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 ORDER - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

EON-NET, L.P., 

Plaintiff, 

v.

FLAGSTAR BANCORP, INC., 

Defendant. 

CASE NO. C05-2129RSM

ORDER ON MOTION FOR FEES AND

COSTS 

This matter is before the Court for consideration of defendant Flagstar Bancorp, Inc.’s

(“Flagstar”) motion for attorney’s fees, filed pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285. Dkt. # 172. This statute

provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a patent case in “exceptional

circumstances.” Plaintiff has opposed the motion. The Court deems oral argument unnecessary and, for

the reasons set forth below, shall grant the motion.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this matter are well-known to the parties and will be recited only as necessary to the

resolution of the present motion. Plaintiff Eon-Net, L.P., (“Eon-Net”) is one of three patent-holding

companies formed to enforce various continuation or divisional patents arising from an original filing in

1991 by inventors Mitchell Medina, Robert Lech, and Catherine Elias. The patents are all titled

“Information Processing Methodology” and all share the same specification. The first patent, Patent No.
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1

 More recently-filed documents describe Eon-Net as organized under the laws of the British

Virgin Islands, with its principal place of business at Tortola, British Virgin islands. Dkt. # 108. 

2

 Electronic dockets of cases filed in district courts around the United States are available to this

Court, as well as to the public, through PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records). 

3

1:96-cv-08251-MBM Millennium, L.P. v. Compaq Computer Corp.; 1:99-cv-01577-JSM

Millennium, L.P. v. Cardiff Software; 1:00-cv-5908-RCC Millennium, L.P. v. Captive Software; 1:01-

cv-03734-JGK Millennium, L.P. v. Readsoft AB, et al.; 1:02-cv-10102-LTS-AJP Millennium, L.P. v.

Top Image Systems, et al; 1:03-cv-01838-RWS Millennium, L.P. v. Dakota Imaging, Inc.; 

1:03-cv-01839-SHS Millennium, L.P. v. Recognition Research; 1:03-cv-01840-JES Millennium, L.P. v.

Datacap Inc.; 1:03-cv-03899-GBD Millennium, L.P. v. Anydoc Software; 1:03-cv-03900-DC

Millennium, L.P. v. Hyland Software; 1:03-cv-07311-NRB Millennium, L.P. v. Filenet Corporation; 

1:03-cv-08563-HB Millennium, L.P. v. Ceresoft, Inc. ; 1:03-cv-08564-DAB Millennium, L.P. v.

Laserfiche Document; 1:03-cv-08565-RMB Millennium, L.P. v. Optika Inc.; 1:04-cv-02860-HB

Millennium, L.P. v. Impression Technology, Inc.; 1:04-cv-02861-WHP Millennium, L.P. v. SER

Solutions, Inc.; 1:04-cv-03116-RJH Millennium, L.P. v. Scansoft, Inc.; 1:04-cv-03117-RJH

Millennium, L.P. v. Docubase Systems; 1:04-cv-03142-DAB Millennium, L.P. v. ISYS Papyrus

America, Inc.; 1:04-cv-06062-GEL Millennium, L.P. v. Newgen Software Inc.; 1:04-cv-06104-DC

Millennium, L.P. v. Scan-Optics, Inc.; 1:05-cv-02282-JGK Millennium, L.P. v. R2K, Inc.; 

1:05-cv-03094-HB Millennium, L.P. v. I.R.I.S., Inc.; 1:05-cv-03330-SAS Millennium L.P. v. Oyster

Software, Inc.; 1:05-cv-04891-KMW Millennium, L.P. v. Verity, Inc.; 1:05-cv-05040-DC Millennium,

L.P. v. Optical Image Technology, Inc.; 1:05-cv-05436-GEL Millennium, L.P. v. Comcom Systems,

Inc.; 1:05-cv-05881-RPP Millennium, L.P. v. Cedartech, Inc.; 1:05-cv-08339-NRB Millennium L.P. v.

Mindwrap, Inc.; 1:05-cv-09942-GBD Millennium, L.P. v. Documentum, Inc.; 1:06-cv-00522-GEL

Millennium, L.P. v. Hewlett-Packard Company; 1:06-cv-00964-LMM Millennium, L.P. v. Captaris,

Inc.; 1:07-cv-04061-RWS Millennium, L.P. v. Columbiasoft Corporation; 1:07-cv-04800-BSJ-FM

Millennium, L.P. v. Vignette Corporation; 1:07-cv-08183-LTS Millennium, L.P. v. Document Imaging

Solutions, Inc.; 1:08-cv-00384-DLC Millennium, L.P. v. Charactell, Inc.; 1:08-cv-02945-WHP

Millennium, L.P. et al v. Pitney Bowes Inc.; 1:08-cv-10691-GBD Millennium, L.P. v. Marex Group,

Inc; 1:09-cv-06104-MGC Millennium, L.P. v. SpringCm; 1:09-cv-06857-RMB Millennium, L.P. v.

A2iA Corp.; and 7:05-cv-08049-CM Millennium, L.P. v. Image Access, Inc.

 ORDER - 2

5,258,855 (“ ‘855 patent”) and four subsequent patents were assigned to Millennium L.P.

(“Millennium”), a limited partnership organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands. Three

subsequent continuation patents, the three at issue in this action, were assigned to another Cayman

Island limited partnership, Eon-Net.1 It appears that a third company, Glory Licensing LLC, a limited

liability company formed under the laws of the Island of Nevis, has been formed to enforce two

recently-issued continuation or divisional patents, Patent No. 7,570,383, issued August 4, 2009, and

Patent No. 7,619,768, issued November 17, 2009. See, e.g., Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.,

Cause No. 2:09-CV-4252 (S.D.N.Y.)2

According to the electronic dockets of the United States District Courts for the Southern District

of New York and the District of New Jersey, Millennium has filed at least forty-one cases in New York

against various companies, alleging infringement of one or more of the patents assigned to it.3 Another
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2:03-cv-05141-JCL-MF Millennium, L.P., v. Fairfax Imaging, Inc; 2:04-cv-01896-JLL-RJH 

Millennium, L.P., v. Science Applications International Corporation; 05-cv-01063-HAA-GDH

Millennium, L.P., v. Abbyy USA; 2:05-cv-01576-WJM-RJH Millennium, L.P., v. Autodata Systems; 

2:05-cv-01706-HAA-GDH Millennium, L.P., v. 170 Systems, Inc.; 2:05-cv-02718-KSH-PS 

Millennium, L.P., v. Optio Software, Inc.; 2:05-cv-02926-WJM-RJH Millennium, L.P., v. Creative

ICR, Inc.; 2:05-cv-04654-WJM-RJH Millennium, L.P., v. SSI Group, Inc.; 

2:05-cv-05574-WHW-SDW Millennium, L.P., v. Eastman Kodak Company; 2:06-cv-00322-JLL-CCC 

Millennium, L.P., v. Doculex, Inc.; 2:09-cv-03159-FSH-PS Millennium, L.P., v. eCopy, Inc.; 

3:07-cv-04424-JAP-JJH Millennium, L.P., v. Imaging Business Machines, LLC; 

3:08-cv-06079-FLW-LHG Millennium, L.P., v. Pegasus Imaging Corporation. 

