jul91; Merdith

Hartley, Liberia Chronology 1991 (Sharp Edge

files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter,

Hartley, LiberiaC; Maj George S. Hartley, Personal

Log/Diary, 24Aug-1Nov90 (Gray Research Center,

Quantico, VA), 21Oct97, hereafter, Hartley, Diary;

Capt Glen N. Cheatham, Notebook, 2Jan91-

15Feb91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA),

18Oct97, hereafter, Cheatham, Notebook.

137. Col William C. Fite intvw, 16Apr91, p.1

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Fite intvw.

138. Ibid., p. 2.

139. Ibid. 

140. LtCol Jon W. Stull intvw, 16Apr91, p. 1.

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Stull intvw.

141. Fite intvw, p. 1.

142. Stull intvw, p. 4.

143. 26th MEU msg to IG 625.5,

210001ZAug90.

144. 22d MEU LFOC Log, 21Aug90; Capt James

K. Shannon intvw, 15Apr91, p. 2. (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Shannon

intvw.

145. Fite intvw, p. 3.

146. BLT 3/8, msg to 26th MEU (SOC),

120854ZSep90.

147. CWO3 Edward E. Deering intvw, 16Apr91,

p.1 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),

hereafter, Deering intvw.

148. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 20.

149. Ibid. 

150. HQMC, Monthly OpSum, 21Sep90, p. B-6.

151. Maj Daniel P Johnson intvw, 17Apr91, p.

1. (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Johnson intvw.

152. ComdHist USS Whidbey Island, 12Feb90

(Ships HistColl, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.), encl. 3, p.25, hereafter, ComdHist

Whidbey Island.

153. Aderiye, “ECOMOG Landing,” pp. 102,

106; MajGen C. Y. Iweze, “Nigeria in Liberia: The

Military Operations of ECOMOG,” Nigeria in

International Peacekeeping 1960-92 (Lagos:

Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), p. 224,

hereafter, Iweze, “Military Operations.” 

154. Aderiye, “ECOMOG Landing,” p. 107;

Darrell M. Lowe, telephone intvw with author,

24Feb97.

155. Aderiye, “ECOMOG Landing,” pp. 241-3. 

156. Hartley, Diary, p. 4.; Shannon intvw, p. 3;

26th MEU msg to IG 62.5, 210001ZAug90. 

157. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 20.

158. Ibid.; Iweze, “Military Operations,” p. 224;

Ibrahim James, “ECOMOG Under Attack,” in The

Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at

Regional Peace Keeping, Margaret A Vogt ed.

(Lagos: Gabumo, 1992), p. 135.

159. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 20.

160. Johnson intvw, p. 8.

161. Derring intvw, p. 5. 

162. Ibid., p. 2.

163. Shannon intvw, p. 10; 26th MEU, ROE

Card, Aug90; 26th MEU msg to TG 625,

210001ZAug90.

164. Shannon intvw, p. 5.

NOTES 121
165. Ibid., p. 5.

166. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 22.

167. Ibid. 

168. USS Barnstable County, Log, 2Sep90

(Ships HistColl, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Barnstable County, Log.

169. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 22.

170. ComdHist, Whidbey Island, encl. 3, p.27;

HMM-162 ComdC, Sep90, encl. 1, sec. 2, p.3;

Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 23.

171. HMM-162 ComdC, Sep90, encl. 1, sec. 2,

p.3; Barnstable County, Log, 6Sep90.

172. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 23. 

173. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 23; Hartley, Diary, p.

6; Weller, Regional Peace-keeping, doc. no. 74, p.

97; Iweze, “Military Operations.” pp. 230-1.

174. HMM-162 ComdC, Sep90, encl. 1, sec, 2,

p. 4; Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 24.

175. Johnson intvw, p. 7. 

176. Barnstable County, Log, 10Sep90; Hartley,

LiberiaC, p. 24. 

177. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 24.

178. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

179. Shannon intvw, p. 6; AmEmbassy,

Monrovia, msg to SecState, Washington, D.C.,

091233ZSep90.

180. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 25.

181. Ibid., p. 26; Hartley, Diary, p. 6.

182. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 25.

183. Shannon intvw, p. 14.

184. Deering intvw, 9; Shannon intvw, p.14;

HMM-162 ComdC, Sep90.

185. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 26.

186. Shannon intvw, p. 6; Regional

Peacekeeping, doc. nos. 80-2, pp. 99-100; Funmi

Olonisakin, “African ‘Homemade Peacekeeping

Initiatives,’” in Armed Forces Society, Spring 97,

vol. 23, no. 3, p.359.

187. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 291158ZSep90.

188. Shannon intvw, p. 10; Dan W. Showalter,

intvw with author, 1May97; Hartley, LiberiaC, p.

27.

189. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 28.

190. Hartley, Diary, p. 6.

191. Barnstable County, Log, 24Sep90; Hartley,

LiberiaC, p. 28.

192. Regional Peacekeeping, doc. no. 83, p.

101; Hartley, Diary, p. 6.

193. Hartley, LiberiaC, pp. 27-28.

194. Johnson intvw, pp. 5-6; Shannon intvw, p.

5; Capt James G. Drager, USN, telephone intvw

with author, 14Jan97; Hartley, Diary, p. 8.

195. Shannon intvw, p. 5; Deering intvw, p. 8. 

196. Shannon intvw, p. 3; Hartley, LiberiaC, p.

29.

197. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 29.

198. Ibid.

199. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 32; Iweze, “Military

Operations,” pp. 220, 238; U.S. Congress, Senate,

Committee on Foreign Relations, Hiran A. Ruiz

testimony to Subcommittee on African Affairs,

Humanitarian Crisis in Liberia, 101st Congress.,

2d sess., 27Nov90, pp 48-60, hereafter, Ruiz,

Testimony.

200. Deering intvw, p. 4

201. Shannon intvw, p. 9.

202. Deering intvw, p. 5.

203. Johnson intvw, pp. 13-14.

204. Hartley, Diary; Iweze, “Military

Operations,” p. 220; Ruiz, Testimony.

205. Hartley, LiberiaC, p. 30.

206. Deering intvw, p. 3.

207. Johnson intvw, pp. 10-11.

208. Deering intvw, pp. 3-4.

209. Ibid., pp. 6, 11.

210. Regional Peacekeeping, doc. no 103, p.

120.

211. Capt Walter E. Lavrinovich telephone

intvw with author, 29Jan97.

212. LtCol Richard H. Kunkel intvw, 15Apr91,

p. 2. (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),

hereafter, Kunkel intvw.

213. Ibid., p. 6.

214. Kunkel intvw, p. 3.

215. MSSG 26 ComdC, Jan91, encl. 2, p. 1.

216. EuCom JHO, The Politics of NEO: Sharp

Edge, Chapter Two, EUCOM JHO NEO manuscript, n.d. (Sharp Edge files, MCHC, Washington

D.C.). 

217. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to COMJTF,

091713ZJan91. 

218. Cheatham, Notebook, p. 7; Capt Glenn

Cheatham intvw, 18Apr96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC,

122 ON MAMBA STATION
Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Cheatham intvw.

219. Cheatham intvw; Capt William F.

Crenshaw telephone intvw with author, 14Jan97. 

220. Ibid.; Cheatham intvw.

221. Cheatham intvw.

222. Regional Peacekeeping, doc. no. 122, p.

133.

Chapter 5 

22d MEU in Operation Assured Response

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter was derived from the following sources: Capt

Jeffrey J. Kenney After Action Report Events at the

U.S. Embassy in Monrovia ltr dtd 4May96

(Assured Response files, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.; 22d MEU ComdC, 1Apr-30Apr96; 22d MEU

ComdC, 1May-31May96; 22d MEU ComdC, 1Jun31Jun96; BLT 2/2 ComdC, 1Jan-31Jul96; SPMAGTF

ComdC, 1Jun-31Aug96 (Assured Response files,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Col Melvin W. Forbush

intvw, 15Aug96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Forbush intvw;

William B. Milam intvw, 5Feb97 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Milam intvw.

223. Weller, Regional Peace-keeping, doc. no.

176, p. 208.

224. Weller, Regional Peace-keeping, doc. no.

215, p. 300.

225. William S. K. Reno, Corruption and State

Politics in Sierra Leone, (Cambridge: University

Press, 1995), pp. 178-183.

226. Colin Scott, Humanitarian Action and

Security in Liberia 1989-1994, (Providence:

Watson Institute, Brown University, 1995), p. 48.

227. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 11544ZMar93.

228. 26th MEU ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec92, sec. 2,

pp. 4, 7.

229. Weller, Regional Peace-keeping, doc. nos.

215, 256, p. 330, p. 382.

230. United Nations Department of Public

Information, “Liberia-UN Peace-keepers to

Monitor Cease-Fire, Elections; Coordinate

Humanitarian Aid” UN Chronicle, Dec93, p.52.

231. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to RUEHAB

AmEmbassy, Abidjan 4187, 132057ZApr96; Sgt

Jose D. Marquez intvw, 3Mayt97 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Marquez

intvw.

232. MSG Running Log, 8Apr 96; Sanchez

intvw; LtCol Hershal Hernandez, USMC (Ret),

intvw, 2May97(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.), hereafter, Hernandez intvw.

233. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to RUEHAB

AmEmbassy, Abidjan 4187, 132057ZApr96.

