IV 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 625 

Censuring the President and Vice President. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

AUGUST 4, 2007 

Mr. HINCHEY (for himself, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. CAPUANO, Mr. COHEN, Mr. 

DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. FARR, Mr. FILNER, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. HALL of 

New York, Mr. HONDA, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. KUCINICH, Ms. LEE, Mrs. 

MALONEY of New York, Mr. MORAN of Virginia, Mr. PASTOR, Ms. 

SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. WATSON, Ms. SHEA-PORTER, and Mr. ROTHMAN) 

submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

RESOLUTION 

Censuring the President and Vice President. 

1 Resolved, 

2 SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE. 

3 (a) IRAQ’S ALLEGED NUCLEAR PROGRAM.—The 

4 House of Representatives finds the following: 

5 (1) In December 2001, the intelligence commu6 nity assessed that Iraq did not appear to have recon7 stituted its nuclear weapons program. 

8 (2) The October 2002 National Intelligence Es9 timate assessed that Iraq did not have a nuclear 


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1 weapon or sufficient material to make one, and that 

2 without sufficient fissile material acquired from 

3 abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a 

4 weapon until 2007 or 2009. 

5 (3) On October 6, 2002, the Central Intel6 ligence Agency advised the White House to remove 

7 references to Iraq seeking uranium from Africa from 

8 a Presidential speech, citing weak evidence. 

9 (4) In November 2002, the United States Gov10 ernment told the International Atomic Energy Asso11 ciation that ‘‘reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure 

12 uranium from Africa are fragmentary at best.’’. 

13 (5) On March 7, 2003, the Director General of 

14 the International Atomic Energy Association re15 ported to the United Nations Security Council that 

16 inspectors had found ‘‘no evidence or plausible indi17 cation of the revival of a nuclear weapons program 

18 in Iraq.’’. 

19 (6) On March 11, 2003, the Central Intel20 ligence Agency stated that it did not dispute the 

21 International Atomic Energy Association conclusions 

22 that the documents on Iraq’s agreement to buy ura23 nium from Niger were not authentic. 

24 (7) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi25 dent Richard B. Cheney overstated the nature and 


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1 urgency of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein by 

2 making repeated, unqualified assertions about an 

3 Iraqi nuclear program that were not supported by 

4 available intelligence, including— 

5 (A) on March 22, 2002, President George 

6 W. Bush stated that ‘‘[Saddam] is a dangerous 

7 man who possesses the world’s most dangerous 

8 weapons.’’; 

9 (B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President 

10 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[m]any of us 

11 are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear 

12 weapons fairly soon.’’; 

13 (C) on September 8, 2002, Vice President 

14 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[w]e do know, 

15 with absolute certainty, that he is using his pro16 curement system to acquire the equipment he 

17 needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nu18 clear weapon.’’; 

19 (D) on September 20, 2002, Vice Presi20 dent Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘we now 

21 have irrefutable evidence that he has once again 

22 set up and reconstituted his program, to take 

23 uranium, to enrich it to sufficiently high grade, 

24 so that it will function as the base material as 

25 a nuclear weapon.’’; 


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1 (E) on October 7, 2002, President George 

2 W. Bush stated that ‘‘[f]acing clear evidence of 

3 peril, we cannot wait for the final proof—the 

4 smoking gun—that could come in the form of 

5 a mushroom cloud.’’; 

6 (F) on December 31, 2002, President 

7 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[w]e don’t know 

8 whether or not [Saddam] has a nuclear weap9 on.’’; 

10 (G) on January 28, 2003, President 

11 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[t]he British gov12 ernment has learned that Saddam Hussein re13 cently sought significant quantities of uranium 

14 from Africa.’’; and 

15 (H) on March 16, 2003, Vice President 

16 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[w]e believe 

17 [Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear 

18 weapons.’’. 

19 (b) SADDAM’S ALLEGED INTENT TO USE WEAPONS

20 OF MASS DESTRUCTION.—The House of Representatives 

21 finds the following: 

22 (1) The October 2002 National Intelligence Es23 timate assessed that ‘‘Baghdad for now appears to 

24 be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist at25 tacks with conventional or CBW against the United 


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1 States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement 

2 would provide Washington a stronger cause for mak3 ing war’’ and that ‘‘Iraq probably would attempt 

4 clandestine attacks against the United States Home5 land if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened 

6 the survival of the regime were imminent or un7 avoidable, or possibly for revenge.’’. 

