STANDARD 321-07 

 

 RANGE SAFETY GROUP 

COMMON RISK CRITERIA STANDARDS FOR NATIONAL TEST 

RANGES 

WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE 

REAGAN TEST SITE 

YUMA PROVING GROUND 

DUGWAY PROVING GROUND 

ABERDEEN TEST CENTER 

NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER 

ELECTRONIC PROVING GROUND 

HIGH ENERGY LASER SYSTEMS TEST FACILITY 

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER WEAPONS DIVISION, PT. MUGU 

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER WEAPONS DIVISION, CHINA LAKE 

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER AIRCRAFT DIVISION, PATUXENT RIVER 

NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER DIVISION, NEWPORT 

PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE FACILITY 

NAVAL UNDERSEA WARFARE CENTER DIVISION, KEYPORT 

30TH SPACE WING 

45TH SPACE WING 

AIR FORCE FLIGHT TEST CENTER 

AIR ARMAMENT CENTER 

ARNOLD ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT CENTER 

BARRY M. GOLDWATER RANGE 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NEVADA)

DISTRIBUTION A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED
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STANDARD 321-07 

COMMON RISK CRITERIA STANDARDS FOR NATIONAL TEST 

RANGES 

JUNE 2007 

Prepared by 

RANGE SAFETY GROUP 

RISK COMMITTEE

Published by 

Secretariat 

Range Commanders Council 

U.S. Army White Sands Missile Range, 

New Mexico 88002-5110 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... iv 

LIST OF TABLES......................................................................................................................... iv 

CHANGES TO THIS EDITION .....................................................................................................v 

FOREWORD ................................................................................................................................ vii 

PREFACE...................................................................................................................................... ix 

ACRONYMS................................................................................................................................. xi 

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION......................................................................................... 1-1 

1.1 Purpose ............................................................................................................ 1-1 

1.2 Scope ............................................................................................................... 1-1 

1.3 Implementation................................................................................................ 1-1 

1.4 Range Responsibilities .................................................................................... 1-2 

CHAPTER 2: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ............................................................... 2-1 

2.1 General Policy and Goals ................................................................................ 2-1 

2.2 Policy Objectives............................................................................................. 2-2 

2.3 Risk Management Process............................................................................... 2-3 

2.4 Risk Uncertainty.............................................................................................. 2-7 

CHAPTER 3: ACCEPTABLE RISK CRITERIA.............................................................. 3-1 

3.1 Performance Standards.................................................................................... 3-1 

3.2 Personnel Protection........................................................................................ 3-2 

3.3 Aircraft Protection .......................................................................................... 3-3 

3.4 Ship Protection ................................................................................................ 3-4 

3.5 Spacecraft Protection....................................................................................... 3-5 

3.6 Catastrophic Risk Protection........................................................................... 3-6 

3.7 Criteria Summary ............................................................................................ 3-8 

REFERENCES

GLOSSARY

iii
LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 2-1. Risk management process.................................................................................... 2-4 

Figure 3-1. Tolerable catastrophe risks for the general public. .............................................. 3-8 

LIST OF TABLES 

Table 3-1. Definitions Used to Define Tolerable Catastrophic Risks................................... 3-7 

Table 3-2. Summary of Commonality Criteria ..................................................................... 3-9 

iv
CHANGES TO THIS EDITION 

 This document is an updated version of RCC Document 321-02 (Common Risk Criteria 

for National Test Ranges: Inert Debris). The following subparagraphs contain a summary of 

changes. Note: the use of the word “supplement” used herein refers to the companion 

(supplemental) document to RCC Document 321. 

a. Expanded Scope. The scope of the standard is expanded to include other flight 

hazards in addition to inert debris. It now addresses risks due to explosive debris, 

overpressure, and toxics. To accommodate this change, the Risk Committee 

recommends that casualty, rather than fatality, be the primary measure of risk and has 

defined acceptable casualty risk criteria. Fatality risk criteria remain as a 

supplemental measure of risk for those range operations that are dominated by fatality 

risk. 

b. New Hazard Thresholds. New hazard thresholds are defined to account for casualty 

risk. Debris fragment thresholds are provided for blunt trauma injuries and chunky 

penetrating injuries, and overpressure thresholds are provided for unsheltered and 

sheltered people. In addition, debris fragment thresholds for penetrating structures 

are updated to reflect the results of recent studies. 

c. Aircraft Vulnerability Thresholds. The aircraft vulnerability thresholds are revised to 

remove the excess conservatism. The previous standard defined a single threshold for 

all types of aircraft. A separate set of vulnerability models are defined for large 

commercial jet transports to represent the robustness of those aircraft more 

accurately. 

d. Ship Probability of Impact. The probability of impact criteria for ships is revised to 

be more in line with United Nations International Maritime Organization and current 

range practices. 

e. Manned Spacecraft Protection. The manned spacecraft protection policies and 

criteria are revised to remove excess conservatism and clear up inconsistencies in 

application. The probability of impact criterion is updated to reflect assumptions of 

space launch activity that are more realistic and to provide an equivalent level of 

protection as that afforded to mission essential personnel. As another means of 

reducing excess conservatism, an ellipsoidal minimum miss-distance volume is 

provided as an alternative to the spherical miss-distance presented in the previous 

standard. 

f. Catastrophic Risk Protection. This revision introduces the subject of catastrophic risk 

protection. Some provisional, advisory criteria are provided, as well as guidelines for 

analyzing and assessing catastrophic risk. 

g. Implementation Guidelines. A new chapter (Chapter 4) was added to the document 

321-07 supplement to provide implementation guidelines for applying the criteria to 

address aggregation and accumulation of risk from the various hazards, multiple 

v
phase/multiple launch missions, annual risk management, and catastrophic risk. It 

also provides guidance on determining the beginning and end of a mission for 

applying the per mission criteria. 

h. Screening Criteria for Other Hazards. A new chapter (Chapter 8) was included in the 

321-07 supplement to provide guidelines on screening criteria for casualty producing 

hazards such as Distant Focusing Overpressure (DFO), toxics, and radiation. 

i. Risk Management Process. The 8-step process for analyzing risk from inert debris is 

replaced with a more comprehensive overall range safety process that expands the 

concept to address hazards beyond just inert debris and includes the major activities 

required to conduct the entire risk management process. A checklist of factors and 

considerations was included to aid in proper execution of the process. 

j. Modeling Considerations. Two new chapters are added to the supplement providing 

advisory requirements for modeling tools (Chapter 3) and approaches and 

considerations for debris risk assessment model (Chapter 7) 

vi
FOREWORD 

 The Risk and Lethality Commonality Team (RALCT) was formed in 1996. The RALCT 

was formed for reaching a consensus on reasonable common standards for debris protection 

criteria and analytical methods. The initial version, RCC 321-97, was very useful, but was 

limited in scope due to the complexity of the subject and time constraints. This standard was 

updated in 1999 and again in 2002 to provide greater detail. In August 2004, the Range 

Commanders Council (RCC), Range Safety Group (RSG) determined that RCC Document 

321-02 (Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges, Subtitle: Inert Debris), should be 

updated and expanded for other flight safety hazards (in addition to inert debris) and 

consequences potentially generated by range operations. 

 The RALCT became a standing committee under the RCC Range Safety Group in 2004. 

It was renamed the “Risk Committee” (RC) in February 2005 when work on this revision began 

in earnest. The Committee has updated RCC Document 321-02 to include: 

a. Risk acceptability criteria and supporting rationale for additional flight safety hazards 

and consequences potentially generated by range operations. 

b. The major activities required to conduct the entire risk management process and 

considerations to address hazards beyond just inert debris. 

c. Top-level requirements for computational models used to analyze the risks posed by 

inert and explosive debris. 

d. Updated hazard thresholds for inert and explosive debris, as well as screening criteria 

for other hazards including toxics, distant focusing overpressure, and ionizing and 

non-ionizing radiation. 

e. Factors and considerations for acceptable debris risk assessment models. 

 This document (RCC Document 321-07) is the basic document that defines consensus 

standards for the range risk management process and risk criteria. The companion document, 

RCC Document 321-07 (Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges: Supplement), 

provides additional detailed information to assist in implementation of the standards in the basic 

document. The criteria in this document should not be considered absolute; rather, this 

document and its supplement is intended to provide guidance on defining acceptable risks for 

hazardous range operations and to assist the user in developing more consistent risk assessments. 

