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95–422PDF 2015

IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH

IRAN (PART I)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 9, 2015

Serial No. 114–79

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Michael Doran, Ph.D., senior fellow, Hudson Institute ........................................ 5

The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, foreign policy project advisor, Bipartisan Policy Center (former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control 

& Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department 

of State) ................................................................................................................. 12

Michael Makovsky, Ph.D., chief executive officer, JINSA Germunder Center 

Iran Task Force .................................................................................................... 22

Kenneth M. Pollack, Ph.D., senior fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, 

The Brookings Institution ................................................................................... 37

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Michael Doran, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 8

The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker: Prepared statement .............................. 15

Michael Makovsky, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 25

Kenneth M. Pollack, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................. 40

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 84

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 85

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 87

(1)

IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 

WITH IRAN (PART I) 

THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. The hearing will come to order. 

I will ask all the members to take their seats at this time. Today 

the committee continues to examine the Obama administration’s 

nuclear diplomacy with Iran as we get set for a congressional review of a possible, and hugely consequential, agreement. 

As we speak, U.S. negotiators in Vienna face another deadline. 

While we don’t have an agreement in front of us, we know the troubling outline taking shape. Just a few months ago, 367 Members 

of Congress signed a letter, Ranking Member Engel and I led stating that any final agreement must last for multiple decades and include full disclosure of Iran’s past efforts to build a nuclear weapon, must include a dramatic reduction in the number of centrifuges, and, most importantly, intrusive inspection and 

verification measures. 

A few weeks ago, several of President Obama’s former advisers 

signed an open letter echoing these same concerns and warned that 

these negotiations may fall short of meeting the administration’s 

own standard of a ‘‘good’’ agreement. Indeed, one witness with us 

today wrote back when these negotiations began, that a ‘‘good 

enough’’ agreement would have Iran giving up ‘‘all but a minimal 

enrichment capacity,’’ agree to intrusive inspections, and would be 

an agreement that could guarantee the reimposition of sanctions. 

But that is not even close to where the negotiations are right 

now. The ‘‘most robust and intensive inspections,’’ and this was the 

original goal, ‘‘the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history,’’ has morphed instead into an agreement of what is now discussed as ‘‘managed access’’ with the Iranians having a big say in 

where international inspectors can go, where international inspectors cannot go. ‘‘Managed access’’ is a big back away from the ‘‘anywhere, anytime’’ terms that the administration once demanded. 

But to be clear, under this agreement, Iran doesn’t even have to 

cheat to be a few steps away from the bomb. Iran is not required 

to dismantle key bomb-making technology; it is permitted a vast 

2

enrichment capacity and it is allowed to continue its research and 

development to gain an industrialized nuclear program once the 

agreement begins to expire in as little as 10 years. That is hardly 

the original concept of ‘‘decades’’ of a long-range agreement. And, 

frankly, it is hardly ‘‘all but minimal enrichment’’ that was the 

original goal as well. 

Meanwhile, Iran continues to develop its ballistic missile capabilities. After Iran’s Supreme Leader called demands to restrict its 

missile program a ‘‘stupid, idiotic expectation,’’ in his words, U.S. 

negotiators backed off this key demand. Instead, Iran is still able 

to ‘‘mass produce’’ its ballistic missiles as the Supreme Leader has 

ordered. If you will recall his quote at the time, he said it is the 

responsibility of every military man to figure out how to help mass 

produce ICBMs. We ought to be concerned, really concerned about 

that attitude, and some of his additional suggestions about what he 

would like to do to the United States. One witness told the committee last month that, ‘‘no country that has not aspired to possess 

nuclear weapons has ever opted to sustain’’ a costly, long-range 

missile program. Already, U.S. intelligence estimates Iran to have 

the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the entire Middle East. 

Simply put, countries build ICBMs to have the capability to deliver 

nukes. 

Not to mention that the terrorist state of Iran will be flush with 

cash. Reportedly, Iran will receive somewhere in the range of $50 

billion under this agreement upfront; $150 billion over the entire 

length of the agreement. Now, that would be 25 times the annual 

budget of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. Such a huge amount 

will breathe life into Iran’s economy, but it will also fund a new 

generation of terrorism in the region and beyond. We should be 

worried when Iran announces, as they recently did, that they will 

help rebuild the tunnels in Gaza, that they will transfer missiles 

to Hamas, and recently that they will provide 100,000 rockets and 

missiles for Hezbollah with new technology which will allow precision guidance systems so that those rockets and missiles can hit 

targets across Israel. 

At every step in this process, whether it is enrichment capacity, 

missile development, or sanctions relief, the Obama administration 

has discounted the fundamental nature of the regime in Iran. 

‘‘Death to America’’ isn’t domestic spin in Iran—it is the regime’s 

rallying cry. And tomorrow, on Friday, they will once again celebrate Quds Day. Since 1979, since the foundation of the revolution, 

that is the day they set aside to celebrate for the destruction of 

Israel. 

As one witness concludes, ‘‘President Obama is agreeing to dismantle of sanctions regime—permanently. In return, Iran is agreeing to slow the development of its nuclear program—temporarily.’’ 

That is a bad deal for us: Permanent concessions in exchange for 

temporary benefits, and that is only if Iran doesn’t cheat, like 

North Korea cheated. So Iran is left a few steps away from the 

bomb and more able to dominate the region. This is my take on 

this. How does that make us and our allies more secure or conflict 

less likely? That is the bottom line this committee will continue to 

look at. Few issues are more important. I now turn to the ranking 

member for any opening comments that he may have. 

3

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank for your calling this hearing. And thank you for your 

steady leadership as we confront the problems of Iran’s nuclear 

program. To our witnesses, thank you. Welcome. It is important 

that members hear views from across the spectrum as we play our 

part and weigh a potential deal. 

I have said from day one the devil is in the details. And until 

I know exactly what is in the deal, it is hard to comment on whether it deserves support or not. I have been troubled as I have said 

many times on the outset of these negotiations. Firstly, I have been 

very troubled that Iran was allowed to enrich and spin centrifuges 

while we are talking. I think it would have been a heck of a lot 

better if Iran was told if you want to have serious negotiations with 

us, while we talk, you stop enriching. But that wasn’t done. And 

that is disappointing. I am told that Iran wouldn’t agree to it. Well, 

does that tell you something about their motives at the outset? I 

am also disturbed that we are talking about Iran’s nuclear capability. We are not talking about, as the chairman pointed out, all 

the destructive roles they play around the world as the world’s 

leading sponsor of terrorism. Somehow or other, we are not really 

talking about that in these negotiations. We have four Americans 

in prison there. We had a hearing in this committee not long ago. 

I don’t know, are they in limbo? What is the story? I think it is 

preposterous that our people are held hostage while we are negotiating with them. 

And the rhetoric still continues to come out. Syria, where hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed and maimed, the 

Iranians prop up the Assad regime, Hezbollah, Hamas, you name 

it, Yemen, they have played negative roles. And so it is very, very 

troubling. And, again, the devil is in the details. I am glad that the 

reports are coming out that the administration is digging in its 

heels. A lot of people said that they would cave at the last minute 

on some of these issues because they wanted a deal very badly. I 

think that is being shown that it is not the case, and the Iranians 

are going to have to make some tough choices or else we are prepared to walk away. I have said from day one that we couldn’t 

want a deal more than the Iranians. If that is the case, then they 

will just, again, dig in their heels. 

And so they need to want a deal, and they need to be ready to 

make tough concessions. The chairman pointed out some of the 

troubling aspects of this. There are a few potential implications of 

a deal I would like to touch on this morning. One of my serious 

concerns throughout this process is sanctions relief. Even if sanctions relief is gradual and conditioned on Iran’s compliance with 

the deal, easing sanctions will eventually, as the chairman said, 

translate into a major financial windfall for Iran’s leaders. Let’s 

think about what that means. 

Even with sanctions in place, even with sanctions in place, Iran 

is still the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world. Even 

with a crumbling economy, Iran spreads its destabilizing influence 

in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza, and among our Gulf allies. 

Iran’s leaders have said they will use sanctions relief to help their 

people and shore up their economy. I will believe it when I see it. 

So Congress will need to play a role here. The House has already 

4

passed legislation to curb funding to Hezbollah, which is wreaking 

havoc in Lebanon and helping Assad cling to power in Syria. I hope 

the Senate will act on this measure. And however sanctions relief 

plays out in the Iran deal, Congress needs to make sure that our 

sanctions against terrorist groups remain robust and effective. That 

way, no matter what Iran chooses to do with its resources, we will 

have other measures to keep funding out of terrorist hands. 

The other issue I would like to address is how other countries 

across the region may respond to a deal. Iran is a nuclear threshold 

state. This leaves our ally Israel in a constant state of insecurity. 

Israel must always know we will have their back to deal with that 

challenge. We need to work with the Israelis, take a hard look at 

any outstanding concerns tied to this deal, and do whatever is necessary to ensure Israel’s security. 

Likewise, for our friends in the Gulf, a nuclear arms race would 

create tremendous volatility in the region. Recently at Camp David, 

the administration heard from our Sunni Gulf allies about their 

concerns over Iran’s behavior. This summit was a good start but 

more needs to be done. I hope our witnesses can shed some light 

on what steps might help shore up stability in the region in the 

wake of a deal. But I think we also have to consider, and I want 

to raise a question that I have asked again and again: If we don’t 

get a deal, what are the alternatives? At this point, we all know 

the refrain, no deal is better than a bad deal. 

But let’s see what the alternative would be. The alternative to 

a deal would surely mean some kind of military strikes on Iran’s 

nuclear plants and would also involve sanctions. I think when we 

weigh whatever final deal there is, we have to weigh it with the 

alternative and see which alternative we like better. There are no 

good choices. But it is very, very troubling that Iran continues to 

do what it has been doing and that we hear negative things from 

the Supreme Leader talking about all kinds of nonsense that we 

could not accept in any kind of a deal. 

So we need to consider where we will find ourselves if these negotiations fail. We cannot accept a bad deal again, but we need to 

weigh the P5+1 proposal versus the alternatives. I look forward to 

hearing our witnesses’ insights on these issues. And I thank them 

again for their testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

This morning, we are pleased to be joined by a distinguished 

group of experts. Dr. Michael Doran is a former Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense and Senior Director at the National Security 

Council. He is currently a senior fellow in the Center for Middle 

East Policy at the Hudson Institution. 

Mr. Stephen Rademaker is former Assistant Secretary at the 

U.S. Department of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. Mr. 

Rademaker is an adviser at the Bipartisan Policy Center and formally served as chief counsel at this committee. And we welcome 

him back. 

Dr. Michael Makovsky also served in the Pentagon where he advised senior officials on defense and energy policy in the Middle 

5

East. He currently heads the Iran Task Force at the Institute for 

National Security Affairs. 

Dr. Ken Pollack is a senior fellow at the Center for Middle East 

Policy at Brookings. Dr. Pollack served twice on the National Security Council where he focused on Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared statements will be 

made part of the record. And members will have 5 calendar days 

to submit any statements or questions or extraneous materials for 

the record. 

And, Mr. Doran, please summarize your remarks if you will. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DORAN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Mr. DORAN. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members 

of the committee, thank you for inviting me today to discuss the 

strategic implications of the nuclear negotiations with Iran. With 

your permission, I will focus my remarks on the perceptions of 

America’s Middle Eastern allies. 

For decades, our partners in the region have been divided among 

themselves on many consequential issues. But on one point they 

have all agreed: The importance of the United States as the guarantor of the regional order. They have also traditionally assumed 

that a primary duty of the guarantor was to orchestrate the containment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

However, President Obama’s pursuit of the nuclear accord has 

convinced our allies that he has shed that duty. None of them believe that he has any inclination to contain the expansionist Iran. 

And some of them even fear that he supports Iran’s ascendancy. 

Of course, the President is well acquainted with these fears. In 

recent months, therefore, he and his staff have labored intensively 

to convince the allies that the nuclear accord is, in fact, consistent 

with their defense needs. The Gulf Cooperation Council Summit at 

Camp David in May was a prime example of these efforts. Our allies, however, have found the administration’s arguments utterly 

unpersuasive. 

Mr. Chairman, it is my intention here to do three things: To 

sketch some of the key concerns of our allies; to describe some of 

the arguments that the administration has made to meet those 

concerns; and then to explain why those arguments fall flat. 

Our Middle Eastern allies passed judgment on the Iran deal a 

long time ago. It is in their eyes a very bad deal. Israeli Prime Minister Bejamin Netanyahu has been uniquely vocal in expressing his 

disapproval. But his view is widely shared by his neighbors who, 

like Netanyahu, feel abandoned and betrayed by the United States. 

In my written testimony, I go into greater detail about the sources 

of those feelings. For the purpose of brevity here, suffice it to say 

that over the course of the nuclear negotiations, the allies have 

seen U.S. relations with Iran become increasingly friendly. They 

are certainly disturbed by President Obama’s willingness to bless 

Iran as a nuclear threshold state. But they are equally unnerved 

by the lack of concern that he has demonstrated as Iran has flexed 

its muscles in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. When viewed from capitals, 

such as Riyadh and Jerusalem, it appears that there is a hidden 

6

price to the nuclear deal, a price that will be paid by the allies 

more than anyone else. 

The United States appears to be tacitly recognizing an Iranian 

sphere of interest in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Indeed, Washington 

has at times even publicly approved of Iran’s expansionism. When, 

for example, Secretary of State John Kerry characterized Iranian 

combat sorties in Iraq as ‘‘a good thing,’’ his words were greeted 

with shock and anger throughout the Gulf. Israeli Defense Minister 

Moshe Ya’alon thus spoke for all of America’s allies last week when 

he lamented that the United States now sees Iran as part of the 

solution, not the problem. 

Of course, President Obama is well aware of the fears that his 

policies are generating. And he and his advisers have crafted a 

number of arguments to quell them. These arguments, which my 

written testimony covers in some detail, all work in support of a 

simple thesis, that the comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran 

will not undermine an American commitment to the allies’ security. 

In fact, the administration is now claiming the deal can function 

as the first step in a new comprehensive regional strategy. The 

Camp David Summit, so the story goes, laid the groundwork for a 

new strategic partnership with the GCC states, a partnership that 

will speed arms transfers and increase cooperation on counterterrorism, ballistic missiles, and a host of other cooperative security 

ventures. 

In truth, America’s Gulf allies have no confidence that President 

Obama will actually deliver on what they consider to be their vital 

needs. They are intensely aware that his understanding of the 

phrase ‘‘Iran containment’’ and their understanding of the phrase 

are entirely different. What they desire from the United States is 

a policy of rollback, a set of initiatives designed to drive Iran from 

Syria and Yemen, to challenge Hezbollah’s monopoly over politics 

in Lebanon, and to weaken the role of Shiite militias in Iraq. They 

want the United States to lead a regional security system that will 

counter the Revolutionary Guard Corps at its favored game, subversion. 