234. Capt Paul A.Shelton, intvw, 13Aug96 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter,

Shelton intvw; Jonathan C. Randel, “Liberian

Fighting Raises Doubts on Peace Force,”

Washington Post, 23Apr96, p. A12; Jonathan C.

Randel, “Liberian Chronic Civil War Threatens to

Burst Its Borders,” Washington Post, 12Jun96, p.

A12; Author’s notes.

235. President William J. Clinton, “Remarks by

the President at Signing of Line Item Veto,” White

House Press Release 9Apr96; Secretary of Defense

William J. Perry, News Briefing, 9Apr96.

236. DoD, Background Briefing-Operation

Assured Response, 11Apr97, p.2; 22d MEU

ComdC, Apr96, p. 7.

237. Col Michael F. Planert, et al, 352d SOG

briefing presentation, Operation Assured

Response, [1996], (Assured Response files, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.), pp. 6,7, 11, hereafter, Planert

briefing.

238. Ibid, pp. 5, 8.

239. Telephone intvws with participants by

author, 4Nov97; Hernandez intvw; Sanchez intvw.

240. DoD, OSD (PA), News Briefing, 9Apr97,

p.2: Maj James E. Viola, “Assured Response,”

Army Aviation, 31Jul96; hereafter, Viola, “Assured

Response”; Sanchez intvw; Milam intvw.

241. 3-325 ABCT, Operation Assures Presence,

Intelligence Summary, 16Apr96 (Assured

Response Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

242. Ibid.

243. Assured Response Planners Briefing, p.

17; LtGen Howell M. Estes, News Briefing on

Operation Assured Response, 18Apr97.

244. Col Melvin W. Forbush intvw, 23Oct90,

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) pp. 9-

10, hereafter, Forbush intvw.

245. LtCol James F. Barnes intvw, 15Aug96

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Barnes intvw; DoD, Background BriefingOperation Assured Response, 11Apr97, p. 1

246. Charles R. Smith, Angels from the Sea:

Relief Operations in Bangladesh, (Washington

D.C.: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1991), pp. 6-7; Milam

NOTES 123
intvw; Barnes intvw.

247. Sgt Robert A. Smith , “Forces Arrive Off

Liberia,” The Globe (Camp Lejeune, N.C.),

2May96, p.1.

248. HQMC, Weekly OpSum, 22Apr96, p. D-3;

LtCol John L. Grimmitt intvw, 15Aug96 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter,

Grimmitt intvw

249. Forbush intvw, pp. 33-36; DOD OASD

(PA), News Briefing, 9May96; Milam intvw;

Shelton intvw. 

250. Milam intvw; Shetlon intvw.

251. Shelton intvw; G-2, ComMarForLant, G-2

Chronology of Liberia’s Civil War 06Apr-15Aug96

(Assured Response files, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.), p. 1, hereafter, ComMarForLant

Chronology.

252. Capt Jeffrey J. Kenney intvw, 16Aug96

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 4,

hereafter, Kenney intvw; Shelton intvw.

253. Kenney intvw, pp. 13-14; Shelton intvw;

Capt Edward M. Jeffries intvw, 16Aug96 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), p. 4, hereafter, Jeffries intvw.

254. 1stLt Aron E. Bennett AAR of 30April96 to

Capt Jeffrey J. Kenney, dtd 2May96 (Assured

Response files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), encl. 2,

hereafter, Bennett AAR; ComMarForLant

Chronology, p. 1; Kenney intvw, pp. 35-36.

255. Gardner intvw, pp. 12-21; Kenney intvw,

pp. 46-48; Hernandez intvw; Kenney intvw, p. 51.

256. Bennett AAR, encls. 1, 2, 3, 4; Kenney

intvw, pp. 54-60.

257. LCpl Jason Angel, press release, “Profiles

in Courage,” 3Oct97(Release # 659, HQMC (PA),

Washington D.C.); Bennett AAR, encl 1, 2, 3, 4;

Kenney intvw, p. 68; Sgt Keith Guay intvw,

16Aug96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.), hereafter, Guay intvw.

258. Gardner intvw, p. 35; Gauy intvw;

Hernandez intvw; Kenney intvw, pp. 69-71;

Milam intvw.

259. Ibid; LtCol Michael E. Dick intvw,

15Aug96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.), hereafter, Dick intvw.

260. Foreign Desk, “Militia Leaves Liberia

Under Siege,” New York Times, 4May97, sec. 1, p.

4; Foreign Desk, Cindy Shiner, “Liberian Peace

Summit Called Off; African Leaders Fail to Appear,

Withdrawal of Peacekeepers Threaten,” Washington Post, 9May96, A Sec.; Milam intvw; Shelton

intvw; Capt James S. Traver, indicated Roosevelt

Johnson was flown by Marine KC-130 to Accra,

Ghana, in Question About Liberia e-mail dtd

12Mar98.

261. Jeffries intvw, pp. 14-17; Foreign Desk,

“Marines at U.S. Embassy in Liberia Again Fire on

Gunmen,” New York Times, 7May97, sec. A, p. 6.

262. Reuters News Service, “Ghana refuses to

take in a Boatload of Liberian Refugees” New York

Times, 1 May96, p. 11; Nicholas Burns, Daily Press

Briefing, DOS, 10May96; Shelton intvw.

263. “Gunbattles Erupt in Liberia Capital”

Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 15Apr96, p. 4;

Kenney intvw, pp. 85-86; Guay intvw.

264. Jonathan Paye-Layleh, “Peacekeeping

Commander Calls for More Troops in Monrovia,”

Associated Press, 20May96; Author’s notes; Milam

intvw.

265. JTF-AR, JTF Assured Response Force

Drawdown Plan, 2Jul96 (Assured Response files,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.) p. 9.

266. Department of State, Testimony by

William H. Twadell, Acting Assistant Secretary of

State for African Affairs, Hearing on Liberia Before

the House International Relations Committee, 26

June 1996, hereafter, Twadell testimony; Reuters

News Service, “Liberia Faction to Disarm,” New

York Times, 12 Jun96, p.5.

267. HMM-162 ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1,

p. 8.

268. Twadell testimony; David Taylor, 22d

MEU as JTF Assured Response: The MEU as a JTF

Enabler, 12Dec96, (Camp Lejeune, NC, CNA Field

Memorandum). pp. 14, 36; Milam intvw.

Chapter 6

Operation Quick Response

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter was derived from the following sources: 22d

MEU ComdC, 1May-31May96; 22d MEU ComdC,

1Jun-31Jun96; BLT 2/2 ComdC, 1Jan-31Jul96;

SPMAGTF ComdC, 1Jun-31Aug96, (Assured

Response files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Col

Melvin W. Forbush intvw, 13Aug96 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Forbush

intvw. 

269. Department of State, Bureau of Public

124 ON MAMBA STATION
Affairs, Country Notes: Central African Republic,

Nov89, pp. 1-5; Europa Publications, Africa, South

of the Sahara, 18th ed (London: Europa

Publications Ltd., 1989), pp. 348-351.

270. Joseph Benamsse, “Curfew in African

Republic City: Civilians Protest French Action,”

Associated Press, 23May96.

271. Ibid; CIA, World Fact Book 1997, “Central

African Republic,” p. 4; Julian Nundy, “Cannibal

Emperor Buried With Honors in Central African

Republic,” Electronic Telegraph, 5Nov96, issue

531. 

272. CIA, World Fact Book 1997, “Central

African Republic,” p. 5; “Central African Republic,

Beware of the Barracudas,” BBC Focus on Africa,

Jul-Sep96, pp. 21-22.

273. Brassey’s ed., The Military Balance

(London: International Institute for Strategic

Studies, 1995), p. 129; Maj John T. Collins intvw,

2Oct96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),

hereafter, Collins intvw; Capt Dave X. Krebs

intvw, 2Oct96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.), hereafter, Krebs intvw.

274. “Centrafriques Bangui Tourne La Page,” Le

Point, no. 1237,1Jun96, p. 27; “Special

France/Afrique, Centralafrique: les EFAO devront

quitter Bangui,” 17Jul97.

275. Nando.net, Reuters News Service, “Key

Facts about Central African Republic,” 21May96,

pp. 1-2

276. Joes Benamsse, “Military Revolts Gains

Strength in Central African Republic,” Associated

Press, 19Apr96; BBC, “Central African Republic,

Beware of the Barracudas,” BBC Focus on Africa,

Jul-Sep96, pp. 21-22. 

277. Norman Kempster, “Marines Help

Foreigners Flee Chaos in Central African

Republic,” Los Angles Times, 21May96; Joseph

Benamsse, “Americans Evacuated From Central

African Republic,” Associated Press, 21May96;

Nando.net, Reuters News Service, “U.S. Marines

Land in Central African Republic,” 21May96, pp.

1-3. 

278. Nando.net, Reuters News Service, “U.S.

Marines Land in Central African Republic,”

21May96, pp. 1-3; Joseph Benamsse, “Curfew in

African Republic City: Civilians Protest French

Action,” Associated Press, 23May96; “Centrafriques Bangui Tourne La Page,” Le Point, no.

1237,1Jun96, p. 27.

279. “Centrafriques Bangui Tourne La Page,” Le

Point, no. 1237,1Jun96, p. 27.

280. Forbush intvw, pp. 46.

281. Nando.net, Reuters News Service, “U.S.

Marines Land in Central African Republic,”

21May96, pp. 1-2.

282. Forbush intvw, pp. 22-24; Capt Richard E.

Luehers intvw, 13 Aug 96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Leuhers intvw.