 This document represents the collective efforts of both government and contractor 

personnel and is the result of an extensive cooperative effort. 

vii
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viii
PREFACE 

 This document presents the results of Task RS-46, Range Safety Group (RSG) in the 

Range Commanders Council (RCC). Planned and unplanned hazardous events generated by 

flight operations present a safety concern for all test ranges. Each range has established its own 

set of criteria and analytical methods for protecting personnel, facilities, aircraft, and other assets 

from hazardous operations. Although these separate efforts have been very successful, the 

logical relationships among criteria used at the test ranges and across different hazards are often 

difficult to comprehend. The consensus standards presented in this document are intended to: 

a. Promote a uniform process among the ranges. 

b. Promote valid, repeatable risk assessments. 

c. Foster innovation to support challenging missions. 

d. Nurture openness and trustworthiness among the ranges, range users, and the public. 

e. Simplify the scheduling process. 

f. Present common risk criteria that can reduce cost for users of multiple test ranges. 

 The RCC gives special acknowledgement for production of this document to: 

Mr. Corey Cather: Chairman, RSG Risk Committee 

30th Space Wing, 30 SW/SELP 

806 13th Street STE 3 

Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437-5230 

Phone: (805) 606-1662 DSN 276-1662 

Fax: (805) 605-7227 DSN 275-7227 

E-mail: corey.cather@vandenberg.af.mil

 Acknowledgements also go to the many participating members of the Range Safety 

Group Risk Committee as shown on the following page. 

Please direct any questions to: 

Secretariat, Range Commanders Council 

ATTN: CSTE-DTC-WS-RCC 

100 Headquarters Avenue 

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico 88002-5110 

Telephone: (505) 678-1107, DSN 258-1107 

E-mail rcc@wsmr.army.mil

ix
RANGE SAFETY GROUP RISK COMMITTEE PARTICIPANTS 

RCC RSG RISK COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

AFSPC/30th Space Wing - 30 SW 

AFSPC/45th Space Wing - 45 SW 

Air Armament Center Eglin Air Force Base - AAC 

Air Force Flight Test Center - AFFTC 

Naval Air Systems Command headquartered at Patuxent River, MD - NAVAIR Patuxent 

River. 

Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division - NAWCWD 

Pacific Missile Range Facility - PMRF 

U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site - USAKA/RTS 

White Sands Missile Range - WSMR 

Yuma Proving Ground - YPG 

RCC RSG RISK COMMITTEE ASSOCIATE MEMBERS 

Federal Aviation Administration - FAA/AST 

Missile Defense Agency; Safety, Quality and Mission Assurance Directorate - MDA/QS 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Dryden Flight Research Center - NASA 

- DFRC 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters - NASA HQ 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Kennedy Space Center - NASA KSC 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Wallops Flight Facility - NASA Wallops 

Sandia National Laboratories - SNL 

RCC RSG RISK COMMITTEE SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS 

3D Research Corporation - 3D Research 

ACTA, Inc. - ACTA 

Aerospace Corporation 

Air Force Space Command - AFSPC 

Analysis, Planning, Test Research, Inc. - APT Research 

Headquarters, Air Force Safety Center, Weapons Safety Division - HQ AFSC 

Research Triangle Institute, International - RTI 

SRS Technologies 

System Test and Evaluation Planning and Analysis Lab - STEPAL 

TYBRIN Corporation 

x
ACRONYMS 

AFSPC Air Force Space Command 

AST Associate Administrator for Space Transportation (FAA) 

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

COP Critical Operations Personnel 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoDD Department of Defense Directive 

DoDI Department of Defense Instruction 

ER Eastern Range 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FTCA Federal Tort Claims Act 

FTS Flight Termination System 

GP General Public 

KSC Kennedy Space Center 

MEP Mission Essential Personnel 

MRTFB Major Range and Test Facility Base 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NAWC Naval Air Warfare Center 

RALCT Risk and Lethality Commonality Team 

RC Risk Committee 

RCC Range Commanders Council 

RSG Range Safety Group 

USAF United States Air Force 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USC United States Code 

VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base 

WR Western Range 

WSMR White Sands Missile Range 

xi
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xii
CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1 Purpose 

 This document provides a common set of range safety policies, risk criteria, and 

guidelines for managing risk to people and assets during manned and unmanned flight 

operations, excluding aviation operations. It establishes the following: 

a. Acceptable risk criteria for both the general public (involuntary acceptance) and 

mission essential personnel (voluntary acceptance). 

b. Debris injury thresholds for unprotected people. 

c. Debris hazard thresholds for aircraft and ships. 

d. Vulnerability models for large commercial transport aircraft. 

1.2 Scope 

 The policies and criteria in this document are intended for use by members of the DoD 

national ranges and Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB). These policies and criteria 

apply to launch and reentry hazards generated by endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric range 

activities including both guided and unguided missiles and missile intercepts, space launches, 

and reentry vehicles. This does not include aviation operations or UAV operations. The RCC 

Document 323-99 (Range Safety Criteria for Unmanned Air Vehicles) provides criteria for 

unmanned air vehicles. 

1.3 Implementation 

 This document is an advisory document. Its content is based on the consensus positions 

held by the Risk Committee (RC) within the Range Safety Group (RSG), which is made up of a 

broad cross section of the US range safety community. Therefore, the content of this document 

represents consensus standards. The organization of this document conveys some of the level of 

imperative associated with the content. Consensus standards with the highest levels of priorities 

are generally provided in the main body of the document, while the supplement contains lower 

levels of priority requirements, guidelines, and example methods. However, precise language is 

used in both this document and the supplement in an attempt to capture the intent of the RC as 

follows: 

a. The words “must,” “shall,” and “will” indicate a requirement that is strongly 

recommended. Legitimate alternatives may exist, but each alternative either shall 

demonstrate an equivalent level of safety or be granted a waiver. 

b. "Should" indicates an advisory requirement or a highly desirable procedure. When 

this standard uses "should," the committee intends that a range will achieve 

compliance to the maximum extent practical, but no waiver or equivalent level of 

safety will be required. 

c. "Can" and "may" permit a choice and express a guideline. 

1-1 
 In order for a range to effectively implement this document, the range should evaluate the 

contents of this document and incorporate it accordingly into its local regulations and 

requirements. 

1.4 Range Responsibilities 

 Department of Defense Directive (DoD) Directive 3200.11, Major Range and Test 

Facility Base (MRTFB), assigns responsibility to each Range Commander for ensuring that all 

missions are conducted safely, consistent with operational requirements. Range flight operations 

typically involve some level of risk. Therefore, an important aspect of the range safety 

responsibility is to ensure that the risk is properly managed within prescribed limits. To 

accomplish this, each Range Commander (or designee) must: 

a. Establish risk management procedures (including hazard containment) to implement 

the risk management process described herein. 

b. Establish acceptable risk criteria appropriate to each type of mission flown in 

consideration of the guidance provided herein. 

c. Accept any risks, including those that exceed the established risk criteria when 

warranted for a mission in consideration of the operational requirements and national 

need. 

(1) Make such decisions based on a thorough understanding of any additional risk 

that exceeds the risk criteria and the benefits to be derived from taking the 

additional risk. 

(2) Ensure such decisions are documented in a formal waiver process (or equivalent), 

preferably in advance of the mission. 

d. Maintain related range policy and requirements documents. 

e. Maintain records of risk assessments and waivers to established risk criteria. 

f. For a mission involving more than one range, coordinate with the other range(s) to 

clearly document safety responsibility for each phase of the mission develop and 

implement joint plans for controlling the mission risk due to all planned and 

unplanned events. 

 

1-2 
CHAPTER 2 

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 

2.1 General Policy and Goals 

 In planning any operation, risk must be reduced to the extent that is practical in keeping 

with operational objectives. Safety should be balanced with operational objectives by 

cooperative interaction between the range and the range user. To maximize achievement of 

mission objectives within safety constraints, the range user should consider overall risk along 

with other factors that affect mission acceptability. These factors include criticality of mission 

objectives, protection of life and property, the potential for high consequence mishaps, local 

political factors, and governing range or programmatic environmental requirements. 