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In the Southern District of New York: 1:04-cv-03665-RWS Eon-Net, L.P. v. Homecenter.com; 

1:04-cv-03667-TPG Eon-Net, L.P. v. Black Hound New York; 1:05-cv-01954-LMM Eon-Net, L.P. v.

Redenvelope, Inc.; 1:05-cv-02049-LAK Eon-Net, L.P. v. Ing Bank; 1:05-cv-08340-JGK Eon-Net, L.P.

v. Sawhorse Enterprises, Inc.; 1:05-cv-08471-JGK Eon-Net, L.P. v. Somethingsexyplant.com; 

1:06-cv-00536-TPG Eon-Net, L.P. v. A18 Corporation; 1:06-cv-00621-LAK Eon-Net, L.P. v. Gristedes

Foods, Inc.; 1:06-cv-00929-RMB Eon-Net, L.P. v. J& R Electronics Inc.; 1:06-cv-01483-DLC

Eon-Net. L.P. v. The Wine Messenger LLC; 1:06-cv-05891-SHS Eon-Net, L.P. v. Sony Corporation of

America; 1:06-cv-05975-LBS Eon-Net, L.P. v. Foot Locker, Inc.; 1:06-cv-06045-RCC Eon-Net, L.P. v.

D'Agostino Supermarkets, Inc.; 1:06-cv-06133-KMK Eon-Net, L.P. v. Hammacher Schlemmer &

Company, Inc.; 1:06-cv-06271-SHS Eon-Net, L.P. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.; 1:07-cv-02822-NRB

Eon-Net, L.P. v. Walgreen Company; 1:07-cv-10488-PKC Eon Net, L.P. v. J.Crew Inc.; 

1:08-cv-03581-RJS Eon-Net, L.P. v. Diascience Corp.; 1:08-cv-06954-JGK Eon-Net, L.P. v. Abazias,

Inc.; 1:09-cv-00043-NRB Eon-Net, L.P. v. Walgreen Company; 1:09-cv-00150-TPG Eon-Net, L.P. v.

B&H Foto & Electronics Corp.; and 7:05-cv-01977-WCC Eon-Net, L.P. v. Random House, Inc.

In the District of New Jersey: 1:06-cv-00584-FLW-AMD Eon-Net, L.P. v. Edmund Optics,

Inc.; 1:07-cv-05578-NLH-AMD Eon-Net, L.P. v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation; 

2:05-cv-00791-DMC-MF Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp; 2:05-cv-00845-JCL-MF Eon-Net, L.P.

v. Drugstore.Com, Inc.; 2:05-cv-00936-DMC-MF Eon-Net, L.P. v. CoolAnimalStuff; 

2:06-cv-00315-FSH-PS Eon-Net, L.P. v. Linen ‘n Things, Inc.; 2:06-cv-00826-JAG-MCA Eon-Net,

L.P. v. Sommers Plastic Products Co., Inc.; 2:06-cv-03670-PGS-RJH Eon-Net, L.P. v. Liz Claiborne,

Inc.; 2:06-cv-03709-KSH-PS Eon-Net, L.P. v. Sys-Con Media; 2:06-cv-03785-FSH-PS Eon-Net, L.P.

v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; 2:06-cv-03899-JAG-MCA Eon-Net, L.P. v. Staples, Inc.; 

2:07-cv-01633-SDW-MCA Eon-Net, L.P. v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers; 2:08-cv-1427-PGS-ES

Millennium, L.P. and Eon-Net, L.P., v. EMC Corporation; 2:08-cv-01797-JLL-CCC Eon-Net, L.P. v. 

American Airlines, Inc.; 2:08-cv-03896-WJM-MF Eon-Net, L.P. v. US Airways, Inc.; 

2:09-cv-00016-WJM-MF Eon-Net, L.P. v. Sony Corporation of America; 2:09-cv-00063-JLL-CCC 

Eon-Net, L.P. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.; 2:09-cv-00843-DMC-MF Eon-Net, L.P. v. Avis Budget Group,

Inc.; 3:04-cv-03738-MLC-JJH Eon-Net, L.P. v. BabyAge, Inc.; 3:04-cv-03778-MLC-JJH Eon-Net,

L.P. v. Beach Camera, Inc.; 3:06-cv-00376-JAP-JJH Eon-Net, L.P. v. Brother International

Corporation (U.S.A.); and 3:06-cv-03655-FLW-TJB Eon-Net, L.P. v. Anadigics, Inc. 

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1:06-cv-02463-CPS-SMG Eon-Net, L.P. v. Jetblue Airways Corporation; 

1:07-cv-01474-ENV-MDG Eon-Net, L.P. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.; 1:08-cv--01555-FB-RLM Eon-Net,

L.P. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.; 1:09-cv-00871-ENV-VVP Eon-Net, L.P. v. United Airlines, Inc.; 

2:02-cv-03049-JS Millennium, L.P. et al v. Kofax Image Products. 

 ORDER - 3

thirteen were filed by Millennium in the United States District Court in New Jersey.4 According to the

same courts’ records, Eon-Net filed twenty-two cases in each court.5

 Eon-Net has filed four additional

cases in the Eastern District of New York, where Millennium has also filed one.6

 All cases but the first
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 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)

 ORDER - 4

four, filed from 1996 to 2001, appear to have been filed by plaintiff’s present counsel, Jean-Marc

Zimmerman. All these cases—apart from six cases recently filed by Glory Licensing LLC in the three

district courts---are now closed. It appears that to this point, this case is the only one that has been

litigated as far as a “Markman”7

 hearing; all others settled or were dismissed prior to that stage of the

proceedings. In none of the cases has the validity of the patents been tested. 

Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of New

Jersey, alleging infringement of Patent No. 6,683,697 (“ ‘697 patent”). The case was transferred to this

district upon the motion of defendant Flagstar. Dkt. # 1. Subsequent events are summarized by the

Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in its Order remanding the matter to this Court:

After the case was transferred, Flagstar filed a motion for summary judgment contending 

that it was not liable for infringing the '697 patent because it used technology from Kofax 

Image Products, Inc. (“Kofax”) to collect, manage, and process all electronic and hard-copy

documents collected through its website, and because its use of Kofax technology was 

covered by a licensing agreement between Kofax and the entity that subsequently assigned 

the '697 patent to Eon-Net. Flagstar's motion for summary judgment explicitly assumed, 

for purposes of the motion, that the '697 patent as corrected is valid, the “unidentified” 

accused device “includes any products or technologies used by Flagstar to manage and 

process documents received through its website,” and that those products or technologies 

are “within the scope of the claims of the '697 patent.” In its memorandum opposing 

Flagstar's motion, Eon-Net contended that Flagstar did not use Kofax technology to 

perform online banking services on its website, but instead used technology from Digital 

Insight Corporation (“Digital Insight”), so that the “accused online banking services” 

Flagstar offered on its website were not covered by the Kofax license and could not be 

covered by Flagstar's license defense.