By contrast, President Obama is offering tools and initiatives 

that will help the GCC states maintain stability at home and 

mount a collective defense against a conventional attack from Iran. 

The America approach, in other words, simply does not meet the 

threat as the allies actually experience it. In their eyes, President 

Obama is like a doctor who is prescribing heart medicine to a cancer patient. 

At the close of the GCC summit, President Obama went out of 

his way to make sure that his approach to containment would not 

be misunderstood. I want to be very clear, he said, the purpose of 

security cooperation is not to perpetuate any long-term confrontation with Iran or even to marginalize Iran. 

Our allies got the President’s message loud and clear: The 

United States is out of the business of Iran containment as it has 

been understood in Washington for the last 36 years. 

Unlike the Israelis, our Gulf allies have chosen not to advertise 

their sense of abandonment and betrayal. Instead, they have chosen simply to go their own way, quietly. For example, Riyadh organized a coalition of Sunni allies that intervened in Yemen in order 

7

to counter the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in that country. But 

the intervention was also meant to send a message to President 

Obama: If you won’t organize the region to contain Iran, we will. 

To drive home the point, the Saudis gave Washington only an 

hour’s notice before their intervention began. The Saudis and their 

closest allies will remain dedicated to contesting Obama’s policies, 

albeit quietly. And they will continue to fight back against Iran 

and its proxies in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. 

Meanwhile, the Iranians, flush with cash from the nuclear deal, 

with grow bolder and richer and more prone to intervention. The 

President’s Iran policy, therefore, will deliver disequilibrium to the 

Middle East, the exact opposite of what the administration is 

claiming. 

Thank you again for inviting me to testify. It is an honor to 

speak before this committee on such a consequential topic. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Doran follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Rademaker. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, 

FOREIGN POLICY PROJECT ADVISOR, BIPARTISAN POLICY 

CENTER (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF 

ARMS CONTROL & BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Engel, 

members of the committee. 

It is a pleasure to be here again to testify on this issue. And it 

is a special pleasure for me to be here with Dr. Makovsky, with 

whom I have worked on this issue on two Iran task forces at this 

point. We haven’t coordinated our testimony, but I am sure I am 

going to agree with what he says. 

I will summarize my testimony. At the moment, we are all focused, because the press is focused, on the remaining issues in disagreement in negotiations. But one of my points is we shouldn’t 

allow that focus on issues like inspections and the possible military 

dimensions to divert our attention from the more fundamental 

problems with this agreement, which I think are basically baked 

in. The first point I make in my testimony is that even if all the 

issues that are in dispute today, the ones we are reading about in 

the newspapers, are resolved on favorable terms to the United 

States, this is still a bad deal. And I would refer you to the testimony I presented previously as to why I think it is a bad deal. 

But among all the reasons that I have put forward in the past, 

the single most important one to my mind is the sunset clause. 

And the point I have made in the past and I repeat in my testimony today is that if it is dangerous for the United States to face 

an Iran today that in 2 to 3 months is able to produce a nuclear 

weapon, if that is dangerous and it is so important to extend that 

to a 1-year breakout time, that we are prepared to eliminate all the 

sanctions that we put in place, why isn’t it going to be even more 

dangerous in 10 years for Iran to have a much shorter breakout 

time with which they will be able to produce a much larger number 

of nuclear weapons than is the case today? 

If 2 to 3 months is dangerous today, isn’t it going to be vastly 

more dangerous to have a breakout time that measures in days or 

weeks starting 10 years from now? That is fundamentally what 

this deal provides to Iran. And to me, that is what is most alarming about it. 

I spent a lot of time in my testimony focusing on the statement 

that was put out by the group of bipartisan American diplomats, 

leaders, and experts at the Washington Institute, a very distinguished group, including some of President Obama’s former advisers on the Iran issue, including Howard Berman, the former chairman of this committee. It is a very useful statement, and I expect 

it will figure importantly in the congressional debate that takes 

place because of the stature of these individuals. They identify a 

number of concerns. They make a number of recommendations for 

modifications to the agreement. I agree with their comments. I 

hope those modifications are made. 

But less noted is the fact that they are also concerned about the 

sunset clause. They don’t use that term, but it is in the statement. 

13

And they come up with what I think is actually a radical solution 

to the sunset clause problem. And I want to draw your attention 

to it because I think it speaks to the question of what Congress 

should do and what situation is this deal putting the United States 

in and what do we do about it. 

I quote the relevant language from their statement, beginning at 

the bottom of page 2 of my testimony, but what they say is it needs 

to be U.S. policy to prevent Iran from producing sufficient fissile 

material—that is material to produce a nuclear weapon—sufficient 

material for a single nuclear weapon, both during the agreement 

and after the agreement expires. So that ‘‘after the agreement expires,’’ they are talking about the sunset clause. We need to make 

sure they can’t produce enough material for a nuclear weapon either now or after the agreement expires. And they say: The United 

States must go on record now that it is committed to using all 

means necessary, including military force, to prevent this. The 

President should declare this to be U.S. policy, and Congress 

should formally endorse it. 

So they are basically saying you, the Congress, should authorize 

the use of military force if Iran at any point, either during the 

agreement or afterwards, produces enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Now, the reason that is a radical proposal is, of 

course, the proposed agreement, in fact, permits Iran to produce 

enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Basically what they 

are saying is if this agreement comes into force, the United States 

concedes to Iran the right to produce fissile material and lots of it 

if they decide they need to do that, but we should then bomb them 

if they exercise this right that we are giving to them. And I think 

that is a pretty sobering recommendation because this debate is 

often cast in terms of we either need this deal, or we are going to 

have to go to war. It is the deal or war. But if you read what all 

these experts are telling you, they are saying: Well, actually there 

may be war even if we give them this deal because the deal is 

going to authorize them or permit them to do things that would require us to use military force in any event. 

I mean, these are not random people. These are very serious people, including President Obama’s top advisers. And the point I 

make at the very end of my testimony is that, as distinguished as 

these people are, I don’t think that recommendation makes a lot of 

sense. If we are going to bomb Iran, let’s do it in defense of the 

existing U.N. Security Council resolutions. Let’s not do it in defiance of this agreement that the President is about to sign because 

this agreement permits Iran to do things that they are saying if 

Iran does, we need to bomb them. I think we will find ourselves 

without many friends if we disregard this agreement and then proceed to use military force against Iran. 

So that is one of the key points of my testimony. I also do comment on some of these issues in dispute, the possible military dimensions issue, which is a question of the history of the Iranian 

nuclear program. I think it is very important. Secretary Kerry said 

we know enough; we don’t need to get into this. I think the International Atomic Energy Agency deserves the support of the United 

States to get to the bottom of that question. We know how to require countries—we required North Korea to cooperate with the 

14

IAEA. They have never required, they have never conditioned any 

of the benefits in this agreement on cooperation between Iran and 

the IAEA. They call for it, but they don’t condition anything on it. 

So that is not serious support to the IAEA in its effort to get to 

the bottom of the matter. 

One of the other issues that has just emerged in the last week 

is Iran is suddenly saying, contrary to what was in the fact sheet 

that was released on April 2 that described the proposed deal, that 

fact sheet said sanctions on ballistic missiles and conventional 

arms transfers from Iran would be kept in place. The Iranians are 

now saying they want all those sanctions to be ended. The intelligence community assesses that with foreign assistance, Iran this 

year could test a ballistic missile capable of striking the United 

States. Understand that what Iran is saying is they want the prohibitions on receiving that kind of foreign assistance to go away. 

They are saying: We want to be able to get the foreign assistance 

we need to be able to produce a ballistic missile to strike the 

United States this year. 

And as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, their whole ballistic missile program makes no sense in the absence of a nuclear weapon. 

To strike the United States with a conventionally armed ballistic 

missile makes no sense. With a nuclear weapon, it is a serious 

threat. And the idea that these two are unrelated is simply illogical. And, in fact, it is part of the possible military dimensions issue 

that the IAEA wants to dig into. They want to look at the links 

between the ballistic missile program and the nuclear program. 

And that is why the United States needs to support them on that 

issue. 

I think I am out of time. So I will end. And I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Dr. Makovsky. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MAKOVSKY, PH.D., CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, JINSA GERMUNDER CENTER IRAN TASK 

FORCE 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me this 

morning to discuss the emerging Iran deal. I also am very honored 

to be on the panel with Steve Rademaker. We have worked together on Iran, on the task force, since 2007. Based on what we 

know today, the emerging comprehensive Iran deal is deeply 

flawed and with historically severe implications for U.S. standing 

in national security. So I believe every day the deal isn’t concluded 

is a good day. 

The Obama administration has four primary arguments on behalf of this emerging deal: First, it will cut off every pathway to 

a nuclear weapon. But President Obama correctly acknowledged in 

April that in 10 or 15 years, Iran’s ‘‘breakout times would have 

shrunk almost down to zero.’’

The second argument is that it will delay a nuclear Iran for over 

a decade. Delay is, indeed, strategically very valuable, but only if 

Iran’s nuclear program is truly frozen and Iran contained, which is 

not the case with this deal. 

Third, that a military strike would create a much shorter delay 

than a deal. But Israeli strikes on Syrian and Iraqi nuclear facilities actually have pushed back their programs for many years and 

counting. And Israelis believe they could push back Iran’s program 

for at least 3 years. The United States has obviously a lot more capability, and will likely push it back even further, especially with 

continued vigilance. We can’t predict, of course, exactly what a 

military strike would delay the program. But I think it is safe to 

say that it would, could dissuade other countries from developing 

their own nuclear program. 

Fourth, the only alternative to this deal is war. That is their 

fourth argument. President Obama claims that Iran came to the 

table because of sanctions. Yet he also contends that any further 

pressure would only cause it to restart its nuclear program, leading 

to war. In fact, as you all know, Iran has shown itself susceptible 

to military and economic pressure. And we obviously could do a lot 

more since we could cut off their oil exports. It wouldn’t have any 

impact on the oil market, with prices having halved in the last 

year. 

However, the administration does not avail itself of these other 

options; leaving itself only diplomacy without other levers simply 

becomes pleading. This empty holster, as Tom Friedman recently 

put it, has made war not the alternative but possibly the consequence of this deal. Let me discuss some of the strategic implications of this deal. Since at least Jimmy Carter was President, 

America has had three main interests in the Middle East; a secure 

Israel, a secure flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, and weakening 

of Islamic radicalism. These three interests have converged in containing the Islamic Republic of Iran. President Obama came into 

office seeking to reverse traditional U.S. foreign policy which he 

deemed wrong, often wrong, counterproductive, and a divergence 

23

from domestic demands. That has led him to reach out and eventually to embrace Iran and align with it at the expense of our traditional allies. Hence, he did not support the 2009 uprising in Tehran 

and did not support Assad’s opponents in Syria. And he didn’t implement the 2013 Syrian red line. Yet he did support in 2011 the 

demonstrations against our allied regimes. He also initiated secret 

talks with Iran even when Ahmadinejad was President without 

consulting or informing our allies like the Saudis and the Israelis. 

As Mike Doran mentioned, he has also increased our alignment 

with Iran in other parts of the region. 

This policy has culminated in what I believe is an overeagerness 

to accommodate Iran in the nuclear talks despite the fact that Iran, 

frankly, is a third-rate power. The result is questionable U.S. reliability and questionable American credibility. There are a number 

of great consequences to this policy. First, some of our Sunni allies 

will seek to develop nuclear programs or acquire nuclear weapons 

to ensure security. As Henry Kissinger and George Shultz wrote in 

April, do we now envision an interlocking series of rivalries with 

each new nuclear program counterbalancing others in the region? 

The fact is nuclear contagion will regionalize this challenge so that 

we will no longer just have to monitor what Iran is doing and not 

doing with its nuclear program, but we will have to also be looking 

at what the Saudis and other countries in the region are doing 

with their nuclear program. This will increase the risks, the 

chances of a nuclear conflict in the Middle East, whether through 

intent or miscalculation. And it could well draw in the United 

States. 

Second, the radicals in the region, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, 

ISIS, and the Muslim Brotherhood, will feel emboldened by this 

deal and what they perceive as American capitulation. There will 

also be continued realignment in the region. Other countries will 

seek closer relations in the region with Russia and China. Other 

countries, including net oil importers, will seek closer relations 

with Iranians. Of course, on the positive side, the Israelis and the 

Arabs, who share a sense of abandonment by the United States, 

will intensify their quiet collaboration. 

Fourth, to counteract all the above, the United States will likely 

try to contain a nuclear Iran as we did in the Cold War. However, 

containment is based on deterrence. Deterrence, in turn, demands 

credibility, of which we will have little on this issue. It requires indefinite, dedicated, and expensive commitment. And it is unclear 

whether containment even applies and deterrence applies to the 

Iranian regime. 

Fifth, Israel could well feel compelled to strike Iran. In short, rising tension and even war, including nuclear war, could result from 

this deal and is not its alternative. 

In conclusion, as the chairman knows, I wrote a book on Winston 

Churchill. And he famously said to Neville Chamberlain, who, by 

the way, was his party leader, as well as the Prime Minister, in 

1938 about the Munich Agreement: You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor, and you will have 

war. 

This is not to compare leaders or situations to today. But it is 

to make two points: First that the consequence of this deal will not 

24

be peace but greater tension and the risk of conventional war and 

even nuclear conflict that can draw in the United States. Second, 

this issue transcends any administration or party. There could still 

be hope. But an acceptable diplomatic solution will require fully 

and truly employing, in President Obama’s words of 2009, all elements of American power. 

I urge Congress that if this deal is concluded to reject the emerging deal and reinvigorate American leverage and credibility to 

achieve an acceptable deal and prevent a nuclear Iran at all costs. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Makovsky follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Dr. Pollack. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. POLLACK, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS 

INSTITUTION 

Mr. POLLACK. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Engel, distinguished members, thank you very much for inviting me to testify before you. 

I don’t know what the terms of the deal are going to look like. 

And those terms are important. As a result, I am going to reserve 

judgment for now on what I think about the actual deal until I 

have it before me. And although the details of the deal are important, not inconsequential, I think, like many of my panel members, 

that it is also important that we recognize that the details of the 

deal are not the only thing that needs to be thought about, that 

needs to be discussed, that needs to be debated with regard to the 

deal. 

And I fear that we are drowning out other critical aspects of this 

issue in our fixation with the specific terms of the deal. In particular, we all need to constantly remember that our fears about 

the Iranian nuclear program are fears about how that program 

could exacerbate the circumstances in the region itself. Our fear 

has always been that Iran with nuclear weapons or even a threshold capability would be encouraged and enabled to act more aggressively in the region. In other words, any nuclear agreement with 

Iran needs to be seen as a means to an end, not an end in and of 

itself. It needs to be seen as a part of a wider American strategy 

toward the region. And we need to consider that entire strategy, 

not just the specific terms of the deal. 