 All ranges must strive to achieve complete containment of hazards resulting from both 

normal and malfunctioning flights. If a planned mission cannot be accomplished using a 

containment approach, a risk management approach may be authorized by the range Commander 

or the designated representative. The risk management approach should conform to the 

guidelines presented in this document or otherwise demonstrate compliance with the objectives 

presented. 

 Range Commanders should never regard events such as injuries as being routine or 

permissible. No adverse consequences are routinely acceptable; however, the probability is 

finite that range mishaps producing adverse consequences may occur. The term “acceptable 

risks” used in this document can be properly interpreted as “tolerable risks.” These are risks the 

range Commander may tolerate to secure certain benefits from a range activity with the 

confidence that the risk is properly managed within prescribed limits. 

 Compliance with this document leads to defensible launch support and launch commit 

decisions. Employing a sound basis for accuracy and repeatability in risk assessments leads to 

consistent risk acceptance decisions, thereby fostering public confidence that the ranges are 

operated with appropriate regard for safety. Thus, individuals living or working at or near a 

range may go about their daily lives without concern for their proximity to range activities. 

Moreover, compliance with these guidelines provides assurance that flights near or over 

communities by space boosters or weapon systems does not significantly increase the risk to 

these communities. These goals have led to the policy objectives provided here. 

 In defining objectives for risk assessment and risk management, the RCC goals are to: 

a. Create a uniform process among the ranges that will achieve the stated risk 

management goals. 

b. Promote accurate, repeatable risk assessments by minimizing errors in estimating and 

ensuring their scientific validity. 

c. Create a process that fosters innovation to support challenging missions. 

d. Nurture openness and trustworthiness among the ranges, range users and the public. 

2-1 
2.2 Policy Objectives 

2.2.1 General Public. The general public includes all people located on and off base that are 

not essential to a specific mission or nearby critical operation. This definition applies to all 

people regardless of whether they are in some mode of transportation (such as airplanes, ships, 

and busses) are within a structure, or are unsheltered. The general public should not be exposed, 

individually or collectively, to a risk level greater than the background risk in comparable 

involuntary activities, and the risk of a catastrophic mishap should be mitigated. 

 In the above context, the RCC considers “comparable involuntary activities” as those 

where the risk arises from manmade activities that: 

a. Are subject to government regulations or are otherwise controlled by a government 

agency, and 

b. Are of vital interest to the US, and 

c. Impose involuntary risk of serious injury or worse on the public. 

2.2.2 Mission Essential Personnel (MEP). A certain degree of risk is inherent in hazardous 

operations. The MEP Individuals should not be exposed, individually or collectively, to a risk 

level greater than that found in comparable high-risk occupations, and the risk of a catastrophic 

mishap should be mitigated. 

2.2.3 Critical Operations Personnel (COP). The COP individuals include persons not 

essential to the specific operation or launch currently being conducted, but who are required to 

perform safety, security, or other critical tasks at the range. The critical operations range user 

(or manager) provides the number and justification of personnel required to conduct the critical 

operations. The range safety personnel will approve or determine the number and location of 

COP individuals with the concurrence of the appropriate Decision Authority. The COP 

individuals should be included in the same risk category as MEP personnel. 

2.2.4 Catastrophe Potential and Transportation Systems. People on aircraft, ships, and other 

modes of transportation and people on oil rigs and offshore platforms should be protected to a 

level commensurate with the background risk associated with those activities. The risk 

assessment should account for potential catastrophic consequences to all exposed people and 

mitigations should be implemented to ensure that the risk from catastrophic events is consistent 

with the allowable risk given in paragraph 3.6.3 and paragraph 3.6.4. 

 Scenario-specific information should be considered in providing protection against 

catastrophic consequences. Combinations of factors that should be considered include the 

number of people who may be simultaneously injured, the risk of damage to high value assets, 

the risk of a casualty, factors that may significantly impair the range’s ability to perform its 

mission, and factors that may have national or international consequences. 

 Transportation systems include all modes of transportation such as airplanes, ships, 

trains, busses, and automobiles. People in transportation systems must be categorized following 

the same rules that apply to unsheltered people and people in fixed shelters (i.e., mission 

essential personnel (MEP), critical operations personnel (COP), or general public (GP). Each 

2-2 
individual in a transportation system must be protected to the level for his population category 

(MEP, COP, or GP). Collective risk must be assessed to include people in transportation 

systems. The collective risk to people in transportation systems must be added to the collective 

risk for unsheltered people and the collective risk for sheltered people. The numerical value 

defining the acceptability of the total collective risk must be based on the population category. 

Additional protection, such as defined in paragraph 3.6, must be applied to people in 

transportation systems in order to minimize the potential for catastrophic risk. 

2.2.5 Spacecraft. Orbiting manned spacecraft will be protected to a level equivalent to that 

provided to mission essential aircraft. When the planned missions involve vehicles or 

propagated hazards with altitude capability greater than 150 km, ranges should coordinate with 

the 1st Space Control Squadron of the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC/1SPCS) for 

Conjunction Assessment if needed. In addition, ranges should establish Collision Avoidance 

periods in the launch window if there are any manned spacecraft within 50 km of, or lower than, 

the 3-sigma altitude capability of the launch vehicle, payloads, jettisoned objects or debris cloud 

boundary. 

 The Risk Committee recognizes that protection for critical unmanned space systems 

should also be provided; however, it is currently considered outside the scope of this safety 

standard. While DoD Directive (DoDD) 3100.10 states that DoD activities are to be conducted 

“...in a safe and responsible manner that protects space systems...,” it does not specify which 

DoD activity, the launching agency (range user) or the range, has the responsibility for assuring 

this protection.1

 Until responsibility is resolved by appropriate authorities, the Risk Committee 

recommends that the launching agencies and the ranges continue their current practices. 

2.2.6 Environment. As part of environmental documentation preparation in compliance with 

federal and local regulations, launch and flight test hazards should be taken into account and 

mitigated as necessary. While safety is a factor in environmental compliance, environmental 

protection and regulation is beyond the scope of this standard. 

2.3 Risk Management Process 

 Risk management is a systematic and logical process to identify hazards and control the 

risk they pose. This process should include the following elements (phases) which are depicted 

in Figure 2-1 and identified as: 

 Phase Title Paragraph

 I Mission Definition and Hazard Identification 2.3.1

 II Risk Assessment 2.3.2

 III Criteria Comparison and Risk Reduction 2.3.3

 IV Risk Acceptance 2.3.4

 

1

 Historically, protection of unmanned systems has been addressed as part of mission assurance by the launching 

agency but only for DoD missions or highly valued NASA missions. In the commercial space industry the launching 

agency retains liability insurance to cover such potential mishaps and has historically not utilized conjunction 

assessments for mission assurance or asset protection purposes. 

2-3 
PHASE I:

Mission Definition

and Hazard 

Identification

PHASE II:

Risk Assessment

PHASE IV:

Risk Acceptance

PHASE III:

Criteria Comparison 

& Risk Reduction

Understand Risks,

mission options,

and conditions

needed for safety

Lessons for

future flights

Understanding of

hazards and initial

mission plan

Modify Mission

to reduce risks

Understanding 

of risk drivers

Refine risk

assessment

PHASE I:

Mission Definition

and Hazard 

Identification

PHASE II:

Risk Assessment

PHASE IV:

Risk Acceptance

PHASE III:

Criteria Comparison 

& Risk Reduction

Understand Risks,

mission options,

and conditions

needed for safety

Lessons for

future flights

Understanding of

hazards and initial

mission plan

Modify Mission

to reduce risks

Understanding 

of risk drivers

Refine risk

assessment

Figure 2-1. Risk management process. 

 The initial goal of the risk management approach is to contain the hazards and isolate 

them from populated areas wherever practical. An alternative to hazard isolation is to define 

hazard containment areas so as to minimize the population exposed or be able to evacuate 

persons not associated with the hazard-generating event. This is in accordance with the primary 

policy that no hazardous condition is acceptable if mission objectives can be attained from a 

safer approach, methodology, or position, i.e., minimizing the hazards and conducting the 

mission as safely as reasonably possible. When hazards cannot be contained or minimized to an 

insignificant level, then assessments that are more detailed are performed to determine if the 

remaining risk is acceptable. An additional benefit of hazard containment is that this process is 

typically less costly than risk assessments and can be evaluated relatively quickly with 

straightforward assumptions and with less required data. 