283. Leuhers intvw.

284. 22d MEU ComdC 1-31May96, encl. 1., p.

7.

285. Forbush intvw; Quick Response, SitRep

01, dtd 211800ZMay 96 (Assured Response files,

MCHC, Washington D.C.).

286. Leuhers intvw.

287. 22d MEU, ComdC 1-31May96, encl. 1, p.

7.

288. Ibid; Forbush intvw; Luehers intvw; 1stSgt

Allan M. Slater intvw, 2Oct96 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Slater intvw.

289. Maj John T. Collins intvw, 2Oct96 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter,

Collins intvw; Capt David Krebs intvw, 2Oct96

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Krebs intvw.

290. Ibid; Forbush intvw.

291. Collins intvw. 

292. Ibid.

293. Slater intvw.

294. Leuhers intvw.

295. Krebs intvw; Collins intvw.

296. Krebs intvw.

297. Collins intvw.

298. Krebs intvw.

299. Ibid.; Collins intvw.

300. Quick Response, SitRep 01, dtd

211800ZMay96 (Assured Response files, MCHC,

Washington D.C.); Leuhers intvw.

301. 22d MEU, ComdC, 1-31May96, encl 1., p.

8; Quick Response, SitRep 01, dtd 211800ZMay96

(Assured Response files, MCHC, Washington

D.C.); Luehers intvw.

302. VMGR-252 Det A, Quick Response 96

Diary (Assured Response files, MCHC,

Washington D.C.), pp. 2-3; Collins intvw; Krebs

intvw.

303. Quick Response, SitRep 01, dtd 211800ZNOTES 125
May96 (Assured Response files, MCHC, Washington D.C.); Luehers intvw.

304. Krebs intvw; Slater intvw.

305. VMGR-252 Det A, Quick Response 96

Diary (Assured Response files, MCHC,

Washington D.C.), pp. 3-4; Krebs intvw; Slater

intvw.

306. Krebs intvw; Slater intvw.

307. SitRep 02, dtd 221700ZMay96 (Assured

Response files, MCHC, Washington D.C.); VMGR252 Det A, Quick Response 96 Diary (Assured

Response files, MCHC, Washington D.C.), p. 4;

Krebs intvw; Slater intvw.

308. 22d MEU ComdC, 1-31May96, encl. 1, p.

9; SitRep 02, dtd 221700ZMay96 (Assured

Response files, MCHC, Washington D.C.); Capt

Richard E. Luehers, Quick Response Events

Memo, 20May-5Jun96, pp. 2-3, hereafter, Luehers

Events Memo (Assured Response files, MCHC,

Washington D.C.).

309. SitRep 02, dtd 221700ZMay96 (Assured

Response files, MCHC, Washington D.C.); Luehers

intvw.

310. 22d MEU ComdC, 1-31May96, encl. 1, p.

9; Luehers Events Memo, p. 3; Luehers intvw.

311. Krebs intvw; David Taylor, CNA Study,

22d MEU as JTF Assured Response: The MEU as a

JTF Enabler 12Dec96. 

312. 22d MEU ComdC, 1-31May96, encl. 1, pp.

9-10; SitRep 03, dtd 231700ZMay96 (Assured

Response files, MCHC, Washington D.C.); SitRep

04, dtd 241700ZMay96 (Assured Response files,

MCHC, Washington D.C.); Luehers Events Memo,

pp. 3-4.

313. 22d MEU, ComdC 1-31May96, encl. 1, p.

10; Luehers Events Memo, p. 4; Taylor, CNA Study

12Dec96.

314. 22d MEU ComdC, 1-31May96, encl. 1, p.

10; 22d MEU, AAR Brief, Aug96; Luehers Events

Memo, p. 4.

315. SitRep 07, dtd 271700ZMay96 (Assured

Response files, MCHC, Washington D.C.); SitRep

08, dtd 281700ZMay96 (Assured Response files,

MCHC, Washington D.C.).

316. 22d MEU ComdC, 1-31May96, encl. 1, 10-

11; BBC, “Central African Republic, Beware of the

Barracudas,” BBC Focus on Africa, Jul-Sep96, pp.

21-22. 

317. SitRep 10, dtd 301700ZMay96 (Assured

Response files, MCHC, Washington D.C.); SitRep

11, dtd 311700ZMay96 (Assured Response files,

MCHC, Washington D.C.); SitRep 23, dtd

311700ZMay96 (Assured Response files, MCHC,

Washington D.C.).

318. 22d MEU, ComdC, 1-31May96, encl. 1, 10-

1; Collins intvw; Luehers intvw; Forbush intvw.

Chapter 7

Planning, Deployment, and Action

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter was derived from the following sources: 22d

MEU ComdC, 1May-31May96; 22d MEU ComdC,

1Jun-31Jun96; BLT 2/2 ComdC, 1Jan-31Jul96;

SPMAGTF ComdC, 1Jun-31Aug96, (Assured

Response files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Col

Melvin W. Forbush intvw, 13Aug96 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Forbush

intvw.

319. 8thMar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1, p.

21; LtCol Lance R. McBride intvw, 19Sep96 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter,

McBride intvw; CSSD 28 NCO’s intvw, 19Sep96

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, CSSD 28 NCO’s intvw.

320. 8thMar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1, p.

17; Corwin intvw, pp. 5-7; LtCol Christopher J.

Gunther intvw, 19Sep96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Gunther intvw; Maj

Daniel J. O’Donohue intvw, 19Sep96 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter,

O’Donohue intvw.

321. 8thMar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1, p.

21; SPMAGTF-Liberia, Post Deployment Brief

7Jun-6Sep96, given to CG, II MEF, 12Sep96

(Assured Response files, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.), hereafter, Post Deployment Brief;

CinCUSACom msg to CMFL, dtd 282113ZMay96

(Assured Response files, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.); CMFL msg to CG, 2dMarDiv, dtd

310502ZMay96 (Assured Response files, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.). 

322. Ibid; Corwin intvw, pp. 11-12; Donohue

intvw.

323. Post Deployment Brief; ACE, SPMAGTF

Input, [Aug96] (Assured Response files, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.), pp. 1-2, hereafter, ACE Input;

LtCol Edward K. Conti intvw, 20Sep96 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter,

Conti intvw.

324. 8th Mar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1, p.

126 ON MAMBA STATION
14; Conti intvw; Corwin intvw, pp. 13-14;

O’Donohue intvw; Maj Joel R. Powers intvw,

18Sep96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.), hereafter, Powers intvw.

325. 8thMar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1, pp

7, 9, 14; O’Donohue intvw.

326. 8thMar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1, p.

21; SPMAGTF-8, JTF Assured Response Brief,

given to CG, II MEF, 12Jun96 (Assured Response

files, MCHC, Washington, D.C); LtCol Paul E.

Lefebvre ltr to all leaders in the BLT, Subj: Leader

Perspective for Liberia, dtd 24Jun96 (Assured

Response files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

327. HMM-264, SPMAGTF Liberia, [Aug96]

(Assured Response files, MCHC, Washington,

D.C), p. 1, hereafter, HMM-264 Liberia; 8thMar

ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1, p. 14; ACE Input,

pp. 1-2; Corwin, intvw, pp. 13-14; O’Donnhue

intvw.

328. 8thMar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1, pp.

21-22; S-3 SPMAGTF, SPMAGTF Liberia Task

Organization, 27Jun97 (Assured Response files,

MCHC, Washington, D.C), p. 2; Corwin intvw, p.

37; CSSD NCO’s intvw; BLT 3/8 Plt Comdr’s intvw,

19Sep96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.), hereafter, 3/8 Plt Cmdr’s intvw.

329. Gunther intvw; VMGR-252, Det A SitRep,

13Jun96 (Assured Response files, MCHC,

Washington, D.C).

330. Gunther intvw; Powers intvw; Lester

intvw; 3/8 Plt Cmdr’s intvw.

331. 3/8 Plt Cmdr’s intvw.

332. 8thMar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1, p.

14.

333. 8thMar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1, p.

17; HQMC, Daily OpSum, 26Jun96, p.1; Powers

intvw. 

334. 8thMar ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun96, encl. 1, p.

15; Corwin intvw, p. 37-38; O’Donohue intvw.

335. Post Deployment Brief; O’Donohue intvw.

336. Corwin intvw, pp. 36-38.

337. O’Donohue intvw; Powers intvw.

338. Corwin intvw, pp 53-54; Lester intvw;

O’Donohue intvw; 3/8 Plt Cmdr’s intvw. 

339. Lester intvw; O’Donohue intvw; 3/8 Plt

Cmdr’s intvw; BLT 3/8 1stSgts and Plt Sgts intvw

19Sep96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington D.C.). 

340. 3/8 Plt Cmdr’s intvw; 8th Mar, Draft

ComdC Timeline, [Aug96] (Assured Response

files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), encl. 1, p. 2.

341. Corwin intvw, pp. 40-42; Gunther intvw;

Powers intvw.

342. Gunther intvw.

343. HMM-264 Liberia, p. 2.

344. O’Donohue intvw; LtCol Paul E. Lefebvre,

Notebook, 27Jun1-19 Aug96, 15Jul96 (Gray

Research Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter,

Lefebvre, Notebook.

345. LtCol Paul E. Lefebvre intvw, 19Sep96

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter, Lefebvre intvw; Lefebvre ,Notebook.

