*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
IN RE TAKIE O.*

(AC 44992)

Alvord, Elgo and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, sought to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with respect to their minor child.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial on the termination petition

was held remotely via Microsoft Teams. The respondent father was

represented by counsel and participated in the proceedings through

audio and video means. The respondent mother consented to termination. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court rendered judgment

terminating the respondents’ parental rights. On the respondent father’s

appeal, held that the record was inadequate to review the father’s claim

that he was denied the right to confront the witnesses against him at

the virtual trial in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth

amendment to the United States constitution: the father conceded that

his claim was unpreserved because he did not raise it before the trial

court; moreover, there was no factual record or factual finding on which

this court could have based a determination of whether the father’s

right to confront the petitioner’s witnesses was violated by the virtual

format of the trial or whether the trial court correctly concluded that

the government’s interests were sufficiently great to warrant conducting

the trial virtually; accordingly, the situation was analogous to those set

forth in In re Annessa J. (343 Conn. 642), and In re Vada V. (343

Conn. 730), in which our Supreme Court recently determined that the

respective respondents’ claims failed to satisfy the first prong of the

test for review of unpreserved constitutional claims set forth in State

v. Golding (213 Conn. 233).

Argued September 6—officially released October 4, 2022**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with

respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Juvenile Matters, where the respondent mother consented to the

termination of her parental rights; thereafter, the matter

was tried to the court, Hon. Stephen F. Frazzini, judge

trial referee; judgment terminating the respondents’

parental rights, from which the respondent father

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, with whom, on

the brief, was Albert J. Oneto IV, assigned counsel, for

the appellant (respondent father).

Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,

on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and

Evan O’Roark, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The respondent father, Takie O., Sr.,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating

his parental rights with respect to his minor child, Takie

O. (child).1 On appeal, the respondent claims that he

was denied the right to physically confront the witnesses against him at the virtual trial, conducted via

Microsoft Teams,2

in violation of the due process clause

of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution.3 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history. On May 4, 2017, the respondent and

Lisa S. were arrested following an incident in which

East Hartford police officers observed the child, who

was six years old, sitting without a seat belt in the front

seat of a vehicle being driven by the respondent. The

police found nineteen bags of marijuana packaged for

sale in Lisa S.’s purse and ninety-three bags of marijuana

inside the child’s bookbag, which also contained his

school homework. The respondent also was found with

two bags of marijuana in his pocket. The police notified

the Department of Children and Families (department).

When the department investigator spoke with the

respondent that same day at a basketball court, the

respondent appeared ‘‘to be impaired by marijuana’’

and acknowledged that he was unable to care for the

child due to substance abuse issues.

On May 12, 2017, the petitioner, the Commissioner

of Children and Families, filed an ex parte motion for

an order of temporary custody, which was issued, and

a neglect petition. On May 19, 2017, the order of temporary custody was sustained by agreement of the respondent and Lisa S. On August 8, 2017, the respondent and

Lisa S. entered nolo contendere pleas to the neglect

petition, and the child was adjudicated neglected and

committed to the care and custody of the petitioner.

The respondent and Lisa S. were given specific steps

to facilitate reunification with the child. On December

26, 2019, the trial court approved a permanency plan

of termination of parental rights and adoption. In February, 2020, the petitioner filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the respondent and Lisa S.

as to the child on the ground that they had failed to

rehabilitate. Subsequently, Lisa S. consented to the termination of her parental rights, and the petition was

amended as to Lisa S. to allege consent as the sole

ground for terminating her parental rights.

The trial court set forth the following procedural

history. ‘‘The first hearing on the [petition] was initially

scheduled for March 26, 2020, but was not held on that

date because of the public shutdown caused by the

COVID-19 pandemic. In June, 2020, before the next

court date, the parents applied for and were appointed

counsel for the [termination] proceeding. In late Decem-
ber, 2020, a new date for the initial [termination] hearing

was scheduled for February 3, 2021. The court on that

day confirmed that both parents had been served with

orders of notice to appear that day, but since neither

one was present the court scheduled a default trial for

the following month. A default trial never did occur,

however, and the court file reflects that counsel for

the parents subsequently participated in a case status

conference and two court hearings in March and April

[2021]. The matter was subsequently assigned for trial

before [the Honorable Stephen F. Frazzini, judge trial

referee] to begin on June [25], 2021.’’

The trial on the petition was conducted virtually using

Microsoft Teams over two days, June 25 and 29, 2021,

with the respondent appearing with his counsel on both

days. On the first day of trial, the respondent joined

the proceeding by telephone. All parties then identified

themselves for the record, including the respondent. At

some point during the first day of trial, the respondent

appeared by video.4

When the petitioner’s first witness experienced technical difficulties joining the proceeding, the petitioner’s

counsel remarked: ‘‘I will be relieved when . . . we’re

back in person.’’ The court commented: ‘‘Well, I think

that’s going to happen pretty quickly. Apparently, the—

I’ve been told that the Chief Administrative Judge has

indicated [that termination of parental rights] trials

should go in person ASAP.’’ The court commented: ‘‘I

don’t know whether that’s—we haven’t gotten—we

didn’t get the email yet today, but it—I think it’s—from

my understanding it’s imminent.’’