2.3.1 Phase I: Mission Definition and Hazard Identification. Phase I is the “problem 

definition” step of the process. Information is assembled to identify mission characteristics, 

objectives, and constraints. Potential hazard sources must be identified by evaluating the system 

to be flown and the range safety constraints. Information sources typically include: 

a. Range safety data packages. 

b. System description documents. 

c. Mission essential and critical operations personnel locations. 

d. Surrounding population data to include public and commercial facilities and public 

and commercial transportation assets (including aircraft corridors and shipping lanes). 

e. Seasonal meteorological data. 

f. The range safety system used. 

g. Lessons learned on similar missions. 

2-4 
Further details of information sources are in Chapter 2 and Chapter 7 of the supplement to this 

document. The output of this step provides a basis for hazard analysis and risk assessment, and 

for use in evaluating options for mitigating risks in ways that will minimize adverse mission 

impact. 

2.3.2 Phase II: Risk Assessment. This step provides information needed to determine whether 

further risk reduction measures are necessary. Risk levels for identified hazards are expressed 

using qualitative and quantitative methods. This step produces basic measures of the risks posed 

by hazards. These hazards include inert, explosive, and flammable debris dispersions, explosive 

overpressure fields, exposure to toxic substances, and exposure to ionizing and non-ionizing 

radiation. In some cases, this step will provide sufficient information to support the decisionmaking without further analysis. 

 A valid risk assessment must account for all potential hazards posed by the range activity 

to personnel, facilities, and other assets. The assessment must be based on accurate data, 

scientific principles, and an application of appropriate mathematics. The assessment must be 

consistent with the range safety control that is planned for the mission. Valid calculations to 

assess risk can be made using the methods presented in the supplement. These typically produce 

conservative estimates; i.e., they produce a scientifically plausible result that characteristically 

overestimates risk given existing uncertainties. In all cases, the analyst is responsible for 

ensuring that the application of the methods in the supplement produces reasonable results. This 

assessment leads to mitigation measures needed to protect individuals and groups of people; this 

topic is discussed more fully in Chapter 3. 

 In general, risk is expressed as the product of the probability of occurrence of an event 

and the consequences of that event. Total risk is the combination of the products, over all 

possible events, of the probability of each event and its associated consequence. The probability 

of an event is always between zero and one; however, the consequences of that event can be any 

value. Risk can be relatively high if the probability is high, or the consequence is great, or a 

combination of the two. 

 Simple risk models are often employed to make an initial determination of risk. They are 

also used when the identified hazards are known to result in low risks and the analyst is assured 

that the estimated risk is conservative. For example, simple models can be used when only inert 

debris occurs and the debris is fairly limited in size and weight, with relatively low values of 

kinetic energy or ballistic coefficients, and shelters would provide protection from debris. These 

models are generally less costly, minimize schedule impacts, and have the following 

characteristics: 

a. Simplified application of input parameters and assumptions. 

b. Simplified measures of population estimation utilized. 

c. A basic injury model and associated casualty areas. 

d. Conservative assumptions of debris fragmentation and survivability. 

2-5 
 If the resulting risk estimate is conservative and well within acceptable limits, then 

models that are more costly and time consuming, more complex, or of higher fidelity, will not be 

necessary. 

 When the identified hazards are significant or the initial risk estimate shows that 

acceptance criteria are, or may be, exceeded, then more complex risk models are typically used. 

Use of these models may be more costly, be time consuming to execute, and require a higher 

fidelity and more sophisticated application of input data and assumptions. The assessment may 

require detailed population and sheltering models, more complex human vulnerability models, 

and more realistic debris fragmentation and survivability models. This may require input 

parameters and assumptions to be supported by empirical evidence or expert elicitation. The 

complex risk assessment models are typically used when significant size debris or explosive 

debris impacts are present that could compromise shelters and the associated population. 

2.3.3 Phase III: Criteria Comparison and Risk Reduction. Risk measures are compared with 

criteria to determine the need or desirability for risk reduction. If the risk is initially 

unacceptable, measures should be considered to eliminate or mitigate it. Elimination is achieved 

by design or system changes that remove the hazard source; such as replacing a hazardous 

material with a non-hazardous one or moving a trajectory to achieve containment. Mitigation is 

achieved by reducing the consequences of an event or the probability of an event happening. For 

example, increasing system reliability of a launch vehicle or test article will increase the 

probability of success, thereby lowering risk. Alternatively, designing a mission to avoid flight 

over densely populated areas will decrease consequences of casualties and thereby reduce the 

risk. Mitigation measures may include elements in the operation plan that reduce risk and are 

consistent with operational objectives, flight termination systems, containment policies, 

evacuation, sheltering, and other measures to protect assets from the hazards. Flight termination 

criteria should be optimized by balancing the risk given a failure and termination against the risk 

given a failure and no flight termination. To evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation measures, 

risk must be reassessed assuming they have been implemented. These risk reduction procedures 

should be followed until risk levels are as low as reasonably practical.

2.3.4 Phase IV: Risk Acceptance. Presentations to the decision authority must be sufficient to 

support an informed decision. The presentations should include all range-mandated risk control 

measures, residual risks, measures of catastrophic loss potential ( such as maximum collective 

risk given a flight termination action, maximum collective risk given failure of a flight 

termination system, and risk profiles), key analysis assumptions, and the protective measures that 

have been considered and implemented. The decision authority must approve proposed mission 

rules and should compare the operational risk to the criteria defined in this document and to other 

applicable mission requirements. When local agreements are in place and the range has 

adequately communicated the content and rationale of RCC Document 321 to the representatives 

of local government, local agreements should govern. This shall not be interpreted as overriding 

any Federal or state laws or regulations. The three-tiered hierarchy of requirements is: 

a. Federal and state laws and regulations. 

b. Local agreements. 

c. RCC Document 321. 

2-6 
 In general, higher-risk operations require a higher level of approval. The Range 

Commander may tolerate risk levels within criteria given herein to secure certain benefits from a 

range activity with the confidence that the risk is properly managed and consistent with “best 

practices.” The outcome of these presentations to the decision authority is the acceptance of 

operational risks by a properly informed decision authority. This acceptance includes a 

determination that the residual operational risk is within tolerable limits. By doing so, it avers/ 

justifies that the proposed conditions for allowing the operation to be initiated and the rules to 

allow the mission to continue to completion comply with “best practices” for ensuring that risk 

falls within accepted levels. 

 The terms of this acceptance and required implementation conditions must be 

documented. The responsible safety office should document a risk assessment to demonstrate 

compliance with the risk management policy applied. 

2.4 Risk Uncertainty 

 The RSG Risk Committee recognizes that there is significant uncertainty in the computed 

risks of rocket launches. Ninety percent confidence bounds describing the uncertainty in the 

computed risk can have a range of several orders of magnitude. For this reason, uncertainty 

cannot be ignored. On the other hand, most of the current risk computation tools are not at a 

level where they compute uncertainty or where the uncertainty results can be trusted. This is a 

significant area to be addressed, but the schedule of the current RCC Document 321 standard did 

not allow for the considerable time required for the launch risk community to produce adequate 

modeling approaches that can respond to uncertainty requirements in risk acceptability. For this 

reason, this standard does not include uncertainty in the risk acceptability requirements, but it is 

understood that uncertainty will be addressed in future versions. In the meantime, the Risk 

Committee encourages the community to develop uncertainty models that can eventually be used 

with risk acceptability standards that require the use of uncertainty. 

2-7 
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2-8 
CHAPTER 3 

ACCEPTABLE RISK CRITERIA 

 This chapter defines acceptable risk criteria for people, aircraft, ships, and spacecraft that 

may be exposed to hazards associated with range flight operations. Hazard thresholds for 

people, aircraft, and ships are provided in Chapter 6 of the supplement. 

 There are two major components of the risk acceptability criteria: a set of performance 

standards for establishing and implementing appropriate risk criteria at a range, followed by a set 

of quantitative standards. The quantitative risk criteria contained in this chapter prescribe limits 

on a per mission and an annual basis. Chapter 4 of the supplement provides guidelines for 

establishing a risk budget for complex missions, such as those that involve multiple launches or 

distinct phases of flight. Chapter 4 also provides guidelines for implementation of these criteria, 

including annual risk management, catastrophe aversion, as well as protection of ships, aircraft, 

and manned spacecraft. 