346. Paul Eijime, “Nigeria Rotates Troops in

Liberia,” Panafrican New Agency, 4Jul96. 

347. Corwin intvw, pp. 44-45.

348. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 191818ZJul96.

349. “ECOWAS Summit Examines Sanctions,”

Panafrican News Agency, 4Jul97. 

350. Lefebvre, Notebook; SPMAGTF, Advance

Party Roster, 25Jul96 (Assured Response files,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.). 

351. AmEmbassy, Monrovia, msg to SecState,

Washington, D.C., 011552ZAug96.

352. HMM-264 Liberia, p. 4; Capt Julian D.

Alford intvw, 18Sep96 (Oral HistColl, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.).

Epilogue

A Stabilizing Presence

353. Jon R. Anderson, “Kearsarge Marines to

the Rescue Again,” Navy Times, 16Jun97;

“Evacuation in Sierra Leone,” Leatherneck, Aug97.

354. Jon R. Anderson, “Split ARGs: Back to the

Future,” Navy Times, 21Apr97. 

355. Sgt Mark D. Oliva, “Marines Assume

Duties in Africa,” 26th MEU Press Release,

18Apr97.

356. Chris Lawson, “Kearsarge Deploys Two

Weeks Early,” Navy Times, 28Apr97.

357. Cpl David Brock, “Supporting The Mission

in Africa: Three Logisticians Do It All,”

Leatherneck, Sep97, p. 24.

358. Jon R. Anderson, “Kearsarge Marines to

the Rescue Again,” Navy Times, 16Jun97.

359. DOD News Briefing, “Preparations for

Possible NEO from Sierra Leone,” 29May97.

360. Jon R. Anderson, “Kearsarge to the Rescue

Again,” Navy Times, 16Jun97; “Evacuation in

NOTES 127
Sierra Leone,” Leatherneck, Aug97.

361. Jon R. Anderson, “Kearsarge Marines to

the Rescue Again,” Navy Times, 16Jun97;

“Evacuation in Sierra Leone,” Leatherneck, Aug97.

362. UN Press Release, “Secretary-General Says

Liberia ‘Torn Apart by Disastrous Conflict’ for too

Long; Ghana Conference at Last Offers Hope For

Peaceful Resolution,” 4Jun03.

363. “French Help Americans Flee Liberia’s

Capital,” USA Today, 9Jun03.

364. UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional

Information Networks News Release, “US

Decision on Liberia Awaited in Monrovia,” 2Jul03.

365. UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional

Information Networks News Release “ECOWAS

Pledges 3,000 Troops for Liberia Force,” 4Jul03. 

366. UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional

Information Networks News Release, “Taylor

Wants Peacekeepers Before he Leaves Power,”

4Jul03; UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional

Information Networks News Release, “Taylor

Accepts Asylum in Nigeria,” 6 Jul03.

367. UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional

Information Networks News Release, “US Military

Team Arrives in Monrovia,” 7Jul03.

368. UN Office for the Coordination of 

ion of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional

Information Networks News Release, “Rebels

Vows to Fight Until Peacekeepers Arrive,” 29Jul03;

26th MEU (SOC) Navy Unit Citation Award

Recommendation, n.d.

369. UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional

Information Networks News Release, 

“Peacekeepers Cheered as They Move into

Monrovia,” 7Aug03.

370. Department of State, International

Information Programs, “President Outlines

Military Steps for Liberia Peace.” 13Aug03.

371. Kathleen T. Rhem, “American Troops Set

to Assist West African Force in Liberia,” American

Forces Press Service, 13Aug03.

372. “The 26th MEU (SOC) Brings Calm to

Liberia,” Leatherneck, Oct03; 26th MEU (SOC)

Navy Unit Citation Award Recommendation, n.d.

373. UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional

Information Networks News Release,

“Government and Rebels Sign Peace Agreement,

19Aug03.

374. Edward Harris, “U.S. Marines Leave

Liberia,” Associated Press, 25Aug03.

375. 26thMEU Daily SitRep, 5Sep03; Rowan

Scarborough, “Marines Got Malaria on Liberia

Mission,” The Washington Times, 9Sep03.

376. U.S. Fleet Forces Command Press Release,

“Iwo Jima ARG Leaves Liberia,” 14Oct03.

128 ON MAMBA STATION
Operation Sharp Edge 1990 to 1991

8 Mar 1990 22d MEU (SOC) deploys from Morehead City, North Carolina.

23 Apr 1990 State Department issues travel advisory on Liberia and advises Americans 

to leave the country. Withdrawal of government employees begins.

22d MEU intelligence section begins to plan for Liberia contingency.

12 May 1990 22d MEU arrives at Camp de Canjuers, France.

Col Granville R. Amos directs that all units have a 12-hour plan to retrograde to the ships.

24 May 1990 22d MEU notified of possible mission in Liberia.

26 May 1990 22d MEU completes emergency backload.

USS Peterson is designated Mediterranean-based Amphibious Ready 

Group escort.

27 May 1990 22d MEU participates in joint French/American Memorial Day Ceremony, 

Draguignan, France.

22d MEU units on board USS Saipan and USS Sumter sail from Toulon,

France.

22d MEU presents Operation Sharp Edge Courses of Action Brief to 

Deputy CinCEur, Gen James P. McCarthy, USAF, and CinCUSNavEur, 

Adm Jonathan Howe, USN, on board the Saipan.

ComSixthFleet and ComSOCEur embarked on Saipan for initial briefing 

and ship orientation.

28 May 1990 22d MEU forward command element given tentative permission to go to Liberia.

USS Ponce departs Toulon upon completion of boiler repairs.

Gen James P. McCarthy, USAF, Deputy CinCEur, and Adm Jonathan 

Howe, USN, CinCUSNavEur embarked on board Saipan to review NEO

draft Operation Order.

29 May 1990 Forward command element departs Saipan and flies to Rota, Spain.

Peterson rendezvous with Saipan and Sumter.

31 May 1990 Forward command element flies from Rota to Liberia and is initially 

housed in the Greystone compound.

EuCom establishes Joint Task Force with Sixth Fleet as ComJTF.

A 75-man advance security force and one CH-46 helicopter moved to 

Peterson, which is sent ahead of the rest of the MEU/ARG at 30 knots.

1 Jun 1990 22d MEU receives CinCEur Sharp Edge Operation Order.

2 Jun 1990 Peterson arrives off the coast of Liberia.

Appendix A

Chronology
3 Jun 1990 Saipan and Sumter arrive off the coast of Liberia and begin 66 days in 

ModLoc before evacuation.

4 Jun 1990 Ponce arrives in ModLoc.

22d MEU force on board Peterson returns to Saipan.

5 Jun 1990 Two KC-130s from VMGR-252 arrive in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

22d MEU receives alert order for extraction of President Samuel Doe: one 

hour alert set.

6 Jun 1990 22d MEU briefs NEO plan to British Task Group 325.1 on board Saipan.

ModLoc named Mamba Station.

8-22 Jun 1990 22d MEU rehearses possible courses of action for Operation Sharp Edge.

These include rehearsals for extracting President Doe and for multiple 

site NEOs.

10 Jun 1990 22d MEU augments forward command element with three-man radio 

battalion detachment.

349 Americans are evacuated on American Embassy charter flight from 

Spriggs-Payne Airport.

Jun-Jul 1990 Forward command element prepares for possible NEO, which includes 

preparing a landing zone at the embassy and checking possible beach 

landing sites.

17 Jun 1990 American embassy evacuates 168 American citizens on charter aircraft 

from Spriggs-Payne Airport.

26 Jun 1990 250 Liberians march to American embassy gate calling on U.S. to intervene.

28 Jun 1990 New U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, Peter De Vos, arrives at Spriggs-Payne Airport.

2 Jul 1990 22d MEU is given a one-hour Doe extraction and two-hour embassy reinforcement alert order.

10 Jul 1990 Commander Sixth Fleet calls on American Embassy and government of 

Sierra Leone officials.

11 Jul 1990 Sumter departs Mamba Station for equator crossing.

14 Jul 1990 Sumter returns to Mamba Station.

18 Jul 1990 Peterson in port at Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

19 Jul 1990 American embassy charter flight carries 15 American citizens out of 

country.

20 Jul 1990 22d MEU attains two-hour alert posture to reinforce embassy.

26 Jul 1990 Refugees fill U.S. compounds, formerly occupied by U.S. citizens now 

evacuated.

27 Jul 1990 Embassy on alert following small arms fire over Greystone compound.

28 Jul 1990 21-man Marine security guard team embarks onboard Saipan.

30 Jul 1990 22d MEU placed on one-hour alert status to reinforce embassy.

4 Aug 1990 Ambassador De Vos calls forward command element members to his 

office to discuss evacuation. The ambassador then seeks approval for 

military action through his chain-of-command.

Ambassador DeVos notifies Col Amos via the forward command element’s

radio that the evacuation will be necessary. Landing Hour is set for 0900

on 5 Aug.

State Department approves the military evacuation.

130 ON MAMBA STATION
APPENDIX A 131

5 Aug 1990 Company E conducts evacuations of Voice of America and American 

telecommunications office sites.

Company H (Rein) reinforces and begins evacuation of embassy.

Security force at the embassy totals 237 Marines and sailors.

26th MEU forward command element flies from Norfolk, Virginia, to 

Monrovia via Rota, Spain, and Freetown, Sierra Leone. 