The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of Flagstar, 

finding that Eon-Net failed to present facts demonstrating infringement, identify products 

that might infringe the '697 patent, “proffer a reasonable construction” for the '697 patent, 

or apply its construction to the allegedly infringing products. Order Granting Summary 

Judgment, slip op. at 1-2. In its order, the district court defined the ' 697 patent as describing 

and claiming “an interface between ‘hard copy’ documents and computer applications.” 

Id. at 2. The district court noted that the '697 patent specification “describes the extraction 

of information from hard copy documents by scanning the documents, parsing the extracted

information, and formatting the information for use.” Id. The district court also noted that

Eon-Net's complaint is “virtually identical” to thirteen other complaints “filed against parties

with greatly disparate business operations.” Id. at 3. The district court concluded that the 

parties agreed that Kofax software is covered by the license agreement between Kofax and

Flagstar, and that although Eon-Net had alleged in a conclusory fashion that Flagstar's use 

of Digital Insight software on its online banking web pages infringed the '697 patent, there 

was no evidence that the '697 patent covered online banking services. Id. at 6-7.
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 ORDER - 5

Eon-Net filed a motion to reconsider raising the same arguments it has raised in the present

appeal, that summary judgment was inappropriate because the district court improperly 

ignored Flagstar's stipulation that the accused products or technologies fell within the scope 

of the claims of the '697 patent, and improperly limited the claims of the '697 patent to an

interface between hard copy documents and computer applications. The district court denied 

this motion. Eon-Net, LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, No. C 05-2129, 2006 WL 2794307, slip op. 

at 4 (W.D.Wash. Sept. 27, 2006). It rejected Eon-Net's interpretation of Flagstar's motion 

for summary judgment as seeking summary judgment only on the affirmative license 

defense, finding instead that Flagstar had sought summary judgment “because the undisputed

material facts preclude finding Flagstar liable for patent infringement.” Id. at 1. The district 

court explained that because Flagstar met its initial burden to show there was no evidence 

of infringement, Eon-Net had to demonstrate that there was evidence of infringement, but 

its identification of “online banking services” and “Digital Insight” software as infringing

products was not supported by facts. Id. The ruling on the motion to reconsider did not 

reference Eon-Net's arguments about Flagstar's stipulation or the district court's purported 

sua sponte limitation of the '697 patent.

At the same time that it filed its motion for summary judgment, Flagstar filed a motion 

for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 on the basis that Eon-Net 

had failed to investigate or identify allegedly infringing products prior to filing suit and 

had asserted baseless infringement claims. The district court granted Flagstar's motion, 

finding that it “must conclude” that Eon-Net's claims were baseless because Eon-Net 

had not performed a reasonable pre-filing inquiry as required by Rule 11, identified 

or investigated an accused product, or reasonably evaluated the '697 patent's claims. 

Order on Cross-Motions for Sanctions, 239 F.R.D. at 614-19. The district court 

explained that it was “very concerned with Eon-Net's continuing conduct” in filing 

numerous identical complaints without sufficient investigation, and explicitly concluded 

that “indicia of extortion are present in this case.” Id. at 619. The district court awarded 

Flagstar attorneys fees and costs, which the court later found to be $141,984.70. Order 

Setting Sanctions, slip op. at 1.

Eon-Net, L.P., v. Flagstar Bancorp, 249 Fed.Appx 189, 191-194, 2007 WL 2818634 (C.A.Fed), found

at Dkt. # 105. 

At oral argument on the motion for sanctions, the Court tried to determine how Eon-Net

analyzed the accused product on Flagstar’s website. The following colloquy ensued:

THE COURT: What’s the product that you did your analysis on?

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Your Honor, the product is as follows. The product in this case, 

infringing products are the web pages we identified on the Flagstar.com website that 

use HTML technology to extract information using content instructions and transmit 

that extracted information to an application program residing on the Flagstar.com 

server. 

THE COURT: So if I go to the website— 

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: All right? Where am I going to find the product identified?
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 ORDER - 6

MR. ZIMMERMAN: If you go to a web page the server—you go into your browser and 

you’ll see a web page. If you go to view with source, the source page, you can see the 

actual code behind the web page. There’s a one-to-one correlation between the lines of 

code that you see and what appears on the web page. So there are HTML document[s]., 

and in the HTML document there are HTML forms, you enter information, for example, 

your name, the account information, wire instructions, whatever the case may be. 

That information is extracted according to content instruction. The content instructions 

identify what those particular pieces of information are, your name, account number, 

that type of stuff. 

THE COURT: There’s got to be a program that runs that process.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Well, there’s software that is used to create these pages. But all 

of this software, none of it is—I understand, Your Honor, you said you didn’t want to 

address the summary judgment issue and I’m not going to, but it’s important for purposes 

of the Rule 11 motion because the Rule 11 motion was predicated on the fact that they 

had a license because of the Kofax software but the Kofax software is admitted by Paul 

Gail, the attorney for Kofax, none of that is used in connection with the online banking 

services offered at the Flagstar.com website. 

THE COURT: I want to know what you did besides looking at the website. What product 

did you identify, and did you purchase it and examine it, laying it side by side with your 

patent? 

MR. ZIMMERMAN: You Honor, the product—there’s no product per se. It’s a system that

has—comprised of steps. If those steps are performed, there’s an infringement. It’s not like

there’s a toaster per se or some other infringing product. It’s a system method. It’s a system

patent. The claims are system claims comprised of steps, and if those steps are performed 

there’s an infringement. 

THE COURT: That leads me to a question of if you are correct—

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: —and you have patented a system—

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: —you own the Web. 

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I can’t speak to the Web as a whole, but, Your Honor, for the websites 

we have looked at and that we’ve brought suits against yes, they’re infringing. I would 

mention the priority date of the first patent, to which this patent refers—that is 1991—predates

HTML form technology, which didn’t appear until later in the nineties.

Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, September 8, 2006, Dkt. # 77, pp. 7-9. 

In the Order awarding sanctions, the Court identified several bases for the sanctions. First, the

Court noted that the original complaint in this action was “virtually identical” to at least thirteen other

complaints filed to that date against parties engaging in greatly diverse business operations. Order on

Rule 11 Sanctions, Dkt. # 79, p. 3. The bare-bones complaint in each case alleged that the defendant
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 ORDER - 7

infringed by 

collecting information over the Internet pursuant to a claim of the ‘697 patent, and 

deploying for Defendant’s own use an application distributed over the Internet in 

which information is collected and extracted from a customer of Defendant and 

processed on Defendant’s server . . .