3.1 Performance Standards 

 Each range must: 

a. Assess the risk to all people from launch and reentry activities in terms of hazard 

severity and mishap probability. Note: Hazardous operations that can be contained 

within a controlled area may not require a risk assessment. 

b. Estimate2 the expected casualties associated with each activity that falls within the 

scope of this document. Additional risk measurements may be useful for range 

operations that are dominated by fatality to ensure fatality risks do not exceed 

acceptable limits. 

c. Document its measure(s) of risk and risk acceptability policy in local requirements 

and policy documentation. 

d. Maintain documentation to demonstrate that its risk measures provide a complete and 

accurate assessment of the risks, to include documentation needed to demonstrate that 

its risk measures: 

(1) Clearly convey the risk for decision makers. 

(2) Are consistent with the measures used by other scientific or regulatory 

communities involved in “comparable involuntary activities” (as described in 

paragraph 2.2.1). 

e. Estimate the risk on a per mission basis, except under special conditions where risk 

management on an annual basis is justified as described below. 

f. Periodically conduct a formal review to ensure that its activities and its mission risk 

acceptability policy are consistent with the annual risk acceptability criteria. 

 

2

 The overall process is a risk assessment, but a particular value (i.e. a point estimate) is referred to as an estimate. 

3-1
3.2 Personnel Protection 

3.2.1 General Public. 

a. Individual Risk Criteria. Individuals must not be exposed to a probability of casualty 

greater than 1E-6 for any single mission3

. If fatality risks are also incorporated into 

the risk management process, then individuals must not be exposed to a probability of 

fatality greater than 0.1E-6 (1E-7) for any single mission. 

b. Collective Risk Criteria. Collective risk for the general public must not exceed a 

casualty expectation of 100E-6 (1E-4) for any single mission3

. If annual risk is 

measured, collective risk for the general public should not exceed a casualty 

expectation of 3000E-6 (3E-3) on an annual basis4

. Risk management using only an 

annual measure of collective risk is only justified for range operations that occur 

frequently and pose low5

 risk on a per mission basis. If fatality risks are also 

incorporated into the risk management process, then the collective risk for the general 

public must not exceed 30E-6 (3E-5) expected fatalities for any single mission. If 

risk management using only annual risks is justified, and fatality risks are also 

incorporated into the risk management process, then the collective risk for the general 

public must not exceed 1000E-6 (1E-3) expected fatalities on an annual basis. 

c. Catastrophic Risk Criteria. Catastrophic risk for the general public6

 should not 

exceed the provisional7 criteria outlined in paragraph 3.6.3. 

3.2.2 Mission Essential and Critical Operations Personnel. 

a. Individual Risk Criteria. Individual mission essential and individual critical 

operations personnel must not be exposed to a probability of casualty greater than 

10E-6 (1E-5) for any single mission. If fatality risks are also incorporated into the 

risk management process, then individual mission essential and critical operations 

personnel must not be exposed to a probability of fatality greater than 1E-6 for any 

single mission. 

b. Collective Risk Criteria. Collective risk for mission essential and critical operations 

personnel must not exceed a casualty expectation of 300E-6 (3E-4) for any single 

mission. If annual risk is measured, collective risk for mission essential and critical 

operations personnel must not exceed a casualty expectation of 30000E-6 (3E-2) on 

an annual basis1

. Risk management using only an annual measure of collective risk is 

 

3

 If a flight operation creates a toxic risk, then the range must separately ensure the allowable level of risk enforced 

by them does not exceed other standards for toxic exposure limits for the general public when appropriate 

mitigations are in place. Chapter 8 of the Supplement provides an approach for implementing this requirement. 4

 Chapter 4 of the supplement provides guidelines to assist in the implementation of annual risk management. 

5

 In this context, “low risk” means approximately two orders of magnitude below the per flight criteria for collective 

and individual risks. 

6

 This includes people in any transportation system, such as ships and aircraft, as described in Chapter 4 of the 

supplement. 

7

 The Risk Committee intends to investigate this further and the criteria are subject to change in the future. 

3-2
only justified for range operations that occur frequently and pose low4

 risk on a per 

mission basis. If fatality risks are also incorporated into the risk management 

process, then collective risk for mission essential and critical operations personnel 

must not exceed an expected number of fatalities of 300E-6 (3E-4) for any single 

mission. If risk management using only annual risks is justified, and fatality risks 

are also incorporated into the risk management process, then the collective risk for 

mission essential and critical operations personnel should not exceed 

10000E-6 (1E-2) expected fatalities on an annual basis. 

c. Catastrophic Risk Criteria. Catastrophic risk for mission essential and critical 

operations personnel should not exceed the provisional criteria outlined in 

paragraph 3.6.4. 

3.3 Aircraft Protection 8

3.3.1 Non-Mission Aircraft Criteria. 

a. Non-Mission Aircraft Hazard Volumes. Non-mission aircraft will be restricted9

 from 

hazard volumes of airspace where the cumulative probability of impact of debris 

capable of causing a casualty on an aircraft 10 exceeds 0.1E-6 (1E-7) for all nonmission aircraft. As an alternative to protecting against a probability of impact, nonmission aircraft will be restricted from hazard volumes that exceed the individual risk 

criteria given in 3.2.1a and the catastrophe criterion given in 3.6.3.

11 

b. Non-Mission Aircraft Risk Criteria. The individual and collective risks posed to the 

general public in any aircraft must comply with the criteria given in 3.2.1. 

 

3.3.2 Mission Essential Aircraft Criteria. 

a. Mission Essential Aircraft Hazard Volumes. Mission essential aircraft will be 

restricted 9

 from hazard volumes of airspace where the cumulative probability of 

impact of debris capable of causing a casualty on an aircraft exceeds 1E-6 for all 

mission essential aircraft. As an alternative to protecting against a probability of 

 

8

 Chapter 4 of the supplement provides important guidelines on the proper implementation of aircraft protection 

measures. 

9

 In this context restricted from means that the range will (1) ensure that appropriate warnings/restrictions are issued 

through the FAA, and (2) not proceed with the hazardous activity if the range has knowledge that any aircraft hazard 

volume is violated. 

10 Chapter 6 of the supplement provides threshold values to help define such debris. 

11 The supplement explains how hazard areas can be defined using probability of impact values and demonstrate 

compliance with 3.3.1.2. A range may prefer to use other methods that demonstrate compliance with the individual 

and collective risk criteria. In any case, the individual and collective risk criteria requirements always apply to all 

people, regardless of transportation mode. 

3-3
impact, mission essential aircraft will be restricted from hazard volumes that exceed 

the individual risk criteria given in 3.2.1a and the catastrophe criterion given in 

3.6.4.

12

b. Mission Essential Aircraft Risk Criteria. The individual and collective risks posed to 

mission essential personnel in any aircraft must comply with the criteria given 

in 3.2.2. 

3.3.3. Aircraft Hazard Volumes for Planned Debris Releases. The range must confirm that 

Notices to Airmen are issued that encompass the volume and duration necessary to protect from 

each planned debris release13 capable of causing an aircraft accident.14

3.3.4. Mishap Response. The range must coordinate with the FAA to ensure timely 

notification15 of any expected air traffic hazard associated with range activities. In the event of a 

mishap, the range must immediately inform the FAA of the volume and duration of airspace 

where an aircraft hazard is predicted. 

3.4 Ship Protection16

 The term "ship" includes boats and watercraft of all sizes. 

3.4.1 Non-Mission Ship Criteria. 

a. Non-Mission Ship Hazard Areas. Non-mission ships will be restricted17 from hazard 

areas where the probability of impact of debris capable of causing a casualty 18

exceeds 10E-6 (1E-5) for non-mission ships. Non-mission ships should also be 

restricted from hazard areas where the cumulative probability of impact of debris 

capable of causing a catastrophic accident19 exceeds 1E-6 for all non-mission ships. 

 

12 The supplement explains how hazard areas can be defined using probability of impact values and demonstrate 

compliance with 3.3.2.2. A range may prefer to use other methods that demonstrate compliance with the individual 

and collective risk criteria. In any case, the individual and collective risk criteria requirements always apply to all 

people, regardless of transportation mode. 