22d MEU evacuates a total of 74 evacuees.

6 Aug 1990 26th MEU sails from Morehead City, North Carolina.

22d MEU strength in embassy compound reduced to 192. 

19 evacuees moved from Monrovia to Freetown, Sierra Leone.

7 Aug 1990 22d MEU evacuates 24 people to Freetown, Sierra Leone.

8 Aug 1990 22d MEU evacuates 8 people, including British Ambassador, to Freetown.

26th MEU forward command element arrives in Monrovia.

9 Aug 1990 22d MEU evacuates 25, including French Ambassador and his staff. The

French evacuees are transported to the French ship Orage and the 

remaining evacuees are taken to Freetown.

10 Aug 1990 22d MEU evacuates 14.

11 Aug 1990 22d MEU evacuates 35.

12 Aug 1990 22d MEU receives execute order from Joint Chiefs of Staff to evacuate 

foreign diplomats from Buchanan. Saipan and Peterson sail to Buchanan.

13 Aug 1990 22d MEU evacuates 96 people from Buchanan including the Spanish 

Ambassador, the Swiss Charge de Affairs, and the Papal Nuncio.

The Peterson is detached from Operation Sharp Edge.

The number of Marines in the embassy compound is reduced to a reinforced

platoon of 90.

15 Aug 1990 22d MEU evacuates 12 people, including the Italian Ambassador.

16 Aug 1990 22d MEU evacuates 359 people, including a woman who gives birth on

board the Saipan.

17 Aug 1990 22d MEU evacuates 88 people.

USS Barnstable County is attached to Amphibious Squadron Four for 

possible contingency operations.

18 Aug 1990 22d MEU evacuates 745 people.

19 Aug 1990 22d MEU evacuates 109 people.

20 Aug 1990 Mediterranean-based ARG 3-90/26th MEU arrives on Mamba Station.

22d MEU evacuates eight people to Mediterranean-based ARG 3-90 ships.

20-24 Aug 1990 Mediterranean-based ARG/26th MEU are reconfigured with a great deal

of cross-decking to create Contingency MAGTF 3-90 (CM 3-90).

21 Aug 1990 Elements of CM 3-90 conduct turnover with 22d MEU in embassy compound.

26th MEU relieves 22d MEU in a blue-water turnover.

22d MEU departs Mamba Station after evacuating a total of 1,648 persons

(132 American citizens and 1,516 foreign nationals).

22 Aug 1990 CM 3-90 evacuates 30 people.

26-28 Aug 1990 Barnstable County sails to Freetown and back with CH-46 helicopter on

board to transfer evacuees.
29 Aug-1 Sep 90 Barnstable County sails to Freetown and back to transfer evacuees.

30 Aug 1990 LCpl D.J. Cassady is hit by a stray 7.62mm round, but is uninjured as the

round is deflected by his flak jacket.

1-30 Sep 1990 CM 3-90 evacuates 57 Americans and 398 foreign nationals with 

Barnstable County transporting the evacuees to Freetown and returning 

to Mamba Station.

17 Sep 1990 Armored vehicle and more than 200 of the government’s Armed Forces

of Liberia soldiers approach embassy. Marine reinforcements are inserted

into the embassy compound via helicopter. AFL soldiers withdraw.

29 Sep 1990 Marines on Post Two report seeing muzzle flashes within 100 meters of

the post. Rounds strike the main embassy building.

CM 3-90 evacuates 2 Americans and 28 foreign nationals.

1 Oct 1990 Five or six rounds hit Post Three (located on the embassy roof).

1-29 Oct 1990 CM 3-90 evacuates 27 Americans and 146 foreign nationals.

2 Oct 1990 One round strikes Post Two (embassy Gate Two).

11 Oct 1990 U.S. Navy Seabee team arrives from Norfolk, Virginia.

3 Nov 1990 USS Newport with Company L, BLT 3/8 embarked arrives on Mamba 

Station. Key personnel go to USS Whidbey Island for briefs.

4 Nov 1990 Barnstable County departs Mamba Station.

8 Nov 1990 CM 3-90 evacuates one American and six foreign nationals.

10 Nov 1990 Marine Corps Birthday. A ceremony was held on the flight deck of 

Whidbey Island and cake is taken ashore to the Marines at the embassy.

12 Nov 1990 CM 3-90 evacuates two Americans and four foreign nationals.

14 Nov 1990 Company L, BLT 3/8 conducts turnover with Company K and assumes 

security force duties at the embassy. Company K remains responsible for

reinforcement mission. Whidbey Island Marines continue to provide 

communications, combat service support, and aviation support ashore.

24 Nov 1990 HMM-162 detachment completes three months on board the Whidbey 

Island even though the ship is not designed for sustained aviation operations.

USS Nashville departs Rota, Spain, for Mamba Station.

30 Nov 1990 Nashville arrives on Mamba Station and turnover briefs are conducted. 

Personnel and equipment are then transferred from Whidbey Island to 

Nashville.

1 Dec 1990 CM 3-90 change of command. LtCol Robert H. Kunkle relieves Maj 

George S. Hartley.

The number of Marines ashore is reduced to 40.

2 Dec 1990 The Whidbey Island detaches, departs Mamba Station, sails south for 

equator crossing, and then proceeds to the Canary Islands for liberty.

Dec 1990 CM 3-90 continues embassy security mission. Calm prevails in Monrovia 

28 Dec 1990 5th Platoon, Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST) Company, Marine

Corps Security Force Battalion, Atlantic, is tasked with assuming the 

embassy security mission. Platoon members are recalled from Christmas leave.

6 Jan 1991 The 50 members of 5th Platoon, FAST Company depart Norfolk, Virginia.

7 Jun 1991 5th Platoon, FAST Company arrives at the embassy compound and conducts turnover with CM 3-90 forces. 

132 ON MAMBA STATION
APPENDIX A 133

9 Jan 1991 Operation Sharp Edge is officially terminated as CM 3-90 departs Mamba

Station. FAST platoon remains to provide additional security for the 

embassy.

15 Feb 1991 FAST platoon departs Liberia via Navy C-130 aircraft.

Operations Assured Response and Quick Response 1996

27 Jan 1996 22d MEU embarks and sails from Morehead City, North Carolina.

11 Apr 1996 22d MEU receives EuCom Assured Response execute order to deploy to

Monrovia, Liberia, to conduct NEO. USS Guam, USS Trenton, and USS 

Portland steam west and staffs begin planning. USS Tortuga (with 

artillery and light armored vehicles) remains in port in Haifa, Israel, for

repairs.

14 Apr 1996 Forward Liaison Cell (FLC) departs Guam for Joint Task Force (JTF) 

Assured Response headquarters in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

15 Apr 1996 22d MEU executive officer, LtCol Barnes, proceeds to the U.S. Embassy, 

Monrovia, Liberia, to conduct turnover with BrigGen Michael A. 

Canavan, USA, commander of JTF Assured Response.

17-19 Apr 1996 22d MEU staff members conduct liaison visit to Freetown.

20 Apr 1996 Company F, BLT 2/2 inserted into embassy compound and assumed 

responsibility for compound security from the U.S. Army’s Company C,

3d Battalion, 325th Airborne Combat Team. Col M. Wayne Forbush 

assumes command of JTF Assured Response.

21 Apr 1996 Forward Support Base (FSB) Freetown established by a detachment from

Fleet Air Mediterranean to facilitate the flow of logistics into and evacuees out of Monrovia.

30 Apr 1996 Marines in the embassy compound return fire for the first time. Marines

engaged Liberian fighters during multiple incidents when Marine posts 

came under direct fire. Approximately six Liberians were killed in the 

exchanges. No Marines were seriously injured.

6 May 1996 Post Seven received and returned fire without effect.

9 May 1996 The Tortuga and a detachment from 22d MEU detached from JTF 

Assured Response to conduct Exercise Matador 96 in Spain.

20 May 1996 JTF Assured Response receives warning order to be prepared to conduct

reinforcement operations in the Central African Republic. Execute order

for Operation Quick Response immediately follows. 

21 May 1996 32-man detachment from 22d MEU flys to Bangui, Central African 

Republic, and immediately processes 13 Americans who were awaiting 

evacuation. The evacuees are flown to a safe haven at Yaounde, 

Cameroon, by the Marine KC-130 that delivered the force.

22 May 1996 Marines process and evacuate 59 Americans from M’Poko Airfield in 

Bangui.

24 May 1996 French forces provided armored transport for logistical supplies from 

M’Poko Airfield to the U.S. Embassy. Marines process and evacuate 38 

Americans and foreign nationals.

25 May 1996 Quick Response execute order is modified directing the insertion of a 

security augmentation and evacuation control center (ECC) force. 

Marines process and evacuate 122 Americans and foreign nationals.
26 May 1996 A 25-man augmentation force arrives in Bangui. Marines process and 

evacuate 100 Americans and foreign nationals.

27 May 1996 The last Americans requiring evacuation are processed and evacuated.

31 May 1996 The augmentation force begins redeploying to JTF Assured Response. 

During Operation Quick Response, 190 Americans and 258 foreign 

nationals were evacuated from the Central African Republic. Security element remains at U.S. Embassy.

2 Jun 1996 Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) Liberia 

received verbal execution order to prepare to deploy.

14 Jun 1996 SPMAGTF Liberia embarks and sails from Morehead City, North Carolina.

14 Jun 1996 Advance Party from SPMAGTF Liberia arrives in Monrovia and begins 

turnover with 22d MEU.