Obviously, the terms of the deal will be important in deciding 

how we should shape our strategy moving forward and in the context of a region changed by whatever happens in that deal. But we 

need to also recognize that our policies beyond the deal itself will 

have an equal if not greater impact on what happens in the region 

as a result of that deal. 

Whatever it does to the Iranian nuclear program or doesn’t do to 

the Iranian nuclear program, the deal can either hurt or help regional stability. But, again, it is only part of that puzzle. Another, 

potentially much bigger piece of that, is the question of what the 

United States does to prepare the groundwork once we have the 

deal in place. There is a great question mark out there that none 

of us can answer as to how Iran will behave in the aftermath of 

a deal. Will they become more aggressive, less aggressive, stay the 

same? All this matters a great deal. Proponents of the deal make 

the case that it may be possible after a deal for President Rouhani 

and Foreign Minister Zarif, who clearly would like a better relationship with the rest of the world and the United States, to forge 

some kind of a rapprochement building on the political capital that 

they will accrue from a successful deal. That is a plausible scenario. 

Unfortunately, an equally plausible scenario is one in which the 

Supreme Leader decides that he has got to either throw a sop to 

his hardliners or else demonstrate to his own constituency that he 

38

has not abandoned Khomeini ideology and so becomes more aggressive to demonstrate that he has not lost his revolutionary mojo. 

From my perspective, I think that, at least in the short term, it 

is most likely that Iran’s behavior toward the region is going to remain basically the same. I think that over the last 4 years, Iran 

has put in place a series of policies toward the different countries 

and problems of the region that suit its interests, its politics, and 

its capabilities. I don’t think that any of those policies were predicated on what did or didn’t happen with the nuclear negotiations. 

And for that reason, I don’t see a successful nuclear deal of any 

kind as fundamentally changing Iran’s approach to any of those 

things. And, unfortunately, Iran’s broad policy toward the Middle 

East is inimical to American interests. It is inimical because the 

Iranians define it as being inimical to our interests. And more than 

that, it is destabilizing in a number of very important places, although not all, in the Middle East. 

As we are all well aware, and as my copanelists have described, 

many of our allies in the region, led by the Gulf Cooperation states, 

are very concerned about how Iran will behave after a deal. They 

fear that the Iranians will be more emboldened, will be more aggressive. They also fear how the United States will behave after a 

deal. They are deeply concerned, as Dr. Doran has eloquently 

pointed out on many occasions, that the United States is going to 

use a nuclear deal with Iran as a ‘‘get out of the Middle East free’’ 

card, that we will take the deal, announce that we have solved the 

greatest problem in the Middle East and walk away. 

And the great danger is that what we have seen is that when 

our allies, particularly when the GCC feels frightened, when they 

feel that they cannot rely on us, their default option is not to accommodate Iran, as many people fear; it is, instead, to get in Iran’s 

face and push back as hard as they can. And the problem there is 

that the GCC lacks the political and military capacity to do so. And 

it runs the risk of overstressing its own political and military capabilities with potentially dire repercussions for their own internal 

stability. 

The Yemen war, the recent GCC intervention in Yemen, I think 

is an eloquent case in point there. It is unprecedented. We have 

never seen the GCC undertake so massive a unilateral military 

intervention. It is also incredibly dangerous. They don’t know what 

they are doing. They don’t have a plan. They don’t know how to 

get out. They can’t do a surge in Iraq, even though they have got 

themselves stuck in Yemen, exactly the way the United States had 

gotten itself stuck in Iraq back in 2005, 2006. And that is a very 

real problem, not just for them but for us. 

As my copanelists have pointed out, they are not assuaged by the 

Camp David Summit or by the administration’s statements. The 

administration continues to plead that they have not disengaged 

from the region and do not plan to further disengage. But here I 

have to agree with my GCC colleagues that me thinks the administration doth protest too much, to paraphrase Shakespeare. The administration said it would disengage from the region. It did do so. 

And it has only partially reengaged when circumstances forced it 

to do so. And it is now trying to do the minimal possible to sort 

out the situation. 

39

I am concerned that in the wake of a deal, it is going to require 

a major American effort to convince the region that we are not 

walking away, to push back on the Iranians, to let them know that 

they will not have a free hand in the region, and to reassure our 

allies so that they do not feel that they need to take on the Iranians themselves in ways that they are simply incapable of doing 

so. Once again, I see ourselves faced with choosing among the least 

bad option. And I am reminded that it seems to me that, once 

again, the Middle East is teaching us the lesson, that whenever we 

try to minimize our commitments there, the problems of the region 

simply get worse. And they force us eventually to come back and 

do more than we had ever intended. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pollack follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Dr. Pollack, your commentary there is interesting to me because there is this phenomenon, this morning the 

New York Times discusses it, the increasing strident nature of the 

regime against the United States. 

I will just read the story from the New York Times:

‘‘The chants of ‘Death to America’ and the burning of American 

flags on the streets are as familiar a part of life here as air 

pollution and traffic jams. With the United States and Iran on 

the verge of a potentially historic nuclear accord, there has 

been a distinct change in tone, however. The anti-Americanism 

is getting even more strident. The rising levels of vitriol have 

been on display this week in the buildup to the annual antiIsrael extravaganza coming this Friday.’’

So the other part of this is that as we reach out to extend that 

‘‘olive branch,’’ to quote the Secretary of State’s words, you have 

this reaction in Iran where the Ayatollah speaks even more fervently of the requirement, you know, to develop, to ‘‘mass produce,’’ 

in his words, ICBMs. And this is the aspect of this where I think 

we are a little disconnected from the reality of the way in which 

that system works and the individual who makes the decisions over 

there. 

As a matter of fact, Rouhani today is meeting with Putin in Moscow. And what is the Russian demand? And this caught us by surprise this week, the demand from Iran now that we lift the arms 

embargo. And, of course, they will be getting this huge tranche—

I have called it a signing bonus, but they will be getting this cash 

on the barrel head. And I think Russia is very, very interested in 

that because you see the stories in the last few weeks about the 

Russians selling weapons systems to Iran, including, you know, 

surface-to-air, which, frankly, would allow them maybe to cheat 

with impunity if they put up a vast enough system across Iran. 

Now, here is the new demand: Lift the arms embargo. 

Dr. Pollack, your thoughts on that. 

Mr. POLLACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I agree with you. I saw Tom Erdbrink’s piece this morning as 

well. And I think that it does speak to exactly the issue that I have 

been concerned about for quite some time, which is we don’t know 

how the Iranians are going to react to their own deal. As I suggested, while I think it is clear that President Rouhani and Foreign 

Minister Zarif would like to move in the direction of accommodation, there are forces pushing in the opposite direction. And what 

we have seen for the Ayatollah himself is he is deeply suspicious 

of the United States. And he may very well decide that he needs 

to tack back to the right to accommodate his hardliners. Because 

he just gave this big bone to Rouhani and the moderates in signing 

the agreement itself. I think this is a very real concern. 

Chairman ROYCE. The only caveat I would make is when we are 

talking about Zarif, remember, we are talking about a man who 

placed a wreath on the grave of the individual who carried out or 

masterminded the attack on the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon. He may seem moderate compared to the Ayatollah. But in 

terms of what he has called for and his past history running the 

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sequence puts it in a little bit different perspective in terms of the 

background of some of these individuals. 

But I wanted to ask Mr. Rademaker, as you note in your testimony, Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for 

at least 15 years. So implicit in that statement is that after 15 

years, Iran is going to be permitted to enrich to higher levels. 

There is no suggestion that there will be any limit on the level to 

which Iran may enrich after 10 or 15 years or the amount of highly 

enriched material that it may accumulate. So let us say Iran begins 

to enrich uranium very close to bomb-grade levels after the sunset, 

and they say it is to operate a submarine program. What is the 

world’s response to that? I mean, do I understand correctly the way 

this is teed up here? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. You are clearly grasping the point I made in 

my testimony, which is this agreement will concede to Iran the 

right after 15 years to produce highly enriched uranium, bombgrade material, without any limitation on the amount of that material they may accumulate. Now, ordinarily, you would think if 

somebody is producing bomb-grade material in amounts in excess 

of what you need to build one or two or three nuclear bombs, that 

they must be on track to build a nuclear bomb. 

But there are peaceful explanations one could put forward. One 

such explanation would be if they were to say, for example, we 

want to build a nuclear navy because, hey, you Americans, you 

have a nuclear navy and you use highly enriched uranium to fuel 

the nuclear reactors in your submarines; that is what we are doing. 

Now, if Iranians say that, are the people in this room going to believe them? Are we going to think that that is really what they are 

doing? Or are we going to suspect that what they are really doing 

is accumulating the material so that they can breakout overnight 

with a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. Personally, I am going to 

think it is a pretext. 

But your question, Mr. Chairman, is, what is the rest of the 

world going to think. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, the other point I would make——

Mr. RADEMAKER. And, you know, I think a lot of the rest of the 

world is going to be prepared to give them the benefit of the doubt. 

And they will point to this agreement and say: Hey, you Americans, too late for you to object; you signed off on this. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, even the North Korean agreement did 

not have a sunset. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Correct. 

Chairman ROYCE. Now, it had the loopholes in it because we 

couldn’t go ‘‘anytime, anywhere,’’ you know, anyplace with the 

international inspectors. It was only a matter of time before North 

Korea would figure out a way to cheat on that agreement and get 

a bomb. But at least it didn’t have a sunset. That is the aspect of 

this I don’t understand. 

And the last point I would just ask Dr. Doran, you know, the administration says that they don’t see, they are going to spend the 

vast majority of the money when we lift the sanctions, most of it 

is going to go to butter not to guns. However, the statement I saw 

was the statement by Iran that they were going to help—this was 

in The Wall Street Journal—that Iran was going to help rebuild 

51

the tunnels—Mr. Engel and I were in one of those tunnels; there 

are 35 tunnels; they are expensive to build—for Hamas, you know, 

under Israel and that they were going to supply missiles to replace 

the inventory that were fired off by Hamas and then, the added 

story the next day, that they were also going to fund precisionguided rockets and missiles, 100,000 of them, to Hezbollah. That 

takes a little bit of cash to do that. How do we know that it is all 

going to butter and not to guns? I would just ask, Dr. Doran, what 

is your calculus on that? 

Mr. DORAN. I think to believe this claim that it is going to go to 

butter and not guns is to discount everything that the Iranians 

have said and done over the last 36 years. And I can’t think of any 

other endeavor of human prediction where we would say everything they did until yesterday has no relevance to what we think 

they are going to do, they are going to do tomorrow. 

In addition to the concerns that you raise, personally, I am also 

very concerned about the ability of the Iranians to prop up the 

Assad regime. It wasn’t that long ago that we thought the Assad 

regime might be toppled. And the greatest factor that changed the 

balance of power on the ground in favor of the Assad regime or 

that gave it a new lease on life was the Iranian intervention, direct 

intervention from Iranians themselves and also the sending of Iraqi 

militias trained in Iran. 

Chairman ROYCE. I am glad you brought up that point because 

not only was the Assad regime on the ropes, but the Iranian regime 

was on the ropes. And Mr. Engel and I had legislation based on 

some of the work of Stuart Levey over at Treasury, to give the Ayatollah an actual choice between economic collapse or real compromise on his nuclear program. It passed out of here unanimously 

in this committee, passed the floor 400 to 20. One of the reasons 

Iran is a little bit back in the game is because we partially lifted 

those sanctions. The suggestion in the House was that we double 

down and give us some real leverage in this negotiation. And the 

administration made the decision to sit on that legislation or at 

least, you know, orchestrated in the Senate the inability to bring 

that to the floor. And I think we lost a lot of leverage out of that. 

My time has expired. I need to go to Mr. Engel. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you on the panel for your good testimony. 

Look, I have a lot of difficulty with some of these deals, these negotiations, as you do. But I think that, at this point, we are almost 

at the midnight hour, so to speak, we have to look at the choices 

that we have. The way I see it right now is that we have a choice 

to accept—Congress does—and support a deal that the administration negotiates, or we don’t. And if we don’t, then we need to look 

at the alternatives. 

I share all of your concerns. There isn’t anything that anybody 

has said that I really disagree with. I think it is a problem. But 

I do think that the alternative, as I mentioned before, would simply 

be, as the chairman and I have long felt, more sanctions on Iran 

but also an attack on their nuclear plant. 

Now, if there is no deal, how long would the current sanctions 

regime hold? We are told time and time again that if there is no 

deal and the perception is that the United States walked away, 

52

that the rest of the international community would abandon the 

sanctions, even including our allies, like the U.K. and France and 

countries that have been most supportive of us. So if we are unable 

to sustain the sanctions regime and have a bombing of their plant 

which sets them back 2 years or 3 years or whatever it is, is that 

really a viable alternative? Anybody care to answer? 

Dr. Makovsky? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Engel. 

I think when we think about the alternatives, again, as I mentioned, I think that we have to weigh, there is no good alternative 

here for sure. I just think that the alternative of this deal, the consequences of the deal are much worse than the consequences of no 

deal right now. And I would think about it in those terms. 

For instance, as I said, I think one of the biggest problems with 

this deal is that the other countries in the region will pursue nuclear weapons. The Saudis have said that. President Obama said 

it only in 2012. He said it with great certainty. And then I think 

you really have a problem. And then this problem is not just about 

Iran, but it is about the region. 

We don’t really want the Saudis to get nuclear weapons. And we 

don’t want other countries to. Then the region becomes a lot more 

dangerous. So even if the alternative to this deal is a military action—I don’t think it has to be. I think we could boost our leverage 

as you indicated. But I think you could argue that even if there 

was a military strike, which we all hope it doesn’t come to that, 

the consequence of that would be a lot less than what could be a 

nuclear contagion in the region and really, really serious conflict 

involving nuclear power. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, the point I am making is, while we all find aspects of these negotiations that we don’t like—and I have been saying mine for over a year—it is not just accepting this deal or nothing. There are things that we are going to have to come to grips 

with. And I believe one of them is bombing the nuclear reactor. 

The Europeans are seeking further economic ties with Iran. The 

Russians and Chinese are preparing to give up on the arms embargo and ballistic missile sanctions, as pointed out. Those are sanctions that are outside of the scope of the negotiations, clearly. 

So to me, it says about the viability of sanctions enforcement, if 

a deal fails, we can see it eroding. 

Let me also make another point. We have a Presidential election 

next year. One of the things that is always pointed out is that a 

new President is not necessarily bound by all the constraints of a 

deal that an administration negotiates. If the new President elected 

in 2016 feels that the Iranians are backtracking or not doing what 

they should be doing, then that President can move in a different 

direction. 