Id., p. 3. The complaints made no mention of HTML form technology and wholly failed to provide

adequate notice of the claims allegedly infringed. In each case, Eon-Net followed service of the

complaint with a quick offer of settlement on a sliding scale ranging from $25,000 to $75,000,

depending on annual sales of the defendant. Id., p. 4. 

In the weeks during which Flagstar’s motion for sanctions was pending, Eon-Net filed eleven

more lawsuits, each with a complaint accusing the defendant of infringing by

operating a website at [web address] pursuant to a claim of the ‘697 patent . . . in 

which information entered by a customer of Defendant into an electronic form 

document displayed on the customer’s computer is extracted and transmitted to 

an application program operating on Defendant’s server . . . 

Id., p. 3. The Court found “indicia of extortion” from the fact that “[d]ozens of parties (regardless of

their actual business) have received the same complaint, claim chart, and settlement letter.” Id., p. 17. 

The Court noted that, given the high cost of patent litigation, “even the finest patent attorney would need

to think carefully before advising a client to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in litigation when a

$25,000, $50,000, or $75,000 settlement was on the table.” Id. 

In addition to the “indicia of extortion,” the Court found grounds for Rule 11 sanctions in

counsel’s failure to perform a reasonable pre-filing inquiry, failure to identify an accused product, and

failure to reasonably evaluate the reach of the ‘697 patent’s claims. Id., pp. 6-12. The Court found no

basis for Eon-Net’s argument that the scope of the ‘697 patent covers far more than the invention

described in the specification: an invention which “provides an integrated and comprehensive system for

handling information from a hard copy document, thus permitting a paperless office.” Id., p. 12. 

On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded both the summary

judgment ruling and the associated grant of sanctions. The appellate court found that the district court

improperly granted summary judgment sua sponte, “without affording Eon-Net notice and the

opportunity to present argument on infringement and the appropriate construction of the ‘687 patent.” 

Eon-Net v. Flagstar Corp. 289 Fed. Appx. at 198. Upon remand, the district judge who originally
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Patent No. 7,075,673 (“ ‘673 patent”), a continuation of the ‘697 patent, issued on July 11,

2006. Patent No. 7,184,162 (“‘162 patent’), a continuation of the ’673 patent, issued on February 27,

2007. 

 ORDER - 8

handled the case recused, and the case was assigned to the undersigned district judge. At a status

conference held December 12, 2007, plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint, and

defendant did not object. The Second Amended Complaint includes claims of infringement of two

continuation patents which issued during the time that this matter was pending in this Court and on

appeal.8

 Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. # 108. 

The Court set dates for a Markman hearing and associated briefing. Dkt. # 114. The Court also

ruled that discovery would be limited to claim construction issues until after the Markman hearing. Dkt.

# 124. During this pre-Markman discovery period, Flagstar filed a motion for sanctions, asserting that

sanctions were warranted for Eon-Net’s destruction of documents, as well as for Eon-Net’s failure to

participate in the claims construction process in good faith. Dkt. # 139. This second contention arose

from counsel’s written statement, on the day that the parties were to exchange proposed claim

construction terms, that 

it is Eon-Net’s position that there are no claim terms in the patents-in-suit that need to be

construed by the Court since the claim terms have their ordinary and customary meaning that

such terms would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the

invention.

Exhibit 4 to Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. # 139-3, p. 9. Flagstar objected to this refusal to comply with

the claim construction procedure. Id., p. 12-13. Eon-Net then agreed to provide, within the week, EonNet’s proposed construction of terms identified by Flagstar as requiring construction. Id., p. 15. 

The basis for Flagstar’s contention that Eon-Net destroyed documents relevant to the litigation

was the discovery, during deposition of Dr. Medina, that Eon-Net had no documents responsive to the

requests for production. When asked whether he recalled searching for any of the documents called for

in Flagstar’s First Set of Requests for Production, Dr. Medina responded, “I don’t save anything so I

don’t have to look.” Deposition of Mitchell Medina, Dkt # 139-2, p. 215. When asked whether he had

requested that anyone else search for documents, Dr. Medina answered, “There is nobody else to ask

and no place else to look.” Id. 
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Patent No. 5,369,508, which issued November 29, 1994. 

10 Prior counsel Jeffrey Schwab, who filed the 1996 lawsuit on behalf of Millennium

(Millennium, L.P. v. Compaq Computer Corp, Case No. 1:96-cv-8251-MBM), and three subsequent

suits, withdrew from representation after the fourth lawsuit was transferred to the Southern District of

California. See, Millennium, L.P. v. Readsoft AB, et al., Case. No. 1:01-cv-03734-JGK (S.D.N.Y.). Mr.

Zimmerman appeared in the California action, and, as noted above, has represented Millennium and

Eon-Net in all cases filed after 2001. 

 ORDER - 9

Early on in the deposition, Dr. Medina stated, 

And further, to be candid, as Millennium and Eon-Net have evolved into patent enforcement

companies which are involved in the business of litigation, we have adopted a document

retention policy which is that we don’t retain any documents. So the only documents that 

exist are in the custody of my attorney.

Early on in the process, we selected some documents, put them in a couple of boxes. They 

were originally in the custody of the predecessor counsel to Jean-Marc Zimmerman and 

then were transferred to him. There may be in that box of documents a copy of the 1984

specification draft. I’m not sure. Whatever is there has been produced to you. There is 

no more. 

Id., p. 63 (emphasis added). Dr. Medina explained that during the first patent infringement suit initiated

by Millennium, in 1996, the “couple of boxes” relevant to the first patent obtained by Dr. Medina and

his partners, the ‘855 patent, together with the first continuation patent, the ‘508 patent9

, were turned

over to Millennium’s prior litigation counsel.10 Id., p. 62-63. He stated, “At the time of that litigation,

the selection of documents was made. We had more records at that time, but that selection became our

selection of what we thought was relevant to the document production requests that were given to us at

that time, and nothing else survives.” Id., p. 63.

Counsel for Eon-Net, Mr. Zimmerman, and Dr. Medina then explained to Ms Baily, counsel for

Flagstar, more about the fate of the documents.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I want to have a clarification. Jeffrey Schwab was prior litigation 

counsel, not prosecution counsel. Jeffrey Schwab’s firm did not prosecute.

THE WITNESS: That’s correct.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: The files, what was transferred to me were documents in connection 

with the litigation that I assumed and at the end of the litigation, we discarded the 

documents. The prosecution files were done by Foley & Lardner, to the best of my 

recollection, they have whatever prosecution files they have. 

THE WITNESS: I know that Foley & Lardner’s document retention process, policy, once 

a patent issues, they discard everything except, you know, what’s in the file history. 
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11Mr. Zimmerman’s admission that he discarded all documents relevant to the earlier

patents—the only documents still in existence regarding the patents—at the conclusion of this one case

is striking, in view of the fact that Millennium had at that time several other cases pending in the New

York district court. 