27 Jun 1996 SPMAGTF Liberia relieves 22d MEU as JTF Assured Response. Company

L, 3/8 assumes security mission in embassy compound. 22d MEU has 

evacuated a total of 49 Americans and 260 foreign nationals from Liberia.

15 July 1996 Phase II draw down of Marines begins.

22 July 1996 Phase III draw down of Marines begins.

1 Aug 1996 Turnover of security in Bangui to American Embassy. Marines redeploy

to USS Ponce. The FSB in Freetown is closed.

3 Aug 1996 Phase IV draw down of Marines begins. Security in Monrovia is turned 

over to Marine Security Guard personnel. The Ponce leaves Liberian 

waters.

5 Aug 1996 JTF Assured Response is disengaged. SPMAGTF Liberia and the Ponce

revert to control of U.S. Atlantic Command and return to U.S. on 21 

August 1996.

134 ON MAMBA STATION
Operation Sharp Edge

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

CO Col Granville R. Amos

XO LtCol Stephen J. Labadie, Jr.

S-1 Capt George A. Kelling

S-2 Maj Stephen L. Sayko

S-3 LtCol Thomas W. Parker

S-4 Maj Donald P. Edwards

Battalion Landing Team 2/4

CO LtCol Robert L. Pugh

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261

CO LtCol Emerson N. Gardner

MEU Service Support Group 22

CO LtCol James W. Head

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

CO Col William C. Fite

XO LtCol Richard H. Kunkle

S-1 Capt Kenny J. Mathis

S-2 Capt Steven R. Kaczmar

S-3 LtCol Brett D. Rayman

S-4 Maj Steven W. Forney

Battalion Landing Team 3/8

CO LtCol Robert G. Essink

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162

CO LtCol Darrel D. Browning

MEU Service Support Group 26

CO LtCol John W. Stull

Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 3-90 (24 Aug to 30 Nov 1990)

CO Maj George S. Hartley

Company K, BLT 3/8

CO Capt James K. Shannon

Detachment HMM-162

OiCMaj Daniel P. Johnson

Detachment MSSG-26

OiCCWO3 Edwin E. Deering

Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 3-90 (1 Dec 1990 to 8 Jan 1991)

CO LtCol Richard H. Kunkle

Company L, BLT 3/8

CO Capt William F. Crenshaw

Detachment HMM-162

OiCLtCol Tommy L. Patton

Appendix B

Command and Staff List
Detachment MSSG-26

OiCCWO3 Edwin E. Deering

5th Platoon, Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team (FAST) Company

Platoon Commander Capt Glen N. Chetham

Operations Assured Response and Quick Response

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

CO Col Melvin W. Forbush

XO LtCol James F. Barnes

S-1 Capt Joseph P. Spataro

S-2 Maj Gregory D. Seroka

S-3 LtCol Michael E. Dick

S-4 Maj Gary A. Lambertsen

Battalion Landing Team 2/2

CO LtCol Walter E. Gaskin

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162

CO LtCol Kenneth D. Bonner

MEU Service Support Group 22

CO LtCol John L. Grimmitt

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force

CO Col Tony L. Corwin

XO LtCol Christopher J. Gunther

Battalion Landing Team 3/8 (-)

CO LtCol Paul E. Lefebvre

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264 (-)

CO LtCol Eugene K. Conti

MEU Service Support Group Detachment 28

OiCLtCol Lance R. McBride

136 ON MAMBA STATION
NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION

MEDITERRANEAN AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP 2-90

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service during Operation SHARP EDGE from 29 May to 21 August 1990.

The Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) 2-90 was dispatched to the vicinity of Monrovia,

Liberia to aid in the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens from the country and to reinforce the United

States Embassy in Monrovia. Due to an unstable, violent situation existing in the country because of an

on-going civil war, the MARG was assigned to help ensure the safety of U.S. citizens, diplomats, and

other noncombatants still in the country. Responding to a constantly changing political and military climate, MARG 2-90 formulated sufficient contingency plans to cope with a variety of possible missions

that might be assigned. Maintaining a high state of readiness throughout the contingency, the MARG

was called upon, beginning on 5 August, to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations in Monrovia,

Liberia as well as the city of Buchanan. During Operation SHARP EDGE, over 1,600 noncombatants from

34 different countries were safely evacuated from the country. In addition, the United States Embassy in

Monrovia, Liberia was reinforced and resupply operations began, delivering badly needed water, food,

and medical supplies, thus enabling the Embassy to continue to operate during the civil war. By their

uncanny resourcefulness, superior professionalism, and total devotion to duty, the officers and enlisted

personnel of Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group 2-90 reflected great credit upon themselves and

upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Henry L. Garrett III

Secretary of the Navy

Appendix C

Citations
JOINT MERITORIOUS UNIT AWARD

JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE

CITATION:

The Joint Task Force Operation ASSURED RESPONSE distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious achievement from 8 April 1996 to 12 August 1996. During this period, the Joint Task Force was

responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of the emergency evacuation of thousands of

civilians from the chaos of civil war in Liberia and the Central African Republic. Within 24 hours of the

initial alert order, the first elements of the Joint Task Force were enroute to the Intermediate Staging

Base to establish a headquarters and to make final preparations for evacuation. Over the course of the

next 4 months, men, women, and children of all ages, nationalities, and language were carried to safety in a courteous and efficient manner despite line hours, stressful work conditions, and 90 plus degree

temperatures. When fighting among mutinous troops in the Central African Republic’s capital city of

Bangui threatened US citizens, Joint Task Force Operation ASSURED RESPONSE dispatched a forward

liaison cell capable of providing security and evacuating threatened Americans. Their diligent efforts

were responsible for the safe evacuation of hundreds of US citizens and third country nationals. Without

hesitation, the men and women of Joint Task Operation ASSURED RESPONSE met this and all other

challenges with success and dispatch in fulfilling the mission. By their exemplary performance of duty,

the members of Joint Task Force Operation ASSURED RESPONSE have brought great credit upon themselves, their Service, and the Department of Defense. 

Given under my hand this 8th day of October 1996

John M. Shalikashvili

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

138 ON MAMBA STATION
ACE Air Combat Element. The ACE of a Marine Expeditionary Unit is normally a reinforced Marine medium helicopter squadron comprised of 12 CH-46E Sea Knights, 4 

CH-53E Super Stallions, 4 AH-1W Sea Cobras, and 4 UH-1N Hueys. A detachment of 

AV-8B Harrier aircraft also is routinely attached to the squadron and a detachment of 

KC-130 Hercules aircraft is placed on stand-by in the continental United States.

AFL Armed Forces of Liberia. The government’s armed forces under President Samuel 

Kenyon Doe.

ARG Amphibious Ready Group. Three to five amphibious ships on which a Marine 

Expeditionary Unit is embarked.

BLT Battalion Landing Team. An infantry battalion usually reinforced with an artillery battery, light armored reconnaissance platoon, assault amphibian platoon, combat engineer platoon, and reconnaissance platoon.

CSSE Combat Service Support Element. The CSSE of a Marine Expeditionary Unit is an 

MEU Service Support Group.

ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Military Observation Group. Established 

initially on an ad hoc basis as a multinational peacekeeping/peace enforcement force,

ECOMOG and was the first such group to be established by a regional body.

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States. A regional group of 15 countries founded by treaty in May 1975 and conceived as a means toward economic integration and

development of an economic union in West Africa.

FAST Fleet Anti-terrorist Security Team. Marines from FAST companies deploy to provide 

additional security to U.S. facilities around the world in response to increased threats.

FCE Forward Command Element. A Marine Expeditionary Unit’s advance party that is 

deployed to an embassy in preparation for a noncombatant evacuation operation.

GCE Ground Combat Element. The GCE of a Marine Expeditionary Unit is a battalion landing team.

INPFL Independent Patriotic Front of Liberia. The rebel faction led by Prince Yormie 

Johnson.

MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force. A MAGTF is made up of command, ground combat, 

aviation combat, and combat service support elements. 

MARG Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group.

Appendix D

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
MEU (SOC) Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable). A Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force made up of a command element, battalion landing team, composite helicopter 

squadron, and Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group. The Special 

Operations Capable (SOC) designation signifies the Marine Expeditionary Unit has 

completed a rigorous six-month training program and has been certified to accomplish a variety of missions including noncombatant evacuation operations. 

MSG Marine Security Guard. Marine security guard detachments are assigned to provide 

internal security to U.S. embassies.

MSSG Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group. The combat service support element of a Marine Expeditionary Unit. MSSGs comprise supply, maintenance, engineer,

and health service units.

NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operation.

NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia. The rebel faction led by Charles Taylor.

RPG Rocket-propelled grenade. The RPG weapons generally used by West African combatants is the RPG-7, a Soviet antitank weapon.