One of the things that really disturbs me about this whole thing, 

and there are plenty of criticisms you can level at the administration or the President or the negotiations or whatever, but I want 

to go back to 2007, because I think there is blame here on a bipartisan basis, quite frankly. In 2007, when President Bush was President, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran told us that Iran 

had abandoned making weapons, and we all thought there would 

be some kind of strike. 

53

We are in this position right now because 10 years ago, 8 years 

ago, 6 years ago, 12 years ago, when we had the ability to really 

destroy Iran’s nuclear capability, we didn’t do it. And so we waited 

till 1 minute to 12, and now it is an impossible situation, because 

they are almost at the breakout point. 

Why didn’t we move sooner? Why didn’t we move during the 

Bush administration when we thought they were going to do something? Why didn’t we move when Iran wasn’t spinning centrifuges, 

and didn’t have the sophisticated centrifuges? What do you think? 

I just think it shows a failure all the way around the political 

spectrum, not one party, everybody, that we failed to grasp the fact 

that this regime, the dangerous regime, poses a threat to us and 

our allies, and there is plenty of blame to go around all the way. 

Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Congressman, I guess the principle observation 

I would make in response to that last question is the military option didn’t look any better in 2006 or 2007 than it does today. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, it looks better because they weren’t as sophisticated. They didn’t have all the centrifuges. It would have been easier to take out their nuclear capability way back when because it 

was a lot smaller. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, it has always been the same problem. You 

can destroy physical things that are on the ground, but you can’t 

destroy technology. And they have the technology, they have the 

blueprints, they can replace——

Mr. ENGEL. That is true, and that is always pointed out by the 

administration when they tell us, well, you can’t destroy technology. But I am saying it was a lot easier years ago when it was 

much smaller and easier to destroy than it is now. I mean, when 

Israel struck at Iraq, Iraq never recovered because their program 

was very, very small. The Iranian program was, obviously, much 

smaller 10 years ago, 6 years ago, than it is now. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The ability to reconstitute was always there. I 

think we could destroy what is on the ground today, but we understand that if we go down that road, we are going to have to come 

back every year or 2. 

Mr. ENGEL. I think their program is much more sophisticated in 

terms of being buried under mountains and things like that, and 

wasn’t necessarily the case 10 years ago. 

Dr. Doran. 

Mr. DORAN. I was in the Bush White House in 2007. And I agree 

with you that there is blame to go around. But I would like to 

share with you some of the thinking at the time, what we thought 

we were doing. 

We looked at it as a disaster if the President got to a point where 

he was faced with the stark choice of either bombing Iran or Iran 

getting a bomb. And we were trying to create a third option, which 

was, I would say, coercive diplomacy. And it was with those 

thoughts in mind that we constructed, on the back of Stuart Levy’s 

insights, the sanctions regime. 

And I think that strategy came to fruition in 2012, 2013, especially with the central bank sanctions, which really did start to 

bite, and you started to see very severe concern in Iran about this. 

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macy approach to the question. And as Chairman Royce mentioned, 

when the regime was actually on the ropes, we let them up and 

made a massive concession to them in the form of a deal that included this sunset clause. 

With the sunset clause, we have sent the world a message that 

we are no longer containing Iran, we are now managing its rise. 

And that has given rise to this—the rush that we see among the 

Europeans to go to prioritize their economic relations with Iran 

over the security concerns of the rest of us, that has actually been 

encouraged by the President’s diplomacy. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I have been—and I am going to end, Mr. Chairman, because I am way over—but, look, I have been as critical as 

many of you about a lot of this stuff. But we were told that the 

Bush administration would never leave office and allow Iran’s capability, nuclear capability, to continue unfettered, and that is actually what happened. 

So I am just pointing out, plenty of blame to go around. I think 

this has been a failure, frankly, in American policy going back a 

couple of decades. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for excellent testimony. 

The only good deal is one in which Iran ceases all enrichment 

and dismantles its nuclear infrastructure. That is the best way, the 

only way to ensure that Iran won’t be able to create a nuclear 

weapon, ever. If a deal is signed based on this framework agreement, that means it allows Iran to keep in place every key element 

of its nuclear infrastructure, preserve its stockpiles of enriched uranium, and keep its equipment and research and development program. 

Not only is this agreement, from what we know, a significant 

step back from what the U.N. Security Council and world powers 

were demanding from Iran just a few years ago—do we remember 

that, do we remember those resolutions?—but it is also significantly weaker than even what the President stated emphatically 

were his lines and his demands, just 11⁄2 years ago. And I have his 

quotes here if we don’t remember. 

We don’t know much about Iran’s possible military dimension. 

That is frightening. And what about the Parchin military facility, 

which was the center of Iran’s weaponization and military program? We need answers on that. But it is clear that the administration is willing to let that fly. 

The Supreme Leader and his puppet Rouhani, because Rouhani 

will only do what the Supreme Leader says, they are saying that 

Iran will only sign the nuclear deal if sanctions are lifted the same 

day. What has the administration offered in terms of sanctions relief and at what scale? We hear a lot of talk about a signing bonus, 

as if it is the NFL draft, of $50 billion before Iran even has to comply with anything. This is beyond irresponsible and incomprehensible. 

55

And can the agreement be verified? In a word, no. The Iranian 

regime still controls access to its sites, and we know how good they 

have been on dodging, on stalling, on misleading, and blocking, and 

there is no reason to believe that they are going to change. Iran 

has said it won’t allow inspections on its military sites. So guess 

what will be happening in its military sites? 

This whole deal is a fanciful notion and is really a disaster waiting to happen for our national security, for our allies in the regions. 

And the sad reality is that the only way we are likely to not get 

this deal is if the Iranians can’t take yes for an answer. 

Similar to the Palestinians and the Israelis, the Israelis were offering them in many of these peace talks everything to the Palestinians. The Palestinians walked away from the deal. We are better off for it. The only way we are not going to get this deal if the 

Iranians walk away. Everything about this deal is my most serious 

concern. 

I wanted to ask you in the little time I have remaining about 

breakout capability. Certainly, 1 year isn’t sufficient. We have had 

many experts tell us it is nearly impossible to even tell when the 

clock begins, and even when it does, it is next to impossible for the 

administration to verify that Iran has started breaking out and 

then send it up to the U.N. Security Council to have that body act. 

Like most everything else related to this deal, it is just a pipe 

dream. 

Is 10 years enough? And what can you tell us about the about 

the breakout capability that we are looking at? 

Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you. And nice to see you again, Congresswoman. 

I have focused a lot of my criticism on the sunset clause, because 

it does essentially give them a radically enhanced breakout capability upon the expiration of the agreement. Even President Obama 

has conceded this. I quoted his statement where he said by the 

13th year of the agreement their breakout time will have—and this 

is President Obama—it will have ‘‘shrunk down almost to zero.’’ 

That is the President. That is the best he can say about his own 

agreement. 

The agreement does include an indefinite prohibition, a 

nonsunsetted prohibition on reprocessing. There are two ways that 

a country can get fissile material for a nuclear weapon, they can 

reprocess spent nuclear fuel, and that gets to plutonium, or it can 

enrich uranium. So they have agreed permanently not to reprocess. 

And that is a very useful, that is an important concession. And 

that one is not sunsetted. But on the enrichment side, which is the 

other pathway to fissile material, it sunsets beginning after 10 

years. 

And what is interesting to me is the Iranians have not hesitated 

to reopen issues in this negotiation. They did it just this week on 

the conventional arms embargo and the U.N. sanctions on ballistic 

missile transfers. That was something that was previously agreed, 

and they have just reopened it and said: No, actually, we don’t like 

the deal we struck a few months ago, we want to renegotiate that. 

I don’t know why the U.S. side isn’t equally tenacious in these 

negotiations. Why doesn’t our team say: You know, this sunset 

56

clause, we have looked at it, it is a problem for us, we need to renegotiate that. The Iranians are doing that today on the arms embargo. Why can’t our negotiators do the same? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I am having a subcommittee hearing with 

Mr. Deutch about the GCC countries and their reaction to a nuclear deal, and several of you were bringing that out. Are they 

going to let Tehran keep its nuclear infrastructure and offer billions of dollars of sanctions relief and they will do nothing? Of 

course, that is not going to be true. So we worry about their reaction to that, and they no longer think that we have their back. 

But thank you. My time is up. 

And I would like to recognize Ms. Robin Kelly of Illinois. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

America’s national security is an issue that those of us trusted 

by the public to serve in Congress must and do take seriously. It 

is going to take all of us on both sides. But I am going to be positive and think that we will get to a deal that most of us can support. I wanted to look forward. 

Saudi Arabia has said that they want the same capabilities as 

Iran if a deal is reached. Jordan and Egypt have hinted the same 

as well. Some have cited these examples as the beginning of a nuclear arms race. How serious do you think the regional actors are 

in pursuing their own nuclear programs? And it is open to all of 

you. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Congresswoman, I think, as I said, we have to 

take that extremely seriously. If you were them and your patron, 

the United States, conducted these negotiations initially without 

even informing them and has shown a shift toward your archenemy, the Iranians, I think you wouldn’t feel that comfortable. 

And therefore I think it would be perfectly natural for these countries to pursue that. 

And I will add, it also complicates the issue of the military action 

and what we do, because, again, going forward, if that is the case, 

what you said, Congresswoman, this issue then regionalizes. It is 

no longer about just a nuclear Iran. It is about what these other 

countries are doing. 

And we have to make sure we act, whatever way it is, to prevent 

this sort of genie spreading and getting out. Because once it gets 

out and a lot of countries have it, as George Shultz and Henry Kissinger raise, as I mentioned, how do you put together a policy that 

actually manages that? And I don’t think you can, is the answer. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. 

Mr. POLLACK. Congresswoman, let me start by disagreeing with 

Mike, but I am going to come around and agree with him at the 

end, if you will follow me. 

I think that the threat of proliferation is a very serious one, but 

we shouldn’t necessarily assume that it is also an uncontrollable 

one. We all remember President Kennedy predicting that there 

would be 25 nuclear powers by 2000. We are still at nine and 

counting. 

Historically, far fewer countries have actually pursued a nuclear 

weapon to its finish and acquired the arsenal than have started 

down that road. Far more stopped along the way. And we have a 

great deal of historical evidence indicating that there are all kinds 

57

of different factors which caused these countries to stop, despite 

the fact that in many cases they do have compelling strategic reasons to acquire them. 

My favorite example is Egypt. I always point out to people, you 

may remember it, although you may be a little too young for this, 

Tom Lehrer, his great song, right, ‘‘Who’s Next?’’ Right? Talking 

about nuclear proliferation. One of his lines was that Egypt wants 

a bomb just to drop on you know who. 

In the 1960s it was so axiomatic that Egypt was going to acquire 

a nuclear weapon that Tom Lehrer put it into a humorous folk 

song. They never got it. And that, again, is the history of this. 

Where I want to agree with Mike is that he is absolutely right 

to focus on the critical variable. The reason that states stop is because they have compelling rationales not to, and because typically 

someone else, almost always the United States, removes the strategic threats. We step in, whether it be with South Korea or Taiwan or Australia, pick your favorite country, and say to them: You 

don’t need it, we will deal with your security problems. 

By the way, I just want to echo, Steve Rademaker is absolutely 

right to be focusing on the sunset clause. That is the most problematic aspect of this. It is the biggest unknown. It is the area where 

I think that we can have the greatest sympathy for our allies, particularly the Saudis. I will be honest, I am not worried about anybody else in the Middle East. I think the Saudis’ proliferating is 

a very significant issue. 

But I think that it is also very susceptible to what we do. It 

would be hard for the Saudis to proliferate. It seems clear the Pakistanis are not simply going to sell them a bomb. They do not have 

the scientific infrastructure to build one easily. 

I think that there are lots of opportunities for the United States 

to step in and convince the Saudis they don’t need to do so. But, 

again, that is why I focused my remarks on the importance of this 

regional context and on the United States remaining engaged, not 

walking away. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Could I just add one thing on that? Ken brings 

up a good point. I will just say, one of those countries was Ukraine. 

And they gave up their nukes with the Budapest agreement in 

1994 based on assurances from the United States, the Russians, 

and the British that their sovereignty will be maintained. As we 

all have seen, of course, over the last 11⁄2 years, those assurances 

were not honored, and that is, obviously, an incentive for other 

countries not to repeat the mistake the Ukrainians made. 

Mr. DORAN. If I could just add one point. One of the arguments 

that is being made—Ken didn’t make that argument, but he was 

moving in that direction—is that a nuclear guarantee from the 

United States would solve the problem. And I think that that is 

just wrong, because when the Saudis look at the whole nuclear 

question, they are not simply trying to match Iranian capability in 

a symmetric fashion. 

One of the reasons why the Saudis would want to bomb is in 

order to get leverage over the United States, because they no 

longer trust the United States. Similar to what the French did 

when they developed their own independent nuclear capability so 

that they could negotiate with NATO about NATO’s security policy. 

58

So the fact that we are willing to—first of all, I have doubts 

about our own willingness to actually extend the nuclear umbrella 

to the Saudis, but I don’t believe that they would feel secure at all 

because of that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE [presiding]. We will go now to Chris Smith of 

New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling 

this, again, timely and important hearing. 

Welcome to our witnesses. 

Based on the outlines of the deal as we know it, President 

Obama’s rush to sign what appears to be an egregiously flawed nuclear deal with Iran may make war more, not less likely, may trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, and surely makes Israel and 

our other friends and allies in the region and the United States 

itself less safe. 

A sunset clause is one, but this deal appears to be riddled with 

Achilles’ heels. And I think we will wake up too late to that fact 

because of this rush. It ought to be self-evident that any nuclear 

agreement must bar every Iranian path to nuclear weapons. This 

deal must last for decades, not for 15 years or whatever the sunset 

provision turns out to be. Iran must be compelled to dismantle its 

current nuclear infrastructure, not merely disconnect centrifuges, 

no enrichment. 

And my friend and colleague from Florida, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, 

was right, all of the previous admonishments from the U.N. and 

Security Council resolutions were no enrichment. That is off the 

table now. IAEA inspectors must have unfettered access to any and 

all suspected sites, including military installations. 

What a theater of the absurd when during these negotiations 

high-level people from the very top say: No access to nuclear inspections on military installations. I mean, that is where they will 

put them. 

And let me also ask our distinguished panelists, if there is no 

deal, or if Iran fails to live up to a deal, say Congress were to go 

along with it, what happens when they fail to live up to it, which 

I think we can almost predict with near certainty will be the case. 

We are in a position of worldwide comprehensive sanctions. Will 

they happen? Or will that coalition, is it being dismantled even as 

we talk? Again, there shouldn’t be a lifeline to China for oil, which 

kept Tehran afloat. 