 ORDER - 10

MS. BAILY: Well, since you brought it up, did you contact the Foley & Lardner law 

firm—

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I did. I spoke with—I did it prior. But in response to your last thing 

to double-check, I also spoke with Blumenthal. David Blumenthal was the original attorney

prosecuting the patents, but he is retired and it has subsequently been taken over by Glen 

Law. Glen Law confirmed for me that there is nothing responsive in the file histories or files 

that have any claim construction issues.

THE WITNESS: To amplify it further, Schwab quit in the middle of the case, not a first one, 

but a case that was [a] pending Millennium case.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: In San Diego.

THE WITNESS: Zimmerman & Levi assumed the representation of Millennium in that case. 

Schwab transferred all the files he had over to Zimmerman & Levi.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: For that case. 

THE WITNESS: And that was it. 

Id., pp. 64-65. 

According to Dr. Medina’s testimony, documents relevant to the first two patents, the ‘855

patent, and the ‘508 patent, were selected for retention and given to his attorney at the time, Jeffrey

Schwab, in relation to the case filed in 1996. After that, Dr. Medina, acting for both Millennium L.P.

and Eon-Net, discarded all documents, including all documents relating to the ‘697 patent at issue in this

action, under the new document retention policy. Mr. Zimmerman then discarded all the documents

relating to the ‘855 and ‘508 patents that he received from Mr. Schwab at the conclusion of the case in

San Diego.11 That was in 2003. Millennium L.P. v. Readsoft AB, et al., Cause No. 3:02-cv-00152-KJFS, United States District Court for the Southern District of California. According to Flagstar’s first

motion for sanctions, this systematic destruction of documents relevant to the stream of litigation

constitutes sanctionable conduct. Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. # 139. Flagstar argued that dismissal of

the complaint was an appropriate sanction, but if the Court declined to dismiss, Eon-Net should be

foreclosed from offering evidence on issues related to the discarded documents, including all issues

related to claim construction. Id., p. 11. 
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12 The validity of the ‘697 and continuation patents was not before the Court at the Markman

stage. As this case settled after the Court issued its ruling on claim construction, the ‘697 and other

patents held by Eon-Net have never been subjected to a validity challenge under Bilski. 

 ORDER - 11

In responding to the motion for sanctions, Eon-Net argued that sanctions were not warranted as

no documents had been destroyed in anticipation of, or during, this litigation. Mr. Zimmerman filed a

declaration stating that the only documents he discarded from Millennium’s and Eon-Net’s files were

documents that are “publicly available, obsolete or no longer of value to Eon-Net or Millennium.” 

Declaration of Jean-Marc Zimmerman, Dkt. # 144-3. Dr. Medina filed a declaration stating that EonNet has no employees, office, or customers, and therefore has no interoffice memos or correspondence

to produce. Declaration of Mitchell Medina, Dkt. # 144-2. Further, while documents relating to patent

prosecution history were discarded by Eon-Net’s agents, those documents are publically available. Id. 

He also pointed to his deposition testimony in which he explained that many of his records from prior

years were lost due to his divorce or separation, and his move to Kenya in 2000, after which he was 

“locked out of Kenya” due to the political situation. Id.

The motion for sanctions was not fully briefed until days before the Markman hearing, which

was set for October 27, 2008. The Court heard oral argument on the motion for sanctions before

proceeding with the hearing, and reserved ruling on the motion. Dkt. # 146. Three days after the

Markman hearing, on October 30, 2008, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision

regarding “method” patents, holding invalid a patent which described a method for managing risk in

commodity trading by performing a series of steps. In re Bilski, 545 F. 3d 943 (2008). Concerned over

Mr. Zimmerman’s statement in prior proceedings that “the claims are system claims comprised of

steps,” the Court directed the parties to present supplemental briefing on any impact the In re Bilski

decision might have on claim construction issues.12 Dkt. # 148. 

The Court issued its ruling on claim construction on March 4, 2009. Dkt. # 162. The Court

construed the terms offered by the parties for construction, and also necessarily resolved what had

become the central issue of Eon-Net’s infringement claims, namely whether the ‘697 patent and its

continuation patents are limited to a methodology for processing information originating from hard-copy

documents. Dkt. # 162, p. 13. Noting that “the claims cannot be of broader scope than the invention
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that is set forth in the specification,” the Court found that the “very character of the invention” requires

that it be limited to hard copy documents. Id., quoting On Demand Machine v. Ingram Industries, Inc.,

442 F. 3d 1331, 1340 (Fed.Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F. 3d 1303, 1313 (Fed.Cir.

2005)) and Alloc, Inc., v. International Trade Commission, 342 F. 3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The

Court did not address the document destruction issues in the claim construction Order, as the missing

documents did not appear to hinder Flagstar in presenting successful arguments in the Markman

proceedings. The motion for sanctions was left for a later date. Dkt. # 162, n. 2

Less than a month after the Court issued the Order on claim construction, the parties filed a

stipulation to entry of judgment of non-infringement, together with dismissal without prejudice of

Flagstar’s counterclaims and defenses regarding patent invalidity. Dkt. # 165. The Court signed the

stipulation on April 6, 2009, making it the Order of the Court. Dkt. # 166. 

Flagstar now moves for attorney fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, which provides in patent suits

that “[t]he court in exceptional circumstances may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing

party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. Eon-Net has opposed the motion. The matter is now fully briefed and ready

for consideration. 

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A determination whether to award attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 involves a two-step

process. First, the district court must determine whether the prevailing party has proved by clear and

convincing evidence that the case is “exceptional.” 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.,

234 F.3d 654, 669 (Fed. Cir.2000); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed.

Cir.1998) (en banc). If the court finds that it is an exceptional case, it must then determine whether to

award an attorney fee---a decision that lies primarily within the district court's discretion. See Forest

Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir.2003).

The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has identified as “exceptional” those cases involving

“inequitable conduct before the [Patent Office]; litigation misconduct; vexatious, unjustified, and

otherwise bad faith litigation; a frivolous suit or willful infringement.” Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P., v.

Stryker Sales Corporation , 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); Hoffmann-La
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Roche Inc. v. Invamed Inc., 213 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir.2000). However, “[i]n the context of fee

awards to prevailing accused infringers, . . . § 285 is limited to circumstances in which it is necessary to

prevent ‘a gross injustice’ to the accused infringer. . . .” Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d at

1329. A finding of exceptionality to prevent such injustice will be upheld “only when the patentee has

procured its patent in bad faith . . . or has litigated its claim of infringement in bad faith.” Id. 

To support an award of attorneys fees for a patent holder's pursuit of a baseless claim of

infringement, the accused infringers must demonstrate “both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad

faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.” Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier

International, 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2005). Although a lawsuit pursued in bad faith is a

sufficient basis for imposing attorney fees under § 285, such bad faith requires vexatious, unjustified, or

frivolous litigation. See, e.g., Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 269 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.