The petitioner presented the testimony of six witnesses and introduced exhibits into evidence, and the

respondent’s counsel cross-examined the petitioner’s

witnesses. The respondent’s counsel periodically conferred with her client, including through text message.

Specifically, counsel conferred with the respondent

during cross-examination of the petitioner’s witnesses,5

before informing the court that the respondent elected

not to testify, and during closing argument.6

In its memorandum of decision issued on July 27,

2021, the court terminated the parental rights of the

respondent and Lisa S. The court found that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with the child. It found by clear and convincing

evidence that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate.

After making the seven findings required by General

Statutes § 17a-112 (k), the court found by clear and

convincing evidence that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.

This appeal followed.

On appeal, the respondent claims that ‘‘he was denied

the right to confront and cross-examine personally

adverse witnesses against him at the virtual trial, in
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth

amendment to the United States constitution.’’7 The

respondent concedes that he did not raise this claim

before the trial court and, therefore, seeks review under

State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823

(1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773,

781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

Pursuant to Golding, ‘‘a [respondent] can prevail on

a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial

only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the

record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;

(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging

the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged

constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived

the [respondent] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to

harmless error analysis, the [petitioner] has failed to

demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional

violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in

original; footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213

Conn. 239–40; see also In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn.

781 (modifying third prong of Golding). ‘‘The first two

steps in the Golding analysis address the reviewability

of the claim, [whereas] the last two steps involve the

merits of the claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn. 709, 719, 275 A.3d

1181 (2022).

On June 20, 2022, our Supreme Court released its

decision in In re Annessa J., 343 Conn. 642, A.3d

(2022), and its companion cases, In re Vada V., 343

Conn. 730, 275 A.3d 1172 (2022), and In re Aisjaha N.,

supra, 343 Conn. 709.8

In re Annessa J. and In re Vada

V. are controlling of the issue raised in the present

appeal. Accordingly, we begin with a discussion of

those cases.

In In re Annessa J., supra, 343 Conn. 649–50, the trial

court terminated the parental rights of the respondent

mother, Valerie H., after a trial held virtually, via Microsoft Teams. Valerie’s counsel joined in the respondent

father’s objection ‘‘to the trial court’s conducting the

trial via Microsoft Teams instead of in person . . . .’’

Id., 653. The basis for the objection was the suggestions

by the respondents’ attorneys that the court would be

unable to see the parties and witnesses and would have

difficulty making assessments regarding their demeanor

and truthfulness. Id. The court denied the respondents’

oral motion objecting to the virtual format, explaining

that it had ‘‘talked to the chief administrative judge

for juvenile [matters], and she confirmed that there is

nothing precluding the court from going forward. And,

in fact, the court has been directed by the chief court

administrator’s office to proceed, whenever possible,

to go forward with matters that are necessary,

important, and appropriate. I do believe that the matter

can be conducted appropriately virtually. We do have

the Connecticut Guide to Remote Hearings [for Attor-
neys and Self-Represented Parties] that was promulgated by the Judicial Branch. I intend to follow it.’’

(Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 654. The court rejected the respondents’ contention

that it would not be able to properly weigh the evidence.

Id. The virtual trial proceeded, during which Valerie,

through counsel, entered nine exhibits into evidence,

and presented the testimony of three witnesses. Id.,

655. Valerie also testified on her own behalf. Id. The

court took corrective measures to address technical

issues that arose during the trial, and the court ‘‘regularly paused the proceedings so that the parties could

confer with their counsel.’’ Id.

On appeal, Valerie claimed, inter alia, that the trial

court ‘‘violated her right to due process of law by precluding her from confronting witnesses in court and in

person when it conducted proceedings over the Microsoft Teams platform . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 650–51. This court concluded that the

record was inadequate to review her unpreserved federal due process claim. Id., 651. Following certification

to appeal, our Supreme Court agreed with this court.

Id., 661.