Secretary Rademaker, you bring up a number of great points 

about the cascade of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, 

which I think is the next step. How can they not build up their own 

deterrence capability in light of an aggressive country like Iran? 

And I thought your including Thomas Friedman’s comments 

about ‘‘it is stunning to me how well the Iranians, sitting alone on 

their side of the table, have played a weak hand against the United 

States, Russia, China, France, Germany, and Britain on their side 

of the table. When the time comes, I am hiring Ali Khamenei to 

sell my house. . . .’’ And you talk about how—quoting him—how 

they should have walked out, say: That is it, there are some bright 

lines. I mean, the future of millions of people’s lives—and what is 

worse than nuclear bombs—hang in the balance. 

59

And let me also finally ask about, given Iran’s long history of 

supporting terrorist organizations, what is to restrain them from 

selling materials for dirty bombs to other rogue or to other terrorist 

organizations? 

And, again, we still have four Americans, including Saeed 

Abedini, being cruelly mistreated while all of this is going on. I 

have chaired, myself, two hearings. The chairman had a hearing 

with relatives from each of the four. That too just begs the question 

of who it is that we are really dealing with. And as you said, the 

whole idea of those sanctions, especially when we went after the 

bank, that had a bite, and it should have had a longer bite to get 

a better deal. 

Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Congressman, you make many great points, 

and I can’t possibly respond to all of them. But on the Thomas 

Friedman piece, I excerpted from it in my testimony. I mean, he 

makes the very insightful point that the Iranians have been much 

more effective negotiators, just as a technical matter, advancing 

their interests, refusing to budge, basically approaching these negotiations with the perspective of the United States and its allies 

need this agreement more than we do. 

And Friedman points out, that is just fundamentally not true. 

Iran needs this more than we do. But the psychology of this negotiation is the opposite and the Iranians have taken full advantage 

of that. And I am with Tom Friedman, I want Khamenei to sell my 

house too, because he has proven a very effective negotiator. 

I don’t know why our team can’t be as effective as they are. Just 

this week—I made this point already, but I want to reiterate it—

just this week the Iranians reopened an issue that was agreed to 

previously. It had been agreed that the U.N. Security Council 

would leave in place the sanctions on ballistic missile transfers and 

on conventional arms transfers. That is in the April 2 State Department fact sheet. It just says these will be kept in place by the 

U.N. The Iranians here at the very end say: Oh, you know, actually, we want to change that, it is disadvantageous to us, we want 

to change it. 

I don’t know how that is going to come out. I really worry, 

though, that you are going to see some backsliding. 

Why is it that only the Iranians can reopen issues? It seems to 

be consensus in this room that the sunset clause is a disaster, 

okay, it is just disastrous for our interests. It scares our allies. Why 

can’t our negotiators reopen that issue? Why can’t they say: Hey, 

we still want a deal, but, hey, Iran, you agreed to an indefinite 

band on reprocessing of spent fuel, okay, so you can’t—I mean, this 

thing doesn’t have to sunset, you have agreed to some restrictions 

that are of indefinite duration. 

We need that not just on plutonium. We also need that on enriched uranium. Let’s go sit down and talk about that. 

Mr. Engel, you made the point, what are the alternatives? I don’t 

know that we need to walk away from the table. I mean, I think 

we can negotiate as aggressively as the Iranians are negotiating 

this week, reopening issues that were previously agreed. Why can’t 

we do that? 

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Mr. MAKOVSKY. If I may add a point, Congressman, just to add 

to your point. I am not in a rush to hire the Supreme Leader as 

a real estate agent. But I think it is just more, frankly, that we 

have played an extremely strong hand unbelievably weakly. 

In fact, historically, if you look back, obviously, Munich, people 

always cite Munich as always one of the worst diplomatic blunders 

in 1938. But in fairness to Neville Chamberlain, the Germans were 

a rising power, the British needed to rearm their RAF and so on, 

and they had no historical connections to Czechoslovakia. 

We, on the other hand, have longstanding interests. We are a superpower. If we wanted to, we could certainly deliver an incredible 

military blow to the Iranians. We are the superpower, yet we are 

acting more like a supplicant. 

And it gets to your first point, Mr. Congressman. You asked, 

what if they violate it? I will just cite a Washington Post editorial 

this week where they talked about the warped proclivity of the administration to respond to questions about Iran’s performance by 

attacking those who raise them. 

And the Iranians have violated the Joint Plan of Action, and 

each time it has been raised, including recent weeks about the oxidation issue, the administration not only has defended the Iranians 

or not reported it, but they have attacked, like, David Albright and 

others who have actually brought it to our attention. 

So I fear that they will violate, as long as this administration is 

in power, they will try to minimize it or hide it or defend it, because then it will admit failure of their policy. So I think if they 

violate it, we will have to wait till the next President for that to 

be addressed more fully. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Dr. Ami Bera of California. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member. And 

I thank the panelists as well. 

I am going to reserve judgment on a final deal until we actually 

see what is in that final deal. But my starting point and my concern is, I don’t trust Iran. Right? In any final deal, verification has 

to be the starting point. I just don’t know how you verify if you 

don’t have unfettered access to places. 

And, again, if you don’t have that verification, as the chairman 

stated, there should be no signing bonus, right? I mean, you don’t 

get a bonus just for signing the deal. You get a bonus after adhering to the terms of the deal, verifying that, and then over time perhaps you can gain trust. And that is what has me concerned. 

I also have very legitimate concerns that as Iran’s economy 

strengthens, what they do with that strength in terms of—many of 

the members, the ranking member and the chairman, have talked 

about the funding of terrorism, the funding of Hamas and 

Hezbollah, and that is a real concern. If we look at the nature of 

the Middle East and how things are changing dramatically, you 

can see a scenario where a revitalized Iran, a Shia-dominated Iraq, 

an Assad who stays in place, Hezbollah and Hamas creating this 

ring around our allies. And even without nuclear weapons, we see 

a very unstable Middle East, where I would never have thought 

that Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, the unlikeliest of allies, 

might actually ally against a common threat. 

61

I certainly would be curious about this scenario, even without acquiring nuclear weapons, what a revitalized Iranian economy 

would look like and how they would use those. 

Maybe, Mr. Rademaker, if you would like to. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think it is clear that a lot of our friends, in 

fact, I think all of our friends in the region are concerned precisely 

about that, that this deal represents a shift in the balance of power 

and acquiescence by the United States to that shift. And it puts the 

question in their laps, what do they do? And some of my copanelists have commented on that. 

But the signing bonus, $100 billion, $150 billion, the estimates 

vary, but when I testified here about 2 months ago I pointed out 

that their national budget, their government budget, is $300 billion 

a year. So this is somewhere between a third and half the amount 

of money that their government spends every year. 

If somebody were offering to hand that much cash to the United 

States Government, it would be Christmas Day and our birthday 

and every other holiday all wrapped up in one. I mean, you can 

imagine the kinds of proposals that would elicit about what we 

could do both domestically, but also in terms of foreign policy. With 

that kind of money, would we feel like we would need to retrench, 

or would we feel like we could be more assertive internationally? 

It is not just the amount of money, it is the amount of money 

relative to the size of the Iranian economy. 

Mr. BERA. Dr. Pollack, would you like to? 

Mr. POLLACK. Thank you very much, Congressman. 

I would start by saying that I tend to find myself very close to 

where Congressman Engel is, in fact, perhaps exactly where Congressman Engel is about this deal, which is to say that I think that 

we could have gotten a much better one. I wish that we had. I 

think that the chairman was actually summarizing my remarks at 

the beginning about the deal that we should have been shooting 

for. 

And I agree that I think we had a much better chance of getting 

it, in part because—I want to give the administration credit—the 

administration did a great job getting the Iranians to the table, 

building that international coalition, putting in sanctions much better than I expected. But I agree, I was very disappointed in the 

way that they have handled the negotiations. 

But it is why I think that your points about the region become 

more and more important. I think that this is the deal that we are 

going to get. What it will look like, like Steve, I suspect it will be 

at least more or less close to the framework agreement. That will 

not be the deal that I wanted, but it may be better than the alternatives. In fact, I suspect it is, and glad to talk about that more 

if you want to. 

But the point that I really wanted to make is that I think that 

we need to be thinking about this regional issue. That is the point 

I keep harping on. 

And I hear Dr. Doran tried to put words in my mouth. I am now 

going to take them out and give them back to him. I don’t believe 

that American guarantees right now are going to be enough for our 

allies in the region. I think that they are going to want to see action. That is what was lacking in Camp David. I think they need 

62

to see us pushing back on the Iranians. And, quite frankly, I think 

the Iranians need to see us pushing back on them in the region as 

well. If we don’t, I think they are going to assume that we are 

going to use this deal as a get-out-of-the-Middle-East-free card and 

walk away. 

That being the case, I think we need to think hard about where 

we do push back on them, and my candidate for that is Syria. Iraq 

is much too fragile. The Iranians have far too much influence. If 

we fight the Iranians over Iraq, we will break it, and we cannot 

afford that. Yemen is the wrong place. We shouldn’t be getting into 

Yemen. We should be helping our allies to get out of it. 

Syria is the place that makes the most sense. Iran has interests 

there. They are not all-consuming as in Iraq. We have important 

allies. We have regional states that want us to do so. There are 

clearly ways to handle Syria differently. 

And, in fact, I will just close by saying, the policy that the President and that Chairman Dempsey outlined in September of last 

year is a perfectly reasonable, functional policy. It is exactly the 

policy I think we ought to be pursuing. The problem is we have 

walked away from it. In the context of a deal, I hope that the administration will go back to that policy and actually make it work. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Dr. Pollack. 

Chairman ROYCE. I think we are out of time. 

Shall we go to Joe Wilson, South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here today on this extraordinarily 

important situation that is developing. And amazingly enough, I 

share the concerns expressed by the editorial of The Washington 

Post. To quote the Washington Post, and I quote, I want to quote 

it correctly:

‘‘If it is reached in the coming days, a nuclear deal with Iran 

will be, at best, an unsatisfying and risky compromise. Iran’s 

emergence as a threshold nuclear power with the ability to 

produce a weapon quickly will not be prevented. It will be postponed by 10 to 15 years. In exchange, Tehran will reap hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief it can use to revive its economy and fund the wars it is waging around the 

Middle East.’’

And, Dr. Makovsky, I sadly agree so much. This is worse than 

Munich. There might have been, as you were indicating, an explanation for Neville Chamberlain’s actions. But I am just very concerned. The President’s actions, the weakness that is being exhibited, is just bizarre. And for a President who has been fixated, 

properly, on not having nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle 

East, it is creating a legacy of proliferation. 

With that in mind, what are the consequences for regional stability if the administration does cave in to Iranian demands? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Thank you, Congressman. By the way, I wasn’t 

here to justify Neville Chamberlain’s actions. I was just trying to 

explain them. 

Mr. WILSON. You were showing a differentiation. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Right. Exactly. 

63

I agree. I think the Washington Post editorial this week, I 

thought was excellent, and I commend you for quoting that. I think 

that I agree that this will—we talk about alternatives to the deal, 

as Ranking Member Engel is raising. I think these are bad choices, 

so you have got to figure out what is the least terrible choice, and 

there are going to be bad alternatives all around, there is no question about it. 

So I think, again, one of the worst consequences of this deal—

not the alternative—a consequence is rising tension in the region. 

When you have a weaker United States, I think we all agree on 

that, all the panelists agree that without a strong United States 

with credibility, the countries are going to take a lot of actions into 

their own hand, including on the nuclear front. 

And, again, there is just going to be rising tension and a greater 

risk—I am not predicting it—but not only a major conventional 

war, but possibly at some point of a conflict, whether intentionally 

or through miscalculation, a nuclear conflict in the region because 

there will be a lot more countries with nuclear weapons, and it 

could draw us in as well. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate you raising the concern. 

And, Dr. Doran, Mr. Rademaker, in a prior hearing, a former 

U.N. weapons inspector discussed the strategy that Saddam Hussein used to evade inspectors, both on the ground in Iraq and at 

the U.N., noting that ‘‘The inspectors reported they could do little 

of their job under the conditions Iraq permitted them to operate.’’

Do you fear a similar outcome with Iran? Given the Iraq experience, what roadblocks do you anticipate inspectors would face, both 

on the ground and at the U.N.? 

Mr. DORAN. I think that, as Steve pointed out, the Iranians keep 

reopening the issues. And we need to understand that behind that 

is their radical ideology of wanting to overturn the international 

system, which they regard as completely unjust. They don’t ever 

feel bound—what I am trying to say is that their attitude toward 

this negotiation is indicative of a mindset where they don’t feel 

bound by any commitment that they make to us because they feel 

that we represent an unjust system to begin with. 

So I think that we can expect them to cheat at every opportunity. 

I think we can expect them to impede us at every opportunity. And 

I think that even if they came to this with good will, which they 

don’t have, the system itself is one that is based on distrust and 

a coercive dictatorship. And so there isn’t a culture of transparency 

and openness in it to begin with. We are being promised unprecedented openness and access and so on. The system itself just can’t 

deliver that. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Congressman, there is a long, long history of 

determined aggressor states, determined cheaters flummoxing 

international inspectors. There is a wonderful Winston Churchill 

quote. I don’t have it in front of me, but it is an absolutely wonderful quote describing how Hitler completely flummoxed the League 

of Nations weapons inspectors who, prior to World War II, had the 

mandate of inspecting whether Nazi Germany was deploying certain prohibited weapons in the Rhineland. And Hitler just ran circles around them, because he stumped them. 

64

You mentioned the example of Iraq. I am speaking here as a 

legal matter. I was a commissioner of UNSCOM, which was the 

U.N. weapons inspection organization for Iraq. The legal authorities given to UNSCOM by the U.N. Security Council were vastly 

stronger than anything that the inspectors are going to have in 

Iran and anything that is under discussion. Iraq was a defeated 

state. Saddam Hussein had been defeated in the first gulf war. 

The U.N. imposed a highly intrusive weapons inspection mechanism on him, and he still ran circles around it. And they had, talk 

about anywhere/anytime access, I mean, those guys could bust 

down doors, they could go anywhere they wanted; seize computers. 

I mean, it is inconceivable that the inspectors in Iran are going to 

have the same sort of legal authorities. 

Saddam Hussein was still able to conceal things from them. I 

mean, if the Iranians wish to conceal, they are going to have ample 

opportunity to do that under any imaginable inspection mechanism. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you all. And, again, our concern too for the 

people of the Iran. And so I am just hoping that, indeed, the President will change course. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Gerry Connolly of 

Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Rademaker, I am not sure where you are going with that. 

By the way, the rearmament in Germany in World War II, as a 

student of history myself, I mean, had a lot more to do than Hitler 

running circles around inspectors. It had a lot more to do with the 

fact that the West was just tired and was not going to challenge 

them. Thus the reoccupation of the Rhineland and the remilitarization, they knew what was happening. He wasn’t hiding the fact he 

was rebuilding an air force and expanding the military with universal conscription and the like, and, clearly, the Ruhr was up and 

running. 