Cir.2001) (affirming an award of attorney fees under § 285 for the “extreme litigation misconduct” of

falsifying evidence); Eltech Systems Corp. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 810-11 (Fed. Cir.1990)

(affirming an award of attorney fees under § 285 for pursuing a baseless claim of infringement). “A

frivolous infringement suit is one which the patentee knew or, on reasonable investigation, should have

known, was baseless.” See Haynes Int'l Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1993),

rehearing granted on other grounds, 15 F.3d 1076 (1994). 

In moving for attorney fees under § 285, Flagstar asserts four bases for a finding that this case is

exceptional: the lawsuit was frivolous and unjustified; it was filed for the improper purpose of inducing

a nuisance settlement; Eon-Net improperly destroyed evidence; and Eon-Net engaged in offensive

litigation tactics. These shall be addressed in turn. 

I. Pursuit of Baseless Claims of Infringement

Flagstar first contends that the lawsuit was frivolous and unjustified, as the claims of infringement

were based upon Eon-Net’s unreasonable interpretation of the scope of the ‘697 patent. As set forth

above, the district judge previously assigned to this case pointed out at the hearing on sanctions that if

Eon-Net’s position on the scope of the patent is correct, then Eon-Net “owns the Web,” and can sue for

infringement virtually any business engaged in internet commerce. Mr. Zimmerman, in his response to

that comment (also set forth above), did not deny the possibility, but instead responded that any website
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using HTML form technology automatically infringes Eon-Net’s patents. 

Dr. Medina also advanced this view of the scope of the patents at his deposition, as follows:

Q. Do you see in the next sentence, “we believe that the website incorporates the invention

claimed in the patents.”

You have to give an audible answer.

A. Yes.

Q. And do you agree with that conclusion?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you arrive at that conclusion?

A. We believe broadly that websites implementing e-commerce more than likely infringe 

our patents. Therefore, if Café Press is conducting electronic commerce, then they are, in 

all likelihood, infringers of our patents. 

This is a belief that I hold. If my attorney says that we, meaning he and I, believe that the 

website incorporates the invention in the patents, and the website, in fact, is implementing

electronic commerce of some kind, then what my attorney is stating, we believe is, in fact

something that I subscribe to.

Q. So you don’t have to analyze any particular website as long as you have information 

that the website is conducting electronic commerce in order to determine whether it 

infringes your patent, is that right? 

A. That’s 99 and 44/100's percent true. There was one instance in which we sued somebody 

and in the end, they represented to us that the information that was being extracted from 

client computers according to content instructions and being formatted into I think an e-mail 

format and transmitted to a server at the web—configured like that. There might be some 

other noninfringing kind of e-commerce that’s being carried on, although perhaps less so 

in the light of what we call patent “8" where we are talking about enabling a transaction 

between a buyer and a seller. 

Deposition of Mitchell Medina, Dkt. # 173, Exhibit W, p 18-19. Dr. Medina thus joined his attorney, Mr.

Zimmerman, in contending that the patents owned by Eon-Net cover virtually all web-based

commerce—a contention that this Court finds insupportable.

Flagstar offers further evidence of the frivolousness of this lawsuit in the Markman proceedings. 

After winning its appeal on the basis that the Court improperly granted summary judgment without

affording Eon-Net notice and an opportunity to argue its position on the scope of the patent claims, EonNet then attempted to evade a careful analysis of the claim terms through the Markman process. During

the claim construction proceedings, Eon-Net first asserted that there were no claim terms in the patents-
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in-suit that needed to be construed, and declined to offer any proposed terms for construction. See,

Declaration of Melissa Baily, Dkt. # 139-3, Exhibit 4. Eon-Net asserted that the claim terms “have their

ordinary and customary meaning that such terms would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in

question at the time of the invention.” Id. Flagstar objected that Eon-Net’s position was untenable and

not in compliance with the Court’s scheduling order on pre-Markman procedures. Id., Exhibit 5. The

parties then stipulated to an extension of time to file their joint claim construction chart. Dkt. ## 129,

130. The joint claim construction chart, when filed, offered the following claim terms for construction:

“document or file,” “document,” “file,” “extract,” “template,” “content instructions,” “customizable

transmission format instructions,” “electronic document template,” “image of the electronic document,”

“template document,” and “electronic document template file.” Dkt. # 134. 

The parties’ opening claim construction briefs were filed on September 23, 2008. Flagstar

attached a supporting declaration with over 1700 pages of documents, including copies of the patents-insuit and related (continuation or preceding) patents, documents from cases filed in other districts by EonNet or Millennium that contained evidence relevant to claim construction, documents from the

prosecution histories of the ‘697 patent and five related patents, and excerpts from the depositions of Dr.

Medina and his co-inventor, Catherine Elias. Dkt. # 137, Exhibits A through Y. Flagstar’s portion of the

claim construction chart cited at length to these supporting documents. Joint Claim Construction Chart,

Dkt. # 134-2. 

Eon-Net, in contrast, attached to its opening claim construction brief a single exhibit, comprising

four pages copied from Que’s Computer User Dictionary, Second Edition, to support its proposed

construction of the claim terms “document” and “file.” Dkt. # 136, Exhibit A. Notably, the definitions

on the copied pages begin with “document comparison utility,” omitting the previous page which bears

the definition of “document.” The copied pages extend through the definition of “file name.” Id. 

Without seeing the definition of “document,” the Court cannot determine whether the omission of the

actual definition for “document” was simply careless or intentional, as it would find if the dictionary

definition were contrary to Eon-Net’s proposed construction. However, the omission appears intentional,

as Eon-Net argued that the dictionary definition for “documentation” supported its construction of the

claim term “document.” Joint Claim Construction Chart, Dkt. # 134, p. 4. The Court rejected this
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substituted definition as irrelevant. Order on Claim Construction, Dkt. # 162, p. 17. In viewing the

proffered claim construction documentation now, in the context of litigation bad faith analysis, the Court 

finds these four pages from a dictionary, standing alone in support of the opening claim construction

brief, so paltry and so irrelevant to valid argument on claim construction as to be deemed frivolous. 

The only other evidence offered by Eon-Net to support its proposed construction of the claim

terms was filed with the responsive brief. This evidence included Eon-Net’s rebuttal expert report,

together with declarations by Catherine Elias and Mitchell Medina, each essentially disclaiming their

deposition excerpts which were offered by Flagstar in support of its claim construction. Dkt. # 141,

Exhibits 1, 2, 3. Dr. Medina stated, “Defendant has cited to my deposition testimony 42 times in the

Joint Claim Chart “in support” of their proposed claim construction, when I agree with none of them and

never testified in favor of any of them.” Id., Exhibit 2, ¶ 12. Catherine Elias stated, “I do not agree with,

and never testified in favor of any of Flagstar’s proposed claim constructions, and any attempt by

Flagstar to argue otherwise is incorrect.” Id. Exhibit 3, ¶ 4. These attempts to re-characterize, deny, or

comment upon their sworn deposition testimony are unavailing. The Court, in construing the claim terms

as a matter of law, read for itself the sworn deposition testimony and determined what weight to give it. 