13 Planned debris releases includes intercept debris, jettisons stages, nozzle covers, fairings, inter-stage hardware, 

etc. 

14 Federal law (49 CFR 830.2) defines an aircraft accident as “an occurrence associated with the operation of an 

aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such 

persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives 

substantial damage.” As described in the glossary, federal law also defines death, serious injury, and substantial 

damage for the purposes of accident reporting. 

15 This may be accomplished through preflight analyses and coordination as described in Chapter 4 of the 

supplement. 

16 Chapter 4 of the supplement provides important guidelines on the proper implementation of ship protection 

measures. 

17 In this context restricted from means that the range will (1) ensure that appropriate warnings/restrictions are 

issued through the USCG or other appropriate authorities, and (2) not proceed with the hazardous activity if it has 

knowledge that any ship hazard area is violated. 18 This includes any debris capable of producing a casualty to an unsheltered person. 

19 In the absence of valid ship vulnerability modeling, this includes any debris capable of deck penetration as 

described in Chapters 4 and 6 the supplement to this standard. 

3-4
As an alternative to protecting against a probability of impact, non-mission ships will 

be restricted from hazard areas that exceed the individual risk criteria given in 3.2.1a

and the catastrophe criterion given in 3.6.3. 

b. Non-Mission Ship Risk Criteria. The individual and collective risks posed to the 

general public in any ship must comply with the criteria given in paragraph 3.2.1. 

3.4.2 Mission Essential Ship Criteria. 

a. Mission Essential Ship Hazard Areas. Mission essential ships will restricted17 from 

hazard areas where the probability of impact of debris capable of causing a casualty 

exceeds 100E-6 (1E-4) for mission essential ships. Mission essential ships should 

also be restricted from hazard areas where the cumulative probability of impact of 

debris capable of causing a catastrophic accident exceeds 1E-5 for all mission ships. 

As an alternative to protecting against a probability of impact, mission essential ships 

will be restricted from hazard areas that exceed the individual risk criteria given in 

paragraph 3.2.1a and the catastrophe criterion given in paragraph 3.6.4. 

b. Mission Essential Ship Risk Criteria. The individual and collective risk posed to the 

mission essential personnel in any ship must comply with the criteria given in 

paragraph 3.2.2. 

3.4.3 Ship Hazard Areas for Debris Releases. The range must confirm that notices to mariners 

are issued that encompass the area and duration necessary to protect from each planned debris 

impact capable of causing a ship accident. 

3.4.4 Mishap Response. The range must coordinate with the USCG or other appropriate 

authorities to ensure timely notification of any ship traffic hazard associated with range 

activities. In the event of a mishap, the range must promptly inform the appropriate authority(s) 

of the area and duration of navigable waters where a ship hazard is predicted. 

3.5 Spacecraft Protection 

 Manned spacecraft shall be protected by: (1) not exceeding a probability of impact 

greater than 1E-6 per spacecraft, or (2) ensuring an ellipsoidal miss-distance of 200 km in-track 

and 50 km cross track and radially, or (3) ensuring a spherical miss-distance of 200 km. A 

spacecraft is considered manned if it is currently occupied, or expected to be occupied, and 

includes spacecraft en route to, and in support of, manned missions. 

 For objects (including launch vehicle, payload, jettisoned components, or planned debris) 

launched into a sustainable orbit, the duration of the conjunction assessment required for manned 

spacecraft protection shall be applied from launch through orbit insertion plus an analyst defined 

number of revolutions to account for (1) the type orbit the vehicle or component is injected into, 

operating in, or passing through, (2) its altitude exceeding the manned spacecraft altitude by the 

appropriate miss-distance, and (3) a sufficient time for the object to be catalogued. Prior 

coordination with 1st SPCS may allow an earlier time for the object to be catalogued and thereby 

result in a shorter duration for the conjunction assessment required to be performed for the 

3-5
launch range. Besides the launch vehicle and payload, conjunction assessments must include all 

components jettisoned during the launch and intentionally propagated debris. 

 The vulnerability of the spacecraft must be accounted for in the risk assessment and the 

minimum debris size ascertained from the spacecraft operator whenever practicable. Otherwise, 

the spacecraft should be considered vulnerable to the current minimum debris size of 1mm or 

greater. 

3.6 Catastrophic Risk Protection 

 Catastrophic risk criteria are designed to protect against scenarios involving numerous 

casualties. The following provisional catastrophic risk criteria are suggested guidelines to 

supplement the collective and individual risk criteria given in paragraph 3.2. Catastrophic risk 

assessments are especially useful for pre-flight analyses intended to evaluate and mitigate 

potentially catastrophic outcomes. 

3.6.1 General. Missions must be permitted only when the catastrophic risks are consistent with 

the policy objectives given in paragraph 2.2. 

 

3.6.2 Ship and Aircraft Hazard Areas. If ships and aircraft are excluded from the hazard 

areas designed to protect against excessive probability of impact limits provided in paragraph 3.3

and paragraph 3.4 in accordance with the guidelines set in Chapter 4 of the supplement, then the 

catastrophic risks to ships and aircraft are consistent with the policy objectives given in 

paragraph 2.2. 

3.6.3 General Public Criteria. Catastrophic risks for the general public should not exceed the 

following provisional criteria: 

 (Eqn 3-1) 5.1 4 10− NP ≤×

 where 

P is the cumulative probability of all events capable of causing N or more 

casualties. 

N is number of casualties, based on the occupant load as defined in Table 3-1. 

10-4 is the maximum acceptable expected casualties as defined in 3.2.1b. 

 Figure 3-1 shows the relationship between P and N for the general public that satisfies 

 this criterion. 

3-6
TABLE 3-1. DEFINITIONS USED TO DEFINE 

TOLERABLE CATASTROPHIC RISKS 

Population Type Catastrophic Outcome Occupant Load (N) 

Public Aircraft An occurrence resulting in multiple 

fatalities20, usually with the loss of the 

airplane21

Maximum occupancy 

Mission Essential or 

Critical Aircraft 

An occurrence resulting in multiple 

fatalities, usually with the loss of the 

airplane 

Expected occupancy 

Public Ship An occurrence resulting in multiple 

casualties, usually with loss of the ship 

Maximum occupancy 

Mission Essential or 

Critical Ship 

An occurrence resulting in multiple 

casualties, usually with loss of the ship 

Expected occupancy 

Public Land Vehicle An occurrence resulting in multiple 

casualties, usually with loss of the vehicle 

Maximum occupancy 

Mission Essential or 

Critical Land 

Vehicle 

An occurrence resulting in multiple 

casualties, usually with loss of the vehicle 

Expected occupancy 

Public Train An occurrence resulting in multiple 

casualties, usually with loss of the train 

Maximum occupancy 

Mission Essential or 

Critical Train 

An occurrence resulting in multiple 

casualties, usually with loss of the train 

Expected occupancy 

Public Gatherings22 An occurrence resulting in multiple 

casualties 

Maximum credible 

occupancy 

Mission Essential or 

Critical Personnel 

Gathering 

An occurrence resulting in multiple 

casualties 

Expected occupancy 

 

20 FAA also has a formal definition for "severe consequence:" forced landing (which is also formally defined), loss 

of aircraft while occupants are on-board, serious injuries (as formally defined), or fatalities 21 FAA Advisory Circular 39-8 

22 Public gathering places subject to catastrophic accidents include any locations where population concentrations 

may occur, such as schools, hospitals, stadiums, beaches, etc. 

3-7
y he Probabilit Allowable Catastro

p

Number of Exposed People 

Figure 3-1. Tolerable catastrophe risks for the general public. 

3.6.4 Mission Essential and Critical Operations Personnel Criteria. Catastrophic risks for 

mission essential and critical operations personnel should not exceed the following provisional 

criteria: 

 (Eqn 3-2) 5.1 4 103 − NP ×≤×

 where 

P is the cumulative probability of all events capable of causing N or more 

casualties. 

N is number of casualties, based on the occupant load as defined in 

Table 3-1. 

3 x 10-4 is the maximum acceptable expected casualties as defined in 3.2.2b. 