I mean, these were not secrets that were kept from inspectors. 

It was actually about political will. It was about whether you are 

going to turn a blind eye to all of that because you were weary of 

war. And World War I had been so traumatic, especially in France 

and Britain, that hopefully, wishful thinking would make it all go 

away, or there would be some modus vivendi we could all accept. 

They were wrong. Churchill on that one was right. He was wrong 

on most everything else, but he was right about that. 

But what is it you are proposing? Should we therefore say we 

shouldn’t have an inspections regime, we shouldn’t have the ability 

to evaluate, because it is fruitless, people can run rings around 

them? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Congressman, I was nearly responding to Congressman Wilson’s question about whether we should take—what 

conclusions we should draw from the Iraq experience. And the Iraq 

experience was that, even with highly intrusive inspection authorities, it is possible for determined cheaters to withhold information. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I understand. But where does that take us? Does 

that mean we should give up on—we shouldn’t even bother because 

they can run rings around us? 

65

Mr. RADEMAKER. I mean, it is a fair question. I think where it 

takes you is you negotiate to get the robust legal authority you can 

possibly get, you exercise that authority, but you still have to view 

the results with skepticism. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. With skepticism. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Because it is possible for a determined cheater. 

And Iran has a long record of secretly proceeding with nuclear development activities that are only exposed by exile groups or foreign intelligence agencies. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. So we just have to approach the Iranians with 

great skepticism given their track record. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. There seems to be precedent for it in the region. 

Mr. Makovsky, did you want to comment? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Just a quick thing, Mr. Congressman, just on 

that. I think the inspection issue that Steve raised is just further 

challenged by the fact that we are permitting in this emerging 

deal, based on what we know, an extensive infrastructure in Iran 

to remain in place. If we had demanded a U.N. Security Council 

resolution, like our policy had been until a couple years ago, a complete dismantlement of their infrastructure, it would have made inspections easier. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Makovsky, unfortunately, my time is limited. 

I agree with you, but I want to come back to Eliot Engel’s question. 

What is the alternative? 

The fact of the matter is we allowed this drift for 8 years. The 

previous administration, we started out with a handful of centrifuges, now we have 15,000, 16,000. They have hardened processing plants. They have significantly increased the amount of enriched uranium and other fissible material. And so we are where 

we are. 

I wish we had done all of that, like Mr. Engel was saying, a long 

time ago so that we would have stopped it dead in its track. The 

Israelis could have done it too before things got hardened. Now 

they can’t do it without us, not efficaciously. But if you turn the 

clock back, Prime Minister Netanyahu thought it was such an existential threat, why didn’t he do then what Israel had done in Syria 

and had done in Iraq? Why did he not take the kinetic option, one 

wonders. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I think it is an excellent point that you should 

raise to him when you see him. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I will. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. But I would say that I wouldn’t discount, although many I think in Washington and certainly the administration believe the Israelis will no longer strike. I think there is still 

a decent likelihood that they still will at the last moment, that they 

feel compelled to, because they will feel no alternative. I am not 

predicting it, I am just saying——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. And that could also be a consequence of this 

deal. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, one wonders, because they have had that 

option before and things got worse, not better. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. That is right. 

66

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me just ask a final question of you, Mr. 

Makovsky. You indicated, and it is a perfectly fair proposition, that 

when you look at the military option versus a negotiated deal that 

may or may not be cheated against and so forth, maybe the military option actually is better. But we are going to have General 

Hayden here I think next week who has said if you exercise the 

military option, all it will do is accelerate the nuclear development 

in Iran and now you have no leverage, the West has no leverage. 

And unless you are prepared to do it every 2 years. And, of course, 

we are not even talking about diplomatic and terrorists and all 

kinds of other ancillary consequences that may flow from that. 

Is that a fair proposition too, that actually, despite what we desire, the opposite could happen? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Very possible. I wasn’t trying to say that it is a 

slam dunk, to use a common phrase, a famous phrase. I am just 

trying to give you the other side, is what I am trying to say. I have 

also spoken to Air Force generals and others who believe that actually we do have a viable strike. It has always been our policy, by 

the way, that we do have this capability, and it is possible that 

they could race. But it is also very possible—but I also think it is 

more likely that if they do—if we agree to a deal that allows them 

to get nuclear weapons at some point, that other countries in the 

region are going to race to it before that even happens. 

So I think that is even a more likely outcome than you mentioned about the Iranians racing to a bomb. I think we can feel 

very confident other countries will get nuclear weapons if we don’t 

stop this before it spreads in the region by whatever means. But 

there are bad consequences to anything we do here, there is no 

question about it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, but it brings me back—and I will end with 

this, Mr. Chairman—but it brings us back to the ultimate proposition. We have got many unattractive options in front of us. The 

question is a negotiated deal that keeps the P5+1 together and that 

rolls back and freezes in place their nuclear development program 

for a period of time, we hope it can be renewed, versus exercising, 

saying, we give up on all that, we are going to exercise a military 

option and hope for the best. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Well, I think if you—you are together, but together in a terrible arrangement that is going to cause a lot more 

problems. I don’t think that is a positive end. And I am not saying 

necessarily that we have to turn to a military option, but unless 

we at a minimum have a very credible one and ratchet up the sanctions, which I believe we could do, certainly with the oil market the 

way it is, I think if we did that, there is a chance of a better deal. 

But, again, I think we shouldn’t just think about alternatives, we 

have to think about consequences. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Connolly. 

Now we go to Mr. Darrell Issa of California. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. 

Well, I am going to pick up where Mr. Connolly left off, but he 

won’t be surprised there may be a slight twist on how I hold the 

blade. 

67

Mr. Rademaker, let me understand a premise that I think you 

have here, and tell me if I am off, the question of do we take the 

deal or don’t take the deal. The fact is, if the deal is to allow the 

equivalent of the entire World War II Luftwaffe sitting on the 

ground with the promise that although the fuel tanks are right 

next to the planes, they won’t fully load the planes and the bombs 

for 10 years, that is kind of where we are. We are letting them 

have all the weapon of war, the launch systems, the missiles, the 

fissile material. What we are saying is, the time it takes to load 

these aircraft and get them in the air is what we are counting on. 

Isn’t that sort of the equivalent? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yeah, I think that is a pretty good analogy. The 

administration is saying, today they could load one plane with one 

bomb in 2 to 3 months, and we want to extend that to 1 year for 

the next 10 years, but then after that it would be an entire fleet 

that they can load with dozens of bombs, and we will worry about 

that in 10 years. 

And the question is, is that sort of a wise—I mean, if you are 

worried about the next 10 years, yeah, you have improved your situation for 10 years, but beyond that a vastly worse situation. And 

then if you want to do something about that in 10 years, you face 

the additional problem that the other side will say: But you are violating your agreements. You promised. 

Mr. ISSA. The French, I think, said that for several hours in the 

beginning of World War II. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Right. It got them a long way, didn’t it? 

Mr. ISSA. Dr. Makovsky, I saw your head shaking yes, so I will 

take you next for obvious reasons. 

But, Doctor, if we go, I think, to Mr. Rademaker’s assumption, 

which is that trying to inspect a fleet of weapons of war and make 

sure they are not quite loaded and ready to fire at us, changing 

that to these weapons of war, you need to dispel them, you need 

to be away from them, you cannot have those, which was a position—and this is where Mr. Connolly, I am sorry he left. 

The Bush administration said, you can’t have weapons of war, 

and they were playing with the no 20 percent, no enrichment, no 

enriched there. Aren’t we playing now only this last-minute game? 

And if so, does or can we get the world—and we are not talking 

about Israel, we are not talking about the United States, we are 

talking about mostly Europe—can we get them back to a point of 

understanding that the only way to have a verifiable deal is to 

have a deal in which there is zero tolerance for these weapons or 

near weapons of war? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. It is a good question, Mr. Congressman. Look, 

obviously, where we are, you are right. I guess, if we had to use 

a baseball analogy, we might be in the bottom of the ninth, I still 

believe with one strike left you still have a chance sometimes to 

win a ballgame, and I wouldn’t want to give anything up. In fact, 

I am from St. Louis. That is exactly what we did in the 2011 World 

Series. And I would say that——

Mr. ISSA. I am a Clevelander. We cite all different years. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I apologize for that. 

But I think we shouldn’t underestimate—Ranking Member Engel 

had raised this before—we shouldn’t underestimate two things. 

68

That American leadership, it is your body, Congress, which led on 

sanctions, and that the administration on some issues, and this 

committee, certainly, Mr. Chairman and the ranking member, you 

guys led on sanctions on banking, on a lot of things, and you got 

the world to go around with you. And by the way, the odds were 

great on that. 

And I think that if there is a deal concluded and there is an overwhelming majority of the Members of Congress that oppose this 

deal, I think it sends a strong signal, and I think there is still a 

chance, then. 

Mr. ISSA. So if I am going to summarize—and, Dr. Pollack, I 

want to hear from you for a moment, because we have given you 

a pass, and you need to get back to work—the fact is, we are negotiating a deal that is not verifiable, sustainable, and reliable, and 

it is not nearly the kind of oversight that we had against Saddam 

when, in fact, Saddam was shipping millions, hundreds of millions 

of gallons and barrels of oil, not even including the weapons program. It is very hard to take a large independent country and supervise it. 

Dr. Pollack, getting back to something that is verifiable, that 

makes sense, that can, in fact, be restrained, how do you see us 

getting from where we are—let’s assume for a moment that Congress rejects a deal or that the President doesn’t come up with 

one—how do you see us getting to one that the other gentlemen at 

the table could support as defendable and verifiable? 

Mr. POLLACK. Can my answer include the building of a time machine, Congressman? 

Mr. ISSA. Yeah. Go for it. 

Mr. POLLACK. That was a joke. 

I am in agreement with all of my panelists. I think the administration did very well in getting the Iranians to the table. I give 

them a lot of credit for that. As I said, I have been disappointed 

in how they have handled the negotiations. 

I think that it is theoretically possible perhaps to get a stronger 

deal even from where we are now. I think that it would require a 

willingness on the part of the United States to walk away from the 

table, but also to be able to make the case to our allies—and I 

think we have certainly got a number of them already onboard—

and our co-negotiators in the P5+1 that what we are talking about 

now is simply a far cry from what is reasonable for us to accept. 

That will be hard, because of how much history we have. We 

have gone this far, and, frankly, a number of the other P5+1 countries, I think, have been surprised at how willing the United States 

has been over the course of the last year to make some of these 

concessions that the Iranians wanted. It will be difficult to roll that 

back. Perhaps not impossible, but difficult. 

But, again, my read of history, Congressman, is that it requires 

a remarkable degree of leadership to fundamentally change course 

on an issue where we have gone so far down the road, and I am 

skeptical that that is going to happen. I suspect that we are going 

to get a deal very much like the one that is being talked about, one 

more or less like the framework agreements. 

And, unfortunately, I find myself much more in agreement with 

Congressman Engel, which is that I wish we weren’t here. It is a 

69

much weaker deal than I think we could have had. But, nevertheless, I still suspect—and as I said, I want to reserve judgment until 

I actually see it—I still suspect that it will be better than the alternatives, because as Congressman Engel and Congress Connolly 

pointed out, those alternatives are even worse. 

Mr. ISSA. So we are going to take the Chamberlain deal, even 

though it is not the deal we should have, because it is the best deal 

he came back with? 

Mr. POLLACK. I would object, obviously, to the analogy, sir. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. We are going to go to Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. I would ask the witnesses to give your advice 

to Congress. We want to control foreign policy, all of us in this 

room, one way or another. You would like to be advising the President. The President isn’t listening to you. You at least have us. If 

you compare him to Neville Chamberlain, he certainly isn’t listening to you. But whatever is going to happen in Vienna in the next 

12 hours is going to happen. 

So you posit a world in which we walk away from a bad deal, 

we sign a good, we do this. The President is going to do what he 

is going to do, and he isn’t going to listen to us in the next 12 

hours. 

So your advice to us has to be: What should Congress do? Not 

in some mythical world where Dr. Pollack has a time machine, not 

in some mythical world where Ronald Reagan is resurrected and 

is the President of the United States on the day we vote on the 

deal, but rather what do we do if the President says, ‘‘This a reasonable deal, Iran has signed a reasonable deal, and Congress is 

being unreasonable’’? Do we go on a codel to Rome, convince the 

Italians to prevent Eni from doing business with Iran on a very 

profitable basis, because, although the President thinks it is a good 

idea for them to make the profits, some of us think it is a bad idea? 

I don’t know if any of you want to join us on that codel. I don’t 

think we would be successful. I realize you have comments, but I 

have got a limited amount of time. 

I do want to set the record straight. The Bush administration refused to have sanctions on Iran. We passed a lot of them out of this 

committee. He blocked them in the United States Senate. And the 

Iran Sanctions Act was disregarded and violated again and again. 

I join with Dr. Pollack in a fear that this is all about a pivot out 

of the Middle East. The Middle East is frustrating. Confrontation 

with China is exciting. The Middle East has un-uniformed terrorists. Confrontation with China over islands, that is the kind of war 

we have had great glory in, especially if we don’t wage it, but rather just confront and win it the way we won the war against the 

Soviet Union. 

And right now everything that the Pentagon is doing is figuring 

out a way to take money away from any forces that might be useful 

in the Middle East and design new weapons to shoot down Chinese 

planes over islands—no, they are really just rocks—that don’t have 

any oil, but if they had any oil, the oil would belong to Japan, 

which by the way, is spending almost nothing on its national defense. That is where we are pivoting to. 

70

This deal needs to be looked at in several phases. The first phase 

is that first year, where it has good and bad points. We get the 

stockpiles out of Iran, we get two-thirds of the centrifuges 

mothballed. And then, as Mr. Rademaker points out, you get to 

year 12 where it is an absolute disaster. So you have the good, the 

bad, and the ugly. 

The good is those centrifuges and stockpiles. The bad is that they 

get that $120 billion-plus signing bonus, which they will use for 

butter, which they will use for graft, they are very good at that, 

which they will use to kill Sunnis, some of whom deserve to be 

killed and some of whom definitely do not, and the remainder they 

will use to attack Israel and the United States. 

But the issue before us is: What do we do as a Congress? And 

we actually shouldn’t just say we—it is a very sophisticated question, because we have three possible votes. Do we vote to approve? 

Do we vote to disapprove? Do we vote to override a Presidential 

veto of a disapproval resolution? Those are three very different 

votes. And since the President isn’t listening, perhaps you can give 

advice to us as to how we handle those three circumstances. 