Our Supreme Court explained: ‘‘Unlike her state constitutional claim, which did not require any factual predicates because she claimed an unqualified right to an

in person trial, Valerie’s federal constitutional claim is

not based on an alleged unqualified right to confront the

petitioner’s witnesses in person under the fourteenth

amendment to the United States constitution. Rather,

Valerie claims that she had the right to do so ‘in the

absence of evidence demonstrating the existence of a

compelling governmental interest sufficient to curtail

the right.’ Valerie thus acknowledges that there are certain countervailing governmental interests that may be

sufficient to justify curtailing any constitutional right

to in person confrontation. Indeed, to address the merits

of Valerie’s claim, this court would apply the three part

test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335,

96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). The third part

of that test requires us to consider the governmental

interests at stake. Id. . . . [T]he trial court explained

that, ‘[d]ue to the COVID-19 . . . pandemic, the trial

[on the termination of parental rights petition] was conducted virtually.’ As a result, we would need to consider

the specific factual circumstances surrounding the trial

and the COVID-19 pandemic to properly evaluate Valerie’s claim. As Valerie concedes, ‘[a]lthough the trial

court referenced the COVID-19 public emergency as

the reason for conducting the trial virtually, there was

no actual evidence before the court that [SARS-CoV-2,

the virus that causes COVID-19], threatened the health

or safety of any of the persons involved in this particular

case.’ It is for this reason that the record is inadequate

to review Valerie’s unpreserved federal due process

claim. Even if this court were to assume that Valerie
had a right to in person confrontation in the absence

of compelling countervailing interests, this court has

no factual record or factual findings on which to base

a determination of whether that right was violated or

whether the trial court correctly concluded that the

government’s interests were sufficiently great to warrant conducting the trial virtually.’’ In re Annessa J.,

supra, 343 Conn. 661–62.

Our Supreme Court further rejected Valerie’s contention that ‘‘the lack of evidence in the record regarding ‘whether there was a compelling reason to curtail

her right [to] physical confrontation was not her burden

to overcome under the first prong of . . . Golding.’ ’’

Id., 662. Our Supreme Court explained that, because

the petitioner and trial court had not been put on notice

that Valerie objected to the virtual format of the trial

on the basis of a violation of her right to confront

the petitioner’s witnesses, the trial court ‘‘did not have

occasion to make findings of fact regarding the threat

posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and whether that

threat was sufficiently compelling to curtail any constitutional right to in person confrontation.’’ Id., 662–63.

Thus, the petitioner bore no responsibility for the evidentiary lacunae, and it would be unfair to the petitioner

for our Supreme Court to reach the merits of Valerie’s

claim ‘‘ ‘upon a mere assumption that [the factual predicate to her claim has been met].’ ’’ Id., 663. Accordingly,

our Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Court that

the record was inadequate to review Valerie’s claim.

Id., 664.

In In re Vada V., supra, 343 Conn. 732, 734, the court

terminated the parental rights of the respondents after

a trial held virtually, via Microsoft Teams, in October

and November, 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic.

‘‘The respondents were represented by separate counsel and participated in the proceedings through audio

and video means.’’ Id., 734. The respondent mother’s

counsel confirmed that she had been communicating

with her client through text messages and email, and

the respondent father’s counsel indicated that he was

communicating with his client through a messaging

application. Id., 735–36. Although they experienced

some connectivity issues, both respondents testified at

trial. Id., 737.

On appeal, the respondents in In re Vada V. raised

an unpreserved claim that ‘‘they were denied the right

to physically confront the witnesses against them at

the virtual trial, in violation of the due process clause

of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution.’’ Id., 733. Our Supreme Court determined that

the record was inadequate to review the respondents’

unpreserved claim, which was identical to the claim

that it had considered in In re Annessa J. Id., 739–40.

Our Supreme Court reiterated that, even if it were to

assume that ‘‘there is a constitutional right to in person
confrontation, there is no factual record or factual findings for this court to rely on to determine whether that

right was violated or whether the trial court correctly

concluded that the government’s interests were sufficiently great to warrant conducting the trial virtually.’’

Id., 740.

Following the release of our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Annessa J. and In re Vada V., this court

ordered the parties in the present case to submit supplemental briefs. The petitioner argues, inter alia, that ‘‘the

record in this case is inadequate for review in the same

manner as the Supreme Court explained that the respective records in In re Annessa J. and In re Vada V. were

inadequate.’’ The respondent contends that the record

in the present case is adequate to review his claim.9

In

arguing that ‘‘the trial court believed it had no discretion

in the decision of whether the trial should be held in

person,’’ the respondent highlights the trial court’s

remark that it had ‘‘been told that the chief administrative judge has indicated [that termination of parental

rights] trials should go in person ASAP.’’ The respondent contends that ‘‘the decision of whether to hold a

virtual trial was not made by the trial court and that,

indeed, the public health emergency brought on by

COVID-19 had already been determined by authority

outside the trial court to override not only confrontation

rights but all other similar rights guaranteed by due

process.’’ Thus, according to the respondent, the

‘‘record is adequate to review [his claim] because the

only question is whether the right to physical confrontation, if it applies to civil matters, can be overridden by

a blanket administrative judicial order.’’