The overall effect of Eon-Net’s sparse presentation of evidence was that there was no evidence beyond

Dr. Medina’s self-serving opinion, stated above, to support Eon-Net’s overly broad interpretation of the

claims. 

II. Purpose of the Lawsuit

 Next, Flagstar contends that the lawsuit was filed in bad faith and for an improper purpose—one

the Court earlier characterized as having indicia of extortion. As noted in the Court’s earlier ruling on

sanctions, Eon-Net has a history of filing nearly identical patent infringement complaints against a

plethora of diverse defendants. The facts regarding this history of patent infringement actions, set forth

in detail above, support Flagstar’s assertion. In each case, according to Flagstar, the complaint has been

followed with a demand for quick settlement at a price far lower than the cost of litigation, a demand to

which most defendants apparently have agreed. 

Flagstar, however, investigated the claim of infringement and determined that it used software

from Kofax Image Products, Inc., in connection with its website operations, and that this software was
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already licensed under the ‘697 patent. Flagstar therefore requested that Eon-Net withdraw the suit, and

notified Eon-Net as well that it intended to seek sanctions under Rule 11 if the request was refused. 

Eon-Net declined to withdraw the lawsuit. Firm in the belief that Eon-Net’s claim of infringement was

baseless, and that the lawsuit was filed for the improper purpose of collecting a nuisance settlement,

Flagstar alone chose to litigate rather than settle. In so doing, Flagstar has incurred significant expense

for the four years of litigation, far beyond what it would have paid to settle. Motion for Attorney Fees,

Dkt. # 172, p. 6, 9-10. Flagstar’s refusal to agree to the settlement demand for what it legitimately

believed was a bad faith claim of infringement further supports a finding that this case is “exceptional.”

III. Destruction of Evidence

Flagstar also contends that Eon-Net’s destruction of documents relevant to discovery indicates

bad faith and renders this an exceptional case. The facts regarding this destruction of documents are set

forth above, along with counsel’s remarkable admission that he discarded the few documents that had

been saved from the ‘855 and ‘508 patents at the conclusion of the Readsoft AB case in San Diego in

2003. Flagstar earlier moved for Rule 11 sanctions on the basis of this destruction of documents, but the

Court did not reach the issue as the parties settled before the Court ruled on the motion. The Court now

finds that it cannot hold the document destruction sanctionable conduct under Rule 11 in this case, as it

occurred prior to the filing of this case, at a time when Dr. Medina and counsel were filing lawsuits under

the name of Millennium, not Eon-Net. However, the Court does find, in the destruction of these

documents, and in Dr. Medina’s description of the Eon-Net’s “document retention policy,” evidence of

bad faith in litigation, and a further basis for finding this an exceptional case. 

This destruction of documents is particularly serious in that, according to Dr. Medina, no

evidence remains to document the inventors’ process in filing the continuation patents assigned to EonNet, the ‘697 and subsequent patents. Dr. Medina stated at his deposition that patents assigned to

Millennium were directed to “scanned hard copy documents,” while patents assigned to Eon-Net “refer

to a system that extracts information from electronic files.” Deposition of Mitchell Medina, Dkt. # 139,

Exhibit 1, p. 25. Yet no documents remain from the inventors’ records that would aid a court in

distinguishing the claims in the ‘855 patent, and others assigned to Millennium, from the ‘697 patent and

others assigned to Eon-Net. This distinction regarding limitation to hard copy documents was a crucial
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issue in this case, and Flagstar was deprived of discovery into that process by the earlier destruction of

documents. By destroying the inventors’ notes and all other documents that could possibly have been

found relevant to the patent claims or prosecution history, apart from what remains in the public record,

Eon-Net and Mr. Zimmerman have clearly demonstrated their disinclination to participate in good faith

in litigating any of the lawsuits they have filed. Viewed in the larger context of the total number of cases

filed, this document destruction represents the type of discovery abuse that supports a finding that this is

an exceptional case under § 285. 

IV. Eon-Net’s Litigation Tactics

Finally, Flagstar asserts that Eon-Net’s offensive litigation tactics support a finding that this is an

exceptional case. The destruction of evidence is one such tactic, and has been discussed above. Flagstar

also points to Eon-Net’s attempt, early in the litigation, to prevent Flagstar from obtaining information

from Kofax regarding the license agreement between Eon-Net and Kofax, information that was essential

to Flagstar’s defense of non-infringement. Further, Flagstar points to Eon-Net’s failure to comply with

the claim construction procedure by asserting, as set forth above, that there are no claim terms in the

patents-in-suit that need to be construed by the Court. Finally, Flagstar asserts that Eon-Net has

displayed a “general contempt for the judicial system that it has repeatedly sought to exploit.” Motion

for Attorney’s Fees, Dkt. # 172, p. 11. The Court agrees. 

At his deposition, Dr. Medina amply demonstrated his lack of regard for the judicial system in

the very litigation which he instigated. When asked what he had thought about in preparation for the

deposition, he responded “How much of an inconvenience and a bother this is.” Deposition of Mitchell

Medina, Dkt. # 139, Exhibit 1, p. 5. He complained about the fact that Flagstar chose to litigate, stating 

I’d like to speak to someone at Flagstar. About why really are we going around the rosy 

with this lawsuit when Flagstar is a money-losing bank that spent a multiple of our license 

fees on this litigation which, A, it is not going to win and, B, is quixotic at best.

I would dearly like to talk to a principal at Flagstar with decision-making authority, but I 

don’t know who such a person is. Perhaps at some point, you will see fit to supply me 

with the name of such a person. 

Deposition of Mitchell Medina, Dkt. # 173, Exhibit W, p. 22. Then, near the end of his deposition, he

fumed,

But you know, it has been a labor of love that has turned into a labor of profound indifference. 
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I tell you I am so sick of this stuff by now. I am so sick of this stuff, especially this haggling 

over stupidities and trivialities which is the name of the game in litigation. 

Deposition of Mitchell Medina, Dkt. # 139, Exhibit1, p. 34. Such “trivialities” apparently include, in

Dr. Medina’s view, claim construction, an essential part of the patent litigation process. 

Perhaps the most egregious example of the cavalier attitude taken by Eon-Net and its principal

Dr. Medina toward the patent litigation process as a whole may be found in Eon-Net’s interrogatory

responses in a separate lawsuit against Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, in the District of New

Jersey. Eon-Net L.P. v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., Case No. 1:07-cv-05578-NLHAMD. The interrogatory responses are dated June 4, 2008, shortly before the June 23, 2008 deposition

of Dr. Medina in this case. Interrogatory No. 2 asked that Eon-Net

[s]pecifically describe the level of ordinary skill in the art that Eon-Net contends is 

applicable for purposes of claims construction for each of the Patents-In-Suit, including 

an identification of all evidence that Eon-Net contends supports such level of ordinary 

skill in the art. 