The first one is so easy, I won’t ask the question, should we vote 

to approve? If we vote to approve then we have to the greatest extent possible locked the United States into a deal which in year 12 

is a nuclear Iran. So we shouldn’t do that. The question is, maybe 

we should vote to disapprove. 

The question is, do we override a veto? If we override that veto, 

then those stockpiles are not shipped out of the country, those centrifuges are not mothballed, and we go to war with Iran in which 

Congress versus Tehran with the White House on one side or the 

other, I am not sure. 

If the President is telling the world that Iran has signed a reasonable deal and deserves sanctions relief, what should Congress 

do? Dr. Pollack. 

Mr. POLLACK. I was afraid you were going to call on me, Congressman. 

First point, I think the time for Congress to make a difference 

is now, before the deal gets presented, because I think that once 

the deal is in hand, it is going to be very, very——

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Pollack, you don’t have the time machine. The 

President gave his final instructions to his negotiators hours ago. 

No one in Vienna is watching this presentation right now. If they 

are, it is such a junior level foreign service officer that they are not 

being listened to. If the President heard from Congress or from you 

or from me, that was prior to this moment. No time machines. 

Mr. POLLACK. I agree with you, Congressman. But if for some 

reason we can’t come to agreement and we do——

Mr. SHERMAN. We will bring you back for that advice. Assume 

a deal is announced in 12 hours and it goes online——

Mr. POLLACK. I come back to the point that you and Congressman Engel and Congressman Connolly make, I think the deal is 

disappointing, but I certainly wouldn’t—I would not advise you to 

override the veto because, again, I think that the alternatives are 

worse than this. But I do want to come back to the point——

71

Mr. SHERMAN. I wish you wouldn’t say ‘‘this,’’ because it is really 

three deals. It is the first year, it is the middle year, it is the 12th 

year. 

Mr. POLLACK. We don’t know exactly what the deal is going to 

look like. But if we assume that it is——

Mr. SHERMAN. The 12th year is ugly. We have got to override the 

deal by then. 

Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. If the final deal looks like what we have been 

told it will look like, my advice to the Congress is use its independent judgment. The President can say he thinks it is a reasonable deal. But I think Congress needs to look at it independently——

Mr. SHERMAN. We——

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. Dispassionately. I am not a Member of Congress, but if I were looking at that detail, I would have 

to vote no on it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Remember, we have got three separate votes. Obviously, if there is a resolution to vote for approval, you and I, and 

I think just about everybody, are going to vote no. If that is the 

advice you are giving us, you are giving us advice on an easy question. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I don’t know whether in the Republican-controlled House a resolution of approval is actually going to be put 

forward. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It will be put forward if the Speaker thinks it will 

be a good idea. And he will be getting advice from our chairman. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. But if it is a resolution of disapproval, you 

know, my recommendation would be a no vote. We hear that the 

alternatives are worse. And it is usually described as either this 

deal or war. We have all these——

Mr. SHERMAN. No, no, no, no. With this President, you don’t get 

war. This President isn’t going to say: Oh, Congress was right; I 

was wrong. I am bombing. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. But the point I want to make to you is you have 

all these wise men who, including President Obama’s former Iran 

advisers, who are saying: Well, actually, it could be this deal and 

the war. And, in fact, Congress should vote to authorize use of force 

in the event not of Iranian cheating but actually in the event that 

Iran exercises some of the rights that are going to be granted to 

it under this agreement. That is what they say. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That would be—I am not sure that is actually 

what they are proposing, knowing those individuals. But I think 

my time has expired. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I can read you the language. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But it is interesting, yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I quote it in my testimony. 

Mr. WILSON [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

We now proceed to Congressman Ted Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here. 

72

If I understand, the policy of the U.S. goes back all the way to 

the Carter administration, that, as you said, Mr. Doran—or is it 

Doran? 

Mr. DORAN. The Irish say Doran. I say Doran. So I go by either. 

Mr. POE. To, the U.S. is going to be the guarantor of stability in 

the Middle East region. Is that a fair statement of what you said? 

Mr. DORAN. Yes. 

Mr. POE. And the Carter doctrine, as Mr. Rademaker talked 

about, was that the United States is committed to making sure 

that the Persian Gulf region is safe from outside influence, even 

using military force if necessary, something to that effect. As I see 

this whole situation, at the end of the day, the deal will be Iran 

will get nuclear weapons. They are also developing an intercontinental ballistic missiles, as we all know, to send nukes, not conventional weapons or bombs, in them. 

At the end of the day, the deal will be that they will be able to 

export all of the oil that they have, oil revenue that is used, in my 

opinion, to fund their terrorist enterprises throughout the world 

since Iran is the number one terrorist sponsoring state in the 

world. What a deal this is. I mean, we are not dealing with nice 

people or honest people. The United States and the West is blissfully ignorant of who we are dealing with. We are dealing with a 

snake oil salesman, and he is going to be able to sell us the snake 

oil. And we are going to buy it and say we won because we got a 

deal. 

The Ayatollah has said as recently as March, if I can find the 

quote, it is just three words, ‘‘Death to America.’’ Now, I don’t think 

he is going to change his mind about being the Supreme Leader 

and about his policy that he wants us all to die: Death to America. 

This is a very, very serious crisis that is taking place worldwide. 

And I am not so sure that we are really dealing with this as we 

should be because, at the end of the day, they are going to get what 

they want. 

And I am concerned, just like some of my friends on the other 

side have said, about what is going to happen next. Next year, the 

year after next. 

I say all that to say maybe our policy should be different. Why 

isn’t it our policy that we promote in Iran free elections, a regime 

change if that is the will of the people in Iran, to change who is 

running the show over there? Why isn’t that part of our policy? We 

had the opportunity in 2009 to help the Iranians, but we did not. 

So is that discussed—you four guys are the experts—is that discussed anywhere by anybody in the administration or the West, 

let’s have free elections and let the Iranian people decide who will 

be in charge? Anybody can answer that question. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I will just jump in real quickly and then turn it 

over to Mike Doran. 

On your last point, Congressman, I don’t hear a lot of discussion. 

I do think that is the ultimate solution to this is not sanctions, not 

military option; it is regime change. But I think I can say with 

more confidence that if there is this deal, then it will strengthen 

the regime. And you will have less, it will be less likely that there 

will be regime change with this deal. This will be one of the consequences of this deal. Their policy will be vindicated. They will be 

73

able to oppress. They will have a lot more money, not just for butter but to oppress their people internally. And they are one of the 

leading oppressors in the world. And they will essentially gain immunity from attack from outside once they achieve their nuclear 

weapons capability. 

So I think this deal certainly strengthens the regime and makes 

what you are saying, regime change, which I think we all think 

would be much better, far less likely. 

Mr. POE. Well, I agree with you. I think regime change is the answer, free elections. We should support a regime change with free 

elections and let the people of Iran make that decision. 

And it will strengthen the Ayatollah and the mullahs who have 

an iron fist on the people, persecuting their own people, killing 

their own people; they are hanging throughout Tehran—almost 

daily—people that disagree with the government. 

I hope we get there. 

And I yield back because you are taking it back. I will yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Here, here. Thank you, Judge Poe. We appreciate 

your insight particularly on behalf of the people of Iran too. 

And we now proceed to Congresswoman Lois Frankel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

First, Mr. Chair, I would just like to say thank you to Josh 

Cohen. This is his last full committee. He has been my adviser. He 

has done a great job. He is going off to Harvard, to the Kennedy 

School. And we wish him well. 

Well, this has been a very troubling discussion. First of all, 

thank you all for sharing. I mean, you can’t help but after listening 

to all this feel a lot of anxiety. So, first, I want to ask a hypothetical, if it is possible for you to answer, which is I think we went 

into this, the P5+1, I think it was November 2013 when they first 

agreed to the plan that is, this temporary plan that is currently in 

place, and then it began in January 2014. Had this joint plan not 

been in place, do you think by now we would have had to take military action to stop a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. DORAN. I don’t think that is true. And I also don’t think that 

the—I also don’t think that the alternative to this deal is necessarily war. And that is because of the point that Mike Makovsky 

made: Iran is a third-rate power and we are a superpower. And if 

we behave like a superpower, and we actually dedicate all instruments of national power toward a goal like preventing Iran from 

getting a nuclear weapon, it has an effect on the thinking of the 

Iranians. 

I notice that when Prime Minister Netanyahu drew his red line, 

the Iranians were very careful to creep right up to it, but they 

never went over it. I suspect that if we made ourselves clear and 

we enhanced our credibility, that we would see that the Iranians 

would be much more circumspect. They are trumpeting their antiAmericanism right now because they know there is absolutely no 

consequence for it. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Does this mean that you feel that the better alternative now would be to try to increase sanctions? 

Mr. DORAN. Absolutely. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Rather than take the deal? 

74

Mr. DORAN. Absolutely. You have to disapprove the deal. And we 

have to step back from the negotiations. We have to show the Iranians that we are willing to negotiate in a much more aggressive 

fashion. And we need to take care to pull our allies together. It 

really isn’t true that the P5+1 is abandoning us, and if we don’t 

make this deal, we have lost them. We are pushing them away 

from a sensible policy. I had in my institution a couple weeks ago 

a delegation of French politicians who came through, people who 

had traditionally been very tough on Iran. And they said, and this 

is a paraphrase, but they said: Basically, you guys have played us 

for suckers. You have put us in the position now, we who want to 

hold out for a better deal, you have put us in the position of angering President Obama by not following his lead on an 

accommodationist policy and losing the possibility of good economic 

contracts in Iran because we are going to be punished by the Iranians as well. We are at the back of the line for the contracts. And 

so they said what suckers we are. So they are shifting now because 

of our policy. What we need to do is define a red line and get the 

P5+1 behind it, especially our European allies, and then stick to it. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Do you other gentlemen agree with that? Or have 

a different opinion? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The only thing I would add is I do think we 

have to take a much firmer line. But I am not sure, people talk 

about walking out of the negotiations. I think what that really 

means is a willingness to not agree to terms that aren’t acceptable. 

But I don’t think we need to slam the door on diplomacy. I think 

in terms of alliance management, just our international, you know, 

maintaining international consensus, there should remain a willingness to achieve a negotiated solution. That would be the ideal 

solution. But it should be a negotiated solution on acceptable 

terms, not the terms that have been agreed to at this point and 

which apparently we are satisfied with the Iranians reopening 

questions where they are dissatisfied, but we—maybe the Iranians 

are right, maybe President Obama thinks we need this deal more 

than they do because he is not willing to reopen disadvantageous 

agreements that have already been reached. I don’t know why that 

would be though. It seems to me we can reopen and try and get 

a better outcome on things like the sunset clause. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Dr. Pollack, you may answer that but I just want 

to add something to that question, which is, do you see the potential—let’s say we are at the negotiating table, and we just said, no, 

we can’t, this is not the deal we are going to accept. Do you see 

the potential of Iran then again moving toward a nuclear weapon, 

taking further steps? 

Mr. POLLACK. Congresswoman, first, I tend to be much more 

where Steve Rademaker is than my friend Mike Doran. I think 

what Prime Minister Netanyahu proposed of kill these negotiations, go back to sanctions, force them to come back to the table 

later, I do not think that will work. I think that it is highly unlikely that we will be able to hold the sanctions in place, that we 

will be able to hold international opinion. As the guy at the White 

House who tried to hold the Iraq sanctions together in the late 

1990s, I was shocked and appalled at how quickly international 

opinion turned against those sanctions when people decided that 

75

we were the problem, not Saddam Hussein, countries which previously had supported it legally and every way imaginable just disregarded them. I am fearful we will have something similar happen 

with Iran. I think the JPOA was worthwhile. 

And, finally, to come back to a point that Steve was making, by 

the same token, I don’t think that it is necessarily the case that 

we have to look at it and say we have to agree to something by 

tomorrow. I don’t understand why we can’t take more time. A willingness to play out these negotiations and insist on the best terms 

possible, even given what we have already put on the table, I think 

is fundamentally different from, again, what Prime Minister 

Netanyahu proposed. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Ms. Frankel. 

We now proceed to Congressman Scott Perry of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, here we are again. As usual, I have to spend some 

of my time—I wish Mr. Connolly were still here so, as a student 

of history, I could remind him of something because I am sure he 

knows it, but I am always amazed by what I hear here. One of the 

first things that amazed me was that George Bush is responsible, 

and he is responsible because we didn’t go to war with Iran from 

the same people that complain daily bitterly that we went to a war 

with Iraq and Afghanistan. 

And then I hear that a veto override by a Republican Congress 

is tantamount to a declaration of war with Iran. So I guess we can 

be prepared for that narrative. 

And, finally, I would like to remind Mr. Connolly that it was the 

Clinton administration, as I remember, in May 1998 that waived 

the sanctions, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which resulted in an 

increase in Iran’s terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and European 

investment in Iran. So I will have to remind him of that on the 

floor. 

I do have a couple questions. If you can tell me, gentlemen, what 

are the consequences for regional stability if the administration 

were to cave to the Iranian demands to lift the U.N. arms embargo? 

Go ahead, Mr. Doran. 

Mr. DORAN. It is catastrophic. And I think we need to see already 

that the Russians are moving and see themselves in competition 

with us for Iran. This is a dimension of the thing that hasn’t got 

much attention, which is that the, it is not just our allies that see 

us as tilting toward Iran, it is also the Russians as well. And the 

Russians would much prefer to have Iran in their sphere than in 

our sphere. So we can see them, I think, moving quite aggressively 

to establish a very strong military-to-military relationship with 

them. 

There is another dimension of this thing as well that deserves 

note, and that is because of the sunset clause but also the very 

large amount of facilities that we are leaving in place, the fact that 

we are recognizing Iran as a threshold nuclear power. It means 

that the knife is never, we have never taken the knife away from 

our neck. So I think most people in the region, and I would include 

myself in this too, believe that the administration, without admitVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:23 Sep 03, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\070915\95422 SHIRL
76

ting it, is already making calculations, tradeoffs in their mind of 

not willing to challenge Iran in Syria and in Iraq and Iranian interests in those areas for fear that it will tank the nuclear negotiations. That calculation never goes away. 

The administration wants us to believe, oh, we pocket, we get 

this agreement, this nuclear negotiation, good, bad, whatever you 

think of it, and then we move toward regional stability. It doesn’t 

work that way because the minute we start to challenge them, say, 

with Assad, they will threaten to—they will threaten to pull out of 

the agreement on the nukes. And that is especially true because we 

have front-loaded it with so many goodies——

Mr. PERRY. I personally cannot separate the two. I can, I guess, 

from a negotiation standpoint. But as a tenet of the negotiations 

themselves, I don’t understand the nation that separates those 

issues. 

Let me ask another question, what has the President and the administration been doing to maintain or strengthen the current 

sanctions regime regarding our international actors during this period of time? Because we understand that it is eroding away. That 

is yet another reason why we must accept this deal. What have 

they been doing to make sure that we have got that right there just 

in case? 