We disagree with the respondent that the comment

made by the trial court renders the record adequate for

review. It does not create the factual record required

to apply the three part test set forth in Mathews v.

Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. 335. In the present case, the

respondent’s counsel did not raise any objection to the

virtual format of the trial, let alone raise an objection

on the basis that it violated the respondent’s right to

confront the petitioner’s witnesses. Consequently, just

as in In re Annessa J., supra, 343 Conn. 662, and In re

Vada V., supra, 343 Conn. 740, there is no factual record

or factual findings on which this court could base a

determination of whether the respondent’s right to confront the petitioner’s witnesses was violated by the virtual format of the trial or whether the court correctly

concluded that the government’s interests were sufficiently great to warrant conducting the trial virtually.

Thus, the respondent’s claim fails under the first prong

of Golding.

The judgment is affirmed.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the Appellate Court.

** October 4, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The court also terminated the parental rights of the respondent mother,

Lisa S., who consented to termination and has not appealed from that

judgment. We hereinafter refer to the respondent father as the respondent

and to Lisa S. by name.

2 Microsoft Teams is ‘‘collaborative meeting [computer software] with

video, audio, and screen sharing features.’’ Connecticut Judicial Branch,

Connecticut Guide to Remote Hearings for Attorneys and Self-Represented

Parties (November 23, 2021) p. 5, available at https://jud.ct.gov/HomePDFs/

ConnecticutGuideRemoteHearings.pdf (last visited October 3, 2022).

3

In his principal appellate brief, the respondent also raised an unpreserved

claim that ‘‘the judgment terminating his parental rights was unconstitutional

under article fifth, § 1, and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution

. . . where the trial was not conducted in the physical presence of the

judicial authority.’’ Considering the same unpreserved claim, our Supreme

Court, in In re Annessa J., 343 Conn. 642, 660, A.3d (2022), determined that the respondent had ‘‘failed to establish that there exists a fundamental right under article first, § 10, and article fifth, § 1, of the Connecticut

constitution to an in person termination of parental rights trial.’’ At oral

argument before this court, the respondent’s counsel conceded that this

claim was no longer viable in light of In re Annessa J. Accordingly, we do

not discuss it further.

4 The following exchange occurred:

‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: . . . Your Honor, I would just note that

there’s another individual with [the respondent] that appeared on the screen

a moment ago.

‘‘The Court: I missed that. So, [respondent], is there—these proceedings

are private and confidential, so are you on headphones so that only you

could hear what’s going on, or can anybody hear what’s going on? Let’s

take that first.

‘‘[The Respondent]: No, I’m in the room.

‘‘The Court: And . . . is there someone else in the room with you?

‘‘[The Respondent]: No, they not—she walking out. No, nobody not in here.

‘‘The Court: But there—yes, I saw somebody in the background just a

second ago after the lawyer mentioned it. But you need to make sure—

‘‘[The Respondent]: Again, she walk—she walking back out. She . . .

picked something off the floor.

‘‘The Court: Okay, so—

‘‘[The Respondent]: But she left out the room. She left out the room.

‘‘The Court: Okay. If she comes back in again let me know, and I’ll wait

for her to leave, okay?

‘‘[The Respondent]: Yeah.’’

5 For example, following cross-examination of one of the petitioner’s witnesses, the following exchange occurred:

‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: One second, Your Honor. I just want to

confer with my client really quick. It’ll take a minute [because] I have to

use text.

‘‘The Court: No problem.

‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: [Respondent], did you . . . get my text

question?

‘‘[The Respondent]: Yes. . . . I just was looking at it.

‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: If there’s something—am I all set with

questions?

‘‘[The Respondent]: Yep.’’

6 After counsel for the child concluded his closing argument, the court

informed the respondent’s counsel that ‘‘it looks like your client wants to

say something’’ and asked counsel whether she would like to confer with

her client. The respondent’s counsel then muted her microphone, and the

court went off the record. When the proceeding resumed, the respondent’s

counsel made additional closing remarks regarding the respondent’s prior

inquiry of the social worker regarding housing.

7 Counsel for the child adopted the brief of the respondent. At oral argument before this court, the petitioner’s counsel represented that it is the

department’s understanding that the child was in support of the termination

of parental rights at the time of the trial, that the child is still in support of

the termination of parental rights, and that the child wishes to be adopted

as soon as possible. When asked for the position of the child during oral

argument, counsel for the child stated that the child enjoys being with his
maternal grandmother and wants her to adopt him, the child is in contact

with his father, and the child has a relationship with his father.

8

In the present case, the petitioner’s counsel filed with this court a letter

in which she represented that all counsel agreed that this court should

hold oral argument in this appeal after the release of our Supreme Court’s

decisions in In re Annessa J., In re Vada V., and In re Aisjaha N.

9 Counsel for the child adopted the supplemental brief of the respondent.

See footnote 7 of this opinion.