alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
From: kpheller@comcast.net

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 5:32:45 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Paul Heller

La Grange, IL 60525
No. 62277.

#### The Tupman Thurlow Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

protests 251169-K, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Donlon, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of meats, prepared or preserved, not specially provided for, similar in all material respects to the meat the subject of *United States*v. *Mercantil Distribuidora, S. A., et al.*(45 C. C. P. A. 20, C. A. D. 667), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________ 

Case No. 5D22-2868 

LT Case No. 2019-CA-000773

_____________________________ 

DILLARD FAMBRO, 

Appellant, 

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

JESSICA RENEE ANDERSON A/K/A 

JESSICA ANDERSON FAMBRO 

A/K/A JESSICA A. FAMBRO, GEOFF 

H. HOATSON, LIVE OAK RESERVE

HOA, INC., AND DOMINICK

VANBROOK,

Appellees. 

_____________________________ 

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County. 

Christopher Sprysenski, Judge. 

Malcolm E. Harrison, of Law Office of Malcolm E. Harrison, 

Wellington, for Appellant. 

Robert S. Hogue and Rasheem Johnson, of K&L Gates, LLP, 

Miami, for Appellee, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 

No Appearance for Other Appellees. 

November 7, 2023 
2 

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. 

JAY, BOATWRIGHT, and PRATT, JJ., concur. 

_____________________________ 

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331. 

_____________________________
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                       2,002,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,968,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (390,000)
<INVENTORY>                                    329,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,204,000
<PP&E>                                      21,451,000
<DEPRECIATION>                             (4,560,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              35,275,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,012,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      5,000
<COMMON>                                       278,000
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                35,275,000
<SALES>                                      9,053,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,535,000
<CGS>                                        8,243,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,468,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             243,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 67,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    67,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        


</TABLE>
No. 68457.

protest 313320-K (New York).

#### Dessy Atco, Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Ford, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the issue is the same in all material respects as that the subject of *United States*v. *Steinberg Bros.*(47 CCPA 47, C.A.D. 727), and the record showing that the merchandise consists of nylon gloves and mittens similar in use to silk gloves and mittens, the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
ENB FINANCIAL CORP



Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADDED BY

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of ENB Financial
Corp (the "Corporation") for the year ended December 31, 2016, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Report"), I, Aaron L. Groff, Jr., Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and President, of the Corporation,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as added by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Corporation as of and for the period covered by the Report.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------







|Date: March 29, 2017 | By: | /s/  Aaron L. Groff, Jr.             
|-------------------- | --- | -------------------------------------
|                     |     | Aaron L. Groff, Jr.                  
|                     |     | Chairman of the Board,               
|                     |     | Chief Executive Officer and President



134
From: largentdc@yahoo.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 8:45:50 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Terry Largent

Arlington, VA 22207
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 ORDER - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

WAYNE SEMINOFF, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

SUNG HONG, a/k/a LAWRENCE HONG, and

YOUNG HONG, a married couple; HYO HONG,

a single woman; and H & H GROUP, INC., a

Washington corporation, 

Defendants.

CASE NO. C06-149RSM

ORDER ON MOTION FOR 

 SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court for consideration of defendant Hyo Hong’s motion for summary

judgment. Dkt. # 56. Defendant asserts that she is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff did

not timely respond to her discovery requests. In opposition, plaintiff asserts that the parties agreed to

hold discovery in abeyance pending efforts to settle the matter, but that his responses have now been

provided. Defendant has not filed a reply to contradict plaintiff’s representations. 

Summary judgment should be rendered only “if the pleadings, discovery and disclosure material

on file, and any affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Defendant has filed no affidavits, exhibits,

or other evidence to demonstrate the absence of any factual issues. The motion cannot be treated as one

for summary judgment. Instead, it is a premature motion for sanctions for failure to comply with
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 ORDER - 2

discovery requests. F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A). The motion is premature because defendant never moved to

compel the responses, so no Court order is in place. Id. The sanction of dismissal is available only for

failure to comply with a Court order. F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). Further, it appears that plaintiff has now

provided his responses. Defendant Hyo Hong’s motion for summary judgment of dismissal is

accordingly DENIED. 