140 ON MAMBA STATION
Abidjan, Ivory Coast, 108

Abuja, Nigeria, 69, 102

Accra, Ghana, 81-83, 101, 109, 114, 116

Adriatic Sea, 103

Air Force Commands and Units

4050th Operations Squadron, 74

56th Expeditionary Rescue Squadron, 111

Albania, 103

Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation

of Congo-Zaire, 103

Alverson, Sgt Todd, 30

Ambe (LST 1123), 47

American Colonization Society, 2-3

American Cooperative School, 10, 15, 24

American Mining Company, 39

American Telecommunications Office, 15, 23-24,

28-29, 41

Americans for African Adoption, 106

Amos, Col Granville R., 6-7, 9, 12, 18-19, 23, 26,

32, 40, 42

Amphibious Squadron, 4, 8

Anders, 1stLt Richard E., 25

Annan, Secretary General Kofi, 108-109

Armed Forces of Liberia, 5

Army Commands and Units

Company C, 325th Airborne Combat Team,

72, 74

U.S. Army’s South European Task Force

(Airborne), 113

U.S. Army Special Forces, 107

Augustine, 1stLt Joseph F. III, 42

Avenue du 18 Victoire, 90

Bangui, Central African Republic, 85, 87, 91, 94

Banjul, Gambia, 8, 35, 49

Barclay Training Center, 10, 15, 22, 52-53, 55, 57,

59, 62-63, 69, 72, 76-77, 81-83

Barclay, President Edwin James, 3-4

Barnes, LtCol James F., 73

Barnstable County (LST 1197), 42, 45, 47, 49-50,

52-53, 55, 59

Belliewaley, Liberia, 111

Benin, 113

Bennett, 1stLt Aaron E., 78

Benson Street, 30, 59

Bensonville, Liberia, 20

Berndt, Col Martin R., 48

Bethesda Naval Medical Center, 116

Black, 1stLt Charles N., 98

Blah, Vice President Moses, 114

Blaney, Ambassador John W., 108, 110, 112, 115

Bodkins, 2dLt Michael S., 30

Bokassa, Col Jean-Bedal, 85-86

Boley, George, 68-69

Bonfiglio, Sgt Brian J., 52

Bong Hills, 1

Brazzaville, Congo, 103-105, 107

Brewersville, Liberia, 10

British Embassy, 23, 55, 76

Browning, LtCol Darrell A., 45

Buchanan, Liberia, 1, 6, 20, 38-39, 41, 112

Bulk Challenge, 82

Bush, President George H., 6, 32, 36, 43, 108,

109-110, 114

Bushrod Island, 10, 21-23, 36, 49, 72

Byron, MajGen Michael J., 75

Cadwell, Liberia, 54, 63

Cameroon, 85, 89-90, 94

Camp Bealle, 85, 87, 90

Camp de Canjuers, 6, 11

Camp Du Kassai, 86, 94

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 95, 108

Canavan, BGen Michael A., USA, 70, 74

Cape Mesurado, 2

Cape Sierra Hotel, 106

Capitol Hill, 35, 53

Careysburg, Liberia, 20

Carter Hall (LSD 50), 104, 112, 116

Carter, Adm Powell F., Jr., 43, 64

Cassady, LCpl Davis J., 52

Central African Republic, 85, 87-90, 93-94

Chad, 85

Chaney, 1stLt James D., 34

Cheatham, Capt Glen N., 64-65

Cheney, Secretary of Defense Richard B., 6

Index
Christopher, Secretary of State Warren, 88

Clay-Ashland District, Monrovia, 19

Cohen, Herman, 58

Cohen, Secretary of Defense Wiliam S., 105

Collins, Cpl Sean, 30

Collins, LtCol Thomas N., 116

Collins, Maj John T., 88-90

Conakry, Guinea, 105-106

Congo, 103, 105

Congo River, 85

Congo Town, 10, 42

Contonou, Benin, 68

Cooper, Lt Johnny J., 98

Corwin, Col Tony L., 95-96, 98-99

Crack Alley, 83

Crenshaw, Capt William F., 62, 64

Crown Hill, Monrovia, 22, 35

Dakar, Senegal, 70, 72-73, 75, 88, 102

Dako, David, 85

David Dacko Road, 90

Davis, LCpl Edward A. III, 71

De Vos, American Ambassador Peter, 20-21, 23,

34, 42, 46, 55-56, 59, 62

Deering, CWO-3 Edwin E., 45, 47, 51, 60-61

Democratic Republic of Congo, 104

Dick, LtCol Michael E., 93

Doe, MSgt Samuel Kenyon, 4-6, 13, 17, 19-22,

42-43, 49, 53-54, 62

Dogonyaro, MajGen Joshua, 58-59, 65

Drager, Commodore James M., USN, 59

Economic Community Ceasefire Monitoring

Group, 107

Economic Community of West African States, 8,

19-20, 35, 43, 62, 67-68, 74, 76, 81, 83, 101, 108

Economic Community of West African States

Military Observation Group, 47

Eritrea, 103

Essink, LtCol Robert G., 45

European Special Operations Command, 73

Executive Mansion, 42, 54, 59

Exercise Purple Star, 95

Fairfax County (LST 1193), 47

Fallon, Lt David M., 98

Farrand, Cpl Json S., 78, 80

Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 3

Fisher, Edward J., 60

Fite, Col William C. III, 43-46

Fitzwater, Marlin, 32

Forbush, Col M. Wayne, 73-75, 81, 83-84, 88-89,

94

Ford, LtCol Barry M., 103

Freeport, Liberia, 3, 54

Freetown, Sierra Leone, 18, 21-22, 42-43, 47, 50,

53, 58, 60, 70, 73, 75, 82, 88, 94, 97, 102, 105

French Embassy, 93

French Foreign Legionnaires, 91, 93

Frick, Col Andrew P., 112, 116

Galvin, Gen John R., USA, 43

Gambia, 36, 49, 113

Garbande, Liberia, 6

Gardner, Col Emerson N., Jr., 25-28, 103-104

Gardner, Cpl William A., 79

Gastar, Commo Stanley D., USN, 38, 45

Gbarnga, 20, 69

Geissler, Capt Eric L., 100

German Embassy, 38, 42

Ghana, 36, 113

Gibson Street, 79, 82

Gio Tribe, 4-6

Grand Gedeh County, Liberia, 5

Grause, Capt Francis P., USN, 48, 57, 60

Greenville, Liberia, 111

Greenwood, LtCol Thomas C., 105-106

Greystone compound, 10, 23, 30, 69, 76, 83, 101,

111

Guam (LPH 9), 73-74, 81-82, 84, 88-89, 94, 97

Guinea, 1, 5, 38, 105

Gunther, LtCol Christopher J., 97-98, 100

Hansen, Col Willis H., 11

Harbel, Liberia, 3, 8, 68

Harper, Liberia, 1

Hartley, Maj George S., 45, 48, 55-57, 59-60, 63

Hartnett, Larry, 13

Head, LtCol James W., 37

Helland, Col Samuel T., 104

Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO-187), 53

Henson, SSgt Effard T., 29

Himes, 1stLt John, 94

Hobbs, Cdr Phillip G., USN, 8

Howe, Adm Jonathan T. USN, 6, 9

I-Hop building, 78-80

Inchon (LPH 12), 45, 47

Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia, 9

Independent Whig Party, 3

Inenger, Gen John M., 75

Interfaith Mediation Committee of the Liberian

Council of Churches, 19

Italian Embassy, 42

Ivory Coast, 1

Iwo Jima (LHD 7), 111-112, 116

Jett, Dennis C., 14-15, 19-20, 63

142 ON MAMBA STATION
John F. Kennedy Hospital, 22

Johnson, Maj Daniel P., 45, 54-55, 59-60

Johnson, Prince Yormie, 9, 20, 21-23, 35, 48, 54,

56-58, 65

Johnson, Roosevelt, 68-69, 81-83

Johnston, 1stLt Gary S., 30

Joint Task Force Assured Response, 88, 99, 107

Joint Task Force Liberia, 110, 116

Jones, Gen James L., 110

Jordan, Ambassador Mosina H., 87, 90

Joulwan, Gen George A., USA, 73, 75, 95

Kabbah, President Ahmad Tejan, 105, 107

Kabila, Laurent-Desire, 103-104

Kakata, Liberia, 6

Kearsarge (LHD 3), 104-105, 107-108

Kenney, Capt Jeffrey J., 76-77, 79-80

Key Junction, Liberia, 110-111

Kinshasa, Congo, 103-104

Kolingba, Gen Andre-Dieudonne, 85-86

Korean Embassy, 42

Koromah, Maj Johnny Paul, 104, 106-107

Krahns, 4-6, 54, 69, 70, 72, 76-77, 79-80, 82-83

Krebs, Capt David A, 88, 90-91

Kromah, Alhiji, 68-69, 83

Kufuor, President John, 116

Kunkel, LtCol Richard H., 47, 63

Labadie, LtCol Stephen J., Jr., 7-8, 12-15, 23

Landherr, Cpl James, 20

Landing Force Sixth Fleet, 6

Landing Zones

Bravo, 98

Condor, 29

Dove, 28

Magic, 15, 30, 42, 46, 49, 52

Landstuhl Army Regional Medical Center, 116

Lapine, Lt Seth I., 98

Lavrinovich, 1stLt Walter E., Jr., 63

Lefebvre, LtCol Paul E., 96-97, 101

Liberia Peace Council, 68

Liberians United for Reconciliation and

Democracy, 108

Libreville, Gabon, 103

Lister, Capt Jeffrey E., 97, 99

Livengood, SSgt Scott T., 89

Lofa River., 1

Love, SSgt Timothy, 13

Lowe, LtCol Darrell M., USMC (Ret), 14

Luehrs, Capt Richard E. II, 88, 90, 94

Lungi Airfield, 36, 42, 50, 60, 64, 72, 88

M’Poko Airfield, 85, 87-88, 90, 93-94

Mahoney, Capt Leon F., 95

Mali, 113

Mamba Point, 36, 51, 59, 69, 77, 82-83, 110

Mamba Point’s Lighthouse Hill, 57

Mamba Station, 10, 16, 45-46, 50, 62, 65, 74, 102

Mammy Yoko Hotel, 106

Mandingo Tribe, 5

Mano Tribe, 4-6

Marine Corps Commands and Unit 

1st Battalion, 8th Marines, 112

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable), 6, 9, 11-12, 42-43,

46, 51-52, 59, 73-74, 84-85, 88, 93-96, 98-

99, 104-105, 107

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)), 42-46,

63, 67, 103-104, 111-112

2d Combat Engineer Battalion, 2d Marine

Division, 42, 100

2d FAST Company, 111

2d Marine Division, 95

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 108

8th Marines, 95-96

Battalion Landing Team 3/8, 45, 52, 62, 98

Battalion Landing Team 2/2, 74, 82, 88, 98

Battalion Landing Team 2/4, 6, 11, 23, 30, 42

Battery B, 10th Marines, 73, 82

Battery L, 10th Marines, 114

Combat Service Support Detachment 28, 96,

98, 101

Company D (-), 2d Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion, 73

Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force

3-90, 44-45, 47, 49, 59, 63, 65

Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST)