8 (2) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi9 dent Richard B. Cheney made misleading state10 ments, that were not supported by the available in11 telligence, suggesting that Saddam Hussein sought 

12 weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of an 

13 unprovoked, offensive attack, including— 

14 (A) on August 26, 2002, Vice President 

15 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘. . . there is no 

16 doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons 

17 of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is 

18 amassing them to use against our friends, 

19 against our allies, and against us.’’; 

20 (B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President 

21 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[t]hese are not 

22 weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq; 

23 these are offensive weapons for the purpose of 

24 inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so 

25 that Saddam can hold the threat over the head 


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1 of anyone he chooses, in his own region or be2 yond.’’; and 

3 (C) on October 2, 2002, President George 

4 W. Bush stated that ‘‘On its present course, the 

5 Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. We 

6 know the treacherous history of the regime. It 

7 has waged a war against its neighbors, it has 

8 sponsored and sheltered terrorists, it has devel9 oped weapons of mass death, it has used them 

10 against innocent men, women and children. We 

11 know the designs of the Iraqi regime.’’. 

12 (c) SADDAM’S ALLEGED LINKS TO AL QAEDA AND

13 9/11.—The House of Representatives finds the following: 

14 (1) Before the war, the Central Intelligence 

15 Agency assessed that ‘‘Saddam has viewed Islamic 

16 extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat, and his 

17 regime since its inception has arrested and executed 

18 members of both Shia and Sunni groups to disrupt 

19 their organizations and limit their influence,’’ that 

20 ‘‘Saddam Hussain and Usama bin Laden are far 

21 from being natural partners,’’ and that assessments 

22 about Iraqi links to al Qaeda rest on ‘‘a body of 

23 fragmented, conflicting reporting from sources of 

24 varying reliability.’’. 


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1 (2) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi2 dent Richard B. Cheney overstated the threat posed 

3 by Saddam Hussein by making unqualified asser4 tions that were not supported by available intel5 ligence linking Saddam Hussein to the September 

6 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and stating that Saddam 

7 Hussein and al Qaeda had a relationship and that 

8 Saddam Hussein would provide al Qaeda with weap9 ons of mass destruction for purposes of an offensive 

10 attack against the United States, including— 

11 (A) on September 25, 2002, President 

12 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[Y]ou can’t dis13 tinguish between al Qa’ida and Saddam when 

14 you talk about the war on terror.’’; 

15 (B) on September 26, 2002, President 

16 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[t]he dangers we 

17 face will only worsen from month to month and 

18 from year to year. . . . Each passing day could 

19 be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives an20 thrax or VX—nerve gas—or some day a nu21 clear weapon to a terrorist ally.’’; 

22 (C) on October 14, 2002, President George 

23 W. Bush stated that ‘‘[t]his is a man that we 

24 know has had connections with al Qa’ida. This 


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1 is a man who, in my judgment, would like to 

2 use al Qa’ida as a forward army.’’; 

3 (D) on November 7, 2002, President 

4 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[Saddam is] a 

5 threat because he is dealing with al Qaida . . . 

6 [A] true threat facing our country is that an al 

7 Qaida-type network trained and armed by Sad8 dam could attack America and not leave one 

9 fingerprint.’’; 

10 (E) on January 31, 2003, President 

11 George W. Bush stated that ‘‘Saddam Hussein 

12 would like nothing more than to use a terrorist 

13 network to attack and to kill and leave no fin14 gerprints behind.’’; 

15 (F) on March 16, 2003, Vice President 

16 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘we also have to 

17 address the question of where might these ter18 rorists acquire weapons of mass destruction, 

19 chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear 

20 weapons? And Saddam Hussein becomes a 

21 prime suspect in that regard because of his past 

22 track record and because we know he has, in 

23 fact, developed these kinds of capabilities, 

24 chemical and biological weapons. We know he’s 

25 used chemical weapons. And we know he’s reVerDate Aug 31 2005 02:52 Aug 06, 2007 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\HR625.IH HR625

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1 constituted these programs since the Gulf War. 