DATED this 21 Day of April 2009.

A

RICARDO S. MARTINEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JORGE L. RUBIO,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

RUSH CARD; THE BANCORP BANK,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 14-16795

D.C. No. 1:13-cv-01470-AWIGSA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 22, 2015** 

Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. 

California civil detainee Jorge L. Rubio appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising

out of defendants’ alleged refusal to disburse funds from a pre-paid debit card. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Barren v.

FILED

JUL 02 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We may affirm on any ground supported by the

record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm. 

Dismissal of Rubio’s state law claims was not an abuse of discretion in the

absence of any cognizable federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (a district

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims upon

the dismissal of the federal claims); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (setting forth

requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction); Pachinger v. MGM Grand HotelLas Vegas, Inc., 802 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining the legal certainty

standard for the amount-in-controversy requirement); cf. Zhang v. Superior Court,

304 P.3d 163, 167 (Cal. 2013) (under California’s Unfair Competition Law, a

private plaintiff’s relief is generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution). 

We do not consider Rubio’s federal claims because Rubio did not present

any discernible arguments in his opening brief regarding the dismissal of his

federal claims. See Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir.

2011) (pro se appellant waived issue not supported by argument in opening brief). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Rubio’s action

without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (standard of review). 

2 14-16795
AFFIRMED.

3 14-16795
H. Res. 597 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

August 1, 2007. 

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall 

be in order to consider the conference report to accompany 

the bill (H.R. 1495) to provide for the conservation and development of water and related resources, to authorize the 

Secretary of the Army to construct various projects for improvements to rivers and harbors of the United States, and 

for other purposes. All points of order against the conference 

report and against its consideration are waived. The conference report shall be considered as read. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
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DETENTION ORDER 15.13

18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) Rev. 1/91

PAGE 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. 

BEKET ELIZABETH CASS-GARCIA,

Defendant.

____________________________________

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Case No. 06-47M

DETENTION ORDER 

Offenses charged: 

Count 1: Conspiracy to Distribute Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and

841(b)(1)(B).

Count 2: Possession of Cocaine Base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

841(b)(1)(C).

Date of Detention Hearing: February 13, 2006.

The Court, having conducted a detention hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), and

based upon the factual findings and statement of reasons for detention hereafter set forth, finds

the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DETENTION

(1) Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), there is a rebuttable presumption that defendant

is a flight risk and a danger to the community based on the nature of the pending charges. 

(2) Defendant has past substance-abuse problems, and it appears that those problems

may be ongoing.

Case 2:06-mj-00047-JPD Document 7 Filed 02/13/06 Page 1 of 2
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DETENTION ORDER 15.13

18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) Rev. 1/91

PAGE 2

(3) Defendant’s criminal background history shows that she has failed to appear in

Court as required on five prior occasions.

(4) Defendant’s criminal background history shows that she has five instances of

violating the terms of her probation.

(5) Although defendant has lived in the Western District of Washington for seven (7)

years, her ties to the community are minimal. She has not been employed for the past five (5)

years. She has minimal family ties and has living arrangements that cannot be verified.

(6) There are no conditions or combination of conditions that will reasonably assure

the appearance of defendant as required, or the safety of the community

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) Defendant shall be detained pending trial and committed to the custody of the

Attorney General for confinement in a correction facility separate, to the extent

practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody

pending appeal;

(2) Defendant shall be afforded reasonable opportunity for private consultation with

counsel;

(3) On order of a court of the United States or on request of an attorney for the

government, the person in charge of the corrections facility in which defendant

is confined shall deliver the defendant to a United States Marshal for the purpose

of an appearance in connection with a court proceeding; and

(4) The Clerk shall direct copies of this Order to counsel for the United States, to

counsel for the defendant, to the United States Marshal, and to the United States

Pretrial Services Officer.

