COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JAMARRIAN CHANRELLE WINGFIELD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 3000-95-2 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 APRIL 1, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Walter W. Stout, III, Judge 

 David P. Baugh for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 On November 13, 1995, Jamarrian C. Wingfield (appellant) was 

found guilty in a bench trial of possession of cocaine with 

intent to distribute. The sole issue on appeal is whether the 

procedure for admission of the certificate of drug analysis 

provided by Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1 violates appellant's 

right to confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the 

Virginia Constitution. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 On May 12, 1995, at approximately 5:00 p.m. Richmond Police 

Officer O'Kleasky (O'Kleasky) observed appellant participating in 

a drug transaction. After witnessing an exchange of money and a 

white substance, O'Kleasky saw appellant place the remainder of 

the drugs down the front of his pants. He radioed a description 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

of appellant to his "take-down team," and Officers Corrigan and 

Williams (Williams) located and arrested appellant. At that time 

they recovered a bag containing a white substance from the front 

of his pants, a pager and $1,489 in U.S. currency. The drugs 

were forwarded to the Division of Forensic Science. 

 At trial on November 13, 1995, the Commonwealth moved 

pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1, to introduce the 

certificate of analysis of the white substance taken from 

appellant at the time of his search and arrest. The Commonwealth 

sought to use the certificate to show that Williams submitted one 

plastic bag containing caked tan powder for analysis, and that 

Robert R. Steiner, a forensic scientist, analyzed the substance 

and determined it to be 23.99 grams of cocaine. Appellant 

objected to the admission of the certificate; however, the trial 

court overruled appellant's "confrontation . . . as to the 

certificate" objection, noted appellant's continuing objection, 

and admitted the certificate. 

 Appellant contends that because Code §§ 19.2-187 and 

19.2-187.1 permit the introduction of an affidavit (i.e., the 

certificate of analysis) without requiring a face-to-face 

confrontation with the person who performed the chemical 

analysis, these sections violate his confrontation rights. 

Appellant argues that Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1 are 

unconstitutional because they allow the government to conduct a 

trial by affidavit. 
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 It is well established that the admissibility of evidence 

lies within the broad discretion of the trial court, whose ruling 

will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of 

discretion. Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 

823 (1986). The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, made 

applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 

provides that "'[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 

enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 

him.'" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980). However, an 

accused's right to confront and cross-examine is "'not absolute 

and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other 

legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.'" Baugh v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368, 371, 417 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1992) 

(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)); see 

also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). Additionally, a 

confrontation claim presupposes the denial of a request to 

confront and cross-examine witnesses. See United States v. 

Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393-94 (1986); Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 

117, 123 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1010 (1990). 

 The rights granted to a defendant under the Confrontation 

Clause are not violated by admitting into evidence against him 

the certificate of analysis which falls within a "firmly rooted" 

hearsay exception. See Raia v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 546, 

551-52, 478 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1996) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 

U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992)); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 
 4 

483 U.S. 171 (1987); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Moreover, 

laboratory analyses identifying controlled substances have long 

been admissible as a business record under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 803(6). See United States v. Roulette, 75 F.3d 418, 

421-22 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 

147, 136 L.E.2d 93 (1996). In the instant case, the certificate 

of drug analysis was admitted under Code §§ 19.1-187 and 

19.2-187.1, Virginia's statutory equivalent to FRE 803(6). 

 Code § 19.2-187 provides, in part: 

 In any hearing or trial of any criminal 

offense . . . a certificate of analysis of a 

person performing an analysis or examination, 

. . . when such certificate is duly attested 

by such person, shall be admissible in 

evidence as evidence of the facts therein 

stated and the results of the analysis or 

examination referred to therein, provided (i) 

the certificate of analysis is filed with the 

clerk of the court hearing the case at least 

seven days prior to the hearing or trial and 

(ii) a copy of such certificate is mailed or 

delivered by the clerk or attorney for the 

Commonwealth to counsel of record for the 

accused at least seven days prior to the 

hearing or trial upon request of such 

counsel. 

* * * * * * * 

 Any such certificate of analysis 

purporting to be signed by any such person 

shall be admissible as evidence in such 

hearing or trial without any proof of the 

seal or signature or of the official 

character of the person whose name is signed 

to it. 

Code § 19.2-187.1 provides: 

 The accused in any hearing or trial in 

which a certificate of analysis is admitted 
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into evidence pursuant to § 19.2-187 . . . 

shall have the right to call the person 

performing such analysis or examination or 

involved in the chain of custody as a witness 

therein, and examine him in the same manner 

as if he had been called as an adverse 

witness. Such witness shall be summoned and 

appear at the cost of the Commonwealth. 

 In Winston v. Commonwealth, we held as follows: 

 The contents of a "written report 

offered to prove the results of testing or of 

an analysis would generally be inadmissible 

hearsay evidence," absent authentication and 

verification by "the person who conducted the 

testing or prepared the report." However, 

Code § 19.2-187 "imposes a condition for the 

exoneration of an otherwise hearsay document 

from the application of the hearsay rule, 

thus making the document admissible." 

Because this statute "deals with criminal 

matters, and it undertakes to make admissible 

evidence which otherwise" might be 

objectionable, it "should be construed 

strictly against the Commonwealth and in 

favor of the accused." 

16 Va. App. 901, 904, 434 S.E.2d 4, 5 (1993) (quoting Gray v. 

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 943, 945, 265 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1980)) 

(other citations omitted). Thus, it is generally recognized that 

"Code § 19.2-187 creates an exception to the hearsay rule and 

permits the written analysis to be admitted into evidence without 

requiring the in-court presence of the person who prepared the 

document." Allen v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 657, 662-63, 353 

S.E.2d 162, 165 (1987) (citation omitted). 

 "Since the statute authorizes the admission into evidence of 

documents whose reliability had not been independently proven, 

the requirement that the certificate be filed seven days in 
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advance provides some guarantee of trustworthiness in that it 

gives an accused an opportunity to verify the results or to 

subpoena and challenge those who constructed the analysis, should 

that be a contested issue." Myrick v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 

333, 337, 412 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1991) (emphasis added). See also

Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 479-80 (4th Cir. 1958) 

(holding that then Code § 18.2-75.2 did not violate the 

Confrontation Clause); United States v. Farmer, 820 F.Supp. 259 

(W.D. Va. 1993) (holding that certificate of blood alcohol 

analysis did not violate Confrontation Clause and was admissible 

under the business records exception to the hearsay rule). 

 No violation of appellant's right of confrontation occurred. 

 Appellant had the express statutory right pursuant to Code 

§ 19.2-187.1 to subpoena the chemist performing the analysis or 

the person involved in the chain of custody to testify at trial 

and be available for his examination. Appellant's choice not to 

avail himself of that process does not constitute a denial of his 

confrontation right. Virginia's statutory scheme provides a 

mechanism for governmental and judicial economy by obviating the 

need for the prosecution to call the preparer and chain of 

custody witness. The statutes provide a defendant with adequate 

notice that the prosecution intends to rely on the certificate 

and affords a defendant the absolute right to call the preparer 

or chain of custody witness as an adverse witness should he so 

desire. Thus, no violation of either the United States or 
 7 

Virginia Constitution occurs by use of the statutory procedure 

authorized by Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.