2 We know he’s out trying once again to produce 

3 nuclear weapons and we know that he has a 

4 long-standing relationship with various terrorist 

5 groups, including the al-Qaeda organization.’’; 

6 (G) on March 17, 2003, President George 

7 W. Bush stated that ‘‘The danger is clear: 

8 using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear 

9 weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the ter10 rorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and 

11 kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of in12 nocent people in our country or any other.’’; 

13 (H) on May 1, 2003, President George W. 

14 Bush stated that ‘‘[t]he liberation of Iraq . . . 

15 removed an ally of al Qaeda.’’; 

16 (I) on September 14, 2003, Vice President 

17 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘the Iraqi 

18 intelligen[ce] service had a relationship with al 

19 Qaeda that developed throughout the decade of 

20 the 90’s. That was clearly official policy.’’; 

21 (J) on September 14, 2003, Vice President 

22 Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[i]f we’re suc23 cessful in Iraq . . . we will have struck a major 

24 blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, 

25 the geographic base of the terrorists who have 


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1 had us under assault now for many years, but 

2 most especially on 9/11.’’; and 

3 (K) on March 21, 2006, President George 

4 W. Bush said at a press conference, ‘‘But we 

5 realized on September the 11th, 2001, that kill6 ers could destroy innocent life. And I’m never 

7 going to forget it. And I’m never going to for8 get the vow I made to the American people that 

9 we will do everything in our power to protect 

10 our people. Part of that meant to make sure 

11 that we didn’t allow people to provide safe 

12 haven to an enemy. And that’s why I went into 

13 Iraq.’’. 

14 (d) INADEQUATE PLANNING AND INSUFFICIENT

15 TROOP LEVELS.—The House of Representatives finds the 

16 following: 

17 (1) The intelligence community judged in Janu18 ary 2003 that ‘‘[t]he ouster of Iraqi dictator Sad19 dam Hussayn would pose a variety of significant pol20 icy challenges for whoever assumes responsibility for 

21 governing Iraq’’ including ‘‘political transformation, 

22 controlling internal strife, solving economic and hu23 manitarian challenges, and dealing with persistent 

24 foreign policy and security concerns.’’. 


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1 (2) The intelligence community judged in Janu2 ary 2003 that ‘‘a post-Saddam authority would face 

3 a deeply divided society with a significant chance 

4 that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict 

5 with each other unless an occupying force prevented 

6 them from doing so.’’. 

7 (3) These judgments were delivered to the 

8 White House and Office of the Vice President. 

9 (4) Then Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki 

10 testified on February 25, 2003, that ‘‘something on 

11 the order of several hundred thousands soldiers’’ 

12 would be needed to secure Iraq following a success13 ful completion of the war. 

14 (5) General Abizaid, then-CENTCOM com15 mander, testified before the Senate Armed Services 

16 Committee on November 15, 2006, that ‘‘General 

17 Shinseki was right that a greater international force 

18 contribution, United States force contribution and 

19 Iraqi force contribution should have been available 

20 immediately after major combat operations.’’. 

21 (6) After President George W. Bush declared 

22 the end of major combat operations in Iraq, there 

23 were insufficient troops to prevent the outbreak of 

24 violence and lawlessness that contributed to the 


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1 flight of millions of Iraqis and the deaths of tens of 

2 thousands of Iraqis. 

3 (7) The Government Accountability Office pro4 vided testimony to the Subcommittee on National 

5 Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on 

6 Oversight and Government Reform, on March 22, 

7 2007, that due to insufficient troop levels, United 

8 States forces were unable to secure conventional 

9 weapons stockpiles in Iraq that continue to pose a 

10 threat to American servicemembers. 

11 (8) President George W. Bush failed to ensure 

12 that plans were prepared and implemented to ad13 dress the challenges that the intelligence community 

14 predicted would occur after the ouster of Saddam 

15 Hussein, and in particular failed to ensure that 

16 there were sufficient coalition troops in Iraq after 

17 major combat operations ended to maintain security 

18 and secure weapons stockpiles. 