3.7 Criteria Summary 

 Table 3-2 below summarizes the criteria defined by this document. All of the criteria are 

considered mandatory requirements except those highlighted by an asterisk, which are advisory 

requirements that may be considered mandatory under certain circumstances (as explained in 

Chapter 4 of the Supplement to this document. 

3-8
TABLE 3-2. SUMMARY OF COMMONALITY CRITERIA 

General Public Mission Essential and Critical 

Operations Personnel 

Max. 

Acceptable Undesired Event 

Max. 

Acceptable Undesired Event 

1E-6b Individual Probability 

of Casualty 

10E-6 Individual Probability 

of Casualty 

100E-6 b Expected Casualties 300E-6 Expected Casualties 

0.1E-6a Individual Probability 

of Fatality 

1E-6 a Individual Probability 

of Fatality 

30E-6 a Expected Fatalities 300E-6 a Expected Fatalities 

0.1E-6 Probability of Aircraft 

Impact 

1E-6 Probability of Aircraft 

Impact 

10E-6 Probability of Ship 

Impact 

100E-6 Probability of Ship 

Impact 

Per 

Mission 

- - - - - - 1E-6 Manned Spacecraft 

3000E-6 Expected Casualties 30000E-6 Expected Casualties Annual 

1000E-6 a Expected Fatalities 10000E-6 a Expected Fatalities 

a

 Advisory Requirements. 

b

 If a flight operation creates a toxic risk, then the range must separately ensure the 

allowable level of risk enforced by them does not exceed other standards for toxic 

exposure limits for the general public when appropriate mitigations are in place. 

Chapter 8 of the Supplement provides an approach for implementing this requirement. 

3-9
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3-10
REFERENCES 

a. United States Code 

 10USC Armed Forces 

 28USC Part IV Judiciary and Judicial Procedures, Particular 

Proceedings (Federal Tort Claims Act) 

 29USC Labor (Occupational Safety and Health Act) 

b. Department of Defense 

 DoD Directive 3100.10 Space Policy 

 DoD Instruction 3100.12 Space Support 

 DoD Directive 3200.11 Major Range and Test Facility Base 

 DoD Directive 4715.1 Environmental Security 

 DoD Instruction 6055.1 DoD Safety and Occupational Health Program 

c. Department of the Army 

 AR 385-10 The Army Safety Program 

 FM 100-14 Risk Management 

d. Department of the Air Force 

 AFI 90-901 Operational Risk Management 

 AFPD 91-2 Safety Programs 

 AFPD 63-12 Assurance of Occupational Safety, Suitability, and 

Effectiveness 

 AFPAM 90-902 Operational Risk Management Guidelines and 

Tools 

e. Department of the Navy 

 OPNAVINST 3900.39B Operational Risk Management 

 NPR 8715 NASA Procedural Requirements: Range Safety 

f. Range Commanders Council 

 RCC 316-98 Laser Range Safety 

 RCC 319-99 Flight Termination Systems Commonality Standard 

 RCC 323-99 Range Safety Criteria for Unmanned Air Vehicles 

g. Environmental Protection Agency 

 EPA 100-B-00-002 Risk Characterization Handbook 
This page intentionally left blank. 
GLOSSARY 

3-sigma: Three times the standard deviation, typically referenced to the mean value. 

Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS): An anatomically based, consensus derived, global severity 

scoring system that classifies each injury in every body region according to its relative 

importance on a 6 point ordinal scale. 

Acceptable risk: A predetermined criterion or standard for a maximum risk ceiling which 

permits the evaluation of cost, national priority interests, and number of tests to be conducted.

Accumulated risk: The combined collective risk to all individuals exposed to a particular 

hazard through all phases of an operation. Guidance Information is as follows: 

• For the flight of an expendable orbital launch vehicle, risk should be accumulated 

from liftoff through orbital insertion. 

• For the flight of a suborbital launch vehicle, risk should be accumulated from liftoff 

through the impact of all pieces of the launch vehicle, including the payload. 

Aggregated risk: The accumulated risk due to all hazards associated with a flight. Guidance 

Information is that, for a specified launch, aggregated risk includes, but is not limited to, the risk 

due to debris impact, toxic release, and distant focusing of blast overpressure.

As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP): That level of risk which can be lowered further 

only by an increment in resource expenditure that cannot be justified by the resulting decrement 

in risk. Often identified or verified by formal or subjective application of cost-benefit or multiattribute utility theory. 

Background Risk: risks voluntarily accepted in the course of normal activities. 

Best practice: There are two definitions: 

• A management idea which asserts that there is a technique, method, process, activity, 

incentive (or reward), that is more effective at delivering a particular outcome than 

any other technique, method, process, etc. The idea is that with proper processes, 

checks, and testing, a project can be rolled out and completed with fewer problems 

and unforeseen complications. 

• An acceptable level of effort that represents the best choice available given the 

circumstances. 

Casualty: A serious injury or worse, including death, for a human. For the purposes of this 

standard, serious injury is defined as Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) Level 3 or greater except 

where prior general practice at the range has been to protect to a lesser level of injury than AIS 

level 3, such as eardrum protection.

Casualty expectation: See Expected Casualties
Catastrophe: Any event that produces a large numbers of casualties or has a severe impact on 

continued range operations.

Clearance Zone: An area or volume from which objects at risk (people, ships, aircraft, etc.) are 

to be restricted or eliminated in order to control the risks. 

Collective risk: The total risk to all individuals exposed to any hazard from an operation. 

Unless otherwise noted, collective risk is the mean number of casualties (EC) predicted to result 

from all hazards associated with an operation. Collective risk is specified as either for a mission 

or per year. The collective risk should include the aggregated and accumulated risk.

Collision Avoidance (COLA): The process of determining and implementing a course of action 

to avoid potential on-orbit collisions with manned objects or with other specified orbiting 

objects. The process includes the determination of wait periods in either the launch window or 

spacecraft thrust firings based on validated conjunction assessments or risk analyses and 

accounts for uncertainties in spatial dispersions and arrival time of the orbiting objects and/or 

launch vehicle. 

Conjunction Assessment (CA): The process of determining the point of closest approach of 

two orbiting objects, or between a launch vehicle and an orbiting object, in association with a 

specified miss-distance screening criteria or the corresponding probability of collision. 

Associated with the closest approach assessment is the closest approach distance, the times of 

launch or orbital firing that would result in the closest approach, and meeting the miss-distance 

or collision probability criteria. 

Conservatism: As used in risk analysis conservative modeling, conservatism is a set of 

modeling assumptions that overstates the risk by overstating event probabilities, hazard 

probabilities, or consequences. Conservatism refers to the degree of overstating risk. 

Containment: The launch safety strategy/process of minimizing risk to the maximum extent 

practical by keeping hazardous operations within defined hazard areas that are unpopulated or 

where the population is controlled and adequate protection can be provided to highly valued 

resources; to stop, hold, or surround a hazard.

Critical operations personnel: Critical Operations Personnel include persons not essential 

to the specific operation or launch currently being conducted, but who are required to perform 

safety, security, or other critical tasks at the range. To be treated as Critical Operations Personnel 

they must be notified of a neighboring hazardous operation and either trained in mitigation 

techniques or accompanied by a properly trained escort. Critical Operations Personnel do not 

include individuals in training for any job or individuals performing routine activities such as 

administrative, maintenance, or janitorial. Critical Operations Personnel may occupy safety 

clearance zones and hazardous launch areas and may not need to be evacuated with the general 

public. Critical Operations Personnel should be included in the same risk category as Mission 

Essential Personnel.
Decision Authority: The Range Commander or senior official designated by the Range 

Commander to make risk decisions on his or her behalf.

Distant focusing: An atmospheric phenomenon that can produce greatly enhanced overpressure 

due to sonic velocity gradients with respect to altitude.

Endoatmospheric: Within the Earth’s atmosphere; generally considered to be those altitudes 

below 100 km. 

Exoatmospheric: Outside the Earth’s atmosphere; generally considered to be those altitudes 

above 100 km. 

Expected casualties: The mean number of casualties predicted to occur as a result of an 

operation if the operation were to be repeated many times. This risk is expressed with the 

following notation: 1E-7 = 10-7 = 1 in ten million. 

Expected fatalities: The mean number of fatalities predicted to occur as a result of an operation 

if the operation were to be repeated many times. This risk is expressed with the following 

notation: 1E-7 = 10-7 = 1 in ten million. 

Fatal injury: any injury that results in death within 30 days of the accident. 

Fragmentation: The break up of an in-flight vehicle into fragments (components of the vehicle, 

pieces of the structure, chunks of solid propellant, miscellaneous hardware, etc.) due to explosive 

loads, aerodynamic and inertial loads, activation of a flight termination system, intercept with 

another vehicle, or impact on a surface.

Federal Tort Claims Act: A statute that limits federal sovereign immunity and allows recovery 

in federal court for tort damages caused by federal employees, but only if the law of the state 

where the injury occurred would hold a private person liable for the injury 28 USCA 2671-2680. 

Also FTCA.]

Fidelity: The accuracy of the representation when compared to the real world. 

Flight Termination System (FTS): The airborne portion of the Flight Safety System. A flight 

termination system ends the flight of a vehicle and consists of the entire system on an airborne 

vehicle used to receive, decode, and execute the ground signals. It includes all wiring, power 

systems, and methods or devices (including inadvertent separation destruct systems) used to 

terminate flight. 

General Public: People who are not declared/identified as mission essential personnel or 

critical operations personnel. This includes the public plus range personnel not essential to a 

mission, visitors, press, and personnel/dependents living on the base/facility. 

Hazard: Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death of personnel, or 

damage to or loss of equipment or property.
Hazard threshold: The lowest level at which adverse outcomes are expected to appear. 

Hazard area: A geographical or geometrical surface area that is susceptible to a hazard from a 

planned event or unplanned malfunction. 

Hazard volume: A geographical or geometrical volume of airspace that is susceptible to a 

hazard from a planned event or unplanned malfunction. 

Hazardous operation: Those activities, which, by their nature, expose personnel or property to 

dangers not normally, experienced in day-to-day actions. 

Impact: The impingement of a fragment on a surface, a structure, a person, or a vehicle. 

Inadvertent Separation Destruct System (ISDS): a specialized form of ADS located on 

vehicle components that automatically activates when inadvertent separation of the component 

from the main vehicle is sensed. There is often a built-in delay included, in hope that the 

separated component will be sufficiently displaced at charge activation to preclude damage to the 

main vehicle.

Individual risk: Individual risk is the risk that a person will suffer a consequence. Unless 

otherwise noted, individual risk is expressed as the probability that an individual will become a 

casualty due to all hazards (PC) from an operation at a specific location. Guidance Information is 

that: 

• If each person in a group is subject to the same individual risk, then the collective risk 

may be computed as the individual risk multiplied by the number of people in the 

group. 

• In the context of this document, individual risk refers to the probability that the 

exposed individual will become a casualty as a result of all hazards from a mission.

Informed decision: The “informed decision” principle is used in tort claims against the U.S. 

Government. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) enjoins the U.S. court system from secondguessing decisions made by properly authorized government officials in determining the 

acceptability of operational risks. A key test under the FTCA requires that the decision-making 

official be fully advised and informed of the known risks. Failure to fully advise the decisionmaking authority of known risks can result in liability of the U.S. Government or its officials. 

Involuntary activity: No choice was made by the person affected which placed them in a 

position of increased risk; or the activity participated in or the item used was one that is generally 

done or used by more than 99% of the population. Examples: bathing, using coins, or drinking 

glasses. 

Manned spacecraft: a spacecraft that is either currently occupied or intended to be occupied. 

Includes spacecraft en route to, and in support of, manned missions. 
Mishap: An unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, injury, occupational illness, 

or damage to or loss of equipment or property or damage to the environment. 

Mission: A flight test or operation. It may include multiple vehicles or all phases of the flight 

beginning with liftoff/launch. See the supplement Section 4.2.4 for details on defining a mission 

for risk assessment. 

Mission essential: Those persons and assets necessary to safely and successfully complete a 

specific hazardous operation or launch.

Mission rules: Rules that define safety constraints and conditions and establish the boundaries 

within which the safety team operates. The lead safety organization develops the mission rules 

and briefs the range user to ensure a complete understanding of the intent and application of 

them. Mission rules are documented and become part of the range safety plan.

Overpressure: The pressure caused by an explosion over and above normal atmospheric 

pressure. It can be significantly affected by the atmospheric conditions, particularly the 

temperature and wind profiles. 

Probability of casualty: The likelihood that a person will suffer a serious injury or worse, 

including a fatal injury, from a hazardous event. This risk is expressed with the following 

notation: 1E-7 = 10-7 = 1 in ten million. 

Probability of fatality: The likelihood that a person will die from a hazardous event. This risk 

is expressed with the following notation: 1E-7 = 10-7 = 1 in ten million. 

Prudent person: See Reasonable Person 

Range Safety System (RSS): The ground-based portion of the Flight Safety System. An 

integrated system of hardware, software, and human operators which is necessary to provide 

mission safety support. Includes instrumentation and communication infrastructure needed to 

fulfill safety’s flight control responsibility. See also Flight Safety System and Flight Termination 

System

Reasonable care: As a test of liability for negligence, the degree of care that a prudent and 

competent person engaged in the same line of business or endeavor would exercise under similar 

circumstances - Also termed due care; ordinary care; adequate care; proper care. 

Reasonable person: A hypothetical person used as a legal standard, especially to determine if 

someone acted with negligence. The reasonable person acts sensibly, does things without 

serious delay, and takes proper but not excessive precautions. Also termed Reasonable Man or 

Prudent Person. 

Reentry: The event occurring when a spacecraft or other object comes back into the sensible 

atmosphere after going to higher altitudes.
Risk: Risk is a measure that accounts for both the probability of occurrence and the 

consequence of a hazard to a population or installation. Unless otherwise noted, risk to people is 

measured in casualties and expressed as individual risk or collective risk.

Risk analysis: A study of potential risk under a given set of conditions. Risk Analysis is an 

activity that includes the complete array of tasks from data gathering, identification of hazards, 

estimation of associated risks, and verification of results. 

Risk management: Risk management is a systematic and logical process to identify hazards and 

control the risk they pose. 

Risk profile: A plot that shows the probability of an accident causing a given number of 

casualties (vertical axis) vs. the number of casualties (horizontal axis). The area under the plot is 

a measure of the casualty expectation. When a catastrophe-averse function is plotted on the 

same graph, the presence or absence of catastrophic risk is indicated.

Safety: Relative protection from adverse consequences.

Serious injury: Any injury that meets one or more of the following: 

• Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the 

date the injury was received. 

• Results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose). 

• Causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage. 

• Involves any internal organ. 

• Involves second degree or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 

percent of the body surface.

Ship Accident: A “ship accident” occurs if the vessel is involved in an accident that results in 

loss of life, personal injury that requires medical treatment beyond first aid, or complete loss of 

the vessel. This definition is consistent with the level of protection afforded people involved in a 

“boat accident” as defined in current regulations. 

Sigma: Standard deviation. 

Substantial damage: Relating to aircraft vulnerability means damage or failure that adversely 

affects the structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and that 

would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component. 

Toxic substance: A chemical or mixture that may present an unreasonable risk of injury to 

health or the environment. 

Toxics: A Generic term for the toxic propellants and combustion by-products resulting from a 

nominal launch vehicle flight or catastrophic launch abort. 
Uncertainty: The absence of perfectly detailed knowledge. Uncertainty includes incertitude 

(the exact value is unknown) and variability (the value is changing). Uncertainty may also 

include other forms such as vagueness, ambiguity, and fuzziness (in the sense of borderline 

cases).

Variability: Observed differences attributable to true heterogeneity or diversity. Variability is 

the result of natural random processes and is usually not reducible by further measurement or 

study (although it can be better characterized).

Verification: refers to the set of activities that ensure that software correctly implements a 

specific function. The verification process determines whether a computer simulation code for a 

particular problem accurately represents the solutions of the mathematical model. Evidence is 

collected to ascertain whether the numerical model is being solved correctly. This process 

ensures that sound software-quality practices are used and the software codes themselves are free 

of defects and errors. It also checks that the code is correctly solving the mathematical equations 

in the algorithms and verifies that the time and space steps or zones chosen for the mathematical 

model are sufficiently resolved. 

Voluntary activity: The person affected made a choice that placed them in an increased 

position of risk compared to the rest of the population. This includes career and job choices. 

Examples include repetitive motion injuries, recreational boating, etc.