Company, 64

II Marine Expeditionary Force, 83, 95-96

Marine Aerial Refueling Squadron 252, 18,

88, 97

Marine Corps Security Force Battalion,

Atlantic, 64

Marine Corps Security Force Company, 110

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461, 96,

97

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

167, 96

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162, 45,

74, 84

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261, 6,

9, 27, 106

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264, 97,

112

Marine Security Guard Battalion, 21

Marines Corp Air Station, Cherry Point, North

Carolina, 89, 97

INDEX 143
Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group 97-

1, 103

MEU Service Support Group 22, 6, 36, 37,

74, 90, 105

MEU Service Support Group 26, 45, 112

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task

Force, 94

Marine House, 100

Martin, Capt Gregory, USN, 116

Masonic Temple, 30

McBride, LtCol Lance R, 96

McCann-Willis, Pinkie, 106

McCarthy, Gen James P., USAF, 9

McClaine, Cpl Phillip L., 23

McMurtry, Mrs. Penny, 16

McWilliams, Jim, 15

Mellinger, Capt Eric M., 74, 98

Mesurado River, 10, 22, 49, 115

Mezbau Gate, 71

Milam, Ambassador William B., 73, 81, 99, 102

Mize, BGen David M., 87-88, 100-101

MoCaf Brewery, 93

Mollahan, Capt David J., 7, 15

Monrovia, 1-3, 6-7, 18-20, 28, 30, 36, 38, 41, 48,

64, 67, 108, 111, 114

Moose, George, 81

Mount Coffee Dam, 20

Movement for Democracy in Liberia, 108

Movement for Justice in Africa, 4

Mozambique, 103

Mudge, Col Wayne, USAF, 74

Mundy, LtGen Carl E., Jr., 43

MV Tano River, 42, 47

Nashville (LPD 13), 47, 62-63, 65, 103, 112, 116

Nassau (LHA 4), 103-104

National Democratic Party of Liberia, 4

National Patriotic Front of Liberia, 5, 67

National Patriotic Party, 108

National Unification Policy, 3

NATO Stabilization Force, 103

Naval Special Warfare Group 2, 10

Navy Commands and Units

Amphibious Ready Group 3-90, 43-44

Amphibious Squadron (Phibron) 8, 67, 74

Amphibious Squadron 2, 44

Amphibious Squadron 4, 9, 12

Fleet Air Mediterranean, 74

Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron 2, 89

Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland, 111

Naval Station, Rota, Spain, 7, 11, 47, 88, 111

Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic, 95

Navy SEALs, 10, 15, 17, 38-39, 71, 115

Sixth Fleet, 45, 65, 84, 88

Newman, LtCol Bruce, USA, 8

Newport County (LST 1179), 47, 62

Niger River, 1

Nigeria, 36, 38, 113

Nimba County, 1, 4-5

NNS Ambe, 42

Nsimalen Airfield, 91-92

Obangui River, 85

Obeng, LtGen Seth, 109

Oles, Capt Gary R., 24, 29, 45

Operation Almandin II, 87

Operation Barracuda, 85

Operation Iraqi Freedom, 108

Operation Matador, 93

Operation Noble Obelisk, 105

Operation Sea Angel, 73

Operation Sheltering Sky, 110

Operation Shining Express, 108

Operation Silver Wake, 103

Organization of African Unity, 19, 35, 68, 108

Paquereau, Capt Thierry, 90, 93-94

Parker, Lt Warren T., 38

Parker, LtCol Thomas W., 39-41

Patasse, President Ange-Felix, 85-87

Paynesville, 20

Peace Corps, 93-94

Pensacola (LSD 38), 103

People’s Redemption Council, 4

Peterman, LCdr Robert, USN, 8, 15, 30, 38-40

Peterson (DD 969), 9-10, 14, 38

Po River, 115

Ponce (LPD 15), 9-10, 94-95, 97-99, 101, 104

Portland (LSD 37), 73, 81-82, 84

Potter, BGen Richard, USA, 9

Powell, Gen Colin L., USA, 6

Progressive Alliance of Liberia, 4

Pugh, LtCol Robert L., 24, 26, 32, 42

Quainoo, LtGen Arnold, 48

Queen Elizabeth quay, 42

Quin, Jack, 29

Quiwonkpa, Gen Thomas, 4, 5

Republic of Zaire, 103

Revolutionary United Front, 67, 105

Roberts International Airport, 3, 6, 8, 10, 20, 110,

112, 114

Robertsport, Liberia, 1

Robison, Maj Norman J., 88-90, 93-94

Rogers, Capt Daniel S., 30, 34

Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Donald H., 110-

111

144 ON MAMBA STATION
Rwanda, 103

Ryan, MajGen Michael D., 95

Rymer, 1stSgt Luther T., 30

Sachtleben, Maj Glen R., 7-8, 13-15, 22-23, 30

Saint Paul Bridge, 111

Saipan (LHA 2), 7, 9-10, 19, 24, 26-27, 30, 36,

38, 39-40, 42, 45

Sam E apartments, 31-32, 52, 63

Sanchez, Sgt Luiz E., 69

Sawyer, Amos, 68

Sayko, Maj Stephen L., 11

Seko, President Mobutu Sese, 103-104

Sekou Toure Drive, 30, 59, 76, 79, 82

Senegal, 113

Shalikashvili, Gen John M., USA, 95

Shannon, Capt James K., 42, 45, 52, 57, 59

Sharp, Sgt Kenneth M., 19

Shelton, Capt Paul A., 75

Sierra Leone, 1, 5, 19, 36, 52, 55, 67, 81, 104-105

Sinkor, Liberia, 10, 20, 42

Slater, 1stSgt Allan M., 90-91

Smith, RAdm Layton W., USN, 59

Somalia Drive, 111

Southern European Task Force, 116

Special Operations Command, Europe, 71, 74, 93

Spriggs-Payne Airport, 10, 18, 20, 23, 38, 42, 52,

63, 65, 84, 101

St. Paul River, 10, 21, 49

St. Peter’s Lutheran Church, 22

Staley, Col David, USA, 12-14, 19, 21

Stull, LtCol Jonathon W., 45

Sudan, 85

Sumter (LST 1181), 9-10

Swedish Embassy, 38

Tanzania, 103

Taylor, President Charles, 4-6, 9, 18-20, 38, 42,

49, 55-56, 58-59, 65, 67, 69, 81, 83, 100, 108-114

Tenaglia, Lt James A., 98

Thorette, Gen Bernard, 87

Togo, 113

Tolbert, Wiliam K., 4

Tortuga (LSD 46), 73, 82

Trenton (LPD 14), 73, 81

True Whig Party, 3

Tubman Boulevard, 10

Tubman, President Willam S., 3-4

Turner, MajGen Thomas, USA, 113

Tutsi Tribe, 103

Tuzinoski, Cpl Dennis, 30

Twadell, Ambassador William H., 75

U.S. Agency for International Development, 5,

23, 92, 93

U.S. European Command, 5-6, 11, 14, 24, 34, 38,

43-44, 45, 47-48, 52, 60, 63-65, 67, 70, 81, 87, 93,

98-99, 101-103, 105

U.S. Special Operations Command, 5

Uganda, 103

United Liberation Movement of Liberia for

Democracy, 67

United Nations, 68

United Nations Drive, 10, 23, 30, 33, 53, 56-57,

59, 65, 76, 78-79

United Nations Observer Mission Liberia, 68

Vaitown, Monrovia, 35

Vicenza, Italy, 113

Voice of America, 10, 15

Wackenhut Corporation, 14

Ward, LCpl Wade M., 79

Wellington apartments, 31, 52-53, 71

West Point, Monrovia, 35

Whidbey Island (LSD 41), 45-47, 53, 55, 57, 62-

63

White, Capt Charles, USN, 74-75

White, Col Thomas J., USA, 19, 36

Widdifield, Sgt Scott R., 8, 15

Williams, Adm James D., USN, 43-45

Williams, VAdm James D., USN, 6, 9, 10, 32

Wologisi Mountains, 1

Yaounde, Cameroon, 88, 91

Young, Capt William D., USN, 74

Zaire, 85, 104

INDEX 145