Mr. DORAN. If I could just quickly, the administration wants the 

new economic relationship with Iran. Its calculation is that it 

wants to create a mutual dependency because that is the thing that 

ultimately is going to moderate the behavior. 

Mr. PERRY. You got to say that in regular English. So they are 

not doing much to——

Mr. DORAN. They are not doing anything because they——

Mr. PERRY. Yeah. 

Mr. DORAN [continuing]. Because they want to relax the pressure. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. Okay. So, listen, I don’t know the tenets of 

this deal. Rumor has it, it is imminent. That is the rumor around 

that town right now. I will tell you that I am personally disgusted 

with the platitudes, the moral relativism, the explaining away by 

people around here in this room, some of them, this, in my opinion, 

administration misunderstands, underestimates, and is being 

duped by the nonrational actor that is Iran that is a known liar, 

is a brutal regime, and will continue to be that. 

To me, I liken this to giving a crocodile or a shark more teeth 

and somehow expecting it to do something different than it already 

does. I think it is just going to do more. I don’t see any reason why 

it wouldn’t. And going back further into history with the moral relativism, the platitudes, and the explaining away, I am sure you 

gentlemen can appreciate this, the United States did the same 

thing with the Soviet Union in World War II, who had a pact with 

Hitler before they were at war with each other, to do exactly what 

they did, which was divide up and conquer Europe. And while Hitler killed 6 million people, the Soviet Communists and their expansion, not only in Europe but into China and Vietnam and places 

all over the globe, are responsible for the deaths of 100 million people. And nobody says a thing about that. And that is exactly what 

77

we are getting into right now by explaining this away in this person’s opinion. 

I thank you for your time, gentlemen. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Perry. 

We now proceed to Congressman Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here. Let me start off with a 

question. Do you believe that in the wake of an agreement, the administration will push to delist the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as 

a proliferator? Dr. Doran? 

Mr. DORAN. I think we have already seen indications that they 

are moving away from, they are moving away from holding their 

feet to the fire on that issue. Whether they will actually move to 

delist, I don’t know. But they will start to explain away behavior. 

And they will start to impute to the Iranians and even to the Revolutionary Guard intentions that they don’t actually have like, for 

instance, building a multisectarian political system in Iraq. 

Mr. YOHO. I am going to get to that. Given that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard at large is designated, pursuant to Executive 

Order 13382, as a proliferator, do you think the administration will 

delist them as part of an Iranian nuclear agreement? And the second part of that question is this would, in effect, legitimize many 

of the aspects of the Revolutionary Guard, creating a terrorist 

wing, being the Quds Force, and a political wing, the Revolutionary 

Guard, that would be open for business. Do you see that happening? 

Mr. Rademaker? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I can’t predict with confidence what the administration will do. But given that it is clear that the administration 

is committed to lifting nuclear-proliferation-related sanctions. It 

will be a definitional question: Is that particular listing related to 

nuclear proliferation, or is it something else? 

Mr. YOHO. Nuclear proliferation. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think there is an issue of ballistic missile proliferation, conventional weapons proliferation. 

Mr. YOHO. WMD. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. But we understand those issues are now on the 

table too. So where this comes out, I don’t know. But I guess what 

I am confident in predicting is it is going to be a pretty darn good 

deal for Iran. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree with that. And what would be the regional effect? I think we know what that would be. It is not going to stabilize it. And I think it would increase the hegemony of Iran in the 

whole Middle Eastern area. You know, I am baffled by this whole 

nuclear negotiation. 

Dr. Pollack, you said the administration did a good job of bringing Iran to the table. What was the purpose of that? Can you take 

us back——

Mr. POLLACK. The purpose, Congressman, was to try to prevent 

them from acquiring nuclear weapons. 

Mr. YOHO. Because I have right here that President Obama says, 

28 times promised Iran wouldn’t get a nuclear weapon. So we have 

moved from, and that is what I remember, this is to prevent Iran 

from getting a nuclear weapon. Now we are at, we are going to try 

78

to slow it down. Just real quickly, do all four of you think Iran will 

have a nuclear weapon, if they don’t have one already, within the 

next 0 to 10 years? Just yes or no. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think the answer to that, if your timeframe 

is the next 10 years, that is the duration of this agreement. So 

really you are asking are they going to cheat on the agreement. I 

don’t know. They have cheated on a lot of things up until now. I 

think they are very comfortable with that idea. But one thing I 

have suggested in my past testimony is that rationally this is such 

a good deal for them that they shouldn’t cheat. Rationally, they 

should let 10 years go by and then if they want to break out and 

produce nuclear weapons, they can produce a much more robust, 

much more serious nuclear force very quickly than they will be 

able to do covertly over the next 10 years. So, rationally, they 

shouldn’t cheat. Rationally they should take advantage of the sunset clause and then emerge either as a nuclear weapons state or 

the other—I mentioned this the last time I appeared here—whether they actually produce nuclear weapons or whether they are a 

screwdriver turn away from having them, there is an important 

legal difference between those two——

Mr. YOHO. I have sat here for 21⁄2 years——

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. You get a lot of the political and 

sort of national security advantages of having nuclear weapons if 

everybody knows you are a screwdriver turn away. So it is not 

clear to me they will necessarily go all the way. But if everyone 

knows they can do it overnight, they get treated as if they had nuclear weapons anyway. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. DORAN. I will make a very clear prediction, they will cheat. 

They are cheating already. It is in their DNA. If their lips move, 

they lie. There is absolute certainty they will cheat. And I also 

think it is a rational decision to cheat. They want to be at odds 

with the world. They want to, with the United States and the alliances. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. DORAN. It benefits them domestically. It benefits them internationally to be at odds. 

Mr. YOHO. I am a veterinarian before I came here. I will always 

be a veterinarian. There was a simple thing we learned: If it looks, 

smells, runs, and smells like a skunk, it is probably a skunk. And 

this is a deal that is a skunk. And we, as Americans, need to run 

away from it. One last question, is it possible to put sanctions back 

on? And will the P5 nations back us up if we wanted to sanction 

and say we are walking away, actually running away—and I would 

spray deodorizer behind us as we left—is it possible that they 

would stand with us? 

Mr. POLLACK. I will answer that by saying that I think it will 

depend on the circumstances of the breakdown. If the P5+1 believes it was the Iranians who were being unreasonable and that 

was the cause of the breakdown, yes, I think they would. If they 

conclude that it was the United States, no. I don’t think so. 

Mr. DORAN. But it is not that hard to imagine an American diplomacy—I agree with my colleagues on that point. I didn’t want 

to suggest before that I think we should just slam the door, get up 

79

and walk away. We need to make a reasoned explanation as to why 

we are doing that. And we can do that very easily by just holding 

to some of the very reasonable proposals that we have made and 

that the Iranians have rejected. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The one clarification I would add, you put the 

question in terms putting sanctions back on. The sanctions are still 

on. They have not yet been lifted. What this deal does is it begins 

to lift the sanctions. 

Mr. YOHO. With just the minimal relaxation of those, you have 

seen what they have done. And they have propped up the Assad 

regime when we thought that he was going to fall. And I can only 

think that the help from Iran with the extra money coming in—

it was supposed to be $14 billion, now it is over $40 billion or $60 

billion with just the relaxation—that that has prolonging the Syrian war, caused that many more deaths. And even today we hear 

there are more chlorine bombs being dropped on Aleppo. And we 

have a resolution and a bill to stop that. This is a disaster. This 

administration has not served America well, the Middle East, or 

world peace. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Yoho. 

We now proceed to Congressman David Trott of Michigan. 

Mr. TROTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all the panelists for your time this morning. And 

I appreciate you sticking around for, I think I am the last person. 

I have only been here 6 months, so I get to ask my questions last. 

Mr. Sherman made a comment that no one in the White House 

is listening to us. I believe that is true. So, in many respects, this 

hearing is all about trying to draw attention through your insightful comments to the deal that is about to get done and draw the 

American public’s attention to it. 

And Mr. Yoho asked my question, so I will change it a little bit. 

If a deal gets done, isn’t the 30-second sound bite headline, ‘‘A 

Done Deal: Iran Will Have a Nuclear Weapon in 10 or 12 Years’’? 

Isn’t that the takeaway from where we are at today? And Mr. 

Yoho, he said they are going to cheat. Let’s assume they don’t 

cheat. So, in 12 years, they are going to have a nuclear weapon. 

Isn’t that the short summary for the evening news? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I don’t think that’s the summary that the administration will give, of course. I think that will be it. I would add 

that it is not just about Iran getting nuclear weapons. I think if 

this deal goes through, it is talking about now, it means a nuclear 

Middle East. 

Mr. TROTT. I couldn’t agree more. 

One of the things that baffles me, and any of the panelists can 

answer this, it would be great, I can’t figure out why the President 

is continuing to pursue the deal, why he doesn’t step away. And I 

don’t know if it is about saving face. I don’t know if he genuinely 

believes that by being nice, that that is going to change behavior. 

Or if he is just determined not to act like a superpower, so whatever happens in the world really shouldn’t concern us. Why not 

step back? We had 367 Members of Congress sign a letter. Every 

editorial says it is a bad deal. No one disagrees that they are the 

largest sponsor of terrorism in the world. 

80

I take issue with one comment you made, Mr. Doran. They 

don’t—when their lips move, they don’t lie—they lie, except when 

they are saying ‘‘Death to America.’’ They mean that. So why not 

step away from this deal and say, I think everyone in the country 

would applaud the President and say: You made the right decision. 

Let’s not close down discussions or diplomatic solutions. Let’s try 

and find an alternative. But we can’t move forward. 

Why is the President determined to do this deal that I can guarantee will be unacceptable to Congress? There is no question about 

that. 

Mr. DORAN. I think it is because, I think the most important decision the President ever made about the Middle East, he made before he walked into the Oval Office, and that was that he was 

going to go down in history as the President who ended wars and 

didn’t start them and that he was going to pull the United States 

back from the region generally. 

And the minute you say that your strategic goal is to pull back, 

then you run into this problem of, well, what about Iran? Am I still 

in the Iran containment business? And what about this nuclear 

program? And it puts a priority on solving that issue so that you 

don’t have to be immeshed in this region where the challenge really 

isn’t worth the outcome, as President Obama sees it. 

Mr. TROTT. It is a world view you are saying? 

Mr. DORAN. Yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I would add an additional observation. As you 

may know, part of my background is in arms control. In addition 

to following the Iran issue, I followed very closely President 

Obama’s negotiations with Russia on the New START Treaty. And 

I see a lot of similarities between the way he negotiated with Russia at the beginning of his administration and the way he is negotiating with Iran here at the end of the administration. I would just 

make the observation that I think as a negotiator, President 

Obama is a man who thinks that demonstrating goodwill will elicit 

reciprocation by the other side. And he thinks goodwill gestures on 

our part will be met by goodwill gestures. And just by demonstrating goodwill, that mistrust can be overcome. It is sort of a 

nice feel-good way to approach the world. And I am sure there are 

situations where that is true. But I think when you are dealing 

with Vladimir Putin, as he learned in the New START negotiations, it wasn’t true. The Russians sensed weakness, and they tried 

to take advantage. And I think the same is true dealing with the 

mullahs in Tehran. These are not men of goodwill. These are very 

hard-nosed individuals who have an agenda. 

And I think Tom Friedman, I commend the piece to you, it is 

quoted in my testimony, the Iranians have read President Obama. 

They know he is determined to get this deal. It is now an issue of 

legacy in his mind as well. And they intend to leave nothing—they 

intend to leave absolutely nothing on the table. They are going to 

pick our pockets and then some. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. If I may just even step back a little more that 

Mike Doran did, I think he came into office, and this is, of course, 

speculative, believing that U.S. foreign policy for a long time had 

been a big mistake, that it had been counterproductive to our interest, that it had oftentimes even been immoral and diverted from 

81

domestic needs. So I think he sought to really upend, to reverse our 

policy in a lot of parts of the world, whether it is in the Middle 

East, or Russia, as Steve talked about. 

So I think what we are dealing with Iran is just the Middle East 

component of this general world view. 

I would say just one other point is that President Obama at least 

hasn’t shown, that I can tell, a great capacity to learn and to shift 

policy based on—I mean, Jimmy Carter, for instance, very famously came into office, talked about an inordinate fear of communism. But after Afghanistan, he recognized, he shifted. I haven’t 

seen that sense, that ability at least in this White House to selfreflect and to shift accordingly. I hope I am wrong by the way. 

Mr. TROTT. So the headline will be, ‘‘Deal Done: Iran Gets Nuclear Weapon in 12 Years, But Everyone Likes Us.’’ Is that the 

summary? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. And have a nice day. 

Mr. TROTT. Last question, and I am out of time. 

Dr. Pollack, so before I came here, I was in business. And negotiating a deal in business, it always threw up a red flag when the 

other side was so focused on what happens if we breach the agreement, and we cheat. What happens if we default. And when folks 

are so focused on that, then, to me, that is telling me that I am, 

you can’t do a good deal with a bad guy. So they are focused on 

cheating, arguing about anytime, anywhere inspections, arguing 

about the military basis. Isn’t it a given they are going to cheat? 

Isn’t it a foregone conclusion that the deal isn’t going to be worth 

the paper it is printed on? 

Mr. POLLACK. I don’t know, Congressman. I have been working 

on Iran for 28 years. The Iranians are very unpredictable. 

I will go back to a point that Steve Rademaker made earlier, 

which is that I think that there is every likelihood, as best we can 

tell now, maybe that is a better way to put it, in the 10 years to 

15 years of the deal, it is hard to see why they would cheat. They 

have every reason not to do so. And I think there is a reasonable 

expectation that they won’t. I think that the bigger question is 

about what happens after. The deal is in many way a bet. When 

I talk to the administration, when I——

Mr. TROTT. Pretty high-stakes bet, wouldn’t you say? 

Mr. POLLACK. Well, this is just it. It is an unknowable bet. The 

bet that the administration is taking is that in 10 or 15 years, we 

will have a kinder, gentler Iran. And they can point to evidence 

suggesting that this could happen. The people of Iran want to move 

Iran in a very different direction. It is plausible. It is just as plausible that we won’t get that kinder, gentler Iran. And that is the 

bet we are taking. 

Mr. TROTT. And I appreciate all of your time. And I will just 

close with I hope the bet doesn’t result in Iran having an intercontinental ballistic missile that will be able to hit the President’s 

library in Chicago. 

Mr. POLLACK. Amen. 

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Trott, thank you very much for your fresh 

freshman approach. 

And I want to thank each of the witnesses for being here today. 

I am really grateful that Chairman Ed Royce and Ranking Member 

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Eliot Engel were able to put this together. We can certainly see extraordinary concern about policies of moral relativism and concern 

about what we are facing. 

At this time, we shall be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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