DATED this 13th day of February, 2006.AJAMES P. DONOHUE

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 2:06-mj-00047-JPD Document 7 Filed 02/13/06 Page 2 of 2
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

49–011 2015

114th Congress, 1st Session – – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 114–56 

AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN FOR MONTHLY BASIC PAY 

INCREASES FOR THE UNIFORMED SERVICES 

COMMUNICATION 

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING

AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN FOR MONTHLY BASIC PAY INCREASES 

FOR MEMBERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FOR 2016, PURSUANT TO 37 U.S.C. 1009(e) 

SEPTEMBER 9, 2015.—Referred to the Committee on Armed Services and 

ordered to be printed 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with HEARINGE:\Seals\Congress.#13

emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with HEARING
(1) 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, August 28, 2015. 

Hon. JOHN BOEHNER, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I am transmitting an alternative plan for 

monthly basic pay increases for members of the uniformed services 

for 2016. 

I am strongly committed to supporting our uniformed service 

members, who have made such great contributions to our Nation 

over the past decade of war. As our country continues to recover 

from serious economic conditions affecting the general welfare, 

however, we must maintain efforts to keep our Nation on a sustainable fiscal course. This effort requires tough choices, especially 

in light of budget constraints. 

Accordingly, I have determined it is appropriate to exercise my 

authority under section 1009(e) of title 37, United States Code, to 

set the 2016 monthly basic pay increase at 1.3 percent. This decision is consistent with my fiscal year 2016 Budget and it will not 

materially affect the Federal Government’s ability to attract and 

retain well-qualified members for the uniformed services. 

The adjustments described above shall take effect on January 1, 

2016. 

Sincerely, 

BARACK OBAMA. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with HEARING
Case No. 14,836.

#### UNITED STATES v. COLLINS.

[2 Curt. 194.] 1

Circuit Court, D. Rhode Island.

Nov. Term, 1854.

Seamen-—Indictment for Flogging—Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

Flogging is not “a cruel and unusual punishment." within the meaning of the third section of the act of March 3, 1835 (4 Stat. 776). The defendant should have been indicted for beating and wounding the seaman.

[Cited in Riley v. Allen, 23 Fed. 48; U. S. v. ' Trice, 30 Fed. 492.]

This was an indictment against [Walter Collins] the master of a vessel of the United States, under the act of March 3, 1835 (4 Stat. 776), for inflicting on one of the crew a cruel and unusual punishment. The case opened by the district attorney was that the defendant had inflicted the punishment of flogging, abolished by the act of September, 1850 (9 Stat. 515).

Dist. Atty. Brown, for the United States.

Mr. Potter, contra.

1

 [Reported by Hon. B. R. Curtis, Circuit Justice.]

CURTIS, Circuit Justice.

I do not think you can maintain this indictment by proving the case opened. The act describes four distinct offences. Beating or wounding, imprisoning, deprivation of suitable food and nourishment, infliction of any cruel and unusual punishment. Each of these is a substantive criminal act, when proceeding from malice, and without justifiable i ause, and one of these offences cannot be properly described in the indictment by words used in the act of congress to describe another of-fence. If the defendant inflicted the punishment of flogging, from malice, he' should have been indicted for beating and wounding the seaman, not for inflicting a cruel and unusual punishment. That clause was not designed to include the punishment of flogging, which was not an unusual punishment when the act of 1835 was passed. On the contrary, it was the kind of punishment then most usual, and known to and sanctioned by the law. However unjustifiably it may have been inflicted, it is not a kind of punishment against which these particular words in the act were directed, and consequently the defendant must be acquitted.
No. 61567.

#### Air Clearance Assn., Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 302805-K (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, C. J.

The protest was dismissed.