19 (e) STRAIN ON MILITARY AND UNDERMINING HOME20 LAND SECURITY.—The House of Representatives finds 

21 the following: 

22 (1) Retired Major General John Batiste, former 

23 commander of the First Infantry Division in Iraq, 

24 testified before the House Committee on Inter25 national Relations on June 27, 2007, that ‘‘[o]ur 


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1 Army and Marine Corps are at a breaking point at 

2 a time in history when we need a strong military the 

3 most. The cycle of deployments is staggering. Amer4 ican formations continue to lose a battalion’s worth 

5 of dead and wounded every month with little to show 

6 for it. The current recruiting system falls drastically 

7 short of long-term requirements and our all-volun8 teer force can not sustain the current tempo for 

9 much longer. The military is spending over 

10 $1,000,000,000 a year in incentives in a last ditch 

11 effort to keep the force together. Young officers and 

12 noncommissioned officers are leaving the service at 

13 an alarming rate.’’. 

14 (2) Extended deployments of 15 months, and 

15 insufficient time to rest and train between deploy16 ments, have undermined the readiness of the Army. 

17 (3) The Army National Guard reported as early 

18 as July 2005 that equipment transfers to deploying 

19 units ‘‘had largely exhausted its inventory of more 

20 than 220 critical items, including some items useful 

21 to nondeployed units for training and domestic mis22 sions.’’. 

23 (4) The Government Accountability Office 

24 found, in September 2006, that ‘‘[a]mong the items 

25 for which the Army National Guard had shortages 


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1 of over 80 percent of the authorized inventory were 

2 chemical warfare monitoring and decontamination 

3 equipment and night vision goggles’’. 

4 (5) President George W. Bush’s policies in Iraq 

5 have undermined homeland security by depleting the 

6 personnel and equipment needed by the National 

7 Guard. 

8 (f) INSURGENCY IN ‘‘LAST THROES’’.—The House of 

9 Representatives finds the following: 

10 (1) Multi-National Force-Iraq reports indicate 

11 that the number of attacks on coalition forces has 

12 increased since the beginning of military action. 

13 (2) The Government Accountability Office, in 

14 March 2007, reported that attacks using improvised 

15 explosive devices continued to increase between 2005 

16 and July 2006. 

17 (3) On June 23, 2005, General John Abizaid, 

18 in his capacity as head of Central Command, testi19 fied before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

20 about the state of the insurgency that ‘‘[i]n terms 

21 of comparison from 6 months ago, in terms of for22 eign fighters I believe there are more foreign fighters 

23 coming into Iraq than there were 6 months ago. In 

24 terms of the overall strength of the insurgency, I’d 

25 say it’s about the same as it was.’’. 


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1 (4) President George W. Bush’s Initial Bench2 mark Assessment report from July 12, 2007, states 

3 that ‘‘[a]s a result of increased offensive operations, 

4 Coalition and Iraqi Forces have sustained increased 

5 attacks in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, Diyala, and 

6 Salah ad Din.’’. 

7 (5) Vice President Richard B. Cheney made 

8 misleading statements that the insurgency in Iraq 

9 was in its ‘‘last throes,’’ including— 

10 (A) on May 30, 2005, Vice President Rich11 ard B. Cheney said, ‘‘The level of activity that 

12 we see today from a military standpoint, I 

13 think, will clearly decline. I think they’re in the 

14 last throes, if you will, of the insurgency.’’; and 

15 (B) on June 19, 2006, Vice President 

16 Richard B. Cheney was asked whether he still 

17 supported the comment he made in 2005, re18 garding the fact that the insurgency in Iraq 

19 was in its ‘‘last throes,’’ to which he responded 

20 ‘‘I do.’’ 

21 SEC. 2. CENSURE BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 

22 The House of Representatives censures President 

23 George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B. Cheney 

24 for— 


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1 (1) misleading the American people about the 

2 basis for going to war in Iraq; 

3 (2) failing to plan adequately for the war; 

4 (3) pursuing policies in Iraq that have strained 

5 our military and undermined our homeland security; 

6 and 

7 (4) misleading the American people about the 

8 insurgency in Iraq. 

Æ 


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