Declaration of Melissa Baily, Dkt. # 172, Exhibit DD, p. 3. Eon-Net responded that “the skill in the art

required is that sufficient to converse meaningfully with Mitchell Medina.” Id. 

Interrogatory No. 3 asked that Eon-Net

[i]dentify each witness, including expert and non-experts, upon whom Eon-Net intends to 

rely by submitting supporting statements or testimony in connection with each proposed 

claim construction or level of skill in the art, including an identification of the specific 

areas of anticipated statements or testimony. 

Id. Eon-Net responded that it would rely solely upon Mitchell Medina, “who will be made available at a

deposition to testify regarding claim construction and the level of skill in the art.” Id., p. 4. Flagstar

contends that these answers were meaningless and improper, and indicative of Eon-Net’s attitude toward

any defendant who chose to litigate rather than quickly settle. 

In opposing the motion for attorney fees, Mr. Zimmerman asserts that arguments based on the

Burlington Coat Factory interrogatories are improper because the responses were provided in a different

case, “something that it appears defendant deliberately failed to make clear in its pleading.” Eon-Net’s

Response, Dkt. # 179, p. 13. That is not the case; counsel’s declaration clearly identifies the

interrogatory as coming from a case in the New Jersey District Court, and the exhibit itself is clearly
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captioned as such. Declaration of Melissa Baily, Dkt. # 173, ¶ 31; Exhibit DD, p. 1. 

Mr. Zimmerman then attempts to repudiate the interrogatory responses, dismissing them as an

un-edited draft that was mistakenly prepared by his legal assistant: 

The response sent to BCF was a non-final draft that included objections to BCF’s 

interrogatories and un-edited responses received from plaintiff’s principal Mr. Mitchell 

Medina, which draft was typed by plaintiff’s counsel’s assistant Naomi McElynn. 

Thereafter, plaintiff’s counsel revised such responses, including revising Mr. Medina’s

responses. On the day that the responses were sent to BCF, it appears that Ms. McElynn

inadvertently prepared the non-final version with Mr. Medina’s un-edited comments as the 

final formal version for posting to BCF which plaintiff’s counsel sent out. 

Eon-Net’s Response, Dkt. # 179, p. 13 (internal citations to the record omitted). Attached to this

response is a declaration by the legal assistant, stating that she “inadvertently” prepared the “non-final”

version for Mr. Zimmerman to post to BCF. Declaration of Naomi McElynn, Dkt. # 179-3. 

In light of the fact that Mr. Zimmerman’s signature appears on the offensive interrogatory

responses, this attempt to place blame on his legal assistant is not well-taken. Had this document been a

pleading or motion filed with the Court, rather than in interrogatory response sent to the opposing party,

counsel could have been found subject to Rule 11 sanctions for his conduct. 

The Court finds the balance of plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for attorney fees

unpersuasive. Plaintiff has cited at length to various portions of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals’

remand order, asserting that the appellate court’s language demonstrates that it did not find the

infringement claims baseless nor the lawsuit to be filed for an improper purpose. However, those

questions were not before the appellate court, and the language cannot be read as plaintiff contends it

should. The Federal Circuit Court’s ruling was that this Court’s summary judgment and sanctions

decisions were premature, made without affording plaintiff an opportunity to present argument on

infringement and the proper construction of the ‘697 patent. In so ruling, the appellate court viewed

Eon-Net’s arguments and assertions from the point most favorable to it, considering what Eon-Net

might be able to prove if given the opportunity. However, the appellate court concluded its analysis by

observing,

It may be true that ultimately Eon-Net’s suit was for an improper purpose and that Eon-Net’s

pattern of filing nearly identical complaints against a wide variety of companies and then 

offering to settle those complaints for a relatively small amount of money is one indicia of 

that improper purpose. Without full analysis of the merits of Eon-Net’s claim construction

argument, however, the mere fact that Eon-Net filed identical infringement suits against a 
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variety of companies does not by itself establish an improper purpose. . . .

Judgment and Opinion of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, Dkt. # 105, p. 15. 

Having now analyzed Eon-Net’s claim construction arguments and issued a ruling, the Court

now finds, for the reasons set forth above, that this case meets the requirements for an “exceptional”

case under § 285. The Court also finds that Eon-Net’s unnoted motion for sanctions pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1927 is without merit, as it was Eon-Net, not defendant, who “unreasonably and vexatiously”

multiplied these proceedings by filing a baseless lawsuit in the first instance, and by presenting multiple

frivolous arguments to the Court, such as the one set forth above regarding the interrogatory responses. 

Eon-Net’s motion for sanctions is accordingly DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

In choosing to litigate this case rather than submit to the settlement demand, Flagstar not only

maintained a well-founded belief that its website did not infringe Eon-Net’s patents, but also challenged

the validity of those patents. While an assertion that the patent-in-suit is invalid is commonly raised in

infringement actions, in this instance there appears to be a reasonable basis for the challenge. The Court

never reached the question of the patents’ validity, as the parties stipulated to dismissal after the Court

issued its Order on claim construction. However, counsel’s statements, set forth above, that “It’s a

system method. It’s a system patent” and “[t]he claims are system claims comprised of steps,” raises

obvious and serious questions about the validity of the patents. By offering cheap settlements to each of

the many alleged infringers they have sued, Millennium and Eon-Net have avoided any challenge to

these patents’ actual validity. 

The Court finds that this case meets the requirements of an “exceptional” case. Flagstar, the

accused infringer, has prevailed in demonstrating through clear and convincing evidence that Eon-Net’s

claims of infringement were baseless, and that the suit was filed for the improper purpose of inducing a

cheap settlement to avoid litigation expense. Flagstar has also demonstrated, with clear and convincing

evidence, that Eon-Net acted in bad faith in filing and in litigating this case. The Court further finds that

the lawsuit was objectively baseless, based as it was on Eon-Net’s overly broad view of the scope of its

patents. 
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 It would be a gross injustice to Flagstar to require it to bear the expense of defending against

the baseless lawsuit, one that was filed in bad faith for the sole purpose of inducing defendant to settle

without questioning the patent itself or its validity. An award of attorney’s fees pursuant to § 285 is 

therefore appropriate. Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d at 1329. Flagstar’s motion is

accordingly GRANTED. 

Flagstar shall file, on or before February 1, 2010, a statement of fees and expenses incurred since

this case was remanded to this Court, together with a supporting memorandum. Eon-Net shall have two

weeks following the filing of the fee statement to file a response. Both parties shall present argument in

their accompanying memoranda as to whether the Rule 11 sanctions previously imposed by this Court

should be reinstated. 

DATED this 4 day of January, 2010. 

A

RICARDO S. MARTINEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE